

THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION ON FRENCH DEFENCE POLICY AND PLANNING

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There are several major difficulties in deconstructing the relationship between French and European defence and security policy. The first, and most obvious, is that European policy, in so far as it exists, is largely French in conception and impulsion. This has been the case virtually since 1944. However, and this is the second difficulty, incitements from Paris for Europe to "get its security act together", sustained and imperative though they have tended to be, are not necessarily paralleled by a tangible Europeanisation of French defence policy and planning. This leads to the third problem: the shortfall between discourse and reality. An uninformed observer called upon to read the major documents, texts and speeches emanating over the last few years from the command centres of French defence planning (Elysée, Matignon and rue Saint Dominique²) might be forgiven for believing that French and European defence policy were largely coterminous³. To an appreciable extent, France acts on defence and security policy as if it were acting for the whole of Europe. In large part, this is because France has a long historical tradition of calling the shots across the continent and there is no doubt that, in terms of resource inputs, military and industrial capacity and grandiose visions for the future, France is in a class of her own. But therein lies at least one problem. To put it at its most neutral, France's defence thinking on certain key issues (such as nuclear policy, alliance policy, resourcing and conscription) is visibly out of phase with that of the majority of her European partners. Where this is so, Paris tends to turn a blind eye and assume that "Europe" will sooner or later step in line. There is little doubt that France sees herself as playing the leading role in pushing European defence policy forward. Few would disagree. It remains to be seen how far she will prove successful in steering the continent along her own chosen course.

1. The 1980s and the emergence of "Europeanisation"

The Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s was instrumental in resuscitating both the vision and the reality of a "European defence entity" which had been moribund, along with the Western European Union (WEU), ever since the 1950s. The differences of opinion between Europe and Washington over key aspects of foreign policy, and particularly over policy with regard to the Soviet bloc, persuaded most European leaders that the time had come to think afresh about the long-delayed European pillar of the Alliance. Although President Mitterrand had stood resolutely shoulder to shoulder with Washington over the Euromissile crisis itself, France was undoubtedly the driving force in the gradual revival of WEU through a series of important meetings leading to the "Platform on European Security Interests" signed at The Hague in October 1987⁴. This endogenous dimension to the process was probably best typified by Franco-German defence cooperation, which intensified throughout the 1980s, notably through the establishment of a Franco-German Defence Commission (1982) and then Council (1988) as well as the launch of the Franco-German brigade (1989)⁵. It was on French insistence, with German backing, that a clause was inserted into the Maastricht Treaty (Title V., Article J.4) establishing a common foreign and security policy dealing with "all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence." The WEU was designated "an integral part of the development of the Union" and requested "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications". Clearly, there is an objective symbiosis between French and European defence planning. This symbiosis developed strongly throughout the 1980s under the twin impulses of a resurgent Europe and an American leadership which appeared to be switching its strategic priorities away from Europe to the Pacific rim. This process of "objective Europeanisation" should nevertheless be kept in perspective. Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the emphasis was on streamlining the European Pillar of NATO, rather than on any attempt to produce a West European "Sinatra doctrine"

in defence or security policy⁶. The 1987 WEU "Platform" drawn up at The Hague was a brave attempt to maintain the fundamentals of a NATO-based security system, while reasserting the rights and responsibilities of the European nations under the modified Brussels Treaty. Close coupling with the United States remained at the heart of the doctrine - which was predicated upon the persistence of a massive and identifiable threat from the East. This effectively ruled out any attempt to rethink the bases of European security. It was the collapse of the Cold War system (not to mention the Warsaw Pact and indeed the USSR itself) which provided an exogenous and qualitatively new impetus towards Europeanisation, synchronising with the endogenous Maastricht process outlined above. The French took an early lead in arguing, from within and without NATO, that the Alliance should undergo a fundamental review, beginning with a political analysis of the new world situation and leading on from that analysis to a shift in strategic approach and military planning. At an important meeting with George Bush at Key Largo, Florida on 19 April 1990, François Mitterrand proposed the convening, towards the end of that year, of a NATO summit intended to initiate a grand strategic review based on a new world-political analysis. It was not coincidental that, on the very same day, the French President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl formulated their joint proposals on EMU and EPU, including the proposal that Europe should "define and implement a common foreign and security policy"⁷. In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, Washington and Paris both argued in favour of strategic review, but in quite different ways. In the confused situation of these years, there were many crossed wires, a considerable degree of mutual misunderstanding and excessive polarisation of positions. The French appeared to be pressing for a radical restructuring of NATO, based on a reduced political role for the Alliance and concomitant eventual military adjustments, accompanied by the emergence of an increasingly autonomous European security entity and a significantly increased role for CSCE⁸. Washington's position implied continued American political hegemony over a possibly extended Alliance, accompanied by rapid military changes within NATO, intended in part to reassure Moscow. Analysts had a field day commenting on the cut and thrust of this very public shadow-boxing. However, history conspired to reduce the "French agenda" to a sideshow. The collapse of the Soviet centre put paid to any French hopes of projecting CSCE to centre stage. The Gulf War removed any doubt as to which country in the world could aspire to the status of a military superpower. And the Yugoslav debacle called critically into question the European Union's capacity to conduct even a unified let alone an autonomous regional security policy. While George Bush remained in the White House, Atlantic relations followed a course of "Business as Usual". The advent of a new American leadership (of a new generation) in the person of Bill Clinton produced a new situation. The NATO summit in January 1994 constituted a breakthrough in trans-Atlantic relations in that, for the first time ever, it gave positive encouragement to the emergence of the European security entity called for in the Maastricht Treaty and even welcomed the notion of a common European defence policy⁹. For the Europeans, and particularly for the French, there seemed to be everything to play for, particularly in the perspective of the 1996 Intergovernmental Review Conference (IGC). Only months after the NATO summit, the French government published a major defence review in the shape of a Livre Blanc (the first since 1972) and this was rapidly followed up by a new defence programme law (loi de programmation militaire - LPM) covering the period 1995-2000. The cardinal feature of both those major documents is, at least on the surface, Europeanisation. In what follows, I shall attempt to show how French defence structures, concepts and policy have changed, particularly in very recent years, as a result of this European agenda. The first point to note in this regard is the constant public reiteration of the equivalence between French and European security policy. In his Preface to the 1994 Livre Blanc, prime minister Edouard Balladur noted that, "with the coming into effect of the Treaty on European Union, our defence policy must in fact contribute to the gradual construction of a common European defence". In his speech to the IHEDN on 8 September 1994, Balladur highlighted this objective as "one of our main ambitions in the coming years". A French contribution to the construction of a common European defence is not exactly the same thing as the "Europeanisation" of French national defence planning. But Defence Minister François Lottard went further: France's aim, he insisted, was to create a European defence "not by playing off one State against another, but by bringing about, for the first time in the tormented history of this old continent, a mutualisation of power, in the service of the defence of Europe and of a common security for the States engaged in its construction. This ambition lies at the heart of the new White Paper [...] In the long run, its consequences are considerable" (p.10). They certainly sound "considerable", but what exactly is meant by "mutualisation of power"? During the parliamentary debate on the LPM 1995-2000, a succession

of deputies, many of them with impeccable Gaullist credentials, outdid one another in asserting that France's defence policy had to be tightly meshed with that of Europe¹⁰. The White Paper itself notes that "the maintenance of France's rank in the world will be in large measure linked to her ability to influence the construction of Europe and its future evolution" (p.52). There is little doubt about the message behind the discourse. France wishes Europe to adopt what Paris conceives of as a European security policy. How far has France herself changed in order to help this process along? For a nation which, ever since the 1960s, has prided itself on what was presented as a growing political consensus on the Gaullist precepts of national independence and non-integration into multilateral defence structures, the implications of the new approach appear on the surface to be very far-reaching in a number of significant areas. These include: command structures and intelligence gathering; force structures and operational missions; bilateral and multilateral integration; the armaments industry and defence procurement; transport and logistics. At the same time, there are very clear limits to the extent to which genuine Europeanisation of French defence policy is actually taking place - or indeed can actually take place. Among factors imposing such limits are the complexity of the international situation, the differences in security vision between France and her European partners, and residual complexities of a purely domestic nature to do with the idiosyncracies of French political culture.

2. The "Europeanisation" of French Defence Policy

One of the main underlying rationales behind this European discourse is the conceptual shift from "defence policy" per se, with its overwhelmingly military implications, to a broader definition of security involving economic and industrial policy as well as diplomatic, cultural, educational and many other dimensions. The principal sources of tension in the post-Cold War world are now seen in France as stemming from structural disequilibria between the rich areas of the world and the poor. Interdependence is perceived not simply as a feature of the economic and industrial systems of the advanced market economies, but also as a desirable foundation stone for regional and international stability. Where previously, both prior to the nuclear age and throughout the Cold War, it was simple to define and thereby to plan for the protection of "vital national interests", in the post-Cold War world, it is recognised that such threats and risks as do exist stem much more from indirect causes such as economic chaos, social and demographic destabilisation and the political upheaval such problems inevitably generate. Moreover, these risks are recognised as shared, primarily by France's immediate EU partners: "In an increasing number of cases [...] France's interests and those of her Western neighbours and partners are barely distinguishable" (p.48). "It cannot be ruled out that, as the interests of the European nations converge, France's conception of her vital interests will eventually coincide with that of her neighbours" (p.49) But the new feature of this approach to security is that these mutual interests are also shared by the EU with the regions on its periphery such as Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean seaboard. "It is in our interest to engage [with the Mediterranean countries] in economic, political and cultural relations which will help them to [...] reduce political tensions and the reasons behind emigration. In this case, a good cooperation policy is our best guarantee of security"¹¹. Where defence, at the end of the day, was more or less infinitely divisible, security is recognised as essentially indivisible. For this reason, according to the *Livre Blanc*, "France will act, in most circumstances, within the framework of her alliances and in the context of a community of interests between Europeans" (p.52). The problem with this approach is that, programmatically as well as doctrinally, France now has to tread a very fine line between her own national interests and those of her European partners. In the following sections, I shall examine the evolution of French defence preparations under five main heads: nuclear doctrine; overall strategic doctrine; conventional force integration and projection; the defence industry and procurement policy; institutional and organisational adjustments.

2.1. Nuclear Doctrine.

Stuart Croft has examined elsewhere in this volume the general problems involved in moving towards a European nuclear policy. For France, with its traditional insistence on independence and autonomy, that problem is even more difficult than for the UK. An analysis of the "nuclear debate" in France is revealing both of the extent and of the limitations of doctrinal evolution in this sphere¹². References to the nuclear future in French strategic discourse invariably carry a dichotomous message: nuclear

weapons remain the backbone of France's strictly national defence; but they represent, in the post-Wall world, a different strategic currency, and one which is bound to evolve¹³. The most obvious element of "evolution" is their potential Europeanisation. Ever since January 1992 when François Mitterrand first performed what Ian Davidson described as a "classic strip-tease" act by delicately lifting one corner of a veil on the notion of a "European nuclear deterrence", there have been regular winks and nods from various quarters¹⁴. The 1994 Livre Blanc states boldly that "the issue of a European nuclear doctrine is destined to become one of the major questions in the construction of a common European defence [...] Indeed, with nuclear weapons, Europe's defence autonomy is possible. Without them, it is out of the question." (p.98). Such a doctrine is conceptually linked in the French mind to the development of a European identity. In all "scenarios", it is generally considered to be at best a medium to long-term prospect. I shall return to it shortly. However, since 1989, there has also been another development on the nuclear front, which has taken place without any reference to France's European partners. The main issue has been the adaptation both of nuclear doctrine and of nuclear systems to the hypothetical threat posed by various forms of unspecified (but presumably Third World) state terrorism. Various specialists have recently advocated de facto reversal of France's traditional approach which insisted that nuclear weapons were not for use but were purely political weapons designed to allow a "weak" state to deter a "strong" one (la dissuasion du faible au fort). The new theories have reversed this dictum in order to conceptualise the deterrence of the "strong" (France) against the "weak" (Iraq? Libya?) by means, if necessary, of precision nuclear attacks on the infrastructure of any hostile state attempting to hold France (or the West?) to ransom (la dissuasion du fort au faible)¹⁵. David Yost has offered the useful distinction in this context between those in France who are in favour of a "more operational" approach to nuclear issues and those who stick to a "less operational" approach¹⁶. This shift in nuclear thinking represents a fundamental break with traditional Gaullist precepts. Although in 1993-1994 Defence Minister Lottard, Prime Minister Balladur and President Mitterrand combined their efforts to reassert nuclear orthodoxy by blowing the whistle on the "more operational" lobby¹⁷, rare were the apostles of restraint such as Pascal Boniface who situated the debate (and the problems it raised) in an overtly European context: "there is a fundamental contradiction between the prospect of the Europeanisation of French nuclear forces and the risk of shifting towards a nuclear policy which would no longer be purely deterrent. Our European partners will not follow us in the direction of nuclear use concepts which we have ourselves always rejected in the past"¹⁸. This is something of an understatement! The prospect of the EU Fifteen reaching agreement on a plan to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike on, say, Tripoli is remote, to say the least. The likelihood of such a doctrinal shift is difficult to gauge, but one is forced to conclude that a Chirac presidency would be more open to pressures in that direction, given the declared support for "use theory" on the part of Chirac's main strategic adviser, Pierre Lellouche. Such a move would, as Boniface has argued, make "Europeanisation" infinitely more complicated. However, French nuclear doctrine is being modified under the impetus of the European debate in a number of other directions. Perhaps most intriguing is the development of the notion of dissuasion par constat, which is usually translated (erroneously in the eyes of its authors) as "existential deterrence". This notion was developed in the 1980s by a number of "intellectual generals" such as Claude Leborgne and particularly Charles-Georges Fricaud-Chagnaud¹⁹. The concept was defined explicitly in order to offer an approach to nuclear weapons and nuclear doctrine which might find a receptive ear not only among the non-nuclear members of the European Union, but also in Britain. It is predicated on the existence of a growing interdependence at every level between the nuclear and non-nuclear states of the Union and therefore on the logical impossibility of identifying and specifying the "vital national interests" of any given state (including France). It presupposes both the continued existence of nuclear weapons (and nuclear weapon states) in the European theatre, but also the existence of serious conventional forces acting as a guarantee against surprise attack or nuclear blackmail. The notion is developed at some length in Fricaud-Chagnaud's recent book on French defence policy, whose provocative title - *Mourir pour le Roi de Prusse?* - symbolically posits the starkness of the security option now facing France²⁰. The notion is presented as one which avoids the pitfalls of most other approaches to a common European nuclear deterrence such as extended deterrence, concerted deterrence or shared deterrence. It is, however, these other concepts which are most in evidence in the various fora where these matters are actually discussed²¹. The most significant of those fora is the Franco-British Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine which was formally established as a permanent group in July 1993 after the London summit between François Mitterrand and John

Major²². The commission, composed of about five officials from each side, representing the two Defence and Foreign Ministries, meets about three times a year, although the supporting group, responsible for drafting position papers, meets more regularly. Discussions have focussed on two types of issues. First, there has been detailed mutual exploration of each side's nuclear doctrine. Discussions have focussed on nuclear policies as they currently exist, rather than on speculative shifts which may or may not take place. This has given rise to the (apparently surprising) mutual recognition that, despite the adversarial posturing of the Cold War period, the nuclear doctrines of the two countries are in fact quite similar and indeed largely compatible. Second, discussion has taken place about topical issues of nuclear relevance such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Arms Control and shifts in the nuclear doctrine of the other nuclear states. Research and development and procurement issues have been excluded from the agenda. The commission has liaised closely with French and British officials working within NATO's Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP). The work of the commission is, of course, classified but highly placed sources suggest that there has been an encouraging convergence of views in discussions about the conditions under which a "European deterrence" might acquire some political and operational meaning. In particular there appears to have been considerable agreement, without attempting to enter into details or definitions, around the notion that the "vital interests" of the main EU countries could well prove to be compatible if not actually common. Officials insist that there has been no discussion of specific hypothetical scenarios (such as the "Islamic threat"), but it is difficult to imagine that such issues will remain "out of bounds". Above all, the commission appears to have developed an excellent working relationship in which both sides have discovered that the prospect of reaching serious agreement on nuclear doctrine ought not to prove particularly problematic²³. Quite what all this amounts to in terms of a "Europeanisation" of France's traditional insistence on the national dimension of the nuclear deterrent is not entirely clear. The fact remains that, from François Mitterrand to Jacques Delors, from Edouard Balladur to Admiral Lanxade, from Alain Juppé, to François Fillon, from François Lottard to Jacques Chirac²⁴, all prominent French officials regularly insist that France is willing (and presumably able) to put its nuclear forces at the service of Europe. As David Yost has concluded, "what is most striking is the extent to which French choices are likely to be influenced by those made by other nations"²⁵. On the nuclear front, the "debate", precisely because it is the most difficult and the most sensitive, has only just begun. But the fact that it has begun is indicative of the distance already covered from what is commonly understood as "Gaullism". The logical corollary to this is a veritable revolution in overall strategic doctrine.

2.2. Strategic Doctrine

Prior to 1994, the relationship between France's nuclear and her conventional weapons was constructed around two strategic precepts. First, the doctrine of deterrence, born of superpower confrontation and the nuclear stalemate, insisted on the notion of "no-war" (non-guerre) or "refusal of battle" (refus de la bataille). For the French, the function of nuclear weapons was to prevent wars, not to fight them. This was counterposed against the NATO doctrine of flexible response. The corollary of that first strategic precept was the second: that conventional forces also were, in a variety of ways, linked to the nuclear deterrent as a kind of trip-wire which prevented its being "short-circuited". Conventional weapons also were intended to prevent wars rather than to fight them. This relationship has, since 1994, changed radically. The Livre Blanc itself makes this explicit. After speaking rather discretely of "certain conceptual mutations" (p.89) and a "different balance" (p.90) in the respective place of nuclear and conventional weapons, the chapter on defence strategy in effect opens up a radical new approach. Since nuclear weapons are henceforth likely to play a significantly less central role in strategic planning, whereas conventional weapons are likely to be very much more in evidence (and also in use), the relationship between the two has explicitly been "inverted" (p.94). Indeed, the Livre Blanc even goes so far as to hint that, whereas previously, conventional weapons were regarded as tactical support systems for the strategic nuclear deterrent (neither of which was intended for use), today it is conventional weapons which are regarded as strategic and, at one level at least, nuclear weapons which might have to be reconfigured for tactical use in order to ensure that the conventional systems are not short-circuited (contourn, i.e. defeated)²⁶. As we have seen, the debate on the potential military use of nuclear weapons (possibly in support of conventional weapons) is both embryonic and extremely problematic. However, the redesignation of conventional weapons as both

strategic and pre-eminent has already taken place. It figures in second place (after Europeanisation of both equipment and structures) as one of the six main priorities of the new loi de programmation militaire. Conventional systems are now designated as being primarily intended for use in certain conflict situations. They are considered as strategic weapons on condition that, in a European context, they confer on their political masters autonomy in three key areas: intelligence gathering, C3I, transport and logistics. We shall examine below (2.3) the evolution of French military planning under these heads. While European considerations are not the only ones involved in this strategic review, they are constantly cited as the main reason for it. Of the six specific scenarios which are sketched out as contexts in which France's conventional forces will be used, by far the most significant ones are in Europe or its immediate hinterland²⁷. Thus it is no exaggeration to state that the revolution in French strategic doctrine which was introduced in 1994 is the direct result of the new international situation in general, and of the new European situation in particular.

2.3. Conventional weapons for power projection

This radical revision of strategy is being paralleled at the level of procurement. The proportion of the defence budget allocated to nuclear forces, which rose to over 30% in the mid-1980s and dropped off to 24% by 1990, fell precipitately to 11% in 1995²⁸. The picture is clearer if we look at actual expenditure.

Year	Overall Budget	Nuclear forces	MF
1987	169,200	36,050	MF
1991	194,548	42,952	
1992	195,268	40,446	
1993	197,916	26,906	
1994	193,828	23,164	
1995	194,262	22,387	

Since 1990, most of the nuclear programmes planned in the 1980s have been either cut, postponed or drastically reduced. The additional resources are going into four priority areas: command and control systems; intelligence; transport and strategic mobility; power projection. The strategic assumption behind all these priorities is the same. These new weapons systems will be required for use in missions connected with peace-keeping or peace enforcement in theatres such as former Yugoslavia. They will be used in conjunction with both WEU and NATO forces, most often under a United Nations mandate. The lion's share of defence equipment expenditure is going to systems for use by the Army (Leclerc heavy tanks, VLB light armoured vehicles, Tigre anti-tank helicopters); the Navy (nuclear aircraft-carrier Charles de Gaulle - launch in 1999 with a decision on a second boat to be taken in 1997; naval version of Rafale to be deployed in 1999; a new generation of TCD landing craft; new La Fayette-class frigates and the development of the Franco-British anti-aircraft frigate Horizon); the Air Force (Future Transport Aircraft; Rafale; KC 135 FR refuelling aircraft; Mirage 2000-D ground attack fighter etc). The objective for the army is to be able to "project" to distances of around 5,000 kms from their bases, as many as 40,000 men (two divisions) which, given the need for replacement, means the training of up to 120,00 men (out of a total army contingent of 227,000) for power projection purposes²⁹. As for the navy, the aspiration is to contribute to the creation of a unified European navy with power projection capabilities across the globe³⁰. The air force, by contrast, will have its role reduced as a result of three factors. First, the declining need for large numbers of fighters and bombers; second, the disproportionately large share of its budget which will be accounted for by the Rafale (currently estimated at 200 billion francs) and the heavy price tag for the Future Large Transport aircraft (currently estimated at 35 billion francs)³¹. We shall examine in the next section of this chapter the significance of the fact that many of these systems (the ones marked in bold above) are being produced by one European consortium or another. It is important to stress at this juncture that many of these weapons systems have been devised, reconfigured or prioritised explicitly in view of the requirements of the new crisis-driven combat missions of the post-war era³². It would be an exaggeration to suggest that moves towards European integration in defence are the principal driving force behind these new deployments. It is no exaggeration to conclude that the shift towards usable conventional systems is indissociable from the new strategic thinking about the future of combat - linked to crisis management - in Europe and its hinterland or from moves to create a genuinely European military capacity with which to approach that combat and to handle those crises. One of the most significant features of recent French procurement plans is the emphasis on intelligence-gathering capacities and command and control systems. The most painful lesson learned in Paris from the Gulf War was the fact that, as the then Defence Minister Joxe put it, without American satellites, the French armies in the Gulf were effectively "blind"³³. Accordingly, ever since the Gulf War, France has placed the utmost priority on the acquisition by Europe of an autonomous space-based intelligence and command capability. This question naturally raises the much broader one

of relations between the two sides of the Atlantic, which we shall deal with under 2.5. below. But there is no doubt that France's new strategic approach, involving the acceptance of multiple combat missions in a European context, has provided a major impetus behind her plans for a European space capacity. The French space budget has decupled since the end of the 1980s, rising from just over 500m francs in 1987 to 1,977m francs in 1989 to 5,017m francs in 1995. Between 1994 and 1995, the space budget rose by 23.4%³⁴. Despite programme setbacks (ambitious plans for a European space shuttle - Hermes - were drastically scaled back in 1992), and a constant shortfall between French projects and European support, the picture is nevertheless relatively positive. The Ariane launcher rocket has established itself as a major international competitor. The SPOT and ERS observation satellites are heavily in demand throughout the world. The HELIOS military observation satellite, which will give France/Europe (limited) autonomous intelligence data is set for launch in the summer of 1995. The WEU satellite monitoring centre at Torrejon in Spain was inaugurated in April 1993. French plans for radar observation satellites (OSIRIS, ZENON, CERISE) are well advanced. The military telecommunications system SYRACUSE has been functioning for several years. A variety of other space-based projects are on the drawing board. The biggest problem with all this space activity is the relative reluctance of France's European partners to involve themselves with political enthusiasm and financial commitment. Italy and, to a lesser extent, Spain have associated themselves in a minor way with a number of programmes, particularly HELIOS. But Germany and especially Britain have hitherto fought very shy. At the time of writing (April 1995), however, there are signs that Germany, now freed of constitutional obstacles to overseas military involvement, is reconsidering its decision to participate in HELIOS³⁵. It is clear to all analysts that, without German inputs, the participation of smaller European countries will remain minimal - Italy's and Spain's continued participation in HELIOS is reported to be pegged to Germany's decision. To a large extent the entire space programme seems dependent upon major European cooperation. In presenting the 1995 defence budget to Parliament, François L,otard expressed growing optimism and confidence that Germany would soon join in the European space programme in a major way³⁶. France continues to assert that, even without European participation, it will continue its ambitious space programme on a purely national basis. Although this could be interpreted as bravado, the energetic pursuit of a major military-space programme seems to be a case of France taking a European lead years ahead of her partners and eventually, through the sheer force of her example, dragging them along with her. Certainly, the WEU seems keen to acquire its own extensive space facilities, but remains dependent on the French lead³⁷. The French shift towards emphasis on conventional weapons for power projection constitutes a radical departure in defence policy from the heyday of "Gaullism". Clearly, at doctrinal, programmatic and operational levels, this shift represents a de facto convergence between French defence planning and that of WEU and NATO. Convergence (rather than integration) is the essential feature. However, if convergence continues, there will inevitably come a time when it is difficult to distinguish between the main features of the defence policies of the countries involved. Before we examine the extent to which France, at institutional level, has adopted a genuinely more European profile, it is necessary to assess the progress of Europeanisation in the more general field of arms procurement and the arms industry.

2.4. The Defence Industry and Procurement

It is in the area of the armaments industry that the discourse on the European imperative becomes universal. Without exception, the major texts on weapons procurement for the 21st century stress not only the desirability but the inevitability of European cooperation³⁸. The Livre Blanc even goes so far as to state that "no major future conventional armaments programme seems able to escape the logic of cooperation" (p.192). Yet, despite these repeated assertions, France still produces 75% of her weapons systems within the confines of the Hexagon³⁹, and the economic, social and political problems involved in industrial restructuring and conversion are very considerable. However, given the sheer scale of the "American challenge" (the recent merger between Martin-Marietta and Lockheed created a giant bigger than the entire French aeronautics industry and equivalent in turnover to one third of the entire European aeronautics industry) it is argued in Paris that, if Europe is to retain an independent armaments sector, it has no alternative but to create a European armaments industry. On that principle, there seems to be little disagreement. The costs of sophisticated weapons programmes, particularly in terms of R & D, are rising exponentially. The CEO of Martin Marietta, Norman Augustine calculated

that, by the year 2043, on current trends, the US Defence Department would only be able to afford one single combat aircraft - to be used four days a week by the Air Force and three days a week by the Navy⁴⁰. In a major speech on procurement policy in September 1994, François Lottard outlined a three point plan: "First, to consolidate our national industry by giving it the necessary means to forge European alliances (my stress) [...]; Next, to conduct these European-wide industrial alliances in the tightest possible synergy with the cooperation programmes. Finally, to agree on a division of labour among the European states for non-strategic programmes"⁴¹. How much of this is actually happening? For the moment, the answer has to be that a lot is being said, but a lot less is being done. One of the reasons is that, given the strategic nature of the sector and the State interests involved, mergers of the American type are simply not possible - at least in the short term. Neither Germany nor France is likely to abandon Deutsche Aerospace or Aérospatiale to the rude vagaries of the market. What is being sought are cooperation agreements and these are notoriously lengthy to negotiate. One positive sign is the agreement reached at the Franco-German summit in Mulhouse in May 1994, to establish a Franco-German Armaments Agency (FGAA) whose main priority in the first instance will be to standardise equipment procurement for the Eurocorps and, thereafter, for the emerging European army. The Maastricht treaty called for the creation of a European Armaments Agency (EAA) and it was hoped that WEU would take the initiative. In the event, despite the transfer to WEU of the former IEPG, through the creation of WEAG, the structural problems were too hard for WEU to resolve at European level⁴². It therefore fell, as so often, to a Franco-German initiative to get the ball rolling. A permanent FGAA cell is being established in 1995 with a view to the launch of a fully-fledged structure in early 1996. The Germans and the French are trying hard to interest the British and the Italians in establishing a genuinely European Agency⁴³. Meanwhile, Franco-German cooperation is increasing. In addition to the creation of Eurocopter (a 50-50 consortium of Aérospatiale and MBB), which is constructing both the Tiger and the NH-90 new generation helicopters, the latter in conjunction with Agusta (I) and Fokker (NL), Franco-German cooperation is central to the Future Transport Aircraft (FTA) and also to the future Modular Armoured Vehicle (light tank) as well as to a large number of smaller projects. France is heavily involved with Britain (and Italy) in the development of the Horizon class frigate, the first ever example of a major joint naval procurement programme, and also in discussions over missile development (Matra and British Aerospace) as well as in the nuclear discussions referred to earlier. These are small but significant steps. The road towards a general European armaments industry is long and riddled with obstacles, but France is doing at least as much of the running as any other country. Decisions such as those of the UK to purchase further American transport planes rather than to await the European FTA (even though Britain has still not ruled out participation in that project) or of the Netherlands to purchase American Apache helicopters rather than European Tigers (a decision which may also soon be taken by the UK), are seen in Paris as regrettable but not fatal. The lesson of the Rafale decision appears to have been well learned. This author was told by a senior official in Paris that Rafale will be the last major weapons system to be built solely in France⁴⁴. It remains to be seen how soon and how successfully a European armaments industry will emerge. That it must emerge is taken, in Paris, for granted.

2.5. Structural and Institutional reorganisation

The strategic and programmatic changes we have just analysed have been accompanied by a radical restructuring of France's defence institutions. This has involved two main thrusts. First, internally, the armed forces have been regrouped in new inter-service command structures to allow for an integrated approach to the new combat missions of the post-Wall world. Second, externally, France has entered into a variety of agreements with her European partners (in some instances via WEU, in others on a bilateral basis) to form integrated military units for specific purposes. All of these developments have been the direct result of the European debate. Internal restructuring has been far-reaching and is still evolving. The main feature has been the break-down of the former rigid divisions between the services - which are now organised in three main inter-service commands: Europe, Overseas and Special Operations. This shift has been paralleled in budgetary terms, the defence budget being broken down into inter-service "modules". Even the centuries old separate "coles de guerre" have been merged into a Collège Interarmées de Défense⁴⁵. The three services have each been broken down into "organic groupings" or "force reservoirs" from which the inter-service commands can summon up the necessary mix of forces for a given situation. Force reservoirs for the army, for instance, comprise three structures: the Corps blind, m,canis,, based in Lille; the Force d'Action Rapide; and the

Eurocorps. All of these are now optimally configured for intervention, if necessary in Europe. The CBM has recently been enhanced by a special air-mobile brigade of helicopters specifically configured for European intervention⁴⁶. The most politically visible of the new structures is, of course, the Eurocorps which is now composed of troops from five nations: Germany, France, Belgium, Spain and Luxemburg⁴⁷. It will be fully operational under NATO and/or WEU hats from the autumn of 1995. In addition, France is in the process of establishing, with Italy and Spain, various integrated force structures (air, land and sea) possibly leading to a Mediterranean Rapid Reaction Force⁴⁸. Moreover, after the Franco-British summit in Chartres in November 1994, it was agreed that the two countries would establish a joint "Euro Air Group" based at High Wycombe to coordinate international and European missions of various sorts. The first commander is a French general⁴⁹. France has thus situated herself at the heart of a European network of integrated military units involving all the main countries of the EU. For a country which once held the rejection of integrated command structures to be a point of principle, this is a considerable shift. The object of most of this activity, it seems clear, is gradually to create the de facto bases for a European military entity, probably based on WEU. At a recent colloquium organised by the Centre d'Etudes et de Perspectives Stratégiques, Europe Minister Alain Lamassoure outlined France's vision of the security requirements of a "European Europe". He foresaw three stages. First, a European security guarantee for Europe. Lamassoure argued that the main risks to European security (essentially destabilisation to the East and South) presented no risk to the USA and had therefore "decoupled the threat" as between the two sides of the Atlantic. The French minister painted a rosy picture of genuine progress through CFSP and WEU and insisted that, for France, the 1996 IGC must be essentially focused on the creation of this common defence and security policy. The second stage would be a revised American assurance in which "the Alliance will be transformed into a Euro-Atlantic Alliance between equal partners (stress added)". The third stage would be a "joint Russo-American co-assurance" based on a complex interlocking network of security guarantees between the USA, Europe and Russia. Whatever the element of wishful thinking, or even idealism in this vision, it does seem clear that it is a scenario which now commands very widespread support across the French political spectrum⁵⁰. It poses quite starkly the question of ongoing relations with NATO. The more NATO seems to be searching around for a new role, the more France seems to become actively involved in the internal discussions. So much has been written about this issue (much of which clouds the reality) that it is difficult to attempt to interpret France's intentions with any real clarity. Broadly speaking, it would seem that the strategy is a long-term attempt to foster the development of a radically rebalanced transatlantic relationship, in which NATO will re-emerge as a new Atlantic partnership with two roughly equal pillars. For almost fifty years, France has been somewhat alone in Europe in pursuing this dream. As Alfred Van Staden, David Chuter and Johannes Bohnen have shown in the present volume, there is still, within Europe, considerable resistance to the realisation of that dream. But there is also growing support for it outside France. The Germans and the British, the latter especially under the (unfamiliar and unwelcome) influence of an entirely new attitude in Washington, are moving, at different speeds, towards a more open acceptance of the historical inevitability of such a development⁵¹. As a result of her active manoeuvring since the end of the Cold War, France has put herself in a strong position to emerge as the main player in that elusive European defence entity - if and when it finally emerges. Conclusion France is intensely committed to the creation of an integrated European defence structure and to a common foreign and security policy. Throughout the period of the Cold War, and particularly from the 1960s onwards, while never losing sight of the objective of a European security entity, France nevertheless pursued policies which stressed autonomy and national decision-making processes. This began to change in the 1980s, but since 1989, there has been rapid and significant movement. Conceptually, "defence" is being replaced by "security" as the guarantor of stability, and security is interpreted both as a collective endeavour and as a collective goal. Doctrinally, where both nuclear and conventional weapons are concerned, there have been important shifts in the direction of convergence, sharing or even integration as between France and some of her European partners. In terms of force missions and military involvement, the previous record of immobilism has been replaced by an almost frenetic activism. And virtually none of this activism is unilateral. France is the largest single contributor to UN missions throughout the world. In terms of weapons development and procurement, the picture is increasingly coloured by a seemingly irresistible move towards European cooperation. In terms of medium to long-term objectives, the vision of an increasingly autonomous European defence entity tied in to intricate new security treaties with both the USA and Russia is

becoming the object of a new consensus. Strictly speaking France may not yet have abandoned her national defence structures and programmes. But the evolution of defence thinking at every level is increasingly conditioned by the supposition that, sooner or later (and preferably sooner) France's entire approach to questions of defence and security will be increasingly meshed with that of her European neighbours. To that extent, French defence policy has already been profoundly affected by the debate about something called Europe.

Notes

1. See my "France and the Quest for a West European Security Entity (1944-1994): fifty years, one agenda", in *Proceedings of the Western Society for French History*, Vol.21 (1994), pp.255-273, a modified version of which appears as "France and European Security (1944-1994): rereading the Gaullist 'consensus' in Tony Chafer and Brian Jenkins (eds.), *France: from Cold War to New World Order*, London, Macmillan, 1995. 2. 14, rue Saint Dominique is the seat of the French Ministry of Defence. 3. "Our defence policy [...] and this is our conscious choice, must be situated in the perspective of a European defence, without which we would be faced with nothing but a constant exhaustion of our resources, our willpower and our capacities". Defence Minister Francois Lottard presenting the 1995 defence budget to Parliament in November 1994, *Propos sur la D, fense*, Novembre 1994, p.6. 4. See Western European Union, *The Reactivation of WEU: Statements and Communiqués 1984-1987*, Paris, WEU, 1988. 5. See, on these developments, Julius W. Friend, *The Linchpin: French-German Relations 1950-1990*, New York, Praeger, 1991; Patrick McCarthy (ed.), *France and Germany, 1983-1993. The Struggle to Cooperate*, London, 1993. 6. The "Sinatra doctrine" was a term coined with respect to the tendency of former Soviet-bloc countries to "do it their way" in the aftermath of the Cold War. On the emerging French consensus over the European Pillar, see my chapter "France and the Defence of Europe: redefining continental security" in Mairi Maclean and Jolyon Howorth (eds.), *Europeans on Europe: transnational visions of a new continent*, London, Macmillan, 1992. 7. "MM Kohl et Mitterrand relancent l'Europe politique", *Le Monde*, 20 April 1990, p.4. 8. WEU in this period was presented as being faced with starkly dichotomous options: either as a bridge between Europe and Washington within NATO; or as the autonomous security arm of Europe. On this, see Jacques Delors' speech to IISS "European integration and security" in *Survival*, XXXIII/2, March/April 1991, pp.99-110. 9. Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO HQ, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, reproduced in *Survival*, Spring 1994, pp.162-167. See in particular articles 3,4,5. 10. Balladur and Lottard quotes from *Livre Blanc sur la D, fense 1994*, Paris, 10/18, 1994, pp.6 & 10, Balladur to IHEDN in *Propos sur la D, fense*, Paris, SIRPA, No.45, September 1994, p.37. On the LPM debates, see "Les députés de la majorité plaident pour une coopération européenne en matière de défense", *Le Monde*, 27 May 1994, p.9. 11. Alain Lamassoure, speech to the colloquium of the Centre d'Etudes et de Perspectives Stratégiques, 11 April 1995, in the French Embassy's France: Statements, 18 April 1995, p.4.

12. The best overall study of this problem, particularly from a European perspective, is Bruno Tertrais, *L'Arme nucléaire après la Guerre Froide*, Paris, CREST/Economica, 1994. See also David S. Yost, "Nuclear Weapons Issues in France", in John C. Hopkins and Weixing Hu (eds.), *Strategic Views from the Second Tier: the Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain and China*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1995 or Yost's condensed version of that same study, "Nuclear Debates in France", *Survival*, Vol.36/4, Winter 1994-95, pp.113-139; and Edward A. Kolodziej, "French Nuclear Policy: adapting the Gaullist legacy to the post-Cold War World" in Michael Mazzur and Alexander Lennon (eds.), *Toward a Nuclear Peace: the Future of Nuclear Weapons*, Boston, St Martin's Press, 1994. 13. A good example of this can be found in Paul-Marie de la Gorce's "Présentation" (pp.9-12) to a special issue of the revue *D, fense Nationale* (February 1993) devoted to "Le Nucléaire Militaire". De la Gorce is one of the more traditional champions of "nuclear Gaullism", but fully recognised that, "today, strategic reflexion must move forward and take account of new perceptible threats". 14. For Mitterrand's declaration, see *Le Monde* 12-13 January 1992, "La France suggère ... ses partenaires d'étudier une 'doctrine' nucléaire pour l'Europe. Ian Davidson's analysis "A Classic Striptease" in *Financial Times*, date. 15. The literature on this emerging "nuclear use" lobby is

reviewed in my chapter "The Debate in France over Military Intervention in Europe" in Lawrence Freedman (ed.) *Military Intervention in European Conflicts*, London, Political Quarterly, 1994, p.108. 16. See Yost, *Survival* article cited in f/n 11 p.114. 17. See refs in Yost, *Survival*, p.121. 18. Pascal Boniface, "D,nucl,arisation rampante ou retour ... la suffisance nucl,aire?" in Pierre Pascallon (ed.) *Quelle D,fense pour la France?*, Paris, Dunod, 1993, p.189. 19. Claude Le Borgne, *La Guerre est morte mais on ne le sait pas encore*, Paris, Grasset, 1987; C-G. Fricaud-Chagnaud, "L'Europe de la dissuasion et des solidarit,s actives", *Strat,gique*, 1986, No.29, pp.7-20. Fricaud Chagnaud rejects the translation "existential deterrence" at least in so far as it has been defined by Michael Howard, "Brodie, Wohlstetter and American Nuclear Strategy", *Survival* Vol.34/2 (1992) pp.110-111; or by McGeorge Bundy, "Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.70/4 (1991), p.84. 20. Charles-Georges Fricaud-Chagnaud & J.J. Patry, *Mourir pour le Roi de Prusse?*, Paris, Publisud, 1994, pp.65-92. 21. See Jacques Mellick's contribution to a colloquium on the future of nuclear weapons and doctrine, in "L'Avenir de la Dissuasion nucl,aire", *Relations internationales et strat,giques*, No.6, 1992, pp.44-48 as well as the other contributions on the same topic in the same journal. Mellick's remarks were also reported in *Le Monde*, 4 February 1992, p.18. See also Fr,d,ric Bozo, "Une Doctrine nucl,aire europ,enne: pour quoi faire et comment?" in *Politique ,trangŠre*, 1992/2, pp.407-421; and Serge Grouard and Patrice Van Ackere, "Pour une dissuasion europ,enne", *Lib,ration*, 19 March 1992, p.25. 22. The summit was exceptionally discreet, *Le Monde* not giving it any coverage at all. For the announcement about the establishment of the commission, see *La Politique EtrangŠre de la France*, 26 July 1993, p.83. 23. I am grateful to Bruce Mann, John Thatcher and Ian Woodman from the Ministry of Defence for their willingness to discuss these issues with me. 24. François Mitterrand in *Le Monde* 12-13 January 1992 p.1; Jacques Delors in *Le Monde*, 7 January 1992, p.3.; Edouard Balladur in; Jacques Lanxade, *Le Monde*, 23-34 October 1994, p.9; Alain Jupp, "La France et la S,curit, europ,enne", *D,fense Nationale*, April 1995, p.6; François Fillon, "Dissuasion nucl,aire et ,largissement" in *MinistŠre de la D,fense*, *Un Nouveau D,bat Strat,gique*, Paris, SIRPA, 1993, p.63; François L,otard, "L'effort de d,fense: une volont, politique", in *D,fense Nationale*, October 1993, p.14; Jacques Chirac in 25. Yost, loc cit., p.135. 26. "One might even say that, in these scenarios, the nuclear deterrent will guarantee that the conventional forces are not short-circuited: the role which the latter played in the Cold War is now played by nuclear forces; thus there is no rupture in strategic doctrine, but an evolution in the respective roles of nuclear and conventional means as a function of different scenarios" (p.95). 27. The six scenarios are sketched out on pp.109-118 of the *Livre Blanc*. They are: 1) A regional conflict not threatening France's vital interests (Europe, Mediterranean, Middle East); 2) A regional conflict which could threaten France's vital interests (Europe, Mediterranean, Middle East); 3) A threat to the territorial integrity of France's overseas possessions (DOM-TOM); 4) Implementation of bilateral defence agreements (essentially in Africa); 5) Operations in favour of peace-keeping and international law (again, essentially Europe, Middle East and Africa, but also possibly the Far East and even Latin America); 6) The re-emergence of a major threat to Western Europe. Apart from the latter threat, which is a separate case almost entirely geared to the prospect of a new Russian threat, the most important scenarios are clearly 1, 2 and 5, all of which cite Europe as their main theatre of concern. 28. Precise percentages are now hard to compare with precision. The French defence budget has always been broken down into many different component parts, but to make matters worse, with the restructuring of the forces in 1993 along "modular" rather than service lines, the figures changed quite dramatically from 1994 onwards. Each year in February, the SIRPA publishes a compendium, *La D,fense en Chiffres*. In 1992, the percentage allocated to nuclear forces, which had been dropping by about 1% per year for several years, was recorded as 21%. In 1993, it was recorded under the new scheme as 14% and in 1995 as 11%. However, in some accounts, a figure of 21% is cited, but this seems to be 21% of equipment allocations (Titre V) rather than 21% of the budget. 29. See details in *Terre-information*, September 1994 and report by Jacques Isnard, "L'arm,e de terre pr,pare une nouvelle architecture de ses forces" in *Le Monde*, 7 September 1994, p.12. 30. See, on this, Robert BuissiŠre, "L'Europe, puissance navale" in *D,fense Nationale*, February 1995, pp.99-110. 31. See, on this, the parliamentary report by Olivier Darrasson and *Le Monde*, 1 November 1994, p.11. 32. See, for example, the explanation given by Admiral Lanxade of the new thinking behind the development of electronic guidance for conventional systems geared to crisis management in "R"le et emploi des armes de pr,cision", *D,fense Nationale*, November 1994, pp.27-32. 33. See on this, David Yost, "France and the Guld War of 1990-1991: Political-Military Lessons

learned" in *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.16/3, September 1993; and my chapter, "French Policy in the Conflict", in Alex Danchev and Dan Keohane, *International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict*, London, Macmillan, 1994. 34. See *Armées d'Aujourd'hui*, No.197, February 1995, Special issue on the Defence

Budget, p.53. On French space policy in general, see Hugh Dauncey, *The Making of French Space Policy, 1979-1992*, Ph.D, dissertation, University of Bath, 1994. For the official French view, see Avis pr, sent, au nom de la Commission de la D, fense Nationale et des Forces Arm, es sur le projet de loi des finances pour 1994, Assembl, e Nationale, Tome V. D, fense: Espace et Communications, No.583, 7 October 1993. 35. Jacques Isnard reported that Germany would take a decision in March 1995 to involve itself in a significant way with the HELIOS programme: "Des satellites-espions pour l'Europe. L'Allemagne se joindra en mars ... la France, l'Italie et l'Espagne pour concevoir un r,seau spatial de renseignement strat, gique", *Le Monde* 15-16 January 1995, p.24. It was also reported in December that France, Germany and the USA were collaborating on the development of an anti-missile defence system which Italy and the UK might subsequently join. See *Le Monde*, 27 December 1994, p.12. 36. See L, otard's comments in response to Alain Moyné-Bressand's written question in *Propos sur la D, fense*, No.47, November 1994, pp.35-37. 37. See the report to the 39th Plenary Session of the WEU Assembly by Jean Valleix (France - RPR), "WEU and Space" summarised in Letter from the WEU Assembly, No.17, February 1994, pp.12-13. 38. "For industry, the creation of a European defence is an imperative and an opportunity" - Livre Blanc, p.192; "there is not a single [defence] industrial sector which, in future should not ally with other Europeans" - François L, otard, speech to Centre des Hautes Etudes de l'Armement (CHEAr), 14 September 1994, in *Propos sur la D, fense*, No.45, September 1994, p.45; "a reinforcement of international cooperation is indispensable because [...] France alone will not be able in future to sustain the complete range of technological and military materials" - Edouard Balladur, speech to IHEDN, 8 September 1994, in *Ibid.*, p.42; "It is obvious that given the necessary industrial scale in the field of weapons and given convergence in economic interests, European

communication is the natural framework in which the nations of the Union should equip their armies" - Henri Martre, former head of DGA, "L'Industrie française d'armement dans la tourmente", *D, fense Nationale*, March 1995, p.18; "European construction is an indispensable element in taking up the challenge of cost reduction and in avoiding structural disarmament" - Henri Conze, current head of DGA, in *Armées d'Aujourd'hui*, No.196, January 1995, p.12. 39. Cited in Conze interview (n.32), p.10. 40. This "Augustine's Law" - attributed to Norman Augustine - is outlined in Jean-Paul H, bert, *Strat, gie française et industrie d'armement*, Paris, FEDN, 1991, p.113. It is also referred to in Martre, *art.cit.*, (n.32), p.18. 41. L, otard speech to CHEAr cited in n.32., p.64. 42. See, on this, Letter from the WEU Assembly, No.19, July 1994, p.2. 43. See, on this, *Le Monde*, 13 September 1994, p.13 and *Propos sur la D, fense*, No.47, November 1994, p.159. 44. Interview with Bruno Vieillefosse, Defence Counsellor for the National Assembly's Finance Commission, Paris, December 1994. On the "selling" of Rafale to an extremely reluctant defence establishment determined to participate in EFA, see Jean Guisnel, *Les G, n, raux*, Paris, D, couverte, 1990, Chapter 10 "150 milliards pour Dassault". 45. See, on this, *Armées d'Aujourd'hui* February 1993, pp.23-25. 46. "La France cr, e une brigade a, romobile pour l'Europe", *Le Monde*, 14 April 1995, p.3. 47. The Eurocorps, under the overall command of Generalleutnant Helmut Willmann,

comprises a mixed general staff of 340; the 1st French armoured division (10,000 men based in Baden Baden); the 10th German Panzerdivision (18,600 men based in Sigmaringen); the 1st Belgian mechanised division (10,000 men based in Saive); the 21st Spanish mechanised infantry brigade (5,000 men based in Cordoba); the Franco-German brigade (6,800 men based in M, llheim) and fifty soldiers from Luxemburg. See *Le Monde*, 14 July 1994, p. 10 and *Armées d'Aujourd'hui* No.189, April 1994, pp.16-19. 48. Firm details on this are hard to come by. The project was first announced by François L, otard on 13 July 1994 (*Le Monde*, 14 July 1994, p.10) At that stage, two initiatives were alluded to: a joint air-maritime force and a rapid reaction force). These projects have been given star treatment in all official pronouncements on France's "European credentials" and the details have varied. It is understood that an announcement will be made in the early summer of 1995 as to what precisely is to be established. 49. Stuart Croft, "An Entente looking more cordiale", *Parliamentary Brief*, March 1995, p.34. 50. The objections of a man like Gabriel Robin, who has consistently argued that the only serious threat to Europe (Russia) can only be dealt with via NATO, and that, therefore, the constitution of a European security identity is a dangerous irrelevance which will only hasten

American isolationism, now represent a voice crying in the wilderness. Gabriel Robin, "Un concept en quête de substance: la défense européenne", *Défense Nationale* March 1995, pp.89-96. 51. Laurence Martin and John Roper in an important new study have recently argued that "in the most important case - NATO - progress towards common European policies offers the best way of offering the United States an acceptable framework within which to remain committed to European security and the stability of Europe's wider neighbourhood without remaining unacceptably entangled in the lesser vicissitudes of European politics". Martin and Roper (eds), *Towards a Common Defence Policy*, WEU, Paris, 1995, p.5.