



Assembly of Western European Union

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-EIGHTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1992

III

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

70017



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WEU

PARIS

The proceedings of the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.




TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
List of representatives and substitutes	10
Documents:	
1320. Agenda of the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session, Paris, 30th November – 3rd December 1992	12
1321. Order of business of the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session, Paris, 30th November – 3rd December 1992	14
1322. WEU Council of Ministers and extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe – Petersberg Declaration	17
1323. Information letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, on the activities of the intergovernmental organs, 23rd March – 19th June 1992	25
1324. Communiqué issued at the close of the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers on the situation in Yugoslavia, Helsinki, 10th July 1992	33
1325. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 – Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur	34
1325. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly Add. for the financial year 1993 – Opinion of the Council – Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur ..	62
1326. Communiqué and statement issued after the meeting of the enlarged Council, Rome, 16th July 1992	71
1327. Communiqués issued after the meeting of the ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia, Rome, 24th August 1992, and after the meeting of the extraordinary Council of Ministers, London, 28th August 1992	73
1328. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991 – the auditor's report	75
1328. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for Add. the financial year 1991 – Motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1991 submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur	96
1329. WEU and the situation in former Yugoslavia – Report submitted on behalf of the Standing Committee by Mr. Marten, Rapporteur	97
1330. Activities of the IEPG – Letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, to Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly	99
1331. Composition of the political groups – Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure – Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges by Mr. Thompson, Chairman and Rapporteur	109

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1332. European armaments co-operation after Maastricht – Report submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee by Mr. Lopez Henares, Chairman and Rapporteur	111
3 amendments	131
1333. Parliamentary debates on security policy under the Maastricht Treaty – Report submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations by Mr. Nuñez, Rapporteur	133
1334. Western European Union (WEU) (draft of a new booklet) – Report submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations by Mr. Lopez Henares and Mr. Tummers, co-Rapporteurs	159
1335. Communiqué issued after the meeting of the WEU Permanent Council at Ambassador level with colleagues of eight Central and Eastern European countries, London 14th October 1992	161
1336. Defence: Central Europe in evolution – Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr. Cox, Rapporteur	162
1 amendment	190
1337. WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis – Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr. Marten, Rapporteur	191
1337. WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis – Supplementary draft recommendation submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr. Marten, Rapporteur	212
2 amendments	233
1338. European security – reserve forces and national service – Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur	235
1338. European security – reserve forces and national service – Supplementary draft recommendation submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur	287
1339. Anti-ballistic missile defence – Report submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur	290
1 amendment	312
1340. The enlargement of WEU – Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Ward, Rapporteur	313
1341. Turkey – Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Moya, Rapporteur	326
3 amendments	352
1341. Turkey – Addendum to the report submitted on behalf of the Add. Political Committee by Mr. Moya, Rapporteur	353
1342. European security policy – reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council – Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur:	
Part One: European Union, WEU and the consequences of Maastricht	354
Part Two: Europe and the crises in former Yugoslavia	376
1343. First part of the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council to the Assembly of WEU	388
1344. Replies of the Council to Recommendations 516 to 525	394
1345. Communiqué and declaration on former Yugoslavia issued after the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers, Rome, 20th November 1992	426

1346. Action by the Presidential Committee – Report submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee by Mr. Foschi, Vice-President of the Assembly	429
1347. Election of the Clerk of the Assembly	432
1348. Declaration on WEU observers issued after the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers, Rome, 20th November 1992	433
1349. Written questions 298 to 310 and replies of the Council	434
1350. Protocol of accession of the Hellenic Republic to Western European Union together with an annex	440
1351. Document on associate membership of WEU of the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey .	442
1351. Presidency declarations extracted from summaries of discussions Add. between WEU and the three other European member states of the Atlantic Alliance; Minutes agreed in connection with the document associate membership at the WEU Ministerial Council, on 20th November, in Rome	444
1352. Information letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, on the activities of the intergovernmental organs, 20th June – 24th November 1992	445
1353. The situation in East Timor – Motion for a resolution tabled by Mr. Brito and others under Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure with a request for urgent procedure	458
1354. Acts of violence in camps, crimes against humanity and war crimes in former Yugoslavia – Motion for a resolution tabled by Mr. Pécriaux and others under Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure with a request for urgent procedure	459
1355. Acts of rape and castration, crimes against humanity and war crimes in former Yugoslavia – Draft resolution submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur ...	460
1356. Emergency assistance to Somalia – Motion for a recommendation tabled by Mr. Fourré and others	461

LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
CHEVALIER Pierre	SP
KELCHTERMANS Lambert	CVP
KEMPINAIRE André	VLD
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
SARENS Freddy	CVP
SEEUWS Willy	SP

Substitutes

MM. DE DECKER Armand	PRL
GHEQUIÈRE Ferdinand	CVP
LAVERGE Jacques	PVV
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
OTTENBOURGH Yvan	CVP
THISSEN René	PSC
WINTGENS Pierre	PSC

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BEIX Roland	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
DURAND Adrien	CDS
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GOUTEYRON Adrien	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
MASSERET Jean-Pierre	Socialist
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PUECH Jean	Ind. Rep.
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	PC

Substitutes

MM. ANDRÉ René	RPR
BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
DUMONT Jean	Ind. Rep.
Mrs. DURRIEU Josette	Socialist
MM. GAITS Claude	Socialist
de GAULLE Jean	RPR
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAULT Xavier	UDF (App.)
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
LE GRAND Jean-François	RPR
LE JEUNE Edouard	UCDP
LEMOINE Georges	Socialist
d'ORNANO Paul	RPR
PISTRE Charles	Socialist
ROGER Jean	RDE
WORMS Jean-Pierre	Socialist

GERMANY

Representatives

Mr. ANTRETTER Robert	SPD
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
MM. BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU

MM. BÜCHLER Hans	SPD
BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
MENZEL Bruno	FDP
MEYER zu BENTRUP Reinhard	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
SPRUNG Rudolf	CDU/CSU
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TERBORG Margitta	SPD
Mr. VOGEL Friedrich	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

MM. BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM. JUNGHANNIS Ulrich	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
LUMMER Heinrich	CDU/CSU
MAASS Erich	CDU/CSU
MARTEN Günter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. MASCHER Ulrike	SPD
MM. MATSCHIE Christoph	SPD
MICHELS Meinolf	CDU/CSU
PFUHL Albert	SPD
PROBST Albert	CDU/CSU
REIMANN Manfred	SPD
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
SCHLUCKEBIER Günter	SPD
Mrs. von TEICHMAN Cornelia	FDP
Mr. ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM. AGNELLI Arduino	Socialist
ANDREOTTI Giulio	Chr. Dem.
BENVENUTI Roberto	PDS
BOSCO Rinaldo	Northern League
COLOMBO Vittorio	Chr. Dem.
DE CAROLIS Stelio	PRI
FERRARINI Giulio	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
LECCISI Pino	Chr. Dem.
MANISCO Lucio	Ref. Com.
MANNINO Calogero	Chr. Dem.
MARONI Roberto	Northern League
PAIRE Giacomo	PLI
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLO Ugo	PDS
PIZZO Pietro	Socialist
RODOTA Stefano	PDS
TATARELLA Giuseppe	PDS

Substitutes

MM. BATTISTUZZI Paolo	PLI
CACCIA Paolo	Chr. Dem.
CALDORO Stefano	Socialist
CICCIOMESSERE Roberto	Radical
COVI Giorgio	PRI
DE PAOLI Paolo	PSDI
FAVA Claudio	Rete
FERRARI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
GOTTARDO Settimo	Chr. Dem.
GUZZETTI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
LECCESE Vito	Verdi

AGENDA

**of the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session
Paris, 30th November – 3rd December 1992**

I. Report of the Council

Thirty-eighth annual report of the Council
(first part)

II. Political questions

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. European security policy – reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council:
Part One: European Union, WEU and the consequences of Maastricht
Part Two: Europe and the crises in former Yugoslavia | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee</i> |
| 2. Enlargement of WEU | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Ward on behalf of the Political Committee</i> |
| 3. Turkey | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Moya on behalf of the Political Committee</i> |

III. Defence questions

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Defence: Central Europe in evolution | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Cox on behalf of the Defence Committee</i> |
| 2. WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Marten on behalf of the Defence Committee</i> |
| 3. European security – reserve forces and national service | <i>Report tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Defence Committee</i> |

IV. Technological and aerospace questions

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. European armaments co-operation after Maastricht | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Lopez Henares on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee</i> |
| 2. Anti-ballistic missile defence | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee</i> |

V. Budgetary questions

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |
| 2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |

VI. Rules of Procedure and Privileges

- | | |
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| Composition of the political groups – Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Thompson on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges</i> |
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VII. Parliamentary and Public Relations

1. Parliamentary debates on security policy under the Maastricht Treaty

Report tabled by Mr. Nuñez on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations

2. Western European Union - information report

Report tabled by MM. Lopez Henares and Tummers on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations

ORDER OF BUSINESS

**of the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session Paris,
30th November – 3rd December 1992**

MONDAY 30th NOVEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

Meetings of political groups.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Opening of the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by Mr. Colombo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
5. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session.
6. Action by the Presidential Committee:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Foschi, Vice-President of the Assembly.
Debate.
7. European security policy – reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council:
Part One: European Union, WEU and the consequences of Maastricht:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

TUESDAY 1st DECEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Election of the Clerk.
2. Turkey:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Moya on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.

11. 30 a.m.

3. Address by Mr. Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom.
4. Turkey:
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Address by Mr. Melescanu, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania.
2. Defence: Central Europe in evolution:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Cox on behalf of the Defence Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
3. Parliamentary debates on security policy under the Maastricht Treaty:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Nuñez on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

WEDNESDAY 2nd DECEMBER**Morning 10 a.m.**

1. European security policy – reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council:
Part Two: Europe and the crises in former Yugoslavia:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee.
2. WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Marten on behalf of the Defence Committee.
Joint debate.
Votes on the draft recommendations.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Address by Mr. Andò, Minister of Defence of Italy.
2. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the draft budget.
4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts:
presentation of the report by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee for Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the motion to approve the final accounts.
5. Composition of the political groups – Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Thompson on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
Debate.
Vote on the draft decision.

6. European armaments co-operation after Maastricht:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lopez Henares on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
7. Anti-ballistic missile defence:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation and draft order.

THURSDAY 3rd DECEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

1. European security – reserve forces and national service:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Defence Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

11 a.m.

2. Address by Mr. Fasslabend, Minister of Defence of Austria.
3. Western European Union – information report:
presentation of the report tabled by MM. Lopez Henares and Tummers on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft order.

CLOSE OF THE SECOND PART OF THE THIRTY-EIGHTH ORDINARY SESSION

*WEU Council of Ministers and extraordinary meeting of
the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe*

Council of Ministers

Bonn, 19th June 1992

PETERSBERG DECLARATION

The foreign and defence ministers of WEU member states met in Bonn on 19th June 1992 and issued the Petersberg Declaration consisting of the following three parts:

- I. On WEU and European security
- II. On strengthening WEU's operational rôle
- III. On relations between WEU and the other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance

I. On WEU and European security

Developments in the security situation in Europe, disarmament and arms control

1. Ministers reviewed the significant changes that had taken place in the security situation in Europe since their last regular meeting in November 1991. They emphasised the importance of strengthening the rôle and institutions of the CSCE for peace and security in Europe. They looked forward to decisions at Helsinki to start new negotiations on measures of arms control and disarmament and to enhance regular consultations and co-operation on security matters. In the light of the establishment of a new CSCE forum for security co-operation, they considered that decisions to enhance the CSCE's capabilities for conflict prevention, crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes are of primary importance. They supported the proposal under discussion at the Helsinki follow-up meeting for the CSCE to declare itself as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. Ministers considered that the CSCE should have the authority to initiate and pursue peace-keeping operations under its own responsibility.

2. As WEU develops its operational capabilities in accordance with the Maastricht Declaration, we are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures, including peace-keeping activities of the CSCE or the United Nations Security Council. This will be done without prejudice to possible contributions by other CSCE countries and other organisations to these activities.

3. Ministers welcomed the decisions taken by the CSCE Council in Berlin and Prague regarding the relationships between the CSCE and other mutually reinforcing European and transatlantic organisations including WEU. They declared that WEU, together with the European Union, was ready to play a full part in building up Europe's security architecture. They likewise reaffirmed their conviction that the Atlantic Alliance is one of the indispensable foundations of Europe's security. They welcomed the ongoing reform process of NATO with a view to establishing a strong new transatlantic partnership.

4. Ministers welcomed the agreement reached at the CFE extraordinary conference on 5th June 1992 in Oslo which provides the basis for the entry into force of the CFE Treaty which has been and remains a major objective of their arms control agenda. Its full and effective implementation will increase stability and open the way to a new co-operative security order in Europe. They call upon the new states parties to the treaty to ensure its ratification by the time of the CSCE summit in Helsinki. Ministers attach great importance to the conclusion of an agreement on the limitation of personnel strengths of ground and air forces (CFE 1a) in time for the Helsinki summit and to the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty. They reaffirmed their commitment to the early entry into force of the Open Skies agreement and invited other CSCE states to accede to the treaty in accordance with its provisions.

5. Ministers welcomed steps recently taken by the states concerned to allow for the entry into force of the START Treaty and the important agreement on further strategic reductions reached between the United States and Russia in Washington on 17th June 1992.
6. Ministers recalled that the presence of foreign forces on the territory of a sovereign state requires the explicit consent of that state. They stressed the importance of rapidly establishing, in the negotiations under way, timetables for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of the Baltic states.
7. Ministers expressed their conviction that a chemical weapons convention can be reached within the next few months. They are confident that this convention can play an important and pioneering rôle in worldwide multilateral arms control and call on all member states of the Conference on Disarmament to lend their support to the emerging consensus. They repeat their commitment to be among the original signatories of this convention and ask all other nations to follow this course.
8. WEU member states reaffirmed their resolution to contribute further to the establishment of a new order of peace in Europe which, in accordance with the Charter of Paris, will be based on co-operation. Ministers underlined the valuable contribution of NACC in this connection. In the same spirit, WEU has invited the foreign and defence ministers of eight states of Central Europe to a special ministerial meeting later today. WEU and the invited countries intend to enhance consultation and co-operation in the framework of the new European security structure.

Implementation of the Maastricht Declaration

9. Ministers stressed the fundamental importance of the Treaty on European Union and they looked forward to the further elaboration of the common foreign and security policy at the Lisbon European Council. They discussed the progress made in developing the rôle of WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance in accordance with the Declaration adopted by WEU member states at the Maastricht European Council in December 1991.
10. Ministers reaffirmed the importance for WEU to develop close working relations with the European Union and Atlantic Alliance in accordance with the Maastricht Declaration of WEU. They adopted a report on the practical measures necessary for WEU to develop these relations. They asked the Permanent Council to propose to the Council of the Twelve and to the North Atlantic Council concrete measures aimed at facilitating the development of close co-operation between the respective secretariats.
11. Ministers heard a report from the Secretary-General on the progress made towards the transfer of the WEU Council and Secretariat-General from London to Brussels. They instructed the Permanent Council and Secretary-General to expedite the necessary arrangements so that the transfer could become effective by January 1993.
12. Ministers heard a report from the German Chief of Defence Staff on the meetings of chiefs of defence staff. Ministers agreed that the chiefs of defence staff should meet twice a year prior to the regular Ministerial Councils and on an ad hoc basis whenever necessary. Ministers also agreed that, following the transfer of the Council and Secretariat to Brussels, national delegations could be reinforced with military delegates to develop and provide advice for the Council, to introduce the views of the chiefs of defence staff to the planning cell and to monitor the professional standards of the planning cell's work.
13. WEU ministers welcomed the IEPG defence ministers' decision, at their Oslo meeting on 6th March 1992, to analyse the future rôle of the IEPG in the new European security architecture. This represents a positive development fully in line with the objective set by WEU member states in Maastricht further to examine enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a WEU European armaments agency. WEU ministers propose that both WEU and IEPG experts analyse this issue in depth, carry out an initial examination of the rôle and functions of a possible European armaments agency and submit a report for consideration.
14. WEU ministers welcomed the decision of Eurogroup defence ministers at their meeting in Brussels on 25th May 1992 to consider the possibility, among other options, and if the necessary pre-conditions are met, of transferring to WEU some or all of Eurogroup's present functions for which there is still a need.
15. Ministers noted with satisfaction the considerable progress which had been made in setting up the experimental WEU satellite centre in Torrejón (Spain), a concrete example of the strengthening of WEU's operational rôle, and they looked forward to the official inauguration which would take place later in the year. They also noted that the contract for the main system feasibility study had been awarded to a consortium of firms from WEU member states led by a German firm.

Activities of working groups

16. In the field of verification, ministers noted with satisfaction that a set of rules for the operation of multinational teams in CFE had been prepared in WEU and had subsequently been adopted in the alliance. This represented the first example since the Maastricht Declaration of the introduction of joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the alliance.

17. Noting the progress which had been made so far, ministers agreed in principle to a feasibility study to identify the most cost-effective means of implementing the Open Skies Treaty co-operatively among member states. They tasked the group of experts to agree assumptions for the study, to identify the options which merit further study and to consider the question of costs, with a view to taking a decision at their next ordinary meeting to proceed with the study, stressed the readiness of WEU to co-operate with third parties at a later stage, and in this context welcomed the contacts which had taken place with other European allies, as well as with the Russian Federation. They agreed that experts should investigate the possibilities for intensified co-operation with the Russian Federation, which could include a joint feasibility study and/or a trial overflight.

18. Ministers reaffirmed the importance of the Mediterranean Sub-Group's work on security in the Mediterranean. They adopted terms of reference for the establishment by WEU of a gradual and phased dialogue with the Maghreb countries, taking into account the political developments both in these countries and in the region.

WEU Institute for Security Studies

19. Ministers noted with satisfaction the activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studies in Paris. Its publications, seminars and colloquia had greatly contributed to deepening understanding for the ongoing development of a European security identity and to enhancing relations between WEU and other European countries.

II. On strengthening WEU's operational rôle

1. In accordance with the decision contained in the Declaration of the member states of WEU at Maastricht on 10th December 1991 to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU member states have been examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means covering, in particular, a WEU planning cell and military units answerable to WEU, in order to strengthen WEU's operational rôle.

2. WEU member states declare that they are prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU.

3. Decisions to use military units answerable to WEU will be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of member states in accordance with national constitutions.

4. Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peace-keeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.

5. The planning and execution of these tasks will be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of all allies.

6. Military units will be drawn from the forces of WEU member states, including forces with NATO missions – in this case after consultation with NATO – and will be organised on a multinational and multi-service basis.

7. All WEU member states will soon designate which of their military units and headquarters they would be willing to make available to WEU for its various possible tasks. Where multinational formations drawn from the forces of WEU nations already exist or are planned, these units could be made available for use under the authority of WEU, with agreement of all participating nations.

8. WEU member states intend to develop and exercise the appropriate capabilities to enable the deployment of WEU military units by land, sea or air to accomplish these tasks.

9. A planning cell will be established on 1st October 1992, subject to practical considerations, under the authority of the Council. It will be located with the Secretariat-General in a suitable building in Brussels. The Council has today appointed Maj. Gen. Caltabiano (Italian Air Force) as its first Director. The planning cell will be responsible for:

- preparing contingency plans for the employment for forces under WEU auspices;
- preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected;
- keeping an updated list of units and combinations of units which might be allocated to WEU for specific operations.

10. The Council of Ministers approved the terms of reference for the planning cell.

III. On relations between WEU and the other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance

A. Following the Declaration released in Maastricht on 10th December 1991 in connection with the Treaty on European Union, WEU ministers recalled the fundamental principles on which relations between member states and associate member states should be based:

- settlement of their mutual differences by peaceful means, in accordance with the obligations resulting from the modified Brussels Treaty, the North American Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the commitments entered into under the terms of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, and the other generally recognised principles and rules of international law;
- in their mutual relations, refraining from resorting to the threat or use of force, in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

They also stressed that the security guarantees and defence commitments in the treaties which bind the member states within Western European Union and which bind them within the Atlantic Alliance are mutually reinforcing and will not be invoked by those subscribing to Part III of the Petersberg Declaration in disputes between member states of either of the two organisations.

B. In their Maastricht Declaration of 10th December 1991, the member states of WEU proposed that states which are members of the European Union be invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wished. Simultaneously, other European member states of NATO were invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which would give them a possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU.

In accordance with Part III of the Petersberg Declaration, ministers agreed that the following points should be made in extending the invitation to the countries interested in becoming members, observers or associate members:

Members:

Member states of the European Union which have accepted the invitation to accede to WEU undertake,

- to respect, in accordance with the principles and values adhered to by all WEU member states, the Brussels Treaty of 1948, modified on 23rd October 1954, its protocols and associated texts, and the agreements concluded among the member states pursuant to the treaty,
- to note with approval the agreements, decisions and rules adopted in conformity with the treaty, and the declarations starting with the Rome Declaration of 27th October 1984,
- to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance in keeping with the obligation entered into on 10th December 1991 in the Declaration on the rôle of WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance attached to the Treaty on European Union, and,
- to accept in full the substance of Part III of the Petersberg Declaration which will form part of the Protocol of Accession.

Observers:

- Member states of the European Union, which have accepted the invitation to become observers,
- may, although not being a party to the MBT, attend the meetings of the WEU Council without prejudice to the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty; at the request of a majority of the member states, or of half of the member states including the Presidency, presence at Council meetings may be restricted to full members;
 - may be invited to meetings of working groups;
 - may be invited, on request, to speak;
 - will have the same rights and responsibilities as the full members for functions transferred to WEU from other fora and institutions to which they already belong.

Associate members:

Other European member states of the Atlantic Alliance which have accepted the invitation to become associate members of WEU, although not being parties to the modified Brussels Treaty, may participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council – without prejudice to the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty – of its working groups and of the subsidiary bodies, subject to the following provisions:

- at the request of a majority of the member states, or of half of the member states including the Presidency, participation may be restricted to full members;
- they will be able to be associated to the planning cell through a permanent liaison arrangement;
- they will have the same rights and responsibilities as the full members for functions transferred to WEU from other fora and institutions to which they already belong;
- they will have the right to speak but may not block a decision that is the subject of consensus among the member states;
- they may associate themselves with the decisions taken by member states; they will be able to participate in their implementation unless a majority of the member states, or half of the member states including the Presidency, decide otherwise;
- they will take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they commit forces;
- they will accept in full the substance of Section A of Part III of the Petersberg Declaration which will form part of the association document;
- they will be connected to the member states' telecommunications system (WEUCOM) for messages concerning meetings and activities in which they participate;
- they will be asked to make a financial contribution to the organisation's budgets.

Space activities

For practical reasons, space activities will be restricted to the present members until the end of the experimental phase of the satellite centre in 1995. During this phase the new members and associate members will be kept informed of WEU's space activities. Appropriate arrangements will be made for associate members to participate in subsequent space activities at the same time as decisions are taken on the continuation of such activities.

Mandate

C. Ministers mandated the Permanent Council to arrange for discussions to start with the states concerned.

Ministers confirmed their wish to conclude the necessary agreements before 31st December 1992.

Council of Ministers

Bonn, 19th June 1992

Declaration on the Yugoslav crisis

1. Ministers recalled the Declaration on Yugoslavia issued by the Community and its member states on 15th June 1992.

They reiterated their deep concern about the ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia. In particular, they deplored the desperate humanitarian situation and the continuing use of force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2. Ministers stressed the urgency of immediate and comprehensive humanitarian aid especially to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They also stressed the importance of establishing a security zone in and around Sarajevo, including its airport, as envisaged in United Nations Security Council Resolution 758, and expressed their support for the efforts undertaken to secure such a zone as well as to reopen Sarajevo airport. They welcomed and encouraged the active participation of member states in this operation.

3. Ministers underlined the determination of their states not to tolerate the continued use of force as well as the disregard for CSCE commitments and basic human standards. In this context, they recalled the recent decisions taken by the CSCE.

4. Ministers appealed to all parties concerned immediately to cease all hostilities and to abide by the cease-fire agreements. They recalled that territorial gains or changes brought about by violence are unacceptable and will not be recognised by the international community. They also reaffirmed the need for the effective protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including those of national and ethnic groups.

5. Ministers reaffirmed their full support for the United Nations peace-keeping operation in Croatia. All elements of the United Nations peace plan must be strictly observed and fully implemented.

6. Ministers reiterated their full support for the conference on Yugoslavia, including the efforts undertaken by the European Community in the framework of the discussions on constitutional arrangements for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

7. Ministers also expressed the determination of their states to abide fully by the provisions of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 757 and to implement comprehensively the sanctions which it contains. In this connection, they noted that the United Nations Security Council has decided to consider immediately, whenever necessary, further steps to achieve a peaceful solution in conformity with relevant resolutions of the Security Council, based inter alia on Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

8. Ministers declared that WEU is prepared, within the bounds of its possibilities, to contribute towards effective implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions in connection with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. They charged an ad hoc group composed of representatives from foreign affairs and defence ministries to examine WEU's possibilities to contribute to the implementation of the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.

***Extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers
with states of Central Europe***

Bonn, 19th June 1992

Declaration

1. At the invitation of the German Presidency of Western European Union, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom met in Bonn on 19th June 1992 to demonstrate their resolve to enhance the scope of the relationship initiated by a decision of the Ministerial Council in Brussels in April 1990.

2. Ministers agreed that, in view of the profound changes in Europe of the last few years, intensifying the relations between WEU and the states of Central Europe will contribute to stability and the

emergence of a new peaceful order in Europe based on partnership and co-operation, greater security and confidence, as well as disarmament.

3. Ministers welcomed the decisions taken by the CSCE Council in Berlin and Prague regarding the relationships between the CSCE and other mutually reinforcing European and transatlantic organisations including WEU. They underlined that security in its broadest sense encompasses not only military but also political aspects, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as economic, social and environmental aspects.

4. Ministers acknowledged that WEU will be one of the essential elements of the future European security architecture, in accordance with the decisions taken by the European Council in Maastricht in December 1991. In this context, they noted that the Petersberg Declaration states:

“ As WEU develops its operational capabilities in accordance with the Maastricht Declaration, we are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures, including peace-keeping activities of the CSCE or the United Nations Security Council. This will be done without prejudice to possible contributions by other CSCE countries and other organisations to these activities. ”

5. The enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania should reflect the specific relations which exist and are developing between these countries and the European Union and its member states. Other appropriate forms of co-operation could be set up as required in the light of the development of these relations.

6. Ministers had a detailed exchange of views on the development of co-operation between WEU and these states. They agreed to strengthen existing relations by structuring the dialogue, consultations and co-operation.

The focus of consultations will be the security architecture and stability in Europe, the future development of the CSCE, arms control and disarmament, in particular the implementation of the CFE and Open Skies Treaties, as well as the 1992 Vienna Document. Developments in Europe and neighbouring regions will be of particular interest to the participants.

In this way, WEU's Central European partners will be able to acquaint themselves with the future security and defence policy of the European Union and find new opportunities to co-operate with the defence component of the Union and with the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance as these develop.

7. The Foreign and Defence Ministers adopted the following concrete measures:

- Foreign and Defence Ministers will meet once a year. Additional meetings at ministerial level may be convened if circumstances require.
- A forum of consultation will be established between the WEU Permanent Council and the ambassadors of the countries concerned. It will meet at the seat of the WEU Council at least twice a year.
- These meetings will provide an opportunity to monitor the implementation of the measures adopted and, where appropriate, to make proposals for the inclusion of other fields of co-operation.
- Consultations at ministerial and WEU Permanent Council/ambassador level on security issues may be complemented by meetings with an ad hoc WEU troika at senior official level.
- The following initiatives will be continued and encouraged:
 - Regular exchanges of documents and information;
 - Growing co-operation between the WEU Institute for Security Studies and the corresponding bodies in the countries concerned. An increasing number of seminars and colloquia will be organised. The programme of scholarships will be continued.

8. Ministers advocated the development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the states concerned.

9. These measures, conducted in the framework of WEU with the states of Central Europe, and similar endeavours conducted in the alliance framework, will be mutually complementary and reinforcing.

*Extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers
with states of Central Europe*

Bonn, 19th June 1992

Declaration on Nagorny-Karabakh

Ministers are deeply concerned about the continuing fighting in Nagorny-Karabakh. They reiterate their appeal to the parties to the conflict to establish immediately an effective cease-fire and to take additional steps, including withdrawal from occupied areas. Any action against any state's territorial integrity in order to achieve political goals by force in contradiction with the principles of the CSCE is unacceptable. Ministers strongly support the peace process which has been launched at the CSCE Council of Ministers in Helsinki on 24th March 1992. They appreciate the initiative to hold two preliminary meetings in Rome. They regret that, for a variety of reasons, including the non-attendance of one of the parties concerned, the meetings have not yet produced the conditions necessary for the success of the Minsk Peace Conference. Ongoing efforts must now be intensified in order to open the way to convening the Minsk Conference as planned on 23rd June 1992. All parties concerned are urged to continue this process in order to stop further bloodshed in Nagorny-Karabakh and to reach a just and lasting political solution.

*Information letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU,
on the activities of the intergovernmental organs*

(23rd March – 19th June 1992)

Dear President,

The foreign and defence ministers of the nine member states of WEU had a particularly fruitful meeting at the Petersberg, which demonstrated in the clearest possible terms the determination to move ahead energetically with the implementation of the Maastricht Declarations and the development of WEU's activities. The meeting produced a set of texts replete with guidelines for the future: the Petersberg Declaration, the Declaration on relations with the states of Central Europe and two texts on the serious events afflicting the Yugoslav republics and Nagorny-Karabakh. They are all annexed to this letter. Their detail and clarity obviates the need for any paraphrase.

I should like therefore to underline for the Assembly the priorities for WEU in the first six months of the Italian presidency. Let it be made quite clear at the outset that the hiccups over the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty should not have any adverse effect on the work of our organisation, even if the current discussions are making a useful contribution to our thinking on procedures for widening and deepening and on closer links with Central Europe, to quote just two examples.

The first priority is the implementation of the third part of the Petersberg Declaration. Ministers approved the mandates for discussions with the candidates for accession and with the candidates for associate membership. They also took note of the draft protocol of accession, which is a basic document for the future discussions with the states applying for full membership.

The second priority concerns the development and strengthening of WEU's operational rôle. The Defence Representatives Group has already resumed its work. The senior officials of the planning cell, General Caltabiano and General Roux, have been appointed. Everything will be done so that this cell can be operational in Brussels by next October, provided that all the material and administrative conditions have been met. The same caveat also applies to the complex task of transferring the Permanent Council and Secretariat to Brussels. At all events, the establishment of WEU in Brussels will mark the beginning of new activities geared to the gradual transformation of the organisation into the defence arm of the future European Union.

The third and last priority is the development of relations between WEU and eight countries of Central Europe within the framework of a "forum of consultation". It is in the mutual interest of the Nine and the Eight to meet regularly to concert their views on the problems of European security, irrespective of what association arrangements certain countries of Central Europe might have with the Community or the various institutions with responsibilities in the field of European security. In this connection, the afternoon meeting on 19th June represented the combination of two years of fruitful contacts. Clearly, the links with the Community will take on growing importance in the future since they are quite specific without being discriminatory, apart from the fact that they seek to avoid duplication with the NACC or the CSCE. Ministers therefore underlined that, as regards the development of WEU as an integral part of the European Union, relations between the Nine and the Eight would have to take account of the links between the Eight and the Union. The subjects for future consultations would be the CSCE, arms control and the maintenance of stability both in Europe and on its periphery. Stress would be laid on the complementary nature of the NACC's activities and those of the WEU forum of consultation, and they would seek to be mutually reinforcing.

These priorities will remain irrespective of whatever other demands may be made by the present extremely worrying situation, especially in the Balkans and the Caucasus.

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Between 23rd March and 19th June, the *Permanent Council* met six times (26th March, 8th and 29th April, 13th May, 4th and 10th June). Its work focused on preparations for the Ministerial Council at the Petersberg and on the close monitoring of the Yugoslav crisis. Developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina led to a special meeting being convened on 4th June.

On 10th June, the Permanent Council, enlarged to include the political directors and their counterparts from defence ministries, reached broad agreement on the content of the Petersberg Declaration and on the draft protocol and mandates for discussions on the enlargement of WEU to new full members, associate members and possible observers. Several reports to ministers were examined, two

concerning the implementation of the Maastricht Declarations: one of these concerned practical measures for co-operation with the European institutions and NATO and the other the transfer of the Permanent Council and Secretariat-General to Brussels. Three reports dealt with the development of WEU's operational rôle: one on the terms of reference for the WEU planning cell, and the two others on possible tasks for WEU forces and on armaments co-operation. Several other reports were approved: on WEU's activities in the field of space, on co-operation in the fields of CFE and CSBM verification and the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty, and on the activities of the Mediterranean Sub-Group.

On 21st May, the Council of Western European Union held its first official meeting at NATO headquarters in Evère, with the North Atlantic Council meeting in permanent session. This meeting took place pursuant to the Maastricht Declarations and enabled the two Councils to take stock of relations between their respective organisations and to envisage a strengthening of practical co-operation.

The Council's *Special Working Group* (SWG) and *Defence Representatives Group* (DRG) held a joint meeting on 6th April 1992, to review the progress of the organisation's preparatory work for the ministerial meeting on 19th June. Discussions centred on the implementation of the Maastricht Declarations and relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Considerable progress was also made in finalising the documents dealing with relations between WEU and the other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance.

The SWG also met on 11th and 19th May to continue its work on the draft decisions to be submitted to ministers in these two areas. There was also discussion on the contacts between WEU and the CSCE.

On 5th June, the SWG held a meeting at the Secretariat with the representatives from the diplomatic missions of the countries of Central Europe, at which the draft declaration on relations between WEU and these countries was presented to them. The meeting generated a lively discussion which led to a number of passages in the draft being reworked.

Lastly, on 9th June, the SWG met at deputy level to discuss the draft Petersberg Declaration prior to the meeting of the enlarged Council the following day.

The *Defence Representatives Group* (DRG) met on 7th April, 14th and 15th May and 4th June. The meetings provided an opportunity for more detailed consideration of possible tasks to be given to military units answerable to WEU, particularly in relation to combat tasks and the implications as regards command structures and rules of engagement. The DRG reached agreement on the terms of reference and establishment table for the WEU planning cell, which ministers formally set up on 19th June. A Group of Experts met four times (24th April, 14th, 15th and 27th May) to finalise the more technical aspects of this project. Other questions discussed were armaments co-operation and proposals on relations between WEU and the IEPG.

The *Chiefs of Defence Staff* (CHODs) of the WEU member countries held their second meeting of the year in Bonn on 20th May. They exchanged views on developments in the Commonwealth of Independent States in the wake of the Tashkent Summit and on the worsening Yugoslav conflict. They discussed their rôle as military advisors and their future responsibilities within the WEU framework and they endorsed the proposals submitted to them concerning senior staff for the planning cell. Its functions, particularly as regards the tasks and command arrangements for the multinational and national forces likely to be made available to WEU were also examined at this meeting.

The *Mediterranean Sub-Group* met on 3rd April and 5th June. The group continued its exchanges of view on three topical questions, namely: the situation in the former Yugoslavia, efforts to resolve the problem in Western Sahara and the Cyprus question. The group concluded its work as regards the annotated list of principles likely to contribute to a resolution of security problems in the Mediterranean. It also took stock of progress in the "Five plus Five" process. Lastly, the group approved a draft mandate for future contacts between WEU and the Maghreb countries. As to the analysis of risks likely to affect security in the Mediterranean and in the Gulf region, the group was now in possession of a number of detailed national contributions on security in the Maghreb, and of a study prepared by the WEU Institute for Security Studies on the situation in Algeria and its consequences for the Maghreb and Europe.

The *Experts Group* on the verification of arms control agreements held several working meetings on the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty. On 26th and 27th March, a WEU fact-finding mission visited Moscow to examine the possibility of using a single type of observation aircraft for open skies, as proposed by France. When, in three years' time, the treaty is implemented in full, there will be a need to use specially equipped aircraft. A fleet of between five and eight aircraft should be sufficient for the 200 observation flights planned each year. A solution consisting of developing a single

type of observation aircraft which could also be used for CSCE transport missions might be adopted, and would offer major advantages in terms of cost-effectiveness. The Russians taking part in the WEU mission suggested two types of aircraft which might be suitable. All the practical arrangements for technical co-operation were considered during the discussions in order to provide experts with the necessary information for subsequent feasibility studies on the pooling of aircraft and/or sensors.

At an informal meeting in Vienna on 29th April of heads of delegation, these exploratory talks on co-operation with Russia were continued and other options were discussed, such as a common WEU pool with national aircraft being used in rotation. Then, on 13th May, experts met in London at the WEU Secretariat to hear a presentation on the German national study and to prepare the activity report for ministers.

The *CFE and CSBM Verification Experts Group* met on 7th May to take stock of the current stage reached in the CFE Treaty ratification process. As of that date, 17 countries had deposited their instruments of ratification, including France on 24th March and Italy on 22nd April. Spain was ready to deposit its instrument of ratification in the very near future.

The experts discussed several aspects of practical co-operation between the member states concerning the implementation of the treaty: rules for the operation of multinational teams, training of inspectors and bilateral inspection exercises.

The *ad hoc Sub-Group on Space* met in Madrid on 9th April to hear a report from the Director on the setting-up of the WEU satellite centre and to review progress made by the team investigating medium- and long-term studies. The satellite centre project team, for its part, met twice, on 24th March and on 19th and 20th May. Lastly, on 6th May 1992, a ceremony took place at the headquarters of the firm Dornier GmbH in Friedrichshafen to mark the signing of the contract for the first phase of the main system feasibility study. The aim of this study is to investigate the functional and programme aspects of a complete system.

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Since the signature of the Paris Charter in November 1990, considerable progress has been made in developing the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe as one of the key elements in Europe's emerging security architecture. The security aspects of the CSCE follow-up conference regularly feature on the agenda of the Council and its working groups. WEU member states favour the strengthening of the CSCE's capabilities for conflict prevention and crisis management. The WEU Council has welcomed the various initiatives of H.E. Mr. J. Dienstbier, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, in his capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE Council, to promote increased co-ordination between European security organisations. Several steps have been taken in order to initiate fruitful co-operation between WEU and the CSCE.

Following an invitation by H.E. Deputy Prime Minister J. Dienstbier, Ambassador Horst Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, attended the Prague Council of Ministers on 30th-31st January 1992, as my personal representative. On 1st-3rd April, Ambassador Holthoff participated in the plenary session of the CSCE Helsinki follow-up meeting 1992 where, on 3rd April, he made an initial contribution on behalf of WEU on the subject "the rôle of Western European Union and the architecture of European security". From 4th to 6th March, Mr. Paolo Casardi, Director of Political Affairs, attended the seminar on armed forces in democratic societies, organised in Vienna by the CSCE Conflict Prevention Centre.

The Berlin meeting in June 1991 of the CSCE Council of Ministers encouraged the exchange of information and relevant documents among CSCE and the main European and transatlantic institutions. As a first concrete step towards increased contacts and co-operation between the CSCE and the main European and transatlantic institutions, the participating states of the CSCE agreed to initiate this exchange of information and relevant documents. Since February 1992, public documents have been exchanged on a regular basis between the WEU Secretariat-General and the CSCE Secretariat in Prague.

A request made on 29th April 1992 by the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE Council for WEU to give serious thought to the idea of possible WEU assistance to the CSCE in the event of a CSCE monitor mission to be dispatched to Nagorny-Karabakh, was discussed by the Permanent Council. Should the CSCE decide to send a monitor mission to Nagorny-Karabakh under its responsibility, WEU member states would duly consider a request to contribute to this effort. According to the WEU Council, a mission to monitor a ceasefire in Nagorny-Karabakh would be subject to an effective and lasting ceasefire in the region as well as to the formal consent of the parties involved.

At its Prague meeting on 30th-31st January, the CSCE Council resolved to send rapporteur missions to the new CSCE member states. The aim of these missions was to evaluate whether commitments entered into under the CSCE had been fulfilled.

Following an invitation by the Czechoslovak presidency of the CSCE for a representative of WEU to participate in the fifth and last mission, I was authorised by the Permanent Council to make available a representative of the WEU Secretariat-General for participation in the CSCE rapporteur mission to Georgia. I designated Mr. C. Bruch from the Policy and Planning Section of the Political Division to participate in the mission which visited Georgia from 18th-22nd May 1992. On 2nd June, Mr. Bruch also represented the Secretariat-General at a special meeting of Working Group 3 (Human Dimension) of the Helsinki CSCE follow-up meeting dedicated to the discussion of the CSCE rapporteur missions to the new member states, the respective reports as well as a general evaluation of those missions.

Here is a short summary of the mission's findings during its stay in Georgia: generally, the mission had the impression that in Georgia the will to reform was real, both at the institutional and legislative levels. It transpired from all the talks and discussions which it had with the competent authorities that it was the aim of present office-holders to build the future Georgian society on democratic principles, ideas and values. Nevertheless, the mission could not fail to emphasise in its report that there was at present no working parliament, that legislative decrees were being promulgated without the consent of elected popular representatives and that continuation of martial law limited, at least partly, the enjoyment by the population of basic human rights. Consequently, the mission expressed the hope that the present transitory period would be short and that CSCE principles would become fully applicable as soon as possible.

The mission found the Georgian authorities generally committed to ensuring respect for human rights. Under the present state of emergency, however, the situation remained tense. Several factions had weapons at their disposal. Of serious concern especially were interethnic relations in Georgia. Though the mission concluded that there was full freedom of religion in Georgia, it should not be overlooked that there are signs of religious intolerance which may cause difficulties in the future unless steps are taken to encourage an open dialogue and tolerance on both sides. The mission found no signs of serious curtailment of freedom of expression or information. Under the present state of emergency, freedom of assembly is limited. While the situation has much stabilised since the consolidation of the new provisional government, the continuing demonstrations nevertheless sometimes result in harsh intervention by the security forces, occasionally with the loss of life.

Under Soviet rule, three autonomous entities were formed on the territory of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic: the Abkhaz Autonomous (Soviet Socialist) Republic, the Adzhar Autonomous (Soviet Socialist) Republic and the South Ossetian Autonomous Region (Oblast).

Tension has been building up in South Ossetia for nearly three years. Numerous violent clashes between Ossetians and Georgians have occurred in South Ossetia since 1989. Due to a personal initiative and a visit to South Ossetia by the Chairman of the Georgian State Council, Mr. Shevardnadze, a dialogue between the two parties has recently started. However, it has been marred by repeated violations of the provisional ceasefire, including the taking of hostages and attacks against civilians. On the day before the mission's visit to the South Ossetian centre of Tskhinvali, a very serious incident occurred, in which 36 Ossetians, including women and children, were killed. The Georgian authorities immediately condemned the atrocity and pledged to bring the perpetrators – who are still unknown – to justice. The incident deeply affected the circumstances under which the visit by members of the mission to Tskhinvali took place.

The mission also visited the Abkhazian capital of Sukhumi. Due to the Abkhaz' campaign for the secession of their Autonomous Republic from Georgia and its attachment to the Russian Federation, the situation remains tense. The predominantly Muslim Abkhaz – as the titular nationality – constitute only 17.8% of the half million inhabitants of their Autonomous Republic, and Georgians account for 45.7% of its total population. In its meetings with the representatives of the factions represented in the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia, the mission emphasised the need for all parties concerned to collaborate in the search for solutions to problems, the potential danger of which should not be underrated.

As far as economic issues are concerned, the mission concluded that Georgia's economy is in deep crisis. Indeed, the disintegration of the economic structures and the loss of trade links on the territory of the former USSR are having painful consequences, as Georgia is wholly dependent on energy imports and also imports 80-90% of raw materials for its industry.

Georgia is not a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States and has taken the position that it does not wish to participate in the unified CIS military structures. The CIS troops sta-

tioned in Georgia are now under Russian jurisdiction and the High Command of the former USSR Transcaucasian military district remains located in Tbilisi. Georgia is currently actively seeking to establish its own independent armed forces. Georgian officials repeatedly expressed their grave concern at the ongoing conflict over Nagorny-Karabakh. In this context, they expressed the fear that this conflict could rapidly escalate with devastating consequences for the Transcaucasus in general, and Georgia in particular.

The mission stressed the overriding importance of general parliamentary elections to be held on 11th October 1992, as announced by the State Council of Georgia. By holding these elections in accordance with accepted democratic standards, legitimacy should be fully restored. In order to ensure the objectivity and credibility of these elections in a multiparty system, international monitoring of the election campaign and the elections themselves should take place. The mission also felt that co-ordination should be organised among CSCE member states and international organisations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Community, the Council of Europe and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe to offer co-operation and expertise in banking, financial and economic matters, the organisation of the judiciary and the civil service and the reform of key areas of legislation. Practical measures to ensure implementation should also be devised. The mission also felt it necessary strongly to urge the parties to co-operate in halting and reversing the dangerous proliferation on Georgian soil of weaponry held by various political factions and ethnic groups, with a view to defusing political tension and interethnic strife.

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Since Maastricht, it is more important than ever to keep senior American and Canadian officials, the press, radio and television and academics in these two countries regularly informed about WEU activities. During recent visits to the United States, I took every opportunity to explain to a very varied American public the importance of strengthening WEU and the European pillar of the alliance for the future of transatlantic relations:

- on 23rd March, I spoke to students at the National Defense University in Washington D.C. on the rôle of WEU after Maastricht;
- the same day, I spoke at a lunchtime debate organised in Washington by the Atlantic Council on the subject "Towards a European defence - and what that really means";
- later on that day, in Washington, I gave a talk on the European pillar of the alliance as part of a programme organised by the World Affairs Council of Washington D.C.;
- on 24th March, in Norfolk, Virginia, I took part in a conference entitled "COMDEF 92 - international symposia and exhibition on common defence", this year's theme being sustaining public support for defence spending in the 90s. I spoke about the problems of European security and the rôle of WEU;
- on 25th March, I gave an address on the European pillar to students of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princetown University (New Jersey);
- on 24th-26th April, I took part in a symposium on issues and challenges of verification, at the Southern Methodist University in Dallas, and I gave a paper on European perspectives of arms control in the new international environment;
- on 27th April in Atlanta, I gave an address at the Center for International Strategy, Technology and Policy of the Georgia Institute of Technology on the subject "European security and the new world order: the rôle of Western European Union";
- on 28th April, in Monterey, California, I spoke about WEU to students at the Naval Post-graduate School;
- from 30th April to 1st May, I took part in a symposium at Georgetown University of Washington (D.C.), the theme of which was "the troubled partnership in transition". This event had been co-sponsored by the following bodies: Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Department of National Defence (Canada), Center for German and European Studies, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (Georgetown University). The subject for my talk was Western European Union and the European Union;
- on 5th June, I gave an address on the rôle of the European security and defence identity in the development of transatlantic relations during a symposium organised by the West Point Military Academy on "the United States and the Atlantic Alliance".

These visits also gave me an opportunity to hold detailed exchanges of view with several representatives of the administration and to explain to them Europe's common defence objectives and the new tasks facing WEU. They also provided an opportunity to explain the démarche underlying initiatives such as the establishment of a Franco-German corps.

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In the field of public relations and information on the rôle and current and future tasks of WEU, my colleagues and I also attended the following events:

- from 2nd-3rd March in Athens, I took part in a conference organised by the magazine "Greek economy", the theme of which was "defence-space: economic opportunities for Greece". I gave a paper on co-operative defence and space programmes: WEU in the constellation of future developments;
- on 4th March, Ambassador Holthoff met the members of the European People's Party (EPP) in Brussels and gave a presentation on WEU;
- from 6th-8th March, I took part in a seminar in Ebenhausen devoted to the fifth review on the future tasks of the Atlantic Alliance: between indifference and engagement - rôles for the Atlantic Alliance within the evolving system of multi-institutional crisis management. This seminar had been organised by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik;
- on 12th March, I took part in a seminar entitled "Heeft Nederland nog een eigen buitenlandse politiek bij een verdergaande Europese integratie?" (Does the Netherlands still have its own foreign policy as European integration moves ahead?). This event was organised in Utrecht by the Studentenvereniging voor Internationale Betrekkingen;
- on 15th March, at the invitation of the European Club of the Netherlands, I spoke in Maastricht on the rôle of Western European Union: including East or defencing West?;
- on 17th March, I gave a talk in Utrecht on Visies op de West Europese Unie na Maastricht: heeft de NAVO de EG verslagen? (Prospects for Western European Union after Maastricht: has NATO defeated the EC?). This event had been organised by the Netherlands Association of Young Europeans for Security;
- on 19th March, I took part in a seminar on the new European security policy architecture, organised in Bolkesjo (Norway) by the Norwegian Advisory Council for Arms Control and Disarmament. I spoke about the rôle of WEU;
- on 23rd-26th March, Ambassador Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, was in Ebenhausen to monitor the work of the fourth European session for advanced defence studies during which he spoke on the rôle of WEU and the architecture of European security;
- on 27th March, at the Secretariat-General, I gave a briefing on WEU to students from the City University in London;
- on 30th March, in Brussels, I gave an address entitled "Security of the new Europe" at a conference organised by the Institut des Relations Internationales de Belgique;
- from 6th-8th April, my colleague, Mr. P. Casardi, Director for Political Affairs, took part in a Eurogroup seminar in Lisbon entitled "Europe - a new era" at which he spoke on European security institutions: adaptation and development - a WEU perspective;
- on 7th April in Brussels, Mr. A. Jacomet, Head of the Policy and Planning Section of the Political Affairs Division, gave a paper entitled "WEU after Maastricht" to a meeting at the Centre for Defence Studies of the Institut Royal Supérieur de Défense;
- from 10th-11th April in The Hague, I took part in the seventh round table conference on the subject "Preventing instability in post-cold war Europe: the institutional responses of NATO, WEU, the EC, the CSCE and the United Nations", which had been organised by the Netherlands Atlantic Commission. I spoke about WEU's potential rôle in crises outside Europe;
- from 13th-15th April, I took part in a round table on the new Europe - from self-determination to integration, organised in Vienna by the Runder Tisch - Europa Association. I spoke about WEU's rôle post-Maastricht;
- on 15th April, I spoke about WEU's activities and future direction post-Maastricht during a dinner-debate organised in Paris by the Institut Français des Relations Internationales;

- on 23rd April at Wilton Park, I took part in a seminar on planning for security in the changing international environment. I spoke about NATO and WEU: changing rôles and responsibilities;
- on 7th May at the Secretariat-General, Mr. A. Jacomet and Mr. C. Bruch outlined WEU's activities and future direction to a group of senior officials from the Swiss Defence Ministry;
- from 7th-8th May at Casteau, I took part in SHAPEX 92, the theme of which was future European security – the changing scene;
- on 8th May, at the invitation of SHAPE, I gave a paper on the development of WEU to chiefs of defence staff from Central Europe on the occasion of their visit to Casteau;
- from 11th-13th May in Budapest, Ambassador Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, and Mr. R. Tibbels, Committee Secretary, took part in the third seminar of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, which brought together diplomats and Defence Ministry representatives from WEU countries and several countries of Central Europe;
- on 14th May, at the Secretariat-General, I outlined the future direction of WEU's work following Maastricht to a group of senior officials from the Federal Republic of Germany who were studying security policy and who were on an official visit to the United Kingdom;
- from 15th-18th May, Ambassador Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, represented the Secretariat at the spring session of the North Atlantic Assembly in Banff (Canada);
- on 18th May in Groningen, I spoke about WEU at the *Congres van de Studentenvereniging voor Internationale Betrekkingen & Europa Dispuut*, the theme of which was *Europa, verbreding of verdieping?* (Europe: widening or deepening?);
- on 22nd May in Brussels, I spoke about WEU's activities post-Maastricht to leaders of the *Comité d'Action pour l'Europe*;
- on 1st June, during a seminar on "la défense de la France et la sécurité de l'Europe", organised in Paris by the *Forum du Futur*, I spoke during the round table on "France and its alliances";
- from 11th-14th June, I took part in the ninth NATO workshop on political military decision-making at Vouliagmeni (Greece);
- on 18th June in Brussels, I described the orientation of WEU's work to the Security and Disarmament Sub-Committee of the European Parliament in Brussels;
- on 20th June in Strasbourg, I spoke about transatlantic relations at an international colloquy on 1992: Europe and North America, the dialogue of the new solidarities, organised by the Council of Europe.

Over these three and a half months, I have continued to have regular contacts with the press, radio and television and with academic circles both in London and on the occasion of other engagements. These meetings have given me an opportunity to clarify the direction of WEU's work post-Maastricht.

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At the request of the Permanent Council, the Secretariat prepares notes on how the international press has reacted to WEU's activities and the debates about its rôle. The notes for March, April and May 1992 are summarised below.

(a) During the month of *March*, WEU was mentioned several times in connection with the publication of an internal Pentagon document, according to which the United States wanted to prevent the emergence of exclusively European security systems. When questioned on this subject, the WEU Secretary-General, Mr. W. van Eekelen, stated that if such a policy orientation were to be confirmed, it would be at odds with the alliance's recognition of the European identity.

The question of setting up a peace-keeping force to be used by the CSCE was raised in Helsinki on 24th March. This initiative attracted the attention of analysts as regards the respective rôles of NATO and WEU in carrying out such missions.

Furthermore, WEU was mentioned in connection with the Open Skies Treaty which authorises access to the air space from Vancouver to Vladivostok for flights to monitor military activities.

Finally, there was some comment in the Belgian press about the transfer of the WEU Council to Brussels.

(b) During the month of *April*, WEU was frequently mentioned along with NATO and the CSCE in articles assessing the rivalry and complementarity between the various European security institutions.

The establishment of a peace-keeping force under WEU auspices began to attract comment in the European press. Some commentators questioned WEU's ability to be able to call on sufficient military manpower and a command and control system which would enable it to execute a peace-keeping operation. Other commentators, however, recalled WEU's rôle during the Gulf war and advocated its participation in the deployment of such a force. At the end of the month, a number of commentators mentioned the possibility of WEU countries becoming involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The issues at stake in the ratification of the Maastricht agreements drew increasing comment in the press, frequent references being made to the WEU declarations and the prospect of its enlargement. Several articles were devoted to the position of Turkey, the specific problems of neutral countries and relations between WEU and the countries of Central Europe.

The establishment of the WEU satellite centre at Torrejón attracted much detailed comment in the Spanish press.

(c) During the month of *May*, the plan to set up a Franco-German army corps drew much attention in the press. There continued to be several question marks about the future links between WEU's operational structures and the Franco-German corps. Some commentators recommended that it should be placed exclusively under the control of WEU, whereas others took the view that it should above all be made available to the alliance. In this connection, several articles underlined the danger of competition between the two organisations. The willingness signalled by Paris and Bonn to open up the corps to other member states of WEU prompted cautious reactions. The favourable reaction of Belgium and the interest shown by Luxembourg and Spain were duly reported.

Commentators paid particular attention to the strengthening of WEU's operational capability, WEU intervention occasionally being mooted in connection with the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

WEU's operational rôle figured prominently in the comments generated by the first keynote speech by Mr. M. Rifkind on 14th May in London in his new capacity as Secretary of State for Defence. Indirect references to WEU appeared in some articles in the French press concerning the future of the IEPG and the proposed European Armaments Agency.

***Extraordinary meeting of WEU Council of Ministers
on the situation in Yugoslavia***

(Helsinki, 10th July 1992)

The ministers of the WEU countries, having taken note of the report of the ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia, adopted the following decisions:

1. *Decision to implement the monitoring at sea operations* as proposed by the ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia at its meeting of 3rd July in Rome. Surveillance of the embargo set by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 will involve the participation of at least five to six ships, four MPA, one support ship, ground base helicopters. Such surveillance will be carried out in international waters, in the Otranto Channel and on other points off the Yugoslav coast, including off the Montenegro coast, following consultations with UNPROFOR.

- The said naval operations will start at the earliest moment under Italian co-ordination. The participation of the member states will be subject to the provisions of their national constitutions. These WEU operations will be open to the participation of other allies and co-ordinated in co-operation with NATO. Rules of engagement and operational co-ordination will be established by the competent naval authorities at the initiative of the Presidency.

- The ad hoc group will constantly update options concerning naval embargo enforcement for which a further United Nations Security Council resolution would be necessary.

2. *Decision on WEU efforts in the field of humanitarian aid* on the basis of the recommendations of the ad hoc group.

- The Presidency will present an inventory of contributions by WEU partners to the competent United Nations authorities.

- The Presidency is also requested to promote a further rapid exploration by the ad hoc group on the options of ground transport through humanitarian corridors.

- In this context the ad hoc group will identify possible modalities and list logistical and other means that partners would be willing to make available. The group will also consider, in consultation with NATO, the need for contributions by other allies.

- Any operation concerning the establishment of humanitarian corridors would have to be subject to further decisions by the Security Council and be co-ordinated with the United Nations in particular for the aspects concerning protection. Appropriate contacts would be established in a timely fashion.

- Co-ordination with United Nations, UNCHR and EC Commission, through the Presidency will also aim at identifying additional needs of the populations and ways to meet them more effectively.

3. *Immediate information on our initiatives will be passed to the United Nations Secretary-General and to the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE.*

**DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1993¹**

*submitted on behalf of
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

- I. Introduction
- II. Head I – Expenditure relating to permanent staff of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly
- III. Operating budget
- IV. Pensions budget
- V. Summary of estimates in the draft budget of the Assembly for 1993 (operating and pensions budgets)

SUMMARY OF ESTIMATES OF EXPENDITURE AND RECEIPTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1993

- Part I: Operating budget
 - Section A – expenditure
 - Section B – receipts
- Part II: Pensions budget
 - Section A – expenditure
 - Section B – receipts

APPENDICES

- I. Recapitulatory table showing changes in the staff of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly proposed in the 1993 budget
- II. Organogram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly
- III. Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions
- IV. Five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of the Office of the Clerk
- V. Trend of the Assembly budgets from 1992 to 1993
- VI. Implications of the various heads for the 1992 and 1993 budgets
- VII. Statement by the President of the Assembly at the meeting of the Permanent Council on 24th June 1992

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee and approved by the Presidential Committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Rathbone (Chairman); MM. Lagorce (Alternate: *Dhaille*), Maas (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alvarez (Alternate: *Roman*), Antretter, Autain, Biefnot (Alternate: *Pécriaux*), Büchler, Curto, Diaz, Eversdijk, *Dame Peggy Fenner*, MM. de Gaulle, *Garcia Sanchez*, Greco, Howell (Alternate: *Lord Mackie of Benshie*), Jurgens (Alternate: *Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman*), Meyer zu Bentrup, Oehler, Pinto, Pauti (Alternate: *Rubner*), *Redmond*, *Regenwetter*, Sinesio, Thissen (Alternate: *Ottenbourgh*), Triglia.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The trend of political events since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty does not yet allow budget estimates to be based on definite facts; the process leading to the building of the European Union is far from complete. However, WEU is playing a rôle in this process and its importance should not be underestimated since it is the meeting point between European defence and Atlantic defence, the bench mark for the Eastern European countries and the natural forum for debating the essential problems of the Mediterranean countries. Here the WEU Assembly has a leading part to play: its very high level of work during the past year testifies to its will to continue its efforts, the aim of which is to co-operate in building the European Union and establishing an order of justice and peace.
2. In the present draft budget, the Assembly asks the governments of member countries for the wherewithal to pursue its action. Its budgetary proposals reflect the financial implications of the political guidelines laid down by the Presidential Committee and presented to the Permanent Council in London on 24th June 1992 by the President of the Assembly, together with the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
3. These proposals should be analysed in three separate chapters corresponding to the following three categories of expenditure:
 - expenditure relating to permanent staff of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (Head I of the budget);
 - operating expenditure (Heads II to V of the budget);
 - expenditure relating to pensions.

II. Head I – Expenditure relating to permanent staff of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly

4. The draft budget for the financial year 1992 (Document 1281) included the creation of three grade B3 posts (two had already been requested in the budget for the financial year 1990) and the regrading of one grade L post and three grade C posts. The WEU Council did not accept these proposals as had already been the case for the budget for the financial year 1991, in spite of the favourable conclusions drawn in the study on the organisation of the Office of the Clerk carried out by three parliamentary experts. It seems extraordinary that such expert opinion is discarded and overturned by the Budget and Organisation Committee.
5. However, the need to apply the changes set out in the organogram of the Office of the Clerk which the Assembly proposed was confirmed in full during the financial year 1992. Corresponding sums therefore have to be included in the draft budget for 1993 with a reminder of the justifications which accompanied the presentation of the proposals in question.
6. Regarding the proposal to create three new posts of assistant, the experts, in their report on the organisation of the Office of the Clerk (Part 3, paragraph 3), expressed the following opinion:

“ The creation of three grade B3 posts of assistant is justified by the creation of new senior posts and the increase in the tasks of the research and administrative services although the Office of the Clerk proposes only two.

The post of assistant to the Political Committee is essential insofar as the committee would be run independently of the Clerk Assistant.

While the duties and responsibilities of the administrative Clerk Assistant are not questioned and must remain as they are, the creation of a post of assistant in the administrative services is made necessary by the increase in material tasks resulting from the Assembly's opening to the outside world (mail, printing, etc.).

The third post of assistant should bring the research and documentation service up to strength and allow it to be equipped with modern documentary data retrieval systems essential for the smooth running of the Assembly bodies.”

7. It should also be mentioned that, in the explanatory memorandum to the draft budgets for 1991 (paragraph 13) and 1992 (paragraph 12), the place of the two grade B3 assistants in the committee service of the Office of the Clerk is specified: they will be assigned to the two new grade A officials. According to the opinion of the experts, this service should be able to count on:

“ – a secretariat for the Political Committee consisting of a grade A5 secretary and a grade B3 assistant.

This is essential to allow the Clerk Assistant, now Secretary of the committee, to carry out his new tasks in full;

– a grade A3/4 head of the research and documentation service and a grade B3 assistant. The creation of an efficient research and documentation service specific to the Assembly is essential to allow the presidency and the committees to give a new dimension to their work. This service should not have a cumbersome structure but a dynamic organisation using modern technology for the retrieval and processing of documentation so as, in particular, to ensure a computerised link with existing sources of documentation (national parliaments, specialised institutes, etc.). However, the attribution of enough staff from the outset is a condition for the success of this operation.”

8. As for the third post of grade B3 assistant for the archives, the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly has a true need for this since the archives section is also responsible for sending out documents for sessions (the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly does not have a dispatching office as is the case, for instance, in the Council of Europe) and is faced with an increase in the volume sent out since 1989 of 250% and this figure will probably be higher in 1992. It is quite clear that the person in the archives service, in spite of the occasional assistance of temporary staff and recourse to a mailing firm, is no longer in a position to carry out all these duties alone.

9. Finally, for the regrading of four existing posts, your Rapporteur can but refer to the justifications already given in the explanatory memoranda to the budgets for 1991 and 1992, which remain fully valid and are summarised below.

10. Regarding the regrading, in a personal capacity, of the post of translator-interpreter from grade L3 to grade L4, it should be noted that the holder has thirty years' experience as a linguist, sixteen of which in NATO (at grade L4 for ten years). Transferred to the WEU Assembly after having worked for the WEU agencies for security questions, she has taken over, under the responsibility of the Clerk Assistant for Administrative and Financial Questions, the management of the teams of interpreters and also takes part herself in the work of these teams, which allows the Assembly to limit recruitment to twenty interpreters instead of twenty-two for each session and five interpreters instead of six for other meetings, thus making a considerable saving. In addition, she also works in conjunction with the French translation section, which is particularly valuable since she also translates from Italian and Spanish. Finally, at the request of the WEU Secretariat-General, the Assembly places the services of this official at the disposal of the Council for ministerial meetings; the Secretariat-General recently expressed its official appreciation of the extremely valuable assistance thus provided (greater than the total cost to the Assembly of approximately F 12 000). To sum up, the official concerned is at the ceiling of grade L3, which corresponds neither to her duties as chief interpreter nor to those of a translator/reviser.

11. The other regradings concern the posts of three members of the staff responsible for storing and accounting for equipment and the reproduction service. Several times in its reports on the budgets of the ministerial organs, the Assembly has drawn the Council's attention to the problem of the staff's career possibilities, an essential condition for ensuring maximum motivation. This problem now arises more specifically for the three grade C officials (one C6 and two C4) who, having reached the ceiling of their grades, have no further prospect of advancement, although their work has changed both quantitatively and qualitatively. This regrading is thus fully in line with the principle that there should be concordance between duties to be carried out, qualifications and the professional category of staff. To give the three officials B grades (B4 for the grade C6 official and B3 for the two grade C4s) is justified by their increased qualifications and knowledge. It should be recalled that their colleagues in the reproduction service of the WEU ministerial organs already have B grades. To give these three officials B grades would, in the immediate future, have financial advantages for only one of them, who would become entitled to the expatriation allowance, but in the years to come they would all be entitled to the additional steps available for B grades.

12. The estimates under Head I take account of the abovementioned proposals to the sum of F 950 000 (3.12% of the operating budget and 2.82% of the total budget) for the overall strength of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly which, in 1993, should have thirty-seven officials in the various services (see Appendix I and the organogram at Appendix II). They also take account of revised salary scales as from 1st July 1992 and steps granted to the staff concerned.

13. A comparison of these estimates with those for the previous financial year shows a total increase in expenditure chargeable to Head I of F 1 662 000, i.e. a growth rate of 10.2%.

III. Operating budget

14. Estimates under Heads II to V are calculated in accordance with the directives of the Presidential Committee, which decided on the overall course of the political activities of the Assembly bodies for 1993. To make an accurate analysis of the financial implications of these directives, they should be grouped in the following categories:

- (a) implications of Greece's accession to WEU;
- (b) programme of work of the Presidential and other committees;
- (c) equipment modernisation programme;
- (d) other operating expenditure.

15. *Implications of the accession of Greece to WEU*

15.1. The Presidential Committee considered that, in accordance with the decisions taken in Maasticht, it is to be expected that Greece will participate as a full member in both parts of the thirty-ninth session of the Assembly. The draft budget for 1993 therefore takes this possibility into account and the following sums have been included under the various sub-heads of the budget for this purpose:

Sub-Head 6.1 – Sittings service (2 Greek sub-editors)	F 75 000
Sub-Head 6.2 – Interpretation service (4 Greek interpreters)	F 234 000
Sub-Head 6.3 – Translation service (2 translators)	F 42 000
Sub-Head 9.2 – Provident fund for interpreters	F 17 400
Sub-Head 9.3 – Insurance for interpreters	F 600
Sub-Head 12 – Installation of an eighth interpretation booth in the chamber of the ESC (including the purchase of electronic equipment, building a dais, labour required for the installation and hire of the booth)	F 105 000
Sub-Head 30 – Expenses for political groups The Greek Delegation will probably have fourteen members (seven representatives and seven substitutes)	<u>F 35 000</u>
TOTAL	F 509 000

15.2. This represents 1.67% of the total net operating budget and 1.51% of the grand total budget.

15.3. It should be pointed out that no credit is requested for an office for the Greek Delegation and temporary staff since, when the time comes, it will be possible to solve this problem only by redistributing offices in the building in agreement with the Secretariat-General.

15.4. In view of prevailing uncertainty about the date of Greece's accession to WEU, the Assembly is prepared to agree to the sums in question being frozen until that country effectively joins WEU.

15.5. But it must be established quite clearly now that the budgetary problems associated with the accession of Spain and Portugal cannot be repeated, so the Assembly cannot agree to Greek membership until the required budget and administrative arrangements are approved and put in hand.

16. *Programme of work*

16.1. The Assembly's programme of work was examined attentively by the Presidential Committee, which studied the proposals for meetings and travelling prepared by the various committees on the basis of the following political guidelines:

- (a) Establishing and maintaining relations between the WEU Assembly and:
 - (i) the European Parliament;
 - (ii) NATO and the North Atlantic Assembly;
 - (iii) the Assembly of the Council of Europe;
 - (iv) parliaments of member countries of the Communities which are not members of WEU;
 - (v) parliaments of member countries of the Council of Europe which are not members of WEU;
 - (vi) "out-of-area" countries.

- (b) increased contacts between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of member countries;
- (c) work arising from the development of the CSCE and the rôle assigned to WEU in it.

16.2. The financial implications of the very intensive activities planned by the Assembly for 1993 mainly concern three heads of the budget for which it is necessary to propose significant increases over the financial year 1992, i.e.:

	1992	1993	Growth	%
Sub-Head 7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	618 000	1 242 000	624 000	101.00
Sub-Head 24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	210 000	506 000	296 000	140.95
Sub-Head 27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	590 000	1 178 000	588 000	99.66
	1 418 000	2 926 000	1 508 000	106.34

16.3. It is these increases – which alone produce a growth rate of 106.34% – that have a marked impact on the overall growth rate of the 1993 budget since they represent 4.96% of the net operating budget, 4.48% of the net total budget and 11.99% of Heads II to V of the operating budget.

17. *Programme for the modernisation of equipment*

17.1. The five-year programme for the modernisation of equipment has been updated for the period 1993-97 (see Appendix IV). As a result, there is an increase of F 97 000 under Sub-Head 17, i.e. a growth rate of 20.42%, justified as follows:

- (a) under the maintenance contracts for the Rank Xerox photocopiers in the reproduction service, the cost of maintenance will henceforth be calculated on the basis of the number of copies over and above the basic number included in the cost of hire. This new criterion means that expenditure relating to this additional number, previously charged to Sub-Head 19, will now be charged to Sub-Head 17 (maintenance). This results in a reduction of F 47 000 in estimates under Sub-Head 19 compared with the financial year 1992 in spite of the considerable increase in the volume of work;
- (b) the paper-cutting machine has been serviced at a cost of F 10 500 (see Appendix IV, item 5.3);
- (c) the Assembly's computerised equipment has been modernised by replacing the old word-processors by computers. This modernisation, the cost of which is largely offset by the cancellation of the former maintenance contracts, allows savings to be made that are referred to in other sections of the budget, in particular in the organisation of the French verbatim service (see explanations to Sub-Head 6) and in the hire of typewriters (see Appendix IV, item 7.7). The use of word-processing by the French verbatim service will also lead to savings in printing costs since the cost of traditional photocomposition will be considerably reduced. It is not yet possible to assess the exact amount of these savings but a fixed sum has been taken into account in estimates under Sub-Head 20 where only the rate of inflation has been calculated. In fact, expenditure to cover the increase in the number of documents printed has been considered as offset by this saving.

17.2. The estimate of F 10 000 under Sub-Head 16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment is for the purchase of two dictaphones for use by the translation service.

17.3. The above considerations bring out the fact that, faced with a considerable increase in its work, the Assembly is continuing its efforts to rationalise the services of the Office of the Clerk in order to keep budgetary increases as low as possible while achieving maximum cost effectiveness.

18. *Other operating expenditure*

18.1. It was in this spirit of economy that estimates under the sub-heads of the operating budget not specifically examined above were worked out. In particular, it should be underlined that the increase of F 30 000 requested under Sub-Head 18 – Postage, telephone, telefax and transport of documents is amply justified by the increase in the volume of communications by telephone and telefax and the volume of mail sent out.

18.2. The same is true for Sub-Head 29 – Expenditure on information, where the F 15 000 increase seems quite modest compared with the greater volume of work.

18.3. The increase in the Assembly's work also justifies the increase of F 40 000 under Sub-Head 25 – Expenses for representation.

19. Your Rapporteur therefore has to conclude that, in view of exceptional political events, the Assembly is asking, in its operating budget, only for the resources essential for it to measure up to its rôle. This is what the President of the Assembly told the WEU Permanent Council on 24th June 1992. (The text of his statement is given at Appendix VII.)

IV. Pensions budget

20. A new old-age pension, which will probably be granted in 1993, is taken into account in the estimates for this financial year which cover all the pensions for 15 retired officials (12 old-age pensions, 2 invalidity pensions and 1 survivor's pension), adjusted as for permanent staff in accordance with the 6.63% increase in salary scales (4.5% as from 1st July 1992 and 3.5% as from 1st July 1993).

21. Regarding receipts under this part of the budget, which consist of contributions by the permanent staff to the pension scheme (7% of basic salary), account has been taken of the contributions corresponding to the creation of three new posts and the regrading of four existing posts. These contributions amount to approximately F 36 500 and should be withdrawn from the budget if these proposals are not accepted.

V. Summary of estimates in the draft budget of the Assembly for 1993 (operating and pensions budgets)

22. To sum up, as shown in the table at Appendix V, the grand net total of estimates in the draft budget of the Assembly for 1993 (operating budget plus pensions budget minus receipts) amounts to F 33 635 500 which, compared with the grand net total of the budget for the financial year 1992, shows a growth rate of 15.28%. As explained above, this figure may be broken down as follows:

2.82% for proposals relating to the organogram of the Office of the Clerk;

1.51% for the implications of Greece's accession to WEU;

4.48% for the programme of work;

6.47% for minor adjustments under certain sub-heads of the budget and adjustments to the salaries of permanent and temporary staff and pensions and a new pension payable as from 1st January 1993.

*Summary of estimates of expenditure and receipts
for the financial year 1993*

Details	Expenditure	Receipts
PART I: Operating budget		
<i>Section A :</i> Expenditure		
<i>Head I:</i> Permanent staff	17 949 000	
<i>Head II:</i> Temporary staff	5 045 000	
<i>Head III:</i> Expenditure on premises and equipment	2 072 000	
<i>Head IV:</i> General administrative costs	2 255 500	
<i>Head V:</i> Other expenditure	3 199 000	
<i>Section B:</i> Receipts		110 000
	30 520 500	110 000
NET TOTAL		30 410 500
	30 520 500	30 520 500
PART II: Pensions budget		
<i>Section A :</i> Expenditure		
<i>Head I:</i> Pensions, allowances and social charges	4 005 000	
<i>Section B:</i> Receipts		780 000
	4 005 000	780 000
NET TOTAL		3 225 000
	4 005 000	4 005 000
NET TOTAL BUDGET		33 635 500

Budget estimates

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET

*Section A – Expenditure**Head I – Permanent staff*

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1993	Budget for 1992	Expected expenditure in 1992	Actual expenditure in 1991
Sub-Head 1 – Basic salaries	12 549 000	11 360 000	11 380 000	10 064 383
Sub-Head 2 – Allowances:				
2.1. Expatriation allowance	1 309 000			
2.2. Household allowance	561 000			
2.3. Allowance for children and other dependent persons	624 000			
2.4. Rent allowance	55 000			
2.5. Education allowance	59 000			
2.6. Allowance for language courses	2 000			
2.7. Overtime	60 000			
2.8. Home leave	50 000			
	2 720 000	2 492 000	2 367 000	2 012 557
Sub-Head 3 – Social charges:				
3.1. Social security	1 740 000			
3.2. Supplementary insurance	599 000			
3.3. Provident fund	198 000			
	2 537 000	2 307 000	2 260 000	2 029 368
Sub-Head 4 – Expenses relating to the recruit- ment and departure of permanent officials				
4.1. Travelling expenses of candi- dates for vacant posts	5 000			
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of permanent officials and their families	11 000			
4.3. Removal expenses	70 000			
4.4. Installation allowance	43 000			
	129 000	114 000	101 000	68 642
Sub-Head 5 – Medical examination	14 000	14 000	14 000	11 031
TOTAL OF HEAD I	17 949 000	16 287 000	16 122 000	14 185 981

Explanations

Sub-Heads 1 and 2

Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to permanent staff in accordance with Chapter III of the Staff Rules of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of global salaries in application of the scales in force on 1st July 1991¹, adjusted in accordance with an expected increase of 4.5% as from 1st July 1992 and 3.5% as from 1st July 1993. These percentages are based on the first results of the statistical study carried out by the Interorganisation Section. They relate only to variations in the rate of inflation and purchasing power and may be changed in accordance with recommendations to be made on this question by the Co-ordinating Committee for salaries. These adjustments amount to F 900 000. Conversely, the increase relating to the calculation of the new monetary parity, which concerns only grades A and L, is not taken into account in estimates under these sub-heads. Additional sums will consequently have to be requested when the rate of this increase is decided. Assuming that the rate is 5.5%, the estimates would amount to F 513 000.

These estimates also take account of the financial implications of creating three new grade B posts and regrading four existing posts. The cost of these proposals is F 724 000.

The table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk, showing grades, is given at Appendix I and the organogram at Appendix II.

Sub-Head 3

Estimated expenditure for "Social charges" is based on commitments stemming from:

- application of the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1)²;
- application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2)³;
- application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the Provident Fund, amounting to 14% of basic salary, for staff not affiliated to the pension scheme (Sub-Head 3.3).

Social charges (F 102 000) relating to the creation of three new grade B posts and the regrading of four existing posts are included in the total for this sub-head. Estimates take into account salary adjustments amounting to F 195 000.

Sub-Head 4

These estimates relate to the new posts included in the organogram of the Office of the Clerk.

Sub-Head 5

The sum requested is to cover the cost of the annual medical check-up which all members of the staff must undergo in accordance with Article 9 of the Staff Rules. Medical check-ups for WEU staff in Paris are carried out at the OECD medical centre.

1. These scales are worked out by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts and approved by the WEU Council and the Councils of the other co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA).

2. Under this agreement, WEU staff benefit from the French general scheme, with the exception of family allowances and old-age pensions.

3. Under this convention, WEU staff benefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or permanent disability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sum to the beneficiaries he has named.

Head II – Temporary staff

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1993	Budget for 1992	Expected expenditure in 1992	Actual expenditure in 1991
Sub-Head 6 – Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly				
6.1. Sittings service	1 458 000			
6.2. Interpretation service	893 000			
6.3. Translation service	1 094 000			
6.4. Other services	<u>85 000</u>			
	3 530 000	2 988 000	2 880 000	2 667 651
Sub-Head 7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	1 242 000	618 000	735 000	624 106
Sub-Head 8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	25 000	50 000	50 000	116 856
Sub-Head 9 – Social charges				
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters	10 000			
9.2. Provident fund for interpreters	230 000			
9.3. Insurance for interpreters	<u>8 000</u>			
	248 000	156 000	164 600	154 890
TOTAL OF HEAD II	5 045 000	3 812 000	3 829 600	3 563 503

Explanations**Sub-Head 6**

Estimates under this sub-head relate to:

(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the reimbursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation and translation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at Appendix III. It should be underlined that, with a view to the accession of Greece to WEU, two extra parliamentary sub-editors are to be recruited for the sittings service. This increase is offset numerically by the abolition of two posts of assistants for the verbatim report following the computerisation of this service.

(b) Lump-sum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post office technician, typewriter mechanic, guards for the security service, etc.). The increase in estimates for these services compared with the previous financial year is due to the recruitment of a fourth temporary security guard to oversee security in the galleries and the television area in the lobby.

Salaries for temporary staff are calculated in accordance with scales in force on 1st July 1991, adjusted in the same way as for permanent staff, the adjustment amounting to F 134 000. The adjustment in respect of monetary parity to be included in an additional budget would be F 90 000.

In application of the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the International Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI), the salaries of interpreters are calculated on the basis of the scale in force for grade L4.8 staff, increased by 6%.

Sub-Head 7

This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at meetings between sessions (salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, travelling time and travelling expenses).

Salaries and working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (see Sub-Head 6 (b) above).

The salary adjustment for 1993 amounts to F 57 000 and the adjustment in respect of monetary parity to be included in a supplementary budget would amount to F 50 000.

Sub-Head 8

A smaller amount than for the previous financial year is shown for this sub-head since the creation of three new grade B posts will reduce the need to recruit temporary staff.

Sub-Head 9

Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges:

Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters

Staff recruited for Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company against the risks of death, accident or sickness, 60% of the premium being paid by the Office of the Clerk and 40% by staff. The estimates take account of the updating of the capital and premiums as from May 1988.

Provident fund for interpreters

In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the IACI, WEU has to pay into the conference interpreters' fund or, where appropriate, another provident fund, a contribution of 14%, which is added to a contribution of 7% by interpreters.

Insurance for interpreters

A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of Stewart Wrightson in London, covers interpreters for accidents, sickness and temporary or permanent disability preventing them from working. The premium of 1.1% of their fees (lower rate) is divided between the Office of the Clerk (0.7%) and the interpreters (0.4%).

Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1993	Budget for 1992	Expected expenditure in 1992	Actual expenditure in 1991
Sub-Head 10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	570 000	540 000	540 000	502 989
Sub-Head 11 – Hire of committee rooms	10 000	10 000	2 500	2 272
Sub-Head 12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	750 000	587 000	592 000	566 453
Sub-Head 13 – Various services for the organisation of sessions	105 000	105 000	102 000	73 217
Sub-Head 14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	15 000	15 000	5 000	1 727
Sub-Head 15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture	40 000	35 000	35 000	37 209
Sub-Head 16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	10 000	–	–	2 007
Sub-Head 17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other equipment	572 000	475 000	470 000	523 551
TOTAL OF HEAD III	2 072 000	1 767 000	1 746 500	1 709 425

Explanations

Sub-Head 10

Estimates under this sub-head represent the 30% share of joint expenditure relating to the management of the WEU premises in Paris. Following the abolition of the agencies, the Council confirmed the validity of the previous system of sharing this expenditure and made the administrative service of the WEU Institute for Security Studies responsible for managing joint services.

Sub-Head 11

For meetings outside Paris, Assembly bodies normally have committee rooms with simultaneous interpretation equipment made available to them by the national delegations concerned. However, in certain cases the Assembly may have to pay for hiring a room or installing portable interpretation equipment in rooms not so equipped. Sums requested under this sub-head are to allow the Assembly to cover such expenditure if necessary.

Sub-Head 12

As its title indicates, this sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment, telephone booths, telefax, screens, a detection gate and other installations in the premises of the Economic and Social Council during Assembly sessions.

The large increase in these sums compared with the previous financial year is due to the proposed installation of an eighth interpretation booth for Greek (F 105 000) and the installation of a seventy-five seat television area in the lobby of the Economic and Social Council. This area, for which the need arose at the June 1992 session, is intended to accommodate guests and the public for whom there is not room in the galleries because of security measures under which no more than seventy persons may be admitted to the galleries.

Sub-Head 13

Estimates under this sub-head relate to contracts for the provision of various services during Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises, cost of using reproduction machinery loaned free of charge, etc.) and are based on experience.

Sub-Head 14

As in the past, this sum is requested to allow minor repairs to be carried out to the premises of the Office of the Clerk.

Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17

Sums under these sub-heads are justified by the five-year maintenance and modernisation programme for equipment given at Appendix IV to this budget.

Head IV – General administrative costs

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1993	Budget for 1992	Expected expenditure in 1992	Actual expenditure in 1991
Sub-Head 18 – Postage, telephone, telefax and transport of documents	630 000	600 000	600 000	612 867
Sub-Head 19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	240 000	287 000	250 000	281 351
Sub-Head 20 – Printing and publication of documents	1 185 000	1 150 500	1 150 000	1 187 212
Sub-Head 21 – Purchase of documents	75 000	72 000	60 000	64 274
Sub-Head 22 – Official car	125 000	125 000	50 000	104 974
Sub-Head 23 – Bank charges	500	500	200	–
TOTAL OF HEAD IV	2 255 500	2 235 000	2 080 200	2 250 678

*Explanations**Sub-Head 18*

Estimates under this sub-head take account of the considerable increase in the volume of documents being posted and of communications by telephone and telefax.

Sub-Head 19

The reduction of F 47 000 compared with the financial year 1992 is due to the transfer from one sub-head to another of the cost of servicing the photocopiers. This is now charged to Sub-Head 17.

Sub-Head 20

Estimates under this sub-head take into account the expected increase in prices (3%).

Sub-Head 21

There is a slight increase in estimates under this sub-head as compared with the financial year 1992 due to the need to purchase a wider range of documentation essential for the preparation of studies and reports.

Sub-Head 22

Estimates under this sub-head include the cost of running the official car of the Office of the Clerk (garage, petrol, servicing, insurance, etc.) and of hiring a chauffeur-driven car for the President of the Assembly when necessary.

Sub-Head 23

The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged.

Head V – Other expenditure

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1993	Budget for 1992	Expected expenditure in 1992	Actual expenditure in 1991
Sub-Head 24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	506 000	210 000	280 000	153 414
Sub-Head 25 – Expenses for representation	400 000	360 000	300 000	399 828
Sub-Head 26 – Committee study missions	5 000	5 000	–	–
Sub-Head 27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	1 178 000	590 000	760 000	588 650
Sub-Head 28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor	50 000	50 000	65 000	31 028
Sub-Head 29 – Expenditure on information	460 000	455 000	400 000	433 961
Sub-Head 30 – Expenses for political groups	569 000	534 000	534 000	484 000
Sub-Head 31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	3 000	16 105	11 827
Sub-Head 32 – Non-recoverable taxes	28 000	28 000	21 000	26 803
TOTAL OF HEAD V	3 199 000	2 225 000	2 376 105	2 129 511

Explanations

Sub-Head 24

The cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly for sessions and committee meetings is borne by the governments of member countries, as are those of members of the Bureau and the Presidential Committee.

The Assembly bears the cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for visits by the President of the Assembly, rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairmen when these visits are connected with the preparation of a report or the work of the Assembly. Journeys by committee chairmen and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee.

Sub-Head 25

The participation in sessions of the Assembly of very high-ranking official speakers and the ever-increasing number of visits by parliamentary delegations from countries of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean to the Assembly justify the increase in credits requested under this sub-head.

Sub-Head 26

Sums under this sub-head are to cover extraordinary expenditure for committee study visits. As these sums cannot be foreseen accurately, the same amount has been requested as last year.

Sub-Head 27

Estimates under this sub-head take into account the variation in per diem allowances provided for in the sixth report of the Co-ordinating Committee on salaries and the increase in air fares.

Sub-Head 28

This sum is to cover the cost of auditing the Assembly's accounts and the participation of experts in the symposium organised by the Assembly.

Sub-Head 29

The estimate is unchanged compared with 1992, except for an adjustment to take account of the trend of prices, mainly in order to give the press service means of developing its action.

Sub-Head 30

Compared with the previous financial year, there is an increase of 6.5% in the estimate under this sub-head since, with the accession of Greece to WEU, the Assembly will probably have fourteen more parliamentarians (seven representatives and seven substitutes).

In accordance with the decisions taken by the Presidential Committee, each of the political groups of the Assembly has an equal fixed share and a further sum in proportion to the number of members listed. All the groups have to submit a balance sheet at the close of the financial year. All the balance sheets are appended to the accounts of the Assembly and are consequently subject to verification by the auditor.

Sub-Head 31

The same amount is requested as for 1992.

Sub-Head 32

The same amount is requested as for 1992.

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET

Section B – Receipts

	Estimates for 1993	Budget for 1992	Estimates for 1992	Actual receipts in 1991
1. Sale of publications	40 000	35 000	35 000	42 589
2. Bank interest	60 000	60 000	20 000	73 866
3. Receipts (Reimbursements, social security, etc.)	10 000	10 000	21 000	92 087
TOTAL RECEIPTS	110 000	105 000	76 000	208 542

Explanations

Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are based on experience.

PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET

*Section A – Expenditure**Head I – Pensions, allowances and social charges*

	Estimates for 1993	Budget for 1992 (authorised)	Expected expenditure in 1992	Actual expenditure in 1991
Sub-Head 1 – Pensions and leaving allowances				
1.1. Retirement pensions	3 191 000			
1.2. Invalidity pensions	469 000			
1.3. Survivors' pensions	63 000			
1.4. Orphans' or dependants' pensions	–			
1.5. Leaving allowances	–			
	3 723 000	3 363 000	3 407 550	3 143 488
Sub-Head 2 – Family allowances				
2.1. Household allowances	147 000			
2.2. Children's and other dependants' allowances	32 000			
2.3. Education allowances	–			
	179 000	185 000	170 650	145 343
Sub-Head 3 – Supplementary insurance	103 000	107 000	93 350	97 084
TOTAL OF HEAD I	4 005 000	3 655 000	3 671 550	3 385 915

*Explanations**Sub-Heads 1 and 2*

In 1993, the Assembly will be paying fifteen pensions, as follows:

- twelve old-age pensions;
- two invalidity pensions;
- one survivor's pension.

Estimates of expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the provisions of the pension scheme rules. The effects of the increase in scales is calculated in the same way as for permanent staff on the basis of a rate of 6.33%. This amounts to F 238 000. The subsequent application of a rate of 5.5% in respect of monetary parity would mean requesting a supplementary sum of F 134 000.

Sub-Head 3

Pensioners are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article 19 bis of the collective convention in force.

Estimates of expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid by the Assembly.

PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET*Section B – Receipts*

	Estimates for 1993	Budget for 1992	Expected receipts in 1992	Actual receipts in 1991
Contributions by permanent officials	780 000	700 000	698 000	623 441


Explanations

Estimated receipts are calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid by the thirty-five permanent staff members of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (7% of basic salary) affiliated to the pension scheme.

APPENDIX I

*Recapitulatory table showing changes in the staff
of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly
proposed in the 1993 budget*

Grade	Duties	1993 budget	1992 budget	+ or -
H.G.	Clerk	1	1	-
A6	Clerk Assistants	2	2	-
A5	Counsellors	5	5	-
A4	First secretaries	2	2	-
L4	Translator-interpreter	1	-	+ 1
L2/3	Translator-interpreter	-	1	- 1
A2	Controller; Head of private office	2	2	-
A2	Translators; Documentalists	4	4	-
B6	Chief accountant	1	1	-
B4	Qualified assistants	7	7	-
B4	Equipment accountant; Head of documents reproduction service	1	-	+ 1
B3	Offset operator; Reproduction clerk	2	-	+ 2
B3	Accountant	1	1	-
B3	Bilingual shorthand-typists	7	4	+ 3
B3	Switchboard operator	1	1	-
C6	Head of documents reproduction service	-	1	- 1
C4	Offset operators	-	2	- 2
		37	34	+ 3



Organigram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly

- Notes**
- Service organised/staff recruited during sessions of the Assembly
 - Posts underlined are those it is proposed to create in 1993
 - * Posts proposed for regrading in the 1993 budget.
- 1) The duties of Head of the Committee Service are exercised by the Clerk Assistant for Political Affairs. His assistant helps him in the exercise of these duties
 - 2) The Clerk and his assistant are responsible for the secretariat of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges
 - 3) This post is normally filled by the assistant in the English Translation Service
 - 4) The duties of Head of the Administration and Finance Service, Head of the Personnel Section, Security Officer and Secretary of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration are carried out by the Clerk Assistant for Administration and Finance. His assistant helps him in the exercise of these duties
 - 5) These duties are exercised by the translator/interpreter in the French section of the Translation Service
 - 6) The Deputy Head of the Administration and Finance Service is responsible for General Services
 - 7) The assistant to the Deputy Head of the Administration and Finance Service is also the assistant for the Mail and Archives Service
 - 8) The staff responsible for storing and accounting for equipment is responsible for the operation of the printing workshop
 - 9) The duties of Head of the Translation and Publications Service are exercised by the most senior reviser who, since 1st October 1986, has been the English reviser. He is helped in the exercise of these duties by his assistant
 - 10) The assistant in the Private Office of the President is responsible for the reception desk

APPENDIX III

*Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions**1. Sittings service*

Duties	Number	No. of days	Daily remuneration F*	Total F	Total F
Counsellors to the President of Assembly	1 a	14	1 118	15 652	
	1 b	16	1 944	31 104	46 756
Heads of sections	1 a	8	1 227	9 816	
	1 a	8	1 236	9 888	
	1 b	10	2 053	20 530	
	1 b	12	2 053	24 636	64 870
Sergeant-at-arms	1 b	10	1 820	18 200	18 200
Parliamentary secretaries	2 a	8	994	15 904	
	2 b	10	1 820	36 400	52 304
Précis writers	3 a	8	994	23 856	
	3 b	10	1 820	54 600	78 456
Verbatim reporters	6 a	8	1 101	52 848	
	14 b	10	1 820	254 800	307 648
Editors	2 a	8	994	15 904	
	4 b	10	1 820	72 800	88 704
Principal assistants	2 a	8	685	10 960	
Assistants to the President's counsellors	4 b	10	1 213	48 520	
	1 a	14	742	6 608	
	1 b	16	1 000	16 000	
Assistants assigned to other services	10 a	8	601	48 080	
	20 b	10	1 129	225 800	
	1 b	12	1 129	13 548	369 516
Ushers	5 a	8	498	19 920	
Messengers	3 a	10	498	14 940	
Installations attendant	1 a	14	392	5 488	
Cloakroom attendant	1 a	8	498	3 984	44 332
Offset-assemblers	8 a	10	498	39 840	39 840
	100				1 110 626
Adjustment for 1993 (6.33%)					46 810
					1 157 436
Travelling expenses					300 000
					1 457 436
				Rounded up to	1 458 000

* In accordance with scales in force on 1st July 1991.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

2. Interpretation service

Duties	Number	No. of days	Total F
Interpreters	13 a	8	328 640
	11 b	10	402 314
	24		730 954
Adjustment for 1993 (6.33 %)			41 156
			772 110
Travelling expenses			120 000
			892 110
		Rounded up to	893 000

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

N.B. On 1st July 1991, the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted to F 3 160. In addition, interpreters recruited outside Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (one or two half days as appropriate), a daily allowance (per diem) corresponding to that of a Grade L4 permanent official, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses.

3. Translation service

Duties	Number	Daily remuneration F	Estimates ¹	Total F
Revisers	5 a	1 248	156 000	311 550
	3 b	2 074	155 550	
Translators	7 a	988	172 900	399 650
	5 b	1 814	226 750	
Principal assistants	1 a	538	16 140	80 100
	2 b	1 066	63 960	
Assistants	4 a	472	56 640	206 640
	5 b	1 000	150 000	
	32			997 940
Adjustment for 1993 (6.3 %)				45 694
				1 043 634
Travelling expenses				50 000
				1 093 634
			Rounded up to	1 094 000

1. Based on 25 days for revisers and translators and 30 days for assistants.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

APPENDIX IV

Five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of the Office of the Clerk*(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices)*

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets				
			1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
1	<i>A. Reproduction and printing equipment</i>						
	<i>Photocopiers</i>						
1.1	1 RX 1090	Hire since 1991 (rate blocked) Maintenance calculated on the basis of the number of copies over and above 240 000 per half-year.	104 500	104 500	104 500	104 500	104 500
1.2	2 Gestetner 2382 ZDF	These are leased for a five-year period. The contract expires in April 1996. Cost of hire The cost of maintenance depends on the number of copies made.	32 000	32 000	32 000	32 000	32 000
1.3	2 RX 5034	As from 1992. One of these photocopiers has replaced the former RX 3107 now unfit for use. The other has been assigned to the offices on the second floor. Cost of hire The cost of maintenance depends on the number of copies made.	63 500	63 500	63 500	28 000	—
1.4	1 Gestetner 2200	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance.	21 000	21 000	21 000	21 000	21 000
2	<i>Offset machines</i>		29 000	29 000	29 000	29 000	960
2.1	1 Gestetner 311	Purchased in 1984. Maintenance contract (indexed).	22 000	22 000	22 000	22 000	22 000
3	<i>Electrostatic stereotypers</i>		1 600	1 600	1 600	1 600	1 700
3.1	1 Gestetner PM/9	Purchased in 1980. Reserved for sessions.	9 700	9 700	9 700	9 700	9 700
3.2	1 Gestetner DT1	Purchased in 1985. Maintenance contract (indexed).	1 600	1 600	1 600	1 600	1 600
3.3	1 Gestetner 100PM	Purchased in 1986. Maintenance contract (indexed).	3 300	3 300	3 300	3 300	3 300
4	<i>Binding machines</i>						
4.1	1 Gestetner 100						
4.2	1 Orpo Planax						
4.3	1 Orpo Thematic						
4.4		Property of the Assembly. This machine is in good condition. Normal maintenance by the staff concerned is enough to keep it in good working order.					
5	<i>Miscellaneous equipment</i>						
5.1	1 Logabax-Ordina 7630 assembling machine with stapler	Purchased in 1977, this machine is serviced when required, since the cost of a maintenance contract is exorbitant. It is no longer considered necessary to replace it as the printing workshop was equipped in 1991 with photocopiers that assemble. An annual general overhaul and a single service are planned for the machine.	8 000	8 000	8 000	8 000	8 000

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets					
			1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	
5.2	1 AM International 5000 addressograph	Property of the Assembly.						
5.3	1 Fortematic 655	Maintenance contract (indexed). Purchased in 1976, it has to undergo a general overhaul.	4 200	4 200	4 200	4 200	4 200	
	<i>B. Typewriters and calculators</i>							
6	<i>Office of the Clerk</i>							
6.1	8 Olivetti ET 121 electronic typewriters	Purchased between 1981 and 1983, these typewriters are in good condition.						
6.2	1 ET 221 Olivetti	Purchased in 1983, it is in good condition.						
6.3	1 ET 2400 Olivetti	Purchased in 1989, it is in excellent condition.						
6.4	3 Olivetti calculators	These machines are in good working order.						
7	<i>For use during sessions</i>							
7.1	4 RX 6015 electronic typewriters (English keyboard)	These machines were purchased in 1986 and are assigned to session services.						
7.2	1 IBM electric typewriter (French keyboard)	Assigned to a political group.						
7.3	2 ET 109 typerwriters (Italian keyboard)	Assigned to the Italian Delegation and the Italian summary reporters.						
7.4	1 Editor electric typewriter (Italian keyboard)	Assigned to the Italian summary reporters.						
7.5	2 Olivetti ET 2400 electronic typewriters 1 Portuguese keyboard 1 Spanish keyboard	Purchased in 1989, they are assigned to the Portuguese and Spanish Delegations.						
7.6		All typewriters and calculators are serviced by a mechanic twice a year, before each session. A single lump sum should be earmarked for possible repairs at other times.	9 000	9 000	9 000	9 000	9 000	
7.7	Hired typewriters	To meet the requirements of the various services during Assembly sessions, the following hire programme is envisaged for each session: - 14 electric machines with English keyboards, - 6 electric machines with French keyboards, - 3 electric machines with German keyboards.	17 000	17 000	17 000	17 000	17 000	

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets					
			1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	
8	<i>Typewriters in reserve</i>							
8.1	6 Olympia SGE 51 electric typewriters 2 English keyboards 5 French keyboards (one with long carriage)	Purchased between 1966 and 1979, they are kept in reserve in case of need (e.g. at the request of journalists or in the event of an electricity cut)						
8.2	21 Olympia mechanical typewriters 19 English keyboards 2 French keyboards							
	<i>C. Miscellaneous equipment</i>							
9	<i>Dictaphones</i>							
9.1	2 Uher 5000	Purchased in 1971, they will remain in service as long as possible.						
9.2	4 Sony BM	Purchased in 1987, 1990 and 1992. These dictaphones are in very good working order.						
9.3	10 Grundig Stenorettes	Purchased between 1963 and 1987, they should be replaced gradually as from 1992.						
9.4	2 Sony dictaphone BM	To replace 2 of the 10 dictaphones under item 9.3.	10 000	10 000	10 000	10 000	10 000	
9.5	1 stenotype machine Grandjean	Purchased in 1974, this machine is in good working order.						
9.6		Provision for an overall sum in the budget for possible repairs to equipment in this category.	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000	
	<i>D. Word processors and computers</i>							
10	<i>Computers and word processors</i>							
10.1	2 Olivetti ETS 2010 6 Olivetti M 300 3 Olivetti M 300/05	These have been hired on a five-year leasing basis. The contracts expire in July 1993, May 1995 and May 1997 respectively. Estimates take account of their replacement on those dates. Cost of hire	135 000	109 000	68 000	30 000	17 000	
10.2	10 computers and 5 printers	Replace the ETS 2010, no longer in use. Cost of hire	45 000	57 000	57 000	57 000	57 000	
10.3	1 Olivetti M 24	Property of the Assembly.						
10.4		Maintenance contract (indexed) for all word processors and computers described in paragraphs 10.1 and 10.3.	37 000	37 000	37 000	37 000	37 000	
10.5		Maintenance contract (indexed) for all word processors and computers described in paragraph 10.2.	-	25 000	25 000	25 000	25 000	
10.6	3 Macintosh II CI SE SE 30	Purchased in 1988, 1990 and 1991.						
		Maintenance contract (indexed).	14 000	14 000	14 000	14 000	14 000	
	<i>E. Office furniture</i>							
11	Office of the Clerk	Purchase or replacement of various items of furniture in the Office of the Clerk.	40 000	40 000	40 000	40 000	40 000	

Breakdown by budget classification

Budget classification		Ref. No. in programme	Budgets				
Head	Sub-Head		1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
III	15. Purchase or repair of office furniture	11	40 000	40 000	40 000	40 000	40 000
III	16. Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	9.4	10 000	10 000	10 000	10 000	10 000
III	17. Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment						
		1.1	136 500	136 500	136 500	136 500	136 500
		1.2	84 500	84 500	84 500	84 500	84 500
		1.3	51 000	51 000	51 000	51 000	51 000
		1.4	1 600	1 600	1 600	1 600	1 600
		2.1	9 700	9 700	9 700	9 700	9 700
		3.2	1 600	1 600	1 600	1 600	1 600
		3.3	3 300	3 300	3 300	3 300	3 300
		5.1	8 000	8 000	8 000	8 000	8 000
		5.2	4 200	4 200	4 200	4 200	4 200
		5.3	10 500	-	-	-	-
		7.6	9 000	9 000	9 000	9 000	9 000
		7.7	17 000	17 000	17 000	17 000	17 000
		9.6	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000
		10.1	135 000	109 000	68 000	30 000	17 000
		10.2	45 000	57 000	57 000	57 000	57 000
		10.4	37 000	37 000	37 000	37 000	37 000
		10.5	-	25 000	25 000	25 000	25 000
		10.6	14 000	14 000	14 000	14 000	14 000
	TOTAL		571 900	572 400	531 400	493 400	480 400
	ROUNDED UP		572 000	573 000	532 000	494 000	481 000

APPENDIX V

Trend of the Assembly budgets from 1992 to 1993

	1992 a	1993 b	% $\frac{b-a}{a}$
A. Operating budget			
Head I. Permanent staff	16 287 000	17 949 000	+ 10.20
Head II. Temporary staff	3 812 000	5 045 000	+ 32.34
Head III. Expenditure on premises and equipment	1 767 000	2 072 000	+ 17.26
Head IV. General administrative costs	2 235 000	2 255 500	+ 0.92
Head V. Other expenditure	2 225 000	3 199 000	+ 43.77
Total expenditure	26 326 000	30 520 500	+ 15.93
Receipts	105 000	110 000	+ 4.76
Net Total	26 221 000	30 410 500	+ 15.98
B. Pensions budget			
Pensions and leaving allowances	3 655 000	4 005 000	+ 9.57
Receipts	700 000	780 000	+ 11.43
Net Total	2 955 000	3 225 000	+ 9.13
GRAND NET TOTAL (A + B)	29 176 000	33 635 500	+ 15.28
TOTAL OF HEADS II TO V OF OPERATING BUDGET	10 039 000	12 571 500	+ 25.22

APPENDIX VI

Implications of the various heads for the 1992 and 1993 operating budgets

	1992			1993		
	Amount	% of		Amount	% of	
		A	B		A	B
<i>Operating budget</i>						
Expenditure						
Head I - Permanent staff	16 287 000	61.87	62.11	17 949 000	58.81	59.02
Head II - Temporary staff	3 812 000	14.48	14.54	5 045 000	16.53	16.59
Head III - Premises and equipment	1 767 000	6.71	6.74	2 072 000	6.79	6.81
Head IV - General administrative costs	2 235 000	8.49	8.52	2 255 500	7.39	7.42
Head V - Other expenditure	2 225 000	8.45	8.49	3 199 000	10.48	10.52
A. TOTAL	26 326 000	100.00	100.40	30 520 500	100.00	100.36
Receipts	105 000		- 0.40	110 000		- 0.36
B. NET TOTAL	26 221 000		100.00	30 410 500		100.00

APPENDIX VII

*Statement by the President of the Assembly at the meeting of
the Permanent Council on 24th June 1992**Presentation of the Assembly's strategy
for the financial year 1993*

The Assembly's budget is set in a political context since the Assembly has prepared estimates of expenditure commensurate with its mission.

This mission was attributed to it by Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty under which it was given a supervisory task whose corollary is the right to make recommendations. Inevitably the exercise of this mission is possible only if there is an in-depth dialogue between the governmental and parliamentary bodies. The Assembly therefore wishes to enhance and strengthen its relations with the Council.

The Assembly can occupy its place in WEU provided it has the wherewithal to follow current events closely. It is indeed the Assembly that draws public attention to European security problems and encourages parallel debates in the parliaments of our countries and of our allies and friends. Through the joint thinking that it organises, the Assembly fosters awareness of the European identity in security and defence matters and encourages the effort necessary to allow Europe to assert itself in the alliance as a full partner. The nine WEU countries endorsed this vocation by their declarations which are appended to the Maastricht Treaty.

It is therefore essential for the Council to grant the Assembly adequate resources to exercise its rôle. The Assembly worked out its estimates bearing in mind concerns for budgetary stringency similar to those which guide the Council. However, it cannot allow to pass unanswered the calls it receives from every quarter, nor can it neglect the vocation that the governments assigned to WEU in the Maastricht agreements or ignore Europe's requirements for planning and organising its security in a new context.

Yet the Assembly has the same concern as the Council to extend its activities, and hence its relations, to new areas.

Our security is now one and the same as that of the new Central European democracies whose peoples are seeking to move closer to us and whose governments are appealing to us. The Assembly, through its committees and rapporteurs, as well as its President, has already established a network of relations that was confirmed again with the symposium it organised at the Reichstag in Berlin in the spring of this year. Other initiatives will be taken whose financial implications will have to be taken into account in our budget. I am thinking in particular of how to follow up our already long-standing relationship with the Supreme Soviet and the problems raised by the growing autonomy or independence of the Soviet republics. I am also thinking of the solicitations we have received from the Central and Eastern European countries with a view to arranging closer relations with their parliaments. Thus, the Assembly was able to respond to the request of the Bulgarian Government by sending observers to the elections held in that country in autumn 1991. Finally, no one knows what initiatives will have to be taken in response to requests from several of the republics of former Yugoslavia.

While Europe has to organise itself in order to ensure that an order of justice and peace prevails, it must also turn its eyes towards the South and South-East where old threats persist but new hopes are emerging.

Our Assembly intends to develop already long-standing relations. Having received the President of the Turkish Republic, Mr. Turgut Ozal, it will delegate its Presidential Committee to effect a visit to the Turkish authorities in response to the invitation received from the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

More recent links must be consolidated. We shall pay the utmost attention to maintaining our excellent relations with Egypt.

Now that negotiations are starting in Madrid, for the first time marking a will to establish, on the basis of an international agreement, more peaceful relations between the peoples of the Middle East, our Assembly is having to deal even more than in the past with problems facing countries in that region. It took part in the parliamentary dimension of the preparations for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean in June 1992 and is continuing to prepare reports on the subject, which implies journeys by rapporteurs.

Finally, our Assembly will continue, as each year, to send at least one of its committees to the United States to strengthen transatlantic relations, and it will tighten still further its relations with the many countries which see Western Europe as a vital instrument of their own security. The more WEU asserts itself politically and acquires the means of using its forces to keep the peace, a greater number of countries will turn to its Assembly to discuss European security in greater detail. It should be noted that, as well as the three Visegrad countries, the three Baltic countries, Romania and Bulgaria, several republics of former Yugoslavia and nearly all European countries pursuing a neutral policy have, in one respect or another, asked to be associated with the work of the Assembly.

However, it should be underlined that the development of relations with the parliamentary assemblies of countries which are not members of WEU involves considerable translation and interpretation work and increases still further the burden on the external relations and mailing services. The Assembly's budget as it now stands no longer allows these new commitments to be met.

The Assembly, which is anxious to deploy all its activities in the directions I have just described, will therefore ask for an increase in real terms in its operating budget (Heads II to V) which may certainly seem large but is nevertheless small if it is borne in mind that it has not been possible to obtain an increase in the last two years.

It is also asking that the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk be completed by the creation of posts of assistant essential for its services and committees and that the classification of certain posts be brought into line with the tasks to be carried out. This amounts to very little but it is essential if such a small secretariat is to be able to cope with its growing burden.

The Assembly's most cherished wish is to establish fruitful co-operation with the Council. We therefore wish to avoid our budgetary difficulties being a cause of friction and we hope the problems will quickly be solved. The draft budget for the financial year 1993 would thus complete the adaptation of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly to the enlargement of WEU with the accession of Portugal and Spain. Any subsequent enlargement would most probably make further adjustments necessary since the composition of the Assembly and the Office of the Clerk must follow the evolution of the composition of the Council.

In conclusion, I would emphasise that the Assembly's wish is to co-operate with the Council in order to tackle the great task of implementing the decisions taken by the Nine in Maastricht since the Assembly intends to bring the support of the representatives of the people to the organisation of a defence Europe.

***Draft budget of the administrative expenditure
for the financial year 1993***

Opinion of the Council

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration ²
by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur***

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

APPENDICES

- I. Note by the Secretary-General on the WEU Assembly budget for 1993 – Document C-B (92) 16
- II. Extract from the summary report of the Council meeting held on 25th November 1992
- III. Recapitulatory table of budget estimates for 1993 as a result of the opinion of the Council
- IV. Trend of Assembly budgets from 1992 to 1993

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Rathbone, Rapporteur)

1. The draft budget for the financial year 1993 (Document 1325) was first examined by the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee on 24th September 1992. This committee having decided to revise estimates for the salaries of permanent and temporary staff on the basis of information given by the Co-ordinating Committee, the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly transmitted to the Budget and Organisation Committee a working paper setting out the new financial implications.

2. At its meeting on 13th November 1992, the Budget and Organisation Committee examined the draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 as set out in Document 1325 and the abovementioned working paper. It decided that the policy of budgetary limitations in force in member countries did not allow the total growth rate of 17.55% proposed by the Assembly to be accepted. (This growth rate was 15.28% before the revision requested by the Budget and Organisation Committee.) Consequently, it decided to recommend to the Council:

- the withdrawal of the proposals concerning the staff of the Office of the Clerk (creation of three new posts and regrading of four existing posts);
- the withdrawal of estimates included with a view to the accession of Greece to WEU since the protocol of accession of that country could certainly not be ratified before the financial year 1994;

1. Adopted in committee by 9 votes to 0 with 1 abstention and approved by the Presidential Committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Rathbone (Chairman) (Alternate: *Lord Mackie of Benshie*); MM. Lagorce, Maass (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alvarez (Alternate: *Roman*), Antretter, Mrs. Durrieu, MM. Biefnot, Büchler, Covi (Alternate: *Rubner*), Curto, Diaz, (Alternate: *Fabra*), Eversdijk, Dame Peggy Fenner (Alternate: *Earl of Dundee*), MM. de Gaulle, Garcia Sanchez (Alternate: *Gonzalez-Laxe*), Howell, Jurgens, Manisco, Meyer zu Bentrup, Oehler, Pinto, Pizzo, Redmond (Alternate: *Lord Finsberg*), Regenwetter, Tatarella, Thissen.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

- to allow the Assembly a growth rate of 6.5% for the operating budget as a whole (Heads I to V less receipts);
- to accept the growth rate of 13.13% in the pensions budget in which a new pension has been included.

3. At its meeting on 25th November 1992, the Council decided to accept the recommendations of its Budget and Organisation Committee, ad referendum in the case of the United Kingdom Delegation.

4. As a result of the reductions made by the Council, the net total budget of the Assembly (operating plus pensions) is reduced from F 33 635 500 (the total adjusted on the basis of the working paper amounted to F 34 298 500) to F 31 268 000. In relation to the financial year 1992, this new total represents a growth rate of 7.17%.

5. The table at Appendix III shows estimates revised in accordance with the opinion of the Council divided into heads and sub-heads.

APPENDIX I

*Note by the Secretary-General on the WEU Assembly budget for 1993 –
Document C-B (92) 16**20th November 1992*

The WEU Budget and Organisation Committee examined the draft budget of the Assembly for 1993, the broad lines of which were described by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, at the meeting on 24th September 1992.

The committee noted that expenditure for staff had been calculated without taking into account the implications of Paris/Brussels economic parity as agreed by the Co-ordinating Committee.

The Office of the Clerk of the Assembly drafted a working paper to adjust the 1993 budget in accordance with the abovementioned comment.

This revised draft budget was examined at the meeting of the committee on 13th November 1992.

The net total budget proposed by the Assembly was as follows:

A. Operating budget	F 30 990 500
B. Pensions budget	F 3 308 000

These figures show an increase of 17.55% compared with the net grand total of the budget for 1992.

The Budget and Organisation Committee considered that estimates relating to the accession of Greece to WEU should be withdrawn from the operating budget. A majority of the delegates said the proposals for creating new posts and regrading existing posts could not be accepted.

After a long discussion, it was proposed to allow a growth rate of 6.50% in the net total operating budget of the Assembly, it being understood that the latter would adjust its budget estimates within these limits on the basis of its own priorities.

The conclusions reached by the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee mean a reduction of F 3 065 500 in the operating budget.

In regard to the pensions budget, the committee noted that the estimates take account of the increased scales agreed by the Co-ordinating Committee and a new pension payable as from 1st January 1993.

The table below shows the sums initially proposed and the revised figures recommended by the committee.

	1993 Original credits proposed by the Assembly F	1993 Revised credits recommended by the BOC F
<i>A. Operating budget</i>		
Head I. Permanent staff	18 455 000	28 035 000
Head II. Temporary staff	5 119 000	
Head III. Expenditure on premises and equipment ..	2 072 000	
Head IV. General administrative costs	2 255 500	
Head V. Other expenditure	3 199 000	
Total expenditure	31 100 500	28 035 000
Receipts	110 000	110 000
NET TOTAL	30 990 500	27 925 000
<i>B. Pensions budget</i>		
Pensions and leaving allowances	4 108 000	4 108 000
Receipts	800 000	765 000
NET TOTAL	3 308 000	3 343 000
NET GRAND TOTAL	34 298 500	31 268 000

ANNEX A

Trend of the Assembly budgets from 1992 to 1993

	1992 a	1993 revised credits recommended by the BOC c	% c/a
	F	F	F
<i>A. Operating budget</i>			
Head I. Permanent staff	16 287 000	28 035 000	6.49
Head II. Temporary staff	3 812 000		
Head III. Expenditure on premises and equipment	1 767 000		
Head IV. General administrative costs	2 235 000		
Head V. Other expenditure	2 225 000		
Total expenditure	26 326 000	28 035 000	6.49
Receipts	105 000	110 000	4.76
NET TOTAL (A)	26 221 000	27 925 000	6.50
<i>B. Pensions budget</i>			
Pensions and leaving allowances	3 655 000	4 108 000	12.39
Receipts	700 000	765 000	9.28
NET TOTAL (B)	2 955 000	3 343 000	13.13
NET GRAND TOTAL	29 176 000	31 268 000	7.17

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TOTAL OF HEADS II TO V OF OPERATING BUDGET	10 039 000	10 523 000	4.82
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ANNEX B

*WEU Assembly budget 1993**Contributions*

In the table below, the contributions to the budget are calculated in accordance with the cost-sharing formula applicable to the nine present member states.

	%	1993 budget F	1991 surplus F	1993 contributions (net) F
Belgium	8.35	2 610 878	42 958	2 567 920
France	17.00	5 315 560	87 460	5 228 100
Germany	17.00	5 315 560	87 460	5 228 100
Italy	17.00	5 315 560	87 460	5 228 100
Luxembourg	0.30	93 804	1 544	92 260
Netherlands	8.35	2 610 878	42 958	2 567 920
Portugal	2.00	625 360	10 290	615 070
Spain	13.00	4 064 840	66 881	3 997 959
United Kingdom	17.00	5 315 560	87 460	5 228 100
	100.00	31 268 000	514 471	30 753 529

APPENDIX II

*Extract from the summary report of the Council meeting
held on 25th November 1992*

*Assembly budget for 1993
(C-B (92) 16)*

Subject to the details of the Budget Committee's decision on this subject contained in the summary report of its last meeting on 13th November, the Council can approve the Assembly's budget for 1993 – ad referendum in the case of the British Delegation.

APPENDIX III

Recapitulatory table of budget estimates for 1993 as a result of the opinion of the Council

Heads - sub-heads	Draft budget for 1993 (Doc. 1325)	Breakdown of changes made by the Council	Revised Budget
HEAD I – PERMANENT STAFF			
Sub-Head:			
1 – Basic salaries	12 549 000	– 184 000	12 365 000
2 – Allowances	2 720 000	– 95 000	2 625 000
3 – Social charges	2 537 000	– 28 000	2 509 000
4 – Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials .	129 000	– 129 000	–
5 – Medical examination	14 000	– 1 000	13 000
TOTAL	17 949 000	– 437 000	17 512 000
HEAD II – TEMPORARY STAFF			
Sub-Head:			
6 – Staff recruited for sessions	3 530 000	– 308 000	3 222 000
7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	1 242 000	– 618 000	624 000
8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	25 000	–	25 000
9 – Social charges	248 000	– 54 500	193 500
TOTAL	5 045 000	– 980 500	4 064 500
HEAD III – EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT			
Sub-Head:			
10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	570 000	–	570 000
11 – Hire of committee rooms	10 000	–	10 000
12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	750 000	– 105 000	645 000
13 – Various services for the organisation of sessions	105 000	–	105 000
14 – Maintenance of the premises of the office of the Clerk	15 000	–	15 000
15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture .	40 000	–	40 000
16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	10 000	–	10 000
17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	572 000	–	572 000
TOTAL	2 072 000	– 105 000	1 967 000

Heads - sub-heads	Draft budget for 1993 (Doc. 1325)	Breakdown of changes made by the Council	Revised budget
HEAD IV – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS			
Sub-Head:			
18 – Postage, telephone, telefax and transport of documents	630 000	–	630 000
19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	240 000	–	240 000
20 – Printing and publication of documents .	1 185 000	–	1 185 000
21 – Purchase of documents	75 000	–	75 000
22 – Official cars	125 000	–	125 000
23 – Bank charges	500	–	500
TOTAL	2 255 500	–	2 255 500
HEAD V – OTHER EXPENDITURE			
Sub-Head:			
24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	506 000	– 260 000	246 000
25 – Expenses for representation	400 000	– 50 000	350 000
26 – Committee study missions	5 000	–	5 000
27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	1 178 000	– 588 000	590 000
28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor ..	50 000	–	50 000
29 – Expenditure on information	460 000	– 30 000	430 000
30 – Expenses for political groups	569 000	– 35 000	534 000
31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	–	3 000
32 – Non-recoverable taxes	28 000	–	28 000
TOTAL	3 199 000	– 963 000	2 236 000
Operating budget	30 520 500	– 2 485 500	28 035 000
Receipts	110 000	–	110 000
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET	30 410 500	– 2 485 500	27 925 000
Pensions expenditure	4 005 000	– 103 000	4 108 000
Receipts	780 000	– 15 000	765 000
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET	3 225 000	+ 118 000	3 343 000
NET GRAND TOTAL	33 635 500	– 2 367 500	31 268 000

APPENDIX IV

Trend of Assembly budgets from 1992 to 1993

	1992 a	1993 Doc. 1325 b	% b/a	1993 (estimates adjusted by BOC) c	% c/a	1993 Council opinion d	% d/a
A. Operating budget							
Head I. Permanent staff	16 287 000	17 949 000	+ 10.20	18 455 000	+ 13.31	17 512 000	7.52
Head II. Temporary staff	3 812 000	5 545 000	+ 32.34	5 119 000	+ 34.28	4 064 500	6.62
Head III. Expenditure on premises and equipment	1 767 000	2 272 000	+ 17.26	2 072 000	+ 17.26	1 967 000	11.31
Head IV. General administrative costs	2 235 500	2 255 500	+ 0.92	2 255 500	+ 0.92	2 255 500	0.91
Head V. Other expenditure	2 225 000	3 199 000	+ 43.77	3 199 000	+ 43.77	2 236 000	0.49
Total expenditure	26 326 000	30 520 500	+ 15.93	31 100 500	+ 18.13	28 035 000	6.49
Receipts	105 000	110 000	+ 4.76	110 000	+ 4.76	110 000	4.76
NET TOTAL	26 221 000	30 410 500	+ 15.98	30 990 500	+ 18.19	27 925 000	6.50
B. Pensions budget							
Pensions and leaving allowances	3 655 000	4 005 000	+ 9.57	4 108 000	+ 12.39	4 108 000	12.39
Receipts	700 000	780 000	+ 11.43	800 000	14.29	765 000	9.28
NET TOTAL	2 955 000	3 225 000	+ 9.13	3 308 000	+ 11.95	3 343 000	13.13
NET GRAND TOTAL (A + B)	29 176 000	33 635 500	+ 15.28	34 298 500	+ 17.55	31 268 000	7.17

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TOTAL OF HEADS II TO V OF OPERATING BUDGET	10 039 000	12 571 500	+ 25.22	12 645 500	+ 25.96	10 523 000	4.82
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***Communiqué and statement issued after
the meeting of the enlarged Council***

Rome, 16th July 1992

WEU enlarged Council, Rome, 16th July 1992

Guidelines for Press

Discussions between WEU member states (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom) and the six candidate states to the enlargement of the organisation (Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Norway and Turkey) began this morning under Italian presidency.

The procedure begun today follows the decisions taken on 10th December 1991 in Maastricht, where member states of the European Union were invited to accede to WEU or to become observers, and simultaneously other European member states of the Atlantic Alliance were invited to become associate members of WEU. Part III of the Petersberg Declaration adopted by the WEU Council of Ministers on 19th June 1992 set out the detailed provisions.

The Italian Political Director, Ambassador Vanni d'Archirafi, opened the discussions, stressing the importance of this step for the development of the organisation along the lines defined in Maastricht for the construction of a new European security architecture. Replies followed from the delegations of the member states and of the candidate states.

During the meeting, delegations drew up a work programme and procedures with the aim of concluding the discussions by 31st December 1992, in accordance with the wish expressed in the Maastricht Declaration.

***Statement by the Italian Political Director,
Ambassador Raniero Vanni d'Archirafi, at the
meeting of the enlarged Council, Rome, 16th July 1992***

On behalf of the Italian Government, I welcome you all in Rome at this meeting of the enlarged Council which has been called by the presidency to start the process of discussions in view of the accession to WEU respectively as members, or observers, and associate members of European states members of the European Union or of the Atlantic Alliance. This is a new, extremely important and significant step in the development of WEU along the lines defined in Maastricht and in the edification of a new European security architecture.

I am very conscious of the responsibilities that in this regard befall on the Italian presidency. Italy will do its utmost to give the necessary impulse to the process of enlargement in the framework of developing WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

The Brussels Treaty, modified in 1954, makes WEU the oldest organisation with a European orientation. Although, over the years, a number of functions have been transferred to other European institutions such as the European Community, the Council of Europe or NATO, recent years have seen an upsurge in WEU's activities and rôle, as evidenced by the Hague platform of 27th October 1987, in which ministers declared that they intended to develop a more cohesive European defence identity which will translate more effectively into practice the obligations of solidarity to which we are committed through the modified Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties. WEU is also unique as an organisation bringing together foreign affairs and defence interests. This politico-military commitment makes WEU a vital component of the European development process. The WEU declaration adopted at Maastricht on 10th December 1991 confirms this orientation. On that occasion WEU member states agreed on the need to "develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility in defence matters".

The relations between WEU and the European Union and between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance are taking on an entirely new dimension and will have to promote a pattern of stricter co-operation, transparency and co-ordination.

In fact, the new Europe which is being shaped will demand such growing co-operation between all the member states of the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance. The Petersberg Decla-

ration, in the wake of Maastricht, has opened a new phase characterised by the strengthening of organisation's operational rôle and structure. The development of a defence dimension of European integration will represent an historic event. It is also a necessity of our time. The political changes which have taken place in recent years have determined a new "demand of Europe" and a demand of a new kind of Europe, capable of playing an increasing rôle for the maintenance of peace and security in our continent. This is strongly evidenced by the present crisis in Yugoslavia that has clearly determined the need for Europe to concretely act with effective means to promote a political solution of the conflict, in support of the United Nations initiatives.

In this context, I wish to recall that in the recent past WEU has seen fit to brief the majority of the non-member states here present on certain operations carried out by the organisation of direct concern to them. Accordingly, they were invited to attend a number of meetings as observers, for example in 1990 and 1991 during the Gulf crisis and the Yugoslav crisis itself.

It is in this spirit that WEU decided at Maastricht to demonstrate more fully its commitment to Europe and to enhance its contribution to European construction and to the effectiveness of its participation in the European security architecture by inviting the other European member states in the European Union to become members or observers, and those of the Atlantic Alliance to become associate members. In so doing it also strengthens its rôle in the perspective laid down in Maastricht and in Petersberg of a common defence within the European Union. In fact, the enlargement of WEU is not merely a political option but is also a vital structural element for the organisation.

The Petersberg Declaration, in its Part III, has clearly defined the criteria for the enlargement decided at Maastricht. The Italian presidency will adhere to those criteria in the conduct of the enlargement discussions, since they represent a substantive consensus among the members.

I shall recall that ministers expressed the wish in Maastricht that the dialogue should be held in parallel with the candidates for accession and observer status on the one hand, and with the candidates for associate membership on the other. Accordingly, the Permanent Council has planned to invite the future members and associate members to become active observers in the period between the signing of the protocol of accession and its ratification.

The Italian presidency will exert any effort with the aim of bringing the discussions to a positive conclusion at the date established in Maastricht, that is at the end of December 1992.

I hope that the dialogue will proceed smoothly and that appropriate modalities can be defined already today. The presidency proposes that such dialogue be carried out in the framework of the SWG, possibly by groups of candidate countries, that is respectively candidates for full membership, observership and associate membership.

I now invite other delegations from member countries and from candidate countries to take the floor. In the afternoon we might then try to answer specific requests of clarification by individual delegations of candidate countries in the framework of two meetings: one with the countries members of the European Community at 3 p.m. and one with European members of the Atlantic Alliance at 4 p.m.

***Communiqué issued after the meeting of the WEU
ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia***

Rome, 24th August 1992

***Communiqué issued after the meeting of the
extraordinary Council of Ministers***

London, 28th August 1992

The WEU ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia, composed of senior officials of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Defence, met in Rome on 24th August to study the report drawn up by the contingency planning group set up at the previous meeting to prepare options for decisions by the Council of Ministers. The latter is to meet in London on 28th August next and will be attended by Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence. This will be the first concrete action taken following the conference on Yugoslavia.

The operational hypotheses worked out and discussed in the ad hoc Group relate to the problem of humanitarian convoys in the context of Security Council Resolution 770 and the question of monitoring heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The speed and efficiency with which the contingency planning group managed to work out options considered appropriate by all the partners reflect the solidarity in WEU, the determination to take joint action and the attention each one accords to the need to facilitate the granting of speedy assistance to the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

One should view in the same spirit the timeliness with which all partners indicated that they were prepared to make practical contributions.

At the meeting of the Ministerial Council, it is planned to adopt final decisions on the contributions of the various member countries intended to facilitate the achievement of the aims of the United Nations and to instruct the Italian presidency to present to the United Nations Secretary-General the result of the planning work accomplished and the means made available by the member countries in order to allow the implementation of the measures envisaged in relation to the various problems.

***Communiqué issued after the meeting of the
extraordinary Council of Ministers***

London, 28th August 1992

1. The Foreign and Defence Ministers of WEU member states met in London on 28th August 1992 following the conclusion of the London conference on former Yugoslavia. They expressed their firm conviction that the principles agreed at that conference should provide the foundations for progress towards a peaceful and just resolution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. In particular, they reaffirmed the urgent necessity for the parties involved to cease the fighting and the use of force immediately and strictly respect the agreed cease-fires. They strongly urged all parties involved in the conflict to adhere to the principles through positive actions and to contribute effectively to the implementation of specific decisions also adopted by the London conference.
2. Ministers noted and endorsed the contributions which WEU and its member states were already making and were prepared to make to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia:

Delivery of humanitarian assistance

The delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina constitutes one of the most immediate requirements for establishing civilised conditions promoting a political solution. Ministers approved the planning carried out by WEU experts covering the protection of humanitarian convoys by military escorts. They welcomed the willingness of the United Nations Secretary-General to recommend to the Security Council that UNPROFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina be enhanced to provide such escorts, and expressed the view that humanitarian operations and associated protective support should be organised by the United Nations. They underlined the collective will of the member states of WEU to contribute to such operations by military, logistic, financial and other means and decided to keep the United Nations informed from today of the details of such contributions. The Nine also decided to offer collectively today through the presidency to the

United Nations the results of WEU's planning. They asked the Ad Hoc Group and Contingency Planning Group to elaborate further the necessary planning.

Supervision of heavy weapons

Ministers underlined the importance of the supervision of heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the overall peace process and for alleviating the suffering of the population. The ministers welcomed the conference's decision that all mortars and heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be subject to international supervision and, as a first step, notified to the United Nations within 96 hours, as a prelude to their disengagement from the conflict. WEU member states are willing to contribute to carrying out supervision operations under the overall responsibility of the United Nations and in co-ordination with the CSCE and other organisations. Ministers took note of the planning undertaken by WEU experts and decided to make it available through the Italian presidency to the United Nations Secretary-General, the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE and the Secretary-General of NATO.

Strengthening the embargo

Ministers noted the success of operation sharp vigilance to monitor the embargo in the Adriatic. They agreed that strengthening the effectiveness of the embargo established by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 would be an important means of promoting a political solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia. They welcomed the conclusions of the London conference and expressed the willingness of WEU member states to contribute to any further measures necessary to make the embargo as effective as possible. Member states of WEU could, if requested, offer expertise, technical assistance and equipment to the governments of the Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river Danube for the purpose of circumventing or breaking the sanctions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757. They also support the call by the London conference to the Security Council to consider further measures to ensure rigorous implementation of sanctions in the Adriatic. They also decided that the Ad Hoc Group should continue its work in this field.

3. Ministers decided that the Italian presidency would continue to ensure a full exchange of information and the necessary co-ordination with the other organisations involved (United Nations, EC, NATO and CSCE).

*Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1991*

THE AUDITOR'S REPORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY TO THE AUDITOR SUBMITTING THE ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1991 – 27th April 1992

LETTER FROM THE AUDITOR TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY – 3rd July 1992

REPORT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR TO THE ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ON THE ACCOUNTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1991 – 3rd July 1992

CERTIFICATE OF THE AUDITOR FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1st JANUARY TO 31st DECEMBER 1991 – 3rd July 1992

APPENDICES

- I. Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1991 – financial position as at 31st December 1991
 - II. Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1991
 - III. Contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1991
 - IV. Provident fund – account for the financial year ended 31st December 1991
 - V. 1991 balance sheet for the Unified European Left Group
 - VI. 1991 balance sheet for the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats
 - VII. 1991 balance sheet for the Liberal Group
 - VIII. 1991 balance sheet for the Socialist Group
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*Letter from the President of the Assembly
to the Auditor submitting the accounts
for the financial year 1991*

27th April 1992

Dear Mr. Arpaillange,

In accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly of WEU, I have the honour to submit to you the accounts for the financial year 1991 in accordance with the statements attached hereto, which refer to:

1. (a) Summary of income and expenditure – financial position as at 31st December 1991 (Appendix I);

(b) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits (Appendix II);

(c) Contributions (Appendix III);

(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV).

As is customary, after being audited these tables will be signed by the President of the Assembly, the Clerk of the Assembly and the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration before being submitted to the Assembly.

2. The statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits shows a saving of F 418 488, whereas the final statement

of income and expenditure shows a credit balance of F 514 471. The difference between these two figures, i.e. F 95 983, shows an excess of receipts over estimates:

	F	F
- Bank interest	73 866	
- Sundry receipts	92 087	
- Sale of publications	42 589	
- Contributions 7%	<u>623 441</u>	
		831 983
- Receipts for 1991 estimated in the budget		<u>736 000</u>
		<u>+ 95 983</u>

3. Excess expenditure under Heads IV and V of the operating budget amounting to F 175 687 has been met by transfers from other heads of the budget. Excess expenditure under the pensions budget amounting to F 32 000 has been met by a transfer from Head I.

4. The statement of contributions for the financial year 1991 received from the Secretary-General of WEU, London, is given at Appendix III.

5. Amounts in the provident fund of the Assembly staff are incorporated with those of the other organs of WEU and the joint fund is administered by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Clerk of the Assembly.

On 31st December 1991, these amounts totalled F 6 535 440 as shown in Appendix IV. On that date there remained two loans to two staff members amounting to F 491 000.

The Secretary-General has continued to receive advice from the advisory panel set up within WEU and from outside bankers on the investment of these funds. On 31st December 1991 the fund was held by Montagu Investment Management Limited in London.

6. Also appended to the accounts of the Assembly are the reports on the funds attributed to the political groups in accordance with the directives issued by the Presidential Committee (Document A/WEU/CP (86) 39) as follows:

- Unified European Left Group;
- Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats;
- Liberal Group;
- Socialist Group.

These reports will be considered as an integral part of the accounts of the Assembly; they give details of the use of credits included in

Sub-Head 30 of the operating budget of the Assembly.

Yours sincerely,

Giuseppe SINESIO
Acting President of the Assembly

Mr. Pierre ARPAILLANGE
Premier Président de la Cour des Comptes
13, rue Cambon
75001 PARIS

***Letter from the Auditor
to the President of the Assembly***

3rd July 1992

Dear Mr. Soell,

I have the honour to enclose the accounts of the Assembly of Western European Union for the financial year 1991 together with my opinion and report on these accounts.

Yours sincerely,

Pierre ARPAILLANGE
*(Premier Président de la
Cour des Comptes de France,
Commissaire aux comptes)*

Mr. Hartmut SOELL,
President of the Assembly of
Western European Union
43, avenue du Président-Wilson
75775 PARIS CEDEX 16

***Report of the External Auditor
to the Assembly of Western European Union
on the accounts for the financial year 1991***

3rd July 1992

I have audited the accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1991 in accordance with Article 15 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly in order to appraise the correct management of the budget and the book-keeping.

The final statement of income and expenditure shows a credit balance of F 514 471 while the statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits shows a saving of F 418 488.

The difference, i.e. F 95 983, shows an excess of receipts over estimates; receipts amounted to F 831 983 while the corresponding estimates amounted to F 736 000.

The saving in the budget may be summarised as follows:

	Total credits after transfers F	Total expenditure F	Balance F
<i>Part I:</i>			
<i>Operating budget</i>			
Head I			
Permanent staff	14 592 000	14 185 981	406 019
Head II			
Temporary staff	3 563 580	3 563 503	77
Head III			
Expenditure on premises and equipment	1 709 470	1 709 425	45
Head IV			
General administrative costs	2 250 700	2 250 678	22
Head V			
Other expenditure	2 129 750	2 129 511	239
Head VI			
Premises	173 554	173 553	1
<i>Part II:</i>			
<i>Pensions budget</i>			
Head I			
Pensions, allowances and social charges	3 398 000	3 385 915	<u>12 085</u>
Total			<u>418 488</u>

The financial situation compared to that on 31st December 1990 has therefore declined slightly but remains at a level comparable with that noted when the accounts for previous financial years were audited as shown in the following table:

Final statement of income and expenditure on 31st December of the financial year	Saving on expenditure	Difference between estimates and income
1988: + 6 591	+ 82 179	- 75 588
1989: + 106 113	+ 42 793	+ 63 140
1990: + 720 333	+ 710 837	+ 9 496
1991: + 514 471	+ 418 488	+ 95 983

When the 1990 accounts were audited, it had been noted that the result was not typical insofar as it had included an exceptional credit of F 396 000. The result noted in 1991 has changed significantly compared with previous years, in particular 1989.

Receipts exceeded estimates in the budgets for three of the four heads concerned:

	Estimates	Actual receipts
Bank interest	60 000	73 866
Sundry receipts (social security reimbursements)	10 000	92 087
Sale of publications	35 000	42 589
Contributions 7%	<u>631 000</u>	<u>623 441</u>
	<u>736 000</u>	<u>831 983</u>

There is a credit balance under these various heads of F 95 983 (F 9 496 in 1990; F 63 140 in 1989).

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Contributions by member states to the Assembly's budget fell by 13.9% in 1991. 1990 was an exceptional year because of the work on reorganising and renovating the building in which the Assembly has its seat.

It should be noted that there is a tendency for the rate at which these contributions are paid to slow down.

At the end of the first half of 1991, the level of payment of contributions by member states - based on the dates on which the Secretariat-General of WEU in London effected the transfers - was 20.3% lower than on the same date in 1990 (whereas, as stated above, the annual overall amount of contributions fell by only 13.9%).

At the end of the first half of 1991, only 51% of the annual overall amount of contributions had been paid compared with 55% the previous year.

Should this tendency continue, it would make the management of the Assembly's budget difficult, particularly during the first months of the financial year.

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Situation of transfers between heads in 1991

+ -

Part I:

Operating budget

Head I		
Permanent staff	63 400	155 400
Head II		
Temporary staff	163 965	235 385
Head III		
Expenditure on premises and equipment	12 440	56 970

Head IV		
General administrative costs	147 420	6 220
Head V		
Other expenditure	149 690	114 940
Head VI		
Premises	-	-

Part II:**Pensions budget**

Head I		
Pensions, allowances and social charges	65 500	33 500
Total	<u>602 415</u>	<u>602 415</u>

As in the previous year, two transfers (for a total of F 92 000) were made in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulations (agreement of the WEU Council by a letter dated 25th October 1991) from Head I of the operating budget (Permanent staff) to Head II, Sub-Head 8 (Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk) (F 60 000), and to Head I of the pensions budget (F 32 000).

Whereas in previous financial years, and in particular in 1990, it was noted that a very large number of transfers had been made affecting the same heads and sub-heads of the operating budget and thus significantly modifying the structure of the budget initially adopted, it should be noted that, generally speaking and with the exception of Head IV (General administrative costs), the conditions in which the budget was implemented followed the initial estimates fairly closely. In 1991, transfers amounted to F 207 950 compared with F 1 343 291 in 1990.

However, it should be underlined that positive transfers are tending to become more pronounced under two heads:

- Head IV - General administrative costs;
- Head V - Other expenditure.

Under Head IV, they amounted to only F 13 000 in 1990; in 1991, they amounted to F 141 200 and related to Sub-Head 18 (Postage, telephone and telex), with an increase of almost 10% compared with the initial estimate; Sub-Head 20 (Printing and publication of documents); Sub-Head 22 (Official cars), where a further amount of F 59 980 had to be added to the initial sum of F 45 000. In the two financial years 1990 and 1991, initial estimates for this Sub-Head 22 of Head IV amounted to F 185 000; a further F 138 740 was transferred to it, making a total credit of F 323 740 for actual expenditure of F 323 734.

Overall, there was a less erratic trend under Head V than in 1990:

- positive net transfers from other heads amounting to F 34 750 instead of F 315 430;

- a slight increase in initial estimates from F 2 022 000 to F 2 095 000;

- a drop in final provisions: F 2 129 750 instead of F 2 337 430.

However, under this head, it should be noted that there was a spectacular rise in expenditure under Sub-Head 25 (Expenses for representation) :

	Initial estimate	Actual amount after transfer
1990	230 000	266 020
1991	260 000	399 830

Expenditure under this sub-head amounted to F 399 827 compared with F 266 014 in 1990, i.e. an increase of 50% from one financial year to another.

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Having completed this audit, I thank the Clerk and staff of the Assembly for their valuable co-operation in the exercise of my duties as Auditor.

Pierre ARPAILLANGE
(Premier Président de la
Cour des Comptes de France,
Commissaire aux comptes)

**Certificate of the Auditor for the financial year
1st January to 31st December 1991**

3rd July 1992

In application of Article 15 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly of Western European Union, I have examined the appended financial statements of the Assembly comprising the summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1991.

My examination included verification of the books and other relevant documents that I deemed necessary.

As a result of this examination, my opinion is that these statements faithfully record the book-keeping operations for the financial year and that these operations were in conformity with the budget estimates, the Financial Regulations, the financial instructions and other decisions of the legislative authority, and that they are a correct record of the financial situation for the year ended 31st December 1991.

Pierre ARPAILLANGE
(Premier Président de la
Cour des Comptes de France,
Commissaire aux comptes)

APPENDIX I

Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1991

(in French francs)

Per attached statement

Assessments of member states (see Appendix III)	27 081 054
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Miscellaneous

<i>(A) Sundry receipts</i>	
Bank interest	73 866
Sundry receipts	92 087
Sale of publications	42 589
<i>(B) Pensions</i>	
Contributions (7%)	<u>623 441</u>
	<u>831 983</u>
Budget credits	27 913 037
Total expenditure (see Appendix II)	<u>27 398 566</u>
Excess of income over expenditure	<u>F 514 471</u>

*Financial position as at 31st December 1991**Assets*

Contributions received	4 040 114
Miscellaneous debtors	85 815
Contributions 7%	12 089
Non-recoverable taxes	<u>429 296</u>
	<u>F 4 595 751</u>

Liabilities

Balance at the bank	2 335 443
Miscellaneous creditors	574 672
Sums paid	1 171 165
Excess of income over expenditure	<u>514 471</u>
	<u>F 4 595 751</u>

Hartmut SOELL
President of the Assembly

Georges MOULIAS
Clerk of the Assembly

Tim RATHBONE
*Chairman of the Committee
on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration*

Certified correct:
Pierre ARPAILLANGE
*(Premier Président de la
Cour des Comptes de France,
Commissaire aux comptes)*

STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE

(in French)

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1991	
A.1. - ORDINARY EXPENDITURE			
HEAD I - PERMANENT STAFF			
<i>Sub-Head 1</i>	Basic salaries	10 374 000	
<i>Sub-Head 2</i>	Allowances		
2.1.	Expatriation allowance	1 004 000	
2.2.	Household allowance	456 000	
2.3.	Allowance for children and other dependent persons	518 000	
2.4.	Rent allowance	80 000	
2.5.	Education allowance	55 000	
2.6.	Allowance for language courses	2 000	
2.7.	Overtime	55 000	
2.8.	Home leave	30 000	
<i>Sub-Head 3</i>	Social charges		
3.1.	Social security	1 399 000	
3.2.	Supplementary insurance	429 000	
3.3.	Provident fund	184 000	
<i>Sub-Head 4</i>	Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials		
4.1.	Travelling expenses of candidates for vacant posts	5 400	
4.2.	Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of permanent officials and their families	16 000	
4.3.	Removal expenses	-	
4.4.	Installation allowance	65 000	
<i>Sub-Head 5</i>	Medical examination	11 600	
Total of Head I		14 684 000	

X II

D UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1991

c)

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
		92 000	10 282 000	10 064 383	217 617
		17 500	986 500	921 294	65 206
		10 000	446 000	422 067	23 933
		14 300	503 700	456 005	47 695
	-	-	80 000	49 313	30 687
	-	-	55 000	54 596	404
	-	-	2 000	-	2 000
	22 300		77 300	77 291	9
	2 000		32 000	31 991	9
		12 100	1 386 900	1 386 866	34
	31 000		460 000	459 951	49
		1 400	182 600	182 551	49
	8 100		13 500	13 451	49
		8 100	7 900	2 808	5 092
	-	-	-	-	-
	-	-	65 000	52 383	12 617
	-	-	11 600	11 031	569
	63 400	155 400	14 592 000	14 185 981	406 019

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1991	
HEAD II – TEMPORARY STAFF			
<i>Sub-Head 6</i>	Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly		
6.1.	Sittings service	1 350 000	
6.2.	Interpretation service	622 000	
6.3.	Translation service	864 000	
6.4.	Other services	66 000	
<i>Sub-Head 7</i>	Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	568 000	
<i>Sub-Head 8</i>	Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	15 000	
<i>Sub-Head 9</i>	Social charges		
9.1.	Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters	10 000	
9.2.	Provident fund for interpreters	135 000	
9.3.	Insurance for interpreters	5 000	
Total of Head II		3 635 000	
HEAD III – EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT			
<i>Sub-Head 10</i>	Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	525 000	
<i>Sub-Head 11</i>	Hire of committee rooms	10 000	
<i>Sub-Head 12</i>	Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	570 000	
<i>Sub-Head 13</i>	Various services for the organisation of sessions	65 000	
<i>Sub-Head 14</i>	Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	15 000	
<i>Sub-Head 15</i>	Purchase or repair of office furniture	35 000	
<i>Sub-Head 16</i>	Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	–	
<i>Sub-Head 17</i>	Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	534 000	
Total of Head III		1 754 000	

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
		43 170	1 306 830	1 306 822	8
		48 550	573 450	573 437	13
		141 955	722 045	722 029	16
		630	65 370	65 363	7
	56 110		624 110	624 106	4
	101 860		116 860	116 856	4
		600	9 400	9 389	11
	5 995		140 995	140 992	3
		480	4 520	4 509	11
	163 965	235 385	3 563 580	3 563 503	77
		22 000	503 000	502 989	11
		7 720	2 280	2 272	8
		3 540	566 460	566 453	7
	8 220		73 220	73 217	3
		13 270	1 730	1 727	3
	2 210		37 210	37 209	1
	2 010		2 010	2 007	3
		10 440	523 560	523 551	9
	12 440	56 970	1 709 470	1 709 425	45

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1991	
HEAD IV – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS			
<i>Sub-Head 18</i>	Postage, telephone, telefax and transport of documents	560 000	
<i>Sub-Head 19</i>	Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	280 000	
<i>Sub-Head 20</i>	Printing and publication of documents	1 154 000	
<i>Sub-Head 21</i>	Purchase of documents	70 000	
<i>Sub-Head 22</i>	Official cars	45 000	
<i>Sub-Head 23</i>	Bank charges	500	
Total of Head IV		2 109 500	
HEAD V – OTHER EXPENDITURE			
<i>Sub-Head 24</i>	Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	200 000	
<i>Sub-Head 25</i>	Expenses for representation	260 000	
<i>Sub-Head 26</i>	Committee study missions	5 000	
<i>Sub-Head 27</i>	Official journeys of members of the Office the Clerk	630 000	
<i>Sub-Head 28</i>	Expenses of experts and the auditor	30 000	
<i>Sub-Head 29</i>	Expenditure on information	455 000	
<i>Sub-Head 30</i>	Expenses for political groups	484 000	
<i>Sub-Head 31</i>	Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	
<i>Sub-Head 32</i>	Non-recoverable taxes	28 000	
Total of Head V		2 095 000	
Total		24 277 500	

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
	52 870		612 870	612 867	3
	1 355		281 355	281 351	4
	33 215		1 187 215	1 187 212	3
		5 720	64 280	64 274	6
	59 980		104 980	104 974	6
		500	-	-	-
	147 420	6 220	2 250 700	2 250 678	22
		46 500	153 500	153 414	86
	139 830		399 830	399 828	2
		5 000	-	-	-
		41 340	588 660	588 650	10
	1 030		31 030	31 028	2
		21 000	434 000	433 961	39
	-	-	484 000	484 000	-
	8 830		11 830	11 827	3
		1 100	26 900	26 803	97
	149 690	114 940	2 129 750	2 129 511	239
	536 915	568 915	24 245 500	23 839 098	406 402

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET	Total budget for 1991	
A.2. - EXTRAORDINARY EXPENDITURE		
HEAD VI - PREMISES		
<i>Sub-Head 33</i> Reorganisation of the building		
<i>Sub-Head 33.1</i> Feasibility study		
<i>Sub-Head 33.2</i> Work on utilities	138 274	
<i>Sub-Head 33.3</i> Prime contractorship	35 280	
<i>Sub-Head 34</i> Installation of committee rooms		
<i>Sub-Head 34.1</i> Interpretation equipment		
<i>Sub-Head 34.2</i> Furnishing committee rooms		
<i>Sub-Head 34.3</i> Furnishing corridor		
<i>Sub-Head 35</i> National delegation offices		
<i>Sub-Head 35.1</i> Furniture and other office equipment		
<i>Sub-Head 35.2</i> Typewriters		
<i>Sub-Head 36</i> Lounge in the first basement		
Total of A.2	173 554	
Total of Part I	24 451 054	

Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
+	-			
-	-	138 274	138 273	1
-	-	35 280	35 280	-
-	-	173 554	173 553	1
536 915	568 915	24 419 054	24 012 651	406 403

PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET		Total budget for 1991	
HEAD I – PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES AND SOCIAL CHARGES			
<i>Sub-Head 1</i>	Pensions and leaving allowances		
1.1.	Retirement pensions	2 802 000	
1.2.	Invalidity pensions	258 000	
1.3.	Survivors' pensions	58 000	
1.4.	Orphans' or dependants' pensions		
1.5.	Leaving allowances	–	
<i>Sub-Head 2</i>	Family allowances		
2.1.	Household allowances	125 000	
2.2.	Children's and dependants' allowances	30 000	
2.3.	Education allowances	14 000	
<i>Sub-Head 3</i>	Supplementary insurance	79 000	
Total of Head I		3 366 000	
Total		27 817 054	

Hartmut SOELL
President of the Assembly

Ged
Clen

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
		13 100	2 788 900	2 782 906	5 994
	45 100		303 100	303 060	40
	-	-	58 000	57 522	478
	-	-	-	-	-
	2 300		127 300	127 280	20
		11 000	19 000	18 063	937
		9 400	4 600	-	4 600
	18 100		97 100	97 084	16
	65 500	33 500	3 398 000	3 385 915	12 085
	602 415	602 415	27 817 054	27 398 566	418 488

OLIAS
e Assembly

Tim RATHBONE
Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration

APPENDIX III

Contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1991

	F	F
1991 budget (Sec. Gen. letter 7.10.1991)	26 907 500	
Brought over from 1990 C-B (91) 7	<u>345 778</u>	
Sub-total	27 253 278	
Carried over to 1992 A/WEU/BA (92) 3	<u>- 172 224</u>	
NET TOTAL	27 081 054	
Contributions received for 1991:		
25th February 1991		1 099 523.12
13th March 1991		533 697.73
29th March 1991		295 805.10
2nd April 1991		1 348 714.49
22nd April 1991		4 706 078.25
10th June 1991		3 289 569.00
28th June 1991		2 194 118.25
19th August 1991		3 494 095.50
24th September 1991		1 097 628.00
16th October 1991		1 656 125.00
8th November 1991		1 097 628.00
28th November 1991		1 507 623.50
22nd January 1992		1 185 889.00
31st January 1992		3 026 449.59
Brought over from 1990		<u>720 333.47</u>
Sub-total		27 253 278.00
Carried over to 1992		<u>- 172 224.00</u>
TOTAL PAYMENTS		27 081 054.00

APPENDIX IV
PROVIDENT FUND
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1991

in French francs

	F		F
<i>Balance brought forward:</i>			
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1991	5 603 997	Withdrawals	18 440
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly of Western European Union	278 805		
Repayments of loans by staff members	164 540	Accounts of existing staff members as at 31st December 1991	6 535 440
Interest received during the year	593 937	Loss on valuation at 31st December 1991	87 399
	6 641 279		6 641 279

Hartmut SOELL
President of the Assembly

Georges MOULIAS
Clerk of the Assembly

Tim RATHBONE
*Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

APPENDIX V

*1991 Balance sheet for the Unified European Left Group**Assets*

	F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1990 (bank accounts, cash)	-
2. Interest	-
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1991	52 678

Liabilities

I. Expenditure

1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)	18 140
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies)	9 837
3. Seminars and meetings	10 263
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff)	5 712
5. Interpretation costs	4 930
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)	3 700
7. Sundry expenses	96

II. Surplus at 31st December 1990 (bank accounts, cash)	-
Total	52 678

Signatures of the Treasurer (BENASSI)

and two auditors of the group (PIERALLI, PECCHIOLI)

APPENDIX VI

*1991 Balance sheet for the Federated Group
of Christian Democrats and European Democrats**Assets*

F

1. Surplus at 1st January 1991 (bank accounts, cash)	91 284.54
2. Interest	19 432.26
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1991	<u>189 322.00</u>
Total	300 038.80

Liabilities

I. Expenditure

1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)	66 000.00
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies)	549.00
3. Seminars, meetings and interpretation costs	50 000.00
4. Travel and subsistence (members and staff)	<u>60 365.95</u>
II. Surplus at 31st December 1991 (bank accounts, cash)	<u>123 123.85</u>
Total	300 038.80

Signatures of the Chairman (CARO), the Treasurer (JUNG)

and an auditor of the group (LENTZ-CORNETTE)

APPENDIX VII

*1991 Balance sheet for the Liberal Group**Assets*

	F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1990 (bank accounts, cash)	47 199.64
2. Interest	1 719.29
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1991	<u>82 082.00</u>
Total	131 000.93

Liabilities

I. Expenditure

1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)	33 280.00
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies)	7 000.00
3. Seminars and meetings	11 000.00
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff)	5 400.00
5. Interpretation costs	-
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)	9 300.00
7. Sundry expenses	<u>-</u>
Total	65 980.00

II. Surplus at 31st December 1991 (bank accounts, cash)	<u>65 020.93</u>
Total	131 000.93

Signatures of the Treasurer (VOHRER)

and two auditors of the group (MARTINO, MENZEL)

APPENDIX VIII

*1991 Balance sheet for the Socialist Group**Assets*

	F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1990 (bank accounts, cash)	151 833.58
2. Interest	6 161.50
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1991	<u>159 918.00</u>
Total	317 913.08

Liabilities

I. Expenditure

1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)	92 682.00
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies)	3 130.00
3. Missions, meetings, seminars	46 094.00
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff)	33 846.97
5. Interpretation costs	-
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)	-
7. Sundry expenses	<u>285.00</u>
II. Surplus at 31st December 1991 (bank accounts, cash)	<u>141 875.11</u>
Total	317 913.08

Signatures of the Treasurer (LAGORCE)

and two auditors of the group (GARRETT, TUMMERS)

*Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1991*

**MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1991 ¹**

*submitted on behalf of
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration ²
by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur*

The Assembly,

Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1991, together with the auditor's report, in accordance with Article 17 of the financial regulations,

Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial responsibility.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Rathbone (Chairman) (Alternate: *Lord Mackie of Benshie*); MM. Lagorce, Maass (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alvarez (Alternate: *Roman*), Antretter, Mrs. Durrieu, MM. Biefnot, Büchler, Covi (Alternate: *Rubner*), Curto, Diaz, (Alternate: *Fabra*), Eversdijk, Dame Peggy Fenner (Alternate: *Earl of Dundee*), MM. de Gaulle, Garcia Sanchez (Alternate: *Gonzalez-Laxe*), Howell, Jurgens, Manisco, Meyer zu Bentrup, Oehler, Pinto, Pizzo, Redmond (Alternate: *Lord Finsberg*), Regenwetter, Tatarella, Thissen.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

WEU and the situation in former Yugoslavia

REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the Standing Committee
by Mr. Marten, Rapporteur*

RECOMMENDATION 525¹

The Assembly,

- (i) Acting through an urgent meeting of its Standing Committee;
- (ii) Recalling Recommendations 506, 511, 512 and 519 which have all sought to prompt specific WEU action to help resolve the Yugoslav crisis;
- (iii) Fully endorsing United Nations Resolutions 713, 757, 770 and 771;
- (iv) Welcoming the progress made as a result of the London Conference but saddened that in spite of many attempts, in varying bodies, to find a political solution to the crisis, the suffering of the peoples concerned is intensifying to a devastating degree, not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also in Croatia where Dubrovnik is still being shelled nightly;
- (v) Regretting that the United Nations embargo on Serbia and Montenegro is not being applied effectively, except at sea;
- (vi) Congratulating the Italian presidency of WEU for its initiatives in convening an extraordinary Council of Ministers meeting in London on 28th August, as requested on behalf of the Assembly by its President, and approving the communiqué issued which offers the United Nations assistance in delivering humanitarian aid, in the supervision of heavy weapons and in strengthening the embargo;
- (vii) Pleased that a majority of WEU countries are contributing forces for Operation "Sharp Vigilance" and are prepared to make forces available to support United Nations efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also hoping for a more equitable cost-sharing agreement between member countries;
- (viii) Welcoming the North Atlantic Council's decision to make NATO's logistical infrastructure available to co-operate in WEU action in the framework of United Nations Security Council directives and also welcoming offers by the United States,

URGENTLY RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Seek immediate United Nations approval to impose a complete and total land, air and sea blockade of Serbia and Montenegro, the cessation of all financial, economic and other international assistance and the exclusion of Serbia and Montenegro from all international organisations until such time as they comply completely with all United Nations resolutions and the decisions of the London Conference;
2. Respond favourably to Romanian requests for help in policing the border with Serbia and help to establish similar arrangements with other neighbouring countries in the region;
3. Insist that Greece give the necessary assurances of total compliance with the United Nations embargo before continuing the present negotiations for WEU membership;
4. Offer to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to keep WEU forces available to the United Nations under European command and operational control in order to maintain cohesion and to carry out Resolution 770 effectively, and in close co-ordination with the United Nations;
5. Ensure that the WEU military planning cell is fully operational when established on 1st October 1992 in order to play a specific rôle in the present crisis;

1. Adopted by the Standing Committee on 3rd September 1992.

6. Institute a formal liaison mechanism with NATO headquarters and appropriate commands and also with the relevant United States authorities to help promote efficient and cost-effective co-operation and to avoid duplication of effort;
7. Prepare, in conjunction with other bodies, the future military requirements which may become necessary should Serbia not respect the London engagements and, in particular, study the need to:
 - (a) develop the alternative options for action considered on 28th August;
 - (b) plan appropriate anti-submarine and mine-hunting operations in the Adriatic;
 - (c) ensure air superiority in the area of operations and if necessary an air exclusion zone;
 - (d) take steps to ensure sufficient air protection for WEU forces made available to the United Nations;
 - (e) confine all naval assets based in Kotor and Bar;
 - (f) develop electronic counter-measures (ECM) to best effect and, more specifically, jam and neutralise military communications as well as fire control systems;
 - (g) provide military hospital facilities in the region for the treatment of the wounded, both service and civilian, and organise facilities for refugees;
8. Invite non-member nations to co-operate in furnishing military forces to complement WEU assets;
9. Examine action to be taken, including military action, not only to stop present fighting but also to prevent present conflicts spreading to Kosovo, Sandjak, Vojvodina and Macedonia and, in conjunction with the CSCE, consider the timely deployment of protective forces.

Activities of the IEPG

*Letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU,
to Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly*

7th September 1992

Dear President,

Further to your acting President's letter of 23rd April 1992, I am pleased to be able to forward to you an information letter from the IEPG covering its activities since 1991.

You will see that a further information letter should be provided after the Bonn IEPG ministerial meeting in December.

Yours sincerely,
Willem van EKELEN

Mr. Hartmut SOELL
President of the Assembly of WEU

*
* *

*Information letter to the WEU Assembly concerning
the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG)*

Introduction

1. Through its comprehensive membership, the IEPG remains the natural vehicle covering all the aspects of defence procurement in Europe. Although its basic functioning method is unchanged, the IEPG has, since 1991, set up two special working groups: the "Ad hoc Group on EC/WEU matters" (on developments in other European fora with possible implications for the IEPG) and the "IEPG Team" for dialogue with WEU. Both special working groups report directly to the IEPG Chair. The current structure of the IEPG is attached at Annex A.

2. Since the last statement to the WEU Assembly in January 1991, the defence ministers of the thirteen IEPG nations met in Brussels on 3rd July 1991 and in Oslo on 6th March 1992. On both occasions, besides reviewing the IEPG's traditional activities, ministers focused on the possible implications for the IEPG of recent evolutions in Europe. The Brussels communiqué is attached at Annex B, the Oslo communiqué is attached at Annex C.

3. At the Brussels meeting, recognising that in other European fora the discussions on the future security architecture of Europe might have a significant impact on the research, development, production and trade in defence equipment, ministers agreed to pursue the exchange of information through appropriate informal contacts (presidency level) with the European bodies concerned, in particular with the EC and WEU.

4. At the Oslo meeting, noting that the evolution of a new security architecture for Europe had gathered momentum, ministers acknowledged that the IEPG nations had to make a contribution in the field of the future framework for defence equipment co-operation in Europe. In their initial analysis of the implications for the IEPG of recent developments in Europe, ministers agreed that the IEPG's rôle and place in the future European security architecture needed further thorough examination.

Future rôle and place in the European security architecture

5. In a time when developments and changes in Europe are taking place which were unpredictable only a few years ago, various European fora are in the process of debating and adapting their structures to the new situation. The IEPG is often mentioned. Recognising the IEPG, at present, as the only European forum with participation of all European defence ministers of the Atlantic Alliance, it seems appropriate for the IEPG itself to participate in this debate and to evaluate its future rôle in the changing environment.

6. At the Oslo meeting, it was stressed that, whatever the future rearrangements might be, the IEPG's unique rôle at present in defence equipment matters in Europe and its expertise in promoting co-operation and competition in defence procurement will be an important contribution and will need to be maintained. The vital importance of ensuring the continued full participation of all IEPG members in the field of defence equipment co-operation was particularly underlined.

7. As directed by ministers in Oslo, national armaments directors have now defined and agreed the basic principles at Annex D to be taken into account during further discussions on IEPG's future.

8. Also following the intentions expressed and the conclusions drawn in Oslo an "IEPG Team" composed of national representatives of the thirteen IEPG nations (and thus the nine WEU nations) has now been established. The team has to examine, in dialogue with WEU, the future rôle of the IEPG in the new European security architecture including an initial examination of the possible rôle and functions of a future European armaments agency.

Co-operation with other European nations

9. Taking into account the rapid changes in Europe of the past two years, the IEPG needs to be prepared to respond to requests from other European nations for participation, in due time, in the group's activities. Through the case of Sweden, who applied for co-operation with the IEPG in September 1991, the IEPG had a preliminary exchange of views on the issue. It was agreed that this question had to be considered in the context of the evolution of the European security architecture.

Traditional activities

Panel I: harmonisation of requirements and equipment co-operation

10. Harmonisation of requirements remains critical for the achievement of the IEPG goals. Panel I has established measures to improve the chances of sub-groups carrying through projects to completion. A list of current projects is at Annex E. The panel has also focused on a revised procedure for equipment review that so far has proved itself very promising. It allows nations to concentrate work on potential areas for co-operation, discuss each project in detail and only establish sub-groups where success is likely. Moreover, it is also aiming at harmonious collaboration with other fora dealing with equipment programmes.

Panel II: research and technology, notably EUCLID

11. Following the signature of the programme memorandum of understanding (PMOU) for EUCLID (European co-operation for the long term in defence) by ministers in November 1990, Panel II has been translating into contractual terms the procedures to manage research and technology projects (RTPs).

12. The list of RTPs approved for entering the definition phase is at Annex F. The RTP management groups continue to prepare the implementing arrangements (IAs) for signature by the participating governments. Until now, seventeen IAs have been signed, the corresponding requests for proposals have been issued and four contracts have been awarded.

13. In addition to EUCLID, a certain number of common technology projects (CTPs) are progressing very well and some have been successfully completed. The expenditure involved in the CTPs, since the beginning in 1986, amounts to about 100 M ecus.

Panel III: defence economics notably European defence equipment market (EDEM)

14. The IEPG again underlined the significance of its continuing work to establish progressively an open European defence equipment market. It is important to achieve the most efficient and effective use of nations' defence budgets which are declining in the light of the changed international security situation.

15. Also in the light of the recent changes in the European defence and security environment, Panel III is currently considering and identifying the possible consequences of the implications of these changes on the EDEM policy as laid down in the IEPG action plan 1988 and in the policy document approved by ministers in November 1990.

16. Besides finalising procedures for a limited monitoring system for overseeing the development of a progressively open EDEM, Panel III has produced guidelines in the field of pre-qualification of suppliers. As national procedures vary largely from nation to nation, it could take time to completely harmonise them.

Transatlantic dialogue including NATO defence trade

17. Defence equipment co-operation NATO-wide remains of major importance. The current participation of IEPG nations in the work of the NATO Defence Trade Group indicates their will to improve the conditions of defence trade alliance-wide. The IEPG has reiterated its belief in the fundamental objectives of avoiding protectionism in all alliance nations and of ensuring that, by applying the principle of reciprocity, all nations are to benefit from a progressive improvement in the conditions of defence trade within NATO.


Publicity

18. The IEPG has extended and improved its visibility through representation at European defence equipment exhibitions in 1991. IEPG stands, in their present "informative" version, will continue to be arranged in 1992 and 1993. The attendance of the national focal points is being reviewed in the light of the experience gained.

IEPG Chairmanship

19. At the end of the year, *Belgium* will have completed two years as IEPG chair nation and hand over the responsibility for co-ordinating the IEPG activities to *Denmark*.

ANNEX A

Structure of the IEPG

* Chairmanship on a rotational basis (two years)

1991-1992 : Belgium
1993-1994 : Denmark

ANNEX B

*Brussels communiqué**Brussels, 3rd July 1991*

The defence ministers of the thirteen IEPG countries met in Brussels on 3rd July 1991. Recognising that defence procurement is one of the areas which could be substantially influenced by the outcome of the debate about a future European security architecture, they reaffirmed the importance of the IEPG as the main European forum for a comprehensive approach to issues related to defence equipment co-operation. Ministers also noted that the experience gained during the Gulf crisis emphasised the importance of interoperability of defence equipment and reiterated the rôle the IEPG could play in achieving that end.

The European defence equipment market

Ministers reviewed the progress made in opening the European defence equipment market on the basis of a report from their national armaments directors. Having endorsed at their previous meeting the broad principles and policies of the open European defence equipment market, based upon the action plan approved in 1988, ministers noted with satisfaction that the IEPG was now focusing its efforts on measures to implement these policies, taking into account the experience gained to date. They also recognised the value of the contribution of the European Defence Industries Group (EDIG) in the IEPG's work.

Research and technology

Ministers reaffirmed the importance of the EUCLID research and technology programme to which industry contributes financially. They welcomed the work now in hand to implement the programme, in consultation with EDIG. The first governmental implementing arrangements have been signed today, paving the way for signature of the first contracts for research and technology projects. A significant number of additional projects will follow in the near future.

Harmonisation of requirements and equipment co-operation

Ministers stressed that – in view of the new political/military environment and limited defence budgets – harmonisation of requirements and equipment co-operation and standardisation were more important than ever. Noting that it was an uncertain time for the initiation of new programmes, ministers welcomed the measures taken to improve procedures. These measures are designed to help identify opportunities for increased co-operation based on common requirements and to implement them more effectively.

DDI countries

Ministers confirmed their commitment to support nations with developing defence industries (DDIs) and recognised the opportunities provided by those nations' participation in the EUCLID programme and their involvement in the opening of the European defence equipment market.

The IEPG and EC/WEU

Ministers recognised the profound implications of discussions now taking place on the future security architecture of Europe, and the significant impact these could have on the research, development, production and trade in defence equipment. The unique expertise of the IEPG on defence equipment matters could be useful to the discussions that are taking place in the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union, the European Community and Western European Union. The future activities and structure of the IEPG is one of the issues linked to the outcome of this debate. Ministers agreed to exchange information through appropriate contacts between the IEPG on the one hand and, on the other, the European bodies engaged in the elaboration of the future European security architecture.

Transatlantic dialogue

Ministers reiterated the importance of defence equipment co-operation among all members of the North Atlantic Alliance. They underlined their view that the strengthening of European defence technological capabilities would facilitate transatlantic co-operation. Convinced that protectionism would be detrimental to all members, they stressed that it should be avoided. Against that background,

they discussed the impact on IEPG activities of initiatives related to transatlantic defence trade, highlighting the need for reciprocity in this field.

Publicity matters

Supporting the continued effort to improve the visibility of the IEPG and its activities, ministers welcomed the IEPG presence at international defence equipment exhibitions in member countries, in particular at Le Bourget exhibition in June 1991. They noted that the IEPG would also be represented at the international defence equipment and aviation exhibition in Ankara in November 1991.

European sessions for defence equipment managers (SERA)

Ministers confirmed the continuing importance of the seminars for defence equipment managers. They noted that France, Belgium and the Netherlands would organise the sessions in 1992.

Future meetings

Ministers agreed to meet again in the spring of 1992.

ANNEX C

*Oslo communiqué**Oslo, 6th March 1992*

At their meeting on 6th March 1992 in Oslo, the defence ministers of the thirteen IEPG countries took stock of developments since their meeting eight months earlier. They noted that the pace of historic change remained rapid, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. They recognised that the dissolution of the Soviet Union introduced a number of new challenges. They noted that in Western Europe the evolution of a new security architecture had gathered momentum. In that regard, ministers recalled the NATO summit in Rome in November, the European Council in Maastricht in December and the parallel meeting of Western European Union (WEU). They noted the differences in membership of those fora. Ministers acknowledged that the IEPG countries had a contribution to make in the field of the future framework for defence equipment co-operation.

In their initial analysis of the possible implications for the IEPG of recent developments, ministers stressed the group's unique rôle at present in defence equipment matters in Europe and its expertise in promoting co-operation and competition in defence procurement. They considered the actual and potential links between the IEPG and other fora and highlighted the need to avoid duplication of effort. They emphasised the vital importance of ensuring the continued full participation of all IEPG members in the field of defence equipment co-operation. Ministers agreed that the IEPG's rôle and place in the future European security architecture needed to be examined in depth and tasked national armaments directors (NADs) to continue their work in this area, and to report accordingly.

Ministers stressed the importance of defence equipment co-operation amongst all members of the North Atlantic Alliance. In that context they reviewed, from an IEPG perspective, progress in the continuing discussions on the feasibility of improving the conditions of defence trade NATO-wide, which was proceeding in parallel with the opening of the European defence equipment market. They reiterated their belief in the fundamental objectives of avoiding protectionism in all alliance countries and of ensuring that, by applying the principle of reciprocity, all nations benefited from a progressive improvement in the conditions of defence trade within NATO. They highlighted the value of the European contribution in this context.

Ministers had a preliminary exchange of views on the possible participation in due course of other European countries in some of the group's activities and agreed that this question had to be considered in the context of the evolution of the European security architecture.

Ministers emphasised the importance of achieving the most efficient and effective use of nations' defence budgets, which were declining in the light of the changed international security situation. They underlined the significance of the IEPG's work to establish progressively an open European defence equipment market. They noted that the previously agreed principles and policies for such an open market – international competitive bidding and technology transfer taking into account transitional measures such as *juste retour* and support to DDI countries – were being turned into practical reality.

Ministers reaffirmed the value for Europe of the EUCLID research and technology programme and welcomed signature by NADs during the meeting of a further governmental implementing arrangement. They noted that the first contracts for research and technology projects were expected to be signed shortly. Ministers also noted that a number of common technology projects, whose launch preceded that of EUCLID, had been completed successfully and that others were progressing well.

Noting improvements in procedures, ministers stressed again the importance of harmonisation of requirements and of equipment standardisation. They welcomed the progress made in equipment collaboration, notably on the future large aircraft and the microwave landing system.

Ministers expressed their appreciation for the helpful contributions of the European Defence Industries Group (EDIG) in the various areas of the IEPG's activity.

Ministers noted the continuing efforts to extend and improve the visibility of the IEPG through representation at major European defence equipment exhibitions. Ministers agreed to meet again towards the end of the year shortly before Denmark takes over the chair of the IEPG for 1993-1994.

ANNEX D

***Basic principles which should guide the discussions on
a possible association of the IEPG in WEU***

The discussions on a possible association/incorporation of the IEPG with/into WEU should be guided by the following basic principles:

1. All IEPG members should be entitled to participate fully, and with the same rights and responsibilities, in any armaments co-operation forum.
2. There should be a single European armaments co-operation forum, there should be no duplication in this field.
3. The IEPG should continue to operate until any replacement forum was to be operational.
4. Any armaments co-operation forum should take over, as starting point, the agreed policies of the IEPG and maintain existing links with NATO.
5. Armaments co-operation activities in Europe should be managed by the national armaments directors of all current IEPG members, who will be accountable to the defence ministers of those member governments.
6. The existing basic structure of the IEPG should, initially, be incorporated into any future armaments co-operation structure and the existing linkage between the IEPG and EDIG should be maintained.

ANNEX E

Panel I Sub-group overview

1. Future large aircraft
2. Vehicle robotics
3. Armoured bridgelayer interoperability
4. Maritime patrol aircraft
5. 155 mm artillery weapon system
6. Aimed control effect-antitank mine
7. Third generation antitank weapon
8. Microwave landing system
9. STINGER
10. Coastal minesweeper
11. Mistral
12. Low caliber/individual/support weapon
13. M483/M864 155 mm arti ammunition dual
14. Submarine advanced propulsion
15. Armoured recce vehicles
16. Meteorological equipment
17. Simulation
18. Combat support ship 2000
19. New logistic vehicles
20. Short-range antitank weapon
21. Stand off air to ground weapons

ANNEX F

List of RTPs

1. Modern radar technology
 - 1.1 Mission related aspects
2. Silicon microelectronics
 - 2.2 SOI technology
 - 2.2 Interconnection assembly
 - 2.3 Military qualification
 - 2.5 SOI cell library
 - 2.7 Mixed analog digital design
 - 2.8 Very high speed A/D converters
 - 2.9 User programmable integrated circuits
3. Composite structures
 - 3.1 Application technology
 - 3.2 Light ballistic optimisation
 - 3.5 Development of technology for high temperature composite
 - 3.6 Composites for electromagnetic windows
 - 3.8 Naval application technology
4. Modular avionics
 - 4.1 Modular avionics harmonisation study
5. Electric gun (dormant)
6. Artificial intelligence
 - 6.1 Advanced work station for command and control systems
 - 6.2 High speed pattern recognition environment
 - 6.3 Knowledge engineering
 - 6.4 Combinatorial algorithms for military application
7. Signature manipulation
 - 7.3 Improvement of RCS prediction codes
 - 7.8 Optimum shape design in electromagnetics
8. Optoelectronic devices
 - 8.1 Affordable lightweight IR sensors
 - 8.2 Intelligent sensors
 - 8.3 Solid state laser sources
9. Satellite surveillance technology, including verification aspects
 - 9.1 Technology concepts and harmonisation
 - 9.2 High resolution optical sensor technology
 - 9.3 Advanced space synthetic aperture radar
 - 9.4 Real time processing and data handling
 - 9.5 Ground segment technology
10. Underwater detection and related technologies
 - 10.1 Low frequency underwater sound propagation
 - 10.2 Towed array heading sensors
 - 10.3 Hydrodynamic noise study
11. Technology in the field of human factors including simulation for training purposes
 - 11.1 Training system concepts
 - 11.2 Simulation techniques
 - 11.3 Mission and/or battle simulation
 - 11.8 Low cost simulators

*Composition of the political groups –
Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure*

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*²
by Mr. Thompson, Chairman and Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT DECISION

on amending Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Thompson, Chairman and Rapporteur

*Draft Decision
on amending Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure*

The Assembly,

DECIDES

To amend Rule 39, paragraph 4, to read as follows:

“The number of members of a political group, representatives or substitutes, may not be less than one-tenth of the number of representatives to the Assembly.”

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Thompson (Chairman); MM. Amaral, Benassi (Vice-Chairmen); Mrs. Aguiar, MM. André, Böhl, Bolinaga (Alternate: Mrs. Guirado), MM. Caccia, Chevalier, Collette, Cuco, Diaz de Mera, Filetti, Lord Finsberg (Alternate: Townsend), MM. Hughes, Jessel, Junghanns, Konen, Ottenbourgh, Pasquino, Pistre, Scheer, von Schmude (Alternate: Maas), Mrs. Soutendijk van Appeldoorn (Alternate: Eversdijk), Mr. Stoffelen, Mrs. Terborg.*

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Thompson, Chairman and Rapporteur)

At its sitting on 1st June 1992, the Assembly adopted the draft order in the report presented to it by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges (Document 1311).

In this order, the Assembly invited the committee to examine whether there should be a change in the minimum number of representatives or substitutes required to form a political group, bearing in mind the ratio to be established between this number and the total number of representatives to the Assembly.

It should first be underlined that the problem of the composition of the political groups may be viewed from two standpoints:

- the minimum number of representatives or substitutes of which a political group must consist;
- the number of nationalities that should be represented.

According to Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, a group may not have less than nine members, but it does not mention the nationality aspect.

Conversely, according to the Rules of Procedure of the Council of Europe, a political group must consist of "representatives or substitutes of at least three different nationalities"¹.

The order just quoted does not invite the committee to raise this matter which, moreover, does not arise since all the Assembly's political groups include members of several nationalities.

The reasons why a political group should consist of a minimum number of members were set out in the committee's previous report: "A minimum number of members must continue to be required for a group, through its representation in the Presidential Committee, to be able to play a de jure part in the organisation of the Assembly's work and, through its budget, to have practical facilities."

However, to this requirement for a minimum number of members in each group should be added the requirement for a small enough number of groups to allow the Assembly to organise its work in the most favourable conditions. But it is precisely the requirement for a minimum number of members that allows it to be guaranteed that the Assembly will at no time be divided into an excessive number of groups.

To avoid revising the Rules of Procedure when the number of delegations to the Assembly is increased, this minimum should not be an integral number but a fractional one, i.e. a proportion of the total number of members of the Assembly.

In his report mentioned above, Mr. Grieve, while referring to the example of the European Parliament, believed that the most desirable proportion would be one-twentieth of representatives² and substitutes to the Assembly of the Council of Europe, i.e. one-tenth of representatives. This proportion also seems valid for the WEU Assembly. It is therefore proposed to draft the new paragraph 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure as follows:

"The number of members of a political group, representatives or substitutes, may not be less than one-tenth of the number of representatives to the Assembly."

At present, the Assembly has 108 members. Since one-tenth of this number is 10.8, a political group could not at present, if this provision is adopted, have less than 11 members (representatives or substitutes). This increase of two in the minimum number of representatives of a political group would take into account the enlargement of the Assembly to include Portugal and Spain.

1. In his report to the Assembly of the Council of Europe of 3rd December 1976 (Document 3900), Mr. Grieve invoked, in support of this requirement, the concern that "the European character of the Assembly and its subsidiary units must be emphasised and preserved", but he mentioned the fact that the European Parliament admits the possibility of purely national political groups.

European armaments co-operation after Maastricht

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee ²
by Mr. Lopez Henares, Chairman and Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on European armaments co-operation after Maastricht

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Lopez Henares, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. Is more armaments co-operation required in a less threatened Europe?
- III. Operational requirements and the results of efforts made so far to meet them with the development of common equipment
 - (i) Ground and air environment
 - (ii) Naval and naval aviation environment
 - (iii) Air and air defence environment
 - (iv) Space
 - (v) Summary
- IV. Creation of a European armaments agency and the future of the IEPG
- V. Conclusions

APPENDICES

- I. IEPG Panel I – operational requirements and equipment programmes: sub-group overview
- II. IEPG Panel II – list of RTPs
- III. Structure of the IEPG

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Lopez Henares (Chairman); Mr. Lenzer, N... (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Atkinson (Alternate: Sir Dudley Smith), Biefnot (Alternate: Kempinaire), Mrs. Blunk, MM. Böhm, Caccia, Colombo, Curto, Davis, Dimmer, Mrs. Francese, MM. Lagorce, Le Grand, Gonzalez-Laxe, Litherland, Menzel (Alternate: Probst), Palacios, Poças Santos, Sarens, Savio, Sir Donald Thompson (Alternate: Alexander), MM. Tummers (Alternate: Aarts), Valleix, Verbeek, Worms.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation**on European armaments co-operation after Maastricht**

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling that the new tasks attributed to allied forces in Europe make essential an in-depth re-examination of defence equipment and technology requirements, taking account inter alia of:
- the disappearance of the threat of a mass attack against Europe;
 - uncertainty about the risk of conflicts and tension that exist or may emerge in several regions of the world;
 - reductions in defence budgets in the majority of WEU member countries;
 - the rapid evolution of advanced technology in the defence area;
- (ii) Stressing that the creation of multinational forces in the framework of NATO and WEU shows how urgent it is to make more effort to enhance the standardisation and interoperability of their equipment;
- (iii) Noting with satisfaction the increased activities of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) in joint research on and development of defence equipment;
- (iv) Noting nevertheless with concern the existence of a number of bi- and multilateral equipment co-operation programmes which are not certain to be either developed or completed;
- (v) Welcoming, on the one hand, WEU's Maastricht and Petersberg declarations, in which it is suggested that a deeper study be made of strengthening European armaments co-operation with a view to setting up a European armaments agency, and, on the other, the Council's proposal to instruct WEU and IEPG experts to study this problem together so that it may be settled without delay;
- (vi) Astonished nevertheless that, more than seven months after the IEPG defined its positions relating to the conditions for possible association of the IEPG and WEU, the Council has still done nothing to implement these proposals;
- (vii) Convinced that it is the duty of the public authorities, as defence industries' principal customers, to try to help them to find means of facilitating their conversion and adapting themselves to the new conditions;
- (viii) Convinced that defence industries should not be excluded from the European market but noting that the Twelve did not reach agreement in Maastricht on abolishing Article 223 of the Rome Treaty,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Speed up its work in order to work out a concept of the rôle and operation of a European armaments agency;
2. Appoint representatives immediately to contact without delay the team made responsible by the IEPG for the dialogue with WEU with a view to studying together the conditions for a merger between the IEPG and WEU;
3. Ensure that the future agency has adequate authority and powers to enable it to facilitate the process of harmonisation, by member countries, of their armed forces' defence equipment in a sensible, not too burdensome manner;
4. Ensure that all the IEPG member countries participate fully in the agency;
5. Reach agreement on its policy towards exports of military equipment and end-destination controls on exports of jointly-produced equipment;
6. Draw up an inventory and a financing plan for all medium- and long-term plans and studies launched by WEU and the IEPG for equipment, and draw up a list of priorities;
7. Inform the Assembly of the results of its study on Europe's strategic mobility needs;
8. Inform the Assembly of the conclusions it drew from the first stage of the feasibility study for the creation of a European space-based observation system.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Lopez Henares, Chairman and Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Since Sir Dudley Smith's report on "Arms and equipment for a European rapid action force"¹, the evolution of the international politico-military environment has given a new dimension to thinking that had been under way for decades with a view to achieving greater harmonisation of arms and equipment for armed forces in Europe.

2. Reassessment of the threat and the operational needs involved was dictated inter alia by a worsening of the war in former Yugoslavia, the re-emergence of tension between Iraq and the United States, the outbreak or pursuit of conflicts in several regions of the former Soviet Union such as Moldova, Ossetia and Nagorny-Karabakh, uncertainty about the future rôle of Russia as the Soviet Union's principal successor and the precarious situation prevailing in several sensitive areas of the world, including the Mediterranean.

2. Initiatives taken to set up multinational forces in the alliance and WEU continued with:

- the creation, on 21st May 1992, of a Franco-German army corps with a European vocation that is to become operational in 1995;
- the official inauguration of the rapid reaction force (Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, ARRC) in NATO on 2nd October 1992; and
- the announcement by the Ministers of Defence of France, Italy and Spain on 7th September 1992 that they intend to examine the possibility of creating a European naval aviation force in the framework of WEU.

4. Furthermore, the obligation for countries that signed the treaty on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) to reduce their armaments in accordance with that treaty and the budgetary constraints facing all the countries concerned can but stimulate joint efforts to rationalise available means to meet remaining legitimate defence needs.

5. At institutional level, the Maastricht Treaty, signed on 7th February 1992, requested WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the European political union which

have defence implications. The WEU member countries have consequently taken a number of decisions, including that to strengthen the operational rôle of the organisation and to examine the possibilities of strengthening co-operation in armaments matters with a view to setting up a *European armaments agency*.

6. At the same time, the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) is examining its rôle in the new European security architecture, but the conditions for a rapprochement with WEU – advocated by the latter in the Petersberg declaration in the context of the creation of a European armaments agency – have not yet been defined.

7. Europe's defence industries, most of which are suffering from a sharp fall in orders from states which are their main customers, are seeking new forms of co-operation among themselves and how to adapt themselves to the new challenges in order to safeguard their competitiveness and ensure their survival. These industries are following very closely the process of building Europe and inter-state co-operation within alliances since these matters have a crucial influence on decisions to be taken in regard to industrial policy, particularly as from 1st January 1993, when free movement of goods within the European Community is to start.

8. However, account must also be taken of prevailing fears among a large section of public opinion about the need for and usefulness of continuing armaments efforts now that the East-West confrontation has come to an end and the public is calling for substantial peace dividends. European political leaders should give the public more explanations about the basis of their future guidelines in this connection.

9. However, in spite of the many declarations of intention issued in Maastricht and Petersberg on strengthening armaments co-operation, the problem does not seem to be a matter of prime importance for governments and administrations. For instance, the half-yearly report of the German Government on the activities of WEU, published on 18th August 1992 and covering the period from 1st January to 30th June 1992, does not even mention the subject of European equipment co-operation or the plan to set up a European armaments agency.

10. Uncertainty about the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty following the Danish "No" and the French people's timid approval have

1. Document 1292, 27th November 1991.

encouraged some commentators to think that these results may slow down the progress of European defence co-operation, thus automatically affecting armaments, too. In any event, it seems necessary to recall that the absence of a joint policy in respect of equipment affects not only the operational standard of forces but also public budgets, research and technological development guidelines, arms export policy and industrial and employment policy.

II. Is more armaments co-operation required in a less threatened Europe?

11. In the alliance's new strategic concept, approved at its meeting in Rome on 7th and 8th November 1991, the North Atlantic Council noted *inter alia* that:

“The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for allied strategy. Particularly in Central Europe, the risk of a surprise attack has been substantially reduced, and minimum allied warning time has increased accordingly.

In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess.”

12. Opinions of all kinds have been expressed this year on defining the state of European security two years after the collapse of the Soviet empire. Mr. Pierre Bérégovoy, French Prime Minister, described this as follows on 3rd September 1992²:

“The unjust Yalta order is no more. A new international order is announced, but it is far from being achieved. We are therefore in this intermediary stage, at one and the same time exulting and disturbing: one major threat has disappeared but new forms of instability are emerging with reawakening nationalism, a possible new source of conflict.

The accession to full and entire sovereignty by the republics belonging to the former Soviet Union has had as a corollary uncertainty about what is to become of its nuclear arsenal.

.....

All continents, in a manner that is always dramatic for their populations, are exposed to many forms of instability.

.....

2. Speech at the opening sitting of the forty-fifth IHEDN session.

Unfortunately, intolerance, the spirit of revenge and the reawakening of ancestral hostility often accompany this movement of history. This is the reason for confrontations in the Caucasus and Moldova. At our doors, the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation has made that country a battlefield, first in Croatia, above all in Bosnia-Herzegovina today, and tomorrow perhaps in Kosovo.

.....

However, hotbeds of instability, disorder and distress are not confined to Europe. Violence is also killing in Iraq and Sri Lanka.

.....”

13. Asked about possible threats to the United Kingdom, Mr. Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defence, said in an interview in *Defense News*³:

“Russia's relationship with Europe and the rest of the world has been transformed. But we are anxious of the fact that even after implementation of [strategic arms reduction treaty] agreements with the United States, Russia will come down from 10 000 strategic nuclear warheads to over 3 000, far in excess of what is required for a minimum nuclear deterrent. They still have massive nuclear stockpiles, and that is something you cannot ignore.

Secondly, we have no certainty about what the future holds for Russia itself, and we cannot exclude the possibility that there will be changes in Russia, and one has to build that into one's policy.

Thirdly, there is the worrying problem of nuclear proliferation.”

14. Conversely, Mr. Salvo Andò, Minister of Defence of Italy, now Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, said in an interview in *Defense News*⁴:

“The conventional military threat from the East has practically disappeared, even if a residual nuclear deterrence is still needed. But other risks are emerging, especially from the Southern European and Mediterranean regions. We do not fear a massive military attack, but we are worried about the growing and general instability, stronger indirect threats against our security and unpredictable limited attacks against our territory and lines of communication.

3. *Defense News*, 7th-13th September 1992.

4. *Defense News*, 14th-20th September 1992, page 54.

Finally, we worry that nuclear, chemical and missile proliferation may become the greatest threat of the future."

15. Mr. Nevrat Ayaz, Minister of Defence of Turkey, described as follows the threat to his country as he now perceives it⁵:

"Turkey lies at the centre of a region of instabilities and uncertainties, from the turbulent Balkans and Transcaucasia to the Middle East, which witnessed a major war only last year. For the 1990s, Turkey sees the threat against it [in] regional crises and conflicts rather than a pre-planned large-scale attack."

16. The German Government's position was described on 17th June 1992 in an answer by Mr. Wilz, Secretary of State for Defence of Germany, to a question put by Mr. Scheer, informing him that his ministry had prepared an analysis of the risks at the beginning of 1992 and this had been adopted by the government:

"It is clear from this analysis of the risks that Germany is not at present under threat. The military potential of the former Soviet Union, which still exists albeit to a lesser degree, is still a serious danger but it is unlikely that it will be used at present.

.....

More real currently are risks stemming from growing political instability, accompanied by the latent danger of recourse to military means. This is the case in particular of South-Eastern Europe and the crisis area stretching from Morocco to India.

Political tension prevailing there suggests that regional wars may break out at any time and that they are increasingly liable to involve means of mass destruction. It cannot be ruled out that such conflicts may spread to the southern alliance partners.

This assessment of the risk is shared by NATO as a whole.

.....

In this context, the Federal Republic of Germany and NATO can no longer take as a premise the existence of a one-dimensional threat consisting of a massive military aggression in its traditional meaning. This has effectively made way for new, less precise, risks which have emerged in various parts of Europe and might even lead to kinds of warfare that were thought to have had their day."

17. The Atlantic Alliance and WEU have started to learn the lessons of the new situation in order to adapt their defence instruments, each within the framework of its own mandate. In Rome on 8th November 1991, the North Atlantic Council declared:

"Our military forces will adjust to their new tasks, becoming smaller and more flexible. Thus, our conventional forces will be substantially reduced as will, in many cases, their readiness. They will also be given increased mobility to enable them to react to a wide range of contingencies, and will be organised for flexible build-up, when necessary, for crisis management as well as defence. Multinational formations will play a greater rôle within the integrated military structure. Nuclear forces committed to NATO will be greatly reduced." (Paragraph 5 of the declaration)

18. WEU for its part, learning the lesson of the Gulf war, the war in former Yugoslavia and latent regional conflicts in several regions of the world, has taken a few fundamental decisions made necessary by the new rôle assigned to it by the Maastricht Treaty.

19. The first fundamental decision was to strengthen WEU's operational rôle, as a consequence of which member states agreed "to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU"⁶.

20. The second was the definition of its forces' principal tasks, on which member countries agreed:

"Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peace-keeping tasks,
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.⁷"

21. The third was the decision to organise these military units on a *multinational and multi-service basis*⁸. It may easily be deduced that, the more multinational the forces in question become, the more essential it would

6. Paragraph II.2 of the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992.

7. Paragraph II.4 of the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992.

8. Paragraph II.6 of the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992.

5. Defense News, 31st August-6th September 1992, page 46.

seem to harmonise their equipment. Greater co-operation is therefore essential in this connection, which does not mean increasing arms but, on the contrary, making available by technological means the capability necessary for new tasks with smaller quantities of equipment.

22. The principle of multinationality of forces also implies far greater standardisation and interoperability of equipment "than was required in the old days of large, in-place national forces set out in a layer cake configuration"⁹. These considerations therefore bring us to a problem that has been well known since the creation of the alliances and to which it has never yet been possible to find a satisfactory solution.

III. Operational requirements and the results of efforts made so far to meet them with the development of common equipment

23. Although your Rapporteur obtained the impression from his talks with senior officials responsible for armaments and equipment in several Western European countries that the need to harmonise equipment concerned at one and the same time land-based, naval, air and space equipment, recent conflicts, particularly the Gulf war, tend to suggest that attention should henceforth be concentrated on the importance of:

- intelligence, data-processing and command equipment, using satellite-borne means of communication;
- space-based observation and electromagnetic monitoring devices;
- strategic mobility (air and maritime transport);
- the choice of accurate stealth systems;
- the need for anti-ballistic missile defence, this being the subject of the report presented by Mr. Lenzer.

24. However, these very specific needs must not make us forget the multinational forces now being set up.

25. The national components of these forces will have to be able to operate together, to communicate among themselves, to afford each other mutual support and undergo joint training. Non-standardised, incompatible equipment, which was not such a stumbling-block in the days when strategy was based mainly on national units, might seriously affect the interoperability of multinational, integrated forces.

26. However, none of the efforts made since the Atlantic Alliance and WEU were set up with

9. See David Cooper, "Allied arms co-operation: need for a transatlantic political strategy", NATO Review, October 1991.

a view to harmonising allied forces' equipment requirements in the framework of various bodies specialising in equipment matters has done anything to change the fundamental fact that all the member countries determine the needs of their own armed forces on an individual basis.

27. Consequently, the degree of both bi- and multilateral co-operation between states in armaments matters until now depended more or less on the hazards of ad hoc decisions and varying relationships between the countries and industries concerned.

28. After more than thirty years of effort, relatively few European bi- or multilateral projects have reached the production stage. Mention may be made of:

- Gazelle, Lynx and Puma helicopters (Franco-German co-operation);
- the Jaguar aircraft (Franco-British co-operation);
- the Alpha-Jet aircraft (Franco-German co-operation);
- the Tornado aircraft (co-operation between Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy);
- Milan anti-tank missiles (Franco-German co-operation);
- Hot anti-tank missiles (Franco-German co-operation); and
- mine-hunters (co-operation between France, Belgium and the Netherlands).

29. The two tables hereafter show how far European production has become diversified in comparison with that of the United States. In spite of efforts by European industries, dependence on the United States for military equipment in 1988 was 89% for Turkey, 78% for Greece, 77% for Denmark, 64% for Norway, 53% for Italy, 44% for the Netherlands and Portugal, 41% for Spain, 33% for Germany and 32% for Belgium.

(i) Ground and air environment

30. Among the areas in which harmonisation of equipment is the least developed, mention should be made of tanks, which are designed in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France but also in other countries under the responsibility of national industries. It would appear that only the latest models of the French Leclerc tank, the German Leopard 2 tank and the United States M1A1 Abrams tank have interchangeable munitions, while the new United Kingdom Challenger 2 tank will have a totally different gun system¹⁰.

10. Defense News, 29th June-5th July 1992, page 6.

TABLE 1

Comparison between the number of different arms currently being produced by European industry (the Twelve plus EFTA) and by United States industry¹

Category	Number of arms produced		European producer countries
	Europe	United States	
Tank	4	1	GB, F, D, I
Armoured infantry combat carrier	12	3	F (3 ^x), D, GB, (2 ^x), I, S, E (2 ^x), A, CH
155 mm self-propelled	3	1	F, D, GB
Fighter-bomber ²	7	5	F (2 ^x), GB, S, D/I/GB, E/D/GB/I
Ground attack/trainer	6	1	GB, E, I (2 ^x), I/BR, D/F
Strategic bomber	0	1	
Anti-tank helicopter	7	3	F (2 ^x), GB, I (2 ^x), D, D/F
Assault rifle	7	1	B, F, GB, E, D, I, A
Portable anti-aircraft missile	4	1	F, GB (2 ^x), S
Frigate ³	11	1	F (3 ^x), GB, D (3 ^x), NL, E, DK, I
Mine-hunter	4	2	F/NL/B, GB, D, I
Aircraft-carrier	3	1	GB, I, E
Fixed-wing aircraft-carrier	1	1	F
Cruiser/missile-launching destroyer	0	1	
Conventional submarine	7	0	D (3 ^x), I, NL, GB, S
Nuclear attack submarine	2	1	F, GB

Source: GRIPDATA. Situation as at 1st January 1992.

GB = United Kingdom; F = France; D = Germany; I = Italy; S = Sweden; E = Spain; A = Austria; CH = Switzerland; BR = Brazil; B = Belgium; NL = Netherlands.

1. The only armaments included are those effectively produced or whose assembly lines may be reactivated in the event of new orders (mainly for export). In this case, the selection criterion is presentation of the equipment for export (at shows, exhibitions, etc.). Nuclear arms are not considered (missiles, missile-launching nuclear submarines).

2. In the air sector, and contrary to European countries, the United States produces strategic bombers (B1, production of which stopped in 1989, and B2, now being produced).

3. In the naval sector, the United States produces cruisers/missile-launching destroyers (Ticonderoga and Arleigh Burke classes) and nuclear aircraft-carriers (T. Roosevelt). In these two categories, only France produces a nuclear aircraft-carrier (Charles de Gaulle).

TABLE 2
*Comparison between fighter aircraft programmes in European countries and the United States
in the last twenty years*

Country	Aircraft	Production	
		National	Total
France	Super Etendard	71	85
	Mirage F1	252	715
	Mirage 2000	205	334
	Rafale ¹	336	336
Sweden	Viggen	330	330
	Gripen ¹	140	140
United Kingdom	Sea Harrier	60	86
	Harrier	120	120
	Hawk	175	500*
	Average production		294
Co-operation: F, GB	Jaguar	170/130	550
	F, D	Alpha Jet	551
	D, GB, I	Tornado	916*
	D, GB, I, E	EFA ¹	700
	I, BR	AMX ¹	400
	Average production		623
United States	F14	600	679
	F15	1 286	1 636*
	F16	2 000*	3 422*
	F18	1 150	1 600*
	A10	650	650
	F117	59	59
	YF22 ¹	1 134	1 134
	Average production		1 311

F = France; GB = United Kingdom; D = Germany; I = Italy; E = Spain; BR = Brazil.

1. These aircraft are currently in the development or pre-production stage. The accompanying figures are estimates worked out in 1991-92. They are of indicative value only and will very probably be revised downwards in the coming years.

* Aircraft in production for which there may still be export orders.

Sources: GRIPDATA with J.P. Hebert, *Stratégie française et industrie d'armement*, FEDN, Paris, pages 100-111; *Military Balance 1991-92*, IISS, London, 1991; *The cost of peace: assessing Europe's security options*, Harwood Academic Publishers, London, 1991, page 45; *Jane's Defence Weekly*, *International Defence Review*, *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, years 1991 and 1992; figures communicated by firms.

31. The example of tanks also shows the importance of more concrete harmonisation of views on operational needs, which may differ, not only for purely military reasons. Thus, Germany's decision not to develop a new "2000 tank" is largely based on financial considerations and the French decision to produce the Leclerc tank is based partly on the assumption that it can be exported to third countries. While several alliance countries have started to concentrate on lighter, more mobile forces, in other regions of the world, particularly the Middle East, some countries are still modernising their heavy tanks.

32. In the ground armaments sector, it seems particularly difficult to determine valid require-

ments for everyone. The IEPG's Panel I, now under Norwegian chairmanship, is responsible for harmonising operational needs, including equipment for NATO's European rapid reaction corps.

33. According to information given by the chairmanship of the IEPG to the Technological and Aerospace Committee in Brussels on 9th February 1992, the IEPG's Panel I has about twenty projects in hand. The latest report on the activities of the IEPG, dated 7th September 1992¹¹, specifies that there are twenty-one projects, of which thirteen relate to armaments or the ground-air environment¹².

11. Document 1330.

12. See list at Appendix I.

34. Among recent initiatives in the ground sector, mention should be made of the French, German and United Kingdom industries, which are trying to develop a new type of combat vehicle (modular armoured vehicle), which seems to follow on from work started in the framework of the defence ministries of the three countries with a view to agreeing on criteria for defining their requirements. On the other hand, it is not known whether the IEPG is associated with this project.

35. In the air-ground environment, experts recognised the need for allied forces to be more mobile and there is no controversy on the matter.

36. In the tactical transport sector, four countries – France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands – have at last reached agreement on the joint production of a new European transport helicopter, the NH-90, which should be developed by the European consortium Eurocopter and be ready for delivery as from 1998. Government financial contributions are broken down as follows: France 42.4%, Italy 26.9%, Germany 24%, the Netherlands 6.7%. The helicopter will have to be capable of carrying at least twenty troops or a combat vehicle over distances of 900 km at a speed of 280 km per hour¹³. The North Atlantic Council set up NAHEMA (NATO Helicopter Management Agency) to manage this programme and, on 1st September 1992, the agency notified industry of the development contract.

37. Development of the Italian-United Kingdom designed EH-101 helicopter received a new boost with Canada's decision to buy fifty for its armed forces¹⁴.

38. In the framework of efforts to improve the mobility of ground forces, there is another example of the difficulties to be overcome in defining needs, jointly at first, then taking decisions on the choice of options offered by industry and subsequently on development and, finally, producing the chosen transport equipment.

39. In the IEPG, eight countries – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain – with the United Kingdom having observer status negotiated for almost a year before instructing the firm Euroflag to carry out a prefeasibility study for a future large aircraft (FLA) programme, this study to be completed by the end of 1992. To meet the needs defined in the framework of the IEPG, a consortium composed of Aérospatiale, Aliena, British Aerospace, CASA and Deutsche Airbus set up the firm Euroflag SRL, which has subsequently been joined by FLABEL (Belgium), OGMA (Portugal) and TAI (Turkey).

40. The call for tenders launched by the IEPG specifies that the new aircraft should mainly meet tactical transport needs but must at the same time be usable for strategic transport purposes. The aircraft, which should replace C-130 and C-160 aircraft in the period 2003-2011, might also be designed in a refuelling version, maritime patrol aircraft or remote surveillance and monitoring version, of the AWACS type.

41. According to Euroflag, the planned time-limits for carrying out the project may be exceeded because of the slow decision-taking procedure in IEPG participating countries and uncertainty about the trend of defence budgets. However, when it visited the Farnborough Air Show, the committee was briefed on the progress of the prefeasibility study by Euroflag representatives, who said they were confident that the time-limits for the project would be respected, while underlining that the programme should receive more support from the governments concerned.

42. The fact that, since 1991, the WEU Defence Representatives Group (DRG) has also been examining questions relating to strategic mobility does not seem to facilitate matters since studies are progressing very slowly and there is no news of the result of the Franco-German study requested on the subject.

43. The slowness of this process merely increases doubt, particularly in the United Kingdom Government, about the usefulness of the Euroflag programme: the British first underline the importance of leaving to each country responsibility for defining its own needs; second, they are very anxious to remain free to seek the most economic solution which might consist either of procuring American aircraft or of using civilian aircraft or maritime transport means. In any event, they are not giving priority to this project, rationalisation being their essential aim.

44. It is hardly conceivable that all these considerations are not also being studied in other member countries participating in the project. The main aim of prior consultations between governments concerned in the IEPG should be to study possible options from every angle before giving a mandate to industry.

45. The committee's previous report on "Arms and equipment for a European rapid action force"¹⁵ listed possible candidates for ensuring air transport capability and, inter alia, described the performances of the American C-17 and C-5 Galaxy project. However, it must be certain that the American transport fleet can be easily available in the event of a future crisis compelling American forces to mobilise their entire capability. The difficulties encountered

13. Le Monde, 3rd September 1992.

14. Atlantic News, No. 2447, 29th July 1992.

15. Document 1292.

by the German army in transporting heavy equipment to Turkey during the Gulf war because the United States army was incapable of providing transport aircraft should be recalled.

46. Furthermore, the success of the Euroflag project aimed at giving Western Europe a large-capacity air transport system to meet the needs of strategic mobility tends to show that parallel co-operation between a large number of European states and industries can produce encouraging results, thus contradicting the very widespread opinion among governments that the optimum number of participants in a project is three or four.

47. Euroflag's presentation to the Technological and Aerospace Committee of the progress of studies made a very positive impression on the committee and it would therefore like the WEU Council to pay more attention to this project than it has done so far.

48. Some experts consider the need for long-haul air transport capability to be of such importance that they are going so far as to advocate the creation of an air transport agency.

49. In regard to co-operation on attack and reconnaissance helicopters, there is an impressive range of national, bilateral and multilateral projects, so this means of transport and armament is not included in IEPG Panel I's list of requirements.

50. The Franco-German consortium Eurocopter and British Aerospace have reached agreement on proposing that the British army procure the Franco-German Tiger attack helicopter¹⁶. Even if France were to delay bringing it into service, British interest in it might jeopardise the chances of the American AH-64 Apache helicopter, opted for by the British army.

51. However, the future of the German version of this project, designed as the PAH-2 anti-tank helicopter, is uncertain insofar as a massive tank attack in Europe has become increasingly unlikely.

52. In regard to weaponry for combat helicopters, the situation has evolved since the last report by Sir Dudley Smith¹⁷ in that the United Kingdom Government is still interested in the long-range anti-tank missile (Trigat) project in which France and Germany are co-operating¹⁸.

53. The programme for the multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) of American design, developed in co-operation with France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, is still a success although the development of the war-

heads is presenting a few problems. In the meantime, the French army has started to integrate the first units of this system in its arsenal.

54. The fact that the harmonisation of equipment is proving particularly difficult because of national divergences at the stage when needs are determined seems to fully justify the large number of projects now being studied by IEPG Panel I with the very aim of facilitating harmonisation in this area. It is interesting to note that anti-tank weapons still play an important rôle in the work of that panel and they are the object of at least four projects, as follows:

- aimed control effect anti-tank mine;
- third-generation anti-tank weapon;
- short-range anti-tank weapon; and
- stand-off air-to-ground weapon.

55. Where artillery is concerned, a joint 155 mm artillery weapon system and M483/864 artillery munitions are among the projects under discussion. Two air-to-ground missile systems such as Stinger and Mistral are also being studied and a low-caliber individual support weapon.

56. Three combat vehicle projects are being studied: vehicle robotics, armoured reconnaissance vehicles and new logistic vehicles.

57. It is difficult to pick out a system in the list of projects being studied by IEPG Panel I, but it is certain that efforts are only starting and that we are still a long way from achieving standardised or interoperable joint equipment in every branch of ground armaments.

(ii) *Naval and naval aviation environment*

58. Things are not easy in the naval area, particularly for submarines, where nearly all European countries, within the limits of their budgets, still build several generations of submarines themselves. It is therefore interesting to know to what extent the proposed definition of criteria for designing an advanced propulsion submarine, discussed by IEPG Panel I, will lead to joint approaches among participating states.

59. Among national programmes, the coming into service of the Triomphant, the first French new-generation missile-launching nuclear submarine, has been delayed until July 1995¹⁹, while the fate of the future German 212 conventionally-propelled submarine is uncertain. Moreover, France and Spain have started to study a joint concept of a conventionally-propelled attack submarine known as Scorpène,

16. *Le Monde*, 26th February 1992.

17. Document 1292.

18. *Le Monde*, 12th March 1992.

19. *Le Monde*, 17th February 1992.

which might be procured by the Spanish navy and would be offered for export by both countries²⁰.

60. Except for the projects relating to the coastal mine-sweeper and the combat support ship 2000, now being studied by IEPG Panel I, most naval programmes are still the responsibility of the national authorities, which co-operate in only a limited manner.

61. However, the project for the Franco-British anti-aircraft missile-carrying frigate is taking shape, the defence ministers of the two countries having agreed to start preparatory work on the vessel, which should come into service after 2000. Italy is now showing interest in the programme and next year may decide to participate. The vessel's task will be to escort naval forces and it will be armed with a FAMS (family of anti-air missile systems).

62. In regard to anti-ship missiles, Franco-German co-operation to develop a new supersonic anti-ship missile system to replace the Exocet system is still encountering difficulties, particularly financial.

63. In July 1991, France and Italy decided to develop together a light torpedo designed mainly for submarine attack, to be launched by aircraft (maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters) or by surface vessels. It can also be used by submarines.

64. At the same time, several countries (United States, Germany and Norway; United States and United Kingdom; Germany, France, Netherlands and Italy) have started to study an anti-submarine system and an anti-torpedo defence system but no joint programmes have yet been defined.

65. In regard to the AV-8B short or vertical take-off and landing aircraft programme, negotiations between American, Italian and Spanish industries are proving difficult because of cuts in the United States defence budget.

66. Conversely, the development of a new generation of FSA anti-aircraft missiles planned by the EUROSAM consortium comprising the French groups Aérospatiale and Thomson-CSF and the Italian group Alenia is looking healthy, even after Spain's withdrawal, particularly as Germany is considering returning to the programme²¹.

67. In naval aviation, the IEPG's Panel I is examining requirements for a maritime patrol aircraft; in parallel, the principal European aircraft manufacturers – Alenia, British Aerospace, Casa, Dassault, DASA and Fokker – have just set up an industrial consortium Euro patrol to define criteria for a maritime patrol aircraft that

might equip Europe in the next century²². It should be recalled that prefeasibility studies conducted by the Euroflag consortium on the development of a future large aircraft include the possibility of producing a maritime patrol version.

(iii) Air and air defence environment

68. While the IEPG's Panel II²³, responsible for research and technology, in particular the EUCLID programme (European co-operation for the long term in defence), is examining inter alia the harmonisation of modular avionics, European fighter aircraft programmes continue to be developed either on a national basis or in co-operation between a small number of states: the most celebrated is the European fighter aircraft (EFA).

69. There has been a serious threat to this quadripartite project, launched in 1988 by the German, Italian, Spanish and United Kingdom Governments, since the German Minister of Defence announced, in July 1992, that Germany would not take part in the production stage of the aircraft and might even withdraw as from the development stage. It is not yet known whether Germany will manage to convince its partners to build a lighter and far less expensive version of a fighter aircraft to replace the EFA, whether the United Kingdom Government will manage to pursue the initial project without Germany's participation but with other interested countries or whether, if necessary, the United Kingdom will proceed on its own.

70. Without recalling here the entire history of this aircraft and all the diverging arguments about its usefulness and about the operational requirements of air defence in an international situation that has changed, it has to be noted that a definite failure of efforts to find a compromise solution would be extremely regrettable and merely increase the influence of those who doubt whether projects carried out in co-operation are more advantageous than those carried out in a purely national framework.

71. The example of the EFA shows once again how difficult it is to co-operate successfully in such a specific area as equipment while all the countries concerned continue to work out their defence requirements on the basis of different criteria, to pursue different security policies and different industrial policies and have different economic and financial problems.

72. In regard to equipment for fighter aircraft, the United Kingdom and France are co-operating on the development of a new radar for new-generation aircraft in which Germany is

20. *Le Monde*, 10th September 1992.

21. *Le Monde*, 21st July 1992.

22. *Impact*, La lettre du SIRPA, No. 48, September 1992.

23. See Appendix II.

interested. According to unconfirmed information, the United Kingdom, French and German armaments directors are believed to have reached agreement on the principle of enlarging the Franco-British project to make it a trilateral programme ²⁴.

73. Conversely, where air-to-air missiles are concerned, the advanced short-range air-to-air missile (ASRAAM) project, initially a programme common to the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway and Canada, is in the process of being carried out by the United Kingdom alone, all the other partners having withdrawn for financial reasons. Anglo-American co-operation on the advanced medium-range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM) came to an end at the end of July and in the meantime British Aerospace has started to study a new medium-range air-to-air missile project with the French and Swedish industries.

74. In the framework of Franco-German co-operation, the two countries have concluded a protocol of agreement for studying an observation system known as Brevel based on light, pilotless stealth aircraft equipped with infrared cameras like the American drones ²⁵.

(iv) *Space*

75. For a long time, France and the United Kingdom were the only Western European countries to carry out, each on a national basis, programmes for the military use of space, particularly in the field of communications.

76. As from 1969, the United Kingdom developed a series of communication satellites (Skynet) and, as from 1980, France developed the Syracuse system (a system of radio communication using a satellite). Other countries followed, such as Spain, with the Hispasat programme, and Italy, with the Sicral project. At the end of 1991, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain started to examine the conditions for developing a joint military satellite communication system (EUMILSACOM).

77. It is above all in regard to earth observation that Europe has started to define the conditions for co-operation of a new type. While the development of a military observation satellite system such as Helios remains limited to co-operation between France (the initiator of the system), Italy and Spain, the decisions taken by the WEU Council in 1991:

- to set up a satellite data interpretation and training centre in Torrejón (Spain);
- and

24. Defense News, 7th-13th September 1992, page 72.

25. Le Monde, 12th-13th January 1992.

- to instruct a consortium of space industries to conduct a feasibility study on the possibilities of setting up a European space-based observation system

demonstrated the determination of member countries to bring about the conditions for institutionalised space co-operation whose quality and intensity would exceed all forms of technical co-operation hitherto seen in Europe.

78. The success of such an audacious undertaking is still far from certain. After the first stage of the feasibility study, which comes to an end in December 1992, it will be for the WEU member countries to decide to move on to the second stage, which will last from February to October 1993. When representatives of the firm Dornier, prime contractor for the feasibility study, briefed the Technological and Aerospace Committee at the Farnborough Air Show on 9th September 1992, they were optimistic about the ability of the industrial consortium responsible for the study to carry out the planned system in spite of the technical requirements imposed, but it is not certain that all the countries taking part in the project will be prepared to bear the cost of investment, then operational expenditure and then expenditure on running the project.

79. While the fact that about thirty European firms have agreed to share the task of establishing the system is an encouraging example for industrial co-operation, it would appear that the choice of which industry should equip the Torrejón satellite centre is causing a few problems. The official inauguration of the centre, initially planned for June 1992, has still not taken place and the decision on its equipment, expected for 8th September 1992, has not yet been taken.

80. NATO for its part is devoting much effort to space-based observation systems, including the requirements of the observation terminals on which the NATO Communications and Information Systems Agency (NACISA) is working.

81. Another programme in which NATO is taking part is the improved AWACS system, examined in the framework of the NATO Airborne Early-Warning Management Agency (NAPMA). Other NATO programmes such as BICES (Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation Systems) and ACCIS (Allied Command Europe C2 Information Systems) are progressing very slowly because of their technical complexity.

82. The "sensitive" programmes carried out in NATO often have to overcome political problems stemming either from a restrictive American attitude in respect of technological proliferation or from difficulties encountered by France in gaining access to certain programmes in view of the fact that it is not part of the military command structure.

83. Your Rapporteur proposes not to consider nuclear or strategic weapons in the present report because of their specific nature and the limited number of European countries belonging to the "club" of nuclear powers. It will be for the committee to decide whether a special report should be devoted to the nuclear problem in the framework of a future European Union.

(v) *Summary*

84. The present situation might be defined as follows:

- (i) there is a multitude of uncoordinated bi- and multilateral programmes based on specific agreements between the states and industries concerned;
- (ii) experience and points of view diverge about the optimum number of participants for carrying out a programme;
- (iii) opinions are divided about whether the development of co-operative programmes is more or less expensive than purely national development;
- (iv) the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), the only European forum responsible for harmonising equipment since the abolition of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) in November 1989 has, in recent years, intensified its efforts to:
 - harmonise requirements;
 - draw up a research and technology programme; and
 - set up progressively an open European defence equipment market,
 but it is not possible to see whether its activities have a direct influence on co-operation as it is now being organised between states or on decisions to develop and produce a given piece of equipment;
- (v) the process of collective redefinition of the threat and equipment requirements is making slow progress;
- (vi) in specific areas such as earth observation, co-operation has been institutionalised in WEU;
- (vii) all public budgets, in particular defence budgets, are tending to diminish not only because of eco-

conomic difficulties but also due to the changing priorities resulting from the disappearance of the former threat;

- (viii) on the other hand, technical developments in all armaments sectors suggests that there will be a rise in the cost of developing new systems, particularly for space;
- (ix) there will be no common rules for exports of armaments outside Europe, which are now falling sharply;
- (x) there is no common doctrine for industrial policy (competition or co-operation?) and the responsibilities of the public authorities vis-à-vis industry.

IV. Creation of a European armaments agency and the future of the IEPG

85. While the Twelve, by signing the Maastricht Treaty, aim to take a decisive step towards European Union, it is not surprising that they should have recalled the rather unsatisfactory state of co-operation in armaments matters. In view of its complexity and member countries' different positions, it will not be found surprising either that, instead of taking concrete decisions (e.g. the abolition of Article 223 of the Rome Treaty), the governments again sought to evade the difficulty by proposing the creation of a new body without specifying its attributions.

86. After the momentum given by the Franco-German initiative of 14th October 1991, the nine WEU member countries mentioned in their declaration appended to the Maastricht Treaty, among the "proposals that will be examined further", "enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency".

87. The Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992 gives no details on this rather timid wording in the Maastricht text. On the contrary, it sets this project in the context of the future evolution of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG):

"WEU ministers welcomed the IEPG defence ministers' decision, at their Oslo meeting on 6th March 1992, to analyse the future rôle of the IEPG in the new European security architecture. This represents a positive development fully in line with the objective set by WEU member states in Maastricht further to examine enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a WEU European armaments agency. WEU ministers propose that both

WEU and IEPG experts analyse this issue in depth, carry out an initial examination of the rôle and functions of a possible European armaments agency and submit a report for consideration.”

88. It should first be recalled that the WEU Council thus followed up several WEU recommendations calling for clarification of its armaments policy, particularly after the ministers decided, on 13th November 1989, to abolish the WEU Standing Armaments Committee (SAC), a subsidiary body of the Council, set up on 7th May 1955 in application of Article VIII, paragraph 2, of the modified Brussels Treaty.

89. It is also worth recalling that the purpose of the SAC, which was composed of representatives of WEU member countries, was to develop, in close liaison with NATO, consultations and co-operation in the armaments field with a view to finding joint solutions which would assist governments of member countries in meeting their military equipment requirements by agreements or arrangements on such subjects as the development, standardisation, production and procurement of armaments concluded between all or some WEU countries and open to participation by other NATO member countries. To this end, the SAC was free to set up any subcommittees and working groups that might be required and observers from NATO might be associated with them.

90. In the context of the examination of arrangements for a future European armaments agency, it will certainly be useful for the WEU experts who will have to contact the representatives of the IEPG to discuss this problem to take cognisance of the experience acquired by the SAC during its thirty-four years of work both in order to use it as a guide and to avoid repeating the shortcomings in the concept of the SAC and which complicated its work.

91. However, at present the WEU Council does not give the impression that it is in any hurry to implement the Maastricht and Petersberg decisions on this subject. According to information that your Rapporteur has obtained from the Secretariat-General, the problem of the agency takes second place to the other projects WEU is to carry out with the aim of enhancing its operational rôle. It emerges from the speech by the Secretary-General of WEU at Chatham House, London, on 22nd September 1992, that the planned meetings between representatives of WEU and the IEPG have not taken place and it is not even known whether WEU has already decided how it will be represented on that occasion.

92. On the IEPG side, things seem different. First of all, the WEU Assembly is gratified to have received from the Secretary-General of WEU, last September, further information

about the activities of the IEPG²⁶, although it has to note that the Secretary-General's promise in his previous letter, dated 16th January 1991, that the presidency of the IEPG would henceforth send information letters of this type after each of its ministerial meetings has not been kept.

93. It emerges from the last report on the activities of the IEPG that this group has inter alia enlarged its structure²⁷ and that, in 1991, it set up an “IEPG team” under United Kingdom chairmanship for dialogue with WEU. Also under United Kingdom chairmanship, it set up an “ad hoc group on EC/WEU matters” to examine developments in these forums with possible implications for the IEPG.

94. Finally, at its last meeting in Oslo, the IEPG approved basic principles which should guide the discussions on a possible association between the IEPG with WEU, as follows:

“ 1. All IEPG members should be entitled to participate fully, and with the same rights and responsibilities, in any armaments co-operation forum.

2. There should be a single European armaments co-operation forum, there should be no duplication in this field.

3. The IEPG should continue to operate until any replacement forum was to be operational.

4. Any armaments co-operation forum should take over, as starting point, the agreed policies of the IEPG and maintain existing links with NATO.

5. Armaments co-operation activities in Europe should be managed by the national armaments directors of all current IEPG members, who will be accountable to the defence ministers of those member governments.

6. The existing basic structure of the IEPG should, initially, be incorporated into any future armaments co-operation structure and the existing linkage between the IEPG and EDIG should be maintained.”

95. It should be recalled that the IEPG member countries that are not members of WEU include Norway and Turkey, which belong to NATO but not to the European Community. These two countries are invited by WEU to become associate members. Conversely, Denmark and Greece, which are also members of the IEPG, are at the same time members of NATO and of the European Community. These countries are invited to become members or observers in WEU if they so wish.

26. Document 1330, 7th September 1992.

27. See Appendix III.

96. The words in the Petersberg declaration that observers and associate members "will have the same rights and responsibilities as the full members for functions transferred to WEU from other fora and institutions to which they already belong" are perfectly compatible with the first principle laid down by the IEPG.

97. Nor would there be any difficulties in respect of points 2 and 3 of the basic principles. Points 4, 5 and 6 will have to be studied carefully since they concern the fundamental question of final aims, the creation of a European armaments agency in the framework of WEU and the transfer of IEPG institutions to WEU.

98. The question whether and to what extent the IEPG's structure and organs, in their present form, could be incorporated in the agency depends largely on the definition of the aims and tasks of the agency. In this connection, all concerned acknowledge that an attempt must be made to avoid creating new bureaucracies to carry out tasks already pursued by existing bodies.

99. In the absence of general agreement on the tasks of the future agency, it seems that the most concrete ideas on the subject are now being worked out in France, which, in co-operation with Germany, has proposed to the other WEU countries working guidelines on which the Minister of Defence has given his views several times.

100. Recalling the success of the European Space Agency created to accompany a great European space programme, Mr. Joxe underlined *inter alia* that the context was different for the European armaments agency. It would come into being at a time when the various countries were involved in co-operative programmes that were already under way. He said the agency would therefore have to prepare itself and be ready when the time came, i.e. at the time future programmes are conceived and launched. He said the agency might therefore, in a first stage, play an active rôle in European research policy; it might first be instructed to guide the EUCLID programme and then take responsibility for other tasks, for instance co-ordinating investment policies in testing facilities²⁸.

101. In an article in *Le Figaro* on 9th September 1992, Mr. Joxe also included among the proposed tasks the management of co-operative programmes.

102. It would appear that, in Germany, emphasis is also being placed on equipment production problems, while the United Kingdom is being more cautious. It is advocating a step-by-step approach, leaving all decisions, including that of recourse to the agency's services, to the discretion of member states.

103. If the future agency is not to suffer the same fate as its predecessors, such as the SAC and the IEPG, which ran into enormous difficulties in their efforts to ensure that their work produced tangible results, i.e. the production of truly European equipment, agreement should be reached on a concept allowing past stalemates to be avoided.

104. In regard to aims, WEU can take as a basis the four tasks defined when the IEPG was created as these are still just as topical, i.e.:

- to promote effective use of resources in the areas of research, development and procurement of military equipment;
- to increase standardisation and interoperability of equipment;
- to safeguard an adequate industrial and technical base in Europe; and
- to strengthen the European element in transatlantic relations.

105. To date, the IEPG has hardly gone beyond the research stage, which is important but cannot be an end in itself. It is the development and subsequent procurement and production of equipment in accordance with previously-defined requirements that are essential.

106. Now that the threat of a massive attack in Europe has disappeared and in view of uncertainty about the nature of new security risks, an attempt should be made to boost the importance of defining operational needs, and this is currently the task of the IEPG's Panel I. The panel and its various subgroups, whose activities were analysed in depth in the report presented by Mr. Wilkinson on the IEPG and WEU²⁹, seem to have concentrated too much on technical details and suffered from a lack of political guidelines, starting with the criteria on the basis of which operational requirements should be determined: will each member country decide on its own needs or is this the task of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole or of WEU in its enlarged form?

107. If common criteria are to be found, either for the alliance or for WEU (depending on the breakdown of tasks between the two alliances which is still to be decided), another problem arises. Some member countries determine their military equipment needs largely in the light of the possibility of exporting to third countries, while other countries have adopted stricter legislation for limiting arms exports.

108. The problem of harmonising export policies is even more acute when it is a matter of deciding on, developing and producing equipment jointly. It is difficult to imagine how the Twelve will manage to agree on common

28. Speech to the IHEDN, 13th May 1992.

29. Document 1228, 25th May 1990.

measures – as provided for in the Maastricht Treaty – for controlling transfers of military technology and weapons exports if Article 223 of the Rome Treaty remains in force. The German Government, answering a question put by Mr. Feldmann on 7th July 1992, states quite plainly that:

“In the foreseeable future, it is not possible to count on significant harmonisation of the various national authorisation procedures in respect of exports of military equipment since several countries are not prepared to make the necessary concessions. The talks envisaged in the framework of European political co-operation have so far produced very few significant results. Nor therefore is there as yet unity at the level of consideration of end-destination controls of exports in the framework of military equipment co-operation.”

109. In the absence of common rules, member states applying the most binding regulations in respect of exports will have great difficulty in taking part in projects for the joint development and production of armaments with countries having the most lax regulations once the free market comes into force within the Community on 1st January 1993.

110. Your Rapporteur is not advocating that the future agency be made responsible for managing arms exports. However, if equipment co-operation is not to be paralysed in the future as a result of disagreement about end-destination controls of military products in the framework of the Twelve, it is essential to seek intermediary solutions.

111. A WEU group of experts might, for example, examine on a regular basis the legitimate defence requirements of third countries importing weapons in the light of political and military assessments by member countries. This group might draw up and publish recommendations concerning exports to certain regions. WEU member countries would follow these recommendations on a voluntary rather than a compulsory basis. If a country did not wish to follow a recommendation, it would have to consult its co-operation partner or partners, so the export in question would be ruled out if the partner or partners were opposed to it.

112. In all the agency's areas of activity, in particular in research and development, emphasis should not be just on a more rational use of existing resources; a list should also be drawn up of the financial means necessary for Europe to remain technologically competitive and carry out the various projects now being studied.

113. It emerges from a study presented at the second international congress on land-based armaments in Paris on 19th June 1992 that,

according to an estimate for 1992, the United States is this year investing F 213 000 million in weapons research and development, compared with a total of F 63 000 million for three WEU member countries – France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

114. All European capabilities should therefore be pooled to avoid duplication but the list of priorities should also be revised in the light of the most important requirements.

115. Particularly worthy of attention is the work started in the framework of IEPG Panel III on creating a European defence equipment market (EDEM), intended to facilitate cross-frontier procurement and allow optimum use of member countries' defence budgets which are liable to be cut. Here, for instance, experience acquired by the IEPG should be examined in regard to the focal points set up in member countries and the publication by member countries of bulletins listing calls for bids that contain basic information on the possibilities for foreign firms to take part in national defence equipment programmes.

116. The future agency should therefore, as the IEPG has started to do since 1991, establish close working relations with the European Community, and the Commission in particular, with a view to harmonising Europe's industrial policies. This is particularly important since Article 130 of the Maastricht Treaty – and this is an innovation – encourages the Community and member states to ensure that the conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Community's industry exist and lists a whole series of concrete measures to be taken.

117. In view of the special situation of the defence industry, which is not subject to the authority of the Community because Article 223 of the Rome Treaty remains in force, close links between the agency and the Community are essential. Similarly, the agency will have to establish close relations with the European Defence Industries Group (EDIG), as the IEPG has hitherto done. However, it must be recalled that it will not be possible in the long run to make significant progress towards the establishment of a European defence equipment market without working out a joint defence policy, a task that is incumbent upon WEU.

118. In regard to the transatlantic dialogue on defence equipment matters, the future agency will have to steer a middle course between those wishing to lay emphasis on the opening of the arms market in all NATO countries and those wishing to concentrate on creating a European defence equipment market.

119. However, the example of the IEPG shows that the two approaches should be considered to be complementary, not contradictory. The close relationship between the IEPG and NATO insti-

tutions dealing with the arms trade should be maintained by the agency in a spirit of openness and compatibility. The strengthening of Europe's industrial competitiveness, far from weakening transatlantic co-operation, may on the contrary enhance it.

120. It will be particularly important for the agency to co-operate very closely with all NATO bodies responsible for strengthening standardisation and interoperability of equipment insofar as this is a need that concerns the alliance as a whole. But the agency should set up a special working unit to examine the needs of multinational forces and, in particular, the Franco-German army corps.

121. In regard to the structure and duties of the agency, a compromise will have to be found between two concepts since some advocate an agency with considerable authority whose responsibilities would replace those of national agencies while others wish its duties to be confined to the co-ordination of national initiatives.

122. The IEPG deplored the fact that it cannot adopt any binding measures because it is not recognised officially by a treaty. "How can we open up one or all of our markets if we have no recourse against the protectionist attitudes of other countries?"³⁰

123. It should also be recalled that the status of the former WEU Standing Armaments Committee (SAC), based on a WEU Council decision in application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, prevented that body too from going further than the discussion and consultation stage.

124. Simply transferring IEPG structures to WEU would not eliminate the well-known difficulties. It would be purely symbolic. On the lines of the European Space Agency, the new body should have a minimum of legal status and a

right of initiative which may, for instance, allow it to call for tenders. This would change nothing in the principle of decision-taking by governments from the moment it is the WEU ministers of defence who constitute a supervisory council.

125. However, even the best juridical structure will not be enough if it lacks the political will of all member countries which is essential if they are to agree on a joint equipment policy.

V. Conclusions

126. For more than forty years, expenditure on defence and military equipment in all member countries of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance has been a heavy burden on national budgets since the threat had to be met. The threat having disappeared, the Western European countries are now faced with new challenges, including the need to help the recovery of Eastern Europe and help to ensure their economic, political and social stability.

127. The number of citizens believing that larger cuts should be made in defence budgets is steadily rising. At the same time, Europe is at a point where the risks of conflict in the world are increasing without it being possible to define their nature clearly. While Europeans wish to follow the evolution of defence technology, they have to grapple with new financial requirements that they will be able to meet only by pooling their capabilities.

128. In the circumstances, it is unacceptable to delay the implementation of more rational, less costly European co-operation on defence equipment in the framework of the new rôle attributed to WEU by the Maastricht Treaty.

129. Furthermore, armaments co-operation is a means of enhancing and promoting the policy of European integration in a specific area where such integration, in spite of the possible technical difficulties, is undeniably useful.

30. Briefing by General van Diest to the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Brussels.

APPENDIX I

*IEPG Panel I**Operational requirements and equipment programmes**Sub-group overview*


1. Future large aircraft
2. Vehicle robotics
3. Armoured bridgelayers interoperability
4. Maritime patrol aircraft
5. 155 mm artillery weapon system
6. Aimed control effect-antitank mine
7. Third generation antitank weapon
8. Microwave landing system
9. STINGER
10. Coastal minesweeper
11. Mistral
12. Low caliber/individual/support weapon
13. M483/M864 155 mm arti ammunition dual
14. Submarine advanced propulsion
15. Armoured recce vehicles
16. Meteorological equipment
17. Simulation
18. Combat support ship 2000
19. New logistic vehicles
20. Short-range antitank weapon
21. Stand off air to ground weapons

APPENDIX II

*IEPG Panel II**List of RTPs*

1. Modern radar technology
 - 1.1 Mission related aspects
2. Silicon microelectronics
 - 2.2 SOI technology
 - 2.2 Interconnection assembly
 - 2.3 Military qualification
 - 2.5 SOI cell library
 - 2.7 Mixed analog digital design
 - 2.8 Very high speed A/D converters
 - 2.9 User programmable integrated circuits
3. Composite structures
 - 3.1 Application technology
 - 3.2 Light ballistic optimisation
 - 3.5 Development of technology for high temperature composite
 - 3.6 Composites for electromagnetic windows
 - 3.8 Naval application technology
4. Modular avionics
 - 4.1 Modular avionics harmonisation study
5. Electric gun (dormant)
6. Artificial intelligence
 - 6.1 Advanced work station for command and control systems
 - 6.2 High speed pattern recognition environment
 - 6.3 Knowledge engineering
 - 6.4 Combinatorial algorithms for military application
7. Signature manipulation
 - 7.3 Improvement of RCS prediction codes
 - 7.8 Optimum shape design in electromagnetics
8. Optoelectronic devices
 - 8.1 Affordable lightweight IR sensors
 - 8.2 Intelligent sensors
 - 8.3 Solid state laser sources
9. Satellite surveillance technology, including verification aspects
 - 9.1 Technology concepts and harmonisation
 - 9.2 High resolution optical sensor technology
 - 9.3 Advanced space synthetic aperture radar
 - 9.4 Real time processing and data handling
 - 9.5 Ground segment technology
10. Underwater detection and related technologies
 - 10.1 Low frequency underwater sound propagation
 - 10.2 Towed array heading sensors
 - 10.3 Hydrodynamic noise study
11. Technology in the field of human factors including simulation for training purposes
 - 11.1 Training system concepts
 - 11.2 Simulation techniques
 - 11.3 Mission and/or battle simulation
 - 11.8 Low cost simulators

APPENDIX III

Structure of the IEPG

* Chairmanship on a rotational basis (two years)

1991-1992 : Belgium
1993-1994 : Denmark

European armaments co-operation after Maastricht

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 ¹

tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the Socialist Group

1. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "not too burdensome".
2. At the end of paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add the words "and retain records of such exports".

Signed: Hardy, Thompson

1. See 12th sitting, 2nd December 1992 (amendments not moved).

European armaments co-operation after Maastricht

AMENDMENT 3¹

tabled by Mr. Lopez Henares

3. At the end of paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add “and promote the notification of such exports to the United Nations Register of International Arms Transfers”.

Signed: Lopez Henares

1. See 12th sitting, 2nd December 1992 (amendment agreed to).

*Parliamentary debates on security policy
under the Maastricht Treaty*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations ²
by Mr. Nuñez, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RESOLUTION

on parliamentary debates on security policy under the Maastricht Treaty

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Nuñez, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. Parliamentary debates in the WEU member countries
 - (a) Belgium
 - (b) France
 - (c) Germany
 - (d) Italy
 - (e) Luxembourg
 - (f) Netherlands
 - (g) Portugal
 - (h) Spain
 - (i) United Kingdom
- III. Parliamentary debates in Denmark, Greece and Ireland
 - (a) Denmark
 - (b) Greece
 - (c) Ireland
- IV. Debates in the European Parliament
- V. Conclusions

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Tummers (Chairman); Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: Müller), Sir John Hunt (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Amaral, Bühler, Caccia, Mrs. Err, Mr. Eversdijk (Alternate: Dees) Sir Anthony Durant, Mr. Fiandrotti, Mrs. Frias (Alternate: Roman), Mr. Ghesquière, Dr. Godman (Alternate: Baroness Lockwood), MM. Gouteyron, Greco, Sir Russell Johnston (Alternate: Baroness Hooper), MM. Kempinaire, Lemoine, Lopez Henares, Martins, Nuñez, Pfuhl, Reimann, Seitlinger, Stegagnini, Vial-Massat.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Resolution

***on parliamentary debates on security policy
under the Maastricht Treaty***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the significant progress in the process of European political integration due to the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty concerning the definition and implementation of a common foreign and security policy;
- (ii) Aware of the importance of the rôle the Maastricht Treaty attributes to WEU, which will be required to work out and implement the union's decisions and action in the defence area;
- (iii) Bearing in mind the need to ensure that there is a new consensus on the one hand between the political and social forces and public opinion in the member countries of Western European Union and, on the other hand, between those countries on questions connected with security and defence policy;
- (iv) Aware that the definition and implementation of a common foreign and security policy is one of the most difficult challenges to be met by the European Union;
- (v) Regretting that, in certain countries, the public was not kept sufficiently informed of the progress of negotiations on the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht;
- (vi) Noting also the absence of an in-depth debate on the rôle of WEU and on its relations with the institutions of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, a debate that ought to have been required by the declaration on WEU appended to the treaty,

INVITES THE GOVERNMENTS OF WEU MEMBER COUNTRIES

To instigate a parliamentary debate on the common foreign and security policy provided for in the Maastricht Treaty and on the rôle of and its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance;

INVITES THE PARLIAMENTS OF WEU MEMBER COUNTRIES

1. To arouse public interest in the common foreign and security policy provided for in the Maastricht Treaty, the rôle of WEU and its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance;
2. To strengthen their co-operation with the WEU Assembly in particular by increasing exchanges of information with it;
3. To debate in full the common foreign and security policy provided for in Maastricht, its evolution and the rôle of WEU as specified in the treaty, as well as relations between our organisation and the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Nuñez, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. A consequence of the radical changes that have occurred in recent years, mainly on our continent, is to bring out even more clearly the contradiction between the economic strength of Europe, on the one hand, and its lack of political influence, on the other. Events in Yugoslavia in 1991 clearly demonstrated this shortcoming and consequently the urgency of Europe being as politically present as possible on the international stage.
2. The European Economic Community treaties have two main goals: a common agricultural policy and the free movement of factors of production. Europe's founding fathers were indeed aware that Europe could not be built in one swoop: it had to be built progressively, creating solidarity by introducing bases of joint development.
3. In force since 1st July 1987, the Single European Act modifying and completing the treaties setting up the European Communities has three dimensions characteristic of European integration. First, it institutionalised political co-operation and the European Council, it modified the powers and decision-taking mechanisms of the institutions and, finally, it launched new Community policies.
4. Institutionalisation of political co-operation, introduced in 1970, and of the European Council, set up in 1974, gave European integration a framework different from the one laid down in the original treaties. The Single European Act effectively granted both institutions the same juridical and institutional status as the other Community institutions.
5. The European Council thus became the main institution of European integration and, whereas the latter had hitherto been hinged on the Community, with the Single European Act, it was now organised round two nuclei: the Community and political co-operation.
6. The Single European Act brought the Commission general responsibilities for applying Community regulations and strengthened the European Parliament's participation in drawing up these regulations although it was not given real legislative powers. The Council for its part was able to take certain decisions by qualified majority.
7. This rapid reading of the Single European Act now comes to the aspects that relate to European co-operation in foreign policy matters as provided for in Title III. This is symbolically limited to laying the juridical foundations for action. By concerting and harmonising positions and taking joint action, exchanges of information and reciprocal consultations are to lead to more definite influence in external policy matters. Nevertheless, such co-operation is not binding on member countries.
8. Finally, according to the Single European Act, greater co-operation in European security matters will make a decisive contribution to the development of a European identity in external policy and, furthermore, none of its provisions should rule out the possibility of closer co-operation between member states in security matters in the framework of Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance. The Single European Act refers to security solely as a general strategic concept and to the political and economic aspects of security but not to its military aspects. The foundations have thus been laid and the ground covered has been neither unduly long nor as constructive as might have been wished; it is on the basis of this experience that, with Maastricht, this title has been revised, as provided for in Article 30, paragraph 12, of the Single European Act.
9. First, the Treaty on European Union replaces political co-operation by common foreign and security policy and, although it does not formally change the responsibilities member states retain for themselves in such sensitive areas, it nevertheless implies a major qualitative step in political matters since, for the first time, these areas are integrated in the union, implicitly moving towards a full Community, even if the process has to transmit through international co-operation.
10. The opening declaration of the Treaty on European Union says member countries are "resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world".
11. These principles, repeated in Article B of the Common Provisions, are a reflection of the ambiguity and conditional nature to be found throughout all the articles relating to the common foreign and security policy – and in particular its security and defence aspects – which are due purely and simply to the need to

reconcile the parties' different wishes and susceptibilities. Most certainly parliamentary debates may bring out differences between those who wish WEU to be half way between the Atlantic Alliance and the Union and consequently not integrated in the latter and those who believe WEU should be fully integrated in the union, even if it continues to co-operate with NATO.

12. According to Article J, "a common foreign and security policy is hereby established" and lays down the aims of this policy and the means of attaining them.

13. These aims, i.e. "to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the union; to strengthen the security of the union and its member states in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Charter of Paris; to promote international co-operation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms", will be attained "by establishing systematic co-operation" and "implementing... joint action in areas in which the member states have important interests in common".

14. "Loyalty and mutual solidarity" and refraining "from any action which is contrary to the interests of the union or likely to impair its effectiveness" must be the practice in member states.

15. "Whenever it deems necessary, the Council shall define a common position" in foreign policy and security matters which must be adopted in accordance with the unanimity rule and "member states shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions and, to this end, they "shall co-ordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences".

16. Procedure provided for in Article J.3 for adopting joint action establishes a delicate balance between respect for national sovereignty safeguarded by the unanimity rule required to approve the principles of joint action and the ability of the Council to determine the tangible aspects of this joint action, which may be decided by qualified majority. The whole of this article shows us, once again, through the ambiguity of the text and the optional nature of its provisions, the reservations, reticence and resistance of certain signatories vis-à-vis any deepening that involves more decision-taking in common foreign and security policy matters.

17. Article J.4, after referring to "the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence", goes on to say that "the union requests Western

European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements".

18. It is immediately specified that decisions and actions are to be governed by the unanimity rule, that the defence policy will "not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states and... respect the obligations of certain member states under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework". Finally, it is underlined that none of the provisions of the article will "prevent the development of closer co-operation between two or more member states on a bilateral level, in the framework of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such co-operation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this title".

19. Articles J.5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 subsequently specify that "the presidency shall represent the union in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy" and be responsible "for the implementation of common measures". The presidency is to consult the European Parliament on these matters and ensure that its views are taken into consideration. "The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy" and on this basis the Council is to define and implement common foreign and security policy. Finally, "the Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field".

20. The WEU member countries endorsed two non-binding declarations appended to the Maastricht Treaty that are directly and specifically linked with Title V of the Treaty on European Union. These declarations specify the nature of WEU's participation in European defence policy and its relations with the European Union and NATO. They refer to the accession of new members. The first declaration, on "the rôle of Western European Union and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance", refers to the agreement of WEU member states "on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters" and adds that "this identity will be pursued through a gradual process".

21. "WEU", continues the declaration, "will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete

implementation through the further development of its own operational rôle."

22. The tightening of links between WEU and the European Union will be encouraged mainly by "the synchronisation of the dates and venues of meetings and harmonisation of working methods, establishment of close co-operation between the Council and Secretariat-General of WEU on the one hand and the Council of the union and General Secretariat of the Council on the other", harmonisation of the respective presidencies, ensuring that the Commission is regularly informed and consulted and, finally, "encouragement of closer co-operation between the parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament", a subject that will be tackled below.

23. On relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, the declaration states that "the objective is to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance". Transparency and complementarity are to be the basis of the development of a closer relationship, still with a view to strengthening "the rôle, responsibilities and contributions of WEU member states in the alliance".

24. In regard to the operational rôle of WEU, provision is made for defining "appropriate missions, structures and means covering... [a] WEU planning cell, closer military co-operation complementary to the alliance..., meetings of WEU chiefs of defence staff" and "military units answerable to WEU".

25. "Creating a European armaments agency" and "development of the WEU Institute into a European security and defence academy" are also envisaged in the declaration, which also provides for the transfer of the seat of the organisation to Brussels.

26. The second declaration contains an invitation to join WEU ("on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty") to countries which, although members of the European Union, are not yet members of WEU. Furthermore, other European states members of NATO may become associate members of WEU, thus playing a full part in its activities. Hence it is these points, referred to briefly above, that should be the subject of the parliamentary debates that are considered in the next chapter. Logically and fortunately, these debates have already been extended to the public and to organisations and institutions directly affected by common external and security policy.

27. From these debates, a clearer definition should emerge of aims that are – as they should be – ambitious and means that will have to be really functional to enable them to be attained. These, too, will be better understood thanks to these debates.

28. Referring to the Treaty on European Union, a Spanish diplomat recently affirmed that the timidity and slowness of the steps now being taken in reality concealed the fact that it was a giant stride forward.

29. Whatever the strength of their impact may be, steps have been taken and perhaps the virtue of patience, as shown by Robert Schuman, thus explaining his obstinate optimism in undertaking the building of Europe, has already, for the time being at least, already produced its final and, it is to be hoped, irreversible, results. Parliamentary debates in the various Community countries will probably remove the shadows that still remain.

II. Parliamentary debates in WEU member countries

(a) Belgium

30. In Belgium, procedure for parliamentary ratification of the Treaty on European Union provides that the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate must approve a bill bringing into force the treaty, its protocols, the final act and the appended declarations.

31. Furthermore, the councils of the communities (i.e. the Vlaase Raad, the Conseil de la Communauté française and the Rat der deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft) must also approve the treaty since some of the matters covered by it affect areas such as international co-operation and the conclusion of treaties, which are within the purview of the three communities (Flemish-, French- and German-speaking). The communities' international responsibilities include cultural and educational matters and certain aspects of health and welfare.

32. For the same reason, the United Assembly of the Joint Community Commission, which exercises community responsibilities in the bilingual region of Brussels-Capital, also has to approve the treaty "for matters which concern it". Ratification of the treaty also means modifying the Belgian Constitution in respect of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate of citizens of other countries of the union resident in Belgium. The State Council considers the constitution should be revised before the treaty is ratified but the government overruled this opinion, considering that Article 8b of the Treaty on European Union was not for immediate application and that, consequently, the constitution could be modified before the article in question came into force. The government also considered that, since international law takes priority over internal law in Belgium, ratification of the treaty in itself implied acceptance of the rights provided for in Article 8b.

33. In June and July 1992, the External Relations Committee held a total of seven meetings to examine and discuss the bill on the Treaty on European Union. At the close of this series of meetings, a committee report was approved and transmitted to the Chamber of Representatives for debate and vote. This report quoted Mr. Claes, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who recognised that foreign policy had evolved little compared with what had been provided for in the Single Act, unlike defence policy, which he thought had made considerable progress. As he said, it was the first time since 1955 that a European text mentioned defence. The union would not merely define a joint security policy; in future, it would also move towards joint defence. He believed it would be necessary, in 1996, to revise provisions relating to security policy since application of the decisions taken was raising questions, in particular about the definition of a joint security policy at military level and the effectiveness of the decision-taking process adopted. He underlined that successes in this area had not been scored prior to the Maastricht summit meeting but were a result of it.

34. In the general debate that started in the Chamber of Representatives on 14th July, Mr. Van Dienderen of the AGALEV-ECOLO parliamentary group expressed the opposition of the greens to the Maastricht Treaty, particularly because nuclear war remained a possibility within the context of the treaty. He believed Europe, through WEU, could behave like a formidable nuclear power. Furthermore, apart from humanitarian assistance, the creation of WEU rapid action forces was intended to safeguard our economic situation vis-à-vis countries producing raw materials, thus maintaining an unfair division of wealth.

35. Mr. Annemans of the Vlaams Blok, the Flemish group that is also opposed to ratification, believed no progress had been made in common foreign and security policy; the status quo ante had been perpetuated which, he thought, prevented the adoption of flexible, energetic action.

36. Mrs. Spaak of the Front démocratique des francophones, in favour of ratification, endorsed the Lisbon declaration on common foreign and security policy which she considered to be a considerable improvement on political co-operation because of the common action envisaged. The co-operation between the CSCE, NATO and WEU that had been decided in Helsinki was a practical example of this and showed, according to Mrs. Spaak, that the European security architecture was capable of working with due respect for the principles of co-operation and openness.

37. Mr. Van der Maelen of the Socialistische Partij considered common foreign and security policy revealed one of the treaty's shortcomings: it was not included in Community structures

and was subject neither to serious parliamentary control nor to scrutiny by the European Court of Justice, thus increasing the democratic deficit.

38. Mrs. T'Serclaes of the Parti social chrétien spoke in similar terms; she said the pillared structure of the treaty left foreign and defence policy outside the field of application of Community regulations.

39. Mr. Matagne of the Front national was in favour of transferring sovereignty to the European Union in areas such as foreign policy but added that his party was insisting on a referendum on the treaty. Although the Front national was in favour of European unification, the presence of other negative elements in the text led him to abstain when the vote was taken.

40. All these speeches were made in the general debate preceding the debate on the various articles. When dealing more specifically with common foreign and security policy, the Rapporteur, Mr. De Decker, first declared that Maastricht gave the European Union instruments that would allow it to assert its own identity in future. The process was thus under way. It would be re-examined in 1996 in the light of progress and experience.

41. During the last forty years, European unification had made war impossible between its members and twelve-power Europe had become the main factor of stability on the continent. Mr. De Decker considered this to be its great merit and he also underlined that procedure agreed upon for defining common positions that should lead to further joint action would not be as effective as had been intended. He thought the twofold rule of unanimity and qualified majority would undeniably be a handicap to the implementation of a common foreign policy.

42. Mr. De Decker also referred to the task assigned to WEU by the Maastricht Treaty and the measures agreed upon to enhance its operational rôle. In this connection, he mentioned the transfer of the Secretariat-General to Brussels, the setting up of the planning cell, co-operation with the alliance, the meetings of WEU chiefs of defence staff and the formation of military units under the aegis of WEU. In relation to the latter decision, he said the creation of the Franco-German army corps might be the nucleus of the future European army.

43. Our colleague Mr. Kempinaire of the Parti de la liberté et du progrès spoke of the need for the European Community to have a coherent, operational instrument to draw up guidelines for the political and military aspects of European policy. He said Maastricht had restored the balance between economy and security in the framework of the European Community. Nevertheless, he expressed concern at the gap separating the political world and the people and his fellow citizens' ignorance of

Maastricht, due partly to the difficulty of understanding the text of the treaty. He therefore called for a clear, intelligible information campaign to reduce the gap between citizens and politicians.

44. On 17th July 1992, the Chamber passed the bill ratifying the Treaty on European Union by 146 votes to 33 with 3 abstentions.

45. The ratification process, which is still under way at the time of writing, will be completed in October or November in the Senate, the Community Councils and the Assembly of Brussels-Capital.

(b) France

46. On 11th March 1992, the President of the Republic submitted the Treaty on European Union to the Constitutional Council, thus initiating the process leading up to its ratification by parliament by 31st December of this year.

47. On 9th April, the Constitutional Council decided that authorisation to ratify the Treaty on European Union by law could be given only after revision of the constitution. There were very precise reasons justifying the decision taken by the Constitutional Council: these were voting rights for foreigners (nationals of other Community countries), the single currency and Community policy towards third countries in respect of visas.

48. The Constitutional Bill adding a new chapter on the European Communities and European Union to the constitution was passed by the National Assembly on 12th May after a first reading and then examined and amended by the Senate in June. The National Assembly passed it without amendment after a second reading and the President of the Republic then convened parliament in congress (in accordance with one of the methods of revising the constitution) at the château of Versailles on 23rd June.

49. Of the 665 votes cast, 592 were in favour of adopting the constitutional reform required by the treaty (the majority needed being three-fifths, i.e. 399 votes) and 73 against. Most Socialist Party and UDF members and the Union des républicains et indépendants, the Rassemblement des démocrates européens, the Union centriste and the Union du Centre voted for, the Communist Party against and the RPR was absent when the vote was taken, having left the sitting immediately after it was opened.

50. The constitutional reform was therefore approved and opened the way to ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. In the midst of the trouble caused by the result of the Danish referendum, the President of the Republic decided to submit ratification of the treaty to referendum, thus triggering off an intense, impas-

sioned debate in the country that divided parties and public opinion and kept European governments and citizens in suspense until the evening of 20th September. The referendum thus placed the fate of European political and monetary union in France's hands, a fact of which those for and against the treaty were well aware. Before examining the various positions adopted by the parties and some of their leading members, your Rapporteur thought it useful to analyse the information reports on the Treaty on European Union prepared in the National Assembly and the Senate by their delegations to the European Communities.

51. The National Assembly's report saw an improvement in the chapter on common foreign and security policy and considered that, while more modest than expected, it would produce a mobilising, dynamic movement. According to this report, progress in defence matters, unthinkable a few years earlier, was due to the Gulf war.

52. The report also indicated that the plan submitted in Maastricht on the basis of a text by the Luxembourg presidency provided that the area of application of foreign policy would be defined unanimously, while methods of application would be decided by a majority. However, the text approved in Maastricht increases the use of unanimity for the principles and form of common action while, under the terms of the treaty, the practical content of such action would be subject to qualified majority voting.

53. The report considered that the practice followed at meetings of the Council of ministers for foreign affairs would be decisive: would unanimous decision-taking continue or would there be an evolution so that minority countries would resign themselves to endorsing a joint decision? Where European defence was concerned, the treaty contained the first signs of such a movement; although no directly applicable measure had been taken, there had been a move towards developing co-operation between WEU and the European Union. Finally, the document underlined that common foreign and security policy was set in an intergovernmental rather than Community framework and that the Commission played no part and was merely fully associated with such work. On the European Parliament, as well as the provisions already provided for by political co-operation, there were consultations by the presidency on the principal aspects of foreign policy and the possibility of putting questions, making recommendations and holding an annual debate.

54. Furthermore, the National Assembly delegation for the European Communities, at a joint meeting with the Foreign Affairs Committee on 22nd April 1992, was addressed by Mr. Klepsch, President of the European Parliament. On

common security policy, he believed the forthcoming deadline for the WEU treaty would provide an opportunity to define and complete it; moreover, the neutrality of certain present or future member states of the Community was not, he thought, an obstacle to the definition of such a policy. Finally, he said he was in favour of holding joint meetings between the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the European Parliament and the Political Committee of the WEU Assembly. Your Rapporteur does not quite see the point of holding such meetings with a body which, according to a questionable statement by Mr. Klepsch, is destined to disappear in the near future particularly if, as he said, this would facilitate a more precise definition and a deepening of common security policy.

55. Where the Senate report is concerned, Mr. Guéna, Rapporteur, underlined the approximate nature of the text and subsequent difficulty of interpreting it. He thought the treaty also bore the mark of suspicion of national policies. Common foreign and security policy being a particularly changing area, the procedure laid down was cumbersome and hence liable to hamper action. The unanimity rule might lead governments to decide action on the basis of the lowest common denominator existing between states. Mr. Guéna was also astonished that compatibility with the strategy of the Atlantic Alliance was specifically stipulated in such an institutional treaty that included an affirmation of the identity of the European Union on the international stage.

56. In regard to the Commission's power to make proposals in this area, Mr. Poniowski recalled that it had been opposed to intervention in Iraq; the senator believed acts of war were the responsibility of governments and not of the Commission.

57. The Rapporteur, too, was surprised at this recognition of the Commission's power to make proposals but considered the latter would probably carry less weight vis-à-vis the heads of state and of government.

58. To return to the vast national debate stemming from the calling of a referendum, in the ranks of the Socialist Party, there was not complete unanimity. Mr. Chevènement, former Minister of Defence, said he had scruples about the Maastricht agreements and this prevented him supporting the government position. He believed the treaty, far from being a step forward, was on the contrary a move backwards since the cold war was over; moreover, it would lead to a two-speed Community and a three-speed Europe. Max Gallo, a Socialist member of the European Parliament, adopted a similar position and rejected the theory that what was right for Germany was right for Europe and what was right for Europe was right for France.

59. The President of the Republic, who had described France as the driving force of Europe, said that if the "Noes" won it would put an end to forty-five years of French foreign policy; it would stop the building of Europe and it would also destroy everything the Community had done to date. Mr. Mitterrand tried to remove any links between the referendum and a personal plebiscite, but many of those in favour of voting "No" had been unable to avoid this latent link.

60. The President considered the treaty to be confederal with states remaining states and entrusting to the Community the rôle of settling a number of problems. He thought a move to federalism would be an unduly hasty step for Europe.

61. The President affirmed that the Single European Act by which it had been decided to abolish frontiers and internal barriers would have deprived us of means of ensuring our own security had it not been completed by the relevant provisions adopted in Maastricht.

62. The referendum was called because there was a wish to change a spontaneous but vague pro-European feeling into reasoned, lasting accession. Moreover, the President of the Republic believed the referendum would make it necessary to remedy part of the public's lack of information and the lack of interest of others. The Prime Minister affirmed that, in defence and security matters, France would be stronger with its partners than on its own. Mr. Bérégovoy made the following statement at the opening of the forty-fifth session of the Institut des hautes études de défense nationale:

"Defence is at the heart of state sovereignty. Whatever may have been heard in certain quarters, it is not true that the Maastricht Treaty, by including security among European ambitions, calls in question state sovereignty. The truth is quite the opposite.

On the contrary, the treaty shows that Europe is walking on two feet: while pursuing economic integration it is adding political co-operation between member states, particularly in security matters, responsibility for which it assigns not to an administrative body but to intergovernmental institutions, democratically answerable to their respective peoples and supervised by the national parliaments. Sovereignty is intact, while co-operation increases strength."

63. Mr. Giscard d'Estaing for his part conducted a convincing campaign in favour of a "Yes" vote, his first argument being the maintenance of peace. On the left, some advocates of a "No" vote held that the Europe of Maastricht was the liberal Europe of Giscard. The latter has

never concealed his satisfaction at this comparison. He was certainly one of the main winners in a referendum that he considered dangerous because of the unpopularity of the person who called for it.

64. In the RPR, the organisation of a referendum opened a wide split between those for and against the treaty. The former included Mr. Chirac, for whom a "No" victory would mean the collapse of Europe, and the latter included Mr. Pasqua, former Minister of the Interior, for whom Europe should be built on states and peoples and not on risky federalist theories like those of Maastricht, and Mr. Seguin, former Minister for Social Affairs, who, in a debate with the President of the Republic, made national sovereignty a decisive aspect of his position.

65. The Communist Party, consistently following its traditional line, advocated voting "No" in the referendum. Mr. Marchais asserted that the treaty bore the mark of Germany and that its economic and monetary provisions alone justified a negative vote; then there was the federal trend which would lead to the abdication of a large part of national sovereignty.

66. The personality of General de Gaulle was also recalled during the referendum campaign, both by those in favour of voting "No", such as the General's son, Admiral Philippe de Gaulle, a senator, who had no doubt whatsoever that his father would have voted "No", and by those in favour of a "Yes" vote, such as Mr. Chaban-Delmas, former Prime Minister, who said Mr. Pasqua and Mr. Seguin, both members of his party, had understood nothing about the General's way of thinking.

67. General Maurice Schmitt, who was army chief of staff from 1987 to 1991, wondered whether the treaty involved France's independence and whether its provisions might improve the conditions in which peace and freedom in France were guaranteed and its interests defended. General Schmitt thought there was nothing in the treaty that might hinder French policy or create more commitments than those that had been freely entered into when the Brussels and Washington Treaties were signed. Conversely, he thought the Maastricht Treaty offered an opportunity to build a solid European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance that France had wanted for so long. The General added that, in this way, the weight and responsibilities of Europeans in the alliance would be increased as they were going to have to take account of many new problems relating to their security and the protection of Europe's interests. Finally, after affirming that Europe must unite to be certain of ensuring its security and defence, the General concluded that nothing in the treaty created new commitments for France or limited its freedom of action; on the contrary, the treaty provisions

would strengthen the security of Europe and hence of France.

68. When the referendum was called, about 60% of the electorate intended to vote "Yes" but this percentage fell steadily until it almost equalled the percentage that would vote "No". The latter drew ahead at the beginning of the campaign on 7th September. The final result, 51% for and 49% against, meant the victory, however slight, of "the most French idea that has ever existed", to quote Jean Daniel, Director of *Le Nouvel Observateur*.

69. The result of the French referendum is probably a key factor in general thinking on the future of the European Union. While the "Yes" victory suggests that the lines laid down in Maastricht are still largely valid, it is nevertheless impossible to ignore the high percentage of "no" votes. If forgotten, this would lead to public opinion being distanced from the building of Europe; this danger is moreover a threat in France and also in the other Community countries. Most of the lessons that can be drawn from this referendum are applicable to the rest of the Community: your Rapporteur will therefore return to this point in his general conclusions, where he will analyse them in greater detail.

70. The French people's approval of the Treaty on European Union in the referendum brought the ratification process to a conclusion.

(c) *Germany*

71. Procedure for ratifying the Treaty on European Union relates to two bills. The first is the bill on the ratification of the treaty proper, creating the necessary conditions for the Treaty on European Union to come into force. In view of the fact that the Treaty on European Union contains provisions which, to be applicable at national level, require a change in the Basic Law (constitution), the Federal Government tabled a second, parallel bill modifying the Basic Law.

72. The latter bill provides for the modification of Article 28 by adding a phrase to the effect that, when local elections are held, the nationals of a member state of the European Community also, in accordance with European Community law, have the right to vote and stand for election and of Article 88 on the European central bank, together with the inclusion of an article on Europe making provision inter alia for extending the Bundesrat's right to take part when sovereign rights are transferred to the Community and confirming European integration as an aim of the state.

73. Under this proposed new article (Article 23.2, laying down that the Bundestag and,

through the intermediary of the Bundesrat, the Länder will take part in examining matters relating to the European Union, and Article 23.4, laying down that if a matter that is the exclusive responsibility of the federation affects the interests of the Länder and in all cases where the federation has the right to legislate, the Federal Government will ask the Bundesrat for its opinion), the Bundesrat, the chamber that represents the Länder, will have to be consulted on each transfer of national sovereignty to the Community, including areas outside the purview of the Länder. It should be added that the Länder have adopted a reticent approach to the ratification of the treaty, mainly because they think there is a lack of clarity in regard to the application of subsidiarity to attributions at national and Land level.

74. For instance, the parliament of Rheinland-North Westphalia, in a resolution on the result of the European Council meeting in Maastricht, while recognising the complexity of the negotiations and the ensuing obligation to reach compromises, considered the result obtained fell far short of what the Länder wanted. To this end, the parliament in question recalled a resolution that it approved in 1990 calling for the union to have a federal structure and a detailed declaration concerning the breakdown of responsibilities with a view to enhancing the rôle of the regions in Europe.

75. The proposed constitutional reform, moreover, reflects the Länder's proposals on extending their rights to participate when sovereign rights are transferred to the Community and guaranteeing Germany's rights in the Council through the presence of a representative of the Länder appointed by the Bundesrat.

76. The Basic Law might also be amended by the creation of a Committee on European Union that would be better able to guarantee the Bundestag's right to be kept informed and its participation in European affairs than has hitherto been the case. Consideration is also being given to the possibility of allowing the Bundestag, in exchange for major transfers of responsibility to the Federal Government in European affairs, to have increased rights to receive information and to participate.

77. On 21st July, the Federal Government adopted unanimously the bill on the ratification of the Treaty on European Union and the related bills on constitutional law. Germany thus started the procedure for ratifying the treaty. Both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat have to approve the treaty. Any law modifying the constitution has, moreover, to be approved by two-thirds of the members of both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, while, for the law ratifying the treaty a simple majority in both houses is sufficient.

78. Chancellor Kohl described the ratification of the Maastricht agreements as by far the most important bill of the current legislature. He thought the European Community would thus be completed by an economic and monetary union, major common foreign policy provisions and joint procedure for certain specific areas relating to internal policy. The Chancellor said the European monetary union would set up an independent European central bank on the lines of the Bundesbank so that German political interests relating to stability would continue to be guaranteed in full.

79. The Bundesrat gave its opinion on 25th September 1992. While declaring itself on the whole in favour of the Maastricht Treaty, it nevertheless made its approval subject to a few conditions. For instance, it asked that the Bundestag and the Bundesrat be consulted before moving on to the third stage of the European economic and monetary union. In regard to the adaptation of Article 104e of the treaty setting up the European Community (budgetary discipline), the Bundesrat insisted that the Länder be able to intervene in the framework of existing co-ordination instruments (financial planning council); it also insisted that the government clarify and enter into commitments vis-à-vis the composition of the regional committee that had just been set up, and more specifically on the participation of representatives of the Länder in the Council of the Community.

80. On 1st October 1992, the Federal Government placed these two bills before the Bundestag, accompanied by the opinion of the Bundesrat, itself accompanied by the government's opinion on it. The first reading in plenary sitting of the Bundestag was planned for 8th October 1992. The committee competent to examine the bill amending the constitution is the Juridical Committee of the Bundestag; in regard to the bill on the ratification of the treaty, the competent committee has not yet been named (Foreign Affairs Committee or Committee on European Community Affairs). Both bills will then have to be passed by the Bundestag at the latest during the plenary session to be held from 7th to 11th December 1992. Finally, the vote in the Bundesrat is planned for 18th December 1992.

81. Since the major political groups in the Bundestag are in favour of the early ratification of the Maastricht Treaty – as confirmed on 25th September 1992 by a government declaration followed by a debate on the future of Europe – the two bills should be passed as planned by the Bundestag before the end of the year.

82. During the abovementioned debate, the SPD and Bündnis 90/Grüne Groups asked that a referendum be held on the Maastricht Treaty. Even if the majority of the political parties agreed (although there does not seem to be a

majority at present), the request tabled by the two political groups would be out of order since the Basic Law, in its present form, would not allow a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. (As indicated above, constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority in both houses.) However this may be, opinion polls conducted in Germany all reveal that, in the hypothetical event of a referendum, there would be a majority of more than 50% in favour.

83. The German public followed the campaign for the referendum in France with remarkable interest, including the televised debate between the President of the Republic and Mr. Seguin in which Chancellor Kohl took part. This debate satisfied the media and public opinion because it was not centred on the fears and apprehensions aroused by the spectre of greater Germany. The Chancellor himself thought the establishment of the European Union was the best way of allaying these fears and linking his country firmly with Western Europe.

84. Moreover, because of the federal structure of Germany, the evolution of the European Community towards what some may consider to be a federal European Union is perceived by the Germans as a natural process. Germany is not afraid of losing its identity in the future union; the most it may fear is that it will lose its Mark. The principal German parties, the government coalition and the SPD agree that European integration is the proper response to German unity or, to quote Adenauer, that the achievement of German unity is possible only within European unity.

(d) Italy

85. On 17th September 1992, the Italian Senate passed the Bill on the treaty on European Union with the seventeen protocols and thirty-three declarations contained in the Final Act.

86. The Senate Foreign Affairs and Emigration Committee discussed the Maastricht text at three meetings on 3rd, 8th and 14th September. At the first of these meetings, the Rapporteur, Mr. Orsini, said the political development of European integration was quite clear in the definition of a common foreign and security policy and in the hint of joint defence. The Rapporteur also said that, in spite of the treaty's limits, it was quite certain that, after Maastricht, Europe could and should speak with a single voice on the world stage. He considered the common foreign and security policy to be so significant that it would have to lead to a decisive change in relations between European peoples and states. He concluded that all these factors constituted real progress towards a federal-type European Union. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Colombo, underlined that

the treaty was perfectly coherent with the evolution of the building of Europe in view of the new circumstances prevailing on the continent since 1989. The Minister added that the treaty was a stabilising factor in face of a disintegrating situation and also wondered what agreement could replace it and when in the event of the treaty not being ratified. Mr. Colombo recalled the experience of the fifties, when the EDC was not ratified.

87. Senator Staglieno of the Northern League, announced that his group was in favour of ratification because of its European, federalist leanings, but he admitted his perplexity at the wish to pursue the process after the unfavourable result of the Danish referendum.

88. Senator Benvenuti (PDS) expressed his group's support for the treaty. In view of the revival of nationalism, or even racism, in certain countries, early ratification was required in response to the disturbing signs of this cultural and political development.

89. Senator Arduino Agnelli regretted that not all the aims previously proposed by the Italian Parliament had been included in the treaty: he referred in particular to the lack of a real federal framework, which most Italian political forces wanted.

90. For Senator Vittorino Colombo, the end of bipolarisation had given rise to a polycentric structure grouping, on the one hand, the United States, Canada and Mexico and, on the other hand, Japan and South-East Asia. Europe should therefore be made the third pillar of that structure. In this context, the senator thought the security and defence policy embodied in the Treaty on European Union was inadequate.

91. Meeting on 16th September, the Defence Committee also discussed the bill: several senators expressed their discontent at not having had enough time to analyse the text. The same complaint was made in the Foreign Affairs Committee and then in plenary sitting in the Senate. The Republics, the PDS, MSI and the Northern League believed Mr. Amato's cabinet had tried to take advantage of the date of the French referendum so that the Senate would ratify the treaty as a matter of urgency, thus giving a sign of support for advocates of the "Yes" in France.

92. Mr. Cappuzzo, Vice-Chairman of the Committee, said the horizon had been darkened by the emergence of phenomena of regression, including separatist tendencies that might lead to nationalisation of defence policies. If this tendency were confirmed, the presence of two member countries with nuclear weapons plus Germany's economic expansionism would contribute to the revival of hegemonic leanings in complete contradiction with the European ideal. However, Mr. Cappuzzo thought the treaty

could effectively counter such tendencies. The Vice-Chairman added that the Franco-German agreement on a joint army corps in part reflects this search for hegemony.

93. Senator Zamberletti recalled that WEU had been formed for a priority aim, i.e. to control possible German rearmament, while today, with the Maastricht Treaty, it was on the point of becoming an instrument supporting Germany. He said it could not be forgotten that two Community countries, France and Germany, had strategic weapons and that the treaty did not say whether the nuclear component would or would not be taken into account when working out the model of joint defence. The parliamentary Assembly of WEU must not overlook this aspect.

94. Closing the committee meeting, Mr. Cappuzzo regretted that it had been so short and added that the questions raised might be dealt with during a subsequent discussion on the defence model that should be brought about by the innovations adopted in Maastricht in this area.

95. During the debate in the Senate in plenary sitting, the majority Rapporteur, Mr. Orsini, started his address by declaring that the treaty did not pave the way for the United States of Europe, an idea for which some Italian political and cultural forces had fought for a long time. Nevertheless, the treaty introduced European integration with sufficient supranational institutions, standards and powers to guide the Community towards a common destiny. From Maastricht onwards, the Twelve would have to speak with a single voice on the international stage and adopt similar positions. Mr. Orsini added that, fifty years after the collapse of the EDC, there were signs not merely of the possibility of joint defence but a real prospect, involving complex procedures and obstacles that would have to be overcome.

96. Mr. Vinci, minority Rapporteur, a member of the Rifondazione Comunista Group, described the treaty as anti-social, anti-democratic, militarist and hostile to the developing world. He said that, for the benefit of the European Union, Maastricht had taken over WEU's offensive-type military system in tune with NATO, opposed to the Warsaw Pact countries and now converted to act as a police force in current and future crises in the third world and Central and Eastern Europe in order to protect the economic, political and strategic interests of the principal Western European countries.

97. Mr. Pozzo, also a minority Rapporteur and a member of the MSI national right-wing group, underlined the lack of information given to public opinion on the treaty, a subject which

the major media organs themselves had not gone into. He then regretted the speed with which the debate in the Senate had been held on the pretext that reasons of state made ratification prior to the French referendum essential at any cost. Mr. Pozzo also referred to the loss of national sovereignty that would ensue from the treaty which he thought could not be ratified without prior modification of the constitution.

98. Senator Acquarone answered the last speaker that the Italian constitution favoured European integration and consequently contained nothing that might prevent ratification of the treaty.

99. Speaking of defence policy, Mr. Migone (PDS) held that the fall of the Berlin wall had removed NATO's *raison d'être* and that nothing therefore stood in the way of Europe's right and duty to have its own defence with the aim of security and legitimate defence in conformity with the provisions of the Italian constitution.

100. Senator Molinari of the Rifondazione Comunista Group, said the security policy foreseen in the treaty was an essential military policy whose main aim was to defend Europe against the third and fourth world. As compared with the treaty, the speaker described his group's concept of security based on disarmament, pacifism and co-operation with other nations.

101. Senator De Matteo (Christian Democrat), although in favour of ratification, expressed doubt about the seriousness of the procedure laid down for joint action and its implementation.

102. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Colombo, affirmed that WEU, which was the security arm of the European organisation, pursued no offensive aims, contrary to what had been said earlier. The Minister added that foreign and defence policy should be the true, authentic sign of the move to political union. He considered foreign policy had without any doubt come within the purview of the Community but that it would be implemented partly in accordance with the principle of co-operation and partly in accordance with that of integration. This way of operating would not be sufficient to solve or help to solve crises in Europe and outside, he said, referring specifically to the Balkans and the Middle East.

103. In the final vote, the Senate passed the bill on ratification by 176 votes to 16 with 1 abstention (the necessary majority being 96). Opinion polls conducted in Italy had always given a high percentage for those in favour of ratification: over 70%. Nevertheless, the possibility of calling a referendum did not exist since the Italian constitution allowed referenda only by special derogation and on internal policy matters.

104. On 29th October 1992, the Chamber of Deputies approved the Treaty on European Union by 403 votes to 46 with 18 abstentions.

(e) Luxembourg

105. The Luxembourg Parliament was the first to ratify the Treaty on European Union.

106. On 26th May 1992, the State Council expressed its opinion that the treaty should be approved by a bill passed by qualified majority of three-quarters of the Chamber in view of the fact that, as a result of this treaty, the exercise of attributions assigned by the Constitution to the legislative, executive and judiciary authorities devolves temporarily upon institutions under international law. The State Council also considered that Article 8b.1 of the treaty meant amending the Constitution, although this did not have to precede ratification. It should be recalled that Luxembourg has a total population of 400 000 and that about 100 000 nationals of other Community countries live there.

107. In respect of the chapter on common foreign and security policy, the State Council also said that the planned process would be unable to attain its aims without there first being effective political determination. Finally, the State Council approved the broad lines of this essential chapter of the treaty insofar as it was to make the Community a more influential and active actor on the international stage.

108. The special Maastricht Treaty Committee, whose members include Mrs. Err, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette and Mr. Goerens, all members of the WEU Assembly, submitted its report on 24th June 1992. This report, together with the assessment of provisions concerning common foreign and security policy, underlined, among the principal innovations in the treaty, the concept of joint action and the Commission's right of initiative that it did not have in the framework of political co-operation. Moreover, the report regretted the lack of precision in the definition of areas in which joint action might be envisaged, the fact that the European Parliament was not associated with common foreign and security policy other than to express its opinion and that the Court of Justice of the Communities had no competence in this matter, thus revealing the democratic deficit that was characteristic of this sector.

109. The report affirmed that the European defence identity would be the result of an evolutive process and that the intergovernmental structure – to take a particularly sensitive area that is a matter for national sovereignty – was explicable during a transitional period. Finally, the report found it particularly regrettable that no serious progress had been made for controlling the arms trade.

110. In his speech to the Chamber of Deputies, meeting to ratify the bill on the Treaty on European Union, the Prime Minister, Mr. Santer, referred to the end of the empire that had separated Europe into two parts: its fall had released many forces, some dynamic but others harmful, and it was therefore necessary to find a new balance for Europe. Mr. Santer said we were currently passing through a period of uncertainty rather than certainty: close to home, it must be ensured that Germany was firmly set within a union of states with equal rights and duties. He said the fall of the Berlin wall, reunification and the growing power of Luxembourg's neighbour had raised many questions.

111. He believed that development of political integration in our countries, on a basis of equality, provided the answer to these questions and was the best way to ward off reductive nationalism whose effects might be devastating.

112. The Prime Minister thought the economic and monetary union would not last without political union. Europe must therefore be an economic power with political personality, capable of gathering together its resources and defending its own interests: for this purpose, it should set priorities, define objectives and have the ability to attain them. These means of action were provided for in the Treaty on European Union through common foreign and security policy, which he said was a decisive step on the way to a single foreign and security policy.

113. Mr. Santer stressed that, for the first time, majority decision-taking was being introduced for carrying out joint action and he considered this to be modest but real progress. Joint actions could be implemented in areas relating to the CSCE process, disarmament policy and nuclear non-proliferation as well as the economic aspects of security.

114. The Prime Minister concluded the part of his speech devoted to common foreign and security policy by saying that Luxembourg's security could no longer be ensured except within a wider entity. He said history had shown us that, by trying to play the national card or the card of neutrality, his country lost at every level.

115. As the text of the debate following Mr. Santer's speech is available only in the Luxembourg language, your Rapporteur was unable to understand it. In the final vote, the bill was passed by 51 votes (45 were needed as the Chamber has 60 members) to 6 with 0 abstentions.

(f) Netherlands

116. On 3rd June 1992, the Netherlands Government handed the Second Chamber of the States-General (the lower house of the Nether-

lands Parliament) the bill ratifying the Treaty on European Union accompanied by an explanatory memorandum in which the government said it considered the treaty was in conformity with the constitution, which would not therefore need to be revised.

117. The Standing Committee on European Community Affairs of the Second Chamber held a first reading of the text and drew up a provisional report, which was transmitted to the government at the beginning of September. The government will have to answer it in a document known as an answering memorandum, after which the committee will draft its final report. If the government considers it expedient, it may send the Chamber a note on the final report. Once the preparatory stage has been completed, the bill can be debated by the Second Chamber. This debate will be held at the end of October and the beginning of November and will be wound up by the vote on motions, any amendments and the bill itself.

118. The debate will then be pursued in the First Chamber of the States-General (the upper chamber) in accordance with the same procedure, the only difference being that the First Chamber does not have a right of amendment.

119. The D-66 and Groen Links parties are in favour of a referendum on the treaty, for which there is no provision in the Netherlands Constitution which would thus have to be revised. The government coalition parties – Christian Democrats, Liberals and Social Democrats – are against holding a referendum.

120. Moreover, in her speech from the throne opening the annual session of parliament a few days before the French referendum, Queen Beatrix said the text signed in Maastricht made it possible for all member countries to safeguard their own identity and she expressed the hope that the “Yes” vote would win in France. France and the Netherlands could contribute to unity and the building of Europe.

(g) Portugal

121. In Portugal, ratification of the Treaty on European Union required prior revision of the constitution. The decision to revise the constitution has to be taken by a four-fifths majority of the members of the Assembly of the Republic. On 12th June 1992, that Assembly, having obtained the necessary majority, had the power to revise the constitution. Such revision has to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly.

122. A total of six bills on revising the constitution were tabled in the Assembly, by the Social

Democrat Party in power, by Mr. Tomé, an independent member, and by the Socialist, Communist, Democratic and Social and National Solidarity Parties.

123. The bill tabled by the Social Democrat Party, the government party that has an absolute majority in the Assembly, contains the wording of a new article laying down that Portugal may, subject to reciprocity and with due respect for the principle of subsidiarity, share the exercise of the powers necessary for building Europe. Furthermore, and still subject to reciprocity, foreign residents in Portugal have the right to vote and to stand for election in local and national elections and in elections to the European Parliament. Finally, Article 105 is amended and provides that the Bank of Portugal will co-operate in the definition and implementation of monetary and financial policy in accordance with the law.

124. The Socialist Party's bill, similar to that of the Social Democrat Party, also contains a proposal by which the autonomous regions (Madeira and the Azores) may give their views on matters within their purview.

125. The Communist Party, considering that the Treaty on European Union involved the partial relinquishment by states of their sovereign powers in fundamental areas such as foreign and defence policy, which guaranteed independence and national identity, tabled a draft revision to the constitution allowing a referendum to be called on the Maastricht Treaty.

126. In its proposed revision of the constitution, the Democratic and Social Centre included, with slight variations, the provisions set out in the texts by the Social Democrat and Socialist Party to which it added the constitutional obligation to hold a referendum for all treaties involving the attribution to an international organisation of the exercise of responsibilities of the Portuguese state. The National Solidarity Party's proposed constitutional revision follows the same line.

127. On 20th October 1992, the parliamentary committee responsible for revising the constitution had only decided the procedure its work should follow. At the time of writing, there is no idea what the parliamentary time-table will be for this revision and for the ratification of the Treaty on European Union.

128. There is every sign that the constitutional revision in question will be closest to the bill tabled by the Social Democrat Party and that the possibility of allowing a referendum to be called has been dropped completely. Finally, it should not appear that ratification of the treaty will encounter the slightest difficulty when submitted to the Assembly of the Republic.

(h) Spain

129. On 17th December 1991, the Spanish Head of Government, Mr. González, addressed the Congress of Deputies meeting in plenary session to which he had just reported on the meeting of the European Council in Maastricht. Mr. González, who considered the results of the summit meeting satisfactory, nevertheless believed the debate on that occasion about the common foreign and security policy "pillar" had been complex and difficult, particularly from a semantic point of view. He thought the most remarkable aspect of the treaty was the affirmation that common foreign and security policy covered "all questions related to the security of the union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence" compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. Mr. González said the latter area remained the responsibility of the Council which defined the principles and general guidelines of common foreign and security policy and decided unanimously on joint action and by qualified majority on its implementation. He added that, for such matters, decision-taking swung between the understandable fear of member states to lose control of foreign policy decisions and the need to continue to make progress in this area. Spain had proposed reaching unanimous agreement on which questions should be decided by qualified majority, said the Head of Government, in order to "get out of the mess", since there was no means of reaching agreement.

130. In his opinion, political co-operation had produced far more results than had been expected in the Single European Act, thus creating a sort of case law, which was not binding where decision-taking was concerned, but that no one had failed to respect in recent years.

131. According to Mr. González, the most interesting part of the treaty was where provision was made for the eventual framing of a joint defence policy, which would probably take some time to achieve, but the fact that it was set down as an aim amounted to qualitative progress of great importance, particularly since the present period was of historical importance. The Head of Government stressed that it would be for the European Council to define the principles and general guidelines of the common foreign and security policy but that the Commission would be fully associated with work in this area and the European Parliament would be consulted and informed.

132. Answering Mr. González, Mr. Aznar, Leader of the Popular Party, quoted, in regard to the positive aspects of the treaty, the remarkable positions adopted on defence. They were very close to those adopted by the Popular Party in respect of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU,

joint defence policy and the possible linkage of WEU and the Community with a joint defence policy. He said this was a coherent approach that strengthened security.

133. For the Izquierda Unida spokesman, the chapter relating to common foreign and security policy was a major step forward, but procedure for adopting joint action seemed to him far too complex and its future effectiveness was a matter of concern.

134. The representative of the Democratic and Social Centre affirmed that some British analysts were heaving sighs of relief on noting the lack of pragmatism in the agreements on common foreign and security policy, but to his great regret these impressions were close to reality.

135. Finally, the spokesman of the Basque Nationalist Group also expressed doubt about the real effect of the provisions relating to common foreign and security policy.

136. When briefing the Senate Defence Committee on 30th March 1992 on the security and defence aspects of the Maastricht agreements, the Minister of Defence said it was essential to take advantage of the sound experience acquired by the Atlantic Alliance but without restricting the area of action and responsibilities of other organisations, in particular WEU. Circumstances made it crucial to draw up a common foreign and security policy, otherwise the political union would not have the necessary autonomy. In its defence-related provisions, the agreement reached was realistic in view of the well-known initial antagonism.

137. Once both houses had been informed of the agreements subscribed to by the government in Maastricht, the process of ratifying the treaty started.

138. According to the Spanish Constitution, approval of an international treaty containing provisions contrary to the constitution means the constitution has to be revised first. For this purpose, the government (or the two houses of parliament) may turn to the Constitutional Council to express a prior opinion specifying whether or not there is contradiction. On 24th April 1992, therefore, the government asked the high court to give its views on the subject. On 1st July, the Constitutional Council decreed that Article 8b, paragraph 1, of the treaty was contrary to the Spanish Constitution as it gave non-Spanish citizens of the European Union "passive" voting rights in municipal elections (i.e. the right to be elected, the right to vote already being provided for in the constitution). The Council also said procedure for constitutional reform should be conducted in a parliamentary framework, which does not require a referendum unless one-tenth of deputies or senators call for one. This was not so and Congress

approved the constitutional reform on 22nd July, followed several days later by the Senate, the votes in both houses being unanimous. This opened the way for parliamentary ratification of the treaty.

139. The results of the Danish referendum and the fact that one was to be held in France encouraged the Izquierda Unida coalition to call for a similar consultation in Spain. Under the Spanish Constitution, political decisions of special importance may be the subject of a consultative (i.e. not binding) referendum, but the government, using the words attributed to Giulio Andreotti, said it did not consider such a consultation necessary and that "anything that is not necessary is, in the best of cases, harmful".

140. A poll conducted by the daily paper *El País* and published early in July showed that 37% of the population was for ratifying the treaty and 17% against. 46% were undecided.

141. At the same time, the division was growing in Izquierda Unida between those against ratification (in the majority) and those in favour. At the meeting of party steering bodies intended to find points of agreement, it was agreed that parliamentarians from the group would abstain from voting when the text came before parliament. Nevertheless, some of these parliamentarians said they did not feel bound by this decision and announced that they would vote in favour. The leader of the pro-Maastricht group even proposed, if invited, to campaign for a "yes" vote in France, like the Prime Minister in Strasbourg and the President of the Catalan Government, the liberal Jordi Pujol, in Toulouse. Members of the European Parliament belonging to the Izquierda Unida coalition had moreover already voted in favour of the Maastricht Treaty on 7th April 1992.

142. Furthermore, the country's two main trade unions, the General Workers' Union (socialist) and the Workers' Commissions (communist) demonstrated their support for the treaty, as had earlier been the case of the European Trade Union Confederation, to which both movements belong.

143. At the beginning of September, the government asked the Congress of Deputies to adopt urgent procedure for ratifying the Treaty on European Union so that ratification might take place before 20th September, the day of the French referendum. The Prime Minister thought Spain's ratification would be a positive gesture vis-à-vis public opinion, particularly in France. The presidency of the chamber decided the normal procedure would be adopted, which meant the debate in the Congress of Deputies would start on 1st October. Although the procedure provides for a full debate in the chamber in plenary sitting, its referral to the Foreign

Affairs Committee and its return to the chamber, followed by the same procedure in the Senate, nothing must prevent the ratification process being concluded by 31st December 1992.

144. The narrow "yes" margin in France and the economic crisis in the Community did not initially significantly change political positions towards the treaty in Spain. The government's attitude was to approve the treaty in its present form and to reconsider its renegotiation impossible. It was said that the aim was to avoid a setback to the building of Europe while influencing the aspects that the government had defended the most strongly: cohesion, European citizenship and common foreign and security policy.

145. On 1st October 1992, the Congress of Deputies started a debate on the Maastricht text and three amendments were tabled relating to the treaty as a whole. The first emanated from the Izquierda Unida coalition and was based on the idea that the Spanish people should make its opinion known by referendum prior to parliamentary ratification. In his speech, the Chairman of that group also raised a series of points relating to various aspects of the treaty. He said the common foreign and security policy had been defined in vague, not very enthusiastic terms and believed that, from a democratic standpoint, it was unacceptable for WEU, to which important defence responsibilities were delegated, to escape any kind of control by the European Parliament. He also thought it unacceptable to try to set up a European defence system in the framework of NATO. The Chairman of Izquierda Unida went so far as to assert that WEU was part of the NATO structure and dependent upon it.

146. The second overall amendment was tabled by Mr. Mur, a member of the Aragon Regionalist Party belonging to the mixed group of parliamentarians not members of a political group. The reason given for this amendment was the need, justified by events in Europe after the signing of the treaty, to postpone the debate until more was known about relevant decisions that might be adopted by other countries.

147. The third amendment was tabled by the Democratic and Social Centre. Its spokesman said that, while fully accepting the treaty, his group wished to remedy the democratic deficit in the text, guarantee that the policy of cohesion was given adequate financial support and ensure that the convergence programme was applied with due respect for a fair sharing of the sacrifices asked of the Spanish people.

148. Before these three amendments were tabled, the Minister for Foreign Affairs had, moreover, declared that the treaty gave the union a common foreign and security policy that

would eventually include joint defence, thus remedying the imbalance between complete economic integration and inadequate political integration that was more than ever necessary.

149. In the grouped vote, the three amendments were negatived by 281 votes to 25 with 4 abstentions. The amendments to the text as a whole having been negatived, the bill is now to be referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee and will follow the process described above.

150. Since the treaty attributes to an international institution the exercise of constitutional responsibilities, this bill is an "organic" one requiring an absolute majority of Congress (176 votes) in the final vote on the bill as a whole.

151. On 29th October 1992, the Congress of Deputies approved the ratification of the Treaty on European Union by an overwhelming majority: 325 of the 350 deputies were present in the chamber; 314 voted for ratification (Socialists, Conservatives, Centrists, Basque and Catalan Nationalists, 8 of the 17 Izquierda Unida deputies and most members of the mixed group of members not belonging to a group), 8 members of Izquierda Unida abstained and 3 members of the separatist Herri Batasuna coalition group (linked with the ETA terrorist organisation) voted against.

152. The Socialist Group spokesman, Miguel Angel Martinez, stressed the significance of the "no" votes in view of their origin.

(i) United Kingdom

153. Of all the Community countries, the United Kingdom is probably the one whose parliament has paid the most attention to the Maastricht Treaty, as testified by the number and extent of debates on the matter. The first was held on 20th November 1991, a few days after the meeting of the European Council in the Netherlands city. Immediately after that meeting, on 18th December 1991, the Treaty on European Union started on its parliamentary peregrination.

154. The ratification process requires the passing of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill by the House of Commons. This bill will carry into law the amendments the treaty makes to the Rome Treaty and other Community treaties. It also contains a provision to require a separate act of parliament to be passed before the United Kingdom can move to the third stage of economic and monetary union.

155. The European Communities (Amendment) Bill had a second reading on 21st May 1992, giving approval to the principle. As is customary with constitutional matters, consideration of the detail of the bill will be undertaken

on the floor of the house in committee of the whole house. However, consideration of the bill in committee was delayed as a result of the Danish referendum and the narrow "Yes" victory in France. The subsequent economic crisis in the United Kingdom in particular and in the Community in general led the Prime Minister on the one hand to delay parliamentary ratification of the treaty until next year and on the other to convene an extraordinary summit meeting of Community heads of state or of government in Birmingham on 16th October 1992.

156. Your Rapporteur thought it appropriate to mention in the present study, apart from the debates already referred to, the Queen's speeches opening the United Kingdom Parliament and to the European Parliament, the debate in the House of Commons on 3rd June on the result of the Danish referendum and the extraordinary debate on the Maastricht Treaty on 24th and 25th September 1992.

157. When presenting the text of the Maastricht Treaty to the House of Commons on 20th November 1991, the Prime Minister underlined that the text submitted by the Netherlands in September brought all the elements of the treaty under a unitary structure. That would have brought foreign, defence, interior and justice policy under the Rome Treaty and within the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. It would have been a massive stride towards a centralised federal structure. The United Kingdom's refusal of that text led to it being modified. The new text created what have become known as separate pillars. Some of these, notably foreign and security policy, would be conducted on an intergovernmental basis so that they would remain outside the Rome Treaty and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice; nor would the Commission have the sole right to make proposals. The Prime Minister recalled that intergovernmental co-operation in foreign policy, security and defence was a result of the Single European Act, in the interests of the country and had been successful. Mr. Major said he was in favour of the concept of joint action which, he said, had been introduced by the Single European Act; nevertheless, the United Kingdom retained the possibility of taking separate decisions and acting separately and unilaterally even after adopting a joint action if the country's interests required. On the fact that majority voting should be used for implementing decisions, the Prime Minister said: "We see great difficulties in that proposal. What, for example is the difference between a decision of principle taken by unanimity and an implementing decision to be taken by majority vote? That seems to be a recipe for muddle and confusion."

158. "On defence", continued the Prime Minister, "the position is clear. We have in

NATO the means of our defence. At the recent summit all the members of NATO were clear that we must do nothing to call in question the continuing American and Canadian presence in Europe... We need to develop a policy that is consistent with our existing obligations and arrangements through NATO and Western European Union. It is for that reason that Britain and Italy put forward proposals which would build up WEU, not as the European alternative to NATO, but as the European pillar of NATO." Throughout his speech, the Prime Minister insisted on the need to safeguard NATO against "competing security structures".

159. Learning that WEU was to be the European pillar of NATO and that there should be no incompatibility between the two organisations Mr. Wilkinson asked the Prime Minister to describe the government's aims. Mr. Major's answer was brief and clear: "The government's aims are... to build up WEU and to ensure that it has an adequate relationship with NATO and the European Council but is not subordinate to either NATO or the European Council." In any event, he added, the government would not accept any treaty that made WEU subordinate to the European Council.

160. Sir Patrick Duffy, former President of the North Atlantic Assembly, enquired what was happening about the Franco-German proposal, which competed with the British-Italian proposal. Was that not still on the European security agenda? Mr. Major told him that the Franco-German proposal had suffered a rebuff as a result of the NATO meeting in Rome and said the government could not accept WEU being subordinate to the European Council - that was the essential core element of the Franco-German paper. The Prime Minister added that there were many in Europe who wanted to set everything in a Community legal framework for fear that if they did not old nationalisms might reassert themselves.

161. Mr. Kinnock, then Leader of the Opposition, disagreed with the idea that that the European political identity would be strengthened by adopting common foreign and security policies with qualified majority voting. On the contrary, he believed it would weaken the Community and its ability to act; co-operation and consensus therefore remained the most reliable arrangement for Community foreign and security policies.

162. Mrs. Thatcher said "countries with a history and a tradition such as Britain's cannot allow their hands to be tied on defence and on foreign policy". On this point, she agreed with the Prime Minister but not with the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Hurd, who had suggested in The Hague that there might be majority voting for implementing joint action. She preferred the

Prime Minister's opinions. The member for Finchley warned her audience that by removing the word "federal" from the treaty would not stop the European Community coming back with new demands for more power for the Commission that she called "the conveyor belt to federalism".

163. Mr. Ashdown, Leader of the Social and Liberal Democrats, having listened to Mrs. Thatcher's views on the European Union, was delighted that the present Prime Minister was in his seat and that Mrs. Thatcher was in another. Being resolutely in favour of the process of European Union, Mr. Ashdown bore in mind recent progress made in this direction by both Mr. Major and the Labour Party but attributed their previous lukewarm attitude to the fact that the United Kingdom had been the laggard in Europe instead of being among the leaders. The United Kingdom should share Europe's institutions instead of submitting to institutions shaped by others.

164. Turning to common foreign and defence policy, Mr. Ashdown underlined the need for Europe to speak with a single and powerful voice. Yugoslavia might well be the first example of threats that might be followed by others: they would come not from border conflicts but from religious, ethnic and cultural conflicts and we should be prepared to cope with them. A strong Europe, speaking with a common voice, would be a rock of stability at the end of a sea of confusion and potential chaos. The presence of United States and Canadian troops on the mainland of Europe was one of the conditions for such stability, although it could not be ruled out that those countries might one day wish their troops to leave Europe. An integrated European pillar within NATO therefore made good sense for today and provided a sensible preparation for what might happen tomorrow.

165. Mr. Ashdown said the battle over the word "federal" was ludicrous since the rest of Europe knew the word meant, not concentrating power, but spreading power. He referred to the paradoxical situation in which the government had placed itself by demanding decentralisation while dismissing out of hand any notion of a parliament for Scotland and Wales.

166. Finally, Mr. Ashdown was in favour of organising a referendum on the Treaty on European Union which would allow a vast national debate once parliament had expressed its opinion.

167. Sir Geoffrey Howe stressed that the rôle of NATO must be preserved while Western European Union should be developed as the European pillar. He illustrated the division within his own party (Mrs. Thatcher was wondering how the people could express themselves when all the parties were split by internal divi-

sions) between those for and those against the Maastricht Treaty, the Euro-sceptics (Euro-phobes or Euro-separatists, to use Mr. Ashdown's words) : the latter were tending to increase or at least to speak more loudly, as shown by the debates, and henceforth were not confined to a single party since ambiguity over or even radical opposition to the treaty found a response even on the Labour benches.

168. Mr. Benn considered the argument was not about sovereignty but should be seen in terms of democracy, since the treaty implied that the nation would be governed by people it did not elect and could not remove.

169. Between those for whom foreign, security and defence policy is a fundamental aspect of national sovereignty and independence, which consequently cannot and should not be transferred to another body – unless there is a desire to wipe the country off the map – and those for whom this policy has been controlled by the United States for forty-five years and who are thus not afraid to follow the same course as their European partners, there is a wide spectrum of opinion: however, the leitmotif of criticism concerns majority voting for the implementation of any joint action.

170. One argument has been used regularly against the treaty provisions relating to common foreign and security policy: if a common policy had existed when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the allies would not have intervened and the United States would have had difficulty in acting alone. For some, therefore, the course proposed offered no solution but, on the contrary, placed obstacles in the way of settling Europe's problems.

171. Finally, answering some of the speakers in the debate, Mr. Hurd said the United Kingdom's aim was a common foreign and security policy on issues where there was unanimous agreement, always allowing for national freedom of action in other matters. No one was proposing a system that would have prevented Britain from liberating the Falklands, or Belgium and France from sending paratroops to Zaire to rescue their fellow citizens. No one, according to Mr. Hurd, was attempting to foist a foreign policy on the United Kingdom. Here, he said he was not persuaded that the distinction between the original agreement, which must be taken unanimously, and the implementing measures (by a majority vote) could be made to stick.

172. The possibility having been put to him that France might attempt to separate Europe's defence responsibilities from NATO, Mr. Hurd said first that any common defence policy must be compatible with NATO, second, that WEU, the instrument of the European defence identity, should be linked to common foreign and secur-

ity policy and the alliance, but be subordinate to neither, and, third, that European defence co-operation should not marginalise other allies, i.e. the United States.

173. Reticence about Germany and, above all, France, suspected of leading a movement that accepted only minimum, not to say zero, participation in Europe's security and defence also provided grist for the debate, as did the underlying fear that this attitude might help to weaken the Atlantic organisation.

174. The debate closed with a vote on the motion endorsing the government's negotiating approach to the Maastricht negotiations (ayes 351, noes 250).

175. About 150 members put their names down to speak during the debate on 18th December following the meeting of the European Council. The Prime Minister, after saying that the word "federal" had been removed from the text of the treaty, said the most significant agreement of the treaty was the agreement to co-operate in a legally binding framework in the key areas of law and order, foreign policy and defence policy.

176. He also believed United Kingdom wishes had been met in regard to making WEU the defence pillar of the European Union while preserving the primacy of NATO. This was a vital national interest for the United Kingdom that had been secured.

177. On common foreign and security policy, there had also been agreement to United Kingdom proposals for a common foreign and security policy going beyond the Single European Act, but remaining outside the Rome Treaty and beyond the reach of the European Court of Justice.

178. In his speech, Mr. Kinnock, Leader of the Opposition, made no reference to foreign, security and defence policy, and this was almost so in the speech by Mr. Ashdown, Leader of the Social Liberal Democrats. Subsidiarity, economic and monetary union, social aspects and the Commission were most frequently raised during the debates. When speakers referred to defence, it was to say that, even if WEU were not subordinate to the union but independent of it, the tendency towards "Communitisation" was inevitable: this would lead inevitably to an effective loss of national sovereignty in one of the key national issues, i.e. defence. Mr. Hurd insisted once again on the possibility of co-operating with other member countries of the Community without necessarily having to do so within Community institutions, thus avoiding the Commission having a monopoly of initiatives and avoiding the jurisdiction of the European Court. Once what was now commonly called a pillared architecture had been achieved, it should be possible to show that such

co-operation between governments could be as effective as action through Community institutions.

179. Other speakers considered the final drafting of the chapters of the treaty of concern to the present report was a victory for the views of pro-Atlantic tendencies, supported by the United Kingdom, over those of pro-Europeans, supported by France with the complicity of Germany, and this victory must be maintained during the future renegotiation of the treaty. One parliamentarian said: "We must not allow salami slicing of NATO powers gradually to transfer them to Western European Union so that WEU does not function, as we hope, as a bridge between NATO and the European Community." Your Rapporteur considers this opinion to be purely anecdotal and consequently of no interest. It may rightly be assumed that, apart from speakers who expressed a positive opinion on aspects of the treaty relating to security and defence policy, there are others who refrained from criticising those aspects and are thus assumed to be in favour of them.

180. The House closed its debate by agreeing, by 339 votes to 253, to a motion congratulating the Prime Minister on achieving all the negotiating objectives set out in the motion that was supported by the House on 21st November.

181. After the April general elections, when the Conservative Party retained a majority in the House of Commons, the Queen's speech at the state opening of parliament included the following paragraph on security and defence:

"My government attach the highest importance to national security. They will continue to give full support to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and will work with our allies to adapt it to changing risks. They will aim to develop Western European Union as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the alliance and the defence component of the European Union. The United Kingdom's armed forces are being restructured to reflect these changes. Britain's minimum nuclear deterrent will be maintained."

182. The Queen's speech to the European Parliament on 12th May 1992 was more controversial. It reopened an impassioned debate on relations with the European Community and did little to calm the Euro-sceptics in the United Kingdom Parliament. The Queen paid tribute to diversity, which was rewarding, asked that decisions be taken at a level as close as possible to the people, stressed Europeans' ability to act together when the nature of the problems involved required a European response, recalled that the strengthening of the Community had always accompanied enlargement and, referring to the debates in parliament, affirmed that dif-

ferences of style and opinion were of little importance compared with Europeans' confirmed vocation for conciliation and democracy. The day before, part of the speech had been leaked. This considered that different national parliamentary traditions were considered of no importance compared with the values of conciliation and democracy. Neither the subsequent correction of the paragraph in question nor the explanation that the differences in question referred to those that existed between national parliaments could prevent the Euro-sceptics' conviction that the treaty implied a lack of importance of Westminster's sovereignty and a relinquishment of powers to Brussels. It was therefore in a heated atmosphere, with the prospect of the coming Danish referendum and in anticipation of its result that the second reading of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill opened in the House of Commons on 20th May. In moving the bill, Mr. Major said:

"The bill contains no provision for those aspects of the Maastricht Treaty which cover foreign and security policy, and justice and home affairs issues. If it did, we would have failed at Maastricht to meet the commitments that we gave this house last November. The virtue of those provisions in the Maastricht Treaty is that they are outside the Treaty of Rome, outside the competence of the Commission, and wholly for agreement between governments, on a case by case basis. They need to be put to the house, but quite specifically have no direct effect in United Kingdom law... There is no social chapter, there is no diminution in the rôle of NATO, there is no power for the European Parliament to approve decisions rejected by the Council of Ministers, no weakening of our power of national decision-taking in foreign policy, no word 'federal' and no commitment to a federal - by which I mean a centralising - Europe."

This was a further attempt to convince national sovereignty die-hards that national sovereignty was not affected in respect of matters of such importance. This attempt was in vain since opposition to the treaty seemed to increase from day to day or at least was becoming increasingly evident.

183. Mr. Major held that "for the first time in a single treaty, agreements between governments are given equal standing with action under Community law. In foreign and security policy, and in justice and interior matters, the member states will work together when it is in their common interest to do so.... Where such co-operation is helpful to this country, we shall co-operate with our partners in Europe. It also

means that we cannot be forced into policies we do not approve of". The Prime Minister considered that a new era in the history of the Community was beginning.

184. Mr. Kinnock, then Leader of the Labour Party, again proclaimed the (far from unanimous) agreement of his party with the treaty in spite of his criticism of the United Kingdom's opting out of the social chapter and monetary union (which, according to him, mean that neither the European Monetary Institute nor the European Central Bank could be located in the United Kingdom). Here, mention should be made of the support for the treaty from the United Kingdom's trade unions, the driving force behind the Labour Party and a decisive factor when the latter's policy is worked out.

185. Mr. Ashdown also confirmed that he was in favour of the bill, in spite of the democratic deficit of the European institutions that the treaty had been unable to remedy.

186. The rest of the debate was confined to consolidating previously-expressed opinions and to showing once again the strength of opposition to the treaty among the Conservatives and, to a lesser degree, the Labour Party.

187. Finally, the Maastricht Treaty's approach to common foreign and security policy was seen as a solution mid-way between the federalists, who had advocated these questions being submitted to European institutions, and, at the other extreme, those who would have liked to maintain the situation prevailing before European political co-operation. The vote held at the end of this second reading of the bill resulted in 336 votes for and 92 against.

188. The first consequence of the negative result of the Danish referendum was the postponement of the bill of ratification, first until autumn 1992 and more recently until 1993, in liaison with the trend of the process in Denmark. The request for a postponement emanated from the Labour leader and was accepted by the Prime Minister, who said on that occasion that ratification and implementation of the treaties was of national interest.

189. The Danish "no" also showed that a growing number of Conservative members of parliament wished to make use of the breach thus opened to amend a text with which they deeply disagreed. During the parliamentary debate held after the Danish referendum, about a hundred members of parliament tabled a motion calling for the revision of the United Kingdom position towards the Community. This motion, because of its moderation and lack of precision, attracted many members not belonging to the group of Euro-sceptics. The division of the parliamentary group also seemed to have spread as far as the government benches.

190. Pressure for a referendum, fuelled by the Danish result and the prospect of the French referendum and by the attitude of the Labour Party, anxious not to refuse its support for the initiative, has increased. The Prime Minister has said that he is firmly opposed to a referendum. Opinion polls show, on the one hand, that, if one were held, the majority of the population (as in the rest of Europe) would be in favour of organising a referendum and, on the other, that if one were held the "noes" would win, although more than 30% of those questioned had not yet taken a decision.

191. After the postponement of the parliamentary debate and in view of the position adopted by the United Kingdom Government, which was determined to withdraw immediately the bill ratifying the treaty if the result of the French referendum were to be negative, since this, in Mr. Major's own words, would mean the death of the treaty, attention turned towards France.

192. The economic storm raging in Europe and the narrowness of the "yes" victory in France led to the convocation of an extraordinary session of the House of Commons at which the Prime Minister had to face renewed attacks from Euro-sceptics and his own party and strong arguments from the new Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Smith.

193. The Prime Minister again proclaimed his support for European Union but was unable to avoid giving an impression of some confusion; the same is probably true of his European colleagues. A few days later, the Labour Party national congress rejected overwhelmingly the possibility of holding a referendum.

194. An opinion poll published in *The Times* early in October revealed that opposition to Maastricht had grown, this probably being connected with the pound's difficulties and its withdrawal from the European monetary system: 68% of those questioned were against ratification of the treaty.

195. These were the circumstances in which the Prime Minister addressed the annual conference of the Conservative Party and affirmed that he would never let Britain's distinctive identity be lost in a federal Europe. Mr. Major recalled the exemption clauses the United Kingdom had obtained in Maastricht in respect of social policy and the single currency and declared that the centralising tendency that had prevailed in the Community in recent years had now been reversed with the agreements reached in Maastricht. The Birmingham summit meeting would also be a move towards decentralisation. However, Mr. Major added that a United Kingdom "No" to Maastricht would be a historic mistake and that the first reason for supporting European unity was in order to safeguard peace.

196. The hearty applause of members at the conference during speeches by Euro-sceptics gave way to approval by the majority of the position adopted by Mr. Major. As the Prime Minister himself said, the applause had come from the heart but delegates had supported him with their head.

III. Parliamentary debates in Denmark, Greece and Ireland

(a) Denmark

197. On 12th May 1992, the Bill ratifying the Treaty on European Union was passed by a large majority in the Danish parliament (130 votes to 25). Among those voting against were the members of the right-wing Progress Party and the extreme left-wing Popular Socialist Party. Those voting for the treaty included the members of the minority coalition government parties (Conservatives and Liberals) and members of other opposition parties, mainly Social Democrats.

198. However, the referendum campaign that began immediately after the parliamentary vote showed that the results of this consultation would not reflect those of the vote. The opinion poll published on 8th May by the daily newspaper *Boersen* showed that 41% of Danes were in favour of the treaty, 37.9% against and 20% still had not made up their minds. This poll was also revealing since it showed that most of those who were undecided were among the Centrists and Social Democrats. 50% of the latter said they were hostile to the treaty. In the referendum held in Denmark in 1986 on the Single European Act, which was approved by 56% of the votes, the Social Democrat Party had voted against the text. Another poll by the Gallup Institute, published on the day of the elections, also gave the "yes" votes a lead over the "noes" (47%), while a poll conducted two days earlier had shown that the "noes" were increasing. The final results confirmed the victory of the "no" vote (50.7%) over the "yes" vote (49.3%), by a narrow margin of 40 000 votes.

199. Although the Danish Government decided not to debate joint defence policy until 1996, when the treaty is due to be revised, this matter was the main source of controversy throughout the campaign because of the interest of opponents of Maastricht in tackling it.

200. On the one hand, the parliamentary majority in favour of the Treaty on European Union does not exactly coincide with the groups supporting Denmark's accession to WEU, these being in the minority. The Minister for Foreign Affairs considers it absurd to support a European Union including common foreign and security policy while refusing accession to WEU,

which will be responsible for carrying out decisions taken in the framework of that policy. Yet this is the case of the Social Democrats (with 69 of the 179 seats in the Folketing), who refuse such accession. Rivalries in its midst have not helped to clarify the situation in the party or, consequently, among the public.

201. Moreover, the possibility of joining WEU was considered by some of the population, marked by a strong tradition of neutrality, as abandoning the sacrosanct principle of non-interference. Maintaining transatlantic links in defence matters and fear of seeing the rôle of NATO diminish in terms of European defence brought grist to the debate for those who believed WEU would act exactly contrary to their wishes. Mr. Elleman-Jensen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in commenting on Canada's decision to withdraw the 1 100 men of its operational force from Europe as from 1994, said this withdrawal should mean Europeans would be given greater responsibilities in NATO. It also showed the need for WEU to play a new rôle and for Denmark to join that organisation. The decision would have to be taken during the year.

202. Another point must be taken into account in the result of the referendum: this is the forecast of opponents of a Europe that they consider would be dominated by the larger states such as France and, in particular, Germany, and the ensuing loss of decision-taking power for the smaller countries. Where Germany is concerned, the spectre of the past for the older generations and the image of an economically strong Germany exercising hegemonic power for the younger generations also influenced the state of mind of a large part of the Danish electorate. It should also be pointed out that a majority in areas along the frontier with Germany voted "yes".

203. Quite apart from any other reasons, the arguments set out above had a particularly strong impact on the result of the Danish referendum; whatever solution Denmark may choose for solving the serious internal crisis caused by the referendum and the no less serious crisis from which the Community is suffering, common foreign and security policy will be at the heart of the debate.

(b) Greece

204. On 31st July 1992, the Greek Parliament passed the Bill ratifying the Treaty on European Union. 295 of the 300 members of parliament were present and 286 of them voted for the treaty. One member of the PASOK abstained and the votes against emanated from the Communist Party (KKE) and the Ecologist member. The party in power (the New Democracy Conservatives), the PASOK Socialists and members

of the Left-Wing and Progress Coalition voted in favour of the treaty. Although the main opposition parties voted in favour, this vote, as they themselves admit, was critical approval because of the social cost of the measures that would be necessary in the context of the economic and monetary union in a country already suffering from serious economic problems. Speaking of the Danish referendum, the Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Mitsotakis, affirmed that, if a similar consultation had been held in Greece, 90% of the electorate would have voted in favour. The overwhelming victory of those in favour in parliament probably proved him right. In the same statement, the Prime Minister included a word of warning: his country's pro-European feelings might change if the Community decided to support Yugoslav Macedonia's claims to retain its name once it became an independent state. In fact, members of the Community were showing growing irritation at the blockage of common foreign policy by the Greeks, who refuse to recognise the right of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to retain its name after independence.

205. In other statements to the press last June, Mr. Mitsotakis held that the use of the name of Macedonia by a new Slav republic in the Balkans was unauthorised assumption of the name of a Greek republic that had borne it for 3000 years and an attempt to steal the Hellenic patrimony and culture of that territory and its population. He added that Skopje's insistence betrayed territorial claims and undermined the prospects of peace throughout the region.

206. Parliamentary ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was initially programmed for November but was brought forward to prove Greece's gratitude at the Community's support for its position vis-à-vis the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

207. Unfortunately, the report of the debates on the Treaty on European Union in the Greek Parliament exist only in Greek and attempts to obtain accurate information, even verbally, on this text have been unsuccessful. Your Rapporteur is therefore unable to express an opinion on these debates.

(c) Ireland

208. The result of the referendum on the Treaty on European Union held in Ireland on 18th June 1992 to some extent restored the balance that had been upset by the Danish referendum. With 57% of the electorate voting, 69% were in favour of the Maastricht Treaty and 31% against.

209. According to the Prime Minister, Mr. Reynolds, the electoral campaign had revealed a shortage of information. The campaign had

perhaps done little to remedy this because of the determination of certain ultra-Conservative Catholic groups to assimilate the Maastricht Treaty with the introduction of abortion in the Republic of Ireland. The possible convening of another referendum on the subject this autumn did not discourage the pro-life movement from pursuing its campaign, basing it solely on the legalisation of abortion in Ireland through the Maastricht Treaty.

210. Moreover, the left-wing and green groups concentrated their attacks on the Treaty on European Union on what they considered to be the threat of the treaty provisions relating to common and foreign security policy for Irish neutrality. Some went so far as to refer to the hypothetical recruitment of a European army, and the image spread throughout the country of young Irishmen called up for that army and taking part in far-off missions. The Prime Minister had affirmed, on the one hand, that none of Maastricht's defence implications would be felt before 1996, when another referendum on those matters would be organised, and, on the other, thanks to the referendum, Ireland might be able to maintain its traditional neutrality within a Europe pursuing a common foreign and security policy.

211. The green paper published by the Irish Government with the intention of making an objective, balanced assessment of the treaty makes the following precisions in the chapter on common foreign and security policy: "The distinction between security and defence drawn by Ireland in the negotiations is upheld. Security issues are matters for the European Union. Where these have defence implications, a rôle for WEU may arise. Moreover, any decision by the European Union to refer matters with defence implications to WEU for elaboration or implementation requires unanimity."

212. The treaty includes a provision that is of particular importance for Ireland since it lays down that the union's security policy "shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states". This guarantees that the union's actions or decisions will not be able to prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of Ireland, which is outside the military alliances.

213. In regard to the declaration appended to the treaty in which the member states of WEU invite states members of the European Union to accede to WEU or to become observers if they so wish, the abovementioned green paper says Ireland has already accepted invitations to attend, as an observer, three ministerial meetings of the WEU Council, two of which to discuss the Yugoslav crisis and the third, in Maastricht, when WEU examined its future relations with the European Union and the abovementioned invitation to member states of

the European Union. The green paper adds: "Membership of WEU or attendance as observers at WEU meetings are not required by the treaty. Nonetheless the government believe that attendance at future meetings of WEU as an observer would have a number of advantages for Ireland. It would ensure that Ireland is fully informed of developments in WEU which might have a bearing on discussions in the European Union when issues with defence implications arise. It would place Ireland in a better position to formulate appropriate policies and responses on such issues within the European Union. It would better enable the government to decide on any vote in the European Union on the reference of defence matters to WEU. Finally, it would enable Ireland to follow the subsequent course of discussions in WEU."

214. The green paper goes on to say: "It is important to note that attendance as observers would not require Ireland to become a member of WEU, to accede to the Brussels Treaty establishing WEU, to take up any obligations under the Brussels Treaty, or to subscribe to policy positions or platforms adopted by WEU. Ireland would not become a party to WEU as an alliance or undertake any mutual defence commitments or military obligations under the WEU treaty."

215. Finally, the text specifies that the treaty provides for the common foreign and security policy to be revised in 1996. Article J.4.6 of the treaty provides that the conference convened in accordance with Article N may revise the provisions of the common foreign and security policy relating to security, including the possible establishment of a joint defence policy. The result of the intergovernmental conference would have to be the subject of unanimous agreement and any changes to the treaty ratified by member states would have to be in conformity with their respective constitutions and legislation.

216. The problem of Ireland's neutrality having thus been deferred to a possible referendum in 1996 and that of abortion to a similar consultation to be organised before the end of the year, the number of "yes" votes recorded in the referendum on 18th June exceeded all estimates. The government coalition parties (Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats) were in favour of ratification as were the Fine Gael and the Labour Party (the latter with some reservations, however), while the pro-life movement mentioned above, the Democratic Socialist Party and the Greens were against. The "yes" vote triumphed in every constituency in the country, including the western rural areas. The highest percentage of "no" votes corresponds mainly to the working-class districts of Dublin, which are particularly affected by unemployment. This referendum, in which the Irish people expressed themselves on the subject of Europe, was the third of its kind, following

the ones in 1972 on joining the Community and in 1987 on the Single European Act.

IV. Debates in the European Parliament

217. The President of the Commission of the European Communities, Mr. Delors, addressed the European Parliament on 12th February 1992 on the occasion of the presentation of the text entitled "From the single Act to Maastricht and beyond: the means to match our ambitions" and of the Commission's programme of work for 1992. In his address on "1992: a pivotal year", Mr. Delors said, on common foreign and security policy, that its functioning depended on decisions to be taken by the Council of Ministers on its implementation. In this area, he added, everything still had to be invented in order to benefit from the process of simple, effective assessments and decisions. In regard to the Commission he said that, because it was granted a shared right of initiative in those areas, it must also organise itself accordingly and adjust its own methods to those that the Council of Ministers would have. Referring to the Council's decision to prepare a report on the Community's foreign policy priorities, Mr. Delors stressed that these priorities also corresponded to the need for coherence between foreign policy proper and economic and financial actions obeying Community rules. The existence of different pillars should not, he thought, prevent foreign policy being handled globally, coherently and effectively.

218. For Mr. Delors, the Community's contribution to international stability must first be through the strengthening of security and stability in Europe, in view of developments in the Central European countries which affect the Community's immediate environment and political, economic and military problems in Russia and the other states of the new Commonwealth of Independent States. Secondly, the Community must assume special responsibility in the Mediterranean and in countries with which it has historical and geographical links, most of which are faced with serious problems of political instability, very high birth rates and vast migrations of populations due to a particularly high unemployment rate among young people.

219. Finally, Mr. Delors said the Community should not forget its responsibilities to Africa, South America and Asia and these should remain essential aspects of foreign policy.

220. In the text from the Commission mentioned above, it was considered that it would not be easy to have a common foreign and security policy in view of the trend of the discussions that dominated the intergovernmental conference on political union. However, it was of

little importance that some considered the prospects offered by the new treaty satisfactory while others thought they would cause paralysis; the main thing was to follow the course laid down and seek to solve the problems that arose bearing in mind priorities already indicated by the President of the Commission.

221. On 7th April 1992, the European Parliament debated the Institutional Committee's Martin report and approved Resolution A3-D123/92 on the results of intergovernmental conferences by a large majority: 226 to 62 (Greens, French Communists and the European extreme right-wing) with 31 abstentions (RPR and Conservatives).

222. The resolution adopted recalled that the Parliament had previously affirmed that a common foreign policy including joint examination of matters relating to peace, security and arms control was one of the fundamental elements of the European Union.

223. After noting that the Maastricht Treaty contained provisions that contradicted the requirements laid down by the Parliament and underlining that the treaty provided for the convocation of an intergovernmental conference in 1996, which amounted to taking note of the inadequacy of its results, the European Parliament urged national parliaments to ratify the treaty and ensure that their respective national governments fill in the principal gaps as soon as possible.

224. Among these gaps are the fact that common foreign and security policy is not included in the European Community treaty, thus implying that the Commission and the Parliament play a less important rôle in this area and ruling out any possibility of recourse to the Court of Justice, and also that the treaty entrusted defence matters to WEU without providing for adequate parliamentary control of the activities of that organisation.

225. The European Parliament has probably forgotten that, on the one hand, Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty lays down that the WEU Council has to present to the Assembly an annual report on its activities and, on the other, that, insofar as defence remains a matter for states, the WEU Assembly, composed of representatives of national parliaments deciding their respective defence policies and approving the corresponding budgets, is the only body capable of filling the gap referred to in the European Parliament's resolution.

226. A working paper of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the European Parliament relating to the establishment of common foreign policy for the European Community, dated 8th April 1992, holds, in regard to parliamentary supervision of the activities of the WEU Council, that it is for the European Par-

liament, the only democratically-elected body, to exercise such supervision and that the parliament should consequently replace the WEU Assembly in all respects, the latter being composed of parliamentarians who must, statutorily, be members of national parliaments and of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The text concludes by inviting the WEU Council to take an official political undertaking to answer questions by the Parliament, to present its activities in plenary sitting or in committee and, in short, to apply procedure in force for foreign policy matters.

227. Your Rapporteur considers the strengthening of co-operation between the parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament as envisaged in the declaration on WEU appended to the Maastricht Treaty should overcome the inadequacies of the abovementioned European Parliament texts.

V. Conclusions

228. Generally speaking, the relative difference between the degree of approval obtained by the Treaty on European Union in the various parliaments and among the public should be underlined, whether the latter expressed itself in a referendum or through opinion polls.

229. Probably a cause of this dissonance between parliaments and public opinion is due to what some considered to be the democratic deficit of the Community institutions. Community Europe has been built on agreements between governments with no direct participation by the public. The institutions and bodies which have absorbed some of the responsibilities of state do not enjoy the same level of representativeness and legitimacy as the corresponding national institutions and bodies.

230. In some cases, the absence of an in-depth national debate and the lack of detailed, clear information have influenced those citizens who were tempted to reject what they did not know or did not know well enough. A referendum is not always the best means of solving the problems referred to above, partly because this type of consultation implies an answer based not so much on the question put as on the person who puts it, thus adding to the debate a whole series of factors, most of which are alien to the subject of the consultation. In any event, it is when parliamentary forces are the most deeply divided that a referendum seems the most appropriate solution.

231. Moreover, because of its imprecision, the model of a supranational institution proposed as an alternative to the national model has not convinced the public that it would offer adequate guarantees of participation, viability and effectiveness.

232. However this may be, the shortcomings noted should not serve as a pretext for preventing ratification: the treaty is an attempt, insufficient perhaps but no less real, to remedy these shortcomings. Ratification certainly does not mean that present difficulties will be overcome completely but it is also sure that failure to ratify would increase these same difficulties and start a period of great instability and uncertainty.

233. In regard to the common foreign and security policy provided for in the Treaty on European Union, rejection of the present text would not result in a better, clearer and more ambitious text; on the contrary, it is to be feared that integration would not go so far, that it would be more acceptable to the United States

and Japan as our political and economic rivals and that it would consequently be less European. Furthermore, it would heighten nationalist tension on our continent and return us to positions held prior to Maastricht.

234. Moreover, it is clear that there is an immediate need for national parliaments to debate in extenso, at sessions devoted solely to the matter, the common foreign and security policy provided for in Maastricht, its evolution, the rôle of WEU as set out in the treaty and relations between our organisation and the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. The path has already been traced, but to embark upon it will mean follow-up action, assessment and contributions by the various national parliaments in full consultation with the WEU Assembly.

Western European Union (WEU)

(Draft of a new booklet)

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations ²
by Mr. Lopez Henares and Mr. Tummers, co-Rapporteurs*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT ORDER

on the draft of a new booklet on Western European Union

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Lopez Henares and Mr. Tummers, co-Rapporteurs

Draft Order

on the draft of a new booklet on Western European Union

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the report on the draft of a new booklet on WEU submitted by its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations;
- (ii) Considering that this text is an appropriate basis for the general information of parliamentarians and the public in member countries,

INSTRUCTS ITS COMMITTEE FOR PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

1. To ensure that, with the aid of national delegations, a booklet based on the report submitted is published in the seven languages of the WEU member countries;
2. To ensure that the text of this booklet is brought up to date in the event of major developments in WEU prior to its publication.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Tummers (Chairman); Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: *Müller*), Sir *John Hunt* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Amaral*, *Bühler*, *Caccia*, Mrs. *Err*, Mr. *Eversdijk* (Alternate: *Dees*), Sir *Anthony Durant*, Mr. *Fiandrotti*, Mrs. *Frias* (Alternate: *Roman*), Mr. *Ghesquière*, Dr. *Godman* (Alternate: *Baroness Lockwood*), MM. *Gouteyron*, *Greco*, Sir *Russell Johnston* (Alternate: *Baroness Hooper*), MM. *Kempinaire*, *Lemoine*, *Lopez Henares*, *Martins*, *Nuñez*, *Pfuhl*, *Reimann*, *Seitlinger*, *Stegagnini*, *Vial-Massat*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Lopez Henares and Mr. Tummers, co-Rapporteurs)

Introduction

The Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations thought it necessary to replace the booklet entitled "Western European Union" published in 1990 because of the development of the organisation, particularly following the Maastricht agreements, followed by the Petersberg declaration: the two events indeed make the modified Brussels Treaty topical again in view of the realities of the new Europe.

The purpose of this text is the same as that which guided the preparation and distribution of its predecessors: to provide accurate, up-to-date information about WEU and to make the necessary effort to ensure that a wide public is contacted so as to rectify our fellow citizens' lack of knowledge of European security and defence matters.

It is well realised that the present text can but be provisional in the present transitional period for WEU after the Maastricht agreements and in view of the sometimes unpredictable international situation.

***Communiqué issued after the meeting of the WEU Permanent Council
at Ambassador level with colleagues of eight
Central and Eastern European countries***

London, 14th October 1992

The WEU Permanent Council met in London today at Ambassador level with colleagues of eight Central and Eastern European countries. The WEU Secretary-General was in the chair.

This was the first meeting of the WEU Forum of Consultation which was set up by an extraordinary WEU ministerial meeting with these countries in Bonn on 19th June 1992.

Participants exchanged views on the enhancement of their relations within the WEU forum and within the wider CSCE framework. They also discussed topical security questions of common concern.

The next meeting of the WEU forum will take place in 1993 at WEU's new headquarters in Brussels.

Defence: Central Europe in evolution

REPORT ¹

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee ²
by Mr. Cox, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on defence: Central Europe in evolution

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Cox, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. WEU initiatives
- III. The political situation in transition
- IV. Economics
- V. Security questions
- VI. Foreign policy developments
- VII. Armed forces and defence
– “ Berlin revisited ”
- VIII. Defence industries
- IX. Conclusion

APPENDIX

GLOSSARY

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. de Puig (Alternate: Moya) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bassinet, Borderas, Brito, Cariglia, Chevalier (Alternate: Sarens), Cox, De Decker, Dees, Durand, Fernandes Marques, Fiandrotti, Fioret, Fourré, Hardy, Irmer, Jung, Klechtermans, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden, Marten, Lord Newall, MM. Pecchioli, Perinat (Alternate: Cuco), Reis Leite (Alternate: Mrs. Aguiar), Scheer, Sinesio, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Steiner, Vazquez (Alternate: Bolinaga), Zierer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft recommendation
on defence: Central Europe in evolution

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming progress made in establishing a formal relationship between WEU and the states of Central Europe;
- (ii) Welcoming the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers together with the Foreign and Defence Ministers of Central European states on 19th June 1992;
- (iii) Welcoming the declaration agreed at the same meeting and aiming "to strengthen existing relations between WEU and the Central European states by structuring the dialogue, consultations and co-operation";
- (iv) Welcoming the Council's largely positive replies on those aspects of relations with the Central European states stressed in Recommendations 518 and 524;
- (v) Welcoming the various initiatives taken under the aegis of the WEU Institute for Security Studies to deepen the discussion with the Central European states;
- (vi) Determined to maintain the momentum of its own relationship with the governments and parliaments concerned;
- (vii) Recalling Recommendation 510 on "Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland" and extending the recommendations to include reference also to Bulgaria and Romania,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Fulfil the expectations of the Central European states by regular and relevant dialogue and timely discussion of current issues;
2. Follow closely possible moves in the European Community to create the new status of "affiliate member" which could have implications for the formal relationship between the Central European states and WEU;
3. Include the Central European states in appropriate seminars to provide an opportunity for debate on subjects of mutual interest, such as national service and conscription;
4. Invite the Central European states to observe the exercises to be co-ordinated by the WEU planning cell;
5. Encourage member states as appropriate to develop relations with the Central European states in the realms of:
 - higher staff training;
 - budgetary management;
 - procurement (especially for air defence);
 - personnel exchanges;
 - language training;
 - military survey and mapping;
 - command and control (C²) and identification friend or foe (IFF) systems;
6. Explore ways in which the Central European states might be associated with the development of a European armaments agency;
7. Seek the opinions of the Central European states on matters scheduled for discussion in the CSCE and NACC and wherever possible co-ordinate positions;
8. Institute regular meetings of the "Seventeen" in the context of the Vienna Forum for Security Co-operation;
9. Ensure that accounts of consultations with the Central European states at ministerial and WEU Permanent Council/Ambassador level and meetings of senior officials or seminars organised by the Institute for Security Studies are included in the annual report to the Assembly;
10. Establish information points in the capitals of the Central European states, by using the good offices of the embassies of WEU members.

*Explanatory Memorandum**(submitted by Mr. Cox, Rapporteur)**I. Introduction*

1. In preparation for the present report, the Defence Committee and your Rapporteur have been fortunate to have had a number of opportunities to meet a series of individuals from the Central European states: ministers, diplomats, military men, parliamentarians, who have all gone to great lengths to explain the hopes and aspirations of their countries and peoples and to discuss the possibilities for defence co-operation for the future.

2. The leading authorities of their countries consulted have included:

Bulgaria

The Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Valentin Dobrev.

Czechoslovakia

The Chief of the Defence Staff, General Pezl.

Hungary

The Defence Minister, Mr. Lajos Für.

Poland

The Foreign Minister, Professor Krzysztof Skubiszewski;

The Defence Minister, Dr. Janusz Onyskiewicz.

Romania

The Foreign Minister, Mr. Adrian Nastase;

The Defence Minister, Lt. Gen. Nicolae Spiroiu;

The Secretary of State for Defence and Chief of the Defence Staff, Lt. Gen. Dumitru Cioflina;

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Teodor Meliscanu.

3. In addition, the respective Defence and Political Attachés in the embassies of the countries concerned, both in London and in Paris, have been particularly helpful in answering a multitude of questions and arranging meetings: the committee and your Rapporteur wish to put on record their gratitude to all concerned.

4. The evolution of matters concerning defence is of course inextricably linked with

political considerations and your Rapporteur makes no excuse for devoting part of the present report to the political and indeed the economic situation which dominates the Central European scene.

5. Every country is of course striving for political and economic stability, but the path is decidedly uphill for all, and positively mountainous for some, with a multitude of crevasses on the way. The worst potential dangers perhaps being the impending split of the Czech and Slovak Republic and the ethnic problems which bedevil a number of states.

6. The member countries of Western European Union have a specific interest in maintaining and developing a good working relationship with Central Europe and are very fortunate in the range of contacts which are now possible in a number of international organisations: the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, the Council of Europe and now, since the Bonn meeting on 19th June 1992, our own consultations at "Seventeen".

7. The present report concentrates on the five Central European states which have a fully-established defence structure where it is comparatively straightforward to discern and quantify current evolution in defence policy, military hardware, etc.

8. As for the Baltic states the immediate necessity is to establish a defence structure where no indigenous organisation has existed hitherto.

9. For Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the first priority is the policing of frontiers and therefore initial efforts at defence are giving priority to establishing border troops in all three countries, and in the case of Estonia and Latvia, also forming a coast guard. In due course each nation is keen to establish rapid reaction units to provide a defensive "fire brigade" capability, but progress in establishing forces has been slow, mainly because of a lack of finance and also a lack of expertise.

10. The WEU and the North Atlantic Co-operation Council have been instrumental in providing moral support but of course the major preoccupation in the Baltic states has been the uncertainty regarding Russian troop withdrawals.

II. WEU initiatives

11. The WEU Assembly has taken various special initiatives with regard to Central European security and in helping to build the relationship between WEU and the states concerned. Likewise the Council. In practical terms this has meant:

- invitations to ministers to address meetings of the Assembly or its committees;
- regular invitations to the parliaments of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania to send delegations to attend the Assembly's plenary sessions;
- study visits by the Assembly's committees and rapporteurs;
- visits by the Secretary-General, usually accompanied by the representative of the current presidency;
- a series of seminars on a variety of themes organised by the WEU Institute for Security Studies;
- contacts between officials working on specific research or initiatives such as open skies or arms control verification.

12. The present report is a follow-on from those presented hitherto:

- Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security¹;
- Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland²;
- A new security order in Europe³,

and the main aim is to bring colleagues up to date, especially where the evolution of security perceptions and defence structures are concerned. The draft recommendations are designed to complement the Council's initiatives vis-à-vis the Central European states which were formalised in the declaration adopted in Bonn on 19th June this year by the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe which reads:

" 1. At the invitation of the German presidency of Western European Union, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,

Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom met in Bonn on 19th June 1992 to demonstrate their resolve to enhance the scope of the relationship initiated by a decision of the Ministerial Council in Brussels in April 1990.

2. Ministers agreed that, in view of the profound changes in Europe of the last few years, intensifying the relations between WEU and the states of Central Europe will contribute to stability and the emergence of a new peaceful order in Europe based on partnership and co-operation, greater security and confidence, as well as disarmament.

3. Ministers welcomed the decisions taken by the CSCE Council in Berlin and Prague regarding the relationships between the CSCE and other mutually reinforcing European and transatlantic organisations including WEU. They underlined that security in its broadest sense encompasses not only military but also political aspects, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as economic, social and environmental aspects.

4. Ministers acknowledged that WEU will be one of the essential elements of the future European security architecture, in accordance with the decisions taken by the European Council in Maastricht in December 1991. In this context, they noted that the Petersberg Declaration states:

" As WEU develops its operational capabilities in accordance with the Maastricht Declaration, we are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, the effective implementation of conflict prevention and crisis management measures, including peace-keeping activities of the CSCE or the United Nations Security Council. This will be done without prejudice to possible contributions by other CSCE countries and other organisations to these activities. "

5. The enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania should reflect the specific relations which exist and are developing between these countries and the European Union and its member states. Other appropriate forms of co-operation could be set up as required in the light of the development of these relations.

1. Document 1263, 27th March 1991, Rapporteur: Mr. Caro.

2. Document 1289, 8th November 1991, Rapporteur: Mr. Atkinson.

3. Document 1309, 13th May 1992, Rapporteur: Mr. Caro.

6. Ministers had a detailed exchange of views on the development of co-operation between WEU and these states. They agreed to strengthen existing relations by structuring the dialogue, consultations and co-operation.

The focus of consultations will be the security architecture and stability in Europe, the future development of the CSCE, arms control and disarmament, in particular the implementation of the CFE and Open Skies Treaties, as well as the 1992 Vienna Document. Developments in Europe and neighbouring regions will be of particular interest to the participants.

In this way, WEU's Central European partners will be able to acquaint themselves with the future security and defence policy of the European Union and find new opportunities to co-operate with the defence component of the Union and with the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance as these develop.

7. The Foreign and Defence Ministers adopted the following concrete measures:

- Foreign and Defence Ministers will meet once a year. Additional meetings at ministerial level may be convened if circumstances require.
- A forum of consultation will be established between the WEU Permanent Council and the ambassadors of the countries concerned. It will meet at the seat of the WEU Council at least twice a year.
- These meetings will provide an opportunity to monitor the implementation of the measures adopted and, where appropriate, to make proposals for the inclusion of other fields of co-operation.
- Consultations at ministerial and WEU Permanent Council/ambassador level on security issues may be complemented by meetings with an ad hoc WEU troika at senior official level.
- The following initiatives will be continued and encouraged:
 - Regular exchanges of documents and information;
 - Growing co-operation between the WEU Institute for Security studies and the corresponding bodies in the countries concerned. An increasing number of seminars and colloquia will be organised. The programme of scholarships will be continued.

8. Ministers advocated the development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the states concerned.

9. These measures, conducted in the framework of WEU with the states of Central Europe, and similar endeavours conducted in the alliance framework, will be mutually complementary and reinforcing."

13. It will be remembered that the extraordinary meeting had originally been scheduled for an earlier date but that certain practical considerations, coupled with the reticence of a number of member countries to create another forum for consultation which might duplicate or conflict with NACC initiatives, had led to postponement. It was good to see, therefore, that the declaration once adopted made reference to specifics and that these were again emphasised by the Council on *16th October 1992* in its reply to Assembly Recommendation 518 on WEU: the operational organisation⁴.

14. By putting the emphasis on the strictly "European" aspects of European security, the Council of WEU, together with the Central European states concerned, have pre-empted the criticism which would have resulted had the Forum for Consultation merely replicated what is being tackled in the broader setting of the NACC. All the Central European states are closely involved with moves towards European Union and therefore have a legitimate interest in the detail of the security and defence aspects as they evolve. The practical dimension of such a theory is being given substance by the various association agreements already in place or presently being negotiated. Should European Commissioner Frans Andriessen's ideas on creating a sort of "affiliate membership" for those in the queue for full membership of the Community come to pass, then our newly-established agreement with the Central European countries would be considerably reinforced.

15. Such moves must of course be seen in context. The Council is at present hard pressed to implement the decisions announced in the WEU declaration at Maastricht to create associate membership and observer status for certain countries which are currently members either of NATO or the EC but not of Western European Union. Fortunately the thorny problem of accepting as a full member of WEU a country which is not already a member of NATO does not appear to be looming, although possible now in theory: Ireland is likely to opt for observer status only.

16. Once other sometime neutral nations or even former Warsaw Pact members are in the Community, or Ireland ever wishes to take full

4. Document 1307, 13th May 1992, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of the Defence Committee.

WEU membership, the paradox would be complete, considering that WEU's modified Brussels Treaty is so much stronger than NATO's Washington Treaty.

17. The logical conclusion to such considerations is examined further in Chapter IX. For the present the practical aspects of WEU's enlargement are examined in detail in a report for the Assembly's Political Committee on the enlargement of WEU (Rapporteur: Mr. Ward).

18. On *14th October*, the WEU Permanent Council met in London at Ambassador level with colleagues from the eight Central European states – the first session of the WEU Forum for Consultation. Views were reportedly exchanged on the enhancement of relations within the forum and within the wider CSCE framework. "They also discussed topical security questions of common concern". Your Rapporteur trusts that the Council will give the Assembly an account of this and future meetings.

III. The political situation in transition

19. Although desovietisation was effected in accordance with a process specific to each country insofar as the social incentives of each one traced the parameters of the transition to democracy, two patterns may be distinguished:

- countries having lived in a reform context for several years in which the opposition was able to become even slightly organised managed to withdraw from the communist régime through progressive, peaceful compromises between the élite of the old régime and the opposition: this is the case of Poland and Hungary;
- features of countries where revolutions spread, mainly by contagion, is the absence of real democratic traditions, the absence of organised opposition or dominant social institutions and the distintegration of a society lacking social solidarity: this is the case of Romania and Bulgaria.

Czechoslovakia lies between the two.

(i) Bulgaria

20. The Bulgarian Communist Party retained control for a very long time. This is due to the special links between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, the Communist Party's grasp on political life as a whole and to the non-existence of change-generating opposition, but above all to the fact that, in Bulgaria, the idea of a nation was seen vis-à-vis Turkey, a context in which the

former Communist Party represented a guarantee that national interests would be defended.

21. The fall of the communist régime on *10th November 1989* gave an impression of a wise revolution closely surveyed by the army. The alliance between the army and reformers ensured a smooth transition.

22. To put it briefly, until summer 1991, the political scene was marked by the struggle between two parties, the Bulgarian Communist Party, which became the Bulgarian Socialist Party (the majority) and the Coalition of Democratic Forces, a coalition of sixteen opposition organisations, set up in 1989.

23. On *12th January 1992*, the first presidential elections by universal suffrage brought victory to Jelio Jeleu, a dissident intellectual, the candidate of the Coalition of Democratic Forces (44.8% of votes in the first round, 53% in the second).

24. However, the good score of Valko Valkesov, an independent candidate having the support of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (30% in the first round, 40% in the second) demonstrates the division in Bulgarian society.

(ii) Czechoslovakia (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic)

25. The "velvet revolution" was marked by the real participation of the Czechoslovak people and dissidents in overthrowing the régime. Student demonstrations that started on *17th November 1989* became a non-violent revolutionary movement, spread to the entire country and compelled those in power to agree to negotiations and then reforms. The Czechoslovak army and Soviet forces on Czechoslovak territory did not intervene.

26. On *29th December 1989*, Vaclav Havel was elected President of the Czechoslovak Republic. Czechoslovakia returned to democracy after two previous experiences from 1918 to 1938 and from 1945 to 1948. Many political parties resurfaced, including Vaclav Havel's Civic Forum.

27. The legislative elections on *8th and 9th June 1990* marked the victory of democracy (96% of the electorate voted). This was a crushing victory for the Czech Civic Forum and its counterpart in Slovakia, Public against Violence. However, the disbandment of the two winning movements called in question further transition.

28. The legislative elections on *5th and 6th June 1992* marked the victory of the separatists. In the Czech Republic, the conservative coalition (Civic Democrat Party and Christian Democrat party) won with 34% of the votes.

29. In the Slovak Republic, the Movement for Democratic Slovakia won with 37% of the votes. This victory of the nationalists, even the most moderate, jeopardised the future of the federation and the division into two separate states is likely now to become de facto on 1st January 1993.

(iii) *Hungary*

30. In Hungary, the transition to democracy was a moderate, progressive rejection of the system as the culminating point of a slow move towards political maturity.

31. The absence of a state-party imposing totalitarian power and the existence of a tolerated opposition allowed political reforms to be carried out.

32. Although Hungary had no unifying social movement or charismatic leader, it nevertheless had the most developed party system of all the Central and Eastern European countries. In autumn 1989, an institutionalised round-table dialogue was held between the party (Hungary Workers' Socialist Party) and the government, on the one hand, and the opposition movements acting in concert, on the other.

33. The elections in March and April 1990 produced two major political formations.

- the majority, comprising the Democratic Forum (42.9%), the Small Landowners' Party (11.4%) and the Christian Democrat Party (5.4%), obtained 60%;
- the liberal opposition, comprising the Alliance of Free Democrats and the FIDESZ, formed a minority of 29.3%. The Communist Party, which, in October 1989, decided to call itself the Socialist Party, progressively lost its importance.

(iv) *Poland*

34. This was the country that opened the way to democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe.

35. There were two principal actors:

- the Church: as from 1980, very deeply-rooted and majority Catholicism formed a rampart against communist ideology,
- the Solidarity movement: initially a well-structured structure opposition, it is the expression of the emancipation of Polish society vis-à-vis the authorities. It then became the symbol rallying almost the entire opposition. Under its

pressure, the transition was effected through a dialogue between representatives of the authorities and of the opposition, leading to the historic compromise, round-table negotiations on *6th February 1989*. This event created a precedent that was to become a catalysing factor for other countries.

36. However, what had been Poland's strong point tended to become an obstacle to the pursuit of democratisation:

- the dispersal of Solidarity's leaders in the various political parties that were being set up deprived the country increasingly of a symbol around which to rally;
- the Church tried to safeguard its power by interfering in political activities, thus provoking anticlerical reflexes among the younger generations.

37. Three types of electorate voted in the presidential elections on *25th November 1990*:

- supporters of Walesa, a popular electorate very attached to the Solidarity movement and strongly influenced by the Catholic Church;
- supporters of Mazowiecki from the middle and well-to-do classes wishing to remain apart from Solidarity,
- supporters of Timinsky, mainly workers.

38. 1991 witnessed the re-emergence of diverging social and political interests.

(v) *Romania*

39. In Romania, 1989 and 1990 witnessed the ideological apogée of a strong central power opposed to the liberal western world and to the environment of socialist countries subscribing to Gorbachev's reformism. In this country there was neither a true organised dissident movement nor political parties.

40. The popular revolution in which the people clashed with the army led to the leaders of the National Salvation Front taking power with the support of part of the army and of Securitate, hitherto at Ceausescu's service. The opposition was extremely fragmented (there were 115 official parties at the last elections).

41. On *20th May 1990*, general elections confirmed the legitimacy of the National Salvation Front, which obtained 85% of votes cast in the presidential elections and 63.3% in the legislative elections.

42. This result underlined a degree of conservatism among the population, who are reticent about change, particularly as fear of political

and social destabilisation in view of the reforms sometimes made the new powers restore order by force (violent repressions of the opposition through the intermediary of "miners" on 13th, 14th and 15th June 1990).

43. In *May 1992*, Prime Minister Roman, who was in disagreement with President Iliescu, left the NSF and set up the Democratic National Salvation Front.

44. In the presidential elections on *27th September 1992*, Ion Iliescu had a strong lead with 48% of the votes in the first round. However, mention should be made of the good score (33%) of the Democratic Convention (opposition coalition) of Emil Constantinescu and there is cause for concern at the rise of the nationalists since Funar, the candidate of the Romanian National Unity party, obtained almost 10% of the votes.

45. In the legislative elections on the same day, Ion Iliescu's party, while obtaining the best score (27.5% of the votes), was to find it hard to form a majority coalition.

46. *11th October 1992*: President Iliescu is re-elected with 61% of the votes cast. At the time of writing, efforts are in hand to try and form a coalition.

IV. Economics

47. The dismantling of the Soviet Union and, on *28th February 1991*, the winding up of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) plunged the Central European countries into a serious crisis because of their interdependence. Priority had to be given to modernising their economies and radical solutions were consequently adopted. The initially inevitable negative effects had a strong impact: high unemployment rate, fall in production, etc.

48. They all took the EEC as a model. On *16th December 1991*, an agreement of association was signed between Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland and the EEC that is to come into force at the end of 1992. It establishes a framework for political and economic integration at the end of a ten-year transitional period.

(i) Bulgaria

49. Considerable economic dependence on the CMEA (80% of its trade of which 66% with the Soviet Union) almost cut Bulgaria off from external trade. The reduction in oil exports as from July 1990 followed by the Soviet Government's decision to be paid in dollars at the world market rate added to an external debt of almost \$11 000 million inherited from the communist

régime. This situation was aggravated by the radical reforms carried out by the new government as from March 1991 in order to curb the accelerated deterioration of the economy: in one year, national production fell by 20%, industrial production by 30% and investment by 35%; inflation rose to 400%, salaries fell by 20% in real terms and unemployment affected about 8% of the active population.

50. There are still many obstacles:

- very high interest rates (they have risen from 15 to 45%) which discourage any effort to privatise (only 2%);
- non-existence of small- and medium-sized firms in the food and agricultural sector, electronics and light industry. Barely 10% of the economy has been privatised.

51. Bulgaria wishes to establish economic links with its former partners to replace the CMEA and is trying to increase the number of bilateral agreements with a view to attracting foreign investment. Its long-term priority aim is accession to the EEC.

(ii) Czechoslovakia

52. After initial hesitation, Czechoslovakia started to carry out its economic reform policy on *1st January 1991*. It made progress in areas such as the freeing of prices and monetary reform:

- keeping inflation down was one of the first successes of the reform. A strict incomes policy (a reduction of 30% in the purchasing power of the people) helped to bring the inflation rate down to 30% in 1991;
- stabilisation of the exchange rate was also a success.

53. In other sectors, including the law relating to businesses, privatisation and financial institutions, it has not yet got into its stride:

- fiscal reform should have led to VAT being introduced on 1st January 1993. However, because of the slowness of the reform of the fiscal system, foreign investors are rather slow in coming forward;
- privatisation has hardly started. In Czechoslovakia, the private sector is less developed than in Hungary and Poland. Until 1989, 97% of total production was under state control. The government was giving priority to a gradual approach that distinguished between small-scale privatisation (shops, restaurants and small- and medium-sized firms) and large-scale privatisation (large firms);

- at the same time, Czechoslovakia has to completely overhaul its banking system. Customer-oriented service is non-existent. It is not yet known how the investment funds will work.

54. In *January 1991* the IMF approved the economic reform programme and granted loans of \$1 700 million, to which has been added a loan of \$500 million by the EEC and \$450 million by the World Bank. Now, however, economic development will have to await the outcome of the country's split into two.

(iii) Hungary

55. Hungary is the Central European country that has made the best start with the transition towards a market economy. It was slightly ahead because timid reforms had already been made in this sense as from 1968.

56. However, the new government had to take infinitely more radical decisions. Like its neighbours, the aim is to reduce inflation (expected to be about 20% in 1992), create monetary balance and carry out a structural reform. It is the only country whose external trade has increased in value (40% in 1990-91, with 47% of exports going to the EEC and Germany replacing the Soviet Union in first place), in spite of the negative impact of winding up the CMEA which cut exports to its former partners by almost 40%.

57. Like its neighbours, the unpleasant effects of the reform policy are making themselves felt: an unemployment rate of 7.3% at the end of 1991 and a fall of 30% in industrial production.

58. However, Hungary is the preferred country for foreign investors (\$300 million in 1990 and \$1 500 million in 1991). It has the largest number of joint ventures with western participation and a credit standby of \$1 600 million over a period of three years was approved by the IMF on 6th February 1991.

59. In spite of the satisfactory influx of western investment, the Hungarian Government is determined not to jeopardise its trade with its former partners, the main reason being the lack of natural resources and raw materials in Hungary. For instance, on *14th June 1991* Hungary concluded a bilateral agreement with Russia guaranteeing the delivery of consumer goods in exchange for raw materials. This agreement is of great importance to Hungary since Russia's share of total trade between the former Soviet Union and Hungary is 80%.

60. However, integration in the EEC is still the main target. On *6th October 1991*, at a summit meeting with Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary opposed Poland's proposal to set up a free trade area in Central Europe.

(iv) Poland

61. The austerity policy started in 1990 is bearing fruit and considerable progress is now being made.

62. The main aims are:

- to privatise the economy by encouraging private enterprise. The private sector now depends largely on newly-created firms (more than 400 000 since 1st January 1990). The economy is now largely in the hands of the private sector: 75 to 80% of trade in 1991 compared with 7 to 8% in 1989, 20% of industry in 1991 compared with 2% in 1989 and 85% of agriculture. It is estimated that about 40 to 45% of workers are employed in the private sector, which represents about 40% of GDP. However, only fifteen major state firms have been privatised;
- to reduce the galloping inflation. This is well under way since it reached 2 000% at the end of 1989 and is believed to have been 80 to 90% in 1991;
- to remove obstacles to investment by foreigners. Poland is finding it difficult to attract foreign investment. The self-management structure of large firms have considerably hindered negotiations on privatisation and takeovers by foreign investors. The 1989 legislation on joint ventures was largely liberalised in June 1991 and the government is relying on this measure to produce positive results in the near future.

63. However, the economic recession worsened following the collapse of Eastern European markets, while industrial restructuring is only just taking off.

64. Thus, in 1991 industrial production fell by 17%, the unemployment rate, which had been 5% in 1990, rose to 11% of the active population and will rise still further when certain large state firms close their doors for lack of orders and financial resources.

65. In *April 1991*, the IMF granted Poland a loan of \$2 500 million over a period of three years to help its economic reforms. However, the loan was suspended in *September 1991* because the country was no longer able to fulfil the conditions laid down (in particular, strict control of government expenditure).

(v) Romania

66. In *October 1991*, Romania in turn embarked upon a process of economic reform in spite of the government's narrow margin for

handling opposition disapproval of such measures and the fear of social movements following the disorganisation of the economy. The economic situation is serious since the independent policy pursued by Ceausescu was detrimental to domestic consumption and the development of many sectors of the economy.

67. The private sector is emerging slowly: 50 000 licences of the 140 000 requested have been granted since August 1991.

68. Reorientation of national production towards the internal market and the abolition of export credits led to a sharp fall in exports.

69. Under the caretaker government headed by Mr. Theodor Stolojan, Romania has set up much of the legal and institutional framework necessary for privatisation and the establishing of a market economy. Praise has come from the IMF for sticking to tough budgetary parameters and a new IMF interim lending agreement is in the offing.

70. A particular blow of late has been the rejection by the United States House of Representatives of the bill, strongly supported by the United States Government, to restore Romania's "most favoured nation" trading status. That Romania should be considered less worthy than China, North Korea and Albania seems somewhat strange. The 300 United States observers present in Romania for the recent elections were reasonably impressed, by all accounts. Perhaps it is merely a case of having to educate Congress in the realities of a changing situation.

V. Security questions

71. Each country has its own views on its security and on European security as a whole in the light of the nature and extent of its internal problems and its geopolitical situation.

(i) Bulgaria

72. Bulgaria's geographical situation in the centre of the Balkans gave it strategic importance in the Warsaw Pact and made it the Soviet Union's preferred ally. Today, Bulgaria finds itself without the protection of a sizeable ally in the region just when it is having to face up to two major problems in an unstable area.

Relations with Turkey

73. Bulgaria is afraid of possible territorial claims by Turkey and is worried about the large-scale concentration of Turkish troops along its frontiers. In spite of the end of the policy of assimilation of the Turkish minority, it fears any intervention by Turkey in respect of this

minority, which is 10 to 15% of the population of the country and has a far higher birth rate than the national average.

The Macedonian question

74. This was revived by the break-up of Yugoslavia. A third of Macedonia was attributed to Bulgaria in the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano.

75. On 15th January 1992, Bulgaria recognised the independence of the Macedonian Republic but not the existence of a separate Macedonian nationality because it was afraid of possible claims by Serbia. However, in Bulgaria many groups are calling for union with the new Macedonian Republic.

(ii) Czechoslovakia

76. Czechoslovakia's problem is a national one. It is a federal state, established in 1918, federated in 1968 and composed of two nations: Czech and Slovak.

77. The last months of 1991 were marked by a revival of tension following Slovakia's will to become independent or, failing this, political and economic autonomy. The whole question is the possibility of democratic management (by the Czech Republic) of the Slovak nationalist claim.

78. It is important to point out that anxiety about the internal difficulties of the former Soviet Union and its subsequent dismantling was an external factor of union and consensus between the Czech and Slovak Republics. Now the division into two countries seems inevitable.

(iii) Hungary

79. The problem of minorities is a special one in Hungary. Since the end of the first world war, a quarter of the Magyar population has been living in one of the four countries which are neighbours of Hungary. In a context of disintegration of federations and rising nationalism, such a situation is obviously explosive.

The Hungarian minority in Ukraine (200 000 persons)

80. The government is on friendly terms with Ukraine which, in its declaration of sovereignty in July 1990, recognised the rights of minorities on its territory. However, in July 1991 the Ukrainian Parliament adopted a declaration guaranteeing all citizens equal political, economic, social and cultural rights. Hungary fears a possible revival of Ukrainian nationalism that would limit the rights of the Magyar minority as an anti-Magyar campaign has sprung up and many Hungarian monuments have been desecrated.

*The Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia
(about 450 000 persons)*

81. The Hungarian Government is trying to be firm in its attitude towards the question of the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. The Yugoslav crisis has placed Hungary in a delicate position. It is trying to remain on friendly terms with Serbia (which is moreover trying to regain control over Vojvodina) in order to avoid retaliatory measures against the Hungarian minority but without forgetting to remain on good terms with the neighbouring breakaway republics. However, the transformation of Yugoslavia into a mini-federation comprising only Serbia and Montenegro is encouraging the Magyars to want to be attached to their mother country, which is unacceptable in Belgrade.

*The Hungarian minority in Romania
(1 800 000 persons)*

82. Hungary is trying to normalise its relations with Romania where, since the fall of the Ceausescu régime, the ethnic problem has resurfaced: this is now the most worrying situation due to the large number of persons involved. The Romanian Government is acutely conscious of the problem and is making every effort to contain a relatively latent antagonism by ensuring equal rights for all.

*The Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia
(600 000 persons)*

83. The situation of this minority, which is concentrated along Slovakia's southern border, has so far been acceptable. Its representation in the institutions conforms to its numerical size and its rights are respected. Moreover, the main religion in Slovakia is the same as that of the Magyars. However, the secession of the Slovak Republic may call this into question.

84. The Hungarian Government is trying to find solutions through diplomatic channels, aware as it is of the negative effect that would be produced by the outbreak of conflicts on the process of integrating the country into western economic and political organisations. This policy is facilitated by the consensus that exists on security matters.

(iv) Poland

85. Poland is facing two major problems from outside:

- *the weight of unified Germany is raising several questions:* the future of Poland's relations with a politically and economically stronger power with twice as many inhabitants and a GNP six times higher; the problem of the Oder-Neisse line; the problem of German minorities in Poland;

- *the dispute with Lithuania:* this follows the Lithuanian Government's decision in August 1991 to abolish local governments. This is a typical case provoked by diverging national interests and the leaders' perceptions following the dismantling of the Soviet Union.

86. Internally, mention should be made of the specific characteristics of the Polish people:

- unity of the population (large majority of Poles);
- religious unity (98% Catholic);
- historical unity (reference to the same history as compared with Germany) unlike most other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

(v) Romania

87. Because of its geographical situation between Yugoslavia and the CIS, Romania is seeking economic and security guarantees. However, there are deep-rooted differences over security matters and threat perception, be they at home (policy towards minorities, who represent 15% of the population in Romania) or abroad.

88. The problem of minorities is not solely linked to the presence of some 1.8 million Hungarian Romanians: in addition, the population includes sizeable numbers of other ethnic origin: German, Ukrainian, Serb, Croat, Russian, Turk and Gypsy. Most minorities are represented in Parliament and the Government has accepted that all international human rights legislation takes precedence over national legislation.

89. Attempts are now being made to conclude a bilateral "treaty on a pattern of behaviour" with Hungary to tackle the twin problems of territorial claims and minority rights. With Germany a bilateral commission on minorities has been formed, chaired jointly by the State Secretaries in the respective Ministries for Foreign Affairs.

An example: Moldova

90. The treaty of friendship signed on 5th April 1991 between the Romanian President and his Soviet opposite number, guaranteeing the inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity of the two states, was very badly viewed by those in favour of the attachment of Bessarabia (part of Soviet Moldova since the end of the second world war) to Romania. They saw this treaty as implicit legitimisation of the annexation of Bessarabia and North Bukovina by the former Soviet Union and the renunciation of Romanian claims to those territories. Although the topic of reunification with

Moldova is not explicitly referred to in official statements, nationalist parties such as *Vatra Romaneasca* (Romanian home) support reunification with Moldova (where two-thirds of the population is of Romanian origin), the recovery of North Bukovina and South Bessarabia, now Ukrainian. However, Moldova, which declared its independence on 27th August 1991, does not seem to want, in the short term at least, to be restored legally to Romania. On 10th January 1991, the Moldovan President, Hircea Snegur, confirmed his country's intention to set up a 12 000-strong army. National institutions are being set up. Although the Moldovan Government's perceptions of its relations with Romania are based on the principle of "one nation, two states" and draw a clear distinction between cultural integration and political reunification, some people in Romania are finding it increasingly hard to endorse this point of view.

91. However, the greatest problem for Moldova remains the Russian 14th Army which is proving even more difficult to dislodge than are the remnants of Soviet forces still in place in the Baltic states.

VI. Foreign policy developments

92. Depending on the problems facing it and its view of its own security, each country adopts a specific foreign policy and takes appropriate steps to implement it. Because of their geo-strategic position, none of them can offer a guarantee of security without allies. This is why they now want to establish lasting relationships, strengthen co-operation with other European countries and be integrated in western alliances. Here, NATO is the only credible alternative as a security guarantee since the CSCE lost credibility because of its lack of action in the Yugoslav crisis.

(i) Bulgaria

93. Since the fall of Todor Jivkov, Bulgaria has turned to the western countries. In January 1991, it condemned the Soviet intervention against the Baltic states.

94. It signed treaties of friendship and co-operation with Germany on 9th October 1991, with Italy on 10th January 1992 and with France on 18th February 1992.

95. In the context of a more open policy, it restored diplomatic relations with Israel that had been broken off in 1967.

96. Bulgaria has also turned to the other Balkan countries to discuss the possibility of economic and defence co-operation.

97. On 7th October 1991, it signed a treaty of co-operation and friendship with Greece. President Jeleu supports the idea of a multilateral conference with Greece and Turkey dealing with regional security problems.

98. The idea of a confederation between Greece and Bulgaria was considered by Bulgarian leaders to be a guarantee of peace in the Balkans and is gaining ground in Bulgaria, which can but worry neighbouring states (Turkey and former Yugoslavia).

(ii) Czechoslovakia

99. There are two stages in Czechoslovakia's foreign policy. In 1990, it was essentially European, advocating at one and the same time the maintenance of regional alliances and integration in wider European structures. However, the country's return to Europe was to be gradual and in a changed European system, which would be European in theory but western in practice. Czechoslovakia was then endorsing the Gorbachev policy.

100. In the second stage, as from 1991, it was no longer seeking to set up new structures in place of the old system but to bring already existing structures nearer to co-ordination with western countries.

101. In *January and February 1991*, Czechoslovakia took part in the interallied coalition in the Gulf war by sending a contingent to Saudi Arabia.

102. In *February 1991*, Czechoslovakia became a full member of the Council of Europe and signed a trilateral agreement with Poland and Hungary aimed at co-ordinating their positions in regard to European integration.

103. In *June 1991*, it obtained the withdrawal of Soviet troops and decided to recognise the independence of the Baltic countries and Ukraine.

104. In *December 1991*, it signed an agreement of association with the EEC.

105. Czechoslovakia wishes to move closer to WEU and NATO. Here it has acted as a pioneer by appointing to its Brussels Embassy a military attaché specially responsible for dealing with relations between Czechoslovakia and NATO.

106. In *February 1992*, a treaty of friendship, co-operation and good neighbourliness was signed with Germany, which has now become its leading economic partner. It now remains to be seen just what effect the splitting of the country will have.

(iii) Hungary

107. Hungary's immediate aim is integration in European structures.

108. On *6th November 1990*, it became a member of the Council of Europe and, on *16th December 1991*, signed an agreement of association with the EEC. It is also endeavouring to conclude bilateral agreements with western countries and with its immediate neighbours. In *July 1991*, it signed a bilateral open skies treaty with Romania and, in *April 1992*, a treaty of friendship and co-operation with Russia.

(iv) *Poland*

109. In *February 1991* the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, describing the broad lines of foreign policy, reassessed the threat and gave a new definition of security. He said that, instead of Europe being divided into specific or grey areas, security should be perceived in a wider context and not only in military terms or the defence of a country. Europe as a whole should be considered as a uniform security area.

Policy vis-à-vis other countries

110. Poland has signed bilateral co-operation treaties with France, the United Kingdom, Italy and the United States and, in *July 1991*, acceded to the Pentagonal, which became the Hexagonal, then the Septagonal and is now known as the Central European Initiative.

111. Its foreign policy is centred on Germany.

112. On *14th November 1990*, the treaty on its frontiers (ratified on *12th January 1991*) guaranteed Germany's recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the permanent frontier between the two countries.

113. On *17th June 1991*, the treaty of co-operation and good neighbourliness granted rights to the German minority in Poland.

114. Together with its former partners, Poland is trying to find new means of co-operation so as to break out of its isolation in face of the CIS and Germany.

115. Relations with the former Soviet Union are more complex. In the difficult negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops, in particular, an agreement was initialled in Moscow on *26th October 1991*: combat units were to leave the country by *15th October 1992* and logistic units by the end of 1993. In view of the risk of worsening political instability in the CIS, Poland is trying to develop its relations with the various republics: it recognised the independence of the Baltic states immediately. It also gives priority to bilateral co-operation treaties.

116. In *July 1991*, a declaration of co-operation with Latvia was signed, in *September 1991* a declaration of bilateral co-operation with Belarus and in *October 1991*

a declaration of bilateral co-operation with Russia.

Policy towards international organisations

117. In *May 1989*, Poland was granted guest status in the Council of Europe and became a full member in *November 1991*.

118. In *June 1991*, the Polish Government approved the declaration by NATO members to link the security of the Atlantic Alliance with European security.

(v) *Romania*

119. Long after 1989, Romania's foreign policy remained without a clearly-defined framework or precise course. In *June 1990*, taking advantage of the international situation, it managed to emerge from its diplomatic isolation (support for the coalition of western forces during the Gulf crisis and United Nations Security Council resolution adopted during the Romanian presidency in August 1990).

120. Part of the problem since the beginning of 1990 has been to reconstitute the diplomatic service, decimated by the vagaries of the previous régime, when even the mere ability to understand a foreign language was often perceived as contrary to the interests of the state.

121. On *1st February 1991*, it was granted observer status in the Council of Europe with the support of France, Spain and Italy, which have close historic and cultural links with Romania. Increasing contacts with western countries thus became a priority.

122. In *July 1991*, a treaty of co-operation and friendship was signed with Italy. In *November 1991*, France invited it to the fourth summit meeting of French-speaking countries. The desire not to leave Romania on the sidelines has also been marked by many agreements. On *22nd October 1990*, an agreement on economic and trade co-operation was signed with the EEC. In *January 1991*, the western countries decided to extend the Phare programme (Poland-Hungary: assistance to economic reconstruction) to include Romania. In *September 1991*, a treaty of friendship and co-operation was signed with Turkey and, in *November 1991*, a twenty-year pact of friendship, co-operation and good-neighbourliness with Greece (economic co-operation agreements, Greek assistance in the framework of the Phare programme).

123. Relations with Bulgaria are still tense because of differences over the territories lost by Romania in 1940 (Dobrudja) that are now part of Bulgarian territory.

124. The greatest friction is with Hungary because there are still differences over the Magyar minority in Transylvania. Romania

considers the Hungarian presence (consulate, cultural and economic exchanges, etc.) to be a threat since it weakens Romanian authority in the region. The movement of Hungarian forces from West to East following a reform of military doctrine merely increased this mistrust.

125. The Yugoslav crisis is accentuating Romania's feeling of insecurity. Fear of the emergence of a stronger Serbia within a smaller Yugoslav federation led the Romanian Government to support the continued existence of Yugoslavia from the outset.

VII. Armed forces and defence

126. In a new regional context and in order to guarantee adequate defence, the military sector is being entirely overhauled, from military doctrine to defence forces. Several common factors can be discerned in the various countries.

127. Economic constraints are leading to a drastic reduction in budgets for defence and armed forces and countries have to abide by the principle of reasonable sufficiency in their defence policies.

128. The stress is on all-round defence. Priority is therefore being given to defensive weapons (mines and anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons).

129. Implementation of a conflict prevention policy, the redeployment of forces hitherto mainly facing westwards, the redistribution of military regions and the development of a rapid reaction and mobile capability are the consequences of the absence of identifiable enemies and the multiple facets of the threat.

130. Finally, all these countries are trying to enhance the army's image. They want to humanise the constraints of military service so as to remobilise the people (and in particular young recruits) round an army that had too often been compromised in the past.

(i) Bulgaria

131. The process of depoliticisation and reform of the army was more recent in Bulgaria than in the other Central and Eastern European countries for several reasons: close dependence of the army on the political authorities, more decisive Soviet influence on military and security matters than in other Warsaw Pact countries (Bulgaria having been considered as the former Soviet Union's most loyal ally) and the fact that many former officers trained in Moscow are still in the army and are opposed to in-depth reforms.

132. The restructuring of the armed forces is nevertheless under way:

- reorganisation of the army in smaller, more mobile units (transformation of divisions into brigades);

- there are no plans for reductions in troop levels, these having fallen already because young people are disinclined to carry out military service;
- debate on professionalising the army.

(ii) Czechoslovakia

133. Reforms of defence policy and modernisation of the armed forces were effected in two stages.

134. Following the events of 1989, the first stage in the slow restructuring of the army started under the supervision of General Vacek, a former communist who had become Minister of Defence: depoliticisation and end of party control over the armed forces, abolition of military training in schools and, above all, publication of the military budget in the mid-nineties for the first time in forty years. The long-term aim is to create a highly mobile, semi-professional territorial defence force.

135. With the appointment of Leon Dobrovsky, a civilian, as Minister of Defence in October 1990, the second stage began. The reform process continued in March 1991 with the appointment of Karol Pezl (a former adviser to the Ministry of Defence and a man of the Prague spring) as army chief of staff. However, differences appeared in the army. The free legion, composed of young officers, wanted the army to be completely purged, while Leon Dobrovsky favoured continuity and supported a gradual transformation that would not jeopardise its operational capability.

136. Another problem was the proportion of Slovaks in the army. They had a 20% majority in the regular army in 1960 and 34.7% in 1991. Risks of ethnic tension cannot be ruled out since the majority of the population and part of the political class does not want to retain a joint army at federal level.

137. It should be noted that, as Czechoslovakia has no access to the sea, it has no navy.

(iii) Hungary

138. Because of the low capability of its armed forces (which were the Warsaw Pact's weak link), the Hungarian leaders have opted for minimum defence. This is all-round defence that gives priority to extremely mobile troops with strengthened air defence and anti-tank capabilities.

139. The President of the Republic is supreme commander of the armed forces. In the past, there was no national defence plan, orders emanating direct from the Communist Party in Budapest or Moscow.

140. The Hungarian army was the only Warsaw Pact army not to be organised in divisions and regiments but in army corps and brigades.

141. The great majority of military equipment is obsolete. It would need to be completely replaced and this cannot be done for budgetary reasons. The weakest point is logistics. To remedy this lack of means and the lack of inclination for military service, the Hungarian Government is having to maintain conscription at the same time as some degree of professionalisation of the armed forces.

(iv) Poland

142. Poland is one of the countries that do not intend to have weapons of mass destruction.

143. The armed forces are entirely under the control of the Polish authorities and they may not be deployed outside the frontiers.

144. According to official statements, on 5th May 1991 there were 305 000 troops in the Polish armed forces, 200 000 of which were conscripts. This figure should fall to a total of 230 000 to 250 000 by 1995.

145. Parallel with reductions in troop levels, the length of military service is being cut and the proportion of professionals, now 40%, may rise to 50 or 60% by the year 2000.

146. Furthermore, territorial defence units have been disbanded, while militias and frontier guards have come under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior.

147. The territory, now divided into three military regions (Pomerania, Silesia and Warsaw), will be reorganised in four regions (Pomerania, Silesia, Mazury and Little Poland) to ensure a better distribution of forces throughout the territory.

148. Poland has the largest navy of any of the former Warsaw Pact members.

(v) Romania

149. Romania's control over its defence sector was one of the keystones of the Ceausescu government. Romanian defence strategy was modelled on that of Yugoslavia, i.e. defence on every horizon, based on the war of the whole people. Today, Romania's defence policy is conditioned by its leaders' fear of being isolated and differences of perception of external dangers.

150. Paradoxically, Romania was the last country to call for the dissolution of the military and political structures of the Warsaw Pact.

151. Romania's case is a striking example of relations between the Communist Party and the

military and of the political rôle of the army. The latter has moved from total sovietisation in the fifties to restructuring by Ceausescu for internal political purposes. This policy prevented any emancipation of the military sector from the political authorities. To a greater extent than in the other Central and Eastern European countries, military policy had a political and social control function (supporting the régime, control and socialisation of young people).

152. All the more credit therefore to those in power now, both in government and in the armed forces, for the changes being made in the relationship of the army to society. Such an evolution takes time however and greatly depends on the personal commitment of those involved. Your Rapporteur has been much impressed by first hand accounts of the changes which are obvious in for example the army's relationship with the parliament: the realisation of the need for lobbying and for an efficient public relations organisation.

153. The recently-created National Defence College, bringing the military together with those from "civilian" ministries, the private sector and the mass media, is a particular step to be applauded.

154. A diminishing demography has meant that there are now far fewer conscripts available for the forces where some units are manned by only some 30% of their CFE-agreed strengths in peacetime. Reductions and restructuring go some way to alleviate the problem but, like Poland, Romania is turning more and more to the idea of giving comparatively short, but renewable, contracts to try and attract volunteers.

155. At the other end of the military hierarchy the current Minister of National Defence, Lt. Gen. Nicolae Spiroiu, is now discussing the possibility of his post being "civilianised" in the future: a move which would counter centuries of tradition but which would be perceived as a very strong pointer to greater accountability.

"Berlin revisited"

156. In the remarkable document on security and defence in Central and Eastern Europe which she produced at the request of the WEU Institute for Security Studies as an introduction to the Assembly's Spring 1992 Symposium in Berlin "A new security order in Europe", Sophia Clément summarised the defence situation in the countries concerned as follows:

(i) Bulgaria

157. In 1990, the National Assembly passed a law on the depolitisation of the entire administration. 98% of civil servants agreed to cancel

their party membership. The Central Political Department of the Armed Forces, subordinate to the Central Committee of the BCP, had been abolished a few months earlier. Many officers retired (112, i.e. 85% of the generals) in December 1991 and only nineteen new generals and thirty-nine commanders were appointed. General Yordan Mustafchiev (Ludzhev's predecessor) was appointed Inspector-in-Chief of the Bulgarian Army (a post resembling that of inspector-general and new in Bulgaria). Seventy-six State Security generals retired in July 1991.

158. The appointment of Dimitur Ludzhev as Minister of Defence on 8th November 1991 by the government of the new Prime Minister, Philippe Dimitrov, continues the depoliticisation process, as do the appointment of Christo Danov, a civilian lawyer, as Minister of Home Affairs in January 1991 and of General Luben Petrov as Vice-Minister of Defence and chief of defence staff in August 1991. Dimitur Ludzhev was one of the three Vice-Prime Ministers in Dimitur Popov's coalition government, which had made him responsible for establishing the new security policy in the National Security Council. He is also close to President Jeleu and the only leading member of the CDF to have experience in military matters since he is a lieutenant in the reserve army and has a diploma from the Plevna Military Academy, thus making him more acceptable to the military. Although depoliticisation took some time – it was started only in November 1991 – it is nevertheless decisive. The posts of advisers to the Minister of Defence are held by civilians and the post of Vice-Minister has been abolished. Many officers have been retired.

Restructuring the military sector

159. The tenth point made by President Jeleu on 18th December 1991 referred more particularly to the establishment of the military guarantees necessary for the country's national security. The army was to be reformed to make it a modern, well-equipped army, highly professional, well-paid and capable on its own of defending the country's frontiers. The education system was to be organised and Bulgarian officers would be retrained in the military academies of NATO member countries. There would be co-operation between the Bulgarian defence industry and the military-industrial complex of the western countries so as to bring Bulgarian standards closer to those of NATO so that more orders might be passed in Bulgaria.

160. Bulgaria would also like to restructure its army, creating smaller and more mobile forces (transformation of divisions into brigades, replacement of tank regiments by infantry units reduced by 30% and a 50% reduction in exercises).

161. The Ministry of Defence is to be restructured to form several directorates (e.g. administration, economics and political questions) and two new departments to handle social questions and ecology. Finally, two study groups, comprising both military and civilians, have been instructed to define the various stages in the development of the armed forces from 1994 to 2 000 (mobile brigades should replace traditional structures and military headquarters should be given increased powers at the expense of the Ministry of Defence) but there are no plans to reduce troop levels (now 100 000 men) as these have already fallen due to Bulgarian young people's aversion to military service. These new concepts will be the subject of a juridical text on security, defence and the armed forces. The army, air force, navy and frontier guards are at present part of the Ministry of the Interior.

162. At his first press conference following his appointment, the Minister of Defence, Dimitur Ludzhev, announced that it was necessary to develop a new security system with a professional army and loyal to the political authorities. There was also a discussion about making the Bulgarian army, 50% of which consists of conscripts, a professional army. The amendment of the military service law, adopted in August 1990, reduced the period of service from twenty-four to eighteen months (Ludzhev would have preferred twelve months). Such measures stem from young people's aversion to military service. In an opinion poll conducted in autumn 1991, only 16% of conscripts had a favourable opinion of military service and 52% adopted a negative view. Officers consider conscription leads to a lack of professionalism and motivation. Young officers in favour of the proposed reforms are grouped in the Georges Rakovski Bulgarian Legion, set up in 1991, which has a real rôle in overseeing military headquarters as a whole and senior officers and acts as a pressure group with the aim of returning to pre-communist military tradition, which implies close relations with the country's intelligentsia. However, there is far from being a consensus. The Legion is against all co-operation with parties representing ethnic minorities such as the Movement for Rights and Liberties or the Movement for Unified Macedonia (Ilinden) which is calling for recognition of a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria that it considers to be a danger to national security.

163. None of the military academies has been closed. There are three high-level academies: combined services, Georgui Sava in Sofia; army, Vassil Levsky in Veliko Tarnovo; air force, Georgui Benkovski in Dolna Metropolia; navy, Nikola Vaptzarov in Varna.

164. Conversion is being carried out even in the various associations connected with the army. The Voenne Izdatelstvo publishing house

has become a stock company and there now remain only four of the seven press organs of the army.

165. The Bulgarian Government is aware of the difficulty of ensuring the country's defence solely by military means. The desire to avoid setting up antagonistic military alliances in the Balkans means that diplomatic and political efforts must be made through the development of bilateral relations in both political and economic areas, creating links between countries in the region.

(ii) *Czechoslovakia*

The in-depth modernisation of the armed forces – depolitisation and humanisation

166. The first stage in the slow restructuring of the Czechoslovak army started with the appointment of General Vacek, a former communist, as Minister of Defence just after the events in 1989. In November 1989, General Vacek replaced Milan Voklavik, close to Mr. Jakes's régime and a member of the Communist Party. Miroslav Vacek had implemented a number of reforms such as the depolitisation of and the end of party control over the armed forces, the abolition of military training in schools and, above all, publication of the military budget in mid-1990 for the first time in forty years. In January 1990, the armed forces were purged on the basis of their qualifications. 9 460 officers, i.e. 15% of the officer corps, had to leave the army. A law passed by the Assembly on 14th March 1990 reduced the length of military service from twenty-four to eighteen months, authorised religious freedom in the army and suspended the right of the army to repress street demonstrations. As in Poland, the right to conscientious objection was recognised both for national servicemen and for professional soldiers. This led to massive departures from the army. Regarding long-term goals, a document has been adopted entitled the development aims of the Czechoslovak army up to the year 2000. It provides for the creation of a highly mobile, semi-professional territorial defence force, which means reducing strengths by 40 000 to 60 000 by 1993 (bringing the number down to 400 000 men), reducing military equipment (heavy artillery, tanks, armoured troop carriers) by 40 to 60% and reducing military service to twelve months. Units stationed in Slovakia will rise from 18% in 1990 to 38% in 1993 and the number of national servicemen will rise from 35% in 1989 to almost 80% in 1993. Three new regional commands will be created in Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia and a single command for the air force and air defence.

167. The second stage of restructuring started in October 1990 when the government gave in to pressure from the newcomers in the political

and military establishment and appointed L. Dobrovsky, a civilian, as Minister of Defence. This process continued in March 1991 with the appointment of Karol Pezl, former adviser to the Minister of Defence, to the post of army chief of staff. The latter was one of the Prague spring men who tried to reform communism and then withdrew following the Soviet invasion. In 1971, he was relieved, for political reasons, of his duties in the military headquarters operational preparation section and dismissed from the army. He is among the élite today returning to the forefront of the political stage in the framework of a wider movement *Obroda* (renewal), which advocates a return to a more human socialism, the motto of the Prague spring. Since the velvet revolution, various tendencies in the army have been calling for it to be radically transformed. Differences remain on this subject. The "free legion" of young officers, would like the army to be completely purged, with the resignation or retirement of all senior officers. They challenge the reliability of an army that is mainly composed of old soldiers who have merely turned their coats inside out in order to remain at their posts. Leon Dobrovsky for his part is counting on the continuity of the army and supporting a gradual transformation that would not jeopardise its operational capability. The training period for reservists has been reduced by four weeks and four out of a total of seven military academies have been closed for lack of staff. The post of Inspector-General, created in 1991, responsible for monitoring the military budget and the armed forces' conformity with the constitution, is still vacant for the time being.

168. The proportion of Slovaks in the regular army has increased in recent years. It was 20% in 1960, 28% in 1980 and 34.7% in 1991. Three of the four Deputy Defence Ministers, 32% of the generals and 45% of the military district commanders are Slovaks. This is an over-representation insofar as just over a third of the population is Slovak. The possibility of ethnic disputes increasing in the army cannot therefore be ruled out, particularly as the majority of the Slovak population and part of the Slovak political class do not want a joint army to be retained at federal level.

(iii) *Hungary*

169. The former Hungarian People's Army, entirely integrated in the Warsaw Pact military structure, subordinate to the Soviet Eastern Forces Group and under strict Communist Party control, was prepared for defence against the West. It was to protect the western flank during a Soviet offensive towards the Danube valley and the Klagenfurt-Graz main road in Austria to prevent a breakthrough by the

German second corps facing West and assumed to be moving towards Budweis in order to carry out a rear attack against the Eastern Forces Group. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops (the bilateral agreement on the total withdrawal of such troops, numbering about 65 000, was signed on 10th March 1990 and implemented on 19th June 1991), the bases and orientation of Hungary's defence were changed. It is now national. It rejects the image of the enemy and aims to ward off any attack from all directions (defence of all frontiers against a potential aggressor). This is all-round defence, which gives priority to highly mobile troops with strengthened air defence anti-tank capabilities. This will ensure adequate defence stems from the meagre capability of the Hungarian armed forces, which were the weakest link in the Warsaw Pact forces. The Hungarian leaders have to ensure credible defence, although security lies first in political, economic and cultural co-operation. This would explain the initial reticence of the Hungarian Government about the CFE agreements which fixed quotas that it considered too restrictive, particularly for tanks, and would have made the Hungarian army wholly unable to ensure its own defence (what it called circular defencelessness). In 1990, Colonel Pick, an officer seconded to the President, said the CFE agreements had introduced a collective security system ranging as far as the Austro-Hungarian frontier but collective insecurity beyond it. It was for this reason, too, that, after its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact military organisation and the latter's disbandment, Hungary continued to affirm that it was not in its interest to reject all relations with the Soviet Union or to exacerbate the latter's internal problems and conflicts with its immediate neighbours. Today, the CIS is evolving and any change in the trend of this new defence concept is so far out of the question. Thus, Hungary intends to refuse to allow any belligerent country to use its national territory and air space.

Modernisation and rationalisation

170. Renamed Magyar Honvedseg in May 1990, the Hungarian army is now a national institution and no longer under communist party control. It has 90 000 men in peacetime and 350 000 in wartime, i.e. 30% lower than in 1990. Most political officers have been withdrawn. In December 1989, only 44 of the 87 serving generals kept their posts: 17 retired en bloc or resigned when the first civilian Minister of Defence, Lajos Für, was appointed in May 1990. The President of the Republic is now supreme commander of the armed forces, responsible for signing the national defence law drawn up in the light of the new defence doctrine officially proclaimed in November 1991. In the past, there had been no national defence plan, orders emanating from communist party

headquarters in Budapest or Moscow. The President may also proclaim martial law and decide, in place of parliament, on the use of the armed forces. He appoints the army chief, his commander, the frontier guard commander and, on the recommendation of the government, generals, whom he also has the power to dismiss.

171. The aim is to keep armed forces with a credible deterrent capability. Since its restructuring in 1987, in agreement with Soviet Marshal Ogarkov's strategic doctrine, the Hungarian army was the only Warsaw Pact army not to be organised in divisions and regiments but in army corps and brigades (twelve divisions transformed into three corps, each being composed of five brigades, and an independent artillery battalion, the brigades themselves being subdivided into battalions) with their headquarters in Tata, Kaspovar and Cegléd under the army high command based in Székesfehérvár.

172. The period of military service was reduced from eighteen to twelve months in January 1991 (parliamentary decision of 29th October 1990) and the age limit for service reduced from 55 to 50.

173. However, economic constraints and the decision taken in 1989 to reduce the defence budget by more than 35% until 1991 significantly limit the possibilities of procuring western equipment, although there is an essential need to modernise military equipment in every sector. Most military equipment is fifteen to twenty years old and in some cases – armoured vehicles and air forces – it is so obsolete that it needs to be completely replaced. The Hungarian air force, which had 160 fighter aircraft and 95 helicopters, of which 30 attack helicopters, in 1988, has been reduced. The number of MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighter aircraft fell from 113 in January 1989 to 70 in 1990 and cannot, for the time being at least, be considered to be a credible deterrent force until they are fully modernised. The T-55 tanks will not be replaced because of stringent budgetary restrictions, but they will be modernised. Logistics are the Hungarian army's weak point. Only regular forces have had adequate training so that the army could not, unassisted, be self-sufficient in the event of war. However, according to a study published at the end of 1990, abandoning the offensive military doctrine would involve large reductions in 1991. If one bears in mind that the defence budget in 1990 was about 40 000 million florins, i.e. 3% of the national budget, that it was reduced to 1 000 million florins in 1991 and that an adequate start to modernisation would alone need some 70 000 million florins, new procurement seems improbable, not to speak of an inflation rate of about 30%, which would in reality mean a reduction of about 26 000 million florins. 91% of the 1990 military budget was already ear-

marked for operational and current expenditure, leaving only 9% for development and procurement (compared with 40% in the Western European democracies). To overcome this lack of resources and the significant decline of regard for military service, which is no longer considered to be an honour, the Hungarian Government is therefore obliged to retain conscription in the armed forces in parallel with some degree of professionalism. Another problem that should not be overlooked is the need to take over the training of officers and the rest of the army on new bases using national methods. So far, the army and air force had been trained according to the Soviet military doctrine. Most officers were sent to Moscow for more advanced training and had to be fluent in Russian, the command language of the Warsaw Pact forces.

(iv) *Poland*

The defence sector: an in-depth restructuring

174. Implementation of these decisions requires deep-rooted changes in the exercise of power (co-ordination of the various agencies and bodies) and there have been many diverging views regarding the extent and rate of the reforms to be carried out.

175. There have been many changes in the defence sector.

176. *Control:* the question discussed first was which authority would be responsible for co-ordinating security questions and replace the country's Defence Committee, set up in the sixties. President Walesa thought a National Security Council should be set up, closely linked with presidential services, to define government policy in national security matters in the event of external or internal danger and to define ways and means of defending the country against any threat: military, economic, ecological, etc. It would be chaired by the President himself and include the Prime Minister, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Interior, Defence, Finance and Justice and the directors of the private offices of the President and Prime Minister. However, since it was set up in mid-February 1991, parliament has refused to give a ruling on the presidential proposal, believing it was for the government to develop new government bodies, with the result that, for months, two bodies, one new, the other supposed to be no longer in office but effectively at work, have continued to share Polish foreign policy.

177. *The depolitisation of the military and the demilitarisation of politics:* the Ministry of Defence is no longer an exclusively military institution but is directed by a civilian with a separation between the military branch and the civil administration in order to avoid the Com-

munist Party having any control over the military. The civil administration is responsible for defining and conducting defence policies, co-ordinating them with the various governmental agencies, ensuring contacts with foreign administrations and developing the armed forces. The military branch, under a chief-of-staff or a senior officer, is responsible for preparing operations.

178. The Political Administration Department has disappeared completely, as have many departments of the Ministry of Defence and military academies. In 1991, the powers of certain branches of the military sector were reduced considerably (internal defence forces have become the military gendarmerie) or they were purely and simply disbanded (frontier defence troops have been replaced by frontier guards, independent of the Ministry of Defence). Finally, an amendment to the 1985 law on judicial proceedings strengthens government control over the military hierarchy. The military jurisdiction used to consist of a special unit, officially subordinate to the Prosecutor-General but in practice dependent on the military command. It had a largely political rôle and its purpose was to ensure party control in the army. The military prosecutor is now responsible to the government and appointed by the Prime Minister on the recommendation of the Prosecutor-General.

Changes in the structure and composition of the armed forces

179. In accordance with the sufficiency principle, Poland decided to phase out heavily-equipped units, many air force units and logistic support units, while retaining an anti-tank and anti-aircraft capability. It therefore gave priority to rapid reaction forces (airborne assault brigades and combat and transport helicopter regiments) and, above all, the air defence system. The withdrawal of eighty MiG-21s was partly offset by the procurement of ten MiG-29s in 1990. The army will be composed of operational forces (ten mechanised divisions) and regional defence units equipped with light weapons. It is expected that Polish troops, 50% of whom have so far been in the West, 25% in the centre and 25% in the east, will be redeployed towards the east. Finally, the army is considering taking part in operations outside its territory.

180. The perception of insecurity at its immediate frontiers is leading to a search for guarantees both inside and outside the country. Thus, the former Minister of Defence, General Florian Siwicki, stated on television at the beginning of 1990 that the restructuring of the army is Poland's contribution to the establishment of an atmosphere of confidence in Central Europe. The aim is to have a small but more efficient defensive army, which means that the doctrine, equipment, command and troop

deployment will be defensive and only part of the armed forces will be able to conduct a tactical counter-offensive. Hence the army is perceived as a useful institution and it would appear that most Polish leaders consider it would be difficult to have a strong republic, confident in its future, without it. However, the need for change has been felt, the army having compromised itself on many occasions (application of martial law in December 1981, invasion of Czechoslovakia in spring 1968, repression of popular demonstrations, very hard service conditions). Nor should one forget the extent of the pacifist trend of the mid-eighties when the army's rôle was not to guard Poland's frontiers but to ensure the presence of Soviet troops on Polish territory to act as political police and protect the privileges of the political powers. In these circumstances, opposition to the army assumes another form and becomes part of the struggle for independence.

181. A series of reforms was thus started in order to rally the population and young recruits round the army. First, the defence budget has been progressively reduced since 1989. In 1990, the breakdown of military expenditure by sector was as follows: more than 55% for personnel, 22% for scientific research and supplies, 15.5% for training and maintenance and only 7% for investment. The defence budget for the first quarter of 1992 amounts to \$ 500 million, i.e. 5.9% of the total government budget and 23% lower than that for the first quarter of 1991. Only 4% of the defence budget is earmarked for the procurement of weapons and equipment. This made certain members of the parliamentary Defence Committee refer to the need to remove restrictions on weapons exports in order to obtain additional funds.

(v) *Romania*

The armed forces: slow depolitisation

182. Romania offers a striking example of relations between the Communist Party and the military and the political rôle of the army, which moved from total sovietisation in the fifties to restructuring for internal political purposes, Ceausescu wishing to pursue a policy independent of that of Moscow and, consequently, to strengthen his personal authority and party hegemony over the army. This policy prevented any emancipation of the military sector as a whole in relation to the political power. Military policy often appealed to Romanian nationalism and anti-Russian feelings in order to present the army as the defender of national sovereignty vis-à-vis external enemies. More than in the other Central and Eastern European countries, it had a rôle of political and social control (support for the régime, control and socialisation of young people, mobilisation of civilian society). In the

early seventies, the entire military sector, split up into many structures independent of each other, was brought under higher military bodies and the authority of Ceausescu, thus becoming the true instrument of the party. Limited resources and technology held up essential modernisation.

183. According to the Romanian Minister of Defence, the Romanian armed forces are not prepared to avert an attack. The restructuring policy is only just starting to be applied. The number of troops has been reduced to 225 000 and the restructuring programme provides for mobile, lightly-equipped forces, adequate air defence and rapid intervention units.

Defence policy

184. Romania's control of its defence sector, without taking into account its potential effectiveness against the Soviet Union, was one of the cornerstones of the Ceausescu Government. The Romanian army's defence strategy followed the Yugoslav model, i.e. all-round defence, based on the war of all the people, implying a strategy of mass mobilisation and the training of a para-military unit for territorial defence purposes, the Patriotic Guards, numbering 700 000.

185. Today, Romania's defence policy is affected by its leaders' fear in view of the country's isolation and divisions relating to the perception of external dangers. Paradoxically, Romania was the last country to call for the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact military and political structures and only Eastern European country to sign a bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union – a gesture considered controversial both outside and inside the country. For the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Adrian Nastase, a separate security system for the whole of Eastern Europe, helping to ensure greater stability and co-operation in the region, would have been to the advantage of the western countries insofar as NATO and WEU are not yet prepared to open their doors to the Central and Eastern European countries. The Romanian Government's wish to integrate Romania in the new Europe is making itself increasingly felt. The Secretary-General of NATO, Manfred Wörner, said on this subject that Romania's status should be identical with that of the newly-emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe:

“We believe that [Romania] should become a constructive partner, because it has an important contribution to make to the balance of security and co-operation in the area.”

186. On 1st December 1991, the Romanian Prime Minister, Mr. Stolozan, therefore repeated Romania's wish to join NATO in order to guarantee its security. He said Romania

wished to join the alliance but that this did not depend on it alone while, in the same talks, the Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Adrian Nastase, said his country wished to develop closer relations with NATO, at the highest level acceptable to NATO in its relations with Eastern European states.

VIII. Defence industries

187. Until 1989, the Central and Eastern European countries were Soviet satellites at both political and industrial level.

188. After the Soviet Union had, it is believed, started to supply them with free military equipment in the years following the second world war, the establishment of the Warsaw Pact meant the burden could be shared. Each country was encouraged to set up a specialised defence industry.

189. The need for each country to barter with other Soviet bloc countries to obtain equipment that it did not produce itself, the "big brother's" private stamping-ground in advanced technology and the obligation to export free of charge to friendly countries prevented any of the countries becoming militarily self-sufficient.

190. Each of these countries must now try to convert and diversify its defence industry. But the future is a dark one since this industry, accustomed to being privileged and to have no competition, now has to be competitive on a world market that is in regression and bow to the rules of the market economy.

(i) Bulgaria

191. During the communist era, the defence industry was considered an integral part of the military sector. The disbandment of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union plunged it into a serious crisis because of the loss of traditional markets and the cancellation of many orders from the Soviet Union, its main customer, for spare parts or raw materials. Between 20 000 and 30 000 workers, i.e. 25% of the work force, were out of work between 1989 and 1991.

192. The restructuring of this industry is being carried out at several levels:

- externally: priority to the East; development of friendly relations with the military in the new states stemming from the former Soviet Union;
- internally: reducing the disproportionate share of the military sector in the economy.

193. Bulgaria has decreed restrictions on its exports of arms to countries which practise terrorism or have authoritarian régimes. However, production costs are very low and for the time being products are competitive on the world market and, more particularly, on third world markets.

(ii) Czechoslovakia

194. Arms production in Czechoslovakia is based on a long tradition. It was the country the least dependent on the Soviet Union for military equipment. It produced 35% of its requirements, 15% coming from other members of the Warsaw Pact and 50% from the Soviet Union.

195. Since 1991, arms exports have fallen sharply because of the international situation and because the political line of the new government, that claims to be non-violent, intends to suspend all arms exports to conflict areas. Furthermore, in 1988, the communist government had announced measures to reduce the military potential and had adopted a resolution giving priority to the development of civil industry at the expense of military industry.

196. The problem is that 80% of production comes from the Slovak Republic (which might, moreover, involve sharing problems in the event of a Slovak army being formed) and that there are profound differences between the two republics on the nature and rate of reforms. The Slovak Republic is particularly affected since its economy is largely dependent on the arms sector. The latter employs 80 000 persons and is Slovakia's main source of revenue. In 1988, Slovakia's arms production amounted to 19 300 million koruna, in 1990 9 000 million and in 1991 only 5 000 million. Thus, in spite of the consensus between the two republics on the suspension of exports to conflict areas, Slovakia reserves the right, in the short term, to export heavy weapons in order to ensure a progressive transition for its armaments industry.

(iii) Hungary

197. Hungary has only a small arms production capability. It has no aircraft industry, apart from an air force maintenance establishment, and its few arms firms are in serious financial difficulties. Its only trump card is that it has managed to set up and maintain a world-level research industry in certain electronics sectors which should allow it to play a rôle in developing a new air defence system, considered to be of first priority.

198. It exports practically no weapons. Because of the limited requirements of the country's armed forces, the Hungarian Government is quite aware that a national defence industry would not be profitable without a good export market.

(iv) Poland

199. The foundations of the Polish defence industry date back to the first world war (fighter aircraft, steelworks, electronics industry).

200. It has the following assets:

- a considerable production capacity that has never been fully exploited. For instance, each year the tank manufacturing industry can produce 350 tanks, 600 armoured vehicles and 1 000 tracked vehicles;
- large research and development capabilities that would be even larger if Poland had the necessary resources (e.g. the successful modifications to Soviet models);
- a large aircraft industry: the PZL (association of aeronautical and engine industries) has a work force of about 90 000. It builds its own aircraft but also takes part in co-operation and co-production programmes with foreign aircraft industries in both East and West (Antonov, Ilyuchin and Piper) which have a future ahead.

Arms exports

201. Until 1989, 80 to 90% of arms exports were destined for other Central European countries and the third world. Decisions on exports are still subject to strict state control. Exports to conflict areas are banned.

202. Since 1990, Poland has been engaged in bilateral negotiations with the United States and numerous members of Cocom and has signed bilateral agreements with France, Belgium and the United Kingdom with the aim of being removed from the list of countries proscribed by Cocom.

203. Poland is endeavouring to make its national armaments industry more competitive so as to enter new markets (Gulf Arab states, Western Europe) and at the same time open up new prospects for its defence industry.

(v) Romania

204. In Romania, self-sufficiency was the rule in the arms production sector so as to limit imports from the West or the Soviet Union which largely ceased supplying equipment and spare parts as a reprisal for Romanian refusal to take part in the 1968 repression of Czechoslovakia.

205. In spite of the absence of a developed arms industry, the Ceausescu régime worked to produce guns, munitions, small fighter aircraft, tanks (modified T-55s) and patrol craft. The cost

of this undertaking was high but it had some successes such as helicopters produced under French licence.

206. The range of equipment currently in production has to be seen to be believed. Falling export markets and shrinking national military manpower implies that this level of production will have to be drastically reduced in the immediate future and the armaments industry restructured. Fortunately there is a keen awareness of the problem and a strong resolve to find pragmatic solutions, not least in increased international co-operation.

IX. Conclusion

207. The foregoing chapters show that the Central European states now face a limited number of choices if they are effectively to organise their individual and/or mutual security and defence. The choices are:

- (i) a network of bilateral and multi-lateral agreements and co-operation between themselves, to manage crises and try to resolve conflicts before they escalate. A beginning was made in the so-called Triangle summits between Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland held in Visegrad and Kracow in 1991. In such a context the idea of a "Central European Union" has been advanced, although seen by some as self-defeating in the sense that, once established, there would be little incentive to amalgamate such arrangements into, say, NATO or WEU, and indeed opposition and eventual confrontation might result in the longer term;
- (ii) membership and security co-operation in regional arrangements which straddle hitherto "east" and "west" conceptions. Examples include the "Pentagonale" proposals by Italy in 1989 and 1990, associating Austria, Italy, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia (the former Habsburg Empire). The addition of Poland produced a "Hexagonale" and then, with Slovenia, a "Septagonale". The organisation was renamed as the Central European Initiative with the inclusion of Croatia during other CSCE meetings of March 1992. The mandate now encompasses a broad range of co-operative activities among the members in the realms of economics, environmental protection and transport as well as culture.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is to consider financing major investments (e.g. a Trieste-Budapest-Kiev highway) on condition that democratic reform proceeds apace as well as freedom for the press and the recognition of minority rights. This would not be the first time that financial pressure has become a major component of enduring democratic reform and a measure of stability in the region.

The Nordic Council now includes observers from the Baltic states and is trying to agree arrangements for co-operation in the Baltic Sea area. Similar initiatives are progressing in the Black Sea area also;

- (iii) a general trend towards Central European participation in the major European institutions in order to receive binding security guarantees if necessary. Such moves include efforts to gain full membership of the European Community, NATO and WEU.

A number of Central European governments have already formally announced a desire to become NATO members; all are already very active in both the NACC and the North Atlantic Assembly. With the long-overdue restructuring and re-orientation of NATO and its developing relationship with the CSCE has not the time now come to consider seriously the idea of admitting at least the Central European nations as full members of NATO?

"Not without Russia" is the probable response, for NATO has a well-founded fear of not wanting to offend Russia and thus aggravate inter-state tensions in Europe. Nonetheless the idea should be examined seriously, perhaps within the context of the CSCE which obviously has an umbrella rôle;

- (iv) bilateral treaties with individual states in Western Europe, especially Germany, which provide for mutual supervision of minority rights according to a European norm and for the settlement of any outstanding claims from the past. A precedent for this form of arrangement exists in the 1970 Paris Treaty between Austria and Italy over the status and rights of the German-speaking majority in the

Italian province of the Alto Adiger. Other parallels are agreements also between Poland and Germany, as well as bilateral agreements between Germany and Romania.

208. Quite rightly, most Central European states try not to abandon any one of the above options, preferring to explore all avenues in the hope of a breakthrough.

209. As far as WEU is concerned, the arrangements agreed with the Central European countries in Bonn on 19th June 1992 are supposed to suffice for the moment. Such considerations do not prevent individual initiative, however, witness the following exchange in the French National Assembly on 19th June 1992 (the same day), when the Rapporteur for the Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Etienne Pinte, made the following point:

"

While Poland is turning firmly towards the Europe of the Twelve, it is also tenaciously seeking guarantees for its security. Its history explains this insistence and it should not be forgotten that it still views its great neighbours as disturbing shadows.

Poland therefore asked to join NATO. It then held out a hand to Western European Union. So far, it has found the great western countries reticent.

Although I understand that it is impossible, for the time being at least, for Poland to be integrated in NATO, I do not see why a place cannot be found for it in Western European Union. I therefore ask what France intends to do to associate Poland with WEU?

Moreover, it would have been desirable for our country to specify in the treaty we are examining that it is prepared to help to find a status for Poland in WEU. I would remind you that the Secretary-General of WEU said dialogue was no longer enough and that WEU should be prepared to further and examine the possibility and political expediency of special links with the Central and Eastern European countries. A status has been found for associating Turkey and a fortiori one should be found for Poland!

.....

I do not endorse your analysis of the possible reactions of third countries. I am in fact convinced that we do not need to fear the reactions of our allies when the purpose is to guarantee the security of a friendly country. To note that our American allies would not view kindly a

rapprochement between Poland and WEU or military co-operation agreements between France and Poland should not frighten either France or the United States. Such agreements exist officially with other Central European countries: why should there not be one with Poland? Furthermore, did the United States not set up NACC to be sure of controlling the security of the Central European countries?..."

The Deputy Minister for European Affairs, Mr. Georges Kiejman, gave the following reply:

"You referred to security problems. As you know, Poland's security is dear to France.

Today, I venture to say that security problems are handled increasingly in multilateral forums rather than bilateral conventions and we are endeavouring to ensure that Poland may take part.

Poland is already associated with certain regular consultations in the European security area thanks to WEU and NACC. Admittedly Poland is not a member of WEU and, in fact, we have not proposed that it become a member. If it depended on France's wish alone, it would of course have to convince its partners.

May I remind you that WEU is now destined to implement the defence policy of the European Economic Community? It would therefore seem very inappropriate, just when we are, or I hope we are, preparing to ratify the treaty on European Union, to bring into WEU a country outside the European Economic Community before WEU can be sure of its aims and its methods of operating at the service of the EEC.

I sincerely think that this is neither the time nor the place to discuss the exaggerated apprehension that I am aware the United States may have about the rôle of WEU. We have stated that WEU action is complementary to that of NATO. However, these considerations are relatively remote from the specific question of bilateral relations between France and Poland and it was therefore normal for the matter not to have been raised in the co-operation treaty.

In any event, believe, like us, that balance and stability in Europe depend largely on our ability to offer these countries clear prospects of future integration in bodies with a general vocation."

210. It is worth noting that, as far as France is concerned, the door is not firmly shut. The same sentiment may be found in many of our member nations individually.

211. Now through the consultation process in the NACC and with the inauguration of discussions between WEU members and the Eight of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, it may be hoped that the security and defence interests of both Western and Central Europe will become mutually supportive. As we are all members of both the CSCE and the NACC, a measure of caucussing might be envisaged to establish joint positions before crucial meetings take place (as occasionally took place in Vienna in the run-up to the signature of the CFE and Open Skies treaties).

212. The particular realm where there would be a definite advantage to specifically European co-operation concerns the procurement of armaments where all our nations now have a vocation to co-operate. With moves to bring the Independent European Programme Group and the Eurogroup within the aegis of WEU to form a European Armaments Agency, now is the time to include the subject also in discussions with the Central European nations.

213. Coupled with such considerations is the need to develop language training in Central European countries, preferably by "training the trainers". In addition, exchanges at all levels of military society are bound to have an effect on traditional attitudes and help to break taboos and traditional barriers.

214. In a forthcoming report of the Assembly, "European security - Reserve forces and national service" (Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker), the Rapporteur argues in favour of inaugurating a European debate on conscription and the rôle of "national service". A majority of Central European countries are also being forced to decide on the pros and cons of conscription: we should pool our resources and discuss the subject together in an attempt to rationalise the arguments.

215. In short, there is no lack of matter for discussion under the rubric "Defence and Security" whenever WEU and the Central Europeans meet, whether in the Assembly, between Ministers or under the aegis of the Institute. However, in your Rapporteur's opinion, mere discussion is not enough.

216. If any nation wishes to be taken seriously, it must go beyond the boundaries of words to deeds and one of the most heartening aspects of the recent behaviour of most Central European states has been a readiness to assume responsibility by contributing for coalition operations in the Gulf in 1990/91 or for one or other of the various current United Nations missions or, in some cases, for both. Not least among the advantages of such co-operation is the opportunity for international contact and the development of military competence to complement co-operation in more political forums. The evo-

lution of "defence forces" for a more humanitarian rôle will in turn have an effect at home, not least on defence budgets.

217. In summary, the evolution of Central European states in the realm of defence is little different from that in Western Europe, in strictly military terms. The difference lies in the potential threat to stability in inherently

political and economic terms and especially because of the "new nationalism" prevailing.

218. Your Rapporteur believes that WEU can and should play a part in ensuring that the Central European states progress together with ourselves towards new alignments for European defence and security which will be of mutual advantage.

APPENDIX 1

(a) Bulgaria		Minister of Defence:	Mr. Leon Dobrovsky
GDP (1991):	138.40 billion Leva (\$25.72 billion)	Armed forces:	
Defence budget (1992):	8.11 billion Leva (\$1.31 billion)	Active:	145 800 (conscripts: 75 000)
% GDP for defence (1991):	6.9%	Reserves:	495 000
Population:	9 098 000	Terms of service:	18 months
Minister of Defence:	Mr. Dimitar Ludjev	Equipment:	
Armed forces:		Main battle tanks (MBT):	3 208 (T-34, T-55, T-72) (CFE ceiling: 1 435)
Active:	107 000 (conscripts: 70 000)	Armoured vehicles:	4 286 (all categories) (CFE ceiling: 2 050)
Reserves:	472 500	Artillery:	3 414 (all categories) (CFE ceiling: 1 150)
Terms of service:	18 months	Fighter aircraft:	402 (CFE ceiling: 345)
Equipment:		Helicopters:	186
Main battle tanks (MBT):	2 100 (T-34, T-45, T-55, T-72) (CFE ceiling: 1 475)	Miscellaneous aircraft:	160
Armoured vehicles:	2 053 (all categories) (CFE ceiling: 2 000)	Participation in United Nations forces:	
Artillery:	2 129 (all categories) (CFE ceiling: 1 750)	Angola (UNAVEM II ²):	16 observers
Surface craft:	75	Croatia (UNPROFOR ²):	20 observers 8 military policemen 1 infantry battalion staff
Submarines:	3	Korea (NNSC ²):	staff
Fighter aircraft:	259 (CFE ceiling: 235)		
Helicopters:	91	(c) Estonia	
Miscellaneous aircraft:	126	GDP (1991):	16.75 billion Roubles (\$9.85 billion)
Participation in United Nations forces:		Defence budget (1992):	135 million Roubles
Cambodia (UNTAC ²):	474	Population:	1 583 000
(b) Czechoslovakia		Minister of Defence:	Mr. Hain Rebas
GDP (1991):	952.24 billion Koruny (\$98.02 billion)	Armed forces:	
Defence budget (1992):	26.90 billion Koruny (\$2.45 billion)	Active:	2 000
% GDP for defence (1991):	2.9%	Terms of service:	15 months
Population:	15 788 800	(d) Hungary	
		GDP (1991):	2 880 billion Forint (\$53.90 billion)
		Defence budget (1992):	59.60 billion Forint (\$1.16 billion)

1. Sources: Military Balance 1992/93, and other publications.

2. See Glossary.

% GDP for defence (1991):	2.3%
Population:	10 543 800
Minister of Defence:	Mr. Lajos Für
Armed forces:	
Active:	80 800 (conscripts: 53 900)
Reserves:	192 000
Terms of service:	12 months
Equipment:	
Main battle tanks (MBT):	1 357 (T-34, T-54, T-55, T-72) (CFE ceiling: 835)
Armoured vehicles:	1 809 (all categories) (CFE ceiling: 1 700)
Artillery:	1 040 (all categories) (CFE ceiling: 810)
Danube Flotilla:	6
Fighter aircraft:	91
Helicopters:	122
Miscellaneous aircraft:	46
Participation in United Nations forces:	
Angola (UNAVEM II ²):	15 observers
Iraq/ Kuwait (UNIKOM ²):	7 observers
Middle East (UNTSO ²):	2 observers

(e) Latvia

GDP (1991):	22.31 billion Roubles (\$13.12 billion)
Defence budget (1992):	257.4 million Roubles
Population:	2 687 000
Minister of Defence:	Mr. Talavs Jundzis
Armed forces:	
Active:	2 550 (conscripts: 1 950)
Terms of service:	18 months

(f) Lithuania

GDP (1991):	32.81 billion Roubles (\$19.30 billion)
Defence budget (1992):	1 billion Roubles
Population:	3 723 000

Minister of Defence:	Mr. Audrius Butkevicius
Armed forces:	
Active:	7 000
Reserves:	12 500 national guard

(g) Poland

GDP (1991):	1 391 431.40 billion Zlotys (\$102.40 billion)
Defence budget (1992):	38 450 billion Zlotys (\$2.44 billion)
% GDP for defence (1991):	
	2.4%
Population:	38 207 000
Minister of Defence:	Mr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz
Armed forces:	
Active:	296 500 (conscripts: 167 400)
Reserves:	435 200
Terms of service:	18 months
Equipment:	
Main battle tanks (MBT):	2 850 (T-54/55, T-72) (CFE ceiling: 1 730)
Armoured vehicles:	2 253 (all categories) (CFE ceiling: 2 150)
Artillery:	2 316 (all categories) (CFE ceiling: 1 610)
Surface craft:	62
Submarines:	3
Fighter aircraft:	481
Helicopters:	188
Miscellaneous aircraft:	115

Participation in United Nations forces:

Cambodia (UNTAC ²):	176 soldiers
Croatia (UNPROFOR ²):	1 battalion (899 soldiers)
Iraq/ Kuwait (UNIKOM ²):	7 soldiers
Korea (NNSC ²):	staff
Lebanon (UNIFIL ²):	84 soldiers
Syria (UNDOF ²):	159 logistics support
Western Sahara (MINURSO ²):	2 observers

(h) Romania

GDP (1991):	2 100 billion Lei (\$37.10 billion)
Defence budget (1992):	173.70 billion Lei (\$0.96 billion)
% GDP for defence (1991):	
	3.1%
Population:	22 749 000

Minister of Defence:	Lt. Gen. Niculae Spiroiu	Armoured vehicles:	3 206 (all categories) (CFE ceiling: 2 100)
Armed forces:		Artillery:	4 009 (all categories) (CFE ceiling: 1 475)
Active:	200 000 (conscripts: 126 700)	Surface craft:	140
Reserves:	593 000	Submarines:	1
Terms of service:	12 months (army, air force) 18 months (navy)	Fighter aircraft:	486 (CFE ceiling: 430)
Equipment:		Helicopters:	220 (CFE ceiling: 120)
Main battle tanks (MBT):	2 875 (T-34, T-55, T-72, T-85, T-580) (CFE ceiling: 1 375)	Miscellaneous aircraft:	272
		Participation in United Nations forces:	
		Iraq/ Kuwait (UNIKOM²):	7 observers

Glossary

MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
NNSC	Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission for Korea
UNAVEM II	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation

Defence: Central Europe in evolution

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Hardy and others

1. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
“Ensure that both WEU member states and Central European states develop effective arrangements to prevent the export of military equipment to those countries and groups which pursue policies of militant nationalism or of aggressive intention.”
Signed: Hardy, Johnston, Dunnachie, Marshall, Davis, Thompson, Litherland, Cunliffe, Hughes, Godman

1. See 10th sitting, 1st December 1992 (amendment agreed to).

WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee ²
by Mr. Marten, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Marten, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. WEU: the operational organisation
- III. Operational developments
 - (i) WEU planning cell
 - (ii) WEU satellite centre
 - (iii) The European Corps
- IV. Recommendations and responses
 - (i) Recommendation 519 on the application of United Nations Resolution 757
 - (ii) Extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers on the situation in Yugoslavia (Helsinki, 10th July 1992)
 - (iii) Fact-finding in the Adriatic area (24th-27th August 1992)
 - (iv) 3rd September: urgent meeting of the Standing Committee
- V. Conclusion

1. Adopted in committee by 14 votes to 0 with 6 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. de Puig (Alternate: Moya) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bassinet, Borderas, Brito, Cariglia, Chevalier (Alternate: Sarens), Cox, De Decker, Dees, Durand, Fernandes, Marques, Fiandrotti, Fioret, Fourré, Hardy, Irmer, Jung, Kelchtermans, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden, Marten, Lord Newall (Alternate: Thompson), MM. Pecchioli, Perinat (Alternate: Cuco), Reis Leite (Alternate: Mrs. Aguiar), Schæer, Sinesio, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Steiner, Vazquez (Alternate: Bolinaga), Zierer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling Recommendations 506, 512, 519 and 525 which have all sought to prompt precise action by WEU to help solve the crisis in the former Yugoslavia;
- (ii) Fully endorsing United Nations Resolutions 713, 757, 770, 771 and 781 and the efforts being made by Lord Owen and Mr. Vance to resolve the crisis;
- (iii) Dismayed that so little apparent progress has been made in finding a political solution to the crisis and that the suffering of the peoples concerned is likely to be intensified still further with the onset of winter;
- (iv) Urging the Council to multiply efforts within the United Nations, the CSCE, the EC and the new WEU Forum for Consultation with the Central European states, to seek greater co-operation at all levels in a further attempt to convince the various belligerents to stop fighting;
- (v) Disappointed that the United Nations Security Council has not heeded WEU's call for reinforcement of the embargo on Serbia and Montenegro and that consequently the fighting is being prolonged;
- (vi) Congratulating the Council for promptly following up a number of the Assembly's recommendations and applauding the Italian presidency for its pragmatic and positive initiatives over WEU co-ordination and liaison with the United Nations, CSCE and NATO;
- (vii) Pleased that all WEU countries have offered to contribute either forces, logistic support or facilities, or a combination of such assets, but insisting on the need for an equitable sharing of costs;
- (viii) Convinced that an air defence capability plus associated intelligence-gathering measures to help protect United Nations forces are essential;
- (ix) Considering that similar WEU and NATO naval and maritime air assets might well be combined to form composite forces to stress complementarity and in a demonstration of cost-effectiveness rather than duplication;
- (x) Believing that when WEU forces are operating as such they should be readily identifiable,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Intensify efforts within the United Nations, the CSCE, the EC and the new WEU Forum for Consultation to support Lord Owen and Mr. Vance's endeavours in Geneva and to sponsor a possible fresh initiative to convince the belligerents in all parts of the former Yugoslavia to stop fighting and seek a political solution to their grievances;
2. Prepare a resolution to be tabled by WEU members of the United Nations Security Council to reinforce the present embargo at least to the level of that enforced against Iraq in 1990/91 and in particular to take account of the problem of cargo in transit and also of the complications of the Danube Convention and to publish evidence at an early stage of any significant breach of the embargo;
3. Fulfil its pledge for WEU member states to " offer expertise, technical assistance and equipment to the governments of Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river Danube for the purpose of circumventing or breaking the sanctions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 " and in particular respond to Romania's request for assistance;
4. Ensure that all WEU nations which have offered forces, logistic support or facilities are permitted to participate in operations, although not necessarily those organised exclusively under the direct aegis of the United Nations. Both the CSCE and the EC, for example, require considerable support for observer missions;

5. Prepare a special supplementary budget for 1992 to take account of operations concerning the former Yugoslavia and also to enable the WEU planning cell to function correctly;
6. Make contingency arrangements to provide an adequate air defence capability to help protect United Nations forces engaged in the former Yugoslavia;
7. In conjunction with the NATO authorities, rationalise naval and maritime air operations in the Adriatic area to form composite and cost-effective forces;
8. Design a symbol of specific European identity to represent WEU and urge member countries to use it to distinguish their military forces – ships, aircraft, vehicles and personnel – taking part in WEU operations. Personnel serving in the planning cell should be among the first recipients of such a badge.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Marten, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The aim of the present report is to acquaint members of the Assembly with the series of developments concerning both WEU's operational organisation and the former Yugoslavia, and which have occurred since the last plenary session in June. The report concentrates particularly on recommendations for action, the Council's replies and initiatives and parallel and complementary actions in other bodies.

2. The period in question has been particularly rich from every point of view, but particularly where WEU and its operational rôle is concerned. The following chapters mark the principal milestones.

II. WEU: the operational organisation

3. In Recommendation 518¹, the Assembly adopted a series of recommendations designed to give an impulse to the Council's deliberations scheduled for the then imminent meeting at the Petersberg near Bonn on 19th June 1992.

4. The Assembly was certainly not disappointed in the Council's Petersberg Declaration which took up the majority of the Assembly's detailed recommendations and announced an array of action for the immediate future:

"II. On strengthening WEU's operational rôle

1. In accordance with the decision contained in the Declaration of the member states of WEU at Maastricht on 10th December 1991 to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU member states have been examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means covering, in particular, a WEU planning cell and military units answerable to WEU, in order to strengthen WEU's operational rôle.

2. WEU member states declare that they are prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU.

3. Decisions to use military units answerable to WEU will be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of member states in accordance with national constitutions.

4. Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peace-keeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.

5. The planning and execution of these tasks will be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of all allies.

6. Military units will be drawn from the forces of WEU member states, including forces with NATO missions – in this case after consultation with NATO – and will be organised on a multinational and multi-service basis.

7. All WEU member states will soon designate which of their military units and headquarters they would be willing to make available to WEU for its various possible tasks. Where multinational formations drawn from the forces of WEU nations already exist or are planned, these units could be made available for use under the authority of WEU, with agreement of all participating nations.

8. WEU member states intend to develop and exercise the appropriate capabilities to enable the deployment of WEU military units by land, sea or air to accomplish these tasks.

9. A planning cell will be established on 1st October 1992, subject to practical considerations, under the authority of the Council. It will be located with the Secretariat-General in a suitable building in Brussels. The Council has today appointed Maj. Gen. Caltabiano (Italian

1. WEU: the operational organisation, Document 1307, 13th May 1992, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith.

Air Force) as its first Director. The planning cell will be responsible for:

- preparing contingency plans for the employment for forces under WEU auspices;
- preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected;
- keeping an updated list of units and combinations of units which might be allocated to WEU for specific operations.

10. The Council of Ministers approved the terms of reference for the planning cell."

5. The formal reply of the Council to Recommendation 518 was somewhat slower in arriving (received by the Assembly on 16th October) but, as well as reiterating the appropriate parts of the Petersberg Declaration, added a number of extra details which demonstrate the Council's readiness now to progress operational matters in a particularly pragmatic and constructive manner. These extra details are highlighted in the following text of the Council's reply to Recommendation 518:

"1. In accordance with the decision contained in the declaration of the member states of WEU at Maastricht on 10th December 1991 to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU member states have been examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means covering, in particular, a WEU planning cell and military units answerable to WEU, in order to strengthen WEU's military rôle.

(a) At its meeting in Bonn on 19th June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers agreed that "a planning cell will be established on 1st October 1992, subject to practical considerations, under the authority of the Council. It will be located with the Secretariat-General in a suitable building in Brussels". The Council of Ministers also approved the terms of reference for the planning cell.

(b) Questions pertaining to closer military co-operation complementary to the alliance, in particular in the fields of logistics, transport and training remain on the agenda of the Council's Defence Representatives Group. Whenever appropriate, information on the outcome of the discussions on this issue and their follow-up will be fed into the ongoing dialogue with the Assembly.

(c) On 19th June 1992, WEU ministers agreed "that the chiefs of defence staff should meet twice a year prior to the regular Ministerial Councils and on an ad hoc basis whenever necessary". The Council does not envisage, at present, the creation of a WEU "Military Committee". However, it should be recalled that - according to paragraph 12 of Part I "on WEU and European security" of the Petersberg Declaration - following the transfer of the Council and Secretariat to Brussels, national delegations could be reinforced with "military delegates" to develop and provide advice for the Council, to introduce the views of the chiefs of defence staff to the planning cell and to monitor the professional standards of the planning cell's work. In the future, an enhanced rôle of the WEU chiefs of defence staff would be envisageable in principle, in line with the organisation's evolution.

(d) In its reply to sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 1 of the recommendation, the Council wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to Part II, "on strengthening WEU's operational rôle", of the Petersberg Declaration. In this declaration, WEU member states "declare that they are prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU". Decisions to use military units answerable to WEU "will be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of member states in accordance with national constitutions." The declaration also specifies that "military units will be drawn from the forces of WEU member states, including forces with NATO missions - in this case after consultation with NATO - and will be organised on a multinational and multi-service basis". Furthermore, "all WEU member states will soon designate which of their military units and headquarters they would be willing to make available to WEU for its various possible tasks. Where multinational formations drawn from the forces of WEU nations already exist or are planned, these units could be made available for use under the authority of WEU, with agreement of all participating nations." WEU member states "intend to develop and exercise the appropriate capabilities to enable the deployment of WEU military units by land, sea or air to accomplish these tasks." The possibility of the

creation of a European aeronaval force with the capability for force projection is currently under consideration by the Council and its working groups, as are the related technical questions. The Assembly will be kept informed on the outcome of these discussions and on any follow-ups in due course.

2. Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, Part II "on strengthening WEU's operational rôle" of the Petersberg Declaration identifies the following tasks for which military units of WEU member states, acting under WEU's authority, could be employed: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. The Petersberg Declaration specifies: "The planning and execution of these tasks will be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of all allies."

3. On 19th June 1992, WEU ministers agreed that a number of points should be made in extending the invitation to the countries interested in becoming members, observers or associate members. In this context, the Council wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to Part III "on relations between WEU and the other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance" which specifies: "Other European member states of the Atlantic Alliance which have accepted the invitation to become associate members of WEU, although not being parties to the modified Brussels Treaty, may participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council - without prejudice to the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty - of its working groups and of the subsidiary bodies", subject - *inter alia* - to the following provisions: (...) they will be able to be associated to the planning cell through a permanent liaison arrangement; (...) they will take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they commit forces (...).

For "practical reasons", however, "space activities will be restricted to the present members until the end of the experimental phase of the satellite centre in 1995. During this phase the new members and associate members will be kept informed of WEU's space activities. Appropriate arrangements will be made

for associate members to participate in subsequent space activities at the same time as decisions are taken on the continuation of such activities."

The possibility of observers participating in the WEU planning cell and in WEU's space activities is not foreseen in the Petersberg Declaration. While possible, in principle, the inclusion "of other NATO states or European Community associates in WEU operations on an *ad hoc* basis" would have to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.

4. Possibilities for co-operation between the experimental WEU satellite centre and the planning cell as well as the desirability and feasibility of ensuring "firm links" of the WEU satellite centre in Torrejón with non-WEU bodies will be examined in due course, as the satellite centre becomes more operational.

5. WEU's relations with the IEPG are addressed in the Council's replies to Recommendations 517 and 523.

6. The declaration adopted in Bonn on 19th June 1992 by the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe states that "the enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania should reflect the specific relations which exist and are developing between these countries and the European Union and its member states. Other appropriate forms of co-operation could be set up in the light of the development of these relations." Ministers agreed to strengthen existing relations between WEU and these states by structuring the dialogue, consultations and co-operation. The declaration specifies that "the focus of consultations will be the security architecture and stability in Europe, the future development of the CSCE, arms control and disarmament, in particular the implementation of the CFE and Open Skies treaties, as well as the 1992 Vienna document. Developments in Europe and neighbouring regions will be of particular interest to the participants. In this way, WEU's Central European partners will be able to acquaint themselves with the future security and defence policy of the European Union and find new opportunities to co-operate with the defence component of the union and with the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance as these develop."

7. Questions pertaining to the "maintenance of an effective and credible

minimum nuclear deterrent" and to the desirability of instituting a WEU "nuclear consultation group" are not at present on the agenda of the Council and its working groups.

8. The contents of the Petersberg Declaration as well as the declaration of the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe, both adopted on 19th June 1992, testify to the fact that WEU member states are fully conscious of the need to develop relations between NATO and WEU on the basis of the dual purpose of transparency and complementarity."

6. Your Rapporteur would like to make a point of drawing the extra information given to the attention of members:

(i) *"The Council of Ministers also approved the terms of reference for the planning cell."*

The terms of reference adopted were broadly in line with the outline given in Sir Dudley Smith's report which also mentioned arrangements for appointing and paying the staff. (See below for further details.)

(ii) *"...national delegations could be reinforced with "military delegates" to develop and provide advice for the Council, to introduce the views of the Chiefs of Defence Staff to the planning cell and to monitor the professional standards of the planning cell's work. In the future, an enhanced rôle of the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff would be envisageable in principle, in line with the organisation's evolution."*

At least one country has already earmarked an officer as a "military delegate" and advisor to the Permanent Representative. Others will follow in due course. It is important that such posts are kept separate from those in the planning cell in order to preserve the integrity and "objectivity" of the latter.

The WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff are already assuming an enhanced rôle (c.f. the last meeting on 16th October 1992 in Rome) and the Assembly has not hesitated to make suggestions regarding subjects for future discussion².

(iii) *"The possibility of the creation of a European aeronaval force with the capability for force projection is currently under consideration by the Council and its Working Groups, as are the related technical questions."*

The creation of a European aeronaval force was first suggested in a 1988 report of the Defence Committee entitled "Naval aviation"³ and it is good to hear that the Council is now to study and develop the idea. The Defence Committee intends to keep a watching brief on the subject and will be reporting progress to the Assembly.

(iv) *"While possible, in principle, the inclusion "of other NATO states or European Community associates in WEU operations on an ad hoc basis" would have to be addressed on a case-by-case basis."*

Ad hoc co-operation in WEU operations is already starting, although not yet with the planning cell which will take time to establish. In particular, "bilateral" co-operative arrangements with the United States and Canada, albeit separately, are about to be developed.

(v) *"Possibilities for co-operation between the experimental WEU satellite centre and the planning cell as well as the desirability and feasibility of ensuring "firm links" of the WEU satellite centre in Torrejón with non-WEU bodies will be examined in due course, as the satellite centre becomes more operational."*

Your Rapporteur is pleased that the idea of links with non-WEU bodies has not been excluded definitively. The work of the satellite centre in Torrejón must be complementary to that of other bodies working in the same domain. As the satellite centre becomes operational it will have to rely on other agencies for certain information and should obviously be in a position to reciprocate.

III. Operational developments

(i) WEU planning cell

7. As forecast in the addendum to the report on WEU: the operational organisation (Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith), Lieutenant-General Marcello Caltabiano (Italian Air Force) was duly appointed to head the WEU planning cell, seconded by Brigadier-General Jean-Philippe Roux (French Army). The cell was established on Thursday 1st October 1992 in premises kindly made available by the Belgian Ministry of Defence at Laeken in the suburbs of Brussels. The cell will move into the same premises as the Secretariat General at 4 rue de la Régence when that building is ready.

2. European security - reserve forces and national service, Document 1338, Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker.

3. Document 1139, 9th May 1988, Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson.

8. At the time of writing, the cell is staffed by a single representative of each member country. Others will soon join and there have been many more volunteers than places for this first operational facet of WEU's new rôle.

9. Apart from the problem of premises not yet being ready, the most immediate requirement is to establish a budget for the planning cell so that it may begin work in earnest. As colleagues will know from the Assembly's perennial problems over its own budget, our governments have been slow to commit the necessary funds to Western European Union in spite of a particular requirement now for WEU to play a more central rôle.

10. Some of the former Warsaw Pact countries with which your Rapporteur has had contact of late have pointed out a definite lack of effective democracy in the way in which the Assembly has been continually hamstrung by governments when it comes to adequate finance.

11. It is obvious that a proper budget must be provided for the planning cell and your Rapporteur would therefore urge that a supplementary budget for 1992 be agreed immediately to allow the cell to function as soon as possible.

(ii) *WEU satellite centre*

12. The Technological and Aerospace Committee's report on European armaments co-operation after Maastricht⁴ makes reference to the problems of equipping the satellite data interpretation and training centre at Torrejón near Madrid. These problems which relate especially to the choice of computer software to be used are in the process of being resolved and your Rapporteur trusts that suitable solutions, allowing for further developments of the centre in the future, have prevailed. There has been a consequent delay in inaugurating the centre.

(iii) *The European Corps*

13. In an effort to ensure transparency with NATO, France and Germany have decided to bring their intentions on the Eurocorps officially to the attention of the North Atlantic Council. This is an excellent way to proceed and should result in SACEUR being charged formally with working out the modalities of co-operation with all concerned.

14. Meanwhile, the corps headquarters is in the process of being established in Strasbourg where two Spanish army officers are now also

present as the precursor for likely Spanish participation. Belgium should also declare its intention to take part once the formal relationship with WEU and NATO is established.

15. France has given further details regarding the formation of the Eurocorps:

"The decision to set up a European corps, announced on 14th October 1991 by President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl, then confirmed in La Rochelle with the adoption of the report and time-table submitted by the defence ministers, is seen to be the logical follow-up to this overall political approach. It foreshadows European integration in defence matters, and, being multinational and having a flexible organisation, it is adapted to the new strategic context.

From the outset, France and Germany opened the project to participation by any other WEU member states so wishing. Advance officers from countries that are the most interested, e.g. Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain, are henceforth invited to take part in the work of the corps headquarters in Strasbourg.

This corps, the joint instrument of the governments of participating nations, is under the command of a staff officer and is to allow Europe to have its own military capability. Its creation shows the will of participating states, in the framework of a European Union that will eventually include a joint defence policy, to assume their security and peace-keeping responsibilities jointly and by common agreement.

Its *missions* are as follows:

- *joint defence of the allies*, in application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, or Article V of the Brussels Treaty;
- *keeping and restoring peace*;
- *humanitarian action*, particularly disaster and famine relief, assistance to refugees and evacuation operations in crisis areas.

The European Corps has a multinational headquarters of mainly ground forces, but with air and naval components, and a number of national units (with the exception, however, of the Franco-German brigade) which are assigned to it as a matter of priority. In any event, they remain in a central chain of command.

The range of possibilities for the use of the European Corps may allow it to be deployed in very different frameworks, either under the aegis of WEU or as a special contribution to NATO. It may also

4. Document 1332, 23rd October 1992, Rapporteur: Mr. Lopez Henares.

be the preferred structure for conducting a peace-keeping action in the framework of the United Nations, be it inside or outside Europe.

Today, it is a Franco-German initiative that is being worked out, but the philosophy underlying this project encourages the integration of components from other countries, either within the headquarters or as additional units. The *time-table* for setting it up is as follows:

- *July 1992 to June 1994*: progressive build-up of the bi- or multinational headquarters, which will be fully operational in July 1994. The first general commanding the European Corps will take up his duties in October 1993;
- *October 1993 to September 1995*: French and German units composing the corps will be assigned progressively. The following are already earmarked: the Franco-German brigade, the first armoured division stationed in Germany and the equivalent of a German division that still has to be determined;
- *1st October 1995*: the European Corps, or at least the French and German units assigned to it, will be finally created and available operationally.

As the first European multinational unit, this corps will be able to give WEU the military means it now lacks. It is the first demonstration of a will for joint defence alongside and not in opposition to NATO. Further multinational (in particular naval or air) units might be envisaged subsequently."

16. It will be seen from the above remarks that we are in a period of consolidation of the operational arrangements for WEU in the aftermath of the Maastricht and Petersberg Declarations. The bulk of initiative has concerned the crisis in former Yugoslavia and it is to consideration of such practical aspects that your Rapporteur wishes to devote part two of the present report.

IV. Recommendations and responses

(i) Recommendation 519 on the application of United Nations Resolution 757

17. The draft recommendations were proposed by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on behalf of the Defence Committee⁵ and adopted during the special

5. The application of United Nations Resolution 757, Document 1319, 2nd June 1992, Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

debate devoted to the Yugoslav crisis on Tuesday 2nd June 1992. The recommendation reads:

" The Assembly,

(i) Recalling Recommendations 506, 511 and 512 on the Yugoslav crisis;

(ii) Anxious that the peoples concerned should no longer be exposed to the terrible suffering which is currently prevailing, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia;

(iii) Wholeheartedly endorsing United Nations Resolution 757 voted in the Security Council on Saturday, 30th May 1992;

(iv) Determined to ensure that the trade and oil embargo designed to bring Serbia and Montenegro to realise the errors of their actions should prove effective;

(v) Strongly supporting the WEU Secretary-General's appeal for European action and calling for the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty,

URGENTLY RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Take immediate steps to invoke Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and prepare appropriate action by WEU states to help apply United Nations Resolution 757. Further measures should be considered if Resolution 757 does not have the desired effect;

Take immediate initiatives to ensure that war criminals will be judged following the guidelines of the proposal of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of May 1992."

18. The Council met on the Petersberg near Bonn on 19th June, as already mentioned, and, after underlining the extreme urgency of humanitarian assistance, principally to the Bosnian people, and the need to establish a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its surroundings, particularly the airport so that it might be reopened, expressed its support for the active participation of member states in this operation in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 758. The ministers also declared that WEU was prepared, within the limit of its possibilities, to help ensure effective implementation of Security Council resolutions relating to the Yugoslav conflict. To this end, the Ad Hoc Group of representatives of foreign and defence ministries was instructed to study specific aspects of the task. The Ad Hoc Group met in Rome on 3rd July 1992 and the incoming presidency of the WEU Council (Italy) acted swiftly in deciding to call an extraordinary meeting on 10th July 1992 in the wings of the Helsinki CSCE Summit.

(ii) *Extraordinary meeting of WEU
Council of Ministers on the situation in Yugoslavia
(Helsinki, 10th July 1992)*

19. The following text was issued at the conclusion of the extraordinary meeting:

“The ministers of the WEU countries, having taken note of the report of the ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia, adopted the following decisions:

1. Decision to implement the monitoring at sea operations as proposed by the ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia at its meeting of 3rd July in Rome. Surveillance of the embargo set by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 will involve the participation of at least five to six ships, four MPA, one support ship, ground base helicopters. Such surveillance will be carried out in international waters, in the Otranto Channel and on other points off the Yugoslav coast, including off the Montenegro coast, following consultations with UNPROFOR.

- The said naval operations will start at the earliest moment under Italian co-ordination. The participation of the member states will be subject to the provisions of their national constitutions. These WEU operations will be open to the participation of other allies and co-ordinated in co-operation with NATO. Rules of engagement and operational co-ordination will be established by the competent naval authorities at the initiative of the Presidency.
- The ad hoc group will constantly update options concerning naval embargo enforcement for which a further United Nations Security Council resolution would be necessary.

2. Decision on WEU efforts in the field of humanitarian aid on the basis of the recommendations of the ad hoc group.

- The presidency will present an inventory of contributions by WEU partners to the competent United Nations authorities.
- The presidency is also requested to promote a further rapid exploration by the ad hoc group on the options of ground transport through humanitarian corridors.
- In this context the ad hoc group will identify possible modalities and list logistical and other means that partners would be willing to make available. The group will also consider, in consultation with NATO, the need for contributions by other allies.

- Any operation concerning the establishment of humanitarian corridors would have to be subject to further decisions by the Security Council and be co-ordinated with the United Nations in particular for the aspects concerning protection. Appropriate contacts would be established in a timely fashion.

- Co-ordination with United Nations, UNCHR and EC Commission, through the Presidency will also aim at identifying additional needs of the populations and ways to meet them more effectively.

3. Immediate information on our initiatives will be passed to the United Nations Secretary-General and to the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE.”

20. Your Rapporteur would draw colleagues' attention to one particular phrase which acquires some significance below:

“The Ad Hoc Group will constantly update options concerning naval embargo enforcement for *which a further United Nations Security Council resolution would be necessary.*” (emphasis added).

21. On the same day, subsequent to the WEU Council meeting, the North Atlantic Council, in ministerial session also in Helsinki, took the following decisions:

“Ministers

- agreed on a NATO maritime operation, drawing on Stanavformed and other assets as appropriate, to monitor compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 in co-ordination and co-operation with the operation decided by WEU. The participation of the member states will be subject to the provisions of their national constitutions;

- agreed that practical details and modalities to implement the decision by Ministers should be worked out by NATO military authorities, in co-ordination with those of WEU, for decision by the appropriate fora.”

22. The result was that a series of operations began in July in the Adriatic in an effort to enforce the United Nations embargo, such as it was. From 16th July, a WEU flotilla alternated in the southern and centre part of the Adriatic with ships of NATO's recently-formed Standing Naval Force Mediterranean. American ships from the 6th Fleet (under national command) also sailed into the area to provide communications facilities and radar surveillance for the aircraft taking part in humanitarian airlift into Sarajevo.

(iii) *Fact-finding in the Adriatic area
(24th-27th August 1992)*

23. Your Rapporteur accompanied the Chairman of the Defence Committee to Italy on 24th August 1992. After briefings in the Ministry of Defence and at naval headquarters, the delegation flew to Brindisi to embark successively in the Italian frigate *Scirocco*, in command of the WEU flotilla, the German frigate, *Niedersachsen*, which was part of the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean with a Turkish Commander, and thence to the American aircraft carrier, *USS Saratoga*. We also met the Commanders of the Spanish and Portuguese ships taking part in the WEU force and flew over the area in an Italian maritime patrol Atlantic. After briefings in Cagliari, in Sardinia, where we met the German maritime patrol crews, the team returned to Rome for discussions.

24. Main impressions gained from the visit were:

- Embargo at sea: excellent organisation by the Italian Navy. Good co-operation with NATO and United States national authorities. Some duplication: e.g. no real need for NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic to relieve STANAVFORMED – WEU could have helped.
- Command and control: good.
- Rules of engagement: clear and simple.
- Need for:
 - (a) better cost-sharing arrangement;
 - (b) all WEU countries to participate in one way or another.

25. Above all, however, it was obvious that the embargo was certainly not being applied as it had been during the Gulf crisis, which is where the Council's opinion on the need for a further United Nations Security Council resolution for embargo enforcement becomes germane.

26. As a result of the study visit, the Chairman of the Defence Committee recommended a strengthening of the embargo and its rigorous application and this call was echoed by the WEU Council meeting at the end of the London Conference on Yugoslavia on Friday 28th August. The Council also considered the options for action agreed by the Ad Hoc Group which had met in Rome on 24th August.

27. The communiqués issued after the two meetings read as follows:

“ Communiqué issued after the meeting of the WEU ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia (Rome, 24th August 1992)

The WEU ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia, composed of senior officials of the Minis-

tries for Foreign Affairs and Defence, met in Rome on 24th August to study the report drawn up by the contingency planning group set up at the previous meeting to prepare options for decisions by the Council of Ministers. The latter is to meet in London on 28th August next and will be attended by Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence. This will be the first concrete action taken following the conference on Yugoslavia.

The operational hypotheses worked out and discussed in the ad hoc Group relate to the problem of humanitarian convoys in the context of Security Council Resolution 770 and the question of monitoring heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The speed and efficiency with which the contingency planning group managed to work out options considered appropriate by all the partners reflect the solidarity in WEU, the determination to take joint action and the attention each one accords to the need to facilitate the granting of speedy assistance to the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

One should view in the same spirit the timeliness with which all partners indicated that they were prepared to make practical contributions.

At the meeting of the Ministerial Council, it is planned to adopt final decisions on the contributions of the various member countries intended to facilitate the achievement of the aims of the United Nations and to instruct the Italian presidency to present to the United Nations Secretary-General the result of the planning work accomplished and the means made available by the member countries in order to allow the implementation of the measures envisaged in relation to the various problems.”

“ Communiqué issued after the meeting of the extraordinary Council of Ministers (London, 28th August 1992)

1. The Foreign and Defence Ministers of WEU member states met in London on 28th August 1992 following the conclusion of the London conference on former Yugoslavia. They expressed their firm conviction that the principles agreed at that conference should provide the foundations for progress towards a peaceful and just resolution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. In particular, they reaffirmed the urgent necessity for the parties involved to cease the fighting and the use of force immediately and strictly respect the agreed cease-fires. They

strongly urged all parties involved in the conflict to adhere to the principles through positive actions and to contribute effectively to the implementation of specific decisions also adopted by the London conference.

2. Ministers noted and endorsed the contributions which WEU and its member states were already making and were prepared to make to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia:

Delivery of humanitarian assistance

The delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina constitutes one of the most immediate requirements for establishing civilised conditions promoting a political solution. Ministers approved the planning carried out by WEU experts covering the protection of humanitarian convoys by military escorts. They welcomed the willingness of the United Nations Secretary-General to recommend to the Security Council that UNPROFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina be enhanced to provide such escorts, and expressed the view that humanitarian operations and associated protective support should be organised by the United Nations. They underlined the collective will of the member states of WEU to contribute to such operations by military, logistic, financial and other means and decided to keep the United Nations informed from today of the details of such contributions. The Nine also decided to offer collectively today through the presidency to the United Nations the results of WEU's planning. They asked the Ad Hoc Group and Contingency Planning Group to elaborate further the necessary planning.

Supervision of heavy weapons

Ministers underlined the importance of the supervision of heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the overall peace process and for alleviating the suffering of the population. The ministers welcomed the conference's decision that all mortars and heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be subject to international supervision and, as a first step, notified to the United Nations within 96 hours, as a prelude to their disengagement from the conflict. WEU member states are willing to contribute to carrying out supervision operations under the overall responsibility of the United Nations and in co-ordination with the CSCE and other organisations. Ministers took note of the planning undertaken by WEU experts and decided to make it available through the

Italian presidency to the United Nations Secretary-General, the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE and the Secretary-General of NATO.

Strengthening the embargo

Ministers noted the success of operation sharp vigilance to monitor the embargo in the Adriatic. They agreed that strengthening the effectiveness of the embargo established by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 would be an important means of promoting a political solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia. They welcomed the conclusions of the London conference and expressed the willingness of WEU member states to contribute to any further measures necessary to make the embargo as effective as possible. Member states of WEU could, if requested, offer expertise, technical assistance and equipment to the governments of the Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river Danube for the purpose of circumventing or breaking the sanctions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757. They also support the call by the London conference to the Security Council to consider further measures to ensure rigorous implementation of sanctions in the Adriatic. They also decided that the Ad Hoc Group should continue its work in this field.

3. Ministers decided that the Italian presidency would continue to ensure a full exchange of information and the necessary co-ordination with the other organisations involved (United Nations, EC, NATO and CSCE)."

(iv) 3rd September: urgent meeting of the Standing Committee

28. The President of the Assembly called an urgent meeting of the Standing Committee on 3rd September to debate developments. As Rapporteur for the Defence Committee, your Rapporteur was asked to present a report on WEU and the situation in former Yugoslavia and also to formulate and present appropriate draft recommendations. Against the background of the study visit to the Adriatic the following recommendations were adopted (comments in brackets):

"The Assembly,

(i) Acting through an urgent meeting of its Standing Committee;

(First time ever the Standing Committee had met: extraordinary procedure, underlining the special urgency.)

(ii) Recalling Recommendations 506, 511, 512 and 519 which have all sought to prompt specific WEU action to help resolve the Yugoslav crisis;

(As the Yugoslav crisis has unfolded the Assembly has suggested a series of actions to the Council: some of these ideas have been examined seriously, others ignored. The Council should re-examine all the Assembly's ideas, many of which are now even more appropriate than when originally suggested.)

(iii) Fully endorsing United Nations Resolutions 713, 757, 770 and 771;

(713 and 757 are United Nations Resolutions setting up the present embargo on Serbia and Montenegro; 770 authorises the use of force to permit access by humanitarian convoys; 771 institutes the notion of war crimes which will be tried by a special court (c.f. Mr. Feldmann's amendment to Assembly Recommendation 519 in June 1992.)

(iv) Welcoming the progress made as a result of the London Conference but saddened that in spite of many attempts, in varying bodies, to find a political solution to the crisis, the suffering of the peoples concerned is intensifying to a devastating degree, not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also in Croatia where Dubrovnik is still being shelled nightly;

(The London Conference was the last in a series of attempts to find a political solution to the crisis. In spite of all the words and pious expressions of intent, real people are still dying every day. The media is concentrating on Bosnia (Sarajevo) but conflict is still intense around Dubrovnik, Mosta... (WEU ships and aircraft watch nightly bombardment of Dubrovnik – powerless to intervene.)

(v) Regretting that the United Nations embargo on Serbia and Montenegro is not being applied effectively, except at sea;

(The only concerted action to apply the United Nations embargo is at sea. The WEU/NATO surveillance operation is effective in that no merchant ship entering or leaving a Montenegro port is unchallenged.

To date: c. 1 700 challenges
c. 17 violations
c. 12 suspicious ships

Although the embargo is not yet a blockade, the information gathered on embargo-breaking is very important and would prove invaluable in applying a Gulf-type operation.)

(vi) Congratulating the Italian presidency of WEU for its initiatives in convening an extraordinary Council of Ministers meeting in London on 28th August, as requested on behalf of the Assembly by its President, and approving the communiqué issued which offers the United Nations assistance in delivering humanitarian aid, in the supervision of heavy weapons and in strengthening the embargo;

(Congratulations to the President of the Assembly for requesting an emergency meeting of the Council of Ministers. Congratulations to the Italian presidency for responding. Approval of the WEU ministerial communiqué which offers assistance to the United Nations under three headings:

1. Delivering humanitarian aid – the provision of military escorts for humanitarian convoys. WEU states would contribute “military, logistic, financial and other means”. WEU's planning to be made available to the United Nations (as after Metz planning meeting in October 1991 with regard to Croatia and Slovenia).
2. Supervision of heavy weapons WEU states willing to help carry out supervision operations under the overall responsibility of the United Nations and in co-ordination with the CSCE and “other organisations”, WEU planning to be made available to the United Nations, CSCE and NATO.

(Note: 1 and 2 refer to operations where WEU forces would be under direct United Nations command.)

3. Strengthening the embargo. WEU willingness to help strengthen the embargo, both at sea and on land, especially offering expertise, technical assistance and equipment to the governments of the Danube riparian states. WEU planning to continue in the Ad Hoc Group.

(Note: WEU forces here are under WEU opcon (operational control).)

(vii) Pleased that a majority of WEU countries are contributing forces for operation Sharp Vigilance and are prepared to make forces available to support United Nations efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also hoping for a more equitable cost-sharing agreement between member countries;

(Hitherto, WEU nations contributing forces are:

- Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom – naval forces;

- Italy, Germany, France and the Netherlands – maritime air patrol;
- France and the United Kingdom – AWACS (national command).

(Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom also contributing to NATO forces.)

At present there is no specific cost-sharing agreement on a WEU basis: unfair for burden to fall on only some countries who contribute forces. Ideally costs should be shared on the normal WEU basis.)

(viii) Welcoming the North Atlantic Council's decision to make NATO's logistical infrastructure available to co-operate in WEU action in the framework of United Nations Security Council directives and also welcoming offers by the United States;

(The North Atlantic Council is reported to have offered logistical support for operations – important for WEU to use the organic link with NATO in the modified Brussels Treaty.)

URGENTLY RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Seek immediate United Nations approval to impose a complete and total land, air and sea blockade of Serbia and Montenegro, the cessation of all financial, economic and other international assistance and the exclusion of Serbia and Montenegro from all international organisations until such time as they comply completely with all United Nations resolutions and the decisions of the London Conference;

(A blockade on Serbia and Montenegro is necessary, both on land and at sea to support the embargo. Strict parallel with the embargo versus Iraq. Action in the United Nations needed now, to convince Serbia that the London agreement must be respected in order to avoid potential isolation.)

2. Respond favourably to Romanian requests for help in policing the border with Serbia and help to establish similar arrangements with other neighbouring countries in the region;

(Romania has already made a démarche with WEU, EC, etc., asking for help in policing its border with Serbia. EC has responded proposing a number of observers. Opportunity here for WEU nations, which might not be willing to send forces to Bosnia, to take part in enforcing the embargo. Direct offers by WEU should also be made to Bulgaria and Hungary.)

3. Insist that Greece give the necessary assurances of total compliance with the United Nations embargo before continuing

the present negotiations for WEU membership;

(Greece appeared ambiguous on applying the embargo:

- in spite of a Greek warship in the Stanavformed and a Greek maritime patrol aircraft searching for ships violating the embargo it is known for certain that at least one Greek merchant ship visited a Montenegrin port recently;

- trucks were reportedly plying across the Greek border with very little control on cargo or final destination.

Greece should be above suspicion as a NATO member and applicant for WEU. The Council should seek assurances before continuing the present membership negotiations.)

4. Offer to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to keep WEU forces available to the United Nations under European command and operational control in order to maintain cohesion and to carry out Resolution 770 effectively, and in close co-ordination with the United Nations;

(The Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council has announced that WEU forces for Bosnia will be made available to the United Nations and used as the United Nations sees fit. WEU forces are likely to be dispersed piecemeal therefore. Recent events have shown that some United Nations commanders lack the experience necessary in such a situation... It would surely be better to try and maintain European cohesion and complementarity by operating our forces as a whole, under WEU command, with the United Nations as an umbrella organisation.)

5. Ensure that the WEU military planning cell is fully operational when established on 1st October 1992 in order to play a specific rôle in the present crisis;

(The WEU military planning cell was to be established from 1st October. Eventually it will be in the same building in Brussels as the Secretary-General. It has a rôle to play now and should be operational as soon as possible: maybe in Rome, co-located with the WEU military experts group?)

6. Institute a formal liaison mechanism with NATO headquarters and appropriate commands and also with the relevant United States authorities to help promote efficient and cost-effective co-operation and to avoid duplication of effort;

(The modified Brussels Treaty contains an article, Article IV which provides for an organic link with NATO. This link must be

invoked and a formal liaison established between WEU and NATO – even to the extent of forming joint planning groups. Liaison with United States forces also should be formalised and upgraded (e.g. United States offers to WEU in Adriatic). Duplication of effort is not common sense, is costly and does nothing for the reputation of any organisation.)

7. Prepare, in conjunction with other bodies, the future military requirements which may become necessary should Serbia not respect the London engagements and, in particular, study the need to:

(The aim of this recommendation is to ensure that WEU is ready to lend further support to the United Nations, if necessary, should Serbia not respect the engagements made at the London Conference.)

(a) develop the alternative options for action considered on 28th August;

(Ministers were presented with a series of options on 28th August. They chose the most basic and probably the least effective: 5 000 extra troops at the United Nations's disposal. Option two would have involved 11 500-13 000 troops under WEU command to carry out specific tasks in support of United Nations humanitarian operations. Such an option would imply a higher level of equipment, air cover also and probably greater efficiency and concentration of effort by WEU forces as well as enhanced morale.)

(b) plan appropriate anti-submarine and mine-hunting operations in the Adriatic;

(At present there is little threat of mining or submarine operations from what is left of the "Yugoslav" Navy, but they have a definite capability and we should be prepared.)

(c) ensure air superiority in the area of operations and if necessary an air exclusion zone;

(d) take steps to ensure sufficient air protection for WEU forces made available to the United Nations;

(Air cover and therefore air superiority will be vital in support of land operations in Bosnia: we should not tackle the task without air cover (which could be easily provided in area from land or sea platforms). Maybe also an air exclusion zone over Bosnian airspace would be the best solution, as presently over Southern Iraq.)

(e) confine all naval assets based in Kotor and Bar;

(The easiest way to neutralise "Yugoslav" naval assets is probably to confine them to port – which should be possible with the very minimum of allied naval co-operation.)

(f) develop electronic counter-measures (ECM) to best effect and, more specifically, jam and neutralise military communications as well as fire control systems;

(Not enough apparent consideration has been given to electronic counter-measures which could be used to jam military communications and the fire control systems, for example, of hostile missiles, artillery, etc.)

(g) provide military hospital facilities in the region for the treatment of the wounded, both service and civilian, and organise facilities for refugees;

(There is a growing need for hospital facilities in the former Yugoslavia. All our countries could help with such a purely humanitarian task, even if they cannot provide military forces, *per se*. Mobile military hospitals could be established in Bosnia, Croatia, even in neighbouring countries. Some possess large hospital ships, or ships which might be used temporarily to house refugees many of whom, will need special help before winter arrives.)

8. Invite non-member nations to co-operate in furnishing military forces to complement WEU assets;

(Some countries, Canada and Czechoslovakia (in spite of problems at home) have offered support to WEU in the past. Any such offers should be encouraged to ensure a truly multinational and international approach. Those countries with aspirations to join WEU or become associate members should be urged to identify with and actively support WEU action.)

9. Examine action to be taken, including military action, not only to stop present fighting but also to prevent present conflicts spreading to Kosovo, Sandjak, Vojvodina and Macedonia and, in conjunction with the CSCE, consider the timely deployment of protective forces.

(The greatest danger now is that present conflicts may spread to other parts of the former Yugoslavia. The CSCE has decided to send long-term missions to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina. WEU should monitor developments and be ready, in conjunction with the CSCE, to support the timely deployment of protective forces.)

Reactions to Recommendation 525

29. The major reaction, to recommendation 3, came initially from the Greek authorities in the form of letters addressed to the President of the Assembly, to the Chairman of the Defence Com-

mittee and also to your Rapporteur. The letter to the Chairman of the Defence Committee contained a number of assurances of Greek compliance with the embargo. It is not known whether the Greek Government gave specific assurances also to the WEU Council: enquiries are continuing.

30. It would have been useful to discuss this particular point with Greek parliamentarians and your Rapporteur would urge that the subject be raised during the next plenary session.

31. In the light of the Greek reaction your Rapporteur put the following Written Question to the Council on 14th September 1992:

“ Written Question 304

With reference to the selective embargo on Serbia and Montenegro decided in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757, to ask the Council:

- (a) to list all those vessels challenged by WEU and other forces in the Adriatic and which are known to have called at Montenegrin harbours, giving details of their port of registry, provenance and declared destination and, where possible, also the cargo carried;
- (b) to report what action has been taken to alert the United Nations authorities to any apparent breach of the embargo at sea;
- (c) to inform the Assembly of approaches made to WEU by Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary and Romania concerning the application of the embargo on the various relevant land boundaries and the response given.”

32. The Council's replies to Recommendation 519 and Recommendation 525 were sent to the Assembly on 16th October 1992. They read as follows:

“ *Reply of the Council to Recommendation 519*

1. Meeting in Bonn on 19th June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers adopted a declaration on the Yugoslav crisis in which ministers expressed the determination of their states “to abide fully by the provisions of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 757 and to implement comprehensively the sanctions which it contains. In this connection, they noted that the United Nations Security Council has decided to consider immediately, whenever necessary, further steps to achieve a peaceful solution in conformity with relevant resolutions of the Security Council, based inter alia on Part VII of the United Nations Charter.”

Furthermore, “Ministers declared that WEU is prepared, within the bounds of its possibilities, to contribute towards effective implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions in connection with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. They charged an ad hoc group composed of representatives from foreign affairs and defence ministries to examine WEU's possibilities to contribute to the implementation of the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.”

In accordance with decisions taken at the WEU Ministerial meeting in Bonn on 19th June 1992, the ad hoc Group on the former Yugoslavia met in London at the WEU Secretariat-General on 26th June 1992 to examine ways of contributing to the implementation of relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions and further steps the Security Council might take to achieve a peaceful solution. Subsequently, two groups of military experts met in Rome to consider requirements for possible naval measures in support of the United Nations embargo and other sanctions, as well as possible WEU contributions in support of United Nations humanitarian efforts in Sarajevo. On 3rd July 1992, both groups reported back to a session of the ad hoc Group.

On 10th July 1992, in the margins of the CSCE Helsinki summit, an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers was held on the situation in Yugoslavia. WEU ministers, having taken note of the report of the ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia, decided to implement the operations of monitoring at sea, as proposed by the ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia at its Rome meeting of 3rd July. Furthermore, ministers adopted a decision on WEU humanitarian aid efforts on the basis of the recommendations of the ad hoc group.

The implementation of the operation of monitoring at sea started immediately after the extraordinary WEU Council of Ministers in Helsinki. They are conducted in close co-ordination with NATO forces.

The foreign and defence ministers of WEU member states met in London on 28th August 1992 following the conclusion of the London conference on former Yugoslavia. They expressed their “firm conviction” that “the principles agreed at that conference should provide the foundations for progress towards a peaceful and just resolution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. In particular, they

reaffirmed the urgent necessity for the parties involved to cease the fighting and the use of force immediately and strictly respect the agreed cease-fires. They strongly urged all parties involved in the conflict to adhere to the principles through positive actions and to contribute effectively to the implementation of specific decisions also adopted by the London conference”.

On 28th August 1992, ministers noted and endorsed the contributions which WEU and its member states were already making and were prepared to make to the United Nations efforts to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia, in the following fields: delivery of humanitarian assistance, supervision of heavy weapons and strengthening the embargo.

As regards the strengthening of the embargo, ministers noted the success of operation sharp vigilance to monitor the embargo in the Adriatic. They agreed that strengthening the effectiveness of the embargo established by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 would be “an important means of promoting a political solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia”. They welcomed the conclusions of the London conference and expressed the willingness of WEU member states “to contribute to any further measures necessary to make the embargo as effective as possible”. Member states of WEU could, if requested, offer expertise, technical assistance and equipment to the governments of the Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river Danube for the purpose of circumventing or breaking the sanctions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757. Ministers also supported the call by the London conference to the Security Council to consider further measures to ensure rigorous implementation of sanctions in the Adriatic. Furthermore, ministers decided that the ad hoc group should continue its work in this field.

The texts of the communiqués of the extraordinary meetings of the WEU Council of Ministers on the situation in Yugoslavia were officially transmitted to the Assembly. Whenever appropriate, the Assembly will continue to be regularly informed on the implementation of the relevant ministerial decisions. Developments in the Yugoslav crisis will remain on the agenda of the Council and its working groups.

2. The Council takes due note of the Assembly’s request in the second para-

graph of the recommendation. It wishes to draw the Assembly’s attention to the fact that – in their strong condemnation of the unacceptable policies of ethnic cleansing and forced expulsions in former Yugoslavia – senior members of governments of individual WEU member states have deemed it appropriate to speak in favour of international sanctions for the perpetrators of war crimes in the context of the conflict in former Yugoslavia.”

“*Reply of the Council to Recommendation 525*”

1. Meeting in London on 28th August 1992 following the conclusion of the London conference on former Yugoslavia, the foreign and defence ministers of WEU member states noted the success of operation sharp vigilance to monitor the embargo in the Adriatic. They agreed that strengthening the effectiveness of the embargo established by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 would be “an important means of promoting a political solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia”. They welcomed the conclusions of the London conference and expressed the willingness of WEU member states “to contribute to any further measures necessary to make the embargo as effective as possible”. Ministers also supported the call by the London conference to the Security Council to consider further measures to ensure rigorous implementation of sanctions in the Adriatic. Furthermore, ministers decided that the ad hoc group should continue its work in this field.

2. At that same meeting, ministers agreed that member states of WEU could, if requested, offer expertise, technical assistance and equipment to the governments of the Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river Danube for the purpose of circumventing or breaking the sanctions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757.

As such requests would be of a civilian nature, they would not, however, concern WEU as such. They could be better handled in other frameworks, such as the EC or the CSCE.

3. The Council takes due note of the suggestion made in paragraph 3 of Recommendation 525.

4. The Council takes due note of the suggestion made in paragraph 4 of Recommendation 525. It recalls that on 28th August 1992, WEU ministers approved

the planning carried out by WEU experts covering the protection of humanitarian convoys by military escorts. They welcomed the willingness of the United Nations Secretary-General to recommend to the Security Council that UNPROFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina be enhanced to provide such escorts, and expressed the view that humanitarian operations and associated protective support should be organised by the United Nations. They underlined the collective will of the member states of WEU to contribute to such operations by military, logistic, financial and other means and decided to keep the United Nations informed from that day of the details of such contributions. The Nine also decided to offer collectively, through the presidency, to the United Nations the results of WEU's planning. They asked the ad hoc Group and Contingency Planning Group to elaborate further the necessary planning.

5. At present, the Council does not foresee a "specific rôle in the present crisis" in the former Yugoslavia for the WEU planning cell.

6. In its reply to the Assembly's suggestion for instituting "a formal liaison mechanism with NATO headquarters and appropriate commands and also with the relevant United States authorities to help promote efficient and cost-effective co-operation and to avoid duplication of effort", the Council wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to paragraph 3 of the communiqué of the WEU extraordinary Council of Ministers of 28th August 1992. Paragraph 3 reads: "Ministers decided that the Italian presidency would continue to ensure a full exchange of information and the necessary co-ordination with the other organisations involved (United Nations, EC, NATO and CSCE)."

7. Measures and options such as those listed in paragraph 7 of Recommendation 525, could be prepared by WEU and other bodies, if and when deemed necessary.

8. In principle, invitations to non-member states "to co-operate in furnishing military forces to complement WEU assets" can be extended by the Council on a case-by-case basis.

9. The Council is fully aware of the risk of the present conflict in the former Yugoslavia spreading to Kosovo, Sandjak, Vojvodina and Macedonia. In the opinion of the Council, any "examination of action to be taken, including military action", as well as "the timely deployment of protective forces" is best undertaken

in the larger framework of the United Nations."

Aid to Danube riparian states

33. In the Council's answers to both Recommendations 519 and 525 it is stressed that "They (Ministers) agreed that strengthening the effectiveness of the embargo established by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 would be "an important means of promoting a political solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia" ". But the Council included a further comment in its reply to Recommendation 525 "As such requests would be of a civilian nature, they would not, however, concern WEU as such. They could be better handled in other frameworks, such as the EC or the CSCE". Why should this be? The Assembly's Standing Committee had urged the Council to "respond favourably to Romanian requests for help in policing the border with Serbia" (much of which is coincident with the Danube) "and help to establish similar arrangements with other neighbouring countries in the region".

34. Was it this démarche by Romania which had given the Council second thoughts? Stranger still is the Council's reply to Written Question 304 (communicated to the Assembly on 16th October 1992):

"Reply of the Council to Written Question 304"

1. The Council regrets that it cannot comply with the request made in paragraph (a) of Written Question 304, as the relevant data is classified. However, the Council would like to take the opportunity to inform the Assembly that, as of 15th September 1992, WEU and NATO forces in the Adriatic had challenged 2161 vessels in implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757. Of these, 32 were suspected of violating the embargo.

2. The WEU presidency is keeping the competent United Nations authorities informed about the progress of operation sharp vigilance.

3. As of 15th September 1992, there had been no official approaches to the WEU Council "by Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary and Romania concerning the application of the embargo on the various land boundaries".

35. To begin with, the Council says that the information on the ships suspected of breaking the embargo in the Adriatic is classified. Surely it is in the interests of all who wish to see the embargo properly applied that details of probable violations are published? In addition, your Rapporteur finds it somewhat strange that

lists which were hitherto unclassified should now prove so difficult to consult. Has the classification been applied by WEU or by NATO or by the United Nations? And for what reason?

36. In addition, the Council goes on to say that Romania had not made an official approach concerning the application of the embargo...

37. The next study visit by the Chairman of the Defence Committee and your Rapporteur was therefore to Romania (from 11th to 15th October 1992).

Romanian efforts to apply the embargo

38. The various Danube conventions dating mainly from the 1920s established a certain measure of freedom of navigation on the Danube which has the status of an international waterway. The situation regarding transit is somewhat similar to that on the high seas and the faithful reader will remember from what precedes that the WEU Council was of the opinion that a further United Nations Security Council resolution was necessary before the embargo might be applied any more stringently in the Adriatic.

39. Some of our member countries, however, and others have told Romania and Bulgaria that they should give United Nations Resolution 757 precedence over the Danube Convention: in other words expecting the Romanians to enforce the present embargo on the Danube to a greater extent than we ourselves are prepared to do in the Adriatic.

40. The Romanian Foreign Office has sought clarification from the United Nations itself, but at the time of writing no definite answer had been received. Fortunately, the CSCE's Committee of Senior Officials has stepped into the fray and meeting on 18th September had this to announce:

"Sanctions monitoring"

The Committee of Senior Officials notes with satisfaction the steps taken by the international community to implement United Nations Security Council resolutions. However, practical problems are being encountered by the neighbouring states in the enforcement of these sanctions, particularly transit traffic. In order to assist the neighbouring states in overcoming these special problems, the CSO urges all participating states to take necessary measures to ensure strict compliance with the sanctions in this respect.

The CSO takes note of the decisions of the London Conference on the former Yugoslavia concerning the implementation of sanctions and endorses the establishment of sanctions assistance missions in all

states neighbouring Serbia and Montenegro. The London Conference has invited the EC and the CSCE to co-ordinate these activities.

The Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania have invited experts to provide advice on ways of overcoming difficulties in the application of the sanctions. Officials from the EC presidency and other CSCE states have participated in preliminary fact-finding missions to these countries. The CSO welcomes the intention of participating states to organise similar fact-finding missions to the other neighbouring states.

The CSO decides to endorse the plan drawn up by the United Kingdom/European Community in close co-ordination with the United States of America and other CSCE participating states. This plan calls for the establishment initially in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania as early as possible of sanctions assistance missions to assist the governments of these states in the implementation of sanctions. The status of these missions will be defined in Memoranda of Understanding agreed with the host governments as soon as possible. Similar sanctions assistance missions will be established in countries neighbouring Serbia and Montenegro that may also be experiencing problems in implementation of sanctions."

CSCE sanctions monitoring

41. On the Danube, the Defence Committee delegation discussed the embargo with the United States customs officers who are already co-operating with Romanian customs officials under CSCE auspices.

42. Nevertheless, your Rapporteur feels that the Romanians should have received a reply to their démarche which was addressed to WEU in preference to any other organisation (NATO, NACC, etc.), especially in view of the Council's apparent offer to Danube riparian states as well as in the context of the newly-formed (19th June) Forum for Consultation with Central European states.

43. This being said, the WEU Council has been instrumental in trying to ensure that a number of the Assembly's recommendations are implemented without delay. From Recommendation 525 the Council has:

- urged a stronger embargo (thus far without success);
- sought air cover for United Nations operations likely to involve WEU forces (United Nations Resolution 781

goes some way to creating a "no fly zone" but not as far as one would wish). Direct contact is now in place between WEU and the United States authorities to explore other air defence possibilities;

- sought to keep WEU forces under a European Commander within the aegis of the United Nations. General Morillon (France) will now have British, Canadian and Spanish forces under his command as well as French plus a number of units from Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal.

44. These forces are being deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina for humanitarian reasons. They are likely to be extremely vulnerable unless their rules of engagement allow a strong response to any aggression. Depending on the way the situation evolves, the Council should be ready to propose additional measures to the United Nations if necessary.

V. Conclusion

45. Given the continuing developments in the Yugoslav crisis, the recommendations formulated by your Rapporteur today may well be overtaken by events tomorrow. Which is why the present recommendations will probably have to be updated before being debated in plenary session in the first week of December.

46. Of course, we may hope for a breakthrough in the talks which continue in Geneva under the aegis of Lord Owen and Mr. Vance but we have been disappointed so many times now by the intransigence of one or other party engaged in this war or by the lies told in order to obtain yet more time to kill and maim.

47. It is obvious that WEU, like the United Nations or NATO is only the sum of its parts – in other words, our governments will only decide to participate in any given action on largely national criteria, in spite of moves towards a common European foreign and security policy at Maastricht. None of our organisations is supranational and all have special viewpoints on what may or may not be achieved.

48. The United Nations, in spite of a series of appropriately partisan Security Council resolutions, still seems to wish to remain "non-aligned" in the present crisis and has demonstrated the serious disadvantages of such an attitude which has been bred through countless blue beret peace-keeping operations. Such operations have tended, however, to include very little military action per se, such as that experienced by the Western European nations in recent years.

49. NATO has been largely paralysed, partly because of its changing but still embryonic organisation for the post-cold war era, partly because traditional attitudes (such as a tendency to over-react in numerical terms) have been slow to change, but primarily because of a lack of specific leadership: the United States has been largely "otherwise engaged" throughout the Yugoslav crisis. Will the situation change after the United States presidential election?

50. In fact the operations being conducted in former Yugoslavia are much less reminiscent of the vast set battle long cherished by NATO and Warsaw Pact planners than they are of, say, Chad or Djibouti, where French forces have become expert at trying to keep the various warring factions apart. It is probably no coincidence therefore that French forces make up the largest contingent currently taking part in United Nations operations.

51. In the present set of draft recommendations, the Rapporteur is seeking to develop those which he formulated for the Standing Committee and which were adopted as Recommendation 525.

(i) The set of recommendations recalled are:

- 506 (on Europe and the Yugoslav crisis);
- 512 (on operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis);
- 519 (on the application of United Nations Resolution 757);
- 525 (on WEU and the situation in former Yugoslavia).

All sought to prompt the WEU Council and member countries to help solve the Yugoslav crisis.

(ii) All relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions are endorsed:

- 713 (Arms embargo, peacekeeping force);
- 757 (Application of the embargo);
- 770 (Humanitarian relief in Bosnia-Herzegovina);
- 771 (Detention camps in former Yugoslavia);
- 781 (Ban on military flights in Bosnia-Herzegovina).

(iii) It appears that a political solution to the crisis is as distant, if not even further away, than previously. What is imminent is the onset of winter – a thin layer of snow was already present in parts of Romania just across the border from Serbia when your Rapporteur visited the area in mid-October. The implications are obvious.

(iv) There has been a tendency to sit back of late and think that the search for a solution in the former Yugoslavia may be left to others. Your Rapporteur believes that there is now room for a specific initiative by WEU in co-operation with the principal organisations, but particularly in the Forum for Consultation with the Central European states, some of which as "neighbours", are the most immediately affected.

(v) As a result of Recommendation 525, it appeared that the WEU Council was adamant in pushing for reinforcement of the present embargo. Unfortunately the idea was not followed through and as a result the fighting continues unabated. It is now evident, for example, that large amounts of fuel are reaching Serbia: the price of a litre of petrol has reportedly dropped from 3.50 DM to 1 DM over the past two weeks. The embargo needs reinforcing, even to the extent of preventing transit through "third party" states or on the Danube.

(vi) Through their actions thus far both the Council and the Italian presidency of WEU have maintained the initiative of action on the European side and ensured an unprecedented liaison with the United Nations, CSCE and NATO. The implications for WEU are considerable: the relationship established now will help determine the rôle to be played in the future.

(vii) All WEU member states are contributing in one way or another. Certain nations, such as Italy, are bearing an unfair proportion of the costs and therefore your Rapporteur suggests that a supplementary budget be formulated to take account of present operations. In addition, the Council must determine a budget to enable the planning cell to function correctly.

(viii) Most military experts believe that an air defence capability is essential to help protect

ground forces. The United Nations resolution on a "no fly zone" (781) does not go far enough to remove the threat of air action against troops present for humanitarian purposes. With a series of air bases across the Adriatic in Italy and even considering recent proposals on aero-naval co-operation WEU would be well-placed to provide efficient air cover. Even more effective would be bilateral co-operation between WEU and the United States in zone – if the necessary political decisions were forthcoming.

(ix) Your Rapporteur saw for himself at the end of August the excellent arrangements made to co-ordinate naval and maritime air activities in the Adriatic area. There is no escaping the fact however that some duplication is taking place. The ideal and most cost-effective solution would be to pool resources in as many domains as possible to form composite WEU/NATO forces.

(x) Much has been made of current actions "under the WEU flag". What flag? The time has come to identify WEU forces as such when taking part in WEU operations. The Assembly has been instrumental in choosing a logo for itself which might well be adopted for use by the different component parts of WEU – even to the extent of putting a special emblem on all military forces – ships, aircraft, vehicles and personnel. The staff of the planning cell should be the first recipients of such a badge.

52. Your Rapporteur trusts that the individual recommendations in the operative text, given the background arguments advanced above, are self-evident. We cannot stop trying to help solve the Yugoslav crisis – our new operational organisation must be developed as a tool to be used to that end as well as for more traditional rôles.

WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis

SUPPLEMENTARY DRAFT RECOMMENDATION ¹

*submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee ²
by Mr. Marten, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUPPLEMENTARY DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Marten, Rapporteur

APPENDICES

- I. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 786 (10th November 1992) and 787 (16th November 1992)
- II. WEU Council of Ministers Declaration on former Yugoslavia (20th November 1992) (This text has been published in Document 1345)
- III. Questions posed by Sir Russell Johnston, MP, to Ministers in the House of Commons, on 27th October 1992
- IV. Steps taken by the Romanian Government to apply the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro
- V. Chronology

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. de Puig (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle (Alternate: *Jeambrun*), Bassinet, *Borderas*, Brito, Chevalier (Alternate: *Laverge*), *Cox*, *De Carolis*, De Decker (Alternate: *Péciaux*), Dees (Alternate: *Tummers*), *Durand*, *Fernandes Marques*, *Ferrarini*, *Fourré*, *Hardy*, Irmer (Alternate: *Feldmann*), Jung (Alternate: *Masseret*), *Kelchtermans*, *Leccisi*, Mrs. *Lentz-Cornette*, MM. *van der Linden*, *Mannino* (Alternate: *Caccia*), *Marten*, Lord *Newall*, MM. *Pecchioli* (Alternate: *Mesoraca*), *Perinat*, *Reis Leite* (Alternate: Mrs. *Aguiar*), *Scheer*, Sir *Keith Speed*, MM. *Steiner*, *Vazquez* (Alternate: *Moya*), *Zierer*.

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.

Supplementary draft recommendation

on WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming United Nations Security Council Resolutions 786 (on an air exclusion zone) and 787 (reinforcing the present embargo to the level of a blockade) which respond directly to the Assembly's recommendations;
- (ii) Welcoming the United Nations Security Council's decision to set up a peace-keeping force for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and wishing to see the initiative extended to Kosovo and elsewhere;
- (iii) Welcoming the WEU Council's prompt responses to the Assembly's Recommendation 525 adopted on 3rd September 1992 and also the Council's Declaration on former Yugoslavia issued on 20th November 1992,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge all member nations to review and improve their participation in at least the humanitarian aspects of operations concerning the Yugoslav crisis;
2. Actively promote the idea of establishing safe areas for refugees and displaced persons throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia;
3. Transform the Ad Hoc Group into a standing advisory group to manage WEU's response to the Yugoslav crisis for as long as the crisis lasts;
4. Publish the evidence of any known breach of sanctions and particularly of cases where arms or other military equipment were exported to the Serbs and other warring factions in the former Yugoslavia.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Marten, Rapporteur)

1. Since the adoption on Thursday 5th November 1992 of the draft report on "WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis", progress has been made both in the United Nations Security Council and in the WEU Council. A number of the Assembly's recommendations have been implemented, especially relating to the reinforcement of the embargo which is now to be enforced in a similar way to that prevailing during the Gulf crisis, i.e. instituting a blockade along the lines suggested by many members of the Defence Committee on 5th November (cf United Nations Security Council Resolutions 786 (on an air exclusion zone) and 787 (reinforcing the present embargo to the level of a blockade)).

2. Your Rapporteur has therefore prepared a number of documents (see contents list) and a set of supplementary preliminary draft recommendations so as to draw colleagues' attention to the changing situation. The original draft recommendations remain valid.

3. Among the documents which follow, your Rapporteur would like to highlight the declaration on former Yugoslavia issued by the Ministerial Council after its meeting in Rome on 20th November which reiterates the positive approach to current problems evident since the beginning of the Italian presidency of WEU. Your Rapporteur was grateful for the opportunity to question and make recommendations directly to Ministers prior to the meeting and also benefited from an extremely constructive exchange of views with the Chairman of the Defence Committee from the Chamber of Deputies, the Hon. Gastone Savio. In particular, there was general agreement on the need to publicise proven breaches of the embargo.

4. With regard to forces currently engaged in the UNPROFOR 1 and 2 operations, your Rapporteur is indebted to our British colleague, Sir Russell Johnston, MP, for the specific questions he posed in the House of Commons on 27th October 1992. His questions and Ministers' answers are included below.

5. After much urging the United Nations now seems poised to engage in a measure of pre-

ventative peace-keeping by sending a mission to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – a measure which should be applauded and extended to other areas.

6. As far as WEU itself is concerned, your Rapporteur believes that:

- (i) there should be a positive response to Romanian requests for help in enforcing the embargo on the Danube;
- (ii) all member nations should review and make qualitative improvements to their participation in operations concerning the former Yugoslavia. If it proves impossible, for national motives, to participate in the potentially more bellicose options, member states might consider further emphasising the more humanitarian aspects;
- (iii) the idea of safe areas must be developed and implemented without delay;
- (iv) while waiting for the WEU planning cell to become fully operational the Council should transform the Ad Hoc Group into a standing advisory group to manage WEU's response to the Yugoslav crisis for as long as the crisis lasts.

7. The Secretary-General's newsletter reached the Assembly as this document is going to print (26th November). As well as including a summary of various operational developments during recent months it gives a chronology of WEU's involvement in the Yugoslav crisis which makes a useful complement to the comprehensive chronology of events included in the present supplement to Document 1337.

8. In organisational terms it is evident that much is being achieved by WEU now compared with only five years ago: we must ensure that the operational organisation is used by its members to best effect – which depends as ever on the necessary political will.

APPENDIX I

***United Nations Security Council Resolution 786
(adopted on 10th November 1992)***

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 781 (1992) of 9th October 1992,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 5th November 1992 (S/24767 and Add.1) and his subsequent letter of 6th November 1992 (S/24783) submitted pursuant to resolution 781 (1992),

Considering that the establishment of a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes an essential element for the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Taking into account the need for a speedy deployment of monitors on the ground for observation and verification purposes,

Gravely concerned at the indication in the Secretary-General's letter of 6th November 1992 of possible violations of its resolution 781 (1992) and of the impossibility of corroborating the information on such violations by technical means presently available to the United Nations Protection Force,

Determined to ensure the safety of humanitarian flights to Bosnia and Herzegovina,

1. Welcomes the current advance deployment of military observers of the United Nations Protection Force and the European Community Monitoring Mission at airfields in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);
2. Reaffirms its ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which applies to all flights, whether of fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft, subject to the exceptions contained in paragraph 1 of its resolution 781 (1992), and reiterates that all parties and others concerned must comply with this ban;
3. Endorses the general concept of operations described in the Secretary-General's report and calls on all parties and others concerned, including all Governments operating aircraft in the area, to co-operate fully with the United Nations Protection Force in its implementation;
4. Calls upon all parties and others concerned henceforth to direct all requests for authorisations of flights pursuant to paragraph 3 of its resolution 781 (1992) to the United Nations Protection Force, with special provisions being made for flights of the United Nations Protection Force, and all other flights in support of United Nations operations, including humanitarian assistance;
5. Approves the recommendation in paragraph 10 of the Secretary-General's report that the strength of the United Nations Protection Force be increased, as proposed in paragraph 5 of the report, in order to permit it to implement the concept of operations;
6. Reiterates its determination to consider urgently, in the case of violations when further reported to it in accordance with its resolution 781 (1992), the further measures necessary to enforce the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

***United Nations Security Council Resolution 787
(adopted on 16th November 1992)***

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25th September 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

Reaffirming its determination that the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes a threat to the peace, and reaffirming that the provision of humanitarian assistance in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is an important element in the Security Council's effort to restore peace and security in the region,

Deeply concerned at the threats to the territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, as a state member of the United Nations, enjoys the rights provided for in the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming also its full support for the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia as the framework within which an overall political settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia may be achieved, and for the work of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the Conference,

Recalling the decision by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to examine the possibility of promoting safe areas for humanitarian purposes,

Recalling the commitments entered into by the parties and others concerned within the framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,

Reiterating its call on all parties and others concerned to co-operate fully with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee,

Noting the progress made so far within the framework of the International Conference, including the Joint Declaration signed at Geneva on 30th September 1992 and 20th October 1992 by the Presidents of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); the Joint Statement made at Geneva on 19th October 1992 by the Presidents of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); the Joint Communiqué issued on 1st November 1992 at Zagreb by the Presidents of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; the establishment of the Mixed Military Working Group in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the production of a draft outline constitution for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Noting with grave concern the report of the Special Rapporteur appointed following a special session of the Commission on Human Rights to investigate the human rights situation in the former Yugoslavia, which makes clear that massive and systematic violations of human rights and grave violations of international humanitarian law continue in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Welcoming the deployment of additional elements of the United Nations Protection Force for the protection of humanitarian activities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with its resolution 776 (1992) of 14th September 1992,

Deeply concerned about reports of continuing violations of the embargo imposed by its resolutions 713 (1991) and 724 (1991) of 15th December 1991,

Deeply concerned also about reports of violations of the measures imposed by its resolution 757 (1992) of 30th May 1992,

1. Calls upon the parties in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to consider the draft outline constitution as a basis for negotiating a political settlement of the conflict in that country and to continue negotiations for constitutional arrangements on the basis of the draft outline, under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee, these negotiations to be held in continuous and uninterrupted session;
2. Reaffirms that any taking of territory by force or any practice of "ethnic cleansing" is unlawful and unacceptable, and will not be permitted to affect the outcome of the negotiations on constitutional arrangements for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and insists that all displaced persons be enabled to return in peace to their former homes;
3. Strongly reaffirms its call on all parties and others concerned to respect strictly the territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and affirms that any entities unilaterally declared or arrangements imposed in the contravention thereof will not be accepted;
4. Condemns the refusal of all parties in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular the Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces, to comply with its previous resolutions, and demands that they and all other concerned parties in the former Yugoslavia fulfil immediately their obligations under those resolutions;
5. Demands that all forms of interference from outside the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including infiltration into the country of irregular units and personnel, cease immediately, and reaffirms its determination to take measures against all parties and others concerned which fail to fulfil the requirements of resolution 752 (1992) and its other relevant resolutions, including the requirement that all forces, in particular elements of the Croatian army, be withdrawn, or be subject to the authority of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded or disarmed;
6. Calls upon all parties in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to fulfil their commitments to put into effect an immediate cessation of hostilities and to negotiate in the Mixed Military Working Group, continuously and in uninterrupted session, to end the blockades of Sarajevo and other towns and to demilitarise them, with heavy weapons under international supervision;
7. Condemns all violations of international humanitarian law, including in particular the practice of "ethnic cleansing" and the deliberate impeding of the delivery of food and medical supplies to the

civilian population of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reaffirms that those that commit or order the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;

8. Welcomes the establishment of the Commission of Experts provided for in paragraph 2 of its resolution 780 (1992) of 6th October 1992, and requests the Commission to pursue actively its investigations with regard to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, in particular the practice of "ethnic cleansing";

9. Decides, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in order to ensure that commodities and products transshipped through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are not diverted in violation of resolution 757 (1992), to prohibit the transshipment of crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tyres, vehicles, aircraft and motors of all types unless such transshipment is specifically authorised on a case-by-case basis by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) under its no-objection procedure;

10. Further decides, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that any vessel in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall be considered, for the purpose of implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, a vessel of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) regardless of the flag under which the vessel sails;

11. Calls upon all states to take all necessary steps to ensure that none of their exports are diverted to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in violation of resolution 757 (1992);

12. Acting under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, calls upon states, acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to use such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of resolutions 713 (1991) and 757 (1992);

13. Commends the efforts of those riparian States which are acting to ensure compliance with resolutions 713 (1991) and 757 (1992), including such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary to halt such shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of resolutions 713 (1991) and 757 (1992);

14. Requests the states concerned, nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to co-ordinate with the Secretary-General inter alia on the submission of reports to the Security Council regarding actions taken in pursuance of paragraphs 12 and 13 of the present resolution to facilitate the monitoring of the implementation of the present resolution;

15. Requests all states to provide in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations such assistance as may be required by those States acting nationally or through regional agencies and arrangements in pursuance of paragraphs 12 and 13 of the present resolution;

16. Considers that, in order to facilitate the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, observers should be deployed on the borders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and requests the Secretary-General to present to the Council as soon as possible his recommendations on this matter;

17. Calls upon all international donors to contribute to the humanitarian relief efforts in the former Yugoslavia, to support the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Programme of Action and Appeal for the former Yugoslavia and to speed up the delivery of assistance under existing pledges;

18. Calls upon all parties and others concerned to co-operate fully with the humanitarian agencies and with the United Nations Protection Force to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need of it, and reiterates its demand that all parties and others concerned take the necessary measures to ensure the safety of United Nations and other personnel engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance;

19. Invites the Secretary-General, in consultation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant international humanitarian agencies, to study the possibility of and the requirements for the promotion of safe areas for humanitarian purposes;

20. Expresses its appreciation for the report presented to the Council by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and requests the Secretary-General to continue to keep the Council regularly informed of developments and of the work of the Conference;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

APPENDIX III

*Questions posed by Sir Russell Johnston, MP, to Ministers
in the House of Commons, on 27th October 1992***Bosnia**

Sir Russell Johnston: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what information he has on the supply of arms or direct military support to the Serbian, Croat and Muslim forces in Bosnia in contravention of the arms embargo; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: There are a number of unconfirmed reports of arms supplies to Bosnia. An Iranian aircraft carrying arms was seized at Zagreb airport recently. The Western European Union/North Atlantic Treaty Organisation surveillance operation in the Adriatic has reported a number of ships suspected of violating the United Nation's trade and arms embargoes. But it is not clear whether these vessels are carrying goods destined for Bosnia.

Sir Russell Johnston: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what information he has on whether the Bosnian-Serbs are continuing to receive arms and military supplies from the rump Yugoslavia; and whether any form of monitoring is proposed of the border between Serbia and the Serbian-controlled area of Bosnia.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: We have no firm evidence of whether Serbia is continuing to supply arms to the Bosnian Serbs. The Yugoslav authorities deny this. Moreover, the Bosnian Serbs are already well-equipped; further supplies from Serbia would be unlikely to have a significant effect on their military capability. The monitoring of Serbia's and Montenegro's borders with Bosnia-Herzegovina was agreed in principle at the London conference. But these borders run through mountainous terrain, and are highly permeable. Effective monitoring would absorb much personnel and equipment. The United Nations is thus according higher priority to using the resources available to ensure the safe and rapid delivery of emergency relief supplies to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Sir Russell Johnston: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs prior to the full deployment of British forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina, what assessment he has made of the number of foreign mercenaries active in the field, their origin and the factions they are fighting with; how confident he is that British forces will be at no risk from attack by mercenaries; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: There have been repeated reports of mercenaries fighting in

Bosnia-Herzegovina, and some are clearly well-founded. No reliable estimate of the numbers involved has been made. Our assessment at present is that mercenaries do not as such increase the threat posed to British troops by the various armed groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Sir Russell Johnston: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he has now secured agreement from the Bosnian-Muslim, Bosnian-Serb and Bosnian-Croat communities to allow free passage for British forces deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to guarantee their safety from attack.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: Security Council resolution 776 of 14th September reaffirms the determination of the Council to ensure the protection and security of UNPROFOR and United Nations personnel: there is no need to seek an explicit resolution on these lines. Furthermore, United Nations personnel deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina to facilitate and escort convoys of humanitarian aid will proceed only on the basis of negotiated safe passage.

Macedonia

Sir Russell Johnston: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will list those countries which have given diplomatic recognition to the independence of Macedonia.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Philippines, Russia, Slovenia and Turkey have been notified to us as having recognised the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia as an independent state.

Kosovo

Sir Russell Johnston: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether the speech by Lord Owen representing the presidency of the EC in the debate on the former Yugoslavia in the plenary session of the Council of Europe on 3rd October in which he excluded any possibility of independence for Kosovo represents government policy; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: We share Lord Owen's views. The Serbian authorities should grant the Kosovars genuine autonomy with full human rights, and the Kosovars should accept this. A special group on Kosovo is working intensively within the international conference.

Overseas missions

Sir Russell Johnston: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether the agreement within the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on 18th September to send missions to Vojvodina, Kosovo and Sanjak have been implemented; how many persons are being deployed and from which countries; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: CSCE long-term missions have been in place since the end of September in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sanjak under the leadership of Ambassador Bogh of Norway. Apart from Ambassador Bogh, there are eight mission participants involved from Norway, United States, Austria, Canada, France, Sweden and Switzerland.

We welcome the establishment of these missions and the valuable rôle they can play on behalf of the international community in monitoring developments and in helping to prevent conflict in these troubled regions.

Yugoslavia

Sir Russell Johnston: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will publish a list showing those countries which have contingents as part of the United Nations protection forces - UNPROFOR - in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, indicating their numbers and function and where they are based.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: The following countries have contributed contingents to UNPROFOR. Numbers, function and location where known are also indicated. The table is divided into two parts to reflect countries' commitments to UNPROFOR - first phase - and those agreed for UNPROFOR - second phase.

UNPROFOR (1st Phase)

Nationality	Strength/Type	Location
Argentina	900/Infantry Battalion	
Belgium	620/Infantry Battalion	
Canada	900/Infantry Battalion	
	350/Engineer Battalion	
Czechslovakia	500/Infantry Battalion	
Denmark	900/Infantry Battalion	
Egypt	400/Infantry Battalion	Sarajevo
France	410/Infantry Battalion	Sarajevo
	143/HQ Company	Sarajevo
	66/Airport Company	Sarajevo
	600/Logistic Base	Zagreb
	900/Infantry Battalion	
Finland	300/Construction Battalion	Zagreb
Jordan	900/Infantry Battalion	
Kenya	900/Infantry Battalion	

Nepal	900/Infantry Battalion	
Netherlands	360/Signals Battalion	Zagreb
Nigeria	900/Infantry Battalion	
Norway	100/Movement Control Unit	Zagreb
Poland	900/Infantry Battalion	
Russian Fed.	900/Infantry Battalion	
Sweden	100 HQ Company	Zagreb
Ukraine	400/Infantry Battalion	Sarajevo
United Kingdom	260 Medical Battalion	Zagreb
Various*	60 Military observers	Sarajevo
	40 Civilian Police/Monitors	Sarajevo
	100 Military Police Company	Zagreb
Luxembourg/ Belgium	Composite Infantry Battalion (40 and 620 respectively)	

In addition to the above, UNPROFOR (1st phase) includes: 160 military observers from 29 countries; 650 civilian police monitors from 16 countries; deployed evenly to various sectors within Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Rapporteur's note: * also includes personnel from Bangladesh, Brazil, Ghana and Switzerland.

UNPROFOR (2nd Phase)

Nationality	Strength/Type	Location
Belgium	100 Transport 16 HQ 2 Support Unit	Vitez Kiseljach Vitez
Canada	800 Infantry 20 HQ 380 Support Unit	Banja Luka- Doboj Kiseljach Banja Luka- Doboj
Denmark	8 HQ 143 Support Unit	Kiseljach Kiseljach
France	1 382 Infantry 199 Engineer Unit 200 Helicopter Unit 33 HQ	Bihac Bihac Bihac Kiseljach
Netherlands	388 Transport 99 Signals 32 HQ 8 Support Unit 50 Engineer Unit	Vitez Vitez Kiseljach Vitez Vitez
Norway	2 Engineer Unit 33 HQ	Kiseljach
Portugal	20 Surgical Team	
Spain	710 Infantry 16 HQ 25 Support Unit	Mostar Kiseljach Mostar
United Kingdom	883 Infantry 508 Engineer Unit 19 Support Element 42 HQ 1 206 Support Unit	Jajce-Vitez Jajce-Vitez Jajce-Vitez Kiseljach Jajce-Vitez
United States	400 Mobile Army Surgical Hospital 15 HQ	Kiseljach

Headquarters will be based in three areas but with the main one in Kiseljach near Sarajevo.

The Defence Secretary, Mr. Rifkind, added: A main party of about 1 800 personnel is expected to be operational in Bosnia by mid-November. In addition, 400 extra troops, mainly Royal Engineers, will be involved in

order to assist in the initial stages of deployment. This brings the total number to be deployed initially to 2 400, including headquarters troops. We have also provided United Nations observers, a field ambulance and an RAF Hercules has been taking part in humanitarian airlift operations in Sarajevo.

APPENDIX IV

*Steps taken by the Romanian Government to apply the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro¹***3rd June 1992**

The Romanian Government declares that it intends to apply to the letter Security Council Resolution 757 in spite of the serious consequences this may have for the country's economy. Romania reserves the right to compensation under Article 50 of the United Nations Charter. Appropriate measures are taken immediately.

20th June 1992

Romania sends a memorandum to the Security Council on measures adopted in application of Resolution 757.

15th July 1992

1. The Romanian Government sends an addendum to its memorandum describing action taken subsequently.
2. The Romanian Government declares that it is prepared to receive foreign experts to co-operate with the Romanian authorities in verifying that the sanctions are respected.
3. Consultations are held in the framework of NACC on setting up this team.

29th July 1992

The Romanian Ambassador in Rome goes to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to stress that Romania is prepared to co-operate with WEU to enforce the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro. He asks that this proposal be submitted at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group to be held in Rome on 30th July.

15th to 18th August 1992

An exploratory team sent by the United Kingdom Chairmanship-in-Office of the EEC visits Romania for talks with the Romanian authorities on the problems that have arisen, and in particular on crossing points and Danube ports. The team's report was favourable to Romania.

18th August 1992

Romania sends a team to the Sanctions Committee in New York. The committee says the Danube régime is not affected by sanctions.

20th August 1992

The Romanian Government approves detailed instructions for verifying respect for sanctions on its territory.

28th August 1992

The Romanian team in New York asks for details on transit traffic.

3rd and 4th September 1992

Legal experts from the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs go to Romania for consultations with experts from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for Communications and Transport and the Customs Directorate-General. They express a favourable opinion on Romania's action.

9th September 1992

The Romanian Government adopts a decision concerning concrete measures to monitor international navigation on the Danube.

10th September 1992

Answering the Romanian Government's question, the Sanctions Committee says there is an obligation for states along the Danube also to apply the embargo to foreign ships on inland waterways within their authority.

14th September 1992

The Ministry for Communications and Transport issues Order 134/92 on measures to strengthen the application of Resolution 757. This decision is circulated as an official Security Council document on 8th October (Document S 24 613).

18th September 1992

A committee of senior officials from countries along the Danube meets in Prague. It decides to call a meeting of the liaison group on international relief missions to apply sanctions against Yugoslavia.

28th September 1992

Two teams are sent to Romania, one composed of two American experts and the other of three experts including an Italian customs expert. They are now working in Tournu Severin for inland waterway matters and Timisoara for road traffic.

1. Information received from the Romanian Embassy in Paris.

APPENDIX V

*Chronology***1991**

- 23rd November* Geneva: signature of the twelfth cease-fire (CF12).
- 27th November* United Nations Security Council Resolution 721 gives full backing to peace-keeping force, provided cease-fire holds; continued shelling of Osijek.
- 28th November* Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom announce readiness to recognise Slovenia and Croatia.
- 29th November* Croatian forces lift blockade of Marshal Tito barracks in Zagreb; beginning of Yugoslavian withdrawal from Zagreb; cease-fire appears to be holding; the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) meets in Prague and confirms earlier CSCE positions, Yugoslavia does not attend.
- 1st December* Some violations; cease-fire generally holding.
- 2nd December* EC restores trade benefits, financial co-operation and PHARE to Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, back-dated to 15th November.
- 4th December* Mr. Cyrus Vance and Mr. Kadijevic hold talks in attempt to make cease-fire hold; fighting at Osijek continues.
- The WEU Assembly adopts Recommendations 511 and 512 calling for the participation of all member states in humanitarian operations, thus setting an example of solidarity; it also calls for these operations to be co-ordinated. Co-ordination is to be increased with a view to participating in a peace-keeping force – still under the aegis of the United Nations – as soon as the conditions making this legitimate have been met. These recommendations also advocate taking without delay the necessary military and naval measures to enforce the embargo decided by the Twelve on 8th November, grounding all military aircraft in Yugoslav air space, using electronic counter measures to best effect and imposing effective arms and oil embargos on all Yugoslav belligerents.
- 6th December* Yugoslavian assault on Dubrovnik; United States imposes sanctions on all republics; general increase in fighting in all areas.
- 10th December* Zagreb: local cease-fire as troops withdraw and prisoners exchanged.
- 14th December* United Nations Security Council Resolution 724 agrees to send advance team of observers, probably 12 civilian, 6 military.
- 27th December* United Nations observers arrive; fighting continues.
- 28th December* Mr. Cyrus Vance arrives for fifth visit (to 4th January) ; confirms that no peace-keeping force will go to “Yugoslavia” until cease-fire observed.

1992

- 2nd January* Croatia and Serbia agree to United Nations force deployment, which hinges on stable cease-fire; new cease-fire, negotiated by Mr. Cyrus Vance, agreed, to come into effect on 3rd January.
- 3rd January* CF13 comes into effect.
- 6th January* United Nations prepares to send 50 military observers to “Yugoslavia”; some violations but cease-fire generally holding.
- 7th January* Yugoslavian air force shoots down EC helicopter; five OM members killed.
- 8th January* United Nations Resolution 727, adopts plan to send 50 military liaison observers; Mr. Kadijevic resigns, replaced temporarily by General Blagoje Adzic, Yugoslavian Chief of Staff.
- 9th January* EC peace conference reconvenes in Brussels.

- 10th January* Mr. Milan Babic (Serbian leader of the self-proclaimed "Krajina Republic") opposes United Nations plan on basis that it provides insufficient guarantees for minority Serbs in Croatia.
- 15th January* EC members recognise independence of Slovenia and Croatia, withholds recognition of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; United Nations advance team of 45 arrives as cease-fire holds generally.
- 20th January* Mr. Milan Babic again rules out deployment of United Nations observers in Krajina region.
- 21st January* Both sides accuse each other of violations; Serbian draft law to allow "nations wishing to remain in common state" to form new parliament and other institutions.
- 23rd January* "Helsinki Watch" reports that Serbian irregular forces are responsible for executions of up to 200 civilians.
- 31st January* Serbian regular and irregular force leaders meet to "discuss" deployment of United Nations peace-keeping forces.
- 3rd February* Mr. Milan Babic claims his agreement with other Serbian leaders for United Nations deployment extracted by "police methods and torture".
- 4th February* First inter-ethnic clashes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the Mostar region. Lord Carrington arrives in Yugoslavia to "knock heads together in Zagreb and Belgrade"; advance United Nations force to be increased to 75 as cease-fire holds.
- 6th February* Mr. Franjo Tudjman drops objections to United Nations force; Mr. Milan Babic now only remaining opposition to United Nations plans; some Security Council members argue for partial deployment; Mr. Cyrus Vance disagrees.
- 7th February* United Nations Resolution 740 calls for hold-out leaders to accept United Nations plans for deployment and increased observers from 50 to 75; Mr. Milan Babic announces plan for referendum on question of deployment.
- 11th February* Croatia renews opposition to United Nations plan after the new United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Butros Ghali, announces that Serb areas within Croatia will remain outside Croatian control under United Nations peace-keeping plan; Mr. Franjo Tudjman claims this is not what was agreed.
- 16th February* The Twelve discuss the merits of recognising Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- 18th February* Mr. Milan Babic postpones referendum on United Nations plan.
- 19th February* United Nations announces that political settlement of Yugoslavia to be left in hands of Lord Carrington; Mr. Butros Ghali recommends immediate dispatch of peace-keeping forces (to be known as UNPROFOR: United Nations Protection Force).
- 21st February* United Nations Resolution 743 establishes UNPROFOR for 12 months; Mr. Milan Babic agrees to peace plan and disarming of militia, explaining that basic objections had been satisfied (including explicit United Nations acknowledgement that Croatian authority would not apply in Serb enclaves); Yugoslavia to withdraw from areas occupied by United Nations; Croatia announces Croatian law will apply in all areas; Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher states that, since his visit, Mr. Franjo Tudjman has no more objections; ethnic leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina agree that republic's borders should remain unchanged.
- 24th February* The United States, the United Kingdom and France argue that the UNPROFOR budget is too high and needs to be reduced by half before approval.
- 26th February* Serbian sources report Mr. Milan Babic ousted, replaced by Mr. Goran Hadzic, Prime Minister of the (self-proclaimed) Serbian Autonomous Region of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem'; the latter supports United Nations plan; Serbia offers new commitment to EC peace conference.
- 27th February* Artillery attacks in Croatia; first major violation of 3rd January cease-fire.
- 1st March* Bosnia-Herzegovina independence referendum; 63% (99% of those who vote,

- mostly Muslims and Croats) vote " yes "; sporadic violence in republic in wake of vote; Montenegrin referendum vote in favour of continued union with Serbia.
- 2nd March* Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina raise barricades around Sarajevo.
- 3rd March* Agreement reached to dismantle barricades; Mr. Cyrus Vance visits Belgrade to discuss UNPROFOR deployment.
- 6th March* Mr. Cyrus Vance visits Bosnia-Herzegovina; claims agreement between ethnic communities reached, promises to seek peaceful settlement; announcement that UNPROFOR to be fully deployed by 15th April – headquarters to be in Sarajevo; the President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, announces he will seek negotiations to allow Yugoslavian withdrawal from Bosnia-Herzegovina if republic is recognised.
- 10th March* The Commander of UNPROFOR, Indian General Satish Nambiar, arrives in Zagreb; fighting continues in East and South Croatia; UNPROFOR to be deployed in Serb-controlled regions of Eastern and Western Slavonia, and in Krajina.
- 12th March* European Parliament calls for EC recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- 16th March* United Nations troops begin full deployment; 350 advance troops head for war zones.
- 17th March* United Nations advance troops now in forward positions.
- 18th March* Agreement between ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina signed; basic agreement to divide republic into ethnic " cantons ".
- 23rd March* Fighting in Herzegovina between Yugoslavian and Croatian forces.
- 26th March* Slovenia urges CSCE to recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia; fighting continues in Bosnia-Herzegovina at Bosanski Brod and Derventa; Western diplomats warning that slow pace of United Nations deployment is allowing militants on all sides to prepare for spring campaign.
- 27th March* More violence in Bosanski Brod; leader of Serbian " assembly " in Bosnia-Herzegovina announces creation of " Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina " which would join Yugoslavia.
- 30th March* Brussels: meeting of leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- 31st March* 1 300 French United Nations troops leave France.
- 1st April* Brussels: 4-point agreement between presidents of all republics, undertaking to dismantle trade restrictions, restore transport and communication links, work to restore power and flow of oil.
- 3rd April* Bosnia-Herzegovina asks United Nations for military help to end fighting, which has now spread across northern Bosnia-Herzegovina (local ethnic militias attempt to gain territory before recognition and division).
- 5th April* Severe escalation of fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina; casualties now in the hundreds (massacres of Muslims by Serbs reported at Kpres and Bijeljina) ; leaders agree to new political talks and all call for cease-fire.
- 6th April* Serbian forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina fight for control of Sarajevo; large demonstrations for peace there; United Nations headquarters attacked.
- 7th April* EC recognises Bosnia-Herzegovina; recognition of Macedonia withheld because of continuing Greek objections, despite Macedonia's meeting of conditions for recognition; fighting continues; US recognises Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina; Security Council authorises earliest possible full deployment of peace-keeping troops; Mr. Butros Ghali announces that violations of January cease-fire now total 100-200 per day; 800 French United Nations troops in Krajina region.
- 27th April* Serbia and Montenegro form the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The EEC insists on federal troops being withdrawn from Bosnia before it recognises the FRY.
- 22nd May* Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia join the United Nations.

- 30th May* The United Nations decrees a total embargo against Serbia and Montenegro while the first bombs fall on Sarajevo.
- 4th June* Meeting of the WEU Permanent Council to discuss former Yugoslavia.
- 19th June* The WEU Council of Ministers, after underlining the extreme urgency of humanitarian assistance, principally to the Bosnian people, and the need to establish a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its surroundings, particularly the airport so that it might be reopened, expresses its support for the active participation of member states in this operation in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 758. The ministers also declare that WEU is prepared, within the limit of its possibilities, to help ensure effective implementation of Security Council resolutions relating to the Yugoslav conflict. To this end, an ad hoc group of representatives of foreign and defence ministries is instructed to study specific aspects of this task.
- 26th June* Meeting of the Ad Hoc Sub-group on Yugoslavia (AHGY).
- 29th June* The blockade of Sarajevo is ended with the opening of an air lift and the United Nations Security Council authorises the deployment of a thousand blue berets at Sarajevo airport.
- 2nd July* Rome: meeting of naval experts.
- 3rd July* Rome: meeting of the AHGY.
- 10th July* WEU decides to start naval monitoring of the Adriatic to enforce the United Nations embargo.
- 14th July* Mr. Milan Panic, an American businessman of Serb origin, is appointed Prime Minister of the FRY.
Rome: meeting of the naval points of contact, mainly devoted to WEU/NATO co-ordination of naval operations of surveillance.
- 17th July* Rome: meeting of the AHGY.
- 23rd July* Rome: meeting of naval experts on embargo and humanitarian assistance.
- 29th July* Geneva conference on Yugoslav refugees. The war in Yugoslavia has already displaced 2.2 million persons and caused more than 12 000 victims.
- 30th July* Rome: meeting of the AHGY.
- 2nd August* An American daily newspaper reveals the existence of Serb internment camps and atrocities. The United Nations Security Council was to confirm this and ask all belligerents to allow international agencies access to these camps.
- 13th August* The Security Council adopts two resolutions, one authorising recourse to military force to convey humanitarian aid to Bosnia, including the camps, and the other condemning the principle of ethnic cleansing practised by certain belligerents.
Rome: meeting of the AHGY and humanitarian group.
- 14th August* France announces that it is prepared to send 1 100 men to Yugoslavia in the framework of United Nations resolutions. The United Kingdom then announces that it will send 1 800 men and Italy 1 500.
- 24th August* Rome: meeting of the Ad Hoc Group to consider the report drawn up by the contingency planning group and the various options to be submitted to the WEU Council following the United Nations Security Council Resolution 770 relating to the protection of humanitarian convoys and the monitoring of heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- 24th-27th August* Fact-finding mission by the Chairman of the WEU Assembly's Defence Committee, Sir Dudley Smith, MP, and Rapporteur, Mr. Günter Marten, MdB, to observe WEU operations in the Adriatic area (and to visit NATO-US ships). Recommendations formulated for WEU extraordinary Council meeting (see 28th August) and Assembly's Standing Committee (see 3rd September).
- 26th-28th August* London: international peace conference.
- 26th August* Lord Carrington, Chairman of the conference since its creation by the Twelve, resigns and is replaced by Lord Owen.

All delegations (including the Serbs) adopt the following four texts:

1. Declaration of 13 principles to be respected by all parties

1. Obligation to cease fighting and respect the cease-fire.
2. No advantage gained by force will be recognised.
3. All parties will take part in negotiations with a view to resolving the political problems and difficulties.
4. Full respect of human rights.
5. Implementation of guarantees in favour of the fundamental rights and freedoms of those belonging to ethnic or national minorities.
6. An end to "ethnic cleansing" and detention camps.
7. Personal responsibility of those who have violated the Geneva Convention on war crimes.
8. Respect of borders and of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the region.
9. The succession of the former State of Yugoslavia will be defined by consensus or by arbitration in mutual respect of the different states.
10. Respect of United Nations resolutions by all states and all factions.
11. Humanitarian aid must be brought to the most in need, notably children.
12. All parties must co-operate fully in international peace-keeping efforts and armament control operations.
13. International guarantees for the establishment of agreements reached at the London Conference and at further work by the permanent structure to be set up in Geneva.

2. Resolution on Bosnia-Herzegovina

It calls on the fighting parties to cease "completely and immediately" hostilities and all kinds of violence and to resume "immediately and without conditions" negotiations in seven sectors and "establish an international peace-keeping force, under the auspices of the United Nations, to enforce the cease-fire, monitor military movements and adopt other measures destined to restore confidence".

3. Action programme

It foresees that the negotiations begun in Brussels under the European Presidency and then carried on at the London Conference continue in Geneva and that *six working groups* be created for this purpose, with responsibility for:

- Bosnia-Herzegovina;
- humanitarian problems;
- minorities;
- the succession of the Yugoslav State;
- economic recovery;
- measures of confidence.

4. Declaration on Serbia

In this document, the Serbs and Montenegrins commit themselves:

- to put an end to any intervention across their borders in Bosnia and Croatia;
- to do whatever is in their power to prevent the Bosnian Serbs from taking territories and expelling minorities;
- to restore the rights of the national and ethnic communities and minorities;
- to use their influence among the Bosnian Serbs to obtain the closing down of detention camps and to allow the return of refugees to their homes;
- to declare that they abide by the integrity of present borders.

It was also agreed that the parties involved in the conflict would notify the United Nations *within the next 4 days* of their mortar shells and heavy weapons, something considered a "prelude" to military disengagement.

- 27th August* Fighting continues throughout the day in Sarajevo. Resumption of Serb artillery fire in Dubrovnik. Brussels: the NATO Defence Planning Committee agrees to STANAVFORLANT taking over from STANAVFORMED from 9th to 26th September. Belgrade: the Deputy Minister of the Interior of the "Yugoslav" Federal Government is dismissed, accused of not having supported the government's anti-ethnic cleansing programme. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Roland Dumas, repeats France's proposal for an air exclusion zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina to protect civilians against Serb bombing.
- 28th August* Extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council. London: the WEU ministers for foreign affairs and defence meet in connection with the London Conference. They express their firm conviction that the principles adopted at the conference should lay the foundations for progress towards a fair political solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia. They also decide to make immediately available to the United Nations almost 5 000 men and various means of transport and logistic equipment.
- 30th August* Violent fighting continues on the main fronts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A shell kills eight people and wounds scores in a Sarajevo suburb.
- 31st August* Poland's former Prime Minister, Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, instructed by the United Nations to inquire into violations of human rights in former Yugoslavia, denounces, in his report, the everyday practice of ethnic cleansing and advocates the extension of the UNPROFOR. Belgrade: socialists and extreme nationalists table a motion of censure of Mr. Milan Panic, accusing him of not defending Serb interests at the London Conference. Lord Owen starts a tour of European capitals.
- 1st September* Sarajevo: violent exchanges of artillery between Serbs and Muslims.
- 2nd September* Meeting of the North Atlantic Council: NATO decides to support action taken under the responsibility of the United Nations to protect the transport of humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina by road and rail.
- 3rd September* Brussels: the Twelve agree to strengthen the trade embargo against Serbia and Montenegro. An Italian relief aircraft is shot down by a missile near Sarajevo in an area under Croatian control. Sarajevo airport is closed and humanitarian relief flights suspended. Geneva: opening of the standing conference on former Yugoslavia under the joint chairmanship of Lord Owen (for the EC) and Mr. Cyrus Vance (for the United Nations). Paris: extraordinary meeting of the Standing Committee of the WEU Assembly, which recommends a complete blockade of Serbia and Montenegro and their exclusion from all international organisations until such time as they respect all United Nations resolutions and the decisions of the London Conference. In Recommendation 525, the Assembly recommends that the Council "seek immediate United Nations approval to impose a complete and total land, air and sea blockade of Serbia and Montenegro, insist that Greece give the necessary assurances of total compliance with the United Nations embargo before continuing the present negotiations for WEU membership, offer to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to keep WEU forces available to the United Nations under European command and operational control and institute a formal liaison mechanism with NATO headquarters". The Assembly also recommends that, if Serbia does not respect the London commitments, an air exclusion zone be created. It recommends that countries that are not members of the organisation be invited "to co-operate in furnishing military forces to complement WEU assets" and, finally, that the Council "examine action to be taken, including military action,... to prevent present conflicts spreading to Kosovo, Sandjak, Vojvodina and Macedonia".

- 4th September* Zagreb: the Croatian authorities seize a cargo of arms on board an Iranian aircraft intended for the Muslims.
- 5th September* The federal parliament of the new "Yugoslavia" rejects the motion of censure of the Yugoslav Prime Minister tabled on 31st August.
- 7th September* Sarajevo: resumption of artillery firing after a few days' calm.
Geneva: the emergency meeting on distributing humanitarian aid is unable to reach a decision on resuming the Sarajevo air lift.
- 8th September* Two French blue berets are killed in an ambush of a humanitarian convoy.
Mr. Mesic is elected President of the Croatian Parliament.
- 9th September* The co-Chairmen of the international conference, Mr. Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, start a five-day tour of former Yugoslavia.
Paris: the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Roland Dumas, has talks with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Butros-Ghali, on the need for rapid implementation of Resolution 770 providing for humanitarian convoys to have a military escort.
Mr. Butros-Ghali says he agrees with the principle of air protection for conveying humanitarian aid to Bosnia provided the Security Council gives a specific mandate.
The United Nations Security Council meets to examine further steps to be taken to ensure the safety of blue berets.
The Serb leader in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Rodovan Karadzic, says the Serbs in Bosnia will place their heavy weapons under United Nations control before the deadline (noon on 12th September) set by Lord Owen and Mr. Cyrus Vance.
The Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Constantin Mitsotakis, denies that Greece has infringed the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro and confirms that his country does not intend to support a military intervention in former Yugoslavia.
- 10th September* The Yugoslav Prime Minister, Mr. Milan Panic, replaces the entire Yugoslav Delegation to the Geneva Conference, affirming that the permanent negotiating team that took part in the London Conference and was composed of supporters of President Milosevic was not equal to its task. The Liberal Minister without Portfolio, Mr. Ljubisa Rakic, leads the new team.
Belgrade: resignation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the new Yugoslavia, Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, who disagrees with Mr. Panic's policy that he considers contrary to the interests of Serbia and the Serb people.
- 11th September* Mr. Butros-Ghali recommends to the Security Council a four- or five-fold increase in United Nations troops to ensure an increase in deliveries of humanitarian aid.
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopts a declaration on the conflict in former Yugoslavia.
Sarajevo: Lord Owen and Mr. Cyrus Vance announce that high-level discussions on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina are to start in Geneva on 18th September.
Istanbul: the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopts a declaration condemning the policy of ethnic cleansing.
- 12th September* Serb and Bosnia militias start to regroup their heavy weapons to place them under the control of the UNPROFOR blue berets. However, several local camps refuse to hand in their 32 mm mortars.
- 12th-13th September* Meeting of ministers for foreign affairs of the European Community. They support the idea of an air exclusion zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina and call on the United Nations to exclude the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from all United Nations bodies.
- 14th September* The fresh outbreak of fighting in Sarajevo jeopardises the Geneva talks.
- 15th September* The United Nations Security Council authorises the deployment of several thousand additional blue berets in Bosnia-Herzegovina to protect humanitarian relief convoys.
Resolution 776, adopted by 12 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions, approves the most recent report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, authorises the extension of the UNPROFOR mandate and the number of troops in Bosnia-

Herzegovina recommended by the Secretary-General to carry out the missions referred to in the report, including the protection of convoys of released prisoners if the International Committee of the Red Cross so requests. About 6 000 European soldiers are thus to join the 1 500 UNPROFOR troops.
The Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) calls for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to be excluded from all United Nations bodies.
Precarious calm in Sarajevo.

- 16th September* Prague: the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials publishes a report on the situation in the detention camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina which is damning for the three communities in Bosnia.
Lord Owen and Mr. Cyrus Vance welcome the positive attitude of the government in Belgrade, which has accepted the presence of observers in Serbian and Montenegrin airports.
- 17th September* Prague: at a meeting of the CSCE, the Vatican proposes an eight-point plan for ending the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The plan provides inter alia for a true naval blockade completed, if necessary, by the closing of the air space of Bosnia-Herzegovina to all flights except for those of the United Nations and a strengthened, verified land and waterway embargo and recourse to all means available to the international community in the absence of good will by the parties to the conflict.
Violent fighting breaks out again in Sarajevo, particularly in the Ilidza sector, held by the Serbs, where Muslim forces have attempted a breakthrough.
Belgrade: the Prime Minister, Mr. Milan Panic, is the target for further attacks after he declares that the new Yugoslavia cannot expect to take over purely and simply from the former federation and should apply for admission to the United Nations.
- 18th-21st September* Resumption of the Geneva negotiations on the constitutional future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Differences jeopardise the alliance between the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims. The views of the Croat and Serb leaders that there should be a three-state confederation are contrary to those of the Muslims, who advocate a unified Bosnia.
- 19th September* New York: The United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 777 laying down inter alia that the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot automatically replace the former Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia in the United Nations.
- 21st September* New York: the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Mr. Milan Panic, meets the diplomatic leaders of the permanent members of the Security Council at the United Nations. Inconclusive end to the Geneva Conference. The Bosnians table a proposal for an internationally-recognised sovereign republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would be a decentralised state ensuring equal rights for Croats, Muslims, Serbs and all other citizens and guaranteeing political pluralism, all religious and national rights and the rights of minorities.
Athens: meeting between the co-Chairmen of the international conference, Lord Owen and Mr. Cyrus Vance, and the Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Mitsotakis, on the Yugoslav crisis as a whole and, more particularly, recognition of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. At the same time, Greece recommences exports of oil to Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia that it interrupted following affirmations that it was violating the oil embargo against Serbia and Montenegro.
The Bosnian President, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, appeals to the United Nations to compel Serbia to respect its undertakings and asks for the creation of an international tribunal to try war crimes committed during the conflict.
- 22nd September* Air raids continue in Bosnia.
New York: the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is officially excluded from the United Nations General Assembly.
Athens: Mr. Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen ask the Greek Government to influence Serbia in order to reach a fair and peaceful settlement, in particular of the Kosovo problem.
- 23rd September* Belgrade: the Serb leader, Mr. Rodovan Karadzic, threatens the West that a true religious war will break out that will lead to an international conflict if the partition of Bosnia is not accepted.

- New York: Mr. Franjo Tudjman and his Bosnian opposite number, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, announce that the two republics have concluded an agreement setting up a commission to co-ordinate their defence efforts against Serb regular and irregular forces.
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council.
- 24th September* The United Nations strengthens its arrangements to protect blue berets. Convoys are escorted by armoured vehicles.
- 27th September* Fighting continues in Sarajevo.
- 28th September* Visit by Lord Owen and Mr. Cyrus Vance, to Belgrade.
The President of new Yugoslavia, Mr. Dobrica Cosic, agrees to meet his Croatian opposite number, Mr. Franjo Tudjman, in Geneva on 30th September. The American press reveals that 3 000 Bosnian Muslim prisoners were massacred near Brcko by Serb militias in May and June 1992.
The French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Roland Dumas, asks the United Nations and the European Community to hold an inquiry into the massacre.
- 29th September* The High Commissioner for Refugees says 400 000 people may die of cold and hunger in Bosnia-Herzegovina this winter if a large-scale effort is not made immediately by the international community.
- 30th September* The Yugoslav Prime Minister, Mr. Milan Panic, obtains Washington's support for a partial lifting of the oil embargo to allow "Yugoslavs" to be heated this winter.
Resumption of the Geneva Conference with the two co-Chairmen, Lord Owen and Mr. Cyrus Vance, and, on the one hand, the Croatian President, Mr. Franjo Tudjman, and his Yugoslav opposite number, Mr. Dobrico Cosic, and, on the other, the Bosnian Serb leader, Mr. Rodovan Karadzic.
Mr. Tudjman and Mr. Cosic undertake to try to find a fair and peaceful solution to the Bosnian conflict. In a joint declaration, they condemn ethnic cleansing, undertake to speed up the normalisation process between their two countries, facilitate the return home of displaced persons and accept the demilitarisation of the Prevlaka peninsula in Croatia. The Yugoslav federal army will leave the peninsula on 20th September, the day the two Presidents are to meet Lord Owen and Mr. Cyrus Vance again in Geneva.
According to Lord Owen, the parties to the Yugoslav conflict have accepted the principle of discussions on the demilitarisation of Sarajevo.
French General Philippe Morillon is officially appointed head of the strengthened UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- 1st October* Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina agree to negotiate at military level, in the presence of the head of UNPROFOR, their progressive withdrawal from Sarajevo.
1 560 prisoners are released from the Serb-controlled Trnopolje camp.
- 2nd October* The President of the United States, Mr. George Bush, announces that he is prepared to send forces to take part in establishing an air exclusion zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to prevent the Serbs from bombing Muslims.
- 3rd October* The Sarajevo air lift is resumed.
- 6th October* The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 780 setting up a commission of inquiry into war crimes.
Serb forces take the town of Boçanski-Brod, the last stronghold of the Croats and Muslims in northern Bosnia.
- 7th October* Opening of negotiations on the demilitarisation of Sarajevo.
- 9th October* The United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 781 imposing an air exclusion zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- 10th October* The Serb air force continues to overfly Bosnian territory.
- 11th October* Belgrade: the referendum organised in Serbia does not produce a large enough majority to allow legislative and presidential elections to be held before the due date.
Serbia boycotts the consultations between Croatia and new Yugoslavia that are

starting in the framework of the agreements on normalising relations between the two countries.

- 12th October* In Kosovo, a province in the south of Serbia that lost its autonomy in 1990, ethnic Albanians who have unilaterally proclaimed a Republic of Kosovo and broken off the dialogue with the Serbs, call for teaching of the Albanian language to be resumed.
- 13th October* Geneva: at a meeting with the co-Chairmen of the international conference, Lord Owen and Mr. Cyrus Vance, the leader of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Rodovan Karadzic, offers to withdraw all his aircraft from Bosnia-Herzegovina and group them in the airports of the Yugoslav Federation under the control of United Nations observers.
- 14th October* Mr. Cyrus Vance urges the Security Council to be most vigilant in face of possible repercussions in Kosovo and Macedonia.
Paris: the Montenegrin Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Miodrag Lekic, asks Mr. Roland Dumas to ensure the presence of international observers for the legislative elections to be held in Montenegro in December.
- 15th October* Mr. Milan Panic goes to Pristina (Kosovo) to establish a dialogue between Serbs and ethnic Albanians.
The chief of the Serb air force, General Zimovir Ninkovic, opposes the agreement on the withdrawal of his forces from Bosnia.
The Chairman of the WEU Assembly Defence Committee, Sir Dudley Smith, MP, accompanied by Mr. Günter Marten, MdB, visits Romania and notes that the country is respecting the embargo against Yugoslavia.
- 16th October* The President of Yugoslavia, Mr. Dobrica Cosic, calls for the resignation of Mr. Slobodan Milosevic and says there is a risk of civil war in Serbia.
- 18th October* The United Nations discovers the location of the Vukovar slaughter. Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, asked by the United Nations to inquire into the human rights situation, denounces serious violations of such rights in Kosovo that may lead to further violence.
After ten days of relative calm, Sarajevo is again heavily bombed.
- 19th October* Belgrade: the Serb police loyal to President Milosevic take control of the Federal Ministry of the Interior to oppose the policy of compromise advocated by the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Mr. Panic.
Geneva: at their first meeting since the beginning of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian President, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, and his Yugoslav opposite number, Mr. Dobrica Cosic, agree to intensify their efforts to normalise relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of mutual recognition.
- 20th October* Geneva: the Croat and Yugoslav Presidents, Mr. Franjo Tudjman and Mr. Dobrica Cosic, undertake to normalise their relations by setting up liaison offices in Zagreb and Belgrade.
- 21st October* Because of the worsening situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the HRC has to suspend its humanitarian relief convoys. The Bosnian President, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, agrees – after refusing for a long time – to an army officer loyal to him playing a direct part in the technical discussions on the demilitarisation of Sarajevo held under the aegis of the United Nations.
Vienna: the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Mr. Milan Panic, meets the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Alos Mock. He asks for tangible Western aid in order to succeed in Yugoslavia.
- 23rd October* For the first time since the beginning of hostilities, military leaders from the three warring communities (Serbs, Croats and Muslims) meet in Sarajevo under the aegis of the United Nations. They discuss technical conditions for a hypothetical cease-fire and means of helping the arrival of international aid.
Bosnia's Serb pilots refuse to move their aircraft to aerodromes in new Yugoslavia.
- 26th October* The French battalion, outside United Nations command, arrives in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- 27th October* Presentation to the steering committee of the Geneva Conference of a plan for a

- very decentralised constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina, providing for a central authority and several multi-ethnic regions. The plan aims to make a political solution possible in Bosnia-Herzegovina when fighting stops. According to the spokesman of the co-Chairmen, Mr. Fred Eckhard, it also aims to safeguard the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a nation (as the Muslims want) while guaranteeing wide autonomy for the provincial governments (to satisfy the Serbs and Croats).
Belgrade: Mr. Rodovan Karadzic rejects this plan from outside.
- 28th October* The deputy leader of the Serb Delegation to the Geneva Conference, Mr. Nikola Koljevic, finds the proposed constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina unacceptable.
At the close of a second mission, the United Nations Rapporteur, Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, produces a very somber review of several months of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and considers that ethnic cleansing has already largely attained its aims.
- 29th October* The strategic town of Jajce, a Muslim stronghold, falls into the hands of the Serb forces, leading to the exodus of thousands of refugees towards central Bosnia.
Lord Owen and Mr. Cyrus Vance arrive in Kosovo to meet local Serb and Albanian leaders.
- 2nd November* Belgrade: in the Chamber of Deputies, the nationalists and Serb radicals vote a motion of censure of the Prime Minister, Mr. Milan Panic.
Geneva: the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Mr. Cornelio Sommaruga, calls for the creation of protected areas to receive as top priority civilians interned in camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Thousands of refugees from Jajce are blocked at Croatia's southern frontiers.
- 3rd November* The Chamber of Deputies rejects the motion of censure of the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Mr. Milan Panic.
- 4th November* After their success in central Bosnia, Serb forces increase their pressure on northern Bosnia. Bosnian radio reports violent fighting in Olovo, Kledanj and Tuzlo.
- 5th November* At a meeting with the President of the European Commission, Mr. Jacques Delors, the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Mr. Milan Panic, pleads for sanctions on new Yugoslavia to be lifted.
- 8th November* The Serb leader in Bosnia, Mr. Rodovan Karadzic, announces a peace plan aimed at confirming his gains on the ground. He advocates the creation of a Bosnian confederation comprising three nation states.
- 10th November* The three parties to the conflict sign another cease-fire but fighting continues in southern Bosnia.
- 12th November* Start of the eighteenth cease-fire.
- 13th November* Opening in the United Nations Security Council of the first public debate on the fate of the Muslim population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serb army breaks the eighteenth cease-fire.
- 14th November* Mr. Roland Dumas launches the idea of a meeting of the London Conference on former Yugoslavia devoted entirely to Bosnia. The meeting would be held at ministerial level.
- 16th November* The United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 787 strengthening economic sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro. The Islamic proposal to lift the embargo on weapons for Bosnia-Herzegovina is rejected.
- 20th November* Rome: meeting of the WEU ministers for foreign affairs and defence. Declaration on former Yugoslavia.

WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis
SUPPLEMENTARY DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. De Decker, Lord Mackie of Benshie and others

1. After paragraph 4 of the supplementary draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Study plans for a European military operation to relieve the region of Sarajevo, liberate the prison camps and put an end to the policy of occupation and ethnic cleansing pursued by the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. ”

Signed: De Decker, Mackie of Benshie, Caro, Finsberg, Hardy

1. See 11th sitting, 2nd December 1992 (amendment agreed to).

WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis
SUPPLEMENTARY DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

AMENDMENT 2¹

tabled by Mr. De Decker, Lord Mackie of Benshie and others

2. After paragraph 4 of the supplementary draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Take measures for and announce sanctions to be taken by member states against shipping companies and airlines guilty of violating the embargo decreed by the United Nations;”

Signed: De Decker, Mackie of Benshie, Andreotti, Caro, Finsberg, Hardy, Pécriaux

1. See 11th sitting, 2nd December 1992 (amendment amended and agreed to).

European security – reserve forces and national service**REPORT ¹**

***submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee ²
by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur***

TABLE OF CONTENTS**DRAFT RECOMMENDATION**

on European security – reserve forces and national service

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. National service in France, Belgium and the Netherlands
 - (i) France
 - (ii) Belgium
 - (iii) The Netherlands
- III. NATO's new force structures and the reserves
- IV. Current reforms
 - (i) Belgium
 - (ii) Canada
 - (iii) France
 - (iv) Germany
 - (v) The Netherlands
 - (vi) Portugal
 - (vii) Spain
 - (viii) Turkey
 - (ix) United Kingdom
 - (x) United States
- V. The Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (the CIOR)
 - (i) NATO relationship
 - (ii) Activities
 - (iii) Organisation
 - (iv) Commissions
 - (v) National Reserve Forces Committee
 - (vi) The CIOMR
- VI. Conclusions

APPENDICES

- I. The CIOR's country-by-country survey of reserve forces
- II. National service in countries of WEU and the North Atlantic Alliance

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. de Puig (Alternate: Moya) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bassinet, Borderas, Brito, Cariglia, Chevalier (Alternate: Sarens), Cox, De Decker, Dees, Durand, Fernandes Marques, Fiandrotti, Fioret, Fourré, Hardy, Irmer, Jung, Kelchtermans, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden, Marten, Lord Newall (Alternate: Thompson), MM. Pecchioli, Perinat (Alternate: Cuco), Reis Leite (Alternate: Mrs. Aguiar), Schœer, Sinesio, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Steiner, Vasquez (Alternate: Bolinaga), Zierer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on European security – reserve forces and national service

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising that adequate standing forces must still be maintained to preserve the requirement for defence incumbent in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the more binding modified Brussels Treaty;
- (ii) Conscious that with the ending of East-West conflict in Europe there is a reduced need for sizeable standing and largely conscript armies and that instead, smaller, flexible, mobile and more professional forces are required;
- (iii) Bearing in mind, however, the imperative of maintaining a capability for home defence in Europe which might be increasingly entrusted to reserve forces;
- (iv) Recognising the devotion to duty of the Atlantic Alliance's reserve forces and mindful of the sacrifices made by those who serve in the reserves;
- (v) Underlining the important liaison rôle played by reserve forces in linking the armed forces with the civilian population, which strengthens public spiritedness and promotes better understanding in our nations of defence problems;
- (vi) Considering the current debate in many member countries on the relative advantages of conscription vis-à-vis all-volunteer and professional forces, although aware that the latter are proportionally more costly;
- (vii) Witnessing the general reductions in the length of national service in the majority of member countries, or its abolition, and wishing to highlight the obvious effect on the availability of properly-trained reservists;
- (viii) Determined to promote full and frank debate in WEU on the subject of national service and reserve forces in member countries;
- (ix) Convinced that more coherent arrangements for assuring a cost-effective European security system should be possible, given greater co-operation and consultation between member states, both within WEU and together with the other nations of the Atlantic Alliance and the North Atlantic Co-operation Council;
- (x) Knowing that the Central European states would welcome the opportunity to discuss matters such as national service and reserve forces;
- (xi) Supporting the efforts of the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR) to stimulate informed discussion among its members on a wide variety of issues, and hoping that the CIOR will soon include all Atlantic Alliance nations, at least as observers, and liaise with the Central European nations which are full members of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council;
- (xii) Recalling Recommendation 469 adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1989;
- (xiii) Believing that multinational units such as the Franco-German Brigade serve as a channel for the enthusiasm of those who wish to place their national service in a European context and that the idea of attributing reserve forces for the European Corps provides a further opportunity for integration;
- (xiv) Considering the increasingly strong calls by the armed forces for modern, varied technologies enabling them to provide further training, particularly for the volunteers who are required to serve for a long enough period, which will be useful for their subsequent employment as civilians;
- (xv) Asserting that the arrangements for organising and mobilising reserve forces in Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland may serve as a future model for both the Western European and especially the Central European states,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Take every opportunity to ensure that the debate on reserve forces and national service in any member country benefits from a common fund of experience and requirements and include discussion on the subject on the agenda of the next WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting;

2. Stimulate informed debate in member countries on revised rôles for reserve forces as well as on reductions in and possible restructuring of national service;
3. Provide a forum for discussion of such matters among member states and also with Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland and interested Central European states;
4. Strongly encourage WEU countries without volunteer reserve forces to consider the example of those which already possess such an asset which is indispensable for countries abolishing national service and to provide proper equipment and training for the reserves;
5. Explore the idea of creating a European "national guard" for territorial defence, using the reserve forces of WEU member states;
6. Reconsider the Assembly's previous recommendation to "take specific action to allow at an individual level the exchange of military personnel between countries to enhance their awareness of European co-operation, give them greater opportunity for travel and a more interesting work environment, and serve as a useful recruiting incentive at a time when the demographic levels are making recruiting most difficult" (Recommendation 469);
7. Give priority to training volunteers who would be asked to form reserve forces whose training would be continued for long enough after their return to civilian life for them to be, if necessary, a useful complement to regular military personnel;
8. Decide to give a symbol of European identity to all forces – ships, aircraft, vehicles and regular and reserve personnel – taking part in WEU operations;
9. Establish and develop a liaison with the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR);
10. Ask the WEU Institute for Security Studies to make a thorough examination of national service and the structure of reserve forces in member states and of the possibilities for co-operation;
11. Invite WEU parliamentarians to participate in discussions on these topics.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The Defence Committee has long been interested in the rôle of the reserve forces and has included regular reference to such forces in its reports. However, the last report dedicated entirely to the subject was reserve forces (Rapporteur: Mr. Delorme) adopted by the Assembly in June 1976¹.

2. The recommendation makes very interesting reading:

“ The Assembly,

(i) Considering that improved organisation, recruitment and training of reserve forces would allow:

(a) a considerable strengthening of the deterrent potential of the field forces of the European armies;

(b) European defence to be based to a substantial extent on recourse to the widest possible mobilisation of the people's energies in the event of attack;

(ii) Considering that the defence of Europe must not be based solely on nuclear deterrence and a modern and effective field force but must also be ensured by a people's deterrent, expressing the will of the peoples of Europe to remain responsible for their own destinies;

(iii) Aware of the importance of the rôle which reserves can play in strengthening the links between the European peoples and their armies, particularly in keeping public opinion better informed about the importance of defence problems;

(iv) Underlining the financial advantages of forming large-scale reserves, as opposed to an equivalent active force, when the proportion of national budgets devoted to defence tends to remain constant or even diminish and when personnel costs linked with the maintenance of active forces are continuously increasing to the point of sometimes jeopardising the implementation of certain equipment programmes;

(v) Considering it necessary to harmonise the concepts which govern the organisation of reserves in Europe, in the framework of a common strategy for all the Western European states,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. (a) Together with the member states of the Atlantic Alliance which are not members of WEU, specify the type of tasks entrusted to the various components of the European defence system: nuclear forces, combat forces, internal defence forces;

(b) Consequently define requirements in respect of internal defence forces and combat forces with a view to harmonising the concepts of European states in this field;

2. To this end, set up a group of experts consisting of senior defence officials to study measures likely to develop the contribution by reserves to the internal defence of European territory and inter alia consider the possibility of:

(a) increasing the number of reservists who could be called up for internal defence, particularly where there is no system of conscription;

(b) producing special equipment for reserves for internal defence forces, combining power, simplicity and robustness, and ensuring that it is made available immediately in the event of mobilisation;

(c) improving training of reserve officers responsible for commanding the units forming internal defence forces, such training to include on the one hand periods of training in active units and on the other hand periods of training together with reservists in the ranks;

(d) adapting compulsory military service, where this exists, to the requirements of internal defence and consequently provide for a short but intensive period of active service followed by a number of training periods at regular intervals;

(e) organising internal defence forces on a territorial basis by assigning the necessary number of national servicemen and the essential reservists, according to their place of residence;

(f) paying reservists undergoing periods of training at an appropriate rate;

3. (a) Study measures likely to increase the availability and effectiveness of reserves for combat forces and inter alia

¹ Document 707.

seek means of improving the training of such reserves and the speed and efficiency of their mobilisation;

(b) Pay particular attention to the question of the time required for the mobilisation and immediate use of reserve units in the field forces;

4. Consider setting up a European defence college where those responsible for Europe's defence and reserve officers would discuss their experiences and endeavour to define joint principles which might govern the use of reserves in Europe."

and much of the detail is extraordinarily germane even today.

3. An appendix gave details of the balance of forces between the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic Alliance and defined the characteristics of land forces in peacetime and their possible strengthening in wartime and the study also gave a forecast of the future shape of war – "attack with or without warning, lightning or long-drawn-out, conventional or nuclear".

4. The situation has of course changed dramatically from that of 16 years ago and the absence of a clear military threat against western interests in Europe has largely undermined the original requirement for considerable numbers of trained reserves. Even the mobilisation of some 230 000 United States reservists for the Gulf conflict in 1990/91 (only a comparatively small percentage left United States soil and the majority filled billets at home vacated by active personnel) is not considered a sufficient reason for retaining the same sizeable reserves for the future.

5. In the United States, as in the United Kingdom and in Canada, the regular forces are all-volunteer and in general do not produce a great deal of manpower for the reserves in practical terms – the bulk of the reserves are themselves voluntary also.

6. Virtually all other members of the Atlantic Alliance, barring Iceland and Luxembourg, rely on forming their trained reserves by giving their conscripts a reserve commitment at the end of national service. What happens therefore if that period of national service is reduced to the point where no effective training is possible or indeed the national service is abolished?

7. The aim of the present report is therefore twofold: to give an account of the present reserve forces maintained by WEU countries and also to examine the effect on the reserves of reducing or abolishing national service.

8. If at the same time our nations may be incited to debate the matter and even take com-

plementary decisions on future force structures instead of acting always unilaterally then the Assembly's efforts will not have been in vain.

II. National service in France, Belgium and the Netherlands

9. Of course national service in most of our countries has fulfilled a number of political and social purposes as well as providing the cheapest way of maintaining large numbers to reinforce the regular army. To examine a number of cases:

(i) France

10. France's commitment to maintaining national service for the future, although at a comparatively reduced level, has been restated on a number of occasions, with the last formal restatement of principle occurring in the Prime Minister's speech to the colloquy on the new strategic debate on 1st October. Mr. Bérégovoy was adamant that conscription formed part of the natural structure of national life and was unlikely to be abolished in the immediate future.

11. The length of national service in France has been reduced, however, from 12 to 10 months and no national servicemen were allowed to serve as such in either the Gulf conflict or nowadays in the former Yugoslavia: all must sign on for a three-year contract of "long service" if they wish to volunteer for active duty.

12. Another particular complication of national service in France is that nearly one in four of the eligible male population escapes his obligation for one reason or another. On the other hand, it is also possible to do one's national service working for a different ministry than the Defence Ministry: perhaps on a co-operative venture overseas or in a prefecture or even with the fire brigade (the "sapeurs pompiers"). The latest idea is to spend time helping the socially deprived – an experience which could be of mutual benefit to all concerned.

13. Although the French Government has a particular attachment to the maintenance of conscription, it is in the process of not only modifying the length of national service (now 10 months instead of 12), but also adapting to new conditions:

"Conscription is at the heart of our defence options. Our attachment to it is not rooted only in the two century old link – and quite different from the mere financing of the armed forces through taxation – that the nation has managed to maintain with its army thanks to military

service. Objective considerations still militate in favour of retaining a large place for conscription in the organisation of our armed forces.

The usefulness of military service has been proved

This is testified by the participation of national servicemen in several external operations, in particular in Yugoslavia and Cambodia. France's ability to deploy a significant part of its units outside its territory and the development of peace-keeping operations and humanitarian actions are thus based on an essential contribution by conscripts, particularly branches such as emergency medical treatment, logistics, interpretation, etc.

Conscription accounts for about 50% of troop levels

The foreseeable trend of troop levels in the years ahead should not modify this proportion. Dropping conscription and building up an entirely professional army could only be at the cost of reducing the size of forces. This would no longer allow them to carry out the tasks that our country wishes to assign to them and would reduce the relative weight of our defence system in Europe.

Conscription ensures the diversity and standard of the human resources of our armed forces

If we deprive ourselves of this contribution, there would be serious difficulties in recruitment which, in the lower ranks, might draw only those without a place in the economic system.

The budgetary aspect can clearly not be concealed

The maintenance of an army of conscripts is the only way compatible with the effort to stabilise financial resources earmarked for defence purposes. Apart from the doctrinal considerations underlying our choice, the army has a deep-rooted, lasting need for conscripts, otherwise it will have to pay a very high price for many essential executive and support tasks, and recruit, at market rates, all the specialists it vitally needs in very many sectors, ranging from unusual languages through medicine to electronics.

Furthermore, while military service remains overwhelmingly the main form of national service since it accounts for 95% of those called up, the essential rôle played by the various civil forms in operating public services should not be for-

gotten: service in the police force, co-operation service, technical assistance in overseas departments and territories and the new civil security service created by the law of 4th January 1992.

However, perpetuating conscription in our defence system means two conditions have to be met – equality and universality – as the basis of its acceptance by public opinion. From this point of view, the demographic trend and the adaptation of medical selection standards have allowed the rate of exemption to be reduced to a historically low level of about 18%. This tendency should be extended by a steady effort to terminate inequality between certain forms of national service.

Obviously, conscription cannot remain outside the far-reaching changes affecting all the components of our defence. It must also be adapted to become fully integrated in the new organisation that the government is planning. By reducing the period of military service to ten months, the law of 4th January 1992 makes this adaptation and extends it through an ambitious renovation of conditions for carrying out military service, particularly in the army.

Thus, the reform of the system of training (abolition of the period of classes, direct incorporation in working units) and adoption of the new concept of *differentiated operational availability* (a system whereby units immediately available coexist with deferred availability units thanks to the possibility of calling up some national servicemen two months after their demobilisation) guarantee a new place and rôle for conscription in the country's defence policy."

14. This does not mean that the debate on a professional army is non-existent, quite the contrary in fact, and it will probably not be very long before the debate is out in the open again.

15. There is a definite effect on the reserve forces as a result of the shortening of national service: the reserves are given 1/6 less training than previously and this is bound to have a consequence particularly for "high-tech" posts. The cost of training is rising as equipment is subjected to a greater turn-around in use. Some consultation has taken place with the United Kingdom on the formation of voluntary reserves.

16. The French Ministry of Defence has recently announced sweeping changes in the arrangements for constituting reserve forces. Many of these ideas coincide with your Rap-

porteur's own suggestions and merit further study within WEU and NATO:

"Current developments that have led us to carry out major reforms in the armed forces will inevitably have repercussions on our reserve forces. It was therefore essential to draw up a plan to modernise and make reserve forces coherent with the options agreed for active personnel.

This plan, the broad lines of which were presented recently by the Secretary of State, is to replace the present system, based on mass recruitment, by a strict organisation corresponding to the operational requirements of the armed forces and of the gendarmerie and adapted to both crisis and war situations.

Guidelines

Four main guidelines will be followed in implementing this plan, known as 'Réserves 2000':

- constructing a general framework within which each service can set up and run its own reserve system adapted to its operational needs, no longer just for wartime but also - and this is a fundamental innovation - for times of crisis.

Thus, voluntary reservists might be called up in time of crisis in the light of the needs of the armed forces;

- concentrating the efforts of the armed forces and gendarmerie on the 500 000 reservists they effectively need and no longer on the 4 000 000 reservists forming the present mobilisation potential;
- ensuring careful administration of these reservists, calling up and training voluntary reserve officers on a more regular basis and guaranteeing them assignments that correspond to their know-how;
- making volunteers 'loyal' by giving them a contractual framework to ensure a better follow-up of their training and career in the reserve.

The Réserves 2000 plan will be based on three categories of reservists:

- *those immediately available* who might be called up for a period of two to three years after the end of their military service and who will thus already have received instruction and training;
- *volunteers* who would have to provide the major part of reserve officers and non-commissioned officers. As the central element of this reform, volun-

teers would be given contracts enabling their training and careers to be followed up on a personalised basis;

- *specialists*, i.e. personnel exercising professions in civilian life that are directly transferrable to the armed forces (interpreters, doctors, etc.). They might be recalled when needed in the event of crisis or war.

This plan is thus aimed at promoting the notion of voluntary service and concentrating the resources of our armed forces on forming, managing and training reservists according to their needs in time of crisis or war and to those needs only.

The Réserves 2000 plan, which will require legislative changes and new regulations, will be implemented progressively through shrewder staff management and an increased effort by the armed forces in favour of their reserves."

17. Your Rapporteur believes that a fine line remains between the length of training received by the average national serviceman and the same man's performance then as a reservist.

18. With the general shortening of lengths of national service in the majority of our countries (see table at Appendix II) sometimes for particular political or economic ends rather than out of concern for efficiency, it is more and more difficult to understand why certain nations do not abolish conscription altogether rather than reduce ad absurdum.

19. That being said, your Rapporteur cannot agree that a decision to abolish conscription with a consequent effect not only on the size of a country's forces but also on the size of its reserves should be taken either lightly or unilaterally.

(ii) Belgium

20. The Belgian Defence Minister's recent decision to end conscription by 1994 foreshadows a dramatic reduction in the size of the country's armed forces overall and means that most equipment programmes will have to be re-evaluated. This decision makes Belgium the first country in continental Europe to abandon conscription (although probably not the last).

21. An end to conscription will involve demobilising more than 30 000 billets for conscripts. National service is presently scheduled to end after 1993. Conscripts called up that year will serve for eight months in Belgium or only six months in Germany.

22. Attempts have been made in parliament to set up a special commission to examine the implications inherent in the decision but so far have not met with any success.

(iii) The Netherlands

23. In the Netherlands, however, a special consultative commission (the "Dienstplicht" Commission) has been hard at work, weighing up the pros and cons of the professional versus a conscript army. For the present the commission has concluded that national service in the Netherlands should not be abolished but be shortened and made more agreeable.

24. Abolishing military service purely and simply would have the effect of vastly reducing the Dutch army's operational ability, especially of its land forces, as well as its eventual recourse to mobilisable reserves. The commission also pointed out that – independently of problems at constitutional level – passing to a career army entailed great cost.

25. The commission considered that a "radical reform" of military service was needed. It especially pleaded in favour of a flexible length of service, of nine, 12 or 15 months, depending on the function (conscripts within this last category could, for example, be posted to humanitarian missions or "peace-keeping"). The report also comes down in favour of an improvement in the material conditions granted to conscripts (compensation, help in finding work, university enrolment, etc.).

III. NATO's new force structures and the reserves

26. Given the alterations in NATO philosophy with the end of the cold war, one might be forgiven for wondering just what reserve forces would be required for within the NATO area.

27. Fortunately, your Rapporteur has had the benefit of expert advice. Writing in the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers' newsletter, Colonel Léon Stenuit of NATO's International Military Staff has this to say about NATO's new force structures and the reserves:

"The new NATO force structure calls for three categories of forces, namely Main Defence Forces, Reaction Forces and Augmentation Forces. Main Defence Forces (MDF) will form the major portion of the force structure and will generally be maintained at lower readiness. However, some MDFs will be kept at high readiness for early defensive operations in a crisis.

Reaction Forces (RF) must be capable, versatile, highly mobile and will be maintained at high degrees of readiness with employment options covering all regions of the alliance. They will be divided into Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF) and Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF). They need

air, land and maritime components. Augmentation Forces (AF) will provide appropriate strategic and operational reserves not necessarily tied to specific regions. They will be maintained at varying degrees of readiness and will be used where appropriate to reinforce the RFs and the local MDFs.

The structure of these forces must be flexible enough to be adapted to the size of the crisis and other factors such as geography and climate. Thus, it may be said that the NATO authorities will have the opportunity to select units from a large menu, depending on the circumstances.

This new NATO force structure clearly calls for a greater reliance on force build-up capabilities through reinforcement, reserve mobilisation and reconstitution. The obvious increased importance of reservists will confront all alliance nations with the challenge to develop or improve their reserve organisation. The options chosen will most probably vary from one nation to another, however the common objective must be effectiveness.

As the bulk of the forces will rely on reservists, reserve officers will now need to be educated and regularly trained and updated in order to be capable of assuming a larger spectrum of responsibilities. Even high technology equipment and weapon systems will be operated or used by reservists. One can envisage that fighter squadrons could be augmented by reserve pilots, or even as we see already now in the United States, that reserve squadrons could be activated. The same is also valid for ground and naval units equipped with modern and sophisticated equipment. Of course, there is a limit. For example, the time is over when you could simply store or even mothball modern aircraft, and reserve fighter pilots need to fly almost as much as regular pilots.

The key issue for the organisation of the forces will be to identify which functions need to be maintained in peacetime in order to allow not only for a timely build-up but also for a continuity training programme that includes the training of reservists and the "maintenance" of equipment (in the broad sense).

The question to define if a unit needs to be on "active" or "reserve" status in peacetime is not necessarily dependent upon the timing in which it needs to be ready. Some nations have already developed structures and training programmes that allow for units primarily

manned by reservists to be maintained at high readiness. Other nations are in the process of developing similar systems. The percentage of active personnel required will essentially depend upon the type of weapon system and mission. It can be expected that some units will be exclusively manned by reservists, whilst others will only rely on reservists to reach full combat strength or even have no reservists at all.

It is well understood that technology and training are essential but not the only matters for consideration during this period of fundamental change in the force structure. Over the years of peace that are hopefully in front of us, the forces will need to maintain their motivation and the required level of expertise in order to be capable when required to assume their tasks. The necessary recall of reservists from civilian life for regular training exercises will be very challenging not only for employers and economic activities in general but also for the armed forces, the reservists and in particular for the reserve officers. The following are a few topics that will need consideration in most NATO countries:

- practical arrangements between the ministries of defence and the civilian employers in order to avoid reservists and their employers being professionally and financially penalised;
- selective recall of personnel in crisis, which avoid disturbing unnecessarily economic activities;
- motivation of reservists through valuable training opportunities;
- public support through well-adapted information programmes.

These are only a few ideas but it is essential that this fundamental transformation of NATO's force structure be successful. Besides the budgetary benefits that may be expected by governments, the opportunity should not be missed to establish efficient and practical plans to allow capable reserve units to support NATO's strategy."

28. Of course the restructuring of NATO is not yet fully complete and is bound to have a further effect on the eventual shape of the reserves in years to come.

IV. Current reforms

29. For the present, almost every country of the Atlantic Alliance is in the process of modifying the structure of its forces, to a greater or a

lesser degree. Current reforms which affect both national service and the reserves are based on the following "snapshot":

(i) Belgium

30. In relation to its size Belgium has traditionally had one of the highest ratios of reserve forces of any country of the alliance. The Belgian army can count on 192 000 reservists who can be mobilised.

31. There were traditional tasks to be accomplished:

- to complement active units and bring them to full defence strength;
- to form two reserve brigades one of which is assigned to the 1st Belgian Corps;
- to form the regiments for home defence and also to form a number of specialised units, notably engineering and logistical units.

32. The air force, with a peacetime strength of 17 300, could be augmented with 40 500 reservists if necessary upon mobilisation. The reservists would be required to bring the active air force to full combat strength and have a particular rôle for airfield defence.

33. For the navy, 12 400 reservists would be available to join a peacetime strength of 4 400. Some billets exist at sea but the majority of reservists would be used for port defence or to take part in the naval control of shipping organisation.

34. Traditionally, a system of conscription provided the opportunity to train a large number of reservists. In common with most countries of the alliance, national service in Belgium was being restructured and it had been planned to reduce from 10 months in Germany and 12 months in Belgium to eight months in Germany and 10 months in Belgium with effect from this year, and to eight months everywhere from the beginning of 1993.

35. International developments and the threat following the upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe, the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany and the prospect of the withdrawal of troops of the former Soviet Union from Central Europe led the Belgian Government to decide, in July 1992, on a complete restructuring of its armed forces.

36. The future structure takes account of the following principles:

- maintenance of three forces (army, air force and navy);

- reorganisation of armed forces round a smaller number of units with high technology equipment and capable of deployment at short notice and in various contexts;
- reduction in the number of regular servicemen from 48 000 to 40 000;
- accentuating the inter-force and inter-army aspects of future operations in the organisation and working of headquarters and lines of command;
- retaining only a small reserve;
- abolishing military service as from 1994.

37. At the present stage in current studies, the new structures of the regular army have not been defined well enough to be able to express an opinion on the future shape of the reserve. With the termination of national service, it is obvious that the reserve concept will have to be completely revised.

(ii) *Canada*

38. Canada is one of the four NATO nations with voluntary military service and no conscription. The armed forces perform tasks in Canada and Europe, as well as in several places in the world in the context of the United Nations (nearly 3 500 Canadians are presently serving in various United Nations operations).

39. The armed forces total 84 000 active forces, 27 500 primary reserves and about the same number of supplementary reserves. These two categories of reserves, the primary and the supplementary, provide the bulk of Canada's citizen-soldiers. The latter category, the supplementary reserve, is a pool of trained personnel who are available in the event of an emergency.

40. The primary reserve consists of volunteers, officers and non-commissioned members who have agreed to perform duties for the military service of their choice. This choice can be the militia, which is the traditional name for the army reserve, the naval reserve, the air reserve or the communication reserve. The members of these four elements generally train one or two nights a week, one or two weekends a month and often participate in summer training which lasts on average two weeks.

41. The militia is the largest element of the primary reserve. It has approximately 20 000 personnel, spread over the vast country in more than 100 cities and towns. The total number of units is 131 of which 99 are combat arms units (infantry, artillery or armour) and 32 are support units (e.g. medical, engineers, military police). Traditionally the militia had its drill-

halls in the town centres and the military activity was part of the community's daily life. Since the second world war, this tradition has faded away and the militia has often moved to barracks out of town.

42. The move has not been without consequence for civil-military relations and attempts have now to be made to interest the public at large both in their armed forces in general and the reserves in particular.

43. The Canadian Government's ambition is to increase the reserve forces to some 35 000, a major part of which will wear the militia's uniform. The planned increase implies that a major recruiting campaign over an extended period will be necessary while at the same time special attention should be given to bringing the forces closer to the people.

44. The naval reserve's rôle is to enhance the war capability of maritime command (the navy) and to complement the navy in ongoing peacetime tasks and activities. The missions of the naval reserve include maritime coastal defence, mine counter-measures, naval control of merchant shipping and the provision of personnel to integrate into regular force ships and shore-based units. The naval reserve is composed of 23 divisions or units across the country, comprising about 4 200 personnel.

45. A modernisation programme for the naval reserve has started. Twelve maritime coastal defence vessels for the naval reserve have been ordered and will come into service during the 1990s. These vessels will be used for training of the naval reserve in coastal, inshore and harbour surveillance as well as in mine counter-measures. Modernising the equipment for diving teams of naval reserves is another example.

46. The smallest element in the reserves system is the air reserve. The air force, which in Canada is called air command, controls the air reserve. It comprises 1 450 personnel in two wings, three squadrons and augmentation flights at each airbase across the country. Its wartime missions include augmentation of the regular force and providing a manpower base for mobilisation. In peacetime, the air reserve is tasked with United Nations peace-keeping missions, search and rescue, light transport and maritime surveillance.

47. Another small element is the communication reserve, comprising some 1 700 specialised personnel, organised in six regiments, 12 squadrons and three troops, all located across Canada. The communication reserves augment regular force units if required, they participate in peace-keeping missions, support civil emergency authorities with their special equipment and participate in military exercises where their particular expertise can be used.

48. Following the September 1991 defence policy announcement, Canada's reserves are to increase by approximately 25% while the regular forces will see their numbers decrease by some 9%.

49. Consistent with the September 1991 decision, economies will be affected in several areas:

- reduction of the regular force from 84 000 to 76 000;
- civilian staff reductions from 33 000 to 32 000;
- closure of the two Canadian forces bases in Germany by 1995;
- cancellation of commitment to maintain a 1 000-man task force in Europe.

50. Some savings are expected to be achieved by slowing the rate of growth in the reserves in the near term. However, the targets for the ultimate size and composition of the reserves have not changed. The Department of Defence remains committed to the implementation of the total force concept. The integration of the regulars and reserves into a total force remains one of the fundamentals of the new Canadian defence policy.

51. The reserve component of the Canadian forces is being required to play a more substantive rôle within the total force in the defence and security of the nation. The process has evolved over the past few years when significant efforts were devoted to making the total force a reality. Positive accomplishments were achieved on a variety of key issues impacting not only on the general effectiveness of the reserves but also on the perception of their value to the overall defence commitments.

52. A strategic plan for the reserves has been formulated. The plan reaffirms the aim of the reserves "to have an effective reserve component, within a viable total force, which enables the Canadian forces to carry out its assigned defence and security responsibilities in peacetime and emergencies or in war". The plan then defines the reservist as a citizen who trains on a part-time basis, or occasionally full-time, possessing strengths and limitations that are different from those of his or her regular force counterpart.

53. An analysis made of the characteristics required by the reserve component in order to be effective within the total force concluded that the reserve component must be the following:

- a reflection of and have the support of the Canadian society at large;
- highly motivated and have competent leadership;

- individually and collectively trained to standards required to be operationally ready;
- structured to facilitate command, control, administration, and training in peacetime and possessing the capacity for expansion and sustainment when deployed in emergencies and war;
- supported by full-time personnel assisting with administration, training and operational requirements;
- funded to recruit, train, and retrain sufficient personnel to support its required rôle with the total force;
- properly equipped to meet training and operational requirements;
- protected through voluntary or legislated employers' support in civilian jobs while absent for training, emergencies, or war;
- given mutual respect, confidence, and support among all members of the total force from both regular and reserve components.

54. Canada is therefore well advanced in formulating structures for a changed security and defence scenario. This determination to tackle a series of very difficult decisions was stressed by the Canadian Associate Minister of National Defence, The Honourable Mary Collins, MP, both when the Defence Committee visited Canada in July 1990 and again when the Chairman of the committee, Sir Dudley Smith, MP, met her during the NAA session held in Banff, Alberta, in May this year.

(iii) France

55. In total almost 680 000 people are involved in the "military" side of defence. Just over 300 000 are professional military, just under 250 000 are conscripts and about 130 000 are civilians. Although 680 000 is no small force, it would not be enough in time of real crisis. In that case, half a million reservists would be needed to bring the peacetime armed forces to wartime strength. At present, over 500 000 reservists are involved and they would man 52% of the army, 27% of the navy, 42% of the air force, 59% of the gendarmerie and 65% of the armed forces medical service.

56. These figures are a convincing indicator that the effective performance of the armed forces depends to a high degree on reservists. Hence it is obvious that the active duty time of the conscripts - recently decreased from 12 to 10 months - must be fully devoted to preparing the citizen-soldiers for their reservist missions. (See also Chapter II (i))

(iv) Germany

57. The Bundeswehr is a conscript army, i.e. approximately 50% of its personnel are servicemen required to complete 12 months of service at present or 15 months or even 18 months at an earlier stage under the Compulsory Military Service Act. As a consequence of compulsory military service, about six million reservists have undergone military training since the build-up of the Bundeswehr. Thus, the Bundeswehr at any given time has more reservists available than are actually required for growth to full wartime strength of more than 1.3 million men.

58. For peacetime purposes, the Compulsory Military Service Act provides that servicemen having completed their basic military service can be earmarked for mobilisation as reservists until the age of 32 (enlisted men), the age of 45 (NCOs) or 60 (officers). With these parameters, the armed forces do not face any difficulties in maintaining a mobilisable reserve of 900 000 men. The reservists available beyond that potential are generally also subject to control under the Military Service Act and can be called up as reserves until the age of 60 in times of war.

59. The new reservist concept will have to establish its priorities:

- (i) introduction of a volunteer reserve component similar to the reserves of the United States armed forces or the United Kingdom Territorial Army;
- (ii) short reserve duty exercise terms of five days maximum, with the weekends being avoided as far as possible;
- (iii) individual determination of reserve duty exercise terms instead of exercises at company or battalion level that are common practice, in particular in the army;
- (iv) recall units based in the regional vicinity, which has become more difficult due to the reduction of the armed forces in an expanded German territory since unification;
- (v) attractive social benefits in order to improve the acceptance of service in the reserve.

60. Because only a minor proportion of the six million reservists trained in the Bundeswehr so far could be earmarked for assignment in the reserve corps of the armed forces and that active duty slots are available only to a limited extent, the possibility of voluntary activity beyond the scope described so far, has been created for reservists.

61. The Federation of Reservists of the Bundeswehr was assigned the mission by par-

liament and the Ministry of Defence to promote reservists in their military development on a voluntary basis, to keep them informed about security policy as regards the armed forces, and to provide support and assistance to them. Moreover, the Federation, in co-operation with its dedicated reservists, pursues public relations activities in the interest of the armed forces. The Federation has more than 100 000 members – including former reservists – indicating that the reservists of the Bundeswehr are a social group acting as an intermediary between the armed forces and the civilian population.

(v) The Netherlands

62. In time of peace about 0.80% of the total Dutch population participates in the preparation of the national and inter-allied defence. The armed forces total 100 000 military women and men in time of peace, of which 45 000 (male) are conscripts. The navy's total is 16 450 men and women of which 1 500 are conscripts; the army has 63 000 men under arms, of which 40 000 are conscripts; and the air force total is 16 000 of which 3 400 are conscripts. The Royal Military Constabulary totals some 3 500 of which 10% are conscripts. The number of women in the Dutch armed forces is still relatively small: 3 500 volunteer women serve the colours. In addition, a total of 23 000 civilians are involved in the activities of the defence ministry and the armed forces.

63. In time of crisis not less than 175 000 reservists are available to bring the armed forces to full defence strength. At complete mobilisation, 2% of the Dutch population would be involved in active defence.

(vi) Portugal

64. The Portuguese armed forces number approximately 70 000 men. In round figures the army totals about 42 000 of which 35 000 are conscripts; the navy has 15 000 men, including 2 800 marines and some 5 000 conscripts and the air force totals 13 000 of which 5 000 are conscripts.

65. The pool of conscripts is large in Portugal. Although annual intakes between 40 000 and 50 000 were normal for many years, such high numbers could be reduced in the future. Whereas in other European countries, Germany for example, the force structure shrinks as a consequence of the demographic reality – the reduction of available young manpower – the reason for the Portuguese decision is political and related to the reorganisation of the armed forces. Portugal has enough manpower in its conscript potential and a demographic decline affecting military requirements will not start before 1999.

66. The regulars in the total armed forces number 23 500 although, to complete the financial picture of the regulars, some 11 500 men should be added. The first group is on active duty, the second has left active military life and is kept in reserve. This category of "regular-reserve" receives full pay during their reserve period. The system obliges officers to leave the active service at a relatively young age: lieutenant colonels and below at 56 and colonels at 57. The real retirement age for officers is 65 and this implies that they remain on the payroll – with full pay – until that age. The same applies to NCOs, although sergeants for example remain on active duty until the age of 57 and the sergeant-major category until 60. Their reserve period is therefore somewhat shorter.

67. The regular reserves are only a small group in the total of Portuguese reservists. The majority come from the many thousands of conscripts who have served in the Portuguese forces. They are soldiers, sergeants and lieutenants with a lower age limit of 22 years. Hence Portuguese reservists vary between the ages of 22 and 65.

68. The conscripts receive a basic training of six weeks. The subsequent training of NCOs lasts another week and for young reserve officers seven weeks. In broad terms, the army musters some 1 000 junior officers and 2 000 conscripted non-commissioned officers. The navy and air force each have approximately 200 conscripted junior officers. The imminent reduction of national service to four months implies considerable reorganisation for the reserves.

(vii) Spain

69. At the end of March 1992, the Prime Minister issued a new national defence directive listing the far-reaching changes on the international stage in recent years and laying the foundations for Spain's defence policy for the years to come and, in this context, those of military policy proper. The new directive, which is the culminating point of a course started more than ten years ago, terminates an era during which defence questions were considered mainly from an isolationist, autonomist point of view and replaces it with other guidelines according to which, without losing sight of necessities stemming from the exercise of national sovereignty, the requirements of interdependence with surrounding nations are assumed in full, particular attention being paid to European security and defence dimensions and the Atlantic Alliance.

70. In accordance with the new directive, military defence will be ensured, on the one hand, by permanent forces set up in peacetime and, on the other, by reserve forces that can be called up. The former will have to handle crises, armed

conflicts of limited intensity and the first stages of large-scale conflicts. Reserve forces for their part will have to be organised and equipped in peacetime to allow the permanent force to be increased progressively up to the strengths that might be necessary in the event of greater hostilities. This is a fundamental change in the structure of the Spanish army, which has hitherto been based on the existence of permanent forces. The increased importance now attached to reserve forces, together with changes in the international situation, allow the number of troops to be reduced significantly. They will be reduced from an end of the 1980s total of 280 000 men to some 180 000 by about 1997, i.e. a one-third reduction.

71. The present structure of the armed forces and that laid down in the directive are both based on compulsory military service which, in Spain, dates back to 1649. Nevertheless, there is some pressure on conscription since, in view of the improvement in the international situation, many people believe it is preferable to have wholly professional armed forces formed entirely of volunteers. However, both the government and parliament consider the maintenance of an army that is close to the population thanks to compulsory military service to be important enough for it not to be abandoned. Moreover, it would seem difficult, for demographic and economic reasons, to obtain enough correctly paid volunteers. These various factors have led to the maintenance of compulsory military service, the length of which has been reduced from twelve to nine months.

72. Two main features of the future structure of the Spanish forces will be the modernisation of military service and a higher rate of professionalism. The first will be put into practice thanks to the improvement made to many aspects of military living conditions and training and a more selective use of troops so that they are increasingly assigned solely to posts and tasks with a direct relationship with the country's defence; the remaining posts will be increasingly attributed to civilian personnel. Furthermore, and without prejudice to the maintenance of military service, the armed forces will in future be composed of a larger number of professionals: in 1997, the latter should represent 50% of regular forces compared with 33% at present. Of the 90 000 men now planned, 50 000 will be officers and non-commissioned officers and the others will be professional soldiers occupying posts requiring the highest qualifications, plus a nucleus of highly combat-ready units that will allow the government to react in the early stages of a crisis.

(viii) Turkey

73. The armed forces are an integral part of the Turkish population. The size of the Turkish

forces is second to none in Europe. Within NATO only the United States has larger forces. The peacetime strength of the Turkish armed forces (1991 figures) is over 620 000, to which in time of crisis almost 900 000 well-trained mobilisable reserves can be added, bringing the full authorised strength for wartime to just over 1.5 million. However, in time of need several more million men could be added to this total; men who are still within the legal age-limits of military service and have received military training in the past.

74. In the event of mobilisation the Turkish army can rely on two categories of reservists: former regular personnel and former conscripts. In the first category are officers and non-commissioned officers who have left the service at an early age and who are still eligible for reserve duty. Some 1 800 officers and 7 700 NCOs form this group. Of the conscript category, almost 30 000 reserve third lieutenants belong to the mobilisable army and almost 645 000 soldiers and sergeants. The mobilisable reserves are meant primarily to bring units which are under strength in time of peace to full time strength and additionally to generate mobilisable units.

75. All personnel and material preparations for this generation process are made on a regional scale. Spread over the country are 20 recruiting offices which are regional centres for a dense network of registration offices. Each community has such an office and each reservist is obliged by law to keep his local office up-to-date until his final discharge. The Turkish General Staff provides the guidelines by which the regional recruitment centres and the military regional establishments can co-ordinate their preparations.

76. In principle a Turkish reservist has a military obligation of 20 years, from his 20th until his 41st year. However, in practice the state does not require the whole period. The full mobilisation strength of some 1.5 million men, which for obvious reasons of efficiency will be composed of those with the most recent training, requires only the actual availability of the most recent six-year groups.

(ix) *United Kingdom*

77. In time of war or crisis, the Territorial Army (TA) would provide significant manpower to support the regular army. At present it contributes over half of the infantry, logistic and medical support of the front line army, and undertakes important home defence tasks. The Royal Naval Reserve provides additional trained manpower for mine counter-measures, naval control of shipping and medical support; the Royal Naval Auxiliary Service provides many of the personnel essential for the defence of ports and anchorages in time of tension or

war. Finally, the Royal Marines and the Royal Air Force also rely upon their reserves as an integral part of their overall operational capability. Even so, the differences between the regular and reserve forces have to be acknowledged. The latter do not substitute for the former, but rather complement them.

78. The key rôle and crucial value of the reserves was graphically demonstrated and re-emphasised during the Gulf conflict; a total of 1 774 reservists, consisting of both individual and volunteer reserves, served in support of the war in the Gulf. Of the 887 volunteer reservists, 19 were from the Royal Naval Reserve, 552 from the Territorial Army, 252 from the Royal Auxiliary Air Force and 34 from the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve. In addition, some 100 Royal Marine Reserves served in Turkey and Northern Iraq in support of the United Nations.

79. The way forward for United Kingdom reserve forces is summarised in the 1992 Statement on the Defence Estimates:

“Reserves in the 1990s

1. The tradition of civil commitment to national defence in times of emergency has deep historical roots in the British Isles, from Anglo-Saxon and Celtic times to the more recent Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers. This tradition is upheld by members of the present reserve forces, both volunteer reservists and ex-regulars. Today, reservists operate alongside their regular service colleagues as an integral part of the armed forces, whether as members of formed volunteer reserve units or as individuals applying their military skills and experience within the regular forces in times of tension and war.

2. The volunteer reserves have been a central component of our armed forces since the early years of this century and undertook a major rôle in both world wars. In recent decades they have made a substantial contribution to our defence: Royal Marines Reserve (RMR) and Territorial Army infantry and support forces for the defence of the United Kingdom and the European mainland; the Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) and the Royal Naval Auxiliary Service (RNXS) in areas such as mine countermeasures and the control of shipping; and the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve (RAFVR) and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force (R Aux AF) in fields such as intelligence, ground defence, air movement, aeromedical evacuation, public relations and maritime headquarters support. Over the years the reserves have successfully adapted to new commitments and patterns of warfare and the need to become expert in a wide range of skills

and specialisms. Members of the reserve forces, most finding time for the reserves while doing full-time jobs, have met the challenge of an ever-increasing requirement for professionalism and dedication. Those qualities were clearly in evidence during Operation Granby, when some 2 000 ex-regular and volunteer reservists were called out or undertook short-term regular engagements in the Gulf and elsewhere. This included TA soldiers serving with "teeth" arms and others providing support elsewhere.

3. The reserves will continue to play an important rôle. With reduced readiness requirements and increased warning times, a study has been made of the balance between regular and reserve forces, with the aim of providing for a more efficient and cost-effective use of reserves in the mid-1990s and beyond. Detailed consideration is being given to the study's wide-ranging recommendations, which include new liabilities for reserve service and changes to reserve forces legislation. A Defence Open Government Document (OGD), "The future of Britain's reserve forces", was published in March and has invited responses to key elements of the study's recommendations. Meanwhile, initial work on the restructuring of the volunteer reserves has proceeded. On 10th December 1991 the then Secretary of State announced firm plans for the TA, including a forecast reduction in strength from 74 000 to 63 500 in the longer term. Some 20 000 volunteers join – and a similar number leave – each year and, as far as possible, the reductions will be made through natural wastage: no active volunteer who remains suitably qualified for TA service will be forced to leave. TA units will undertake important rôles in the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, most notably in the combat support areas, and in the defence of the United Kingdom, including rôles previously undertaken by the regular army. A key feature of the new organisation will be flexibility, with units not committed to the ARRC having more of a general reserve rôle.

4. TA units will continue to be distributed widely across the United Kingdom, taking account of the need for strong links with local communities to sustain public understanding and support. The advice and assistance of the 14 Territorial Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve Associations (TAVRAs) in preparing future force structures in the regions and maintaining these links will continue to be important to the government. The exis-

tence of the reserve forces depends not only on the dedication of the reservists themselves but also on the support of families and employers, the latter represented through the work of the National Employers Liaison Committee.

5. The TA will also benefit from equipment enhancements for its new rôle. These will include the Scimitar family of tracked combat reconnaissance vehicles for the medium reconnaissance regiment assigned to the ARRC; 155mm FH70 howitzers and the Starstreak Air Defence Missile for the Royal Artillery; the Ptarmigan communication system for some Royal Signal units; the Gazelle helicopter for Army Air Corps Squadrons and DROPS for transport units.

6. For the smaller RNR and RNXS, reorganisation has already begun, with a reduction in the former from about 5 900 to 4 700, and in the latter from 2 850 to 2 700 by April.

7. The planned changes for the RAFVR and the R Aux AF are comparatively small. A review of units is likely to confirm their existence, though in some cases a change of rôle will be necessary. We are investigating the feasibility of employing auxiliaries in mission planning for the Nimrod MPA. We intend to retain the six R Aux AF field squadrons for the area defence of airfields and are aiming to increase the number of R Aux AF defence flights for the perimeter defence of other vital installations.

8. These changes, and in particular those for the TA and the RNR, have involved some difficult decisions on the future of units which have served the United Kingdom with distinction. The government sought the views of all interested parties, before proceeding with plans for reorganisation. Consideration is being given to retaining old regimental affiliations or unit identities where that would be of benefit to the units concerned.

9. In order to sustain the enthusiasm and dedication of reservists in the face of change it has been essential to remove uncertainties by consulting, and by drawing up and implementing our plans as quickly as possible. We will continue over a longer period to make improvements in the structure and organisation of the reserves, particularly in the light of changed readiness requirements and extended warning times. Work on improvements to the procedure for selective call-out of reservists is already well advanced, and we are addressing the scope for greater flexibility in the call-out

of reservists within the manpower structure for 1995 and beyond. In sum, the government remains committed to capable and effective reserve forces, ready to take their place alongside their regular colleagues as an effective fighting force."

(x) *United States*

80. The United States has had by far the largest number of fully-trained reservists of any major power. With some 560 000 in the National Guard, 1 222 600 in the army, navy, marines and air force reserves, 28 700 in the standby reserve and 178 700 on the retired reserve, the United States must hold the record for the best-trained and best-equipped reserve force to complement its all-professional army, navy, marines and air force.

81. The Defence Committee was privileged to visit a number of units in various parts of the United States in the second half of July 1990 and was greatly impressed by the enthusiasm and prowess of those we met, many of whom were to be called up for active duty only a month later.

82. In 1973, a fundamental change in the American military personnel policy took place. In that year conscription was abandoned. The system which had provided the armed forces throughout the second world war and the years since with hundreds of thousands of young men had come to an end as a result of the Vietnam war. The United States now relies entirely upon volunteers for both regular service and reserve duty.

83. In order to make the most effective use of available resources, the Department of Defence developed the "total force policy", whose objective is "a balanced mix of active and reserve forces that fully utilises all available assets, while ensuring that maximum military capability is achieved at the minimum realistic cost".

84. The total force policy has now been in existence for almost 20 years and has been a major success. Active forces and reserve units have participated together, complementing each other, in exercises and in live actions. A significant equipment modernisation programme for the reserve forces has been in existence since 1980, making reserve units compatible with the active units. This has been a tremendous boost for the readiness and morale of national guard and reserve personnel. The total force policy and its implementation made it possible for the United States Government to place greater dependence on the reserve forces.

85. The United States with a population of over 250 million has about two million regular forces and just over 1.6 million active reserve

forces for its many security tasks, both in the United States and abroad. Regulars and reservists perform these tasks together as members of the total force. In fact, in the past decade the number of active force missions to be carried out by guard or reserve units has increased. The extensive and expensive equipment modernisation programme for the reserve forces, which was carried out in the 1980s, provided them with the essential tools for these missions. At the basis of this programme were policy decisions aimed at stopping the competition for badly-needed modern equipment between regular and reserve forces. The general goal was "to equip all active, guard and reserve units to full wartime requirements... Units, that fight first shall be equipped first, regardless of component."

86. Five of the seven reserve components have only federal missions. The other two, the army national guard and the air national guard, also have a responsibility towards the state to which it belongs. The special position of the guard stems from the militia clause of the constitution. Based on this clause the different states are responsible for the appointment of officers and the training of the militia. The army and air national guard units therefore carry the name of their state, such as Texas Army National Guard or California Air National Guard. The federal Congress, however, has the power to provide for organising, arming and disciplining the guard.

87. In peacetime, the national guard of each state is responsible to the State Governor but can be called up for federal duty in case of national emergency. Through the National Guard Bureau in the federal Defence Department - the Pentagon - the services provide guidance in matters of administration, organisation and operational readiness. This channel also makes possible the implementation of federal control on the level of exercises and training of the national guard as guard units are required to meet the same standards as their active duty counterparts.

88. The heart of the national guard and reserve components are the Selected Reserve Units.

89. The largest reduction in the United States military force structure since the second world war will be carried out between 1992 and 1997. How and where the cuts will be made has still to be decided but the overall goal is a 25% reduction in five years time.

90. The diminution of forces includes a massive reduction of the United States forces in Europe. Another area of change will concern forces for deployment. In the 1980s, some 40 000 reservists were deployed annually from the United States for exercises in Europe. In

general, deployments will decrease and the importance of computer exercises will increase in the future.

91. The mix between active and reserve forces will certainly change, due to the changing requirements. The Reserve Officers Association (ROA) of the United States is concerned about the future as it sees "unwarranted negative signals regarding the prospects for the guard and reserve" and "proposals to reduce the reserve forces that are budget rather than strategy or cost-effectiveness driven...that are simply fair-share across-the-board reductions".

92. ROA points to the fact that "the ability to attain high levels of readiness in the reserve components is not only theoretically possible but is now a proven fact". A major ROA study aimed at influencing policy decision-makers was issued in August 1991, taking into account the experience of the Gulf war. In summary it states:

- The total force policy provides a cost-effective, combat capable force that makes the best use of resources in the face of severe budget constraints.
- The total force policy has been successfully tested in both minor and major contingencies throughout the past decade.
- Well-trained and well-equipped reservists have demonstrated that they can perform as professionals equal in skill and dedication to their active duty counterparts.
- The use of reserve components of the total force in contingency operations brings a vital citizen involvement and consensus to these conflicts.
- Therefore, the total force policy should be reaffirmed and sufficient resources should be allocated to increase the proportion of the nation's military capability in the reserve components and to ensure their effectiveness.

93. It remains to be seen whether or not budgetary considerations will prevent the implementation of the total force policy. When your Rapporteur met the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs from the Pentagon, Mr. Stephen Duncan, in Breda in August the mood could perhaps be qualified as "cautious optimism tempered with a fair dose of realism".

V. The Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (the CIOR)

94. In the preparation of the present report, your Rapporteur has been fortunate to receive a

great deal of information courtesy of the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers and was a guest at their 1992 Summer Congress held in Breda in the Netherlands.

95. Breda provided a particular opportunity to discuss the evolution of European security and the CIOR deserves every congratulation for its efforts to inform its members of the latest developments.

96. Just what is the CIOR apart from being an organisation which pre-dates NATO?

97. CIOR, the abbreviated title of the organisation, is derived from the full name in French, "Confédération Interalliée des Officiers de Réserve". CIOR is a non-political, non-governmental, non-profit organisation dedicated to co-operation between the national reserve officers associations of NATO countries and to strengthening the basic solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance.

98. CIOR's principal objectives are:

- to contribute to the strengthening of the deterrent and defence capabilities of NATO and its signatory countries;
- to support the policies of NATO and to assist in the achievement of its objectives;
- to maintain close contact with all NATO military authorities and commands;
- to establish and develop international contacts between reserve officers in order to improve mutual knowledge and understanding;
- to maintain, through the individual country associations, close liaison with appropriate national defence organisations;
- to develop uniformity in the duties, rights, training and mobilisation of reserve officers within NATO while respecting national differences and traditions.

(i) NATO relationship

99. The relationship between CIOR and NATO, which through the years has been intensive, was formalised in 1976. NATO's highest military authority, the Military Committee (MC) then approved document MC 248 which regulates the co-operation on military matters between NATO and CIOR. A permanent representative of CIOR to the Military Committee was then established in the International Military Staff (IMS). At the political level, the Defence Information Liaison Officer in the NATO Information Directorate has, on behalf of the Secretary-General, responsibility for formal contact between NATO and CIOR and

for providing political advice. In accordance with an MC 248 recommendation, a Reserve Affairs Adviser was appointed at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). His principal duties include liaison with CIOR for Allied Command Europe.

100. NATO and SHAPE support educational and information activities for reserve officers. All 20 courses at the NATO School at Oberammergau are open to reserve officers. Every two years a one week NATO reserve officers course is given at the NATO Defence College in Rome. Annually, one information seminar is held for young reserve officers at NATO and SHAPE. Additionally, a young reserve officers' workshop is held in conjunction with the CIOR summer congress. Once every two years NATO and SHAPE host a seminar for experienced reserve officers, and, in alternating years, one for editors of reserve officer magazines.

(ii) Activities

101. In order to accomplish its objectives, CIOR meets on an annual basis alternating the location among member countries.

102. These congresses, lasting five days, are held in July or August. Here current issues affecting NATO and its reserve forces are discussed. Additionally there is communication and interaction between reserve officers of the alliance. During the time of the congress, a military competition consisting of military orienteering, marksmanship (rifle, pistol and sub-machine gun), obstacle course, utility swimming and first aid is conducted. As mentioned already, also a workshop for young reserve officers is held during the summer congress. The host country association is entirely responsible for planning and administering all the details of the congress.

103. The mid-winter conference for the Executive Committee and Commissions is held at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, usually during the first week of February to discuss issues further, interact with NATO Headquarters and finalise summer congress activities.

(iii) Organisation

104. The national reserve officers associations form the heart of CIOR, but remain completely independent in national operations. They elect from their members delegates to CIOR and the head of each delegation is a Vice-President of CIOR. The CIOR International President and Secretary-General serve for two years and are members of the same national association.

105. The Executive Committee, the highest authority in the confederation, is composed of

the President, Secretary-General, Vice-Presidents and up to four other delegates from each national association. Vice-Presidents cast a single vote for their entire delegation. The Executive Committee is CIOR's policy body and decides which country will assume the presidency, where congresses will be held, what projects will be assumed by the various commissions and the final actions to be taken on these projects.

106. The financial status of CIOR is maintained by assessments of annual dues from its component national associations based on the membership of each association and on subsidies, gifts and legacies.

(iv) Commissions

107. Six permanent commissions work on behalf of the Executive Committee (EC). Guidance is provided directly from the President. The EC also can appoint special commissions for ad hoc tasks. Each national delegation is required to appoint at least one member to each commission. All commissions have a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and a Secretary. These offices are held for a period of two years with a possible re-election for two more years.

- Commission 1: Status of the reserve officer, mobilisation, education, training and exchanges.

Studies and suggests ways NATO defence can be improved through the use of member reserve forces.

- Commission 2: Defence issues and attitudes.

Exchanges information about member nations' attitudes, events and trends affecting NATO. Studies disinformation related to NATO and its reserves.

- Commission 3: Public relations and information.

Exchanges information on public awareness of NATO, its defence and its reserves. Recommends press and information policy and helps to promote NATO in member nations. Supports the EC in general policy and planning areas.

- Commission 4: Legal affairs.

Studies legal matters affecting NATO, its defence, and its reserves. Assists the EC in maintaining and changing the CIOR by-laws as desired.

- Commission 5: Civil defence and emergency planning.

Exchange of information on disaster preparation and emergency procedures in member nations. Includes command and control, preparation, planning and training.

- Commission 6: Military competitions.
Directs and monitors the conduct of the CIOR military competitions.

(v) *National Reserve Forces Committee*

108. A sound and effective relationship between national reserve officers associations and the national authorities responsible for matters concerning reserve forces in general and reserve officers in particular, is an obvious asset for both parties.

109. Internationally such a relationship exists between CIOR and the National Reserve Forces Committee (NRFC), which is composed of the Chiefs of Reserves of the NATO nations.

110. Although fully independent, the two organisations have established a system for close co-operation and exchange of information. It has its greatest visibility during the two annual CIOR events – the summer congress and the midwinter meeting – as the NRFC holds its meetings also twice a year and in conjunction with those of CIOR.

111. The chairmanship of NRFC rotates once every two years. Here too the NRFC has opted for synchronisation with CIOR, as it has decided that the Chairman of NRFC will be of the same nationality as CIOR's President.

112. The NRFC studies and discusses reserve forces issues of mutual concern and through its Chairman exchanges results and views with CIOR's Executive Committee.

(vi) *The CIOMR*

113. CIOMR, the "Confédération Interalliée des Officiers Médicaux de Réserve", was established in Brussels in 1947 as the official organisation of medical officers in the reserve forces. Originally founded by Belgium, France and the Netherlands, the "Confédération" now includes all CIOR member countries. Its objectives are to:

- establish close professional relations with the medical doctors and services of the reserve forces within the alliance;
- study and discuss issues of importance to the medical reserve officer to include medico-military training;

- promote an effective collaboration with the medical services of the active forces;

- generate maximum support in the study of medical problems affecting the morale of the troops.

114. CIOR and CIOMR are associated organisations. CIOMR holds its sessions at the same time and place as the CIOR summer congress and mid-winter conference but prepares a separate agenda for the discussion of medical matters.

115. The main drawback to the activities of the CIOR and CIOMR over the years has been that not all member countries of NATO have taken part. Now, however, after intensive lobbying, Spain has been invited to join the confederation and your Rapporteur hopes that a way will soon be found for the remaining countries of the alliance to be at least observers.

116. The above remark explains why some detail is missing from the country-by-country survey which follows at Appendix I and which was kindly made available by the CIOR.

117. Colleagues who seek further information on the reserves are advised to consult "NATO's reserve forces" by Colonel Sjouke De Jong, published by Brassey's as No. 6 in the Atlantic Commentaries in 1992.

VI. Conclusion

118. In formulating the draft recommendation on European security – reserve forces and national service, your Rapporteur has been very conscious that the report is being presented at a critical but propitious time. "Critical" because what is being decided now by our nations will affect the shape of Europe's ability to defend itself and its interests for the foreseeable future; "propitious" because much of the debate on reserve forces and on national service is now current in our countries or is about to begin. It is therefore to be hoped that the WEU Council will respond positively to a very constructive set of recommendations.

119. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to give a few words of amplification for each preliminary draft recommendation in turn:

1. Take every opportunity to ensure that the debate on reserve forces and national service in any member country benefits from a common fund of experience and requirements and include discussion on the subject on the agenda of the next WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting;

The impression of the moment, rightly or wrongly, is that much of the debate in any of our countries is being conducted in isolation from the debate in neighbouring countries. Of course,

particular circumstances apply to individual countries, but surely the priority must be to examine the requirement for the various forces on a collective basis before moving to purely national considerations. Likewise the fund of experience of some nations who have already had to cope with difficult decisions should be pooled for the benefit of all. One of the best places to begin is by putting the subject on the agenda of the next meeting of the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff Committee.

“ 2. Stimulate informed debate in member countries on revised rôles for reserve forces as well as on reductions in and possible restructuring of national service; ”

A logical progression from recommendation 1.

“ 3. Provide a forum for discussion of such matters among member states and also with Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland and interested Central European states; ”

Ideally your Rapporteur would like to see a WEU initiative, preferably sponsored by the presidency, to create such a forum for discussion perhaps beginning with a colloquy to sound out interested parties.

The Defence Committee's pioneering study visits to Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland, as well as prompting the current specific interest of all those countries in WEU, reminded us of the relevance for territorial defence of the arrangements for organising and mobilising reserve forces practised by the hitherto “ neutral ” countries. These examples are now also being studied by many of the Central European states with whom the Defence Committee has also had contact.

“ 4. Strongly encourage WEU countries without volunteer reserve forces to consider the example of those which already possess such an asset which is indispensable for countries abolishing national service and to provide proper equipment and training for the reserves; ”

The recommendation is of course referring to the United Kingdom primarily (within WEU) because of Britain's experience over some 30 years in recruiting and utilising a large volunteer reserve force. France is already conducting a study but the example, both of the United Kingdom but also of Canada and the United States, is very relevant for others of our member nations. Part of the success of the reserve programme is attributed to the modern weapons with which units are equipped. Quality training is also essential.

“ 5. Explore the idea of creating a European “ national guard ” for territorial defence, using the reserve forces of WEU member states; ”

The comparison here is particularly with arrangements for territorial defence in the United States where the national guard plays a major rôle. This idea is linked with the premise that “ smaller, flexible, mobile and more professional forces ” are increasingly required for possible operations outside traditional areas, but that “ home defence ” in Europe should not be neglected (coupled with the need to preserve the requirement for defence incumbent in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty with its more binding commitments.

Therefore your Rapporteur submits the idea that a “ European national guard ” composed mainly of reservists could be part of the solution for the future.

“ 6. Reconsider the Assembly's previous recommendation to take specific action to allow at an individual level the exchange of military personnel between countries to enhance their awareness of European co-operation, give them greater opportunity for travel and a more interesting work environment, and serve as a useful recruiting incentive at a time when the demographic levels are making recruiting most difficult (Recommendation 469); ”

This recommendation was originally formulated in May 1989 by Sir Keith Speed in a report for the Defence Committee entitled “ State of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north ”. As with so many of the Assembly's recommendations, the idea was ahead of its time, but one particular development since then serves to prove its worth.

Visiting the Franco-German Brigade at Böblingen the Defence Committee was much impressed by the obvious enthusiasm of both French and German national servicemen, given the opportunity to serve in a multinational and especially European context. The principle will apply also as the Eurocorps is expanded with other WEU countries participating. As well as allowing national servicemen to put their European idealism into practice your Rapporteur believes that the idea should be extended to reserve forces where the Eurocorps and similar multinational developments provide further opportunity for integration.

“ 7. Give priority to training volunteers who would be asked to form reserve forces whose training would be continued for long enough after their return to

civilian life for them to be, if necessary, a useful complement to regular military personnel;”

The idea of giving priority to training volunteers and continuing that training after resettlement in civilian life might prove useful in establishing the necessary bridge between the two.

“ 8. Decide to give a symbol of European identity to all forces – ships, aircraft, vehicles and regular and reserve personnel – taking part in WEU operations;”

The idea behind this recommendation is developed in a report for the Defence Committee on WEU’s operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis (Document 1337, Rapporteur: Mr. Marten). It is reiterated here mainly because of the “ reserve ” dimension but also because your Rapporteur believes the Council should be made aware of the deeply-held political conviction that the European identity has “ to be seen to be believed ”.

“ 9. Establish and develop a liaison with the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR);”

Through your Rapporteur, the WEU Assembly has already established a link with the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR) and the wealth of detail contained in the present report bears witness to that link. The Secretary-General has also addressed the CIOR

which, with its vast international membership, has a potential for reflection and influence in the twin domains of security and defence going far beyond the immediate domain of reserve forces. Our countries are represented on the National Reserve Forces Committee which has a regular working relationship with the CIOR and where the Council might consider some gentle WEU “ caucussing ”...

“ 10. Ask the WEU Institute for Security Studies to make a thorough examination of national service and the structure of reserve forces in member states and of the possibilities for co-operation;”

Through its growing network of international contacts, both official and unofficial, the Institute is well-placed to conduct such an examination, the results of which would form a very useful basis for discussion, for instance at the colloquy proposed as part of recommendation 3 above.

“ 11. Invite WEU parliamentarians to participate in discussions on these topics. ”

This final recommendation is included as a reminder to the Council that the parliaments of WEU member countries include a wealth of knowledge and experience appropriate to the discussion of the subject in hand. Indeed a number of parliamentarians, like your Rapporteur, and parliamentary officials are themselves reservists and are therefore particularly competent to express a purely objective viewpoint.

APPENDIX I

The CIOR's country-by-country survey of reserve forces

A. WEU COUNTRIES

1. Belgium

I. Reserve structure

A. General organisation

(i) The rôle of the armed forces is to take part in joint NATO defence and in carrying out national tasks. The latter, carried out on behalf of both NATO and the nation, are assigned to interior forces under national command.

(ii) 90% of the combat troops of the interior forces are reservists. For the military defence of the territory, in wartime the commander of the interior forces has available two light regiments, four security battalions and nine provincial regiments.

Depending on the structure of the province, the provincial regiments are a parachute commando company and a varying number of tactical battalion headquarters, light infantry companies, companies of guards and light reconnaissance squadrons.

The rôle of these forces is:

- (a) ground defence on national territory, including a ground, air and NBC intelligence and warning system,
- (b) protecting Belgian and allied lines of communication in Belgium.

B. Military service

(i) General

As from the age of 18, under the law on the militia all male Belgians declared fit have to accomplish compulsory military service.

Once released from regular service, recruits are given a mobilisation assignment.

Some are assigned as a complement to active units and others to reserve forces, combat units or support units.

(ii) Reserve officers

The number of places open to candidate reserve officers is fixed by the Minister of Defence in the light of the needs of each force.

II. Personnel policies

A. Recruitment

To become a reserve officer, the candidate has to meet the following criteria:

- (a) to have expressed the wish to be a reserve officer;

- (b) to have agreed to effect the required active service (at present eleven months or fifteen for parachute commandos);

- (c) to have obtained at least a secondary school-leaving diploma;

- (d) to be able to produce a certificate of good conduct as a civilian;

- (e) not to have been found guilty of any act considered by public opinion to be dishonourable for an officer;

- (f) to have passed various psychological and medical tests;

- (g) to carry out a probationary course as second-lieutenant or the equivalent;

- (h) to be between 19 and 35 years of age.

B. Assignment

Assignments are made by each force's mobilisation body.

C. Training and promotion

Although the programme is reviewed in the light of the period of military service, the following course is followed:

- (a) basic military training: about three months after which the cadet becomes a candidate reserve officer with the rank of sergeant;

- (b) specialised training lasting about six months in the force and unit to which he is assigned; after this training, the candidate reserve officer is given the rank of warrant officer;

- (c) after carrying out the duties actually incumbent upon him within the framework of the unit to which he is assigned, the candidate reserve officer is given the rank of second lieutenant.

As well as the badge corresponding to their rank, candidate reserve officers wear a red flash as soon as they take up their duties and until they become officers.

D. Rank

Reserve officers have their own status but rank and seniority entitle them to exactly the same rights as regular army officers when they are recalled.

E. Recall and voluntary service

(i) Reserve officers may be recalled as follows: They are subject to ordinary recalls of not more than thirty days a year. In peacetime, they may be recalled in the cases of emergency provided for under Belgian legislation; in wartime, they are subject to mobilisation recalls.

(ii) With the consent of the Ministry of Defence, reserve officers may also effect voluntary refresher and training periods, i.e. on the occasion of exercises organised by URNOR or regular units.

Not more than thirty days a year may be spent on such activities and reserve officers take part in them voluntarily.

They take place:

(a) within units:

- at the request of the commander of the unit, according to requirements and usually during exercise periods;
- on the proposal of the reserve officer himself in the light of the programmes proposed by each force or unit.

In the navy, there is a training programme for anti-mine warfare flotillas drawn up in co-operation with associations of reserve officers. Most of these activities are carried out during the week-end.

(b) At URNOR or in its clubs:

URNOR (Association Royale Nationale des Officiers de Réserve) organises, with the support of the armed forces, week-end activities comprising small-scale exercises involving tactical light infantry and guerrilla procedures.

(iii) Remarks:

(a) During periods of compulsory recall, work contracts are considered to be suspended and the employer may then decide not to pay reservists, but he may not oppose compulsory recalls and does not have the right to cancel the work contract.

The national association is trying to convince employers that experience acquired in many areas by reserve officers largely makes up for the disadvantage of their short absences due to recall.

(b) It is interesting to note that refresher courses are not necessarily all remunerated.

III. Mobilisation

Mobilisation of reserve forces

(i) When leaving active service, each member of the armed forces receives a document showing his mobilisation assignment.

(ii) Since individual personal situations may change, reservists may, in certain conditions, obtain a suspension of their recall.

(iii) In the framework of military defence of the territory, the policy of the armed forces is to assign reservists, as far as possible, to units near their homes so as to reduce the real period of mobilisation.

(iv) The government is very flexible in recalling reservists. Depending on circumstances, they may be recalled in varying numbers on an individual basis or as entire units.

(v) Recalls may be made through national and regional broadcasts on Belgian radio and television (RTBF/BRTN).

2. France

I. Reserve structure

A. General organisation

In wartime, the reserves would account for 24% of the navy strength, 42% of the air force, 47% of the army, and 10% of the nuclear forces.

Even the active army divisions (now 13) and the new "Force d'Assistance Rapide" need reservists to bring them to full war strength. Their proportions are 24% for organic army corps units, 72% in service units (in particular the medical service), 62% for the equipment support units. Finally, the reserves represent 80% of the reserve divisions and about 100 territorial regiments.

II. Personnel policies

A. Appointment of reserve officers

Accession and schooling of reserve officers: in France, physically and mentally apt reserve officer candidates get an initial curriculum and training in normal units and at specialised schools of the different services.

Admission at an "Ecole des Officiers de réserve" (EOR) is quite selective. Young men with a high level of education, or/and having passed successfully final examinations at pre-military training centres and a security desk may be admitted directly in training or schools.

Access to the rank and status of reserve officer is possible for reserve cadets under 35 and reserve non-commissioned officers with

good training marks aged from 30 to 44 years. Reserve officer training starts normally in standing units and continues in specialised application schools for selected candidates. In some cases (especially air force and navy) candidates may be accepted directly in the schools. Pre-military training with good results gives the best selection chances in all cases.

Trainees for the navy are selected "on file" among the graduates of universities, engineer schools, the Merchant Marine School, and pre-military preparation graduates. The reserve officers school of the navy teaches all needed specialities at schools at major navy bases.

At the air force "EOR" at Evreux air force base, one-third of the voluntary candidates will be accepted for the four cycles in a year. These young men had first been incorporated in air base units where they had an initial training. Those scoring at least a 12/20 mark, must succeed in a number of tests before admission. 400 more cadets come from military preparation and a few dozen more from high level schools (engineering, magistrature, administration).

After 10 more training weeks at specialised schools or units, they are promoted "aspirant de réserve" and "sous-lieutenant" when they return home.

B. *Reserve/regular officer policies*

The normal reserve officer policies exist within the services so the most qualified personnel are retained in the reserve structure to maintain a strong armed force.

C. *Assignments*

Assignments are made for all reserve officers so they are used as best qualified within their service. Reassignments are carried out so the reserve officers obtain experience in different units and levels of command and support.

D. *Legal position of reserve officers*

French residents, if fit, are reservists until the age of 35. Officers and non-commissioned officers can be maintained "dans les cadres" beyond that age limit if they prove a minimum activity in exercises and reunions (as distinct from purely associative activities which are by no means compulsory nor are they taken into account as such).

The law determines the age limits, according to rank. This age is the age limit of the same rank in the regular forces augmented by five years. Officers are then discharged from military obligations, and if their service records are good, can be awarded by the Ministry of Defence the status of "honorariat" (retired officer).

A reserve officer over 35 years old having no activities, is automatically dismissed after a few years. It must be emphasised that the staffs issue mobilisation assignments up to a "maximum employment age" (Age Limite d'Emploi or ALE).

Honorary (retired) officers are "accepted" at some military exercises, but must be insured at their expense against accidents, and can get only a "congress ticket" (20% reduction on railways). All reserve officers have access to garrison officers messes, for a yearly contribution.

III. *Training*

No details available.

IV. *Mobilisation*

A. *Mobilisation of reserves*

Reserve officers cannot be considered separately in the total reserve. The employment of all reservists is governed by the "plan de mobilisation" of all the arms: army, air force, navy, gendarmerie and services.

The plan foresees 545 000 men, 281 000 being reservists. Those numbers do not include personnel who have not received mandatory instruction and those stationed overseas.

The mobilised force of the army comprises 26 000 reserve officers and 52 500 non-commissioned officers (against respectively 60 000 and 245 000 existing ones). The mobilised army accounts for (situation 1983):

- 1 army with its organic elements;
- 3 army corps with organic elements;
- 15 active divisions (8 armour, 7 infantry);
- 14 mobilised divisions, of which 10 are "deviated" from active divisions and 4 from the schools.

The "armée de l'air's" (air force) mobilisation plan is very decentralised down to its 40 metropolitan bases and stations. In 1981, there were 16 223 air force reserve officers (of whom 3 259 had a mobilisation assignment) and 35 500 non-commissioned officers. The needs are as follows: support, training, supervision: 28%; fusiliers commandos of the air force: 28%; operations: 19%; instruction: 15%; infrastructure: 6%; computers, organisation: 2%; mechanics, communications: 2%. The French territory is divided into four "régions aériennes" totalling five mobilisation centres.

The "armée de mer" or "marine nationale" (navy) still sometimes affectionately called "La Royale", has 160 000 reservists of whom 14 000 are navy officers, 40 000 NCOs. The mobilisation plan of the navy is adaptable to the degree of international tension. Criteria

for reserve officers for obtaining a mobilisation assignment are basic qualification (including operational and technical skills, age) voluntary service, and proximity home-base.

The navy uses a system of selective recalls, which imposes a very strict discipline on the reservists concerned. The military administration of the French coasts (roughly 3 000 km) depends on three maritime districts called "préfectures maritimes" (PREMAR): Cherbourg (Channel coast), Brest (Atlantic coast), and Toulon (Mediterranean) and their subdivisions COMAR ("commandant de la marine").

They also have civilian responsibilities. These structures are responsible for navy mobilisation through their CMM ("centres mobilisateurs marines").

The "gendarmerie nationale" is a service depending on the Ministry of Defence. Its normal function is a police function (agents of the public force).

Administratively, France is divided into "départements", "arrondissements" and "cantons". Each "canton" has a "brigade of gendarmerie", a few men commanded by a lower non-commissioned officer rank. Their main asset is their transmissions, so the entire territory is covered by a gendarmerie-own transmission which cannot be struck by strike or other disorders. This is an important asset in a time of crisis.

This so-called "gendarmerie départementale" is territorial, whereas another force, the "gendarmerie mobile" is equipped with specialised vehicles and transmissions. They also have light weapons and live in barracks. Their mission is to oppose disorders of all kinds and help in case of catastrophe. In wartime, they become combat units.

There are also other specialised units, like "gendarmerie maritime, fluviale" (river police), "de l'air" (security of air bases). In case of mobilisation, the gendarmerie recall their own reservists, as well as reservists of the army, including 1 100 reserve officers (30% of their reserve officers).

3. Germany

I. Reserve structure

A. General organisation

The Bundeswehr manpower planning concept for the 1990s delimits the operational minimum peacetime strength to 456 000 active servicemen, 24 000 reservists from the standby readiness component, and up to 15 000 reserve duty training spaces from 1995 onwards, together with the projected manpower reserve of 350 000 men, earmarked for security and improving manpower sustainability. This indi-

cates that only a quarter of the projected war authorised strength will be made up of active servicemen and three-quarters will be reservists designated for wartime assignment. This leads to the following total:

Wartime strength	1 609 000	Approx. 350 000 reservists designated for assignments as part of the manpower reserve
	1 340 000	Approx. 73 % 884 000 reservists designated for assignments as part of the war authorised strength
Augmentation		
Peacetime strength	495 000	
15 000 reserve duty training spaces	8 %	
24 000 standby readiness reservists		
456 000 active service men	92 %	456 000 active servicemen 27 %

B. Reserve structure and administration

In the Federal Republic of Germany there exists no exclusive reserve component. Due to the planned restructuring of the army and the pending implementation of the reservist concept, discussion of this subject will have to be postponed until final decisions have been reached.

C. Reserve categories

The following differing reserve categories exist:

- (i) standby reserve;
- (ii) reservists designated for assignment as part of the war authorised strength (alert reserve);
- (iii) reservists designated for assignment as part of the manpower reserve;
- (iv) remaining manpower reserve.

D. Command structure/status of reserve forces

Reservists are fully integrated into the armed forces command structure. A separate reserve structure does not exist.

E. Limitations on number of reserve officers

Limitations on the number of reserve officers only depend on the armed forces requirements and on the reserve officer candidates' successful completion of their obligatory training courses.

F. Full-time personnel assignment/support

A number of active servicemen are assigned to mobilisation bases for the maintenance of arms and equipment of reserve units.

Reservists receive additional support from officers and non-commissioned officers at the military district, military region, and military subregion command levels.

II. Personnel policy

A. Appointment as reserve officer

The criteria for appointment as reserve officer candidate are:

- (i) place of residence in the Federal Republic of Germany;
- (ii) German nationality;
- (iii) age limits;
- (iv) educational or vocational qualifications;
- (v) minimum medical and physical fitness requirements.

B. Reserve/regular officers policy

The reservist concept, prepared by the armed forces staff in the Federal Ministry of Defence, outlines the qualitative and quantitative manpower requirements in terms of reserve and regular officers. The concept specifically deals with issues ranging from reserve resources, satisfaction of personnel requirements, and reserve manpower management, to the training, extension training and follow-on training of reservists.

C. Assignments

In keeping with the Bundeswehr war authorised strength, reserve officers can be assigned at the various levels of command.

D. Legal status of reserve officers

Reserve officers are subject to the same disciplinary regulations as regular officers.

A separate code of military justice specifically applying to reservists does not exist.

E. Civilian employer support of reservists

A specific system, comparable with the American system, does not exist. However, during reserve training periods, legal protection from loss of job is provided to reservists in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Job Reservation Act.

III. Training

A. Officer initial/basic training

The training of reserve officer candidates is conducted in several stages:

Basic training (three months). Promotion to reserve officer candidate (Fahnenjunker) (OR-5) may follow after successful completion of the non-commissioned officer training qualifying him as squad leader and 12 months of military service.

Promotion to Fähnrich (OR-6) may follow upon successful completion of the platoon leader course and 21 months of military service.

Promotion to Oberfähnrich (OR-8) may follow after 30 months of military service, and the promotion to second lieutenant, after completing 36 months of military service.

B. Advanced officer selection and training

Training and selection of future reserve officers takes place during reserve duty training periods. Qualifications are based and depend on the individual officer's willingness, his ability, his mental capabilities and physical fitness.

C. Active duty training of reserve officers

A number of courses can be completed by reserve officers during reserve duty training periods. This applies to the levels of platoon leader, company commander, and field grade officers.

D. Inactive duty training of reserve officers

Not applicable.

E. Extended active duty

Limited to a maximum of 12 years, if the reserve officer has the necessary qualifications and if he is needed in the armed forces.

F. Training during recall

The purpose of reserve duty training of reserve officers is to provide training and extension training.

G. Training exercises

Individual reserve officers may be called up for participation.

H. Exchange training

In accordance with the existing bilateral agreements between the Federal Republic and the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, participation in exchange training programmes is possible. Efforts are under way to arrange additional agreements on exchange programmes with other nations.

IV. Mobilisation

A. Mobilisation of reserves

Every mobilisation-assigned reservist receives a draft notice specifying his assigned unit in case of mobilisation.

B. Liability to perform service in peacetime/war

The National Military Service Act provides that call-up for military service may be made in peacetime, in a crisis or in wartime.

C. Exemption from recall

Certain groups or individuals may be exempted from recall on medical or vocational grounds.

D. *Other mobilisation aspects*

In case of mobilisation, reservists can be recalled by publications in newspapers, radio and television announcements, by telegram or by specific calling-up orders.

4. *Italy*

I. *Reserve structure*

A. *General organisation*

The reserve forces are formed in a small share by officers and non-commissioned officers retired from active service and for the most part by personnel (officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men) who fulfil their required military service.

The earmarking of conscripts who leave the armed forces occurs by different procedures for the army, navy and air force according to the manpower requirements of each service.

B. *Reserve structure and administration*

(i) *Army.*

Each unit designates, for the purpose of mobilisation, the officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men belonging to the contingents discharged last. On their discharge, these personnel are "hooked" in the necessary amount for filling the unit.

In case of recall, these men must return to their unit where they had previously served. On the northeastern border of Italy (along the river Tagliamento), as regards the creation of the first and second defence line, cadre units personnel come from the same region, in analogy to "Alpini" and "Lagunari" designated to defend mountains and lagoons near Venice.

(ii) *Navy.*

Personnel appointed for the completion of crews of naval squadron are directly recalled by their respective naval headquarters. The remainder are earmarked by maritime departments.

(iii) *Air force.*

The Air Regional Command recalls: pilot officers and non-commissioned officers, officers and non-commissioned officers of the administrative rôles, and enlisted men of the vigilance.

C. *Limitation on number of reserve officers*

Recall for training purposes is set forth by a specific decree of the Ministry of Defence in the context of training requirements and of financial possibilities without any particular procedure.

II. *Personnel policies*

No details available.

III. *Training*

A. *Officer initial/basic training*

The training of reservists depends upon the requirements of filling existing units, of establishing new units, and upon the mobilisation systems used in the three services:

(i) *Army.*

The system of "hooking" assures reservists who are still young and who have been discharged for over two or three years. Training problems pertain to the need for refreshing training and for the amalgam among the men.

Training recalls are made each year for reserve officers and non-commissioned officers in order to update their preparation on new tactics and weapons.

(ii) *Navy.*

The high level of operational readiness of naval forces creates limited training problems and to the amalgam of personnel designated for completion of crews.

Particular care is given to the training of personnel belonging to the command branch who are periodically recalled for 40 days of courses. Furthermore, on the occasion of the biggest NATO exercise, a number of reserve officers are recalled for a maximum of 30 days.

(iii) *Air force.*

The same considerations pertain to the air force, which annually recalls a limited number of reserve officers.

B. *Inactive duty training for reserve officers*

A substantial percentage of reserve officers operate every day with units of regular armed forces for the normal training and updating exercises.

They are motivated by the conviction that they loyally contribute to the defence of free institutions and the strengthening of the state's natural alliances.

IV. *Mobilisation*

A. *Mobilisation of reserves*

The general principles regarding mobilisation of reserve forces are fixed by law.

Recall for mobilisation is a political decision and, according to the Italian Constitution, ascends to the chief of the state, to the parliament, and to the government.

The compulsory recruitment of enlisted men: after the compulsory drafting period enlisted men are discharged. However, they normally remain - for a period of 12 months -

“committed” to augment the same unit in which they had served, in order to bring these units to combat strength in time of emergency.

The remaining personnel (specialists) are committed for 24 months to augment units to be mobilised in time of emergency.

Within operational units, “committed” personnel are replaced each year by personnel who have been discharged no more than two years before.

B. *Liability to recall in peace/war*

The recalling of reservists can be carried out:

- in case of general mobilisation, through the use of wall posters and mass media; or
- in case of gradual mobilisation, through the dispatching of recall papers.

C. *Exceptions for recall*

The recall by the system of the “hook” is on a national basis: units displaced in the Northeast of Italy can also receive reservists from Sicily or Sardinia.

This means arrival is delayed because of distances. But such a disadvantage is counter-balanced by the fact that the men fill units where they have previously served. In this way, operational readiness is acquired in a short time.

5. *Netherlands*

I. *Reserve structure*

A. *General organisation*

While the number of reservists who have a mobilisation post in the navy and in the air force is comparatively small, about 70% of the wartime posts in the army are filled with reservists.

Thus, in general, there are a number of individual selected mobilisation posts in the navy and air force such as traffic controller, medical officer, etc., which are filled by reservists.

Except for some guard companies in the air force and a number of companies of marines in the marine corps, there are no complete units that have been identified and are called up in wartime which are comprised mainly of reservists.

In addition to the call-up of individuals for functions in standing units, complete units comprised of reservists would be called up to support army operations.

A total of 175 000 men belonging to 900 company-sized units and about 400 replacement

detachments are mobilised. Approximately 107 000 reservists (soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers) will be called up.

Although the reserve units are composed primarily of reservists, key personnel will be regular active duty personnel. For example, a battalion of the standing army could lose its staff officer personnel and intelligence officer (S1 and S2) to become an operations officer (S3) and logistics officer (S4) in a reserve unit of the same kind. Reservists would fill the vacant S1 and S2 functions in the battalion of the standing army.

Regular officers not serving in units of the standing army, but employed at training schools, in staff duties, or at the Ministry of Defence will become commanding officers or will be employed in other functions of the reserve units in wartime.

Regular active duty non-commissioned officers will be distributed throughout the reserve units to ensure adequate and up-to-date expertise and knowledge is available in key functions.

B. *Reserve structure and administration*

Overall responsibility for the army reserve components is vested in the Office of Mobilisation Preparation that is directly responsible to the National Territorial Commander.

The head of this office is also Special Advisor for Mobilisation Affairs to the Commander in Chief Landforces (BLS). In addition, the Deputy Commander Landforces is Inspector of Army Reserve Personnel (officers and non-commissioned officers). The above-mentioned office is responsible for training and assignment to units of all army reserve personnel.

C. *Command subordination/relationships of reserve forces*

The Office of Mobilisation Preparation is responsible for training and assignment to units of all army reserve personnel.

In time of mobilisation, this office remains responsible for reserve units and personnel during call-up and unit formation, upon completion of which the fully-manned and equipped reserve units are turned over to and then come under the responsibility of Commander First Army Corps (field army) or the National Territorial Commander (territorial army).

D. *Limitation on number of reserve officers*

(i) *Army.*

The number of reserve officers that are appointed yearly is dependent upon the requirements of the standing forces. Once commissioned, promotion to first lieutenant follows

three years after the final appointment as second lieutenant.

Promotion to captain (and major) requires a special course, completed successfully, a number of days active service in mobilisation post capacity as a first lieutenant (as a captain) and the availability of a mobilisation post vacancy for captain (for major) besides having held the rank of first lieutenant (captain) for five years.

(ii) Navy.

The Ministry of Defence (navy) determines annually the number of reserve officers required in accordance with peacetime duty and mobilisation plan requirements.

(iii) Air force.

The number of reserve officers on active duty depends on the number of vacancies in the peacetime establishment. After having completed their general conscription or contract, only a small number of reserve officers are assigned to fill vacancies in the wartime establishment.

Those not assigned to fill these vacancies are kept in a wartime reserve or are put at the disposal of the Secretary of State for Home Affairs to fill leading jobs in the Civil Defence (as civilians).

E. Full-time personnel assignment/support

The only regular personnel assigned full time to a reserve unit are the personnel tasked with the maintenance of the reserve unit's wartime equipment. There is one staff member of a reserve division with some regular personnel to execute wartime preparations.

When the reserve unit is called up for exercises or in a real emergency, the regular active duty personnel with wartime assignments would be made available for the duration of any exercises.

II. Personnel policies

A. Appointment of reserve officers

Reserve officers are derived from:

(i) Reserve officer candidates who have successfully completed their training at one of the reserve officers' schools.

(ii) Former regular army officers. By law, all former regular officers are appointed reserve officers when under the age of 45. On request, all discharged officers over the age of 45 are appointed as reserve officers until the age of 55.

(iii) The same applies for former regular navy and marine corps officers. If needed in their special jobs, some naval reserve officers are employed on a voluntary basis until the age of 50.

B. Reserve categories according to service duties in peacetime

(i) Army.

(a) Active duty.

- (1) General conscription of 16 months.
- (2) Reserve officers with a contract of six years maximum.

(b) Inactive duty (expiring at the age of 45 or 55 years)

- (1) After having completed general conscription.
- (2) After termination of contract.

(c) Reserve officers in categories (b)(1) and (b)(2) can be:

- (1) Reserve officers with mobilisation post (in a unit of individual assignment) or temporarily without a mobilisation post awaiting a new assignment.
- (2) Reserve officers assigned to the replacement pool.
- (3) Reserve officers with no assignment at all.

(d) Reserve officers in category (c)(1) above can be called up from time to time for refresher courses, exercises, etc.

(ii) Navy/marine corps.

(a) Active duty.

- (1) General conscription of 18-21 months.
- (2) Reserve officers with a contract of six years maximum.

(b) Inactive duty (expiring at the age of 45 or 50 years).

- (1) After having completed general conscription.
- (2) After termination of contract.

(c) Categories (b)(1) and (b)(2) above are called up periodically for exercises and refresher courses.

(iii) Air force.

(a) Active duty.

- (1) General conscription.
- (2) Contract: limited (two-six years) or unlimited (expiring category).

(b) Inactive duty (expiring at 40 or 45 years of age).

- (1) After completion of national service.
- (2) After termination of contract.

C. *Appointment (nomination) of reserve officers*

(i) General conditions including civil education.

(a) Army. All candidates for reserve officer must:

- (1) Be Dutch citizens.
- (2) Have at least passed senior high school final examinations successfully.
- (3) Have been selected by a selection centre of the armed forces after tests during pre-service observation sessions.
- (4) Successfully complete the training, to include passing a final examination, at a reserve officers training school.
- (5) Be recommended by their commanding officer during their service period as ensign.

(b) Navy/marine corps. All reserve officer candidates must:

- (1) Be Dutch citizens.
- (2) Have passed senior high school final examinations successfully or a combination of high school and technical or nautical college.
- (3) Have been selected by an armed forces selection centre after various tests.
- (4) Have been selected by a naval reserve officers selection board after various psychological and medical tests.
- (5) Pass a final examination successfully in a reserve officers training school.

(b) Air force. All reserve officer candidates must:

- (1) Be Dutch citizens.
- (2) Have passed at least the final high school examination successfully.
- (3) Prior to enlistment, pass a Ministry of Defence selection board for general officer selection, and an air force selection board for a specific-to-job selection.
- (4) Have successfully completed a military job-training.
- (5) Pass successfully a final examination at the air force reserve officer training school.
- (6) Be recommended by their commanding officer during their service period as ensign.

(ii) Number of months (effective service) from call-up to appointment as a reserve officer.

(a) Army.

The first training for the reserve officer will follow this scheme:

After approximately two months – corporal.

After approximately four months (total) – sergeant.

After approximately six months (total) – vaandrig (ensign).

The “vaandrig” or “kornet” will then be assigned to an operational unit and will be commissioned to second lieutenant 10 months later in the week before he is demobilised if his fitness report by his commanding officer is satisfactory.

(b) Navy.

Depending on educational background and service branch, reserve officers receive their commission nine weeks to one year after call-up.

(c) Air force.

After two months – corporal.

After approximately four and a half months – sergeant.

After 11 months – vaandrig (ensign).

Total general conscription – 17 months.

Definite appointment to second lieutenant takes place directly after regular officers who have started their training at the same time, are commissioned. As a matter of fact, recently very few candidates are accepted for reserve officer training, unless they are willing to sign up for a couple of years beyond national service.

D. *Age conditions*

(i) Army: minimum 18 years old

(ii) Navy: minimum 19 years old

(iii) Air force: minimum 18 years old

E. *Exemption from the normal conditions for persons with a specialised civil education that is useful for the armed forces*

(i) Army.

This applies to draftees who have qualified as doctors, dentists, or chemists; after eight weeks training with satisfactory results, they may be appointed first lieutenant.

Draftees, with a technical or economical scientific education may, after a reduced military training, be appointed "vaandrig" and accordingly be assigned a post where their civil education may be utilised. Appointment to second lieutenant will take place in the same way as for other "vaandrigs".

(ii) Navy.

University graduates with an appropriate degree, e.g. naval architects and marine engineers, mechanical and electrical engineers, economists, lawyers, social scientists, and psychologists are commissioned as ensign after nine weeks of reserve officers training.

This is done provided that they will have a non-combatant position as a reserve officer; university graduates qualified as medical doctor, dentist, pharmacist or clerical officer are commissioned as lieutenant junior grade after nine weeks of reserve officer training.

(iii) Air force:

Those who have completed a specific civil education such as engineers, lawyers, and economists, are granted the acting rank of second lieutenant after nine weeks of reserve officer training. Medical doctors are put at the disposal of the Royal Air Force by the army in the rank of flight lieutenant.

F. Reserve/regular officer policies

When on active duty a reserve officer is treated in exactly the same manner as other active regular officers.

G. Assignments

Reservists are assigned to units or to individual positions as described above.

H. Legal position of reserve officers (*vis-à-vis* their civilian employer)

There are no legal statutory provisions governing the position of the reserve officer in civilian life.

There are a number of employers who appreciate the reserve officers' service, and do not count any recall periods as holidays, paying them normal salaries less officer's pay.

Others will try not to engage reserve officers, or inform them that any liability they have or undertake as to recall periods, etc., is on their own time, i.e. in lieu of holidays, and at their own expense. The latter seems to be prevalent, due to the surplus number of reserve officers and the fact that no-one not wishing to do so, needs to continue reserve service after attaining the rank of first lieutenant. The foregoing applies in peacetime.

In time of war or in an emergency, it is stipulated by a special law that the reserve

officer, when returning to civilian life has to be given again his former function in enterprise.

Practice has shown, however, that in reality the employers – with some good exceptions of course – do not adhere to same, which means the reserve officer in question has to restart his career.

As to the legal position of the reserve officer in the employment of government, province, or municipality (i.e. the civil servant officer), generally speaking, there is no discrimination as compared to his colleagues and, when fulfilling his duties as a reserve officer, he is legally protected.

I. Policies on uniforms

Rules for wearing uniform when not on active duty

Reserve officers of the army and air force are allowed to wear uniform when not on active duty whenever they wish.

A reserve officer of the navy or marine corps, however, is not allowed to wear uniform when and where he likes when not on active duty, but needs special permission from the Ministry of Defence to wear uniform.

No permission is needed to wear uniform when attending activities of one of the (reserve) officers associations, when attending special occasions such as weddings and funerals, and when the reserve officer has a position in one of the national (reserve) officers associations.

All Dutch reserve officers must apply for special permission when they want to wear their uniform abroad.

III. Training

A. Officer initial/basic training

(i) Army.

Each officer candidate is given his initial training at the training school of the branch or arm he is posted to. Training schedules differ from branch to branch.

(ii) Navy.

All reserve officer candidates are trained at the naval academy at Den Helder where the regulars are also trained.

(iii) Air Force.

All reserve officer candidates receive their initial training at the Gilze-Rijen Air Base. Afterwards they receive specialised training at the different air force schools at different air bases (i.e. electronics at Deelen, mechanical transport at Soesterberg, etc).

(iv) Marines.

All reserve officer candidates are trained together with their regular comrades at the marine depôt at Rotterdam.

B. Advanced officer selection and training

Selection for and advanced training is dependent on the officer's fitness reports received during the first period of service and during recalls. Those performing the best will be selected for further training and promotion.

An important consideration is the amount of time the officer is willing to voluntarily spend on recalls.

C. Active duty training for reserve officers

This training can consist of the following:

- (i)* Training for three weeks with the reserve unit (all tactical units qualify).
- (ii)* Regular call-up for a few days staff or field training for key personnel of all army reserve units.
- (iii)* On-the-job training with a standing unit if they have no mobilisation post with a similar unit.
- (iv)* Individual call-up for specialised training (in specialised subjects as well as courses for advancement in rank).

D. Inactive duty training for reserve officers

No inactive duty training is available for reserve officers.

E. Extended active duty

A reserve officer can usually (depending on favourable fitness reports) extend the first period of active duty by a number of years (commonly referred to as a KVV volunteer).

F. Training during recall

Apart from courses, some reserve officers are called up for three weeks with their reserve unit to do practical training. This applies to all tactical units.

Reserve officers of the navy are called up for training periods of a maximum of two weeks and reserve officers of the marine corps are called up for periods of five weeks every three years.

Key personnel of all army reserve units are called up regularly for a few days staff training. All army reserve officers have the opportunity to do on-the-job training with a standing unit if they have a mobilisation post with a similar unit.

G. Training exercises

No details available.

H. Exchange training

Much exchange training has taken place in previous years. However, at the present time the Ministry of Defence now wishes to confine future exchange training to NATO partners with whom close co-operation in wartime would exist (i.e. Federal Republic of Germany).

*IV. Mobilisation**A. Mobilisation of reserves*

As already mentioned a total of 197 000 personnel will be mobilised in time of war. As 175 000 of these personnel belong to the army, it is obvious that the major mobilisation problems are those of the Royal Netherlands Army. The mobilisation system depends on the following:

- (i)* The system of army structure with a mobilisable component with Short-leave, RIM, and other mobilisable units.
 - (a)* Shortleave is the four to six month period in which the conscripts are on leave after completion of their active duty, but they still belong to an active unit.
 - (b)* RIM units (RIM means Direct Intake unitwise from active units into mobilisable units). Thus every RIM unit has a parent unit of the same size in the standing army. It has exactly the same equipment as the parent unit and conscripts are assigned to the RIM unit for a period of 16 months after leaving the parent unit in the standing army. After 16 months personnel are assigned to a second-line mobilisable unit and distributed over different units.
- (ii)* The way equipment, ammunition and supplies are stored to support the above-mentioned units is by using mobilisation storage sites which are ready for quick delivery and immediate use.
- (iii)* The use of typical Dutch conditions such as short travel distances, well developed public transport, and a high audience density on the nationally-controlled broadcasting system will ensure maximum response to any call to mobilise.

A full army mobilisation will be accomplished in three successive stages. Each of these

stages corresponds roughly to the State of Military Vigilance and the first two stages of the formal NATO Alert System "simple" and "reinforcement alert".

Any mobilisation can be preceded by measures to improve operational readiness (which would most likely include the call-up of conscripts on short leave).

B. *Liability to recall in peace/war*

A statutory law governing reserve officer status empowers the Minister of Defence to recall into active service all or any reserve officers he considers required by existing conditions for an indefinite period.

The Ministry of Defence can also recall, in the interests of the service, any reserve officer for periodic training of up to 60 days every three years, divided over a maximum of six periods.

C. *Exception for recall*

There are certain exceptions to the above, mainly if the reserve officer is employed in a civilian occupation that contributes to the planned war effort.

6. *United Kingdom*

I. *Reserve structure*

A. *General organisation*

The Territorial Army (TA) was formed in 1908 from existing militia, yeomanry and other volunteer units. From then until 1967, it consisted mainly of TA divisions and brigades who did some annual training but were not committed to battle until they had completed several months of intensive training after mobilisation. That was how they were used in both world wars.

During the period 1967-1969, the Territorial Army was reorganised into its present form in which it is integrated into the Regular Army Order of Battle immediately on mobilisation, thus making its peacetime standard of training of far greater importance than hitherto.

As a result of the 1981 Defence Review, the Territorial Army is being expanded to reach a strength of 86 000 by 1990. With the reduction in size of the regular army, the expansion of the Territorial Army places even greater emphasis on its importance.

The rôle of the TA is to provide units and individuals available both for employment on specific tasks at home and overseas and to meet the unexpected when required, and in particular:

- (i) To complete the Army ORBAT (order of battle) of NATO-committed

forces and to provide certain units for the support of NATO Headquarters.

- (ii) To assist in maintaining a secure United Kingdom base in support of forces deployed in Europe.
- (iii) Since the reorganisation in early 1969, the Territorial Army has consisted of two elements: Group A and Group B. Group A is distinguished from Group B by the higher call-out liability. Of the current TA in the main TA establishment, over 90% are in Group A.

The newly-formed Home Service Force (HSF) forms Group C of the TA. Although an integral part of the TA, the HSF is not at present included in the main TA establishment.

B. *Reserve structure and administration*

Units of TA Group A are organised as follows:

1. Independent units. These comprise the largest part of the TA and consist of both major and minor units which are recruited locally. They have their own permanent staff and premises (TA centres) and keep most of their equipment with them.

On mobilisation, they collect the balance of their equipment and supplies from ordnance depôts in the United Kingdom and those with overseas rôle move to Germany and elsewhere.

2. Sponsored units. Sponsored units are filled by volunteers recruited countrywide. This is partly because many such units are small technical specialist units (e.g. blood supply units, petroleum laboratories, specialist teams, Royal Engineers) whose specialist manpower is unlikely to be available in sufficient numbers in any one area.

Many of these specialist units are not normally required in the regular army's peacetime ORBAT. Sponsored units are administered and trained by a central volunteer headquarters (CVHQ). CVHQs are regular army establishments in their particular arm or service who are also responsible for the embodiment of their own sponsored units on mobilisation.

Virtually all TA teach arm units are independent. Of the logistic services, approximately half are independent and the remainder is sponsored.

TA Group B consists of the following:

1. University Officers Training Corps (University OTC). The University OTC consists of 19 independent units which cover not only universities but also polytechnics and colleges.

The military training in the University OTCs aims to:

- (a) foster knowledge and understanding of the army and its rôle;
- (b) develop leadership qualities;
- (c) prepare officer cadets for commissioned service in the regular army and the TA.

2. Bands. There are 22 TA Bands.

3. Minor miscellaneous units.

TA Group C comprises the Home Service Force (HSF) composed of trained officers and soldiers from all three services, including the Territorial Army. Recruits are required to have had military experience. The HSF companies are hosted by an independent TA unit which provides some training and administrative assistance. The rôle of the HSF is to guard key points thus releasing regular and TA home defence units for mobile rôles elsewhere.

Individual reservists. There are several categories of individual reservists available to provide individual reinforcements to bring units up to full-time strength and to provide battle casualty replacements (BCRs).

1. Regular Army Reserve of Officers (RARO). RARO consists of both compulsory and volunteer members including retired regular and short service officers and officers with previous service in the Army Emergency Reserve, the TA and TAVR. Members of the RARO have no peacetime training liability and volunteers are needed for all activities.

All regular officers who join the army have a RARO liability, and six-year annual training commitment upon leaving. Members of RARO receive no emoluments unless they volunteer for annual reporting, when they receive an annual grant, and when they take part in exercises they receive TA rates of pay.

2. The regular reserve comprises:

- (a) Section A. Former regular soldiers fulfilling their compulsory period of service with a regular reserve for a period generally up to six years dependent on their length of regular service.
- (b) Section D. Those who have completed their regular engagement and regular reserve liability in Section A may volunteer to enlist or re-engage in Section D.

3. Long Term Reserve (LTR). By virtue of the reserve Forces Act 1980, all individuals who joined the regular army on or after 28th February 1964, serve in the LTR up to the age of 45, following completion of their regular army

and regular reserve service. They are not liable for training, but can be called out in a national emergency.

4. Army Pensioners. These are individuals who have completed 22 years of regular service and draw a pension. They have no training liability and their recall liability is similar to the LTR.

C. *Command subordination/relationships of reserve forces*

The Director General Territorial Army and Organisation (two star) is the adviser on TA policy within the Ministry of Defence to the Army Board and other army department directorates with the Director Army Reserves (one star) as his chief-of-staff dealing with all matters directly concerned with the TA reserve and cadets.

A small number of TA formation headquarters exist specifically to command special-to-arm units grouped under them (e.g. an engineer or signals brigade headquarters). The remaining TA units and independent sub-units are commanded directly or through a brigade by the district headquarters in whose area they are located.

The commanders of TA formations are regular officers whose staffs consist of regulars and volunteers, and include volunteer deputy commanders (colonel).

The Commander, United Kingdom Field Army (three star) was appointed Inspector General TA in 1983 and, as such, is responsible for monitoring standards of operational efficiency and training in all TA units.

D. *Limitation on number of reserve officers*

The number of reserve officers is limited only by the establishment vacancies for reserve officers in the regular and reserve units, ships and formations. There is also a requirement to pass promotion qualification examinations.

E. *Full-time personnel assignment/support*

Some regular army staff (normally the commanding officer, quartermaster and regimental sergeant major) are integral to the independent units with which they are serving, and remain with it on mobilisation. Others including the Training Major, Permanent Staff Instructors (PSIs) and Permanent Staff Administrative Officers (PSAOs) are supernumerary and may be posted once mobilisation is complete.

II. *Personnel policies*

A. *Appointment of reserve officers*

The conditions for appointment to a reserve commission in the Territorial Army include:

1. domicile in the United Kingdom;
2. citizen of the United Kingdom;

3. age limitations;
4. educational requirements;
5. medical requirements;
6. special approval for those occupying certain government appointments in their civilian jobs.

Candidates who have no previous service will normally carry out basic training before appearing before a Selection Board, after which they must attend a 14-day TA Commissioning Course at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. They will then be appointed to a commission as a second lieutenant on the basis of a probationary period, normally of one year.

Direct appointment as officers in the Territorial Army may be granted to those who have previously:

1. served satisfactorily as officers in the regular forces, or in the reserve or auxiliary forces (including the UDR and Commonwealth Forces);
2. obtained qualifications for service as chaplains, doctors, dentists or nurses;
3. served satisfactorily as warrant officers in the regular army of the TA or UDR;
4. become eligible for direct appointment as quartermasters by virtue of previous service as warrant officers of the regular army or the TA.

B. *Reserve/regular officer policies*

Commander United Kingdom Field Army (three star), the Inspector-General Territorial Army, is responsible for monitoring standards of operational efficiency and training in all TA units.

After considerable discussion with many interested parties, the Inspector General issued a new directive in February 1985 on the recruitment, selection, assessment and training of potential Territorial Army officers.

The arrangements outlined in this directive represent a significant step forward in improving the quantity, calibre and training of potential Territorial Army officers.

C. *Assignments*

Volunteers for independent units join a local unit and generally follow the British regimental system of recruiting by geographic location. Volunteers who join sponsored units, may join a local unit if they live in either London or in other major urban areas where such a unit is located. Volunteers who live elsewhere in the country are sponsored through Central Volunteer Headquarters (CVHQ).

There are no pre-designated regular army personnel who would be assigned to TA units in the event of mobilisation.

D. *Legal position of reserve officers*

Reserve officers are subject to military discipline at all times, whereas other ranks are subject to military discipline only on training. Reserve officers are subject to the same disciplinary measures as their regular colleagues.

Civilian courts deal with offences against civilian law, and military courts deal with offenses against military law.

E. *Civilian employer support*

A civilian employer is under no legal obligation within the United Kingdom to release his employees for training within the reserves forces. In practice, employers vary widely in their support of the reserve forces.

An employer may:

1. insist that all training must be carried out within holiday periods;
2. allow one week's additional paid leave;
3. allow two week's additional unpaid leave;
4. allow two week's additional unpaid leave and then make up an individual forces rate of pay to his normal civilian rate.

Some employers make it practically impossible for a member of the reserve forces to complete his minimum commitment, and they have no obligation to do so. A programme of employer support similar to the ones in Canada is being started.

III. *Training*

A. *Officer initial/basic training*

Since September 1985, new training arrangements have applied to the training of potential officers in the Territorial Army. The new scheme is designed to be flexible enough to allow for the variation in military knowledge of individual potential officers and the differing time they have available to train. A potential officer may take between nine months and three years to complete the cycle. Training is divided into four phases:

- Phase 1 – basic training based on the Common Military Syllabus Territorial Army (CMS (TA)).
- Phase 2 – district-sponsored weekend training.
- Phase 3 – nine-day tactics and leadership course.
- Phase 4 – 14-day TA Commissioning Course at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.

Phase 1 and 3 training is conducted at infantry depôts.

District Assessment Boards (DAB) are mandatory for all candidates prior to their commencement of officer cadet training (towards the end of Phase 1 training).

District-sponsored week-end training within Phase 2 is supplemented where possible with unit training.

Entry standards have been laid down for courses at Phase 3 and 4 level. The Territorial Army Commissioning Course at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, is mandatory. Officer cadet status is given automatically to all candidates who pass the District Assessment Board.

B. Advanced officer selection and training

Units are responsible for the training of their own officers within the framework established by the brigade commander. Brigade headquarters provide training activities for officers within the brigade which include study periods, tactical teach-ins, as well as specialist individual training.

Courses normally of 15 days duration are provided at the regular army training establishments for special-to-arm training. Attendance on these courses is often a mandatory requirement for promotion. There are promotion examinations from lieutenant to captain and captain to major. Courses in staff duties are now provided both at Grade 3 and Grade 2 level.

The Territorial Army Command and Staff Course at the Army Staff College, Camberley, provides training for TA staff officers and TA officers about to command their units. The recommendations by commanding officers and brigade commanders are critical in the selection process for this course.

C. Active duty training for reserve officers

All members of the Territorial Army have an annual training obligation. Officers in independent units spend 15 days at in-camp training, up to 12 days in out-of-camp training and 15 days voluntary training.

However, it is quite likely that many officers will do considerable amounts of voluntary training in excess of the 15 days specified. The major limiting factor is how much time a volunteer officer is prepared or able to give to his TA.

Officers in sponsored units spend 15 days at in-camp training and four days in out-of-camp training. Officers in the Parachute Regiment and Special Air Service (SAS) territorial units have additional out-of-camp requirements for training.

Territorial Army units may attend annual camp at any time during the year, but the main period is from March to October. The annual in-camp training is based on a cycle during which those units with an overseas rôle in BAOR are able to train in Germany, normally every other year.

D. Extended active duty

In practical terms it is extremely difficult for TA officers either as individual reserves or within a TA unit to be accepted for extended active duty.

E. Training exercises

Reserve officers may be selected to participate in training exercises.

F. Exchange training

Substantial opportunities exist for exchange training with other NATO forces, although the exchange programme with Germany is by far the largest.

IV. Mobilisation

A. Mobilisation of the reserves

Before 1967 when the Territorial Army was reorganised, the concept of mobilisation was to provide reserve forces organised in divisions and brigades to reinforce the regular army worldwide and to defend the home base. This concept has now changed and the Territorial Army has the major rôle of providing units available for employment on specific tasks both at home and overseas.

In particular, the Territorial Army will:

1. complete the Army ORBAT of our NATO-committed and home defence forces and provide certain units with support;
2. assist in maintaining a secure United Kingdom base;
3. act as a basis for future expansion.

The arms, and in particular, logistic units needed to complete an increased and balanced ORBAT for general war, must be found from the reserves. These consist of the individual reserves which provide individual reinforcements, and the Territorial Army which, in general, provides reinforcing formed units.

The rôle of individual reinforcements, the great majority of whom are reservists, is to supply War Establishment Reinforcements (WER) to bring units, both regular and TA up to War Establishment (WE) and to provide Battle Casualty Replacements (BCRs).

Mobilisation is the act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organising national resources, and the process by which the armed forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes assembling and organising personnel, supplies and materials for active military service.

All mobilisation plans are prepared and, where possible, practiced in peacetime. These plans enable all TA units and individuals to be equipped and moved to their war locations as quickly as possible during the transition to war period. Call out is by one of a combination of the following methods:

1. Public broadcast on television, radio, and in the press. This is always followed by a postal notice.
2. Postal notice only when a public announcement is not considered suitable or desirable. Notices are dispatched under special arrangements with the Post Office.

Independent units mobilise at their own TA centres and move as formed bodies to their war locations. Sponsored units mobilise at nominated regular units in the United Kingdom. Individuals earmarked for posting overseas report to Reinforcement Drafting Units (RDUs).

B. Liability to recall in peace/war

Different categories of the reserves may be mobilised in accordance with the Reserve Force Act of 1980, which outlines the following full call-out liabilities:

1. To be called out by order of Her Majesty for service in any part of the world when war-like operations are in preparational progress.

No member of the Territorial Army may be called out under this liability until full use has been made of Section A of the Regular Reserves. TA Group B may not be called up under this liability which sometimes is referred to as "higher liability" or Queen's Order I (QOI).

2. To be called out by order of Her Majesty for service in any part of the world when national danger is imminent or a great emergency has arisen. This is sometimes referred to as the "lower liability" or Queen's Order II (QOII).
3. To be called out by the Secretary of State for Defence for home service in defence of the United Kingdom against actual or prospective attack.

B. OTHER NATO COUNTRIES

1. Canada

I. Reserve structure

A. General organisation

The National Defence Act (NDA) states that the Canadian forces (CF) are one service composed of the following components: the regular force; the reserve force; and the special force. The reserve force is that component of the Canadian forces consisting of members who are not on full-time active duty. It is, in turn, composed of the following sub-components: the Primary Reserve; the Supplementary List; the Cadet Instructors List; and the Canadian Rangers. The Primary Reserve includes the Militia (the ground component) and the Communications Reserve, in addition to the Naval Reserve and the Air Reserve. Members of the Primary Reserve are normally located in units or in headquarters, but there is also a Primary Reserve List of personnel who are not in organised units.

(i) Units (Land Forces Reserve)

The Canadian annual defence review, Defence 83, notes that there are 117 major and 14 minor units in 112 locations across the country. Of these units, 99 are combat arms units and the others are administrative units. Most of these units are assigned to the mobile command; and none is larger than a battalion in size. The non-combat units provide for transportation, medical and other logistical support. The units vary in size, especially at the battalion level. Battalions may have different numbers of companies, and most units are generally under strength. It is important to note that signal support is provided by the Communications Reserve rather than by the Militia and must be considered as part of ground support. There are 21 units (6 regiments, 12 squadrons and 3 troops) located in major Canadian cities throughout the country.

(ii) Individuals (reservists)

There are two major sources of individual reservists – the Primary Reserve Lists and the Supplementary List – and one minor source – the Cadet Instructors List.

The Primary Reserve Lists are carried by each of the reserve establishments, so there is a list for both the Militia and the Communications Reserves. There is, in addition, a non-service list which is commanded and controlled by National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). These lists are composed of members of the Primary Reserve who cannot be conveniently carried on unit or headquarters rosters. These members may be specialist officers for whom

there are no established positions in the Militia units or headquarters, members who for practical reasons have been exempted from weekly training sessions by their commanders, or members held for special types of employment.

The Supplementary List consists of members of the reserve force who are not required to perform duty or training except when on active service. It consists of ex-regular officers and other ranks, ex-Primary Reservists, and former Cadet Instructors who have volunteered to return to service in an emergency. Members of the Supplementary List are obliged to serve only when placed on active service by the Governor in Council or when called out on an emergency. The list is administered by the National Defence Headquarters, and it serves as a record of former members of the Canadian forces and of civilians who have special qualifications that are useful to the Canadian forces. The only obligation of these personnel is to notify the Director, Personnel Information Systems at NDHQ/DPIS, of any change of address or other circumstances which might affect his status and to verify the information on the Annual Reporting Card sent by NPHQ/DPIS. Many of these members would probably volunteer in the event of mobilisation.

Finally, the Cadet Instructors List is a very minor source of individual reservists. It consists of officers of the reserve force whose primary duty is the supervision, administration and training of cadets. Much of this service is voluntary without pay. These officers are obliged to serve only when placed on active service by the Governor in Council or when called out on an emergency. They may be required to undergo annual training but generally do not.

Special note should be made of the Canadian Rangers. These are unit members of the reserve force who are resident in the sparsely settled, northern, coastal, and isolated areas of Canada, who volunteer to hold themselves in readiness for service but who are not required to undergo annual training. They provide a military presence in those areas which cannot conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the reserve force. These native men of the land possess special knowledge of their areas and perform such tasks as reporting suspicious or unusual activities, participating in exercises or operations, providing detailed information concerning their local areas, and assisting in immediate local defence by containing and observing small enemy detachments pending the arrival of other forces. There are 650 rangers organised into 12- to 50-man patrols in 34 different locations in the northern areas. They normally operate as individuals and perform their tasks without pay in conjunction with their civilian occupations.

B. Reserve structure and administration

Information included in section A.

C. Command subordination/relationships of reserve forces

1. Naval reserve units are under the direct command of the Naval Reserve Headquarters in Quebec city – a branch of Headquarters Maritime Command Halifax, Nova Scotia.

2. Land forces reserve units of the combat arms, logistics and medical support (Militia) are under command of Headquarters Mobile Command. They are allocated to area and district headquarters as follows:

- Militia Area Pacific, Vancouver, British Columbia (19 units)
- Militia Area Prairie, Winnipeg, Manitoba (37 units)
- Militia Area Central, Toronto, Ontario (60 units)
- Secteur de l'Est, Montreal, Quebec (36 units)
- Militia Area Atlantic, Halifax, Nova Scotia (31 units)

Militia Units

– Artillery	18
– Armour	18
– Infantry	52
– Field Engineer	11
– Service Battalions	20
– Medical Companies	12
– Bands	57

3. Communications units are under command of Headquarters Communications Command, Ottawa, Ontario.

4. Air reserve units are under command of Headquarters Air Command, Winnipeg, Manitoba.

D. Limitation on number

The overall total of officers and men is authorised by the government. Detailed control is exercised through reserve unit establishments.

E. Full-time personnel assignment/support

Mobile command provides a regular support staff to Militia units for the purpose of aiding in administration and training support matters. A regular force captain is usually assigned to battalion headquarters to act as adjutant and training officer for the companies of the battalion. In addition, a non-commissioned officer is assigned to act as chief instructor and another non-commissioned officer to handle supply matters. Finally, there is a non-commissioned officer at company level to

assist with training and other matters. There are no civilian employees who work with Militia units.

A similar system of regular force support is in place at naval, communications and air reserve units.

II. Personnel policies

A. Appointment of reserve officers

Officer selection and training

Selection of Militia officers is the same as for regular force officers. A person who is medically fit, and who is a university graduate, may be interviewed by a personnel selection officer and then by a board of review. A favorable recommendation by the board is necessary for a commission. A programme also exists which allows selected enlisted reservists to secure a Militia commission. Area and/or district headquarters may provide the training courses for those newly commissioned.

Similar systems of selection exist for naval, communications and air reserve.

Officer categories according to basic training

1. "Born" reserve officers (direct entry officers);
2. former regular force officers;
3. commissioned from the ranks; and
4. Canadian service colleges.

Categories according to service duties in peacetime

1. Primary Reserve: members perform duties and training required of them;
2. Supplementary Reserve: perform no duties or training unless they volunteer or are placed on active service;
3. Cadet Instructor List: Administer and train cadets; and
4. Canadian Rangers: voluntary duties in the north.

Conditions of appointment

1. Citizenship. Must be a Canadian citizen, except that a citizen of another country with landed immigrant status who can meet the professional qualifications may be considered for enrolment.
2. Character. Must have a record of good conduct and be recommended by commanding officer of the unit.
3. Age.
 - (a) Except as provided in subparagraphs (b), (c) and (d), an applicant must have reached his 17th, but

not 35th, birthday on the date of enrolment.

- (b) An applicant applying for enrolment and training in maritime surface and sub-surface, aircrew, artillery or infantry must have reached his 17th, but not 24th, birthday on the date of enrolment.
- (c) A former officer of the Canadian forces may be enrolled in the Primary Reserve provided he has at least one year to serve before reaching compulsory release age.
- (d) Maximum age limits may be exceeded on authority of the commander when it is clearly in the interests of the Canadian forces.

4. Academic/professional.

- (a) An applicant who is not a former officer of the Canadian forces and whose officer classification does not require special academic qualifications should have a complete credit for a high school programme leading to university entrance, at a level or grade that is four years short of a basic baccalaureat degree and that includes:
 - English or French;
 - science;
 - mathematics; and
 - at least one of history, social studies, geography or economics.
- (b) A former officer of the Canadian forces who is otherwise qualified for enrolment may be considered regardless of educational qualifications.
- (c) For certain specialist classifications, an applicant must possess academic or professional or other specialist standards.

5. Medical. Shall meet the standards prescribed for the classification for which enrolment is being considered.

6. Selection tests. Pass selection-prescribed tests.

7. Pre-enrolment screening. Be capable of being security-cleared to the level specified for the applicable officer classification.

B. Reserve/regular officer policies

No difference in status.

C. Assignments

Reservists: members of the reserves volunteer for units located in their home areas. Per-

sonnel are recruited mainly from regimental and high school cadet corps, from student militia courses, from the regular forces, and from other volunteers of the general public. Non-unit members of the Primary Reserve are carried on the Primary Reserve List and have no assignments.

Pre-designated active personnel: if the reserves are mobilised to serve as a training base for total mobilisation, there are pre-designated active service personnel who would fill key billets in the units. These personnel would be company-grade officers and key non-commissioned officers.

D. Legal position of the reserve officer vis-a-vis his civilian employer

There are presently no laws governing this aspect.

E. Civilian employer support of reservists

There is no law requiring civilian employers to support the reserve forces of Canada by granting "special military leave" etc.

A group of prominent businessmen has been organised to provide "ad hoc" support and community involvement with the reserves.

III. Training

A. Officer initial training

There are several methods whereby a volunteer can qualify to become a reserve officer:

(i) Navy.

- (a) Reserve Entry Scheme Officers (RESO).* Applicants under this plan are enrolled as officer cadets while attending university or college and receiving training at the division during the winter and receiving training at regular force schools during the summer. Commissioned in rank of sub-lieutenant on completion of classification training.
- (b) Direct Entry Officer (DEO).* Must be university-trained or have merchant marine certificate.
- (c) Commissioning from the ranks (CFR).* Serving members may be commissioned from the ranks providing they are recommended by the commanding officer and have a minimum rank of petty officer second class and a minimum of eight years service.
- (d) Ex-regular force.* Ex-members of the regular force may be enrolled in naval reserve in their former

classification provided they were released honorably and have not reached the Compulsory Release Age.

(ii) Army and communications.

- (a) Enrolled as officer cadet.* Trained under various officer production programmes by phases including RESO (see *(a)* above). Commissioned as second lieutenant after completion of basic officer qualification training phases or blocks.
- (b) Commissioned from the ranks as second lieutenant (private/corporal), lieutenant, (master corporal/sergeant), captain (master or chief warrant officer).* Further promotion requires qualifying courses which are the same for all officers.

(iii) Air force.

In addition to the plans in the navy section above, the air reserve sends pilots through the Regular Officer Pilot Training Plan (ROPTP). It also has a Reserve Officer Flying Assessment (ROFA) programme under which pilot candidates may attend an air force school for assessment as to suitability. Upon successful assessment of the ROFA, these pilots receive fixed wing or rotary wing training after which they are awarded the Canadian armed forces pilot badge and are commissioned.

B. Advanced officer selection and training

In the militia, qualification for promotion is achieved by progressing through a series of 14 blocks of training. This is called the Militia Individual Training Career Profile (MITCP).

Some of these blocks are home-study sessions while others are formal courses. For promotion from the rank of captain through to lieutenant-colonel, there is also a minimum time in rank requirement. It is possible for an officer who takes qualifying courses each year to progress through the 14 blocks in 12 years.

C. Active duty training for reserve officers

Qualified reservists are encouraged to volunteer for class C service with regular force units in Canada and Germany. This duty is usually less than a year in duration. Personnel are used to bring units up to strength for major exercises and other purposes. In addition, when Canada contributes units to United Nations peace-keeping operations, reservists are encouraged to volunteer for class C service for a six-month period (the normal period of deployment). The number of personnel on extended active duty depends on service needs and money available.

D. *Extended active duty*

Reserve officers may apply to fill regular force vacancies on a need to basis. Contracts are for an indefinite period of service and are reviewed and renewed on an annual basis.

E. *Training exercises*

Collective training (in the army) is conducted:

- (i) District level – annually;
- (ii) Area (brigade level) – annually;
- (iii) Divisional level – bi-annually as part of the regular force formation training in the Rendez-Vous series;
- (iv) Corps/army level – as part of fly-over training on NATO Fallex.

F. *Exchange training*

Very little is done in this respect. On occasion a Canadian reservist could take advantage of training outside the country, i.e. participation with allied unit in an exercise (United Kingdom) or attendance at USMC Command and Staff Course (Quantico) or other such exchange opportunities.

IV. *Mobilisation*

A. *Mobilisation of the reserves*

Mobilisation of the reserve forces would be accomplished by the Governor in Council, when acting in pursuance of the powers vested in him by Section 31 of the National Defence Act. He has the power to place the reserve force, any unit or element thereof, or any officer or man thereof, on active service. In an emergency, the Minister of National Defence may call up to perform any military duty other than training such officers and other personnel, and such units, as he considers necessary. Wartime mobilisation would be a political act requiring parliamentary approval before the minister could countersign the governor's declaration.

At the present time, detailed plans for mobilisation of the reserve force are still being developed. Currently, units and individuals, upon notice, would report to their armories or to a central location for those on the Primary Reserve Lists. Members of the Supplementary List would be invited to volunteer their services, and it is expected that many would do so.

There have been no actual mobilisation exercises conducted specifically to determine how mobilisation would operate in practice. Units do practice alerts, but this is part of their normal field exercises, and no surprise alerts have been held.

The Primary Reserve of the Canadian forces would be used to augment the regular force by providing units up to company level which would be assigned to regular force bat-

talions in Canada or in Germany. Individuals from other units, from the Primary Reserve Lists, and volunteers from the Supplementary List would be used as individual fillers to bring regular force units up to full strength or to provide specialists in technical areas.

B. *Liability to recall in peace or wartime*

(i) The Primary Reserve. This "active" portion of the reserve force may be:

- (a) ordered to take 60 days unit training and 15 days collective training each year;
- (b) called out on full-time service by the minister in the event of an emergency;
- (c) called out on full-time service by the government in the event of a disaster;
- (d) called out on full-time service by the chief of defence staff for aid of the civil power.

(ii) The reserve force.

- (a) All or any part of the reserve force may be placed on active service by the government because of an emergency in the defence of Canada and in support of NATO, the United Nations, or other measures of collective defence.
- (b) Any member may be employed full-time on a voluntary basis.
- (c) There is no periodic recall.

C. *Other mobilisation aspects*

A comprehensive reorganisation of units, training missions, locations, equipment holdings, etc., is underway as a result of a recommendation to the Department of National Defence that a National Mobilisation Plan should be developed and implemented. Accordingly units would train to a specific rôle and at mobilisation would be able to perform their assigned task in a new formation.

2. *Denmark*

I. *Reserve structure*

A. *General organisation*

All Danish reservists (including reserve officers, sergeants and corporals) are members of the Augmentation Force or the Mobilisation Force; and therefore, Denmark does not have any reserve units. Some individual reserve officers are assigned to international military staffs in the NATO structure (army, navy and air force).

B. Reserve structure and administration

All assigned reserve officers are managed from their "home" – regiments, which are responsible for education, training, exercises, call-up, etc. Reserve officers have to be trained in several jobs such as platoon leader, company second-in-command, company commander and sometimes in staff jobs and/or similar jobs in the navy and air force.

C. Limitation on number of reserve officers

Reserve officers' appointments are generally not limited except for lieutenant colonels, who are only appointed according to vacancies in mobilisation jobs.

II. Personnel policies

A. Appointment of reserve officers

A candidate for reserve officer must:

1. Be a Danish citizen.
2. Have completed at least nine years civilian school duty.
3. Have completed his national service commitment in the regular forces. At present, that amounts to six to 12 months of service.
4. Have completed the six-month course at the non-commissioned officer school, and have been selected by the commander of the school as fit for reserve officers school.
5. Pass successfully the final examination of the reserve officers school after a period of four and a half months.
6. A candidate can be nominated as a reserve officer between 18 and 32 years of age.

Doctors, dentists and veterinary surgeons receive reduced military training during the university summer holidays, ending with appointment to lieutenant (medical or veterinary corps.). A Priest (lutheran) can, at once, be appointed as "Chaplain of the Reserve" but will be outside the normal ranks system; he is neither private nor officer.

B. Reserve/regular policies

All "born" reserve officers (officers of the reserve) receive the same basic training. At the end of their regular service, former regular officers can accept an assignment to a mobilisation post, thus becoming reserve officer.

There are two main categories of reserve officer:

1. Volunteer reserve officers with common standby contract. These officers undertake a four-year engagement rating three week's service per year.

2. Volunteer reserve officers with limited standby contract and without contract. It is possible for most of these officers to get a contract with limited standby. These officers undertake engagement according to the armed forces' demand and their own possibilities.

There is no difference of status compared to regular officers, except that any regular officer always outranks a reserve officer of equal rank, regardless of seniority involved. Uniforms, insignia, etc., are identical.

C. Assignments

The reserve officer must be qualified to carry out, in wartime, the following duties connected with the rank in question (e.g. in the army).

1. Lieutenant: platoon leader in a company-size unit.
2. First lieutenant: second-in-command in a company-size unit.
3. Captain: commander or second-in-command of a company-size unit. Operations officer or equivalent in the battalion staff.
4. Major: commander of a company-size unit. Operations officer or equivalent in the battalion or brigade staff.
5. Lieutenant-colonel of the reserve: battalion commander or wartime garrison commander.

In the navy and the air force, the duties are generally more specialised than mentioned above. So far, no captains (navy) have been promoted, and the number of commanders is rather limited.

D. Legal position of reserve officers

When not called up for service, a reserve officer has to pay for all his articles of clothing. A certain percentage of the price paid for the uniform is refunded.

E. Civilian employer support of reservists

Since August 1989 a programme with the participation of the Ministry of Defence, the Danish Employers Association and National Board of Communities promotes understanding and support from the civil employers.

III. Training

A. Officer initial/basic training

The basic training of a reserve officer lasts 18-21 months, during which he obtains the rank of lieutenant.

B. Advanced officer selection and training

The programme for advanced training of officers requires that a reserve officer, in order

to be promoted to captain, must complete a correspondence course lasting 12 months, including an exam for which he is called on duty.

C. *Training during recall*

If at all possible, reserve officers, during recall periods, will be trained in their own appointments, principally in recalled units.

D. *Training exercises*

In the army, during exercises, some regular officers may act as umpires, while reserve officers take their command. Normal appointments in these cases are: lieutenants – platoon commanders; first lieutenants – company second-in-command; majors – company commanders; captains may act as company second-in-command or as company commanders. Outside of recalls and manoeuvres, there are possibilities of taking over from regular officers during the latter's leave or other absence.

IV. *Mobilisation*

A. *Mobilisation of reserves*

All reserve officers are liable to be mobilised on an individual basis or as part of a general mobilisation.

B. *Liability to recall in peace/war*

Reserve officers with a common standby contract can be recalled in wartime or in periods of international tension, substituting or supplementing a mobilisation of key personnel, units or general mobilisation. Recall in peacetime can take place as described above.

C. *Exception for recall*

On general or partial mobilisation, all reserve officers below retirement age are liable to be called up with the units to which they are assigned.

D. *Other mobilisation aspects*

Danish defence relies mainly on mobilisable forces, of which the reserve officer is an important part. 80% of the full-strength wartime force is mobilisable, and since 1988, also non-commissioned officers and privates have had the possibility of signing contracts with the armed forces, in order to improve training and readiness of the total mobilisable force.

3. *Greece*

I. *Reserve structure*

A. *General organisation*

In Greece there are no reserve or territorial military services or units separate from the regular national armed forces. These have the exclusive and sole responsibility for the

recruitment, organisation, and training of all military personnel and for the defence of the country. The national armed forces consist of conscripts (called up annually for their national military service) and of the permanent (professional) officers and other ranks who constitute their framework. There are no permanent or professional private soldiers, though there are volunteers for fixed-time service periods (periods of service).

Military service is compulsory for all male Greeks, with some exceptions (monks, priests, disabled, heads of family, criminals, etc.). Also, people who have served in the armed forces of any allied country are exempted from the obligation to serve in the Greek forces. Women are not normally recruited, though they are accepted in the armed forces as volunteers (officers and non-commissioned officers). Positions for non-combat military services are often proclaimed for them, for fixed-time periods (three to five years), in all arms (army, navy, air force), but in non-combat arms, especially for auxiliary services (medical, communications, office work, etc.).

Conscripts for the armed forces are normally called up at various times of the year, depending on the service (army, navy, air force), regiment, and specialisation, etc., at the age of 21, though they may be called up earlier if needed. They may volunteer for their national service earlier than 21, even from the age of 16. The number of volunteers to be accepted is fixed each year. In case of general mobilisation or war, as well as under special circumstances, the normal age for recruitment can be postponed up to the age of 26 or even 29 in the case of students who are in the middle of their successful studies for higher or highest education, or if they have a brother serving in the armed forces at the same time.

The length of service varies for each "arm" and specialisation. The normal time is 21 months for the army, 23 months for the air force, and 25 months for the navy. For reserve officers and for specialised categories of conscripts, this time gets longer, but they are paid as professionals. On the other hand, the length of service may be reduced to half the normal time or even less, under certain circumstances, e.g. if the conscript is a father of many children, if he is the only or the oldest son of a father incapable for work, etc. In these cases, he is allowed to only serve the time required for completion of his military training and for restricted practice. Reduced-time service is not applicable to officers.

After completion of their compulsory military service, reserve officers may re-enlist, if they wish, for definite time periods (six months to three years). However, they can never become regular soldiers unless they pass through a professional military school. There may be exceptions for wartime periods. Besides the regular and the

reserve soldiers, there are some "in-between" categories of well-paid military personnel who fill specialised positions proclaimed by the Ministry of Defence; they are volunteers for medium terms (five years) which can be renewed.

Recruitment of all conscripts and reservists is carried out by the recruitment service of the army. Its headquarters is in Athens, and it has branch offices throughout the country; one in each of all 54 civil administrative regions (prefectures). All Greek male citizens are registered in these offices at birth. Besides the main army recruitment service, there are two central recruitment officers for the other "arms", one for the navy and one for the air force, but they have no regional branch offices in the prefectures. Recruitment services are also established in all military units, large and small, for the reception, registration, movement, etc., of the recruits, and for handling demobilisation matters. After completion of their compulsory national service, men are registered in the catalogues of reservists. It is noted that retired regular officers are not considered reservists and they are registered in separate lists of the Ministry of Defence as "ex-regular officers in retirement".

B. Reserve structure and administration

There are two categories of reservists; category A which includes those who are under 40 years old and category B extending up to the age of 50 or 55 though this age limit may be further extended under special circumstances. For officers the age limit is 60. Reservists can be called up again for training in new weapons and techniques as well as for military exercises, or for any other reason considered necessary by the Ministry of Defence. The call may be general or partial, by area, category or arm, regiment, specialisation, rank or even personal. In the case of general mobilisation or war, the post for each recruit is pre-designated in accordance with the existing plan of mobilisation. The same plan provides for the formation of the required additional large and small units; their commanders and basic cadres (officers, other ranks) consist of regular staff designated for the purpose beforehand.

II. Personnel policies

A. Appointment of reserve officers

Reserve officers and non-commissioned officers are selected from amongst the conscripts after basic training which lasts about two months. The criteria for the selection of reserve officers are based on the education of the conscript, his civilian occupation, his native area, and other more specific qualifications, not excluding his character, enthusiasm and psychological or conscientious factors. Some of the criteria also influence decisions concerning the "arm" or the regiment in which they are to be posted or even the special unit for which a candidate is most suited.

B. Reserve/regular officer policies

Reserve officers in active service receive the same pay and normal allowances, and they enjoy the same privileges (travel, medical, etc.) as regular officers. They are treated the same as their professional colleagues of the same rank. When out of military service, they receive no remuneration of any kind, unless they became invalids while in active service. Invalid officers are pensioned with full pay and allowances as their professional counterparts and get regular promotions. However, all reserve officers may make use of the facilities of military clubs and shops set up for professional officers and can participate in various events and activities (military, national, social) of the regular soldiers.

C. Assignments

All reserve officers are registered in special catalogues showing the units to which they are to report if called up again. These catalogues change with time as new officers come in and the old ones grow older. Any officer condemned by courts (civil or military) for serious crimes is crossed out from the catalogues.

D. Legal position of reserve officers

The time spent in the forces by all reservists (including private soldiers) is added to the time of their civilian employment for pension purposes and early retirement. During the period of military service, reservists are granted leave of absence from their civilian employment, with full pay. However, if they are public servants or employed in government enterprises, they can only get one of the two salaries (military or civilian); they have to make a choice.

III. Training

A. Officer initial/basic training

Initial training is done when conscripts are first called up for their national service, normally at 21, though they may be called earlier according to the actual needs of the armed forces.

Training for officers is carried out in the reserve officers schools, established in various parts of the mainland and on some islands. Selection is effected after basic training of the conscripts, according to the needs of the armed forces each year.

There are nine reserve officers schools proper, of which five are for the land forces, i.e. infantry, artillery, tanks, engineers, and signals, one is for the main auxiliary services, i.e. transport, war materials, and medical. Training time in these schools is normally four to six months. After completion of training, the students are designated "cadets" and are posted in their regiments and units. Their commissioning to the rank of second lieutenant is effected one

month before completion of their national service and demobilisation.

B. Active duty training for reserve officers

From time to time reserve officers, especially younger officers, are called up for training purposes in order to become acquainted with new weapons and equipment or to participate in advanced educational seminars in military techniques, new methods of command, and new systems.

IV. Mobilisation

A. Mobilisation of reserves

Reserve officers have to be in readiness for mobilisation up to a certain age (depending on the rank, specialisation, and the area of their residency), which may vary from 35 to 50 or even older in special cases.

Mobilisation is declared by special decree of the Ministry of Defence, through personal written orders and/or public announcements in the press and the mass media. These orders or announcements also indicate the place where everyone is to report.

For the period of military service, reservists are granted leaves of absence by their civilian employers with full salary. If they are public servants, they must choose which of the two salaries (military or civilian) they prefer.

After his demobilisation from national service, military service records for each reserve officer are transferred to the military recruitment office in the area of his birth place.

B. Liability to recall in peace/war

Reserve officers are mobilised either for training and educational purposes, special assignments, emergency cases or national defence.

4. Norway

I. Reserve structure

A. General organisation

Conscription system

In principle, the armed forces have always been based on conscription with some sort of militia or mobilisation system. The traditions in this field can be traced as far back as the year of 950. One of the ancient Kings, Hakon the Good, then established the first organised military system.

The history of kings tells the following about King Hakon's law:

"King Hakon made a law, that all inhabited land along the sea-coast, as far back from it as the salmon swims up

the rivers, should be divided into ship sites according to the districts, and the law stated how many ships there should be, when the whole people were called out on service, whenever a foreign army came to the country.

The law also included the order that beacons then should be erected upon the hills, so that every man could see from one to the other, and it is told that a war-signal could be given in seven days, from the most southern point of Norway and all the way up to North Cape."

In 1682, the army was restructured and given a permanent organisation. According to the system of that time, a stipulated farm, or a number of farms, were jointly responsible for providing and maintaining one soldier. These soldiers were formed into companies/regiments on a regional basis.

This arrangement remained in force up to 1799, when conscription was introduced as a form of national service and later included in the Constitution of 1814.

Norwegian law requires today every Norwegian male citizen, physically and mentally fit to be subject to military conscription from the age of 20 to 44. Actual enrolment takes place at 19 for the approximately 30 000 in an annual contingent.

The initial service is 12 months in the army plus refresher training periods, totalling 15 months. In the navy and air force, the initial service is usually 15 months.

B. Reserve structure and administration

Norway does not actually have a reserve forces system in the true sense of the word. There are only a few regular or standing forces in peacetime, and Norway is thus wholly and fully dependent on rapid mobilisation forces.

Many defence problems are due to the size and location of the population. This means that the reserve or mobilisation forces are not always activated near their area of operations.

Norway has to make plans for rapid mobilisation and transfer. The principle of local recruitment is maintained in order to achieve rapid activation.

The population dispersion also creates transport requirements. At first the soldiers shall gather from their dispersed living places to their unit depôt. Thereafter, the units must move to different deployment areas.

A rapid mobilisation also depends on a flexible call-up system based on a War Service Card issued each year to all conscripts and regular personnel.

This card contains information on assignment, unit, and reporting place. All per-

sonnel assignments are reviewed once a year, and kept up-to-date at all times. The mobilisation plans are adjusted the same way. It is a basic principle that all personnel are assigned according to their specialties – both military and civilian – and kept in the same post as long as possible.

The administrative (depôt) units are responsible for this posting. This comprehensive operation now is simplified by use of data processing for all the mobilisation forces. The administrative (depôt) units are also responsible for storing and maintenance of weapons, ammunition and all other equipment according to approved tables of organisation and equipment.

Officers and non-commissioned officers assigned to these administrative (depôt) units in peace are earmarked to fill key positions within the units to be mobilised.

The Home Guard

The Home Guard is a force of some 90 000 men organised in small units of squad, platoon, and company size. The men keep their personal weapons and equipment at home, and unit weapons are stored centrally in each local community.

This enables the Home Guard, in the event of a conflict, to be on their defence objectives and other tasks in a very short time. Recruitment for the Home Guard is partly through a volunteer system, partly by transfer of surplus personnel from the mobilisation lists of the services upon completion of three months basic training.

The training of Home Guard personnel takes place on a local basis at training centres in the various districts. The annual training period is, at present, 50 hours or six consecutive days. The mission of the Home Guard is to defend key points within their area, post guards on vital objectives, take part in traffic control and, during the first hectic period of a crisis or conflict, to assist in and protect the process of mobilisation. While the majority of the Home Guard units are from the army, some are also found in the other services. The navy Home Guard man some 350 guard cutters in a variety of rôles.

In the air force, some anti-aircraft artillery units are organised and manned by the Home Guard.

All Home Guard personnel have completed a period of initial service within one of the three services and the average age is about 33-34 years.

C. Command subordination/relationships of reserve forces

Since the Norwegian conscription and mobilisation system is basic throughout the

forces, the standing forces and the reserve forces are integrated.

D. Limitation on number of reserve officers

The number of reserve officers in the mobilised forces is sufficient for filling all needed positions with reserves. However, since many key positions demand highly-trained officers, these officers are found in the standing forces. There are too few fully-trained reserve officers to fill these positions to make true reserve positions.

E. Full-time personnel assignment/support

In the army, 10% of officers are regular officers. The ratio is higher in the navy and the air force due to the fact that most units are also active in peacetime.

II. Personnel policies

A. Appointment of reserve officers

Initially all officers, regulars and reserves, start with the same basic training for the normal conscript period. The regulars continue extended training while the reserves are assigned to the mobilisation units.

B. Reserve/regular officer policies

When they are on duty, there are no differences in policy except for the salary and welfare benefit arrangements.

C. Assignments

Reservists are assigned to units or to individual positions. The reserve officers are mobilised at the same dépôt unit for their entire career but they are rotated in different positions as they take training courses and on the job training.

There are also pre-designated active duty personnel assigned to reserve units. Norwegian law gives officers who have done duty longer than the basic conscription training period another 10 years of service with the mobilisation force, i.e. up to 55 years of age. They may even stay longer on a voluntary basis up to receiving a pension for their age. They enter their mobilisation positions according to their rank and competence.

D. Legal position of reserve officers

When on duty, the reserve officer has the same obligations and security as the regular officer.

Off duty, there are no special legal situations in peacetime.

If war breaks out, there is a royal decree which gives the reserve officer authority to act in certain situations without formal orders on his way to his mobilisation unit and when commanding his unit a higher level command is established.

E. *Civilian employer support of reservists*

The legal requirements of the Norwegian conscription system mean that no reservist is in danger of losing his job while performing obligatory military service.

There are several agreements between employers and employee organisations where policy has been agreed upon to provide full pay or partial pay when reservists are performing refresher training.

Since conscription is fundamental in the Norwegian society and national culture, most employers support the system.

However, the reserve officer often occupies key positions in civilian life and, as such, refreshment training is a burden for the employers.

III. *Training*

A. *Officer initial/basic training*

Initial military service for the average army soldier starts with three months of recruit training. This basic training is carried out at special training centres located in southern Norway.

After finishing their basic training, most of the conscripts are transferred to units – companies and battalions – which in reality perform two formal functions: continue the training, and produce units for the mobilisation forces.

These units are, during this “unit training period”, M-day forces (standing units). Those soldiers who are picked out for specialist training will go to a technical training centre for approximately another three months and then join the standing units.

Officer candidate school

Each branch of the army has an officer candidate school. Applicants to these schools must have a high standard of civilian education (high school) and are selected after going through specific and rather comprehensive entry tests. The school lasts 12 months and implies a further 12 months compulsory service, as a sergeant, normally with a standing unit.

Upon completion of the “compulsory service year”, these non-commissioned officers are then promoted to second lieutenant and placed “in the reserve” with their mobilisation unit. They will thereafter be called up for refresher training with their unit normally for 30 days every third year.

Most of the reserve officers and non-commissioned officers have the background and service obligation in peacetime just addressed. In this connection, it should be mentioned that to become a regular officer, the grade I officers must go through the military academy (three

years) and the grade II officers the advanced officer school (one year) in addition to schooling and training already mentioned.

B. *Advanced officer selection and training*

This may be done on a voluntary basis by participating together with the regulars.

C. *Active duty training for reserve officers*

The reserve officer may sign a three-year contract to serve 45 days during the period. This may be done together with active units. Some reserve officers, mostly students, do voluntary duty during their summer holidays.

Refresher training

After completion of the initial service, the soldier returns to his home. He is then transferred to a mobilisation unit, where an administrative unit (depôt unit) will keep him on record as long as he is liable to serve as soldier in the event of war – up to the age of 44.

Until he is 34 years old, he will normally be assigned to a mobile field unit – or first-priority unit (brigade, group, or combat team). From 35 to 44, he will join local defence or supply units.

After the age of 45, the individual has no obligations as far as compulsory military service is concerned, but may volunteer to serve in the Home Guard or the civil defence.

Present regulations permit the following amount of refresher training to be carried out; however, manpower and economy may be limiting factors:

Maximum five refresher training periods each not exceeding 21 days for the individual as long as he stays with a first-priority army unit. Total length of refresher training periods should, however, not exceed 84 days for the individual during his time in a first-priority unit.

First-priority field forces (combat brigades) will be exercised every third year, other regional units will be trained every fifth year or so.

Personnel doing initial 15 months' service (approximately 20% of an annual contingent) will normally not be called up for refresher training, except for those transferred to Home Guard and special categories in the navy.

In total, the army calls up for refresher training some 20 000 men per year for periods from 12-21 days, whereas the coastal artillery and the air force call up some 3 000 each.

During the refresher training periods, every man serves in his mobilisation assignment. Training is progressive and realistic, normally leading up to a final field exercise in which the unit practices its full operational rôle (wartime task).

D. Inactive duty training for reserve officers

Norway tries to stimulate voluntary service by various means, special refresher courses and correspondence courses combined with a practical training period, which can be taken during periods when it is suitable for the individual.

E. Extended active duty

Normally, no opportunity except as part of UN peace-keeping force.

F. Training exercises

Reserve officers can be selected to participate in exercises.

G. Exchange training

Norway participates in exchange training with other nations.

*IV. Mobilisation**A. Mobilisation of reserves*

All personnel in mobilisation units are given notice each year by special cards, some of which are marked with colour codes.

When activation is required, these cards may be referred to when orders are announced by broadcasting and television. If time permits, activation by mail or telegram is used.

Full mobilisation will be announced by use of all means possible, sirens, church bells, radio, television, etc. Telephone, police channels and messengers will be used when applicable. Reservists will immediately report to their mobilisation depôts as detailed in the orders received in advance.

B. Exceptions for recall

Reserve officers in key positions in the wartime civil establishment may be excepted for recall.

5. United States*I. Reserve structure**A. General organisation*

Overall responsibility at the Department of Defence (DOD) for the reserve components is vested in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence for Reserve Affairs.

An important component of DOD is the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB), first created by the Secretary of Defence in 1949 and made a statutory body by the Congress in 1952.

The board is composed of 21 members, including a civilian chairman, the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, one regular officer

from each of the three military departments, two reserve officers from each of the six Department of Defence reserve components, a coast guard officer, and a reserve general or flag officer, who serves without vote as military advisor to the chairman and as executive officer to the board.

The board is the only formal means by which the Secretary of Defence consults with high-ranking non-active duty reservists. The individual services also have policy boards which meet and help develop policy and guidance for each service.

B. Reserve structure and administration

Within the service, each service Secretary has an Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs.

The Chief, Army Reserve, and the Chief, Air Force Reserve, are reserve major generals on full-time active duty and who advise their respective chief-of-staff on reserve matters.

The Director of Naval Reserve is a naval reserve rear admiral who also serves as Chief, Naval Reserve, and has two naval reserve rear admirals on his staff. One acts as the Deputy Chief, Naval Reserve, at USNR Headquarters in New Orleans, and one as his Deputy Director on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington DC.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Marine Corps Reserve Affairs is an active duty major general. Similarly, the Chief, Coast Guard Reserve, is an active duty rear admiral. Overall responsibility for the coast guard reserve lies with the commandant of the coast guard, subject to regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation and agreed to by the Secretary of the Navy.

The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is joint agency of the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force and is responsible for national guard matters. NGB is led by a national guard lieutenant general serving on active duty and is assisted by an admiral national guard major general and an air national guard major general who also serve on active duty at NGB.

The United States has seven reserve components:

<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>
Army National Guard	Navy Reserve
Army Reserve	Marine Corps Reserve
<i>Air force</i>	<i>Coast guard</i>
Air National Guard	Coast Guard Reserve
Air Force Reserve	

and two other components where operational control is transferred to the Navy in wartime:

Public Health Service;
National Oceanographic and Aeronautical
Administration.

*C. Command subordination/relationships of
reserve forces*

Although the Total Force Policy was first announced as such by the Secretary of Defence in 1969, the United States has relied extensively on the national guard and reserves throughout its history.

The United States has never maintained, in peacetime, sufficient regular military forces to meet the demands of war. The current Total Force Policy places increased reliance on the national guard and reserve components to meet national defence requirements. This policy has gone far to integrate the active, national guard and reserve organisations into a single military force.

The Department of Defence is providing increased support to the national guard and reserve forces in terms of funding, equipment and training assistance.

D. Limitation on number of reserve officers

Budgetary constraints, as applicable to each service, provide limitations on the numbers of reserve officers who can be on active duty, in troop units, and assigned to some mobilisation positions.

E. Full-time personnel assignment/support

A critical element in improving the readiness of the army reserve is the number of personnel available to provide full-time support for its soldiers and units. Four categories of personnel form the army reserve's full-time support team: Active Component soldiers, active guard/reserve (AGR) soldiers, Army Reserve civilian technicians, and Department of the Army civilians. Each of these groups provides its particular strengths to the Army Reserve's Full-Time Support Programme. Active army soldiers provide current experience with Active Component equipment, operational doctrine, and training techniques; AGR soldiers provide Reserve Component expertise and training and assignment flexibility; civilian technicians provide continuity, institutional memory, and ties with the local civilian community; and Department of the Army civilians provide the clerical skills that support all levels of army reserve administrative operations. Together, these team players enable drilling reservists to concentrate their limited training time on preparing for their mobilisation missions.

The army reserve is working hard to further refine its full-time support programme to make it more efficient and cost-effective. It is the effectiveness of this programme that has allowed the army's leadership to confidently

assign an unprecedented proportion of the total army mission to the reserve components. With active army and strength capped at about 780 000 the total army must look to its reserve components to provide the flexibility that allows it to absorb new missions within its constrained resources. The perceptible improvements in army reserve mobilisation readiness attributable to increasing levels of full-time support have been a major factor in the army leadership's growing conviction that the reserve components are, more than ever, equal to the job they have before them.

The total army's increased reliance upon its reserve components evidenced by their expanding and evolving missions, is a prime measure of the difference that full-time support can and does make. The cost of a full-time reserve soldier is the same as that of a full-time active component soldier; however, the reserve expertise and professional experience the full-time reservist brings to his support mission, make the difference that enables a reserve unit to accomplish an active component mission at a fraction of the active component cost.

II. Personnel policies

A. Appointment of reserve officers

Officer accessions in the reserves occur through a variety of programmes summarised as follows:

Officers who left active duty and joined a Reserve Component. These officers, in most cases, were commissioned through service academies, Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), or Officer Candidate Schools (OCS) conducted by a service.

Direct appointment of enlisted members or civilians with college degree/professional degrees in special skills (e.g. medical officers and nurses).

Flight training programmes for each service.

Deserving Airmen Commissioning Programme.

B. Reserve/regular officer policies

There are numerous policies that cover the regular and reserve officer. When reserve officers are on active duty, most of the normal active duty policies and regulations cover their actions. The reservist on active duty for short training periods is generally covered under reserve policies.

When reservists are not serving on active duty, there are limitations on their actions, and their legal status and compensation, in case of accident or injury, is quite complicated.

C. *Assignments*

As with the active service, the officer who has the most exposure and varied background has the best opportunity for success. There are several policies that ensure reservists move from a troop programme unit to a mobilisation post or to other assignments. The main objective is to gain experience and not become stagnated in one duty assignment.

Periodic rotational assignments of officers is designed and scheduled for officers to ensure the officer skills are sharpened and up-to-date, and they are ready for active service.

D. *Legal position of reserve officers*

The legal position of reserve officers varies with the type of orders they serve under and primarily whether they are on active or inactive duty. The uniform code of military justice is the governing document for most legal action. A recent 1987 ruling clarifies the legal status of reservists.

E. *Civilian employer support of reservists*

In June 1972, the President established a National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve. The committee was mandated to seek employer understanding and appreciation of the guard and reserve. It reaffirms and implements personnel policies which would assure individuals the freedom to participate in guard and reserve training without job impediment or loss of earned vacations.

By December 1987, employers employing over 61% of the nation's workforce had signed the Committee's Statement of Support for the Guard and Reserve, in which employers pledge that:

1. Employees' job and career opportunities will not be limited or reduced because of guard and reserve service.
2. Employees will be granted unpaid leaves of absence for guard or reserve training without having to sacrifice vacation time.
3. The Statement of Support and resultant company policies will be made known throughout the organisation.

The committee in its regular pursuit of employer support for the guard and reserve, now has succeeded in securing pledged support from almost 300 000 employers, covering in excess of 60 million employees.

Members of the reserves are granted protection against discrimination in retention in employment and loss of any benefit of employment as a result of their reserve status.

In October 1986, United States public law also barred employer discrimination against guard/reserve personnel in the hiring process. It

is now unlawful for an employer not to hire an otherwise-qualified job applicant because of the person's guard/reserve affiliation.

III. *Training*

A. *Officer initial/basic training*

Each reserve officer must attend initial and/or basic officer training so they can receive training in a skill and qualification within the officer ranks. They also receive training within their service according to policies that apply to officer personnel. Some services such the army reserve and army national guard require the officer basic course to be taken in residence at an active army school.

B. *Advanced officer selection and training*

The officers who perform the best through required evaluations are selected for higher-level schooling and training. In all cases of promotion, some higher level of schooling is required so if one is to advance, they must pass this training.

Because of time and resource constraints, other advanced training may not be readily available. Therefore, competition is keen and there are selection procedures to ensure the most qualified receive the schooling and valuable training.

C. *Active duty training for reserve officers*

United States reserve forces are divided into three categories: ready reserve, standby reserve, and retired reserve.

Ready reserve

The ready reserve is the principal source of trained units and individuals available for call to active duty in time of war or national emergency. Members of the ready reserve are those personnel who join ready reserve units without prior active duty service and military personnel released from active duty to the ready reserve to fulfil their military obligation (six or eight years total).

In general, unit members perform 48 drills annually of four hours each and 12-17 days of active duty for training annually. In addition to the many units and individual mobilisation augmentees in the ready reserve structure (selected reserve), there are individuals who do not belong to units and do not attend regularly-scheduled drills. This group of service members is called the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR individuals are a pool of trained reservists for use as fillers and replacements upon mobilisation.

Individual mobilisation augmentee programme

The Individual Mobilisation Augmentee (IMA) programme is designed to provide trained individuals to complement active com-

ponent organisations, the Selective Service System, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency upon mobilisation. An IMA is a member of the selected reserve and, therefore, is available for mobilisation under the President's call-up authority.

The IMA performs two weeks of annual training in a pre-assigned billet and may or may not (depending on the service policy and pay/training category) attend inactive duty for training drills. There are "drilling" IMAs who may perform up to 48 drills per year in some components.

Standby reserves

The standby reserve is composed of reservists who have completed their reserve obligation by performing a tour of active duty or service in the ready reserve. Standby reserves are not required to attend drills or receive further training nor are they parts of units. They are a pool of training individuals who could be mobilised if necessary.

Retired reserves

The retired reserve is composed of reservists who have completed the requirements for retired pay and those who are on the retired list and are receiving retired pay.

D. Inactive duty training for reserve officers

As already mentioned, there are several possibilities for inactive duty training for reserve officers. There are many units with which officers can train on a voluntary basis (no pay) and they can also take military education courses.

Highly-motivated, aggressive reserve officers can obtain inactive duty training through various sources, and of course for each day they perform this training, they collect a reserve "point" which counts towards retirement (up to 60 points per year).

E. Extended active duty

Some reserve officers are serving on extended active duty. Reserve officers on extended active duty are given the same protection on disability, retirement, medical and dental care, survivor benefits, and non-disability retirement, as are regular officers.

Any reserve commissioned officer who accumulates 20 years of federal active duty, 10 of which are as a commissioned officer, may request retirement. The current regulations require reserve officers to retire upon completion of 20 years extended active duty.

Waivers may be granted on a case-by-case basis by each service.

Most enlisted naval reservists on active duty (other than active duty for training) are members of naval reserve's 3x6 programme which requires three years of active duty service followed by three years in the selected reserve of the naval reserve. Other categories of enlisted reservists of all services on active duty include those who voluntarily requested tours of extended active duty.

F. Training exercises

Each reservist and most units are required to participate in some type of training exercise on a recurring basis. Units must function well as a unit and the best way to do this is to train in an exercise. Individuals train with a unit or on a special assignment to best use their qualifications.

G. Exchange training

Exchange training is accomplished between services for reserve and active members. There are written agreements with many allied countries for exchange training during exercises and at resident schools of instruction. Exchange training offers true interoperability for contingencies, should they occur.

APPENDIX II

*National service in countries of WEU
and the North Atlantic Alliance*

Country		Length of service (months)*		
		Army	Navy	Air force
W E U	Belgium	10 8 ¹	12 8 ¹	12 8 ¹
	France	10 10	10 10	10 10
	Germany	12 12	12 12	12 12
	Italy	12 10	12 10	12 10
	Netherlands	14 12	14 12	14 12
	Portugal	8 4	12 4	12 4
	Spain	12 9	12 9	12 9
Other NATO	Denmark	11 11	9 9	9 9
	Greece	17 12 (?) ²	21 12 (?) ²	19 12 (?) ²
	Norway	12 12	15 12	12 12
	Turkey	18 12 (?) ²	18 12 (?) ²	18 12 (?) ²

(Canada, Luxembourg, United Kingdom and United States have all-professional forces.)

* Current/projected.

1. End of conscription by 1994 announced.

2. Decisions awaited.

European security – reserve forces and national service

SUPPLEMENTARY DRAFT RECOMMENDATION ¹

*submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee ²
by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur*

Supplementary draft recommendation

on European security – reserve forces and national service

The Assembly,

Further developing the theme of “European security – reserve forces and national service”,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Encourage member states to consult with a view to:
 - (a) safeguarding the status of national servicemen or reservists from both the public and the private sectors to allow them “leave of absence” to serve in the forces;
 - (b) introducing fiscal advantages for firms which employ reserve servicemen;
 - (c) proposing European norms for equipment, service structures and command organisation;
2. Consider forthwith the idea of establishing a “European guard” composed of reserve forces which would be used to help defend the common European territory of all member states;
3. Propose that member states which shorten the length of, or abolish, conscription should make the terms of voluntary military service more attractive especially with regard to pay and allowances and also give those leaving the forces priority treatment for employment within the public sector;
4. Urge member states abandoning the practice of conscription to *suspend* legislation relating to national service rather than revoking it entirely, thus leaving current legislation on the statute books in case of future requirements;
5. Ask the Ministries of Defence of member states to organise the dissemination of appropriate information regarding military matters to all parliamentarians and especially those who have no service background.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. de Puig (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle (Alternate: Jeambrun), Bassinet, Borderas, Brito, Chevalier (Alternate: Laverge), Cox, De Carolis, De Decker, Dees, Durand, Fernandes Marques, Ferrarini, Fourré, Hardy, Irmer (Alternate: Feldmann), Jung (Alternate: Masseret), Kelchtermans, Leccisi (Alternate: Caccia), Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden, Mannino Marten, Lord Newall, MM. Pecchioli, Perinat, Reis Leite (Alternate: Mrs. Aguiar), Scheer, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Steiner, Vazquez (Alternate: Bolinaga), Zierer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Explanatory Memorandum**(submitted by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur)***I. Introduction**

1. Meeting on Thursday 5th November 1992 in Paris at the seat of the Assembly, the Defence Committee unanimously adopted the set of recommendations on "European security - reserve forces and national service" and the associated draft report¹. The number of members present bore witness to the interest of the subject.

2. Subsequently, the committee held a joint meeting with its "sister committee": the Security and Defence Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly and members of the two committees also visited the Headquarters of the French rapid action force (FAR) in Maisons-Laffitte.

3. As a result of continuing discussion, therefore, your Rapporteur has decided to propose that colleagues adopt a further series of recommendations relating to reserve forces and national service.

4. The attached recommendations are self-explanatory for the most part. The following notes are therefore designed merely to highlight or emphasise certain aspects:

1. Employer support is perhaps the most critical area when it comes to attracting volunteer reservists. Without such support very few individuals have the courage to go against the obvious source of their livelihood. Your Rapporteur here proposes both the stick (1(a)) and the carrot (1(b)).

In addition, common structures, etc., within the armed forces of our nations would have an effect far greater than mere standardisation (1(c)).

2. Reflecting the debate in committee and subsequently, your Rapporteur feels that the idea of a European "national guard" suggested in recommendation 5 of the original report should be developed and investigated without delay and as part of the current reorganisation of forces in the majority of member states (2).

3. This recommendation is in line with some of the first findings of the Dutch "Dienstplicht" Commission's interim report mentioned in paragraphs 23 to 25 of Document 1338.

4. Your Rapporteur would submit this recommendation as being crucial in any nation's determination to "expect the unexpected". Once legislation on national service has been revoked it is almost impossible, politically, for any government to reverse the decision. As well as having to remain insured against future risks and crises, a nation might also decide that "national service" should take perhaps a different form. France for example is now experimenting with the idea of a national service taking care of the handicapped.

5. The United Kingdom's experience of phasing out conscription in the early 1960s, as well as leading to better conditions of service for its all-volunteer forces (hence the greater costs emphasised in the original report) had another definite effect. Without national service and with a much reduced force overall fewer and fewer people in any position of influence (industry, public sector, education, media, etc., etc.) have experience of military matters. The same premise applies to all our national parliaments. Some countries are perhaps better than others in this respect and those of us who have been members of national defence committees (or indeed of the WEU Assembly's Defence Committee) are probably better informed than some.

In the United Kingdom a specific programme is organised by the Ministry of Defence to conduct specialist army, navy or air force orientation for Members of Parliament. In addition the services maintain special "presentation teams" which are continually updating specialist audiences on the latest developments in the military domain. A very good example for the rest of our nations.

5. Finally, on a note of actuality to complement the report being presented to the Assembly on WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis² your Rapporteur would like to draw colleagues' attention to the rôle of reserves now in the Yugoslav crisis. On 5th

1. Document 1338, 5th November, Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker.

2. Document 1337, 5th November, Rapporteur: Mr. Marten.

November 1992 in the House of Commons in London, Mr. Brazier, MP, asked the Secretary of State for Defence "what plans he has to use members of the reserve forces in support of current operations".

6. The Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Mr. Archie Hamilton, MP, gave the following reply:

"My right honourable and learned friend the Secretary of State for Defence reported to the House by notice last month the call-out of a small number of willing officers of the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve to support current operations.

A further need for specialist support available only from the reserve forces has now become apparent, and a number of individuals from the Territorial Army's intelligence and security group (volunteers) have offered to serve on duties in the United Kingdom. My right hon-

ourable and learned friend the Secretary of State has made the Queen's order required by section 12(1) of the Reserve Forces Act, 1980, and has formally called them out under section 11(1) of the Act.

A number of officers of the Royal Naval Reserve have also volunteered to serve, and they are being called up under the provisions of an Order in Council made in May 1982."

7. At Maisons-Laffitte on 6th November in answer to a question by your Rapporteur, General Roquejeoffre stressed the need for certain specialisations in the forces, who were available only from the annual intake of national servicemen or within the corps of reservists.

8. These two further examples fully illustrate the necessity for our governments to pay particular attention to reserve forces and to make proper provision for their activation when necessary.

Anti-ballistic missile defence

REPORT ¹

submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee ²
by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on anti-ballistic missile defence

DRAFT ORDER

on anti-ballistic missile defence

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. The ballistic missile threat to Europe
- III. Current defence measures against the ballistic threat
- IV. The European attitude
- V. Questions for debate
- VI. Conclusions

APPENDICES

- I. Treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems signed by President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev, Moscow, 26th May 1972
- II. Number of missiles existing within different third world countries
- III. Operational ballistic missiles planned or being developed in third world countries

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Lopez Henares (Chairman); Mr. Lenzer, N... (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Atkinson, Biefnot (Alternate: Kempinaire), Mrs. Blunck, MM. Böhm, Caccia, Colombo, Curto, Davis, Dimmer, Mrs. Francese, MM. Lagorce, Le Grand, Gonzalez-Laxe, Litherland, Menzel, Palacios, Poças Santos, Sarens, Savio, Sir Donald Thompson, MM. Tummers, Valleix, Verbeek, Worms.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on anti-ballistic missile defence

The Assembly,

- (i) Gratified that Europe is no longer threatened by a ballistic missile attack from the territory of the former Soviet Union;
- (ii) Recalling nevertheless that the danger of proliferation of ballistic technology and nuclear, biological and chemical warheads stockpiled on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States has not yet been averted;
- (iii) Noting that several third world countries, particularly in the Mediterranean and the Near and Middle East, are making considerable efforts to procure ballistic systems capable of reaching European countries;
- (iv) Noting further that a number of countries that have not joined the missile technology control régime (MTCR) are endeavouring to develop ballistic technology and to export it to third world countries;
- (v) Disturbed at the growing number of countries endeavouring to develop nuclear, biological and chemical weapons;
- (vi) Recalling the uncertainty that still remains about the completion of the United States programme for establishing a system of global protection against limited strikes (GPALS) and its consequences for Europe;
- (vii) Considering that such a system of protection will mean renegotiating the anti-ballistic missile treaty of 26th May 1972;
- (viii) Stressing the importance of the evolution of Russian-American co-operation in this matter in the framework of which the possible creation of an early warning centre to avert the risks of ballistic attacks is being studied;
- (ix) Recalling that the technical difficulties encountered during the Gulf war in intercepting with Patriot systems Iraqi missiles launched against Tel Aviv and Riyadh showed that protection against this new type of threat was still far from perfect;
- (x) Convinced, therefore, that it is high time for the Western European countries to adopt a joint position, on the one hand on the assessment of the possible risks for Europe of the development of ballistic technology throughout the world and, on the other, on the corresponding response;
- (xi) Also convinced of the need to ensure that efforts to afford protection against ballistic missiles do not lead to an arms race in space,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Assess without delay the risks to Europe stemming from:
 - (a) the development of strategic and theatre ballistic capability and nuclear capability in several countries of the world;
 - (b) the proliferation of ballistic technology in countries close to Europe's southern and south-eastern flanks;
2. Identify without delay Europe's needs and the means available to it to counter the ballistic missile threat;
3. Adopt without delay a joint European position towards the American programme for global protection against limited strikes (GPALS) ;
4. Submit its conclusions to the Assembly.

Draft Order
on anti-ballistic missile defence

The Assembly,

(i) Considering that the rapid development of advanced ballistic missile technology and its proliferation in the third world represents new challenges to Europe and to the whole world whose consequences have not yet been fully defined;

(ii) Convinced of the need to hold a public debate on the repercussions of these challenges and on the appropriate response,

INSTRUCTS its Technological and Aerospace Committee to pursue its work on anti-ballistic missile defence problems and to organise a symposium in 1993 on this subject, to be attended by technical, industrial and legal experts as well as parliamentarians and representatives of governments and the public.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In the past twenty years, the scale of the problem of protection against ballistic missiles has changed several times, for very different reasons.

2. During the long period of East-West confrontation, the concept of nuclear deterrence seemed to afford the best protection against all kinds of attacks, including those by ballistic missiles.

3. However, this concept, based on a credible response capability, has always been threatened by changes in the very nature of the response or by efforts by the two opposing alliances to acquire means of defence against missiles. This merely speeded up and strengthened the offensive strategic weapons race in which the two superpowers were involved.

4. Hence the idea of halting the race for offensive arms by limiting means of defence against them, the principle underlying the treaty on limiting anti-ballistic missile systems concluded between the United States and the former Soviet Union on 26th May 1972, which is still in force¹, was of a novel not to say revolutionary nature.

5. In this treaty, each party undertook not to bring into service defence systems against ballistic missiles except within specific areas round the two countries' capitals and limited areas surrounding ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missiles) silos.

6. By launching its strategic defence initiative (SDI) on 23rd March 1983, the President of the United States ran counter to the spirit of the ABM Treaty since the SDI programme was intended to protect United States territory by a complex system of anti-missile missiles designed to ward off a massive attack by the Soviet Union comprising several thousand nuclear warheads, although at the time the President gave an assurance that this was merely a research programme in conformity with the ABM Treaty.

7. It was in an international environment that had undergone radical transformations but in which the Soviet Union still existed that President Bush announced, on 29th January 1991, that the SDI programme was to change course, emphasis henceforth being shifted to defence by

theatre missiles. This was christened GPALS (global protection against limited strikes).

8. According to the Director of the Strategic Defence Initiative Organisation (SDIO), Henry F. Cooper, "under the new GPALS programme, the objective is to protect the United States, our forces overseas, as well as our allies and friends, by destroying the warheads of limited ballistic missile strikes (up to 200 warheads) launched from anywhere on earth"².

9. Although the GPALS programme was launched a long time before the first interception of an Iraqi Scud by a Patriot anti-missile missile during the Gulf war, the consequences of the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the third world and increased efforts by several developing countries to develop such systems were certainly a major factor in this reorientation of the SDI programme.

10. In this connection, it is striking to note that the United States is still the only country carrying out concrete research and development for an anti-ballistic missile defence system when, for geographical reasons, it is less threatened by such systems than Europe (and the territory of Russia). Europeans must therefore take certain decisions. First, they must examine whether there is a need to recognise the existence of a new type of threat since several third world countries in the Mediterranean, Near East and Middle East are able to procure ballistic missiles that can reach European countries. Second, if they affirm the existence of such a threat, they must give their views on the ensuing conclusions and consequences, particularly as the United States has proposed that its GPALS programme be developed mainly in the framework of NATO and that it is already in regular contact with Russia with a view to negotiating the conditions and methods for Russian participation in the programme.

II. The ballistic missile threat to Europe

11. With the coming into force of the INF Treaty and the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and subsequent to the West's new relations with Russia, the principal successor of the former Soviet Union, the threat of a missile attack from the East is no

1. See Appendix I.

2. NATO Review, 3rd June 1992, page 18.

longer a matter of concern for the alliance, in spite of uncertainty about the rôle that Russia will eventually play following the transitional period which all countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States are now traversing.

12. Conversely, paragraph 14 the communiqué issued by the NATO Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group notes that:

“In light of the risks posed by the increasing proliferation of ballistic missiles, we discussed ballistic missile defences against this potential threat. We agreed to intensify alliance consultation in this area.”

13. In this context, it should not be forgotten that there are still many intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) held by countries on the territory of the former Soviet Union where the political situation is still unsettled. A proliferation of such systems might therefore be a danger for Europe, particularly as it is technically possible to modify the range of intercontinental missiles and use them as shorter-range missiles.

14. However, it was the Gulf war and the Iraqi Scud missiles fired at Tel Aviv and Riyadh whose destructive effects, even with conventional warheads, everyone could see on television that first opened the eyes of Europeans and made them realise the risks they themselves might be running if the proliferation of ballistic missiles in third world countries were to continue or if the number of countries developing their own systems were to continue to increase along Europe's southern flank.

15. This is why the Assembly, on the basis of a first assessment of the threat from ballistic missiles after the Gulf war³, had already asked the Council, in Recommendation 501 adopted on 5th June 1991, to instruct the committee of chiefs of defence staff of WEU to study inter alia “the ballistic missile threat on Europe's southern flank and a possible subsequent common European requirement for an anti-ballistic missile capability”. However, in its reply to this recommendation the Council throws no light on its thinking on this matter.

16. Estimates relating to countries possessing ballistic missiles vary in respect of short- and medium-range systems, but, according to information in the SIPRI Yearbook for 1992, no third world country yet has operational intercontinental systems (ICBMs). *China's* position towards proliferation is particularly important since it has developed its own intercontinental

system and also has the CSS-2 missile with a range of 2 700 km and the M-9 with a range of 600 km. Although China has said it intends to respect the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Régime)⁴, to which it has not acceded, it remains an unknown factor where the export of space technology is concerned, particularly as it is developing a CSSX-5 system (with a one-ton payload and a range of 2 000 km) and the M-11 system (with a 500 kg payload and a range of 300 km).

17. *Brazil*, which has not acceded to the MTCR either but has said it intends to do so, is in the process of developing a VLS launcher with a range of about 10 000 km and is considering developing an ICBM with a range of 3 000 km. In the arsenal of missiles in the 150 to 1 200 km range, Brazil is in the process of developing at least seven different systems, including the SS-1000 (range 1 200 km).

18. *India*, which to date has no intention of acceding to the MTCR, is considering developing a launcher with a range of 14 000 km and is already testing two other systems, one (PSLV) with a range of 8 000 km and the other (ASLV) with a range of 4 000 km, the latter with the assistance of the French and German industries, moreover.

19. India's efforts to develop the Agni missile with a range of 2 500 km should also be recalled. The United States reacted strongly to the most recent test of this system at the end of May 1992.

20. According to recent reports, *South Korea* is considering developing a launcher with a range of 4 000 km.

21. Where short- and medium-range systems are concerned, the SIPRI Yearbook for 1992 estimates that twenty-six countries now have ballistic missiles or will have them by 2000.

22. Among the nearest countries on Europe's southern and south-eastern flanks that are not associated with the MTCR, *Algeria* has operational Soviet Frog-7 ballistic missiles with a range of 65 km.

23. Where *Libya* is concerned, it has still not been forgotten that it tried unsuccessfully to launch missiles against the Italian island of Lampedusa in response to the American air raid on Tripoli. In addition to Frog-7s, the country now has Scud-B missiles with a range of about 300 km and, according to unconfirmed sources, SS-21s with a range of 120 km. Some sources say

4. The participants in this unofficial agreement banning the export of conventional missiles and ballistic nuclear-capable missiles and limiting exports of associated technology are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Community.

3. See Document 1272 – report submitted by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee.

– with a question mark – that Libya may have about twenty Chinese M-9 missiles with a range of 600 km⁵ and others refer to work by the German firm OTRAG which, after helping Libya in the seventies and eighties to develop a system with a range of 480 km, had to leave the country under pressure from the German Government.

24. Rumour has it that German engineers are still in Libya to develop a missile (Ittisalt) with a range of 700 km and it is also said that a system (Al Fatah) is also being developed with a range of 500 km⁶ according to some sources and 950 km according to others.

25. *Egypt* has Frog-7 missiles and Scud-B systems and, with the assistance of North Korea, is in the process of developing Scud-100s with a range of 600 km. According to sources that cannot be verified⁷, it is also believed to have a few Condor IIs with a range of 900 to 1 000 km. This system was designed in *Argentina* but development has since been discontinued. According to information from the French economic interest group CoSyDe, *Egypt* is also developing a ballistic system known as BADR/2000 Vector (range 1 200 km).

26. *Syria* has Frog-7 (range 65 km), SS-21 Scarab (range 120 km) and Scud-B (range 280 to 300 km) systems. It should be added that there are a number of derivatives of the Scud-B system with payloads varying from 300 to 1 000 kg and ranges of between 300 and 900 km. In 1991, it also received about twenty Scud-C missiles (range 600 km) from North Korea, developed by the latter country and China, but it is not sure whether this system is operational yet. There are also rumours that *Syria* tried to procure Chinese M-9 missiles with a range of 600 km, but there is no confirmation that China in fact delivered them.

27. *Saudi Arabia* has the Chinese CSS-2 missile with a range of 2 000 km (2 700 km according to certain sources), but there is also talk of a DF-3 system with a range of 2 200 km.

28. It is difficult to assess *Iraq's* current capability as it was obliged by United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 to destroy all its systems with a range of more than 150 km. This applies in particular to the Al Hussein missile, the Iraqi version of the Scud used in the Gulf war. However, *Iraq* had also developed a Tamuz-1 and Al Abeb system with a range of 2 000 km.

29. *Iran* obtained a large short-range missile capability by developing its own systems, partly

with the assistance of China and North Korea. It also has North Korean Scud-Cs with a range of 600 km.

30. With the assistance of China, France and the United States, *Pakistan*, which has so far hesitated to accede to the MTCR, has developed a series of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles which are now operational, such as Haft-I (range 80 km), M-11 (range 290 km), Shahpar (range 120 km) and Suparco (range 280 km). With Chinese assistance, *Pakistan* is currently developing Haft-II (range 300 km) and Haft-III (range 600 km). It is also thinking of developing a space launch vehicle with a range of 1 200 km.

31. *Taiwan*, which has not acceded to the MTCR, is believed to have cancelled development of the Tien Ma missile that would have had a range of 950 km.

32. Among countries not having acceded to the MTCR that are trying to develop their own ballistic missile capability and which intend to export them, *North Korea* plays an important rôle. Inter alia, it has developed a North Korean version of Scud-B, with an extended range of 340 km and a version of Scud-C with a range of 600 km (sold to *Syria* and *Iran*) and is now, with Chinese assistance, developing the No Dong 1 system with a range of 1 000 km.

33. *Israel* and *South Africa* co-operate in ballistic missile technology. However, *Israel* has announced that it would respect the principles of the MTCR and *South Africa* has said it intends to accede to it. With the assistance of France, *Israel* has developed Jericho I (range 650 km) and Jericho II (range 1 500 km) missiles. Components for the latter have been delivered to *South Africa*. *Israel* has also developed a Jericho II-B with a range of 1 300 km and – with French assistance – the Shavit system with a range of 2 500 km.

34. In the case of *South Africa*, mention should be made of the Arniston system, with a range of 1 500 km, that it is developing in co-operation with *Israel*.

35. *Argentina*, which is now interested in acceding to the MTCR, has cancelled development of the Condor II system (range 900 km), designed in co-operation with *Egypt*, and, until 1988, with the financial participation of *Iraq*. *Argentina* has also embarked upon the Alacran programme with the aim of developing a missile with a range of 200 km.

36. To obtain a realistic idea about the possible threat from ballistic missiles, it should be recalled that they are pilotless, self-propelled weapons launchers with a surface-to-surface trajectory; they may or may not pass through outer space and be guided to their target. As shown by the two diagrams below, a Scud-type missile can

5. See table at Appendix II.


6. See table at Appendix III and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, March 1992.

7. See table at Appendix II.

reach a target about 500 km away in 6 minutes and 30 seconds (at a speed of 1 600 m/s) with an altitude of 140 km at the apogee of their ballistic trajectory. A Chinese CSS-2-type missile can

reach a target about 3 000 km away in 16 minutes and 40 seconds (at a speed of 4 650 m/s) with an altitude of 650 km at the apogee of their ballistic trajectory.

Stages in the flight of Scud-type missiles




Range: 500 km
 Flight time: 6 minutes and 30 seconds
 Speed: 1 600 m/s

AEROSPATIALE

SOURCE: **CoSyDE**

THOMSON-CSF

Stages in the flight of CSS-2-type missiles



Range: 3 000 km
 Flight time: 16 minutes and 40 seconds
 Speed: 4 650 m/s

AEROSPATIALE

SOURCE: **CoSyDE**

THOMSON-CSF

37. Assessment of the threat ballistic missiles represent for Europe is still based mainly on a hypothetical estimate of future developments since, at present, of the two countries "hostile" to Europe, i.e. Iraq and Libya, only the second could reach European territory with the ballistic missiles available to it.

38. However, according to United States estimates:

- fifteen third world countries have the capability to produce their own missiles between now and the end of the century;
- at least twenty-four third world countries will have ballistic missiles by 2000;
- at least six third world countries will have missiles with a range of up to 3 000 km by 2000;
- by the turn of the century, three third world countries will have missiles with a range of up to 5 000 km.

39. However, this assessment would not be complete without a reference to the ABC weapons programmes being carried out in third world countries interested in developing ballistic missiles.

40. Among those working on nuclear weapons programmes are India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, South Africa and Taiwan. In this context, the problem of nuclear non-proliferation becomes even more acute, particularly if account is taken of nuclear weapons stockpiled on the territory of the former Soviet Union, and recent press reports that Iran is believed to have concluded an agreement with Kazakhstan on the delivery of nuclear warheads underscore the urgency of the situation. Moreover, research and development are continuing on chemical and biological weapons and the danger of proliferation of equipment and know-how in this area has not diminished.

41. According to certain American estimates, by 2000 thirty third world countries will have chemical and ten biological capability⁸.

III. Current defence measures against the ballistic missile threat

42. At present, only the United States is definitely carrying out an anti-missile defence programme. Whereas, at the outset, the SDI programme was aimed primarily at protecting the North American continent against a large-scale

Soviet intercontinental missile attack – thus, at the time, leading to fears of a break in the security link between European countries and the United States – President Bush announced on 29th January 1991 that the SDI was to change course. There were two new elements: first, defence against limited strikes of theatre ballistic missiles would be concentrated on and, second, a world anti-ballistic missile system, of whatever origin, would be set up.

43. This recentred programme is now called Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS). Mr. Henry F. Cooper, Director of the United States Strategic Defence Initiative Organisation, described the concept of this programme as follows⁹:

"A GPALS defence would consist of three elements working in concert to provide the best possible protection against limited ballistic missile attacks. First, improved theatre missile defences could protect against ballistic missile attacks on United States forces overseas and on United States friends and allies. Second, a ground-based defensive system, at five to seven sites, could defend the United States against accidental and unauthorised ballistic missile strikes from any source. And finally, a global, space-based element (Brilliant Pebbles) could intercept ballistic missiles with ranges greater than a few hundred miles, destroying the targets by colliding with them."

44. It is mainly the first element that should interest Europeans although it is not quite clear what the protection of "United States friends and allies" means, particularly where the protection of civilians is concerned.

45. To meet theatre missile requirements, two ground-based systems now being developed will carry out the following tasks:

- low-altitude interception, i.e. the protection of pinpoint targets against attack by cruise and other missiles, will be the task of the ERINT (Enhanced Range Interception) missile, on which it is planned to start tests in 1993;
- high-altitude interception (between 100 and 200 km) will be ensured by the THAAD (Theatre High Altitude Defence) which will be developed by Lockheed and will probably not be tested before 1996.

46. Both anti-missile systems will have to destroy attacking missiles without any explosives and use only their own kinetic energy.

8. Henry F. Cooper, *Enjeux atlantiques*, No. 4, November 1991, page 32.

9. NATO Review, No. 3, June 1992, page 27.

47. In regard to the space components of the system, consideration is being given to placing in a 400 to 500 km orbit a large number of satellite interceptors known as Brilliant Pebbles, each having a missile working by kinetic energy. The 1 000 Brilliant Pebbles initially planned have already been reduced to 500, but the pursuit of this programme as such is nevertheless not certain, for budgetary reasons and following the restrictions imposed by the law of December 1991 on anti-missile defence which limits anti-missile defence work to that in conformity with the ABM Treaty.

48. Furthermore, the programme provides for the development and launching of about sixty satellites with infrared captors called Brilliant

Eyes, which will ensure observation for the entire system and communication between space- and ground-based components.

49. However, it has been realised that there was a gap between the strategic and tactical functions of the system which would have to be filled by the development of two additional ground-based systems, one called Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) and the other Endo-atmospheric/Exo-atmospheric Interceptor (E2I), believed to be derived from the HEDI missile developed in the framework of the SDI.

50. Figures I to IV below illustrate the global system, its ground-based components and the functions of the Brilliant Pebbles and Brilliant Eyes systems.

FIGURE I




GPALS

FIGURE II
GPALS ground-based component




Source : Enjeux atlantiques, No. 4, November 1991, page 31.

FIGURE III
GPALS space-based components



Source : Enjeux atlantiques, No. 4, November 1991, page 32.

FIGURE IV
Functioning of the Brilliant Pebbles system



51. The total cost of the GPALS programme is roughly estimated at about \$46 000 million. It has already absorbed most of the sums earmarked for the SDI for the financial year 1992, i.e. about \$4 150 million. In the budget for the financial year 1993, credits earmarked for the SDI were reduced to \$3 030 million and those for theatre missile defence to \$935 million.

52. Nevertheless, although the programme has hardly entered its initial research and development stage, some American experts fear the improved types of ballistic missiles equipped with re-entry vehicles may dodge the interceptors. The difficulties Patriot missiles had in intercepting the not very sophisticated Iraqi Scuds are believed to have been observed closely by certain third world countries.

53. Moreover, the Americans will have to solve the problem raised by the general concept of the system which, because it means setting up five to seven ground-based anti-missile sites and placing interceptors in space, will require the ABM Treaty to be renegotiated. This is why the GPALS programme is evolutive and provides initially for the Grand Forks (North Dakota) anti-missile site to be reorganised to receive 100 THAAD ERIS-type interceptors, this being in conformity with the treaty. (However, the choice of site has already been questioned by the Director of the SDIO, who has proposed another site in the north-east of the United States.) The 1991 law on anti-missile defence banned programmes that did not conform with the treaty, which is inter alia the case of Brilliant Pebbles.

54. However, since October 1991, the leaders of the former Soviet Union have already been informing the Americans that they were prepared to discuss anti-missile defence matters with them and, on 29th January 1992, the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, proposed working out, jointly with the United States, a global defence system that might replace the SDI.

55. At the close of the Russian-American summit meeting in Washington on 17th June 1992, during which President Bush and President Yeltsin agreed on further reductions in their arsenals of offensive strategic weapons not covered by START, the two parties issued a joint declaration:

“The presidents continued their discussion of the potential benefits of a Global Protection System (GPS) against ballistic missiles, agreeing that it is important to explore the rôle for defences in protecting against limited ballistic missile attacks. The two presidents agreed that their two nations should work together with allies and other interested states in developing a concept for such a system as part of an overall strategy

regarding the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Such co-operation would be a tangible expression of the new relationship that exists between Russia and the United States and would involve them in an important undertaking with other nations of the world community.

The two presidents agreed it is necessary to start work without delay to develop the concept of the GPS. For this purpose they agreed to establish a high-level group to explore on a priority basis the following practical steps:

- The potential for sharing of early warning information through the establishment of an early warning centre.
- The potential for co-operation with participating states in developing ballistic missile defence capabilities and technologies.
- The development of a legal basis for co-operation, including new treaties and agreements and possible changes to existing treaties and agreements necessary to implement a Global Protection System.”

56. In spite of some hostility among Russian military experts about taking part in the GPALS programme, American-Soviet contacts have continued and have been intensified. High-level delegations from the two countries met in Moscow on 13th and 14th July 1992 and in Washington on 21st and 22nd September 1992. Three working groups have been set up:

- a working group on the concept of the global protection system to study the structure, conditions and functions of a future protection system;
- a working group on technical co-operation to examine research and development projects and possible tests;
- a working group on non-proliferation to examine the trend of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of increasing efforts to prevent such proliferation.

57. The Americans immediately submitted the GPALS project to their European allies in the framework of NATO, where several studies on anti-missile defence have been conducted. When the project was presented to the NATO ambassadors, the United States Delegation proposed to its allies, on 17th September 1992, that NATO be assigned the main rôle in planning a global protection system. Other countries such as Russia might be associated with NATO, which would form the nucleus of the system.

IV. The European attitude

58. United States efforts to obtain other countries' support for its work in the framework of the SDI led to the conclusion of memoranda of understanding (MOU) with the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Israel and Japan. The United States then financed work by industries in about ten countries on the basis of 301 calls for tenders worth \$833 million. Tenders were awarded inter alia to firms in the United Kingdom, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, France, Canada, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands.

59. However, except in the United Kingdom and Israel, for various reasons this work did not lead to significant government programmes. Thus, certain countries were hesitant, some fearing the SDI might weaken nuclear deterrence, others being anxious to retain the ABM Treaty and still others being against the deployment of weapons in space. However, the United States' restrictive policy in respect of the information it gave its allies about its research was also a major reason for this hesitant attitude.

60. The most significant result where co-operation is concerned is the Arrow missile programme developed jointly by Israel and the United States for intercepting ballistic missiles with a range of up to 1 000 km. Israel is considering deploying a first prototype of the Arrow system in 1997 in spite of disappointment due to the failure of the first tests. An improved version, Aces, should be tested in about 1995.

61. In the European framework, the Franco-Italian consortium Eurosam (Aérospatiale, Thomson-CSF and Alenia) is now developing the Aster/ARABEL anti-aircraft missile with anti-missile interception capability. This group is also working on the development of two systems in the future ground-to-air missile family, one of which, the SAMP-T (surface-to-air medium-range) missile, might be given a limited anti-ballistic missile capability.

62. These activities concern only low-altitude interception functions comparable to those of Patriot and Erint missiles and are set in the framework of pinpoint defence. They correspond to American studies on the CORPSSAM (corps-level surface-to-air missile) defence system and German work in the framework of an enlarged air defence concept that is considering the establishment of a limited anti-theatre ballistic missile defence capability based on the TLVS (Taktisches Luftverteidigungs System) (tactical air defence system).

63. In regard to high-altitude interception, it should be noted that a number of European industries, including the French firms Aérospatiale and Thomson-CSF, are taking part

as sub-contractors in the development of the American THAAD (theatre high-altitude defence) system, designed to protect areas of more than 10 000 km².

64. However, no European country now has an operational interception capability unless it has procured the American Patriot system. Only Russia has several versions of anti-missile weapons systems, the most modern of which, the SA-12 or S-300V, was presented to the public at the Moscow air show in summer 1992 as an anti-aircraft and anti-tactical and ballistic missile capable of intervening at a distance of 100 km and at an altitude of 30 000 m.

65. In several Western European countries, industries have started, either at the request of their own government or on their initiative, to study the feasibility of a ballistic missile defence architecture.

66. These initiatives include the agreement concluded in 1986 between the French firms Aérospatiale and Thomson-CSF by which they set up an economic interest group CoSyDe (defence systems concepts) to develop in co-operation weapons systems capable of countering the threat of ballistic or non-ballistic missiles in the European theatre. After taking part between 1987 and 1989 in the study of the theatre missile defence architecture study (TMDAS) at the request of the United States army, the CoSyDe group is inter alia conducting a study for the French Ministry of Defence on the ballistic missile threat and strategic defence.

67. In order to improve its knowledge so as to be better able to express its views on this matter, the Technological and Aerospace Committee accepted with pleasure the CoSyDe group's offer to describe its studies on anti-ballistic missile defence. This briefing, which was also attended by representatives of the Italian firm Alenia, was given during a committee meeting in Paris on 23rd October 1992.

68. The briefing was especially useful in that it brought out the problems facing Europe in particular and allowed this major European defence industry group to deliver a specific message, i.e. that the technology required for anti-missile defence is either available or being developed in Western Europe and that such defence might be built in the framework of intra-European co-operation. The briefing also provided important information for the discussion of further questions developed in Chapter V of this report.

69. The discussion is particularly important as the governments of the Western European countries hold differing views on how to meet the challenge of the ballistic missile threat.

70. It is *France* that has so far adopted the clearest position described by its Prime Minister,

Mr. Bérégovoy, who, on 1st October 1992, spoke as follows at the close of the colloquy on a new strategic debate organised in Paris by the French Minister of Defence:

“One may also wonder about possible threats from countries that may possess strategic weapons and which would be indifferent to the logic of deterrence. We have a range of nuclear weapons whose diversity should allow us to meet all situations. It is a matter of determination. In these conditions, I do not believe it desirable to join the anti-missile space shield project. The early-warning aspect of this programme admittedly seems interesting and might precede an international system of space-based monitoring and transparency. However, apart from the fact that its capabilities are limited by technical constraints, it involves the unacceptable risk of relaunching the arms race and militarising space, thus running counter to nuclear disarmament efforts. In reality, the true answer is to be found in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We are therefore determined to strive for nuclear disarmament.”

71. This position may be interpreted as clearly unfavourable to French participation in the American GPALS programme; it corresponds, moreover, to the negative attitude expressed publicly this year by a number of experts among the French political class¹⁰. However, one might also wonder whether these remarks are an indication of what the French position would be towards any European initiatives taken in this connection in view of the fact that, on this matter, governmental and industrial circles do not all hold the same views, the political class is well aware of the problem and industrial studies are now being conducted with a view to establishing a system of European theatre defence against the missile threat.

72. At the same colloquy, the *United Kingdom* Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Rifkind, adopted a different approach:

“In the medium term, there is also the welcome prospect of defences against limited ballistic missile strikes. Although the development of defences will never remove the need to be able to take more active measures, it will be a useful complement to those other capabilities. The Patriot system played an invaluable rôle in the Gulf conflict and, whilst the cir-

cumstances were special ones which might never repeat themselves, it is certainly worth exploring the scope for wider application of the same principles.

Defences would be a great boon in the scenario I mentioned earlier, where chemical or biological attack was threatened yet uncertainty about the justifiability of nuclear retaliation cast doubt on the effectiveness of a nuclear deterrent threat. And theatre defences would offer much-improved protection for troops deployed overseas. Indeed, this would perhaps make the political decision to deploy troops easier in some circumstances: a greater ability to minimise casualties would be an influential factor in any calculation of the advantages and disadvantages of operations involving important but not vital interests.

Of course, the development of defences has to proceed in a way which does not disrupt strategic stability, to which the ABM Treaty has contributed so much. Amendment of that treaty may well be inevitable if limited defences are to become a reality: but is clearly crucial that we avoid unconstrained competition in this area. The United States administration has made very clear that it will not take any action which might prejudice the credibility of the European nuclear deterrence, and is proceeding on a sensible step-by-step basis. It is now important that the European allies engage on the issues, and the opportunities, that technological progress is bringing to the fore.”

73. Although it is not clear from these remarks whether the United Kingdom is in favour of European participation in GPALS or a more European approach, the need to move towards an anti-missile defence system is recognised, although the United Kingdom will find it difficult to justify continuing with its nuclear deterrence programme based on the Trident system.

74. In any event, the United Kingdom Government has started ministerial studies on the question with a view to defining the United Kingdom's own needs for an anti-missile defence system. In the context of these studies, consideration is being given to the usefulness of the American GPALS programme and of European participation in an integrated system, which would be contrary to the ABM Treaty, Article IX of which bans the transfer of anti-missile systems to other countries.

75. The United Kingdom is thinking of setting up a group to assess the risks and requirements of anti-missile defence. This might be set up under the aegis of NATO, WEU or even the

10. Frédéric Bozo: Une doctrine nucléaire européenne: pourquoi faire et comment? in *Politique étrangère*, No. 2, 1992, page 419; Dominique David: La coopération globale contre des frappes limitées (GPALS) et la stratégie américaine in *Défense nationale*, June 1992, page 51.

CSCE. However, the United Kingdom tends to prefer an approach in the NATO framework with a view to establishing a NATO missile defence initiative.

76. The *German* Government's position has not yet been clearly decided. The prevailing opinion in the Ministry of Defence is that Germany is not threatened, but a potential threat is recognised along the southern flank of the alliance. The tendency, therefore, is to tackle all matters relating to ballistic threats in the framework of NATO. Answering a question put by Baroness Hooper during the session of the WEU Assembly in Paris on 3rd June, Mr. Rühle, German Minister of Defence, referred to the problem in the context of the European fighter aircraft (EFA) :

"I also have to ask myself what threats we may face after the year 2005 up to 2030 or 2040. In this case I have to try - after 2005 at least - to relate an airborne component, a fighter aircraft... to a possible threat in the form of missiles."

77. German studies in the framework of an enlarged air defence concept are concentrated on the establishment of a limited defence capability against theatre ballistic missiles composed of improved Patriot and TLVS systems.

78. In *Italy*, no position has been made public recently, except for the view of Mr. Andó, Italian Minister of Defence, who said, during the colloquy already mentioned, that he was in favour of further European action to counter the proliferation of ballistic technology.

79. To date, the Italian Ministry of Defence and air force seem to have considered that the establishment of an anti-ballistic missile capability is not necessary immediately. It is believed that only the island of Lampedusa and the Central Mediterranean might be within the range of Libyan Scud missiles. Conversely, Libya's procurement of Soviet Su-24 long-range bombers is a threat. In view of Italy's financial difficulties, it would hardly be possible to finance research and development programmes for systems more sophisticated than the Patriot.

V. Questions for debate

80. By comparing the different attitudes of the four WEU member countries mentioned above, one can see how urgent it is for Europeans to agree to work out a joint approach to measures to be taken to tackle the growing dissemination of ballistic weapons throughout the world, and in particular along Europe's southern flank.

81. Even those who still doubt the existence of a definite ballistic missile threat to Europe

should recognise that Europe can no longer remain undecided and risk the United States - perhaps together with Russia - presenting it with a *fait accompli*.

82. Many questions face the European countries. It is therefore time to hold a public debate to determine what Europe needs to guarantee its future security.

83. The debate should concentrate on two main topics: the possibilities of building on international law as an instrument of security on the one hand and the measures necessary for improving defence and protection arrangements on the other. However, it should be underlined that these two approaches cannot be alternatives. They are complementary.

84. Legally, every effort should be made to improve and extend the nuclear non-proliferation régime with a view to making it truly universal including chemical and biological weapons. In particular, work should at last be completed on a universal convention banning the production and dissemination of chemical weapons.

85. Furthermore, steps should be taken to perfect and extend the missile technology control régime (MTCR) on which most encouraging progress has already been made. Since it was set up in 1987, the number of countries acceding to it has risen from seven to twenty-two and many countries are prepared to accede to or respect it. According to American estimates, cancellation of the Argentinian Condor II ballistic system was largely due to the MTCR, which limited Argentina's access to the necessary technology.

86. With particular regard to space, the question is how far will it be possible to build on international law to set limits for the military use of space. It should be recalled that the January 1967 space treaty banned the placing in orbit of warheads of mass destruction and the placing of military installations on celestial bodies, but made no provision for the demilitarisation of outer space as such.

87. Conversely, the draft treaty submitted to the United Nations General Assembly in 1981 provided for a ban on the emplacement of weapons of all kinds in outer space. Since the stationing of interceptors in space will probably be followed by further research aimed at developing space-based counter-measures and in view of the fact that the rôle and functioning of the United Nations have improved considerably since the end of the East-West confrontation, it is time to review the abovementioned draft treaty.

88. Finally, in the framework of efforts to develop and perfect disarmament and arms limitation measures in respect of ballistic missiles

and anti-missile weapons, there will have to be a study of the extent to which one might still follow the spirit of the ABM Treaty when drawing up future agreements with a wider scope.

89. On the second topic, i.e. Europe's defence requirements, there should first be an examination of the nature of the threat, which may vary in the light of technological developments. There is already talk of the threat of aerodynamic missiles, which are quite different from ballistic missiles and require different protective measures. It is therefore essential to plan a multi-purpose defence system.

90. Specific protection requirements should then be examined. The briefing by the CoSyDe group showed that technical needs differ considerably in the light of the tasks attributed to the anti-missile defence system. To protect the entire population against unforeseeable attacks requires a far more complex architecture than fixed targets or allied troops in a given area.

91. According to CoSyDe, a protection architecture covering Europe's southern flank, particularly in the Mediterranean region, should first take into account the possible threat from Scud-type missiles or their derivatives. In this context, it would suffice to use warning methods already available: observation satellites, ground-based radar stations or airborne monitoring equipment. Next, interception by low-altitude anti-missile means would be enough to protect pinpoint targets. Such defence might be set up at national level and be operational by the year 2000. The protection of French sites alone would cost about F50 000 million. Such an architecture might be the first step towards a wider system of European co-operation.

92. However, according to CoSyDe, protection extended to embrace the whole territory of Europe would require a far more complex and costly architecture and would not be operational until 2010.

93. Since a threat to civilians cannot be ruled out following experience in the Gulf war, consideration should be given to all the means of countering it. Here, a distinction is drawn between passive defence (concentrated on shelters, warning systems and satellite observation) and active defence (anti-missile means) and protection by offensive and preventive military means, including nuclear deterrence.

94. In this context, Europeans must inevitably take a decision on their attitude towards the American GPALS programme providing for a global anti-missile protection system. If they opt for this solution, Europeans will have to ensure that they incorporate the elements necessary for meeting their own specific needs. Moreover, by learning the lessons of their participation in the SDI, they will have to avoid being

wholly dependent on United States concepts, decisions, information and finance. The main problem would remain the United States' restrictive policy in respect of technology transfers and access to information.

95. Framing conditions for European participation in GPALS will in any event imply truly European studies and research, but it should be underlined that it will be difficult for Europe to make up for lost time in relation to this American programme.

96. Another option would be to work out an independent European system compatible with the American one. This concept would have the advantage of making Europeans independent of American information policy and meet Europe's needs and interests more closely. However, the drawback would be that it could not be operational until after the American project.

97. Since Europe, and WEU in particular, is tending to assert itself increasingly as an important figure in space-based security, including earth observation, and in view of the success of national programmes developed and carried out in Europe, it would be logical for a more intensive debate on this question to be held in WEU, bringing together parliamentarians, industry, the Council and the public. This debate might lead eventually to a decision to give a mandate to the European industry to conduct a feasibility study on the conditions for setting up a European anti-ballistic missile defence system.

VI. Conclusions

98. The first aim of this report was to draw the attention of the Council and the public to a problem of a new kind that makes it necessary for Europe to assess the risks to its security that may arise from the increasing proliferation of ballistic technology in third world countries, particularly those along Europe's southern and south-eastern flanks.

99. It was important to show that it is not yet possible to identify the exact nature of the ballistic risk to Europe or the consequences Europe should draw from this because information on the various aspects of the problem is still incomplete. It was therefore necessary to open a more in-depth debate on the subject, particularly as the European governments are divided on the matter.

100. However, Europe can no longer postpone working out a joint approach to anti-missile defence, otherwise it will risk being left dangerously far behind in relation to the evolution of the threat. Above all, it will be for the WEU Council to include this subject in its agenda and for the Assembly to follow developments with particular attention.

APPENDIX I

*Treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems
signed by President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev, Moscow*

26th May 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favourable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between states,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this treaty.

2. Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defence of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defence, and not to deploy ABM systems for defence of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this treaty.

Article II

1. For the purpose of this treaty, an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

- (a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM rôle, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;

- (b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and

- (c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM rôle, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this article include those which are:

- (a) operational,
- (b) under construction,
- (c) undergoing testing,
- (d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion or
- (e) mothballed.

Article III

Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

- (a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of 150 kilometres and centred on the party's national capital, a party may deploy: (i) no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (ii) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometres, and
- (b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of 150 kilometres and containing ICBM silo launchers, a party may deploy: (i) no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (ii) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (iii) no more than 18 ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the abovementioned two large phased-array ABM radars.

Article IV

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each party may have no more than a total of 15 ABM launchers at test ranges.

Article V

1. Each party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based or mobile land-based.
2. Each party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

Article VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this treaty, each party undertakes:

- (a) not to give missiles, launchers or radars, other than ABM interceptor radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode, and
- (b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

Article VII

Subject to the provisions of this treaty, modernisation and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.

Article VIII

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this treaty shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

Article IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this treaty, each party undertakes not to transfer to other states, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this treaty.

Article X

Each party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this treaty.

Article XI

The parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this treaty, each party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognised principles of international law.
2. Each party undertakes not to interfere with national technical means of verification of the other party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.
3. Each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures, which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion or overhaul practices.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this treaty, the parties shall establish promptly a standing consultative commission, within the framework of which they will:
 - (a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;
 - (b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;
 - (c) consider questions involving unintended interference with a national technical means of verification;
 - (d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this treaty;
 - (e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, regulations for the standing consultative commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

Article XIV

1. Each party may propose amendments to this treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the parties shall together conduct a review of this treaty.

Article XV

1. This treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardised its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other party six months prior to withdrawal from the treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying party regards as having jeopardised its supreme interests.

Article XVI

1. This treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each party. The treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

APPENDIX II

Number of missiles existing within different third world countries




FIGURE I

APPENDIX III

*Operational ballistic missiles planned or being developed
in third world countries*

Country	System	Range/Payload	Type	Source	Status
Afghanistan	Scud-B	300 km/1,000 kg	BM	Soviet Union	O/U
Algeria	Frog-4 Frog-7	50 km/250 kg 65 km/450 kg	BM BM	Soviet Union Soviet Union	R O
Argentina	Alacran Condor I Condor II	200 km/500 kg 95 km/365 kg 900 km/450 kg	SLV/BM BM/SR BM	Consortium Consortium Consortium	D O (?) C
Brazil	MB/EE-150 SS-300 MB/EE-350 MB/EE-600 MB/EE-1000 SS-1000 IRBM Sonda 3 Sonda 4 VLS	150 km/500 kg 300 km/990 kg 350 km/N.A. 600 km/N.A. 1,000 km/N.A. 1,200 km/N.A. 3,000 km/N.A. 80 km/135 kg 950 km/500 kg 10,000 km/500 kg	BM BM BM BM BM BM BM SR SR SLV	Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil/Ger./Fr Brazil/Ger. Brazil	D D/T D D D D D P O D P/D
Cuba	Frog-4 Frog-7	50 km/250 kg 65 km/450 kg	BM BM	Soviet Union Soviet Union	R O
Egypt	Frog-5 Frog-7 Scud-B Scud-100	50 km/450 kg 65 km/450 kg 300 km/1,000 kg 600 km/500 kg	BM BM BM BM	Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union N. Korea/Egypt	R O/U O/U D
India	Prithvi Agni Centaure Rohini SLV-3 ASLV PSLV GSLV	250 km/500 kg 2,500 km/900 kg 50 km/N.A. 130 km/N.A. 800 km/100 kg 4,000 km/150 kg 8,000 km/1,000 kg 14,000 km/2,500 kg	BM BM SR SR SLV SLV SLV SLV	India India India/U.S./Fr. India/France India/(?) India/Fr./Ger. India India	T/D T/D O O O D/T D/T P
Indonesia	RX-250 SLV (?)	100 km/N.A. 1,500 km/N.A.	SR SLV	Indonesia/Fr. Indonesia/(?)	D P
Iran	Shahin-2 Nazeat Mushak-160 Iran-200 Scud-B Scud-C	60 km/180 kg 120 km/180 kg 160 km/N.A. 200 km/N.A. 300 km/1,000 kg 600 km/700 kg	BM BM BM BM BM BM	Iran Iran/China Iran/China Iran/China China/N. Korea North Korea	O/U O/U O/U (?) O/U (?) O/U O
Iraq *	Frog-7 Laith Nissan	65 km/450 kg 90 km/N.A. 110 km/N.A.	BM BM BM	Soviet Union Soviet Union Iraq	O/U D/T D
Israel	Lance Jericho I Jericho II Jericho IIb Shavit	130 km/275 kg 650 km/500 kg 1,500 km/650 kg 1,300 km/~ 700 kg 2,500 km/750 kg	BM BM BM BM SLV	United States Israel/France Israel/France Israel Israel/France	O O T/O T/O (?) O/U

Country	System	Range/Payload	Type	Source	Status
North Korea	Frog-5	50 km/450 kg	BM	Soviet Union	O
	Frog-7	65 km/450 kg	BM	Soviet Union	O
	Scud-B	340 km/1,000 kg	BM	S.U./N. Korea	O
	Scud-C	600 km/700 kg	BM	N. Korea/China	T/O
	No-Dong 1	1,000 km/N.A.	BM	N. Korea/China	D
South Korea	Nike-SSM	180 km/500 kg	BM	U.S./S. Korea	O
	Korean-SSM	260 km/N.A.	BM	U.S./S. Korea	P
	Honest John	37 km/580 kg	BM	United States	O
	SLV	4,000 km/N.A.	SLV	South Korea	P
Kuwait	Frog-7	65 km/450 kg	BM	Soviet Union	R
Libya	Frog-7	65 km/450 kg	BM	Soviet Union	O
	SS-21 (?)	120 km/450 kg	BM	Soviet Union	O
	Scud-B	300 km/1,000 kg	BM	Soviet Union	O/U
	Otrag	480 km/N.A.	BM	Libya/Ger.	D/C (?)
	Al-Fateh	500 km/N.A.	BM	Libya/Ger.	D
	Ittisalt	700 km/N.A.	BM	Libya/Ger.	D
Pakistan	Haft-I	80 km/500 kg	BM	Pak./Fr./China	O
	M-11	290 km/800 kg	BM	China	O (?)
	Half-I	300 km/500 kg	BM	Pak./Fr./China	T/D
	Half-II	600 km/N.A.	BM	Pak./China	D/T (?)
	Shahpar	120 km/N.A.	SR	Pak./Fr./U.S.	O
	Suparco	280 km/N.A.	SR	Pak./Fr. (?)	O
	SLV	1,200 km/N.A.	SLV	Pakistan	P
Saudi Arabia	CSS-2	2,000 km/2,000 kg	BM	China	O
South Africa	Arniston	1,500 km/N.A.	BM	S. Africa/Israel	T/D
	Jericho II	1,450 km/N.A.	BM	Israel	T
Syria	Frog-7	65 km/450 kg	BM	Soviet Union	O/U
	SS-21	120 km/450 kg	BM	Soviet Union	O
	Scud-B	300 km/1,000 kg	BM	Soviet Union	O
	Scud-C	600 km/700 kg	BM	North Korea	O (?)
Taiwan	Honest John	37 km/580 kg	BM	United States	O
	Ching Feng	100 km/275 kg	BM	Taiwan/Israel	O
	Tien Ma	950 km/N.A.	BM	Taiwan	C (?)
Turkey	Honest John	37 km/580 kg	BM	United States	O
Yemen	Frog-7	70 km/450 kg	BM	Soviet Union	O
	SS-21	120 km/450 kg	BM	Soviet Union	O
	Scud-B	300 km/1,000 kg	BM	Soviet Union	O

Key: BM - Ballistic missile R - Removed from service
C - Cancelled SR - Sounding rocket
D - In development SLV - Space launch vehicle
O - Operational T - Tested
P - Planned U - Used in attacks

Note: The ranges and payloads given represent best estimates based on unclassified sources. Range/Payload trade-offs are applicable to many systems, giving increased range with lighter payloads, for example.

* Only systems with less than 150-kilometre range are listed for Iraq, which is required to destroy all other systems under U.N. Security Council Resolution 687.

Sources: ACA, ACDA, CIA, CEIP, CRS, CSIS, DoD, IDDS, IDR, IISS, JDW, JSIR and RUSI.

Anti-ballistic missile defence

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Atkinson and others

1. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:
“Promote the participation of the largest possible number of countries and competent international and national institutions to share the burden of the establishment of a global protection system;”

Signed: Atkinson, Lopez Henares, Aarts, Ward, Lenzer

1. See 12th sitting, 2nd December 1992 (amendment agreed to).

The enlargement of WEU

REPORT ¹

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee ²
by Mr. Ward, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on the enlargement of WEU

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Ward, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. Relations between WEU and other European states
- III. Relations between the WEU Assembly, parliaments of other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance, and parliaments of other European states
- IV. Conclusions

APPENDICES

- I. Petersberg Declaration (Part III)
- II. Paragraph 15 of the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993
- III. Written Question 300 put to the Council by Mr. Goerens

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Lord Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: Verbeek), Alegre, Beix (Alternate: Lemoine), Bowden, Caro, De Hoop Scheffer, Fabra, Feldmann, Forni, Foschi, Goerens, Homs I Ferret, Sir Russell Johnston (Alternate: Sir Anthony Durant), Lord Kirkhill, MM. Kittelmann, Koehl, Martino, Moya, Müller, Péciaux (Alternate: Chevalier), Pieralli, de Puig, Reddemann, Rodrigues, Roseta, Seeuws, Soell, Ward, Wintgens.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on the enlargement of WEU

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that Part III of the Petersberg Declaration of 19th June 1992 on relations between WEU and the other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance needs further clarification;
- (ii) Regretting that the Council has felt it necessary to declare that the field of application of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty will be subject to certain restrictions;
- (iii) Noting that at an earlier stage it strongly expressed the wish for both Greece and Turkey to be admitted simultaneously as full members and regretting that the Council was not willing to accept this view;
- (iv) Considering that the invitation to become an associate member of WEU falls within the provisions of Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, and that the provisions of Article X calling for the peaceful settlement of disputes between members – whether full or associate – should be applied;
- (v) Considering that Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty is the foundation of the Assembly's rôle and existence;
- (vi) Asserting that as a sovereign body it requires to know the conditions agreed between the Council and other states acceding to the modified Brussels Treaty before it can establish a status for members of parliament from those states, who will be required to take part in the activities of the Assembly;
- (vii) Stressing that the enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania should also find expression in specific relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliamentarians of those states;
- (viii) Stressing that the participation of parliamentary representatives of new member states, associate member states and observer states in the activities of the Assembly will have an important bearing on the budget, personnel, office space and assembly hall required for the Assembly to perform its task properly,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that the protocols of accession to WEU of members and associate members now being negotiated by the Council will be subject to ratification in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty;
2. After satisfactory negotiations, admit simultaneously all countries which in the Maastricht Declaration have been invited to become members or associate members;
3. Conclude no accession agreement with states invited to become members or associate members of WEU which could lead to a suspension of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty;
4. Explain whether associate members will take part in adopting the annual report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments as stipulated in Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty;
5. Provide clarification on the rôle of associate members in the activities of the Council of WEU;
6. Take into account that the Assembly will not be able to implement the consequences of enlargement until sufficient accommodation and additional financial means are made available for this purpose.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Ward, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht, the declaration of the nine member states of WEU at Maastricht and the ensuing Petersberg Declaration will, if ratified and implemented, profoundly change WEU. Its membership will be extended, other states will participate in many of its activities, and it can also be assumed that the scope and character of its activities will change considerably.

2. The present report will try to formulate a clear opinion on the process of enlargement at the stage now reached and on the consequences for the Assembly. It is not intended to discuss relations between various candidates for participation in WEU's activities.

3. The report will be divided into two parts. The first part will discuss relations between WEU and other European states. The Council is known to have drawn up basic guidelines for these relations and their nature differs depending upon whether such nations are member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance or if they belong to the developing democracies in Central Europe. For the sake of consistency in the discussion, it is assumed that the Treaty on European Union will be ratified and come into force.

4. The second part of the report will examine the consequences of enlargement of WEU for the Assembly and the policy to be conducted as regards parliamentary observers.

5. It should be emphasised here that both the present accommodation and the present budget of the Assembly do not allow for any reasonable enlargement of the number of parliamentary delegations participating in the Assembly's activities. If the Assembly is obliged, through initiatives of the Council and through the considerable increase in interest in WEU's activities in general, to increase the number of parliamentary delegations participating fully or partly in its activities, it must be granted the accommodation and financial means to meet these new legal and political obligations.

II. Relations between WEU and other European states

A. Relations between WEU and the other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance

6. In a declaration issued on the occasion of the 46th European Council meeting in Maastricht on 9th and 10th December 1991, the WEU member states stated the following:

"States which are members of the European Union are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European member states of NATO are invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which will give them the possibility to participate fully in the activities of WEU.

The member states of WEU assume that treaties and agreements corresponding with the above proposals will be concluded before 31st December 1992."

7. Candidates under the Maastricht declaration for full membership or observer status are Denmark, Greece and Ireland. Although, after Maastricht, it would be logical to have parallel membership of the EC and WEU, there are still some problems.

(a) Greece

8. Greece made availability of WEU membership to Greece a condition of agreeing to the Treaty on European Union. It should be noted that in spite of Greece's obstinate stands on this point its membership of WEU should be negotiated seriously. In this framework, it should be recalled that the Council felt it necessary to stress, in Part III of its Petersberg Declaration¹, the fundamental principles on which relations between member states and associate member states should be based. These include: settlement of their mutual differences by peaceful means, and refraining from resort to the threat or use of force. Further, the Council excluded the possibility of invoking Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty in relations between members and associate members of WEU.

9. Moreover, in the EC, Greece has to clarify its policy towards the Macedonian question. As is known, the independent Republic of Macedonia has fulfilled all legal conditions set by the EC for recognition. Greece has used its veto in the EC to block recognition of Macedonia for different well-known reasons. There is a well-founded fear that the conflict in the former

¹ See Appendix I.

Yugoslavia could well be extended to Macedonia if the question of its recognition is not solved. Greek membership should enhance the mutual coherence and security which is the objective of the WEU alliance and not be a source of additional security risks.

10. It is also recalled that in paragraph 3 of Recommendation 525, the Assembly's Standing Committee has recommended that the Council "insists that Greece give the necessary assurances of total compliance with the United Nations embargo before continuing the present negotiations for WEU membership." Until now, the Council has not yet given a reply to this recommendation.

(b) Denmark

11. Denmark is now participating in negotiations to have observer status in WEU. Since the Danish "no" voiced at the 2nd June 1992 referendum, the situation has been confused. The three opposition parties which control a majority of votes in parliament have now prepared a position paper detailing the supplements to the Maastricht treaty that Denmark requires before it can hold a second referendum on the treaty next year. This paper, which the government has accepted as a basis for the official Danish position, contains proposals for special arrangements, including, in particular, the proposal that Denmark should have no obligation to participate in a common European defence policy.

(c) Ireland

12. For Ireland, full membership of WEU would be difficult to reconcile with its policy of neutrality. It is, however, engaged in negotiations to be given observer status.

13. The European member states of NATO which have been invited to become associate members of WEU are Norway, Turkey and Iceland.

(a) Norway

14. Norway has recently shown concern at being neglected in the European security framework while it has the Kola Peninsula and Murmansk with huge concentrations of Russian armed forces almost on its doorstep. It considers associate membership of WEU to be a welcome opportunity to participate in European security discussions. The public debate on possible Norwegian membership of the EC is still going on, but it is understood that Norway is planning to apply officially for admission to the EC in November 1992.

(b) Turkey

15. Turkey would accept associate membership of WEU, but it has made it clear that serious negotiations are needed to determine its rights and obligations in this framework. It has

also rightly insisted on a legally binding protocol of its associate membership which should be ratified by all the signatory states. Turkey applied for full membership of the EC in 1987 but it has not yet received a clear and unambiguous reply².

(c) Iceland

16. Iceland has replied positively to the invitation to become an associate member of WEU and its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hannibalsson, has said that such a status could enable his country to defend its interests and opinions better. It should be noted that the opposition has criticised the government's policy as regards WEU.

17. Part III of the Petersberg Declaration of 19th June 1992 has given a number of useful clarifications as regards the invitation extended in the Maastricht Declaration of 10th December 1991 to countries interested in becoming members, observers or associate members³. However, many questions still remain to be solved in the negotiations which started on 15th September 1992.

B. Relations between WEU and states of Central Europe

18. In an official declaration issued after an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council with states of Central Europe in Bonn on 19th June 1992, it was stated that:

"The enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania should reflect the specific relations which exist and are developing between these countries and the European Union and its member states."

19. This declaration clearly confirms the existence of a parallel development in economic and security relations of the EC/European Union and WEU with third countries. It would therefore be logical for the Council of WEU to invite those European countries which have concluded association agreements with the EC/European Union to become associate members of WEU.

20. The ministers also decided that the foreign and defence ministers of WEU member states and of the abovementioned Central European states would meet once a year, while additional meetings at ministerial level might be convened if circumstances require. Furthermore, a Forum of Consultation is to be established between the WEU Permanent

2. A full discussion of Turkey's position in the European and Atlantic Alliance's security framework is provided in the report on Turkey prepared on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Moya (Document 1341).

3. See Appendix I.

Council and the ambassadors of the countries concerned which will meet at the seat of the WEU Council at least twice a year. The first meeting of the WEU Forum of Consultation took place on 14th October 1992 in London. In the Petersberg Declaration it was also stated that: "Ministers advocated the development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the states concerned."

21. The Assembly could play a useful rôle in building bridges with these countries through various kinds of activities which will be examined in the second part of this report.

III. Relations between the WEU Assembly, parliaments of other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance, and parliaments of other European states

A. Preliminary remarks

22. The decisions taken at Maastricht on 10th December 1991, combined with the Petersberg Declaration and the declaration issued after the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe, both of 19th June 1992, offer an excellent opportunity to consider the Assembly's policy regarding its relations with parliaments of other European states. The objective is to develop a logical and consistent line of conduct in order to prevent ambiguities. It should be noted, however, that with regard to observers the basic principle as embodied in Rule 17 should remain intact⁴.

23. Before discussing the Assembly's policy in more detail, it may be useful to specify some principles which should always be observed:

- Apart from the obligations laid down in the Charter of the Assembly and the modified Brussels Treaty as regards full members of WEU, the WEU Assembly will have certain obligations as regards the parliamentary delegations of states which will have the status of associate member or observer in WEU as mentioned in Chapter II A of the present report, depending on the article in the treaty which will be at the basis of this relationship. It has full autonomy to take decisions regarding its relations with the parliaments of other states. In this respect there is no compulsion to follow exactly the line of conduct of the Council. On the other hand, there should be no misunderstanding that the

Assembly's granting of special status to a parliamentary delegation does not necessarily lead to similar actions being taken by the Council.

- Any new special status of associate member or observer to be created should be unambiguous and easy to understand for everybody concerned.
- Major changes in the Rules of Procedure should be avoided, while those changes deemed inevitable should not affect the specific character of the Assembly's Rules of Procedure and its activities.
- An increase in the number of delegations participating fully or partly in the Assembly's activities, which is a direct consequence of decisions taken by the WEU Council, should be accompanied by a proportional increase in the budget of the Assembly.
- The number of members and observers attending committee meetings and taking part in other committee activities may have to be reviewed in order to maintain the effectiveness of such meetings and activities.
- If the Assembly creates a status of parliamentary observer which could also be granted to parliamentarians from European states not members of the EC/European Union or the Atlantic Alliance, it should take into account (a) the truly democratic and parliamentary nature of the country from which parliamentarians are invited; to this end, the Assembly might follow the decisions taken by the Council of Europe; (b) the determination of the country concerned to play an effective rôle in a European security organisation.
- The Assembly invites parliamentary observers with the aim of establishing a political dialogue that takes into account the various opinions of both government and opposition in the nation concerned. In principle it should invite not more than two parliamentary observers from a given country, in the hope that one of them will represent the opposition. In some instances, it might issue an invitation to more than two observers for a particular meeting in order to hear a broader spectrum of opinion.
- The Assembly should retain the ability to invite, whenever it deems necessary, parliamentary observers from any country without this constituting an obligation to renew such invitations.

4. Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly reads as follows: "On the proposal of the Presidential Committee, the Assembly may admit representatives of parliaments of non-member states of WEU as observers. These observers shall sit in the chamber but not be entitled to vote. They may speak with the authorisation of the President of the Assembly."

- Any reasonable enlargement of the number of parliamentary delegations participating in the Assembly's activities will be impossible in the present accommodation.

B. Proposals regarding different categories of European states

- (i) *Member states of the EC which have been offered full membership of or observer status in WEU*

(a) Greece

24. Continuing a standing practice, parliamentary observers from Greece should be invited. They should have the right to speak in the plenary Assembly. After admission, Greece will be entitled to send a full parliamentary delegation, i.e. its delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

25. The protocol of accession of Greece may be signed at the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 20th November 1992. As regards Greek parliamentary representation in the Assembly, Greece would like the Assembly to adopt the same procedure as it adopted for delegations from Spain and Portugal.

26. It is recalled here that in an early stage of preliminary talks between Spain, Portugal and WEU, the Assembly had invited parliamentary observers from Portugal and Spain to participate in all committee meetings and plenary Assembly sessions with a right to speak but without the right to vote. It should also be noted, however, that these invitations were inspired by the Assembly's desire to see both countries accede to WEU as soon as possible.

27. In the case of Greece, it is Greece itself which has exerted maximum pressure on the European Council and on the Council of WEU to be admitted to WEU. The Assembly has never seen any specific advantage in early Greek accession to WEU and, as a consequence, there would be no reason at the moment to provide preferential treatment for Greek parliamentary observers as long as the protocol of accession of Greece to WEU has not been ratified in the signatory countries.

28. The proposal is to continue inviting Greek parliamentary observers to Assembly sessions with a right to speak until the accession protocol has been ratified, after which date the members of the Greek parliamentary delegation to the Assembly of the Council of Europe may assume their rights as a full parliamentary delegation to the Assembly of WEU. The consequences of full Greek participation in the Assembly's activities as regards the provision of office space, interpretation facilities and personnel should be worked out as soon as the

Council has provided the necessary financial means.

29. As regards these financial consequences, reference is made here to the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993, paragraph 15 of which is attached to this report (Appendix II).

(b) Ireland

30. With Ireland having responded positively to the invitation to become an observer in WEU, parliamentary observers from Ireland should be invited to attend the plenary session. They should be given the right to speak.

(c) Denmark

31. Denmark has also responded positively to the invitation to become an observer in WEU. For several years now, observers from the Danish Parliament have attended sessions of the Assembly with the right to speak. It is proposed to continue this practice.

32. By inviting parliamentary observers from both Ireland and Denmark, the Assembly could act as a bridge to enable parliamentarians from these countries to familiarise themselves with discussions in WEU.

- (ii) *European member states of the Atlantic Alliance which have been invited to become associate members of WEU: Iceland, Norway and Turkey*

33. According to the Petersberg Declaration, these countries may participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council – without prejudice to the provisions of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty – subject to certain conditions, which are listed in the declaration⁵.

34. As negotiations over associate membership of WEU are going on, there is still uncertainty over its legal basis. It also seems that until now the Council has paid little or no attention to the consequences of its views on associate membership for the status of associate members of the Assembly.

35. As things now stand, the Assembly would prefer a protocol of associate membership to be signed by all contracting parties, to be ratified later in each country. It is, however, likely that all parties have agreed on a joint political declaration in which the member states and the associate member states would subscribe to the rather vague conditions for associate members set out in the Petersberg Declaration. In that case they would have none of the rights and obligations mentioned in the modified Brussels Treaty and in its Protocol, and in these circumstances it is difficult to see what advantages there are in being an associate member of WEU.

5. See Appendix I.

36. Turkey, which is playing a very active rôle in the negotiations over associate membership, has also expressed very clearly its wishes as regards the status of its parliamentary representatives in the Assembly. The Turkish authorities consider that the following essential principles should be retained in determining Turkey's associate member status in the WEU Assembly:

- as the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the WEU Assembly at present make no provision for the status of associate member, these texts should be revised and modified accordingly;
- it should be made possible for Turkey to participate fully in all the Assembly's activities;
- in this context, Turkish parliamentarians participating in the WEU Assembly should be given the right to speak, vote and originate documents;
- in the same context, Turkish parliamentarians should be represented at all levels in all the Assembly's committees and assume corresponding responsibilities.

37. Your Rapporteur would agree with the Turkish request but he is not in a position to reach a conclusion until the negotiations with the Council on associate membership are finished. It is essential for the Assembly to know what the specific intentions of the Council are.

38. It may be difficult, if not impossible, for the Assembly to meet the Turkish wishes as long as the legal basis and the nature of associate membership have not been agreed upon by the contracting parties. If associate members of WEU have no specific legal status in which their rights and obligations are set out, what then should be the contents of the Assembly's status for associate members? If in every single case there is uncertainty over the associate member's participation in WEU activities, the Assembly cannot create a status for parliamentarians from associate member states, including the right to vote.

39. No difficulties would arise if the Council considered associate membership as falling under Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty. Each associate member state would then be a "Brussels Treaty Power" subject to certain conditions, to be agreed upon, and according to Article IX would automatically have a parliamentary representation in the Assembly, with a right to participate in the Assembly's committees and plenary sessions as full members with the right to vote.

40. Some of the abovementioned questions were put to the Council by Mr. Goerens in Written Question 300, which is appended to this document⁶.

6. See Appendix III.

41. If the Assembly were to decide to allow parliamentary delegations from associate member states to participate fully in the activities of the Assembly, including those of its committees, there would not be enough space in committee meeting rooms and in the chamber for delegations from the three associate member countries - Turkey, Norway and Iceland - nor would it be possible to provide additional office space for the parliamentary delegations of these new associate member states.

(iii) *Central European states which have developed or are developing special relations with the European Union and its member states: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania*

42. As set out in the declaration issued after the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe on 19th June 1992, ministers have decided to strengthen existing relations by restructuring the dialogue, consultations and co-operation in order to enable the Central European nations to acquaint themselves with the future security and defence policy of the European Union and find new opportunities to co-operate with WEU.

43. It should also be recalled here that the ministers advocated the development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the states concerned. It is in the Assembly's interest to continue to intensify the political dialogue with parliamentary delegations from these countries that had been established in previous years. But the question could be asked whether they should be given a status of permanent observer or whether they should be invited each time by special decision. Taking into account the standing practice and the opinion of the Assembly as expressed in several previous recommendations, it would be logical to grant delegations from these countries a status of permanent observer at the Assembly's plenary sessions with a right to speak if there is sufficient evidence that the members of the parliaments concerned have been elected democratically. Any other decision would be contrary to expectations raised.

44. The consequences of the partition of the Czech and Slovak Republic into two different republics as regards parliamentary observers from these republics will have to be taken into account as soon as the partition has come into force.

(iv) *Neutral European states which have asked to join the European Union: Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland*

45. Since these countries are either permanently neutral or have adopted a policy of neutrality and negotiations on their accession to the

European Union have not yet started, the only reason to invite parliamentary observers from these countries is that it might be interesting to hear them without any future commitment. As long as these countries remain neutral and do not insist on being given security guarantees by any security organisation, it seems to be of little use to allow their representatives to attend sessions of the Assembly on a permanent basis.

46. By inviting too many parliamentary observers, the Assembly may create a situation where too many parliamentarians with only a very remote interest in WEU affairs take part in the debates at the expense of representatives from member states.

47. On the other hand, it may be difficult to respond negatively to requests from these countries' parliaments to become acquainted with the work of the Assembly.

(v) The Russian Federation

48. The mere fact that the Russian Federation has special guest status in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe cannot be a reason for giving it similar or comparable status in the Assembly. On the other hand, it is by far the most important power in Eastern Europe and it will certainly try to reaffirm its position as a leading nation once it has overcome the present crisis. Russia is recognised as the legal successor to the former USSR, with which the Assembly established relations as early as 1987 and it would be helpful for the Assembly to pursue this dialogue in a way which is satisfactory for both sides.

(vi) Other Eastern European states: all the other independent republics on the territory of the former Soviet Union

49. These republics are all represented in the NACC and CSCE. It is far too early to consider them eligible for a more or less permanent invitation to send a delegation of parliamentary observers but, on occasion, it might be useful for the Assembly to invite observers from one or other of them.

(vii) Other Central European states: Albania and the new republics on the territory of former Yugoslavia

50. Whether they are recognised by the European Community or not, the situation regarding these states is still very confused. Their representatives may be invited to follow debates from the public gallery, but it seems too early to invite parliamentary observers to attend sessions of the Assembly. Most of these states are still involved in a violent conflict for which no settlement has yet been found. Others are again or still living in relative peace, but it seems unwise to make a distinction between them from WEU's specific point of view for the time being.

(viii) Malta and Cyprus

51. These two countries have applied to join the European Community, but their applications have not been accepted. There is a risk of them wishing to use any European status they might be granted as a means of pressure on the Community, whereas they do not seem prepared to join the Atlantic Alliance, or to co-operate effectively with WEU in security matters. Their parliamentarians, therefore, should not be granted any special status, although this does not preclude their being invited to attend sessions whenever this may appear to be useful.

(ix) The European Parliament

52. The invitation to observers from the European Parliament must be the subject of a joint agreement between the two assemblies, giving equal and reciprocal status to the observers of both assemblies.

53. As there is no observer status in the European Parliament, there is no reason for the WEU Assembly to offer such status to members of the European Parliament. Relations therefore have to be considered on a different basis.

54. On 23rd September 1992, the Presidents of the WEU Assembly and of the European Parliament met in Brussels. The two Presidents have now:

- (a) decided to meet regularly. Some members of the Political Committee have asked that representatives of each political group be invited to attend these meetings;
- (b) examined the possibility of exchanges of ideas and documents between rapporteurs from the two assemblies dealing with matters of joint interest. Such exchanges were obviously desirable provided they did not allow a representative of one assembly to have a prior view of the work of the other, thus respecting Rule 42, paragraph 10, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly;
- (c) examined the possibility of meetings between committees or subcommittees of the two assemblies.

55. Moreover, a proposal has been made in the Political Committee for delegations of not more than six members of the Assembly's Presidential Committee and the European Parliament's Bureau to meet in the future in order to make sure that the agreement between both Presidents is implemented.

IV. Conclusions

(i) Before final decisions are made, clarification is needed from the Council on the status and responsibilities of associate members.

(ii) Enlargement of the Assembly by inclusion of new full and associate members should take place simultaneously.

(iii) With the present rules of the Assembly, there is no problem in inviting additional observers.

(iv) Any enlargement of the WEU Assembly must be accompanied by sufficient additional funds.

(v) A final report on enlargement including rules for associate members cannot be prepared before the signing of the agreements between WEU and the candidates for full and associate membership.

APPENDIX I

*Petersberg Declaration (Part III)**III. On relations between WEU and the other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance*

A. Following the Declaration released in Maastricht on 10th December 1991 in connection with the Treaty on European Union, WEU ministers recalled the fundamental principles on which relations between member states and associate member states should be based:

- settlement of their mutual differences by peaceful means, in accordance with the obligations resulting from the modified Brussels Treaty, the North American Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the commitments entered into under the terms of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, and the other generally recognised principles and rules of international law;
- in their mutual relations, refraining from resorting to the threat or use of force, in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

They also stressed that the security guarantees and defence commitments in the treaties which bind the member states within Western European Union and which bind them within the Atlantic Alliance are mutually reinforcing and will not be invoked by those subscribing to Part III of the Petersberg Declaration in disputes between member states of either of the two organisations.

B. In their Maastricht Declaration of 10th December 1991, the member states of WEU proposed that states which are members of the European Union be invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wished. Simultaneously, other European member states of NATO were invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which would give them a possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU.

In accordance with Part III of the Petersberg Declaration, ministers agreed that the following points should be made in extending the invitation to the countries interested in becoming members, observers or associate members:

Members:

Member states of the European Union which have accepted the invitation to accede to WEU undertake,

- to respect, in accordance with the principles and values adhered to by all WEU member states, the Brussels Treaty of 1948, modified on 23rd October 1954, its protocols and associated texts, and the agreements concluded among the member states pursuant to the treaty,
- to note with approval the agreements, decisions and rules adopted in conformity with the treaty, and the declarations starting with the Rome Declaration of 27th October 1984,
- to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance in keeping with the obligation entered into on 10th December 1991 in the Declaration on the rôle of WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance attached to the Treaty on European Union, and
- to accept in full the substance of Part III of the Petersberg Declaration which will form part of the Protocol of Accession.

Observers:

Member states of the European Union, which have accepted the invitation to become observers,

- may, although not being a party to the modified Brussels Treaty, attend the meetings of the WEU Council without prejudice to the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty; at the request of a majority of the member states, or of half of the member states including the presidency, presence at Council meetings may be restricted to full members;
- may be invited to meetings of working groups;
- may be invited, on request, to speak;
- will have the same rights and responsibilities as the full members for functions transferred to WEU from other fora and institutions to which they already belong.

Associate members:

Other European member states of the Atlantic Alliance which have accepted the invitation to become associate members of WEU, although not being parties to the modified Brussels Treaty, may participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council – without prejudice to the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty – of its working groups and of the subsidiary bodies, subject to the following provisions:

- at the request of a majority of the member states, or of half of the member states including the presidency, participation may be restricted to full members;
- they will be able to be associated to the planning cell through a permanent liaison arrangement;
- they will have the same rights and responsibilities as the full members for functions transferred to WEU from other fora and institutions to which they already belong;
- they will have the right to speak but may not block a decision that is the subject of consensus among the member states;
- they may associate themselves with the decisions taken by member states; they will be able to participate in their implementation unless a majority of the member states, or half of the member states including the presidency, decide otherwise;

- they will take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they commit forces;
- they will accept in full the substance of Section A of Part III of the Petersberg Declaration which will form part of the association document;
- they will be connected to the member states' telecommunications system (WEUCOM) for messages concerning meetings and activities in which they participate;
- they will be asked to make a financial contribution to the organisation's budgets.

Space activities

For practical reasons, space activities will be restricted to the present members until the end of the experimental phase of the satellite centre in 1995. During this phase the new members and associate members will be kept informed of WEU's space activities. Appropriate arrangements will be made for associate members to participate in subsequent space activities at the same time as decisions are taken on the continuation of such activities.

Mandate

C. Ministers mandated the Permanent Council to arrange for discussions to start with the states concerned.

Ministers confirmed their wish to conclude the necessary agreements before 31st December 1992.

APPENDIX II

Paragraph 15 of the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993

“ 15. Implications of the accession of Greece to WEU

15.1. The Presidential Committee considered that, in accordance with the decisions taken in Maastricht, it is to be expected that Greece will participate as a full member in both parts of the thirty-ninth session of the Assembly. The draft budget for 1993 therefore takes this possibility into account and the following sums have been included under the various sub-heads of the budget for this purpose:

Sub-Head 6.1 - Sittings service (2 Greek sub-editors)	F 75 000
Sub-Head 6.2 - Interpretation service (4 Greek interpreters)	F 234 000
Sub-Head 6.3 - Translation service (2 translators)	F 42 000
Sub-Head 9.2 - Provident fund for interpreters	F 17 400
Sub-Head 9.3 - Insurance for interpreters	F 600
Sub-Head 12 - Installation of an eighth interpretation booth in the chamber of the ESC includ- ing the purchase of elec- tronic equipment, building a dais, labour required for the installation and hire of the booth)	F 105 000
Sub-Head 30 - Expenses for political groups The Greek Delegation will probably have fourteen members (seven representa- tives and seven substitutes)	F 35 000

TOTAL F 509 000

15.2. This represents 1.67% of the total net operating budget and 1.51% of the grand total budget.

15.3. It should be pointed out that no credit is requested for an office for the Greek Delegation and temporary staff since, when the time comes, it will be possible to solve this problem only by redistributing offices in the building in agreement with the Secretariat-General.

15.4. In view of prevailing uncertainty about the date of Greece's accession to WEU, the Assembly is prepared to agree to the sums in question being frozen until that country effectively joins WEU.

15.5. But it must be established quite clearly now that the budgetary problems associated with the accession of Spain and Portugal cannot be repeated, so the Assembly cannot agree to Greek membership until the required budget and administrative arrangements are approved and put in hand.”

APPENDIX III

*Written Question 300**put to the Council by Mr. Goerens*

Countries that become associate members of WEU will be invited to take part in all the activities of WEU and to contribute to the organisation's budget. Does this include the Assembly's budget? Will they take part in the drafting and adoption of the annual report of the Council? Will their delegations to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe benefit from Article IX of the treaty? Does the

Council consider that the definition of the status of associate member or observer in WEU is covered by Article XI of the treaty and that, consequently, it is for the Council alone to determine the nature of such status or that it is covered by Article VIII, paragraph 2, which would allow the Assembly to draw the consequences of decisions taken by the Council where it is concerned?

Turkey

REPORT ¹

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee ²
by Mr. Moya, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on Turkey

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Moya, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. The political situation
- III. The Kurds in south-eastern Anatolia
- IV. The south-eastern Anatolia project
- V. Turkey and the EC
- VI. Black Sea Economic Co-operation Pact
- VII. The Cyprus question
- VIII. Turkey's relations with Greece
- IX. Turkey's relations with Central Asia
- X. Turkey's relations with Transcaucasia
- XI. Turkey and the conflict in former Yugoslavia
- XII. Turkey's relations with Iran, Iraq and Syria
- XIII. Russia
- XIV. Turkish minorities in neighbouring countries
- XV. Modernisation of the Turkish armed forces
- XVI. Turkey and WEU

APPENDICES

- I. Davos joint communiqué
- II. Paragraphs of the Petersberg Declaration with regard to associate membership of WEU

1. Adopted in committee by 19 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Lord Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Agnelli, Alegre, Andreotti, Beix, Benvenuti, Bowden (Alternate: *Sir Keith Speed*), Caro, De Hoop Scheffer, Fabra, Feldmann, Forni, Foschi, Goerens, Homs I Ferret, *Sir Russell Johnston*, Lord Kirkhill, MM. Kittelmann (Alternate: *Vogel*), Koehl, Maroni (Alternate: *Caldoro*), Moya, Müller, Pécriaux, de Puig, Reddemann, Rodrigues, Roseta, Seeuws, Soell, Ward, Wintgens.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation**on Turkey**

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming Turkey's associate membership of WEU, while looking forward to close co-operation in the framework of the association document;
- (ii) Recalling Turkey's most loyal membership of NATO and its vital contribution to security in Europe during the many years of East-West confrontation;
- (iii) Aware of Turkey's important geostrategic position which has changed to some extent but whose interest has remained undiminished since the end of the cold war;
- (iv) Stressing the importance of Turkey's participation in debates on Europe's future security in the framework of WEU;
- (v) Concerned about the volatile situation in the newly independent republics of Transcaucasia and Central Asia where political instability and ethnic strife seem to dominate the agenda;
- (vi) Noting that Turkey, which has historic, cultural, linguistic and religious affinities with the populations of many of these new republics, can serve as a model for their gradual development into modern states based on democratic government and a market economy;
- (vii) Aware of the specific contribution which Turkey can make in concerted efforts to bring about stable inter-ethnic and international relations in the Balkans;
- (viii) Recalling the report by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the situation of human rights in Turkey (Document 6553) and Resolution 985 of that Assembly;
- (ix) Concerned about the mounting violence in south-eastern Anatolia which stands in the way of a balanced policy towards the Kurdish population in that area as announced by the Turkish Government;
- (x) Condemning all forms of terrorism, even if it is used as a means of attaining political objectives;
- (xi) Recalling paragraph 10 of the Council of WEU's Venice communiqué on 30th April 1986, which stated that " They gave special attention to the threat to security posed by international terrorism and underlined the importance of early and effective action to implement the measures that the countries of Western Europe have agreed upon to combat this scourge. ";
- (xii) Convinced that Greece and Turkey, which both wish to be well-respected members of the community of civilised European states and to participate in WEU, cannot afford to continue to harbour differences over many issues which could be solved if approached in a positive manner,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Afford active encouragement to Turkey in the establishment of close relations with the newly independent republics in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, in particular in activities which may help to prevent or solve conflicts in those regions;
2. Be certain to involve Turkey in all its consultations and initiatives regarding the Balkan crisis;
3. Establish close co-operation with Turkey in containing the threat to security posed by international terrorism;
4. Make every effort to promote a solution to existing differences between Greece and Turkey in order to prevent such differences being a strain on security discussions in WEU, particularly taking into account Section A of Part III of the Petersberg Declaration which refers to the settlement of mutual differences by peaceful means, among others in accordance with Article X of the modified Brussels Treaty;
5. Endeavour, as matters now stand, to give Turkey guarantees allowing it to participate at the highest possible level in the tasks and missions of WEU, account being taken of its status of associate member as contained in the document on associate membership signed in Rome on 20th November 1992.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Moya, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. After the end of the cold war, the Gulf war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the position of Turkey and its geostrategic importance have changed. It would certainly be wrong, however, to conclude that its importance has diminished. On the contrary, one might say that it is bound to play a more active rôle in a changing world than it has ever done before in the twentieth century.

2. It would also be wrong to think that the problems which Turkey is facing are easier to solve. There are many problems of a different scale, size and character, which all demand attention at the same time, and the country will have to employ all its resources, be they political, financial, economic or intellectual, to take advantage of the extraordinary position in which it has been placed by the vicissitudes of history.

3. With Turkey having been invited to become an associate member of WEU, while its application to become a full member of the EC is still pending, there is every reason to examine closely the present situation in Turkey and its relations with neighbouring and western countries.

4. One aspect, the position of human rights in Turkey, has recently been examined by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Your Rapporteur has no intention of duplicating this work, which led to a debate in the Standing Committee on 30th June 1992 and the adoption of Resolution 985.

5. The present report tries to examine Turkey's foreign and security policy, its rôle in a region in turmoil, its relations with its western allies and its position as an associate member of WEU. A number of issues related to associate membership will be discussed in the report on the enlargement of WEU submitted by Mr. Ward on behalf of the Political Committee.

II. The political situation

6. In the general elections on 20th October 1991, Mr. Turgut Özal's Motherland Party (ANAP) obtained 115 seats, Mr. Suleyman Demirel's True Path Party (DYP) 178 seats and the SHP, led by Mr. Erdal İnönü, in alliance with the Kurdish nationalist People's Labour Party (HEP) 88 seats. The Islamic fundamentalist Welfare Party (RP) entered parliament for the first time with 62 seats in an electoral

alliance with the neo-fascist Nationalist Labour Party (MCP). This alliance was dissolved shortly after the elections, leaving 19 seats for the MCP (now called MLP) members and the remaining 43 for the RP. The Democratic Left Party (DSP) of former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit obtained 7 seats.

7. On 30th November 1991, the Grand National Assembly approved the coalition government consisting of representatives of the True Path Party and the Social Democrat Party under Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel. This coalition government held 266 of the total of 450 seats in the Grand National Assembly.

8. The government's recent decision, however, to lift the ban on political parties outlawed after the 1980 military coup has opened the door to a revival of the centre-left Republican People's Party (CHP), which has elected Mr. Demirel Baykal as its leader. Fears have been expressed that up to 20 Social Democrat Populist (SHP) deputies might form a new party as a first step to joining the CHP. This might reduce the coalition's majority to just two seats. CHP members are critical of government policy on among other things the Kurds. Mr. Baykal is in favour of lifting the state of emergency in south-east Turkey. On nationalist grounds, he is also opposed to the extension of the allied air operation over northern Iraq to protect the Kurds.

9. The coalition partners had agreed to establish a more open democracy, including a revision of "anti-terrorism" legislation, and improvements in the field of human rights, media censorship and academic freedom. It was stated that Kurdish cultural rights were to be recognised and that Kurdish regions would enjoy increased autonomy in local government. However, strong measures would continue to be taken against the Kurdish guerrillas in the south-east region with the proviso that they should not infringe human rights. The Grand National Assembly is to start its examination of the new human rights legislation in October 1992. Reforms envisage changes in the criminal procedure code as the main thrust in an effort to reduce the incidence of torture.

III. The Kurds in south-eastern Anatolia

10. Considering the mounting unrest in south-eastern Anatolia and the steep rise in armed activities and in the number of victims, it

is clear that the Kurdish issue will increasingly be the main political and security problem facing the government. The present report would be incomplete without a review of this issue.

11. After the first world war, the Ottoman Empire was dismembered, and in that framework the Treaty of Sèvres envisaged the creation of Kurdistan, a Kurdish state. The treaty was, however, never ratified. It was superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which omitted the creation of Kurdistan. In 1925, the League of Nations stipulated some forms of cultural and administrative autonomy for the Kurds living in Iraq. Otherwise, large numbers of Kurds also continued to live in areas which are part of Iran, Syria and Turkey. It is estimated that approximately 500 000 Kurds are living in Syria, 4 million in Iraq, 5 million in Iran and 12 million in Turkey.

12. About half of the 12 million Turkish Kurds live in south-eastern Turkey, a part of the country which has an archaic and uneven distribution of land ownership, and also higher unemployment and lower literacy and school completion rates than the rest of the country.

13. Through the huge south-eastern Anatolia project (GAP), discussed in Chapter IV of this report, the government hopes to redress the social and economic imbalances in this region. As bad luck would have it, the decision to build the Atatürk Dam, the flagship of GAP, is also seen as the main reason for Syria to start supporting the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK).

14. Last year (1991), President Özal already started to ease restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language in order to improve Turkey's minority rights record and to undercut support for the PKK. On taking office, Prime Minister Demirel, recognising the "Kurdish reality", was determined to continue the policy of easing the expression of Kurdish cultural identity, while he also promised increased autonomy for the Kurdish regions. Since then, the increasingly forbidding character of the PKK's action has not encouraged the government to carry out all its intentions.

15. The marxist-leninist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is conducting an armed campaign against Turkish Government forces and civilians in support of its demands for an independent Kurdish state which were first made in 1984. It is estimated that to date this violent campaign has cost almost 5 000 lives.

16. In recent weeks, the conflict seems to have intensified. In the most violent engagement between Kurdish separatists and Turkish troops since 1984, a twelve hour battle near the Iraqi-Turkish border in Hakkiri province on 29th September, more than 210 people were killed, of which more than 150 were guerrillas.

17. In the last week of September 1992, the Grand National Assembly gave an almost unanimous vote of confidence for the Interior Minister's handling of the conflict with the PKK.

18. On 30th September, Prime Minister Demirel declared that Turkey was determined not to give up an inch of its land. He also said that there was no place for talks with the guerrillas and ruled out any devolution of power from Ankara, even if this fell well short of independence. He added that the first priority was to defeat the terrorists. The government is planning to exclude Kurdish areas from the proposed human rights legislation mentioned in paragraph 9. In this framework, Prime Minister Demirel has warned that the "security forces will be left with no authority if the same clauses are implemented in a region where the fight against terrorism is going on." The government coalition parties are the more likely to endorse this opinion as they are in a political fight with the new Republican People's party to retain a majority in parliament.

19. The 1990-91 Gulf war and the resulting situation in Iraq have certainly reduced Turkey's chances of finding an easy solution. True, the United States, the United Kingdom and France have declared that they are in favour of maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq and that they will continue to oppose the creation of a Kurdish nation in the region. As for the Kurdish leaders on Iraqi territory, both Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, have shown their willingness to co-operate with the Turkish government. They had assured the Turkish government that the territorial integrity of Iraq was not in danger through the creation of a Kurdish parliament in the north of the country. Feeling a common cause they recognised its right to fight the PKK. They also promised Turkey that they would not let separatist Turkish Kurds use the area under their control as a springboard for cross-border raids. After a meeting with Foreign Minister Cetin, they declared they had reached an understanding "that the security of the border must be protected and activities of terrorism must be stopped."

20. Of late, new developments have taken place. On 4th October, the "Kurdish parliament of Iraq" adopted a resolution in favour of the creation of a federal Kurdish state within Iraqi territory. Mr. Massoud Barzani has tried to explain the decision, stating that "it is not a declaration of independence, but rather the expression by the Kurdish people of its right to self-determination". In a first reaction, the Turkish government criticised this decision, saying that it was "against any step which could open the way towards the disintegration of Iraq." On the other hand, Prime Minister

Demirel, recognising that Iraq will not easily be reconciled with the rest of the world as long as the present leadership is in control of the country, has suggested that "the initiative of a federal state in northern Iraq could be transformed into a wish to establish a federation with Turkey"¹.

21. As regards PKK activities in the border region between Turkey and Iraq, Turkey is worried that there is no sufficiently powerful authority on Iraqi territory to control the border region and that the PKK has taken advantage of this situation to establish bases in that area which have been reinforced after the recent Syrian decision to close the PKK training camps Helweh and Yanta in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa valley.

22. Moreover, it is said that the Iraqi leadership has allowed the PKK to establish a camp near Baghdad with the aim of punishing Turkey for its support of the anti-Iraq coalition in the Gulf war and stirring up existing dissension between different Kurdish factions. The Iraqi Kurds are extremely upset over the PKK presence and its armed activity on their territory for several reasons. First, the PKK is disturbing the relative peace which has been established through the protection of coalition forces since April 1991. Second, because the PKK is effectively blocking the frontier with Turkey, which is the Iraqi Kurds' only possibility to communicate with the free world and to receive essential humanitarian aid. Last, because the PKK, through its actual occupation of villages, is preventing Iraqi Kurds who became refugees during the Gulf war from returning to their homes.

23. When the PKK ignored calls by the different Iraqi Kurd factions to stop its armed activities in the border area with Turkey, the Peshmergas or Iraqi Kurd warriors, at the beginning of October 1992, started an offensive against the PKK to drive them out. This is wholeheartedly and actively supported by Turkey.

24. It has been suggested that Iraqi Kurds consider the expulsion of the PKK from Iraqi territory to be the price they may have to pay for Turkish acquiescence in their recently-declared semi-independence.

25. Turkey has reached understanding with both Iran and Syria to prevent terrorists crossing their common border, but there is no absolute guarantee that such agreements will be strictly implemented. Moreover, the Turkish Interior Minister has stated that three unnamed countries from outside the region are responsible for encouraging separatist activity among Turkish Kurds.

26. As has already been stated in the recent report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the position of human rights in Turkey (Document 6553), these terrorist activities must be vigorously condemned, also because they have a very negative effect on the government's efforts to achieve a solution to the problems in the region. On the other hand, there are indications that the security forces have overreacted and that their actions do not always fall within the rule of law. Over-zealous counter-insurgency tactics may easily be counterproductive and polarise the opinion of the Kurdish population which is not naturally responsive to the PKK's extremism. If the Turkish Government overreacted, it might thereby also throw away its chances of reaching a peaceful solution with the reasoning majority of the Kurdish population.

27. There can be little doubt that the present situation in south-eastern Turkey is serious, up to the point where the security and territorial integrity of the state are under threat.

28. For western Europeans looking at the unfolding conflict, it is not difficult to provide perfect recipes for the solution of a complicated political problem. The security and territorial integrity of western European states is by no means under threat. They can boast long-standing democratic traditions, which have developed naturally, may consider the modern concept of human rights of their own making and have well lubricated mechanisms for reaching a consensus or at least a *modus vivendi* among partners with divergent views and interests.

29. It may be wrong for the Turkish Government to put all its money on one horse, a military victory over the PKK, while there are still opportunities to continue and intensify co-operation with the reasoning part of the Kurdish population in that region.

30. It goes without saying that earlier pledges made by the Turkish Government as regards the granting of cultural rights and certain forms of administrative autonomy should not be shelved. It makes sense for western European governments to try to convince the Turkish Government that a government, when fighting to control a terrorist organisation, should always try and make sure that it is acting within the rule of law and respecting basic human rights since such behaviour can only enhance respect for its authority with those citizens who are the core and spine of the nation.

31. Turkey's associate membership of WEU should be an excellent opportunity to recall the communiqué issued after the ministerial meeting of the Council of WEU in Venice on

1. *Le Monde*, 10th October 1992.

29th-30th April 1986 where, in paragraph 10, the Ministers stated:

“ 10. They gave special attention to the threat to security posed by international terrorism and underlined the importance of early and effective action to implement the measures that the countries of Western Europe have agreed upon to combat this scourge.”

32. Compared with the situation in 1986, the field of action of international terrorism may have changed, but its methods and objectives have not. The member states of WEU, who have a long experience in combating terrorism while respecting human rights and the rule of law could help their Turkish ally to maintain peace and security within its borders with appropriate means, also keeping in mind the international dimension of Kurdish terrorism.

IV. The south-eastern Anatolia project

33. In a major effort to improve the economic conditions of its poorest region, Turkey is developing a huge construction project, the south-eastern Anatolia project or GAP, which stands for its Turkish name Guneysdogu Anadolu Projesi.

34. The GAP comprises a network of dams, hydropower plants and irrigation schemes spanning the Euphrates and Tigris rivers along Turkey's borders with Iraq and Syria. The project plans to increase Turkey's irrigated farmland by a third while power from the dams will double the country's electricity capacity. It also includes land reform in a region where feudal allegiances still predominate. The government hopes that the project will create jobs in an area facing endemic unemployment and the country's highest population growth. This should stem the flow of migrant workers which has put a heavy strain on public services in cities such as Istanbul and Izmir. At the same time it hopes that the project will positively motivate the Kurdish population and undermine support for the separatist-terrorist movement PKK.

35. By the next century when the irrigation infrastructure and all 21 dams and 19 power-plants are in place, the total cost of the GAP will have reached 2 billion. However, the GAP has also caused trouble for Turkey. First, it is a source of continuing friction with both Iraq and Syria. Syria is dependent on water for 75% of its power generation, while drinking water and water for irrigation and industrial use from the Euphrates are essential for the country's survival. Iraq is less hydropower dependent, but the Euphrates provides water for its agricultural sector. Both countries are facing pollution and degraded supply of water.

36. Most problems have arisen with Syria where the Euphrates supplies 85% of surface water. Turkey, controlling 98% of the Euphrates' discharge, has sought to accommodate Syria's concerns and in 1987, the then Prime Minister offered to guarantee a flow of 500 cubic metres a second at the Turkish-Syrian border until a "final allocation of the waters of the Euphrates between the three riparian states" is achieved.

37. Turkish water officials estimate that Syria can only make use of a third of the 500 cubic metres a second which it receives, while Syria continues to demand 700 cubic metres. Moreover, the Turkish position is that there is no legal case for sharing the waters, both rivers having their sources in Turkish territory.

38. The GAP has had other political and security consequences as well. It is widely believed that Turkey's decision to start building the Atatürk dam in 1983 was the main reason for Syria starting to support the Kurdish separatist PKK. Because of the continuing riparian dispute with Syria and Iraq, few western donors are willing to provide credits for the GAP. Some economists estimate that the huge government expenditure for the project accounts for one-third of Turkey's 70% inflation rate.

V. Turkey and the EC

39. Turkey, which concluded an association agreement with the EC in 1963, applied for full membership in 1987, but until now there has been no positive and unambiguous EC answer.

40. In the conclusions of the presidency, made public after the European Council in Lisbon on 26th and 27th June 1992, it was stated:

“ the European Council discussed the applications which have been submitted by Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. The European Council agrees that each of these applications must be considered on its merits.

With regard to Turkey the European Council underlines that the Turkish rôle in the present European political situation is of the greatest importance and that there is every reason to intensify co-operation and develop relations with Turkey in line with the prospect laid down in the Association Agreement of 1963 including a political dialogue at the highest level. The European Council asks the Commission and the Council to work on this basis in the coming months.”

41. Recently, the EC made it known that the Turkish application will again be considered in 1993 and, in July 1992, at the request of the EC ministers for foreign affairs, the British Foreign

Secretary, Sir Douglas Hurd, submitted a report on relations between the EC and Turkey. It was said that this report received only a lukewarm welcome because it did not pay sufficient attention to the issue of respect for human rights. During their meeting in Broomfield Hall on 12th and 13th September, the EC foreign ministers reaffirmed their wish to intensify relations with Turkey, as expressed at the Council meeting in Lisbon, although the issue was not discussed in depth at the request of Greece, which wanted the Ministers to wait for the results of negotiations on Cyprus, which were to begin on 26th October in New York. The next discussion on Turkey in the Council is to be held on 9th November 1992.

42. It should be noted that the Turkish human rights record is indeed one of the stumbling-blocks for the entry of Turkey into the EC. Others are, as is known, the underdevelopment of large parts of the country, a high rate of inflation, and the danger of massive migration of unskilled labourers towards western Europe. Turkey is now seeking activation of the financial arrangements provided for by the 1963 association agreement but blocked since 1981. At the European Council's request, the European Commission has made proposals to intensify the EC's co-operation with Turkey, including the coming into effect of a customs union by 1995 to promote industrial and technological co-operation, reactivate the financial arrangements of the association agreement and intensify the political dialogue.

43. Even so, Turkey is likely to delay its ambition of establishing a full customs union with the EC by 1995 in an effort to protect key domestic industries. While the country is ready to eliminate tariffs and introduce a common external tariff, it intends to negotiate the extension of import protection for some sectors beyond the 1996 deadline. All this would mean that Turkey is considering a rescheduling of the phased elimination of tariff barriers under the 1963 association agreement with the EC, a first step to full accession.

44. At the moment, Greece is still using its right of veto in order to block any real progress but there is a growing uneasiness in other EC countries over Greece's attitude.

45. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Cetin, has recognised that Turkey is unlikely to become a full member of the EC before the end of the century, but he emphasised that Turkey would pursue its long-term objective of becoming part of Europe and a full member of the EC. The Italian foreign minister Emilio Colombo rightly questioned whether a re-assessed association agreement between Turkey and the EC, combined with associate membership of WEU, would in fact lead to the tacit accession of Turkey to the EC.

46. It is becoming ever more clear that at some stage in the near future, the EC has to work out a time-frame for the future accession of Turkey.

VI. Black Sea Economic Co-operation Pact

47. On 25th June 1992, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine signed the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Pact in Istanbul. The participating countries declared that they had decided to develop multi- and bilateral economic co-operation and that in particular common projects would be established in many fields, such as transport and communications infrastructure, energy, agriculture, health, protection of the environment, science and technology. They also decided to take the measures necessary to encourage co-operation in free trade zones. In the official document, mention was even made of the possibility of establishing a trade and investment bank on the lines of the European Development Bank.

48. The idea of this co-operation pact was originally put forward by Turkey. It was thought that the geographical proximity and mutual complementarity of the economies of the countries around the Black Sea, the reform and restructuring in the former socialist countries and the Turkish reform experience were natural advantages whose exploitation could yield significant mutual benefits. It should be mentioned, however, that even if the pact was conceived in an exclusively economic context, the broad inspiration behind it was the desire to contribute to regional peace and security. The inclusion of Greece and Albania in the pact should be interpreted as a clear sign of Turkey's political goal to have good relations with both countries.

49. Even so, the pact needs to be worked out in greater detail if it is meant to be effective. It falls short of practical proposals and the national economies of several participants such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia will have little chance of developing as long as internal conflicts and political instability prevail.

50. Another problem is whether Turkey considers the pact as an alternative to the European Community. The Turkish Government rejects this suggestion. It should nevertheless be noted that the creation of one or more free trade zones around the Black Sea, of which Turkey would be a part, could easily cause problems for Turkey's admission to the EC.

VII. The Cyprus question

51. A discussion of Turkey's position would not be complete without mentioning the Cyprus question, which plays an important rôle in

Greek-Turkish relations and, partly as a consequence, in relations between Turkey and the EC.

52. Even if the recent history of Cyprus is well known, some basic facts should be repeated here.

53. The independent Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960. When the government decided to limit the autonomous rights of the Turkish-Cypriot minority to cultural and religious issues while its rights in the fields of government and administration, as guaranteed by the constitution, were suspended, fighting broke out between the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot population. As a result of United Nations mediation efforts in March 1964, United Nations peace-keeping forces were deployed on the island. In 1967, the Turkish-Cypriot population established a provisional Turkish administration, which was not recognised by the Cypriot government. In July 1974, officers of the Greek-Cypriot National Guard mounted a successful putsch against the then President Makarios. The putsch collapsed when a few days later Turkish troops landed on the island. These troops occupied the northern part of Cyprus and Cyprus was in practice divided into a Greek and a Turkish part, the latter comprising 37% of the island. In November 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared their own state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which was recognised only by Turkey.

54. At the moment, some 30 000 Turkish troops are permanently stationed in the northern part of Cyprus. Cyprus is still an unresolved problem notwithstanding the more than seventy resolutions which, since 1964, have been adopted on this subject by the United Nations Security Council.

55. After the end of the Gulf war, the EC, the United States and the United Nations intensified their diplomatic activity to find a satisfactory solution to the Cyprus question. In February 1992, the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers, respectively Konstantinos Mitsotakis and Suleyman Demirel, indicated in a seven-point communiqué issued in Davos that the two governments were working together towards a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus issue under United Nations auspices.

56. The United Nations Security Council favours a settlement based on the existence of one sovereign state of Cyprus with a single citizenship, guaranteed independence, territorial integrity and two politically equal communities, living in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation.

57. Some progress has been made in the negotiations on Cyprus's future under United Nations auspices. Both parties have accepted certain basic rights of citizens to go back to their

original settlements and to hold property and their views on territorial adjustments have drawn closer. Too many questions still remain to be settled, such as the sharing of power in the central organs of a future federation and territorial adjustments.

58. The Turkish part of the population, representing 18% of the total population, now occupies 37% of the island. According to the United Nations Secretary-General, they should reduce their portion of land to 28%, but the leader of the Turkish Cypriots considers 30% to be the minimum.

59. Both parties will resume their talks with the Secretary-General on 26th October 1992 and the Security Council has expressed the hope that, after direct negotiations between the two parties, an international conference with the participation of both communities on the island as well as Greece and Turkey could conclude a framework agreement before the end of 1992.

60. After so many years of fruitless United Nations resolutions and other attempts to find a satisfactory solution for the existing stalemate, the importance of an early settlement can hardly be overestimated. A positive and stimulating attitude on the part of both Turkey and Greece would certainly increase the chances of such a settlement. It should, however, be stressed here that a genuine solution cannot rest on a simple agreement over shares of territory, GNP and parliamentary and executive powers. Genuine respect for minorities should be the basic principle without which a future federal state of Cyprus will never prosper. Finally, a solution of the Cyprus question cannot be a prerequisite for starting talks over other disputes between Greece and Turkey.

VIII. Turkey's relations with Greece

61. There are many points of friction between Greece and Turkey and, especially since 1974, they seem to have been involved in an undisguised cold war.

62. Issues under dispute are among others the delimitation of the Greek and Turkish portions of the Aegean continental shelf as well as Turkish complaints and challenges regarding present and potential arrangements of Greek territorial air space and territorial waters, defensive emplacements on the Greek islands of the Eastern Aegean and the Dodecanese islands, civil rights for the Muslim minority living in Greek Western Thrace, and both present and potential command and control responsibilities within the framework of NATO. Greek complaints, in turn, begin with the continued Turkish occupation, since July 1974, of Northern Cyprus, the emplacement of large Turkish amphibious forces at the western coast of Turkey, violation of Greek minority rights in

Istanbul and the islands of Imvros and Tenedos, and continuing pressures on the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.

63. It would not be wise to try to put the blame for unsolved conflicts and strained relations between Turkey and Greece on either of the two parties. Both countries are carrying the burden of a long and complicated history during which the Byzantine and Ottoman empires struggled to dominate the region. Strictly speaking, neither of them could honestly maintain that during those many centuries it has been less aggressive, of a higher moral standing, or the sole party to keep the flame of civilisation burning.

64. History can help to understand and maybe even explain the course of events in the past but it should at least be mistrusted if used as the basis for a nation's behaviour. In fact, history is the worst when used as an argument to justify a country's foreign policy because in such circumstances it always represents a subjective and selective order of events.

65. Western European nations have lived through a most violent succession of wars and conflicts. Nevertheless, after the second world war they decided to share their future destiny by establishing the EC. France and Germany, arch-enemies until 1945, are now forming the core of European integration and recent events have again provided clear evidence.

66. If both Turkey and Greece wish to be part of a future Europe, they will have to solve their differences without too much looking into the past and follow the example of France and Germany. Implementation of the positive and hopeful joint declaration by the Turkish and Greek prime ministers at Davos, in February 1992², should be welcomed since it offers a perfect framework for the global approach which is much needed. Indeed, it is thought here that the worst possible approach to the two nations' existing intricate web of disputes would be to tackle them one by one in accordance with the stance taken by some that they are not interrelated in any way but that on the other hand the solution of one problem is a prerequisite for starting negotiations on the next problem. To begin with, the solution of the Cyprus question should not be considered as a *sine qua non* for all other questions.

67. The substance of Section A of Part III of the Petersberg Declaration³, which will have to be accepted in full by both Greece and Turkey as a member and an associate member respectively of WEU clearly states that the relations between member states and associate member states should be based on the "settlement of their

mutual differences by peaceful means", among others "in accordance with the obligations resulting from the modified Brussels Treaty". It is observed here that Article X of the modified Brussels Treaty provides a satisfactory guideline for the peaceful settlement of disputes if the global approach, chosen by the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey in Davos fails to achieve positive results.

68. As regards the problems in the Aegean, both countries could start by signing a non-aggression pact, including the mutual denunciation of the use of force. After that, both countries could start bilateral negotiations in order to reach a peaceful settlement which will be possible only on the assumption that the Aegean cannot be transformed into a "Greek lake" and likewise that it cannot be subdivided so as to enclave Greek territories (the Eastern Aegean and the Dodecanese islands) into a Turkish zone of functional responsibility. Questions not leading to mutual agreement should be submitted to arbitration or to the International Court of Justice.

69. A solution for the possibility of extending Greece's territorial waters from the present six miles to the widely accepted 12-mile limit could be that both Greece and Turkey would agree to 12-mile limits for their mainland territory and to six mile limits for islands belonging to Greece and Turkey in the Aegean.

70. The issue of minorities in Greece and Turkey should be dealt with following the principles that minority protection should not lead to claims by either side calling for boundary changes and that minorities within a country should be treated as one might wish one's own people to be treated in third countries.

71. As a general means of building confidence, both countries could contribute to improving mutual relations by starting to reduce the level of their armed forces in border areas along their common frontier.

IX. Turkey's relations with Central Asia

72. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey started to establish close diplomatic, cultural and economic relations with the newly-independent Islamic republics in Central Asia, which are: Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The inhabitants of these republics are mainly Turkic people except for the Tajiks, who are ethnic Persians. In May 1992, the Turkish Prime Minister paid a high-profile visit to the abovementioned republics and Azerbaijan and took part in the summit of Central Asian republics with Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. At this summit, a number of economic issues was discussed, including customs, and road, railroad and pipeline connections.

2. See Appendix I.

3. See Appendix II.

73. Recently, on 30th and 31st October, Turkey organised a summit in which the heads of state of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan participated. It should be noted, however, that the new Turkic republics were not yet prepared to sign the important agreements on trade liberalisation, customs harmonisation and oil and gas exports sought by the Turkish Government. The Ankara Declaration, which was signed by all participants, reflects the intention to intensify relations between the participating republics, in particular by organising a yearly summit.

74. In the following chapters some of the recent developments and prospects for the future will be discussed before drawing conclusions on Turkey's rôle in the region.

Kazakhstan

75. Kazakhstan, although faced with the same problems as all other former Soviet republics such as a collapsed economy, rampant inflation, disastrous pollution of the environment and ethnic problems, has also a number of promising advantages. It has many valuable raw materials, in particular oil, natural gas, gold, diamonds and uranium and its agriculture is relatively well developed. Its industry is obsolete, apart from the high-tech aerospace industry which was part of the Soviet military industrial complex. There is relative political stability under the leadership of its popular President Nursultan Nazarbayev who, although a former communist apparatchik, is supported by all the different political groups.

76. Kazakhstan is making progress in the implementation of its economic reform programme which also envisages the exploitation of the huge resources of natural gas and oil.

77. Its 17 million population is composed of more than one hundred nationalities. The largest groups of population are the Kazakhs, with more than 7 million, and the Russians – the best educated and trained part of the labour force – with 6.5 million. The Kazakhs are of Mongolian origin, but they adopted Turkish culture and Sunnism long ago.

78. Kazakhstan has an important defence industry and is one of the former Soviet republics with nuclear arms on its territory. It should be noted that President Nazarbayev is to be admired if only for the way he is playing his nuclear arms trump card with ambiguous statements. After earlier pledges to transfer all nuclear warheads to Russia, President Nazarbayev later stated that his country will keep the warheads as long as China, Russia and the United States retain nuclear arms. Only recently, he declared (*Le Monde*, 26-27th September 1992) that Kazakhstan wishes to become a denuclearised state. In seven years' time it will

reduce the strategic arms in accordance with the START agreement, which has now been ratified by Kazakhstan. It is expected that in the near future, the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan will conclude an agreement which will enable Russian military and technicians to be in charge of the nuclear weapons which remain on Kazakh territory.

79. In the framework of the CIS, united armed forces have been created, and Kazakhstan has placed its nuclear arms under the unified command of the CIS. With Russia it has also signed a collective defence agreement according to which the signatories decide themselves where and on which territory they will deploy their arms.

80. As in all other Central Asian republics, the main question is whether Kazakhstan will succeed in achieving positive economic results within the foreseeable future. If economic performance fails, scenarios for disaster can easily be imagined.

81. After having participated in the summit of the newly independent Turkic republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus in Ankara on 30th and 31st October 1992, President Nazarbayev visited Teheran, where he signed agreements between Kazakhstan and Iran on oil, energy, transport, finance and culture. Apparently, the Kazakh President does not want to be seen as favouring either Turkey or Iran.

Kirgizstan

82. A silk revolution took place in Kirgizstan in the autumn of 1990, when the communist party's monopoly of power was broken with the election of the Academy of Science head Askar Akayev as President on 28th October. After the coup attempt in Moscow in August 1991, President Akayev banned the communist party. He has gone further than any other Central Asian leader in attacking old élite power, reforming local government bodies and ordering the government to cede control over the press. The president has furthermore pushed strongly for land reforms, and claimed that in early 1992, half of the country's farms had been privatised or converted into co-operatives.

83. It is generally thought that President Akayev's policy has strongly stimulated the establishment of Central Asia's most developed democratic movement. He is trying to prevent conflicts by balancing political appointments among regional, ethnic and political groups. With its 4.4 million inhabitants and little natural resources, Kirgizstan has a largely rural economy and is dependent on its neighbours' basic inputs of fuel, foodstuffs and raw materials. It maintains the closest relations with Russia and Kazakhstan. It is not certain that Kirgizstan is safe from ethnic rivalries. In spring 1990, conflicts between Kirgiz and Uzbeks in

the valley of Och flared up and several hundreds were killed. In recent years, 200 000 Slavs left the country, but 850 000 remain, most of them Russians, whom President Akayev would like to stay.

84. In October 1992, the President announced that his country would leave the rouble zone and introduce its own currency by 1995. It is the first CIS republic to have adopted an economic restructuring programme with the IMF, which it joined in September this year, and which undertook to lend \$300 million next year.

85. According to President Akayev, the CIS will no longer be a political confederation after an obligatory transitional period, but he is convinced that economic links between its members will continue to exist.

86. It should be noted that the majority of Kirgizstan's population, the originally nomadic Kirgiz adopted Islam relatively late and that, except in the Fergana Valley and the south of the country, the influence of Islam on public life is limited. The religious leader of the Muslim Kirgiz, Kimsanbai Abdurakhmanov, insists on the separation between state and religion and is a declared opponent of fundamentalism.

Tajikistan

87. Tajikistan, with 5.2 million inhabitants, has a language and culture of Persian origin and the Tajik's religion is a version of Islam, quite similar to Islam as practised in Iran.

88. Tajiks view Iranian culture as a major resource for strengthening their identity. On the other hand, relations with Iran are ambiguous and the Tajik Sunni religious leaders, weary of Iranian Shiism, have strained relations with the Shiites in their own country.

89. The political situation is by no means settled. In April 1992, Muslim militants, combining forces with a democratic movement, forced the government to form a coalition with their representatives.

90. On 7th September 1992, opposition factions mainly consisting of poorer Tajiks from the central plains and eastern mountainous regions, the democratic opposition and a revived Islamic party forced President Rakhmon Nabiyev out of office notwithstanding the fact that he enjoyed the support of the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan and the protection of units of the Russian armed forces. President Nabiyev, coming from the communist party's ruling class, also had strong support from the security services, the middle class and the industrial sector.

91. Violent combats between supporters and adversaries of the ousted president but also involving regional, ethnic and clan disputes are

still continuing and altogether the fighting has killed more than 2 000 people this year.

92. Russia ordered more troops to the region, formally at the request of Tajikistan, but their main objective, as stated by the Defence Ministry, was to stop the capture of armaments, ammunition and military hardware from Russian troops and to protect the Russians in the region. Weapons used by rival movements which are engaged in a civil war are acquired from Afghanistan and from raids on Russian military bases guarding the Afghan-Tajik border.

93. It is difficult to ascertain how far Iran is involved in the political upheaval in Tajikistan. It has provided textbooks for Persian-language teaching in schools and offered much needed economical assistance, but the government appears to prefer staying out of the ongoing internal disputes in Tajikistan.

94. On the other hand, the presidents of neighbouring Central Asian republics are accusing fundamentalist forces, not necessarily from Iran, of stirring up the conflicts. It is said that they are pitting peoples from Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube against each other in order to be able to ask their religious leader to restore order and create a government to rescue the nation.

95. Political relations have been strongly polarised and the Islamic leaders behind the new government have increasingly marginalised their secular allies in the former opposition against the then President Nabiyev. It is said that Qaszi (muslim leader) Akhbar Toradzon Zoda and the Islamic Renaissance party are now the most powerful political forces in the republic.

96. On 14th October, conflicting parties in the south of Tajikistan had accepted a cease-fire after negotiations between the government, Russian armed forces and leaders of armed factions. It was accepted that Russian troops would deploy around the strategic companies in the country. On the other hand, Kirgizstan has not yet sent the buffer forces which were requested, because the conflicting parties were not able to provide the necessary guarantees.

97. According to President Akayev of Kirgizstan, buffer forces in Tajikistan should be a multinational force with military personnel from Kirgizstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Russia could provide equipment, but no troops. All this could be done only at the request of the Tajik Parliament.

98. The main aim of the proposed CIS peace-keeping force would be to dislodge warring forces from the southern region of Kurgan-Tyube. It would be deployed in Kaleninabad, a town north of Kurgan-Tyube, and at the Sharshar Pass, near the southern region of Kulyab, a stronghold of former President Nabiyev.

99. Here it is recalled that in May this year, the opposition, then mainly the Democratic Party and the Islamic Renaissance Party, had called upon the United Nations, Iran and Afghanistan to act in order to protect the population against CIS forces. Such forces would therefore certainly encounter strong resistance.

100. At the end of October, the government, backed by Russian troops and irregular forces, defeated a two-day coup attempt by supporters of the ousted former President Rakhmon Nabiyev. The government of acting President Akbarshah Iskandarov promised that a special parliamentary session would be held to decide whether former President Nabiyev should be reinstalled. It is, however, expected that the situation in Tajikistan will not improve soon. The government is dependent on irregular volunteer forces, some of which are said to include criminal gang members, who may soon be engaged in an internal struggle for power. Moreover, President Iskandarov's government controls little territory outside the capital, and even there his control may be subject to doubt. Unrest in Tajikistan has caused the greatest alarm to the President of Uzbekistan (see paragraphs 111 and 112).

Turkmenistan

101. Turkmenistan, with 3.6 million inhabitants is in every respect Central Asia's most primitive republic. There is no effective opposition or democratic pluralism and power is concentrated in the hands of the Teke, the largest of the country's three main tribes. Political repression is still tight. President Saparmurad Niyazov and his administration rely heavily on Russian bureaucrats and the country still has many Russian troops and sensitive military installations.

102. Islam is a powerful force in the countryside, but the religious establishment is relatively unified and disposed to co-operate with the government. In general, the Turkmen population is not inclined to consider Iranian Shiism as a basis for the religious and political development of its country. Iran has no particular influence in Turkmenistan, which finds its origin in long-standing conflicts between both populations.

103. Economically, the republic is largely dependent on Russia, but it has important resources of natural gas, which it now hopes to develop with help from Iran. No agreement has yet been reached over a planned gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to the Black Sea, which Turkey would prefer to go through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Georgia, while Iran would prefer to trace it first through Iran and then through Turkey.

104. In May this year, Turkmenistan concluded a separate agreement with Iran on transport, banking and trade. Both countries will establish a joint banking and customs system. Road and rail links will be completed with Iran largely financing the \$500 million cost of the railway link. Iran has also announced a \$50 million credit offer to Turkmenistan. There was also an agreement over building a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Iran for Iranian gas purchases.

105. In October 1992, the Government of Turkmenistan signed an agreement with a United States-Turkish consortium envisaging a feasibility study of the six possible routes for a pipeline to export natural gas from Turkmenistan to Europe.

Uzbekistan

106. With its 20.3 million inhabitants, mostly Sunni Muslims, Uzbekistan is the most important new republic in Central Asia. It is the world's third largest producer of cotton and the seventh largest producer of gold. 68% or billion of the country's exports are raw cotton and textiles. After becoming independent, it is now keen on foreign investors helping it to process more of its wealth internally rather than export raw materials. In March 1992, oil was discovered in the Fergana valley and the government hopes to attract foreign investors for its exploitation, but it is still too early to make reliable estimates of existing reserves.

107. Uzbekistan is a net importer of consumer goods, food and energy. It has traditionally relied on funds from the Soviet Government for up to 30% of its budget expenditure. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it started trying to sell its raw materials on international markets without going through Moscow.

108. One of the issues which will certainly demand the government's greatest possible attention in the near future is the population growth of 600 000 per year which is already causing a tremendous rise in demand for water and land resources.

109. President Islam Karimov, a former hard-line communist, is ruling his country in an authoritarian manner. He has pledged, however, to abide by a set of ten principles for democracy and human rights formulated by the United States, in exchange for United States diplomatic recognition. For President Karimov, Turkey is a model of development for his own country. He wishes to develop a secular state which respects the country's Muslim identity but carefully keeps religion separate from government.

110. The President, together with the ruling National Democratic Party is taking hesitant steps towards introducing a market economy. A new constitution for a democratic state is being

prepared, but the first drafts have been criticised strongly by the opposition for the lack of political freedom. In any case, President Karimov has banned the creation of Islamic parties, while trying to enforce a division between the authority of the state and the mosques which are free of state control. Even so, Islamic politicians and leaders think it is a matter of time before their ideas prevail. On the other hand, it should be noted that they are Sunni Muslims who say that they do not intend to follow the Iranian Shiite model. The religious opposition is hoping that supporters of an Islamic state will be able to assume power after the next presidential elections due to take place in five years time and they are convinced that expected economic hardship in the years to come will help to popularise the Islamic faith.

111. Understandably, events in Tajikistan are causing concern with the leadership of Uzbekistan, which is now strongly criticised by the opposition for authoritarian government.

112. In connection with the worsening of the civil war in Tajikistan with reports of the use of tanks and artillery and the killing of several hundreds of people on 30th September, President Karimov sealed the border against refugees from the fighting, while increasing his control over the political opposition in his own country. The President's worries about the civil war spilling over into Uzbekistan are not unjustified, if it is realised that 24% of Tajikistan's population is ethnically Uzbek.

Turkey's policy

113. The sudden high profile adopted by Turkey in its relations with the new independent Central Asian republics which were proclaimed after the collapse of the Soviet Union has not failed to attract the attention of its western allies on both sides of the Atlantic.

114. Most of them consider this prominent new rôle a welcome initiative which could help to stabilise a region which is in great turmoil. By now, the arguments to support the Turkish initiatives are almost too well known to be repeated here. In essence it is said that Turkey can boast strong ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic ties with these countries. Moreover, Turkey, although being a Muslim country, has adopted the principles of a secular and democratic form of government and could thus be an ideal mentor. It can also teach the advantages of a market economy, pointing out its own remarkable economic growth. Last but not least, it could save Central Asia from the pitfalls of fundamentalism which, it is said, Iran is trying to introduce in the whole region. The merits of each of these arguments will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

(a) Close relationship with Turkish culture

115. Apart from the population of Tajikistan, the populations of the other Central Asian republics are generally referred to as being Turkic. However, the ethnic, linguistic and cultural unity which this implies does not exist, and there are significant differences among these populations, even within the borders of the different republics. Before the important Turkic migrations, which took place after the tenth century AD, large parts of this particular Central Asian region were inhabited by Iranian Indo-Europeans and, even if the Turkic element became dominant, also as regards language, there was an intermingling of Turkic and Iranian people. Iranian cultural influence and traditions continued to exist within the Turkic cultural mainstream. The fact that, at present, many political and cultural leaders are developing a purely Turkic cultural identity for their republics has partly to do with a tradition of cultural and historical revisionism in the Soviet Union. It has been standing Soviet policy to force national cultures and histories upon each of the Central Asian republics which were created on the basis of rather arbitrary borders. Now that each of the independent republics is involved in a process of defining its national identity, they will barely be inclined to stress aspects of a broader cultural and political unity. In conclusion, it should still be noted that, with the exception of Tajikistan, the Turkic element dominates in language, population and culture in the republics of central Asia.

116. Turkey is therefore well placed to exercise a stimulating and positive influence in most of the Central Asian Republics. The fear being expressed by some that an overwhelming Turkish influence might, sooner or later, lead to claims for the establishment of a large Pan-Turkish state, reviving the old idea of a united Turkestan which would include all the Central Asian Turkic republics, seems to be far fetched. At the moment, there are still too many nationalistic ethnic rivalries, and natural centrifugal forces at work. Moreover, the process of dismantling old and existing government institutions, creating new ones and the struggle for power within the new republics will still absorb most of the political energy in the foreseeable future.

(b) The threat of fundamentalism

117. Although most Central Asian republics are still being governed by the same élites in politics and administration as during Soviet rule, communist ideology has lost its authority, and an ideological vacuum has come into being. The lack of experience of democratic government and the existence of an Islamic tradition together with an increasing politisation of Islam in that region could easily lead these countries to turn to Islam as a cure for all ills.

118. There can be little doubt that Islam is going to play a more important rôle in all these republics and this has been confirmed by their leading politicians. It may be a rallying force, helping to create stability in social and political life. On the other hand, one should not exaggerate the danger of these republics embracing fundamentalism.

119. The ruling élites in all these republics consider the West as their model for economic development and progress. They know that the establishment of fundamentalism as the leading system would deter the West from providing technological and economic assistance which is so badly needed. Moreover, the Sunni version of Islam is dominant in the region, even in Tajikistan.

120. If the population in these republics is touched by religious influence from abroad, it comes rather from Afghan Mujahidin with Wahabbi sympathies, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

121. Indeed, it would be exaggerated to say that Iran is trying to play a dominant rôle in the Central Asian region. It is making efforts to establish economic and political relations with these new republics and it has signed a number of agreements and memoranda of understanding with them. There are different reasons for this activity. Understandably, the first is to open markets with prospects for development in the future. A second reason is that Iran is worried about its own security and territorial integrity in a region where existing frontiers may be called in question by nationalist and ethnic rivalries. Iran is coming to the conclusion that its rigorous foreign policy, meant to serve the fundamentalist Islamic revolution has only led to useless isolation. Now, it is increasingly feeling encircled and threatened and its recent policy towards Central Asian republics may be seen as an effort to enhance its security and prevent encirclement. It should also be noted that Iran is not in a position to devote much money to economic and other assistance. Again, it is more concerned with its own economic reconstruction than with exporting the Islamic revolution, which cannot boast great economic achievements despite the presence of large natural resources.

122. In conclusion, it should be said that at the moment there is no strong fundamentalist movement in the Central Asian republics. The Islamic revival in Central Asia is mainly an indigenous movement which is cultural rather than political, stemming from the aspiration to assert the identity which the Soviet Government had suppressed for many decades. At the moment, secular government is well rooted in this area, but the Islamic revival could be the core of a fundamentalist striving for power if the secular governments fail to meet the basic aspirations of the population, in particular the hope for economic revival.

(c) The rôle of Turkey

123. What can Turkey do? When visiting Central Asian republics in May this year, Prime Minister Demirel generously offered loans. Turkey's Eximbank has now begun extending consumer and investment loans of \$250 million for Uzbekistan while Kazakhstan is getting \$200 million, and Turkmenistan and Kirgizstan \$75 million each. With additional incentives, the total sum would almost reach \$1 billion. But at the same time, Turkish bank officials have shown some scepticism, considering the country's foreign exchange reserves and the incapacity of debtor countries to provide adequate guarantees for the loans. Turkey has started to train diplomats and military officers from these countries. Regular flights have been established between Turkey and Central Asian capitals. Communications systems for telephone and telex to the rest of the world through Turkey have been set up with Turkish help, and assistance programmes are being planned for educational and cultural activities.

124. It should be noted that Turkey's financial resources are too limited to fund major initiatives for economic assistance to Central Asia. In fact, Turkey is well aware of its own limitations and it knows that, for the foreseeable future, the conditions in the Central Asian region, which is rich in natural resources but lacking the banking infrastructure and the credit worthiness to warrant extending loans, make it necessary to resort to economic exchanges through barter arrangements.

125. Central Asia's economic geography and structures still need to be examined in depth. On the other hand, Turkey shares a cultural heritage and linguistic affinity with Central Asian republics which may help them to confirm their identity. It can also provide an example of how a Muslim country can establish a secular state based upon a pluralistic democracy.

126. The Central Asian republics still have a long way to go towards democratic government and a market economy. Their leaders have legitimised their position through elections, but these were only remotely democratic or properly contested, except for those which took place in Tajikistan.

127. Central Asia's governments will not be able to rejuvenate their economies without relinquishing essential levels of power, such as state ownership of land and industry. It is noted that the economic development required for political stability is complicated by an extremely high annual population growth of more than 3% in many areas and a disastrous environmental legacy. Existing industry is very inefficient and will have to be abandoned and replaced in many cases. Education and job-training systems in Central Asia are the poorest in the ex-Soviet Union.

128. The only possible conclusion is that Turkey should be encouraged to intensify its contacts with Central Asian republics because, to those countries, it appears to be a natural partner to be imitated.

129. The conflict on the territory of former Yugoslavia has shown the importance of early information, consultation, and conflict prevention. The establishment of a close relationship between Turkey and Central Asian republics at different levels of interest and activity should also be seen as a contribution to conflict prevention. Clearly Turkey cannot do everything alone and Western Europe should therefore be asked to provide support in every possible way, notwithstanding the overwhelmingly strong centrifugal forces in the former Soviet Union.

130. Finally, it should be noted that, in a number of member states of the CIS, a new tendency can be perceived towards what could be called "reintegration" of the now independent republics. Recently, President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan not only pleaded in favour of establishing a strong common defence, but also for economic integration and setting up efficient common institutions. Up to a certain point, these wishes are shared by most of the Central Asian republics which are dependent on Russia for their economic survival and for the protection of their borders. The ruling factions in these republics also need the support of the Russian army in order to maintain their political power and authority and to maintain the often volatile and fragile regional stability. As regards a number of tasks and activities which are vital for the survival of the new Central Asian republics, Turkey, for all its good intentions and the positive influence it can exercise, will not be able to take Russia's place in the near future.

X. Turkey's relations with Transcaucasia

131. In the north of the Anatolian peninsula, Turkey shares its border with Georgia, Armenia and, for only 12 km, with the autonomous republic of Nakhichevan, which, although further enclosed by Armenia, is part of Azerbaijan. In all these republics, the political situation is still in a state of flux. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has now been raging for more than four years, and recently, Georgia also became entangled in thorny ethnic conflicts.

Georgia

132. Georgia, with its 5.4 million inhabitants, has not joined the CIS. As everywhere else in the newly independent republics, the economy has collapsed. After dropping by 5% in 1989 and by

12% in 1990, economic output fell by 25% in 1991 and there is no indication of improvement in the near future. Elections for the new parliament, which is to replace the unelected State Council, are to be held on 11th October 1992.

133. Georgia is facing ethnic conflict in south Ossetia, where the population wants to secede in order to create an independent republic together with neighbouring north Ossetia. Both parties have now accepted the deployment of peace-keeping forces and at the moment the situation is relatively quiet.

134. Recently, a conflict broke out between Georgia and Abkhazia, an autonomous republic on Georgia's western territory, which declared its independence in July 1992. Georgia's claim to the Abkhazian region goes back to the fourth century BC, saying that Abkhazian tribes arrived only 600 years later. Later, the Abkhazians were granted autonomy by the Czars and Soviets.

135. According to the Abkhazians, their territory was inhabited exclusively by Abkhazians until 100 years ago and they put forward that changes in its population only occurred since then, in particular through Stalin's forced migration policy. They also note that they received the statute of independent Soviet republic in 1925 and that the republic was absorbed by Georgia only in 1931. Nowadays, Abkhazia's population consists of 45% west Georgians and only 18% Abkhazians.

136. The Abkhazians converted to Islam in the 16th century when they came under the Ottoman empire. Nowadays, many descendants of Abkhazian emigrés are living in Turkey.

137. The government of Georgia is the more worried about Abkhazia because of the presence of armed volunteers coming from other Caucasian republics on Russian territory in order to support their "Abkhazian brothers". The volunteers sent by the "confederation of northern Caucasian mountain people", a mainly Muslim, pan-Caucasian organisation, yearning for a Caucasian state, have announced that they will retreat only after the withdrawal of Georgian troops from the region.

138. Indeed, if one looks at the mounting unrest in other Caucasian republics in the region, more conflicts may be on the horizon and the question is whether the governments of Georgia and Russia will be able to contain them.

139. On 5th September 1992, a cease-fire between Georgia and Abkhazia came into force and Georgia agreed to keep only enough troops in Abkhazia to protect the railroad and highway network. The cease-fire has now been violated and fighting has flared up again.

140. After seizing the Black Sea resort town of Gagra in early October, Abkhazia separatists are in control of virtually all northern Abkhazia from Sukhumi to Russia's southern border. Russian troops have taken control of the Abkhazian section of the Moscow Tbilisi railway, but Mr. Shevardnadze has disputed their legal authority to do so on Georgian territory and he is against intervention by Russian or CIS armed forces. Georgia has repeatedly accused Russia of backing the Abkhazians, but apart from some Russian officers who are openly sympathetic to the Abkhazians and a few former Russian troops discharged from local bases who participate in the fighting there is no proof of official Russian involvement.

141. On 11th October, Mr. Shevardnadze was elected President of the Parliament of Georgia, the highest position in the country. Mr. Shevardnadze has said that he would do all that is possible to find a political solution but that he would use force if needed.

142. Georgia's ruling state council is now creating a defence council under the chairmanship of Mr. Shevardnadze, which will have the power to pass decisions that will be "mandatory for all organisations and citizens across the state". The establishment of the Council is an important step in efforts to stop the conflict in Abkhazia.

143. Turkey has no particularly close relations with Georgia, nor is it particularly alarmed by the conflict between Georgians and Abkhazians, but this may change if the conflict extends in size and time. In that case, Turkey could face massive migration of those who prefer to join their kinsmen who have been living in Turkey for many generations.

Azerbaijan

144. Not unlike some other nations in the region, Azerbaijan has often been a bone of contention in the struggle for influence between the different larger powers in that area. From the beginning of the 7th century AD, the territory of Azerbaijan was invaded by Turkish tribes from Central Asia. After Mongolian rule during the Middle Ages, the Safavid dynasty, extending its rule from today's Iran, introduced Shiism. Between the 16th and 18th century, the territory of Azerbaijan frequently changed hands between Persians and Ottomans until, in 1828, Russia acquired rule over the khanates of Nakhichevan, Yerevan, Karabakh and the northern part of Azerbaijan, while its southern part was annexed by Persia.

145. In Azerbaijan, the political situation has been fairly unstable since the country declared its independence on 30th August 1991. Mr. Ayaz Mutalibov, a former first secretary of the communist party who was elected president, had tried to restore order under the pretence of fighting Armenian aggression, but his decrees

proclaiming the state of emergency, curfew and the suspension of political organisations have had no effect. When President Mutalibov came back from the 15th and 16th May CIS summit, the Popular Front, representing the nationalist opposition, ousted him and also suspended the parliament, which had an artificial communist majority. In June 1992, Abulfaz Elchibey, a former dissident and political prisoner, supported by the Popular Front of which he is a co-founder, was elected president. Mr. Elchibey is a well-known and respected figure in Turkey and before his election he already had material support and advice from Turkey's leading political parties.

146. Turkey attaches great importance to its good relations with Azerbaijan and this country has now chosen Turkey's latin script for its Turkish language over the cyrillic or arabic letters used by Iran. President Abulfaz Elchibey has also made it clear that he is in favour of a secular state model and of close relations with Turkey without aiming at pan-Turkism.

147. One of Azerbaijan's problems is that, in its contacts with Turkey, it cannot completely ignore Iran with which it has a common border. Only Nakhichevan, an autonomous Azeri enclave in Armenia, has a common border with Turkey.

148. Iran has a very active cultural policy towards Azerbaijan through radio broadcasts, the opening of schools, the building of mosques and distribution of literature.

149. President Elchibey has demanded self-determination and cultural rights for the 20 million Azeris living in Iran since Russia took the northern Azeri region, now Azerbaijan, from the Persian empire in the early 19th century, but he may be aware that an independent South Azerbaijan with 20 million inhabitants could easily swallow up the north with its little more than 7 million inhabitants.

150. A retired Turkish air force general, Yasar Demirbulak, is adviser to President Abulfaz Elchibey on how to set up Azerbaijan's army. General Demirbulak admits that it will take five or six years to create a modern and trained national army in the western sense. Apart from the general, dozens of retired Turkish officers are alleged to be present in the Azerbaijan army. However, the Turkish defence minister, Nevzat Ayaz, has stressed that these officers have no relations with Turkey. He insists that his government wishes to solve the conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan through peaceful negotiations.

151. It is generally thought that the recent improved performance of the Azeri armed forces has more to do with improved morale

since the election of President Elchibey than with anything else.

152. As regards relations between Azerbaijan and Russia, it should be noted that on 8th October 1992, the Azeri parliament by a vote of 48 to 1 rejected a treaty signed in December 1991 by their President Mutalibov to join the CIS. The new President Elchibey agreed with parliament that the country will develop relations with the other republics of the former Soviet Union on a bilateral basis. A bilateral friendship treaty of co-operation and mutual security was signed by the Presidents of both republics on 12th October last. It is the counterpart of a similar treaty between Russia and Armenia signed about a year ago, which the Russian parliament has refused to ratify.

Armenia

153. Armenia's history has been at least as an eventful and sometimes even more tragic than that of its neighbours. Armenians, coming from south-eastern Europe, settled in the Transcaucasian region in 1200 BC. During the reign of Tiridates III, the kingdom of Armenia adopted christianity as the state religion around 300 AD. One hundred years later, the country was divided into a Byzantine Armenia and a Persarmenia. A long period followed in which the Byzantines, Turks, Persians and Mongols struggled for power in the region. Armenia was conquered by one or other of them and sometimes succeeded in being independent. After the capture of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453, Armenia became part of the Ottoman empire, but later it continued to change hands between Ottoman and Persian occupation.

154. In 1813, the Persians were obliged to acknowledge Russia's authority over Georgia, northern Azerbaijan and Karabakh, while they ceded Yerevan and Nakhichevan to Russia in 1828. At the peace of San Stefano in 1878, the Ottoman empire received the region of Kars, Ardahan and Batumi, but it was stipulated that reforms should be carried out in favour of the Armenians. However, both the Ottoman empire and Russia were faced with a strong Armenian nationalist movement. In 1895 and 1896, there were massacres in the Ottoman provinces inhabited by Armenians. In 1915, after the outbreak of the first world war, the Ottoman empire, worried over the loyalty of the Armenian population at its border with Russia, deported the entire Armenian population of about 1 750 000 to Syria and Mesopotamia, an operation which cost the lives of around 600 000 Armenians. In 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres recognised Armenia as an independent state, but it was immediately attacked by both Turkey and Russia and in December 1920, according to the peace treaty of Alexandropol between Armenia and Turkey, the western part of Armenia came

under Turkey. Moreover, the Armenian signatory had to recognise that there were no Armenian majorities anywhere in Turkey. The next day, the eastern part became a Soviet republic which, under the constitution of 1936, became a constituent republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

155. In a referendum on the independence of Armenia from the Soviet Union on 21st September 1991, 94.4% of the population voted in favour of secession. The Republic was declared an independent state on the following 23rd September. Presidential elections were held on 16th October 1991, when Levon Ter Petrosian, an academic, was elected with 83% of the votes.

156. Armenia's 3.3 million population is largely christian. Its economy is in a very bad state, also since Azerbaijan through which 80% of Armenia's fuel and goods were previously transported has blockaded its neighbour because of the conflict over Nagorny-Karabakh. The country's two nuclear power units, which provided one-fourth of its total energy needs were shut down following the 1988 earthquake and there is strong public opposition to their reactivation, which is said to cost several hundred million dollars.

The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia

157. The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which started in 1988 and which has so far cost an estimated 2 000 victims, is a particularly thorny problem for Turkey, which shares a border with Armenia and a 12 km border with the autonomous republic of Nakhichevan. Turkey claims that the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne named it the peace-keeper in the region and charged it with the task of maintaining borders as they were established in the 1920s.

158. In the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, the autonomous province of Nagorny-Karabakh, originally attributed to Armenia because of the fact that 95% of its population was Armenian, was finally placed under the government of Azerbaijan because of historic claims. At the same time, the autonomous republic of Nakhichevan was also attributed to Azerbaijan because of the fact that the majority of its population was Azeri.

159. In 1988, the Karabakh Committee, which now controls Armenia's government, started agitating for the return of Nagorny-Karabakh to Armenian control, and with the weakening of Soviet influence the issue developed into a violent conflict, especially after massacres of Armenians in the Azerbaijani cities of Sumgait and Baku in 1988-89. In 1990, the Soviet army occupied Karabakh in an effort to impose calm, but this intervention was of little avail and open hostilities increased when the troops pulled out

in early 1992. In May this year, after the capture of Shusha and the area around Lachin, the Armenians opened a corridor between Armenia and Nagorny-Karabakh and at the same time succeeded in driving the last Azerbaijani from the enclave.

160. A new front was then opened up on the borders of Nakhichevan, which is part of Azerbaijan, but is separated from it by Armenia. After the first armed clashes, however, the Nakhichevan President, Mr. Gaidar Aliev, a former politburo member who is now a member of the Azerbaijani Popular Front, agreed with Armenia's President, Mr. Levon Ter-Petrosian, to the creation of a security zone along the border.

161. Earlier this year, Turkey accused Armenia of aggression against Nakhichevan and in May President Özal even threatened to send the Turkish army into the region. This remark led to a sharp reaction from the commander of the CIS armed forces, Marshal Shaposhnikov, who gave warning of war between Turkey and the CIS. Later, in May 1992, aware of the dangers of becoming directly involved in the conflict, Turkey proposed taking a regional initiative to solve the Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute.

162. At a meeting of the CIS in Tashkent on 15th May 1992, Armenia signed a mutual security pact with five other newly independent republics. The pact, including Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, stipulates that "an aggression against one of its members will be considered by the others as an aggression against them all," and it calls for members to provide military aid if one of them comes under attack. However, the coming into existence of this pact has had no consequence for the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It seems the other partners are reluctant to get involved in the conflict militarily.

163. A cease-fire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, signed in Alma Ata on 28th August and to come into force on 1st September 1992, all under the patronage of Kazakhstan's President Nazarbaev, was totally ignored by both parties. Nevertheless, unofficial negotiations started again in Rome on 8th September under the patronage of the CSCE. A new cease-fire agreement in Nagorny-Karabakh, concluded on 26th September, was violated on the very same day, both parties accusing each other of violations.

164. It is said by some that the final objective of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan is to occupy the Armenian territory between Nakhichevan and Azerbaijan in order to create a pan-Turkish greater Azerbaijan which, in the medium term, should also include that part of Iran along the border inhabited by ethnic Azeris, but Turkey categorically rejects such a solution, perfectly

well knowing that it would only wreak havoc on the entire region.

165. It should be noted that claims of ethnic and religious kinship with Azerbaijan are not the only reasons for Turkey's uncompromising attitude towards Armenia, which it repeatedly has stigmatised as the aggressor. It has also strategic and political reasons to resent a possible Armenian military and political success in the conflict. One of them is that Armenian success would only reinforce Armenia's claim to the region in north-eastern Turkey which used to be inhabited by Armenians before the mass deportations mentioned in paragraph 152 took place. Armenian success would also harm Turkey's stand as tutor and protector of Muslim populations in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Furthermore, Armenia has good relations with Iran which has treated the country and its population far more benevolently throughout history than Turkey. Armenian success would therefore also give a boost to Iran's political prestige, not especially desirable for Turkey.

166. Attempts by Turkey, Iran and the CSCE to mediate in the conflict have failed and Armenia has called for the United Nations to step in. Until now, the Russian Federation has not reacted enthusiastically to calls for United Nations' mediation to solve conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union. After four years of fighting, however, it seems that only a settlement mediated and guaranteed by the United Nations and the great powers can bring peace to Transcaucasia. There may be pressure for an arrangement to include a partition along ethnic lines with a new border between the republics, but such a solution could have dangerous implications. The changing of borders might open Pandora's box and trigger a never-ending chain of demands for border corrections throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union. Iran is bound to be a fierce opponent since a border correction might not only deprive it of a connection with Russia through its trusted neighbour Armenia, it might also reinforce Azerbaijani calls for reunification, in one way or another, with Azerbaijanis living in northern Iran.

XI. Turkey and the conflict in former Yugoslavia

167. The conflict on the territory of former Yugoslavia is only too well known for it to be necessary to discuss again its origin and development in this report. For such details, reference is made to the reports on European security policy (Rapporteur: Mr. Goerens), WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis (Rapporteur: Mr. Marten) and operational arrangements for WEU - the Yugoslav crisis (Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop Scheffer) (Document 1294).

168. The present report will limit itself to Turkey's interest and rôle in the conflict.

169. It should be recalled that most of the territory of the republics which formed Yugoslavia has been part of the Ottoman empire from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century. Croatia and North Slavonia were liberated from the Ottomans in 1699, South Slavonia in 1718. In 1878, the Congress of Berlin put an end to factual Ottoman rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina and it recognised the independence of Serbia and Montenegro. Macedonia was annexed by Serbia in 1912-13.

170. When Slovenia and Croatia started to break up the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1990-91, Turkey initially favoured a diplomatic solution, declaring that it was in favour of maintaining Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. However, when it became clear that the international community had decided to legitimise the different republics of former Yugoslavia and when increasingly strong pressure was exerted by both Bosnia and Macedonia, which had already been recognised by Bulgaria, Turkey understood that it had to change its policy and in February 1992 it recognised collectively Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia.

171. The Yugoslav crisis and possible other crises in the Balkan area could lead to massive migration of Muslims and ethnic Turks to Turkey. Understandably, the Turkish Government has the greatest difficulty in facing the resulting social and economic problems, well knowing that, at the beginning of the conflict, in Bosnia-Herzegovina there were about 1.9 million Serbo-Croat speaking Muslims and 200 000 ethnic Turks, while altogether there are 10 million Muslims in the Balkans, of whom between 1 and 1.5 million are ethnic Turks. An estimated 2 million people of Bosnian Muslim origin are living in Turkey.

172. With Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina being threatened, harassed, persecuted and killed for purely ethnic-religious reasons, Turkey cannot afford to remain idle. Still, for Turkey, even if it follows events closely, there are other priorities at and within its own borders which absorb much of its attention, such as the mounting tension with Kurdish separatists in the south-east of the country, strained relations with Greece over many different issues, and the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, it does not fit the modern Turkish tradition of a secular nation state to become directly involved in other nations' policies for reasons of religious kinship.

173. At the moment, Turkey's greatest concern is that the ethnic-religious conflicts in former Yugoslavia might spill over into Macedonia, Kosovo and possibly other states, which could lead to the direct or indirect involvement of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey.

174. In this framework, Turkey might actively seek closer co-operation in security policy with Bulgaria and Albania.

175. In its active search for a solution, Turkey has joined Iran and Tunisia in calling for a meeting of foreign ministers of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), a forum in which 46 Islamic countries participate. The OIC foreign ministers met in Istanbul to discuss the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Apart from worries over the massacre of Muslims and the failure of the West to respond, an important Turkish objective was to provide Muslim support for international action in the framework of the United Nations and to prevent unilateral action by Muslim countries.

176. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Hikmet Cetin, recently said that his government was becoming "increasingly discouraged" by the ineffectiveness of United Nations and EC efforts to stop the killing and persecution of Bosnian Muslims. He said that the reluctance of the United States and other members of the Security Council to contemplate the use of military force in Bosnia was a serious mistake which only served to encourage the aggressors. Turkey advocated "limited military intervention" under United Nations control, essentially involving limited air strikes against Serb militias which did not implement the recent London agreements. Moreover, an air-exclusion zone over Bosnia should be imposed. Turkey was prepared to contribute to international action, but it would not act alone, even if hundreds of thousands of Bosnian Muslims have taken refuge in the country (Financial Times, 29th September 1992).

XII. Turkey's relations with Iran, Iraq and Syria

177. Relations with Iran, Iraq and Syria are rather complicated. Understandably, the Kurdish problem and in particular the terrorism exerted by the PKK is playing an important rôle in these relations. Turkey has accused each of these neighbouring countries of actively supporting the PKK in order to destabilise Turkey.

178. Recently, the Turkish Minister of the Interior, Ismet Sezgin, after meetings with the Iranian Government, declared that "both countries had the political will to co-operate in the fight against terrorism". Mr. Sezgin also stated that Tehran had provided guarantees concerning the fight against the Kurdish separatists of the PKK. Mr. Demirel visited Tehran at the end of October 1992. Turkey is also worried about the activities of the Iranian Mujahidins among the Turkish population.

179. In April 1992, Mr. Sezgin had visited Damascus in order to discuss Syrian support for the PKK after Turkish threats to shell PKK

training camps in the Bekaa valley. Approximately 60% of the 500 000 Kurds living in Syria are thought to support the PKK. Syria has closed these training camps, but it is still a safe haven for the PKK's leadership. Turkey and Syria are further said to have agreed that they will control illegal border traffic.

180. Another problem in Turkey's relations with Syria is Syria's claim to part of Turkey's territory. The area claimed, as mentioned in the Syrian constitution, may include one seventh of Turkey's territory, including the cities of Antakia, Iskenderun, Inçirlik, Adana and İçed.

181. Water in the Euphrates, which is controlled by the Turkish Keban and Atatürk dams is also a cause of tension. Syria is very much dependent on water from the Euphrates and it would like the Turks to provide more than the 500 cu.m per second which were agreed on in 1987.

182. Relations with Iraq are in a state of flux, in particular since the Gulf war, when Turkey was part of the coalition against Iraq. Economic relations have almost come to a standstill and the pipeline which transported Iraqi oil through Turkey is still blocked. There is great uncertainty over the future of Iraq but Turkey is strongly against any proposals to divide the country into different parts, also because it would provide Turkish separatist Kurds with arguments for complete independence, threatening the territorial integrity of the country.

XIII. Russia

183. Turkey is determined to build a "strategic relationship" with Russia, embracing both politics and economics. It is co-operating with Russia in finding solutions for ethnic conflicts in Transcaucasia on the assumption that both states have an interest in preventing such conflicts spilling over their own borders. Another good reason for co-operation is that Turkey hopes to harness Russia's energy supplies and high technology with Turkish trading skill and industrial potential.

184. In economic relations, the objective of common efforts would be a \$10 billion annual trade within five years, which sounds fairly ambitious, given a total trade of \$644 million in the first half of 1992. On the other hand, it should be noted that the Turkish official export credit institution, Eximbank, has earmarked 85% of all its lending to the CIS, most being earmarked for Russia.

185. It should be noted that in 1984, Turkey and the Soviet Union signed a trade protocol under which Turkey imports Soviet gas in part exchange for Turkish goods and services. The break-up of the Soviet Union also caused the collapse of Turkish-Soviet trade.

186. In May 1992, the Russian Government gave assurances that it would settle its outstanding debt with Turkey through an extended gas deal, but it has not been able to keep its promises, pleading more urgent spending priorities, and this year it owes Eximbank \$48 million in arrears. After Prime Minister Demirel's successful visit to Moscow in May 1992, Eximbank stated that it would unblock its credit lines to Russia as from June 1992, but, in view of the worsening situation since that date, this has not yet happened.

187. Russia and Turkey are developing projects to make Turkey an international channel for transferring oil and gas from the former Soviet territory to the rest of the world. Turkey has indicated that it can also help to develop the Russian port of Novorossisk on the Black Sea, now that Russia no longer has free access to Odessa, which is a part of the Ukraine.

XIV. Turkish minorities in neighbouring countries

(a) Bulgaria

188. In 1984-85, the Bulgarian Government under Todor Zhivkov which had gradually denied Turkish forms of national cultural expression, started a forced campaign to change Turkish names into Bulgarian. At that time, the Turkish ethnic minority, officially estimated at 500 000, was thought to be between 700 000 and 1 000 000, or a maximum 11% of the total population. In addition, there were some 100 000 Pomaks, or Islamised Bulgarians. The Turkish population was concentrated in the Arda river basin in the south and in the mountainous region in the north-east of Bulgaria.

189. Following earlier emigration agreements between the two neighbouring countries, in 1950-52 and 1968-78, some 120 000 and 115 000 Bulgarian Turks respectively had been allowed to leave for Turkey. As a result of this forced assimilation policy, some 320 000 Turks, mainly agricultural workers, emigrated to Turkey. After this mass migration of ethnic Turks to Turkey, around 120 000 returned to Bulgaria after United States mediation and relations between both countries have since improved.

190. At the moment, the third most powerful political party in the Bulgarian Parliament, holding the balance, is the Turkish movement for rights and freedoms. It should, however, be noted that this ethnically-based political movement naturally generates reactions, partly motivated by fears that ethnic polarisation could cripple democratic development in Bulgaria.

191. A Bulgarian senator has suggested that only by treating minority concerns in a calm, restrained manner, could a nation avoid an

exacerbation of sensitive concerns. Excessive public debate provides "free advertisements" for those who would generate ethnic strife.

192. It is a positive sign that Ahmed Dogan, the leader of the movement for rights and freedoms, has declared his party's opposition to all demands to create separate states or autonomous regions. He continued that his party was committed to guaranteeing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bulgaria. The basic objective of the party is recognition of the Turkish minority as a constructive force and helping Bulgaria to become a part of the EC, which is necessary to the development of "pluralism and genuine democracy."

(b) Republic of Macedonia

193. At the moment, between 80 000 and 90 000 Turks are living in the Republic of Macedonia. From the beginning of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after the second world war, the Turks in Macedonia were recognised as a nationality and they were allowed educational and cultural rights from the outset.

194. Although in the first years after the second world war Turks had been seen as suspect because of the friendship between Turkey and the West, such sentiments have long since calmed down and there is no specific reason to think that today Turks living in the Republic of Macedonia do not enjoy full rights as citizens.

195. In preparation for the 8th September Macedonian referendum on sovereignty, the Turkish Democratic Alliance (DST) encouraged Turks in Macedonia to support Macedonian independence. Both the Macedonian President Gligorov and Turkey's Prime Minister Demirel have stated their intention to forge close relations between the two republics. Turkey has made special efforts to help Macedonia economically, but it is unlikely to intervene directly should any state take military action against the Republic of Macedonia.

(c) Greece

196. After the first world war, when the Ottoman government in Turkey was opposed by Mustafa Kemal, who had established a national government in Ankara in May 1919, the allied countries allowed Greece to occupy the region of Smyrna (Izmir). The following Peace of Sèvres in August 1920 between the allies and Ottoman Turkey attributed eastern Thrace, without Constantinople and its surroundings, and the region of Smyrna to Greece. Immediately after the Peace of Sèvres, Greece started an offensive against the nationalist government of Mustafa Kemal and occupied western Anatolia. This Greco-Turkish war resulted in the Peace Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Greece had to abandon eastern Thrace and the territories in Asia Minor

and Anatolia. The treaty also stipulated that the Greek and Turkish populations of Turkey and Greece respectively were to be exchanged, except for the Greeks in Istanbul and the Turks in western Thrace. Some 400 000 Turks residing in northern Greece were transported to Turkey, while 150 000 Greeks from Asia Minor joined those 1 250 000 Greeks who had already fled the advance of the Turkish army in that region.

197. It is thought that the Turkish minority in western Thrace numbers some 100 000 people. However, according to the Greek authorities they are not Turks but "Greek Muslims" and there has been a government policy to drive them out of Greece and to discriminate against them economically. One of the methods frequently used was to strip these Turks of their Greek citizenship while travelling abroad and then refuse them re-entry but there are signs that this practice would be abandoned. Greece has fears that, following the Cyprus example, a Turkish movement could develop in western Thrace, pressing for autonomy or even union with Turkey.

198. It should be observed, however, that the present government seems to be making efforts to improve the situation in Western Thrace. European Community funding for regional development is being directed to Thrace and the government is trying to change ingrained attitudes among local officials in order to remove obstacles to active Muslim participation in the economy. Nevertheless, the situation still needs further improvement.

XV. Modernisation of the Turkish armed forces

199. In 1986, Turkey started a ten year modernisation programme for its armed forces at a total estimated cost of \$10 billion. Since then, budgetary problems, a changing strategic situation and the general elections in October 1992 leading to a change in government have all had negative effects on the implementation of the programme.

200. The new government, however, has realised that growing instability in the region, which is examined elsewhere in this report, the lessons learned from the Gulf war and increasingly violent activity by Kurdish separatists in the south-east of the country are urgent reasons to continue the modernisation programme and to restructure the armed forces. The army's strength will be reduced from 470 000 to 300 000, employing a maximum of 60 000 professional soldiers who will replace conscripts insofar as possible. In order to allow better mobility and flexibility, divisional and regimental echelons will be replaced by a brigade and battalion structure.

201. Turkey has a positive attitude towards the multi-national rapid reaction forces to be formed under the new NATO strategy and is planning active participation, but so far the Turkish Government has entered into no detailed commitments.

202. In the framework of NATO's programme to remove equipment from its central region to its flanks, the equipment of the Turkish army will be considerably modernised at minimal cost. Turkey will receive 1 057 tanks, 600 armoured combat vehicles and 72 artillery pieces. The tanks include United States M 60-A1 and M 60-A3 models and the German Leopard I A1 recently refurbished to A3 configuration.

203. In 1992, Turkey will spend \$1.59 billion from its defence budget on arms procurement and in addition to that \$760 million from its defence industry support fund. Defence procurement expenditure for 1993 will reach a total of \$2.7 billion. The major procurement programmes for the near future for which contracts are still to be awarded, include 80 F-16s, 54 low-level air-defence systems, fire-control systems for air defence artillery and 130 multiple-launch rocket systems. Turkey is considering diversifying its defence procurement in the belief that reliance on one main supplier may easily reduce its political flexibility.

204. In that framework, negotiations have been held between Russia and Turkey on the acquisition of Russian military equipment, which could also include the transfer of military technology and licensed manufacturing of military equipment in Turkey. Other suppliers of military equipment for Turkey are Spain (CASA transport aircraft), the United Kingdom (Marconi radio systems), France (Thomson CSF radars) and Italy (Agusta trainers).

205. The Turkish Defence Minister, Nevzat Ayaz, has, however, made it clear that before taking concrete steps on lasting co-operation, issues such as the reliability of the source, concept of use, standardisation, training and logistic support must be fully evaluated.

206. It is known that in the past the United States has set conditions for the use of armaments to be acquired by Turkey. Recently, Germany and Switzerland have suspended arms shipments to Turkey because they were concerned that these arms could be used against Kurdish insurgents. A contract with the Swiss company Oerlikon for 25mm guns for Turkey's FMC armoured personnel carriers was cancelled following objections in the Swiss parliament over Turkey's handling of the Kurdish questions.

207. Last month, Turkey announced that the United States company Sikorsky had been selected to negotiate terms for the joint manufacture of 50 S-70A multipurpose Black Hawk

helicopters, with a further 25 sold for immediate delivery. The Italian firm Agusta and the French-German consortium Eurocopter had also competed for the contract but it seems that the support provided by the United States Export Import Bank, which provided Sikorsky export credit guarantees for 80% of the contract, helped to facilitate Turkey's choice. It is said that long-term co-production will pave the way for an additional supply of 75 helicopters.

208. The helicopters are part of a programme to enhance Turkey's rapid reaction capability. It hopes this programme will also help to improve its stand in the struggle with the Kurdish separatist movement.

XVI. Turkey and WEU

209. It is impossible to imagine a European security structure without Turkey, first because it is the bulwark of the defence of South-Eastern Europe and second because, as the successor to the Ottoman empire, it has a rôle to play in the Balkans.

210. For many years, Turkey has played a fundamental rôle in western security. Its loyalty as a member of NATO is real and proven and it made a major and, for itself, costly contribution to the Gulf war. During the long period of East-West confrontation, Turkey played a loyal and efficient rôle in European security.

211. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the new scenario of risks and threats in Europe changed but did not diminish the rôle that Turkey must continue to play.

212. While centres of tension have shifted to the Middle East, the Caucasian region and the Balkans, on all these fronts Europe must take into account Turkey's views and contribution now that a security strategy has to be defined.

213. Its rôle as a bulwark is too well known to need detailed examination. It is enough to recall that its south-eastern neighbours – Iran, Iraq and Syria – have not, in recent history, been particularly peaceful. Moreover, the whole Caucasian region, along Turkey's north-eastern frontiers, has also been victim to serious ethnic conflicts which are liable to become increasingly bitter.

214. Turkey is also anxious to settle disputes by peaceful means and even to avert them by preventive diplomacy. Western Europe, with which Turkey feels closely linked, could and should make use of the Turks' knowledge of the region, one of the most disturbed in the world today, in order to pursue a balanced security policy. Turkey is thus destined to make a major contribution to a European security policy in the framework of WEU. At the same time, its rôle might increase in the framework of preventive diplomacy in the CSCE.

215. There can be no question of Europe trying to pursue an external security policy in the Balkans without taking account of Turkey's opinion in view of the fact that the region is inhabited by millions of Muslims, some of them ethnic Turks.

216. Obviously, there is a Western European interest in co-ordinating its policy towards the Balkans with Turkey. Any future security arrangement for the Balkans should include a settlement of Turkish-Bulgarian and Turkish-Greek relations. Guarantees for the existence of an independent Macedonia within the present borders would be important. Even more important would be the limitation of armed forces of all the nations in and around the Balkans. Participation of both Greece and Turkey in WEU consultations and other activities could certainly contribute to enhanced security in that region.

217. After the member states of WEU meeting in Maastricht on 9th and 10th December 1991, had invited Turkey to become an associate member of the organisation, they set out their conditions in the Petersberg Declaration⁴. The proposed status of associate member was met with a mixture of disappointment and hope from the Turkish authorities: disappointment because of their desire to become a full member; hope since it was a step forward and a real contribution to the idea of a European defence identity in which Turkey wishes to play a full part.

218. What does associate membership of WEU mean for Turkey? Strictly speaking, Turkey will find itself in a difficult position. It may participate in the WEU Council meetings, but it may not block a decision which is the subject of consensus among the member states, as is the case with all important decisions. It can still be excluded from participation by a majority of member states or half the member states including the presidency.

219. In fact, it is giving up its freedom of action by associating itself with a European security alliance without having the protection offered by that alliance. It may participate in the implementation of decisions taken by member states without having been able to participate in the decision-making process other than as a consultant. It might even become a target of choice for a possible aggressor if it is known that others will not come to its aid because they have no contractual commitments to it. Conversely, a country attacking a member state of WEU might expect Turkey to be prepared to afford assistance to the members of WEU, including Greece, because of Turkey's associate status. It is not the associate state that might involve member states in international conflicts, but the

latter that might involve Turkey. Logically speaking, it might even be concluded that Turkey would weaken its own security in the region by accepting the status of associate member of WEU.

220. The Council's decision to suspend the application of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty in relations between members and associate members of WEU may be understandable for those who are afraid of a situation where Greece might invoke this article against Turkey, but your rapporteur wonders why the modified Brussels Treaty had to be weakened in order to allow Greece to become a member of WEU. If the Council had decided that associate membership came within the terms of Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty⁵, there would have been no problem since, in that case, Article VII of the treaty would have provided enough guarantees⁶. Also, associate membership would then have had a sound legal basis, to be ratified by all the member states of WEU, a procedure which seems appropriate if a country is invited to be an associate member and to "participate fully" in the activities of a security alliance.

221. For political reasons, however, the Council has chosen a different approach. Preferring to make a clear distinction between members and associate members, it has negotiated with the candidate for membership in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, while for candidates for associate status a different procedure was chosen.

222. At the moment, it is not yet clear whether the association agreement – or document, as it is called in the Petersberg Declaration – will have to be ratified by all signatory states. The Declaration of the nine WEU member states in Maastricht may also give rise to different interpretations⁷.

5. Article XI reads: "The high contracting parties may, by agreement, invite any other state to accede to the present treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the state so invited. Any state so invited may become a party to the treaty by depositing an instrument of accession with the Belgian Government. The Belgian Government will inform each of the high contracting parties of the deposit of each instrument of accession."

6. Article VII reads: "The high contracting parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that none of the international engagements now in force between him and any other of the high contracting parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of the present treaty. None of the high contracting parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed against any other of the high contracting parties."

7. On enlargement, this declaration reads as follows: "States which are members of the European Union are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European member states of NATO are invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which will give them the possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU."

4. See Appendix II.

223. The definition and scope of commitments that Turkey considers stem from the status of associate member – the subject of current negotiations – must be agreed upon to the satisfaction of both parties, i.e. Turkey and WEU.

224. It would be desirable for the negotiations between the Turkish authorities and WEU for

fixing the conditions of Turkey's participation in the activities of WEU to be concluded with a balanced agreement for both parties, guaranteeing Turkey's rights and obligations vis-à-vis WEU, bearing in mind the requirements laid down in the Petersberg Declaration.

APPENDIX I

Davos joint communiqué

(Davos, Switzerland – 1st February 1992)

1. The Prime Ministers of Turkey and Greece with the presence of their foreign ministers, met in Davos, Switzerland on 1st February 1992. They had a comprehensive exchange of views on the issues affecting their bilateral relations as well as on matters of common interest on regional and international developments. Their discussions were held in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and in a constructive spirit.
2. The two Prime Ministers reiterated their mutual desire and readiness to develop and expand their relations effectively in all areas. They, accordingly, decided to give a new impetus to their relationship by engaging in a meaningful and substantive dialogue.
3. The two Prime Ministers underlined the desirability and importance of high-level visits and contacts between the two countries.
4. The two Prime Ministers reaffirmed that their relationship rests on friendship, good-neighbourliness and co-operation in all fields, reflecting the common interests and aspirations of their two nations. To enhance this relationship, they confirmed their readiness to conclude an agreement of friendship, good-neighbourliness and co-operation between the two countries. In this connection, they instructed their foreign ministers to undertake the necessary preparations for this agreement which would be signed on the occasion of the visit of the Greek Prime Minister to Ankara. The two Foreign Ministers will meet at a date to be decided through diplomatic channels.
5. The two Prime Ministers reviewed the situation concerning the Cyprus problem. They noted that both sides shared the objective of an early negotiated settlement in Cyprus which would be just and lasting. They agreed that the good offices mission of the United Nations Secretary General should be supported. They expressed their will to contribute to a mutually acceptable solution in Cyprus by providing appropriate encouragement.
6. The Prime Minister of Turkey informed the Prime Minister of Greece that Turkey supports the participation of Greece in the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Project.
7. The two Prime Ministers expressed their conviction that successful and timely implementation of the steps they agreed to take in their meeting will chart a new course of mutually beneficial relations between their countries.

APPENDIX II

Paragraphs of the Petersberg Declaration with regard to associate membership of WEU

“ Following the Declaration released in Maastricht on 10th December 1991 in connection with the Treaty on European Union, WEU ministers recalled the fundamental principles on which relations between member states and associate member states should be based.

Moreover, the Petersberg Declaration recalled the fundamental principles on which relations between member states and associate member states should be based as follows:

- settlement of their mutual differences by peaceful means in accordance with the obligations resulting from the modified Brussels Treaty, the North American Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the commitments entered into under the terms of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, and the other generally recognised principles and rules of international law;
- in their mutual relations, refraining from resorting to the threat or use of force, in accordance with the United Nations Charter.
- They also stressed that the security guarantees and defence commitments in the treaties which bind the member states within Western European Union and which bind them within the Atlantic Alliance are mutually reinforcing and will not be invoked by those subscribing to Part III of the Petersberg Declaration in disputes between member states of either of the two organisations.

Associate members:

Other European member states of the Atlantic Alliance which have accepted the invitation to become associate members of WEU, although not being parties to the modified Brussels Treaty, may participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council – without prejudice to the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty – of its working groups and of the subsidiary bodies, subject to the following provisions:

- at the request of a majority of the member states, or of half of the member states including the Presi-

dency, participation may be restricted to full members;

- they will be able to be associated to the planning cell through a permanent liaison arrangement;
- they will have the same rights and responsibilities as the full members for functions transferred to WEU from other fora and institutions to which they already belong;
- they will have the right to speak but may not block a decision that is the subject of consensus among the member states;
- they may associate themselves with the decisions taken by member states; they will be able to participate in their implementation unless a majority of the member states or half of the member states including the Presidency, decide otherwise;
- they will take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they commit forces;
- they will accept in full the substance of Section A of Part III of the Petersberg Declaration which will form part of the association document;
- they will be connected to the member states' telecommunications system (WEUCOM) for messages concerning meetings and activities in which they participate;
- they will be asked to make a financial contribution to the organisation's budgets.

Space activities

For practical reasons, space activities will be restricted to the present members until the end of the experimental phase of the satellite centre in 1995. During this phase the new members and associate members will be kept informed of WEU's space activities. Appropriate arrangements will be made for associate members to participate in subsequent space activities at the same time as decisions are taken on the continuation of such activities.”

Turkey

AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3¹

tabled by Mr. Speroni and Mr. Bosco

1. Leave out paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
“ Concerned about the repression of the Kurdish people living in Turkey; ”
2. After paragraph (x) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:
“ Wishing the rights of the Kurdish people to be recognised by peaceful, democratic means; ”
3. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
“ Establish as a condition for the accession of Turkey recognition of the Kurdish people’s right to self-determination in accordance with the principles of the Helsinki declaration. ”

Signed: Speroni, Bosco

1. See 10th sitting, 1st December 1992 (amendments 1 and 3 withdrawn; amendment 2 negatived).

Turkey

ADDENDUM

*to the report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee
by Mr. Moya, Rapporteur*

1. Since the committee adopted its report on Turkey on 6th November 1992, there have been certain new developments which should be taken into account. At the same time, the Turkish authorities have kindly informed the committee that some passages in the report might lead to misunderstandings.
2. First of all, it is noted that, on 20th November 1992, the document on associate membership of WEU for Iceland, Norway and Turkey was signed in Rome. This document is not necessarily subject to ratification by the signatory states. The Council, in its answer to Written Question 300 put by Mr. Goerens, stated that associate members are not parties to the modified Brussels Treaty.
3. For semantic reasons, the word "guerillas" in paragraphs 9, 16 and 18 should be replaced by "terrorists" which, according to Chambers English Dictionary more appropriately identifies persons who take part in "an organised system of intimidation, especially for political ends".
4. In addition to the text of paragraph 11 of the report, the Turkish Government has made it known that it estimates the number of Kurds living on its territory to be between 8 and 12 million.
5. The operations against the PKK in northern Iraq mentioned in paragraph 23 of the report have now been concluded and they seem to have been successful.
6. The Black Sea Economic Co-operation, discussed in Chapter VI of the report, which is widely referred to as a pact, is in fact a declaration.
7. In order to avoid misinterpretation, in paragraph 60 the words "Genuine respect for minorities" should be replaced by "Mutual confidence between the two communities of the island and respect for their equal political rights".
8. It should be noted that the Turkish complaints referred to in paragraph 62 speak of "militarisation of" rather than of "defensive emplacements on" the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean and the Dodecanese islands.
9. As regards paragraphs 87-199 on Tajikistan, it is worth mentioning that the movement of former communists is making a remarkable come-back. In recent weeks, militias loyal to the former communists have inflicted heavy losses on the Islamic forces and the capital Dushanbe is now under siege. The parliament meeting in Khojand for a special session elected Mr. Imamali Rakhmanov as its speaker and effective head of state to succeed to Mr. Iskandarov.
10. It should also be noted that, according to the Turkish Government, there are not ethnic Turks in Bosnia-Herzegovina as is mentioned in paragraph 171 of the report. On the other hand, people of Turkish origin are living in Kosovo, Macedonia and Sandjak.
11. As regards NATO's multinational rapid reaction forces mentioned in paragraph 201 of the report, the Turkish Government has now allocated a division consisting of one mechanised and one tank brigade to the allied reaction corps which is also open to the participation of other allies. Furthermore, NATO authorities have been informed that Turkey could place one commando brigade with the southern region multinational division, one combat engineering company with the corps support unit, one Howitzer battery and one combat engineering company with the immediate reaction land force. It has also expressed its willingness to host the headquarters of the southern region multinational division (MDN-S).
12. According to the Turkish authorities, Prime Minister Demirel never made any declaration such as was quoted from Le Monde in paragraph 20 of the report. They have made it known that Turkey was, and still is, in favour of the territorial integrity of Iraq. In a press conference on 24th October 1992, Prime Minister Demirel once again declared: "We are opposed to steps which might open the way to threats to the territorial integrity of Iraq and to unilateral action".

*European security policy –
reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council*

REPORT ¹

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee ²
by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur

PART ONE

European Union, WEU and the consequences of Maastricht

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on European security policy – reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council: European Union, WEU and the consequences of Maastricht

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. The direct consequences of Maastricht for WEU
- III. The Petersberg Declaration
- IV. The WEU Assembly and the European Parliament
- V. The dialogue with the Central European countries
- VI. Conclusions
- VII. The meeting of the committee on 6th November 1992

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. *Stoffelen* (Chairman); Lord *Finsberg*, Mr. De Decker (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: *Verbeek*), *Alegre*, *Beix* (Alternate: *Baumel*), *Bowden*, *Caro* (Alternate: *Lemoine*), *De Hoop Scheffer*, *Fabra*, *Feldmann*, *Forni*, *Goerens*, *Homs I Ferret*, *Sir Russell Johnston*, *Lord Kirkhill*, *MM. Kittelmann*, *Koehl*, *Moya*, *Müller*, *Péciaux* (Alternate: *Chevalier*), *de Puig*, *Reddemann*, *Rodrigues*, *Roseta*, *Seeuws*, *Soell*, *Ward*, *Wintgens*, *N...*, *N...*, *N...*, *N...*, *N...*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

*on European security policy –
reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council:
European Union, WEU and the consequences of Maastricht*

I

The Assembly,

1. Is resolutely in favour of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by all signatory countries;
2. Considers the modified Brussels Treaty to be the only treaty providing the foundations for truly European solidarity in defence matters and, as such, the inevitable basis of a European Union in this area;
3. Recalls its Recommendations 490 and 504 urging the Council to revise the treaty to adapt it to the new situation in Europe without weakening the commitments it includes;
4. Notes that the Maastricht Treaty recognises this fact and specifies that WEU is part of the process of European Union;
5. Believes that, for WEU to assume the rôle attributed to it by Article I of the modified Brussels Treaty and by the Maastricht Treaty, it is essential for the modified Brussels Treaty to continue to be strictly applied;
6. Notes that the Council is apparently using various means to diminish the importance and juridical significance of the treaty, to circumvent its provisions and to weaken its political significance, e.g. by:
 - (i) feigning to ignore the way the responsibilities of WEU under Articles I, II and III of the modified Brussels Treaty, the exercise of which has been entrusted to other organisations, are effectively carried out, as can be seen from paragraph 4 of the reply to Recommendation 517, while paragraph 3 of the answer to Written Questions 302 and 303 recognises the Assembly's responsibility for "any matter arising out of the Brussels Treaty";
 - (ii) not reaching agreement with NATO to avoid duplication of work, as required by Article IV, as it emerges from the parallel decisions taken by NATO and WEU on the naval deployment to enforce the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro decided by the Security Council and on the deployment of armed forces from member countries to escort humanitarian assistance for Bosnia-Herzegovina;
 - (iii) introducing in the Petersberg Declaration a reservation that seems to be of general significance relating to the application of Article V;
 - (iv) wrongly taking Article VII as a basis for justifying this reservation, as it does in its answer to Written Question 301;
 - (v) making no reference, in the second part of its thirty-seventh annual report, to the Agency for the Control of Armaments, a subsidiary body of the Council in accordance with Article VIII;
 - (vi) thereby violating Article IX;
 - (vii) limiting the significance of this article by:
 - (a) not communicating to the Assembly important documents on its activities;
 - (b) providing for the implementation of the Petersberg Declaration in regard to the enlargement of WEU and the creation of the status of associate member and of observer without the Assembly having been able to discuss the matter;
 - (viii) not applying the provisions of Article XI to states that it is inviting to become associate members of WEU;
 - (ix) insisting on an arbitrary interpretation of Article XII and not following up paragraph 21 of Recommendation 517 which states that the Assembly considers that the period of fifty years ran from 1954 and where the Assembly invites the Council of Ministers to submit this issue to independent arbitration;

7. Considers that, by acting in this way, the Council, far from preparing the establishment of a European Union with clearly specified competences and responsibilities, is apparently weakening such a prospect.

IT RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Report effectively to the Assembly on every aspect of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even in cases where the responsibilities attributed to it by the treaty are exercised in other fora as it has undertaken to do on several occasions;
2. Seek an understanding with NATO to avoid duplication, while leaving WEU the possibility of exercising fully the responsibilities assigned to it by Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty;
3. Proceed to no modification in the scope of the modified Brussels Treaty by any process other than international agreements subject to ratification;
4. Report in its annual report on the application of Protocols Nos. II, III and IV;
5. Provide the Assembly in time with all the information it needs to exercise the mandate assigned to it by Article IX, *inter alia* by:
 - answering without delay Written Question 305 asking the Council to communicate its organogram to the Assembly;
 - reversing its refusal to answer Written Question 304 asking for details of the results of the operations of the naval force co-ordinated by WEU in the Adriatic;
 - communicating:
 - the report on practical measures necessary for the development of close working relationships with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance;
 - the proposals of the Permanent Council for promoting co-operation between the respective secretariats of those organisations;
 - its report on the mandate of the WEU planning cell;
 - its report on the possible tasks of WEU forces;
 - its report on co-operation in armaments matters;
 - its report on current WEU activities in space matters;
 - its report on current WEU activities in regard to the verification of arms control agreements and implementation of the Open Skies Treaty;
 - its report on the activities of the Mediterranean Sub-Group;
6. Follow up paragraph 21 of Recommendation 517 according to which:

“Noting that the Assembly believes that the period of fifty years laid down in Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty starts from the ratification of the 1954 Agreements while the Council considers the starting date is 1948,

THE ASSEMBLY STRONGLY URGES

That the issue be referred to a group of independent European legal experts for arbitration.”

II

The Assembly,

- (i) Considers that the European Union has a vocation to associate all Central European countries;
- (ii) Welcomes the fact that the Council, after the Assembly, has started to examine with those countries the conditions for a collective security organisation in Europe;
- (iii) Notes that the information it has received concerning requests from some of those countries about their approaches to the Council do not correspond to the information it receives from the Council;

(iv) Considers that the rapprochement between the Central European countries and the European Union means that they must henceforth base their relations on the principles governing relations between the member countries of WEU.

IT RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Develop its exchanges with the CSCE with a view to making a more effective contribution to maintaining peace in Europe;
2. Offer the Central European countries any technical assistance they may request, in particular to allow them to play a better part in operations to verify all the disarmament or arms limitation agreements they may have signed;
3. Respond favourably to the requests some of those countries have made so as to improve the restoration of confidence and maintenance of peace in Central Europe;
4. Arrange for requests sent to the Chairmanship-in-Office to reach the Council and be the subject of real consultations;
5. Urge the Governments of Hungary and Slovakia to submit the dispute between them to conciliation procedure similar to that provided for in Article X of the modified Brussels Treaty.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Several aspects of your Rapporteur's mandate relate to the activities of the WEU Council, although it is nevertheless difficult to prepare a homogenous, coherent text.

2. (a) The reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council to the Assembly is of little interest. The second part of that report, covering the Council's activities in 1991, did not reach the Assembly until 25th May 1992, thus ruling out the possibility of preparing and adopting a reply at the June 1992 session. It relates to the Council's work prior to the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty and, in particular, preparation of the treaty in respect of matters for which WEU is responsible. Once the treaty was signed, with its appendices relating to WEU, this work became of purely historical importance and the Assembly's opinion on it pointless. Your Rapporteur will therefore propose that the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council be approved in principle. This will concern only the fact that the Council took part in drawing up the treaty and will disregard the regret that it was not possible to uphold more strongly the requirements of the modified Brussels Treaty which, it should be noted, moreover, is increasingly frequently called in government communications "the WEU treaty", an incorrect title which merely illustrates the juridical laxism that now seems to prevail. This is a curious title for a treaty that the Council is anxious to date back to 1948 and not 1954, when it was the 1954 Paris Agreements that gave birth to WEU.

3. It is probably also due to this laxism that the thirty-seventh annual report says nothing about the activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments. As everyone knows, the rôle of the Agency is now a residual one. Nevertheless, as long as the treaty has not been revised, it remains statutory and the Council has no right to violate Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty according to which the annual report of the Council relates to "its activities and in particular... the control of armaments". The thirty-seventh annual report also said that the ACA was following the Geneva chemical disarmament negotiations and the Assembly is entitled to know what conclusions it drew from them. Furthermore, the first part of the thirty-eighth annual report, covering the period 1st January to 30th June 1992, has not reached the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly in time for your Rapporteur to take it into account.

4. (b) The Political Committee asked another Rapporteur to deal with the enlargement of WEU. For the Assembly in particular, enlargement raises a number of specific problems which your Rapporteur will therefore not address. Conversely, it seems impossible to deal with the question of European co-operation in security matters without referring to some of the consequences of the new relationships that WEU is in the process of establishing with countries that are not at present members.

5. (c) At its meeting on 22nd July, the Assembly's Presidential Committee decided to assign to your Rapporteur the task of reporting on WEU's activities in matters relating to the conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia. In fact, this work has its place in the establishment of a new security system in Europe affording WEU an opportunity to play a rôle that should be defined. It is also set in the specific framework of Yugoslav affairs. To facilitate the debates in the Assembly, your Rapporteur has been asked to divide his report into two separate parts, one on WEU, the other on Yugoslavia.

6. At its meetings on 24th September and 15th October, the committee noted once again that the Council was not doing enough to sustain a useful relationship with the Assembly. Apart from the tardy communication of the annual report for 1991, the committee received the replies to a number of recommendations adopted at the June session only on 2nd November. Written questions which had been put in order to facilitate the work of rapporteurs were not answered until the same date, i.e. more than three months after having been put.

7. Quite apart from any reservations about the content of these answers, the work of the Assembly's committees is made difficult because of the Council's slowness in answering texts addressed to it by the Assembly which relies on these answers to maintain a dialogue with the Council in accordance with Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty.

8. In fact, the Council's conduct rules out any useful exchanges of views between it and the Assembly. For instance, it was after the first part of the thirty-eighth session of the Assembly, the date of which (1st to 4th June 1992) had been fixed many months earlier, that the Council, on 19th June, adopted the Petersberg Declaration that your Rapporteur will analyse below. This declaration includes decisions of great importance for the future of WEU, particularly in regard to the application of the treaty and the

creation of observer and associate member status. A number of points required clarification by the Council which several members of the Assembly asked for in written questions. The Council was well aware that the second part of the session was to be held from 30th November to 3rd December but it nevertheless decided that several documents implementing the Petersberg Declaration would be signed on 20th November, making it impossible for the Assembly to discuss the matter in time to convey its opinions to the Council. The Assembly will therefore hardly have been able to hold any discussions before the meeting between the Presidential Committee and the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council in Rome on 18th November and its proposals, which it will have been impossible to debate in plenary session, will be made far too late for the Council to study them before its ministerial meeting on 20th November. It therefore has to be considered that the Council has done its utmost to avoid any form of dialogue whatsoever with the Assembly on these matters that are essential for the future of WEU.

9. The Assembly also notes that a wholly satisfactory, open and fruitful exchange between two Assembly committees and the permanent representatives of the sixteen member countries of the Atlantic Alliance was held in Brussels on 23rd September, although it has never been able to arrange the same kind of discussion with members of the WEU Permanent Council. It can but conclude that it is not the governments that place obstacles in the way of such an open dialogue but the Permanent Council. It therefore trusts that, once the Council is installed in Brussels, these obstacles will be removed. Finally, it has to note that the Council, in spite of the soothing remarks of successive chairmen-in-office, is unwilling to take into account the budgetary consequences for the Assembly of decisions reached by the Council or even the need for the Assembly to know in time the sums on which its budget can be based so that it may organise its work.

10. Hence, in analysing the developments on which it should report, the present document will have to be based mainly on the declaration adopted by the Council at Petersberg on 19th June. However, it can take into account the serious discussions in committee on 24th September and 15th October which led your Rapporteur to make substantial changes to his preliminary working paper.

II. The direct consequences of Maastricht for WEU

11. At the time of writing, the Maastricht Treaty has not been ratified by all the signatory countries. On 2nd July, the Danish electorate rejected ratification and the consequences of its

decision are not yet known, although it may be expected that Denmark will not accede to the modified Brussels Treaty in the near future. In fact, from a legal point of view, the Maastricht Treaty is, in present circumstances, null and void, even if there is still a possibility that Denmark may ratify it subject to reservations. One needs to know how Denmark intends to participate in a European Union in order to see what shape it will be. In any event, the Danish white paper published on 9th October 1992 shows that it is out of the question for a Rome Treaty revised in Maastricht to coexist with an unrevised Rome Treaty for Denmark and the Danish referendum makes it essential to re-examine the decisions taken in Maastricht. It would be unacceptable for the smaller European countries if the other members of the Community failed to take account of the vote by the Danish electorate since this would be tantamount to establishing the European Union on a basis of contempt for the principle of equality between states.

12. Moreover, the very small majority by which the French electorate approved the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty on 20th September 1992 showed that in France and in a number of other countries the public is not comfortable about the interpretation of the treaty. In particular, the monetary crisis in Europe in the second half of September raised the question of how realistic were the deadlines fixed in the treaty for introducing a single currency. The extent and nature of the Commission's powers in the future European Union are also being questioned. The definition of the subsidiarity principle is being challenged everywhere. In short, there are ample signs that the implementation of the treaty will be slower and more difficult than expected.

13. One may therefore already wonder what will be the effects of these delays and of the Danish vote on the measures decided at Maastricht in regard to WEU, since an early alignment of WEU and the European Community was planned. This view emerges from two declarations adopted by the Nine on that occasion and, in its answer to Written Question 295, the Council said:

“The two WEU declarations are closely related politically to the Maastricht Treaty and can only be understood in its context. This is clearly reflected in the fact that Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union is quoted in full in the declaration of the Nine ‘on the rôle of Western European Union and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance’.”

14. On receiving this answer, your Rapporteur put Written Question 299, as follows:

“The declarations by the nine member countries of WEU adopted in Maastricht

are part and parcel of the legal arrangements agreed upon in Maastricht. Would they still be valid in the event of the Maastricht Treaty not being ratified?"

The Council's reply, received by the Assembly on 16th October, does not correspond to the remarks made by the Chairmanship-in-Office to Assembly committees in June and reveals a certain state of mind when it says that:

"As far as formal aspects are concerned, the declarations of the Nine, given their political nature, are not subject to ratification and would thus remain valid even 'in the event of the Maastricht Treaty not being ratified'."

15. This is useful confirmation of the Petersberg Declaration adopted on 19th June 1992 by the Council at ministerial level. The declaration is a purely WEU text which is not governed by the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty. However, it contains a section entitled "Implementation of the Maastricht Declaration", which amounts to saying that the Council did not wait for the treaty to be ratified before considering this declaration as binding upon itself. It distinguished between the commitments contained in the declarations forming part of the group of agreements signed in Maastricht and their political link with the treaty. If this is truly the case, neither the Danish decision nor even possible delays in ratifying the Maastricht Treaty in other countries should jeopardise the implementation of the declarations by the Nine, particularly as these declarations do not seem to be in contradiction with the modified Brussels Treaty. This point is essential for the present and future of WEU. It is therefore hard to see why the Council is trying to reduce a juridical consideration of such importance to a "formal aspect" unless it is because it has an growing tendency to treat application of the modified Brussels Treaty as a formality with which it too willingly dispenses.

16. The Council's interpretation is thus correct but leaves certain questions open, e.g.:

17. (i) What would be the relationship between WEU and the European Community if it were not based on Article J.4 of the treaty but only on a declaration by the Nine which is obviously not binding upon the Twelve?

18. (ii) If the union is not set up, what would be WEU's obligations towards any member countries of the European Community that decided to accede to WEU or to become observers? In particular, the undertaking entered into with Greece is known to have been given in exchange for its accession to the Maastricht Treaty. Would this commitment be valid in 1992 if ratification of the Maastricht Treaty were delayed? Would the reservation – which is clearly aimed at relations between Greece and

Turkey – in the Petersberg Declaration that Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty would not apply to disputes between member states of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance be maintained? The Council's answer to Written Question 301 asking about this point is far from satisfactory.

19. (iii) The decision to move the headquarters of the WEU secretariat to Brussels in autumn 1992 was very largely the consequence of the implementation of Article J.4 of the treaty. Will the move still be made if this article is not implemented before the end of 1992, as planned? Would all member governments agree to apply a decision whose sole effect would be to move WEU headquarters nearer to those of NATO? Would it be possible for member countries' permanent representatives to the Community to compose, wholly or partly, the WEU Permanent Council? One may well wonder whether these considerations are not a reason for the Council's delay in carrying out this decision as there are clear signs that speed is not of the essence. Perhaps the difficulty of finding suitable premises mentioned in the reply to Recommendation 517 is nothing more than a pretext for a politically-motivated delay.

20. (iv) Would references in the Maastricht Treaty to a 1998 deadline¹ on which the fate of WEU would be called in question still make sense if the treaty did not come into force at the end of 1992? It is no secret that the Assembly has always challenged this interpretation of the modified Brussels Treaty and Recommendation 517 asked for an opinion to be given by independent legal experts. The Council seems to have rejected this request, judging by its reply, which reaffirms the Council's point of view without taking into account the Assembly's request. Written Question 306, put by Lord Finsberg, and Written Question 309 ask it to spell out its position on this point. This attitude will confirm the Assembly's conviction that, here too, the Council has taken a political decision without being too concerned about the legal aspect. It may do so, but why not say so? Generally speaking, what would be the significance of the statement that WEU is part of the process of European unification if this process was delayed?

21. (v) Would the governments' encouragement to the Assembly to develop closer co-operation with the European Parliament, which the Assembly has endeavoured to follow up in spite of the difficulties to which your Rapporteur will refer later, still apply in the latter case?

22. Your Rapporteur believes that, when the Maastricht summit meeting was being prepared,

1. The English text, which refers only to "the date of 1998" is, moreover, more accurate than the French text, but both texts are authentic.

the Council was far too keen on promoting a policy aimed at giving the European Union an institutional architecture giving an impression of coherence and did not pay enough attention to two aspects of building Europe that he considers essential: the juridical dimension, i.e. the consideration that it is the modified Brussels Treaty and not WEU which is the essential element of a European Union covering defence matters, and a pragmatic dimension, according to which, if WEU is to be able to help to advance this process, it must realise all Europe can accomplish in the areas within its purview. Clearly the approach adopted by the Council has now placed it in a position which, although its action in the operational area is not paralysed, makes it difficult, in the political area, to carry out the programme it set itself in Maastricht, at least within the time span then agreed.

III. The Petersberg Declaration

23. The Petersberg Declaration, adopted by the Council on 19th June 1992, is of particular importance since, to the same extent as the Rome Declaration and the Platform of The Hague, it, or at least its third part, is one of the texts to which countries will have to subscribe if they wish to be given observer or associate status or become members of WEU. It tries to explain how the Council intends to apply its two Maastricht declarations and is in three parts:

24. *The first* concerns WEU's place in the system ensuring Europe's security. It emerges from this that:

25. (i) WEU is associated with all the agreements on arms control already concluded or to be concluded in June 1992 and will co-operate with all measures aimed at their application (START, CFE, Open Skies, chemical weapons).

26. (ii) WEU endorses the CSCE's efforts to obtain the status of regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. The Council declares its preparedness "to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures, including peace-keeping activities of the CSCE or the United Nations Security Council". What this article (I.2) of the declaration does not say is whether this support is to be decided directly by the WEU Council or whether it is a matter for the European Council to decide, WEU merely being responsible for ensuring its implementation. The relative paralysis of the CSCE, at least in the areas referred to above, as shown by the Yugoslav conflicts, does not allow an assessment to be made of whether this affirmation effectively applies.

27. (iii) The Council "welcomed the ongoing reform process of NATO with a view to establishing a strong new transatlantic partnership". What the declaration does not say is to what extent the future activities WEU organises will depend on NATO decisions. The Council seems to have wished to avoid a geographical breakdown of the areas of responsibility of the two organisations, which has the advantage, in each case, of allowing one or other to be called upon, but it might easily lead to overlapping, confusion or even rivalry between them. The coexistence of NATO and WEU co-ordination in the system for monitoring the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro and the dual decision by WEU, on 28th August, and NATO, on 2nd September, that member countries of both organisations will help to protect humanitarian convoys in Bosnia-Herzegovina suggest that the question has still not been settled, the result being that, in due time, WEU will adapt itself to decisions taken by NATO. Paragraph 13 of the reply to Recommendation 517, moreover, lets this be clearly understood. Moreover, at its meetings with NATO authorities on 23rd September, the committee was able to see that the decision to introduce "joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the alliance" was not a firm decision but still subject to a future NATO decision. The Council has not informed the Assembly of the "report on the practical measures necessary" for the development of "close working relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance" or the proposals that the Permanent Council is responsible for making with a view to promoting co-operation between their respective secretariats. It is quite impossible, on the basis of the information about the joint meeting held by the North Atlantic and WEU Councils in Brussels on 21st May 1992 given in the NATO communiqué and the letter from the Secretary-General of WEU of 1st July 1992, to assess the results of that meeting.

28. Greater participation by France in NATO's politico-military activities, as referred to by the French Minister of Defence, Pierre Joxe, in his opening speech at the colloquy on "A new strategic debate" on 29th September 1992, might obviously alleviate much of the suspicion that some alliance countries have of WEU and promote the establishment of better working relations between the two organisations. Everything points to the French Minister envisaging a possible return of his country to the Defence Planning Committee and the Military Committee, but he ruled out France's participation in the Nuclear Committee and – he was explicit on this point – the integrated military structures, which would give France a status comparable to that of Spain. This position seems logical because, as long as NATO has not adopted a perfectly clear doctrine on the use of

its nuclear and conventional forces, it would be hard to see any meaning in France returning other than the abandonment of the position it adopted in 1967. Conversely, France's participation in working out alliance strategy should make the necessary sharing of responsibilities between NATO and WEU easier, and if France takes this step it should make the United States realise that the establishment of a European pillar of the alliance is not intended to separate Europe from America.

29. During its talks with Mr. Wörner, Secretary-General of NATO, on 23rd September, the committee was given an official summary of a speech by Mr. Wörner in Annapolis on 18th June and this summary is also a synthesis of his remarks to the committee. The main passage reads as follows:

“ In order to accelerate the emergence of a European security and defence identity, the Secretary-General believed that Western European Union should be given effective means for military action ‘with NATO’s assistance but not at NATO’s expense’. This did not mean ‘that Western European Union should or would be subordinated to NATO’ but rather that ‘NATO remains the primary instrument in defence of the security of our member nations’. Mr. Wörner reminded his audience that alliance governments had all agreed that ‘the primary responsibility of forces assigned to NATO will be the collective defence of the alliance under the Washington Treaty’. He was convinced that there ‘is no need for a competing military structure in Western Europe – nobody could afford it at a time of shrinking defence budgets, so it could only be built at the expense of the existing NATO military structure’.

The Secretary-General thus concluded that the practical way to make a European security and defence identity fully compatible with NATO was for the latter to make available to Western European Union its ‘assets or NATO-committed forces in cases where NATO does not choose to act. Such a double assignment, or double-hatting, does not create any major problem as long as the priority for NATO is clearly established’. Commenting on the proposal to create a Franco-German corps, Mr. Wörner informed his audience of the assurances he had received to the effect that ‘the corps shall be available to the alliance for the purpose of collective defence and that NATO will be deprived of none of the German units’.

30. However, this concept raises certain questions since, while one can imagine cases in

which WEU decided on an action that NATO does not wish to take, particularly if it is not directly a matter of “ the security of our member nations ”, how could it do so if there “ is no need for a competing military structure in Western Europe ”? For instance, how could NATO undertake a priori to give WEU a logistic infrastructure, as the committee was told on 23rd September, if the members of NATO were not unanimously in favour of such an action? Operational decisions taken in the framework of WEU since June 1991 are specifically aimed at eventually giving it its own means of observing and monitoring the application of disarmament agreements, planning possible action and having strategic transport means. It is quite possible for the same national units to be placed, if necessary, under NATO command or under WEU command. It is logical that, when the sixteen NATO countries are agreed on a joint action, there is no call for a specifically WEU action. However, for WEU to be deprived of “ effective means for military action ” without “ NATO’s assistance ” means giving up all hope of making WEU the instrument of a European Union and reducing its rôle to that of a branch of NATO and denying the Twelve any means of basing a common external and security policy on the possibility of recourse to force. It is hard to understand what part the WEU planning cell would play in this case.

31. Your Rapporteur considers relations between WEU and NATO should be based on a form of subsidiarity in security, defence and, no doubt, armaments matters. Elements of this stem from the modified Brussels Treaty:

(a) National states recruit and maintain armed forces. They use them, as necessary, for matters that concern them (internal affairs, commitments peculiar to each state) without having to call on their partners other than to inform them so that their actions do not harm alliance cohesion. They produce the armaments necessary for these forces insofar as they are able and so wish.

(b) These states may come to an agreement with one or more partners on setting up joint forces and their deployment or on the joint production of armaments.

(c) Under the modified Brussels Treaty, they are obliged to assist any of their partners that are the object of an armed attack and to consult each other in the event of a threat to international peace, which means that they must be able to take joint action in certain cases. This requires mechanism for consultation (the WEU Council), prior preparation of joint action (planning cell, meetings of chiefs of defence staff, study of satellite images, etc.) and the joint development of facilities that WEU member countries no longer have the means to produce on an individual basis (space-based observation and strategic transport).

(d) NATO's task is to ensure peace in a defined area, which implies political action on its part and the availability of large armed forces with modern equipment. This means joint command of forces made available to it by its members and interoperability of their armaments. However, in no case must NATO be called upon a priori to take the place of its members or WEU. If it did, it would have to play a rôle that would soon be challenged by everyone just as, in economic matters, the authority of the Community is now being challenged by those who feel they are being affected by questionable initiatives it is taking.

32. As Mr. Giscard d'Estaing points out in articles on Community subsidiarity which he published in various newspapers on the eve of the Birmingham meeting of the European Council, it is at one and the same time necessary to say in which cases subsidiarity can and must be applied and impossible to fix it permanently because it depends on economic developments. The same is true in the security and defence sector and one of the Council's main aims should be to draw up and constantly keep up to date a list of points on which it intends to intervene. This is what it did in regard to the naval blockade of Iraq and military space-based activities, is considering doing in respect of strategic transport and the armaments agency but failed to do in the case of Yugoslavia. However, the modified Brussels Treaty provides an excellent basis for proceeding in this manner, while the North Atlantic Treaty has, from the outset, suffered from the difference between the meagre commitments it contains and true European defence requirements. This led NATO to replace international commitments by the integration of forces and, now integration is no longer forced upon us by a specific external threat, NATO is in a delicate situation.

33. (iv) Nor has the Assembly seen the report made to the Council on the meetings of chiefs of defence staff. It notes, however, that the decision to hold twice-yearly meetings of chiefs of defence staff and to reinforce national delegations with military delegates corresponds to its recommendations.

34. (v) The Assembly will also welcome the fact that the IEPG and NATO's Eurogroup are studying the possibility of regrouping their respective activities round WEU. It was therefore pleased to receive the IEPG's annual report for 1991, following that for 1990 since this shows recognition of its rôle as the only European assembly with defence responsibilities, thus indicating that the governments of the IEPG member countries are prepared to move towards restructuring round WEU the various bodies that contribute to Europe's security, as announced in the Petersberg Declaration. Moreover, this declaration gives an assurance

that all the IEPG member countries will play a full part in the activities of WEU organs responsible for tasks now carried out by the IEPG. However, the most recent information received by your Rapporteur suggests that significant difficulties have been raised by some members of the IEPG that are not, and are not required to become, full members of WEU. Probably, they may use this means to try to obtain a status in WEU different to the one the Council is prepared to offer them.

35. (vi) The Assembly can but wonder about the nature of the terms of reference adopted by the ministers "for the establishment by WEU of a gradual and phased dialogue with the Maghreb countries". While considering this dialogue to be essential for organising a peaceful order in the Western Mediterranean, your Rapporteur wonders why WEU has been chosen rather than common foreign and security policy. Does it mean the dialogue is to relate to defence? If so, can this be envisaged at present? If, on the contrary, it is to relate to more general aspects of security, it would appear to be more a matter for the European Union.

36. (vii) The Assembly will note that the Council welcomed "the considerable progress which had been made in setting up the experimental WEU satellite centre" but also that the title of the centre was changed in the Petersberg Declaration, which reduced it to an "experimental" function, and that the date of its inauguration, initially June 1992, as the Secretary-General informed the Assembly at its December 1991 session, has been postponed to an unspecified date. What can be the reasons for this delay?

37. (viii) Transformation of the WEU Institute for Security Studies into an "academy", decided in Maastricht, has disappeared from the Petersberg Declaration. Your Rapporteur has never really understood what this term covered, nor does he understand why it seems to have been abandoned.

38. In this connection, it will be noted that when the Clerk of the Assembly asked the Secretary-General for an organogram of the Council, with a view to preparing the information booklet that Mr. Tummers, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, is to submit at the forthcoming session, he was sent only an "illustrative presentation of ministerial organs in Brussels", i.e. quite unofficial and making no reference to bodies such as the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the Torrejón satellite centre or the Paris Institute for Security Studies. One may wonder what prevented the Council answering a similar request in 1990 and made it give such an incomplete answer in 1992. There is an impression that the notion of "subsidiary body of the Council", as referred to in Article VIII

of the treaty and as applied by the Council to those three institutions, is very imprecise. The Assembly will therefore pay the greatest attention to the Council's answer to Written Question 305 put by our colleague, Mr. Lopez Henares, on this subject.

39. These various remarks make your Rapporteur feel that the Council is embarrassed because it has been unable to obtain from the Maastricht Treaty a clear idea of the future rôle of the European Union. On the one hand, the treaty provides, in terms that are more evocative than clear, for WEU to be disbanded in favour of the Union in 1998. Furthermore, the governments are considering extending WEU's activities in various directions that would associate it with the CSCE, NATO, the IEPG or Eurogroup, thus implying the participation in its work of countries which are not now members of the union and probably will not be in 1998 but leaving out countries which are members or may be in 1998. For this reason, and also because of the measures relating to the creation of the new status of member, associate member or observer, WEU is so to speak separated from the modified Brussels Treaty by which it was set up and attached by links that are juridically very tenuous to a number of other organisations, starting with the European Union with which it is not "identifiable in legal terms", as the Council said in its answer to Written Question 298. In particular, it can be seen that the WEU Council may either implement measures taken by the European Council or prepare and take certain decisions in foreign policy and joint security matters since these are worked out by countries which are not and will not all be members of NATO.

40. Here we are dealing with an essential problem which first arose during the negotiations of the intergovernmental conference preparing the Maastricht Treaty and that has never been settled. The governments, instead of defining WEU's rôle for itself and in terms of the modified Brussels Treaty, tried to do so on the basis of its links with other institutions based on other treaties: the European Union and NATO first and, to a lesser extent, the CSCE. Nor did they agree on the priority to be given to these various relationships among themselves and all they managed to agree on was a sort of equidistance evoked by ideas of the "European pillar of the alliance" and "armed branch of the Community" or words such as "observer" and "associate member" whose juridical content, in relation to the modified Brussels Treaty, seems very hard to determine. However, these ideas or words merely defer solving problems to later and today they are resurfacing. Thus the Council is having to take decisions that it was unable to take in 1991, but in worse conditions, because states outside WEU are now concerned and have every intention of obtaining, in their own

interests, advantages going further than what the governments were prepared to grant them. Your Rapporteur can recall that the Assembly warned the Council, *inter alia* in Recommendation 517, about the drawbacks of the way it was proceeding. It could not foresee that the Petersberg Declaration would hasten this day.

41. The hold-ups the Council is now facing are due to the juridical cloud in which it pursued this procedure. The following are the main ones, but this is not a complete list:

- the conditions for Greece's accession to WEU;
- definition of a status of "associate member", particularly in the case of Turkey;
- the establishment of new relations with NATO in view of the fact that not all the European members of NATO are invited to accede to WEU, except with an inferior status;
- the integration of the IEPG in WEU, for the same reasons;
- the establishment of new relations with the European Community, in view of the fact that not all members of the Community are prepared to join WEU;
- the constitution of the WEU Permanent Council, because it raises the direct question of the equidistance between WEU, on the one hand, and NATO and the Community, on the other;
- the establishment of co-operation between the Assembly and the European Parliament for reasons that your Rapporteur will analyse below;
- the Assembly's relations with countries whose relations with WEU have not yet been defined.

Your Rapporteur believes that most of these questions could be solved satisfactorily if the Council agreed to re-examine the situation on the basis of the modified Brussels Treaty and not on that of relations with other organisations and applied the treaty more rigorously.

42. *The second part* of the declaration relates to the strengthening of WEU's operational rôle and is therefore more within the purview of the Assembly's Defence Committee. Your Rapporteur will merely refer to certain points which relate to the very nature of WEU and, through it, the common foreign and security policy of the European Union.

43. While the setting up of a WEU planning cell means WEU may become engaged in operations not involving NATO since, otherwise,

there would be no reason for it, the notion of "military units answerable to WEU" is far from clear. Would these be military units made available to WEU by member states for tasks "conducted under the authority of WEU"? It is stated that "participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of member states", which means that the decision will not be taken collectively either by the Twelve or by the Nine. It is known, for instance, that France is linked to certain African countries by military assistance treaties and that Germany's Basic Law does not allow it to deploy forces outside Europe in any framework other than the United Nations. Hence it is only after a national decision that the forces of any countries having so decided may take part in "military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU". But can it be thought that countries which have not decided to take part in these operations would have a say in "the authority of WEU"? What is meant by units being "answerable" to WEU if their deployment depends on a national decision? It is also known that, during the present reduction of armed forces in all WEU member countries, there can be no question of drawing from them in order to form WEU units in addition to those assigned to national tasks. The units will always be the same ones and this hardly clarifies the relationship between WEU and NATO. In paragraph 11 of the reply to Recommendation 517, the Council specifies that military "bilateral initiatives" by member states – and here everyone thinks of the Franco-German Eurocorps – are no more set in the institutional framework of WEU than are national forces.

44. Particularly noteworthy is the wording used in the declaration that refers twice to the use of forces under "WEU auspices". The term seems to have been carefully chosen to describe, with no details, the nature of relations between these forces and WEU: Command? Co-ordination? Under high-level military or political direction?

45. The participation of some member countries' forces in operations in Yugoslavia sheds little more light on the matter: some of member countries' naval forces engaged in monitoring missions in the Adriatic are under NATO command, others are co-ordinated by WEU. Member countries' ground forces assigned to tasks for which the United Nations is responsible are under United Nations command, and those helping to protect humanitarian convoys remain under national command, while subject to the conditions set out in Security Council resolutions. This is perhaps not illogical and may not have too many drawbacks on the ground, but it makes it very difficult to assess the operational rôle of WEU as the body responsible for implementing the common foreign and security policy of the Twelve.

46. *The third part* concerns relations between WEU and the other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance. It defines three principles on which relations between member states and associate member states of WEU should be based and therefore does not relate to observers. "Settlement of their mutual differences by peaceful means" is included in the modified Brussels Treaty and "refraining from resorting to the threat or use of force" is the obvious corollary thereof. However, the third principle deserves attention. It reads as follows:

"They also stressed that the security guarantees and defence commitments in the treaties which bind the member states within Western European Union and which bind them within the Atlantic Alliance are mutually reinforcing and will not be invoked by those subscribing to Part III of the Petersberg Declaration in disputes between member states of either of the two organisations."

47. Everyone is aware that this declaration is rendered necessary by the poor relations between Greece, a member of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Community, which is thus invited to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty, and Turkey, a member of the alliance but not of the Community, which can thus become only an associate member of WEU. The purpose is to avoid Greece being able to invoke Article V in order to feel protected against Turkey, which might encourage it to adopt provocative measures vis-à-vis the latter. This seems logical, but nevertheless is disturbing in that, by a simple declaration, the Council establishes an important reservation concerning the application of the essential article of the modified Brussels Treaty, i.e. that it considers the accession of Greece to WEU as more important than the treaty signed and ratified. This is probably the most serious aspect of this "juridical laxism" about which your Rapporteur complains, but it also means that the European Union is to be built on very shaky foundations if one problem in the "process" of European Union is to take priority over an international treaty undertaking. It would have been quite understandable for such a reservation to be made in the protocol of accession of Greece to the modified Brussels Treaty. This is not so, since it is a general declaration, adopted by the Council, which restricts the field of application of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.

48. Close examination of Article XI of the treaty makes one question the justification of the Council's approach since this article draws a distinction between the high contracting parties, i.e. the seven founder countries of WEU, in accordance with Article I of Protocol No. I, and countries invited by the high contracting parties

“ to accede to the present treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the state so invited ”. This wording was obviously designed first and foremost to allow the accession of new members to WEU without their being ipso facto invited to take part in the arms controls provided for in Protocols Nos. III and IV. This was the procedure that was applied to Portugal and Spain. It will be noted, for instance, that those two countries did not subscribe to all the agreements concluded between the high contracting parties in application of the treaty but to only two of them. In Written Question 308, your Rapporteur asked the Council to confirm that Portugal and Spain were not concerned by all the obligations of Protocol No. I binding the high contracting parties.

49. On that occasion, member states also issued the following declaration:

“ During the consultations which were held with a view to the enlargement of WEU to include Portugal and Spain, the member states of WEU with Portugal and Spain, taking into consideration the spirit in which their security co-operation has recently developed, found that a number of the provisions of the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954, did not correspond to the way in which they intend to pursue and strengthen that co-operation, on the basis of the Rome declaration on 27th October 1984 and of the platform on European security interests, adopted in The Hague on 27th October 1987.

Consequently, the member states of WEU with Portugal and Spain consider that the relevant provisions of the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954, and its corresponding protocols will be re-examined, as appropriate, having regard for the practice and achievements of, and the prospects for, their co-operation in security matters.”

50. It should be noted in passing that this declaration has still not been followed up in spite of the Assembly's recommendations on the subject. One may wonder whether it will be taken up in the protocol of accession of Greece, but it is already known that the conditions agreed with that country include its endorsement of Part III of the Petersberg Declaration with the restriction it contains about the application of Article V. However, your Rapporteur believes the Council does not intend to apply similar procedure to “ associate members ” in general and to Turkey in particular but is proposing to that country accession by means of a text of no equivalent juridical worth and not subject to ratification while, on the contrary, Turkey intends, quite rightly taking as a basis Article XI, the status of “ associate member ” to be defined solely in accordance with conditions negotiated

between each country concerned and the high contracting parties.

51. That is why your Rapporteur put Written Question 309 to the Council, as follows:

“ Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty draws a clear distinction between the high contracting parties to the treaty which, account being taken of Article I to Protocol No. I, include Germany and Italy, and any other state invited subsequently to ‘ become a party to the treaty ’ ‘ on conditions to be agreed between them and the state so invited ’. In these conditions, can the Council say, basing its answer on serious legal considerations:

1. Whether it is possible to consider Germany and Italy as high contracting parties and at the same time claim that the period of fifty years provided for in Article XII started in 1948?

2. Whether, in the event of Greece acceding to the modified Brussels Treaty, it would be entitled, as a state acceding to the treaty, to participate in the decision relating to the conditions for the accession of other countries as they have to be agreed with the high contracting parties to Protocol No. I?

3. If the Council is prepared to submit to recognised experts in international law the Assembly's well-founded considerations concerning the interpretation of Article XII of the treaty or whether it intends to confine itself to its ‘ opinion ’ which has never been justified, even in the answer to Written Question 297, in order to reject the Assembly's point of view on this matter? ”

52. Furthermore, our colleague, Mr. Caro, put Written Question 310, with a similar aim, as follows:

“ The Petersberg Declaration is an understanding between states with a view to creating, modifying or abolishing a legal relationship between them in two respects:

1. because it provides for non-application of a fundamental article of the modified Brussels Treaty (Article V) in the event of a dispute between a country acceding to that treaty and a country having acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty,

2. because it creates a status of ‘ associate member ’ in an organisation set up by the 1954 Paris Agreements.

Does the Council not consider that the adoption of acts having such effects requires the intervention of constitutional authorities in member states conversant with the conclusion of treaties? Can it specify the nature of these acts? ”

53. Since these two questions were put on 19th October, it is normal that the Assembly has not yet received an answer, but it is entitled to hope that, this time, the Council will ensure that its answers have a firmer legal basis than earlier answers. It may contest the formal distinction, for which your Rapporteur believes there are grounds, between "high contracting parties" and "members acceding" to WEU, but it is difficult to deny that countries which were not founding members of WEU have a different status to that of founding members.

54. It will also be noted that, whereas paragraph 9 of Recommendation 517 urged the Council "to develop a defence and security policy for WEU in accordance with the treaties in force", paragraph 7 of the reply "testifies to the willingness of WEU member states to continue to develop the organisation as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance in accordance with the decision contained in the declaration of the member states of WEU at Maastricht on 10th December 1991", which means the Council does not intend to refer to the modified Brussels Treaty.

55. Your Rapporteur will not deal here with the problems that would arise for WEU from enlargement to include several categories of states, since this is the subject of the report presented to the Political Committee by Mr. Ward.

56. An analysis of the Petersberg Declaration shows plainly that it is a prolongation of the declarations by WEU member countries appended to the Maastricht Treaty where the activities of WEU are concerned and that it has the merit of clearly distinguishing between the decisions it implies and the treaty proper. However, it may be wondered whether some of them are still relevant in the event of the treaty not being ratified. If it is ratified, they raise a number of questions in regard to the "1998 deadline", the main one being how the governments are considering integrating WEU into the European Union on that date.

57. Apparently, and in view of the highly arbitrary decision to fix a deadline for the modified Brussels Treaty, which does not contain one, and to fix it in 1998, the governments hope that by that date all member countries of the Union - including, consequently, those which may join it in the meantime - will be prepared to take part in "a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence", to quote Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty. This is possible and, if so, the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty would be out of date because their fundamental aim would have been attained: to set up a true European Union. If this is not so, in order to achieve the desired result it

would be necessary to continue to weaken the commitments imposed on member states by the modified Brussels Treaty in order to shift WEU's activities to the context of a new treaty organising the European Union and acceptable to twelve, or more probably sixteen, members or even more, as the Council is already doing in order to bring Greece into WEU. It is doubtful whether this approach is to Europe's advantage. Some of WEU's activities might perhaps then be transferred to the union, but it is hard to see how, as long as member states alone are empowered to decide whether their armed forces should intervene, as specified in the Petersberg Declaration, an enlarged European Union could do more than WEU does unless it is in areas not directly concerned with defence, such as economic sanctions. On the contrary, it can be seen how any action by Europe involving armed forces might thus be paralysed.

58. On 6th November, i.e. the very day the Political Committee was to adopt the present report, your Rapporteur took cognisance of the English version of the Council's answer to Written Question 300, but before this answer had been officially communicated to the Assembly. The answer confirms his impression, referred to in paragraph 50, since it specifies that "neither associate members nor observers are parties to the modified Brussels Treaty" but that special procedure will be applied to associate member countries since "the precise modalities of this provision [i.e. those countries' contribution to the organisation's budgets] will have to be specified by the Council in the dialogue with the states concerned". The choice of the word "dialogue" is interesting since it seems intended to avoid the word "negotiation", probably so as to evade the obligation to conclude with a protocol subject to ratification. The answer also says that "only the representatives of the 'Brussels Treaty powers' [this no doubt means the 'modified' treaty] (i.e. full member states of Western European Union) to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe could be full members of the WEU parliamentary Assembly". The Assembly will obviously have to grant the delegations of associate member countries and observers appropriate rights, but it is hard to see how it could grant the right to vote to delegations from countries not participating in the adoption of the annual report. These rights will of course imply that the Council takes account of the implications of the arrival of these delegations when taking decisions on the financial resources it grants the Assembly.

59. Your Rapporteur also wishes to draw attention to the fact that the Council bases WEU's invitation to other members of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance on the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty which specifies that the high contracting parties are

“resolved... to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe, to associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other states inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination”. If this means anything, it is that member countries are determined to support the principle of the candidature to the European Union of any “associate member” country of WEU, thus including Turkey. Your Rapporteur wishes to be sure that this is really what the Council intends.

60. However, this answer reveals a degree of incoherence on the part of the Council. The preamble to a treaty is merely the statement of principles to which the provisions of the treaty correspond and the passage quoted by the Council sets out the very principle on which Article XI is based. Why then refuse to apply Article XI to “associate members”? What is interesting about the answer to Written Question 300 is that it shows the Council’s embarrassment now that it has to tackle the application of the texts it adopted at Maastricht and Petersberg, with a lack of reflection that the Assembly has already underlined. There is every reason to doubt whether the legal views expressed in this answer are well-founded enough to provide a satisfactory solution to the problems it has put so badly.

IV. The WEU Assembly and the European Parliament

61. Clearly, the existence of the WEU Assembly is linked with the modified Brussels Treaty remaining in force. If the 1998 deadline is to lead to the signatory countries denouncing the treaty in order to place their co-operation in defence matters in the framework of the European Union, the Assembly will no longer have a juridical basis and will disappear. However, as long as the modified Brussels Treaty continues to exist, including Article IX, the Assembly is the Council’s de jure parliamentary interlocutor, and the Council again confirmed this in its reply to Written Question 298 of 17th June 1992, as follows:

“...the Council stressed that it remains fully aware of the WEU parliamentary Assembly’s independence and its powers, as expressed in the Charter of the Assembly, which is in itself an application of the provisions of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty...”

This recognition by the governments of the value of the Charter of the Assembly, which is the work of the Assembly, should be underlined.

62. However, this rôle is constantly challenged by the European Parliament. In its Resolution A 3-0123/92, adopted after Maastricht,

the European Parliament holds that the Maastricht Treaty “provides for defence matters to be delegated to WEU without providing for appropriate parliamentary control of the activities of this organisation”, which is tantamount to saying that the WEU Assembly does not fulfil the rôle assigned to it by Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty. As far as your Rapporteur knows, this allegation is not based on a real criticism of the work of our Assembly but on a belief that the European Parliament is the only parliamentary assembly entitled to speak on behalf of Europe. This view is diametrically opposed to the opinion of the French Constitutional Council on the Maastricht Treaty, quoted by Mr. De Decker in Written Question 298, which, to show that the powers attributed to the European Parliament do not encroach upon those of the French Parliament, says that “the European Parliament has only the responsibilities defined by the treaties attributing them”, which concurs fully with the concept that the WEU Assembly has always had of its own responsibilities and the views of the WEU Council on the Charter of the Assembly quoted above. There is every reason to think that the relevant jurisdictional authorities of the other member countries will react in the same way as the French Constitutional Council.

63. Some members of the Assembly have regretted that the Secretary-General of WEU is not being more firm in respecting this point of view. For instance, our colleague, Mr. Fourné, put Written Question 302 to the Council, the main points of which read as follows:

“...just before the ministerial meeting of WEU on 19th June 1992, the WEU Secretary-General spoke to the Security and Disarmament Sub-Committee of the European Parliament to describe the change in the rôle of WEU with a view to the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty, whereas he communicated information to the WEU Assembly on this question only after the ministerial meeting.

1. Does this mean that the Council shares the view expressed in Resolution A 3-0123/92 of the European Parliament?...

2. Does this mean that the Council envisages transferring to the European Parliament the responsibilities attributed to the Assembly of WEU under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty?

3. Does the Council consider that Article J.7 of the Maastricht Treaty providing for a direct link between the presidency of the European Union and the European Parliament is liable to render null and void either the modified Brussels Treaty as a whole, or Article IX of that treaty?

64. It is indeed evident that the European Parliament's claims make more difficult the "closer co-operation between the parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament" that the Council expressed a wish for in the declaration appended to the Maastricht Treaty. On 23rd October, Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, met Mr. Egon Klepsch, President of the European Parliament, to examine the conditions in which such co-operation might be established.

65. Informing the committee of the results of this meeting, Mr. Soell recalled that exchanges between the two assemblies could be based only on equality and reciprocity. As there was no observer status in the European Parliament, there was no reason for the WEU Assembly to offer such status to members of the European Parliament. Relations therefore had to be considered on a different basis. The two Presidents had:

- (i) decided to meet regularly. Some committee members had asked that representatives of each political group be invited to attend these meetings;
- (ii) examined the possibility of exchanges of ideas and documents between rapporteurs from the two assemblies dealing with matters of joint interest. Such exchanges were obviously desirable provided they did not allow a representative of one assembly to have a prior view of the work of the other, thus respecting Rule 42, paragraph 10, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly;
- (iii) examined the possibility of meetings between committees or subcommittees of the two assemblies.

66. However, first and foremost, it should be specified on what juridical bases the Council's encouragements are based. Lord Finsberg put the question extremely clearly in Written Question 303, when he asked:

"A. Can the Council say whether its 'encouragement' is based:

1. On Articles J.7 and J.11 of the Maastricht Treaty which establish the European Parliament's consultative powers in the European Union's common foreign and security policy, completed by Article J.4, paragraph 1, which specifies that this policy 'shall include all questions related to the security of the union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence'? Does this imply preparing a transfer of WEU's responsibilities to the European Union referred to in paragraph 6 of Article J.4 and hence of

the responsibilities of the WEU Assembly to the European Parliament?

2. On Article J.4, paragraph 3, which excludes the procedures set out in Article J.3 'Issues having defence implications'? In this case, is it a question of endeavouring to distinguish between the respective responsibilities of the two assemblies?

3. Does the Council consider that, as long as the governments of the member states retain their full sovereignty, from the moment recourse to force is envisaged, the European Parliament, elected by direct universal suffrage and with consultative powers under Article J.7 of the Maastricht Treaty in regard to measures taken by the European Union for the common defence, is an adequate democratic instrument of supervision? Does it not believe, on the contrary, that the WEU Assembly, formed of delegations of the parliaments of the member countries and with supervisory powers under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, is in a better position to exercise true democratic control over the defence of the union and to uphold Europe's defence requirements with the authorities which have effective power in this field?"

67. The Council's single reply to the questions put by Mr. Fourné and Lord Finsberg has the merit of setting the problem on a sound basis by specifying that the European Parliament has only the responsibilities attributed to it by the Maastricht Treaty and the WEU Assembly those attributed to it by the modified Brussels Treaty and it again confirms that it subscribes to the Assembly's Charter in that the WEU Assembly has responsibility for any matter arising out of the Brussels Treaty (the word "modified" should no doubt be added), thus obliging the Council to give an answer even in cases where the Council itself is not actually dealing with such a matter. Its encouragement of closer co-operation between the two assemblies is therefore based only on the concern "to develop a close working relationship with the Union", without prejudice to any legal position. Finally, the Council "takes due note" of the considerations of the two members of the Assembly concerning the democratic legitimacy of the WEU Assembly, without adopting a clear position on the future implications of that legitimacy. In any event, WEU's own bodies should adopt an attitude towards the European Parliament parallel with that of the Community bodies towards the WEU Assembly. So far, the President of the European Commission has not followed up the invitations addressed to him by the Assembly.

68. It is indeed to be feared that, as long as the governments allow doubt to prevail about the nature of the responsibilities they acknowledge for each of the assemblies, it may be difficult for the latter to co-operate because of the radically opposite concepts of their respective attributions. The WEU Assembly for its part has always endeavoured to avoid any controversy with the European Parliament because it thought such a course would be detrimental to the cause of Europe. It is difficult to understand why the European Parliament, using juridical bases that are, at the very least, fragile in today's Europe, does not show similar discretion.

69. The WEU Assembly has a very sound juridical base: the modified Brussels Treaty, which gives it very wide responsibilities, including in economic, social and cultural matters under Articles I, II and III of the treaty, whereas Rule 223 of the Rome Treaty, which was not modified by the Maastricht Treaty, excludes defence matters from the responsibilities of the Community and hence of the European Parliament.

70. The WEU Council admittedly renounced the exercise of its economic, social and cultural responsibilities, but it admitted that the Assembly was entitled to ask it how these responsibilities were being exercised by other organisations. Your Rapporteur was therefore surprised to learn from paragraph 4 of the reply to Recommendation 517 that the Council refused to answer a recommendation relating to the accession to the Community of countries that are not members of NATO on the pretext that this matter concerned the Twelve and not the Nine. It is in fact application of the modified Brussels Treaty that is in question, since the matter concerns the process of European Union, although it is the Twelve that effectively deal with it in accordance with the Rome Treaty, revised in Maastricht. This reply therefore seems unacceptable. Moreover, the Twelve did not hesitate, in Maastricht, to adopt (dubious) interpretations of the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly when they referred to the 1998 deadline.

71. This means that, should the European Union be in a position to assume responsibilities that now belong to WEU, it would have to do so on the basis of a new treaty that should include all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty that are still relevant. Moreover, it is hard to see why the date on which this is done should be determined by the date on which member countries are authorised to give one year's notice of their withdrawal from the modified Brussels Treaty, whether in 1998, as fixed arbitrarily by the governments, or in 2004, as the Assembly believes. The governments have the power to revise the treaty when they like,

provided they are unanimous in wishing to do so, and, consequently, to integrate provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty in a treaty of European Union immediately. If they did not do so in Maastricht, it is not for legal reasons but for purely political reasons. It should be recalled that several times the Assembly has asked, particularly in Recommendations 490, 491 and 504, that the Council revise the treaty to remove obsolete provisions as it undertook to do in its declaration accompanying the protocol of accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU.

72. The question raised by the Maastricht Treaty reference to the 1998 deadline suggests that this is not how the governments intend to act. It is just as if they wanted, here and now, to allow the modified Brussels Treaty to lapse and to withdraw from it when they can by transferring to the union in its present form activities that they are now pursuing in the framework of WEU. This would therefore lead to co-operation in defence matters no longer being based on a treaty of alliance. The danger of proceeding in this manner is clear because it would replace a binding treaty by a practice whose fragility has been confirmed by recent problems with the European monetary system. It is clearly such a development that the European Parliament is claiming to forestall in the name of its claim to be the only parliamentary assembly of the European Union.

73. Your Rapporteur believes that, in any event, Maastricht is the last step the governments have managed to take – assuming they succeed – without taking a clear decision on the kind of Europe they intend to build. Whatever the final decision, each time the people have been consulted regarding ratification of the treaty it has been seen that the public no longer accepts the building of Europe if it is not based on a clear definition of the responsibilities and powers of each institution and that it is no longer possible to propose a movement whose aims are not clear. Similarly, where defence is concerned, the same public is also not prepared to accept the full consequences of a transfer of national sovereignty to a European body.

74. This was the basis of your Rapporteur's affirmation in Document 1308 that a European Union that did not aim at setting up a centralised state, of which there is no question, but a more or less federal system different from the rather hybrid edifice that emerges from the Maastricht Treaty would, in any event, need a bicameral system allowing national parliaments to be represented in European affairs, alongside direct representatives of the people. President Pontillon defended this idea in several lectures he gave in 1991 and President Soell took the idea up again in his talks with President Klepsch and at his press conference in Brussels on 24th September. In other words, a merger of the

Rome Treaty, revised in Maastricht, and the modified Brussels Treaty should lead to a union integrating Community and intergovernmental structures, with a bicameral parliament, one elected by direct universal suffrage and representing the citizens of the union and the other appointed by the parliaments of member states and representing the countries forming the union. Both might deal with all the union's affairs, but the first would give priority to matters that are the responsibility of the Community and the second to those which remain intergovernmental matters.

75. However, your Rapporteur fears that the approach adopted by the governments, particularly in the WEU Council, may lead not to a strengthening of the European Union, as some seem to think, but to a weakening of its juridical foundations. There is every reason to fear, as Lord Finsberg and Mr. Fourré mentioned in Written Questions 302 and 303, that if, in 1996, a decisive step is not taken towards a political union covering "common defence policy" or even "common defence", the governments may agree to apply Articles J.3 and J.11, as well as Article J.4, paragraph 1, of the Maastricht Treaty, by purely and simply transferring the WEU Assembly's responsibilities to the European Parliament. This would in no way represent progress towards the European Union or offset the democratic deficit about which many are complaining. On the contrary, it would submit to an assembly with no power over member governments control of an area which remained an intergovernmental matter. Once again, it would be one of those false starts by means of which the governments claim to build Europe while strengthening rather than relinquishing any of their prerogatives.

V. The dialogue with the Central European countries

76. The decision to start a dialogue between WEU and a number of Central and Eastern European countries was taken more than a year ago but implemented only on 19th June, when ministers from eight countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia) met in Bonn with the WEU Council. It had to be decided which countries should be invited to take part in such exchanges, i.e. in what political context they were set. It would, in fact, have been possible to invite some of the Soviet Union's successor states, in particular Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, and also those republics that used to form part of Yugoslavia and had been recognised by the Twelve, which would have been logical if priority had been given to organising security throughout the continent. However, such an initiative would have placed

WEU in competition with NACC, organised by NATO, and with the CSCE. By choosing to discuss security matters with the eight countries invited, WEU decided, rightly, your Rapporteur believes, to set itself in the context of Maastricht and to establish relations with countries which seem, in the more or less long term, likely to join the European Union with which three of them are already associated.

77. This initiative corresponds more or less to those taken by the Assembly since 1990 in inviting parliamentary observers from some of those countries and organising the Berlin symposium in April 1992 in which most of them participated at a high level. Hence the action of the Council and of the Assembly are in parallel and it is not surprising that the ministers "advocated the development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the states concerned". It is to be hoped that the Council will grant the Assembly the material means necessary to follow the direction it "advocates".

78. At that meeting, the ministers "agreed to strengthen existing relations by structuring the dialogue, consultations and co-operation" and went on to say:

"...The focus of consultations will be the security architecture and stability in Europe, the future development of the CSCE, arms control and disarmament, in particular the implementation of the CFE and Open Skies Treaties, as well as the 1992 Vienna document. Developments in Europe and neighbouring regions will be of particular interest to the participants.

In this way, WEU's Central European partners will be able to acquaint themselves with the future security and defence policy of the European Union and find new opportunities to co-operate with the defence component of the union and with the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance as these develop."

79. Furthermore:

"The Foreign and Defence Ministers adopted the following concrete measures:

- Foreign and Defence Ministers will meet once a year. Additional meetings at ministerial level may be convened if circumstances require.
- A forum of consultation will be established between the WEU Permanent Council and the ambassadors of the countries concerned. It will meet at the seat of the WEU Council at least twice a year.
- These meetings will provide an opportunity to monitor the implementation

of the measures adopted and, where appropriate, to make proposals for the inclusion of other fields of co-operation.

- Consultations at ministerial and WEU Permanent Council/ambassador level on security issues may be complemented by meetings with an ad hoc WEU troika at senior official level."

The first forum met in London on 14th October 1992. The communiqué issued on that occasion gives no significant information about the results of the meeting.

80. The Assembly, which has for long attached the utmost importance to the development of such relations, will unreservedly welcome the fact that the Council managed to place its approach in a framework that corresponds to the need for a rapprochement between these countries and the European Union. This does mean it is leaving the former Yugoslav republics out of the process, but it was obviously wise not to associate them before a solution is found to their present crisis. However, the Assembly has several times expressed the wish that the Council commit itself rather more than in the past in the context of a simple dialogue and have these countries participate in the security system now being developed round the European Union and WEU. That is why, in Recommendation 511, it proposed sending military observers to the frontier between Hungary and former Yugoslavia to deter the belligerents from violating the frontier and, in Recommendation 525, it proposed responding to Romanian requests for help in monitoring respect for the embargo decided by the Security Council against Serbia and Montenegro. Your Rapporteur has learned from Romanian sources that the Romanian Government has twice approached the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council in this sense but apparently the matter has not been effectively raised in the Council. He recalls that the same confusion occurred in 1991, as he indicated in paragraph 119 of Document 1293, over a Polish approach to the then French Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council. He therefore wonders whether there is a proper exchange of information between the Chairmanship-in-Office and the Permanent Council.

81. The Assembly also expressed the wish that the Council examine, on a case-by-case basis, with those Central European countries so wishing, the possibility of associating them with some of the activities of the Council's subsidiary organs. Paragraphs 3 and 14 of the reply to Recommendation 517 suggest that it is willing to do so in a manner that the Assembly can but approve. On 19th June, the Council confirmed the vocation of the Institute for Security Studies to turn in this direction, which it had already been doing from the very start. However, it is

above all the opening of those countries towards the West in armaments matters that would be an important step in their rapprochement with the European Union in security matters. As matters now stand, it is not a question of giving a formal security guarantee to the Central European countries but of encouraging the stabilisation of democracy there by reassuring them that this is not at the expense of their security.

82. Western Europe must pay particular attention to the current serious dispute between Hungary and Slovakia over the completion of a vast project to divert the waters of the Danube above Bratislava at a point where the river forms the frontier between the two countries. Slovakia is taking as a basis a 1977 agreement by which Czechoslovakia and Hungary agreed on a hydraulic programme that concerned both of them. However, pressure by a section of Hungarian public opinion, in particular ecologists, led Hungary to renounce the project in 1989 and, in 1991, to denounce the 1977 agreement. The advanced stage reached in the work and the needs of the Slovak economy led the Slovak Government to continue the work, which is now being completed. It is accusing the Hungarian Government of wishing, on this occasion, to cause unrest among the large Hungarian minority in Slovakia, grouped particularly in the region concerned by the Gabčíkova dam. Attempts by the European Community to bring the positions of the two countries closer have so far been unsuccessful.

83. It is certainly not for our Assembly to express its opinion on this delicate, complex question. However, its responsibility for security matters makes it concerned about how this question will be handled and solved. Your Rapporteur feels the governments of the WEU countries are entitled to ask the two countries, which wish one day to join a European Union in which WEU is to participate, to agree, here and now, to respect conciliation procedure commensurate with the provisions of Article X of the modified Brussels Treaty. They should be informed very quickly that creating faits accomplis before negotiations is not likely to facilitate their rapprochement with the European Union.

VI. Conclusions

84. Both the positive and the negative aspects of the Yugoslav affair demonstrate the state of the European Union in external and security policy and military matters. The most positive aspects are the smoothness of relations between the European Council and WEU and the effective co-ordination of WEU and NATO naval action in the Adriatic. This shows that, in a period when the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty is still in the balance, the WEU countries are applying without difficulty the principles

they defined in their Maastricht and Petersberg Declarations: transparency and complementarity vis-à-vis NATO and placing WEU at the service of common foreign and security policy in the framework of the application of decisions taken by the Security Council. Moreover, Europe has shown that it is not allowing itself to be divided by certain differences of views: between Germany and France in summer 1991 and between Greece and its eleven partners over Macedonia at the Lisbon conference.

85. Conversely, Europe has shown that, from the moment the United States avoids involvement, as is the case for any intervention on the ground in Yugoslavia, its military means of action remained limited. It was not even ready to group the forces of WEU member states under a single command even in application of measures decided by the United Nations. Admittedly, the WEU planning cell is not yet functioning and truly collective action had not been prepared. Nevertheless, the will shown by all governments to keep the forces they assigned for humanitarian operations at their full disposal shows that we are far from the "common defence policy" and, a fortiori, "common defence" mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty. Are these policies attainable by the 1998 deadline which, in the eyes of the authors of the treaty, should allow defence to be included among the responsibilities of the union by integrating the functions and organs that WEU will, in the meantime, have organised or regrouped? In view of the positions adopted by several governments during parliamentary debates or the campaign for the referendum on adopting the treaty, this seems doubtful.

86. This doubt should lead to the realisation that WEU's specific mission might have to continue well after the date on which the signatory states are authorised to denounce the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly if that date remains arbitrarily fixed at 1998. This consideration should lead to two practical conclusions:

87. (a) The modified Brussels Treaty, as it stands, is still the firmest cornerstone for any European security organisation and it should be ensured that the value of the treaty is not diminished by a desire to ensure at all costs that the geography of WEU coincides with that of the union. There are signs, noted in the present document, suggesting that the governments are nevertheless sorely tempted to do so.

88. (b) Every part of WEU, including the Assembly, must be able to continue to exercise the mission assigned to it by the modified Brussels Treaty for what may be some considerable time. The governments must not, for what may be quite understandable budgetary reasons, moreover, deprive it of the necessary means to do so. Nor must they, in an attempt to show public opinion that "progress", more

apparent than real, is being made towards the achievement of the European Union, proceed to dismantle WEU in advance. There are signs that they may be only too prepared to do so, in particular where our Assembly is concerned.

89. At the present juncture, there are many indications that the development of WEU, as envisaged by the Nine in Vianden, Maastricht and at Petersberg, is held up by uncertainty among members of NATO about that organisation's new tasks. It is understandable that this uncertainty is making NATO fear competition from a European organisation that might act in its place or jeopardise the smooth running of the alliance, and it may be said that, just as the difficulties facing NATO are holding up WEU's activities, doubts about the political development of Europe since Maastricht are holding up those of the alliance. This was seen in connection with Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Americans' decision not to intervene prevented direct action by NATO and concern not to make WEU a rival of the Atlantic Alliance led some members of WEU to avoid having the Nine take significant collective initiatives at this juncture. The feebleness of action taken by both organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina illustrates this mutual paralysis.

90. Any alliance has three foundations: political aims, legality and effectiveness. In times of tension, effectiveness takes priority over the others. The preponderance enjoyed by NATO for forty years was due to its effectiveness. WEU survived only thanks to its founding treaty whose political aim was lost from sight. The effectiveness requirement has now lost ground and this has weakened NATO particularly since its legitimacy stems from no precise political plan. However, the North Atlantic Treaty still provides it with a solid foundation. WEU was given new legitimacy by the governments' decision to associate it with the process of European Union, but the reference to the 1998 deadline in the Maastricht Treaty limits this legitimacy significantly and will reduce it even more if the governments hesitate to say how it will fit into the European Union. Attributing to WEU aims that are limited in time, i.e. a transitional rôle, is liable to diminish its effectiveness. Your Rapporteur therefore considers that the modified Brussels Treaty, which allows WEU to take its due place in the European Union, should not be abandoned in 1998, nor at some other date, but should be one of the foundations of the union. He regrets the attitude adopted by the governments, who treat it off-handedly to show their preference for a movement whose success is even more uncertain as its very existence now seems in doubt.

91. One may wonder whether the twofold approach adopted in Maastricht, which was to

make WEU at one and the same time the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and the armed branch of the Community, does not include factors that are incompatible from the moment one tries to move from the level of easy ideas to juridical and political realities. Reality is that twelve-power Europe cannot be linked to NATO and does not want to rule out the possibility of enlargement to include countries that are not members of the Atlantic Alliance. Nor does it want to open its door to all the European member countries of NATO. If the governments refuse to face up to this reality, they will be exposing themselves to pressure from all the countries to which they do not wish to divulge this truth. This is their present position vis-à-vis the Greek and Turkish applications for membership of WEU. The result is a weakening of the modified Brussels Treaty, the failure of attempts to draw the IEPG and NATO's Eurogroup closer to WEU and a NATO blockage in face of any initiative by WEU. Another result will probably also be crises in relations between WEU and twelve-power Europe. If, on the contrary, the Council agrees to recognise WEU for what it is, i.e. the modified Brussels Treaty organisation, it will find it much easier to handle problems raised by its relations with candidate countries and with the two organisations and the other countries that are members of them. This is the approach the Assembly has been suggesting that it adopt for a long time and it is the only one that seems reasonable and beneficial to the cause of Europe.

92. Having prepared several reports on various aspects of the modified Brussels Treaty, your Rapporteur has had to study closely the text of the treaty and he is consequently convinced that the work accomplished by the governments in 1954 is of exceptional quality because they managed to set out in appropriate legal terms intentions that they still share today: to contribute to the unification of Europe and to ensure openness and complementarity between WEU and NATO. He believes the negotiations conducted in the framework of WEU in 1991 and 1992 fall well short of producing texts of the same standard and he regrets that they resulted in doubt being cast on the value of the 1954 treaty, assuming that their aim is not to reduce it to the status of a scrap of paper.

VII. The meeting of the committee on 6th November 1992

93. At its meeting on 6th November 1992, the committee considered that some parts of the preliminary draft recommendation duplicated the draft recommendation it had adopted the same day in Document 1340. It therefore decided to give them at the end of the present report.

These are:

SECTION I

Draft recommendation proper:

Paragraph 4

4. Enlarge WEU to include new members – whether or not called associates – only in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article XI, specifying the conditions laid down by the high contracting parties for their accession.

Renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly.

Paragraph 7

7. Implement the provisions of the Petersberg Declaration relating to the enlargement of WEU (and the creation of the status of associate member and of observer) only after considering the Assembly's recommendations dealing with the problems raised by these provisions.

Renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly.

SECTION II

The Assembly,

Notes that the concern expressed by the Nine in the Maastricht declarations to make WEU at one and the same time the European pillar of the alliance and the defence organisation of the European Union is encountering serious difficulties because:

(i) it is leading to the accession of Greece and Turkey to WEU in accordance with statuses established a priori and not only in accordance with conditions appropriate to each of the countries as intended in Article XI;

(ii) it aims to merge NATO's Eurogroup and the IEPG with WEU without all members of those two bodies being given member status;

(iii) in the new constitution of the Permanent Council in Brussels it adopts no clear principle common to all members of WEU;

(iv) it does not allow a coherent European armaments policy to be defined;

(v) it emerges from the Petersberg Declaration that there is a tendency to establish WEU's action on bases other than the modified Brussels Treaty.

IT RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Admit no new member to WEU, whatever their status, without specifying the conditions for its accession in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty;

2. Constitute the new Permanent Council of WEU only after reaching agreement between all the present members of WEU specifying how this Council will be composed;

3. Invite all the countries it accepts as members of WEU to participate in the planning cell and the organs for promoting the joint organisation of military space activities;

4. Explain, in a public document, the tasks it intends to assign to the future WEU armaments agency;

5. Make it plain that the modified Brussels Treaty is still the only basis for military action by WEU, whatever organisation may have defined the aims of such action.

SECTION III

The Assembly,

(i) Considers that the modified Brussels Treaty is required to remain the juridical basis for European defence;

(ii) Notes that neither the European Community in its present form nor, a fortiori, a Community enlarged to include countries attached to a neutral status or policy will be able, for a long time to come, to bear responsibility for defence policy or common defence;

(iii) Believes that, as long as defence remains a matter for state sovereignty, only an assembly composed of delegations from the parliaments of those states will be able to exercise the responsibilities attributed by Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty to the WEU Assembly in respect of European co-operation in defence matters;

(iv) Recalls that a political organisation of a federal or confederal type requires the supervision of a two chamber parliament in which representatives of the parliaments of the federated or confederated states constitute a chamber with powers adapted to the specific features of the union.

IT THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Take into consideration, in the examination it has to make in 1996 of the implementation of the nine-power declarations in Maastricht, the rôle that the WEU Assembly will be required to play in the organisation of a European Union and accept no measure that might jeopardise Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty.

SECTION IV of the preliminary draft recommendation becomes SECTION II of the draft recommendation.

*European security policy –
reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council*

REPORT ¹

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee ²
by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur

PART TWO

Europe and the crises in former Yugoslavia

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on European security policy – reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council: Europe and the crises in former Yugoslavia

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. The situation on the territory of former Yugoslavia
- III. Europe and Yugoslav problems
- IV. WEU in the Yugoslav crisis
- V. Conclusions

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Lord Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: Verbeek), Alegre, Beix (Alternate: Baumel), Bowden, Caro (Alternate: Lemoine), De Hoop Scheffer, Fabra, Feldmann, Forni, Goerens, Homs I Ferret, Sir Russell Johnston, Lord Kirkhill, MM. Kittelmann, Koehl, Moya, Müller, Pécriaux (Alternate: Chevalier), de Puig, Reddemann, Rodrigues, Roseta, Seeuws, Soell, Ward, Wintgens, N..., N..., N..., N..., N...*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

*on European security policy –
reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council:
Europe and the crises in former Yugoslavia*

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling its Recommendation 525;
- (ii) Noting with satisfaction that, in a number of respects, this recommendation has been followed up;
- (iii) Noting, however, that the decisions taken in WEU and NATO to protect humanitarian assistance to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina are being implemented very slowly;
- (iv) Considering that the approach of winter makes the conditions for the survival of these people a matter of supreme concern;
- (v) Noting that the measures decided by the Security Council to ensure a cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina still fall short of achieving such a result;
- (vi) Noting the slowness with which Security Council decisions are applied in the parts of Croatia that are outside the authority of that republic;
- (vii) Insisting that a statute must be created for the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina by qualified representatives of the three principal components of the population of that republic;
- (viii) Fearing a spread of hostilities to regions of former Yugoslavia which have remained safe from them, particularly in the region of Kosovo,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Speed up intervention by forces of member countries to protect the transport of humanitarian relief to Bosnia-Herzegovina;
2. Approach the Security Council to ensure that it makes effective the coercive measures it has taken to make the parties to the conflict put an end to military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
3. Offer the United Nations a larger contribution to the peace-keeping operations it has undertaken;
4. Consider the possibility of extending the UNPROFOR mission to Kosovo;
5. Agree to its members urgently recognising the independence of the Republic of Macedonia with a name acceptable to the population of that republic.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The Yugoslav crisis started just when the European Community was preparing the Maastricht Conference, which was intended to associate member countries more closely in a better-welded European Union and help them to meet the new situation created by the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and then the Soviet Union. It seemed that Western Europe was going to have to assume more responsibility for establishing a new European order and that, politically and militarily, it was inadequately prepared to do so. The Yugoslav affair had a twofold effect since, during summer 1991 in particular, it brought to light serious disagreements among the Twelve about the nature of what they could do to keep peace in the region, but, at the same time, it led those countries to speed up their effort to consolidate political Europe and gave them a testing-ground for the implementation of a European policy in which WEU had a place alongside the joint external policy. The Maastricht process therefore influenced the Twelve's reactions to the Yugoslav crisis, while that crisis influenced the process of European Union.

2. It has been deplored that Europe managed neither to prevent nor to solve nor even to moderate the conflicts on Yugoslav territory. It has perhaps not been sufficiently underlined that, thanks to action by the Twelve, Europe managed to contain the crisis within the territory of former Yugoslavia. It is because the European Community offered former Yugoslavia's neighbouring countries prospects of security, economic recovery and, eventually, in the more or less long term, integration that they managed to remain above purely national interests, sometimes quite legitimate, which would at any other time have involved them in armed confrontation. It is because it was taking part in the search for a new, peaceful order for the whole of Europe that Russia has, so far, managed to resist calls from traditionalist and nationalist elements urging it to demonstrate active solidarity with the Serbs, traditional Slav, orthodox allies, whose government was still in the hands of former communists. Finally, it is a mystery to no one that the Community countries tackled the Yugoslav problem with different historical memories: at the beginning of the conflict, some were more in sympathy with Serbia and the Yugoslav state while others were more sensitive to the national claims of the Slovenes, Croats or Macedonians. It is therefore quite remarkable that these differences did not lead to serious

tension among the Twelve and that the latter were able to work out political action and even joint military action. This may be considered insufficient, but one should recall that, only three quarters of a century ago, the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina triggered off the first world war. This may be measured by the progress achieved in Europe thanks to the Community, and also to WEU, and how far the will for understanding and joint action now prevails over national reactions. It should be added that, in the framework of the United Nations, several member countries are helping to monitor respect for the cease-fire between Croats and Serbs in the north-eastern part of the Republic of Croatia, now controlled by what are effectively Serb authorities with the support and assistance of the authorities in Belgrade.

3. The governments of the Twelve seem to have been very anxious to safeguard this situation, which perhaps led them to be more cautious than many would have liked when consideration was given to the possibility of military action. However, it should be underlined that any undertaking that did not have the consent of all member states of the Community would have significantly weakened Europe just when it was negotiating the Maastricht Treaty and then proceeding to ratify it. In the light of the scenes that daily show us the atrocity of the struggle in Bosnia-Herzegovina or even in Croatia, the reservations of Community Europe may appear to be a shameful failure. However, a military engagement that divided Europe might have such serious consequences, even for the peoples of former Yugoslavia, that this caution cannot be condemned, particularly as it is known that, with passions as they now are, any real military intervention can produce results only if it is massive and prolonged. It would involve such heavy losses for those participating that none of our countries seems prepared to accept them. So far, no really credible plan to restore lasting peace has been worked out, be it in the framework of the United Nations, the CSCE, the Twelve or even at the London Conference held on 26th and 27th August 1992. It may even be wondered whether the principles laid down in these various forums are likely to facilitate the search for a peaceful solution which, in any event, requires the prior agreement of the parties to the conflict. WEU, for its part, has had only to consider or implement the use of military means to ensure that measures decided in one or other of these frameworks are applied and apparently it has carried out the tasks assigned to it satisfactorily. It cannot be re-

proached for the fact that these measures are far from sufficient to meet the concern of all Europeans to put an end to the conflict as soon as possible.

II. The situation on the territory of former Yugoslavia

4. Created on 19th October 1918, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes replaced Serbia, the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire for the region peopled by the southern Slavs. While earlier régimes had proved increasingly incapable of maintaining peace in the area, in particular with the crises that occurred in 1878, 1908, 1912, 1913 and 1914, the Yugoslav Kingdom was far from achieving a satisfactory order, mainly because of the political preponderance of the Serbs. The second world war provided an opportunity for many scores to be settled in a particularly cruel manner and made way for Marshal Tito's communist dictatorship. Whatever that régime might rightly be reproached for, it should nevertheless be borne in mind that it succeeded in creating a true Yugoslav national feeling – although claims were still being made, in particular by the Croats, Slovenes and Albanians – and in ensuring that real order prevailed in the country, not only through the monopoly of power in the hands of the Communist League but also by making the Yugoslav people take a stand against the Soviet threat since 1948 and laying the foundations for a certain type of federalism. To that end, as from 1943 Tito had weakened the strength of the dominant national element, i.e. the Serbs, in a plan to organise the country worked out by the resistance movement and implemented when the country was liberated. This federal organisation attributed to certain republics, in particular Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, territories on which there was a Serb majority and separated from Serbia proper the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. In the framework of a federation, the Serbs accepted these amputations and they continued to play an important rôle in the federal state. After the death of Tito in 1980, the Serb element resumed a dominant position in the state, which is one of the main reasons why Albanians in Kosovo then, in 1991, Slovenes and Croats and, finally, Bosnians and Macedonians rejected a state that they considered too authoritarian, too stamped with communism and too dominated by Serbs.

5. The crisis that had existed in Yugoslavia for several years grew considerably worse in spring 1991 and in June led to successive proclamations of independence by the Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. Together with the Yugoslav Federal Army, Serb and Montenegrin elements, more or

less controlled by Belgrade, reacted with force against those republics, first in the hope of bringing them back into the federal system and then, realising the inevitability of their separation, of constituting a new Yugoslav federation which would in fact merely be a greater Serbia grouping present-day Serbia (with the two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo) and Montenegro. It laid claim to the territories of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina where the population includes large groups of Serbs. A series of armed conflicts ensued involving not only the federal armed forces and those of the Republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina but also local militias with the support of one side or another without being really under their control.

6. It should be noted that Serbia and Croatia have contradictory ambitions. Quoting the right of the Serbs to be grouped in a Serb state, Serbia is claiming parts of the Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina but is refusing the right to self-determination of Hungarians in Vojvodina and Albanians in Kosovo. Croatia is refusing to allow Serbia what it is claiming in Bosnia-Herzegovina, i.e. the regrouping of the Croat populations in that republic round Croatia. This is leading Serbs and Croats to associate with each other in their struggle against the authority of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while they are fighting each other in Dalmatia, Krajina and Slavonia.

7. In Slovenia, where there were few alien elements, the situation became stabilised fairly quickly and its constitution as an independent republic within its present frontiers seems established.

8. Nor does the existence of a Croatian Republic seem in question, but the Croats are involved in the war in two ways: a large part of the territory of the Croatian Republic is effectively occupied by Serb armed forces following murderous, destructive military operations, and a large part of the Croatian population has been brutally driven out. While a United Nations buffer force moved in after fighting ended in the northern regions of the republic, this is not so in the southern part of Dalmatia, particularly round Dubrovnik, which is still under siege and being shelled by Serb forces. Furthermore, Croatian forces have intervened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where almost a quarter of the population are Croats. They control part of the territory of that republic and are pursuing a policy of expelling Serbs and Muslims and regrouping Croats similar to the policy the Serbs are pursuing in other regions of Bosnia and in the parts of the Croatian Republic that they occupy.

9. The war is now at its worst in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most of the territory of that republic, where Serbs, Croats

and Muslims each represent a significant proportion of the population¹, although none of those national groups is in the majority, is occupied by Serb or Croat forces. The government seems quite powerless and the Muslim element is finding it very difficult to remain in place, either in besieged and constantly shelled towns or in the country where ethnic grouping is brought about at the cost of massacres, destruction, internments in concentration camps where living conditions are lamentable and the deportation of populations. It should be underlined that prevailing uncertainty about the outcome of the conflict is leading each side to erase from the territories it occupies all trace of the presence of other peoples, not only by eliminating them physically but also by the systematic destruction of historic monuments, religious edifices and memories of the past, thus making the conflict particularly barbarous and irreparable. It is becoming increasingly clear that, although, on the ground, Croats and Muslims are collaborating in opposition to a military take-over of this republic by the Serbs, the Serbian and Croatian Governments have agreed on a sharing of Bosnia-Herzegovina which leave only a small place for the Muslims, in spite of the fact they are the largest ethnic group in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10. So far, the war has spared the Republic of Macedonia, but its independence has still not been recognised by the international community, with the exception of seven states (Bulgaria, Turkey, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lithuania, the Philippines and Russia). Because Greece is opposed to recognising a state bearing the name of Macedonia that might one day take advantage of this to claim territories that are part of Greece, the Twelve, at a meeting of the European Council in Lisbon on 27th June 1992, refused to recognise the Republic of Macedonia, unlike their attitude towards the other republics stemming from former Yugoslavia. The Greek Government now seems prepared to be more flexible on this point, but it is encountering a strong reaction from the opposition parties.

11. The two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina also pose a problem. They are part of the Serbian Republic but the majority of the population of Kosovo is Albanian and Muslim. It constantly demonstrated its opposition to Serbian domination in

1. Your Rapporteur has to note that all sources, whether or not official, from 1850 onwards that refer to nationalities and, a fortiori, give figures and percentages in respect of them are divergent and subject to caution. They emanate, directly or indirectly, from sources more inclined to defend national views than to respect sociological realities which, in spite of efforts at conceptualisation and objectivity by western experts, are difficult to translate into definite data. In this connection, he will therefore confine himself to prudent, but vague, appraisals.

the former Yugoslav state and there is every reason to fear that it would find it even more difficult to accept more overwhelming domination in the new Yugoslav Federation and that the war may overflow into it. This might also be the case of the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, a small territory in the Republic of Serbia, on the frontier with Montenegro, where the majority of the population is Muslim. Some of them have already fled the region to take refuge in Bosnia-Herzegovina where they have suffered particularly badly from the measures taken by the Serbs or Croats against Muslims. In Vojvodina, a large Hungarian minority and the Croat minority also fear a strengthening of Serb domination, particularly as they are under strong pressure, or are even being coerced, by the Serbian army and police who are urging them to leave the province to make way for the Serbs chased out of Croatia and to take refuge in Hungary or Croatia.

12. We are thus witnessing a vast operation, mainly by the Serbs, but also by the Croats, to precede any settlement of the conflict by regrouping, by force and in particularly brutal, inhuman conditions, each of the Yugoslav ethnic groups in a national territory that does not correspond to that of the republics in their present form but which foreshadows a new political carving up of what used to be Yugoslavia.

III. Europe and Yugoslav problems

13. The problems raised by the state of war that has existed since June 1992 on the territory of former Yugoslavia have, ever since, been prominent among the concerns of Europeans in general and the work of WEU in particular. Admittedly, there was no defence commitment associating members of WEU with the former Yugoslav Federation, nor has one been entered into in respect of its component republics. However, Europe could not remain indifferent to events on that territory because:

14. (i) The war has reached a scale and degree of cruelty, particularly vis-à-vis the civilian populations, that have profoundly moved public opinion throughout Europe. The shelling and destruction of towns in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the proliferation of summary executions and the discovery, in August and October 1992, of concentration camps and mass graves have been all the more disturbing since the international agreements subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE had convinced the public that the European continent was now secure from such practices.

15. (ii) Confrontations over the southern Slavs were at the origin of the first world war; they suffered particularly badly from the second world war and energetically and effectively resisted Soviet threats during the cold war.

16. (iii) Neighbouring countries of former Yugoslavia are threatened by a spread of the conflict: the influx of refugees, particularly in Hungary and Austria, the possible calling in question of Macedonia's frontiers and the sensitivity of a section of the Russian public to the fate of the Serbs mean that Europe's peace is at risk. It should be added that quite a strong feeling of solidarity with the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and the sanjak is becoming increasingly apparent among Arabs, Turks and Iranians, who are reproaching the West for being far less firm in defending the elementary rights of the Yugoslav Muslims than in defending Kuwait's interests in 1990 and 1991. Finally, Greece feels threatened by an independent Macedonia, where Bulgaria seems to be making claims, and Turkey seems tempted to set itself up as the protector of Albanians and Muslims in Bosnia.

17. (iv) The presence of many workers from the former Yugoslav territory in Western European countries alerted public opinion to the fate of the populations of the region. Requests for asylum from Yugoslavs, victims of the fighting, are increasingly numerous and the attitude of western governments has been extremely reserved. Only Germany has accepted them in significant numbers but part of the German public is now reacting strongly against the inflow of immigrants.

18. For these various reasons, many see the pursuit of the war as a demonstration of failure on the part of Europe, in all its forms, and in particular the European Community, not because the latter had special responsibilities towards the countries concerned, but because it seemed to be the strongest European organisation around which Europe would unite. From this point of view, just as the Maastricht agreements were being concluded, the Yugoslav affair revealed the limits of the influence that the Community could effectively exercise outside its frontiers. Those opposed to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty have taken this as an argument in favour of their cause, while those in favour of it pointed out that the strengthening of political and military co-operation provided for in the treaty is specifically designed to increase that influence.

19. In order to assess the decisions taken by governments in the framework of WEU, a careful examination should therefore be made of what Europe is at one and the same time entitled and able to do in terms of effective action to restore peace in what used to be Yugoslavia, to promote humanisation of the methods used in the war and to help people who are victims of the conflict or who are threatened by its extension, without thereby endangering international peace or affecting the cohesion of the Twelve.

20. In summer 1991, it became clear that the Yugoslav Federation was no longer able to keep order within its frontiers by acceptable means, thus justifying the decision taken by the Twelve and then the United Nations to recognise, in December 1991, the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia as independent states followed, in April 1992, by Bosnia-Herzegovina. Only Greece's opposition is still preventing the Twelve recognising Macedonia. However, such recognition raises a number of problems since it implies, in accordance with a principle affirmed several times when the Warsaw Pact was dissolved and the Soviet Union broke up, keeping those republics within their present frontiers and respecting the rights of minorities. However, while those frontiers were more or less generally accepted within a federation, they are being contested by some of the newly-independent republics. The Hungarian minority in Vojvodina and the Albanian majority in Kosovo are in a far more difficult situation inside the new Yugoslav Federation where the Serb element is much more dominant than in former Yugoslavia. But the Serb populations of certain Croatian regions, where they form compact groups, and of a large proportion of Bosnia-Herzegovina fear that they may become minorities in new states where national sentiments are strong and they may be threatened. Their revolt is thus not at all surprising, nor is the fact that Serbia is giving them armed support. This has led some people, including President Mitterrand, to wonder whether, in 1991, the Twelve should not have accompanied their recognition of the independence of the republics by more precise conditions than those accompanying recognition of the successor states of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, particularly in respect of the rights of minorities or even the rectification of the internal frontiers of the former federation.

21. This situation now belongs to the past and the Twelve's action can be developed only within relatively narrow margins. In present circumstances, there can indeed be no question of Western Europe taking unilateral, massive military action in order to impose its own kind of peace, however tragic the fate of the people concerned may be. First, such an intervention would have to be decided upon by an international authority empowered to do so, i.e. the United Nations. Second, it would have to take as a basis extremely precise objectives accepted by all parties, otherwise its action would appear to be unilateral to the advantage of some of them. Although the armed forces of the Yugoslav state, in its successive forms, and now of Serbia and the Serb militias in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the support of the Serb army, seem to bear particularly heavy responsibility for the innumerable attacks on the most elementary human rights, starting with

their physical integrity, they do not have a monopoly. Although the uncompromising attitude of the authorities of the Republic of Serbia was the main cause of the armed conflict and did much to aggravate it, it does not bear sole responsibility. While most of the collective massacres so far known may be attributed to Serb groups, and while the Serbian Government bears very heavy responsibility in the implementation of a policy of ethnic cleansing using the most barbarious methods, it would appear that a series of attacks on United Nations forces protecting the delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo are attributable to Bosnian groups, whether or not controlled by the authorities of that republic. The aim of the perpetrators of those attacks would seem to be to make the United Nations or, in any event, the western countries, take military action going far beyond the protection of humanitarian assistance and, eventually, to make them become involved in a conflict in which they do not wish to participate.

22. In short, twelve-power Europe cannot confine itself to supporting the causes of the Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and perhaps tomorrow Macedonia or Kosovo. Nor can it impose its own political solution on the populations of Yugoslavia. It can but bring pressure to bear on the belligerents to encourage them to negotiate a settlement and perhaps then help them to facilitate the implementation of any conventions agreed to by the various parties. As long as the confrontations last, its direct action can but be confined to the implementation of measures decided by the United Nations, particularly in Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 (and this is the framework within which air and naval operations designed to monitor respect for the embargo on trade with Yugoslavia should be set), sending humanitarian assistance to the civilian population, under the protection of armed forces, and the participation of certain countries in the United Nations force monitoring respect for the ceasefire, wherever it is applied.

23. Hence separate initiatives by Europe must be distinguished, as these have different aims:

24. (a) Assistance to refugees, going so far as to receiving some of them on the national territory of some Community countries, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany.

25. (b) Sending humanitarian relief to civilian populations, mainly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the fighting is now the most cruel for civilians and most of the people torn from their homes are concentrated. Aid is of many kinds and is distributed by very diverse organisations, but it has to be protected by United Nations forces, particularly at Sarajevo airport. Its delivery is still not assured and it is not reaching many regions of Bosnia-Herze-

govina. The attack on an Italian aircraft carrying humanitarian aid to Sarajevo on 3rd September, followed by another serious attack on a land convoy protected by a French unit on 8th September, shows that even this form of assistance involves serious dangers. The air lift to Sarajevo, suspended after the incident on 3rd September, was resumed early in October, but it is still threatened and its suspension increased the shortages from which the people of Sarajevo are suffering at the approach of a winter during which their survival seems threatened.

26. (c) Measures to detect, denounce, prevent or punish infringements of the law of war and human rights: massacres, torture and ill-treatment, detention in inhumane conditions, deportation of persons, etc. The international press played a considerable rôle in revealing and denouncing such practices. The International Committee of the Red Cross has endeavoured to play its due rôle in this area. However, only at the end of September did the international community receive news of the massacre of 3 000 Muslims interned in the part of Bosnia controlled by the Serbs. The fact that, to date, all direct armed action has been ruled out lends little credence to the would-be deterrent declarations of the western allies.

27. (d) Action to terminate war operations or to limit death and devastation. For instance, the United Nations force can exercise meaningful control over the use of force in a part of Croatia occupied by Serb forces. However, this is not enough to allow Croatian refugees to return home and United Nations forces have had to use force to hold them back so that they will not be massacred by the Serbs. One of the aims pursued by the Twelve in this area is to group and neutralise heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The aim of the embargo decided by the United Nations is to induce Serbia and Montenegro to put an end to their armed intervention on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was also the aim they set themselves in deciding to exclude (new) Yugoslavia.

28. (e) An attempt to induce the parties to the conflict to negotiate a global political settlement to Yugoslav problems. This is the rôle of the conference on restoring peace, a meeting of which was organised by the Twelve in 1991 under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington. The ill-will shown by the parties concerned was a decisive factor in the resignation of Lord Carrington and in holding the London Conference on former Yugoslavia in London on 28th August 1992, under the aegis of both the United Nations and the European Community. The following countries took part in this conference: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania,

Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Serbia and Montenegro sent a joint delegation on behalf of the (new) "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", the governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia were represented there as were the non-recognised entities known as the "Serb Republic of Krajina", the "Republic of Kosovo", the "National Council of Sandjak Muslims" and the "Democratic Union of Hungarians of Vojvodina". The London Conference adopted a declaration of principles to govern a negotiated settlement. These principles are as follows:

1. effective application of a cease-fire;
2. non-recognition of any advantages gained by force;
3. the opening of negotiations between all parties concerned;
4. respect for human rights;
5. constitutional guarantees of human rights and the rights of minorities and application of the right to self-determination;
6. condemnation of forcible expulsions, illegal detentions and attempts to change the ethnic composition of populations, the closure of detention camps and the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons;
7. compliance with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the personal responsibility of those who breach them;
8. respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and frontiers of all states in the region;
9. a final settlement of all questions of succession to the former Yugoslav state to be reached by consensus or by arbitration and the commitment of all parties to recognise each other mutually and to share the duties and responsibilities of successor states;
10. full compliance with all United Nations resolutions;
11. the obligation for all to allow humanitarian assistance to be distributed;
12. the obligation on all parties to co-operate in international monitoring, peace-keeping and arms control operations;
13. the need to provide international guarantees to ensure the full implementation of all agreements reached within the framework of the international conference.

29. One may wonder to what extent the various Yugoslav parties feel committed by their endorsement of these principles. In particular, Serbia now seems to be divided into two camps. One, round the government of the Republic of Serbia, which will consider a return to peace only on the basis of a strong position allowing all Serb-populated territories to be regrouped in a single political entity and maintaining Serb domination over Kosovo. The other, round the authorities of the new Yugoslav Federation, supported by the government of Montenegro and a large section of the Serb population, which is prepared to negotiate on the basis of the principles laid down at the London Conference. Consequently, on his return from London, the Prime Minister of the present Yugoslav Federation, Mr. Milan Panic, was accused by part of the Serb opposition of selling off Serbia's vital interests.

30. Hence it now appears that the possibilities of a return to reasonable peace depend on a show of force in Belgrade between the Serbian Government, probably supported by part of the army, Serbs from other republics and nationalist elements of Serb society, and the government of New Yugoslavia, supported by the government of Montenegro and a large, but impossible to calculate, part of the population of Serbia. In particular, the Federal Government says that it is prepared to renounce all ethnic cleansing and revert to peace on the basis of frontiers between republics which could be changed only by agreement between all the parties and also to give some degree of autonomy to Kosovo. This policy, which would also tend to give the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina federal status, is contrary to that of the Republic of Serbia, which is seeking agreement with the Republic of Croatia to share Bosnia-Herzegovina, leaving only a small portion for the Muslim Bosnians. The aim of the economic blockade measures taken under the aegis of the United Nations would then be to increase the lassitude now becoming apparent in Serbia about continuing the war and to facilitate the victory of the government of New Yugoslavia over that of Serbia. However, there is a contradiction between this attempt and the refusal to recognise New Yugoslavia and consider the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro as being the only responsible authorities.

31. As long as the parties to the conflict have not subscribed to the principles of a political agreement on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on that of the regions of the Croatian Republic occupied by the Serbs and on the status of Kosovo, it is highly unlikely that the measures intended to contain the conflict, limit its intensity and ensure respect for human rights will be really effective. In these circumstances, Europe can do little more on the ground than

afford humanitarian aid and protect its delivery. At diplomatic level, it can but continue the task of drawing the parties together that it started over a year ago, with little success.

32. Apart from the declaration of principles, the London Conference adopted eight other documents concerning its programme of work, the conditions for a return to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the application of sanctions, humanitarian issues, confidence, security and arms control, as well as a formal notice addressed by the co-Chairmen to Serbia and Montenegro and "specific decisions" containing a long series of concrete measures with a view to implementing the principles laid down. Finally, the conference decided to organise permanent negotiations between participating parties under the co-Chairmanship of Mr. Cyrus Vance for the United Nations and Lord Owen for the European Community. They were started in Geneva on 7th September. It therefore appears that, far from concluding international action to promote the restoration of peace, the conference establishes a permanent system of interaction by the international community and the parties to the conflict which probably corresponds better to the complexity of the situation. But its effects are still subject to the will of all parties to reach an agreement and this will is as yet still far from clearly confirmed. To date, it has been possible to see only the start of implementation of the London agreements on the part of the Federal and Bosnian Governments, which have started to regroup the heavy weapons deployed round Sarajevo. Furthermore, the Serbs have evacuated some of the territories they occupied in the Croatian Republic, south of Dubrovnik, and the motorway from Zagreb to Belgrade has been reopened under United Nations control. However, these measures are not yet of real significance.

33. At a meeting held at Brocket Hall near London on 12th September, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Twelve drew up a programme designed to obtain a de-escalation of the conflict. This process, whose effects would be felt only progressively, would consist of:

- (i) a stiffening of the international blockade on Serbia and Montenegro, mainly in order to strengthen the conciliatory tendency represented by the leaders of the new "Yugoslav Federation" as compared with the uncompromising attitude of those grouped round Mr. Milosevic, President of Serbia;
- (ii) support for an American proposal to create an air exclusion zone in part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, without involving western intervention by air;

- (iii) the setting up of a court of justice to try those responsible for war crimes;
- (iv) action to ensure that the Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian Governments regroup their heavy weapons under United Nations control;
- (v) the closure of detention camps and the return home of any refugees who so wish;
- (vi) confidence-building measures, including the deployment of United Nations forces along Bosnia's frontiers and in certain towns, and air cover of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

These various measures are the subject of negotiations in Geneva with the parties to the conflict and were proposed to the Security Council which, on 14th September, adopted Resolution 776 authorising the enlargement of the mandate and an increase in United Nations troops to protect humanitarian convoys on condition this was at no cost to the United Nations.

34. At the time of writing, the implementation of all the points in this programme has been started, but new difficulties are being encountered which show how little control the various Yugoslav leaders have over their own forces. For instance, in spite of orders from the leaders of the Serb community in Bosnia, Serb pilots stationed in Banja Luka have refused to evacuate their base, planned exchanges of prisoners have had to be postponed, evacuation of the Dubrovnik region by the "Yugoslav" army has led to resumed fighting between Serbs and Croats and various incidents have led to the interruption of overland humanitarian convoys to Sarajevo.

IV. WEU in the Yugoslav crisis

35. WEU's action in Yugoslav affairs has been marked by the concern of member governments to confine the organisation to the rôle attributed to it at the Maastricht Conference, i.e. to be the armed branch of the future European Union. The course to be followed by the Twelve was examined in the framework of foreign policy and joint security, including recognition of the independence of the republics stemming from former Yugoslavia. They have therefore not shown much enthusiasm about denouncing those members of the European Community who were not very eager to apply joint decisions, particularly in regard to the blockade of Serbia and Montenegro. It was also in that framework that decisions concerning the possible use of force were taken. In September 1991 and again in August 1992, WEU, for its part, was made responsible for studying the possible military options implied by recourse to force in precise

circumstances and, if appropriate, how to implement them.

36. The Twelve have also been most concerned not to take any initiatives outside the framework of decisions adopted by the international community, either in the CSCE or in the United Nations. Thus, the WEU Council met twice at ministerial level during the summer: at the close of the CSCE meeting in Helsinki on 10th July and at the close of the London Conference on peace in former Yugoslavia on 28th August 1992.

37. On 10th July, the WEU Council decided to co-ordinate member countries' naval operations to ensure respect for the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro reinforced by the Security Council on 30th May (Resolution 757). These operations were confined to monitoring navigation in the Adriatic and provided for no recourse to force. They are co-ordinated with similar measures taken by NATO. A delegation from our Assembly's Defence Committee visited the area at the end of August where it was able to see the perfect organisation of the allied arrangements and the excellent way in which they were working. But they are still of very limited effectiveness due to the fact that WEU and NATO flotillas, despite the air cover deployed, were not allowed to stop and search suspicious vessels. The embargo was not total and concerned only certain goods, in particular weapons. There were no similar controls along the land frontiers of Serbia and Montenegro. The very fact that the fighting is continuing indicates that the armed forces of the various parties, whose autonomy of action was estimated in June 1991 at a fortnight, have had and continue to receive supplies of arms, munitions, equipment and various materials from abroad. Information so far obtained by your Rapporteur is not reliable enough for him to be able to establish their origin. However, shortcomings stemming from Security Council decisions cannot be attributed to a failure on the part of WEU in carrying out its mission.

38. The meeting of the WEU Council on 28th August at the close of the London Conference was held in response to a convocation by the Italian presidency, itself urged to do so by the President of the Assembly to whom the chairmen of two political groups had written calling for a strong reaction by the WEU Assembly following the discovery of concentration camps in the part of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the control of Serbia. It was indeed logical for the WEU member countries to meet to examine what armed forces they were prepared to make available for an international action and in what conditions to help to implement decisions taken at the London Conference.

39. When he spoke to the Standing Committee of the WEU Assembly on 3rd September

1992, Mr. Andò, Italian Minister of Defence, provided the following list of forces:

- Belgium: 100 men and 24 tanks;
- France: 1 100 men from all services, including tanks and helicopters;
- Germany: medical and logistic support (1 000 tons of equipment);
- Italy: 1 300 men from all services, helicopters and a medical unit;
- Luxembourg: a financial contribution;
- Netherlands: 60 lorries, 500 tons of equipment and 200 men;
- Portugal: medical personnel and means of transport²;
- Spain: an armoured unit of 300 to 400 men;
- United Kingdom: 1 800 men from all services, including an armoured battalion.

40. It should be noted, however, that these forces are supposed to intervene only to protect humanitarian convoys and thus only in the event of such convoys effectively being organised. They afford means of escorting convoys but not the possibility of permanently occupying the regions these convoys would have to cross, particularly between the Dalmatian coast and Sarajevo.

41. It should also be pointed out that these are national means which are not a priori meant to form a real WEU force. Since the member countries of NATO, for their part, said on 1st September that they would make available 6 000 men for such missions, it might seem legitimate to add these 6 000 men to the 5 000 envisaged by the WEU Council. In fact, as these were national decisions and not decisions to make troops available to each of the two organisations, it would appear that the two contingents cannot be added together: the same troops were taken into account at both meetings, at least by the WEU countries. Finally, some governments are not empowered to decide alone to send national forces in such cases and their engagement is then subject to a vote in their parliaments. For all these reasons, the impact of the decisions taken by both WEU and NATO is fairly limited. Although, in Resolution 756 of 14th September, the Security Council authorised the deployment of these 6 000 additional men, some countries are insisting on a delay of several months before they carry out their commitment.

42. The WEU Council also offered to take part in verifying procedure aimed to neutralise heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The

2. A Portuguese member of the committee said his country had decided to make a larger contribution to this operation, but your Rapporteur has not been able to obtain precise information on this point from the Portuguese authorities.

parties to the London Conference certainly subscribed to this neutralisation process and even undertook to carry it out within a very short lapse of time (96 hours). This time-limit was not respected, but a start has been made with regrouping round Sarajevo under United Nations control. This has been only partly successful. In these circumstances, WEU does not yet have a rôle to play. This situation may well continue since it is hard to see the warring Yugoslav parties laying down their heavy weapons as long as the process designed to guarantee peace has not been started more seriously.

43. Finally, answering concerns expressed by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of the Assembly's Defence Committee, at the close of his visit to the Adriatic, the Council decided to urge the United Nations to transform into a real blockade the embargo measures taken against Serbia and Montenegro. This means WEU is prepared to adopt more coercive measures to enforce a blockade, but on condition the United Nations takes the decision.

44. Hence the decisions of the WEU Council cannot be considered as effective military measures but simply as gestures designed to encourage the United Nations to be firmer and more active in its action to promote the restoration of peace and induce the parties to the conflict to co-operate more effectively in that restoration.

45. Was this a weakness on the part of the WEU Council? Can it be thought that a greater degree of organisation of military co-operation in Europe would allow more important initiatives to be taken? In your Rapporteur's opinion, this is not at all the case. Apart from a few points of detail, all the western governments are equally anxious to limit their military commitment on the territory of former Yugoslavia and not to become involved in a conflict that they do not feel they have the means to control. This was the position they adopted in September 1991 when they made their choice among the options they had worked out by the group set up by the WEU Council in Metz and that they have constantly maintained since then. They can do no less because of public reactions and also because they do not wish to give the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe the impression that they would allow just anything to be done. They cannot do much more without running the risk of becoming embroiled in a cruel conflict to which they cannot impose a solution.

46. Consideration was given to air operations to reinforce action to promote peace. These might be of three kinds:

- air cover for humanitarian convoys;

- a ban on overflights of Bosnia-Herzegovina by aircraft of the warring republics;
- selective bombing of military targets, in particular any heavy weapons detected.

At first sight, these have the advantage of not exposing forces engaged in such operations to unduly heavy losses. It may be hoped that the two first options at least would not affect civilians. However, the first applies solely to humanitarian measures and does not claim to obtain political results. The second was effectively adopted by the Security Council on 10th October 1992 (Resolution 781) but with no associated coercive or retaliatory measures. Such interventions, like air raids, seem hardly compatible with the pursuit of humanitarian measures since convoys and their military escorts would become possible hostages and marked targets for possible retaliation by parties victims of air operations. Hence it is understandable that the governments are hesitating to embark upon ventures which might well lead to a worsening and extension of hostilities.

47. However, it may be wondered whether, in this matter, they were not wrong to suggest that they were prepared to take more decisive action than they actually decided upon, thus encouraging some of those concerned to accelerate their use of force to occupy territorial positions before being compelled to negotiate and others to call for independence that they did not have the means to ensure, thereby giving many people the impression that the atrocities in former Yugoslavia mean a serious setback for European Union and WEU, just when the parliaments, or even the people, of several countries that signed the Maastricht Treaty are required to vote on the ratification of the treaty.

48. It is also thought that Western Europe's relative abstention in Yugoslav affairs might encourage other peoples of Central and Eastern Europe to resort to force in order to try to settle, to their own advantage, national problems that have arisen since Soviet power stopped imposing its order in the region. Allowing conflicts to continue and deteriorate may tempt certain neighbouring countries to intervene to protect their nationals or to obtain bargaining chips to back up their interests when peace is restored. Allowing a policy such as ethnic cleansing to be pursued may encourage other countries to use such methods against their own minorities. However, systematic European support for national claims, however legitimate they may be, would probably increase the risk of destabilising a large number of southern and eastern European countries and also endanger the application of principles embodied in the 1991 Charter of Paris. However this may be, the Twelve might ask for far stricter application of sanctions decided by the Security Council and it

is hard to see why some countries, suspected of not applying the embargo, might, with no further explanation, be allowed to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty.

49. It is probably not by trying to arbitrate the affairs of the whole European continent that the union of the Twelve will be able to safeguard peace there; it is more likely to succeed through its economic influence and the hope it offers to the peoples of the rest of Europe of acceding, within a reasonable lapse of time, to a Europe of prosperity and progress. The manner in which Czechs and Slovaks have started to handle and settle the matters that divided them is certainly due in part to Czechoslovakia's association with the Community and the Twelve's undertaking that it may join as soon as it is capable of shouldering the commitments this involves.

50. It would appear, however, that WEU might, in the immediate future, act more positively to promote peace in the region. In December 1991, the Assembly recommended, in Recommendation 511, that the Council deploy small numbers of forces on the territory of any of Yugoslavia's neighbouring countries which might so request to provide a guarantee against any violation of their frontiers. This deployment might also help to ensure application to roads and waterways of the embargo measures, or even blockade, decided by the United Nations against the belligerents. In its reply, the Council said a United Nations mandate would be required for this purpose, which does not seem evident. But the possibility of a military presence in Romania to see that the embargo is respected on land and waterways was considered by the WEU Council at its meeting in London on 28th August and it is to be hoped that it will follow this up, although, in its reply to Recommendation 525, it denies having received any calls from the countries concerned in this respect.

V. Conclusions

51. Recommendation 525, adopted by the Standing Committee of the Assembly at an urgent meeting held on 3rd September 1992,

sets out exactly what the Assembly believes it can expect of the Council at the present juncture. It can already be noted that several of the points set out in Recommendation 525 have been taken up in the Council's requests to the United Nations, including strengthening the blockade and creating an air exclusion zone. In the meantime, Lord Owen's address to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 3rd October has allowed a better idea to be obtained of the type of action taken by the international conference on peace in former Yugoslavia of which he is co-Chairman.

52. Lord Owen described the principles this conference intended to take as a basis. First, there must be a return to the frontiers between republics except in the case of changes obtained by agreement between the parties, i.e. the return home of refugees and cohabitation of persons of different nationalities in states stemming from former Yugoslavia, which means totally abandoning the policy of ethnic cleansing pursued mainly by the Serbs and also the maintenance of Kosovo in the Republic of Serbia. Second, the search for illusory cease-fires must be abandoned in favour of a progressive end to hostilities, helped by the extension of areas controlled by UNPROFOR throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and the disarmament of armed forces fighting on the territory of that republic. Finally, Lord Owen proposed that the Council of Europe take the initiative of setting up a body to monitor respect for human rights, separate from the jurisdiction created by the United Nations to punish those guilty of violating human rights and intended above all to inform the international community of the crimes thus committed.

53. It now seems that internal developments in the new Yugoslav Federation offer a possibility of action by the international community to promote the progressive restoration of peace that did not exist at the beginning of October. The limited intervention by WEU can but form part of a much vaster undertaking that now seems to have some chance of succeeding. It is in the light of this still very fragile hope that an assessment should be made of what has been done to date.

***First part of the thirty-eighth annual report
of the Council to the Assembly***

(1st January to 30th July 1992)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. Introduction
- II. Situation in Yugoslavia
- III. Contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
- IV. Activities of the Council
- V. Activities of the Special Working Group (SWG) in separate sessions and in joint sessions with the Defence Representatives Group (DRG)
- VI. Activities of the Defence Representatives Group
- VII. Activities of the Mediterranean Sub-Group
- VIII. Activities of the ad hoc Group on Space
- IX. Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA)
- X. Activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studies
- XI. Administrative questions
- XII. Activities of the Public Administration Committee (PAC)

ANNEXES

- 1. Petersberg Declaration (This text has been published in Document 1322)
- 2. Declaration on the Yugoslav crisis (This text has been published in Document 1322)
- 3. Declaration on Nagorny-Karabakh (This text has been published in Document 1322)
- 4. Declaration published after the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with the states of Central Europe (This text has been published in Document 1322)

I. Introduction

As far as the activities of the WEU ministerial organs are concerned, the first half of 1992 saw the start of implementation of the declarations adopted in the margins of the Maastricht summit. These texts represent a major step in the definition of the rôle and place of WEU in the new European security architecture. The dual mission now incumbent on WEU has been clearly set in the context of building a European Union and strengthening the European pillar of the alliance.

The Permanent Council has organised its discussions and work around three main topics.

Firstly, WEU's contribution to stability and co-operation in Europe, including arms control and disarmament. In this context, the proliferating conflict in the former Yugoslavia

and the initiatives to contain and end it have been uppermost in the Council's mind. The strengthening of WEU's operational rôle was the second major topic on the Council's agenda. Thirdly, the Council has set about the task of clarifying the commitments of the states applying for accession and the respective rights and responsibilities of future observer or associate states in consequence of the WEU declaration issued by Ministers on 10th December 1991 in Maastricht.

The fruit of this work is clearly set out in the three parts of the Petersberg Declaration – a stage in the reinforcement of co-operation between the Nine. The guidelines it contains are paving the way for the implementation of the WEU declarations adopted at Maastricht.

This declaration will determine the way in which WEU's relations with the European Union and the alliance will develop following

the strengthening of the organisation's operational rôle and its enlargement. It will require practical measures to which the Council has been giving detailed thought. New relations will gradually develop, based on mutual transparency and complementarity.

WEU's démarche will therefore continue to be marked by a three-fold requirement: firstly, conformity with the United Nations Charter and Security Council resolutions; secondly, compatibility with the operating procedures of the Atlantic Alliance; and thirdly, strengthening of the CSCE whilst continuing to contribute to the arms control and disarmament negotiations. Success of this démarche requires enhanced cohesion on the part of WEU member states, which the Council and presidency have made a major objective of their work during this half of the year. That objective has been achieved since, under the German presidency, WEU enhanced its standing in the new configuration of institutions responsible for European security.

II. Situation in Yugoslavia

In January, the Permanent Council was briefed by the Portuguese Ambassador, on behalf of the presidency of the Twelve, on the decision to recognise the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia, Lord Carrington's mediation efforts and preparations for the deployment of a United Nations force, partly based on studies conducted within WEU. In general, throughout the first quarter the Permanent Council was kept informed of developments in the situation on the ground and the many diplomatic initiatives aimed at securing compliance with cease-fires. The constitutional problems facing Bosnia-Herzegovina and its recognition by the European Community were also extensively debated, as was the mediation by the Twelve between Greece and Macedonia.

With the marked deterioration in the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in May, at every meeting the Council debated the advisability of a possible concrete contribution by the organisation towards stabilising the conflict. The Council had to admit that none of the political conditions that might justify WEU action were met. The adoption by the United Nations Security Council of its Resolution 757 on 30th May, duly noting the failure to comply with the provisions of Resolution 752 and deciding upon various embargo measures, led to consultation within the Permanent Council on the ways in which WEU could contribute towards monitoring the implementation of the embargo at sea.

The enlarged Council of 10th June had been asked to consider the prospects for

European co-operation on the reopening of Sarajevo airport in order to facilitate the movement of humanitarian aid. This question, as well as the possible contribution by WEU to the monitoring of the maritime embargo, were on the agenda for the Ministerial Council on 19th June. In addition to adopting a declaration on Yugoslavia, which is attached to this report, ministers decided to convene an ad hoc group consisting of representatives of the foreign and defence ministries to consider the resources that member states could deploy in order to contribute towards the implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions. This group met on 26th June.

III. Contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe

From 21st to 24th January 1992, the German presidency and the Secretary-General visited the three Baltic states on a fact-finding mission. This was an opportunity for detailed discussions on their security concerns with both foreign affairs and defence ministers and with many senior officials in these new republics.

On 11th-12th May, the third seminar on Central Europe was held in Budapest under the auspices of the WEU Institute for Security Studies.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Ministerial Council on 18th November 1991, the foreign and defence ministries of the eight Central European countries were invited to an extraordinary meeting with their counterparts in the WEU countries at the Petersberg in the afternoon of 19th June 1992.

During their discussions, the foreign and defence ministers adopted several practical measures:

- foreign and defence ministers will meet once a year. Additional meetings at ministerial level may be convened if circumstances require.
- A forum of consultation will be established between the WEU Permanent Council and the ambassadors of the countries concerned. It will meet at the seat of the WEU Council at least twice a year.
- These meetings will provide an opportunity to monitor the implementation of the measures adopted and, where appropriate, to make proposals for the inclusion of other fields of co-operation.
- Consultations at ministerial and WEU Permanent Council/Ambassador level

on security issues may be complemented by meetings with an ad hoc WEU "troika" at senior official level.

- The following initiatives will be continued and encouraged:

- (a) regular exchanges of documents and information;
- (b) growing co-operation between the WEU Institute for Security Studies and the corresponding bodies in the countries concerned. An increasing number of seminars and colloquia would be organised. The programme of scholarships will be continued.

Ministers recommended the development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the countries concerned.

In the declaration on Nagorny-Karabakh, issued after this extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with the States of Central Europe, ministers reiterated their appeal to the parties to the conflict to establish immediately an effective cease-fire and to take additional steps, including withdrawal from occupied areas.

IV. Council activities

With the exception of meetings relating to a specific subject in response to events, the Council agendas continued to include items on the results of working group meetings and on topical questions.

The Permanent Council devoted particular attention to monitoring the work of preparing draft decisions for submission to the Ministerial Council and also their implementation after adoption. The Council kept itself directly informed on the activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studies and on the establishment of the satellite centre in Torrejón. It placed special emphasis on the institutional dialogue with the Assembly and followed with particular interest the discussions in the first part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session. Lastly, the Council reached decisions as appropriate on administrative and budgetary matters, on the advice of the Budget and Organisation Committee.

1. Topical questions

(i) The Council was regularly briefed on developments in the situation in Yugoslavia (see section III of this report).

(ii) The Council also kept a watching brief on the main events within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Russian Federation.

(iii) The Council discussed the work of the CSCE. Following an agreement reached at the level of the Committee of Senior Officials, the Council was invited to send a representative as guest of honour at the meeting of the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers in Prague on 30th and 31st January 1992. The Council was also represented at the fourth CSCE follow-up meeting which opened in Helsinki on 24th March 1992.

(iv) Lastly, at its June meetings, the Council devoted a substantial portion of its time to considering the impact of the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty ratification process.

2. Activities of the intergovernmental organs

(i) Council working groups.

The Council took note of the results of working group meetings held in the period leading up to each Council meeting. The summaries of these negotiations were discussed as appropriate.

(ii) WEU Institute for Security Studies (ISS).

The Director of the Institute attended every Council meeting where the agenda justified his presence. The Institute's annual and quarterly reports to the Council provided an opportunity for an exchange of views on the ISS's current activities.

3. Relations between WEU and other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance

The Council, supported by the Council working group, had regular exchanges of views on the two aspects of this subject: WEU enlargement, and practical measures for co-operation between WEU, the European institutions and the Atlantic Alliance. For example, the Council discussed the draft of a declaration on enlargement which was approved by ministers at their meeting in Petersberg on 19th June. A report has been produced on the practical measures.

The enlarged Council meeting on 10th June 1992 drew up the text of the draft declaration by member states on enlargement and the draft protocol of accession and draft mandates for discussions. At this same Council meeting, the text of the report on the practical measures and its annex on concrete measures for co-operation between secretariats were also agreed with a view to their inclusion in the dossier for ministers.

V. Activities of the Special Working Group (SWG) in separate sessions and in joint sessions with the Defence Representatives Group (DRG)

1. Joint SWG and DRG sessions

The SWG held two joint meetings with the DRG in preparation for the Ministerial meeting on 19th June 1992.

2. SWG meetings

(i) The purpose of the meetings was to implement the Maastricht Declarations issued by WEU member states in the margins of the European summit.

The SWG prepared the Council's discussions and ministers' decisions on relations between WEU and the other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance. Consolidated documents on the respective rights and obligations of the future associate members and observers were drawn up in the course of various meetings.

At its meeting on 26th June, the SWG agreed, on the basis of the Petersberg Declaration, to entrust the Italian presidency with the task of pursuing the discussions and opening negotiations at a meeting of the enlarged Council in Rome with the candidate countries.

The SWG also debated relations with third countries, in the broad sense of the term, whether from EFTA or the CIS.

(ii) The SWG discussed the follow-up to be given to the CSCE Helsinki summit and both the implementation of the Open Skies and CFE Treaties and the continuation of the CFE 1a.

(iii) Lastly, the SWG proposed an increase in co-operation between WEU and the CSCE through the exchange of information and documents and through the presentation of contributions to the work of CSCE bodies.

VI. Activities of the Defence Representatives Group

(i) DRG meetings provided an opportunity to discuss in greater detail the missions that could be envisaged for WEU's operational capability and the resources needed for their implementation. The DRG discussed "military units answerable to WEU". It was briefed on the plan for the creation of a "European corps" on the joint initiative of Germany and France.

Delegations considered future relations between the Council, chiefs of defence staff and the DRG on the one hand and the planning cell on the other.

As to the evaluation of requirements for WEU co-ordination and planning structures, the DRG agreed on draft terms of reference and establishment table for a WEU planning cell, whose creation was decided by ministers on 19th June. The DRG expressed the wish that key personnel for the cell be in place in October.

The question of arms co-operation was also raised and proposals examined for the development of relations between WEU and the IEPG.

(ii) Experts on the verification of arms control agreements continued their work on practical procedures for CFE inspections. They considered the effects of the creation of the CIS on the verification of the CFE Treaty. Lastly, experts held several meetings on the problems of implementing the Open Skies Treaty.

VII. Activities of the Mediterranean Sub-Group

The Mediterranean Sub-Group held three meetings during the first half of 1992.

The group continued its work on defining principles likely to contribute to a resolution of security questions in the Mediterranean. An annotated list of seven principles was agreed.

The group produced a preliminary review of the development of the Five + Five process.

The group also completed its study on security in the Maghreb and discussed the implications of the situation in Algeria for the security of its neighbours and of Western Europe. On the basis of the report by the Secretary-General, the Ministerial Council of 19th June gave a mandate to the group for the step-by-step establishment of a dialogue with the countries of the Maghreb, with due regard for developments in the political situation in these countries and in the region.

Finally, the group exchanged information on conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Western Sahara, and on the Cyprus question.

VIII. Activities of the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space

In essence, the purpose of meetings of the ad hoc sub-group was to monitor the implementation of decisions reached by the Ministerial Council in Bonn on 18th November 1991 as regards:

- establishing the WEU satellite centre in Torrejón near Madrid, whose Director had been appointed for a three-year period from 1st January 1992;

- launching the work of the multinational team set up in Paris with the responsibility of the management of long-term studies on a European satellite observation system.

In these two essential fields of space co-operation within WEU, considerable progress has been achieved both by the ad hoc subgroup and by the many meetings of experts which addressed the more technical aspects of the problems. The Ministerial Council took due note in the part of the Petersberg Declaration relating to WEU and European security.

On 6th May 1992, a ceremony for the signing of the contract for the first phase of the satellite observation system feasibility study took place at the head office of Dornier GmbH in Friedrichshafen. The purpose of this study is to consider the mode of operation and the timetable for the creation of a complete system.

On 22nd April, the Council approved the WEU budgets for 1992 for the WEU satellite centre and studies on medium- and long-term space co-operation.

IX. Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA)

The Agency for the Control of Armaments continued its residual tasks as regards the limitation of atomic, biological and chemical weapons, at a level of activity corresponding to that obtaining at the time of the 1984 Rome Declaration and in accordance with the procedures approved up to that time.

In the first half of the thirty-seventh year of monitoring within WEU, the legal sources used to justify the control levels and procedures have remained unchanged. The number of agreed verifications in 1992 will be the same as for previous years (four in 1990 and in 1991). They will take place during the second half of the year.

X. Activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studies

1. Research staff

Dr Peter Schmidt, from the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, completed six months at the Institute, during which time he worked on Franco-German relations. Dr Mathias Jopp, from the Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, took up his post as a research fellow in April 1992.

2. Documents intended for the Council and its working groups

(i) The Institute prepared discussion papers on topical subjects for the Council and its

working groups: "CSCE and peace-keeping in Europe" and "the consequences of the Danish referendum result for European Union and Western European Union". It commissioned a paper on "Algeria: adversaries in search of uncertain compromises" from Professor Rémy Leveau. The report of a military fact-finding mission to Moscow, Minsk and Kiev by four West European researchers, which took place in February, was also sent to the Council.

(ii) The Institute forwarded reports to the Council on the seminars it had arranged, as well as quarterly reports for the period 1st October 1991 to March 1992.

3. Seminars

The Institute organised the following seminars during the first half of 1992:

- The implications of the "republicanisation" of defence and nuclear policy in the Soviet Union;
- Five challenges for European security: a seminar for heads of policy research institutes and senior representatives from foreign ministries;
- Europe and the future of conventional arms control: a seminar organised jointly with the Clingendael Institute in The Hague;
- Towards a new transatlantic partnership: two meetings with researchers of the Rand Corporation, one held in California and the second in Paris, to discuss outlines of papers for this joint project;
- Second meeting of the defence industries task force;
- A seminar to discuss the report, mentioned above, on a fact-finding mission to Moscow, Minsk and Kiev;
- Neutral EFTA countries on the doorstep of European Union;
- The third seminar for senior officials from WEU countries with colleagues from Central European countries.

In addition, the Institute hosted one in the series of meetings of major institutes of international affairs in Western Europe to discuss the preparation of a report on security issues in Eastern Europe.

4. Activities in conjunction with the Assembly

A paper on security and defence in Central and Eastern Europe was commissioned by the Institute as a contribution to the Assembly symposium on a new security order in

Europe, held in Berlin from 31st March – 2nd April.

The Director of the Institute addressed the Presidential Committee of the Assembly at its meeting in May.

5. *Institute Rencontres*

The third meeting in this series of occasional meetings of a study group of specialists on European security was held on 12th March, when the invited speaker was His Excellency Ambassador Carlos Miranda, Permanent Representative of Spain to NATO.

6. *Meeting for members of the Council*

On 1st June, the Institute invited members of the Council to a meeting to discuss topical questions of joint interest.

7. *Fellowships and study awards*

Institute fellowships, for scholars from WEU member countries, were awarded to be taken up in the second half of 1992. Study awards for researchers coming from Central and Eastern Europe to spend time at West European research institutes were made to scholars from Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria.

8. *Publications*

(i) *Book: Western Europe and the Gulf*

The Institute's first book-length study, *Western Europe and the Gulf*, was published in May. It was composed of chapters commissioned from both external and internal authors and was jointly edited by Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper.

(ii) *Quarterly newsletter*

The fourth and fifth issues were published in February and May respectively.

9. *Other activities*

The Director and research fellows took part in a number of conferences and seminars

organised by other institutes, and received visitors from a wide range of countries.

XI. Administrative questions

In paragraph D6 of the Declaration of WEU member states issued on 10th December 1991, it was stated that "to facilitate the reinforcement of WEU's rôle, the seat of the WEU Council and Secretariat will be transferred to Brussels".

Accordingly, the Secretariat, in close co-operation with the competent authorities in the future host country, embarked on a search for a building. The new requirements created by the proposals submitted to the Ministerial Council for the planning cell meant that the scope of this démarche was broadened in late June. As a result, the necessary arrangements were made so that the transfer could take place by January 1993, provided that all the physical prerequisites for housing the Council, Secretariat and planning cell under the same roof were satisfied.

XII. Activities of the Public Administration Committee (PAC)

The Public Administration Committee held the first of its biannual meetings in London on 27th April 1992, providing an opportunity to exchange views on the future of the PAC and the adaptation of its future activities to WEU's new rôle. At the end of the debate among the delegates, it was agreed to ask the Secretariat to draw up a summary document as a basis for future discussions on these questions by both the PAC and the Permanent Council. Delegates also had a free exchange of views on the administrative developments in member countries. The report on this meeting may be consulted at the Assembly Secretariat.

*Recommendations 516 to 525 and replies of the Council***RECOMMENDATION 516**¹*on a new security order in Europe*²

The Assembly,

- (i) Concerned about the revival of ethnic, territorial, nationalist and other conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe;
- (ii) Aware that the young and still fragile democracies in this region are all encountering serious economic crises resulting from the transformation of their societies and economies;
- (iii) Recalling the principles of the November 1990 Charter of Paris in which all signatories confirmed their intention to maintain freedom of expression for all and respect for the rights of minorities;
- (iv) Regretting the failure of CSCE attempts to solve conflicts, but noting the efforts being made at the Helsinki follow-up meeting to enhance the capability of the CSCE for conflict prevention, crisis management and the peaceful settlement of conflicts and suggesting that increased concentration should be directed to these approaches;
- (v) Welcoming the Treaty on European Union which should allow the member countries of the European Community to take a decisive step towards establishing a European Union meeting the requirements of an economic and monetary union and capable of developing a joint foreign and security policy, which might in time lead to common defence;
- (vi) Noting that the decisions taken at the Maastricht summit give the WEU Council the ability to take initiatives in external and joint security policy matters;
- (vii) Underlining that the common foreign and security policy, and the accompanying further definition of WEU's rôle and the development of a common European defence policy will in the future also help to prepare Europeans to assume their responsibilities and contribute to the management of international crises and contingencies in which military assets could be required;
- (viii) Recalling that the positive aspect of the two Gulf exercises in 1987-88 and 1990-91 has demonstrated that WEU can act as an effective European forum for establishing political concertation and practical co-operation among member countries in crisis situations in which their security interests are affected;
- (ix) Considering that Western Europe has a vital interest in present developments in Central and Eastern Europe insofar as the foundations are now being laid for parliamentary democracy and a market economy in nations which should eventually be able to join the European Union, in order to give greater assurances of peace and security for the whole of Europe;
- (x) Recalling Recommendation 500 on the consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security, adopted by the Assembly on 5th June 1991,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Starting this year, associate the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary and Poland with WEU;
2. Conclude a peace-keeping agreement with those countries and accordingly hold, at least twice a year, a meeting of the Council enlarged to include their ministers for foreign affairs and defence;
3. Also hold, at least once a year, consultations at ministerial level extended to the Baltic countries, Bulgaria and Romania;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st June 1992 during the first part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session (2nd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Caro on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1309).

4. Establish in WEU an automatic mechanism for mobilising politico-military consultation in order to react to serious crises in Central and Eastern Europe;
5. Endow WEU with the permanent structures it needs to reach joint decisions in consultation and co-operation with NATO and, where necessary, effectively to implement ad hoc contingency plans, tailored to possible theatres of operation, including those within Europe;
6. Take all preparatory measures needed to provide WEU peace-keeping and peace-restoring forces at short notice if they are required for CSCE or United Nations operations on European territory and for WEU operations in the framework of agreements as mentioned in paragraph 2 of this recommendation;
7. Urge, in the light of continuing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, the leaders of the CSCE at the forthcoming Helsinki summit to review current machinery for the prevention of conflict and the peaceful resolution of disputes, with a view to establishing a process of binding arbitration and peace enforcement.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹*to Recommendation 516*

1. The Council welcomes the keen interest shown by the Assembly in developing WEU's relations with Central European states. In its reply to paragraphs 1-3 of Recommendation 516, the Council wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to the declaration agreed in Bonn on 19th June 1992 by the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers together with the foreign and defence ministers of Central European states. This declaration states that "the enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania should reflect the specific relations which exist and are developing between these countries and the European Union and its member states. Other appropriate forms of co-operation could be set up in the light of the development of these relations."

On 19th June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers together with the foreign and defence ministers of Central European states adopted a number of concrete measures including the decision that foreign and defence ministers should meet once a year. Additional meetings at ministerial level may be convened if circumstances require.

2. As regards the Assembly's proposal for the establishment in WEU of "an automatic mechanism for mobilising politico-military consultation in order to react to serious crises in Central and Eastern Europe", the Council wishes to quote Article VIII, paragraph 3 of the modified Brussels Treaty, which reads: "At the request of any of the high contracting parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability."

3. Part II of the Petersberg Declaration of 19th June 1992 states that - in accordance with the decision contained in the Declaration of the member states of WEU at Maastricht on 10th December 1991 to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance - WEU member states "declare that they are prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU." Part II of the Petersberg Declaration also states that "decisions to use military units answerable to WEU will be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of member states in accordance with national constitutions." Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, the Petersberg Declaration identifies the following tasks for which military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. The Petersberg Declaration underlines that "the planning and execution of these tasks will be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of all allies."

4. In its reply to paragraph 6 of Recommendation 516, the Council wishes to quote from Part I "on WEU and European security" of the Petersberg Declaration which states in paragraph 2: "As WEU develops its operational capabilities in accordance with the Maastricht Declaration, we are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures, including peace-keeping activities of the CSCE or the United Nations Security Council. This will be done without prejudice to possible contributions by other CSCE countries and other organisations to these activities." This excerpt of the Petersberg Declaration was also quoted in full in paragraph 4 of the declaration adopted on 19th June 1992 by the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe.

5. In Part I "on WEU and European security" of their Petersberg Declaration of 19th June 1992, ministers emphasised "the importance of strengthening the rôle and institutions of the CSCE for peace and security in Europe (...). In the light of the establishment of a new CSCE forum for security co-operation, they considered that decisions to enhance the CSCE's capabilities for conflict prevention, crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes are of primary importance. They supported the proposal under discussion at the Helsinki follow-up meeting for the CSCE to declare itself as a regional arrangement under Part VIII of the United Nations Charter. Ministers considered that the

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 16th October 1992.

CSCE should have the authority to initiate and pursue peace-keeping operations under its own responsibility. ”

In this context, the Council welcomes the approval on 10th July 1992, by the heads of state or government of the states participating in the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, of the “ CSCE Helsinki document 1992 – the challenges of change. ” Paragraph 10 of the Helsinki summit declaration of 10th July 1992 states that “ Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the European Union. It is also the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. It is developing an operational capacity. It is opening itself to additional co-operation with new partners and has offered to provide resources in support of the CSCE. ” Moreover, the CSCE Helsinki decision on “ early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management (including fact-finding and rapporteur missions and CSCE peace-keeping), peaceful settlement of disputes ” specifies under the heading of “ co-operation with regional and transatlantic organisations ”: “ The CSCE may benefit from resources and possible experience and expertise of existing organisations such as the EC, NATO and WEU, and could therefore request them to make their resources available in order to support it in carrying out peace-keeping activities ”.

The Council welcomes the fact that the CSCE has declared itself as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. It considers that this does not affect the exclusive competence of the Security Council of the United Nations concerning decisions on peace enforcement. The Council is of the opinion that the Helsinki decisions will make the CSCE more operational and effective, and thus greatly enhance its central rôle in fostering and managing change in Europe.

RECOMMENDATION 517¹

on WEU after Maastricht²

THE ASSEMBLY welcomes the fact that the treaty drawn up in Maastricht in December 1991 permits the member countries of the European Community to take a decisive step towards establishing a European Union meeting the requirements of an economic and monetary union and capable of developing a joint foreign and security policy;

It wishes this treaty to be ratified by all member countries;

It is satisfied to note that the strengthening of WEU and the development of its activities are taking their place in the process of setting up the union;

It considers, however, that the wording of the declarations by the nine member countries of WEU is not precise enough;

It notes that the WEU Council will consequently have to take forthwith a number of important decisions;

It also notes with satisfaction that the decisions taken in Maastricht give the WEU Council the ability to take initiatives in external and joint security policy matters;

It recalls that the Maastricht Agreements are but one stage in the building of the European Union and that priority should still be given to setting up a union with substantial powers in the area of external and security policy;

It further recalls that no time-limit has been set for the validity of the modified Brussels Treaty;

It emphasises that the modified Brussels Treaty makes WEU an instrument for maintaining peace throughout Europe,

IT THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Implement without delay, in areas within its purview, the decisions contained in the nine-power declarations in Maastricht and to this end:

1. Make it known that the modified Brussels Treaty remains one of the juridical bases of the union and that WEU, as it exists in its ministerial and parliamentary bodies, is, in parallel with the organs of the European Union, a part which will have its place in the European structure;
2. Decide without delay the points to be considered in negotiations leading to the accession to WEU of each of the member countries of the European Community that apply for membership so as to ensure that accession signifies that new members adopt in full the principles guiding the joint foreign and defence policy, thus allowing WEU to intervene, if necessary, to apply them;
3. Explain what is meant by the status of observer for those countries if they do not accede to WEU;
4. Explain what is meant by the status of associate member of WEU for countries which are not members of the Community;
5. Draw up proposals for countries associated with the European Community to be involved in some of WEU's operational activities;
6. Make it abundantly clear to what extent accession to the Community may be granted to countries which do not intend to join WEU;
7. Arrange forthwith the synchronisation of dates and places of meetings and the harmonisation of WEU's working methods with those of the European Union without, however, reducing the number and importance of specifically WEU ministerial meetings;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd June 1992 during the first part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session (3rd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1308).

8. Proceed here and now with installing the Permanent Council in Brussels and specify which responsibilities will then be assigned to the permanent representatives of member countries to NATO and to the European Community respectively;
9. Continue to develop a defence and security policy for WEU in accordance with the treaties in force;
10. Examine how it is possible to organise the development of effective methods for conflict prevention, the restoration of peace, crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes for use in the framework of the CSCE, the European Political Union or the United Nations;
11. Have a directive drawn up and adopted on exports of armaments by member countries in the light of the decisions taken by the European Council in the context of joint foreign and security policy;
12. Follow up quickly the intention expressed in Maastricht to set up a European armaments agency in the framework of WEU, associate the activities of the IEPG closely with those of WEU in this area and, with this in mind, continue to transmit to the Assembly the annual report of the IEPG;
13. Associate the European Commission with the activities of that agency;
14. Set all the bilateral initiatives of its members clearly in the institutional framework of WEU;
15. Instruct a working group to examine Europe's requirements in respect of deterrence in the new circumstances with a view to defining a European concept of the rôle of nuclear weapons and developing consultations between its members on the possibility of resorting to such weapons;
16. Seek agreement with NATO on adapting to the new European security requirements the application of reciprocal "transparency" between the two institutions in accordance with the principles laid down in Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty in both political and operational matters;
17. Specify the conditions for "complementarity" between WEU and NATO, in particular in regard to exchanges with countries which are not members of these organisations, in connection with possible operations designed to maintain peace inside and outside Europe;
18. Establish procedure for consultations at an appropriate level prior to NATO ministerial meetings on matters on the agenda of those meetings;
19. Pursue exchanges with those Central and Eastern European countries which so wish with a view to ensuring that the progressive rapprochement of those countries with the European Union is extended to include defence matters;
20. Ask signatory states to correct the error in paragraph 6 of Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty noted in its reply to Written Question 297 before the text is submitted for ratification;
21. Noting that the Assembly believes that the period of fifty years laid down in Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty starts from the ratification of the 1954 Agreements while the Council considers the starting date is 1948,

THE ASSEMBLY STRONGLY URGES

That the issue be referred to a group of independent European legal experts for arbitration.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹*to Recommendation 517*

1. The points made in paragraph 1 of Recommendation 517 are addressed in the Council's replies to Written Questions 296, 297 and 298.

2. In its reply to paragraphs 2-4 of Recommendation 517, the Council wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to Part III "on relations between WEU and the other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance" of the Petersberg Declaration adopted by ministers on 19th June 1992, which spells out the points to be made in extending the invitation to the countries interested in becoming members, observers or associate members.

3. The Council takes due note of the suggestion made in paragraph 5 of Recommendation 517 to "draw up proposals for countries associated with the European Community to be involved in some of WEU's operational activities." According to Part III "on relations between WEU and the other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance" of the Petersberg Declaration, European member states of the Atlantic Alliance which are not member states of the European Union and which have accepted the invitation to become associate members of WEU, although not being parties to the modified Brussels Treaty, may participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council. They will be able to be associated to the planning cell through a permanent liaison arrangement.

In this context, the Council wishes to remind the Assembly that one of the countries eligible for associate membership of WEU has an association agreement with the European Community. As regards WEU's relations with Central European states – some of which have association agreements with the European Community – the declaration adopted in Bonn on 19th June 1992 by the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe specifies that "the enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania should reflect the specific relations which exist and are developing between these countries and the European Union and its member states".

4. Questions relating to the "accession to the Community" of new members are a matter for the Twelve, not for the Nine.

5. How systematically the synchronisation of WEU's meetings with those of the European Union dealing with security or having defence implications and those of NATO will be applied will have to be examined once WEU bodies have been established in Brussels and decisions taken on the composition of the WEU Council and on the institutional arrangements for common foreign and security policy. The same provisions apply to questions relating to the harmonisation of working methods. Information on the outcome of the discussions on these questions and their follow-up will be made available to the Assembly in due course.

6. On 19th June 1992, ministers instructed the Permanent Council and Secretary-General to "expedite the necessary arrangements so that the transfer of the WEU Council and Secretariat-General from London to Brussels could become effective by January 1993." The Assembly will be kept informed on progress made with the transfer of the WEU Council and Secretariat-General. The timetable of the transfer is, inter alia, dependent on agreement being reached on a suitable building able to accommodate both the Secretariat-General and the planning cell.

7. The Assembly will doubtless agree with the Council that the outcome of the WEU Council of Ministers in Bonn on 19th June 1992 testifies to the willingness of WEU member states to continue to develop the organisation as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance in accordance with the decision contained in the Declaration of the member states of WEU at Maastricht on 10th December 1991.

8. The Council fully shares the Assembly's views on the importance of the questions raised in paragraph 10 of the recommendation. It wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that, in Part I of the Petersberg Declaration, "on WEU and European security", WEU ministers "emphasised the importance of strengthening the rôle and the institutions of the CSCE for peace and security in Europe." The Council is aware of the need "to organise the development of effective methods for con-

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 29th September 1992.

flict prevention, the restoration of peace, crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes " for use in a framework of mutually reinforcing institutions such as WEU, the European Union, NATO, the CSCE and the United Nations. In this context, it should be recalled that the Council has welcomed the outcome of the CSCE Helsinki follow-up meeting in its reply to Recommendation 516.

9. Questions pertaining to exports of armaments are addressed in the Council's reply to Recommendation 520.

10. Meeting in Bonn on 19th June 1992, WEU ministers welcomed the IEPG defence ministers' decision, at their Oslo meeting on 6th March 1992, to analyse the future rôle of the IEPG in the new European security architecture. Part I of the Petersberg Declaration, "on WEU and European security", states that "this represents a positive development fully in line with the objective set by WEU member states in Maastricht further to examine enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a WEU European armaments agency. WEU ministers propose that both WEU and IEPG experts analyse this issue in depth, carry out an initial examination of the rôle and functions of a possible European armaments agency and submit a report for consideration".

The Assembly's suggestion for "associating the European Commission" with the activities of a future European armaments agency in the framework of WEU will have to be examined in due course. The Council will continue to request and transmit to the Assembly a report on the IEPG as soon as it is made available and has been considered by the Council's members.

11. The Council is not competent for "setting all the bilateral initiatives" of WEU member states "clearly in the institutional framework of WEU". It is the sovereign decision of WEU member states to set any of their relevant bilateral initiatives in a WEU framework, if they so wish.

12. The "definition of a European concept of the rôle of nuclear weapons" and the "development of consultations between its members on the possibility of resorting to such weapons" are not at present on the agenda of the Council and its working groups.

13. In the Council's opinion, the contents of the Petersberg Declaration and of the declaration adopted by the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe both testify to the fact that WEU member states are actively seeking "transparency" and "complementarity" between WEU and NATO. The intensification of co-ordination by WEU member states on alliance issues representing an important common interest will encompass activities ranging from prior discussion within WEU to the introduction of joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the alliance. The alliance will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of allies under the North Atlantic Treaty. The kind of issues on which joint WEU positions should be agreed is linked to the future division of labour between the common foreign and security policy and WEU. Holding WEU meetings prior to meetings of the alliance will assist the process of timely introduction of joint WEU positions into the alliance.

14. The declaration adopted in Bonn on 19th June 1992 by the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe states that "the enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania should reflect the specific relations which exist and are developing between these countries and the European Union and its member states. Other appropriate forms of co-operation could be set up in the light of the development of these relations." Ministers agreed to strengthen existing relations between WEU and these states by structuring the dialogue, consultations and co-operation. In this way, "WEU's Central European partners will be able to acquaint themselves with the future security and defence policy of the European Union and find new opportunities to co-operate with the defence component of the union and with the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance as these develop."

15. As stated in its reply to Written Question 297, the Council is of the opinion that references to the modified Brussels Treaty contained in the declaration on Western European Union leave no doubt that it is Article XII of the treaty of economic, social and cultural collaboration and collective self-defence, signed at Brussels on 17th March 1948, as amended by the protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty, signed at Paris on 23rd October 1954 – and not a non-existent Article XII of the treaty signed in Brussels on 17th March 1948 – that is actually referred to in paragraph 6 of Article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union.

16. On the issue raised in paragraph 21 of Recommendation 517 the Council can only confirm its position as stated in its replies to Written Questions 288 and 297.

RECOMMENDATION 518¹***on WEU: the operational organisation***²

The Assembly,

(i) Welcoming and endorsing the WEU declaration made at Maastricht on 10th December 1991, whereby member states agreed on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters;

(ii) Pleased that member states are decided to strengthen the operational rôle of WEU in the longer-term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union which might in time lead to a common defence;

(iii) Delighted at the reaffirmation, therefore, of WEU's paramount rôle as the unique instrument to express Europe's defence identity, and determined to continue to provide the parliamentary dimension required to oversee WEU's operational responsibilities;

(iv) Confident that the setting up of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón will enable WEU to play a fuller operational rôle in co-operation with all other bodies concerned with verification, crisis management and environmental control;

(v) Recalling recommendations:

- 456 on naval aviation;
- 469 on the state of European security - intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north;
- 488 on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: operations in the Gulf;
- 493 on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region;
- 498 on the Gulf crisis: lessons for Western European Union;
- 502 on arms control: force reductions and the rôle of multinational units;
- 505 on the rôle of women in the armed forces;
- 512 on operational arrangements for WEU - the Yugoslav crisis,

as well as Written Question 294 put to the Council by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on 17th December 1991;

(vi) Gratified that so many of its recommendations above have been accepted by the Council, at least in part, and trusting that all its recent recommendations, touching on the operational aspects of WEU, will now be re-examined with a view to implementation within WEU's new operational context;

(vii) Conscious that as long as a minimum nuclear deterrent is to be maintained by any WEU member state it should remain effective and credible;

(viii) Considering that Europe's arms procurement needs would be best served by creating a European Armaments Agency which would associate all European countries so wishing,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Take the necessary decisions at the next ministerial meeting to give substance to the WEU declaration at Maastricht by:

- (a) agreeing the arrangements for setting up a WEU military planning cell with appropriate and detailed terms of reference;
- (b) deciding the parameters for closer military co-operation in the fields of logistics, transport and training, and giving the necessary mandate for action to the relevant WEU bodies;
- (c) confirming the need for a committee of WEU chiefs of defence staff and considering the creation of a WEU military committee;
- (d) progressing the idea of earmarking certain forces for WEU and giving particular consideration to the creation of a European rapid action force to comprise elements of the future European corps and airmobile units from those WEU member nations possessing such forces;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd June 1992 during the first part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session (4th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1307).

2. Investigate as a matter of priority the various areas for possible WEU action once an operational organisation is in place;
3. Define the status and responsibilities of associate members and observers to include the possibility of participation in WEU's operational activities (notably the work of the Torrejón Centre) and also give due consideration to including other NATO states or European Community associates in WEU operations on an ad hoc basis;
4. Ensure that the WEU satellite centre in Torrejón establishes firm links with:
 - (a) the WEU military planning cell to be established in Brussels;
 - (b) NATO's Verification Co-ordinating Committee;
 - (c) the CSCE's Conflict Prevention Centre;
 - (d) the Open Skies Consultative Committee;
5. Set up a defence representatives procurement sub-group to examine ways to bring WEU and IEPG closer together, instituting a special liaison with the IEPG secretariat in Lisbon;
6. Include co-operation on armaments production and reduction on the agenda for discussion with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe;
7. Encourage France and the United Kingdom in co-operation if possible to maintain an effective and credible minimum nuclear deterrent and, in parallel, consider the desirability of instituting a WEU "nuclear consultation group" to give practical expression to the principles of nuclear deterrence reiterated in the Hague Platform as well as helping to define a European opinion on nuclear disarmament and anti-proliferation measures;
8. Ensure that all arrangements aimed at giving a stronger operational rôle to WEU are discussed with the Atlantic Alliance to make them fully compatible with present and future military dispositions designed to safeguard allied collective defence and institute channels of communication to maintain such transparency and complementarity between NATO and WEU.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 518***

1. In accordance with the decision contained in the declaration of the member states of WEU at Maastricht on 10th December 1991 to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU member states have been examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means covering, in particular, a WEU planning cell and military units answerable to WEU, in order to strengthen WEU's military rôle.

(a) At its meeting in Bonn on 19th June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers agreed that "a planning cell will be established on 1st October 1992, subject to practical considerations, under the authority of the Council. It will be located with the Secretariat-General in a suitable building in Brussels." The Council of Ministers also approved the terms of reference for the planning cell.

(b) Questions pertaining to closer military co-operation complementary to the alliance, in particular in the fields of logistics, transport and training remain on the agenda of the Council's Defence Representatives Group. Whenever appropriate, information on the outcome of the discussions on this issue and their follow-up will be fed into the ongoing dialogue with the Assembly.

(c) On 19th June 1992, WEU ministers agreed "that the chiefs of defence staff should meet twice a year prior to the regular Ministerial Councils and on an ad hoc basis whenever necessary". The Council does not envisage, at present, the creation of a WEU "Military Committee". However, it should be recalled that – according to paragraph 12 of Part I "on WEU and European security" of the Petersberg Declaration – following the transfer of the Council and Secretariat to Brussels, national delegations could be reinforced with "military delegates" to develop and provide advice for the Council, to introduce the views of the chiefs of defence staff to the planning cell and to monitor the professional standards of the planning cell's work. In the future, an enhanced rôle of the WEU chiefs of defence staff would be envisageable in principle, in line with the organisation's evolution.

(d) In its reply to sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 1 of the recommendation, the Council wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to Part II, "on strengthening WEU's operational rôle", of the Petersberg Declaration. In this declaration, WEU member states "declare that they are prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU". Decisions to use military units answerable to WEU "will be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of member states in accordance with national constitutions." The declaration also specifies that "military units will be drawn from the forces of WEU member states, including forces with NATO missions – in this case after consultation with NATO – and will be organised on a multinational and multi-service basis". Furthermore, "all WEU member states will soon designate which of their military units and headquarters they would be willing to make available to WEU for its various possible tasks. Where multinational formations drawn from the forces of WEU nations already exist or are planned, these units could be made available for use under the authority of WEU, with agreement of all participating nations." WEU member states "intend to develop and exercise the appropriate capabilities to enable the deployment of WEU military units by land, sea or air to accomplish these tasks." The possibility of the creation of a European aeronaval force with the capability for force projection is currently under consideration by the Council and its working groups, as are the related technical questions. The Assembly will be kept informed on the outcome of these discussions and on any follow-ups in due course.

2. Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, Part II "on strengthening WEU's operational rôle" of the Petersberg Declaration identifies the following tasks for which military units of WEU member states, acting under WEU's authority, could be employed: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. The Petersberg Declaration specifies: "The planning and execution of these tasks will be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of all allies."

3. On 19th June 1992, WEU ministers agreed that a number of points should be made in extending the invitation to the countries interested in becoming members, observers or associate members. In this context, the Council wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to Part III "on relations between

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 16th October 1992.

WEU and the other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance” which specifies: “Other European member states of the Atlantic Alliance which have accepted the invitation to become associate members of WEU, although not being parties to the modified Brussels Treaty, may participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council – without prejudice to the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty – of its working groups and of the subsidiary bodies”, subject – inter alia – to the following provisions: (...) they will be able to be associated to the planning cell through a permanent liaison arrangement; (...) they will take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they commit forces (...).”

For “practical reasons”, however, “space activities will be restricted to the present members until the end of the experimental phase of the satellite centre in 1995. During this phase the new members and associate members will be kept informed of WEU’s space activities. Appropriate arrangements will be made for associate members to participate in subsequent space activities at the same time as decisions are taken on the continuation of such activities.”

The possibility of observers participating in the WEU planning cell and in WEU’s space activities is not foreseen in the Petersberg Declaration. While possible, in principle, the inclusion “of other NATO states or European Community associates in WEU operations on an ad hoc basis” would have to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.

4. Possibilities for co-operation between the experimental WEU satellite centre and the planning cell as well as the desirability and feasibility of ensuring “firm links” of the WEU satellite centre in Torrejón with non-WEU bodies will be examined in due course, as the satellite centre becomes more operational.

5. WEU’s relations with the IEPG are addressed in the Council’s replies to Recommendations 517 and 523.

6. The declaration adopted in Bonn on 19th June 1992 by the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe states that “the enhancement of WEU’s relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania should reflect the specific relations which exist and are developing between these countries and the European Union and its member states. Other appropriate forms of co-operation could be set up in the light of the development of these relations.” Ministers agreed to strengthen existing relations between WEU and these states by structuring the dialogue, consultations and co-operation. The declaration specifies that “the focus of consultations will be the security architecture and stability in Europe, the future development of the CSCE, arms control and disarmament, in particular the implementation of the CFE and Open Skies treaties, as well as the 1992 Vienna document. Developments in Europe and neighbouring regions will be of particular interest to the participants. In this way, WEU’s Central European partners will be able to acquaint themselves with the future security and defence policy of the European Union and find new opportunities to co-operate with the defence component of the union and with the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance as these develop.”

7. Questions pertaining to the “maintenance of an effective and credible minimum nuclear deterrent” and to the desirability of instituting a WEU “nuclear consultation group” are not at present on the agenda of the Council and its working groups.

8. The contents of the Petersberg Declaration as well as the declaration of the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe, both adopted on 19th June 1992, testify to the fact that WEU member states are fully conscious of the need to develop relations between NATO and WEU on the basis of the dual purpose of transparency and complementarity.

RECOMMENDATION 519¹

on the application of United Nations Resolution 757²

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling Recommendations 506, 511 and 512 on the Yugoslav crisis;
- (ii) Anxious that the peoples concerned should no longer be exposed to the terrible suffering which is currently prevailing, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia;
- (iii) Wholeheartedly endorsing United Nations Resolution 757 voted in the Security Council on Saturday, 30th May 1992;
- (iv) Determined to ensure that the trade and oil embargo designed to bring Serbia and Montenegro to realise the errors of their actions should prove effective;
- (v) Strongly supporting the WEU Secretary-General's appeal for European action and calling for the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty,

URGENTLY RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Take immediate steps to invoke Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and prepare appropriate action by WEU states to help apply United Nations Resolution 757. Further measures should be considered if Resolution 757 does not have the desired effect;

Take immediate initiatives to ensure that war criminals will be judged following the guidelines of the proposal of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of May 1992.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd June 1992 during the first part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session (4th sitting).

2. See: draft recommendation submitted by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1319).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 519***

1. Meeting in Bonn on 19th June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers adopted a declaration on the Yugoslav crisis in which ministers expressed the determination of their states "to abide fully by the provisions of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 757 and to implement comprehensively the sanctions which it contains. In this connection, they noted that the United Nations Security Council has decided to consider immediately, whenever necessary, further steps to achieve a peaceful solution in conformity with relevant resolutions of the Security Council, based inter alia on Part VII of the United Nations Charter."

Furthermore, "Ministers declared that WEU is prepared, within the bounds of its possibilities, to contribute towards effective implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions in connection with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. They charged an ad hoc group composed of representatives from foreign affairs and defence ministries to examine WEU's possibilities to contribute to the implementation of the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions."

In accordance with decisions taken at the WEU Ministerial meeting in Bonn on 19th June 1992, the ad hoc Group on the former Yugoslavia met in London at the WEU Secretariat-General on 26th June 1992 to examine ways of contributing to the implementation of relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions and further steps the Security Council might take to achieve a peaceful solution. Subsequently, two groups of military experts met in Rome to consider requirements for possible naval measures in support of the United Nations embargo and other sanctions, as well as possible WEU contributions in support of United Nations humanitarian efforts in Sarajevo. On 3rd July 1992, both groups reported back to a session of the ad hoc group.

On 10th July 1992, in the margins of the CSCE Helsinki summit, an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers was held on the situation in Yugoslavia. WEU ministers, having taken note of the report of the ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia, decided to implement the operations of monitoring at sea, as proposed by the ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia at its Rome meeting of 3rd July. Furthermore, ministers adopted a decision on WEU humanitarian aid efforts on the basis of the recommendations of the ad hoc group.

The implementation of the operations of monitoring at sea started immediately after the extraordinary WEU Council of Ministers in Helsinki. They are conducted in close co-ordination with NATO forces.

The foreign and defence ministers of WEU member states met in London on 28th August 1992 following the conclusion of the London conference on former Yugoslavia. They expressed their "firm conviction" that "the principles agreed at that conference should provide the foundations for progress towards a peaceful and just resolution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. In particular, they reaffirmed the urgent necessity for the parties involved to cease the fighting and the use of force immediately and strictly respect the agreed cease-fires. They strongly urged all parties involved in the conflict to adhere to the principles through positive actions and to contribute effectively to the implementation of specific decisions also adopted by the London conference".

On 28th August 1992, ministers noted and endorsed the contributions which WEU and its member states were already making and were prepared to make to the United Nations efforts to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia, in the following fields: delivery of humanitarian assistance, supervision of heavy weapons and strengthening the embargo.

As regards the strengthening of the embargo, ministers noted the success of operation sharp vigilance to monitor the embargo in the Adriatic. They agreed that strengthening the effectiveness of the embargo established by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 would be "an important means of promoting a political solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia". They welcomed the conclusions of the London conference and expressed the willingness of WEU member states "to contribute to any further measures necessary to make the embargo as effective as possible". Member states of WEU could, if requested, offer expertise, technical assistance and equipment to the governments of the Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river Danube for the purpose of circumventing or breaking the sanctions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757. Ministers also supported the call by the London conference to the Security Council to consider

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 16th October 1992.

further measures to ensure rigorous implementation of sanctions in the Adriatic. Furthermore, ministers decided that the ad hoc group should continue its work in this field.

The texts of the communiqués of the extraordinary meetings of the WEU Council of Ministers on the situation in Yugoslavia were officially transmitted to the Assembly. Whenever appropriate, the Assembly will continue to be regularly informed on the implementation of the relevant ministerial decisions. Developments in the Yugoslav crisis will remain on the agenda of the Council and its working groups.

2. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's request in the second paragraph of the recommendation. It wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that – in their strong condemnation of the unacceptable policies of ethnic cleansing and forced expulsions in former Yugoslavia – senior members of governments of individual WEU member states have deemed it appropriate to speak in favour of international sanctions for the perpetrators of war crimes in the context of the conflict in former Yugoslavia.

RECOMMENDATION 520 ¹on arms export policy ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalls the international public debate during and immediately after the Gulf war expressing embarrassment regarding earlier large sales of arms to Iraq and calling for reductions in the international sale of armaments;
- (ii) Is preoccupied that continuing uncontrolled international armaments transfers might worsen existing tensions and latent conflicts in a number of world regions;
- (iii) Also fears that economic difficulties among the members of the now defunct Warsaw Pact may encourage the development of the black market in armaments because of the large stocks that exist;
- (iv) Welcomes therefore the declared determination of the CSCE member countries to support the new United Nations Register of International Arms Transfers and to provide it with comprehensive information;
- (v) Underlines the rising danger of nuclear proliferation and know-how and the imperfection of existing international régimes responsible for preventing the dissemination of chemical and biological weaponry and of missile technology;
- (vi) Welcomes therefore the decisions of France and the People's Republic of China to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and of North Korea to join the nuclear safeguards agreement;
- (vii) Also welcomes the decision of the European Community, the United States, Russia and Japan to establish an international Science and Technology Centre in Russia in order to discourage scientists of the former Soviet Union from selling nuclear, biological and chemical know-how to third countries;
- (viii) Recalls the need to restrict arms exports and to harmonise arms export policies and regulations governing dual use items within the European Community prior to the abolition of frontiers and internal controls on 1st January 1993;
- (ix) Also recalls the special responsibility of Western European Union in the arms export area since it has implications for the defence and essential security interests of its member countries,

THE ASSEMBLY THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Elaborate and implement the necessary decisions of the European Union for a harmonised arms export policy restricted in accordance with common criteria identified by the European Council in Luxembourg;
2. Take a joint initiative in the United Nations in order:
 - (a) to make the information to be sent in to the United Nations Register of International Arms Transfers a binding obligation for all United Nations member countries and enforceable by sanctions;
 - (b) to call on all United Nations states to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the safeguard agreements making the United Nations Security Council responsible for supervising their observation;
 - (c) to strengthen the IAEA's rôle by increasing its budget, giving it the power of sanctions and placing it under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and the Secretary General of the United Nations;
 - (d) to draw up an international convention in order to complement the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and to prevent the export of nuclear know-how or technology;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd June 1992 during the first part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session (4th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Aarts on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (Document 1305).

- (e) to call for the early conclusion of a worldwide convention on chemical weapons and to make the chemical list of the Australia Group a worldwide exportation ban list under United Nations supervision;
 - (f) to make the missile technology control régime a worldwide régime;
- 3. Call upon the next Munich economic summit to held in July 1992 to support vigorously the strengthened rôle of the United Nations in monitoring a worldwide arms export régime ;
- 4. Urge its member countries to provide financial contributions for establishing and operating the International Science and Technology Centre in Russia.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 520***

1. The WEU Council fully endorses the declaration by the European Council on areas which could be the subject of joint action of 10th December 1991. The implementation of joint action by the Twelve in the areas envisaged in this declaration is contingent, however, on the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union. In view of Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty, any possible rôle for WEU in the elaboration and implementation of the necessary decisions of the European Union for a harmonised arms export policy would necessarily be subject to the same provision.
2. The Council is aware of the importance of questions such as those mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Recommendation 520. Within the framework of the European Community, WEU member states have, together with Japan, introduced a comprehensive but non-discriminatory register of arms transfers in order to enhance and make worldwide the process of greater transparency in conventional arms with a view to contributing to greater restraint. The Council has already set out this position in its replies to Assembly Recommendations 502 and 513. The Council also remains fully aware of the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to seek greater respect for the Missile Technology Control Régime. Furthermore, the Council wishes to recall that – at their meeting in Bonn on 19th June 1992 – WEU ministers expressed their conviction that a chemical weapons convention “ can be reached within the next few months. They are confident that this convention can play an important and pioneering rôle in worldwide multilateral arms control and call on all member states of the Conference on Disarmament to lend their support to the emerging consensus. They repeat their commitment to be among the original signatories of this convention and ask all other nations to follow this course. ” The Council welcomes the successful conclusion of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention (CWC) in Geneva in August 1992. WEU member states will co-sponsor a United Nations General Assembly resolution that commends the chemical weapons convention drafted by the Conference on Disarmament and calls upon all states to sign and ratify the convention at the earliest possible date.
3. The Council would not favour a worldwide exportation ban on the goods contained in the Australia Group list, since these goods are dual use in nature, and are mainly used for legitimate, civilian purposes. WEU member states nevertheless remain committed to the aim of preventing the spread of chemical weapons, and for that reason they continue to co-operate in the Australia Group, in order to control the export of, inter alia, chemical weapons precursors.
4. Individual WEU member states are providing financial contributions for establishing and operating the International Science and Technology Centre in Russia.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 16th October 1992.

RECOMMENDATION 521 ¹

***on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial year 1992 ²***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that:
- (a) in Maastricht the ministers of the WEU member countries decided to transfer the Secretariat-General of WEU to Brussels;
 - (b) the budget of the Secretariat-General of WEU for 1992 does not consider the financial implications of this transfer and is therefore of a provisional nature;
 - (c) credits in this budget, in particular those relating to the mission expenses of members of the Secretariat-General of WEU, are estimated on the basis of restrictive criteria;
 - (d) the budget of the Institute for Security Studies sets out the financial requirements of that Institute without modifying the organogram authorised last year;
 - (e) the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU are extremely cost-effective;
 - (f) problems relating to staff policy are still being studied by the co-ordination bodies concerned and that, among these, the problem of financing the pension scheme is becoming increasingly important;
- (ii) Welcoming the fact that the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU are presented clearly and efficiently and allow a detailed examination of those organs' needs,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Give the Secretariat-General the wherewithal to exercise its activities during a period which, although transitional, is no less important and complex;
2. Notify the Assembly of any structural changes that are envisaged on the occasion of the transfer of the Secretariat-General to Brussels and of the measures taken in respect of staff not wishing to be transferred;
3. Inform the Assembly of decisions taken in regard to staff policy in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations, particularly in respect of the financing of the pension scheme.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1992 during the first part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session (5th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Lord Mackie of Benshie on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 1303).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL***to Recommendation 521***¹

1. The Council assures the Assembly that it will examine in a constructive spirit the proposals which the Secretary-General will submit to it in this regard.
2. Any changes of structure arising from the transfer will also be communicated to the Assembly together with the measures to be taken for the benefit of those staff unable to follow the organisation.
3. The question of the financing of the pension scheme is still being studied by the Co-ordinating Committee on Remunerations (CCR).

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 29th September 1992.

RECOMMENDATION 522 ¹*on new Euro-American relations* ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Agreeing that the development of a European security identity and defence rôle, reflected in the further strengthening of the European pillar within the alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance and that the enhancement of the rôle and responsibility of the European members is an important basis for transforming the alliance;
- (ii) Noting that NATO's Rome declaration on peace and security calls for a new security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other;
- (iii) Convinced that the Atlantic Alliance will be of lasting value as long as it provides the essential transatlantic link, demonstrated by the significant presence of North American forces in Europe;
- (iv) Recognising that the development of WEU as the instrument for a common European security and defence policy is a logical and inevitable consequence of a determined effort by European countries to achieve greater integration;
- (v) Convinced that the creation of genuine multinational forces in a European framework, which could be deployed in both NATO and WEU operations, is the best guarantee for future security in Europe, insisting in this connection that, in accordance with the Maastricht agreement, the Franco-German Eurocorps must be placed under WEU authority and that its arrangements must strengthen the alliance military structure;
- (vi) Considering that in some quarters in the United States there is still uncertainty due to lack of insight into and understanding of the motivation of Western European nations for developing a specific European security and defence identity, notwithstanding the multiple exchanges and consultations taking place in the different existing organs and institutions of the Atlantic Alliance;
- (vii) Recognising the useful rôle being accomplished by the WEU Institute for Security Studies in making European views known to the foreign policy and defence community in the United States;
- (viii) Aware that, notwithstanding the repeated assurances given by the present American administration, there is uncertainty over the level and corresponding effectiveness of American troops based in Europe;
- (ix) Recalling that, in Rome, all NATO member states pledged to support all steps in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe towards reform and to give practical assistance in helping them to succeed in this difficult transition;
- (x) Considering the apparent growing anomaly between the determination of the United States to exert political influence on developments in Europe and its diminishing will and ability to maintain a military presence and financial-economic commitments in Europe;
- (xi) Considering that notwithstanding the recent Canadian decision to withdraw all its forces from Europe, Canada remains committed to NATO and Europe's security by retaining the ability to send contingency forces and must therefore be included in the transatlantic dialogue with WEU,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Define more clearly, in consultation with its transatlantic allies, the respective rôles of the armed forces of NATO, WEU and the United States in maintaining security and peace in Europe;
2. Establish with the United States more clearly-defined criteria for the maintenance of United States forces in Europe;
3. Continue to support the rôle of the WEU Institute for Security Studies in making European views on security better known across the Atlantic, also by publishing and disseminating more widely the results of its work;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1992 during the first part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session (5th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Soell on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1310).

4. Co-ordinate more closely the policy of allied partners on both sides of the Atlantic to satisfy the security needs of the new democracies in Central Europe, while recognising that, for the moment, no formal security guarantees can be provided;

5. Take account of the fact that a new concept of security means developing capabilities allowing the deployment at the appropriate time of political, as well as diplomatic, economic, financial and military means for peace-keeping and peace-restoring;

6. (a) Reinforce the joint allied political instruments in order to make sure that, in crisis prevention, a joint assessment can be made as a precondition for co-ordinated action;

(b) Establish a joint high level group consisting of political, diplomatic, economic and military experts in order to make up-to-date threat assessments and develop adequate models to respond to such threats.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹*to Recommendation 522*

1. The Council has taken note of the ideas expressed in Recommendation 522 on new Euro-American relations as well as in the remarkable report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee at its last session by Mr. Soell. It fully subscribes to the conclusion of this report, "that possible tensions in the long-standing Atlantic relationship can be averted or neutralised only if the causes, possible consequences and related issues are discussed in an atmosphere of openness and without mutual recriminations".

The Council is confident that a clearer definition of the respective rôles of military units answerable to WEU and the armed forces of NATO and the United States in maintaining security and peace in Europe is already emerging as a result of bilateral and multilateral consultations with the transatlantic allies. Moreover, the Council is of the opinion that Part II, on strengthening WEU's operational rôle, of the Petersberg Declaration will contribute to this clearer definition.

2. The establishment with the United States of "more clearly-defined criteria for the maintenance of United States forces in Europe" should be primarily addressed in an alliance framework.

3. The Council encourages the WEU Institute for Security Studies to develop its activities, in order to make European views on security better known across the Atlantic. It fully supports the Institute in its joint project with the Rand Corporation "Towards a new transatlantic partnership". It should be recalled that, on 19th June 1992, WEU ministers "noted with satisfaction the activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studies in Paris. Its publications, seminars and colloquia had greatly contributed to deepening understanding for the ongoing development of a European security identity and to enhancing relations between WEU and other countries."

4. The Council is fully aware of the necessity "to co-ordinate more closely the policy of allied partners on both sides of the Atlantic to satisfy the security needs of the new democracies in Central Europe". In this context, it should be stressed that WEU's relations with Central European countries do not aim at the creation of a scaled-down version of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC). The Nine wish to offer their Central European partners an opportunity to conduct in an appropriate framework a security dialogue, which they greatly value taking into account their planned or existing association agreements with the European Community. Neither is there any intention to duplicate NACC activities. The declaration agreed by the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe on 19th June 1992 in fact explicitly stressed the "mutually complementary and reinforcing" nature of the respective activities conducted in the frameworks of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. In their Petersberg Declaration, the Nine also underlined the "valuable contribution" of NACC in connection with the establishment of a new order of peace in Europe which, in accordance with the Charter of Paris, will be based on co-operation.

5. The Council fully agrees with the Assembly that "a new concept of security means developing capabilities allowing the deployment at the appropriate time of political, as well as diplomatic, economic, financial and military means for peace-keeping and peace-restoring". It was in fact a very similar assessment by the WEU member states which led to the adoption of the Petersberg Declaration by the WEU Council of Ministers.

6. The Council is grateful for the valuable suggestions expressed in paragraph 6 of Recommendation 522 and concurs with the Assembly on the need to "reinforce the joint allied political instruments in order to make sure that, in crisis prevention, a joint assessment can be made as a precondition for co-ordinated action". The Council will keep in mind the Assembly's suggestions on the establishment of "a joint high level group consisting of political, diplomatic, economic and military experts in order to make up-to-date threat assessments and develop adequate models to respond to such threats", as the Council advocates close institutional links between the Secretariats and with all suitable WEU and NATO bodies.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 29th September 1992.

RECOMMENDATION 523¹

on the development of a European space-based observation system²

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcomes the establishment of the WEU Satellite Centre and the fact that the management team to study conditions for developing a European space-based observation system has started work;
- (ii) Emphasises that this first multinational effort to make use of space to establish a control system for international peace-keeping and security is unique in the world;
- (iii) Underlines the importance of obtaining public support in order to carry out the planned project;
- (iv) Considers the definition of the tasks of the system requires a more intensive, regular dialogue between the Council and the Assembly than has been the case hitherto;
- (v) Recalls its Recommendations 465 and 466;
- (vi) Welcomes the conclusion of the Open Skies Treaty and trusts it will be ratified as soon as possible by all the countries concerned;
- (vii) Is convinced that, in setting up the observation system, WEU should take the fullest possible advantage of the services and experience, on the one hand, of the European Space Agency (ESA) in carrying out earth observation programmes and, on the other, of national agencies;
- (viii) Recalls the work carried out by the IEPG in the context of the Euclid programme on radar technology and satellite observation;
- (ix) Considers it essential for the principle of transparency to be applied to the interpretation of satellite data and for all aspects of the activities of the Centre and observation system as a whole to be subject to parliamentary scrutiny,

THE ASSEMBLY THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Design the planned system in such a way as to serve the security of WEU member countries and also to be useful to wider organisations with a European, Atlantic or universal vocation;
2. Inform the Assembly regularly
 - (a) about each stage of the entry into service of the Satellite Centre, its organogram and the progress of feasibility studies;
 - (b) about criteria governing the choice of space industries to equip the Centre and establish the observation system;
3. Define
 - (a) the consequences of the Open Skies Treaty for satellite verification and for the tasks of the WEU Satellite Centre;
 - (b) the exact significance of the expression crisis observation and the consequences of closer WEU co-operation in strategic observation for the tasks of the Centre and of the space-based observation system;
 and submit its conclusions to the Assembly;
4. At the earliest possible opportunity, contact the European Space Agency (ESA) in order to work out with it the possibilities for co-operation between WEU and ESA in space-based observation and arrange to be represented at the next meeting of the ESA Council of Ministers in Spain in November 1992;
5. Contact the IEPG to co-ordinate the work carried out by that group on space technology in the context of the Euclid programme with WEU's activities in this area;
6. Keep the public better informed about its space policy.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1992 during the first part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum; see the report tabled by Mrs. Blunck and Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (Document 1304).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 523

1. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's wish that – in addition to “serving the security of WEU member countries” – a possible future WEU space-based observation system should be designed “in such a way as to also be useful to wider organisations with a European, Atlantic or universal vocation”. However, it must be borne in mind that in designing any possible future WEU space-based observation system, a number of technical and financial constraints will have to be taken into account.

2. The Assembly will be kept informed about progress with the experimental WEU satellite centre and the main system feasibility study.

3. The question of possible relationships of the experimental WEU satellite centre with security initiatives such as Open Skies could be addressed by the Council and its ad hoc Sub-Group on Space in the very near future. Information on the outcome of such discussions and their follow-up would be made available to the Assembly in due course.

The precise consequences of closer WEU co-operation in strategic observation for the tasks of the experimental WEU satellite centre and for a possible WEU space-based observation system will be examined in the light of progress in these fields. The Assembly will be kept informed of the outcome.

The significance of the terms “crisis” and “crisis observation” has to be seen in conjunction with Article V and paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.

4. Initial contacts with ESA have already been made. Possible specific forms of co-operation will be investigated in due course.

5. Meeting in Bonn on 19th June 1992, WEU ministers welcomed the IEPG defence ministers' decision, at their Oslo meeting on 6th March 1992, to analyse the IEPG's future rôle in the new European security architecture. Part I “on WEU and European security” of the Petersberg Declaration states that “this represents a positive development fully in line with the objective set by WEU member states in Maastricht further to examine enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a WEU European armaments agency. WEU ministers propose that both WEU and IEPG experts analyse this issue in depth, carry out an initial examination of the rôle and functions of a possible European armaments agency and submit a report for consideration.”

In the opinion of the Council, questions such as the one addressed in paragraph 5 of Recommendation 523 could be examined in the framework of such an in-depth analysis.

6. The Council agrees, in principle, with the Assembly that the public should be kept better informed about WEU's space policy. In the Council's opinion, this could be done only in the overall framework of WEU's public relations effort, which should be commensurate with the organisation's expanding rôle. However, WEU's public relations can be developed only gradually, in line with the organisation's evolution.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 4th November 1992.

RECOMMENDATION 524¹

on arms control: CSCE and WEU²

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the signing of the Maastricht Agreements which give new impetus to the building of the European Union and offer prospects of future joint defence;
- (ii) Aware of the challenge to WEU raised in the Maastricht agreements which make WEU an integral part of the European Union and, in the long run, the instrument of a joint defence policy;
- (iii) Pleased that the Maastricht Treaty and the WEU declaration confirm the rôle of WEU and therefore of its parliamentary Assembly as Europe's paramount defence body both at present and for the foreseeable future;
- (iv) Congratulating the Council and the Secretary-General on the various initiatives taken by WEU in the realm of arms control, notably over verification and for open skies, and pleased generally with the fuller and more constructive answers given to Assembly recommendations;
- (v) Taking into account the development of the peace and disarmament process now under way in Europe and in particular welcoming the 1992 Vienna document as a major contribution to this process;
- (vi) Aware of the importance of current negotiations on European security and arms control being held in the framework of the Helsinki meeting;
- (vii) Following attentively the process of political and military restructuring in the states of the former Soviet Union;
- (viii) Convinced that WEU must take part in the system of peace and security outlined by the organisation and operation of the new CSCE structures and that consequently our own Assembly should take every opportunity to support the development of the CSCE Assembly, both politically and practically;
- (ix) Considering that there should be much greater co-operation between the CSCE and the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, even to the extent of combining the two;
- (x) Recalling Recommendations 481, 513 and 514 and restating in particular two recommendations which it urges the Council to tackle without further prevarication:

“Elaborate and subscribe to a policy of minimum nuclear deterrence which takes account of recent changes but which safeguards European interests;

Encourage member countries and CSCE colleague states to pay greater attention to the environmental problems linked with the destruction of both conventional and nuclear weapons, study and report on avoiding this type of potential pollution, thus ensuring greater transparency in this important domain;”

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Pursue its action to promote peace and disarmament in co-operation with all international organisations dealing with security problems, in particular by encouraging close co-operation between the member countries of WEU so that they may express a joint position during the negotiations at the CSCE conference in Helsinki and future conferences;
2. Afford political and practical assistance to the Central and Eastern European countries in overcoming problems linked with military and strategic reorganisation by helping to speed up the implementation of decisions essential for their full integration in the collective security system being set up in the framework of the CSCE;
3. Establish contacts with the “neutral” countries applying for membership of the European Community so as to examine jointly the evolution of the present situation, the future of European security and progress to be made to meet the commitments entered into in Maastricht;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1992 during the first part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session (7th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. de Puig on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1306).

4. Establish co-operation links with Central and Eastern European countries so wishing;
5. Contribute to the adoption and application of the new confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) to be included in the Helsinki final document by co-ordinating member countries' action in this area;
6. Promote the ratification of the CFE Treaty and its immediate application to all the CSCE countries, in particular the new states of the CIS, by taking part in the name of WEU in procedure for information, control and verification of disarmament;
7. Help to apply the Open Skies Treaty by offering the support and means available to WEU, for instance the Torrejón observation satellite centre;
8. Through its deliberations, contribute to planning the future European defence system and the reduction of armed forces to allow the establishment of a true security system corresponding to the new geostrategic situation of the European continent;
9. Resolutely support plans to eliminate chemical and biological weapons and to reduce nuclear weapons, by adopting joint positions, bearing constantly in mind the strict application of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT), encourage the establishment of a register of arms transfers by the United Nations and complete this initiative with measures aimed at limiting arms exports at world level;
10. Take the following immediate steps, under the auspices of the Chairman-in-Office:
 - (a) continue the WEU consultations in Vienna which have proved so effective an impetus for NATO action in the domain of arms control;
 - (b) ensure that such consultations bring a positive approach to helping refine disarmament discussions among the Twelve in Helsinki;
 - (c) further specific arms control initiatives already begun with certain CIS states, notably Russia;
 - (d) include discussion on a possible CSCE security treaty and on open skies co-operation at the forthcoming ministerial meeting between the WEU Nine and the Central and Eastern European Eight;
 - (e) consult the non-WEU members of NATO with a view to establishing the NACC as part of the infrastructure of the CSCE.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 524***

1. In its reply to paragraph 1 of Recommendation 524, the Council wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to Part I "on WEU and European security" of the WEU Petersberg Declaration of 19th June 1992, in which ministers emphasised the importance of strengthening the CSCE's rôle and institutions for peace and security in Europe.

Aspects of the CSCE follow-up conference in Helsinki – including confidence- and security-building measures – are very high on the agenda of the Council and its working groups, as will be future CSCE conferences.

2. Questions pertaining to the enhancement of WEU's relations with Central European states are addressed in the Council's reply to Recommendations 516 and 518.

3. The Council expects to address the issue of contacts with EFTA member states in the second half of 1992.

4. The Council is convinced that the action of WEU member states has greatly contributed to promoting the ratification of the CFE Treaty. In this context, it should be recalled that, at their meeting in Bonn on 19th June 1992, WEU ministers "welcomed the agreement reached at the CFE extraordinary conference on 5th June 1992 in Oslo which provides the basis for the entry into force of the CFE Treaty which has been and remains a major objective of their arms control agenda. Its full and effective implementation will increase stability and open the way to a new co-operative security order in Europe." Ministers called upon the new states parties to the treaty "to ensure its ratification by the time of the CSCE summit in Helsinki". Ministers also attached great importance to the conclusion of an agreement on the limitations of personnel strength (CFE 1S). In the field of verification, they "noted with satisfaction that a set of rules for the operation of multinational teams in CFE had been prepared in WEU and had subsequently been adopted in the alliance. This represented the first example since the Maastricht Declaration of the introduction of joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultations in the alliance."

5. Possible consequences of the Open Skies Treaty for satellite verification and for the tasks of the experimental WEU satellite centre could be addressed by the Council's ad hoc Sub-Group on Space in the very near future.

6. The Council is convinced that the development of WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance is a substantial contribution to "the establishment of a true security system corresponding to the new geostrategic situation of the European continent". WEU member states reaffirmed in Bonn their resolution to contribute further to the establishment of a new order of peace in Europe which, in accordance with the Charter of Paris, will be based on co-operation.

7. WEU ministers also welcomed steps recently taken by the states concerned to allow for the entry into force of the START Treaty and the important agreement on further strategic reductions reached between the United States and Russia in Washington on 17th June 1992. They expressed their conviction that a chemical weapons convention can be concluded within the next few months. The Petersberg Declaration specifies in this context: "They are confident that this convention can play an important and pioneering rôle in worldwide multilateral arms control and call on all member states of the Conference on Disarmament to lend their support to the emerging consensus. They repeat their commitment to be among the original signatories of this convention and ask all other nations to follow this course."

WEU member states fully support the strict application of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Within the framework of the European Community, WEU member states, together with Japan, introduced a resolution at the 46th United Nations General Assembly calling for a comprehensive but non-discriminatory register of arms transfers in order to enhance and make worldwide the process of greater transparency in arms transfers with a view to contributing to greater restraint. The Council is also fully aware of the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to encourage wider adherence to the Missile Technology Control Régime guidelines.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 16th October 1992.

8. The Council takes due note of the constructive suggestions contained in paragraph 10 of the recommendation. It welcomes the interest expressed by the Assembly in the WEU consultations which have taken place in Vienna.

In Bonn, ministers stressed the readiness of WEU to co-operate on the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty with third parties at a later stage, and in this context welcomed the contacts which had taken place with other European allies, and with the Russian Federation. They agreed that experts should investigate ways of intensifying co-operation with the Russian Federation, which could include a joint feasibility study and/or a trial overflight.

In the declaration on the occasion of the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe in Bonn on 19th June 1992, ministers resolved to "strengthen existing relations between WEU and these states by structuring the dialogue, consultations and co-operation. The focus of consultations will be the security architecture and stability in Europe, the future development of the CSCE, arms control and disarmament, in particular the implementation of the CFE and Open Skies Treaties, as well as the 1992 Vienna document. Developments in Europe and neighbouring regions will be of particular interest to the participants."

The Petersberg Declaration stressed the "valuable contribution of NACC in connection with the reaffirmation by WEU member states of their resolution to contribute further to the establishment of a new order of peace in Europe which, in accordance with the Charter of Paris, will be based on co-operation". In the Council's opinion, however, any questions pertaining to the relationship between NACC and the CSCE will have to be addressed primarily in these two fora.

RECOMMENDATION 525¹

on WEU and the situation in former Yugoslavia

The Assembly,

- (i) Acting through an urgent meeting of its Standing Committee;
- (ii) Recalling Recommendations 506, 511, 512 and 519 which have all sought to prompt specific WEU action to help resolve the Yugoslav crisis;
- (iii) Fully endorsing United Nations Resolutions 713, 757, 770 and 771;
- (iv) Welcoming the progress made as a result of the London Conference but saddened that in spite of many attempts in varying bodies, to find a political solution to the crisis, the suffering of the peoples concerned is intensifying to a devastating degree, not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also in Croatia where Dubrovnik is still being shelled nightly;
- (v) Regretting that the United Nations embargo on Serbia and Montenegro is not being applied effectively, except at sea;
- (vi) Congratulating the Italian presidency of WEU for its initiatives in convening an extraordinary Council of Ministers meeting in London on 28th August, as requested on behalf of the Assembly by its President, and approving the communiqué issued which offers the United Nations assistance in delivering humanitarian aid, in the supervision of heavy weapons and in strengthening the embargo;
- (vii) Pleased that a majority of WEU countries are contributing forces for Operation "Sharp Vigilance" and are prepared to make forces available to support United Nations efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also hoping for a more equitable cost-sharing agreement between member countries;
- (viii) Welcoming the North Atlantic Council's decision to make NATO's logistical infrastructure available to co-operate in WEU action in the framework of United Nations Security Council directives and also welcoming offers by the United States,

URGENTLY RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Seek immediate United Nations approval to impose a complete and total land, air and sea blockade of Serbia and Montenegro, the cessation of all financial, economic and other international assistance and the exclusion of Serbia and Montenegro from all international organisations until such time as they comply completely with all United Nations resolutions and the decisions of the London Conference;
2. Respond favourably to Romanian requests for help in policing the border with Serbia and help to establish similar arrangements with other neighbouring countries in the region;
3. Insist that Greece give the necessary assurances of total compliance with the United Nations embargo before continuing the present negotiations for WEU membership;
4. Offer to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to keep WEU forces available to the United Nations under European command and operational control in order to maintain cohesion and to carry out Resolution 770 effectively, and in close co-ordination with the United Nations;
5. Ensure that the WEU military planning cell is fully operational when established on 1st October 1992 in order to play a specific rôle in the present crisis;
6. Institute a formal liaison mechanism with NATO headquarters and appropriate commands and also with the relevant United States authorities to help promote efficient and cost-effective co-operation and to avoid duplication of effort;
7. Prepare, in conjunction with other bodies, the future military requirements which may become necessary should Serbia not respect the London engagements and, in particular, study the need to:
 - (a) develop the alternative options for action considered on 28th August;
 - (b) plan appropriate anti-submarine and mine-hunting operations in the Adriatic;

1. Adopted by the Standing Committee on 3rd September 1992.

- (c) ensure air superiority in the area of operations and if necessary an air exclusion zone;
 - (d) take steps to ensure sufficient air protection for WEU forces made available to the United Nations;
 - (e) confine all naval assets based in Kotor and Bar;
 - (f) develop electronic counter-measures (ECM) to best effect and, more specifically, jam and neutralise military communications as well as fire control systems;
 - (g) provide military hospital facilities in the region for the treatment of the wounded, both service and civilian, and organise facilities for refugees;
8. Invite non-member nations to co-operate in furnishing military forces to complement WEU assets;
9. Examine action to be taken, including military action, not only to stop present fighting but also to prevent present conflicts spreading to Kosovo, Sandjak, Vojvodina and Macedonia and, in conjunction with the CSCE, consider the timely deployment of protective forces.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 525***

1. Meeting in London on 28th August 1992 following the conclusion of the London conference on former Yugoslavia, the foreign and defence ministers of WEU member states noted the success of operation sharp vigilance to monitor the embargo in the Adriatic. They agreed that strengthening the effectiveness of the embargo established by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 would be "an important means of promoting a political solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia". They welcomed the conclusions of the London conference and expressed the willingness of WEU member states "to contribute to any further measures necessary to make the embargo as effective as possible". Ministers also supported the call by the London conference to the Security Council to consider further measures to ensure rigorous implementation of sanctions in the Adriatic. Furthermore, ministers decided that the ad hoc group should continue its work in this field.

2. At that same meeting, ministers agreed that member states of WEU could, if requested, offer expertise, technical assistance and equipment to the governments of the Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river Danube for the purpose of circumventing or breaking the sanctions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757.

As such requests would be of a civilian nature, they would not, however, concern WEU as such. They could be better handled in other frameworks, such as the EC or the CSCE.

3. The Council takes due note of the suggestion made in paragraph 3 of Recommendation 525.

4. The Council takes due note of the suggestion made in paragraph 4 of Recommendation 525. It recalls that on 28th August 1992, WEU ministers approved the planning carried out by WEU experts covering the protection of humanitarian convoys by military escorts. They welcomed the willingness of the United Nations Secretary-General to recommend to the Security Council that UNPROFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina be enhanced to provide such escorts, and expressed the view that humanitarian operations and associated protective support should be organised by the United Nations. They underlined the collective will of the member states of WEU to contribute to such operations by military, logistic, financial and other means and decided to keep the United Nations informed from that day of the details of such contributions. The Nine also decided to offer collectively, through the presidency, to the United Nations the results of WEU's planning. They asked the ad hoc Group and Contingency Planning Group to elaborate further the necessary planning.

5. At present, the Council does not foresee a "specific rôle in the present crisis" in the former Yugoslavia for the WEU planning cell.

6. In its reply to the Assembly's suggestion for instituting "a formal liaison mechanism with NATO headquarters and appropriate commands and also with the relevant United States authorities to help promote efficient and cost-effective co-operation and to avoid duplication of effort", the Council wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to paragraph 3 of the communiqué of the WEU extraordinary Council of Ministers of 28th August 1992. Paragraph 3 reads: "Ministers decided that the Italian presidency would continue to ensure a full exchange of information and the necessary co-ordination with the other organisations involved (United Nations, EC, NATO and CSCE)."

7. Measures and options such as those listed in paragraph 7 of Recommendation 525, could be prepared by WEU and other bodies, if and when deemed necessary.

8. In principle, invitations to non-member states "to co-operate in furnishing military forces to complement WEU assets" can be extended by the Council on a case-by-case basis.

9. The Council is fully aware of the risk of the present conflict in the former Yugoslavia spreading to Kosovo, Sandjak, Vojvodina and Macedonia. In the opinion of the Council, any "examination of action to be taken, including military action", as well as "the timely deployment of protective forces" is best undertaken in the larger framework of the United Nations.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 16th October 1992.

*Communiqué and declaration on former Yugoslavia issued after the meeting
of the WEU Council of Ministers*

Rome, 20th November 1992

Communiqué

Foreign and defence ministers of WEU member states met in Rome on 20th November 1992.

They reaffirmed their determination to implement the Maastricht and Petersberg Declarations which were landmarks in WEU's reactivation, a process begun in 1984 with the Rome Declaration. They stressed that the enlargement of the organisation, the strengthening of its operational rôle and the transfer of the WEU Council and Secretariat to Brussels, opened a new chapter in WEU's development as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

Ministers also issued a declaration on the situation in former Yugoslavia.

For the first time, the presidency of the Twelve and the Secretary-General of NATO had been invited to attend.

Enlargement of WEU

1. Ministers expressed their profound satisfaction that an important step in the process of strengthening WEU had been taken today with the successful conclusion of the discussions on enlargement held with the countries concerned in line with the objectives set out in the WEU declarations of Maastricht and Petersberg.

Ministers from WEU member states together with their colleagues from the states invited have today agreed the necessary documents so that Greece will become a full member of WEU, Denmark and Ireland will become observers and Iceland, Norway and Turkey will become associate members of WEU.

Development of WEU's operational rôle

2. Ministers stressed the importance of the development of WEU's operational capabilities, in accordance with the Maastricht and Petersberg Declarations, in order to allow a more effective contribution to humanitarian tasks, peace-keeping and peace-making in co-ordination with NATO and other organisations and in accordance with the United Nations Charter and national constitutions. Thus WEU member states would increase their contribution to international peace and stability.

3. Ministers took note of the progress made since their June meeting in strengthening WEU's operational rôle. They were given an account of the recent meeting of WEU chiefs of defence staff. They welcomed the establishment of the WEU planning cell in Brussels on 1st October and looked forward to it becoming operational by April 1993. Ministers asked the Council and its working groups to guide and encourage the planning cell in implementing its tasks and responsibilities including developing planning options and designating military units for missions under WEU auspices. Ministers tasked the Defence Representatives Group to finalise the guidelines for selecting headquarters for these missions.

4. Ministers noted that the planning cell will take forward work on the proposal for European air-maritime co-operation in connection with its rôle of drawing up contingency plans for the employment of a range of national and multinational forces.

5. Ministers agreed that a transfer of IEPG functions to WEU would represent an important step towards enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a WEU European armaments agency. The WEU Permanent Council has been mandated to take all necessary steps in the light of the results of the next meeting of the IEPG ministers.

6. WEU ministers also took note of an interim report on the possible transfer of certain Eurogroup activities to WEU. They agreed that a final report should be prepared for decision by WEU ministers in spring 1993 on the basis of positions prepared within WEU and the subsequent views of a joint WEU/Eurogroup working group.

7. Ministers agreed to the progress report on space activities. They welcomed the fact that the WEU satellite centre would rapidly become operational, as the refurbishment of the building in Torrejón had now been completed and the choice of consortium to equip the centre had been made.

Transfer to Brussels

8. The transfer of the WEU Council and Secretariat-General to Brussels in January 1993 will contribute to the development of WEU's specific relations with the European Union on the one hand and with NATO on the other as they have been defined by the Maastricht Declaration, and to the enhancement of WEU's operational rôle. In this respect, ministers stressed the importance of implementing the necessary practical measures.

WEU co-operation in the field of arms control and disarmament

9. Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the objectives on disarmament and arms control, security co-operation and conflict prevention set out in the CSCE's Helsinki document of 1992. They will promote the achievement of significant results in the CSCE forum of security co-operation in Vienna.

10. Ministers reiterated their commitment to the early entry into force of the Open Skies Treaty. They took note of the progress report prepared by experts and tasked them to continue the search for cost-effective solutions for implementing the Open Skies Treaty, including the possibilities for establishing a WEU pool. Ministers stressed the readiness of WEU to co-operate with third parties and welcomed the intention of the presidency to inform them of the state of play of WEU's work.

11. Ministers welcomed the co-operation between WEU member states on the opening of national inspection teams for the baseline validation phase of the CFE Treaty and looked forward to similar arrangements for the next phase of inspections.

Dialogue with other countries

12. Following the extraordinary ministerial meeting in Bonn on 19th June 1992 between the WEU foreign and defence ministers and their colleagues from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, the first meeting of the Forum of Consultation at Ambassadorial level was held in London on 14th October. WEU ministers welcomed this step in the development of relations with the partner countries of Central Europe and looked forward to meeting their colleagues in the spring of 1993. Ministers also took note of a report on relations with third countries.

13. In accordance with the decision adopted at Petersberg on 19th June 1992 gradually to establish a dialogue with the Maghreb countries, ministers welcomed the first contacts which had been made by the presidency and secretariat with the London Embassies of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

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Ministers expressed their gratitude to the United Kingdom Government, as representative of the host country where the Permanent Council and Secretariat-General had resided since 1956.

Declaration on former Yugoslavia

Ministers discussed the extremely grave situation in former Yugoslavia and in particular the deteriorating conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They expressed dismay at continuing acts of aggression and violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the unacceptable practice of "ethnic cleansing" as well as at the repeated gross violations of human rights. They condemned all forms of obstruction of humanitarian operations. They called on all parties to respect the principles and decisions agreed at the London conference and to work with the United Nations and EC special envoys to seek a peaceful and negotiated settlement to the problems of former Yugoslavia.

They reaffirmed the need for strict compliance with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and stressed that violations of these resolutions would call for consideration of further measures by the United Nations Security Council.

They also reaffirmed their determination to reinforce the contribution WEU and its member states were making in support of the efforts of the whole international community to bring peace to former Yugoslavia and to relieve the suffering of its peoples. In this regard, they noted that, since 16th July 1992, warships and aircraft of WEU member states, under Italian operational control, have been

carrying out operations to monitor at sea compliance with the embargo established by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757. So far, 3 649 ships have been monitored by WEU operations and 71 suspected violations have been reported.

Ministers therefore welcomed the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 787. They decided that WEU will contribute to its implementation and that, to this end, warships and aircraft of WEU member states, on the basis of approved joint planning, will start operations aimed at ensuring the strict implementation of the embargo at sea. These will include stop and search actions and other measures as necessary. The participation of the member states will be subject to the provisions of their national constitutions.

WEU operations in the Adriatic have been undertaken and will continue to be carried out in close co-ordination with NATO. WEU will continue to ensure that the two organisations work closely together.

WEU member states emphasised the importance of the sanctions assistance missions to which they contribute as members of the EC. They appealed to the Danube riparian states to ensure the strict application of the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and confirmed that they were prepared to offer, if requested, expertise, technical assistance and equipment to those states to prevent the use of the river Danube for the purpose of circumventing or breaking sanctions. They also affirmed their willingness to make similar contributions to the implementation of the control of the land embargo at the frontiers.

WEU member states are contributing in a variety of ways to the enhanced operations of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina which are now beginning their task of ensuring the delivery of humanitarian assistance. They reaffirmed the collective determination of WEU member states to contribute to the protection and delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the responsibility of the United Nations and to offer further support to these operations. The member states of WEU are also prepared to study the possibility of and the requirements for the promotion of safe areas for humanitarian purposes.

Action by the Presidential Committee

REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee
by Mr. Foschi, Vice-President of the Assembly*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. Political action
 - II. Organisation of the Assembly's work
-

I. Political action

1. In ensuring the continuity of the Assembly's work in the period between sessions, the Presidential Committee has had two main political concerns: the protection of the people of former Yugoslavia and the future of WEU.

A. The situation in former Yugoslavia

2. At its meeting in Bonn on 25th June 1992, the Presidential Committee "strongly emphasised the helplessness of European governments in face of the tragic events in the last year in former Yugoslavia and particularly in the last three months in Bosnia-Herzegovina". It urged Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, to convey its reactions to the ministers of the Twelve meeting in Lisbon. The Presidential Committee said the time had come to ask the governments "to act immediately to halt the barbaric fighting which is devastating former Yugoslavia".

3. The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina having deteriorated seriously last August, Mr. De Decker, Chairman of the Liberal Group, and Mr. Caro, Chairman of the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats, agreed with Mr. Soell on the need for the Assembly to notify the Council of its consternation at the peoples' suffering and Europe's powerlessness and to make recommendations on the course to be followed. However, it was impossible to organise an extraordinary session at such short notice. The President of the Assembly therefore decided to convene, for the first time, a meeting of the Standing Committee in Paris on 3rd September 1992.

4. Set up last year on the same lines as the Standing Committee of the Assembly of the Council of Europe, our Standing Committee was set up for the specific purpose of adopting recommendations without its action being subject to subsequent ratification by the Assembly. The

members of the Presidential Committee sit on the Standing Committee together with members appointed by the Assembly on a proportional basis so that the representation of delegations is weighted in accordance with the number of their members. The Standing Committee therefore votes in conditions similar to the rules for plenary sessions.

5. The Standing Committee was informed by Mr. Andò, Minister of Defence of Italy about the latest developments in the situation in former Yugoslavia and the arrangements made by WEU. I had previously given an account of my talks with Mr. Emilio Colombo, who had received me specifically so that I could explain his views to the Standing Committee. Consequently, the Italian Chairmanship-in-Office, which had also organised a study mission in the Adriatic for the Chairman and Rapporteur of the Defence Committee, allowed the body that is a miniature assembly to deliberate in full knowledge of the facts. After a detailed exchange of views, the Standing Committee adopted Recommendation 525 on strengthening the embargo. This text was transmitted to the Council in the same way as the recommendations adopted during the first part of our session.

6. The study of the problem of former Yugoslavia has been continued by the Defence and Political Committees. At the present part-session, their reports are to be the subject of a joint debate which the Presidential Committee prepared by holding a joint meeting with the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council in Rome on 18th November, just two days before the ministerial meeting.

7. The Presidential Committee had asked the Italian presidency to resume the custom of joint meetings which allowed it to hold talks with the Chairmanship-in-Office prior to ministerial meetings to ensure that its members and the committee rapporteurs concerned were kept informed and to explain the Assembly's views

on topical matters. Mr. Colombo and Mr. Andò met this wish in full. The meeting allowed participants to describe the positions adopted by the Defence and Political Committees and to have a detailed dialogue with the ministers on the conditions in which the embargo was monitored, on violations of the embargo and on possible solutions to put an end to the ethnic conflicts which are endangering the survival of the populations. The Presidential Committee noted with satisfaction that the Council was at last starting along the course advocated in the recommendation transmitted to it on 3rd September.

B. The future of WEU

8. Tackling the question of the enlargement of WEU at the joint meeting on 18th November, the Presidential Committee referred to the position adopted by the Political Committee which was concerned by the prospect of the accession of Greece and Turkey to WEU on different dates and in different conditions. The Rome communiqué seems to have partly satisfied our Political Committee.

9. The Presidential Committee had stressed the value it attached to the enlargement of WEU. We are gratified that at least one of the three members of the European Community that are not members of WEU, i.e. Greece, signed a protocol of accession on 20th November that will allow its delegation, once the last parliament has ratified the protocol, to play a full part in the work of our Assembly.

10. Last June, in Recommendation 517, the Assembly contested the affirmation in the Maastricht Treaty that 1998 might be a deadline for WEU and asked that legal experts be consulted on this subject. At the joint meeting in Rome, Mr. Colombo gave favourable consideration to this proposal. The Presidential Committee welcomed this because it believes it is essential for the authority of WEU not to be weakened just when it is given a vital rôle in ensuring security in Europe and the world.

II. Organisation of the Assembly's work

A. Preparation of the session

11. As is customary, the Chairmanship-in-Office, held by Italy since 1st July, is represented at this session by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Colombo, and the Minister of Defence, Mr. Andò.

12. The Presidential Committee also decided to invite Mr. Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, whose views on the matters we are to debate will be heard with the greatest attention.

13. In June, the Presidential Committee invited the Minister of Defence of Sweden. At this part-session, it is the Minister of Defence of Austria who is to address our Assembly. It is particularly important for the Assembly to hold a dialogue with the representative of a country that wishes to accede to the European Community with full knowledge of the prospects offered by the Maastricht agreements. Austria's position at the heart of Europe confers special weight on the opinions of its government on the problems affecting part of our continent.

14. I would stress the value the Assembly attaches to associating with its deliberations representatives of the parliaments of neutral countries. The Presidential Committee decided to send, for the first time, an invitation to the Swiss Parliament, which showed its satisfaction at taking part in the work of our Assembly.

15. After hearing in turn the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, our Assembly will be addressed at this part-session by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania. Mr. Melescanu's contribution to our work is set in the context of a European security that necessarily transcends the narrow framework of defence organisations and requires the establishment of an order of justice and peace throughout Europe.

16. Finally, the Presidential Committee has made the necessary arrangements to allow the Assembly to elect a new Clerk. Document 1347 on the election of the Clerk gives all necessary details on this matter.

B. Budgetary questions

17. With a view to implementing Assembly Order 80 on improving procedure for organising the dialogue with the Council on budgetary matters, the President of the Assembly, accompanied by the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, informed the Permanent Council at its meeting in London on 24th June of the guidelines for our draft budget for 1993 and the Assembly's wish to know the Council's opinion earlier than in the past. Indeed, the relevant Assembly bodies must have the time and the facts to discuss the attitude to be adopted in response to the Council's opinion and to take the necessary steps to amend the draft budget, i.e. reorganise the Assembly's activities, in the light of the credits available.

18. To speed up procedure, our Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee adopted this draft budget on 22nd July 1992 and it was immediately transmitted to the Council, whereas it was not usually transmitted until the end of September.

19. It is the more regrettable that the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee did not examine the Assembly's budget until 13th November 1992. I wish to emphasise the backing the Assembly was given on that occasion by the Italian presidency. Its representatives recognised that the Assembly should have resources commensurate with its tasks. We can but regret that the Italian presidency was unable to convince all members of the Council to examine the Assembly's requests more benevolently.

20. The Council's opinion finally reached us on 27th November 1992. The Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration will explain in greater detail the reasons invoked by the Council to justify this tardy

answer. These reasons are linked with the transfer of the seat of the Secretariat-General to Brussels. However this may be, the Presidential Committee will do its utmost to ensure that, in 1993, the Assembly's requests in its Order 80 are met and the Assembly's budgetary dialogue with the Council is held in more harmonious conditions than in the past. The Secretary-General and members of the Permanent Council can testify to the efforts made by the Presidential Committee to this end.

21. The Presidential Committee's efforts to develop a fruitful dialogue with the Council and to organise the work of the Assembly will be crowned with success if the present session measures up to the hopes that members of the Assembly have placed in it.

Election of the Clerk of the Assembly

Document not published in the proceedings.

*Declaration on WEU observers issued after the
meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers*

Rome, 20th November 1992

1. The ministers of foreign affairs of the WEU member states and the representatives of the Kingdom of Denmark and of Ireland met in Rome on 20th November 1992. They recalled the declaration in which the WEU Council of Ministers in Maastricht on 10th December 1991 invited those states to become members of WEU or observers, the invitation issued on 30th June 1992 by the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, the then Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, to open discussions on the basis of the Petersberg Declaration of 19th June 1992, and the replies of the Kingdom of Denmark and Ireland indicating their interest in becoming WEU observers.
2. Following these discussions, the ministers of foreign affairs of WEU confirmed their wish to see the Kingdom of Denmark and Ireland become WEU observers.
3. Accordingly, and without the following factors entailing any changes to the modified Brussels Treaty, the Kingdom of Denmark and Ireland will become WEU observers.
4. They may attend the meetings of the WEU Council, without prejudice to the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty; at the request of a majority of the member states, or of half of the member states including the presidency, presence at Council meetings may be restricted to full members.
5. They may be invited to meetings of working groups.
6. They may be invited, on request, to speak.
7. The Kingdom of Denmark will have the same rights and responsibilities as the full members for functions transferred to WEU from other fora and institutions to which the Kingdom of Denmark already belongs.

*Written questions 298 to 310 and replies of the Council***QUESTION 298**

*put to the Council by Mr. De Decker
on 14th May 1992*

The Council's reply to Written Question 296 raises the following additional questions:

1. What is meant by the fact that Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty is "essentially of a political nature" and that it is not "identifiable in legal terms", when it is part of a treaty that has been signed and submitted for ratification? Is it a policy or a treaty that has to be ratified?
2. Can the Council say what are the "powers" attributed to the European Parliament, referred to in paragraph 3 of its reply, and whether it endorses the opinion of the French Constitutional Council that the European Parliament has only the responsibilities defined by the treaties attributing them?
3. Can the Council say whether the fact that it refers in paragraph 3 of its reply to its "opinion" means that it is based on a political option and not on the juridical certainty that the text of the modified Brussels Treaty appears to justify?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 9th July 1992*

1. The honourable parliamentarian will note that in its reply to Written Question 296, the Council spoke of the "relationship" between WEU and the European Union as described in Article J.4 relating to the common foreign and security policy of the Treaty on European Union. In this context, the Council stressed that this "relationship" is essentially of a political nature and cannot be seen as implying that Western European Union is identifiable in legal terms with the European Union. Treaty Article J.4 constitutes a legal basis for this relationship.
2. The Council's reply to Written Question 296 spoke in very general terms of the fact that the Maastricht Treaty does attribute "certain powers" to the European Parliament in regard to its application. For obvious reasons, the WEU Council has no competence for defining the powers attributed to the European Parliament.
3. In its reply to Written Question 296, the Council expressed its "opinion" that the fact

that the Maastricht Treaty on European Union does attribute "certain powers" to the European Parliament in regard to its application does not in any way impart the rôle attributed to the WEU parliamentary Assembly by virtue of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty. Furthermore, the Council stressed that it remains fully aware of the WEU parliamentary Assembly's independence and its powers, as expressed in the Charter of the Assembly, which is in itself an application of the provisions of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty. However, the WEU Council has no competence for defining the powers attributed to the European Parliament. Therefore, the Council can only express its "opinion" that provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on powers attributed to the European Parliament will not impart the rôle attributed to the WEU parliamentary Assembly by virtue of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty.

QUESTION 299

*put to the Council by Mr. Goerens
on 26th June 1992*

The declarations by the nine member countries of WEU adopted in Maastricht are part and parcel of the legal arrangements agreed upon in Maastricht. Would they still be valid in the event of the Maastricht Treaty not being ratified?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 16th October 1992*

WEU member states are fully committed to the goal of European unity and progressive integration, as expressed in the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty. Furthermore, in their platform on European security interests of October 1987, WEU member states recalled their "commitment to build a European Union in accordance with the Single European Act". The Petersberg Declaration adopted by the WEU Council of Ministers on 19th June 1992 clearly testifies to the commitment of WEU member states to achieve significant progress in developing the rôle of WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance in accordance with the declaration adopted by WEU member states at the Maastricht European Council in December 1991. The

WEU Council's tasks for the next six months are clear and will promote a quantum leap in the organisation's capabilities and responsibilities. As to the declaration adopted by the nine member countries of WEU in Maastricht, indeed they are politically homogeneous to the Maastricht Treaty and respond to the same finalities of European integration. In fact they are aimed at the objective of a European integrated dimension in the field of security and defence, in line with the October 1987 platform on European security interests (according to which "the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence"). As far as formal aspects are concerned, the declarations of the Nine, given their political nature, are not subject to ratification and would thus remain valid even "in the event of the Maastricht Treaty not being ratified".

In any case, the member states of the European Community have repeatedly confirmed their willingness to ratify the Maastricht Treaty within the planned timeframe.

QUESTION 300

*put to the Council by Mr. Goerens
on 29th June 1992*

Countries that become associate members of WEU will be invited to take part in all the activities of WEU and to contribute to the organisation's budget. Does this include the Assembly's budget? Will they take part in the drafting and adoption of the annual report of the Council? Will their delegations to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe benefit from Article IX of the treaty? Does the Council consider that the definition of the status of associate member or observer in WEU is covered by Article XI of the treaty and that, consequently, it is for the Council alone to determine the nature of such status or that it is covered by Article VIII, paragraph 2, which would allow the Assembly to draw the consequences of decisions taken by the Council where it is concerned?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 4th November 1992*

1. According to Part III of the Petersberg Declaration "on relations between WEU and the other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance", "European member states of the Atlantic Alliance which are not member states of the European Union and which have accepted the

invitation to become associate members of WEU, although not being parties to the modified Brussels Treaty, may participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council – without prejudice to the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty – of its working groups and of the subsidiary bodies", subject to a number of provisions. These provisions include the following: "they [the associate members] will be asked to make a financial contribution to the organisation's budgets". The precise modalities of this provision will have to be specified by the Council in the dialogue with the states concerned.

2. As regards the drafting and adoption of the Council's annual report, the modified Brussels Treaty clearly states that a Council created by the High Contracting Parties (Article VIII, paragraph 1) "shall make an annual report on its activities..." (Article IX). It is pointed out that Part III of the Petersberg Declaration specified that neither associate members nor observers are parties to the modified Brussels Treaty.

3. It should be recalled that Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty states: "The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe". Part III of the Petersberg Declaration specifies that associate members and observers are not parties to the modified Brussels Treaty. Hence it appears that only the representatives of the "Brussels Treaty Powers" (i.e. full member states of Western European Union) to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe could be full members of the WEU parliamentary Assembly.

4. According to Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, "the High Contracting Parties may, by agreement, invite any other state to accede to the present treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the state so invited. Any state so invited may become a party to the treaty by depositing an instrument of accession with the Belgian Government". As specified in Part III of the Petersberg Declaration, neither associate members nor observers are parties to the modified Brussels Treaty. Hence associate membership and observer status are not covered by Article IX or Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. The definition of a status of associate state or observer state cannot therefore be considered as creating a subsidiary body within the meaning of Article VIII, paragraph 2 of the modified Brussels Treaty.

The invitations extended by WEU to other member states of the European Union and other European member states of the Atlantic

Alliance reflect the preamble of the modified Brussels Treaty which states: "[The High Contracting Parties,] resolved:... To promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe; to associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other states inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination...".

QUESTION 301

*put to the Council by Mr. Goerens
on 29th June 1992*

Does the reservation in the Petersberg Declaration that Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty would not apply to disputes between member states of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance apply only to countries yet to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty or does it also relate to countries that have already signed the treaty?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 16th October 1992*

In Part III of the Petersberg Declaration, WEU ministers "also stressed that the security guarantees and defence commitments in the treaties which bind the member states within Western European Union and which bind them within the Atlantic Alliance are mutually reinforcing and will not be invoked by those subscribing to Part III of the Petersberg Declaration in disputes between member states of either of the two organisations". This statement is derived from Article VII of the modified Brussels Treaty. It is indeed a transposition of this article to relations between member states and associate members. Article VII states: "The high contracting parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that none of the international engagements now in force between him and any other of the high contracting parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of the present treaty. None of the high contracting parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed against any of the high contracting parties".

QUESTION 302

*put to the Council by Mr. Fourré
on 22nd July 1992*

In its reply to Written Question 296, the Council said that, in its opinion, the powers attributed by the Maastricht Treaty to the European Parliament do not "in any way impair the rôle attributed to the WEU parlia-

mentary Assembly by virtue of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty." Furthermore, just before the ministerial meeting of WEU on 19th June 1992, the WEU Secretary-General spoke to the Security and Disarmament Sub-committee of the European Parliament to describe the change in the rôle of WEU with a view to the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty, whereas he communicated information to the WEU Assembly on this question only after the ministerial meeting.

1. Does this mean that the Council shares the view expressed in Resolution A 3-0123/92 of the European Parliament, according to which the Maastricht Treaty "provides for defence matters to be delegated to WEU without providing for appropriate parliamentary control of the activities of this organisation"?

2. Does this mean that the Council envisages transferring to the European Parliament the responsibilities attributed to the Assembly of WEU under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty?

3. Does the Council consider that Article J.7 of the Maastricht Treaty providing for a direct link between the presidency of the European Union and the European Parliament is liable to render null and void either the modified Brussels Treaty as a whole, or Article IX of that treaty?

QUESTION 303

*put to the Council by Lord Finsberg
on 22nd July 1992*

In their declaration annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, one of the measures listed by the nine governments of the WEU member countries was "encouragement of closer co-operation between the parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament". The Council has subsequently reiterated its encouragement. However, implementation of this encouragement is encountering a number of difficulties, the first of which being the uncertainty regarding what this co-operation should be.

A. Can the Council say whether its "encouragement" is based:

1. On Articles J.7 and J.11 of the Maastricht Treaty which establish the European Parliament's consultative powers in the European Union's common foreign and security policy, completed by Article J.4, paragraph 1, which specifies that this policy "shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence"? Does this imply preparing a transfer of WEU's responsibilities to the European Union referred to in paragraph 6 of

Article J.4 and hence of the responsibilities of the WEU Assembly to the European Parliament?

2. On Article J.4, paragraph 3, which excludes the procedures set out in Article J.3 "issues having defence implications"? In this case, is it a question of endeavouring to distinguish between the respective responsibilities of the two Assemblies?

B. Does the Council consider that, as long as the governments of the member states retain their full sovereignty, from the moment recourse to force is envisaged, the European Parliament, elected by direct universal suffrage and with consultative powers under Article J.9 of the Maastricht Treaty in regard to measures taken by the European Union for the common defence, is an adequate democratic instrument of supervision? Does it not believe, on the contrary, that the WEU Assembly, formed of delegations of the parliaments of the member countries and with supervisory powers under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, is in a better position to exercise true democratic control over the defence of the Union and to uphold Europe's defence requirements with the authorities which have effective power in this field?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL TO QUESTIONS 302 and 303

*communicated to the Assembly
on 16th October 1992*

1. In view of the fact that the issues addressed in Written Questions 302 and 303 are closely related, the Council considers it appropriate to give a joint reply to both questions.

2. In its replies to Written Questions 296 and 298, the Council acknowledged that the Maastricht Treaty on European Union does attribute "certain powers" to the European Parliament in regard to its application. Since the WEU Council has no competence for defining the powers attributed to the European Parliament, the Council can only give its own interpretation that the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on powers attributed to the European Parliament will not impair the rôle attributed to the WEU parliamentary Assembly by virtue of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty.

In the Maastricht Declaration of the Nine on the rôle of Western European Union and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, under the heading "Other measures" (paragraph 8), "WEU notes that, in accordance with the provisions of Article J.4 (6) concerning the common foreign and security policy of the Treaty on European Union, the Union will decide to review the provisions of this article with a view to furthering the

objective to be set by it in accordance with the procedures defined. WEU will re-examine the present provisions in 1996. This re-examination will take account of the progress and experience acquired and will extend to relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance." It should be recalled that Article J.4, paragraph 6, of the Maastricht Treaty reads: "With a view to furthering the objective of this treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this article may be revised as provided for in Article N (2) on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then."

In the present phase, the Council is not, understandably, in a position to prejudge the results of these revisions.

3. The Council takes due note of the issues raised in paragraphs 1-3 of Written Question 302 and paragraph B of Written Question 303. It remains fully aware of the WEU parliamentary Assembly's independence and its powers, as expressed in the Charter of the Assembly, which states: "The Assembly carries out the parliamentary function arising from the application of the Brussels Treaty. In particular, the Assembly may proceed on any matter arising out of the Brussels Treaty and upon any matter submitted to the Assembly for an opinion by the Council."

4. The Council takes due note of the issues raised in paragraph A of Written Question 303. The Council's encouragement of closer co-operation between the parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament is based on the fact that the Maastricht Declaration of the Nine on the rôle of Western European Union and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance specifies under the heading "WEU's relations with European Union" (paragraph 3): "The objective is to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the European Union. To this end, WEU is prepared, at the request of the European Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications." The "encouragement of closer co-operation between the parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament" is one of the "measures" which "WEU will take... to develop a close working relationship with the Union".

QUESTION 304

*put to the Council by Mr. Marten
on 14th September 1992*

With reference to the selective embargo on Serbia and Montenegro decided in United

Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757, to ask the Council:

- (a) to list all those vessels challenged by WEU and other forces in the Adriatic and which are known to have called at Montenegrin harbours, giving details of their port of registry, provenance and declared destination and, where possible, also the cargo carried;
- (b) to report what action has been taken to alert the United Nations authorities to any apparent breach of the embargo at sea;
- (c) to inform the Assembly of approaches made to WEU by Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary and Romania concerning the application of the embargo on the various relevant land boundaries and the response given.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 16th October 1992*

1. The Council regrets that it cannot comply with the request made in paragraph (a) of Written Question 304, as the relevant data is classified. However, the Council would like to take the opportunity to inform the Assembly that, as of 15th September 1992, WEU and NATO forces in the Adriatic had challenged 2161 vessels in implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757. Of these, 32 were suspected of violating the embargo.
2. The WEU presidency is keeping the competent United Nations authorities informed about the progress of operation sharp vigilance.
3. As of 15th September 1992, there had been no official approaches to the WEU Council "by Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary and Romania concerning the application of the embargo on the various land boundaries".

QUESTION 305

*put to the Council by Mr. Lopez Henares
on 8th October 1992*

The frequent changes in the names of the organs of WEU make it difficult for the Assembly to follow correctly the activities of the Council.

Could the Council send the Assembly a full and accurate organogram without delay?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 19th November 1992*

The Council regrets that – for the time being – it cannot comply with the request made in Written Question 305. Preliminary discussions on an updated comprehensive organisational chart have been taking place in the Council and its working groups, and the Council hopes to be able to make available a revised organisational chart to the Assembly in the very near future.

QUESTION 306

*put to the Council by Lord Finsberg
on 15th October 1992*

Does the answer of the Council in paragraph 16 of its reply to Recommendation 517 mean that it refuses to refer to independent arbitration?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

QUESTION 307

*put to the Council by Mr. Goerens
on 15th October 1992*

According to the Petersberg Declaration, associate member states of WEU "will take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they commit forces".

In view of the fact that the two "bases" for military action by WEU are Article V and Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, can it be considered that these articles may be the "basis" for a military commitment by countries that will not be acceding to the modified Brussels Treaty? Should it be considered that WEU military operations might have other "bases" than the modified Brussels Treaty and, if so, which?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

QUESTION 308

*put to the Council by Mr. Goerens
on 15th October 1992*

Do the acts of accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU imply that those two countries subscribed to Protocols Nos. II, III and IV of the Paris Agreements? Do those countries assume all the obligations implied by the said protocols?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

QUESTION 309

*put to the Council by Mr. Goerens
on 15th October 1992*

Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty draws a clear distinction between the high contracting parties to the treaty which, account being taken of Article I to Protocol No. I, include Germany and Italy, and any other state invited subsequently to "become a party to the treaty" "on conditions to be agreed between them and the state so invited". In these conditions, can the Council say, basing its answer on serious legal considerations:

1. Whether it is possible to consider Germany and Italy as high contracting parties and at the same time claim that the period of fifty years provided for in Article XII started in 1948?
2. Whether, in the event of Greece acceding to the modified Brussels Treaty, it would be entitled, as a state acceding to the treaty, to participate in the decision relating to the conditions for the accession of other countries as they have to be agreed with the high contracting parties to Protocol No. I?

3. If the Council is prepared to submit to recognised experts in international law the Assembly's well-founded considerations concerning the interpretation of Article XII of the treaty or whether it intends to confine itself to its "opinion" which has never been justified, even in the answer to Written Question 297, in order to reject the Assembly's point of view on this matter?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

QUESTION 310

*put to the Council by Mr. Caro
on 15th October 1992*

The Petersberg Declaration is an understanding between states with a view to creating, modifying or abolishing a legal relationship between them in two respects:

1. because it provides for non-application of a fundamental article of the modified Brussels Treaty (Article V) in the event of a dispute between a country acceding to that treaty and a country having acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty,
2. because it creates a status of "associate member" in an organisation set up by the 1954 Paris Agreements.

Does the Council not consider that the adoption of acts having such effects requires the intervention of constitutional authorities in member states conversant with the conclusion of treaties? Can it specify the nature of these acts?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

***Protocol of accession of the Hellenic Republic
to Western European Union
together with an annex***

The High Contracting Parties to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, signed at Brussels on 17th March 1948, as modified and completed by the Protocol signed at Paris on 23rd October 1954 and the other protocols and annexes which form an integral part thereof, hereinafter referred to as "the Treaty", on the one hand,

and the Hellenic Republic on the other,

Reaffirming the common destiny which binds their countries and in accordance with the undertaking to complete a European Union made at Maastricht on 7th February 1992 in the Treaty on European Union;

Convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include the development of a European security and defence identity;

Determined to strengthen the rôle of WEU, in the longer-term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union which might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance;

Noting that the Hellenic Republic, which is fully committed to the process of European construction and is a member of the Atlantic Alliance, has formally stated that it is prepared to accede to the Treaty;

Noting that the Hellenic Republic accepts the agreements, decisions and rules adopted in conformity with the Treaty and the declarations starting with the Rome Declaration of 27th October 1984;

Noting that the Hellenic Republic undertakes to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, in keeping with the obligation entered into on 10th December 1991 in the Declaration on the rôle of WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance attached to the Treaty on European Union, and accepts in full the Petersberg Declaration, in particular its Part III, issued on 19th June 1992;

Recalling the invitation issued on 30th June 1992 by the German Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Western European Union to the Hellenic Republic to open discussions with a view to its possible accession to the Treaty;

Noting the satisfactory conclusion of the discussions which followed this invitation;

Noting the invitation to accede to the Treaty issued to the Hellenic Republic on 20th November 1992;

Considering that the enlargement of Western European Union to include the Hellenic Republic represents a significant step in the development of the European security and defence identity;

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

By the present Protocol, the Hellenic Republic accedes to the Treaty.

Article II

By its accession to the Treaty, the Hellenic Republic becomes party to the agreements concluded between the member states, as listed in an annex to the present Protocol.

Article III

Each of the signatory states shall notify the Belgian Government of the acceptance, approval or ratification of the present Protocol, which shall enter into force on the day of the receipt of the last of

these notifications. The Belgian Government shall inform the signatory states of each such notification and of the entry into force of the Protocol.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signed the present Protocol.

Done at Rome this twentieth day of November 1992 in the English and French languages; both texts being equally authoritative, in a single original, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium, which shall transmit a certified copy to the governments of the other signatory states.

For the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium:

For the Government of the French Republic:

For the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany:

For the Government of the Hellenic Republic:

For the Government of the Italian Republic:

For the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:

For the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands:

For the Government of the Portuguese Republic:

For the Government of the Kingdom of Spain:

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

ANNEX

Agreements concluded between the member states in fulfilment of the Treaty:

1. Agreement on the status of Western European Union, national representatives and international staff, signed at Paris on 11th May 1955.
2. Agreement drawn up in implementation of Article V of Protocol No. II to the Treaty, signed at Paris on 14th December 1957.

*Document on associate membership of WEU
of the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey*

1. The ministers of foreign affairs of the member states of WEU and the ministers of foreign affairs of the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey met in Rome on 20th November 1992. They reaffirmed the commitments which bind their countries aimed at ensuring peace and security in Europe. In this connection, they welcomed the development of the European security and defence identity. Determined, taking into account the rôle of WEU as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, to put the relationship between WEU and the other European states of the Atlantic Alliance on a new basis in order to promote stability and security in Europe, they recalled the declaration in which the WEU Council of Ministers invited these states on 10th December 1991 in Maastricht to become associate members of WEU.

2. In this context, they recalled the invitation issued on 30th June 1992 by the German Minister of Foreign Affairs and the then Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council to the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey to open discussions with a view to their possible association to WEU. During these exchanges of views, it has been confirmed that the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey accept the determination of the WEU member states to strengthen the rôle of WEU in the longer-term perspective of a common European defence policy compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance, and that they accept in full Section A of Part III of the Petersberg Declaration.

Following these discussions, the ministers of foreign affairs of WEU confirmed their wish to see the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey become associate members of WEU.

Ministers considered, moreover, that the association of these three countries represents a significant step in the strengthening of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, and thus of the transatlantic link itself, in the spirit of the Declaration of Rome on Peace and Co-operation of 8th November 1991.

3. Accordingly, and without the following elements entailing any changes to the modified Brussels Treaty, the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey become associate members of WEU. They may, although not being parties to the modified Brussels Treaty, participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council – without prejudice to the provisions laid down in Article VIII – of its working groups and of the subsidiary bodies, subject to the following provisions:

- at the request of a majority of the member states, or of half of the member states including the presidency, participation may be restricted to full members;
- they will have the right to speak but may not block a decision that is the subject of consensus among the member states;
- they may associate themselves with the decisions taken by member states; they will be able to participate in their implementation unless a majority of the member states, or half of the member states including the presidency, decide otherwise;
- the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey will be able to be associated to the planning cell through a permanent liaison arrangement;
- they will take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they commit forces;
- they will be connected to the member states' telecommunications system (WEUCOM) for messages concerning meetings and activities in which they participate;
- they will be asked to make a financial contribution to the organisation's budgets.

For practical reasons, space activities will be restricted to the present members until the end of the experimental phase of the satellite centre in 1995. During this phase the new member and associate members will be kept informed of WEU's space activities. Appropriate arrangements will be made for associate members to participate in subsequent space activities at the same time as decisions are taken on the continuation of such activities.

4. The Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey will have the same rights and responsibilities as the full members for functions transferred to WEU from other fora and institutions to which they already belong.

5. The Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey will become associate members of WEU on the day the Hellenic Republic becomes a member of WEU. In the meantime, the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey will be considered as active observers to WEU.

For the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium:

For the Government of the French Republic:

For the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany:

For the Government of the Republic of Iceland:

For the Government of the Italian Republic:

For the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:

For the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands:

For the Government of the Kingdom of Norway:

For the Government of the Portuguese Republic:

For the Government of the Kingdom of Spain:

For the Government of the Republic of Turkey:

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

Council of Ministers, Rome, 20th November 1992

*Presidency declarations extracted from summaries of
discussions between WEU and the three other European member states
of the Atlantic Alliance*

1. *Planning cell*

“ Replying to the Turkish representative, the presidency recalled that the Petersberg Declaration stated that future associate members would be able to be associated to the planning cell through a permanent liaison arrangement.

It follows that an arrangement will be worked out with Turkey and with any other of the associate members who so wish.”

2. *Information to associate members*

“ The presidency, in reply to the representatives of the candidates for associate membership, confirmed that there will be full transparency among the full member states and the associate member states and that timely information on restricted sessions will be given to that effect.”

3. *Statement on “existing treaties or agreements”*

“ The presidency, in reply to a question by the Icelandic representative, confirmed that the reference to “existing treaties or agreements” in the minutes agreed in connection with the document on associate membership includes the Washington Treaty.”

*Minutes agreed in connection with the document associate membership
at the WEU Ministerial Council, on 20th November, in Rome*

– As associate members are not parties to the modified Brussels Treaty, it follows that the reference to the acceptance in full of Section A of Part III of the Petersberg Declaration by the associate members is not related to the provisions of Article X of the Treaty.

– The fifth indent of paragraph 3 of the document on associate membership states that associate members will take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they commit forces. The reference to commitment of forces may cover the provision of logistical and other facilities of a significant nature. If associate members participate in WEU military operations deriving from decisions taken by member states, the arrangements for the conduct of these operations will be established on a case-by-case basis by the participating states.

– The right to speak brings with it the possibility to present proposals.

– Full participation will include participation in caucuses subject to the same rules as for participation in the meetings of the WEU Council and other bodies.

– It is understood that the provisions of this document on associate membership are without prejudice to the rights and obligations deriving from existing treaties or agreements.

– The Council will take fully into consideration associate members’ security interests.

– The document on associate membership cannot be modified without the assent of the associate members.

INFORMATION LETTER

*from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU,
on the activities of the intergovernmental organs*

(20th June – 24th November 1992)

Dear President,

WEU is at a crossroads. From the time of the Rome Declaration in October 1984 which set the course for WEU's reactivation to the Ministerial Council in Rome on 20th November last and which confirmed the organisation's enlargement to a tenth member – Greece – to two observers – Denmark and Ireland and to three associate members – Iceland, Norway and Turkey – the organisation has done much to shape the European defence identity. The reactivation of WEU, which may now be considered as having been accomplished, is an undeniable success in the process of European construction. From now on, we can expect greater cohesion among Europeans within a revamped alliance. We are also seeing the gradual putting into place of the instruments for a "Europe de la défense", and our expectation is that these instruments will provide the European integration process with this vital defence dimension without which it would be unbalanced and stunted.

The successive enlargements of WEU demonstrate that some measure of variable geometry combined with the necessary flexibility have enabled it to move towards the objectives set in 1984, objectives which are still valid despite the turn of events. That is true of the definition of a new Euro-American partnership within the Atlantic Alliance and also true of the gradual edification of WEU as the defence component of the future European Union, and of the enhanced operational rôle of WEU.

The work programme set out by WEU in the Maastricht Declaration has been actively pursued under the Italian presidency. The organisation is not in fact affected by either the pace or the outcome – which I think is favourable – of the Maastricht ratification process. The Declarations adopted on 19th June last by the WEU Council of Ministers at the Petersberg near Bonn, and the Rome communiqué of 20th November provide unambiguous evidence of this fact.

Eschewing futile institutional rivalry, WEU must now, and in future, demonstrate that, having been revitalised and enlarged to embrace its true dimensions, it remains the unique framework for co-ordinating the security and defence policies of its member states with a view to their genuine harmonisation. Between now and the 1996 review date, a further effort of consolidation and in-depth debate will therefore be needed.

The transfer of the Permanent Council and its Secretariat to Brussels early in the new year gives the organisation the opportunity to open a new chapter. Naturally enough, 1992 has been largely dominated by institutional questions and administrative and procedural problems. The urgent task now for WEU is to put back on the Council and working groups' agenda the key issues which are dominating the debate about the conditions of European security between now and the turn of the century.

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The prospect of a European Union with its three dimensions, namely a common foreign and security policy, the gradual establishment of a common defence policy and ultimately a common defence means that – within a system of mutually-supporting organisations, Europe could acquire the means to act by and for itself in this key field of external sovereignty. The total commitment of its member states to this project is needed if Europe is one day to speak and act in unison principally within the alliance but also on the international scene. WEU's future is therefore clearly mapped out provided that its ten member states resolutely move forward together to forge their common destiny. Now recognised as the defence arm of the European Community, WEU must equip itself to be the dynamic defence component of the future European Union¹.

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1. Annex III contains the texts published at the Rome Ministerial Council on 20th November 1992.

Between 20th June and 19th November, the unfolding Yugoslav crisis led to two extraordinary Ministerial Councils being convened, the first on 10th July in Helsinki, in the margins of the CSCE summit, and the second on 28th August in London following the London Conference on the former Yugoslavia².

The Permanent Council has met eleven times (24th June, 1st, 13th, 16th, 22nd and 29th July, 16th and 30th September, 14th and 28th October, 10th November).

Its work focused on the implementation of the Petersberg Ministerial decisions and on preparations for the extraordinary Ministerial Councils in Helsinki and London and the ordinary Ministerial Council in Rome.

On 16th July, the Permanent Council, enlarged to include the political directors and their defence ministry counterparts, met in Rome with the representatives of the other European member states of the European Union and the other European members of the Atlantic Alliance. This meeting, held under the Italian presidency, officially opened the discussions on enlargement between the WEU member states and the six candidate states (Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Norway and Turkey). The procedure initiated on 16th July was pursuant to the decisions taken on 10th December 1991 in Maastricht when the member states of the European Union had been invited to join WEU or become observers, and when the other European member states of the Atlantic Alliance had simultaneously been invited to become associate members of WEU. Part II of the Petersberg Declaration, adopted by the WEU Ministerial Council on 19th June 1992, spelled out the detailed provisions on the status of future associate members or observers. The Italian Political Director, Ambassador Vanni d'Archirafi, opened the discussions by stressing the importance of this step in the organisation's development. The delegations of the member states and the candidate states then formally welcomed the commencement of this work on WEU enlargement. A work programme and procedures were agreed in accordance with the aim stated at Maastricht to conclude the negotiations before 31st December 1992.

On 10th November, the enlarged Council, meeting in London, addressed the preparation of the agenda for the Ministerial Council on 20th November and in particular the questions concerned with enlargement, WEU relations with NATO and the European Union, the development of WEU's operational capabilities and the transfer of the Council and Secretariat to Brussels.

The Council's *Special Working Group* (SWG) and *Defence Representatives Group* (DRG) held four joint meetings (26th June in London, 17th July in Rome, 8th September and 23rd October in London) to consolidate the work in hand to implement the Petersberg Declarations. Among the main topics on the groups' agenda were relations with third countries, the Yugoslav conflicts and the various issues involved in establishing the planning cell.

The SWG also met on 8th and 15th September, 2nd October and 5th November to prepare the discussions on enlargement and the reports to the Council of Ministers on WEU's future relations with the IEPG and Eurogroup. It also took stock of the work of the CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation and developments in the former Yugoslavia.

Four series of meetings under SWG auspices were held in London with the delegations from those EC member states applying for accession or observer status, on the one hand, and with the delegations from the European member states of the Atlantic Alliance, which were applying for associate membership, on the other (15th September, 1st and 22nd October, 5th and 6th November).

The *Defence Representatives Group* (DRG) met six times (25th June, 20th July, 9th and 25th September, 2nd October and 4th November). In accordance with the Petersberg Declaration of 19th June 1992, under which "all WEU member states will soon designate which of their military units and headquarters they would be willing to make available to WEU for its various possible tasks", the group considered how these units could be designated and the type of headquarters likely to suit WEU operations. The DRG also examined in detail all the aspects of setting up the planning cell, which became established in Brussels on 1st October. It also examined a presidency document on a proposal for air-maritime co-operation, which had initially been put forward by the Defence Ministers of France, Italy and Spain on 7th September. Lastly, the DRG addressed itself to WEU's relations with Eurogroup and the IEPG.

The *Chiefs of Defence Staff* (CHODs) of the WEU member countries held their third meeting of the year in Rome on 16th October. They exchanged views on the situation in the former Yugoslavia and in the Commonwealth of Independent States, on the proposal for European air-maritime co-operation, and more generally on all questions relating to the strengthening of WEU's operational

2. An annotated list of the meetings which took place in the context of the Yugoslav crisis is given in Annex IV to this information letter: WEU's involvement in the Yugoslav crisis and conflict - Chronology (June 1991 - October 1992).

rôle. Mr. Salvo Andò, Italian Defence Minister, addressed the Chiefs of Defence Staff during this meeting.

The *Mediterranean Sub-Group* met on 24th July, 21st September and 30th October. It continued its discussions on three topical questions, i.e.: the situation in Algeria, the efforts to resolve the problem of the Western Sahara and the Cyprus question. The group was informed of the preliminary démarche already made by the presidency and the Secretariat-General pursuant to the decision taken by the Ministerial Council on 19th June 1992 progressively to establish a dialogue with the Maghreb countries.

It continued closely to monitor developments in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and to analyse the risks of an escalation of the conflict to Kosovo and Macedonia in particular. The group exchanged views on the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and its repercussions for security in the Mediterranean region, taking as its basis a study carried out by the Institute for Security Studies.

The *Experts Group on the verification of arms control agreements* held several working meetings on the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty (6th July, 25th September and 27th October). Since the Ministerial Council had given its agreement in principle on 19th June 1992 for a feasibility study to be carried out to determine the most cost-effective means of implementing the Open Skies Treaty within the framework of co-operation between the WEU member states, the experts discussed the assumptions on which the study should be based, the definition of options meriting further study, and considered the study's likely costs and the ways in which it might be funded.

The *CFE and the CSBM Verification Experts* met on 20th and 29th July and on 9th October. They continued their work on the practical arrangements for European co-operation to implement the CFE Treaty: operating rules for the multinational teams, training of inspectors and bilateral inspection exercises. Their exchanges of view on the 1992 Vienna document focused on visits to air bases, observations, inspections and evaluation visits in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The *ad hoc Group on Space* met at the Secretariat on 9th, 10th and 30th July and on 9th November to take stock of the work of the team tasked with medium and long-term studies and of the activities of the WEU satellite centre. Experts concerned with the setting-up of the centre met, in turn, at Torrejón on 23th and 24th July, 17th and 18th September and from 4th-6th November.

The *Public Administration Committee* met in London on 8th and 9th October. Its exchanges of views centred on the committee's future and on administrative developments in the member countries. The PAC members stressed the value of their informal meetings within this framework, which gave them the opportunity for a regular – and completely free and frank – exchange of information on their respective administrations. The PAC's work is often linked to the debate on stability and security in our societies. Accordingly, it might well continue to have a place within WEU. The committee members proposed that the PAC's terms of reference and framework be reviewed in 1996.

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* *

As regards relations with the governments of WEU member states, it is worth pointing out that, on 8th July, at the invitation of Mr. van den Broek, the Netherlands Foreign Minister, I accompanied him on the plane from Rotterdam to Helsinki for the CSCE meeting. This gave us an opportunity for a useful exchange of views prior to the extraordinary WEU Ministerial Council on 10th July and on the progress made in implementing the Maastricht and Petersberg Declarations.

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At the invitation of the Icelandic Association for Atlantic Co-operation, I visited Reykjavik from 8th-9th October. On the second day of my visit, I met senior officials from the Foreign and Defence Ministries. The same day, I also had an opportunity for talks with the Prime Minister, Mr. David Oddsson and with Mr. Jon Baldvin Hannibalson, the Icelandic Foreign Minister, on the implications for the Republic of Iceland of associate member status for which it was applying. I was also received by Mr. Björn Bjarnason, Chairman of the Althing Foreign Affairs Committee.

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In the wake of Maastricht and Petersberg, it is vital to keep the American and Canadian leadership and the newspapers, television and academic circles of these two countries regularly informed of WEU's activities. During a recent trip to the United States, I took every opportunity to explain to a very varied American public the importance of strengthening WEU and the European pillar of the alliance for the future of transatlantic relations:

– on 19th October in Washington, I had talks with Mr. Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Niles, Assistant Secretary of State and Mr. Gumpert, Special Assistant to President Bush for European Affairs;

– that same day in Washington, I met the Ambassadors of the WEU member states at a luncheon given in my honour by Mr. Boris Biancheri, Italy's Ambassador to Washington; in the evening, during a dinner-debate organised by the European Institute in Washington, I spoke about "Meeting European security challenges: the rôle of European institutions and transatlantic co-operation";

– on 20th October in Cincinnati, I spoke to members of the Executive Committee of the Council of World Affairs on "The future of European security and the rôle of intergovernmental organisations";

– on 21st October, still in Cincinnati, I gave an address on the same subject to members of the International Studies Academy;

– thanks to an initiative by the New York Council on Foreign Relations, I was able to meet that same day in Minneapolis members of the Mondale Fellows Program under the auspices of the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs (University of Minnesota);

– still on 21st October, I gave a talk on "The European pillar of the Alliance" as part of a workshop on "European security and transatlantic relationships after the cold war: winning the peace"; this had been organised jointly by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Mondale Policy Forum of the University of Minnesota.

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Turning to WEU's relations with the countries of Central Europe, the first meeting of the Forum of Consultation took place in London on 14th October. On the agenda for discussion between the members of the Permanent Council and the Ambassadors of the eight partner countries of Central Europe were the expansion of this dialogue, the development of the CSCE and in particular the post-Helsinki Forum on Security Co-operation and also topical questions, including the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries and the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

In this connection, you will find annexed to this letter a chronology of the main decisions and activities concerning WEU's relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe covering the period April 1990 to October 1992 (Annex V).

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Since Maastricht and Petersberg, the EFTA countries have shown much interest in a dialogue with WEU representatives on the problems of European security. Accordingly, on 29th October in Vienna, I took part in a seminar on "Security and democracy in East-Central and South-Eastern Europe – political developments and possible solutions of ethnic conflicts", organised jointly by the University of Vienna and the Austrian Defence Academy. During my stay, I met Mr. Werner Fasslabend, The Austrian Defence Minister and Ambassador W. Schallenberg, Secretary-General at the Foreign Ministry.

On 9th July, in the margins of the CSCE summit in Helsinki where I was a special guest of the Finnish Government, I had the opportunity to meet Mr. Paavo Vayrynen, the Foreign Minister. I went back to Finland from 15th and 17th November at the invitation of the Finnish Government. I had a number of talks with Mr. Koivisto, President of the Finnish Republic, Mr. P. Vayrynen, Foreign Minister, Mr. J. Blomberg, Director-General of the Political Directorate at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lieutenant-General A. Pajunen, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence and Lieutenant-General G. Hagglund, Acting Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. I also gave a talk on the development of WEU.

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Together with a representative of the presidency, I paid an official visit to Moscow from 2nd-4th November. We were received in turn by the Vice-President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Rutskoi; the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Adamishin; the First Deputy Minister of Defence, Mr. A. Kokoshin; the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defence and Security, Mr. S. Stepashin, and Marshall E. Shaposhnikov, Commander-in-Chief of the CIS High Command. On 3rd November, I was invited to give a talk on WEU at the Moscow State Institute of Foreign Relations (MGIMO). The same day, I met members of the Russian Academy of Sciences at the Institute of

Europe. On 4th November, the presidency representative and I gave a press conference at the press centre of the Foreign Ministry. The same day, I briefed the WEU member states' Ambassadors to Moscow on our talks.

These recent months have been marked by a number of meetings between the Council and representatives of the WEU parliamentary Assembly:

- on 24th June in London, the Permanent Council received the President of the Assembly, Mr. H. Soell, and the Chairman of the Committee for Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Mr. T. Rathbone, who had come to present the Assembly budget for 1993. Prior to this meeting there was a working breakfast attended by Mr. Soell and Mr. Rathbone, H. E. Baron von Richthofen, German Ambassador, H. E. Mr. G. Attolico, Italian Ambassador, Ambassador H. Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General and myself;

- on 25th June in Bonn, Ambassador H. Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, represented the Secretariat at a meeting at which the presidency was able to brief the Assembly's Presidential Committee on the outcome of the Council of Ministers on 19th June;

- on 24th September in London, the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Mr. T. Rathbone, and Mr. R. Cannizzaro, Clerk Assistant for Administrative and Financial Affairs, took part in the discussions of the Budget and Organisation Committee on the Assembly's budget for 1993;

- on 6th November, at a hearing organised at the House of Commons in London, I gave a progress report on the work of WEU to the members of the Assembly's Political Committee;

- on 18th November in Rome, Mr. P. Casardi, Director for Political Affairs, represented the Secretariat-General at the usual meeting between the presidency and the Assembly's Presidential Committee with a view to the Ministerial meeting on 20th November.

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In the field of public relations and information on the rôle and current activities of WEU, my colleagues and I attended the following events:

- on 25th June, at the Secretariat-General, Mr. P. Casardi, Director for Political Affairs, and Mr. A. Jacomet, Head of the Policy and Planning Section, gave a presentation on WEU to a group of officers from the Netherlands Naval Staff College;

- from 1st-3rd July, Ambassador H. Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, represented the Secretariat-General at a seminar on "The problems of European security in the 1990s" organised by the WEU Institute for Security Studies in Pultusk (Poland);

- on 6th July, I gave an address on the European pillar of the alliance as part of a programme organised by the Royal Military Academy at Camberley;

- on 14th July in London, I spoke on "The former Yugoslavia and international security" at a seminar on "The war in former Yugoslavia" organised at the House of Commons by Mr. Bruce George MP and the editorial staff of "YugoFax";

- the same day in London, I gave a talk on "Western European Union and arms co-operation" during the Fifth Annual Seminar on Armaments Co-operation organised by the Defence Systems Management College of the United States Department of Defence;

- on 23rd July, I gave an address on "The security of the new Europe" to students on the course for Central and Eastern European diplomats at Leeds University;

- from 20th-24th July, Ambassador Holthoff took part in the SHAPE Crisis Management Course at Oberammergau. On the 20th, he gave a talk on "WEU and crisis management";

- on 3rd August in Breda (Netherlands), I attended the 45th Congress of the "Inter-Allied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR) "on the subject" Security 2000 and the reservists". I gave an address on the same subject;

- on 4th August, I gave a lecture on "Security in a changing Europe" at the 35th International Seminar for Younger Diplomats organised in Salzburg by the Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs;

- the same day at the Secretariat-General, Mr. P. Casardi, Director for Political Affairs, and Ms. Valleix, Committee Secretary, received a group of students from the French National School of Administration (ENA);

- on 1st September, Ambassador Holthoff gave a presentation on WEU at a symposium on the problems of European security, organised at Skive (Denmark) by the Information Department of the Danish armed forces;
- from 17th to 19th September in Rhodes, I took part in the seminar on "Security challenges in South Eastern Europe" organised jointly by the WEU Institute for Security Studies and the Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy;
- on 22nd September in London, I gave a lecture to the Royal Institute for International Affairs on "WEU - on the way back to Brussels";
- on 25th September in Brussels, I took part in a meeting of the "Petit Comité pour l'Europe" and described WEU developments since the Petersberg meeting;
- on 29th September in Paris, I attended the opening of a symposium on "A new strategic debate" organised by the Ministry of Defence under the patronage of the President of the French Republic;
- on 5th October in Paris, I took part in a seminar organised by the Akademie für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (ASZE) on the subject "The development of security structures and co-operation in Europe";
- on 10th October, Ambassador Holthoff gave a talk on WEU at a symposium organised by the "Freie Demokratische Partei - Bayern" in Würzburg;
- on 12th October in Bracknell, I took part in a "Seminar on peacekeeping" organised by members of the Royal Air Force Advanced Staff Course. I spoke about "WEU's rôle in European security";
- on 15th October in Ebenhausen, I took part in a symposium organised by the "Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik" on the subject "The interlocking of institutions";
- on 21st October in Brussels, Ambassador Holthoff gave an address on the rôle of WEU after Maastricht and Petersberg to the Security and Defence Committee of the European People's Party (PPE);
- on 26th October, I took part in the "Conference on the integration of security policy in Europe - the challenge for Switzerland" organised by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. I spoke about the prospects for WEU after Maastricht and Petersberg;
- on 27th October, I gave a speech on the rôle of WEU at the Royal College of Defence Studies in London;
- the same day, at the Secretariat-General, I received a delegation of Swedish and Finnish journalists;
- on 28th October in Soesterberg (Netherlands), I gave a talk to the "Nederlandse Officierien Vereniging" on the subject of "European defence in a changing world";
- on 29th October in Villach (Austria), Ambassador Holthoff gave a talk on "The rôle of WEU after Maastricht and Petersberg" as part of the symposium on "Security for the Europe of tomorrow" organised by the "Österreichische Volkspartei";
- on 30th October in Rome, I took part in a joint meeting of the European Strategy Group and the Aspen Institute on the subject "Proliferation in the 1990s";
- on 31st October in Madrid, I attended a seminar organised by the WEU Institute for Security Studies in conjunction with the "Centro Español de Relaciones internacionales" on the subject "Security and co-operation in the Western Mediterranean". I spoke on "Prospects for co-operation in the Western Mediterranean";
- from 7th-8th November, I took part in a symposium in Brussels of the Centre for European Policy Studies on the subject of transatlantic relations;
- on 12th November in Bonn, I gave a lecture on "WEU in the 21st century" as part of a seminar on "The prospects for European security" organised by the Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik;
- the same day in Bonn, I took part in the European Round Table on Security Policy organised by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation;
- on 13th November in Amsterdam, I gave a talk on the rôle of the European security and defence identity to members of the Netherlands Officers' Association;

– on 18th and 19th November in Brussels, Mr. A. Jacomet took part in the “ United States Mission Workshop for Central and Eastern Europeans ” on the subject “ Towards a European security architecture ”. He spoke about “ WEU and the European security architecture ”.

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Over this period, I have continued to have regular contacts with the press, radio and television both in London and on the occasion of other engagements.

At the request of the Permanent Council, the Secretariat prepares notes on how the international press has reacted to WEU's activities and the debates about its future. Summarised below are the notes for June, July/August and September 1992.

I. At the beginning of June, journalists paid much attention to the ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union, held from 1st-4th June. The German press paid particular attention to the election to the Assembly presidency of Mr. H. Soell (MdB – member of the German Bundestag). Commentators reacted favourably to the speech given by the WEU Secretary-General and by various foreign and defence ministers.

The press took great interest in the meeting of the WEU Ministerial Council in Bonn on 19th June. The Petersberg Declaration prompted exhaustive and generally positive reports. Comment focused on the new vitality of WEU and the strengthening of its operational capability and the prospect of its enlargement and its relations with the countries of Central Europe. Journalists paid particular attention to the establishment of the planning cell and the question of the availability of forces in the event of a crisis. Several journalists took the view that the intense consultation within WEU would pave the way for concerted European action in the Yugoslav crisis.

There was frequent mention in the press of relations between WEU and NATO and Franco-American relations. Several articles referred to WEU in connection with the multinational air-land and naval exercise known as “ Farfadet ”, which was seen as a move towards giving WEU an operational capability.

II. WEU's involvement in the Yugoslav crisis in July was widely reported in the international press. Journalists underlined the importance of the WEU Council of Ministers held in Helsinki on 10th July in the margins of the CSCE summit at which it was decided to deploy a naval monitoring force off the coast of the former Yugoslavia.

Several in-depth articles were published on co-operation between WEU and NATO. Some articles touched only generally on the question of the complementarity between WEU, NATO and the CSCE while others focused on the role of the CSCE in co-ordinating a possible peace-keeping operation under WEU or NATO auspices. Following the announcement of co-ordination between the WEU fleet monitoring the Strait of Otranto and the NATO fleet operating off the Montenegrin coast, opinion was more divided. Most journalists took note of this co-ordination provided by Italy, but some were concerned at the prospect of an imbroglio in what they described as a clear example of rivalry between WEU and NATO.

Finally, the press monitored the work of WEU enlargement, principally on the occasion of the meeting on 16th July in Rome between the WEU member states and the six candidate countries.

III. During September, press attention focused on the follow-up to the extraordinary Ministerial Council on 28th August, which had taken place after the London Conference on Yugoslavia, and more specifically on the contributions made available to the United Nations by the nine WEU member countries to protect humanitarian aid convoys; it was also underlined that WEU was prepared to take part in a strengthening of the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro if a decision were to be taken to that effect by the United Nations Security Council. Some commentators highlighted the fact that WEU had supplied contingency plans to the United Nations.

The Yugoslav crisis is still prompting many questions about transatlantic relations and the rivalry between WEU and NATO, seen by some as a “ guerre d'étiquettes ” (war of labels). According to the media, there is some confusion in the public mind about the respective responsibilities of the two organisations. In view of some analysts, the Yugoslav conflict has highlighted the fragile credibility of a common European security and defence policy.

During the referendum campaign for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the security dimension of the European Union was scarcely mentioned other than in speeches by some political leaders and in analytical comment by defence experts. Finally, there was considerable press reaction to the speech given on 29th September by the French Defence Minister, Mr. Pierre Joxe, in which he suggested increased participation by France in the activities of the Atlantic Alliance.

- ANNEX I: Extraordinary meeting of WEU Council of Ministers on the situation in Yugoslavia, Helsinki, 10th July 1992: This text has been published in Document 1324.
- ANNEX II: Communiqué issued after the meeting of the extraordinary Council of Ministers, London, 28th August 1992: This text has been published in Document 1327.
- ANNEX III: Declaration on WEU observers issued after the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers, Rome, 20th November 1992: This text has been published in Documents 1348 and 1345.

ANNEX IV

*WEU's involvement in the Yugoslav crisis and conflict**Chronology**(June 1991-October 1992)***1991**

- 27.6 Ministerial Council meeting (Vianden, Luxembourg). First WEU public statement on the Yugoslav situation.
- 1.7 START OF GERMAN PRESIDENCY
- 5.7 Permanent Council meeting in London mainly devoted to the Yugoslav situation.
- 11.7 Ibid.
- 25.7 Ibid.
- 7.8 Permanent Council exclusively devoted to the Yugoslav situation in the wake of the EPC extraordinary Ministerial meeting at The Hague.
- 19.9 *First extraordinary Ministerial meeting on Yugoslavia in The Hague. The EPC communiqué made a reference to WEU. Ministers decided to reconvene the "Ad Hoc Group" created in the context of the Gulf conflicts to review the politico-military implications of the Yugoslav situation. The group comprises of high level experts from both Defence and Foreign Affairs national ministries.*
- 23.9 First meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia in Bonn.
- 26.9 Second Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia meeting in Bonn.
- 30.9 *Second extraordinary Ministerial meeting devoted to Yugoslavia in Brussels.*
- 7.10 Third Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia meeting in Bonn. Consideration of implications of implementation of United Nations Resolution 713 (embargo on arms) by WEU member states.
- 7-8.10 Meeting of the Military Experts Group and the Embargo Group.
- 11.10 Meeting of the Cost-sharing Working Group.
- 15.10 Meeting of a Joint Contingency Study Group in Metz.
- 29.10 Extraordinary Ministerial meeting on the rôle of WEU. The opportunity is

seized to review and discuss the Yugoslav situation on the basis of a report drawn up by the presidency.

- 11.11 The enlarged Council noted the reports and studies of the Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia and decided not to reconvene it or the Joint Contingency Study Groups unless warranted by new developments arising from the decision to impose economic sanctions.
- 18.11 Ordinary Ministerial meeting in Bonn. A declaration on the Yugoslav situation is issued, taking note of the failure of the Yugoslav army to comply with agreed ceasefires or its own undertakings.
- 22.11 Fourth Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia meeting in Bonn.

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1992

The evolution of the Yugoslav conflict was monitored by the WEU Council on a permanent basis during the first five months of 1992. The former Yugoslavia in fact figured on all its agendas under "Topical questions". The same was true of the Special Working Group and Defence Representatives Group, as well as the Mediterranean Sub-Group, which analysed the different aspects of the developments of the conflict.

After its active contingency planning exercise in the summer and fall of 1991, WEU directed its action along two lines:

- preparing for the deployment of Blue Helmet contingents on the basis of Security Council resolutions, a deployment to which member states might contribute;
- Stepping up member states' efforts to create humanitarian corridors.

In this context, the Ad Hoc Group's rôle was to consider practical arrangements for the possible implementation of the required contingency plans.

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- 4.6 Meeting of the Permanent Council mainly devoted to the Yugoslav conflict.
- 19.6 Ministerial meeting in Petersberg, Bonn, followed by an extraordinary Ministerial meeting with the Central European countries. In both meetings, the situation in the former Yugoslavia was reviewed and discussed. A special statement was issued condemning the ongoing use of force, urging humanitarian aid, reaffirming full support for the United Nations operations and resolutions as well as for the Conference on Yugoslavia.
- 25.6 Meeting of military experts on Yugoslavia.
- 26.6 Meeting of the Ad Hoc Sub-Group on Yugoslavia.
- 1.7 START OF ITALIAN PRESIDENCY
- 2.7 Meeting of naval experts in Rome.
- 3.7 Meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia in Rome.
- 10.7 *First extraordinary Ministerial meeting in the margins of the CSCE Helsinki meeting.* Ministers took note of the Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia report and decided:
1. to implement the monitoring at sea operations proposed by the Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia for the surveillance of the embargo set up by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 (off the Yugoslav coast, in international waters and under Italian co-ordination).
 2. to make an inventory of WEU member states' contributions to the competent United Nations authorities in the field of humanitarian aid.
- 14.7 Meeting in Rome of the naval points of contact, mainly devoted to WEU/NATO co-ordination of naval operations of surveillance.
- 17.7 Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia meeting in Rome.
- 23.7 Meeting of naval experts on embargo and Humanitarian Group in Rome.
- 30.7 Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia meeting in Rome.
- 13.8 Meeting of Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia and Humanitarian Group in Rome.
- 17-21.8 Meetings of the Contingency Planning Group in Rome.
- 24.8 Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia meeting in Rome.
- 26.8 Opening of London Conference on Yugoslavia.
- 27.8 Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia meeting in London.
- 28.8 *Second extraordinary Ministerial meeting on Yugoslavia in London.* A communiqué was issued. Ministers discussed the contribution WEU could make to the peace process in former Yugoslavia on the basis of the Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia report and the conclusions of the London Conference. They stressed the importance of strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations embargo and sanctions. They noted contributions which WEU and its member states were already making and were prepared to make for humanitarian aid and supervision of heavy weapons. The Presidency would liaise with the United Nations as well as the EC, NATO and CSCE. It wrote to the United Nations Secretary General to send a document listing member states' contributions. The United Nations Secretary General conveyed to WEU officials his appreciation for the quality of WEU's planning work, which greatly helped the preparation of United Nations Secretariat and HCR decisions.
- 8.9 Meeting in London, the Special Working Group reviewed the follow-up to the extraordinary Ministerial Council.
- 14.9 In its Resolution 776, the Security Council authorised the enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength. Among the countries participating in the UNPROFOR are 6 WEU member states: Belgium (with a contingent from Luxembourg), France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.
- 14.9 Meeting of the Contingency Planning Group in London on anticipated requirements and updates of proposed contributions.
- 16.9 Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia meeting in London.
- 30.9 Meeting of the Contingency Planning Group in London.
- 1.10 Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia meeting in London.
- 14.10 Meeting of the Contingency Planning Group in Rome.

ANNEX V

***Chronology of main decisions and activities concerning
WEU's relations with countries of Central Europe****(April 1990 – October 1992)*

- 23rd April 1990: The WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Brussels gives the initial mandate to the Presidency and Secretary-General to establish "contacts for two-way information with the democratically elected governments in Central and Eastern Europe". (Paragraph 8 of the Brussels Communiqué). After subsequent discussions in the Permanent Council, it was agreed that these contacts should take the form of fact-finding missions by a representative of the French Presidency and the Secretary-General. Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland would be the first countries to be visited.
- 22nd-23rd October 1990: French Presidency – Secretary-General fact-finding mission to Hungary. Talks with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky and First Deputy Defence Minister, Lt. Gen. Antal Annus, and representatives of the Hungarian Parliament.
- 5th-6th November 1990: French Presidency – Secretary-General fact-finding mission to Czechoslovakia. Talks with Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier, First Deputy Foreign Minister Robert Harenar, Deputy Foreign Minister Zdenko Pirek, Deputy Defence Minister Mr. Rasek and representatives of the Federal Assembly.
- 10th December 1990: The WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Paris agreed to develop the contacts and "took up the idea of multilateral meetings under the aegis of the WEU Institute for Security Studies" (Paragraph 4 of the Paris Communiqué).
- 7th-8th March 1991: French Presidency – Secretary-General fact-finding mission to Poland. Talks with Ministers and officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence and from the President's office as well as with representatives of both houses of the National Assembly.
- 11th-12th March 1991: Seminar under the aegis of the WEU Institute for Security Studies bringing together the officials responsible for politico-military affairs in the Foreign and Defence Ministries of WEU member states and their counterparts from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.
- 27th June 1991: Ministers meeting in Vianden endorsed a series of measures to give WEU's dialogue with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe more depth and breadth (see Vianden communiqué):
- ad hoc contacts with Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland at Ministerial level on specific subjects of common interest;
 - information links between the Secretariat-General and the Embassies of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland and between these three governments and the Embassy of the Presidency;
 - Secretary-General – Presidency fact-finding missions to Bulgaria and Romania;
 - WEU Institute study awards to be granted to young researchers from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe;
 - exchanges of views among experts on subjects of common interest including further seminars for officials organised by the WEU Institute for Security Studies.
- July 1991: The Secretary-General, with representatives of the German Presidency, inaugurates the information links between the Embassies of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland and the Secretariat-General in separate meetings with the three Ambassadors on 9th, 10th and 31st July respectively.

- 31st Oct.-1st Nov. 1991: German Presidency – Secretary-General fact-finding mission to Bulgaria. Talks with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Valkov, President Zhelev, Defence Minister Mustavchiev, Prime Minister Popov, Chairman of the UDF Co-ordination Committee Dimitrov.
- 3rd-4th November 1991: German Presidency – Secretary-General fact-finding mission to Romania. Talks with Foreign Minister Nastase, representatives of the Romanian Parliament, Defence Minister Spiriou, Prime Minister Stolojan and President Iliescu.
- 18th November 1991: Meeting in Bonn, Ministers reaffirm their intention to help consolidate peace and stability in Europe by enhancing the dialogue on security and co-operation between WEU and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic states and the Soviet Union. Ministers resolved that the next measures should be as follows:
- the Foreign and Defence Ministers of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania will be invited to participate in a special meeting with the members of the Council;
 - seminars in these countries organised by the WEU Institute for Security Studies;
 - expansion of the WEU Institute scholarship programme;
 - fact-finding visits by the Presidency and Secretary-General to the Soviet Union and to the Baltic States, if the latter are interested.
(see Bonn Communiqué).
- 28th-29th November 1991: Second seminar under the aegis of the WEU Institute for Security Studies bringing together the officials responsible for politico-military affairs in the Foreign and Defence Ministries of WEU member states and their counterparts from Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Poland.
- 21st January 1992: German Presidency – Secretariat-General fact-finding mission to Estonia. Talks with Foreign Minister Meri, Chairman of the Supreme Council Ruutel, Minister of State for Defence Questions Vare, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Economy Leimann.
- 22nd January 1992: German Presidency – Secretariat-General fact-finding mission to Latvia. Talks with Minister of State Dinevics, Minister of Defence Jundzis, Chairman of the Defence and Internal Affairs Commission of the Supreme Council Simonis, Minister of Foreign Affairs Jurkans, Deputy Foreign Minister Virsis, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Council Berzins, Chairman of the Supreme Council Gorbunovs.
- 23rd-24th January 1992: German Presidency – Secretariat-General fact-finding mission to Lithuania. Talks with Foreign Minister Saudargas, Defence Minister Butkevicius, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council Kuzmickas, Deputy Prime Minister Vaisvila.
- 11th-12th May 1992: Third WEU Central and East European seminar under the aegis of the WEU Institute in Budapest.
- 19th June 1992: Extraordinary Meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with eight states of Central Europe (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania) in Petersberg (Bonn).
- The Foreign and Defence Ministers adopted the following concrete measures:
- Foreign and Defence Ministers will meet once a year. Additional meetings at ministerial level may be convened if circumstances require.
 - A forum of consultation will be established between the WEU Permanent Council and the Ambassadors of the countries concerned. It will meet at the seat of the WEU Council at least twice a year.
 - These meetings will provide an opportunity to monitor the implemen-

tation of the measures adopted and, where appropriate, to make proposals for the inclusion of other fields of co-operation.

- Consultations at ministerial and WEU Permanent Council/Ambassador level on security issues may be complemented by meetings with an ad hoc WEU troika at senior official level.
- The following initiatives will be continued and encouraged:
 - Regular exchanges of documents and information;
 - Growing co-operation between WEU Institute for Security Studies and the corresponding bodies in the countries concerned. An increasing number of seminars and colloquia will be organised. The programme of scholarships will be continued.

Ministers advocated the development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the states concerned.

These measures, conducted in the framework of WEU with the states of Central Europe, and similar endeavours conducted in the alliance framework, will be mutually complementary and reinforcing.

In a "Declaration on Nagorny-Karabakh" of the extraordinary Meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe, Ministers reiterate their appeal to the parties to the conflict to establish immediately an effective ceasefire and to take additional steps, including withdrawal from occupied areas.

14th October 1992:

First meeting of the forum of consultation (consisting of Permanent Representatives to the WEU Council and Heads of Mission in London of the eight Central European countries) at the WEU Secretariat-General, London.

As of early October 1992, the WEU Institute for Security Studies had offered 12 study awards to students from the following Central European countries: Bulgaria (2), Czechoslovakia (1), Hungary (4), Poland (5).

The situation in East Timor

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION ¹

*tabled by Mr. Brito and others
under Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure
with a request for urgent procedure*

In the spirit of its resolution of 3rd December 1991, the Assembly of Western European Union:

- (i) Considering the imprisonment by Indonesia of the East Timor resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, on the eve of the United Nations negotiations for obtaining a political solution with due respect for the United Nations Charter and relevant resolutions;
- (ii) Considering that the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and many other international organisations still do not to accept the occupation of East Timor,

PROTESTS at the detention, without legal assistance and with no possibility of visits from the International Red Cross, of the Timor leader Xanana Gusmao

and URGES THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT to release him immediately.

Signed: Brito, Borderas, Martinez, De Decker, Lentz-Cornette, Finsberg, Caro, Smith, Mackie of Benshie, Agnelli, Cuco, Roseta, Fernandes Marques, Aguiar, Curto, Pinto

Request for urgent procedure:

Signed: Brito, Poças Santos, Curto, Martinez, Nuñez, Cuco, Pistre, Roman, Masseret, Pinto

1. See 12th sitting, 2nd December 1992 (urgent procedure agreed to).

*Acts of violence in camps, crimes against humanity
and war crimes in former Yugoslavia*

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION¹

*tabled by Mr. Pécriaux and others
under Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure
with a request for urgent procedure*

Thousands of women and children are victims of the most brutal acts of violence. They are physically and morally humiliated and forced to have "Chetnik" children. Reports by women who have been raped prove that they are aggressed in an incredible sexual manner and totally humiliated. Each day they are ill-treated by several men – sometimes at the same time – and are forced to watch acts of violence committed on those close to them. The psychological consequences are difficult to imagine. These women can expect no help from their compatriots, who believe that the women who have been raped have lost their honour. Those responsible for the rape wish to reduce the Muslim population, which is tantamount to ethnic cleansing. Women and girls are held in "rape camps" where each day they are humiliated and tortured repeatedly and by groups and are often even killed.

The parliamentary Assembly of WEU considers that these acts and war crimes are in the context of the policy of violence by armies at war and urges

1. the governments of member countries to endeavour to ensure that these tortures and war crimes are brought to an immediate end;
2. governments to examine the question of including rape as a war crime in conventions of international law;
3. the governments of member countries to earmark financial means for counselling and assisting women and girls who have been raped;
4. the European Community to take effective steps to put an end to the war, extend aid programmes, assume joint responsibility for assisting refugees and examine guarantees for receiving the women concerned;
5. international organisations such as the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees to strengthen their assistance to the women concerned in Bosnia-Herzegovina, establish true areas of protection and increase their medical and psychological assistance to the victims of torture.

Signed: Pécriaux, Fischer, Caro, De Decker, Lenzer, Antretter, Marten, Tummers, Borderas, Brito, Speed, Dimmer, Newall, Aarts, De Hoop Scheffer, Finsberg, Jung, Fry, Hooper, Hunt, Ghesquière, Fabra, Alvarez, Martinez, Stoffelen, Lopez Henares, Soell, Dundee, Alloncle, Durand, Thompson

1. See 13th sitting, 3rd December 1992 (urgent procedure agreed to).

***Acts of rape and castration, crimes against humanity and war crimes
in former Yugoslavia***

DRAFT RESOLUTION ¹

***submitted on behalf of the Political Committee ²
by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur***

The Assembly has been informed that on the territory of former Yugoslavia:

1. thousands of women and children, sometimes concentrated in special camps, are victims of brutal rape;
2. women are being forced to complete the resulting pregnancies;
3. men are being castrated.

The Assembly condemns most strongly these sexual aggressions perpetrated as acts of humiliation of the human being and used as a weapon of war.

The Assembly urges the governments of member countries:

- (a) to intervene immediately to bring about an immediate end to these tortures and war crimes;
- (b) to bring to trial those responsible for these crimes against humanity;
- (c) to assist the victims by all the means at their disposal.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. *Stoffelen* (Chairman); Lord *Finsberg*, Mr. *De Decker* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Aarts*, *Agnelli* (Alternate; *Bosco*), *Alegre* (Alternate: *Mrs. Aguiar*), *Andreotti*, (Alternate: *De Carolis*), *Beix*, *Benvenuti*, *Bowden* (Alternate: *Sir Keith Speed*), *Caro*, *De Hoop Scheffer*, *Fabra* (Alternate: *Martinez*), *Feldmann*, *Forni*, *Foschi*, *Goerens* (Alternate: *Mrs. Err*), *Homs I Ferret* (Alternate: *Diaz*), *Sir Russell Johnston* (Alternate: *Hughes*), *Lord Kirkhill*, MM. *Kittelmann*, *Koehl*, *Maroni* (Alternate; *Caldoro*), *Moya*, *Müller*, *Péciaux*, *de Puig*, *Reddemann*, *Rodrigues*, *Roseta*, *Seeuws*, *Soell* (Alternate; *Antretter*), *Ward*, *Wintgens* (Alternate: *De Decker*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Emergency assistance to Somalia

MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION¹

tabled by Mr. Fourré and others

The dramatic situation in Somalia and the growing difficulty of taking in humanitarian assistance are making the international community take urgent action in that country. The announcement of the imminent deployment of a United States expeditionary force and the forthcoming adoption of a United Nations Security Council resolution raise the question of a European presence in this humanitarian action.

WEU, which, during the Gulf war, showed that it was capable of swift implementation of the appropriate operational means, must, on behalf of Europe, make its contribution to restoring normal conditions for distributing humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

Answering a question put by Mr. Fourré in the WEU Assembly on 2nd December 1992, Mr. Andò, Italian Minister of Defence, said that if several WEU countries wished to take part in this action, WEU would have to define a joint operational position.


THE ASSEMBLY THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine as a matter of urgency the conditions for implementing joint action by WEU member countries in the context of the operation carried out in Somalia under the aegis of the United Nations;
2. Instruct the chiefs of defence staff to define the logistic means necessary for such an intervention.

Signed: Fourré, Fischer, Poças Santos, Antretter, Tummers, Roseta, Newall, De Decker, Hunt

1. See 13th sitting, 3rd December 1992 (motion referred to the Political Committee).



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