

REJECTING EUROPE:

**Norwegian Social Democratic Opposition to
the European Union in the 1990s**

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On November 28, 1994, a remarkable 88.9% of the Norwegian electorate turned out on a stormy night to vote on the most important and divisive issue in their post-WWII history, membership in the European Union (EU). In 1972 Norway had become the only country to reject membership in the European Community (the name of the EU from 1968-1992) through a national referendum: the vote was 53.5% against to 46.5% in favor of membership. For a country renowned for its peaceful politics, the intensity of the debate surrounding the 1972 vote had been truly startling.¹

In 1994 the debate was equally intense and divisive. In the months preceding the referendum every aspect of the potential or imagined impact of EU membership on Norway (and Norway's impact on the EU) was scrutinized and debated. Every day the newspapers and television news programs were full of articles and presentations on the EU. Every issue that arose, from whaling, interest rates, Norwegian oil, to the rights of Norwegians to walk through the forest, was examined for its potential impact on the referendum and used accordingly by the anti- and pro-EU forces. Norway had become a dualistic society, where every event was seen and interpreted differently by anti- and pro-EU camps. Even the weather on the night of the referendum was analyzed for its impact.²

Not only did the EU debate dominate popular political debate and media coverage of politics, but every major Norwegian social, economic, and political organization was forced to take a stand on the issue.³ The general divisions in the country were very similar to those that had occurred in 1972. Political parties of the right and business interests, especially in the Southern urban areas, strongly supported membership, while parties of the far left and organizations that represented the interests of the Northern and rural parts of the country were strongly opposed.

The key for the pro-EU forces during the 1994 debate, as in 1972, was the Norwegian Labor Party (DNA, *Det Norske Arbeiderpartiet*). In 1994, the DNA was the largest and most nationally distributed party in Norway. The DNA leadership, including the Prime Minister Gro H. Brundtland and party leader Torbjorn Jagland, were strong EU supporters. If the party had moved enough of its members to support the EU this, in combination with the urban right-wing oriented voters, would have been enough to win the referendum. However, the DNA was far from united over the EU issue and the anti-EU groups knew that if they were to keep Norway out of the EU, they had to keep many of Norway's social democratic voters from following the DNA

¹As Nils P. Gleditsch and Ottar Hellevik note in their work, Kampen on EF (Oslo, NAVF, 1977, pg.7):

Before the referendum there were eleven years of political struggle. The debate was very intense in 1962 and from Fall 1971 until the referendum (in September 1972) the temperature of the conflict reached new heights... In the sober Norwegian political climate, the final stages of the EF debate appeared to be a veritable political storm. (our translation).

²Pro-EU voters were concentrated in the urban areas while anti-EU voters were found disproportionately in the rural areas. The pro-EU leaders hoped that the bad weather during the referendum would keep more of the isolated rural voters from making it to the polls. The anti-EU leaders, fearing this result, begged the rural voters not to let Mother Nature stop them from voting.

³The degree of politicization of the issue was truly remarkable. Even schoolchildren formed pro- and anti-EU organizations and held their own national vote on the issue (the No side won 60-40%). The most amusing though theoretically the most encompassing anti-EU organization pressure group to organize was "Blondes against the EU".

leadership. To do this they organized a group within the DNA called Social Democrats Against the EU (SME, *Socialdemokrater Mot EU*). The SME was a relatively small group (only 4,000 members), compared to DNA as a whole (around 100,000 members) and to the main anti-EU organization (*Nei til EU* had over 100,000 members). Nevertheless, its strategic position within the party and within a core group of undecided voters made it absolutely central to the anti-EU forces and to the eventual victory of those forces in the 1994 referendum. EU opponents eventually won by a margin of 52.8% to 47.2%, a change of only 1.3% from the 1972 result.

Central Research Questions and Paper Organization

The purpose of this paper is to examine the composition, beliefs, policy orientations, and political attachments of the strategically important SME members. We orient our inquiry around three sets of central questions. First, who were the anti-EU social democrats? We address this question below by focusing on the demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender), social class-related attributes (e.g., education, occupation, union membership), sectoral location (primary activities, traditional industries, new service enterprises), and geographic location (urban-rural, North versus Oslo area, and so forth). We are also interested in the ideological dispositions, values, and policy orientations of the anti-EU social democrats.

Following the literature on the transformation of European social democracy generally, and on Norwegian social democracy in particular, we expect to find the SME membership dominated by two groups -- the "old left" and "new left," or what some have called traditionalist left and left-libertarian voters, respectively.⁴ Specifically, we anticipate that the SME members will stand to the left of Norwegian political spectrum and lean toward one of these two groups. The traditional left will tend to be concerned with "materialist issues" such as full employment and economic growth while left libertarians will emphasize "post-materialist" values and policy goals such as democratic participation and environmental protection. Subsequently, we will distinguish between the "old" and "new" left by labeling them traditional-materialist and post-materialist left, respectively.

Currently among theorists of social democracy there is a growing debate over the nature and composition of the "new left" within social democracy. For post-materialist thinkers, the key determinants of the post-material value orientations of the new left faction should be youth and

⁴ On the challenges and divisions besetting European social democracy, see, among others, William Patterson and Alastair Thomas, eds, The Future of Social Democracy: Problems and Prospects of Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe, Oxford, Clarendon, 1986; Richard Gillespie and William Patterson, eds., Rethinking Social Democracy in Western Europe, London, Frank Cass, 1993; Karl Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein, "What's Wrong with Social Democracy," in Pranab Bardhan and John Roemer, eds, Market Socialism: The Current Debate, New York, Oxford University Press, 1993; Christiane Lemke and Gary Marks (eds.), The Crisis of Socialism in Europe, Durham, Duke University Press, 1992; and Thomas Koeble, The Left Unraveled, Durham, Duke University Press, 1991. On Norwegian social democracy specifically, see Jan Fagerberg et al, "The Decline of Social-Democratic State Capitalism in Norway," New Left Review, Volume 181, 1990; Lars Mjøset, "Norway's Full-Employment Oil Economy - Flexible Adjustment or Paralyzing Rigidities?," Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol.12, #4, 1989. On the conflict between the traditional left and left-libertarian policy and ideological orientations, see Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1994.

higher education.⁵ Meanwhile, theorists of left-libertarianism argue that the strongest correlate is occupational position. The new left should be employed in "new white collar" positions (i.e., employed in the production and management of ideas, information, and symbols) and in the new service sector of contemporary (post)industrial societies.⁶ Finally, the "new left" may also be more urban in composition. Through our survey we attempt to ascertain the relative strength of these arguments.

We also expect the SME membership itself to stand in juxtaposition to the "modernizing" wing of the party. That is, we anticipate that the anti-EU social democrats, anchoring the left-wing of the party and exhibiting a mix of traditional-materialist and post-materialist orientations, will not adopt the neo-liberal positions of concern with market efficiency and economic competitiveness associated with the modernizers.⁷ However, recent Norwegian experience suggests that we might find signs that the SME draws some members from the center and right of the party, particularly those from the North and rural areas. These members are likely to be concerned with state protection of agriculture and other primary sectors and could be seen as the remnants of the farmer-labor alliance that brought the DNA to power in the 1930s.⁸ In sum, our analyses should reflect and highlight many of the tensions within European social democracy that have developed with European integration and the structural socioeconomic changes of the last 20 years. A division between the left-wing and modernizing wing of the party should be evident as should the split within the left between traditional-materialists and post-materialist members. Remnants of the old farmer-labor alliance of left social democrats and rural state protectionists might also be found. Figure One summarizes our theoretical conception of the major wings of the DNA and their relationships to the EU.

⁵On the development of post-materialism, see among other: Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990.


⁶On the work related to the development of left-libertarian challenges to traditional social democrat see: Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1994.

⁷The "modernizing" wing of social democratic parties is a term most closely associated with the British Labour Party. Following the disastrous 1983 election, Labour abandoned its radical traditionalist platform of full employment, national economic autonomy, welfare state expansion, and statist economic policy. The modernizers, under Neil Kinnock, demanded that the party abandon its traditional policies, move to the political center (abandon full employment, accept anti-inflationary monetary policy and the constraints of the international economy) and de-link from the trade unions. The modernization drive in the British Labour Party was closely linked to a pro-EU position. See: Colin Hughes and Patrick Wintour, Labour Rebuilt: The New Model Party, London, Fourth Estate, 1990; Martin Smith and J. Spear (eds.), The Changing Labour Party, London, Routledge, 1992; and Eric Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979: Crisis and Transformation, London, Routledge, 1994.

As we shall see, the Norwegian Labor Party went through a similar modernization process. However, despite the success of the modernizers in capturing the leadership of the DNA, they were never able to fully reorient the party to a modernist direction.

⁸The role of this alliance in the development of Scandinavian social democracy is explored in Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Politics Against Markets, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1985; and Robert Erikson et.al. (eds.) The Scandinavian Model: Welfare States and Welfare Research, New York, Sharpe, 1987.

FIGURE ONE



The second set of questions that focuses our inquiry involves the specific perceived costs and threats posed by EU membership. First, why did the SME members oppose membership against the pro-EU position of the party leadership? Following the many leads provided in the debate before the national referendum, we suspect that a variety of reasons played central roles. Among them are concerns over losses of sovereignty, opportunities for democratic politics, the ability to pursue redistribution and traditional social democratic economic policies, and the capacity to pursue groups rights and environmental policies. Second, we are interested in how the different anti-EU groups, traditional-materialists and post-materialist for instance, assessed the problems of EU membership. Specifically, are the reasons for opposition different across SME component groups or do the groups cohere around a central perceived problem of the EU such as the loss of sovereignty and democracy?

The third and final set of questions in our study revolve around the core question of how SME members perceived the impacts of staying out of the EU. Does non-membership help or hurt the Norwegian economy? What policy goals and strategies are possible outside the EU? In addition, we are interested, as in the preceding section, with how these perceptions of non-membership vary across type of SME member. For instance, are left post-materialists more likely to emphasize that non-membership maximizes the pursuit of environmental protection than traditional-materialists? Does occupational position, education, ideology, or other factors correlate with the expectations of the effect of the EU on policy areas?⁹

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we begin with some historical background on the EU issue in Norwegian politics and the DNA's response to the EU question in order to provide the reader with a better understanding of its impact and importance. The second section provides some methodological detail on our sample survey and an overview of our analyses, while the third section presents our findings in light of the three main sets of questions that orient our study. In the conclusion, we try to draw out some of the implications of our study for debates over the future of social democracy and its relationship to the European Union.

⁹A fourth area which we hope to explore in later work will involve the impact of the EU debate on SME members relationships to the DNA.

A Brief History of Norway and the EU

During the first discussions over European integration in the 1950s and 1960s, the divisive national referendum in 1972, the creation of the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement in 1991, and the second national EU referendum in 1994, Norwegian society and the Norwegian Labor Party (DNA) were extremely divided over European integration.¹⁰ After five years of German occupation during WWII, the Norwegians were uninterested in strategies of European integration, skeptical of continental entanglements, and tended to mirror the policies and concerns of their traditional ally, Britain. Following the British lead, the DNA government (which lasted from 1945-65) took a critical attitude towards the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the 1957 European Economic Community (EEC). At the time, DNA elites were resistant to ceding sovereignty, concerned about the "laissez-faire" economic nature of the ECSC and EEC, afraid of European competition, and skeptical of the success of integration.

The opportunity to ignore European integration changed drastically in the 1960s. When Britain, Denmark, and Ireland applied for membership in 1961, the DNA government felt compelled to follow and submitted its first application in April 1962. However, when the British were rejected in 1963, the Norwegians immediately withdrew. Similarly, the Norwegians reapplied with the British in 1967 and were again unwilling to join when the British were rejected. Following the death of De Gaulle in 1970 the British and Norwegian applications were accepted.

As membership in the EC became increasingly likely, opposition to joining became wide-spread and highly organized. Norwegian farmers and fishermen were deeply afraid of losing their special rights and protection. Northern and rural areas of Norway were frightened of a weakening of the Norwegian "districts" (regional) policy. Meanwhile, the left within the DNA was highly suspicious of the liberal economic nature of the EC and the constraints it would put upon national economic controls. In the prelude to the 1972 EC referendum the DNA became increasingly divided over the issue. Traditional DNA voters who were opposed to the EC began to defect to the anti-EC party to the left (the Left Socialist Party). Meanwhile, anti-EC activists within the party formed the Labor Movement Information Committee (AIK, Arbeiderbevegelsens informasjonskomite mot norsk medlemskap i EF) to oppose the pro-EC position from inside the party. As mentioned earlier, the 1972 referendum was a close vote, 53.5% voted no to membership while 46.5% voted yes. Of DNA party members, 58% voted yes and 42% voted no.¹¹

In the 1973 election the DNA's share of the national vote dropped drastically from 46% to 35% as disgruntled DNA voters drifted out of the party. The DNA responded by banishing the EC issue from virtually all party debates and policies. For the DNA leadership, the referendum had "solved"

¹⁰There are a large number of works on this period in Norwegian and a few works in English. Some of the English language works include: Hilary Allen, Norway and European in the 1970s, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1979. Nils Orvik (ed.), Fears and Expectations: Norwegian Attitudes toward European Integration, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1972. Helga Pharo, "The Norwegian Labour Party", in R. Griffiths (ed.), Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950s, New York, E.J. Brill, 1993.

¹¹For more information on this earlier referendum period see: Nils Peter Gleditsch and O. Hellevik, Kampen om EF, Oslo, NAVF, 1977. Ottar Hellevik and N. P. Gleditsch, "The Common Market Decision in Norway: A Clash Between Direct and Indirect Democracy", Scandinavian Political Studies, 1973-4. Helge Hveem, "Integration by Whom, for Whom, against Whom?", Conflict and Cooperation, Vol.11, 1974. Henry Valen, "Norway: 'No' to EEC", Scandinavian Political Studies, 1973-4. Henry Valen, "National Conflict Structure and Foreign Politics: The Impact of the EEC Issue on Perceived Cleavages in Norwegian Politics", European Journal of Political Research, Vol.4, 1976.

the issue and recovering its electoral footing was top priority. The DNA could get away with this strategy since most of the other parties had been divided over the EC issue and had no wish to revive the often bitter and acrimonious debates.

This strategy of ignoring the EC continued until the mid-1980s. In 1986, the newly elected DNA government under Prime Minister Gro H. Brundtland encouraged a reevaluation of the relationship between the European Free Trade Association (EFTA, of which Norway was a member) and the EC. This led to the foundation of the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement between the two organizations in 1988-89. Through the EEA Brundtland and the other modernizing DNA leaders¹² hoped to bring Norway into the EC without directly confronting membership.¹³

Unfortunately for Brundtland, as the DNA inched closer to Europe, the anti-EC movement within the Norwegian society and the party quickly began to revive. The major anti-EC group "No to the EC" rapidly expanded at this time. This movement was quick to criticize the EEA and any moves towards eventual EC membership. From 1990-1992 Brundtland was constantly forced to backtrack and qualify her support for eventual membership in the EC/EU. However, in mid-1992, following a vote by the regional divisions of the DNA which supported applying for membership 184-94, Brundtland moved to openly support membership. Even after the submission of the Norwegian application in 1992 (along with the Austrian, Finnish, and Swedish applications), the party tried to hold down the EC/EU debate by arguing that the debate should wait until the application negotiations were completed.

It was at this time, late 1992 - early 1993, the SME was formed. The SME was inspired by the AIK, the earlier anti-EC movement within the DNA, and led by two high ranking DNA leaders, Tove Strand Gerhardsen and Halvard Bakke. Tove Gerhardsen had been the Social Affairs Minister under Brundtland from 1986-89 and Labor and Administration Minister from 1990, but was purged from the cabinet for her anti-EU views in September 1992.

¹²At about the same time as the British Labour Party, the DNA in the mid-to late 1980s, under the dual pressures of increasing global economic constraints and the electoral successes of the conservative parties, began to adopt increasingly modernized positions such as a reduced dependence on statist economic policy and an increasingly internationally oriented monetary policy (which was in direct contradiction to the earlier form of state credit control which had been a key feature of the post-WWII Norwegian social democratic state). The DNA also moved toward a general weakening of the party's links to the main trade union organization, the LO. A pro-EU policy became increasingly important in promoting party modernization.

However, unlike the British case, the DNA modernizers were only partially successful in shifting the party to the center and dumping its traditional left orientation. See: Robert Geyer, "Socialism and the EC After Maastricht: From Classic to New Model European Social Democracy", in Alan Cafruny and G. Rosenthal (eds.), The State of the European Community: Volume 2 Boulder, Lynn Reiner, 1993; Lars Mjøset, "The Nordic Model Never Existed, but Does it Have a Future", Scandinavian Studies, Vol.64, #4, 1992.

¹³One may wonder why Brundtland and the DNA modernizing leadership chose to pursue the pro-EU policy when it seemed obvious that it would be opposed by substantial segments of their party. We see three main reasons for this. First, when they first took this position in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Norwegian opinion was becoming more pro-EU, so they assumed that this trend would continue. Second, they were greatly entranced by the activity and the possibilities that were presenting themselves at the EU, not only personally in terms of job opportunities but also in terms of the development of some form of European social democracy. Third, like other European elites, the DNA leadership had a more pro-EU opinion than the majority of its members and assumed that Norway would suffer if it did not join.

She was a particularly important figure since her husband was not only a member of the DNA leadership (head of the Oslo city council) and shared her anti-EU views, but was also the son of the most famous post-WWII Norwegian Prime Minister, Einar Gerhardsen. Halvard Bakke had been a long-term party activist and leader and had served as Culture Minister in Brundtland's 1986-89 government.

SME strategy was straightforward. Whatever the DNA would argue in support of the EU, it would counter. If the DNA published a pro-EU report, SME would publish an anti-EU report. If a pro-EU article was written in the labor-oriented press, SME would counter with an anti-EU article. The main idea, as several of their publications and articles stressed, was to offer an alternative social democratic interpretation to the EU and make it as widely known as possible.¹⁴

In April 1994 the negotiations were completed and each of the four EU applicants scheduled membership referendums. In an obvious attempt to maximize support for membership, the referendums were ordered so that the most pro-European states would vote first. The strategy appeared to work. Austria voted to join in June 1994 (66% yes - 34% no), Finland in October (57%-43%), and Sweden in mid-November (52%-48%). The last of these referendums had a particularly strong impact on the Norwegian debate as the pro-EU side began speaking of a Swedish sucking sound ("Svenskesuget") attracting Norwegians to vote for the EU or become the isolated Switzerland of the North.

In Norway, the debate continued to intensify throughout the Summer and Fall of 1994 as the pro-EU forces continued to cut into the lead that the anti-EU side had maintained throughout 1993 and early 1994. Brundtland and the DNA leadership did everything they could to promote a yes vote.¹⁵ However, two major events helped to maintain the strength of the No-side. First, on September 23, the LO ("Landsorganisasjon", Norway's largest trade union federation and closely linked to the DNA) held a special congress to take a position on the EU issue. Brundtland and the pro-EU DNA leaders had always expected this vote to support the EU. The LO had supported membership in 1972, voting 230-81 in favor of joining, and the LO leadership was strongly pro-EU in 1994. However, in an extremely tense and close vote, the LO congress voted by 156-149 to oppose membership in the EU. Brundtland and the Labor Party leadership were stunned and the No-side quickly gained in the national polls.¹⁶ The second event was the holding of the largest rally of the entire debate by the No-side. On a cold and rainy November 20, 25,000 anti-EU protestors gathered in central Oslo in front of the DNA and LO headquarters. The success of this rally and the

¹⁴Key documents include: Sosialdemokratisk Alternativ, Oslo 1994 and Solidaritets for alle, Oslo, A-info #15, May 1994.

¹⁵Not only did Norwegian voters get two solid weeks of evening EU debates on the national television channel before the referendum, but the DNA government produced a twenty minute pro-EU film entitled "Your Vote Counts". It was produced by the Foreign Office and 10,000 copies were sent throughout Norway. The film brought together a number of pro-EU heavyweights to present their positions and, using a technique similar to anti-health care reform groups in the US, had an average couple debate the issue (Gunnar and Hjørdis instead of Harry and Louise). Unfortunately for EU proponents, the film was a flop. Even the pro-EU labor-oriented newspaper, Arbeiderbladet, only gave the film two stars out of six.

¹⁶"Trade Union Setback for Norwegian EU Hopes", Financial Times, September 24/25, 1994.

inability of the Yes-side to produce a similar rally¹⁷ highlighted the popularity of the No movement.¹⁸

Finally, up until the last minute the referendum was too close to call. However, in the end the No-side won, 52.3% - 47.7%. Brundtland had been successful in convincing the majority of the DNA voters to support the EU, 65%-35%, an improvement of 7% points over the 1972 result, and a drastic improvement over the 50-50 split the party was expected to experience if the vote had been taken in late 1993. Nevertheless, this was not enough to swing the national vote. The No movement, including SME, had prevailed.

The Sample Survey, Questionnaire, and Overview of Analyses

The basic data for our project was collected by a survey mail questionnaire distributed to a random sample of SME members. Specifically, the SME leadership provided us with a sample of 592 members drawn randomly from the SME membership list.¹⁹ A standard survey questionnaire was mailed to all individuals in the sample during early January, 1995. A cover letter encouraging a timely response and return envelopes were enclosed with the survey.

The survey instrument, reproduced in its entirety in Appendix A, consisted of 32 fixed-response multiple choice questions and four open-ended questions. These questions produced a total of 81 variable response items. The questionnaire was designed to elicit information on the three sets of central questions that motivated this study as well as a fourth set of questions about future party attachments and political behavior of SME members. First, we asked a series of questions to obtain basic demographic and socioeconomic data as well as information about ideological position within the DNA and the Norwegian political spectrum. We also asked a series of questions derived from Eurobarometer items that attempt to gauge basic policy preferences and values along the post-materialist/materialist dimension. Second, the survey instrument included a set of questions that attempted to ascertain why SME members opposed Norwegian membership in the EU. Third, we included several additional items designed to elicit information about SME members' expectations of the impact of EU non-membership on Norway. Here, we were concerned with their expectations of effects on specific policies as well as on broad social democratic policy commitments and goals. Finally, we inquired about the future of their attachments to and participation in the Norwegian Labor Party. The issue of future party attachments and participation will be the subject of a separate paper.

The response rate to the mail questionnaire was not particularly good. Approximately 209 completed questionnaires were returned for a response rate of slightly more than 35%. Generally, this low rate does not bode well for our ability to generalize precisely to the population of all

¹⁷Two weeks earlier on the anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Yes-side had only been able to get 7,000 supporters to a rally in Oslo. The amazing point about the anti-EU rally was that it was able to get so many of its supporters to travel from the rural and Northern areas to protest in Oslo. For many EU opponents this was the highlight of the campaign.

¹⁸"Oslo Rally Shows No Camp's Strength", Financial Times, November 21, 1994.

¹⁹Our thanks go out to Alf Skogly, Kari Skogly, and Trond Jensrud for helping us to obtain the membership list.

SME members.²⁰ We suspect that the typical factors of interest, time, and an exhaustion with the issue account for most of this low rate. On the other hand, we believe that the relatively large population fraction that flows from our sample (5%) and the absence of other clear sources of bias allow us to use the sample data for suggestive indicators of overall SME member characteristics.²¹

In the pages that follow, we present the preliminary results of our analysis. Much of the work rests on standard categorical and ordinal level data from the sample survey, operationalized as conventional demographic and socioeconomic variables that measure the focal characteristics of SME members highlighted above. In the subsequent statistical analyses, categorical variables were transformed into binomial or "dummy" variables such as "1/0" codings for union/non-union, agricultural sector versus non-agriculture, and so on. These core demographic and socioeconomic variables are displayed for descriptive purposes in Table 1, below. Beyond this, measurement of demographic, social class, economic sector, and location factors deserves little comment. We do need to provide a bit more detail on the measurement of ideological and policy orientations and on measurement of reasons for EU opposition and expectations about impacts of non-membership in the EU.

As to ideology and general policy orientations, we asked respondents to place themselves on a standard, five-point left-right continuum, with "1" being far left and "5" being far right. We asked them to do this from the perspective of the Norwegian political spectrum and of the DNA itself. Thus, we have a general ideology variable (IDEOLOGY) and a party ideology variable (PIDEOLOGY). We also asked respondents to rank the three most important policy goals or values from a six-item battery adapted from Eurobarometer surveys on materialist/post-materialist orientations. These items consist of the priority of economic growth, law and order, and fighting unemployment (materialist) as well as items highlighting more say in government, protecting freedom of speech, and promoting environmental awareness (post-material). If a respondent designated all three materialist items, they were classified "materialist" with a value of "1." If they selected two materialist items and one post-materialist, they were classified as "mixed-materialist" with a value of "2." Ultimately, a four-value ordinal variable measuring materialist/post-materialist orientations was produced (POST-MATERIAL).

We used the same procedure for measuring conventional "left-wing" versus "modernizer" positions within the party. We utilized a six-item battery where the importance of LO-DNA linkages, of full employment, and of independent credit and monetary policies were deemed conventional left-wing orientations and the importance of international competitiveness, (re)privatization of banks, and non-statist solutions to social problems were designated modernizing orientations. Following the operationalization scheme for materialist/post-materialist orientations, we produced a four-value ordinal variable, ranging from "1" for pure left-wing and "4" for pure modernizer (LEFT-MODERN).

With respect to reasons for opposing membership in the European Union, we asked members of the SME sample to list their five principal reasons for opposing Norwegian membership in the EU. From these lists, we condensed the varied responses into central categories such as threats to

²⁰The limited resources available to us and the short time frame within which we worked did not allow us to mail pre- and post-questionnaire letters encouraging participation in the survey. These factors certainly exacerbated the low response rate.

²¹For a clear overview of these and related issues of non-response see, among others, : Floyd J. Fowler, J., Survey Research Methods, Applied Social Research Methods Volume 1, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1984.

democracy, sovereignty, redistribution and so on (see Appendix B). For purposes of the analyses below, we computed a series of binomial variables where a respondent that mentions a specific reason involving, let's say, a threat to some facet of democracy, would score "1;" if a respondent did not mention an aspect of democracy in their five principal reasons for opposition, that person would score "0." All told, we computed 10 aggregate categories of reasons (and associated binomial variables) for opposing Norwegian membership in the European Union.

We measured expectations of the impact of Norwegian non-membership by asking respondents to assess whether staying out strengthened, weakened, or had no effect on five policy areas: social democratic economic policy, environmental policy, women's rights policies, income redistribution, and full employment policy. In addition, we inquired about respondents' thoughts on the impact of non-membership on the Norwegian economy. Would staying out improve, harm, or have no effect on overall economic performance? Thus, we have for the present analysis six ordinal variables that tap different expectations about how staying out of the European Union affects the pursuit of various policy goals and overall economic conditions. We now turn to a presentation of findings about the SME and the European Union.

The SME and Norwegian Membership in the European Union

Who Were the Anti-EU Social Democrats?

Table 1 presents basic descriptive information along demographic and socioeconomic dimensions for our sample of anti-EU social democrats. As to demographics, SME members are distinctly older and more likely to be male than the Norwegian population. Over 55 percent of SME members are 46 or more years of age and a full 70 percent are male. The importance of age as a factor in opposing the EU was confirmed in a national poll that was taken during the referendum.²² In that poll, voters between the ages of 18-39 supported the EU by 52 to 48 percent while voters 40 and above opposed it by 53 to 47 percent. Of DNA voters, 18-39 year olds supported membership 69 to 31 percent while the 40 and overs supported it by only 62 to 38 percent. However, the high percentage of male members is somewhat puzzling since the national poll showed that women opposed the EU by 57 to 43 percent while men supported it by 52 to 48 percent. Furthermore, of DNA voters women supported the EU by only 59 to 41 percent while men supported it 69 to 31 percent. Therefore, one would have expected to see a larger number of female members in the SME. Since the male-female ratio in the membership list which the SME provided us was also 70-30, we assume that female participation rates in party activity must be significantly lower than male levels.²³ This is true despite the fact that within the DNA's parliamentary group, the male-female ratio is close to 50-50 and the DNA leader, Gro H. Brundtland, was also female.

Social class-related characteristics of the anti-EU social democrats are also notable. Roughly 45 percent of respondents have earned advanced technical, undergraduate, or graduate degrees. This is significantly higher than the national average of between 25-30 percent in 1990.²⁴ Moreover,

²²The poll was performed by the private polling company MMI for the Norwegian newspaper, Dagbladet. The poll consisted of 4,282 telephone interviews with a nationally representative sample of the Norwegian voting public. The results were published in the November 29, 1994 issue of Dagbladet.

²³Checking relationship between # of male and female party members...

²⁴Various OECD studies on education report for the early 1990s figures of 25 to 30 percent for the share of Norwegian college-age cohorts enrolling in higher education.

this highly educated opposition to the EU contrasts with the national results in which the less educated tended to oppose the EU while the more educated tended to support it.²⁵ In relation to occupation status, we found that SME members followed the general outlines of the national occupation structure. Nationally, there are 19% blue collar workers, 44% white collar, and 35% student/retired/other.²⁶ As Table 1 shows, the SME membership was composed of 25% blue collar (unskilled and skilled workers), 46% white collar (professionals, managers, and self-employed), and 28% other. SME respondents also report a high unionization rate of 79.5 percent.²⁷

Table 1 about here

With regard to geography, our sample is split equally between those living in urban (cities of 10,000 plus) and rural areas (48.3% - 48.3%). This is very similar to the national statistics, with 47% living in urban areas and 53% living in rural areas.²⁸ The anti-EU social democrats come from all regions of Norway with a full 41 percent coming from the North. Relative to the regional distribution of the party, the North is strongly over represented in the SME. Of DNA party members in 1993 only 22% lived in the northern fylke. 36% lived in the Oslo region, 19% in the West, 16% in the Interior, and 8% in the South.²⁹ The most under-represented area was the Interior.³⁰ The over-representation of the North confirms the historic strength of the Northern opposition to the EU. In that region, voters opposed the EU by 63-37%.

In terms of economic sector, all industry types are well represented with 12.3 percent of respondents working in farming, fisheries, and forestry; 25 percent in traditional sectors of manufacturing, mining, construction, transportation, trade, and utilities; and 52 percent in the "new service" sectors of business and financial services, insurance, personal services, and community and social services. The most notable aspect here is the large number of respondents from the farm/fish/forest sector. In national terms this sector employs only 6% of the workforce.³¹ Its preponderance in the SME once again confirms the strength of anti-EU opinion in the rural and Northern regions where the majority of this sector's activities are located.

Table 2 reports results of our inquiry into the distribution of

²⁵Voters who did not receive an advanced technical or university education opposed the EU 59-41 percent while those with a university education supported it 58-42 percent.

²⁶See: Statistisk Årbok 1992, pg.131.

²⁷ Jelle Viser's studies of unionization rates across time and nations within the OECD report unionization rates of about 68 percent in the Norwegian labor force in 1989. These figures include retired and self-employed members. (See Jelle Visser, "Trends in Trade Union Membership," in OECD, The OECD Employment Outlook, July, 1991, pp. 97-143.)

²⁸See: Statistisk Årbok 1992, pg.39.

²⁹List of fylke and relation to regional generalizations.

³⁰The Interior region opposed the EU 56-44%, hence one would have expected to see a larger SME membership in this region. At present we have no explanation for this discrepancy.

³¹See: Statistik Årbok 1992, pg.133.

general ideological and policy orientations of the anti-EU social democrats. As expected, the table reveals that SME members are concentrated on the left of the Norwegian political spectrum and on the left within the party. A full 86 percent place themselves on the (moderate or far) left within Norwegian politics; 83 percent place themselves on the left within the party. This strongly confirms the left-right division within the party over the EU issue.

Table 2 about here

As to the division in the left between traditional-materialist and post-materialist components, the data again support our expectations. Moving to the bottom left of Table 2, one can see that SME members are indeed divided between those with traditional-material and post-material orientations. Roughly 43 percent are materialist or mix-materialist in orientation while about 57 percent lean clearly to post-materialist value and policy commitments. As the table reveals, the largest category of respondents on this dimension is the mixed-post-materialist. This relatively equal division demonstrates that the anti-EU social democrats tend to consist of two groups, a more materialist "old left," and a more post-materialist "new left".

Table 2 also reports the results of our exploration into the division between left-wing and modernizing factions of the DNA. Here, we expect most SME members to display more conventional left-wing attachments as opposed to neo-liberal orientations. The data largely confirm this expectations. As the bottom right of Table 2 suggests, some 88 percent of SME members are mixed or pure "left-wing." Only 11.8 percent of respondents are mixed-modern while none fall into the pure modern category. Given that the weight of our sample falls toward the left-wing within the party (and there are no pure modernizers at all in the sample), analyses below will focus on the impact of divisions within the left (i.e., between traditional-materialist and left-libertarian individuals) and not the impact of left versus modernizing wings of the party.

Before moving to a discussion and analysis why SME members opposed entering the European Union (and the perceived impact of staying out), we return to the question of what demographic and socio-economic factors are associated with the basic split within anti-EU social democrats, the division between old and new left value orientations. Table 3 displays the results of an analysis of this question. Here we provide the results of an analysis that models traditional-material and post-material orientations (the variable POST-MATERIAL above) as a function of demographics, social class, economic sector, and locational factors.³²

Table 3 about here

Table 3 reveals that two -- and only two -- factors stand out as significantly differentiating between material and post-material orientations. The first is age. As the table suggests ($b = -.078$), younger respondents are more likely to be post-materialist in orientation (recall "1" is the value for pure materialist while "4" is the score for pure post-materialist). The second (highly) significant factor is education ($b = .217$; $t = 3.446$). As education increases so to does the likelihood of post-material orientations. The impact of other factors such as sex and specific occupational position were explored, but were not included in the table because they were not significant. As shall be discussed more thoroughly in the conclusion, these findings are consistent with Inglehart's generational

³² We choose to estimate this model with ordinary least squares as opposed to ordered probit estimation, a frequently used technique when the dependent variable is an ordinal-level variable. Generally, OLS will perform as well as order probit.

replacement and socialization hypotheses, linking youth and higher education with increased post-material values. However, the absence of any clear relationship between independent occupation and sectoral effects on the one hand, and material\post-material values on the other is not consistent with arguments such as Kitschelt's that have emphasized the roll of the changing character of work, economic structure, and occupation position as a source of development of "left-libertarian" orientations.³³

Reasons for Opposing Norwegian Membership in the EU

Table 4 presents the results of our survey of SME member reasons for opposing Norwegian entry into the EU.³⁴ As the table reveals, virtually 60 percent of respondents list concerns over the EU's impact on democracy as a principal reason for opposition. Concerns over threats to Norwegian sovereignty (52.2 percent mention this item) and the perceived neo-liberal orientation of the EU (45.5 percent mention) follow the democracy category as top sources of opposition. Between roughly one-quarter and one-third of respondents mention threats to economic management, the environment, independent foreign policy, control over oil and other natural resources, and agri-fishery sectors as principal reasons for opposition.³⁵

Table 4 about here

Only 12.4 percent of anti-EU social democrats mention problems connected to the potential impact of the European Union on income redistribution. This category includes the item of threats to the Norwegian welfare state. Somewhat surprisingly, SME members do not appear to be motivated, at least as far as their principal objections to the EU, by specific concerns over threats to income maintenance programs and social benefits. Typically, these fears are often associated with Scandinavian opponents to European economic integration. While some of these fears might be captured by the high percentage mentioning the neo-liberal (anti-statist, market-oriented) character of EU and the threat to sovereignty (pressuring states to cut back on their national welfare states), we find the figure of 10 percent to be low for what appears to be a highly debated aspect of European integration, social democracy, and the process of globalization generally.³⁶

³³ Again, see Inglehart, Culture Shift (op. cit.) and Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy (op. cit.), on these two arguments, respectively.

³⁴ For a list of specific reasons for opposition that are now grouped within a category such as democracy or sovereignty, see Appendix B.

³⁵ All of these areas were reflected in SME literature and positions. For example, in SME's major pre-referendum publication Sosialdemokratisk Alternativ, they emphasized the threat to EU membership to democracy and sovereignty, full employment, trade union rights, the welfare state, women's rights, the environment, agriculture, fish, international solidarity with the Third World, and security policy. Finally, despite its potential to play a deeply embedded underlying role in the EU results, only 10 respondents mentioned a fear of the Germans as one of their five reasons for opposing the EU. This fear was never openly mentioned by the SME leadership.

³⁶ On this topic, see Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, "What's Left for the Left," International Organization, xxxxx; Duane Swank, "Social Democracy, Equity, and Efficiency in an Interdependent World, paper presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC; and Robert Geyer, "Globalization and Social Democracy", forthcoming in New Political Science.

We also find somewhat surprising the very low percentage of SME members that lists concern over group rights as a principal source of opposition. Here, only 10 percent of all respondents mention women's rights, union rights, or related reasons as a principal cause of opposition to the EU. Generally, concern with broad political institutions as well as general economic control seem to be the central driving factors behind opposition to the Norwegian membership in the European Union.

Finally, we conducted an analysis of whether mentioning a particular type of reason was associated with demographic, social class, sectoral, geographic, and ideological characteristics. The results of this inquiry are reported in the right-hand columns of Table 4.³⁷ While no clearly dominant determinant or set of determinants emerged, several subtle patterns exist in the data. First, as one would expect, post-materialists are more likely than materialists to cite threats to democracy and environment as reasons for opposition to the EU. Second, some evidence of a "red-green" division exists in the data. With regard to those factors associated with concern over threats to natural resources and to the agricultural sector, SME members outside of the Oslo region, living in rural areas, and to the right of the ideological spectrum tend to be more likely to cite these potential threats as reasons for opposition than those to the left, living in urban settings, and within the Oslo area. (The "urban" variable is only significant in the agricultural relationship.) Moreover, rural voters were less concerned with traditional left positions such as threats to economic management and redistribution, yet strongly concerned with the neo-liberal implications of EU membership on rural economic activities.³⁸ We believe that this subtle pattern suggests the continued presence of a traditional, more centrist, rural wing of the DNA (the Rural/State Dependent group in Figure One), the remnant of the old farmer-labor alliance of the 1930s. This rural wing is strongly opposed to free market strategies and highly dependent on state support of the rural economy. Generally, controlling the national economy and redistribution are much less important to them than protecting agriculture and natural resources.

In addition, one can see that older and younger anti-EU social democrats differ to an extent on reasons for opposition. For instance, younger voters are less concerned with threats to sovereignty and natural resources³⁹ and more concerned with threats to foreign policy, the environment, and economic management when compared to older voters. Beyond these patterns, a variety of readily expected effects emerge. For instance, women tend to list group rights more often than men while those with greater education are more concerned with threats to democracy than those with less education.

Perceived Impacts of Staying Out of the EU

We now turn to an analysis of what the anti-EU social democrats in the SME said about the impacts of staying out of the EU. The results of

³⁷The symbols "-" and "+" indicate direction of relationship between mentioning a type of reason and demographic, socio-economic, or political factor. Thus, for example, the plus sign following education in the democracy row indicates that as education increases respondents are more likely to mention democracy.

³⁸As one British political scientist was heard to comment at a recent conference, "Scandinavian agriculture is the only agricultural system that makes the EU's CAP look neo-liberal."

³⁹This may reflect the historical legacy of WWII and the attempts by Norwegians to control their national resources and limit foreign ownership of them throughout the first half of the 20th century.

this inquiry are presented in Table 5. (The reader should recall that we are interested in perceptions of the impact of non-membership on the ability to pursue policy goals in five areas and on general economic performance.) As the top portion of Table 5 reveals, more than 80 percent of respondents believe that staying out of the EU will improve the ability of Norwegian governments to conduct (social democratic) economic policy, environmental policy, women's rights policy, redistribution, and full employment policy. Fewer than six percent believe that non-membership will weaken such abilities.

Table 5 about here

The picture for the impact of staying out on general economic performance is different. While only 1.5 percent of SME members believe that non-membership will weaken overall economic conditions, only 45.1 percent believe that the Norwegian economy will be stronger. The majority, 52.9 percent, believe that staying out will have no effect. Our interpretation of these findings is that, while anti-EU social democrats believe policy autonomy will be enhanced as a result of the no vote, general economic conditions may not necessarily improve. Although we have no direct evidence, we surmise that SME members probably believe that many uncontrollable factors, particularly those emanating from the international economy, have substantial impacts on Norway regardless of the policy autonomy that derives from staying out of the European Union. Furthermore, saying no to EU membership did not mean saying no to existing levels of European trade and economic integration.⁴⁰

The bottom portion of Table 5 reports the principal findings from our analysis of the correlates of perceptions of the impact of non-membership. In this analysis, we find little, if any, effect of demographic, social class, sectoral, and geographic factors on beliefs about weakening or strengthening policy capacity in the focal areas. However, we do see one particularly strong, consistent pattern concerning political effects on perceptions of impact. For the five policy areas, we found that general ideological orientation is a strong predictor of the degree to which respondents believed staying out would strengthen policy capabilities. For each area, the more left an SME member was, the greater the likelihood that he/she will say that staying out strengthens the ability to pursue policy goals in each of the areas. This relationship is statistically significant in all cases. Interestingly, this relationship does not hold true for expectations of overall performance. Apparently, leftists within the SME are just as skeptical of the effect of staying out of the EU on economic performance as rightists. This represents an interesting and perhaps realistic outlook by the left within the SME and perhaps a growing acceptance that national control may not automatically lead to economic success. Nevertheless, for the left, similar to sovereignty and democracy, national economic control may be a desired good in its own right.

In addition, one final political effect on perceptions is reported in the table. This involves the finding that a person's position on the post-materialist variable is significantly related to perceptions of the effect of staying out on the ability to pursue environmental policy. However, post-materialism is not related to perceptions about impacts in any other policy area. Overall respondents in all groups and across all dimensions seem to be roughly equally divided between pessimism and optimism regarding how staying out of the EU will effect the Norwegian economy.

Discussion and Conclusions

This article and survey is not an attempt to explain the result of the 1994 Norwegian rejection of membership in the EU. It is an attempt to

⁴⁰When asked what form of economic cooperation should take the place of the EU for Norway, 54% said that Norway should continue with the EEA, 28% with free trade with Europe, and 11% with EFTA.

understand one of the key anti-EU groups, the SME, within the Norwegian Labor Party (DNA). Through our survey research we endeavored to discover who the SME supporters were, how did they perceive the costs and threats of EU membership, and what did they expect the impacts of staying out of the EU would be.

The proto-typical SME member is older, male, educated, unionized, from the North (or Oslo region), and a leftist both within national politics and the DNA. As presented in Figure One, we argue that this left-wing group was divided into two main factions: a traditional-materialist left and a post-materialist left. The traditional-materialist faction represents the traditional core working class constituency of the DNA. This group is older, more materialist, and less educated. Meanwhile, the post-materialist faction, representing new and more diverse wage-earning positions, is younger, less materialist, and more educated. A third group, which is conspicuous by its absence, is the social democratic "modernizers". Since we did not find a single pure modernizer in our entire sample, we speculate that modernizers predominate on the right wing of the party are younger, more educated, upper-level professional, with a more market-oriented outlook. They are also strongly in favor of Norway's ascension to the EU.

Theoretically, in recent works on social democracy and its current crisis, there has been a growing debate over the composition of the social democratic polity. Following the lines sketched out by Ronald Inglehart, some argue that advanced industrial societies are divided along two main axis, left - right and materialist - post-materialist. The central factor determining position on the left - right axis is class, while on the materialist - post-materialist axis it is the combined effect of age and education. For others, advanced societies are divided along two main axis, left - right and authoritarian - libertarian (roughly similar to materialist - post-materialist). Again, class is the main determinant of left - right position. However, occupational position (the degree to which individuals manipulate goods or symbols) is supposed to be the primary source of position on the libertarian - authoritarian axis.

As Table Three shows, the only correlates which are significant in distinguishing the group of traditionalists-materialists from the post-materialists were those of age and education. Factors of occupation and economic sector were not. Consequently, subject to the obvious limitations of the scope of our study, our findings seem to confirm the strength of Inglehart's interpretation of the origins and dynamics of change in the conflict structures of advanced industrial societies, while they question Kitschelt's view of these developments.

Regarding the perceived costs and threats of the EU, SME members were most concerned with matters of democracy and sovereignty, the neo-liberal economic threat of the EU, and threats to economic management. Surprisingly, elements such as specific concerns over the welfare state and groups rights were less important. Important correlates of the various reasons for opposition included factors such as age, education, and ideology among others. Most interestingly, we found a pattern of relationships in this part of the analysis that suggests the existence of a fourth faction of the social democratic polity, the rural/state dependent faction. This faction is predominately rural, living in the North, linked to the agriculture and fishing sectors, and strongly protectionist and statist.

In regards to the perceived impact of staying out of the EU, it is not surprising we found that over 80% of SME members thought that it would enhance the five listed policy capacities of the Norwegian state and society. However, only 45% thought that staying out would strengthen overall economic performance. We attribute this to the SME members' recognition that other international and national forces may override the enhanced policy making autonomy that comes from staying out of the EU. Further, the primary correlate of the expected impacts of non-membership was ideology. The more to the left one was, the more one expected that

staying out would enhance policy performance. No factor correlated with the expectation of overall performance. Apparently, even leftists are as unsure of Norway's economic future as others.

In conclusion, we feel that our work has two major implications for the study of social democracy and its relationship to the EU and globalization. First, evidence from the survey seems to point to a four-way division of the Norwegian social democratic polity based along two main cleavage lines (see Figure One). A left - right and materialist - post-materialist cleavage breaks the social democratic polity into traditionalist-materialists, post-materialists, modernizers, and rural/state dependents. Following similar thinking, G. Esping-Andersen⁴¹ argued in the early 1980s that if Scandinavian social democracy was going to maintain its traditional political dominance into the 21st century, it had to recast its electoral alliance, moving away from the traditional alliance between the farmers and working class and towards a new "wage-earner" class alliance (between the traditional working class and new post-material wage-earning classes). Our research seems to indicate that this has occurred in the sense that the SME involves an alliance between these factions. However, there is a built-in division within this new "wage-earner" class between those on the left (materialists and post-materialists) and modernizers and potentially between the "old" and "new" faction of the left wing. This makes it particularly difficult in the current context to create a unified social democratic polity and party. Not only are the interests of the sub-groups distinct, but with the large number of significant parties within the Norwegian political system,⁴² each of the various factions could be pulled out of the DNA's orbit.⁴³ Maintaining this alliance may be much more difficult than earlier theorists had hoped and expected.

Second, since its founding in the latter half of the 19th century, social democracy has been based on a implicit bargain between socialism and nationalism.⁴⁴ For social democrats, the nation-state became the boundary of the socialist community. Economic controls, democratic representation, civil, political, and social rights would all be confined within and linked to the national community. The strength of the social democratic movement was linked to its ability to combine the ideals of social democracy with

⁴¹Gosta Esping-Andersen, Politics Against Markets, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1985.

⁴²Currently, there are seven major parties in the Norwegian political system. From Left to Right they are: the Left Socialist Party, Labor Party, Center Party, Liberals, Christian People's Party, and Progress Party.

⁴³The left - post-materialists could be pulled into the Left Socialist Party. The rural/state dependents into the agriculturally oriented Center Party. The modernizers into the Liberal Party and Conservative Party. The only group that does not have a clear party to drift into are the traditionalists.

⁴⁴As John Schwartzmantel argues in his interesting book, Socialism and the Idea of the Nation (London, Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1991):

social democracy involves a perspective of integration into the nation, of making the nation a socialist nation. This is to be done through a series of reforms benefiting not just the working class but the many and varied groups all of which contributed to the productive work of society (p.81).

the ideals of the nation.⁴⁵ The EU issue (and larger issues of economic globalization) seems to split the party along its major cleavage lines. It splits the left from the right and the materialists from the post-materialists. It revives the old farmer-labor alliance (between traditionalists and rural/state dependents) linked to the post-materialists and sets them up against the right-wing modernizers. The problem for social democrats is that, if the party is to maintain its political position, these factions must be reconciled. Unfortunately, the question of state sovereignty and democratic control (which the EU threatens) reverberate to the core of the traditionalist social democratic being (see Table Four). Modernists are much less concerned with these threats. The rejection of EU membership in November 1994 demonstrated the continued appeal of the traditional nationalist vision. However, other issues related to globalization and Europeanization will continue to confront the Norwegian society. As such, one would expect to see continued divisions within the Norwegian social democrats over these issues and a continued inability of DNA to unite, coordinate, and sustain a hegemonic social democratic polity.

⁴⁵As Hugh Heclo and Henrik Madsen conclude in their work on Swedish social democracy, Politics and Policy in Sweden: Principled Pragmatism (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1987):

(Swedish) Social Democrats have captured the idea of the nation -- they have successfully interpreted the national identity as one of an ever-reforming welfare state, a national social community always striving to make itself more of a community (p.27).

TABLE 1
Composition of the SME
The Anti-EU Social Democrats

Demographics					
Age	#	%	Gender	#	%
25 and below	27	12.9	Female	62	29.7
26-35	25	12.0	Male	147	70.3
36-45	41	19.6			
46-55	62	29.7			
55 and above	54	25.8			
 Social Class Related					
Education	#	%	Occupation	#	%
below high school	34	17.0	student/retired/other	59	28.1
high school	77	28.5	blue collar	50	24.6
undergraduate	60	30.0	white collar	94	46.3
graduate	29	14.5			
 Union					
			union	163	79.5
			non-union	42	20.5
 Location and Economic Sector					
Urban	#	%	Region	#	%
urban	101	48.3	north	86	41.5
non-urban	101	48.3	west	38	18.4
			south	11	5.3
			interior	10	4.8
			Oslo	62	30.0
Economic Sector	#	%			
Agriculture	25	12.3			
Traditional	51	25.0			
New Service	106	52.0			
other	22	10.8			

Table 2
Ideology and General Policy
Orientations of SME Members

Ideology	#	%	Party Ideology	#	%
far left	30	14.6	far left	77	43.8
moderate left	147	71.4	moderate left	69	39.2
center	25	12.1	center	30	17.0
moderate right	2	1.0	moderate right	0	0.0
far right	2	1.0	far right	0	0.0

Post-Material	#	%	Left-Modern	#	%
material	10	5.2	left-wing	31	21.5
mixed-material	72	37.5	mixed-left-wing	96	66.7
mixed-post-material	102	53.1	mixed-modern	17	11.8
post-material	8	4.2	modern	0	0.0

Table 3
Correlates of Left-Libertarian and
Left-Traditional Orientations

Variable Type and Factor	b	se	t
Demographics			
Age	-.078*	.042	-1.856
Social Class Related			
Education	.217*	.063	3.446
Occupation	.025	.114	.221
Union	.076	.124	.613
Economic Sector			
Traditional Industry	.051	.151	.340
New Service Industry	-.167	.145	-1.144
Location			
Urban	-.044	.122	-.359
North	-.062	.135	-.459
West	.030	.144	.205
South	-.120	.278	-.431
Interior	.091	.244	.370

Equation estimates are generated through least squares estimation. Unstandardized slopes, standard errors, and t-tests are reported. * = significance at the .05 level or below.

Table 4
Principal Reasons for Opposing
Norwegian Membership in the European Union

Reason for Opposition:	% of Total Mentioning	Principal Correlates* of Reason (effect direction)
Threats to Democracy	59.3 %	Education(+), Post-Material(+)
Threats to Sovereignty	52.2	Age(+)
Neoliberal Economics	45.5	Education(+), Agriculture(-)
Threats to Economic Management	35.9	Age(-), Union(+), Urban(+) Occupation-Upper(-)
Threats to Environment	35.9	Age(-), Post-Material(+)
Threats to Foreign Policy	29.7	Age(-)
Threats to Natural Resources	27.8	Age(+), Gender(+), Ideology(+) Occupation-Upper(+), Oslo (-)
Threats to Agriculture	24.4	Urban(-), Ideology(+), Oslo(-)
Threats to Redistribution	12.4	Urban(+)
Threats to Group Rights	10.0	Gender(-), Education (+)

* Analysis of correlates of reasons for opposition is based on Pearson correlational analysis. Subsequent analysis will employ simple logit models of the likelihood of listing a reason.

Table 5
Perceived Impacts of Staying Out
of the European Union

Policy/Performance Area	Weaken	Staying Out Will have no effect	strengthen
Social Democratic Economic Policy	2.2 %	10.5 %	87.5 %
Environmental Policy	5.5	13.0	81.5
Women's Rights	2.5	17.0	80.3
Redistribution	3.6	12.2	84.3
Full Employment Policy	.5	13.6	85.9
Overall Economic Performance	1.5	52.9	45.1

	Correlates of Perceived Impacts	
	Ideology	Post-Material
Social Democratic Economic Policy	-.27*	-.04
Environmental Policy	-.21*	.28*
Women's Rights	-.21*	.08
Redistribution	-.24*	.07
Full Employment Policy	-.20*	.07
Overall Economic Performance	-.04	-.07

Relationships are Pearson correlation coefficients. * = significance at the .05 level or below.

APPENDIX A

Questionnaire for members of Social Democrats Against the EU (SME)

Personal Information

1. Age: -25___, 26-35___, 36-45___, 46-55___, 56-___.
2. Sex: Male___, Female___.
3. Profession: Are you employed___, unemployed___, student___, retired___, other___.
4. Which economic sector do you work in (for example, agriculture, education, metal working, etc.) _____.
5. Is the economic sector in which you work:
 - private___ or public___.
 - export market oriented___, or domestic market oriented___
6. Are you a: unskilled worker___, Skilled worker___, Professional (white collar)___, Management___, other___.
7. Are you a trade union member: Yes___, No___.
8. Are you a member of a political party? Yes___, No___.
If yes, which party_____.
9. Location: Which fylke do you come from? _____.
Do you live in an urban area (over 10,000 pop.) Yes___, No_
10. Education: What level of education have you completed:
 - below high school___;
 - high school___;
 - undergraduate university degree___;
 - graduate university degree___.
11. Where would you position yourself in the political spectrum of the Norwegian political system?
Left 1-----2-----3-----4-----5 Right (Circle one number)
12. Of the following major societal goals, which do you think are the **THREE** most important for Norway to pursue in the next 10-15 years? (Please order your choices, first, second, and third)
 - Stable economic growth_____.
 - Giving people more say in government decisions_____.
 - Maintaining order in the nation_____.
 - Protecting freedom and speech_____.
 - Control unemployment_____.
 - Environmental awareness_____.

General Questions

13. What were your five main reasons for opposing membership in the EU?
 - A.
 - , B.
 - C.
 - D.
 - E.

14. What were your five main criticisms of the EU itself?

- A.
- B.
- C.
- D.
- E.

15. How has staying out of the EU affected Norwegian social democracy? Has it strengthened or weakened its ability to pursue:

-a social democratic national economic policy?

Strengthened___, Weakened___, No effect___.

-environmental policies?

Strengthened___, Weakened___, No effect___.

-women's rights?

Strengthened___, Weakened___, No effect___.

-economic redistribution between the upper and lower classes?

Strengthened___, Weakened___, No effect___.

-full employment?

Strengthened___, Weakened___, No effect___.

-a more open and democratic government policy?

Strengthened___, Weakened___, No effect___.

16. Now that Norway has rejected membership, what should Norway's relationship to the EU be? Continue with the EEA___, continue in EFTA___, free trade agreement___, other___?

17. Do you think this referendum has ended the EU debate in Norway for all time___, for the next 10-20 years___, for the next 5-10 years___, for a few years___, not at all___.

18. How do you think Norway's economy will be affected by staying out of the EU? Improve___, Decline___, No change___?

19. After the result of the referendum, do you think Norway will have more___, less___, or the same___ cooperation with its Scandinavian neighbors?

20. Who do you think benefits from Norway staying out of the EU?

-upper class___, middle class___, lower class___, all___, none___.

-men___, women___, both___, neither___.

-urban areas___, rural areas___, both___, neither___.

-Northern Norway___, Western Norway___, Southern Norway___ Eastern Norway___, All___, None___.

-agriculture and fishing___, industry___, the service sector___, all___, none___.

-the private sector___, public sector___, both___, neither___.

-the educated___, less educated___, both___, neither___.

-the skilled___, the less skilled___, both___, neither___.

-the unionized___, non-unionized___, both___, neither___.

21. How has the EU debate in Norway affected your general feelings towards Norwegian politics?

The EU debate has:

-reaffirmed my positive feelings towards Norwegian politics___.

-reaffirmed my negative feelings towards Norwegian politics___.

-had no effect___.

22. Has the EU debate encouraged you to be more active___, less active___, no change___, in Norwegian politics?

23. What do you think is the future of the DNA?

-will it continue as the dominate party? Yes___, No___.

-will it be able to integrate EU opponents into its leadership

structure? Yes___, No___.

-will it be able to cooperate with anti-EU parties in a government? Yes___
No___.

-following the result of the EU referendum, do you think the DNA needs
new leadership? Yes___, No___.

-if yes, who?

A.

B.

24. Were you active in SME?

___Very active (attended meetings, other activities)

___less active (some meetings and activities)

___not active

25. What do you think about a possible role for SME in the future?

-Should it continue as a faction in the DNA___, Create a new party___, .

Join another party___.

26. Has the EU issue encouraged you to be more likely to vote for___ the DNA
in future elections, for other parties___, or has had no effect___.

27. Are you a DNA supporter or party member? Yes___, No___.

If you answer No, Thank you for your participation.

Questions for DNA supporters and party members

28. How long have you been a supporter/party member of the DNA?

less than 1 year___, 1-5___, 6-10___, 11-15___, 15+___.

29. Have you been an active participant in the party?

___ Very active (attended meetings, performed party work)

___ Less active (some meetings, some work)

___ not active

30. Where would you position yourself in the political spectrum of the DNA?

Left 1-----2-----3-----4-----5 Right (Circle one number)

31. Which of the following long-term goals are the **THREE** most important goals
for the DNA to pursue:

-a strengthened link between the DNA and the LO___.

-a re-privatization of the banks___.

-an independent credit and monetary policy___.

-maintain full employment___.

-stress international competitiveness___.

-non-statist solutions to social problems___.

32. How has the EU debate affected your feelings towards being a DNA party
supporter/member? It has:

-encouraged me to work more actively with the party___.

-encouraged me to be more distant from the party___.

-had no effect___.

32A. If it has encouraged you to work more actively with the party, why do you
feel this way?

A.

B.

C.

32B. If it has encouraged you to be more distant from the party, why do you feel this way

- A.
- B.
- C.

32C. If it has encouraged you to be more distant from the party, do you intend to support/join another party? Yes___, No___.

If yes, which party do you intend to support/join_____.

33. How do you think your membership in SME will affect your chances of influencing the DNA.

- ___ the party will be more likely to listen to you.
- ___ the party will be less likely to listen to you.
- ___ being an SME member will have had no effect on the party's willingness to listen to me.

APPENDIX B

**Coding Categories and Component Items
for Reasons for Opposing Membership in the EU**

Democracy	"weakens Norwegian democracy" "EU is non-democratic/bureaucratic/centralized/too big/distant"
Sovereignty	"threatens Norwegian sovereignty/self-government rights"
Neoliberalism	"EU has conservative economic policy/overly market oriented/common currency" "EU is too conservative/dominated by capital/market forces/elite oriented" "EU dominated by 'growth philosophy"
Environment	"EU has poor environment record/will weaken Norwegian environmental policy"
Resources	"EU threatens control of Norwegian oil/ control over Norwegian resources"
Redistribution	"EU threatens the welfare state/threatens redistribution"
Agriculture	"EU threatens Norwegian agriculture/fishing sector"
Group Rights	"EU threatens union rights/threatens women's equality/EU is anti-women's rights"
Economic Policy	"EU aggravates the unemployment problem/threatens Norwegian economic control"
Foreign Policy	"EU weakens international solidarity with third world/Eu has a threatening economic and political 'bloc' philosophy"
other	"dislike of Maastricht Treaty/fear of Germans/Norway pays more than it gets out of EU/EU threatens Norwegian public sector" (and a variety of additional miscellaneous reasons)