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CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY:
SPANISH NATIONAL INTEREST AND ACCESSION TO THE EC

by

Robert E. Breckinridge

Department of Political Science
Lycoming College, Williamsport, PA

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INTRODUCTION

States typically have overriding economic interests in joining an economic community - economic growth, increasing competitiveness, even economic development. The Member States of the European Community have joined with an interest in promoting economic growth and increasing competitiveness. One argument in favor of North American Free Trade Area is that it will increase competitiveness in several industries. Economic communities in Less Developed Countries have been attempted to stimulate economic development (e.g., in East Africa, West Africa, and Latin America). However, there are often political interests involved as well.

Political interests may be "international," such as lowering the threat of military confrontation with a partner (e.g., France, Germany, and the European Coal and Steel Community) or increasing one's bargaining position in international negotiations (e.g., the East Asian Economic Grouping in its original form, LDCs). They also may be "domestic" political interests, as in the case of Spain. In this paper, the role of the EC in helping to consolidate democracy in Spain will be analyzed. Leaders claim that a decision as fundamentally domestic as the type of political system is not influenced by external actors, yet there is evidence that actors in Spain looked to the EC to provide impetus and support for its decisions to become democratic.

The hypothesis to be investigated is that actors in an emerging political system will look for support and rewards not only within the society, but also outside. To evaluate this hypothesis, data will be analyzed to determine whether or not actors in Spain sought membership

in the European Community as a reward and a support for democracy. Evidence to support this hypothesis includes statements by segments of Spanish society that they favored membership in the EC for the support it would provide for democracy, not simply for economic reasons. Such statements would indicate they were looking outside Spain for support. Short of these explicit statements, support of EC membership for different reasons, in effect, allowed those segments seeking to consolidate democracy to use EC membership as a support for doing so. In other words, the desire of any segment of society for accession allowed the actors charged with consolidation to seek support from the Community through membership, if they so desired. To falsify this hypothesis, the evidence would have to indicate no belief that accession would support democracy. Thus, the actors would not be seeking such outside support. Membership would be for economic reasons only, with only economic impacts on the society.

In this paper, the Spanish transition to democracy will be discussed briefly. Subsequently, the positions of various segments of Spanish society toward membership in the EC will be presented. These segments include industry, agriculture, fishing, political parties, governments, and trade unions. Finally, the evidence will be analyzed and the hypothesis evaluated.

THE SPANISH TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY UP TO APPLICATION TO THE EC

To understand the transition to democracy in Spain, which formally began upon Franco's death in 1975, it is necessary to begin two decades before Franco's death, in the late 1950s (see Clark and Haltzel 1987;

Coverdale 1979; and Malefakis 1982). Ministerial changes in the Spanish government in the 1950s led to a period of economic liberalization and economic growth (the Spanish "Miracle"), and subsequent desires for political liberalization as well. Tourists and the migration of Spanish workers abroad exposed Spaniards to the democratic principles of the rest of Europe. New or revitalized political and labor organizations and an increasingly free press during the 1960s and 1970s, in addition to reformers within the government, laid the foundation for the transition to democracy which occurred after Franco's death.

To understand the consolidation of democracy in Spain, it is important not only to consider developments within Spain, but also relations between Spain and the European Community. The EC rejected the possibility of Spanish membership as long as the Franco regime was undemocratic. The incentive of membership was extended when the EC had the opportunity to influence the change in Spain's domestic regime in the direction of those of its own Member States, after Franco's death.

Franco died on November 20, 1975. The general reaction in Spain was one of disbelief and mourning (Eaton 1981, 11); but there was also uncertainty of what was to come - life under King Juan Carlos. No one was sure how different Spain would be under the King, who, after all, was raised under Francoism and educated by Francoist institutions, and could be considered Franco's protégé.

Juan Carlos was proclaimed King on November 22. In his speech to the Cortes, while not using the term democracy, he included several norms of a democratic society, such as the recognition of social rights

and religious liberty. Furthermore, he argued that

A free and modern society requires the participation of all in the forums of decision, in the information media, in the various levels of education and in the control of the national wealth (ABC, 23 November 1975).

With respect to Europe, he stated that the "idea" of Europe would be incomplete without including the Spanish and that Spaniards are Europeans (ABC, 23 November 1975).

In a speech to the United States Congress six months later, Juan Carlos did mention democracy and the European Communities explicitly:

The monarchy will insure, under the principles of democracy, that social peace and political stability are maintained in Spain. At the same time the monarchy will insure the orderly access to power of distinct political alternatives, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the people.

At the same time, Spain wishes to reinforce its relations with the European Communities, looking toward eventual integration in them (U.S. Congress, House 1976, 16196).

Indeed, it was reported by Ymayo (1977) that the King told author Hugh Thomas that one of his top priorities after the establishment of a constitutional democracy was Spanish accession to the European Communities.

A detailed account of the Spain's transition to democracy after Franco's death is not necessary for the purposes of this paper. It has been amply narrated by others (see, for example, Amodia 1977; Carr and Fusi 1979; Coverdale 1979; Maravall and Santamaria 1986; Medhurst 1984; Preston 1986; Share 1986). A general overview will be discussed here, leading up to Spain's application for membership in the EC.

King Juan Carlos retained Franco's last Prime Minister, Carlos

Arias Navarro, until July 1976. In his six months in office, Arias was successful in achieving only limited reforms. The King, unhappy with the slow pace of reform, asked for and received Arias' resignation. After hard work by his ally, President of the Cortes Torcuato Fernández Miranda, to place Adolfo Suárez's name among those to be considered, the King appointed Suárez Prime Minister (Eaton 1981, 36-40). The appointment was met with outrage from reformers, both within the government and within the democratic opposition. Suárez was not viewed as a reformer and seemed to many to be a step away from political liberalization (Coverdale 1979, 45). However, he embarked on a series of democratic reforms far beyond what many expected from a former government official under Franco associated with Franco's supporters in the Movement.

Among Suárez's first moves as Prime Minister was to declare amnesty for political prisoners not convicted of violence against persons (Coverdale 1979, 48). Over the next fifteen months, the government would declare two additional amnesties for political prisoners. In November, 1976, the Law on Political Reform provided for the restructuring of the Cortes in preparation for writing a new constitution.

There was continued reform activity throughout 1977, including legalization of trade unions and political parties. Formal legalization of trade unions came with the Law of Syndical Freedom in March, 1977 (Foweraker 1987, 108-109). Following their legalization, the CCOO and the UGT became the largest unions, and were associated with the Communist (PCE) and Socialist (PSOE) Parties, respectively.

Several smaller, independent unions also formed after legalization, including the Unión Sindical Obrera (USO), which became favored by the Suárez government (Kohler 1982, 30).

The government revised procedures for the registration of political parties in February 1977. Within days, all of the major political parties applied for legalization. In total, 156 parties were registered, excluding extreme-left parties, but including, eventually, the Communist Party (Coverdale 1979, 57-59).

Although there was a proliferation of parties after their legalization, only a few survived with seats in the Parliament after the first elections under the monarchy, in June 1977. The Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) under Suárez received a plurality of votes, 34.0%. The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) followed closely with 28.9% of the vote. The Communist Party, the right-wing Popular Alliance, and some regional parties followed behind (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad, 1986, 37-38).

Only six weeks passed between the elections of the Cortes and the application by the Spanish government for accession to the European Community on July 28, 1977. The application was made in Brussels by Foreign Minister Oreja. As evidence of his determination to join the EC, Suárez appointed his senior colleague (and later Prime Minister), Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, as Spain's minister in charge of relations with the EC (Harrison 1985, 183). In the following section, the positions of several segments of Spanish society toward membership in the EC will be discussed.

SPANISH SOCIETY ON THE EC AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY

Political Parties and the Government. Given the short period between the Spanish elections and the application to join the EC, there was no time for extensive debate in the new Cortes on the topic; in fact, such debate was not to occur until 1979. The swiftness of the application was

. . . prompted by the pro-European unanimity of Spanish party and public opinion at that time. However, the Spanish government was also aware that failure to act at once might mean losing the chance altogether to participate in the second enlargement of the European Communities. For the Spanish application of July 1977 had been preceded by the Greek one in June 1975, and the Portuguese one in March 1977. Spain had no real commercial choice but to join the other two applicants (Preston and Smyth 1984, 66).

The position of the government on accession to the EC was presented to the Senate of the Constituent Cortes in 1978; and, by this time, all of the political parties, including the PCE, which had become a strongly "Eurocommunist" party, had voiced their support for accession. In his presentation, Foreign Minister Oreja began with a discussion of the economic impacts of accession, but went on to say that it was also a political option with political aspects, such as realization of a new way of life under liberty and justice (Spain, Cortes Generales 1978, 557).

This appears to be a contrast to Oreja's response to a question at a press conference following Spain's application to the EC in 1977. He was asked whether or not there were links between Spain's application and the consolidation of democracy. He replied, "Democratization depends exclusively on the Spanish people" (EL PAIS, 29 July 1977).

But the statement was addressed in the British Parliament, where an official in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office noted that it must not be considered ". . . a denial that an association with the Community must be linked with the democratic process; rather, one sees it as an assertion which we too would make if confronted with this position - that our choice is for us to make rather than a condition imposed on us" (U.K. Parliament 1978a, 3).

The 1979 debate in the first Congress of Deputies elected under the new constitution opened with another statement of the government's position, this time by Minister of Relations with the European Communities Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo. He gave several reasons for pursuing membership in the European Community: 1) "in the first place," economic reasons; 2) social reasons; 3) political reasons, "naturally"; and 4) historical reasons. The economic reasons were the level of Spanish exports to, and imports from, the Community - in each case 50% (excluding petroleum imports). The social reasons were the 500,000 Spaniards working in the Community and the 900,000 Spaniards living there. The political reasons for accession were the fact that decisions affecting Spanish trade, industry, agriculture, fishing, and employment were made in Brussels with no input from Spain, and ". . . in solidarity with [our European neighbors] we are best able to support our road toward prosperity and toward liberty" (Spain, Cortes Generales 1979, 900-901). Finally, the historic reason was that Spain belonged in Europe (Spain, Cortes Generales 1979, 901).

The spokespersons of each of the various parliamentary groups who followed Calvo Sotelo's presentation voiced support for accession.

While some urged that accession not be at any price nor without conditions of any type (Andalucian Socialist Party), others pledged their complete cooperation (Basque National Party). Former Foreign Minister Areilza, as spokesperson for the Democratic Coalition Parliamentary Group, spoke of accession ". . . binding . . . the Spanish political system with the fundamental democratic principles of the Treaty of Rome . . ." (Spain, Cortes Generales 1979, 923), while the spokesperson for the Socialist Parliamentary Group of the Congress stated that accession would ". . . imply the confirmation and recognition of our democratic society and . . . will be a dynamic factor in supporting and deepening democratic life in a certainly important moment of our own political development (Spain, Cortes Generales 1979, 933).

Industry. The economic growth of the 1960s and early 1970s had already caused a transformation in the outlook of Spanish businessmen. They had become one of the most politically liberal segments of Spanish society. The international outlook of industrialists and their changing attitudes toward labor were among the most important reasons for this. Parts of Spanish industry were increasingly linked to, and, in many cases, controlled by, multinational corporations. Therefore, they were better able to face international competition (Kohler 1982, 5). This was an important consideration, because many businessmen considered the European Community as the key to future economic expansion (Malefakis 1982, 220; Medhurst 1984, 32); and, as part of the EC, they would face strong competition without the benefits of protectionist barriers.

Industrialists had become used to the suppression of trade union activity during the Franco regime; however, in the interest of economic expansion, they were ". . . prepared to pay the price of political liberalization" (Kohler 1982, 5), with free trade unions. The EC's membership criteria included free trade unions. While industrialists may have had a difficult time accepting the idea of free trade unions at first, their attitudes began to change by the early 1970s.

This changing attitude among industrialists toward labor was stimulated by the economic miracle and increasing international links. It appeared to be in place by 1973, when a survey showed that only students were more liberal than business owners and managers on questions of political reform and that 74% of owners and managers were in favor of free trade unions (Coverdale 1979, 13). First, as profits increased during the period of rapid economic growth, they found it more beneficial to keep their businesses operating and to improve labor productivity than to "win pyrrhic victories over workers" (Malefakis 1982, 219). Second, increasing exposure to the liberal political and capitalist attitudes of Western Europe led to acceptance of collective bargaining and strikes (Malefakis 1982, 219; Coverdale 1979, 12-13). With the change in management's attitude toward labor, the industrialists no longer required the authoritarian regime to keep labor in check, and they began to realize that the "benefits it conferred could be provided equally well by a stable democracy of the European type . . ." (Malefakis 1982, 220). Such a democracy would also meet the EC's requirements for membership, which would lead, in turn, to future economic expansion.

Not all segments of Spanish industry were as supportive of EC membership as those with an international focus. Indeed, as Spain applied for membership and negotiations commenced, the economic difficulties posed by accession became more real. However, industrialists continued to support democratization and accession on the grounds that it would stimulate economic growth.

Those in sectors such as shipbuilding, iron, steel, and shoes were in favor of accession from a political point of view, but against it from an economic point of view (García Lombedero 1991). This was reflected also in the position of the Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE, Spanish Confederation of Employers' Organizations), an organization incorporating 165 individual employers' organizations which represent 80% of the labor force in the private sector (Donaghy and Newton 1987, 202). In a published report of its position, the CEOE stated that it was aware that accession to the European Community would contribute to social and political stability in Spain, although it would also require a "formidable effort" to make the Spanish economy competitive within the European Community (Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales 1981). Most of the report dealt with the impact on the Spanish economy, on Spanish industries, and what must be done to limit negative impacts. Leaders of the CEOE reflected this position in speeches during the period of negotiations with the EC, again emphasizing the political and social stability and profound economic changes which would result from accession (Ferrer Salat 1981; and Cuevas 1985).

The president of the Business Roundtable, an association of

leading employers from large firms which is concerned with economic order and social policy in general (Kohler 1982, 59), wrote that the fundamental objective of accession to the Community in the short-term was the consolidation and stabilization of Spanish democracy. He warned, however, that Spain should not lose sight of the economic problems brought about by accession (Foncillas 1980).

Another statement of industry's position and attitude toward accession is evident in the first of a series of articles written by a Delegate of the National Council of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Navigation of Spain, Daniel de Busturia. The National Council is the central coordinating body for, and international representative of, the eighty-five local and provincial level chambers. The latter provide services to their members, such as export promotion, trade missions, and economic and financial advice. Membership is not voluntary: "All those engaged in the activities covered by the chamber are automatically members, either as individual traders or as firms, and their fees come in the form of tax surcharges" (Donaghy and Newton 1987, 204).

The articles were written for EL PAIS at the time of Spain's application for full membership in the EC. De Busturia's first article, written on the day of Spain's application, was entitled "Common Objective: To Consolidate Democracy." After providing some background of Spanish-EC relations, he writes that ". . . accession to the Communities is a necessary and realistic decision to correspond with the objective of democratic consolidation . . ." (de Busturia 1977b). Furthermore, Spanish democracy ". . . needs to be underpinned

and the request of accession to the Communities . . . can be one of the factors of its consolidation" (de Busturia 1977b, 36). Only in his second article did he deal with the difficulties of the impending negotiations (de Busturia 1977a, 32).

A Study Group of the European Community's Economic and Social Committee travelled to Spain and reported that, "despite the new constitution, businessmen are not sure what sort of society Spain will have in 10 years" (Economic and Social Committee 1979, 16). This, along with uncertainties over the economic changes required for accession, led to an unwillingness on the part of Spanish businessmen to invest locally. "This may be why the business world attaches so much importance to EEC membership. It is looked on as an anchor, a guarantee that Spain will evolve within the framework of a market economy which is open to the outside world" (Economic and Social Committee 1979, 16). Therefore, Spanish businessmen saw the European Community not only as a politically stabilizing force, but also as a factor in economic stabilization.

To summarize, industry generally expressed political support for accession, and the belief that accession would contribute to political stability and consolidation of the democratic regime. There remained, however, concerns about the economic consequences of membership. The lowering of protectionist barriers would force many industries to restructure and to adapt in order to face competition within the EC (Holmes 1983, 170).

Agriculture. In the agricultural sector, support for membership on

economic grounds varied according to the size and type of the operation. Large-scale producers expected to benefit greatly from lower tariff barriers to European markets. Smaller producers who would not compete as well in open markets had no organization to press their views on accession and, therefore, mounted no serious opposition to membership (Malefakis 1982, 220).

The type of operation was also an indicator of support or opposition to Spain's accession. Those agricultural producers whose products did not compete well against those of EC Member States (e.g. milk and meat) generally opposed membership, while those whose products had a competitive edge over the Member States (e.g. fruits and vegetables) supported membership. It was the latter group, however, whose products threatened European Community farmers the most, and therefore created opposition among those farmers to Spanish membership. Overall, however, despite differences of opinion over the economic costs and benefits of membership, agricultural groups supported entry on political grounds (García Lombedero 1991).

Fishing. The fishing industry was another segment of the Spanish economy whose integration into the EC caused controversy. The Spanish fleet was larger than the entire Community fleet. Spanish fishermen stood to benefit greatly if they were allowed to enter Community waters freely upon Spanish accession. However, this would have been at the expense of other Community fishermen. France, in particular, opposed immediate, unlimited access for Spain's fleet. When Spanish fishing boats were discovered off the coast of France in 1984 (outside French

territorial waters but within the Community's economic zone), French Navy patrol boats fired on them, injuring nine fishermen. After the fishermen were fined by France, a fine which was paid by the Spanish government, they responded by burning foreign trucks in Spain. French and other truck drivers retaliated by blockading the Spanish border until they received assurances that foreign trucks would be protected (Nicholson and East 1987, 225-226).

As a result of the controversy, the chapters on fishing fleets of the Accession Treaty were the last completed. The only way for Spain to reduce its catches to meet Community quotas was to prevent its ships from entering Community waters. However, these ships could not be transferred easily to other waters, because different types of fish require different types of fishing vessels. Spanish fishermen stood to lose jobs and money as a result (although Spain received approximately \$24.5 million in aid from the EC for restructuring its fleet (Nicholson and East 1987, 231)). Furthermore, with fish as a staple in the Spanish diet, increases in the price of fish would have an impact on the whole economy. Yet the fishing industry, which, as a very powerful lobby could have worked to prevent accession, favored it on political grounds, and did not oppose the Accession Treaty (García Lombedero 1991).

Trade unions. Spanish trade unions supported the entry of Spain into the European Community. Among the Spanish unions, there was some discussion of the political benefits to be gained by membership; however, debate centered mostly on economic concerns. The UGT argued

that membership would help in "modernizing the structures" in Spain; and, the EC was seen as a way to reap the benefits of social and economic progress (Union General de Trabajadores 1985). Additionally, in personal correspondence with this writer, an official of the UGT played down the consolidation of democracy as a benefit of membership and expressed his concerns with economic and social aspects (Gala 1991). Furthermore, at the time of Spain's application, the spokesperson of the UGT spoke of "reinforcing the unity of Europe", but did not speak of reinforcing Spanish democracy, again concentrating on the social and economic aspects of accession (EL PAIS, 28 July 1977).

Similarly, the spokesperson of the CCOO, while supporting accession, stressed the competition that would result from joining the Community (EL PAIS, 28 July 1977). A representative of the USO wrote of the social aspects of accession, and argued that European integration should take place on a social basis with primary concern for the impact on workers (Zaguirre 1980).

The concern with social progress and other social aspects of accession implies, however, a consideration of the impact of membership on democracy. Social concerns are a part of democracy in the Western European sense, and social progress could conceivably begin only with a democratic regime in Spain. Turning to EC membership as a contribution to social progress means turning to EC membership as a support for democracy.

European Community. Although the focus of this paper is on Spanish interests, it is important to note that the EC believed it was

supporting Spanish democracy by negotiating and ultimately approving Spain's accession. The Commission's responses to Spain's application were supportive; they often mentioned the belief that membership would support democracy in Spain and, occasionally, that the Commission's impression was that support for democracy was one of the main reasons Spain applied. In a statement in October, 1977, Commission President Roy Jenkins stated:

. . . the Commission believes that any reply which we might give to the candidate countries [Spain, Portugal, Greece] which rejected their applications, even implicitly or indirectly, would not be acceptable. A straight refusal would be a severe blow to the fragile democratic regimes which have emerged with the open encouragement of the Community . . . (Commission 1977b, 67-68).

In February, 1978, Commission Vice-President Natali of Italy visited Spain as a prelude to the Commission's work on its Opinion on Spanish accession. After speaking with King Juan Carlos, Prime Minister Suárez, Foreign Minister Oreja, Minister of Relations with the European Communities Calvo Sotelo, other members of the government, and political party leaders, Natali "noted the unanimity of the Spanish political and economic forces in favor of rapid accession to the Community, as an essential support for the stabilization of democracy in Spain" (emphasis added, Commission 1978a, 55).

In a preliminary assessment of enlargement, the Commission expressed its view that the application for accession to the EC by Spain (and Greece and Portugal) was a political commitment, ". . . reflecting the concern of the three new democracies for their own consolidation and protection against the return of dictatorship . . .

[and] entrust[ing] the Community with a political responsibility which it cannot refuse, except at the price of denying the principles in which it is itself grounded" (Commission 1978b, 6).

In response to Spain's application, the reactions by the Council of Ministers and in the Member States were generally favorable. Two months after Spain's application, on September 20, 1977, the Council of Ministers returned a favorable decision on it and called for negotiations to commence (Commission 1977a, 6-7).

Soon after the Council's acceptance of Spain's application for membership, the British House of Lords heard testimony on enlargement (including the accession of Greece and Portugal). The Superintending Under Secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr. J. Fretwell, testified that the Prime Minister was on record as stating, "We welcome the application by Greece, Portugal and Spain to join the Community. We believe it will have the effect of buttressing democracy in those states . . ." (U.K. Parliament 1978a, 2). Furthermore, "the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary (Rt. Hon. David Owen, MP) has also stated in the Commons the Governments' unequivocal support for Enlargement 'in order to buttress the democratic and political elements for which I believe the European Community stands'" (U.K. Parliament 1978a, 2).

Early in 1978, Dr. Owen reiterated his beliefs to the House of Lords:

. . . in all three cases, one of the dominant reasons why they have asked to join, and certainly have asked to join fairly speedily, is their belief that this will buttress their democracies, it will give them the framework of support and of solidarity which they might not

otherwise have.

There is a danger that if the Community were to respond to this request in a time scale of so many years and frustration were built up in these countries that we could actually damage the very thing that we have been trying to encourage by our membership . . . (U.K. Parliament 1978b, 290-291).

To summarize the positions of the other Member States on Spain's accession to the Community, the most strenuous opposition came from other southern European states and was based on economic concerns. While they supported accession on political grounds, France and Italy were concerned about the direct competition in agriculture that Spanish membership would create. Northern European countries such as Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands supported Spanish membership on political grounds; and they were not as concerned about the competition in agriculture because their products did not compete directly with those from Spain.

In the period from Juan Carlos' proclamation as King in 1975 until the first general elections under the new monarchy in 1977, the European Parliament was very active in debating Spanish membership and the political developments in Spain. Generally, there was support for Spanish accession; at each step forward in Spain's transition, the EP applauded the progress.

Subsequent to Spain's application for membership, the EP held a debate on the issue of enlargement. During the debate, the spokespersons of several Groups spoke of membership as a method of strengthening democracy in the applicant countries, and, in some cases, in the Nine as well. The spokesperson for the Christian-Democratic Group, from Germany, argued that ". . . by absorbing these countries

into a free Europe, we shall be making the best and most effective possible contribution to the maintenance of political and economic stability . . . a contribution which will serve to strengthen these young democracies" (European Parliament 1977, 83). Subsequently, the Socialist Group spokesperson, from Italy, stated that Spain (and Greece and Portugal) ". . . must be accepted by the Community institutions and by the Member States in order to strengthen democracy" (European Parliament 1977, 84). The French spokesperson of the Liberal and Democratic Group spoke of the role of responsibility of the Community:

Let us not forget that these peoples have overcome dictatorship, thanks mainly to moral encouragement from the Community and from the European Parliament. The Community would lose all credibility if it were to turn its back on them in their hour of need for petty financial reasons. In all those countries, Europe and democracy are synonymous (European Parliament 1977, 87).

Speaking of the impact of enlargement on democracy in the Nine, the European Conservative Group spokesperson stated that ". . . enlargement will give a new strength to European democracy. By contrast, any rejection of enlargement would weaken European democracy and undermine the coherence of the Community" (European Parliament 1977, 90).

While there were differences of opinion in the European Parliament over when Spain was "acceptable" for membership, once Spain had held its first elections under the Monarchy and had applied for membership, the major Groups within the EP were supportive of Spain's accession for political reasons. Concerns shifted to the economic impacts once the political requirement had been met.

Outside of the EC, but at the European level, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) expressed their views on Spanish accession. The ETUI published its views of the socio-economic aspects of enlargement. It began, however, with a statement on the political reasons for enlargement:

The political objective of both the European Community and the applicant countries in the enlargement of the Community . . . is based primarily on the desire to consolidate political democracy recently restored in these countries after years of dictatorship. The European Trade Union movement endorses this objective but not unconditionally (Hutsebaut 1979, 3).

The main condition which the European trade union movement placed on enlargement was that it not be to the benefit of industrialists and to the detriment of workers (Hutsebaut 1979, 3). The remainder of the report included a discussion of the economic and social aspects of enlargement.

The ETUC expressed its opinion on the political impact of Spanish accession after the fact. In a 1988 report from its Statutory Congress, it noted that accession ". . . lent support to the democracy which was established in [Spain and Portugal] following decades of dictatorship" (European Trade Union Confederation 1988, 3).

CONTINUING THE TRANSITION AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EC

Between August 1, 1977 and October 31, 1978, the Cortes debated and adopted a new Constitution. In a referendum on December 6, 1978, 67.7% of all eligible voters voted, with 87.8% in favor, 7.9% against, and 4.3% casting blank or null ballots (Coverdale 1979, 119). Thus, within eighteen months of the first parliamentary election under the

monarchy, Spain had a new constitution.

Negotiations between Spain and the European Community on membership began in February, 1979, two months after the referendum approving the Spanish constitution. At the opening session, Roy Jenkins, President of the Commission, said

You come to this table with the immeasurable asset of full support from your people and all the political parties through which Spanish opinion is expressed.

The new institution of parliamentary democracy in Spain and your respect for human rights have together created the conditions for Spanish membership of the Community . . . (Commission 1979, 22).

He was followed by Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, Spanish Minister for Relations with the European Communities. Calvo Sotelo described the application as a step along the path "to freedom," and that Spain was ". . . prepared to accept the Treaties and the [acquis communautaire] - not passively or apathetically, but actively and resolutely, because we share the political ideals of peace and freedom on which the Treaties are based . . ." (Commission 1979, 23).

Some of the more difficult issues to be resolved in the negotiations were the free movement of workers, the social policy, the Common Agricultural Policy, and the introduction of the value added tax. The budgetary problems raised in the Community by Great Britain in the early 1980s also hampered the progress of the negotiations. After this dispute was resolved, the negotiations moved more quickly. The fisheries and agricultural chapters of the Accession Treaty were the last ones to be completed (Nicholson and East 1987).

The most serious threat to Spanish democracy since the first

elections under the monarchy took place during the votes to confirm Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo as Prime Minister, replacing Suárez, who had resigned because of declining support. On February 23, 1981, there was an attempted coup d'état, during which members of the military held deputies to the Cortes hostage and took over radio stations. The coup never progressed any further than that, however, when King Juan Carlos denounced the attempt and the deputies eventually escaped or were released. Although the coup attempt shook the new democracy, it did have at least one beneficial aspect: it gave a strong boost to the negotiations for Spain's accession to the EC. Most of the EC Member States felt a new sense of urgency to complete the negotiations (The Economist 7 March 1981, 51). This attitude was fostered, in part, by the fact that the coup attempt was televised throughout much of Europe, and the strong stance against it taken by the King and most governmental institutions and parties impressed Western Europe favorably.

The successful resistance to the attempted coup strengthened democracy in Spain, both in the eyes of Spaniards and of people around the world. It reinforced the need for Spanish entry into the EC on political grounds and generated more pressure to conclude the negotiations within the Community in order to indicate its support of Spanish democracy.

The first alternation of governments under the new Constitution took place in 1982. With the UCD in a weakened position, and the PCE suffering from internal divisions and electoral losses, the PSOE won a majority of seats (202, an increase of 81) and the AP became the main

opposition party (with 107 seats, an increase of 98). The UCD splintered into several groups, some running in coalition with the PSOE and the AP. Those running independently won only 13 seats (down from 168) while the PCE won only 4 seats (down from 23). The regional parties won 24 seats, a loss of five (López-Pintor 1985, 293-295). This dramatic change in power resulted from the problems within the UCD, the resulting belief that the UCD could not effectively govern Spain, and the economic troubles facing the state (López-Pintor 1985). However, with the alternation of governments, even the most skeptical observers would have a hard time arguing that democracy had not been consolidated.

THE SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT AND ACCESSION

The PSOE supported EC membership as a party in the Cortes, and maintained that support as the governing party. In his speech of investiture, Prime Minister Felipe González acknowledged the importance of negotiations for membership (Morán 1990, 45). In the first State of the Nation address to the Cortes, in September, 1983, González stated that the Government wanted rapid integration, but not at any price (Spain, Cortes Generales 1984a, 68). In his State of the Nation address the following year, González said that the presence of Spain in the European Community was ". . . logical for the development of democracy" (Spain, Cortes Generales 1984b, 108). González's first Foreign Minister, Fernando Morán, under whom the negotiations for accession were completed, has written that the recovery of liberties and a democratic constitution have been identified with European

institutions (Morán 1990, 38). He has also written that upon completion of the negotiations, the "man in the street" considered that accession would make democracy more robust (Morán 1990, 443). Even the title and front cover of his book indicate the importance attached to Community membership. The front cover shows the Spanish flag among the flags of the EC Member States, and the book is titled Espana en su Sitio, Spain in its Place. The PSOE government thus brought the negotiations to a successful conclusion, and there is some evidence that it associated membership with the support of democracy.

Negotiations with the European Community continued until June 12, 1985, when the Accession Treaty was signed (Commission 1985b). Ceremonies took place in both Portugal and Spain on that day, and in Lisbon, the Italian President of the Council of Ministers stated that

once again we see that membership of the European Community follows naturally from the restoration of the values inherent in a pluralist democracy. This represents a guarantee, since within the process of European integration there has never been nor can there be any turning away from the path of freedom (Commission 1985a, 7).

Later in the day, in Madrid, Prime Minister Felipe González stated that unanimous support for accession ". . . let it be known from the very beginning that the goal of our accession to the Europe represented by the Community was a state matter because it reflected the desire of an overwhelming majority of Spaniards for whom Spain's entry into Europe was identified with its adherence to the ideals of freedom, progress and democracy" (Commission 1985b, 11).

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The hypothesis to be evaluated is that actors in an emerging political system will look for support and rewards not only within the society, but also outside. Based on the evidence reviewed above, there were two segments of Spanish society which sought support from the EC for the consolidation of democracy: industry and political parties. Although there were differences of opinion and differences in emphasis within them, in general, they both considered the buttressing of democracy as an important reason for joining the Community.

The segments of Spanish industry with an international focus had become increasingly liberal (politically) as a result of the economic miracle. They realized that with better labor-management relations, an authoritarian regime was no longer necessary for economic growth and development: a stable democracy could provide the same benefits. According to the writings of several organizations representing industry, including the largest, the CEOE, industry looked for accession to the European Community to contribute to political stability and democratic consolidation. This would provide a better environment for investment within Spain, and membership in the EC was believed by many to be the key to future economic growth and development. Support from outside society was sought by industry to contribute to the consolidation of the new regime. While industry's ultimate motives may have been economic, it still looked to the EC for promoting a stable democracy.

Time and time again, Community and Spanish officials remarked about the unanimous support in the Cortes for accession to the EC. All

of the political parties represented in the parliament favored membership, but not all for the same reasons. Several of them did, however, explicitly look to the Community for support for the consolidation of democracy. The ruling UCD party sent mixed signals about its political reasons for joining the Community. Immediately after Spain applied for membership, UCD Foreign Minister Oreja stated that democratization relied solely on the Spanish people, and not on membership in the Community. Yet during the first Cortes debate on Community membership, Oreja stated that accession had political aspects, including the realization of a new life under liberty and justice. Later, another UCD minister listed several reasons for Spain applying to join the Community, including a political one. But this was defined as the need for Spain to be included in decision-making in Brussels which had a direct impact on Spain. Therefore, it is not clear that the UCD sought support for the consolidation of democracy from Community membership.

Other parties in the Cortes, however, did make explicit their belief that accession would consolidate democracy. The Democratic Coalition stated that membership would bind the Spanish political system with the democratic principles of the Community. The Socialists, at the time the major opposition party, believed that accession would be a dynamic factor in supporting democracy in Spain. When the Socialist Party came to power in 1982, they continued to look to the Community to buttress Spanish democracy. Its position was that membership was logical for the development of democracy. At the end of negotiations, the PSOE Foreign Minister believed that the Spanish

people understood accession as making democracy robust. Thus while one of his predecessors argued that consolidation was up to the people, it might have been the case that the people were depending on the EC to support consolidation.

These two segments of society, industry and the political parties, sought support from outside Spanish society for the consolidation of democracy. They sought support from the European Community by means of membership, which was the incentive provided by the Community for Spain's transition to democracy. They believed that membership in a Community which required democratic Member States would help buttress their own democracy.

The evidence provided on the other segments of Spanish society including agriculture, fishing, and trade unions, does not indicate that they looked to the Community for support for democracy. In the cases of agriculture and fishing, however, it does indicate that they supported membership in the EC for political reasons. While the exact reasons are not clear, the fact that they supported accession allowed the political actors to pursue membership for their own reasons. The powerful fishing lobby could have lobbied against membership, thereby forcing the political parties to reconsider their position. The same can be said for agricultural interests. However, since neither of these groups opposed accession, they, in effect, allowed the political parties to seek support for democracy from the Community.

In the case of trade unions, there is little evidence that they considered political reasons for joining the Community. They emphasized economic concerns, but still were in favor of membership.

Therefore, the same can be said of trade unions as was said of fishing and agriculture. While trade unions did not seek support for Spanish democracy from the EC, neither did they force the political parties with which they were associated to reconsider looking to the Community as a buttress for democracy.

It is conceivable that the links between the trade unions and the political parties allowed the unions to concentrate on the economic and social impacts of membership. In general, the unions supported the positions of the parties (in this case, in favor of membership), and therefore did not concern themselves with political impacts. They were not able to change the positions of the parties, and thus concentrated their efforts on the impacts of those positions. It is also possible that trade unions calculated that their continued existence depended on the consolidation of democracy, and that the support provided by the EC for Spanish democracy was therefore worth the economic problems which would result from accession.

The interaction with the Community had no direct impact on the Spanish transition: the EC was not involved in planning or implementing reforms, planning or running elections, writing the constitution, or suppressing the coup attempt. These events were all carried out by Spanish national actors. The influence the EC did have, however, was as a support, a buttress, for these events. The EC continually stressed its norm of democracy, through Commission statements, Council of Ministers communiqués, European Parliament debates and resolutions, and joint resolutions by all three institutions. It encouraged reforms by providing the incentive of membership, expressed its satisfaction

with elections and the suppression of the coup, and frequently stated its support for Spanish democracy and its belief that membership would help support and strengthen the democratic regime.

Each of the segments analyzed represented a major subsection of society: The parties and the governments represented the political tier; industry and agriculture (including fishing) represented the economic facet; and trade unions represented the social aspects of Spanish society. There was a realization on the part of these actors that the economic impacts of membership would be severe. Industry, agriculture, labor, and the political parties all voiced concerns over the strains that accession would place on the economy. Yet, they all supported accession. Whatever economic reservations they might have had were put aside in favor of the political and long-term economic benefits which would accrue from membership. Fernando Morán acknowledged a pro-European ideological consensus:

Spain's Europeanism, our country's vocation to collaborate in the political construction of Europe . . . is one of the most undisputed values in the current Spanish political situation. At the time of the transition from dictatorship to democracy it attained almost a metapolitical worth and constituted one of the facts on which was established the unanimity which permitted change (Preston & Smyth 1984, 30).

On the part of the Community, there was continual support for the Spanish transition, and the belief that membership would help to support, strengthen, and consolidate democracy. Through the various debates, statements, communiqués, and resolutions, the EC made clear its position, similar to that in Spain, that Spain must join for political reasons regardless of the economic costs to the Community.

Therefore, while the EC had no direct influence on the events of the transition, it did provide support for the transition and consolidation process. All segments of Spanish society supported accession to the European Community, and some segments explicitly looked to the EC as a buttress for democratization.

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