

**Attempting to By-Pass the State to Empower the Periphery: An Examination of the Strategy of
Catalan Political Elites to Gain Direct Access and Recognition in the European Union**

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"As a result it is clear that we [the Catalan regional government, the Generalitat] have the resolve to lead this European regional movement. When we speak of this now we know that Catalonia is different than the other European regions. Catalonia is more than a region: It is a nation.... Catalonia should play a leadership role in the European regional movement." Joan Vallvé. Commissioner for Foreign Relations of the Generalitat of Catalonia. Interview with José Antich. El País 9/20/92. [] mine.)

In December 1991 the European Council approved the Maastricht Treaty creating the European Union. One of the less publicized components of this treaty was the creation of a Committee of the Regions to advise both the Council of Ministers and the Commission on specific issues. Therefore, while Maastricht made the headlines because of the unprecedented transfer of state initiative to a larger political organization, it also increased substantially the potential for an accelerated transfer of political initiative to regions. This paper will examine the Catalan case as an example of how regional political elites are using European organizations to push for a major change in the position of regions not only within the emerging European Union, but also within their respective states.

Introduction

The major regions of Europe (e.g. German Länder, Belgian regions, Spanish "historic" regions) have long been politically active in Europe as well as in their respective states.¹ The Catalans are among the most active and influential of these regional elites in the EU. Two Catalans are president of the major European regional organizations.² Furthermore, Pasqual Maragall is also Vice-president of the EU's Committee of the Regions, while a Catalan, Communist, Antoni Guitiérrez-Díaz is President of the Commission on Regional Policy of the European Parliament. The Catalans are part of the "Four Motors of Europe" initiative, comprised

of the economically advanced areas of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, as well as being active in the "Euroregion" movement (See below). As a self-described national elite, the leaders of the Catalan regional government (Generalitat) have developed a European strategy as a major component of their political platform. First, their open and enthusiastic posture on Europe is a crucial element in their claim to be "moderate" nationalists of an advanced "nation". Furthermore, European initiatives are an important element in their broad strategy to gain greater political autonomy from the Spanish state by attempting to establish a direct political link with Brussels.

This paper will analyze this strategy and then describe how the Catalans have executed it through extensive activities in the 1990's. Part 1 begins by analyzing how the issue of "Europe" and the EU is used by Catalan political parties in the domestic political debates in Catalonia. Part 2 will examine specific European strategies and activities by Catalan political leaders by focusing on two kinds of activities. First, this paper describes Catalan participation in several European regional initiatives: "Four Motors of Europe", Euroregions, and a peculiar attempt to create a "Eurocomarca" ("Eurocounty"), a unit of local government which straddles the French-Spanish border.

Secondly, Part 2 will then analyze Catalan activities within European level organizations and the EU itself. This entails an examination of the activities of the Assembly of European Regions, the Council of European Municipalities and Regions, and recent activity around the creation of the Committee of the Regions.

PART 1: THE DOMESTIC USE OF "EUROPE" BY CATALAN POLITICAL PARTIES

Background

Often overlooked in Spain's transition to democracy was the development of a decentralized system of territorial organization. The 1978 Constitution outlines in broad form a system of regional Autonomous Communities which regions could develop in bilateral negotiations with Madrid.³ Originally intended to mollify the political ambitions of Spain's three "historic regions" (Basque Provinces [Euskadi], Galicia, Catalonia), this vague, open-ended system instead produced 17 autonomous regions by 1983.⁴ With a wide variety of competencies and capacities this system of disparate Autonomous Communities has unevenly developed through the 1980's.⁵ The ambiguous and open-ended nature of this system has provided flexibility; however, it has also produced an unending series of demands from certain regions, particularly the national regions of Euskadi and Catalonia which have continually pressed for greater home rule. In fact some of the most significant political issues in current Spanish politics involve debates between Catalonia or Euskadi and Madrid.⁶ Finally, this disparity between a few powerful regions and the more limited regions has created a trend of growing regionalist sentiment within these latter regions.⁷

In part this regional activity is a reaction to the Catalan and the Basque position on Spain's system of regional autonomies. Rather than supporting a uniform system for all of Spain's regions, either a federal system supported by regional socialists, or a more limited regional system supported by the Spain right (PP, Popular Party), the moderate nationalist parties in Euskadi (PNV) and Catalonia (CiU) have always sought to develop a special regional regime for their "nations" which would clearly distinguish their status and capacities from other "regions" in Spain. Recent attempt in Catalonia to gain greater control of police activities, income tax funds (IRPF),

and to move their policy of Catalan language "normalization" to new levels embody the Catalan perspective that they are a unique nation, with unique political needs, which should be accommodated *within* a Spanish polity.

The Use of "Europe" in Catalan Political Debates

To this end Catalan leaders have followed a dual strategy of specific activities at both the level of Spanish politics and the level of the European Union. This paper will focus solely on the European element of this strategy. However, prior to analyzing specific European initiatives this paper will review a crucial subject -- how the issue of "Europe" and the EU is used by the various Catalan political parties in the political debates in Catalonia.

Over time each political party has had to articulate a specific political ideology, as well as its own vision of Catalan identity. The trick is that they had to do this in a way which was both effective with the Catalan electorate and yet congruent with their political strategy at the Spanish level.⁸

The point to make here is that each of these parties must balance their objectives at each of these two levels when formulating their political strategy. It is striking to note that all political parties in Catalonia must present themselves, in Catalan, as Catalan parties with Catalan concerns and perspectives. Hence the distinction in Catalan public discourse between "Catalan nationalists" and "*catalanistes*", and the use of "Europe" by each party, as a way to both assert the importance of Catalan identity while also allaying fears that one is a reactionary, *excluyente* (exclusive/xenophobic), nationalist.

1. "A Europe of Nations".⁹ Perhaps this is most explicitly done by the separatist party ERC

(Republican Left of Catalonia). This party dates back to the 1930's and had represented a republican, leftist, and a loose federal perspective until a young cohort of separatists won control of the party in 1989. Self-defined as mixing "progressive", leftist political positions with a national, separatist, message, this party has risen from a low point of 4.2% (1988 regional elections) to 8% in the 1992 regional election. If ERC hopes to maintain this position, or increase it, then it is of crucial importance that it display a reasonable, progressive, and inclusive political vision in order to distance themselves from Basque separatism's ambiguous position on violence, and from events in Eastern Europe.

Furthermore, the cultural attitudes and the social environment presently in Catalonia would not support such nationalist articulations. Of Catalonia's 6 million inhabitants approximately 2 million are of Castilian speaking origin. Furthermore, Catalonia long history within the Spanish polity, coupled with extensive economic and social links, create a complex political environment. As a result the assertion of Catalan identity in conjunction with debates over the form of the Spanish polity, and Catalonia's position within it, demand careful treatment by all political parties if they wish to achieve significant voter support.

For these reasons ERC on the one hand will claim that "each nation must have a state" while noting that a state only has one language. The implications of such statements are mitigated by soft talk about a decades long "period of transition", and by talk of Europe. A central argument of ERC is that the Spanish state is not only oppressive but obsolete as Europe moves towards full integration. ERC states that Catalonia, as the most progressive and European of Spain's peoples, should set the example of a progressive path into Europe. Mixing standard leftist critiques of the Maastricht form of unification, ERC advocates the dissolution of states and the creation of a

"Europe of Nations". Not to be confused with regionalism this position states that peoples which are "nations" are the nature unit of large eclectic societies such as Europe; therefore, the political organization of Europe should be based on these national units. Hence, ERC's nationalism is "progressive", inclusive, and positive because it does not seek to turn Catalonia in on itself with a xenophobic reaction; rather they seek to lead Catalonia into a progressive, leftist Europe of Nations in which Catalonia would be leading the way for Spain.¹⁰

As the above paragraph demonstrates the use of "Europe" adds a persuasive twist to this nationalist message and provides the appearance of a reasonable and progressive party. While one can debate about the substance behind the message, the fact remains that "Europe" is a powerful issue and symbol in state level and regional politics.

2. "A Federal Europe of Nationalities".¹¹ The Catalan Communist Party (PSUC which heads a left coalition called Catalan Initiative IC) is a communist party dating back to the 1930's with a strong Catalan component to its positions. This party stakes a claim as being the only real progressive party in Catalonia. PSUC mixes a "New Left" message, an assertion of Catalan identity within a Spanish polity, and a robust use of a European vision. With statements such as, "the sovereignty of Catalonia must be understood within a federal Europe", IC's leader, Rafael Ribó, presents a clear image of a New Left party which also asserts Catalan identity. (Avui interview 3/11/92) The basis of this position is a strong leftist critique of Spain as a capitalist state, and the Maastricht treaty as a symbol of how capitalist economic interests will control the political evolution of Europe. Within this classic leftist position IC strongly asserts its strong vision of Catalonia, and criticizes the governing nationalist coalition (CiU) in the Generalitat as well as the Catalan Socialists. They are "two sides of the same coin" because behind the socialist

or nationalist rhetoric lies a firm support for the status quo. Hence they assert their Catalan credentials by attacking the Catalan nationalists for using Catalan identity to hide their support of big business which exploits Catalan society. Ribó criticizes CiU "Four Motors of Europe" project as being "disingenuous and manipulating" because it is part of President Pujol's strategy of making Catalonia seem grandiose in Europe when in reality it is small compared to other European regional economies. By articulating a broad European vision of a progressive, left society, IC leaders can situate their policy of radical decentralization in a progressive, not reactionary context.

"The Spanish state is plurinational... we do not agree that these 17 regional communities continue to be considered in similar fashion. For us, the sovereignty of Catalonia is based on an organization of a federal Europe, where the units would be nationalities."(Avui 3/11/92)

3. "The Treaty of European Union". ¹² The Catalan Socialists (PSC) have always been in a difficult position in Catalonia because of their close party ties with the Spanish Socialists (PSOE) who have been governed Spain since 1982. Many important Catalans have been in Socialist governments; in fact Spain's present Vice-president, Narcís Serra is a major leader of PSC. With a "Jacobin" image in Catalonia due to years of Catalan-Madrid friction over the development of the regional autonomy system, PSOE is highly associated with PSC. PSC supports the classic socialist position, of Spanish and European socialists, by supporting Jacques Delors' vision of the European Union. Hence, their position in Catalonia is defensive as IC attacks their leftist credentials for supporting Maastricht, and as ERC and CiU attack them for selling out Catalonia to gain power and influence in Madrid.

The details of PSC European policies will be filled out below when this paper explains the

activities of a key political figure, Pasqual Maragall, who is the Mayor of Barcelona and a major figure in European regional politics. The point to be made here is that PSC defends itself by distinguishing between *catalanisme* and Catalan nationalism. The latter, represented by CiU, is characterized as being a classic nationalist position: Close minded, insular, reactionary, and which looks back to the past; Catalan nationalists in the end are no different than nationalists anywhere. To be a *catalanista* is to assert Catalan identity and its political and cultural protection as well as development, but within the modern and progressive context of accepting Catalonia's position in Spain and the present European project of a European Union. While active in adjusting regional representation within the Maastricht framework the Catalan socialists are locked into PSOE's European policy, and the policy of European Socialists represented by Jacques Delors. As PSOE goes and Maastricht goes, so go the Catalan Socialists.

4. "A Europe of Regions".¹³ The Socialists and the Catalan moderate nationalist (CiU led by Jordi Pujol) are reviewed last because their leaders are the most active in the European activities and institutions covered below. They represent two completely different visions, strategies, and actions of regional elites in Europe. CiU dominates Catalan politics. To most observers the historic error of Catalan Socialists, which they admit, was refusing Jordi Pujol's offer to form a coalition government after the first regional elections in Catalonia in March 1980. With a strong plurality of the vote, Pujol instead formed a minority government with the old ERC, and proceeded to initiate the construction of Catalonia's first regional government and administration since the short-lived Catalan regional government of Spain's Second Republic (1932-39). By 1984 Catalonia was personified by Pujol, permitting his party to create a position of political dominance in Catalan regional politics. CiU "moderate" credentials as nationalists rests on a

carefully measured strategy of regional government, coupled with a clear and ambitious European project.

President Pujol claims to embody a modern, culturally progressive, and economically dynamic Catalonia which looks towards Europe for its future. "A Europe of Regions" epitomizes the pragmatic balance in CiU's message: They are constantly seeking greater powers from Madrid and Brussels in recognition of Catalonia's unique, national status, but these nationalist demands are couched within a discourse on Spain and Europe which does not alarm the eclectic population of Catalonia (the same cannot be said for the reaction it elicits from other sectors of Spanish society). They present themselves as statesmen who are realistic and pragmatic, not wild eyed nationalists (ERC) or utopian leftists (IC). While CiU constantly fights with Madrid for an "equitable" degree of self-government, to fit the status of Catalonia as a nation within Spain, Pujol's discourse of a Catalonia, which is open to Spain and to Europe, is essential to his overall image. President Pujol and his assistants are often seen traveling throughout Europe -- acting on a European stage as major players in European regional politics. Furthermore Pujol often travel with the attitude of a head of state and is often received as such (most recently in Eastern Europe, *El País* 9/20/92). Hence, "Europe" is an essential component of the CiU moderate nationalist coalition's overall strategy.

5. The Activities of the Generalitat in Western Europe. "The government is demonstrating its serious preoccupation with the 'growing interference in the international activities of the State by the autonomous communities ... and the nonexistent of set rules which regulate these activities'...". (*El País*, 1/10/93) This citation by *El País* of a study written by Spain's Ministry of Public Administration, in an article on the international activities of regional

governments, represents the serious concern by Madrid of the growing foreign activities of regions, mainly within Europe. While using the term "autonomous regions" Madrid's real concern lies with the activities of Euskadi and particularly Catalonia. Pujol's 27 foreign visits in 1992 (the year he became president of the Assembly of European Regions) is triple of any other regional president except Manuel Fraga (ex-president of the Popular Party and President of the Xunta of Galicia [regional government]).

Pujol's election to head AER (Assembly of European Regions) in July 1992 and his subsequent appointment of Joan Vallvé to a post referred to by many as the "minister of foreign affairs" for Catalonia, in September 1992, reopened a simmering debate over the role of regions in international affairs. A flurry of articles in the Spanish press and anonymous quotes by Madrid officials expressed concern for such activities and their possible violation of Article 97 and 93 of the Constitution, which pronounce that foreign affairs was the domain of the state. (El País 9/15, 9/20, 9/27/1992; 1/10, 1/31/1993) Yet the reaction from a Catalan official clearly expresses the Generalitat's commitment to such activities: "We are within the bounds of the Constitution; clearly we do not wish to direct foreign policy, but we are allowed to be present with our own identity abroad." (El País 1/20/92)

Catalonia has "offices" in 23 countries which nominally serve as a lobbying agent for the region but which in European countries, particularly Brussels, clearly aspire to serve as a pseudo-embassy: Such offices are tolerated by Madrid, according to the ministry's study,

"... as long as the act with the class goals of a lobby or with the function of obtaining information for the respective region";
but the line is crossed when, they act "with representative functions, incompatible with those reserved for the state in the Constitution." (El País 1/10/93)

The timing of this issue's new political relevance was not coincidental. As explained below Pujol's leadership in AER is a powerful platform for Catalan nationalists to project themselves in Europe not only because of this organizations size (representing over 180 regions in Europe); furthermore since late 1992 it became apparent the Maastricht treaty was finally to have a future. Because the Treaty on European Union creates a Committee of the Regions, and gives juridical status to the concept of "subsidiarity", this period began intense activity by regions to position themselves to influence the application of these two ideas in concrete terms. This shift in strategy and activity is particularly apparent in Catalonia.

After having lost interest in regional organizations such as AER and CEMR, Maastricht significantly altered the European strategy of Catalan leaders.(see below) In the opening quote of this paper, and the following quote, Joan Vallvé underscores the thinking behind this new strategy. In response to a question, "In what area of foreign policy should the Generalitat reinforce its efforts?", Vallvé was quite clear:

"More than reinforce what is important is to consolidate the regions in the EC. Maastricht has been the first step. Insufficient, because we now have to cohabitate with municipalities, but it is important. Now we must know how to give substance to this committee and to make it function to serve the interests of regions."(El País 2/27/92)

Behind this regional strategy one can see that regional leaders such as the Catalans will use the new juridical status of "subsidiarity" as a powerful justification for their efforts.

"Why did France, one of the fathers of Europe, give such a conditional yes to the European Community? [French referendum on the European Union] In good part this was due to that fact that the French citizen feels isolated from the decisions that are made in Brussels, very distant from his own interests and his own identity."([] mine.)

Hence, Vallvé argues, a greater role for regions would increase the importance of regional

issues in the EU, but more significantly it would bring closer to the daily life of an ordinary citizen the EU and its "mechanisms". For these reasons Vallvé states that the "regionalization" of Europe as proposed by AER, and the "construction" of Europe, are parallel rather than divergent processes.

PART 2: THE EUROPEAN ACTIVITIES OF CATALAN POLITICAL LEADERS

The second half of this paper analyzes a set of European initiatives by Catalan leaders which clearly demonstrates two divergent strategies for regions in Europe. One strategy is the ambitious strategy of Catalan nationalists in the Generalitat while a second, more limited approach, is espoused by Catalan socialists led by Pasqual Maragall from Barcelona's City Hall. This section will begin by examining several regional initiatives in which Catalan leaders are active. The section will then review Catalan participation in European regional organizations (AER, CEMR) and recent activity around the formation of EU institutions such as the Committee of the Regions.

1. Transnational Regional Initiatives.

The initiative which was flashy but perhaps of least long-term significance to the development of the EU was the "Four Motors of Europe". Composed of Lombardy, Rhône-Alpes, Baden-Württemberg, and Catalonia these self-proclaimed economic powerhouses formed this organization to promote economic growth in their regions, which they felt would then pull along their respective countries. In the late 1980's Pujol and the Generalitat became enamored with this initiative for two reasons. First, they felt that it was a good vehicle for promoting Catalan economic growth. Furthermore, the image of Catalonia rubbing shoulders with Europe's most economically powerful and sophisticated regions reassured a chronically insecure Catalonia

that it was a modern and advanced region, not simply of Spain but of Europe.

However, even before the ratification of the Treaty on European Union the Generalitat's shifted its European strategy. On the eve of Maastricht the Generalitat was positioning Catalonia not only to compete economically in a single market, but also to exist in a new European Union in which traditional patterns of political, and territorial, organization would be called into question. With the Treaty on European Union, and initiatives such as the Schengen Agreement, these considerations have strengthened.

i. The Euroregion Project. On October 19, 1991 the presidents of Catalonia, Midi-Pyrénées, and Languedoc-Roussillon signed the constitutive act of their Euroregion, which has the stated goal of coordinating their development policies and serving as a regional lobby to their respective states as well as the EU. Perhaps the potential significance of this initiative can be measured in the reticent attitude of Madrid, Paris, and Brussels to this activity. In fact this agreement came shortly after the European Parliament had voted against the possibility that states could cede representation to regions. All three leaders asserted that this was not an attempt to undermine the state but rather a project to develop the internal relations between these regions in the area of economic development, communications and transportation, cultural exchange, and scientific research.(El País 10/20/91; Avui 11/10/91)¹⁴ A second role will be that of a regional lobby in Brussels which will "reinforce the driving role of the Euroregion within the Large European Single Market".(Communique of three presidents 10/19/91)

One example of their activities was their action to revive the high speed train link between France and Spain which was delayed in Paris and Madrid due to financial problems. Yet one reason for the Generalitat's interest in the Euroregion initiative (which began in 1989 with

uninspired meetings between regions, but which accelerated in 1991) is specifically its geographic and transnational character. Avui reports that, "these two elements are more valued every day as the moment of eliminating borders within the EC approaches, because it will pressure neighboring areas to coordinate their activities which have been scarce until now."(Avui 11/10/91) Clearly the drive towards a European Union is creating a profound and unprecedented reevaluation of strategies for regional development in Europe. A comment by the influential regional leader Jacques Blanc, president of Languedoc-Roussillon hints to these potentially more far reaching implications when he states that the "destiny" of these three regions is "linked" together given the trends in Europe.

At an April 1992 meeting of Euroregions in Braunschweig, Germany, Jordi Pujol was much more explicit about the ultimate ambition of such projects: "Euroregions are not only administrative entities but could also manage the democratic development of the EC through the decentralization of power."(Avui, 4/30/92) This organization compliments well the Catalan leadership's desire to project themselves as more than simply a geographic region. Given the much greater political capacities of the Generalitat, as a Spanish Autonomous Community compared to these French provinces, Catalonia will play a leadership role in this nascent organization representing 10.5 million people.

ii. Eurocomarca. The extent to which the movement to a European Union might affect the organization of local and regional government can be seen in a curious initiative by 5 Catalan comarques and 3 French départements (each equivalent to a county), to form a single *mancomunidad*.¹⁵ These local areas lie along the Mediterranean coast where the region of Catalonia meets the Pyrenees and passes into southern Languedoc-Roussillon (an area of mixed

French and Catalan culture). This is an area whose local economy depends on fishing and the now eliminated business generated by the major border crossing between France and Spain (Cerbère-Portbou); surprisingly this part of France voted 'no' in the referendum on the European Union. An impoverished area of 23,000 inhabitants, these counties wish to organize their limited local services into a regional "comarca" which will better serve all of these coastal communities (Distribution of water, trash collection, management of the fishing areas of the coast, and the formation of common schools).(El País 2/14/93)

The influence of the move to a Single Market and a European Union can be seen the development of this initiative. What is now a serious attempt to create a transnational, local governmental, entity began as a folkloric and cultural exchange organization in 1985 to promote festivals, cultural events, and sporting events (Asociació Cap de Creus-Cap de Sant Vicenç). Yet the movement to European integration and the elimination of the border, and its economy, has transformed a cultural society and vague ideas of cooperation into a potentially significant initiative. Serious enough that the Civil Governor for Girona (the state's representative in a province, roughly equivalent to a French *Préfet*), Pere Navarro, pronounced that such a project is in conflict with the administrative and territorial legislation of both countries.(El País 2/14/93)¹⁶

Pushed by CiU mayors in the Catalan towns, this group claims to truly test the idea of the European Union to see if it is more than mere words. The statement by a French Mayor in this region is perhaps the most revealing:

"Neither the French state or the region of Languedoc-Roussillon helps us, we are very alone. In this association we will have the support of the Catalan Generalitat and of its President Jordi Pujol, who has much charisma in Europe."(El País 10/14/93)

After trying for over 300 fruitless years to recuperate "Northern Catalonia" this initiative, along with the Euroregion project, could interweave local economies¹⁷ and offer the Generalitat a modest but effective means of projecting itself into this area; simultaneously, it could create a larger regional platform from which to operate in Europe.

2. European Regional Associations: AER and CEMR.

Transnational regional initiatives annoy the states and the European Parliament, and do hold the potential to become significant entities in the long-run. However events at Maastricht created a new political environment for regions. For at least the short term it is the European regional associations (Assembly of European Regions, and Council of European Municipalities and Regions), and their links to the Committee of the Regions, which provide a potentially important European platform for Catalan leaders.

These two associations represent very different strategies and goals for regional activity in a new Europe. Significantly, Jordi Pujol is president of the Assembly of European Regions (AER) which advocates a strong regional role in European affairs. Pasqual Maragall is president of the Council for European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR). As a result, the confrontation between the Catalan socialist's and the Catalan nationalist's use of Europe in domestic politics has been transferred to a European level, in the struggle between these two associations (AER and CEMR). This paper ends by examining these divergent strategies and the resulting struggle between them to define the role of regions in Europe; a struggle which centers presently on the operation of the Committee of the Regions.

In a speech which many European regionalists consider to be a watershed in the EC's position on regions, Jacques Delors stated before the Bavarian parliament in March of 1991 that: "The

participation of regions in the construction of Europe is an essential factor to its success."(L'Express 3/6/1992. "L'Europe par la petite porte". Europe by the Small Door.) However, this statement says something to everyone for the essential question is what *kind* of participation will regions have. Among self-proclaimed regionalists this debate breaks down into two different visions, with different strategies and objectives. To study the articulation of these two positions, and the evolution of their conflict, it is instructive to study the period from November 1991 (on the eve of the Maastricht meetings), until the summer of 1994 when the Committee of the Regions began to function.

In a meeting of the national council of Pujol's political party (CDC, Democratic Convergence of Catalonia), in April of 1992, Pujol stated clearly the Catalan, nationalist, position on the political organization of Europe. Citing the German Länder, particularly Baden Württemberg, as regions which have similar goals, Pujol stated that given the new context of the EC, the state should only conserve the broadest policy functions: Macroeconomic and fiscal policy, foreign affairs, and defense fiscal policy. (Avui 4/27/92) Without explicitly using the term Pujol in essence formulated the regional nationalist position on subsidiarity.

i. The European Strategy of Catalan Nationalist (CiU) in AER: Over the course of the following month Jordi Pujol emerged as the favored candidate to replace the Italian Carlo Bernini as President of the Assembly of European Regions (who defeated Pujol in 1988). Founded in 1985 (its charter was written in Barcelona) AER had grown to represent more than 180 regions from all of Europe. From its inception Pujol has been active in this organization by promoting the notion of a "Europe of Regions" in which regional level governments, especially in regions with national communities, would play a prominent role. However, Pujol's emergence as a candidate

to lead this organization in May of 1992 reversed what had been the Generalitat's recent strategy to move away from AER and to focus completely on the "Four Motors of Europe" initiative, which at the end of the 1980's was deemed to hold more promise for Catalonia in terms of economic development. AER was seen to have little real influence.

The "decisive factor" in this change in European strategy was the Maastricht treaty and the creation of the Committee of the Regions. (El País 5/25/92) AER and CEMR have taken on new importance because these organizations will influence the initial formation of the Committee of the Regions, and will have a hand in its development and operation. The potential implications of this new strategy were great enough that Pujol personally, and the Generalitat as an institution, fully committed themselves to his election campaign for this post, thereby exposing themselves to significant political risk in the event of failure.

The importance placed on this European strategy was underscored after Pujol's victory in July 1992. The Catalan government was reorganized in September of 1992 to free Pujol and top CiU officials to devote substantial time and energy to the AER organization and the future Committee of the Regions. A Commissioner of Foreign Relations was created in a cabinet shuffle placing Joan Vallvé in this new post which carried significant responsibility and prestige. To occupy this position was to be considered a close confidant of Pujol, and the only reason that a full cabinet position and department of foreign affairs was not officially created, at this time, was to address Madrid's sensitivity over Catalan activities in matters of international relations. (El País 9/15/92) Statements by Vallvé (see above quotes) underscored the importance placed by the Catalan nationalists on their European strategy. Finally, indicating the extent of Pujol's political project in European regional circles, AER, which comprises the most economically advanced and politically

developed regions of Europe, overwhelming elected Pujol to lead them during this crucial period of European integration.¹⁸

ii. The Strategy of Catalan Socialists in Europe and CEMR: During this same period (May 8, 1992), in the City Hall of Barcelona, Pasqual Maragall was invested with the presidency of the Council of European Municipalities and Regions. Created in 1951 this organization represents 30,000 regional and municipal entities in over 24 countries. Significantly, Jacques Delors was present at this ceremony in a clear gesture which linked CEMR and Maragall's position, on regions AND municipalities in Europe, to that of Brussel's official position. Delors reaffirmed two elements of his position at this ceremony. First that regions and municipalities both have an "essential role" to play; and secondly that this role is to approach EU institutions to European citizens.(El País 5/8/92) Therefore, Delors and Maragall argue that both regions and municipalities must have a "balanced" representation in EU institutions, particularly the Committee of the Regions. The Committee of the Regions is composed of by regions and municipalities, at least until 1996, when the Treaty on European Union, and the Committee of the Regions which it created, can be revised. Maragall and CEMR argue for a permanent arrangement in which municipalities would play a significant role in EU decision-making while Pujol and AER are willing to grit their teeth until 1996, but strongly argue for significant changes at that point in time.

3. The Committee of the Regions and the Conflict between Two Visions of Regions in Europe.

Just as this debate over the political organization of Europe has a Catalan context in which Maragall and Pujol have been clashing for years over the role of regions within Spain, and

Barcelona within Catalonia, this debate also has a European context. The dominant position, held by states with unitary traditions and by many of the EU's institutions, use the municipal argument to thwart the development of robust regional prerogatives which they view to be potentially disruptive and inefficient. A counter position is held by countries such as Germany and Belgium, supported by national regions such as Catalonia, who argue that significant decentralization is an effective way to implement the notion of subsidiarity in a manner which will bring government down to the scale of citizens and increase institutional efficiency. (See below) Yet while Catalan socialists and Catalan nationalists were posturing to gain the advantage on the issue of Europe in 1992-1993 (a period of regional and general elections), and while AER and CEMR were debating on how the Committee of the Regions would function internally, the main characteristics of the Committee of the Regions were already defined in November of 1991, prior to the Maastricht meeting.

The Initial Agreement to Form a Regional Body. In mid-November of 1991 the Intergovernmental Conference for European Political Union accepted the proposal by Germany and Spain to create a Committee of the Regions which would serve as a consultative body to both the Commission and the Council.(El País 11/15/91) In fact it was reported that this issue was one of the few issues which countries agreed to prior to this historic meeting. (El País 11/22/91) This is surprising given the reticent view of many member states and EC institutions (particularly the Parliament) which were concerned that granting regions political recognition would be "divisive" rather than useful in making the EC more efficient and representative.

This rare consensus was reached prior to Maastricht by modifying Germany's initial proposal to create a committee of only regions, which was the strategy most favored by the ambitious

regions seeking to maximize their presence in European institutions.(Avui 11/26/91) The new German-Spanish proposal instead contained the classic strategy by those concerned with the fallout of regional recognition -- mix both regions and municipalities into a single category. In this way one can claim to be granting representation to local authorities while assuring that the divergent interests of municipalities and regions would contain the agenda of certain regions who would certainly push the limits of any organization in pursuit of their ideal of a "Europe of the Regions".(German Länder, Belgian regions, Euskadi, Catalonia, etc.)

The Basic Characteristics of the Committee of the Regions. The compromise achieved in this proposal between these two positions is clearly seen in the basic characteristics of this Committee of the Regions as outlined in the Treaty on European Union. While it is a purely consultative body, it must be consulted on certain issues.¹⁹ Its recommendations are not binding. However, the Committee can meet and act on its own prerogative and can emit opinions "in cases in which it considers such action appropriate". (Article 198) Its members are selected for four years terms by each country (which itself determines the mix of regional to municipal representatives); these members may elect their own president and formulate the committee's internal rules and procedure, *upon approval by the Council.* (Article 198b) However, these members can act with complete independence and may not be bound by "mandatory instructions" from their country's government. (Article 198a) Although this body appears to have a wide margin of action, "community sources" indicated to El País that this committee was designed to be "purely symbolic" as indicated by its institutional association with the Economic and Social Committee.(11/22/91)

The Committee of the Regions would be composed of 189 members: the largest member states

(Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy) have 24 members, while the smallest state, Luxembourg, has six.(Article 198a) Spain has 21 members which the Socialist government decided to distribute to all 17 autonomous regions and four municipalities (Madrid, Barcelona at least, but there is some kind of rotational system in place for municipalities).

The Reaction by Catalan nationalist Leaders. The reaction by Catalan nationalists and Pujol was swift. Pujol and José Antonio Ardanza (President of the Basque regional government) applauded the creation of this committee because it had been one element of their program to create the "legitimacy of regions" at the EC level. However, in Brussels and Barcelona Jordi Pujol quickly outlined a series of objections to this organization.(El País 11/22/91; Avui 11/26/91) The mixing of regions and municipalities creates "confusion" over the objectives of this committee. In mentioning Germany's initial proposal Pujol reiterated the Catalan nationalist view that regions should be solely present on this committee because they are a higher order of government than municipalities, while national regions such as Catalonia are an altogether special case.

Furthermore, Pujol criticized the placing of this committee in conjunction with the Economic and Social Committee. The Committee of the Regions should have been given complete organizational autonomy. Seen as a purely symbolic entity by many, the Catalan nationalists did not wish to be associated with this Economic and Social Committee. Their ambition is to energize the Committee of the Regions and to quickly establish it as an organization with a certain degree of influence. For this reason the Catalan nationalists also would have liked to have increased the prerogatives of this committee and its ability before the Council and the Commission to inject its opinions into the policy process.

Even Manuel Fraga voiced several criticisms: He was critical of the "timid" nature of this

committee, of the European Parliament's recent admonition against regional representation, and of the fear that a "Europe of the Regions" would compromise rather than compliment a "Europe of the States". (Avui 11/20/91) While his position on regions is not as ambitious as that of Jordi Pujol, Fraga does see an inevitability in the political evolution of Europe:

"The Nation-States will not disappear, but neither will they again be the sole protagonists in the international sphere. Nor will regions become as they were in the Middle Ages, almost sovereign, but they will have a much greater projection in the interior of States and they must also have a similar projection in Europe. This is the road which is open... and it will ameliorate without a doubt the organization of the European Commission and the European Parliament."(Avui 11/20/91)

1993: A Struggle to Control the Committee of the Regions. In the first months of 1993 Catalan socialists and Catalan nationalists fully articulated their vision of Europe, and their strategy to achieve it, in two editorials. First, Joan Vallvé outlined the Generalitat's position, titled "Maastricht and the Regions", in early January. (El País 1/8/93) Vallvé begins by noting the historic precedent of this Committee of the Regions, even with its limitations. "The Treaty of Maastricht expresses for the first time the regional reality [*el hecho regional*], of regions, in the text of a community treaty". Vallvé claims that this is part of a political evolution of both the EC and European states towards decentralized patterns of organization which Austria, Sweden, and Finland will accentuate.²⁰ Quoting the economist Alvin Toffler²¹, Vallvé sees the state being absorbed into a superstate while simultaneously devolving specific policies to local authorities. For Vallvé this inevitable evolution of the political organization of Europe requires, for reasons of efficiency and democracy, the creation of a special and important role for regions within the EU.

"This reality necessitates the rethinking of what should be from now on the function of the State before a changing world which advances towards the constitution of larger entities which are increasingly more distant from citizens, but in which each individual seeks the affirmation of his identity through the existence

of regions [a través del hecho regional]. This is the principal function that regions should have in the new construction of Europe."

Here Vallvé has added the subtle nuance of Catalan nationalists to the discussion that subsidiarity will "democratize" the EU by bringing government closer to the people. By speaking of identity Vallvé includes, into the very notion of democracy, the assertion that the protection of the national identity of a region is essential; by inference then a political entity (i.e. the EU) will only be considered legitimate, by the population of that region, if it "affirms" their identity. In this way the Generalitat's European strategy seeks to create a direct political relationship with Brussels which will empower the Generalitat in its struggle with Madrid to redress perceived injustices on the issues of nationality and self-government.

Seen from this perspective the Catalan nationalists find that the AER's definition of "subsidiarity" addresses their position when it states that all decisions, "of any type" should be made at the closest level to the citizen, which guarantee the best efficiency in its administration; in this way the Generalitat can argue that the state is too distant, but that the municipality is too limited to be effective.

In a response entitled, "Regions and Cities in Europe", Pasqual Maragall defines the Catalan socialist position in clear distinction to CiU's stance.(El País 2/3/93) He begins by quoting Jacques Delors who defined cities as "' ... the essential element in the construction of an authentic Europe... indispensable intermediaries between the power that is ever more distant, and the problems this creates, and its citizens.'" Citing the Maastricht treaty itself Maragall reminds the reader that the Committee of the Regions is to be formed by both regions and cities. Because many countries are not organized in regions, what is essential is the principle of subsidiarity rather

than the explicit support of regional government. This point underscores Maragall's central premise of defending a broad set of political principles rather than the parochial prerogatives of a region.

Subsidiarity for Maragall is the "approximation" of power to the citizen which is the most adequate to administer the issue in question. "This is a profoundly democratic principle, but it is also, a principle that selects one of many forms of democracy: that which minimizes the difference between the citizen and the administrator...". What is important is that "all levels of government have equal dignity". By reaching beyond the narrow defense of a national region, to state a broader democratic principle, Maragall seeks to reinforce the Catalan socialist vision of Catalonia within the Maastricht EU.

From this normative high ground the Catalan socialists can balance an assertion of their *catalanisme* with two political realities: One, they must maintain an alliance with PSOE in the Spanish government (and its support of Delors); two, the political reality in Catalonia dictates that they may firmly control many city governments in Catalonia, but are locked out of the Generalitat by Pujol. Maragall ends by reaffirming the importance and uniqueness of Catalonia as a national region while also asking for "generosity" from Europe's national regions to cohabitate with municipalities during this transition period in European regional affairs (1994-96). During the treaty revision process in 1996 a more permanent solution can be found which addresses both the general principle of subsidiarity as well as the principle that national regions have specific needs.

Tensions Between Maragall and Pujol Condition European Regional Negotiations

By the Spring of 1993 tensions were increasing between AER and CEMR, and between Catalan socialists and nationalists, over the exact internal functioning of the Committee of the

Regions. Pujol and Maragall have always had a tense relationship given the personal conflict between two influential politicians in a small region, and the significant institutional conflict between Barcelona's City Hall, long controlled by socialists, and the Generalitat held by nationalists. In May 1993 the Catalan Antoni Gutiérrez Díaz, as president of the Commission on Regional Policy of the European Parliament, attempted to mediate tensions without success, during the European Parliament's debates over the future form of the Committee of the Regions, by inviting both leaders to testify at his commission's hearings. In the end his commission's proposal to the full assembly resembled Maragall's and CEMR position: The period 1994-1996 should serve as a trial period until a final arrangement was found during the treaty revision in 1996. Until then both regions and municipalities should have "equal" representation in the Committee of the Regions. AER and Pujol agreed to the idea of a trial period but sought to reduce the role of municipalities during this initial phase. (El País 3/18/93)²²

In the fall of 1993 Maragall and CEMR offered to meet with Pujol and AER to negotiate the internal functioning of the Committee. AER was unresponsive in part because Pujol, in keeping with his regional strategy, did not want to acknowledge Mayor Maragall as a peer to the President of the Generalitat; rather he sought to establish that Vallvé should meet with the Mayor and his association of municipalities. (El País 10/2, 10/24/1993) During this period CEMR also filed a complaint with the European Commission because countries such as Spain, Germany, and Belgium had violated the "letter and spirit" of Maastricht on the equality of representation, by giving far greater representation to regions. Maragall also called for the enforcement of the principle of subsidiarity to assure its application at all levels of government, and suggested the creation of legal mechanisms which would allow one to appeal this issue to the European Court of

Justice.

Finally, in February 1994, after more than seven months without personal contact, Pujol agreed to meet with Maragall. These events underscore the prominent role of Catalan leaders in European regional activities, and describe the maneuvering between two very different visions of regions in Europe, by Catalan leaders. Pujol acceded to Maragall's demands to meet only when Maragall began to talk of running for the post of President of the Committee of the Regions. (Avui 1/21/94) With his organization firmly supporting his candidacy Maragall pushed hard for his strategy: The key was to establish the role of local governments in Europe, based on the principle of subsidiarity, by using the activities of the Committee of the Regions, to instill the criteria that "territorial intimacy" should be used to assure that "all elected powers and territorial levels have equal dignity." Maragall and CEMR agreed that if this precedent was established during the 1994-1996 period, then a more permanent solution should be crafted in 1996 to clearly define the roles of regions and municipalities. (Avui 3/3/94)

In effect two Catalan leaders, representing different visions of Catalonia, divergent strategies for regional action in Europe, and as presidents of the two regional associations in Europe, were to condition these final negotiations. (Avui 2/25/94) Maragall's proposal that they alternate as president of this committee was refused by Pujol because AER argued that regions should control the Committee and its key posts. However by February and March of 1994 AER and Pujol were under pressure as Maragall's candidacy for president solidified while within AER no unanimous regional candidate emerged; Pujol did not want the post but no consensus could form around Jacques Blanc, President of the French province Languedoc-Roussillon, and Luc Van Den Brande of Flanders. (El País 3/2/94)

The Initial Activities of the Committee of the Regions On March 9-10, 1994 the Committee of the Regions held its opening session.²³ Initial indications reveal that the less ambitious strategy and vision of Pasqual Maragall and CEMR orient the committee's activities. AER and CEMR compromised on the committee's president; Jacques Blanc (AER) was elected president and Maragall Vice-president with the understanding that they will switch after two years. (Agence Europe 3/11/94) Perhaps the most significant event was the opening speech by Jacques Delors which underscored the similarities between his views and those of Maragall's. With the ultimate mission of helping to add "soul" to abstract and aloof EU institutions, the Committee of the Regions is to "bring the Union, perceived as being too distant, closer to local reality". (Agence Europe 3/10/94)

Yet in order to avoid "misunderstanding" Delors went on to stress that the Union is a union of nation-states; therefore EU institutions should not interfere with the "natural" relations between central and regional authorities. Citing Article F1 of the Maastricht Treaty the Agence Europe report ended this section with the statement, "the Union respects the national identity of Member States."²⁴ Even before its first actions the limits to this Committee were being made clear.

Delors made two additional points in his speech. First, he claimed that this body was unique because of, "the extraordinary diversity of its members: the leaders of large regions will sit alongside mayors from small towns, and mayors from major cities will mix with representatives of rural communities." What sounds like a quaint aspect of this committee is in reality a central element which conditions its activity. The "uniqueness" of this "diversity" is what diffuse any attempts to use this committee as a platform to enact the ambitious regional strategy of AER and Pujol. Secondly, Delors stated that the "special expertise and influence" of this regional body

should be used to give a better understanding of cohesion and structural funds as well as "strengthen people's feeling of belong". Again Delors' "compliment" seeks to limit this committee's focus to narrow, concrete, issues. Finally, Delors warned that this committee "bears a heavy burden" because many are "wary" that this committee will be a divisive force with little substantive contribution to the EU. Delors ended by asking this committee to disprove these fears.

The next day President Jacques Blanc closed the committee's first session by outlining some of its principles (e.g. geographic diversity among its leaders) and characteristics (4-5 plenary sessions annually, 5 permanent committees, and a plan of focusing on a few substantive issues such as Cohesion Fund regulations).(Agence Europe 3/12/94) This was seen in subsequent meetings which worked principally on the Cohesion Fund issue. Stated future subjects included programs on AIDS, education, "Youth for Europe", "community initiatives", and trans-european networks. (Agence Europe 4/7; 4/8/94)²⁵ Clearly the early activities of the Committee of the Regions are centered on limited administrative tasks rather than on a strategy of pushing the limits of this committee's mandate in order to articulate a radical position on the role of regions in Europe.

Of final interest are two statements by President Blanc which hint at the environment in which this committee is working. On April 6, 1994 he felt the need to explain that , "We are not against the States, but we want to express the experience of regional and local authorities".(Agence Europe 4/7/94) On May 5, 1994 after the committee met in cramped quarters, Blanc complained and explained that the inadequate accommodation were deliberate: "Parliament is fearful of the success of the Committee of the Regions and fear is a poor advisor".(Agence Europe 5/19/94)

Conclusion

This paper has outlined the activities and strategies of Catalan political leaders in regard to regional activities in Europe. Two principal European strategies were discovered and examined. The moderate nationalist Jordi Pujol and the Catalan socialist Pasqual Maragall are the proponents of these two radically different strategies for positioning Catalonia in the emerging European context of the European Union. Beyond the discovery of the great influence which these Catalan leaders have in European regional activities this paper revealed that these Catalan strategies correspond to two regional strategies at the European level, as well as to two specific European regional associations which are active proponents of each approach. Early activity in the Committee of the Regions suggests that the more limited strategy of Maragall and CEMR has clearly oriented this unprecedented regional institution within the EU. Perhaps this is not surprising given the positions of the nation-states which control the Council and the EU establishment as represented by Delors and the Commission.

This paper has reviewed a series of frenetic activities and initiatives by Catalan regional leaders which appear initially to be quite impressive. However, while holding a long-term potential to significantly change the political organization of Europe, there are no short-term reasons to think that the position of the nation-state is being seriously challenged. In fact Jordi Pujol's initial reaction to the Maastricht Treaty was to state that the role of the state had been strengthened -- an interesting comment by a regional leader on a treaty which gave subsidiarity a juridical status, and which created an unprecedented institution for regional representation in Europe. Yet a close look at the Committee of the Regions demonstrates that the Council can exert tight control over many of its elements. The European Parliament has stated that regions cannot be represented in

this body. finally, the nation-state maintains a firm control over political relations between its territory and the EU. An important moment in judging the direction of these trends will be the 1996 revision process of the Treaty on European Union.

Domestically, within Catalonia, the European strategy of Pujol's nationalist government is productive since their vision Catalonia in Europe is an integral part of their basic political position as "moderate" nationalists. Pujol's image and influence is greatly strengthened in Catalonia by his European activities and strategy. While not underestimating the importance placed on these European activities by the Generalitat, perhaps here lies the best short-term motivation for CiU's European strategy. These leaders have demonstrated over the past 15 years a great sense of patience and timing in their dealings with Madrid. They know that it takes time to accomplish the reorganization of political power within a territory. Perhaps their European policy is aimed as much at the immediate benefits gained within Catalan domestic politics as it is aimed at the long-term transformation of the role of regions in Europe which is still to be defined.

ENDNOTES

1. For discussion of regionalism and the activities of regions in West European states as well as in the context of the EC, see Hueglin (1986) and Keating (1988b) for concise, if dated, reviews. Keating (1994) and Harvie (1994) look specifically at the European context while Rousseau and Zariski (1987) and Keating (1988b) deal not only with the issues around regional nationalism, but also review several West European countries. See also Meny and Wright (1985), Krejci and Velimsky (1981), Rudolph and Thompson (1989), and Tiryakian and Rogowski (1985) for edited volumes which approach the issue of regional nationalism from different perspectives. An edited series which still provides interesting insights on the historical dimension of these issues, from the perspective of political sociology, is Eisenstadt and Rokkan (1973).

2. Jordi Pujol, president of the Generalitat, and the dominant political figure of Catalonia since 1980 is president of the Assembly of European Regions. Pasqual Maragall, a Catalan socialist and mayor of Barcelona is president of the council of European Municipalities and Regions. This paper will analyze in detail their activities in these organizations.

3. Title VIII of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 outlines the territorial organization of the state. Articles 148 and 149 list the powers which are exclusive to the state and those which may be exercised by the Autonomous Communities. What is unique to the Spanish system is the manner in which regional autonomies are formed. Either through a restrictive procedure (Article 143) or through the "fast track" procedure for the "historic regions" of Galicia, the Basque Lands, and Catalonia. Each region negotiates with Madrid bilaterally to determine the exact nature of its autonomous government; hence a wide disparity exists between regional governments depending on their manner of formation (143 or 151), and subsequently their negotiations with Madrid.

For more general information on the formation of these Autonomous Communities see: Robert Clark in Rudolph and Thompson (1989); Díaz-Lopez (1981) and in Meny and Wright (1985); for an historical perspective see Linz (1973), and Zariski in Rasseau and Zariski (1987). For an important look into the constitutional debates surrounding the drafting of Article VIII see Solé Tura (1985).

4. Four regions used the powerful Article 151 to create their Autonomous Communities: The Basque Lands, Catalonia, Galicia, and surprisingly Andalucía. At the time that it was written few people suspected that areas outside of the "historic regions" would seek to form an Autonomous Community. However, by the May regional elections of 1983 the entire territory of Spain had been organized into 17 Autonomous Communities. A surge in Andalucian regional sentiment in the late 1970's led its leaders to demand access to the 151 process. Its final victory by early 1982, over strong resistance from Madrid, opened the flood gates as every region felt the

need to be so organized. Hence, 13 other regions formed regional entities through Article 143.

To place these events within the context of Spain's democratic transition see Maravall and Santamaría's short but excellent review of the transition period in O'Donnell et.al. (1986). For a more indepth study of the transition period there are many sources. A recently edited volume by CIS covers a lot of ground. (Cotarelo 1992)

5. On February 28, 1992 Spain's two main political parties agreed to an autonomy agreement (Pacto Autonómico) which attempts to create greater uniformity among the disparate levels of administration between the 17 Autonomous Communities. The core of this agreement is the transfer of 32 areas of policy (with varying degrees of exclusive control) to the Article 143 regions in an attempt to bring them up to the level of the four more fully developed regional governments formed under Article 151. Basque and Catalan nationalists have not signed this agreement which is in line with their position that the "historical regions" of Spain should have a special political status given that they are nations not regions. *El País* 2/6 2/16, 3/15/92; *Avui* 1/13, 1/24, 1/28, 2/6,92)

6. Over the last several years a few issues have been prominent -- the transfer of control of 15% of tax receipts to the regions, pushed by the Catalans; the control of the police by Euskadi and Catalonia in their regions; and the prerogatives of the unique civil law traditions in Catalonia. The degree of tension has risen greatly since the June 1993 elections in which PSOE lost the majority, but maintains a minority government with the legislative support of the Basques (PNV) and especially the Catalans (CiU). Accusations of "selling out" Spain to the "nationalists" accentuate the bitter struggle between the moderate right (PP) and the socialists for the future political control of Spain. This has exploded a final issue to a dangerously high level of tension: The language policy in Catalonia based on a 1983 law by the Generalitat (held to be constitutional) which seeks to create a bilingual population in Catalonia (Catalan, Castilian). The Law of Linguistic Normalization in Catalonia.

7. An explosion in regional movements is occurring in Spain since 1992. In 1992, the year prior to the June 6, 1993 general elections, 189 local and regional parties were registered. (*El País* 11/8/92). While most of these are insignificant 6 regional parties formed an election coalition for the June 6th elections, while various regional parties won an unprecedented total of 6 seats (this figure does not include traditional nationalist parties). This regionalism tends to be right of center (Aragón, Valencia) and critical of the February Autonomy Pact, because they feel that it continues to favor the "privileged" national regions. Hence this movement is in some ways more of a reaction against the national regions than it is against Madrid. However the motives and issues do vary depending on the area (e.g. Canary Islands) as all movements call for political reforms as a well as a further development of regional governments. (*El País* 1/6/93)

8. E.g., Catalan Communists (PSUC/IC) exist in a party coalition with the Spanish Communist party (PCE) and leftist groups (IU); Catalan Socialists (PSC) have a very close organizational relationship with the Spanish socialists (PSOE) who have governed Spain since 1982 -- in this way an historical number of Catalans have been serving in cabinets and agencies in Madrid; Catalan Christian democrats (UDC) are the minor partner of the a dominant, moderate nationalist,

coalition (CiU) formed with the Catalan conservative party (CDC) -- this coalition dominates regional politics and controls a large Catalan contingent in the Spanish parliament (which presently plays a crucial role in keeping the minority socialist government in office); curiously, even the Popular Party, which is a conservative party with a centralized, single national view of the Spanish nation-state, claims that its Catalan section is autonomous -- these leaders speak in Catalan of the Spanish *patria*; finally, small separatist groups were completely marginalized during the 1970's and 1980's -- however, their takeover of the historic ERC (Republican Left of Catalonia) in 1989 gave them a new political vehicle; but as of the 1992 regional elections, the 1993 general elections, and the 1994 European elections their support may reached it maximum. (8%, 5%, 5.5%)

9. The following description of the political positions of ERC are in part derived from the informal section of an interview (off tape) with Heribert Barrera, President of the ERC during June 1994.

10. Catalan nationalism has always looked in towards Spain, not out towards independence. The affirmation of Catalan identity date back to the mid-1800's while Catalonia's difficulties with Madrid go back to the mid-1600's. These event are much earlier than the Basque discontent and nationalist movement which arose at the turn of the century. In the diverse, 19th century *catalanista* literature one similar theme was always the call for a modern and European Catalonia to lead a backward Spain into the modern era (e.g. Almirall, Prat de la Riba, Rovira i Virgili). This motif is consistently present down to this day as seen in the positions of ERC and CiU. For a good, concise review of the history of Basque and Catalan nationalism see Payne (1973). Balcells (1988) is a thorough review of Catalan political thought. See Rossingyol (1974) for a wide-ranging historical study.

11. The following description of the political positions of PSUC are in part derived from the informal section of an interviews (off tape) with Rafael Ribó, Gregori Lopez Raimundo, and Antoni Gutiérrez Díaz during June and July 1994.

12. The following description of the political positions of PSC are in part derived from the informal section of an interview (off tape) with Joan Reventos and Jordi Solé Tura during June 1994.

13. The following description of the political positions of CiU are in part derived from the informal section of an interview (off tape) with Jordi Pujol and Joaquim Xicoy, President of the Parliament of Catalonia, during July of 1994.

14. "This Euroregion does not question the role of States but has the objective of mobilizing our energies to create strong dynamics in the area of culture as well as in the development of communications, transportation, the exchange of scientific investigators and tourism." Jacques Blanc, President of Midi-Pyrénées, Avui 11/10/91)

15. A *Mancomunidad* is a "Commonwealth" in the sense of being a larger entity which coordinates the administrative prerogatives of smaller government units in order to function as one administrative unit.

16. These mayors claim that this project is within the "spirit" of the Union Treaty, but in precise legal terms they claim that the Convention of European Standards [*Marco*] on Transnational [*Transfronteriza*] Cooperation between Communities and Territorial Authorities, signed by Spain in October 1986, allows the formation of transnational associations when there exists a common language and customs.(El País 2/14/93)

17. A growing trend since the late 1980's is for waves of Catalans to pour into the large department stores and supermarkets in France on the weekends, while many French vacation, dine, and ski on the Catalan side of the Pyrenees. This is one aspect of a growing transnational economy which is being fostered by such projects as the tunnel of Pimorent which will create a straight line, road link between Barcelona and Toulouse.

18. Pujol's years of activity in regional associations was one key for his 104 to 34 vote victory over Manuel Fraga, President of the Xunta of Galicia and historic figure of the Spanish right. In a statement attributing his victory to his years as a European regional activist Pujol demonstrates the importance that the idea of "Europe" has been to the self-identity of Catalans and to the articulation of "moderate" Catalan nationalism:

"Ever since I was a little boy I was already a catalanist and a regionalist, in a period when it was complicated to be these things [in reference to his opposition activities during the Franco regime]"(El País 7/4/1992. [] mine.)

19. The sections of Article 198, of the Treaty on European Union, simply say "where this treaty so provides" in reference to the subjects on which the Committee must be consulted. These subjects are: Economic and social cohesion, education, professional training and youth, public health, culture, tourism, consumer protection and transeuropean networks of telecommunications, transportation, and energy.(El País 3/2/94)

20. His quote of the AER statute which defines a region demonstrates the underlying ambition of the Catalan nationalist position. Regions are,

"political entities of a level immediately below that of the State, empowered by specific competencies exercised by a Government, which itself is responsible to a democratically elected assembly."

21. "Over the long-term there will be distinct levels of competencies, and the future of Europe will be determined on the one hand by Brussels, and on the other hand by an equilibrium between nation-States and regions."

22. On March 16, 1993, In a parallel development in Strasbourg, the Permanent Conference of Regional and Local Powers of the Council of Europe agreed to increase its role within the Council of Europe and create within it two different sections -- one for regions and one for municipalities. (El País 3/18/93)

23. In a Commission Decision of April 21, 1994 (94/209/EC), the European Commission ended the existence of the Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities which had been a limited advisory body to the Commission since 1988. This decision is a small indicator that, however limited, the Committee of the Regions does demonstrate a substantive change in EU institutions in regards to regions. (Official Journal of the European Communities. L 103/28)

24. Significantly, the meaning of Article F1 is subtly altered in the context of this report to infer a specific view that the internal conflicts between capitals and regions are beyond the scope of the EU. While this may be a valid interpretation, a straightforward review of this article indicates that it was a statement protecting cultural aspects of Member States from EU meddling, as long as the country was organized on democratic principles. However, assumptions behind terms such as "national identities of its Member States", and "principles of democracy" are deliberately called into question by regional nationalists. Furthermore, there is no specific reference to the center-periphery relations of Member States on these issues.

Article F1: "The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy."

25. Official Communications from the Commission to the Committee of the Regions during 1994 also indicate a focus on narrow, substantive issues: "Industrial and social challenges" COM (94) 528; "European Social Fund" COM (94) 510; "Structural Funds" COM (94) 421; "Industrial Competitiveness" COM(94) 319, etc..

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