



Inside the Spring 2014 EUSA Review:

EUSA Review Forum: Varieties of Simulations

Preparing US students for an EU simulation

Rebecca Jones 2

Involving Policy Practitioners in EU Simulations

John Scherpereel 5

Teaching The European Union in Action: Using the Passenger Name Records (PNR) Negotiations (2002-2012)

Eleanor Zeff 7

EUSA AFSJ Interest Section Essay

European Governance of Digital Spaces

Helena Carrapico 11
Javier Argomaniz

EUSA EU-Latin America Interest Section Essay

Drug Policies in the EU and Latin America Relationship

Alejandro Chanona 15

EUSA EU and the Developing World Interest Section Essay

Aid Effectiveness meets Domestic Politics

Svea Koch 18

Book Reviews

20

Maas, Willem (ed.). *Multilevel Citizenship*

Reviewed by **Nathan Cambien**

DeBardeleben, Joan and **Crina Viju** (eds.). *Economic Crisis in Europe: What It Means for the EU and Russia*

Reviewed by **Beverly Barrett**

Buonanno, Laurie and **Nugent, Neill**. *Policies and Policy Processes of the European Union*

Reviewed by **Alba Cicala**

Adebajo, Adekeye and **Kaye Whiteman**. *The EU and Africa: From EuroAfrique to Afro-Europa*

Reviewed by **Tatiana Coutto**

Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., and **Schimmelfennig, F.** *Differentiated Integration: Explaining Variation in the European Union*

Reviewed by **Christopher J. Williams**



Varieties of Simulations

In this edition of the Review forum, we revisit the theme of simulations in EU studies, drawing much on the contributions of EUSA's interest section on teaching. In many ways, the evolution of the European Union has been paralleled by the proliferation of EU simulations. Thirty years ago, when the EU's Common Market and governing institutions were still maturing and its membership was less than half of what it is today, few opportunities existed for students to participate in simulations of the European Union. Indeed, it is not clear whether there were any regular opportunities for this anywhere at that time.

Today, as with EU, much has changed. There is now a wide variety of EU simulations, and the number and type of these experiences seems to grow annually. Moreover, as argued in the articles featured here, it is widely accepted that simulations can enhance the ability of students to learn about the EU. Consequently, more faculty members are willing to include simulations in their curricula, and more institutions are willing to support these initiatives. Certainly students have embraced simulations as well, though we may not know whether they want to just want learn about the EU, or, more likely, that they are drawn to experiential learning because it is more enjoyable than traditional approaches to course material. In any case, participating in simulations augments what students know about the EU and sets them apart from peers who learn only through textbooks and lectures. Each of the articles below describes a different type of EU simulation and emphasizes a different aspect of the simulation experience.

Rebecca Jones, who is co-chair of EUSA's interest section on teaching, writes about her experience with an intercollegiate simulation of the EU, known as "EuroSim," organized by the Transatlantic Consortium for European Union Simulations and Studies (TACEUSS). This simulation takes place over four consecutive days and usually focuses on the EU's legislative process in a particular policy area. An important feature of EuroSim is that it brings together 150 students from colleges and universities on both sides of the Atlantic and includes both undergraduate and graduate students. Jones focuses on the preparation phase of this EU simulation regarding her own students at Widener University.

John Scherpereel also writes about a simulation that takes place over several days, this one sponsored jointly by James Madison University's Florence-based M.A. program in Political Science (for its concentration in the EU Policy Studies) and the University of Flor-

ence's M.A. program in International Relations and European Studies. However, this simulation is aimed just at 40 or so students in both programs, occurs in multi-day segments across several months, and always focuses on EU foreign policy. Another prominent feature of this simulation is its inclusion of EU practitioners in the learning experience, which is important for both programs because of their focus on professional training for future diplomats and policy-makers. Scherpereel's impressive article deals mainly with how and why this simulation is designed.

Eleanor Zeff has much experience with intercollegiate EU simulations, but, here, she writes about case-teaching, which takes place in her undergraduate course at Drake University (but be conducted in any classroom). Zeff's simulation is also unique because it deals with transatlantic differences and issues, particularly the sharing of European airlines' Passenger Name Record (PNR) data with the US Department of Homeland Security. This experience is divided into four stages of 15-25 minutes each, during which students simulate the actual negotiation between the US and EU on PNR that took place between 2007 and 2012. Zeff's article focuses on how her scenario helps students learn about real international relations and highlights how simulations can help students appreciate international differences concerning values, decision-making styles and culture.

John D. Occhipinti, *EUSA Review Editor*

Preparing US Students for an EU Simulation

Rebecca Jones

Introduction

Preparing students for effective and beneficial participation in an EU simulation can be challenging. Most US students are unfamiliar with the European Union at best and completely unaware of its existence at worst. Participation in a simulation can increase cognitive knowledge (facts and figures) in a manner that is fun and effective. However, how does one go about not only introducing the EU, but helping students arrive at a point where they are effective and engaged policy-makers within the EU simulation? And, given the potential difficulties in preparation, why would one choose to engage students in such a simulation?

Simulations are viewed as a more effective means of teaching facts and theories than traditional lectures because, as Shellman notes, students are required "to analyze specific situations, reflect on their observations, confront problems, and develop their own ideas" (Shellman 2001: 827). Dougherty agrees, pointing out

that simulations comprise "a number of broad practical and pedagogical goals" (Dougherty 2003: 240). Simulations currently in use in political science classes include everything from "Fantasy Congress" which is based on fantasy football or baseball games, to making political and policy decisions in the town of Camelot (Woodworth, Gump, and Forrester 2005), to playing the role of a Congressional representative marking up a bill in committee to writing and passing legislation for the European Union (see Zeff 2003). As Watson noted, simulations and games "serve as vehicles through which the individual can practice communication skills, and experiment with strategies and tactics of social interaction. In games the individual is able to learn about and try out new or potential social roles" (Watson 1975: 43). When students act as lawmakers or business managers in a simulation they are trying out new and potentially future roles for themselves. Additionally, students benefit from participation in simulations in ways not always as immediately noticeable as grades or class performance. It has been shown that affective learning is more than a beneficial side-effect of simulations, it is actually a desirable outcome (Jones 2008; Jones and Bursens 2013).

Preparing for EuroSim

EuroSim is a cross-continent simulation of the EU involving US and European universities. Every other year it switches venues between the US and Europe. Participants range in age and experience from freshmen/first year students (approximately 18 years of age) to master's level law and EU policy students (about 23 years of age and older). The wide range of age and experience presents a challenge in preparation for those faculty members with younger students. Many US students have not traveled outside of the US prior to participating in EuroSim (and a good number has not traveled more than two hours away from home). At Widener University, many students are first-generation college students and are coping with the stresses of family expectations as well.

Once the simulation is underway, faculty are no longer involved in any of the processes. Therefore, giving students the most thorough preparation possible is necessary. At Widener University, two courses, one full three-credit course (POLS 228), and one half-semester, one-credit course (POLS 229), are used to prepare students for EuroSim. The three-credit course is offered approximately every other year as students repeat their participation in EuroSim; the one-credit course is offered every year and is required for every student participating in EuroSim.

In POLS 228, the first half of the semester is centered on the history and institutions of the EU. Since US students are familiar with the concept of a federal

government, the structure and relationship of the US national government and the states is used as a comparison case with the structure of the EU. In this section, the focus is on the powers of US states versus the powers and positions of the EU Member States. The focus then moves on to the institutions of the EU. Again, the comparison with institutions of the US federal government is made. In the attempt to find equivalent institutions across the two political structures, students come to realize the differences between the two sets of institutions. The next section of the course examines the contrast between the US constitution and the treaties of the EU; how these documents distribute power, create institutions and bureaucracies, and change governing structures is examined. Additionally, the policy process and treaty process are explored. The differences in policy implementation at the level of EU Member States and US states are examined as well. Throughout the semester, random, in-class quizzes covering the readings are assigned, as well as short reaction papers. These two types of assignments help keep students up-to-date on the readings and insure that any problematic issues are addressed early on in the process.

The second half of the semester is spent studying the specific topic for EuroSim both in terms of the details of the policy or issue and what path it will take through the EU institutions. The background questions, problems, and Member States' positions are researched and discussed. Students again work on reaction papers and have a take-home exam. An additional project will be added for the Fall 2014 iteration of POLS 228. Students will work in teams to create a country position paper and present their position on the issue at the end of the semester. Based on results from presentation assignments in other classes, such an assignment should mean that those students participating in EuroSim will arrive feeling more comfortable speaking in front of, or to groups, while those students not participating will still gain a more "inside" view of the EU. In addition, such an assignment provides students with an opportunity to gain experience working in groups, something they will have to do during the simulation.

The one-credit class, POLS 229, is offered in the same semester as EuroSim, or immediately prior depending on the dates of the simulation, and is treated as a topic-specific review course. This course begins with a very quick overview of the structures, treaties, and policy processes of the EU; excerpts from basic texts are used (Ginsburg 2010, McCormick 2011). Focus then shifts to the EuroSim topic and the specific roles students will be playing and the countries they will represent. Students first submit a short paper discussing the topic area, problems, benefits and any implementation issues. This paper should include a discussion regard-

ing any Member States who may ask for exemptions or strongly resist implementation. The final assignment due before the simulation is a short paper on their alter-ego role. This paper includes the background, general political views, and opinions regarding the topic and/or policy for EuroSim. The paper assignments are ordered this way so that students (hopefully) have a complete understanding of the topic, and then can figure out how their alter-ego will react and easily remain in character. This assignment also prepares students to respond to any counter-arguments that may be brought up in discussions during the simulation.

About a week after the simulation, students are required to submit a debriefing paper. This assignment asks students to review the preparation provided by the instructor, their own efforts at preparation, and an evaluation of their performance during the simulation. Students who are first-time participants have indicated that while they were more prepared than they initially believed, they also recognize that there was more they could have done themselves. This is borne out by post-simulation surveys which show that students do recognize when they have not adequately prepared (Jones 2008, Jones and Bursens 2013). Additionally, assignments such as the team presentations on individual country positions are being added to the course at the suggestion of the students.

So, how did they do?

Participation in EuroSim opens up a broader understanding of the world and how it works for US students, many of whom have not traveled beyond a two-hour radius of their hometown. When they are presented with the EU as a comparison to the US system, they appear to have an easier time grasping the differences between the two political structures. While preparing students to successfully participate in EuroSim presents challenges both in terms of understanding and time constraints, the results can be eye-opening and are beneficial for content knowledge as well as gaining practice and experience with life-skills such as negotiation and group work. Over the course of ten years of Widener University participation in EuroSim, student responses to debriefing questions have shown a great deal of similarity; they understand the workings of the EU far more clearly than without the simulation, and they realize that complicated topics can become understandable.

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Involving Policy Practitioners in EU Simulations

John Scherpereel

Scholars of teaching and learning have shown that EU simulations can be powerful pedagogical tools in EU politics classes (Jozwiak 2012; Kaunert 2009; Switky 2003; Zeff 2003) and in more elaborate simulation events (Jones 2008; Van Dyke et al. 2000). Regardless of their specific setting, all simulations aim to increase students' understanding of complex political dynamics through role playing. Instructors who lead simulations routinely introduce their exercises by telling participants to disregard their personal opinions, predispositions, and biases; to learn as much as possible about the preferred outcomes, tactics, and resources of the actor or actors they represent; and to pursue their assigned actors' preferred outcomes throughout the simulation - during formal debates, off-the-record talks, press conferences, etc. No simulation can model reality perfectly, but all simulations strive to produce learning and growth through verisimilitude.

The desire for verisimilitude has led many simulation event organizers to inform practitioners about their simulations and to invite "real-life" actors to their events. On the first day of the Mid-Atlantic European Union Simulation Consortium event (http://www.wcupa.edu/_academics/sch_sba/political_science/MEUS/default.asp), for example, students representing EU member states visit "their" embassies for briefings and speak with personnel at the US Department State on issues of transatlantic concern. The West Coast Model EU (<http://jsis.washington.edu/euc/meu>) typically features a keynote address by a European diplomat. The Strasbourg Model EU (<http://meu-strasbourg.org>) involves day-one workshops with practitioners and occasional meals or events with practitioners.

In these and other simulation events, invited practitioners tend to leave simulation preparations and proceedings to faculty organizers and student participants. Simulation topics are decided without policymakers' involvement. Position papers and amendments are drafted without policymakers' engagement. Negotiations proceed without policymakers' monitoring. Viewed from one angle, this division of labor is entirely understandable. Real-life actors are buried in real-life business. They are not (usually) trained educators. Their closeness to the issues of the day may obstruct their appreciation for the broader learning outcomes that event organizers seek to achieve.

Recognizing these hurdles, organizers of an EU simulation in Florence have nonetheless designed and implemented a simulation built around steady, substantive, and relatively deep relationships between students and policy practitioners. The practice of deepening actors' engagement with the simulation is motivated by a

number of hypotheses: first, that such engagement will increase the simulation's verisimilitude; second, that such engagement will boost students' appreciation for the forces that move EU politics; and third, that such engagement will help students to develop professional confidence and professional networks.

For each of the last four years, James Madison University's (JMU's) Florence-based M.A. program in political science with a concentration in EU Policy Studies and the University of Florence's (UNIFI's) M.A. program in International Relations and European Studies have invited policy practitioners from Brussels to co-direct, along with program faculty, a simulation of EU foreign policy decision-making.

The simulation's culminating event is a formal ministerial meeting of the Council that takes place at Florence's historic city hall (Palazzo Vecchio). This event generally occurs in late spring. By the time the Council meeting takes place, students have been working with each other and with the policy practitioners for months. In general, the simulation involves approximately 40 students—half from JMU, half from UNIFI.

Faculty members and the practitioners—two long-serving professional staff members of the European Parliament—typically begin discussing potential simulation scenarios one year before the ministerial event in late spring. Because of the nature of the involved programs (the JMU program seeks to train transatlantic diplomatic, political, and economic professionals; the UNIFI program seeks to train diplomats, scholars, and EU policy professionals) and the expertise of the involved practitioners, the topics always revolve around EU foreign policy.

Organizers have been careful to construct scenarios that involve multiple EU foreign policy instruments and multiple decision-making rules. In addition to high-politics debates that require unanimity (e.g., debates about CSDP missions), for example, they have also placed issues covering trade, development cooperation, and financial/technical assistance on simulation agendas. The latter areas are governed, respectively, by Articles 207, 209, and 212 TFEU and are subject to the ordinary legislative procedure. In addition, issues related to accession (Article 49 TEU, requiring EP consent) have been placed on simulation agendas.

Once the simulation topics have been decided, faculty organizers and practitioners develop a plan for three to four simulation sessions (this number includes the final ministerial session; the precise number of sessions depends on practitioners' availability), spread across four to seven months. Specific learning goals and simulation activities vary from one session to the next, as described below. According to Kaunert (2009, pp. 255), one of the most important pedagogical payoffs

of well-designed simulations is cumulative learning, where “a subject is introduced repeatedly and with an increase in the levels of complexity during the course of study, which leads to an increase in the student’s capacity to remember the knowledge presented.” In 2012-2013, for example, the simulation involved three discrete sessions of intense practitioner-student contact (January, March, and May).

In the days leading up to the January session, faculty organizers covered information regarding the EP’s role in scrutinizing and “nuancing” cooperation agreements with third countries and divided students into EP party groups; each party group contained multiple JMU students and multiple UNIFI students. Practitioners also circulated, prior to the session, an actual draft motion for a resolution on the conclusion of a partnership and cooperation between the EU and Turkmenistan, and students researched “their” party group’s positions on Turkmenistan, human rights abuses, and other relevant issues. During the session, students assembled in party groups and crafted specific amendments to the draft motion. The practitioners, who had both worked on the actual dossier in question, worked closely with each party group, circulating from one to the next. In tandem with the faculty organizers, they concluded the session by giving feedback on the content and the form of the amendments that various groups proposed. They also laid out the general “plan of attack” for the second simulation session, which would take place in March.

The second session in March sought to produce a cumulative effect. As before, students were divided into teams representing EP party groups (party group memberships were “shaken up,” but they continued to consist of students from both universities), and a draft document was distributed. This time, students considered a Commission proposal for a new instrument of foreign policy (the “partnership instrument”); this proposal was subject to the ordinary legislative procedure. In this round, student groups met before their session with the practitioners to propose amendments to the proposal. Then, during the session, they negotiated with each other over the amendments (the parliamentary process was overseen by a student serving as committee chair). By the end of the debate, they had produced and voted on a final amended document. In the first session, practitioners’ feedback had focused on the form and content of amendments. In the second session, feedback focused on negotiation tactics and (to a lesser extent) parliamentary procedure. Practitioners and faculty organizers concluded by remarking on the differences between the outcome reached by the students and the real-life negotiation outcome and engaged students in conversations about factors that

might explain those differences.

The final session of the 2013 simulation took place over two days in the spring. Unlike the first two sessions, where students had played the roles of MEPs, most students in the final session played Council roles. Here, two students (one JMU, one UNIFI) represented the High Representative/Vice President of the Commission (the HRVP). One student (JMU) represented the Commissioner for Enlargement and the ENP; another (UNIFI) represented the Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid, and Crisis Response. All other students were divided into fourteen 2-member country teams, each consisting of one JMU student and one UNIFI student. In the weeks preceding the final session, organizers distributed materials related to three dossiers—one on the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, the second on Ukraine’s progress toward meeting criteria necessary to sign an Association Agreement, and the third on the crisis in Syria and related refugee issues in surrounding countries. Students also received a draft Council press release with specific draft wording regarding the Council’s position on the three dossiers. In the days preceding the final session, student groups tackled the background documents, drafted amendments to the Council’s conclusions, and wrote actor-specific strategic plans that presented their approach to (and appreciation of the relationships among) the three dossiers. On the first day of the final session, each student group met individually with the practitioners and received substantive feedback on their draft amendments and strategic documents; after their meetings with the line commissioners and the member states, the practitioners spent extra time with the HRVP (who had been meeting with the member states during the bilateral practitioner-student meetings) to discuss the distribution of opinion and strategies for seeking consensus. On the final day of the final session, the HRVP oversaw a vigorous debate in Palazzo Vecchio’s Salone dei Duecento, and faculty and practitioners debriefed with students.

Like most simulations, the Florence simulation involves major investments of time and energy. Coordination of multi-institution simulation events is a notoriously laborious business, which is further complicated by efforts to coordinate with busy and mobile practitioners. But is it worth it? Do students get more from a simulation with heavy practitioner involvement than they do from simulations with limited or symbolic practitioner involvement? While colleagues and I hope to address these questions systematically in the future, preliminary evidence has been positive.

Following each year’s simulation, for example, students are asked to reflect on the overall simulation

experience (including a self-criticism). In the previous two iterations, they have also been asked to discuss positives and negatives of the practitioners’ involvement. Feedback in these fora has been overwhelmingly positive, ranging from general approbation (“no real negatives; I think this added immensely to the simulation”) to more specific consideration (“they challenge us to think . . . not [like] students in a simulation but actually [like] political figures within the European Union”; “they know the way the institutions work and how the EU functions from a high level, so they push you to arrive at the reality rather than fantasize about how things are done”). We hope that deeper investigations will throw more light on the payoffs of this variety of simulation.

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Teaching The European Union in Action: Using the Passenger Name Records (PNR) Negotiations (2002-2012)

Eleanor E. Zeff

Introduction: Using the PNR Case to teach the EU

The Passenger Name Records (PNR) controversy between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) lasted from 2002 until 2012 and involved a large cast of characters, four of the five major EU institutions, multiple transatlantic negotiations, power plays among EU institutions and between the US and the EU, and demonstrated differences between European and American values. This rich scenario provides a great opportunity for teaching the EU because it allows students to see the EU and its institutions in action over an extended period of time. Some criteria for choosing a case study to teach the EU include: an interesting current issue, pertinent in many parts of the world, a case that covers several years, so students can see development over time, and an issue involving several EU institutions.

Passenger Name Records contain information that airlines obtain from passengers. After the 9/11, 2001 attacks in New York, the US Government thought having more information about passengers coming into US air space would help protect citizens from future attacks. The US negotiated separate agreements with several individual countries but entered the PNR negotiations with the EU in 2002. The US had the backing of its executive powers and a clear line of command. The EU was inexperienced at negotiating as a unified entity, and its institutions, new and untried, each tried to demonstrate power. The State Department and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) were the main actors for the US. The Commission represented the EU at the negotiating table, but due to the complex nature of the EU’s organization, it had to gain approval from the other EU institutions to ratify agreements. Agreements between the EU and the US were negotiated in 2002, 2004 and 2007, but only ratified by both sides in 2012.

The Teaching Plan and Using Case Studies to Teach the EU

When students start the simulation, they generally have little knowledge about how the EU functions as a “supranational” organization. They prepare by reading basic texts on the EU or chapters in books on European politics. Their closest comparisons to the EU are the UN and the US.¹ Initial questionnaires indicate students do not understand the powers of the EU’s member states or the EU institutions, nor do they comprehend how they interact with each other or with the 28 member states. Students know only the minimal about relations and negotia-

tions between the EU and the US. They are surprised to see differences in values, as reflected in different policies. A preliminary paper is due at the beginning of the debate and is designed to assure that students have enough information about the case and the EU institutions to contribute to the simulation.

Three agreements negotiated between 2002 and 2007 formed the basis for “Power Plays” a 2008 PEW case study of the EU/US PNR negotiations.² The case study covers “the performance of the European Union’s institutions as they interact and compete for dominance within the EU, and then as they negotiate with the US ---with the goal to protect against terrorism.”³ The PNR case was ideal to teach about the EU as it showcased changing transatlantic relations and evolving EU institutional functions up through 2007.⁴ The “Power Plays” case study has a simulation format, where students divide into groups and play the parts of major institutions such as the US Department of Homeland Security and the EU Commission. It also contains appendices with details about each institution and a chronology of events,⁵ starting in 2001 and continuing through the 2007 PNR Interim Agreement. Most of the EU institutions, including its rotating Presidency, were involved in these PNR negotiations. Although the US felt that it made significant compromises by the time of the 2007 Agreement, the Europeans saw little improvement. New negotiations were necessary, and an addendum to the 2007 case, containing information about PNR negotiations held from 2007 to 2012, now exists for use in class simulations.

To bring the EU to life, techniques from the manual “The ABCs of Case Teaching”⁶ were used, and examples from simulation models,⁷ and active learning exercises were included. The purpose is to get everyone involved in discussion because they are playing a role. Cases are useful teaching devices “because they tell the stories about events and problems so that students can better experience the complexities, ambiguities, and uncertainties confronted by the original participants in the case.”⁸ Using the PNR case study to teach the EU appears to encourage students to find pertinent information about the EU, identify problems faced by the actors, and more clearly define the contexts of these actors’ actions. Students have a directed goal for research, and they have to learn to gather information that will help them play their specific parts better.⁹ Students say, and studies support this idea, that when they have to act a part, they read the case differently and get more involved in discussions. They begin to think differently about how and why institutions and other actors make decisions.

Playing the Game¹⁰

To prepare, students are placed on teams representing the institutions (both EU and US). They answer a short questionnaire to gauge their knowledge of the EU. The simulation is divided into 4 stages, each of which ends in some kind of agreement between the EU and the US. The early stages are described in the “Power Plays” case study, and the last stage comprises the period between 2007 and 2012. Before the stages begin, groups meet together to decide on their goals and policy positions. There may be different EU and US institutions meeting during each stage. Students discuss their goals and positions before each stage, keeping in character. They need to know what their institution does, what power it has, and what role it plays in governing or regulating. Members of each EU institution group regularly consult the other groups.

Stage one begins in 2002 at the start of official transatlantic negotiations between the US and the EU. For each stage, students need to be aware of the problems facing their institutions and what their institution or actor wants to gain from the negotiations. Each stage has an allotted time period to negotiate (15 to 25 minutes), and students must reach an agreement within that time period. Conclusions of each stage are read in the form of press releases. The groups not involved in the stage then voice their opinions to any agreements, basing remarks on what occurred and on their own platforms agreed during preliminary meetings. Objections may also be presented as press releases coming from the groups. There should be time allotted to objections about PNR agreements from outside individuals such as Sophie In’t Veld¹¹, a member of the EP. At the end of each stage, a debriefing should occur¹² to allow students time for periodic assessment.

There are more intense debates between the EU institutions in Stage 2, and Stage 3 includes the 2007 PNR Interim Agreement. The European Commission after approving the 2007 PNR Agreement submitted it for ratification by the 27 member states (MSs). However, in 2009, only 24 MSs had ratified it.¹³ New negotiations became necessary, leading to Stage 4, 2007-2012. “In 2010, the Parliament directed the Commission to, again, resume PNR negotiations with the United States.”¹⁴ Many changes had occurred when these renegotiations commenced in 2010. The US held elections in 2008, and the EU and the member states ratified the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, giving the EP co-decision powers. In 2011, the EU and the US signed a PNR Agreement that the Council of Ministers approved.¹⁵ In April 2012, the EP finally ratified it, with 409 votes in favor, 226 against and 33 abstentions. The new PNR Agreement strengthened privacy provisions for EU citizens.

What students learn

The early US proposals violated EU laws, and it was obvious from the start of negotiations, that the US had more negotiating power and a clearer chain of command, making it easier to negotiate transatlantic decisions. Acting out the scenario in stages, allows students to see the changes in the negotiating power and strategies of both sides. They see that the US made compromises, and that the EU’s negotiating skills develop. After simulation play ends, students participate in another debriefing discussion¹⁶. A final paper is due at the end of the simulation and should also contain a debriefing section so students can reflect on the purpose and value of using PNR negotiations to study the EU’s decision-making processes. Students have stated that they are surprised to discover that both countries changed tactics, and that each side confronts obstacles that they want to overcome. Because they are actually playing roles, they witness more closely the changing negotiating techniques from the 2007 case study to the more recent 2011-2012 negotiations.

The EU’s complex decision-making process calls into action its competing institutions, and student comments indicated that they were surprised to see that decisions could be reached at all, despite the multiple actors. Students gain a firmer understanding of how difficult negotiations can be when the participants do not have equivalent power, and when they see how EU institutions use their power. The case is useful for showing the complexities of the EU’s institutional structure and administrative practices, which reduced the EU’s negotiating power, especially in the early stages of the negotiations. The case also shows the differences between the US and the EU in terms of values, decision-making style and culture. Student evaluations point out that the simulation helped them to better understand the time constraints on making decisions and the compromises that EU cabinet ministers and bureaucrats have to make to reach decisions. Open-ended evaluations and surveys are good ways to assess student learning. Most surveys convey that students feel that they learn better and retain more through active participation in simulations even though some class time may be lost.¹⁷ Finally, students say they enjoyed the simulation experience, and they perceive that it helps them understand the dynamics among the EU institutions better than if they just had readings and class discussions.¹⁸

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Notes

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2 Eleanor E. Zeff, *Power Plays: U.S. War on Terrorism Versus EU Privacy Protection*, Case 298, GUID PEW Case Study Center, Georgetown University, Washington D.C. NW, 2008.

3 Zeff, *Power Plays*

4 The 2008 “Power Plays” Case study has a section on the European Union institutions and their functions. See pp. 7-9. This section was included to teach about these institutions and to demonstrate them in action.

5 *Power Plays*, pp. 3-4.

6 Vicki Golich, Mark Boyer, Patrice Franko and Steve Lamy. “The ABCs of Case Teaching”, *Pew Case Studies in International Affairs*, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 2000.

7 The Midwest Model European simulation and the SUNYMEU simulation, both of which have simulation manuals: *SUNY Guide to the Model European Union*, Laurie Buonanno, Alex Caviedes, Kathleen Dowley, and Neill Nugent, (Editors), 7th Ed. 2012; and John McCormick, *The Midwest Model European Union Guide*, Department of Political Science, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI), 2011.

8 Vicki Golich, Mark Boyer, Patrice Franko and Steve Lamy, p. 1.

9 *Ibid.* Data and students’ statements from classes in 2009 and 2011 indicated they perceived they had a better grasp of the EU’s complexities after they studied the case than before.

10 The time frame of the simulation can be very flexible depending on the goals of the professor. The author usually spends about three classes of 75 minutes each period, but it could stretch over two or four days as well with more time for debriefings or extra readings.

11 Sophia In't Veld, Personal Interviews, June 2012 and December 2007. Speeches by Sophia In't Veld may be found on You Tube, see especially 2011 and 2012.

12 See Eleanor E. Zeff, "Negotiation in the European Council: A Model European Union Format for Individual Classes, *International Studies Perspectives*, 4, 2003, p.272.

13 With the Irish vote in a referendum and the signature of the Czech President, the EU has begun the process of implementing the Treaty of Lisbon. "That treaty, which entered into force on December 1, 2009, creates new institutions in the European Union, changes voting rules, and changes the allocation of power among European institutions. It will, quite naturally, work a sea change in the operation of the EU, something that Europeans have long anticipated."

14 Paul Rosenzweig "European Union Approves Passenger Name Record Agreement With US — An Era Ends," Friday, April 20, 2012.

15 Europa Press Releases, "Frequently Asked Questions: Passenger Name Record", Reference: MEMO/12/258 Event Date: 19/04/2012

16 E.T. Smith and M.A. Boyer, "Designing Your Own In-Class Simulations, *PS: Political Science and Politics* 29, 2000. Krain, Matthew, Jeffrey Landis (2006) "Building Knowledge? Evaluating the Effectiveness of Global Problems Summit Simulation," *International Studies Perspectives*, 7(4).

17 Zeff, 2003. pp. 272-3. This paper included complete student evaluations of simulation experiences. Literature on SoTL indicates students retain more information after participating in simulations.

18 Student comments on a 2011 in-class simulation at Drake University.

EUSA Review

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EUSA AFSJ Interest Section Essay

European Governance of Digital Spaces: an Exploratory Analysis of Cyber Security and Cyber Crime Agencies and their Regulatory Potential

Helena Carrapico
Javier Argomaniz

In recent years, the European Union (EU) has come to view cyber threats and cyber crime as relevant challenges to the completion of its Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (European Union, 2013; Kroes, 2012). Given European societies' increased reliance on borderless and decentralized information technologies, this sector of activity has been identified as an easy target for a variety of very different actors such as organised criminals, hacktivists, state agencies or terrorist networks (Bendiek, 2012). Such analysis has been accompanied by EU calls to step up the fight against unlawful online activities, namely through increased cooperation among law enforcement authorities (both national and extra-communitarian), the approximation of legislations, and public-private partnerships (European Commission, 2012, 2011; European Parliament, 2012; Mendez, 2005).

Such impetus reflects both a perceived increase in Internet-related risks and the policy expansion of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) itself (Rijpma, 2010). As the fastest growing policy field of the European Union in the past 15 years, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has increasingly been governed through agencies, whose traditional role has been to support Member States and to facilitate cooperation (Monar, 2006; 2001). Such role however seems to be currently evolving in the direction of a more centralist regulatory approach (Carrapico & Trauner, 2013; Busuioc et Al. 2011; Egeberg & Trondal, 2011; Ekelund, 2010). In other words, EU institutions seek to promote a greater involvement of the agencies in the development and implementation of Justice and Home Affairs policies (European Commission, 2008).

The literature on EU regulatory agencies has been paying attention to these bodies since the end of the 90s (Levi-Faur, 2011). It has mainly focused on two topics: The proliferation of EU-level agencies as a mode of governance (Dehousse, 1997) and the agencies' autonomy and accountability (Busuioc et Al. 2011; Wonka & Ritterberg, 2010). The arguments looking at why the model of agencification has developed so rapidly throughout the EU have so far proposed a number of alternative accounts: (i) EU agencies have been created in order to provide a higher degree of professionalism, neutrality and credibility to the process of policy-making, creating a distance between

the agencies and political bodies (Majone, 2000, 1997; Dehousse, 1997); (ii) the expansion of agencification is related to a broader liberal trend towards 'regulatory capitalism', whereby agencies are considered to be the most efficient means of governing sectors of activity (Levi-Faur, 2005); and (iii) the growth in agencies can be related to an attempt on the side of the European Commission to indirectly increase its influence over policy-making (Kelemen, 2005).

The literature focusing on the work of these agencies has concluded, firstly, that the formal mandate of agencies tells us very little about their actual autonomy and their day to day policy-making practices (Busuioc et Al. 2011), and, secondly, that the way agencies work and operate is likely to have an effect on various dimensions of governance (Ekelund, 2010). Finally, the literature on accountability has concluded that there is an important tension between the need for democratic accountability and the technocratic way of functioning of agencies, which lacks transparency due to the non-existence of solid frameworks for oversight (Busuioc et Al. 2011). Insights from this literature, however, have only rarely been applied to Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies. As a result, most research on Justice and Home Affairs agencies, such as Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, the EMCDDA, ENISA, and others, has tended to focus on their institutional development, accountability procedures, levels of legitimacy, and operational contribution, rather than their potential capacity to shape policy (Busuioc et Al. 2011; Den Boer & Bruggeman, 2007; Deflem, 2006).

Bearing this background in mind, this short review wishes to present a set of exploratory findings, which relate to our on-going work exploring the role of EU agencies in the governance of digital spaces based on two case studies: ENISA, the EU's cyber security agency, and the EC3, Europol's cyber crime unit. The project considers the evolution of these agencies' activities in the area of cyber crime and cyber security, their positioning as experts in the field, the possible development of regulatory capacities, and the potential implications from this trend vis-à-vis the evolution of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.

The case study on the EC3, Europol's cyber crime unit, is based on previous work on Europol's capacity to influence policy-making in the area of organised crime (Carrapico & Trauner, 2013; Parkin, 2012) and on recent fieldwork (Interviews in the Hague, November 2013). The EC3 constitutes the European Union's most recent step in the fight against cyber crime. The new unit is largely a continuation of pre-existing structures at Europol, albeit in a centralised form (RAND, 2012). It also reflects Europol's attempt to become more competent in an area that is increas-

ingly more demanding, thus enhancing the visibility and relevance of the agency for the cybercrime law enforcement community (interview with Europol official, 2013). The EC3's aspiration is to ensure a coordinated response to a specific area of criminality, serve as the European cyber crime information focal point, provide support to Member States in their cyber crime investigations and promote meetings with cyber crime experts (European Commission, 2012).

Although no direct references to policy-making are made in any official document, interviews reveal that there is an explicit ambition to influence policy, in particular by becoming the leading voice for the law enforcement community in cyber crime and by reflecting at EU policy level the on-going national discussions and concerns (interview with Europol official, 2013). Such goals should not come as a surprise given the work already developed by Europol in other areas of activity. Although Europol is officially considered to be a platform for information exchange and for coordination of member states' investigations, it has come to acquire a much more influential role in policy-making than what its legal mandate would suggest (Carrapico & Trauner, 2013). Europol has clearly evolved from the periphery to the core of EU policy-making in the area of organised crime, as illustrated by the growing influence of Europol's Organised Crime reports on EU organised crime policies and initiatives (Council, 2012; Europol 2012). More specifically, the reports went from being perceived as being of marginal interest only, due to the quality of their content and methodology (Van der Heijden, 1996) to being the basis for the EU organised crime policy cycles (Council, 2012). Given the position achieved thus far by Europol, it is expected for the EC3 to follow a similar pattern.

Where the second case-study is concerned, ENISA is the pre-eminent EU body in the field of cyber-security. It is a relatively new player, set up in 2004 by EU Regulation 460/2004 following a European Commission (EC) proposal (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2013). The agency, which started its operations in 2005, was established with the aim of improving the level of Network and Information Security (NIS) within the Union and contributing to the development of a NIS culture in Europe. ENISA is, first and foremost, a centre of expertise. It aims to work as a platform to help European and national authorities to exchange and share information, know-how and best practices. Although it sees itself as bridging the gap between policy and operational requirements, ENISA is neither an operational actor nor does it deal with law enforcement.

The most recent mandate gives ENISA five main objectives: to develop and maintain high levels

of expertise, assist EU actors in developing policies, support EU bodies and Member States (MS) in the implementation of NIS policies, strengthen European capabilities and preparedness to prevent, detect and respond to incidents in the cyber-space and, finally, foster public-private partnerships and cooperation (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2013).

So far, ENISA has tended to work more closely with national agencies than European institutions in their most high-profile initiatives, including the coordination of a number of pan-European cyber-security exercises to improve contingency planning and recovery, and the organisation of a series of international conferences on cyber crises cooperation. These are seen within the organisation as important tools for building trust and sharing information.

Before addressing whether the Agency has fulfilled a regulatory role, it must be noted that ENISA's original 2004 mandate does in fact task the agency with helping the Commission in drafting Community legislation. Hence, Article 2 declares that one of the goals of the agency is to 'assist the Commission, where called upon, in the technical preparatory work for updating and developing Community legislation in the field of network and information security' (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2004). So in actual fact, being a 'policy shaper' is a role that ENISA was expected to play from its conception. However, the Agency had other priorities during its first few years, mainly awareness raising, the promotion of best practices and the establishment of networks of expertise in member states (Voudouris, 2005). Indeed one of the stated reasons behind the 2013 mandate amendment was to better align the agency to the Union's regulatory processes and enhance its capacity to provide MS and European institutions with assistance and advice (European Commission, 2010). So there seems to be a clear interest from ENISA's stakeholders to, not only provide it with more resources to solidify their position in the cyber-security arena, but also to formally invite the agency to have a stronger say on European cyber-security policies.

ENISA has willingly assimilated this policy entrepreneurship role. It has formally recognised that, the new mandate 'foresees a more proactive role' for the organisation in supporting the development of policy and legislation in this field (ENISA, 2013).

We must note that the drive to incorporate ENISA into the Union's policy and regulatory process had already started before the 2013 reforms. The 2010 Commission proposal already highlighted some of these trends. It described how the Council had already started addressing ENISA directly in Resolutions and

how the EP and the Council had assigned NIS-related tasks to the Agency in the regulatory framework on electronic communications (European Commission, 2010). ENISA had also presented policy positions at EP Committees and participated in High Level Panels and Working groups with representatives of EU institutions. In fact, the very same year the director of the agency confirmed that one clear way for ENISA to deliver added value was to provide guidance to the European Commission in the legislative process (UK House of Lords, 2010). Therefore, although the enhancing of its mandate allowed the agency to be better prepared to act as a policy-shaper, there was already existing evidence of ENISA's capacity to inform decisions in the cyber-security arena.

All things considered, it is safe to say that the expectation is that ENISA will continue having a role to play in cyber-security decision-making in the near future. This can be easily gathered from official documents: the recent high-profile proposal for an NIS directive does, for instance, call upon ENISA to work with the Commission and MS in the development of a Union NIS cooperation plan defining cooperation mechanisms to counter risks and cyber-incidents (European Commission, 2013).

A key difference between Europol and ENISA is that, in the former case, the agency has been able to exert policy influence beyond its narrow mandate by making its threat assessments a point of reference. Thus, although the EC3 may be a recently formed unit, its potential for policy shaping rests on the position already achieved by Europol. In contrast, ENISA's mandate included the possibility to participate in decision-making, but in practice this has never been one of its main priorities until recently.

The findings of these two case-studies are particularly relevant both for the cyber security policy field and for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. On their own, they provide an insight into cyber security decision-making and some of its drivers. More interestingly, however, is what these case-studies reveal in terms of the larger on-going trend in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, where the traditional model of the cooperation agency is slowly being replaced by regulatory policy shaping agencies.

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EUSA EU-Latin America Interest Section

Drug Policies in the EU and Latin America Relationship

Alejandro Chanona

Cooperation against drug trafficking and consumption has been gradually incorporated into the European Union (EU)-Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) agenda since the mid-1990s. In contrast with traditional views such as the so-called "war on drugs", which has focused on combating production and emphasizing drug interdiction, the EU-LAC cooperation considers illegal drugs as a social and security problem that requires a comprehensive policy response.

From the Action Plan of Panama (1999) to the Cooperation Program between Latin America and the European Union on Drugs Policies (COPOLAD) (2009), bi-regional cooperation has been based on the principles of shared responsibility for reducing both supply and demand. According with this vision, the priority areas of cooperation includes: 1) demand reduction; 2) technical assistance on capacity-building (police, customs, judicial action); 3) maritime cooperation; 4) money laundering, 5) "drug precursor" (precursor chemicals) control; and 6) funding alternative development projects, specially in the Andean region. Yet, bi-regional cooperation faces different constraints:

a) The impact and the perceptions of drug trafficking are very different in both regions: while in an important number of Latin American countries, drug trafficking is a national security concern (for example Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Peru), for EU members, drugs problem is related to public health and public security.

b) There is no a single voice, neither a common strategy on drugs in Latin America and the Caribbean. Despite efforts to implement a regional drug strategy, joint policies have not been implemented (Gratius, 2012). Some countries have chosen to focus on prevention and decriminalization (for example Uruguay with cannabis), although others privileged the traditional punitive approach (Mexico).

c) Changing nature of drug trafficking from LAC in Europe. Cocaine consumption in Europe doubled between 1998 and 2008 and Europe accounted for 24% of all cocaine users worldwide

in 2011 (UNODC, 2013). Spain and Portugal are the main point of entry for cocaine into Europe, followed by the ports of Belgium and the Netherlands. (EMCDDA, 2013). This situation explains why the EU has been prioritizing sub-regional and bilateral cooperation programs with Andean countries (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia as the cocaine producers).

d) The limited resources allocated to the bi-regional projects.

The European Model: Harm Reduction

Around 14.5 million people are taking -or have at some time taken-cocaine; 11.4 million for ecstasy and 77 million cannabis (Trautmann, 2013). Currently, the main concern is the increasing use of synthetic drugs and the so-called "new psychoactive substances". It is also important to note that, during recent years, the region has become a producer for cannabis and synthetic drugs.

The main responsibilities for drug policy and implementation remain at national level, however, the EU has been coordinating drug trafficking policy for 20 years in order to create a common framework that gives coherence to national strategies and encourage regional cooperation. According to the European Commission, "illicit drugs are a major threat to the health and safety of individuals and societies in the EU" (European Commission, 2011). Therefore, for the EU members' drug trafficking and consumption are related to public security (health and well-being). In 2003, the EU adopted "harm reduction" as a common principle for the drafting of the EU drugs strategy for the period 2005-2012, which was adopted in December 2004. The result is that national strategies are increasingly oriented around this model prevention, medical treatment and partial decriminalisation of drug use (Gratius, 2012).

Hence, the European drugs policy aims to take a "balanced, integrated approach to the drugs problem" (European Commission, 2011). The European Council has identified two general aims in regard to drugs: 1) Complementing national actions in preventing and reducing drug use (in order to contribute to the attainment of a high level of health protection and well-being); 2) taking action against drugs production, cross-border trafficking and diversion of precursors. The EU Drugs Strategy 2013-2020 is structured around those policy areas, and three crosscutting themes: 1) coordination (Police cooperation and coordination within EU, improving Europol capacities and border controls in the framework of the European

Area of Freedom, Security and Justice); 2) international cooperation (identifying European Neighbourhood Countries as priority and the need to address old and emerging trafficking routes such as West Africa); 3) research, information, monitoring and evaluation (through the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction –EMCDDA-) (EU, 2013).

Even the main approach adopted in the region for reducing demand is the harm reduction model, member states still have different opinions about drug policy and priorities, and there are still gaps in the anti-narcotics actions, specially among countries such as Italy, Spain and some eastern European countries, where criminal groups are more active. These differences make it difficult for the EU to adopt common positions in international bodies and in discussions with third parties, including Latin America. (Gratius, 2012).

Latin America War on Drugs

An assessment of the “war on drugs” in Latin America shows its limits: between 1999 and 2010, coca leaf and cocaine production decreased by 50% in Colombia, but has increased in Peru and Bolivia (during the same period the land used for drug cultivation practically double in Peru); there has been a worrying increase in cocaine consumption in South America, especially in Brazil (the annual prevalence of cocaine use among college students stood at 3% and among the general population 1.75%) followed by Argentina and Chile; and drug trafficking is one of the main factors behind increased criminal violence in the region, particularly in Central America, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil and Colombia. With figures of 100,000 murders per year, Latin America is the most insecure region in the world. (UNDOC 2013, UNDP, 2013).

The complex problem of drug trafficking in Latin America has generated a variety of responses at national, sub-regional and hemispheric levels. It is important to note that in all cases, the need to promote comprehensive policies to combat this threat is recognized, but historically governments have privileged the traditional model of combat through the use of force. For many countries in the region, drug trafficking is the main threat to national security and the armed forces have been incorporated into a variety of activities in the war on drugs: border enforcement, interdiction activities, arrest of criminal leaders and public security. With their respective differences, Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Brazil and Colombia are examples of these policies. For other countries, like Chile or Uruguay, the drugs problem remains on the agenda of public security. Even, the Uruguayan Government has gone beyond to decriminalize cannabis, regulating their production and trade.

At hemispheric level, since the 1980s Latin American countries have promoted regional cooperation against drug trafficking in the framework of the Organization of American States. The first initiatives were intended to create multilateral mechanisms against U.S. unilateral policies, such as the famous “counter-narcotics certification”. In particular, emphasis was on the shared responsibility principle and promote regional counter-narcotics cooperation. The establishment of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) in 1986, the approved of the first Anti-Drug Strategy in the Hemisphere in 1996 and the creation of the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism in 1998 responded to this logic (Chanona, 2011).

The principle of share responsibility, the promotion of multilateral cooperation and the commitment to adopt comprehensive policies against drug trafficking, are common elements of the Hemispheric Plan of Action against Transnational Organized Crime (2006); the Hemispheric Drug Strategy (2010) and the Hemispheric Plan of Action on Drugs 2011-2015 (2011). Nevertheless, until now the hemispheric cooperation against drug trafficking and consume has its limits, there is still a lack of mechanism of coordination and sub-regional initiatives have been playing a more important role against organized crime.

Bi-regional cooperation

Latin America and the European Union share values and principles that are the core of the bi-regional partnership. On the issue of illicit drugs, both regions agreed that fighting against drug trafficking and consumption requires international cooperation and comprehensive policies. For Latin America, the partnership with the EU on illicit drug issues is particularly relevant, facing their strong relationship with the United States.

As noted before, since the Action Plan of Panama (1999) both regions have been working in key areas of cooperation. However, when we analyse the UE-LAC cooperation programs on drugs during last decade, we can identify the pre-eminence of programmes with the Andean and the Caribbean countries, over the bi-regional ones. For example: 1) the special trade preferences to Andean and Central American countries under the “GSP-Drugs scheme”; 2) sub-regional programs, such as the Program for Combating Illegal Drugs in the Andean Community (PRADICAN), founding with 2.5 million €; and DROSICAN with 3.23 million € to struggle synthetic drugs; 3) the alternative development projects in Bolivia (such as PRAEDAC, PRODEVAT and APEMIN I and II, that in total reached 37 million €) Peru (PALCAZU, with 22.6 million €, and the Alternative Development and

State Modernization Programme, with 10 million €) and Colombia (that has received around 126 million € for peace laboratories and regional development) (Gratius, 2012 & EEAS 2014).

There are only two programs at UE-LAC bi-regional level: PRELAC, with 2.5 million €, and COPOLAD, established in 2009 and funding just with 6 million €. In fact, we can sustain that, more than a specific program COPOLAD is a broad framework for cooperation and coordination. Following the idea to promote an inclusive anti-drug strategy, COPOLAD has four components: 1) consolidation of the EU-LAC coordination and cooperation mechanism on drugs; 2) consolidation of the national drugs observatories; 3) capacity-building in the reduction of demand (prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and harm reduction) and 4) capacity-building in the reduction of supply (law enforcement and alternative development).

Thus, although in the discourse the EU identifies LAC as “strategic partners” against drug trafficking, insists on the importance of strengthening bi-regional cooperation and promote comprehensive policies against illicit drugs; reality shows that the Europeans prefer sub-regional and bilateral agreements and programs, centred in controlling cocaine and synthetic drugs production and trafficking. In a study for the European Parliament, Susanne Gratius (2012) revealed, that most of the EU projects in LAC are designed to reduce drugs supply. According to her data 102 out of 135, are focused on reducing supply, whereas only 22 are focused on reducing demand.

In a context which anti-drug policies are being evaluated all around the world, the European model of “harm reduction” remains a benchmark for Latin America and the Caribbean. Furthermore, the EU-LAC partnership could contribute to outline a new global drug policy. Though, any initiative would also need close coordination and cooperation with the United States.

It is also important to considerate that, beyond good will, the bi-regional cooperation on drugs faces “new” limits. The situation in many Latin American countries forces to delay the implementation of a broader strategy, so the European model could only “complement” the current policies in areas like citizen security. At this stage, the EU is in a period of limited resources and the priorities has changed: the new concern is the increasing consumes of synthetic and “new psychoactive substances”, as a consequence the European neighbourhood area has become a priority for EU international cooperation on struggling against drugs.

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**Aid Effectiveness Meets Domestic Politics – the
Case of the EU's Budget Support Policy**
Svea Koch

The EU's ability to formulate well-coordinated and coherent positions and policies is considered a key prerequisite for its effectiveness on the global stage. However, regarding most of the EU's external policies, and in particular the non-communitised policies, the EU faces the continuous struggle of achieving internal consensus and coordination among member states and EU institutions without losing sight of the effective external representation and impact of the EU. This is also true for development policy, for which the level of internal coordination between 28 bilateral policies plus the aid programme of the European Commission (EC) is often considered insufficient. Greater internal cohesiveness, however, is required in order for the EU to remain a relevant and effective actor in development, in particular against the background of geopolitical and economic power shifts that decrease – or at least challenge – the EU's potential influence (Koch 2012). In this context, the degree of convergence between the preferences of the EU's member states and the EU's institutions has been highlighted as key for the EU's actorness (Carbone 2013). More recently, scholars have also started to adopt a liberal foreign policy perspective to explain how the preferences of member states are determined by domestic political dynamics that hinder or support aid coordination. This article uses the case of the EU's budget support policy – one of the most prominent aid instruments – to show, firstly, how different preferences within the EU have led to severe coordination problems and, secondly, how effectiveness concerns have fallen prey to domestic politics and internal conflicts among member states and the EC.

During the last decade, budget support – that is, the direct transfer of aid resources to a developing country's treasury – has become a very popular, yet contested aid instrument. It originated as a result of critiques of traditional forms of foreign aid, which was disbursed mostly through projects. Over 40 years of experience revealed severe flaws of project aid and showed that it was too fragmented, creating parallel structures and high transaction costs for national administrations in developing countries, without having a substantial impact on development. The 2005 'Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness' thus aimed at setting new principles for the provision of foreign aid. Accord-

ing to these principles, it was expected of donors to respect recipient countries' ownership over their own policies, to align with the recipients' development objectives, to use recipient countries' own administrative systems for channelling aid, and to better harmonise and coordinate donor aid interventions. Budget support has been considered most apt to implement these principles and to make aid more effective.

From the outset, the EC was among the most dedicated supporters of budget support in the EU and considered it to be "the most effective instrument in development" (EC 2008, 3) as well as a suitable means to finance partner countries' national development plans. The perception of budget support as an innovative and effective aid instrument was, however, not shared uniformly by European governments and aid bureaucracies. Sceptics as well as the wider public quickly denounced it as a "blank cheque to corrupt regimes" and as an instrument that bears high political and fiduciary risks. Over time, these different perceptions led to severe tensions. It became obvious that, within the EU, different preferences prevailed with regards to when and how to provide budget support. Some bilateral donors were very cautious and selective from the beginning (e.g. Germany) and highlighted the need to tie budget support to political governance issues – an approach the EC initially resisted. Others (e.g. the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) were strong supporters in the beginning, but they gradually reduced their use of the instrument and started to attach stricter political conditionalities to budget support. In particular, these differences in policy became apparent during times of political crises in developing countries. Some European donors suspended budget support as a political signal to the recipient country as well as to the European donor's domestic constituencies (e.g. Molenaers 2012).

The EC and individual member states, however, failed to coordinate a joint EU response in most cases, and thus sent largely inconsistent signals to developing country governments. First, EU donors could not agree on the appropriateness of using budget support to exercise political pressure. In many instances, the EC did not react in a similar fashion and continued to emphasize the aid effectiveness and the function of financing for poverty reduction over more political concerns. Moreover, as has been documented by several case study analyses (e.g. Faust / Schmitt / Leiderer 2010), even those member states that were in favour of withdrawing budget support in times of political upheavals reserved the right to act individually, often resulting in them not coordinating their actions sufficiently with other member states. The different preferences for budget support – and in particular to-

wards the perceived risks of the instrument – thus led to highly uncoordinated actions by the EU.

Recent analysis of budget support provision shows that these different preferences and degrees of risk-averseness are not just randomly distributed among European donors but driven by at least three key factors of the domestic political context within European donor countries: (i) partisan politics, (ii) the economic context and (iii) bureaucratic interests (Faust / Koch 2014). Differences in party ideology are significant in determining how sceptical or supportive European donors are towards budget support. The more conservative and right-wing a government is, the less budget support it disburses. This is also in line with findings from public opinion research that shows that conservative constituencies are more sceptical about the waste of foreign aid due to corruption in developing countries (Bauhr / Charron / Nasiritousi 2013). In addition, budget support suffers most in times of economic crisis, as it is less visible and considered to be more risky than other aid modalities. The case studies of Germany and the United Kingdom furthermore suggest that the institutional set-up of a donor's foreign aid system impacts on its preferences for budget support. In Germany, powerful implementing agencies of technical cooperation opposed the provision of budget support, whereas in the United Kingdom no such opposition existed, which made it easier for the government to disburse increasing amounts of foreign aid as budget support (Faust / Koch 2014). The analysis thus shows how political factors within donor countries shape donors' preferences and the provision of particular aid instruments and undermine efforts for better aid coordination.

Most importantly, these preferences not only have shaped individual donor policies but also impacted on the EC's budget support policy. Development policy is a shared competency in the EU, and member states focus mainly on how they can influence the EC according to their own preferences and priorities rather than promoting joint European approaches that accept influence from Brussels over individual domestic development policies. Recent analysis has shown that, if preferences of member states are largely homogenous, or if powerful coalitions are formed among members, the EC's policies tend to follow national interests rather than its own programmatic goals (Schneider / Tobin 2013). This is also apparent in the case of budget support, in which a large number of member states raised an increasing number of concerns and exercised pressure on the EC to change its policy. On 13 October 2011, the EC published its revised budget support policy and introduced a number of important changes as part of a larger package

of Communications outlining a new direction for EU development policy. Throughout the new policy, there is a very strong emphasis on the need to link budget support more strongly to political issues and to provide it more selectively. As with some member states, the EC now considers budget support to be not merely an effective financing instrument for poverty reduction and improving the recipient country's public financial management systems; budget support is now explicitly more political and considered to reflect trust in the political leadership of the country.

This is not to say that being more sensitive to political issues when providing budget support is wrong, as such. But it clearly comes at the expense of aid effectiveness concerns that have so far led the Commission's policy. Several independent evaluations showed that budget support tended to provide satisfactory development results, in particular with regards to developing country government's spending on social sectors and the improvement of their public financial management systems (see e.g. Caputo / de Kemp / Lawson 2011). These evaluation results, however, did not influence actual policy-making, which relied more heavily on domestic political considerations and the uneasiness of politicians in defending a potentially more effective aid instrument against the concerns of their core constituents. As outlined above, these national interests were apparent in a number of influential member states, leaving little room for the EC to follow its own original programmatic choice.

The case of budget support is not only interesting from a development policy perspective, but also relevant for wider discussions on the EU's external relations, as it shows how the external effectiveness of the EU can easily be undermined if domestic political and bureaucratic considerations and interests are at stake. A major stumbling block for internal EU coordination thus not only consists of structural or technical impediments – due to, for example, the sheer size of the EU or the sometimes cumbersome procedures – but mainly of political motivations and preferences. As long as the EC continues to have only very limited power over coordinating member states' policies (rather than the member states dictating the EC's policy), it is unlikely that effectiveness concerns will become the guiding principle for the EU's external policies.

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Book Reviews

Maas, Willem (ed.). *Multilevel Citizenship*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.

EU citizenship is often described as an “odd animal”, a sui generis kind of citizenship that is incomparable with any other forms of citizenship. Some authors even take the view that EU citizenship is doomed to fail, precisely because it is not a homogeneous and unitary legal status conferred by a sovereign state, unlike other citizenship concepts. This compelling volume challenges the traditional view on citizenship and aptly demonstrates that varieties of multilevel citizenship have always existed in different historic and geographic contexts.

The book consists of eleven contributions grouped in three parts. It starts with three chapters that consider the challenges to national citizenship from the perspective of migrants and migrations. Amongst them is Luicy Pedroza's contribution on the extension of voting rights to non-citizen residents, a phenomenon common in a number of countries. Pedroza convincingly argues that the traditional unitary conception of citizenship is wrong and that one person can maintain several allegiances to different state levels, be they local, national or – one could add – even supranational. Somewhat unfortunately perhaps, the chapter does not elaborate on how the extension of voting rights impacts on the dynamics of (local) politics, citizenship and immigration policies in particular.

An analysis of the impact of local politics on citizenship policies can be found, however, in the chapter by Marcus Helbling, which figures in the third part of the book. Helbling's analysis of Swiss citizenship policies poignantly illustrates some of the problems ensuing from a citizenship model which is contingent on decentralized naturalization policies. As such, it offers important lessons for EU citizenship, which is entirely dependent on the nationality laws of the EU Member States. The Swiss example may provide support for those who advocate some level of harmonization of Member State nationality laws, especially in times where some nationality laws are becoming more controversial, as the recent proposal to “sell” Maltese citizenship neatly demonstrates.

The second part of the volume approaches multilevel citizenship from the perspective of “empires and indigeneity”. This part includes a highly original chapter dealing with the so called “Su Bao” trial of 1904 in which revolutionaries were convicted for acts of treason against the Chinese state. The author (Elizabeth Dale) convincingly argues that the Su Bao

case demonstrates how people can express and even expand their citizenship across several layers of transnational political spaces. Her historical account of how citizenship can be created by the people themselves, offers invaluable inspiration for the potential development of EU citizenship in our present days. Sheryl Lightfoot's chapter on citizenship rights of Indigenous Peoples in Canada and the USA offers another brilliant illustration of the book's central proposition that citizenship cannot and should not be viewed as a unitary construction that operates only at the national level. The various Indigenous citizenship models also show that EU citizenship is not an exceptional or novel concept different from any historical precedents.

The volume is edited by Willem Maas, a scholar famous for his work on EU citizenship. One can readily agree with his claim that EU citizenship is the most exciting case of multilevel citizenship in the contemporary world. The different chapters of the book approach citizenship from an innovative perspective and offer a lot of food for thought for EU citizenship scholars. It is perhaps unfortunate that the different chapters do not address the consequences for EU citizenship more explicitly, although such would presumably have resulted in a wholly different book. In any event, the volume is highly recommended literature for anyone studying EU citizenship and can be expected to spark some exciting literature on the subject.

Nathan Cambien
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DeBardeleben, Joan and Crina Viju (eds.). *Economic Crisis in Europe: What It Means for the EU and Russia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Economic Crisis in Europe explains how the financial crisis moved from an economic crisis to a political crisis, and how it affected the various regions within Europe and Russia. The interdisciplinary approach appeals to economists and to political scientists. The editors' deep knowledge of the region is evident in the expert scholars and relevant articles that they have

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assembled in this volume. This review discusses aspects of the economic crisis and its relationship to politics in the EU, Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in particular, and Russia. Giving thorough attention to the new Member State post-communist countries and Russia, this volume assesses the crises at multiple levels: national, EU, and broader regional. The interplay of economics and politics at these levels affects the impacts of the crisis in the near-term and the long-term.

This timely book provides the wisdom of hindsight, taking into account the events that transpired in three phases from 2007 to 2012. The crisis that began in the U.S. in the real estate sector in 2007 had fully taken hold in Europe after the collapse of financial markets in the autumn of 2008. In the first phase of the crisis, governments responded to falling economic growth with liquidity and stimulus programs throughout 2009. These measures entrenched national debts, as countries struggled to foster upward growth in the face of rising unemployment. In the second phase, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was established in early 2010 and countries continued to use monetary policy to stimulate lending and economic development. The third phase entered in full with the sovereign debt crises in the Mediterranean countries and Ireland. This resulted in the downgrading of public debt in 2011, as countries continued to struggle with economic growth in times of budget austerity. By 2011 surveys from most countries indicated declining levels of trust in EU institutions, and, as the chapter by Lawrence LeDuc and Jon H. Pammett explains, national elections that year favored the challengers ousting incumbents from power.

In Part I “The Economic Crisis in the European Union,” there is analysis of how the EU has dealt with the democratic deficit, the future of the project for regional integration, the European Monetary Union (EMU), and the potential for fiscal union. Impacts of the crisis have been felt not only by increasing debt levels, but also by banking regulations as part of the new EU institutional governance provided by the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance signed by 25 Member States in June 2012. There have been varying effects from the crisis on debt, budget, and employment policies across the region of Europe and Russia.

In Part II “The EU's Global Role and International Institutions,” there are three policy areas that receive close attention. They each have a dedicated chapter on the topics international trade, climate sustainability, and the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Crina Viju and William A. Kerr assess the mechanisms of the common trade policy in the EU that have contributed to the weakness of protection-

ist trends amid the financial crisis. Matthew Paterson considers the place of the EU as a leader in global climate sustainability, addressing policy challenges such as the Emissions Trading System (ETS). Patrick Conway analyzes the historical comparative advantage of the IMF as “a lender of last resort” and as a driver of reform in this economic crisis.

In Part III “The Crisis in Central and Eastern Europe,” there is a closer look at the CEE countries and Russia. By 2010 the CEE countries were in a better position with public debt, having had more moderate debt positions at the start of the crisis, and their attitudes towards the EU were more positive. In Russia the financial crisis in 1998 was pivotal, and following the sovereign debt default that year’s devaluation of the rouble brought about domestic economic growth. In the first phase of the recent crisis, the decline in the price of fossil fuels reduced the surplus from exports, a concern given trade dependence on demand from the region. Rather than embracing the EU’s continued pursuit of economic liberalism, Russia has accepted protectionist policies that reverse the modernization strategy of several years prior.

Adeptly explaining how what started as an economic crisis led to political crises within the EU and Russia, the contributors have provided the reasons for the differential impacts across the region, with particular attention to the CEE countries. This allows for comparison between the countries still in transition, inside and outside the EU. The varying impact and pace of recovery across countries makes it challenging to find a unified approach in the ongoing efforts for European integration and social cohesion. With full recovery from the economic crisis still in the future, this book contributes to the literature on European politics and political economy by serving as a guide to navigate the recent events and their differentiated impacts across countries in the region.

Beverly Barrett
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Buonanno, Laurie and Nugent, Neill. *Policies and Policy Processes of the European Union*, The European Union Series. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Notwithstanding the existence of a burgeoning literature dedicated to the European Union from its very inception, still few works have been devoted to delivering a thorough overview of EU policies and policy processes. By means of an extremely complete

and lucid outline of the latter, the present volume sets out an innovative way of understanding – or teaching – the key-features distinguishing the EU’s policy portfolio. To be sure, the contribution starts from a valid assumption, namely that this matter should not be approached in a monolithic fashion. Rather – in a hybrid political system such as the EU one, the constantly evolving learning processes, alongside with a physiological extent of variation, shall be the points of departure for any kind of examination aimed to assess what the EU does, and how and why it does it.

Related to this, the authors happily decided not to rigidly divide the book into thematic sections: in fact, chapters fluidly follow one another, with a view to give a concrete idea of the complexity and the intertwined character of EU policy activity.

In particular, the first two chapters are dedicated to the overall description of the EU’s policy portfolio, not only recalling classic typologies such as the one famously advanced by Lowi, but also comprising descriptions – equipped with smart “recapitulation boxes” – of the wide range of EU policy involvement, legal statuses and purposes (ch.1). Similarly, while classic theories of European integration are reviewed, a so-called “federal integration approach” is set out. In a nutshell, the latter draws on economic integration and federal theories: acknowledging the limitations of established mainstream political science-based theoretical tradition, this approach fruitfully considers both the compelling economic efficiency of integration and the nature of political and policy relationships in federal systems (ch.2).

Chapters 3 and 4 constitute the most “didactic” parts of the book, in that they look at the principal EU institutions’ roles and functions (ch.3) or at other important policy actors, such as European Agencies or the Member States’ domestic institutions. Much appreciated the mention to the enhanced role of national parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty, or the rapid hints to sub-national levels of government – which really make the point of the multi-level polity adjoining the EU (ch.4).

Chapters 5-7 shall be considered as the core of the volume, since they cope with a 360° examination of the EU’s policy processes. Some distinctive characteristics are enucleated, underlining the ever-increasing growth in number and type of decisions, policy processes and responsibilities – connected with consecutive EU enlargements leading to the inclusion of states, which are more differentiated amongst themselves, both from a geographical and a cultural viewpoint (ch.5). Coming to the concept of policy cycle per se – and applying it to EU policy processes, the authors efficaciously manage to demonstrate how it

eventually may resemble a “normal” political system. The latter impression lasts in spite of the considerable degree of variation occurring in response to divergences across policy areas, both within and between the policy stages. Effective use of graphs and figures – coupled with that of the aforementioned “recapitulation boxes” – represent a plus, particularly for the student-reader (ch.6). A classificatory system is added, suggesting renowned categories for the sake of grouping the processes. In connection to this, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and its contested narrative is evaluated, locating it into a straightforward policy mode framework (ch.7).

Completing the educational share, chapters 8-13 describe the EU’s main policy domains – in an extensive, perhaps inevitably scholastic, manner. Chapter 14 annotates the latter part with an inspection of the budget: ça va sans dire, this timely contribution treats the issue from an up-to-date standpoint, including appropriate reflections concerning the impact the Eurozone crisis has exercised – specially in terms of restrictions and limitations which the Euro area member states have been exposed to.

Chapter 15, the last one, takes stock of what has been overall put forward – recollecting the theoretical frameworks primarily depicted. Facing an increasingly challenging atmosphere, chiefly vis-à-vis the long-lasting economic and financial crisis, the authors argue that the most valid analytic tool for exploring the EU adaptation processes is the federal integration approach, essentially because federalist arrangements seem to provide enough flexibility for allowing the system to “bump” into the crises without collapsing. Indeed, the outbreak of the crisis may have augmented some unanticipated side effects entailed within the EU integration path. The validity of the approach proposed in the volume is doubtless, since it takes into account the economic logics, but also includes political – even federal – dimensions of policy development. Further, federal theory is devised to explain constantly evolving processes – pointing out the possibility of power shifts between the federal government and its constituent units, without losing sight of the horizontal relationships among the latter. This differentiation – the authors clearly show – has become an important defining feature in the European construction over crucial policy areas. As a direction for future research, these sorts of wide-ranging approaches could serve as theoretical lens to look for patterns of policy-making and policy development in the post-crisis EU system.

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Adebajo, Adekeye and Kaye Whiteman. *The EU and Africa: From EuroAfrigue to Afro-Europa*. London: Hurst & Company, 2012.

In recent years the external role of the European Union (EU) has been the subject of numerous books, theses and articles. Some of these works analyse how the interplay between various EU institutions and actors may shape EU foreign policy. Another body of literature seeks to understand the mechanisms that allow the EU to diffuse certain policies and values beyond its borders, and the conditions that prevent it from doing so. A smaller group explores the multifaceted relationship between the EU and other regions of the world in order to investigate the role of the EU as a global actor.

Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director of the Cape Town-based Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), and Kaye Whiteman, writer on African affairs and former European Commission official belong to the third group. In *The EU and Africa: From EuroAfrigue to Afro-Europa* they take up the challenge of organising a “holistic and comprehensive assessment of the relations of the European Union and Africa” (p.1). The book tackles pressing issues that have shaped the interactions between the two regions from the late 19th century until today, such as trade and investment, military operations and economic partnerships. As suggested in the title, this uneven relationship has evolved from domination and pure exploitation of Africa’s resources to a sophisticated system where various states, regional organisations and international institutions tackle issues of political, economic and ethical impact for both regions. The book suggests that the EU – an ongoing project itself – still needs to define its role and its identity in order to be able to devise a coherent foreign policy approach towards Africa.

The book consists of 22 chapters organized in six thematic parts. Following Whiteman’s thorough introduction, Part 1 provides a historical account of the relationship between Africa and Europe; part 2 addresses the political and economic dimensions of regional integration in Africa, as well as the EU approach to the Maghreb, the Mediterranean and South Africa. Parts 3 and 4 deal with specific issues such as trade, development, and economic cooperation, and analyse the [unfulfilled] role of the EU as a security provider in different sub-regions of Africa. Part 5 explores specific features of the relations between Africa, former colonial powers and European middle powers. Particularly interesting are the contributions of Anne Hammerstad’s about the Nordics, the EU and Africa and Douglas Yates’ text on the role of France in

the continent. Part 6 tackles the issues of migration - special attention should be given to Andrew Geddes' chapter on the admission and asylum of developing countries' nationals - and identity. Hartmut Mayer's text on EU postcolonial role concludes the book.

The editors do a remarkable job in bringing together contributions from diplomats, scholars, journalists, EU officials and practitioners from European and African political organizations and think tanks. The result is a comprehensive and informative work about how the relationship between the EU and Africa has evolved over time. The chapters follow a similar structure: almost all the contributions provide an introduction to the topic from a historical perspective and are concluded by normative considerations or future perspectives on specific dimensions of Africa-EU relationship. Different writing styles can be identified, but the chapters are well balanced and organized in a coherent and harmonious manner. The various authors manage to summarize a considerable amount of information, to present it to the reader in a clear way, and to offer the public a critical appraisal of salient policy issues - Charles Mutasa's text on the EU Common Agricultural Policy and Rob de Vos' contribution on aid and partnership are good examples. The EU and Africa successfully avoids the Eurocentric tone that is so currently present in this type of work, and is a worthwhile read.

On the other hand, some crucial dimensions of EU-Africa relations are underexplored or overlooked in the book. This is the case of environmental protection, health, and fight against corruption, for example. Thus, by approaching a large number of issues, the editors make a choice not to engage in an in-depth analysis of each topic, but to identify and approach specific issues from a critical perspective. Although the book has an explicit empirical character, some theoretical and methodological considerations could have been included; there isn't a theoretical chapter properly speaking, although some chapters refer to seminal works in EU external relations such as the capability-expectations gap put forth by Christopher Hill. A concluding chapter by the editors would have also contributed to the overall organization of the book. Finally, a table of acronyms would have made it easier for the reader to navigate in the "alphabet soup" of EU and Africa's foreign policy institutions. Such aspects do not compromise the quality and the importance of the work, but may render it less attractive to PhD candidates who are in a more advanced stage of their research, and to established academics.

Written in an accessible language and without extensive use of EU jargon, this comprehensive account of the relations between the EU and Africa will

appeal most notably to early graduate students working on the foreign policy of the EU and its member states, regionalism in Africa and development-related issues. Certain chapters may also be used in undergraduate and masters' courses on EU foreign policy, inter-regional relations and Africa in the world as basis for group discussions. The book aims at a broad audience: foreign policy analysts and practitioners - diplomats, think tank advisors and journalists - might also find Adebajo and Whiteman's work particularly useful. This book not only contributes to the debate on the relations between Africa and the EU, but also stimulates further discussions about the EU's identity as a global actor as well as Africa's role in an increasingly interdependent world.

Tatiana Coutto

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Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., and Schimmelfennig, F. *Differentiated Integration: Explaining Variation in the European Union*. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2013.

This book occupies a gray area between textbook and new empirical research concerning the process of European integration. It clearly lays out the three most commonly cited theories of integration (intergovernmentalism, supranationalism, and constructivism), while at the same time, further developing, and empirically testing these theories. Although this volume is likely too advanced for all but the most sophisticated undergraduates, graduate students seeking to better understand the major theoretical perspectives regarding integration can easily utilize this book. Moreover, this work may be quite useful to researchers as it attempts to synthesize the major theories concerning the process of integration, and provides for a set of empirically testable expectations.

Chapter 1 presents the basic concept of this volume; namely that integration is not monolithic, but rather that the "nature and degree of integration" is heterogeneous across policy areas and territory (p. 8). Leuffen, Rittberger, and Schimmelfennig propose that different types of governing bodies vary along three key dimensions - level of centralization, functional scope, and territorial extension. According to the authors, the levels of centralization, functional scope, and territorial extension actually vary within the EU by policy area.

In chapters 2, 3, and 4, the authors delve deeply into the competing theories of integration. It is these chapters that likely serve as most useful to

students seeking to develop a sound understanding of existing theory concerning the process of European integration. That is not to say, however, that the authors merely rehash previously published ideas. Rather, they begin each chapter with an in depth review of intergovernmentalism, supranationalism, and constructivism, respectively. In the remaining sections of these chapters, the authors logically extend these theories to account for differences in nature and degree of integration across policy areas.

The authors contend that intergovernmentalism explains differentiated integration through "differences in interdependence and cooperation problems, state preferences, bargaining power, domestic ratification constraints, and . . . autonomy costs and benefits" (p. 54). Supranationalism can explain heterogeneous integration through "variation in the intensity of transnational exchange between different sectors and countries," as well as, "the capacity and preferences of supranational actors to promote their policy and institutional interests" (p. 77). The driving factor of differentiated integration in constructivist theory is "imperfect ideational consensus" across states and policy areas (p. 99).

In the next four chapters, Leuffen, Rittberger, and Schimmelfennig tested these theories. Using extremely detailed, qualitative case studies, they examined integration across four policy areas, the Single Market, the Economic and Monetary Union, security and defense policy, and freedom, security, and justice policy. This piece is extremely well done qualitative work, and does not suffer from any of the problems commonly attributed to small N studies. There is significant variation in the four cases chosen, and the cases show no overt signs of selection on either the dependent or independent variables.

The authors point out that they began this work with the assumption that each of these theories can be useful in developing an understanding of European integration, and the findings bore out this assumption. In some cases, one theory was clearly superior in explaining integration processes. For example, it is noted that neither intergovernmentalism nor supranationalism provide for explanations as to why certain states opted out of the common currency. Rather, constructivism, with its emphasis on identity, proves to be the best explanation. In other cases, 2 or more theories of integration performed equally well. The authors noted that factors associated with both intergovernmentalism, and supranationalism, played important roles in the early integration of the Single Market.

Due to the relative traction that each theory provides, Leuffen, Rittberger, and Schimmelfennig argue that it is important to build a theory accounting for

each of the examined theories. They then turn to developing a synthetic theory of integration, incorporating ideas of intergovernmentalism, supranationalism, and constructivism.

The authors start with the basic contention that governments are the key actors in integration. The preference compatibility of the governments in policy areas, the level of interdependence of states concerning specific policies, and the politicization of those policies are the key forces affecting initial integration in those areas. Once integration has begun a spillover effect leads to greater interdependence and calls for more integration. If at this time autonomy and identity costs remain low one should see preference convergence, and further integration. If these costs are high, one should see differentiation or stagnation in integration.

Clearly, the greatest strength of this work is the synthesized theory developed in the concluding chapter. This theory allows researchers to move beyond questions concerning the correctness of each paradigm, and presents an interesting starting point for future empirical studies of integration processes and differentiation. Readers are left with a set of theoretical expectations concerning the progression of integration. This, in turn, leads to multiple research questions, such as, do particular contexts exist in which the effects of autonomy and identity costs are increased? In sum, this work is an interesting and enlightening study that highlights and attempts to explain differentiated integration; at the same time it furthers research on European integration by presenting an improved theoretical paradigm.

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Interest Groups and Policy-making in the European Union"

EUSA Ernst Haas Fellowship for Dissertation Research
Andrea Aldrich (University of Pittsburgh)
Matthew Spears (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

