

*European Integration, Public Opinion and Immigration Policy:
Testing the Impact of National Identity*

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Abstract:

This paper empirically tests the theory that national identity causes opposition to EU control over immigration policy. The EU has been gaining more control over immigration policy in recent years, but this has been a controversial, uneven, and politically sensitive process, as many member states are reluctant to cede control over this area of policy. What accounts for member state opposition to EU control over immigration? This paper argues that public opinion in the member states is important in explaining such opposition, and proposes a theory of national identity to explain this public opinion, arguing that those who identify with their nation-states (vis-à-vis Europe) are less likely to support EU control over immigration policy than those who identify, at least partially, with "Europe". This tendency is shown to be stronger than calculated support for or against European integration. Other, competing hypotheses are also tested, including economic cost/benefit calculation, country of residence, social class, political ideology, and a range of social characteristics and political beliefs. The empirical test operationalizes and measures the variables using Eurobarometer survey data, and employs a logistic regression model to test the hypotheses, for an EU-wide sample and 15 individual country samples.

1. Introduction

Immigration is a crucial political issue in turn-of-the-century Europe. Eighty-two percent of European Parliament Members surveyed agreed that immigration is one of the top problems facing Europe (Lahav 1997). Immigration policy cooperation is necessary for the EU's single market, its internal border-free space, and its shared external borders. Especially since the September 11th attacks, immigration also high on the EU's agenda as a shared security threat that can only be mitigated through common action.

With this goal in mind, EU leaders met in 2002 for the Seville summit, which focused on reducing illegal immigration and harmonizing national migration policies. Before the summit, Spanish Prime Minister Aznar announced that reducing illegal immigration was "the most important question in European politics at the moment" (Migration News 2002). And the result of the summit? Failure to reach concrete agreement on any of the ambitious proposals.

This spectacular political divergence between mandate and results presents a puzzle: Why has harmonization of immigration policies been so elusive, if such harmonization is seen as necessary if the EU is to become a single market with free movement of labor? The answer lies with national politics, since some member state governments, at various times, have blocked harmonization proposals advanced by other member states and by the EU's central institutions.

From where does this national opposition to harmonization of immigration policies originate? I propose that some EU citizens have been resistant to the idea of granting Brussels control over immigration *not* because of instrumental calculations regarding perceived strategic gains or losses from immigration cooperation, but because the proposed supranationalization of immigration control clashes with historically-rooted *national identities*. To test this theory, I will show who supports harmonization and who opposes it, and what factors stand out about these opposing groups, while attempting to differentiate between identity and instrumental calculation.

None of the existing literature on immigration policy harmonization addresses the nature of public opinion towards harmonization, knowledge of which is crucial for understanding why harmonization has failed politically thus far.

Some might invoke the oft-mentioned “democratic deficit”, arguing that it makes no difference what the common EU voter thinks of the need for a harmonized EU immigration policy, since these decisions are made at the elite level, behind closed doors, with very little public input. “EU integration constitutes a threat to democratic accountability derived from the empowerment of unaccountable, expert transnational coalitions of national ministers, officials and technocrats” (Geddes 2000, 4). However, the EU has taken greater strides towards open and accountable decision-making in recent years, including a push for a greater role for the European Parliament, the EU’s only elected body. Stung by public criticisms and discouraging referendum results, the political difficulties faced by Brussels have shown that “mass attitudes appear to be crucial to the success of new institutions and reforms associated with the process of European integration” (Cichowski 2000, 1244). This factor, coupled with the need of *national-level* politicians to be sensitive to their voters’ opinions regarding European integration, means that explaining voter opinion towards integration remains of paramount importance for understanding the future of the Union (Anderson 1998, Dalton & Eichenberg 1998, Eichenberg & Dalton 1993, Gabel 1998, Gabel & Whitten 1997, Inglehart 1977, Shepherd 1975).

This paper will show who supports a common EU immigration policy, and why. Do they consciously support such a policy for “rational” reasons, based on calculated support for economic integration, or do they react based on non-economic, non-*calculated* considerations such as national identity or membership in a particular national polity? Precious little work has been done, theoretical or empirical, to answer these questions. Therefore, this paper will test the theory that national identity (versus “European identity” or some mixture of the two) can account

for political opposition to the harmonization of EU immigration policy. In addition to testing this theory, I will also propose and empirically test several alternative theories, using survey data.

The next section defines the concept of national identity and proposes a hypothesis of how national identity affects public opinions over harmonization of immigration policy. The third section proposes alternative explanations for public opinion. The fourth and fifth sections perform data analysis on these factors, in the EU as an entire sample, and all 15 member states as separate samples, respectively. The sixth section concludes.

2. Conceptualizing National Identity

What is “national identity”? The concept is oft-used, but rarely defined. For the purposes of this paper, I define identity, in a social sense, as an affective (emotional) state of belonging in a social group. An affective state, as opposed to a cognitive state, is one that is psychologically held in a “deep” sense, meaning that it stems from extended socialization, and is not easily changed.

This definition of social identity can be applied to the concept of the nation and nationalism. While some theorists of nationalism would see national identity as freely and/or instrumentally chosen in a cognitive sense (Hardin 1995), theorists such as Benedict Anderson (1991) see national identity in an affective sense, as a “deep, horizontal comradeship” (7). Building on the work of Anderson, Tsygankov (2001) defines national identity as “a cultural norm that reflects emotional or affective orientations of individuals toward their nation and national political system” (1). As a norm of belonging and self-definition that is cultural and emotional in nature, this theory implies that national identity would hold relatively steady over time, despite instrumental or political incentives for members of nations to drop, add to or modify their national identities:

“Social psychology theory tells us that social identities are unlikely to change frequently. Individuals cannot constantly adjust their cognitive schemes to the many complex and often contradictory signals from the social world around them, as a result of which these perceived signals are integrated into existing cognitive schemes and stereotypes or simply rejected outright if they seem to be incommensurable with existing world views. Nation state identities therefore tend to be sticky rather than subject to frequent change” (Marcussen, Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher 1999, 616).

As institutions in their own right, national identities can thus be prior to, or “constitutive”, of national citizens, shaping their preferences. This hypothesis utilizes constructivism, which seeks “to understand how preferences are formed and knowledge generated, prior to the exercise of instrumental rationality” (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998).

How does national identity affect immigration policy in the European Union? Institutions, laws and policies to regulate immigration¹ are often said to be based on conceptions of national identity (Thielemann 2001, Ugur 1995, Hollifield 1994, Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994). If national identity means self-definition and belonging in the national polity, then immigration cuts to the heart of this concept, because it raises political questions of how the nation-state should be defined. Immigration policy determines who should belong to the nation-state (and who should be excluded), and determines the very nature of that belonging (by determining the criteria for entrance, expulsion, settlement, and naturalization). “There is a close connection between the ways a polity responds to the challenge of migration and its values, collective understandings and institutions” (Kostakopoulou 2001, 1).

In postwar Europe, nation-states chose widely differing immigration policies, from the assimilationism of French republicanism to the *jus sanguinis* (until recently) ethno-citizenship of Germany. Since national identity is embedded in political institutions (Marcussen et al 1999), many scholars have located the origins of these particular immigration policies in the national

¹ I use the term immigration in its broad sense here, to include entry, residence, integration and naturalization of humanitarian, economic and political migrants.

identities of their respective countries (Checkel 2001, Hollifield 1994, Baubock and Cinar 1994, Faist 1994, Wischenbart 1994, Schnapper 1994). Therefore, if there is a single policy issue where non-instrumental factors might override instrumental calculation, immigration is an ideal candidate.

If immigration is so strongly connected with national identity, then we would expect to see that national identity is a determinant of public opinion towards *national control* over immigration policy, under conditions of globalization and/or Europeanization. That is, a citizen who identifies strongly with his or her own nation-state will most likely prefer that the nation-state retain control over its own particular, historically-based immigration policy, despite the countervailing forces of globalization that have pushed immigration policies towards cross-national convergence (Castles and Miller 1998, Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield 1994).

The EU provides an excellent test case for national identities being challenged by Europeanization and globalization, because the process of European integration has brought with it new norms and identities that have challenged historically rooted national identities (Risse 2001). In the case of Germany, Checkel (2001) argues that “Germany’s historically constructed identity, for some domestic agents, has acted as a filter or block vis-à-vis . . . European-level norms” (197). In the case of the UK, Wallace (1995) argues that English identity causes Tory opposition to Brussels: “The Conservative Party’s discourse is *instinctively* that of national identity” (50, emphasis added).

Although the EU’s single market, which has given the impetus to immigration policy harmonization, is a project of *economic* integration, some argue that in matters of immigration, national identity overrides economic considerations, and that people cannot be “rational” when

contemplating outsiders and the national polity's ability to control them² (Ugur 1995). Ugur argues that immigration policy is a "nondivisible, nontransparent policy issue," meaning that it cannot be dealt with in the bargaining/compromise manner of most economic negotiations due to its resonance with citizenship, membership and identity. Thus, "immigration in Europe is perceived by societal forces as a threat to established visions of identity and societal integrity" (Ugur: 972). For example, much thinking on immigration policy in France is dictated by a "Republican consensus" over values, goals and procedures, that is strongly correlated with French national identity (Hollifield 1994). Those who identify strongly with the French nation-state will not want to give up immigration sovereignty to the EU (Hoffmann 1993).

How salient is collective identity in determining preferences over who should control immigration policy in the EU? As European integration proceeds, we should expect to see changes in identity, leading to changes in public opinion. "This emerging European polity impacts upon the way individuals and social groups view themselves and the nation-state" (Risse 2001; 200). Identities may be "sticky" (Marcussen et al 1999), but this does not mean that they are mutually exclusive. Some Europeans might identify with both the nation-state and with "Europe", while others would identify with only one or the other. "Individuals inhabit multiple worlds simultaneously, interact in various contexts and grow as personalities by developing various identifications in relation to all these contexts" (Kostakopoulou 2001, 24).

This hypothesis draws on broader theories of constructivism and sociological institutionalism, which hypothesize that identity factors can override and/or prevent individualistic, instrumental calculations (Schimmelfennig 2001, Marcussen et al 1999, Checkel 1999, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, McNamara 1998). When contemplating the possibility of a

² These theories, of course, would assume that identities are sociologically "given" (constitutive) and cannot be thought of as public "goods" that are "chosen" according to some type of cost-benefit calculus on the part of individuals.

supranational immigration regime, does rational calculation play a role for the average European voter? The *Economist* Magazine, normally a proponent of rational, instrumental explanations, sees the political difficulty in forging a common EU immigration policy as a problem of: “balancing the benefits offered by the free movement of labor against voters’ fears, *often irrational*, about threats to *national identity*” (June 22, 2002 issue, emphasis added). In immigration politics, like in many areas of EU politics, “a calculus of identity and appropriateness is sometimes more important to actors than a calculus of political costs and benefits” (Thielemann 2001; 1). Regardless of consciously held personal interests or economic costs and benefits, perhaps certain options are “off the table” for those who see themselves as “Finns” as opposed to “Europeans,” and one of these options is Brussels having control over who can enter the national space of Finland.

Therefore, if my theory is correct, as more and more EU citizens identify with “Europe” (either alone or together with their nation-state), then they should become more open to an EU-controlled immigration policy. If I can show that those who now see themselves as “Europeans” (at least partially) are more prone to grant Brussels control over immigration policy than those who remain identified solely with their nation (while controlling for economic interests and other cost/benefit calculations), then we can see the political salience of these collective understandings and loyalties.

H1 (National Identity): National identity leads to a preference for the nation-state to control immigration. The more strongly one identifies with one’s nation-state, the more likely it is that one will oppose a harmonized EU immigration policy.

3. Alternative Explanations

International relations theories that posit unitary state actors, especially realism, would see *nationality* alone (not national “identity”) as the most important factor in determining support for a harmonized EU immigration regime. That is, regardless of national identity, social characteristics, or political ideology, feelings about control over immigration policy will be dictated primarily by membership in a particular national polity, due to immigration’s deep resonance with issues of *national security*. For example, residents of countries on the EU’s Eastern border, or residents of the United Kingdom, with its own borders, might feel very differently about immigration than do other Western or Southern Europeans, regardless of how strongly they *identify* with their nation (and regardless of their political preferences or other social characteristics), due to the perception of a national security threat posed by immigration.

The idea of state sovereignty is crucial to understanding the role of nation-states in the global political economy of immigration (Weiner 1995). And for a realist, international migration is an anarchic situation that should be seen as a security issue due to its threat to state sovereignty. “Realists stress the capacity of state agents to structure exchange relations at the international level” (Caporaso 1993, 461). Therefore, if we think of cross-border movements of people as an “exchange”, then a realist would see sovereignty and control as the first priority, with free circulation of labor, voluntary exchange of migrants and the economic benefits of immigration as a secondary priority. “When it comes to the free movement of people, considerations other than the efficient use of resources come into play” (Weiner 1995, 113). Even in the absence of fully open borders, many nationalists worry about the security problem of a peaceful “invasion” of one state by another through immigration. “States in anarchy fear for their survival as independent actors” (Grieco 1993, 118). In the face of such a security threat, realism constitutes the nation-state as “an autonomous agent, governing a supposedly

homogenous and distinct society. In such a context, the immigrant . . . undermines the conceptual assumptions involved in the territorial state and, by implication, its power” (Harris 1995, 86-87). For realism to hold true, then, one should see national electorates (in countries that are more “threatened”) homogeneously favoring all necessary avenues of national “protection” through immigration control, irrespective of economic costs and pro-EU identities that might push some members of the electorate in the other direction.

Lest one think that such sentiments are confined to hard-line, nationalistic elites, it should be noted that public opinion throughout the developed world rests solidly on the side of increased control (Castles and Miller 1998, Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield 1994). Therefore, with the collusion of both favorable democratic opinion and a perceived threat to sovereignty, one would expect to see that opinions regarding supranational control over immigration policy should be dictated by one’s nationality, assuming that some states are more “threatened” than others by immigration, due to their geographic location (Eastern or Southern borders of the EU), ties with former colonies (politicized immigration from colonial populations, as in the case of France), or perhaps even the lack of large immigrant populations, as in the case of Scandinavia, or the presence of large immigrant populations, in the case of France (Perrineau 1985).

H2 (Nationality): Residing in nation-states that are more threatened by immigration leads to a preference for the nation-state to control immigration. Residing in nation-states that are less threatened by immigration would make one more supportive of an EU-controlled immigration policy.

Other perspectives, of course, would hold economic *interests* to be paramount, and not all members of a national polity would have identical interests regarding a unified EU immigration policy. One might hypothesize that blue-collar workers, the unemployed and/or those with low

education levels would be against harmonization while white-collar workers, the employed, and/or the highly educated would support it, since these socioeconomic differences would reflect labor competition arising from an EU single market with free movement of labor. Blue-collar workers, the unemployed, and those with low education levels would fear the labor competition arising from an EU immigration regime that could freely move capital and cheap labor around, potentially putting them out of work, while white collar workers and business owners, those with jobs already and/or the highly educated may perceive more gains from such an arrangement. “Given that most immigrants . . . lack a university degree, higher education should decrease natives’ sense of economic threat” (Fetzer 2000, 21). These theories draw on literature by Fetzer (2000), Harwood (1986) and Simon (1987), who trace opinions about immigration policy to economic interests.

H3 (Socioeconomic Variables): Being in the working class, unemployed, and/or having less education makes one more opposed to free movement of labor, which leads to a preference for the nation-state to control immigration. The “lower” one’s socioeconomic position, the more likely it is that one will oppose a harmonized EU immigration policy.

But there are other measurable economic interests and preferences besides socioeconomic indicators. If we are trying to prove that a calculus of costs and benefits is more important than a calculus of identity and appropriateness, then we must operationalize a cost/benefit calculus that would lead to testable preferences regarding a harmonized EU immigration policy. The entire EU project is fundamentally a project of economic integration, being that the single market has been the driving impetus for political integration (Moravcsik 1998), as well as for a harmonized immigration policy (Papademetriou 1996, Philip 1994). Currently the most politically important facet of economic integration is the Euro currency. The

Euro holds paramount importance for economic integration because of its high visibility and controversy as a “flagship” project. Being that support for the Euro has been somewhat shaky following its introduction, a rationalist might hypothesize that support for the Euro is a good test of support for economic integration in general, including the willingness to give up national control over an area of policy that has both practical and symbolic value (be it currency or immigration).

The opening for the EU to regulate immigration has come from the need for free circulation of labor in the Single Market, which can only be achieved by open internal borders and cooperative control over external borders. Those EU citizens that understand this linkage, and support the project of economic integration (including the Euro currency), will also support Brussels controlling immigration policy, regardless of whether they identify with their nation-state, or how they feel about immigrants in general. This theory assumes a conscious cost/benefit calculus by EU voters, who are capable of understanding the link between economic unity and a harmonized immigration policy, and therefore assumes that there will be a pro/anti-EU immigration policy cleavage cutting across nationalities and even national identities. Therefore, if most Europeans see the EU as a project of economic integration, then those that support the single currency, the Euro, will also support the EU having control over immigration policy as a key area of economic unification. If an EU citizen supports *economic* interdependence, then they will also be willing to relinquish national control over borders, passports, visas, and other “touchy” issues (Philip 1994, Callovi 1992, Ireland 1991).

H4 (Opposition to European Integration): Individuals opposed to the expansion of the single market project (EU, enlargement, Euro) will be less likely to support harmonization of immigration policy.

Other variables also come to mind when trying to explain public opinion towards EU control over immigration policy. To rule out other explanations, my analysis will test the impact of the following control variables on support for harmonization: political ideology, satisfaction with democracy in the EU and the national, gender, age, feelings towards immigrants, and the belief that immigrants from outside the EU should have the same social rights as EU citizens.

4. Data & Methodology

To test these competing hypotheses, I use a set of questions and responses from the 53rd *Eurobarometer* (Hartung 2001). This survey asks a broad variety of questions regarding EU issues, to measure social and demographical characteristics as well as opinions on the EU and all manner of political issues. With a size of roughly 15,000 respondents, at around 1,000 per country, this sample is representative of the fifteen national electorates and of the EU electorate as a whole.

Regarding the harmonization of immigration policy, public opinion is split somewhat evenly across the EU as to whether Brussels or the national governments should have control, with less than a majority in most countries preferring that the EU should gain control. Only 43 percent of EU citizens, overall, support a harmonized EU policy (Figure 1), but the variation across countries is dramatic, with support ranging from 72 percent in Italy to only 15 percent in Finland. What accounts for these variations? Is the variation stronger between countries (i.e. between Italians and Finns) or is it stronger within countries (e.g. between those in each country who identify with their nation-states and those who do not)? No literature thus far has speculated on the variation in public opinion on this issue, but we might initially guess that a realist perspective (H2) would hold that voters in each country will reflect a unified national opinion regarding immigration and the EU, while H1, H3 and H4 would expect that there would be

significant cross-national cleavages in every country, reflecting contentious domestic politics (interests and/or identities) on a controversial issue (Moravcsik 1998).

Figure 1 about here

As a preliminary test of my national identity hypothesis, we can compare the above data with national data on identification with the EU and the nation-state, displayed in Figure 2, which shows the percentage breakdown of those who identify themselves as one of three categories: 1) nationals only; 2) both European and national; and 3) European only.³

Figure 2 about here

Obviously, a “European identity” has a long way to go before it outweighs national identity in any member state (although it is relatively close in Italy), but how do these national rankings on identity compare with the data on support for EU control over immigration policy? Looking at Figure 3, we notice that although the rankings on the two variables do not line up perfectly, there is a clear relationship between the top half of the countries and the bottom half. That is, the top seven countries in support for immigration policy are also the bottom seven countries in terms of how many identify as “nationality only”, and the eight countries that have weakest support for an EU immigration policy are also the eight countries that identify most exclusively with their nation.

Figure 3 about here

Obviously, this initial correlation (while striking) is not enough to prove that national identity is doing the actual explanatory work. To statistically control for the other explanations listed above, therefore, and to show that national identity is a more powerful predictor than instrumental calculations about the EU, I will now use binary logistic regression to inquire into

³ See Kostakopoulou (2001) for evidence that the Eurobarometer question about self-identification can be taken as a valid indicator of national and European identities.

the existence of a statistically and substantively significant relationship between national identity and support for an EU immigration policy.

The dependent variable in the analysis is the belief that immigration policy should be controlled by the EU. The overall analysis estimates the degree to which national identity, nationality, socioeconomic variables, opposition to European integration and other control variables have an effect on the probability that an EU resident will support an EU immigration policy, all other things being equal. Table 1 displays the results of my first model, which shows the impact of national identity alone on the probability of supporting harmonization. The expected direction of the relationship is positive, since the identity scale goes from national to European, while the immigration control scale goes from national government to EU.

Table 1 about here

To weigh the explanatory *power* of national identity, we must look at the far-right column in Table 1, which shows the *change in odds* (likelihood) of support for EU control over immigration that we can expect from a full-scale shift in national identity. Thus, moving up two points on the three-point national identity scale (from “[NATIONALITY] only” to “European only”) makes a respondent roughly *six and a half* times more likely to support EU control over immigration policy! Conversely, those who identify only with their nation-states are over six times more likely to oppose harmonization than those who identify with Europe only.

These are strong results, on their own, showing a clear, significant and relatively powerful relationship between national identity and support for harmonization of immigration policy. But the challenge now is to control for other explanations. Perhaps the relationship between identity and harmonization support is merely a spurious correlation, or is not as powerful as the relationship between harmonization support and some other factor(s). Table 2 attempts to get at this possibility, by including all fifteen nationalities in the analysis as separate

dummy variables. If any one of these nationalities is significant, it means that the holding of that nationality, irrespective of how one identifies oneself, is a significant predictor of support for harmonization. Such a result would lend weight to H2, especially if the inclusion of nationalities causes the explanatory power of national identity to drop a great deal.

Table 2 about here

As shown in Table 2, the inclusion of nationalities into the analysis does indeed cause the explanatory power of national identity to drop, from 6.3 to 4.8. This means that after removing the effect of nationality, those who identify with Europe are now only 4.8 times more likely to support harmonization than those who identify with their nation-states. Additionally, five nationalities, alone, are statistically significant predictors of support for harmonization, including Belgian, Spanish, Italian, Dutch and Finnish. If one is Belgian, Spanish, Italian, or Dutch, one is *more* likely to support harmonization of immigration policy, while if one is Finnish, one is 3.3 times *less* likely to support harmonization. Most nationalities, however, are not statistically significant predictors of support for harmonization, and the ones that are significant still have less explanatory power than national identity does. Being Dutch, with a 4.3 odds change, is close to the impact of national identity, but still not at the same level.

It is now time to factor in socioeconomic conditions, including education level, being employed, and being blue-collar, which is done in Table 3. If the impact of national identity or nationality lessens with the inclusion of these variables, then we know that some of the variation apparently being explained by national identity and/or nationality, in the previous model, was actually being explained by socioeconomic differences.

Table 3 about here

Table 3 shows that of our three socioeconomic variables, only education level is significant. The inclusion of this control causes the predictive impact of national identity to drop

slightly, meaning that education level is a better explanation for opinions towards harmonization than national identity for only a tiny proportion of our respondents. However, national identity is still a significant predictor, and is still the most powerful variable in the model, with a 4.4 odds change. This means that after removing the impact of nationality and socioeconomic factors, those who identify with Europe are still 4.4 times more likely to support harmonization than those who identify with their nation-state.

Table 4 factors in support for European integration, including support for the single currency, enlargement, and the EU in general.

Table 4 about here

Not surprisingly, support for European integration has an effect on support for immigration policy harmonization, and controlling for these factors also has a significant impact on the strength of our other variables. All 3 EU variables are significant predictors of support for harmonization, with those who support the EU in general being twice as likely to support harmonization of immigration policy as those who do not.

Also, the Belgian and Spanish nationality variables drop from significance, meaning that these nationalities were merely correlated with positive feelings towards European integration, which in these countries can better explain support for harmonization than nationality. Furthermore, the explanatory power of the national identity variable drops again, to 2.5, meaning that a significant share of the explanatory work being done by national identity can better be accounted for by feelings towards European integration. However, the odds change of 2.5 for national identity is still greater than the 2 for EU support, meaning that national identity is still the best predictor of immigration policy harmonization support that we have, being a 25% more accurate predictor of opinion than support for the EU.

Finally, table 5 shows the impact of adding political variables, personal variables, and feelings towards immigrants, respectively, to our analysis of predictors for support of harmonization.

Table 5 about here

Only four additional variables in these models are significant, including political ideology, satisfaction with democracy in the EU, feelings about immigrants, and the belief that TCNs should have equal social rights with citizens. However, none of these variables gave an odds change above 1.5, while national identity remained strong at 2.5, meaning that national identity, in the final analysis, is still the best predictor of support for harmonization, out of all 15 variables (except for being Italian, Dutch and Finnish). The changes in adjusted odds from model to model are shown in Table 6.

Table 6 about here

However, despite the success with which national identity can predict support for immigration harmonization across the EU, the existence of significant and relatively powerful impacts of nationality alone (regardless of identity) as an explanatory factor (for Dutch, Italians, and Finns) means that unitary-state theories of national security and/or “national opinion” are potentially validated, at least in a few cases. To discover why it is that citizens from these three nationalities have “unique” opinions regarding immigration policy, and what factors within each country are driving these opinions, I will now turn to a 15-nation comparative model that will test the other 14 explanatory variables in each of the 15 EU member states as a separate sample.

5. A Multi-Country Comparative Study

The adjusted, exponentiated regression coefficients for the 14 variables, in each country as a separate sample and model, are displayed in Table 7. Where the variable was not

statistically significant at the .05 level, an asterisk is displayed. Remember that the adjusted, exponentiated regression coefficient tells us the change in odds of a change in the dependent variable (support for harmonization) when that independent variable shifts from one end of its range to the other. For example, looking at Table 7, we see that Belgians who identify solely with their nation-state are 2.3 times more likely to oppose the harmonization of immigration policy than Belgians who identify solely with Europe.

Table 7 about here

As is clear from Table 7, the results are quite mixed for my national identity hypothesis, in some very interesting ways. My hypothesis is boosted by the fact that national identity is significant in more countries than any of the other variables – it is statistically significant in *eleven* countries (all but Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Finland). Thus, it appears that national identity is a relatively stable and consistent predictor of feeling towards EU immigration policy across most member states. The most dramatic results are in Austria and Denmark, where those who see themselves as Europeans are over *five times* more likely to support a harmonized EU immigration policy than those who see themselves as Austrians or Danes only. Additionally, in every other case where national identity is significant, the odds of supporting harmonization are *at least doubled*.

However, national identity is obviously not the only significant predictor of feeling towards immigration policy harmonization in the EU, as the table reflects. National identity is not even statistically significant in Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Finland. Two of the three countries whose *nationalities* were significant, powerful predictors in the EU-wide sample above (Finland and Italy) are in this group, while in the third country whose nationality was significant, the Netherlands, national identity is at its weakest predictive power (only 2.0). Thus, there is

something other than national identity that is driving feeling towards a Brussels-controlled immigration policy in these three countries, as well as in Ireland and Luxembourg. What is it?

In Luxembourg, feelings towards the EU are a powerful predictor of feelings towards harmonization of immigration policy. In the Netherlands, like Spain, the only other significant predictor out of all 14, aside from national identity, is support for the Euro currency. From this we might infer that Dutch and Spanish voters are apparently aware of the political linkage between the single market, freedom of movement, and a common EU immigration policy, and to see EU-controlled immigration policy as being reflective of *economic* unification. Those voters that support the economic unification, therefore, are also likely to support a regime for (free?) movement of labor that is controlled at the single market level.

In Ireland, however, two additional variables are significant, aside from support for the Euro currency. These are: satisfaction with democracy in both the EU and in Ireland, with satisfaction with democracy in both polities being the most powerful predictors (when the exponentiated regression coefficient for this variable is adjusted, to reflect a 3-point rise in this scale, from “not at all satisfied” to “very satisfied”, respondents are almost *three times* more likely to support harmonization of immigration policy). In Italy, however, being unemployed is the most powerful predictor. Italians who have jobs are almost four times more likely to support a harmonized EU immigration policy than those who do not. For unemployed Italians, then, it might be feelings about labor competition arising from free movement of workers that drives their hostility towards harmonization of immigration policy.

In skeptical Finland, where voters most fiercely oppose EU control over immigration, neither national identity *nor* support for the Euro currency are significant predictors (aside from Luxembourg, Finland is the only member state where this applies – what explains such strong Finnish exceptionalism?). Instead, feelings about the EU in general are the most powerful of the

three significant variables in Finland (the other two being enlargement of the EU and gender). It appears that enlargement is on the Finns' minds when it comes to control over immigration policy, probably because those Finns that are against enlargement are afraid of increased immigration via Eastern Europe once those countries join, and thus would prefer for their national government to retain sovereignty over immigration. Interestingly, Finland and Austria (two of the four countries on the EU's Eastern border) were the only two countries where feelings about enlargement were statistically significant predictors of feeling regarding immigration policy control, perhaps lending support to the geopolitical IR hypothesis that countries in the East will prefer national control, out of fears of a "swarm" of Eastern European migrants in future years.

Additionally, some other interesting national exceptionalisms arise from the data. Political ideology is a significant national predictor only in Sweden, but, strangely, the relationship between political ideology and feelings towards immigration policy harmonization in Sweden is opposite to that in the EU sample as a whole. In the EU, the left is slightly more favorable (1.3 odds) towards harmonization, while in Sweden those on the left are 1.6 less likely to support harmonization, probably owing to a belief that immigrant rights will be better protected at the national level (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000, Joppke 1999). But whatever the reason for the left/right discrepancies, this divergence dramatically demonstrates the politically cross-cutting nature of the immigration policy control issue.

Table 8 about here

6. Conclusion

Rational choice and constructivist theorists of European integration have been known to assume that calculation and socialization, respectively, are the only things that really matter. If pressed, most will admit that the rival factor is having some impact, but will usually claim that

the impact is minimal for the purpose of their particular analyses. In trying to explain the failure of immigration policy harmonization in the EU, however, this paper has clearly shown that both factors are playing an important role in driving public opposition to harmonization. While self-identification and self-definition, through national socialization, are having a stronger impact than calculated support for European integration, it's clear that the importance of both factors cannot be ignored. Without controlling for calculated support for European integration, identity is twice as strong of a predictor as it is when I control for EU support, obviously obscuring the causal importance of calculated support for the European integration in general.

Constructivists, however, might argue that support for European integration is not actually calculated, and is instead learned through socialization. By the same token, rationalists might argue that national identity is actually "chosen" for instrumental purposes. The analysis here brings in to question these assumptions. If identity were instrumental, then identities would merely be proxies (indirect indicators) for calculated self-interest and/or socioeconomic status, and therefore would have no more explanatory power than these other factors in analyzing why Europeans support or oppose the harmonization of immigration policy. Thus, my analysis shows that identity is generally non-instrumental when it comes to feelings about immigration policy, because it is a better predictor of these feelings than socioeconomic status, attitudes towards European integration, and other factors that are generally considered to be instrumentally motivated.

Additionally, I must emphasize that the three national exceptionalisms arising from the data (in the case of the Italians, the Dutch and the Finns) merit further research, since they show that there is something unique in each of these countries that is driving national support for harmonization (in the Italian and Dutch cases) and opposition to harmonization (in the Finnish

case). Country specialists can potentially shed light on why citizens from these countries hold “unique” opinions regarding who should control immigration policy in the single market.

FIGURE 1: Percentage of Respondents Who Favor Harmonization of Immigration Policy (by Country)





FIGURE 2: National, European and Mixed Identities (By Country)



**Figure 3:
Comparison of Identity and
Harmonization Rankings**

Ranking of Percent Supporting Harmonization of (Descending)	Ranking of Percent Identifying as Nationality Only (Ascending)
1. Italy	1. Italy
2. Netherlands	2. Spain
3. Spain	3. France
4. France	4. Luxembourg
5. Belgium	5. Netherlands
6. Luxembourg	6. Belgium
7. Germany	7. Germany
8. Greece	8. Portugal
9. Portugal	9. Denmark
10. Sweden	10. Ireland
11. Ireland	11. Austria
12. Denmark	12. Greece
13. UK	13. Finland
14. Austria	14. Sweden
15. Finland	15. UK

TABLE 1: MODEL 1 (SUPPORT FOR HARMONIZATION ON IDENTITY)

	B	S E	Sig	Exp(B)	Adj. Odds
IDENTITY	.905	.037	.000	2.472	6.3
Constant	-1.769	.064	.000	.170	

TABLE 2: MODEL 2 (SUPPORT FOR HARMONIZATION ON IDENTITY AND NATIONALITIES)

	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)	Adj. Odds
IDENTITY	.772	.039	.000	2.164	4.8
AUSTRIA	-.669	.411	.103	.512	*
BELGIUM	.877	.406	.031	2.402	2.4
DENMARK	-.140	.405	.730	.869	*
FINLAND	-1.123	.411	.006	.325	-3.3
FRANCE	.767	.406	.059	2.154	*
GERMANY	.306	.403	.449	1.358	*
GREECE	.351	.406	.387	1.421	*
IRELAND	-.088	.407	.828	.915	*
ITALY	1.345	.409	.001	3.839	3.8
LUXEMBOURG	.207	.413	.617	1.229	*
NETHERLANDS	1.496	.408	.000	4.466	4.5
PORTUGAL	.223	.407	.584	1.249	*
SPAIN	.925	.408	.023	2.522	2.5
SWEDEN	.051	.403	.900	1.052	*
UK	-.414	.405	.306	.661	*
Constant	-1.851	.404	.000	.157	

*=NOT STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL

TABLE 3: MODEL 3 (SUPPORT FOR HARMONIZATION ON IDENTITY, NATIONALITIES, AND SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES)

	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)	Adj. Odds
IDENTITY	.729	.040	.000	2.073	4.4
AUSTRIA	-.675	.415	.104	.509	*
BELGIUM	.833	.410	.042	2.301	2.3
DENMARK	-.238	.410	.563	.789	*
FINLAND	-1.214	.416	.004	.297	-3.3
FRANCE	.744	.411	.070	2.103	*
GERMANY	.296	.408	.469	1.344	*
GREECE	.348	.411	.397	1.416	*
IRELAND	-.113	.412	.785	.894	*
ITALY	1.341	.414	.001	3.821	3.8
LUXEMBOURG	.184	.418	.659	1.202	*
NETHERLANDS	1.463	.412	.000	4.318	4.3
PORTUGAL	.273	.411	.507	1.314	*
SPAIN	.949	.413	.022	2.583	2.6
SWEDEN	-.019	.408	.962	.981	*
UK	-.406	.410	.322	.667	*
EMPLOYED	.036	.094	.702	1.037	*
BLUE COLLAR	.114	.063	.067	1.121	*
EDUCATION	.132	.024	.000	1.141	1.3
Constant	-2.155	.412	.000	.116	

*=NOT STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL

TABLE 4: MODEL 4 (SUPPORT FOR HARMONIZATION ON IDENTITY, NATIONALITIES, SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES AND OPPOSITION TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION)

	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)	Adj. Odds
IDENTITY	.490	.042	.000	1.633	2.5
AUSTRIA	-.612	.411	.136	.542	*
BELGIUM	.738	.405	.068	2.093	*
DENMARK	-.223	.405	.582	.800	*
FINLAND	-1.165	.411	.005	.312	-3.3
FRANCE	.772	.406	.057	2.164	*
GERMANY	.358	.403	.374	1.431	*
GREECE	.122	.406	.765	1.129	*
IRELAND	-.352	.407	.387	.703	*
ITALY	1.257	.409	.002	3.515	3.5
LUXEMBOURG	.010	.413	.981	1.010	*
NETHERLANDS	1.350	.407	.001	3.856	3.9
PORTUGAL	.090	.406	.824	1.094	*
SPAIN	.795	.408	.051	2.215	*
SWEDEN	.103	.403	.799	1.108	*
UK	-.238	.405	.557	.788	*
EMPLOYED	.095	.096	.321	1.100	*
BLUE COLLAR	.093	.064	.142	1.098	*
EDUCATION	.104	.025	.000	1.110	1.3
EU	.358	.035	.000	1.430	2.0
EURO	.254	.027	.000	1.290	1.7
ENLARGEMENT	.107	.024	.000	1.113	1.2
Constant	-3.319	.414	.000	.036	

*=NOT STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL

TABLE 5: MODEL 5 (SUPPORT FOR HARMONIZATION ON IDENTITY, NATIONALITIES, SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES, OPPOSITION TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, POLITICAL VARIABLES, PERSONAL VARIABLES AND OPPOSITION TO IMMIGRATION)

	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)	Adj. Odds
IDENTITY	.455	.042	.000	1.577	2.5
AUSTRIA	-.614	.414	.138	.541	*
BELGIUM	.763	.409	.062	2.145	*
DENMARK	-.243	.409	.553	.785	*
FINLAND	-1.270	.415	.002	.281	-3.3
FRANCE	.732	.409	.074	2.079	*
GERMANY	.348	.406	.391	1.417	*
GREECE	.101	.409	.804	1.107	*
IRELAND	-.442	.410	.282	.643	*
ITALY	1.188	.412	.004	3.281	3.3
LUXEMBOURG	.004	.416	.992	1.004	*
NETHERLANDS	1.360	.411	.001	3.897	3.9
PORTUGAL	.020	.410	.962	1.020	*
SPAIN	.664	.411	.106	1.943	*
SWEDEN	.058	.406	.887	1.059	*
UK	-.326	.408	.424	.721	*
EMPLOYED	.102	.098	.301	1.107	*
BLUE COLLAR	.053	.067	.428	1.055	*
EDUCATION	.104	.029	.000	1.110	1.3
EU	.317	.036	.000	1.373	2.0
EURO	.241	.028	.000	1.272	1.7
ENLARGEMENT	.087	.024	.000	1.091	1.2
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY	.052	.029	.075	1.053	1.3
NAT DEM SATISFACTION	.042	.023	.065	1.043	*
EU DEM SATISFACTION	.084	.024	.000	1.088	1.5
GENDER	.075	.044	.084	1.078	*
AGE	.031	.027	.259	1.031	*
IMMIGRANTS	.138	.037	.000	1.148	1.2
TCNS	.119	.026	.000	1.127	1.2
Constant	-4.212	.453	.000	.015	

*=NOT STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL

Table 6: Comparing the Models

	model 1	model 2	model 3	model 4	model 5
identity	6.3	4.8	4.4	2.5	2.5
Belgium		2.4	2.3	*	*
Denmark		*	*	*	*
Germany		*	*	*	*
Greece		*	*	*	*
Spain		2.5	2.6	*	*
France		*	*	*	*
Ireland		*	*	*	*
Italy		3.8	3.8	3.5	3.3
Luxembourg		*	*	*	*
Netherlands		4.5	4.3	3.9	3.9
Portugal		*	*	*	*
UK		*	*	*	*
Austria		*	*	*	*
Sweden		*	*	*	*
Finland		-3.3	-3.3	-3.3	-3.3
employed			*	*	*
blue-collar			*	*	*
education			1.3	1.3	1.3
EU				2.0	2.0
Euro				1.7	1.7
enlargement				1.2	1.2
pol. ideology					1.3
nat. dem. dis.					*
EU dem. sat.					1.5
gender					*
age					*
imms					1.2
TCNs					1.2

*=not statistically significant at the .05 level

Table 7: Odds Changes for 15 Individual Models of National Samples

	Bel	Den	Ger	Gre	Spa	Fra	Ire	Ita	Lux	Net	Por	UK	Aus	Swe	Fin
National Identity	2.3	5.3	3.2	2.3	2.3	2.3	*	*	*	2.0	4.8	2.9	5.3	2.6	*
Employed	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	3.7	*	*	2.2	*	*	*	*
Blue Collar	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Education	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	2.7	*	*	*
EU	*	4.4	*	2.3	*	*	*	2.0	4.0	*	*	2.0	*	2.9	2.6
Euro	*	1.4	1.7	2.3	2.3	1.4	2.0	1.7	*	1.7	2.0	2.0	*	*	*
Enlargement	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	2.0	*	2.3
Pol. Ideology	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-1.6	*
Nat. Dem. Sat.	*	*	*	*	*	*	2.9	*	*	*	*	*	*	2.9	*
EU Dem. Sat.	*	*	*	*	*	2.9	2.9	2.9	*	*	*	*	2.9	2.1	*
Gender	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	1.9	*	*	1.6
Age	*	*	1.7	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Immigrants	*	2.6	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	2.0	*	3.2	*	*
TCNs	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	2.0	2.6	*	2.0	*	*	*	*

*=not statistically significant at the .05 level

Table 8: Comparing the Results

VARIABLE	ODDS CHANGE IN EU-WIDE SAMPLE	NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WITH STATISTICAL SIG.
National Identity	2.5	11
Euro Currency	1.7	10
EU Support	2.0	7
EU Dem. Satisfaction	1.5	5
TCN Support	1.2	3
Immigrant Support	1.2	3
Nationality	N.A.	3
Enlargement Support	1.2	2
Nat. Dem. Satisfaction	*	2
Gender	*	2
Employed	*	2
Political Ideology	1.3	1
Education Level	1.3	1
Age	*	1
Blue Collar	*	0

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