

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-FIRST ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

May 1975

I

Assembly Documents

W E U

BONN

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Assembly Documents

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The Proceedings of the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume I : Assembly Documents.

Volume II : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.

The Proceedings of the special Sitting held on Monday, 26th May 1975, commemorating the Twentieth Anniversary of the Assembly are printed separately.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
DEQUAE André	Chr. Soc.
KEMPINAIRE André	PLP
LEYNEN Hubert	Chr. Soc.
SCHUGENS Willy	Socialist
de STEXHE Paul	Chr. Soc.
TANGHE Francis	Chr. Soc.

Substitutes

MM. BREYNE Gustave	Socialist
de BRUYNE Hektor	Volkunie
DUVIEUSART Etienne	FDF-RW
Mrs. GODINACHE-LAMBERT Marie-Thérèse	PLP
MM. HULPIAU Raphaël	Chr. Soc.
PLASMAN Marcel	Chr. Soc.
VAN HOEYLANDT D. Bernard	Socialist

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BOUCHENY Serge	Communist
BOULLOCHE André	Socialist
BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
CERNEAU Marcel	Centre Union
DELORME Claude	Socialist
GRANGIER Edouard	Dem. Left
KAUFFMANN Michel	UCDP
KRIEG Pierre-Charles	UDR
LEGARET Jean	Ind. Rep.
de MONTESQUIOU Pierre	Soc. Dem. Ref.
NESSLER Edmond	UDR
President of the Assembly	
PÉRIDIÉ Jean	Socialist
RADIUS René	UDR
RIVIÈRE Paul	UDR
ROGER Émile	Communist
SCHMITT Robert	UDR (App.)
VALLEIX Jean	UDR
VITTER Pierre	Ind. Rep.

Substitutes

MM. BEAUGUITTE André	Ind. Rep.
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BIZET Émile	UDR (App.)
BOURGEOIS Georges	UDR
CERMOLACCE Paul	Communist
DAILLET Jean-Marie	Soc. Dem. Ref.
DEPIETRI César	Communist
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	UDR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left

MM. LA COMBE René	UDR
du LUART Ladislas	RIAS
MÉNARD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SOUSTELLE Jacques	Non-party
VADEPIED Raoul	UCDP
WEBER Pierre	Ind. Rep. (App.)

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ALBER Siegbert	CDU
AMREHN Franz	CDU
DREGGER Alfred	CDU
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
GESSNER Manfred	SPD
KEMPFLER Friedrich	CDU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU
MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
MATTICK Kurt	SPD
MENDE Erich	CDU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU
RICHTER Klaus	SPD
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
Mrs. SCHUCHARDT Helga	FDP
MM. SCHWENCKE Olaf	SPD
SIEGLERSCHMIDT Hellmut	SPD
Mrs. WOLF Erika	CDU

Substitutes

Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM. BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
CARSTENS Karl	CDU
GÖLTER Georg	CDU
HAASE Horst	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
KLEPSCH Egon	CDU
KLIÉSING Georg	CDU
LAGERHAUSEN Karl-Hans	ODU
LENZER Christian	CDU
PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
SCHAUBLE Wolfgang	CDU
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
VOHRER Manfred	FDP
WALTHER Rudi	SPD
WENDE Manfred	SPD
WÖRNER Manfred	CDU
WURBS Richard	FDP

ITALY

Representatives

MM. AVERARDI Giuseppe	Socialist
BETTIOL Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
BOLOGNA Giacomo	Chr. Dem.
COPPOLA Mattia	Chr. Dem.
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
LAFORGIA Antonio	Chr. Dem.
LEGGIERI Vincenzo	Chr. Dem.
MAMMI Oscar	Republican
MINNOCCI Giacinto	Socialist
Mrs. MIOTTI CARLI Amalia	Chr. Dem.
MM. PECORARO Antonio	Chr. Dem.
PICA Domenico	Chr. Dem.
PRETI Luigi	Socialist
QUILLERI Fausto Samuele	Liberal
TALAMONA Augusto	Socialist
TREU Renato	Chr. Dem.
VEDOVATO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
ZAFFANELLA Renzo	Socialist

Substitutes

MM. ARFÈ Gaetano	Socialist
ARTALI Mario	Socialist
BONALDI Umberto	Liberal
CASTELLUCCI Albertino	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. CATTANEO-PETRINI Giannina	Chr. Dem.
MM. CAVEZZALI Paolo	Socialist
FARABEGOLI Furio	Chr. Dem.
LA ROSA Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
MAGLIANO Terenzio	Socialist
MANCINI Antonio	Chr. Dem.
MONETI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
NEGRARI Andrea	Chr. Dem.
PACINI Arturo	Chr. Dem.
PREARO Roberto	Chr. Dem.
PUMILIA Calogero	Chr. Dem.
REALE Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
SANTALCO Carmelo	Chr. Dem.
SPORA Ettore	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. ABENS Victor	Soc. Workers
MARGUE Georges	Chr. Soc.
MART René	Dem.

Substitutes

MM. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
KONEN René	Dem.
SPAUTZ Jean	Chr. Soc.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. CORNELISSEN Pam	Pop. Cath.
DANKERT Pieter	Labour
LETSCHERT Hendrik	Pop. Cath.
de NIET Maarten	Labour
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	Antirevolution.
VOOGD Joop	Labour

Substitutes

MM. de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
van OOIJEN David	Labour
PEIJNENBURG Marinus	Pop. Cath.
PIKET Frederik	Chr. Hist.
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
WALTMANS Henk	Radical

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

MM. Ronald BROWN	Labour
Paul CHANNON	Conservative
Stanley COHEN	Labour
Julian CRITCHLEY	Conservative
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. Raymond FLETCHER	Labour
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
John HUNT	Conservative
Dr. J. Dickson MABON	Labour
MM. John MENDELSON	Labour
John PAGE	Conservative
Lord PEDDIE	Labour
MM. Tom PENDRY	Labour
John PRESCOTT	Labour
Sir John RODGERS	Conservative
MM. John ROPER	Labour
David STEEL	Liberal
Thomas URWIN	Labour

Substitutes

Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Raymond CARTER	Labour
John CORDLE	Conservative
Lord DARLING of HILLSBOROUGH	Labour
MM. John FARR	Conservative
Andrew FAULDS	Labour
Sir Harwood HARRISON	Conservative
MM. Jim LESTER	Conservative
Arthur LEWIS	Labour
Hilary MILLER	Conservative
Baroness PHILLIPS	Labour
Lord SELSDON	Conservative
MM. Peter SNAPE	Labour
Patrick WALL	Conservative
Lord WALSTON	Labour
MM. Kenneth WARREN	Conservative
Phillip WHITEHEAD	Labour

AGENDA
of the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session
Bonn, 26th-29th May 1975

I. Report of the Council

Twentieth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly

II. Political Questions

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. de Bruyne on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 2. European union and WEU | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Krieg on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 3. East-West relations | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Sieglerschmidt on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 4. Co-operation with the United States | <i>Report tabled by Mr. de Koster on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |

III. Defence Questions

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| 1. Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. de Niet on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 2. State of European security — General Report for the Twentieth Anniversary of the Assembly | <i>Report tabled by MM. Critchley, Dankert, Duviolsart, Wall and Lemmrich on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 3. Proliferation of nuclear weapons | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |

IV. Technical and Scientific Questions

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| 1. The European Space Agency — Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Richter on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |
| 2. The European aeronautical industry and civil aviation | <i>Report tabled by MM. Warren and Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |

V. Budgetary and Administrative Questions

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|---|---|
| Draft Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1975 | <i>Report tabled by Lord Selston on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |
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VI. Relations with Parliaments

- | | |
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| Twelfth half-yearly report | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments</i> |
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ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session
Bonn, 26th-29th May 1975

MONDAY, 26th MAY

Morning 9 a.m.

Meetings of Political Groups.

10.30 a.m.

1. Welcoming address by Mrs. Renger, President of the Bundestag.
2. Opening of the Session by the Provisional President.
3. Examination of credentials.
4. Election of the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session.

10.45 a.m.

Sitting commemorating the Twentieth Anniversary of the Assembly

Address by Mr. Georg Leber, Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Address by Mr. Paul Vanden Boeynants, Minister of Defence and Brussels Affairs of the Kingdom of Belgium.

Address by Mr. Bernard Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.

Address by Mr. Adolfo Battaglia, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Italian Republic.

Address by Mr. Emile Krieps, Minister of Public Health, the Environment, Civil Service and Armed Forces of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

Address by Mr. P.H. Kooijmans, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Address by Mr. Frederick Mulley, Minister for Transport of the United Kingdom.

Address by the President of the Assembly.

12.30 p.m.

Meeting of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Meeting of the General Affairs Committee.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Votes on the draft recommendations postponed from the last session :

(a) The energy crisis and European security :

Vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 656 presented by Sir John Rodgers on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

(b) Conditions of service in the armed forces :

Vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 650 presented by Mr. Klepsch on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

(c) State of European nuclear energy programmes :

Vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 655 presented by Mr. Small on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

2. East-West relations :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Sieglerschmidt on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

3. State of European security — General report for the twentieth anniversary of the Assembly :

presentation of the report tabled by MM. Critchley, Dankert, Duvieusart, Wall and Lemmrich on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

At the close of the sitting

Meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Meeting of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

TUESDAY, 27th MAY

Morning 9 a.m.

Meeting of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

9.30 a.m.

Address by Mr. Gaston Geens, Secretary of State for Budget and Scientific Policy of Belgium.

10.15 a.m.

Address by General Alexander Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

11 a.m.

Address by Mr. Bernard Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.

State of European security — General report for the twentieth anniversary of the Assembly.

Resumed Debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. State of European security — General report for the twentieth anniversary of the Assembly.

Resumed Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. Proliferation of nuclear weapons :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

WEDNESDAY, 28th MAY

Morning 9.30 a.m.

1. Draft opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1975 :

presentation of the report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Vote on the draft opinion.

2. European union and WEU :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Krieg on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Twentieth annual report of the Council :

presentation by Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

(a) Political activities of the Council — Reply to the twentieth annual report of the Council :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Bruyne on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

(b) Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the twentieth annual report of the Council :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Niet on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

(c) The European Space Agency — Reply to the twentieth annual report of the Council :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Richter on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate on the annual report of the Council and the replies of the Committees.

Votes on the draft recommendations.

5.30 p.m.

2. *Votes on the draft recommendations* not already voted upon by the Assembly.

3. Twelfth half-yearly report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

THURSDAY, 29th MAY

(No morning sitting)

Afternoon 3 p.m.

Address by Mr. Roy Hattersley, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

1. Co-operation with the United States :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Koster on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. The European aeronautical industry and civil aviation :

presentation of the report tabled by MM. Warren and Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE TWENTY-FIRST ORDINARY SESSION

At the close of the sitting

Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

*Twentieth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly
of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period
1st January to 31st December 1974*

INTRODUCTION

1. The Council of Western European Union transmit to the Assembly the Twentieth Annual Report on their activities, covering the period 1st January to 31st December 1974.
2. The main questions considered by the Council are dealt with in the following chapters :

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III. Armaments Control Agency	26
IV. Standing Armaments Committee	34
V. Public Administration Committee	37
VI. Budgetary and administrative questions	39

CHAPTER I

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY

A. Progress of relations between the Council and the Assembly

In 1974, as in previous years, the Council made every effort to develop close and constructive relations with the Assembly. In response to the frequently expressed wishes of the Assembly, the Council succeeded in arranging for it to receive replies to its recommendations and written questions sooner than previously.

The nineteenth annual report was sent to the Assembly at the earliest possible dates compatible with the Council's procedures.

As to the substance of their replies to the Assembly, the Council are well aware that the Assembly's wishes and expectations are not always fulfilled. The reasons for this were more clearly apparent in 1974 than in the past.

When asked by the Assembly to provide information or state their attitude on current political questions, the Council had to refer, more often than in the past, to other agencies dealing with these matters, because their own activities in these fields have diminished as political co-operation between the Nine has developed. In the case of defence policy which both the Assembly and the Council look upon as WEU's essential concern, it was even more apparent that the Council could not reply to the Assembly in the desired manner because co-operation in European defence policy had not yet reached a stage at which governments could state a joint view to the Assembly.

This explains why the Council were unable to comply with the request from the General Affairs Committee for a joint meeting to consider a large number of questions on the whole of European policy, and particularly on defence. The Council did, however, state that they would be prepared to consider informal discussions with members of the Committee on the occasion of the next Ministerial Council meeting, provided the Committee would regard such an arrangement as useful.

Despite these aspects of the situation, the Council continue to attach the greatest value to the recommendations initiated by the Assembly.

Inevitably, the budget proposed by the Assembly for 1975 and submitted to the Council for opinion, has not escaped the consequences of the financial difficulties now facing all the member governments and the often stringent economies imposed as a result. Discussions between the Council and the Assembly on the amount and the methods of applying the reductions called for by the governments were not completed by the end of the year.

As in previous years, the interest of member governments in the Assembly's work was demonstrated in 1974 by the attendance of several Ministers at its debates. In their speeches and their replies to questions put by members of the Assembly, they stated the attitudes of their governments. The Council noted that this was appreciated by the Assembly, as is shown in particular by the report accompanying Recommendation 246. Furthermore, as in the past, Assembly Committees had talks with Ministers during visits to member countries.

Finally, the Council were able to meet the Assembly's wishes on a number of specific points:

— They accepted the request, in Recommendation 247, that future annual reports should include the details given in reply to Written Question 130 on the implementation of the resolution of 15th September 1956.

— Details regarding two passages in the nineteenth annual report were given in reply to Written Questions 139 and 142, put by members of the Assembly.

— In accordance with the Assembly's wishes, they referred, where appropriate, to consultations between Western European governments in other bodies.

B. Summary of contacts between the Council and the Assembly**1. Speeches by Ministers of member governments made during the Twentieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly***First Part (18th-20th June 1974) :*

Mr. Roy Hattersley, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth

Affairs, representing the Chairman-in-Office of the Council;

Mr. Alex Eadie, United Kingdom Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Energy;

Second Part (2nd-6th December 1974):

Mr. Hans Matthöfer, Federal Minister for Research and Technology of the Federal Republic of Germany;

Mr. Renaat Van Elslande, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation;

Mr. H. Vredeling, Netherlands Minister of Defence;

Mr. Bernard Destremau, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

Lord Goronwy-Roberts, United Kingdom Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

2. Assembly Recommendations to the Council

The Council gave replies to fifteen recommendations transmitted after the Second Part of the Nineteenth Ordinary Session and the First Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session. These recommendations were numbered 240 to 245 (excluding Recommendation 242) and 246 to 255.

The Council also began consideration of the four recommendations, numbered 256 to 259,

adopted by the Assembly at the Second Part of its Twentieth Ordinary Session in December 1974.

3. Written questions put to the Council by members of the Assembly

Replies were given to seventeen written questions, numbered 135 to 151.

4. Meetings between the Council and Assembly bodies

The Council of Ministers and the Presidential Committee of the Assembly met after the ministerial meeting in The Hague on 11th March 1974.

5. Personal contacts

Meeting in London on 15th July between the Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the Council, Sir John Killick, in the name of the Chairman-in-Office and accompanied by the Secretary-General, and Mr. Dequae, Chairman of the Assembly Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Meeting in Paris on 3rd December between the Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the Council, Sir John Killick, in the name of the Chairman-in-Office and accompanied by the Acting Secretary-General, and Mr. Siegler-schmidt, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee of the Assembly.

CHAPTER II

ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL

A. Introduction

In 1974, the Council met at ministerial level in The Hague on 11th March, under the chairmanship of the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Max van der Stoel.

In addition, the permanent representatives met seventeen times, and the working group held twenty-three meetings to prepare their discussions.

The Council's meeting of 23rd October coincided with the twentieth anniversary of the signing in Paris in 1954 of the Protocols modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty ; on this occasion, the United Kingdom Permanent Representative, Sir John Killick, speaking for the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. James Callaghan, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, read the following statement :

"The last twenty years have seen vast changes in Europe and the world. There have also been changes in Western European Union, which has shown a remarkable capacity to adapt itself to new requirements and circumstances. Indeed, the organisation owes its existence in its present form to the challenge of such circumstances. The revised Brussels Treaty remains as valid today as when it was signed twenty years ago. It brings our seven countries together in a fifty-year alliance in which we accept the most binding obligation any country can assume with regard to another : the commitment to mutual defence. Not least, it is the origin of the Assembly which has since made such an important contribution to our work. May WEU flourish in the future as it has in the past."

The Permanent Representative of Italy, Ambassador Raimondo Manzini, made the following statement in his capacity as doyen of the Permanent Council :

"In associating myself with Sir John Killick's remarks on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of Western European Union, I trust that I am also expressing the views of the other members of the Council.

The ideals which inspired the seven countries when they signed the Paris Protocols in 1954 undoubtedly still hold good today.

Just as they did twenty years ago, our common culture and our countries' attachment to the vital principles of freedom and democracy impose upon us tasks which cannot be set aside. Some of these tasks have been fulfilled ; the fact that we have succeeded in defending our freedom and in strengthening our co-operation is in itself an achievement of the greatest importance.

I should also like to recall the rôle played by WEU when the United Kingdom was still not in the Common Market ; for a number of years, our organisation provided the link between the Six and the United Kingdom until it became a full member of the European Economic Community.

Much has happened in the meantime and the international situation has changed considerably, but even in this new context, our old agreements are still genuine evidence of a unity of purpose. Our organisation embodies the spirit of co-operation between the countries of Western Europe. This has been clearly proved by the many subjects and problems which the Council and the parliamentary Assembly have studied and debated to advantage.

In celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the union, we therefore express the hope that over the next thirty years, it will continue to provide an important forum for the member countries, not only for consultation and political co-operation, but also for achievements of a practical nature.

To achieve this purpose, the member countries will clearly have to use WEU and its agencies in the most effective manner possible and to co-ordinate their activities rationally with those of other joint institutions.

WEU will then, as we all sincerely hope, be able to retain its rightful place alongside the other leading western organisations,

such as the European institutions and the Atlantic Alliance.”

*
**

The Council accepted with regret the resignation of the Secretary-General of the organisation, Mr Georges Heisbourg, on taking up a new post under the Luxembourg Government. The Assembly was informed by a letter to its President from the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

*
**

In the course of the year, the Secretary-General and his senior colleagues attended, on invitation, meetings of other international organisations and institutions when questions of concern to WEU were under discussion. The most frequent of these contacts were made as in previous years with NATO and the Council of Europe.

B. Political questions

At their ministerial meeting in The Hague in March, the Council discussed aspects of East-West relations, particularly relations between the member countries of WEU and the German Democratic Republic.

Throughout the year, the members of WEU played an active part in political co-operation between the nine members of the European Community. The Council noted with satisfaction the progress made within the framework of this co-operation in important areas of foreign policy; they mentioned this in their reply in November to Assembly Recommendation 255.

The seven member governments were of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served by a study within WEU of questions which they were already discussing in what they considered to be a completely satisfactory manner; the Council indicated this to the Assembly when answering Written Question 149.

However, in view of their responsibility for political matters and their determination to maintain the closest possible dialogue with the Assembly on all questions concerning the application of the modified Brussels Treaty — in accordance with the intention repeated several times since the inception of co-operation between the Nine — the Council have given careful

attention to the recommendations and written questions transmitted to them. In their replies, they have made every effort to state their views as fully as possible on the problems dealt with by the Assembly. Where appropriate, they have referred to consultations in other institutions or between the Nine.

1. East-West relations

At the ministerial meeting in The Hague, on 11th March 1974, the German delegation gave the Council an account of the state of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. All delegations agreed it was desirable that Western European governments should consult as frequently as possible and should co-ordinate their attitude, in order to ensure the satisfactory progress of relations with the German Democratic Republic.

In the course of the year under consideration, the main aspects of the course of East-West relations were the subject of many detailed discussions between the Nine and in the North Atlantic Council.

In reply to the points raised by the Assembly in Recommendation 252 concerning three important sets of negotiations in progress with the East, the Council noted that there were close and regular consultations between the allies taking part in the Geneva conference on security and co-operation in Europe, and in the Vienna conference on mutual and balanced force reductions; moreover, the United States authorities kept their European allies informed, in the North Atlantic Council, of the progress of the strategic arms limitation talks. The Council added that in all these negotiations, Europe's vital interests in the matter were constantly stressed by the European governments directly concerned.

In the case of the CSCE, which has formed the subject of a number of Assembly recommendations to the Council in recent years, it should be noted that the Nine continued to make a major contribution to Atlantic co-operation and to play an active and substantial part in the conference itself, which is now in its second stage. As regards the progress of negotiations in Geneva during 1974, it is recalled that the Ministers of the member governments of WEU and of their allies, meeting in Brussels for the North Atlantic Council session of 12th and 13th

December, noted that there had been enough progress to show that substantial results were possible ; this statement appears in paragraph 4 of the final communiqué of the meeting, which goes on to say that nonetheless, important questions remain to be resolved. Ministers expressed the undiminished determination of their governments to work patiently and constructively towards balanced and substantial results under all the agenda headings of the conference, so as to bring about a satisfactory conclusion to the conference as a whole as soon as possible.

2. Situation in the Eastern Mediterranean

The Council followed with interest the Assembly's debate in December on the report produced by the Defence Committee as a result of events in Cyprus during the summer of 1974 and the situation to which they gave rise. The Council are now studying Assembly Recommendation 256 on this subject.

It will be recalled that the United Kingdom, as part of its responsibility shared with Greece and Turkey, as co-guarantor of the Zurich and London agreements on Cyprus, made every effort to help in finding a negotiated settlement between the parties concerned. Moreover, all the member governments of WEU took part in discussions in the United Nations, in the North Atlantic Council and among the Nine on the Cyprus question, covering both its humanitarian and political aspects and its repercussions on the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Together with their partners in the European Community they expressed their concern, in particular through the declaration adopted by the Nine on 22nd July, and later in the appeal of 14th August to the Greek and Turkish Governments.

In the United Nations, France and the United Kingdom took an active part in the debates of the Security Council, of which they were, at that time, the only WEU members. Following those referred to in the Committee's report, the resolution of 30th August was adopted by the Security Council on the basis of a draft submitted by France and the United Kingdom, together with Austria. In addition, the delegations of the seven member governments of WEU voted for the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 1st November, which was also mentioned in the Committee's report.

In the course of many discussions in the North Atlantic Council, the desire of the representatives of the member governments of WEU and of those of their allies, has all along been to maintain the coherence of the Alliance, to avoid conflict between two of its members, and to find an acceptable settlement to the humanitarian problems of Cyprus ; this was underlined by the Committee's Rapporteur in his speech to the Assembly.

Finally, it is recalled that the Council, in their reply in October to Written Question 148, noted that substantial weaknesses had been shown to exist in the constitutional arrangements for Cyprus which, from 1960 onwards, have been based on the London and Zurich agreements. Any new settlement on the island would not, in their view, necessarily be based on these agreements.

3. Relations between Europe and the United States

Two developments which took place during 1974 were noted by the Council as having met points of common concern to member governments and the Assembly. They were mentioned in the replies to Recommendations 251 and 252 and to Written Question 146.

— In their reply to the first of these recommendations, the Council stated that they shared the Assembly's view that close understanding between the members of the Atlantic Alliance, especially between the United States and its European partners, was essential for the security of Western Europe. They added that in their opinion, Europe's development towards political unity was by no means inconsistent with the maintenance of solidarity within the Alliance.

In this context, they recalled the conclusions of the review of Atlantic relations undertaken by the allies in 1973. In the Ottawa declaration signed in Brussels on 26th June 1974, the members of the Alliance affirmed their resolve to maintain close consultation and co-operation. This declaration emphasised that the progress towards unity, which the member States of the European Community are determined to make, should in due course have a beneficial effect on the contribution to the common defence of the Alliance of those of them who belong to it.

— As regards the separate question of relations between the Nine and the United States, the intentions of the member countries of the European Community were set out in the declaration on the European identity adopted by the Heads of State or Government meeting in Copenhagen on 14th December 1973. This declaration stated that the close ties with the United States, which are mutually beneficial, must be preserved. They do not conflict with the determination of the Nine to establish themselves as a distinct and original entity. The Nine intend to maintain their constructive dialogue and to develop their co-operation with the United States on the basis of equality and in a spirit of friendship.

During 1974, informal practical arrangements for consultation between the Nine and the United States were worked out and put into effect. The Assembly was informed of this in the Council's reply to Recommendation 252, which added that such consultation in no way derogated from the importance of the bilateral channels of information and consultation between each of the European partners and the United States to which the Assembly had referred.

C. Scientific, technical and space questions

The Council followed with interest the work of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, which was again directed to the progress of European co-operation in the aeronautical and space fields and developments in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

They answered three recommendations (244 on an aviation policy for Europe, 248 on the European Space Agency, and 253 on a European policy on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy), adopted by the Assembly in November 1973 and June 1974, as well as six written questions (135 to 138, 150 and 151) put by members of the Assembly.

1. Civil and military aviation

Both the Council and the member governments, who gave their support to the colloquy organised by the Committee in September 1973, appreciated the quality of the Committee's subsequent report.

In the reply which they gave to Assembly Recommendation 244 in May 1974, the Council

explained how they saw the general problem of an aviation policy for Europe.

— They recalled the discussions which had taken place in 1973 between the European countries, at both industry and government level. They observed that much of this action had taken place within the framework of the European Economic Community; it had been concentrated on the civil side of the aeronautical industry, but the importance of the military sector had been recognised in the context of an overall industry policy.

— The Council referred to the action taken on the communication from the Commission of the European Communities on the European airframe industry, which had been mentioned in the reply to Recommendation 231. The studies undertaken covered some of the points raised by the Assembly: the principle of a concerted approach in national policies was recognised in the first of the implementing texts for the Community policy recommended by the Commission for Industrial and Technological Development in the Aeronautical Sector; the various aspects of government aid for civil projects had been studied by groups of experts with the aim of reaching agreement on the harmonisation of existing methods of support. On this point, the Council stated that, like the Assembly, they considered that government aid should be channelled towards projects which would strengthen the competitive position of the European industry.

The Council also gave their views on a number of questions raised by the Assembly concerning European co-operation in the field of civil air transport: the development of the European network, the balanced development of air and other forms of transport, the definition of equipment requirements, the harmonisation of airworthiness standards, and the standardisation of equipment. On these points, they broadly shared the Assembly's preoccupation. The clear and detailed statement of views in their reply cannot easily be summarised in this report. It should be mentioned, however, that the Council stressed the importance of the contribution made by the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) to co-operation on European air transport questions. They also remarked on the extent and value of current work on a number of the questions mentioned above: for example, the COST 33 project (*Coopération européenne dans le domaine de la recherche scientifique et technique*) on the

development of inter-city transport systems ; study of the requirements of airline companies by the Association of European Airlines (AEA) ; the current activities of EUROCAE (European Organisation for Civil Aviation Electronic Equipment) ; the programme of work undertaken under the auspices of the Joint Airworthiness Requirements Committee of the manufacturing countries ; and the work of the Standardisation Committee of the *Association européenne des constructeurs de matériel aéronautique* (AECMA).

— Since the Council's reply to Recommendation 244 was transmitted to the Assembly, one member country (the United Kingdom) has announced a policy to bring its aircraft industry into public ownership. In their reply to Written Question 151, which referred to a number of points in the recommendation, the Council remarked that until the United Kingdom Government has given details of its plans, it will not be possible or profitable to take consideration of the general questions raised by the authors of the question. They added, however, that these problems had not escaped the full attention of the national authorities.

— The Council noted the concern expressed by the Assembly in Recommendation 244 and repeated by the author of Written Question 137, that member governments "should endeavour to draw up a European policy for the procurement of military aircraft with a view to reducing costs and, to this end, to ask the Standing Armaments Committee for assistance". In their replies, they accepted that it would be both desirable and necessary for there to be greater collaboration in the military aircraft field than hitherto, and that the eventual formulation of a European military procurement policy was a desirable goal. They referred to the study initiated by Eurogroup on the procurement of defence equipment, which includes military aircraft. They added that any approach to the Standing Armaments Committee was related to the study of proposals for reactivating this body (cf. Chapter II. C).

2. Space questions

The Council noted the points raised by the Assembly in the preamble and enacting terms of Recommendation 248 on the European Space Agency.

— In their reply sent in September, they said they would welcome wider participation in the work of the Space Agency ; the draft convention setting up the Agency in fact allowed for this possibility.

— They shared the Assembly's concern that it had not been possible to appoint the Director-General and other senior officials of the Agency ; in their reply to Written Question 150, sent in December, they expressed the hope that agreement could soon be reached on this problem.

Meanwhile, the programme agreed by the European Space Conference, on 31st July 1973, for creation of the European Space Agency, participation in the United States post-Apollo programme by the construction of the space laboratory Spacelab, design and construction of a European maritime orbital test satellite (MAROTS), and development of a European rocket launcher (Ariane) was already under way, as recalled by the Council in their reply to Recommendation 248. In their answer to Written Question 150, they stated that pending the establishment of the Space Agency, day-to-day work on implementing the whole of this programme was being conducted by the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO).

— As for co-operation between the Space Agency and European parliamentary bodies, the Council pointed out that draft Resolution No. 5 appended to the Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries set up to establish the Agency, was designed to maintain the arrangements which had applied hitherto to ELDO and ESRO. These two organisations sent their annual reports, for information, to the Council of Europe ; this facilitated the discussion of their work by the Consultative Assembly and, therefore, by the WEU Assembly, whose members attend both bodies.

3. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

In their reply to Recommendation 253, the Council set out their views, which are basically as follows :

A solution for the energy problem is now of vital importance for the economic future of Europe.

While co-operation between European countries is still to be established in the case of oil and gas, achievements in the nuclear field and,

in particular, in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, are already substantial, even if imperfect and open to improvement.

Over the last few years, many attempts have been made to promote, if not a common industrial nuclear policy, at least some concertation of national policies.

This concertation has already produced practical results in the shape of a number of joint actions which are limited in scope, no doubt, but are by no means unimportant and are encouraging for the future ; the Council quoted a number of examples.

This line of action, which some may consider to be too limited and over-cautious, represents a pragmatic, realistic approach to the situation, which has offered the only means of achieving any success.

The Council added that it would appear that while the creation of political agreements is an essential condition, it is by no means sufficient if industrialists are not already willing to act in concert. Their willingness to do so would, of course, be encouraged by such political agreements.

Lastly, while the vital rôle of reactors in the nuclear energy process cannot be disputed, the main guarantee of a measure of European independence in the nuclear field lies not in reactors, but in supplies of uranium and the means of enriching it.

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The Council noted with interest the reports prepared by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, after its visits to Japan and Canada.

In reply to Recommendation 245 on advanced technology in Japan — the consequences for Europe, they recognised the importance of developing co-operation with that country. They noted, amongst other points, that the concertation urged by the Assembly already takes place in several fields of science and modern technology, mainly within the OECD.

The Council have also begun to consider Recommendation 259 on advanced technology in Canada — the consequences for Europe, which was received in December 1974.

D. Defence questions

On the occasion of the presentation of the nineteenth annual report to the Assembly in June, the representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, recalling that the modified Brussels Treaty bound the member countries together in a fifty-year alliance, observed that the treaty, which retains its full validity, contained, in Article V, one of the most binding defence commitments into which the partners had ever entered.

1. Level of forces of member States

In the course of the year under review, the Council have continued to fulfil their responsibilities under the Protocols to the modified Brussels Treaty which relate to the levels of forces of member States, and the procedures worked out for this purpose have continued to operate normally.

(a) Forces under NATO command

The maximum levels of ground, air and naval forces which member States of WEU place under NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty. Article III of the Protocol provides for a special procedure, if necessary, to enable these levels to be increased above the limits specified in Articles I and II.

So that they may satisfy themselves that the limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II are not exceeded, the Council receive information every year concerning the levels in question, in accordance with Article IV of that Protocol. This information is obtained in the course of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and is transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking officer designated by him to that end.

The information, as at the end of 1973, which was conveyed by this officer at the appropriate time, was considered by the Council on 24th April. Information indicating the status as at the end of 1974 was requested in December.

Furthermore, the Council have taken the necessary steps to implement the procedure laid down in their resolution of 15th September 1956, whereby the levels of forces under NATO command are examined in the light of the annual review.

In this connection, and in view of Written Questions 130 and 141 as well as Recommendation 247, and the Council's replies thereto, it can be stated in addition that, for the year 1973, a meeting was held in Brussels on 17th December 1973 of the permanent representatives (or their substitutes) to the North Atlantic Council of the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The report from this meeting was examined by the Council on 16th January 1974, who noted that the level of forces of these member States, as set out in the NATO force plan, fell within the limits fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty. The Council also took note at the same time of a declaration by the Permanent Representative of France on the level of French forces for 1973. The same procedure has already been set in train, for 1974, by the end of the year under review.

The Council were notified in June that Vice-Admiral Vittorio Savarese, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Armaments and Administration at SHAPE, had succeeded the late Vice-Admiral Giovanni Fiorini as SACEUR's representative to the Council.

(b) Forces under national command

The strength and armaments of forces of member States on the mainland of Europe remaining under national command are fixed in accordance with the procedure laid down in the agreement signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 implementing Article V of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty.



By means of the methods set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the Council have been able to fulfil in 1974 their obligations under Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty concerning levels of forces.

2. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe

In accordance with the undertaking given in paragraph 2 of the Council's reply to Recommendation 213, the United Kingdom Government declared that the total level of British forces on the continent of Europe at 30th November 1974 amounted to 60,136 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force.

The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland and the situation in Cyprus in the second half of the year made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty in those places. At 30th November 1974, there were some 4,000 men from BAOR in Northern Ireland and 310 in Cyprus. In the event of an emergency affecting NATO, it is expected that these units could be quickly returned to their duty stations.

3. Examination by the Council of the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee and of the problem of the standardisation of armaments in Europe

Following the decision taken by the Council in December 1973 and referred to in the nineteenth annual report to the Assembly, the deputy national armaments directors of member countries met in Paris on 29th and 30th January 1974, with the terms of reference quoted in the same report.

In paragraph 9 of the Council's reply to Recommendation 244, the Assembly was informed how this meeting had been followed up at permanent representative level and at the ministerial meeting held in The Hague on 11th March 1974. In their reply to Recommendation 247, in October, the Council stated that although they had devoted considerable time and effort to this complicated question and made a study of several possible solutions, they had not yet been able to reach definite conclusions. This situation has not altered and the Council have not discussed this question in depth for several months. Nevertheless, it is still before the Council who will bear in mind the possibility of reporting to the Assembly as soon as more substantive results have been obtained.

4. Assembly recommendations and written questions

(a) During 1974, the Council have replied to the various recommendations drafted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and adopted by the Assembly in plenary session in November 1973 and June 1974.

In their reply to No. 243 on the state of European security — relations with the United States, the Council referred, on the matter of the strength of United States forces in Europe, to the assurance given by the United States Govern-

ment that, given a similar approach by other countries of the Alliance, the United States will maintain and improve their forces in Europe and refrain from reductions except in the framework of mutual and balanced force reductions. The Council recognise that the maintenance of United States forces in Europe at their present level implies that each country should undertake, according to its place in the Alliance, its proper share of the burden of maintaining the security of all.

And so, the Ottawa declaration emphasised that all members of the Alliance agree that the continued presence of Canadian and substantial United States forces in Europe plays an irreplaceable rôle in the defence of North America as well as of Europe. Similarly, the substantial forces of the European allies serve to defend Europe and North America as well.

In the context of the close links between security on the mainland of Europe and in the Mediterranean area, the Council, in their answer to Recommendation 254 on this subject, recalled the draft declaration on the Mediterranean, which had been prepared jointly by the Nine and approved by all member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, before being submitted to the CSCE. They agreed that full use should be made of the lessons learned from the latest conflict in the

Middle East, to complement the study of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles and observation satellites.

With regard to Recommendation 247 on the application of the Brussels Treaty, the Council replied that they provide the Assembly with as much information as they can in their annual reports.

Finally, after the December part-session, the Council began their study of Recommendation 256 on European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.

(b) Five written questions in all on defence subjects were dealt with by the Council during the year. These concerned: clarification of the text of the resolution of 26th September 1973, amending Annex III to Protocol No. III (No. 139); notification by the Council of the reasons why a final reply could not yet be given to Written Question 133 regarding an interpretation of the Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits by the two member governments signatories of the Convention (No. 140); implementation of the resolution of 15th September 1956, on forces of member States (No. 141) — cf. 1 (a) above; controls of levels of armaments (No. 142); and maintenance of United States forces in Europe (No. 147).

CHAPTER III

ARMAMENTS CONTROL AGENCY

A. Introduction

The programme of activity drawn up by the Agency for 1974, the nineteenth year of control, was carried out satisfactorily.

The Agency has a dual mission. Under the terms of Article VII of Protocol No. IV, it is required :

- first, to control the level of stocks or armaments held by member countries on the mainland of Europe, this control extending to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective ;
- secondly, to satisfy itself that the undertakings given by the Federal Republic of Germany not to manufacture certain types of armaments on its territory are being observed.

Within the terms of this general mission, controls from documentary sources serve mainly for checking levels of armaments as a whole. They also contribute to the preparation of field measures for the control of levels and of the non-production of certain categories of armaments. This aspect covers all activities concerned with processing, for the purposes defined above, any useful documentary material and the results of field control measures carried out earlier.

The execution of test checks, visits and inspections, and all that is linked with these functions, constitutes that part of control carried out physically wherever there are activities and stocks subject to control and, more generally, wherever this is necessary to ensure that the information supplied is correct and that undertakings not to manufacture certain types of armaments are observed.

Controls from documentary sources can be considered as the basis for the control ; the purpose of field control measures is to verify, physically, the accuracy of the information obtained from documentary controls — when such information exists — particularly as regards the control of levels. Field control measures may also have to take account of information from other sources (Article XX of Protocol No. IV), which it may have been considered necessary to

verify ; documentary and field control measures are thus complementary and equally essential for the accomplishment of the Agency's task.

Traditionally, the annual report has always presented documentary and field control measures separately, in the interests of both convenience and clarity. However, it must not be forgotten that these measures together make up a single control function.

During 1974, no changes were made in the general methods of armaments control described above. Both documentary controls and field control measures were applied without difficulty.

B. Controls from documentary sources**1. Information processed by the Agency***(a) Annual Agency questionnaire and replies by member States*

The questionnaire sent to member States for 1974 was substantially the same as in the previous year.

As in all previous years, follow-up action on the replies was twofold. It is recalled that some of the facts reported are checked physically by means of field control measures. In addition, all the replies are studied by the Agency experts, and compared with the other sources of information available, including member countries' earlier replies to Agency or NATO questionnaires and budgetary documents.

As last year, the Agency was able to send to the Council at the proper time, the basic documents which they must have each year before they can accept or approve, as appropriate, the maximum levels or armaments for forces maintained by member States under national command on the mainland of Europe.

(b) Requests for annual information for facilitating the Agency's task of "non-production control of certain types of armaments" (long-range missiles and guided missiles, chemical weapons)

This annual procedure was applied as usual in 1974.

(c) Co-operation with NATO

In the context of the Agency's relations with the appropriate NATO military authorities and in accordance with the provisions of Protocol No. IV to the treaty, a meeting for the exchange of information was held at the Agency, as in previous years (see point 2 (a) below).

In addition, the NATO authorities arranged a technical information visit for the Agency to the Anti-Submarine Warfare Research Centre at La Spezia (see point E.2. (b) below).

(d) Co-operation with the United States of America and Canada (Article XXIII of Protocol No. IV)

The Agency received, through the Council, information supplied by the Governments of the United States and Canada concerning their programmes of external aid in military equipment to the forces of member States stationed on the mainland of Europe. Since 1966, these countries have provided no aid to the forces concerned.

(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information (Article VII 2 (a) of Protocol No. IV)

In 1974, the defence budgets published by member States and their replies to the Agency questionnaire on this subject were studied in the same way as in previous years.

This scrutiny of budgets confirmed the findings of other studies carried out by the experts to determine quantities of armaments.

2. Verification of appropriate levels of armaments*(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces placed under NATO command*

After receiving and processing the replies of the member States to the annual questionnaire and after studying the statistical reports furnished by the authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Article VII 2 (a) of Protocol No. IV) and, in particular, by the NATO international staff, the Agency arranged, as each year, for the annual consultations with the NATO military authorities called for by Article XIV of Protocol No. IV.

As in previous years, these consultations included a joint study session at Casteau on

19th November 1974, attended by Agency experts and the appropriate officers of SHAPE, and concluded with a meeting in Paris on 13th December 1974, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Director of the Agency; this meeting was attended by the representatives of the Director of the International Military Staff of the NATO Military Committee, and of the Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics, Armaments and Administration, SHAPE, as well as by the Agency experts. There were no comments on the total quantities of armaments declared as held by the member States (Article XIII of Protocol No. IV), and presented by the Agency for study by these authorities.

In consequence, the total quantities of armaments declared to the Agency by the member States for forces placed under NATO authority and stationed on the mainland of Europe can be considered as appropriate levels for the control year 1974, within the terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV.

(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe

The quantities of armaments declared to the Agency by the member States as being required on 31st December 1974 for their forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe have been accepted or approved by the Council, who have taken note of these figures of maximum levels of armaments for these forces in 1974. The quantities notified to the Agency can thus be considered as appropriate levels of armaments for the current control year, within the terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV.

(c) Comment

The situation remained unchanged in 1974 and, in consequence, the term "armaments", whenever used with reference to levels in this report, should be understood to mean :

armaments declared by the member States as being held by their forces on the mainland of Europe, with the exception of armaments with nuclear capability and of the armaments of what one member State calls "strategic forces", that is to say, the armaments over which the Agency has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate of controlling levels.

C. Field control measures

1. Principles governing the application of field control measures and general methods of execution

As recalled in the introduction to this Chapter, the treaty requires the Agency :

- to satisfy itself that the undertakings not to manufacture certain types of armaments are being observed ;
- to control the level of stocks of certain armaments.

In order to fulfil the first of these tasks, the Agency experts must be very well acquainted with the special installations and facilities required to produce the proscribed weapons. They also have to study in depth all published information on industrial plants with the capacity to produce such weapons. After comparing their findings with the results of their analysis of the information supplied by member countries for the year in question, or obtained from the whole series of visits and inspections during previous years, the experts first exclude factories where the production of such weapons seems highly unlikely. They then review the remaining plants and select those which are suitable for control measures. Finally, after a further selection, a sampling programme is worked out for each year. Here, it may be noted that the Agency's studies in the fields open to control are greatly assisted by the replies received from the German authorities to the annual requests for information to facilitate the Agency's task of non-production control.

For the Agency's second task, the basic information is provided by the declarations made by member States in their replies to the annual questionnaire. These declarations are checked both against those made in previous years and against information from various other sources. A suitable number of sample checks are then included in the programme. Due weight is, of course, given to weapons of the greatest military importance. Care is also taken to inspect factories at what is considered to be the most appropriate stage of the production cycle. This strictly-applied programme of sample field control measures, conducted by experts, provides an accurate check of the declarations concerned and, as a result, the declarations as a whole can be accepted with every confidence.

The previous paragraphs clearly indicate the differences between the Agency's two tasks

in the application of field controls. However, in order to ensure the most effective control possible with the resources available, controls of levels of stocks and non-production controls are carefully co-ordinated so that the information obtained can be cross-checked and the services of the experts concerned are used to best advantage. Thus, a control of quantities of weapons produced and of the non-production of prohibited weapons may be carried out at the same time in the same factory.

The general methods of execution have remained unchanged for some time, but the Agency is still trying to perfect and improve both its selection procedures and the conduct of its annual programme.

Article VIII of Protocol No. IV states that control measures in respect of forces under NATO authority shall be undertaken by the appropriate NATO authorities. This being so, the percentage of forces to be inspected by the Agency varies between member countries. Special considerations apply to the depots also covered by the same article. In peacetime, each country is wholly responsible for the logistic support of forces placed under NATO authority. It is therefore difficult to determine accurately which depots are wholly under NATO authority and which are under national command. Nevertheless, the system of combined Agency/SHAPE inspections, introduced in 1957, worked well in 1974, as in previous years.

As the Convention for due process of law¹ has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns take the form of "agreed control measures".

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency must give some six weeks' notice. This agreement has never been withheld.

These restrictions complicate the Agency's task, but are not considered to have reduced the effectiveness of control measures in 1974.

1. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member States of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954. (Signed in Paris on 14th December 1957).

2. Type and extent of field control measures

The programme drawn up early in the year was carried out in full, except for minor modifications for practical reasons.

In 1974, the total number of seventy-one control measures was slightly higher than the average for the five previous years, because two control measures were carried out concurrently at several of the establishments visited.

These measures fell broadly into the following categories :

- (a) quantitative control measures at depots ;
- (b) quantitative control measures at units for forces under national command ;
- (c) control measures at production plants :

- (i) quantitative control measures :

These control measures were carried out at aircraft and aircraft engine plants, at plants manufacturing armoured equipment, at plants manufacturing missiles and ammunition, and at shipyards ;

- (ii) non-production control measures :

These control measures were carried out at plants producing aircraft and aircraft engines, chemicals and missiles and at a shipyard.

On the basis of all the field control measures carried out in 1974, the Agency was able to report to the Council :

- the measures taken for the control of the levels of stocks of armaments at depots, units under national command and production plants confirmed the data obtained from documentary control measures ;
- the measures taken for the control of non-production revealed no production contrary to undertakings.

3. General remarks

(a) In the fields where it is authorised to exercise its mandate, the Agency was able effectively to carry out its task of applying control measures. Such problems as arose from the very complex nature of the inspections were dealt with

satisfactorily through good relations with the national authorities.

(b) In present circumstances, the Agency's activities do not extend to atomic weapons or, in one member State, to what that State calls "strategic forces". Nor does the Agency apply any controls to biological weapons.

(c) As the Convention for due process of law, signed on 14th December 1957, has not yet entered into force, control operations carried out by the Agency in private establishments had to be applied in accordance with the "agreed control" procedure, as in previous years.

D. State and problems of control in general — Development of control methods

The Agency made no changes in its control methods in 1974.

E. State and problems of control in certain particular fields

1. Guided missiles and other self-propelled missiles

(a) Production and purchases

New guided missiles now in production include the Mamba anti-tank missile, the Sea Dart and Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles, and the Matra Magic 550 air-to-air missile. Several other guided missiles have reached an advanced stage of development or are now going into production ; they include the Hot anti-tank missile, the Sea Wolf and Indigo surface-to-air missiles, the Kormoran air-to-surface missile and the Otomat surface-to-surface missile.

Production of older guided missiles, such as the SS-11 and Cobra, is continuing.

This also applies to the production of surface-to-surface self-propelled 110 mm. artillery rockets and to the development of other rockets in France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy.

Larger quantities of guided and unguided missiles were exported to countries outside WEU. Three European anti-aircraft guided missile systems (Roland, Rapier and Crotale) were tested by the United States army during 1974.

(b) Control of levels in 1974

Control measures were carried out at a number of depots containing guided or other self-propelled missiles or launchers, at several units under national command equipped with these weapons and at plants manufacturing guided and other self-propelled missiles.

(c) Verification of non-production undertakings

As in previous years, the Agency sent a "request for annual information in order to facilitate the Agency's non-production control of guided missiles and long-range missiles" to the State concerned. No evidence of any production contrary to undertakings was found when the reply received was verified.

(d) Documentary studies and technical information visits

The Agency assembled valuable information on missiles likely to be produced in Europe in the years ahead, in its efforts to keep abreast of the most recent techniques in this field.

Its experts made technical information visits in France (SNIAS at Issac, CAEPE and the *Société Nationale des Poudres et Explosifs* at *Saint-Médard-en-Jalles*; the *Société Européenne de Propulsion* at Haillan), the Federal Republic of Germany (Hanover Air Show), the United Kingdom (Farnborough Air Show) and the Netherlands (25th International Astronautical Congress, Amsterdam). These visits helped greatly in keeping them up to date with the latest European developments and techniques in the missiles field.

2. Warships*(a) Current construction*

On the mainland of Europe, naval construction programmes are in hand in all member States which have navies.

Belgium is building ASW escort vessels. In France, work is continuing on the submarine programme and the building of ASW frigates; construction of ASW corvettes has been started. Conventional submarines are under construction in Italy, and missile frigates and a supply ship will soon be completed in the Netherlands. The Federal Republic of Germany has just completed a building programme of conventional sub-

marines and has a programme for missile coastal craft, some of which have been ordered from France.

(b) Control activity in 1974

Control measures were carried out in naval shipyards combined, in one case, with an agreed non-production control measure.

These operations were highly satisfactory and gave rise to no comments.

(c) Technical information visits

The Director of the Agency, together with a number of experts, visited the Anti-Submarine Warfare Research Centre at La Spezia (Italy) on the invitation of the NATO military authorities.

3. Military aircraft*(a) Production and purchases*

The German Federal air force began to take delivery of the Phantom F 4F aircraft purchased from the United States.

The Belgian and Netherlands Governments, which completed the modernisation of their air forces two years ago by the purchase of Mirage 5 and Northrop NF-5 aircraft respectively, have for some time been studying a replacement for their F-104G aircraft by 1980. Norway and Denmark have joined these two WEU countries in looking for an aircraft to replace their F-104Gs. The types of aircraft under consideration are: Mirage F-1 M-53 (France), Saab Viggen J-37 (Sweden) and YF-16 and YF-17 (United States).

In France, production of the Jaguar, in co-operation with the United Kingdom, and of the Mirage F-1 is continuing according to plan. Some units have already received these new aircraft. In the United Kingdom, the Jaguar aircraft in the tactical support version, began to be delivered to units of the Royal Air Force early in 1974.

The Italian aircraft industry is continuing production of the F-104S and G-91Y aircraft.

(b) Control activity

Control measures were carried out at depots holding aircraft or jet engines, at air force units

under national command and at plants producing air frames or jet engines.

(c) Future prospects

The first prototype of the MRCA 75-Panavia 200, built in co-production by the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, made its first flight in August 1974.

The production of prototypes is continuing according to plan by the three main firms associated with the MRCA 75 programme, namely, MBB (Federal Republic of Germany), Aeritalia (Italy) and BAC (United Kingdom).

The first prototypes (training and tactical support version) of the Alpha-Jet, built in co-production by France and the Federal Republic of Germany, have already made several flights.

The first prototype of the Hawk training aircraft, built by Hawker Siddeley (United Kingdom) made its first flight during August 1974. This aircraft will replace the Gnat advanced trainer in the Royal Air Force flying schools.

(d) Technical information visits

Agency experts visited the Hanover Air Show (Federal Republic of Germany) and the Farnborough Air Show (United Kingdom); they also participated in the 25th International Astronautical Congress at Amsterdam (Netherlands).

4. Chemical weapons

(a) List of chemical weapons subject to control

Since the procedure in force was completed before the end of 1973, the Council informed the Assembly, in their nineteenth annual report, that they had noted the renewal for 1974 of the list of weapons subject to control.

(b) Control activities

The replies given to the questions asked in implementation of Article III of Protocol No. III show that no effective production of chemical weapons has yet been undertaken on the mainland of Europe by member countries which have not renounced the right to produce such weapons.

As in previous years, the Agency also addressed to the appropriate authorities of the State concerned, a "request for annual information to

facilitate the non-production control of chemical weapons".

The detailed reply received to this request was of great assistance to the Agency in drawing up its programme of agreed control measures for 1974: such control measures were carried out at major chemical plants in the country concerned. In each case, a delegation from the national authorities took part in the exercise.

None of these measures revealed any indication of production of chemical weapons within the terms of Annex II of Protocol No. III.

(c) Improvement of control methods

The choice made by the Agency of establishments to be visited is the basis of all field control activity. As mentioned above, the reply to the request for annual information is a major guide to the choice made.

As previously stated in the eighteenth and nineteenth annual reports, a supplementary procedure, designed to increase the effectiveness of the Agency's action in this respect, was tried out in 1973. The encouraging results for that year were confirmed during its application in 1974.

(d) Technical information visits

On the invitation of the Italian authorities, the Agency experts visited two major chemical plants with very advanced technical facilities.

An Agency expert also had two meetings with the Commandant of the NBC establishment at the Defence Research Centre at Vilvorde in Belgium.

5. Biological weapons

(a) As mentioned under point C.3 (b) of this chapter, no controls are carried out by the Agency in this field.

It may be noted, however, that, with a view to facilitating any future non-production control of biological weapons, the Agency received in 1974, as in previous years, information supplied by the country concerned in response to the Agency's annual request.

The Council also noted, in December 1973, that the list of biological weapons subject to control was to be renewed for 1974; this was mentioned in the nineteenth annual report to the Assembly.

(b) Technical information visits

During the year, the Agency experts made several technical information visits to establishments equipped with very modern facilities in Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and France. They obtained valuable information on a number of microbiological problems and had very useful talks with leading scientists.

6. Atomic weapons

Since the situation regarding these weapons remained the same as in previous years, the Agency is not in a position to engage in any control activities, or even to carry out preparatory studies with regard to atomic weapons.

7. Electronic (radiation) weapons

Study of the use of the laser in weapons continued in the majority of countries. With the means available to it, the Agency makes every effort to keep abreast of developments in this technique.

E. Miscellaneous contacts**1. Contacts with the national authorities**

The Agency again maintained its numerous ties with national authorities, through Agency officials sent on mission and through national representatives visiting Paris.

As in previous years, the main object of these contacts was to arrange inspections and technical information visits, or to solve problems relating to control measures. As usual, these contacts were very helpful to the Agency in fulfilling its task.

2. Contacts with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

There were a number of personal contacts between Agency officials and officers of the International Military Secretariat and SHAPE.

Also, at the meeting held on 13th December at the Agency and attended by representatives of NATO, for the purpose of fixing levels of armaments for forces under NATO command,

there was an interesting exchange of views on questions of common interest.

G. Improving the proficiency of the experts

As in previous years, the experts' technical knowledge was kept satisfactorily up to date and further improved by means of the documentation collected by the Agency and the technical information visits organised by member States to this end.

To assist the experts, the documentation office draws on published material (press, specialised periodicals and various technical publications), which constitute a very valuable source of information concerning armaments under study, being developed or in production. In addition to the data sheets and monthly bibliographical bulletins which it provides for them at intervals, this office has produced summaries on such subjects as the laser, atomic propulsion and helicopters. It also obtains bibliographical bulletins for the experts from other documentation services specialising in armaments, with which it keeps in touch.

Technical information visits, which form part of a programme now being drawn up for a number of years, were directed to various fields in 1974. Their aim is twofold : to study all armaments techniques within a given period, and to acquire a wide knowledge of current progress in these techniques in the different countries.

The experts also improved their proficiency through meetings with engineers and other qualified staff during control measures at plants.

H. General conclusions

In accordance with Article XIX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency was able to report to the Council that, as a result of the control exercised in 1974, the figures obtained in accordance with Article XIII of Protocol No. IV :

- for armaments of forces under NATO command under the terms of Article XIV of Protocol No. IV ; and
- for armaments of forces maintained under national command under the terms of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of Protocol No. IV and the Agreement of

14th December 1957 concluded in execution of Article V of Protocol No. II,

represented for the control year 1974 and for each of the member States, the appropriate levels of armaments subject to control for those categories of armaments over which the Agency has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate.

As required by Article XX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of field control measures at production plants, it did not detect for the categories of armaments which it controls :

- either the manufacture in these establishments on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany of a category of

armaments that the government of this member State has undertaken not to manufacture ;

- or the existence, on the mainland of Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of Protocol No. IV) or not justified by export requirements (Article XXII of Protocol No. IV).

In 1974, the Agency applied controls effectively in those fields which are open to it.

In this, relations between the Agency and the national authorities and services of the member States, and also with those of NATO and SHAPE have continued to play an important part.

CHAPTER IV

STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE

A. Activities of the Standing Armaments Committee**1. Relations with FINABEL**

In accordance with the conclusions of the joint meeting of 16th May 1973, the Standing Armaments Committee has established close contacts with FINABEL and, in particular, has studied the most recent FINABEL agreements with a view to follow-up action in the field of armaments production. Prominence has also been given by the Standing Armaments Committee to the three-service aspect of the activities of its working groups.

2. Co-operation on armaments

The study of the economic and financial problems of armaments production in the member countries, referred to in the nineteenth annual report, has been held over pending further developments in the move to reactivate the Standing Armaments Committee.

A study of further action which governments might take on the various FINABEL agreements and draft agreements led the Standing Armaments Committee to consider drawing up a complete list of target-drone requirements and classifying them so that the various types of target capable of meeting the needs of the three services can be identified. The possibility of defining and developing some of these targets jointly would be studied at a second stage.

The exploratory group met twice to consider what action should be taken on the proposal mentioned in the nineteenth annual report for defining evaluation criteria for military equipment. They suggested that a working group should be set up, composed of officers, engineers and operational research experts, who would be asked to study evaluation techniques and their inclusion in the development process, as well as evaluation criteria. The Standing Armaments Committee is at present studying the whole question.

3. WEU agreement 4.FT.6.

In accordance with the wish expressed by the former ad hoc sub-group No. 6 at its last meeting, the Standing Armaments Committee agreed that a small group of two national experts, assisted by the International Secretariat, should revise the final wording of WEU draft agreement 4.FT.6. (technical testing programme for wheeled transport vehicles). This task, calling for the closest study, was completed by the middle of 1974. The draft agreement was presented to the Standing Armaments Committee at its meeting on 18th September 1974 and has been submitted to the appropriate national military authorities for approval.

As regards future work on vehicles, the Standing Armaments Committee studied the proposals submitted by the former ad hoc sub-group No. 6 before it was disbanded. They decided that this was not an appropriate time to examine the proposal to draw up a similar test programme for tracked vehicles but discussed at some length the continuation of technical studies and of the test programme for wheeled vehicles.

In this connection, the Committee decided not to set up a separate working group to bring WEU agreement 4.FT.6 up to date, but to entrust this task and the technical work involved to national experts appointed by member governments. It was agreed that the experts should deal with their problems chiefly by correspondence and that the work should be co-ordinated by the United Kingdom as pilot country, with the help of the International Secretariat. The Standing Armaments Committee will receive a progress report each year and may be asked to approve special meetings of the experts and visits to technical centres if those should prove necessary. It was understood that these activities would not duplicate those of FINABEL in the operational field.

4. Visits

Along with a large number of civilian and military experts from member countries, one delegate represented the Standing Armaments

Committee in September at German and British demonstrations held at Lichtenau and Meppen in the Federal Republic of Germany to assess the usefulness and progress of the work of working group No. 9.

On the invitation of the French authorities, the delegates to the Standing Armaments Committee visited the Technical Trials Centre at Angers on 19th September to study the methods and facilities used by the French army for evaluating military equipment (wheeled vehicles, engineering equipment, river-crossing equipment, engines, generators, pumps, etc.).

5. Liaison Sub-Committee on joint production of armaments

A meeting of the Sub-Committee is planned for 18th February 1975.

B. Activities of working groups

1. Working group No. 8 on operational research

Working group No. 8 on operational research held two meetings, the second of which was combined with a visit to Italy.

Exchanges of information took place as in the past, with the submission of data sheets and declarations of interest, and through bilateral exchanges of reports on operational research studies.

Work is continuing on the compilation of a five-language WEU glossary of operational research terms.

Rules for a library of operational research reports were approved by the Standing Armaments Committee, and the International Secretariat is now organising this collection of documents.

In Italy, the group visited the air force's air defence technical training centre at Borgo Piave (Latina), where various tactical situations in air defence were simulated on computers.

In the course of a visit to the operational research centre in Rome, Italian experts presented operational research studies from the three services and this was followed by discussion of the methods applied.

2. Working group No. 9 on hindrances

Working group No. 9 which is engaged in the study, extended experimentally to all three services, of new means of hindering enemy action, held three meetings, the last of which was coupled with demonstrations at the test centres at Lichtenau and Meppen in the Federal Republic of Germany. They included experiments carried out by German and British experts.

C. International Secretariat

1. Meeting of deputy armaments directors

The International Secretariat provided the necessary support services for the meeting of deputy national armaments directors held in Paris on 29th and 30th January 1974. The report on the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee, submitted at the end of 1973, formed the main working document for this meeting¹.

2. Relations with member countries and the Council

In January 1974, the Assistant Secretary-General visited Brussels where he had talks with the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Van Elsdale.

In October, the Assistant Secretary-General met the Italian military authorities in Rome and had talks with the Secretary of State, Mr. Mario Pedini, and with the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Gaja.

Lastly, on 22nd May 1974, the Assistant Secretary-General made his usual annual report to the Council on the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee and its working groups.

3. Parliamentary assembly

The International Secretariat informed the Standing Armaments Committee of the concern expressed by the WEU Assembly at its sessions of June and December 1974, regarding the need to improve European co-operation on armaments, and gave details of the questions put to the Council on the subject by a number of parliamentarians.

¹ Reference is made to this meeting in Chapter II. D of this report.

4. Relations with NATO

As in the past, satisfactory relations were maintained with NATO through the regular attendance of NATO observers at meetings of the Standing Armaments Committee, and of a representative of the International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee at all meetings of the NATO Naval Group and of the Conference of National Armaments Directors.

5. Relations with FINABEL

The contacts established between the Standing Armaments Committee and FINABEL secretariats at the joint meeting in May 1973 were fully maintained during 1974 in the best spirit of co-operation.

The chief positive feature of these contacts is that the Standing Armaments Committee is

now better informed and is consequently in a position to exploit, as and when appropriate, those FINABEL agreements which seem most suitable for co-operation or exchanges of views between member countries on subjects of common interest concerning ground forces. Furthermore, the new orientation of FINABEL's work towards long-term projects will, in future, offer the Standing Armaments Committee greater scope for action by enabling it to intervene before countries start the individual study and development of equipment.

In November 1974, the International Secretariat was represented at the annual meeting of the FINABEL Co-ordinating Committee which reviews the work and future programmes of the working groups. In the same way, the head of the FINABEL secretariat attended the meeting at the end of the year, at which the Standing Armaments Committee reviewed the results achieved by its working groups.

CHAPTER V

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE

A. Meetings of the Committee

The Public Administration Committee held two meetings in 1974 — at Brussels, from 24th to 26th April and at The Hague from 25th to 27th September.

An important part of each meeting was devoted, as is customary, to exchanges of information on new developments affecting public administration in the member countries during the six-month interval between meetings. A number of subjects which are raised regularly during these exchanges were mentioned, country by country, in the nineteenth annual report. Although the choice of subjects discussed is naturally governed by the current situation, it is significant that many of the problems arising in the various member countries are very similar and can be grouped under a few broad headings — national development plans, regionalisation, administrative deconcentration and dispersal of government services outside the capital, initial and further training courses for senior and middle grades, relations with the unions, the problems of strikes in the public services, etc. These discussions provide an opportunity for comparing notes on the solutions adopted in the various countries and on the obstacles encountered.

During its meetings, the Committee also prepares the multilateral course for government officials and the study visits, which are dealt with later in this chapter.

With regard to courses for government officials, the Committee decided, at the September meeting, to modify the formula used in 1974 and the three previous years. The purpose of these courses, designed basically for young civil servants, was to present the main characteristic features of the administrations of member countries. Despite their undoubted success and without wishing to abandon this formula for future courses, the Committee recognised the need to provide courses dealing with a specific subject for government officials who, as is the case in many sectors of the administration, have little or no opportunity to meet at international level. Bilateral study visits do not really meet their needs, since the comparisons they offer are always

too limited. Noting that the United Nations had decided to declare 1975 International Women's Year, the Committee agreed that the subject of the 1975 course for government officials, which will take place in Italy, should be "The position of women in the civil service". The Committee also hopes that with the more specialised courses now planned, it will be easier to select participants, which often proves difficult for a subject of a general nature.

At the September meeting, the Public Administration Committee noted that the Council had decided to entrust it with the task of following the implementation by member States of the principles defined by the special working group set up by the WEU Council in October 1971 to study the secondment of national officials to international organisations. These principles, which the Council have transmitted to member governments with a recommendation for their application, are reproduced in Chapter VI, point F.1 of this report.

The Public Administration Committee plans to report to the Council on this matter during the summer of 1975.

B. Multilateral course for government officials

The twenty-third course for government officials, organised by the Public Administration Committee, took place in the United Kingdom. It was held at the Civil Service College, in Edinburgh, from 4th to 15th November. It was designed for young senior civil servants from the national administrations and, like the three previous annual courses, was intended to give them a clearer insight into the principal characteristic features of the administrations of member countries.

The first week was devoted to a series of talks given by each national delegation in turn explaining the structure of their national administration and how it functions. The five specific topics selected, within the general theme, were the following :

1. The rôle of parliament and its relations with the executive.

2. Relations between Ministers and officials of the central administration, including the use of ministerial cabinets.
3. Regional administration.
4. Administrative discretion and the functions of administrative law, with special reference to the redress of grievances.
5. The functions of the Ministry of Finance.

These talks, followed by discussions and complemented by four lectures, added to participants' knowledge of comparative administration, clarified points of detail and, in some measure, enabled them to form an overall picture of the subject under study. As noted last year, in references to the previous course in the nineteenth annual report, participants also profit greatly from the linguistic standpoint, from the opportunity which they are given to understand more clearly the meaning of the administrative terminology used in the languages of the other countries.

During the second week, each delegation presented a case study or an important recent development in the administration of their country. These sessions were designed to illustrate the general features of the country's administration, which had already been described, by showing how the administrative process works in practice. Participants were, for example, invited to explain the procedure in their country for selecting a site for a major installation, such as an airport or a steel works, or to describe the procedure for the passing of legislation by parliament, emphasis being on the rôle of civil servants and Ministers.

At the end of the course, there was a general discussion on the impact of international institutions on national administrations and the handling of business arising from their membership. Participants were asked to comment on the arrangements and experiences in their own countries.

It would appear that the Edinburgh course was a complete success, as is shown by the comments received from delegations.

C. Study visits

The study visits arranged under the auspices of the Public Administration Committee did not increase in number during the year for the reasons explained in the two previous annual reports. Visits of this kind are organised in all the member countries through a great many channels, and are sometimes found to be in competition with each other. In addition, the financial difficulties encountered everywhere during 1974 and the desire of governments to economise in most sectors undoubtedly affected activities of this kind unfavourably, despite their value for the officials who participate in them.

These were the main reasons underlying the Council's reply to Written Question 145, in which they were asked whether they considered it possible and desirable to invite the Public Administration Committee to take steps to promote exchanges of ideas and persons between Western Europe and the United States.

The Committee noted, however, that a number of delegations hoped to be able to give a new impetus to study visits sponsored by the Committee next year. Moreover, by deciding to modify the formula for courses for government officials, as stated under point A, the Committee aims to organise "multilateral study visits" which would enable some senior civil servants from the member countries to study a specific subject together, to their mutual benefit.

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As in previous years, the Public Administration Committee received full support from member governments, which recognise and appreciate the value of its work.

CHAPTER VI

BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS**A. Budget**

Summaries of the main, supplementary and total budgets for 1974 and the main budget estimates for 1975 are shown in the appendix to this report.

The supplementary budget for 1974 was introduced primarily to take account of (a) standard-of-living increase awarded to staff as an advance against the 1974 general review, (b) two exceptional reviews of the remuneration of staffs serving in both the United Kingdom and France, (c) the annual review of remunerations effective from 1st July 1974, and (d) a forecast estimate of the cost of the general review, also due to take effect from 1st July 1974. No decision in regard to the general review, however, had been taken by the end of 1974.

On the recommendation of the Budget and Organisation Committee, the scope and presentation of the WEU budget estimates for 1975 have been modified. Hitherto, the annual main budget was prepared on the basis of known costs to be met in the coming year, a procedure which invariably entailed the presentation of supplementary budgets in the course of that year to take account of increased costs, resulting essentially from cost-of-living awards to staff, approved by the Council.

In order to circumvent, as far as possible, the necessity for supplementary budgets, it was decided to include in the main budget, increases forecast for the year 1975, to cover salaries, allowances, goods and services. The increases covering salaries and allowances, however, would remain blocked until approved by the Council on the recommendation of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts.

B. WEU administrative meetings

The practice was continued of holding periodical meetings between the administrative officials of the Secretariat-General, the Armaments Control Agency, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Office of the Clerk to examine matters of common interest.

C. WEU provident fund

The advisory panel, set up by the Secretary-General in 1972 to work out practical arrangements for the day-to-day administration of the provident fund, met on three occasions in 1974, in the presence of a representative of the Clerk of the Assembly. On the advice of the panel, the Secretary-General maintained the policy adopted in July 1972 of investing the fund in several currencies. By arranging these investments on a short-term basis, staff were better protected than hitherto against losses incurred through monetary fluctuations, but it cannot be concealed that the Secretary-General, with his responsibility for the administration of the provident fund, is seriously preoccupied by the effects upon it of monetary erosion which progressively diminishes its capital value.

D. Pension scheme

Progress in introducing the pension scheme for the staff of the co-ordinated organisations is reported in paragraph E. 3. below.

Within the framework of WEU, however, a number of preparatory measures were taken with a view to facilitating, so far as possible, the transition from the provident fund to the pension scheme, as laid down in the draft pension regulations.

Among these preparatory measures was the need to calculate the sums required from the provident fund of staff in service before 1st July 1974, to enable them to join the pension scheme by validation of past service. Since this involved not only serving staff members but also former staff, the operation represented a considerable task.

Until the relevant figures are available, and until a number of important issues affecting pensions have been resolved within the Co-ordinating Committee (see paragraph E. 3. below), it will not be possible to estimate accurately the number of WEU staff likely to opt for the pension scheme in preference to maintaining the provident fund. Options may be exercised within

the year from the date on which the Council approves the text of the "Pension Regulations" currently being studied by the Co-ordinating Committee. No such options, however, are open to staff joining WEU from 1st July 1974, who are obliged to subscribe to the pension scheme. Nevertheless, until the pension scheme becomes operative, they contribute to the provident fund.

E. Activities within the framework of the co-ordinated organisations

1. Committee of Heads of Administration

As in the previous years, the Heads of Administration of the co-ordinated organisations met frequently in the course of 1974. Apart from exchanging views on common problems, they were entrusted by the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General with the task of preparing numerous documents for submission to the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts, notably the proposals of the Secretaries-General for the 1974 general review of remunerations.

The Heads of Administration also set up an administrative committee on pensions, which met on several occasions in the latter half of 1974 to advise on a wide and complex variety of problems concerning the application of the pension scheme for the co-ordinated organisations, especially in the transitional period.

2. Standing Committee of Secretaries-General

The Standing Committee of Secretaries-General held twelve meetings in the course of 1974, in addition to three joint meetings with the Standing Committee of Staff Associations.

As the Assembly will have noted from the Council's reply to Recommendation 240, the Secretary-General's proposal to introduce a system of dual grading, which had been advocated by the Assembly, did not find favour with the other co-ordinated organisations, which are not faced to the same extent as WEU with problems of promotion.

The Standing Committee of Secretaries-General was primarily occupied in preparing for discussions with the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts on the rules to

be applied to the pension scheme and on the question of taxation of pensions. It also submitted to the Co-ordinating Committee proposals to establish machinery for a co-ordinated application of the pension rules. No decision on these has yet been taken.

Apart from pensions, the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General considered and approved, for submission to the Co-ordinating Committee, a number of proposals concerning exceptional salary reviews of staff serving in member countries, in accordance with established procedures, and for the 1974 general review of salaries. In the latter case, the Secretaries-General, recognising the economic difficulties encountered by several member countries within the co-ordinated framework and the acceleration of inflation, limited their proposals to a straightforward adjustment of remunerations to the standard-of-living trends during the reference period 1st October 1971 to 1st July 1974 (on which an advance, averaging 2%, was accorded from 1st January 1974). No major proposals affecting allowances were made.

The Co-ordinating Committee had not completed their study of the general review proposals for staffs serving in Belgium, France and Germany at the end of 1974. Proposals covering staff serving in the United Kingdom have not yet been submitted.

3. Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts

In the course of 1974, the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts issued seventeen reports, Nos. 93-109. Sixteen of these were subsequently adopted by the Councils.

The WEU Council's nineteenth report to the Assembly outlined the substance of the recommendations contained in the 93rd report of the Co-ordinating Committee, concerning equality of treatment for male and female staff, and the 94th report on the establishment of a pension scheme for the co-ordinated organisations. Both these reports were approved by the WEU Council early in 1974, and were reproduced as Appendices VI and VII respectively in Assembly Document 631.

It will be noted that in Part IV of the 94th report on pensions, the Co-ordinating Committee sought the approval of Councils to pursue the

study of certain problems, notably in preparing the rules to be applied, the arrangements to be made to guarantee the payment of pensions, no matter what might happen to an organisation, and in finding an appropriate solution to the tax arrangements to be applied to the pension scheme.

The Councils having approved these proposals, the Co-ordinating Committee devoted twelve meetings in the course of 1974 to discussions on the pension scheme, nine of them to the tax problem. By the end of the year, a large measure of agreement had been reached on most of the essential points covered by the pension rules, including both guarantees and the bonus to officials remaining in service after the normal age of entitlement, as recommended by the Assembly in Recommendation 250, paragraph I, 1. However, a divergence of views remained between governments on the extent and method by which pensions should be taxed. Since the deadlock could not be resolved within the Committee, the Chairman issued a report (No. 109) to Councils outlining the conflicting viewpoints and seeking their guidance. To this report, the Secretaries-General have attached a memorandum, in which they ask Councils to adopt the proposal of the majority (subject to improved conditions), or to invite the Co-ordinating Committee to find an alternative solution.

The Councils expect to discuss the 109th report and the memorandum of the Secretaries-General early in 1975.

Of the other reports issued by the Co-ordinating Committee, and approved by Councils during 1974, the following affected WEU staff :

95th report : Standard-of-living increase of 2 % awarded to staffs of the co-ordinated organisations as an advance against the 1974 general review (effective from 1st January 1974).

98th report : Exceptional review of salaries in various countries including United Kingdom (6.1 %) and France (6 %) as from 1st January 1974.

99th report : Adjustment of subsistence allowance rates for staff travelling on mission, as from 1st May 1974.

102nd report : Adjustment of kilometric allowance rates for staff using their own vehicles on official duty.

104th report : Exceptional review of salaries in various countries including the United Kingdom (5.4 %), as from 1st April 1974.

106th report : Exceptional review of salaries in various countries including France (5.4 %), as from 1st May 1974.

108th report : Annual review of salaries for staffs of the co-ordinated organisations, including the United Kingdom (5.8 %) and France (3.8 %), as from 1st July 1974.

F. Other administrative activities

1. Secondment of national officials to international organisations

The studies carried out on this subject by a special group of experts set up by the Council in October 1971 originated from Assembly Recommendation 200 of 27th November 1970.

The Assembly was kept continuously informed of the progress of these studies, which concluded with the approval by the Council in July 1974, of the principles worked out by the experts for application in fixing the conditions for secondment.

These principles are as follows :

1. In view of the particular importance attaching to the secondment of national officials to international organisations, the States should be guided by a minimum of common principles in fixing the conditions for the secondment of these officials. Officials subject to these rules would be on European seconded service.
2. Each of the governments of the member countries of WEU shall determine the categories of officials who can be placed on European seconded service and shall decide in each individual case whether this system shall apply.
3. The proposed system envisages the secondment of national officials to international organisations and, in particular, the co-ordinated organisations.
4. Officials on European seconded service will not be regarded as having left their national civil service ; they will be placed in the appropriate administrative position under their terms of service as national officials.

5. Without prejudice to the principle that each member State is free to establish the duration of secondment, the following points might be considered :

- (i) the normal period would be from three to five years ;
- (ii) possibility of extension ; ten years appears to be the normal maximum, any exceptions would be left to the discretion of governments ;
- (iii) governments would still retain the option, in certain special cases, of applying either a formula other than secondment (e.g. "temporary release" for very short periods, particularly for technical work in international organisations of a scientific or a technological nature) or the national secondment rules which can vary from one country to another.

6. Any official or member of staff to whom the benefit of European seconded service had been granted would, at the end of his period of secondment, automatically be reintegrated into his national civil service.

7. Officials on European seconded service should suffer no discrimination, at least on being reintegrated into the national civil service, as regards progression in that service and, for this purpose, a period served in an international organisation should be counted as service with the home civil service ; there should be no delay in progression based on seniority and seconded officials should be entitled, like other officials in their civil service, to compete for promotion by selection based on merit.

Such promotion by selection may be granted according to the rules of each State, either during secondment or when officials return to their home civil service, with retroactive effect where applicable.

8. Respect for the essential independence of an official on European seconded service implies that, subject to the principles set forth below regarding retirement pension, he cannot, in principle, during the time of his secondment, accept any kind of fee, gift, reward or emolument from any source other than the international organisation to which he has been seconded.

9. Although, because of the independence of officials on European seconded service, governments are not, in principle, informed of the reports on their seconded staff, an organisation can forward a report and the government can request one, if necessary, especially at the end of the period of service, in order to consider its official's suitability for promotion.

10. Years of service counting for a retirement pension or a capital sum paid by an international organisation are not, in principle, also counted for the pension payable to the same official by his own State.

However, there should be no disadvantage for an official on European seconded service in comparison with his national colleagues.

The members of the Council transmitted the text of these ten principles to their governments with a recommendation for their application.

It was further agreed that the Public Administration Committee should follow the implementation of these principles by member States.

The Public Administration Committee¹ therefore has to consider how this duty is to be carried out and will have to report to the Council in due course.

2. Special measures to offset promotion difficulties for WEU staff

As stated in paragraph E.2. above, and as the Assembly was informed in the Council's replies to Recommendations 240 and 250, the Assembly's proposal to introduce dual grading at every level of employment did not win the support of the other co-ordinated organisations, and consequently could not be placed before the Co-ordinating Committee.

The Council, while recognising that the position of WEU staff gave rise to special problems as regards promotion prospects, considered that individual special measures should be sufficient to resolve the difficulties arising in this connection.

1. On this point, see Chapter V.

APPENDIX

Summary of WEU main budget for 1974

	A *	B *	C *	Total B + C
	£	Frs.	Frs.	Frs.
Salaries and allowances	348,705	3,418,624	7,668,758	11,087,382
Travel	11,325	68,000	194,000	262,000
Other operating costs	61,440	253,600	326,205	579,805
Purchase of furniture, etc.	4,475	13,000	14,500	27,500
Buildings	—	—	—	—
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	425,945	3,753,224	8,203,463	11,956,687
WEU tax	104,750	1,082,390	2,495,915	3,578,305
Other receipts	7,890	7,600	11,000	18,600
TOTAL INCOME	112,640	1,089,990	2,506,915	3,596,905
NET TOTAL	313,305	2,663,234	5,696,548	8,359,782

National contributions called for under the WEU main budget for 1974

	600ths	£	F. frs.
Belgium	59	30,808.33	822,045.23
France	120	62,661.00	1,671,956.40
Germany	120	62,661.00	1,671,956.40
Italy	120	62,661.00	1,671,956.40
Luxembourg	2	1,044.34	27,865.94
Netherlands	59	30,808.33	822,045.23
United Kingdom	120	62,661.00	1,671,956.40
TOTAL	600	313,305.00	8,359,782.00

* A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Armaments Control Agency.

Summary of WEU supplementary budget for 1974

	A *	B *	C *	Total B + C
	£	Frs.	Frs.	Frs.
Salaries and allowances	+ 62,529	+ 589,088	+ 1,228,958	+ 1,818,046
Travel	+ 3,690	—	+ 5,400	+ 5,400
Other operating costs	+ 5,150	+ 14,525	+ 18,710	+ 33,235
Purchase of furniture, etc.	—	+ 500	+ 1,160	+ 1,660
Buildings	—	—	—	—
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	+ 71,369	+ 604,113	+ 1,254,228	+ 1,858,341
WEU tax	+ 23,909	+ 242,159	+ 374,378	+ 616,537
Other receipts	+ 880	+ 14,000	+ 25,200	+ 39,200
TOTAL INCOME	+ 24,789	+ 256,159	+ 399,578	+ 655,737
NET TOTAL	+ 46,580	+ 347,954	+ 854,650	+ 1,202,604

National contributions called for under the WEU supplementary budget for 1974

	600ths	£	F. frs.
Belgium	59	4,580.37	118,256.06
France	120	9,316.00	240,520.80
Germany	120	9,316.00	240,520.80
Italy	120	9,316.00	240,520.80
Luxembourg	2	155.26	4,008.68
Netherlands	59	4,580.37	118,256.06
United Kingdom	120	9,316.00	240,520.80
TOTAL	600	46,580.00	1,202,604.00

* A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Armaments Control Agency.

Summary of total WEU budget for 1974

	A *	B *	C *	Total B + C
	£	Frs.	Frs.	Frs.
Salaries and allowances	411,234	4,007,712	8,897,716	12,905,428
Travel	15,015	68,000	199,400	267,400
Other operating costs	66,590	268,125	344,915	613,040
Purchase of furniture, etc.	4,475	13,500	15,660	29,160
Buildings	—	—	—	—
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	497,314	4,357,337	9,457,691	13,815,028
WEU tax	128,659	1,324,549	2,870,293	4,194,842
Other receipts	8,770	21,600	36,200	57,800
TOTAL INCOME	137,429	1,346,149	2,906,493	4,252,642
NET TOTAL	359,885	3,011,188	6,551,198	9,562,386

National contributions called for under the total WEU budget for 1974

	600ths	£	F. frs.
Belgium	59	35,388.70	940,301.29
France	120	71,977.00	1,912,477.20
Germany	120	71,977.00	1,912,477.20
Italy	120	71,977.00	1,912,477.20
Luxembourg	2	1,199.60	31,874.62
Netherlands	59	35,388.70	940,301.29
United Kingdom	120	71,977.00	1,912,477.20
TOTAL	600	359,885.00	9,562,386.00

* A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Armaments Control Agency.

Summary of WEU draft main budget for 1975

	A *	B *	C *	Total B + C
	£	Frs.	Frs.	Frs.
Salaries and allowances	481,305	4,850,790	10,609,960	15,460,750
Travel	13,360	72,700	229,000	301,700
Other operating costs	61,605	270,925	396,620	667,545
Purchase of furniture, etc.	3,210	13,500	18,300	31,800
Buildings	—	—	—	—
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	559,480	5,207,915	11,253,880	16,461,795
WEU tax	154,355	1,645,020	3,602,970	5,247,990
Other receipts	7,315	12,000	16,600	28,600
TOTAL INCOME	161,670	1,657,020	3,619,570	5,276,590
NET TOTAL	397,810	3,550,895	7,634,310	11,185,205

* A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Armaments Control Agency.

European union and WEU

REPORT¹

**submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Mr. Krieg, Rapporteur**

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1. Adopted in Committee by 11 votes to 0 with 6 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee: Mr. Sieglerschmidt (Chairman); Mr. Krieg, Sir John Rodgers (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Abens, Amrehn (Substitute: Müller), Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Bettiol, Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Brugnon, Fletcher, Mrs. Godinache-Lambert, MM. Leynen, Mende,*

Minnocci, Nessler, de Niet, Peijnenburg (Substitute: Voogd), Périquier (Substitute: Soustelle), Porthéine, Preti, Quilléri, Roger, Schmidt (Substitute: Schwencke), Steel (Substitute: Lord Beaumont of Whitley), Tomney (Substitute: Grieve), Van Hoeylandt, Grussenmeyer, Pecoraro.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on European union and WEU

The Assembly,

Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty is the basis of European political union in defence matters ;

Expressing the wish that the efforts of the Nine to achieve such a union will allow rapid progress to be made in this direction ;

Noting the decision of the Heads of State or of Government to examine, in 1975, a report on European union ;

Noting that the defence policies of member countries are insufficiently co-ordinated ;

Noting nevertheless that these policies pursue a common goal, that of ensuring Western European security in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance ;

Considering that there is broad agreement between the members of WEU to plan their defence policy in such a way as to make Europe a true partner of the United States in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance ;

Considering moreover that the most serious threats at present are to the northern and southern flanks of the western defence system ;

Recalling Recommendation 145 adopted by the Assembly on 15th December 1966,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Propose that a future meeting of the European Council study the requirements of a European defence policy in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty ;
2. With this conference in view, ask member governments to make the necessary preparatory studies now ;
3. Examine in particular the consequences for European security of the emergence of new nuclear powers and the agreements concluded or to be concluded between the nuclear powers ;
4. Ensure that WEU is maintained with its present responsibilities and that it takes effective action in all matters of concern to it ;
5. Remind the EEC countries which have not yet acceded to it, and all the European countries with a democratic régime which wish to be associated with a common defence policy, that they may accede to the Brussels Treaty ;
6. Consider regularly and in the context of a European defence policy, foreign policy matters affecting the defence of Western Europe and the defence policies of the member States with a view to co-ordinating military efforts, developing industrial potential and limiting the cost of defence for these States ;
7. Bear in mind, particularly in the examination it has been instructed to effect regarding the reactivation of the Standing Armaments Committee, the need to preserve and develop Europe's industrial potential with special reference to advanced technology.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Krieg, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. This document is a sequel to a report on European union and WEU submitted by your Rapporteur to the Assembly at its last session and referred back to Committee for presentation at the session to be held in Bonn in May 1975.

2. Although the previous report was agreed to by a very large majority in Committee, the Assembly's debates showed that there was deep-rooted disagreement between members in two respects: first, some members of the Assembly made fundamental objections to the report because they considered it anti-American, which was not at all your Rapporteur's intention, nor probably that of the Committee; others had strong objections to specific parts of the report but were not against the general direction taken.

3. Your Rapporteur therefore gathered that he had mistaken the significance of the vote in the General Affairs Committee and underestimated the differences still existing between the members of WEU over the shape of the European union which a large majority is seeking to promote.

4. The discussions in Committee showed that there were very clear divergencies between its members, essentially over the likelihood of a European defence policy, the possibility of which was challenged by some members.

5. Your Rapporteur is well aware that the text he is submitting does not represent the Committee's unanimous opinion. He has taken full account of all the objections made in plenary sitting and in Committee either, where they do not affect the general trend of his work, by completely revising the terms of the report or, in the case of positions he could not endorse, by incorporating a summary of the objections in the body of the report, indicating that they are not his own views.

6. The divergencies no doubt stem from the fundamental opinions of those concerned, but are also due to a degree of uncertainty about the future of WEU, of Europe and perhaps of the Atlantic Alliance too. It is therefore difficult to distinguish between what is due to present, temporary circumstances and what is paving the way for the future organisation of Europe.

7. Speaking in the Dutch Parliament, Mr. van der Stoel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, recently defined the present position of WEU as follows:

"Ministerial consultation in the context of WEU takes place less frequently since the accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC and since political co-operation has mainly been transferred to the European political co-operation (of the Nine).

This does not, however, mean a weakening of WEU, as it is a direct result of the ever-increasing political consultation of the members of the European Communities, which group comprises besides Ireland and Denmark all seven member partners of WEU.

It does, however, mean that within WEU, even more than before, the accent will come to lie on the work of the Assembly which in the opinion of the government makes an important contribution to opinion-forming and on the dialogue between the Assembly and the Council and individual Ministers."

8. Your Rapporteur might fully agree with such a statement if the Minister had also given his government's position on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty which, until further notice, is the only juridical basis for a truly European defence policy. Moreover, one Committee member felt that, in view of uncertainty about British intentions, the possibility of WEU resuming its importance should be left open and in the meantime its rôle should be confined to that of the Assembly, as Mr. van der Stoel had said.

9. Your Rapporteur, for his part, has confidence in the British desire to remain in the European Community and has based his thinking on the prospect of a European union comprising in any event the nine present members of the EEC. It is evident that if circumstances were to modify the situation in Europe the present report would have to be reviewed.

10. Another objection to the report was that it sought to justify "French policy, which was to have France play a leading rôle in the defence of Europe".

11. This is a criticism your Rapporteur could not accept. He had in no way sought to justify

French policy or claim French supremacy in Europe, he had merely considered the prospects open to Europe taking account of the positions adopted by France in the last ten years.

12. Finally, your Rapporteur has to take account of a number of events which occurred since he wrote his last report, i.e. essentially the decisions taken at the summit conference held in Paris on 9th and 10th December 1974 and the important views expressed at the WEU Assembly's session in December 1974 by Mr. Van Elsslande and Mr. Vredeling, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium and Minister of Defence of the Netherlands respectively, which very directly concern the rôle attributed by these two countries to WEU at the present juncture.

13. For all these reasons, this document will not be the result of a vain attempt to correct, cut up and rearrange an old report, it will seek to give an entirely new shape to the presentation of ideas which have remained the same.

II. European union

14. On 9th and 10th December 1974, the Heads of State or of Government of the member countries of the European Economic Community held a summit meeting in Paris which they decided should be the last of its kind. At this meeting, they defined the way in which they intend in future to deal with matters concerning relations between Europe and the rest of the world as follows :

"...Recognising the need for an overall approach to the internal problems involved in achieving European unity and the external problems facing Europe, the Heads of Government consider it essential to ensure progress and overall consistency in the activities of the Communities and in the work on political co-operation.

The Heads of Government have therefore decided to meet, accompanied by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, three times a year and, whenever necessary, in the Council of the Communities and in the context of political co-operation. The administrative secretariat will be provided for in an appropriate manner with due regard for existing practices and procedures.

.....

Greater latitude will be given to the permanent representatives so that only the most important political problems need be discussed in the Council. To this end, each member State will take the measures it considers necessary to strengthen the rôle of the permanent representatives and involve them in preparing the national positions on European affairs."

15. Thus, the Heads of State or of Government defined new procedure for dealing more efficiently with questions which are essential for the European Community. It should however be noted that the British and Danish Delegations did not associate themselves with the other seven member countries of the EEC on the election of the parliamentary assembly by universal suffrage. Furthermore, matters concerning defence and the relationship between foreign policy and the security of Europe were probably not discussed at the summit meeting in Paris. In any event, they were not mentioned in the final communiqué.

16. It may nevertheless be considered that the Paris summit meeting gave new impetus to European union in political matters. Consequently, the question of organising Europe in defence matters will become increasingly acute as and when progress is made with political Europe.

17. Decisions taken at the Paris summit meeting and the establishment of the European Council in 1975 make it unlikely that a European union will be formed on federal lines. Within the EEC, the governments seem to wish to give the Council sway over the Commission. Opposition between the institutions of the Rome Treaty and WEU is therefore declining and there seems little justification for the idea that the treaties on which European co-operation is based might be considerably modified.

18. It therefore seems realistic to envisage Europe being organised in the next few years on the basis of existing treaties, among which the modified Brussels Treaty is the only one to cover security and defence questions. Since Ireland and Denmark, members of the European Community, have never acceded to the Brussels Treaty, it is rather unlikely that WEU will be able to form the defence branch of the European Community in the near future, however logical this may appear at first sight. Conversely, it is unlikely that if Denmark and Ireland were prepared to be associated with a European defence

policy they would still refuse to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty.

19. In this connection, your Rapporteur wishes to recall a remark made by Lord Gladwyn in a report submitted to the WEU Assembly in November 1971 :

"...It would be unacceptable, therefore, for any State to join the EEC on the implied assumption that it would not one day have to accept responsibility for European foreign policy and defence. For if it did join on such an assumption there might be real difficulty in organising the defence of Europe at some possibly very critical moment in the not too far distant future. If this thesis is not admitted then it is difficult to see how progress can be made otherwise than by building up WEU as it were in parallel with the EEC pending the day when the parliament of Europe can be brought into the field of defence and foreign policy. But if it is admitted, there is a strong case for now taking over the whole WEU machine as it is and to a certain extent merging it with the existing EEC apparatus."

20. When conditions allow, it would therefore seem desirable for the Council to invite Denmark and Ireland officially to join the treaty and to do likewise in the case of all countries applying for membership of the EEC. Should such countries refuse to accede to the treaty, it would still be possible to envisage the formation of a lop-sided European union, wider in the economic field, narrower in the defence and external policy fields. Everything indicates that this is the course on which Europe has actually embarked.

21. There is one more objection to the previous report of the General Affairs Committee advanced by several speakers at the December session. They stressed the discriminatory nature of the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly towards the Federal Republic of Germany, and considered it undesirable that a treaty whose signatories are not on equal footing should serve as a basis for European union.

22. Here your Rapporteur endorses the wish expressed by the European Progressive Democrat Group on 25th June 1974 calling on the December summit conference to take a decision on progress in defence and political co-operation including :

"a uniform statute for the member States of WEU, with an increased emphasis on the rôle of the Armaments Committee of this organisation."

23. It should be noted that Irish parliamentarians also endorsed this wish, which implies that Irish public opinion is perhaps less hostile to a European defence organisation than is sometimes claimed. Conversely, the Federal Republic has never officially asked that the modified Brussels Treaty be re-negotiated in order to revise the discriminatory clauses.

24. It is clear that the European union as it is now taking shape is in many ways reminiscent of the Fouchet plan submitted to the European Parliamentary Assembly on 20th December 1961. In a report dated 4th April 1962, Mr. Badini Confalonieri meticulously compared the bases of a European union in the then French proposals with what the seven member countries of WEU had subscribed to in the modified Brussels Treaty which, according to him :

"goes just as far as the French proposals, notably in :

- in principle, wider competence ;
- two-thirds, and simple majority vote in certain cases ;
- automatic assistance in the case of attack ;
- the whole defence provisions..."

He added :

"If the French proposals can be amended in this sense, the European interest prescribes that they should be accepted in order to give a new start. If this is not done, the whole organisation could fall back into inter-governmental inertia. The adaptation of the now proven and tested community methods to the new political community constitutes the right method for the future."

25. This now seems to have occurred and the problems facing Western Europe in 1962 are still there today in a not very different form and your Rapporteur feels that here he is upholding a cause and ideas which for a long time and on many occasions have been upheld by the General Affairs Committee and the Assembly.

26. Summing up the discussion on this report, the Committee Chairman pointed out that he considered the question which seemed to be

dividing Committee members was mainly when could a discussion on defence be held in the framework of the Nine. Your Rapporteur feels this should be quite soon, otherwise, if it fails to assume responsibility for its own security, Europe might be taken unawares by new situations towards which its members might take individual action to ensure their own security. The result might be to bring down the European edifice and considerably increase the threat to the independence of our countries.

III. European defence in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance

27. Eight of the nine member countries of the European Community are members of the Atlantic Alliance, as are also the seven member countries of WEU. For them, the North Atlantic Treaty has a number of implications in the political field on the one hand and the defence field on the other. Signed on 4th April 1949, the treaty dates back to a time when there was no real organisation of Europe. The States which signed it were totally independent of each other. The treaty implies a number of commitments, the principal of which are set out in Article 3, by which the parties undertake separately and jointly to resist armed attack; Article 5, by which the parties agree that if one of them is attacked they will take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area", and Article 9 establishing a Council to consider matters concerning the implementation of the treaty. It should be noted that the undertakings entered into by the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty are rather vague and limited. Article 5 does not define the measures to be taken by each party in the event of one of them being attacked and Article 9 places no obligations on those taking part in the Council set up by the treaty.

28. It therefore became necessary subsequently for the Atlantic Alliance to set up a number of bodies to compensate for the shortcomings of the treaty. Thus, through NATO and the military integration of forces stationed in Europe under one command, also integrated, the European members of NATO entered into military commitments extending far beyond those embodied in the treaty. Where deterrence is concerned, it may be said that the effect of integrated forces is at least equal and probably superior to what

might be achieved through the undertaking set out in the treaty. It is especially valid in that for more than twenty-five years the United States has maintained large numbers of troops on the mainland of Europe and in the Federal Republic of Germany in particular. Their presence means that an attacker would have to come to grips with the United States, and the American nuclear weapon can thus play its full deterrent rôle.

29. However, two European countries, France in 1966 and Greece in August 1974, decided to withdraw their forces from the NATO integrated commands, although proclaiming their wish to remain members of the Atlantic Alliance. In February 1975, Turkey for its part announced that it was considering closing all or some of the American bases on its territory in response to a decision by the United States Congress to suspend American military assistance to Turkey because of the Cyprus conflict.

30. France's withdrawal from NATO raised a number of military, technical and financial problems which now seem to have been almost entirely solved. When President Ford and President Giscard d'Estaing met in Martinique in December 1974 they concluded an agreement on the last outstanding point at issue, that of reimbursing the United States for the cost of infrastructure set up in France by the Americans prior to 1966 and taken over by the French Government in 1967. Moreover, co-operation between French and NATO forces has continued and has been strengthened in recent years in a way that appears acceptable to both parties.

31. This is not the case for Greece. No one yet knows the full extent of the decision taken by Greece in summer 1974 for reasons which seem to be due more to the then prevailing situation in the Eastern Mediterranean than to an overall view of the future of the Atlantic Alliance. Finally, in the case of Turkey, whose latest decisions are still not fully known, the United States Congress has gone against the advice of the United States Government and has taken steps which may have a considerable impact on European security.

32. However, progress made by the European countries in economic integration since 1950 suggested that a time might come when the forces of a united Europe would constitute a sufficiently strong element of the Alliance to counterbalance American power. By speaking of the two pillars of the Atlantic Alliance, President Kennedy

raised the idea of a partnership in which Europe and the United States would, in principle, be placed on an equal footing. In reality, this equal footing has never been achieved, particularly because Europe has been unable to achieve political unity.

33. In such circumstances, General de Gaulle decided to withdraw French forces from the NATO integrated military structure and to ask NATO forces to withdraw from French territory. At the same time, France accelerated the development of its nuclear force. However, no other member of NATO has followed France's policy and it has consequently become isolated from its European partners. In a manner of speaking it constitutes a separate element of the Alliance since it intends to respect in full the undertakings into which it entered on signing the Atlantic Pact but does not intend to find itself committed beyond that through a system of military integration. Even so, it is prepared to go a long way in military co-operation with the allied countries in order to be prepared to meet any contingencies and in the military field it co-operates closely with its NATO allies.

34. France's withdrawal also compelled it to hold bilateral negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany on the legal grounds for maintaining French forces in Germany, which the Federal Republic wished.

35. The maintenance of French forces in Germany is now raising two sets of problems, which should be reconsidered by the French and German Governments, concerning the need for and conditions of stationing French forces on Federal German territory, as was very clearly shown recently in a series of articles by the military correspondent of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Adelbert Weinstein.

36. First, in 1974 the French forces were equipped with tactical nuclear weapons which are located not on the territory of the Federal Republic but in France's eastern provinces. It is evident that the use of such weapons concerns the Federal Republic not only because it is a matter of defending the whole of Western Europe but also because German territory would suffer considerable damage if these weapons were to be used.

37. Second, the maintenance of French troops on Federal German territory is now raising a number of problems which call for clarification of the status of these forces, which was laid down

in a bilateral Franco-German treaty. In this connection, Chancellor Schmidt said in an interview in the *Figaro* of 3rd February 1975 :

"French public opinion must realise that despite our differences of opinion about NATO we consider French participation in the defence of Europe to be essential, for one day it might well prove necessary. This is not the situation at present, but it cannot be entirely precluded. We therefore hope the French Government is not considering withdrawing French troops from Germany. This might give the impression that France has absolutely no interest in common defence."

38. For some years, further difficulties have been emerging within NATO due to the fact that the members of the Atlantic Alliance are becoming increasingly reluctant to make the necessary effort to maintain adequate forces in Western Europe.

39. In recent years, it has become clear that the Warsaw Pact armies have more troops and weapons than NATO in every sector of conventional defence. Recourse to nuclear weapons in the event of war may therefore very quickly become necessary, whereas all members of NATO agree that it is essential to deploy sufficient conventional forces to be able to put up efficient resistance to any attack without resorting to the terrible destruction involved in the use of nuclear weapons. This shows a degree of weakness on the part of the European governments, and behind the governments the people, who are not prepared to accept the implications — particularly financial — of an effective defence policy. The time taken to replace obsolete weapons is increasingly long, force levels are falling and there are many signs that the combat-readiness of these forces is on the decline.

40. It is difficult to assess the relative importance of the various causes of this weakening of the Western European countries' will to defend themselves. Fighting in Europe certainly seems less likely than twenty years ago, it is more difficult to make the younger generations accept the constraints of military life and economic recession is forcing States to make savings and savings in defence budgets are the least unpopular. But one may also wonder whether the fact of relying on American nuclear weapons for the main element of collective defence policy is not one of the reasons why European society appears increasingly to be losing interest in its

own security. European defence efforts often seem to be aimed more at convincing the United States that it must maintain its forces in Europe than at preparing an effective participation in the defence of Europe.

41. Admittedly, the adoption of a declaration by the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa on 19th June 1974, signed by the Heads of European Governments in Brussels on 26th June, sought to give new significance to western defence policy. But close study of this text shows that it has little effect on the present situation since the signatories recognise that the presence of American forces in Europe "remains indispensable", without specifying for how long, however. The European countries, for their part, "undertake" to contribute to maintaining the common defence "at a level capable of deterring and if necessary repelling all actions directed against the independence and territorial integrity of the members of the Alliance", while the Americans declare their "resolve" to do likewise. These had been everyone's officially proclaimed aims for a long time, but there is nothing to show that the Brussels declaration has profoundly changed the *de facto* attitude of its signatories.

42. Your Rapporteur believes that Eurogroup was set up within NATO in order to meet the need felt by most of the European members of the Alliance to find a new balance within the Atlantic Alliance.

43. He does not wish to enter into the debate between France and its European partners on the usefulness of Eurogroup. It is enough to note the French position as again defined by the French Minister of Defence on 14th December 1974 :

"Eurogroup is in fact a club with no formal structure which itself carries out no programme of co-operation. Results achieved to date give no reason to think that it is the best tool for European co-operation in the armaments field. It is closely linked with the Defence Planning Committee of which France is not a member."

44. It may therefore be assumed that France has no intention of joining Eurogroup at the present juncture. Some non-French Committee members wished the present report to record the fact that they deplored this situation.

45. Consequently, the question is whether it is necessary or desirable for Europe to concern itself with matters affecting its defence and in

what institutional framework is it possible to do so. It is evident to your Rapporteur that Europe can in no event depend on others for shaping its defence policy. Even if it is essential for this to be carried out in close co-operation with the United States and for co-operation normally to take place in the framework of NATO, this does not mean that Europe must condemn itself to non-existence in the defence field. The real problem is what are the priorities. Should Europe be built first while ensuring its own defence — which means that Europe must identify itself through its institutions and through its policy in external relations and defence matters? Or should an effective western defence policy have priority over building Europe?

46. Lord Gladwyn gave an excellent description of the institutional framework of the problem in a report which he submitted to the European Parliament at the end of 1974. He described three alternatives: organising European defence round the European Communities, round Eurogroup or round WEU.

47. The fact that the European Heads of State or of Government have never given serious consideration to defence matters at the summit meetings which have succeeded each other in recent years makes the first alternative highly unlikely in the foreseeable future, even though many may consider it the most desirable.

48. The second alternative would in any event mean France giving up what has been one of the basic elements of its foreign policy since 1966. It hardly seems prepared to do so and your Rapporteur, for his part, does not want it to.

49. In your Rapporteur's view, the third alternative has the considerable merit of being based on existing treaties and, as the WEU Assembly has often proposed, of allowing existing links between WEU and NATO or even between WEU and Eurogroup to be retained and strengthened. Finally, this solution has the advantage of placing defence matters in a European framework which could easily be integrated in a European union at a later date. Your Rapporteur advocates the third solution since Lord Gladwyn's first alternative seems fairly unlikely in the near future and the second hardly desirable.

IV. WEU in the European union

50. In a report submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee in December 1966,

Mr. Kirk described the implications for WEU of the withdrawal of French forces from NATO and concluded as follows :

"The essential element in all that has been said here is the maintenance and strengthening of the Alliance as a whole, both through placing greater emphasis on the defence of Europe by Europeans, and by maintaining a contact with the French through WEU. Two things should be underlined, however. The first is that, though the immediate problem may appear to be temporary, the objective of placing greater stress on European activity, either through European conventional and nuclear forces, or through some other means, should be regarded as permanent. It should, in fact, have been attempted long ago. The second is — and this is perhaps the most important thing of all — that there should be no suggestion of WEU acting apart from the United States, let alone in active hostility to it. The vast majority of the States and peoples of Western European Union would wholly repudiate any such a suggestion. So, it goes without saying, does your Rapporteur."

51. He thus stressed that he saw no contradiction between the desire to build a European union with defence responsibilities and close co-operation between Europe and the United States. This is a fundamental attitude which seems to have dominated the work of our Assembly, particularly when it adopted the abovementioned report by Lord Gladwyn in November 1971. Moreover, at the same time it adopted another report, submitted by Mr. Boyden, which affirmed the Rapporteur's concern to pursue political and military co-operation in the framework of NATO to the greatest possible degree and relegated the prospect of European union to second place. Finally, this has been the nucleus of the debate which has dominated the work of the Assembly since 1966.

52. It is quite clear that no one envisages a European defence policy without a major American contribution. The question is whether the defence of Europe is an American affair to which the Europeans are merely required to make a contribution or whether it is first and foremost a European affair. In the latter case, Europe must define its intentions in the fields of arms production, strategy and foreign policy, even if it has to discuss them subsequently with the Americans. No institution can replace political

determination which, of course, can be defined only in the framework of the nine countries which have affirmed their intention to form a European union.

53. Two Ministers replied to this question at the Assembly's last session : Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, and Mr. Vredeling, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands. The first stated that :

"A common foreign policy necessarily implies a common defence policy. The fact that we are all members of the Atlantic Alliance cannot be used as an alibi to justify the lack of a European defence policy.

.....

Standardisation is made necessary by compelling economic considerations. Thorough standardisation implies the unification of tactical and strategic concepts, together with increasing integration of production. But such integration is inconceivable in the absence of political decisions.

It seems to me therefore that through this approach we have a pragmatic means of promoting military integration in Europe, thus progressively imparting an initial content to this notion. It is a limited and technical approach but, as I shall point out, it also has the merit of emerging, though in a more modest manner, on to the political field and thus preparing the ground for European defence."

54. Mr. Vredeling said :

"...The Nine of the EEC likewise have decided to consider, at their periodic consultations, that area in which it is evidently most difficult to arrive at a form of co-operation — namely, foreign policy.

They expressly demonstrated their desire to evolve a European policy, with its own distinctive personality vis-à-vis the outside world, by transforming the system that governs their relations into a European union by the year 1980 or thereabouts.

It is against this background that I discern possibilities for intensifying European co-operation in the field of defence, and ultimately for working out a policy of collective security designed to proceed hand in hand with political unification."

55. The French position was described by Mr. Soufflet, then Minister of Defence, on 14th December 1974 :

"The government attaches great importance to European co-operation in the field of armaments. Following on past and present achievements, carried out principally with Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, it is endeavouring in the same spirit to find other projects which could lead to co-operative programmes. It has also had WEU consider the conditions in which the Standing Armaments Committee might be reactivated to deal with these matters. Its action, with the support of some of its partners, and Italy in particular, has come to no conclusion for the moment."

56. It may be wondered whether real progress can be made towards political union, i.e. not the creation of any form of new organisation but the definition of a European foreign policy, if there is no fundamental agreement in the defence field. To an increasing extent, the idea is gaining ground in Europe and it is evident in the European press that such agreement cannot be confined to what is done in the NATO framework but must cover :

(a) A concept of defence policy and strategy so that relations between Europe and the United States in the defence field are not confined to national resistance — uneven and in any event ineffective — to successive United States concepts which correspond solely to United States interests in this field.

(b) Co-ordination of national nuclear policies. There is obviously no changing the fact that the United Kingdom and France have national nuclear forces and the only question that may arise is whether they must remain an instrument of national policies or whether co-ordination is possible in a European framework.

(c) The use of various kinds of forces in the event of hostilities so that Europe's defence may be based on a common concept of military action. Naturally, NATO can but remain the preferred forum for concertation as long as American forces occupy an essential place in the Western European defence system.

(d) The maintenance of European forces at an adequate level in the Central Europe sector. In this connection, General Valentin, former Commander of the French First Army, writing in *Revue de Défense nationale*, August-September 1974, said :

"The first reaction to consideration of the balance of forces in the near future is concern at the reduction of the effort being made by the Western European powers, whereas the East's arms are being increased in number and quality. We saw above that the present stability was possible without parity between the opposing forces because of the threat of recourse to nuclear weapons ; nevertheless, this balance implies that the level of the West's forces must be above a certain threshold. In other words, the ratio of Warsaw Pact forces to those of the Atlantic Pact must not be such as to allow the former to advance like water through a sieve without any firm reaction or real fighting. Yet it may be considered that this threshold is not much lower than the point which Western European forces will soon have reached.

The Germans, who are well equipped numerically, are going to reduce their peacetime level¹ : admittedly, the reduction of numbers in the smaller units will be offset by an increase in the number of brigades and improved organisation of the call-up of reservists. However this may be, overall, it is to be feared that these reforms may not result in an improvement and there will undeniably be a reduction in the number of troops. The British BAOR divisions have two brigades, which does not permit manoeuvre. For several years the Dutch and the Belgians have been steadily reducing their troop levels in Germany, and the future measures envisaged by the latter are hardly likely to reverse this trend, quite the contrary. As for France, although its first army will soon be reinforced with tactical nuclear weapons, it needs more thirty-ton tanks and to speed up the modernisation of its equipment, which is spread over too long a period. Moreover, it is no secret that the fighter aircraft of all these nations are below strength. In fact, the Western European countries should increase the percentage of military expenditure rather than reduce or stabilise it, otherwise, because of the progress of the Warsaw Pact armed forces, the ratio of one army to the other will soon fall below the critical threshold."

1. A German member of the Committee specified that the Federal Republic would make such a reduction only in the framework of mutual and balanced force reductions.

(e) Armaments, their standardisation, production and distribution to European forces. It seems increasingly essential to the survival of a European arms industry capable of ensuring some degree of independence for Europe in this field for Europeans to define their needs jointly and work out their production programmes in the light of joint requirements.

57. Some Committee members underlined that they considered satisfactory results had already been achieved in this field. Your Rapporteur does not deny that prospects are promising but he feels that in most cases this is just a start, many of them being bilateral agreements which, although useful, contain but few commitments for the future and in no way constitute a meaningful European policy for the joint production of armaments.

58. In this connection, your Rapporteur wishes to recall the reply given by General Beaufre to a question put by a member of this Assembly on 15th December 1966 :

“.....

What I say is that if we do not set up a common market for armaments in Europe, that is, if we do not manufacture 2,000 tanks at a time instead of only 15, our whole armaments production is wasteful. That is certain.

In the second place, I think the same holds good for research. If we do not pool our research potential and provide research with powerful means — both financial and intellectual — we lose ground and we shall end by buying only American or Russian matériel, for in a decade or two the Americans and the Russians will be a long way ahead of us, and I do not think I am mistaken.

You are asking if this is possible. I repeat what I said earlier : we must develop our ideas, and, after that, we shall see what happens. I think that since this idea is right it must work out. If our industrialists had it clearly before them, they might be interested...”

59. If such a programme is agreed to, the question arises as to the framework in which it should be implemented. In this connection your Rapporteur wishes to quote from an article by General von Kielmansegg, former NATO Com-

mander-in-Chief Central Europe, published in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on 29th August 1974 :

“Politicians might be advised to reread the EDC treaty. The treaty proper covers fifty-five pages which means a good hour’s reading. Even if many elements, particularly in the military and economic fields, have now had their day or are obsolete, there are also many ideas or provisions in this text which were at the time the subject of very detailed work and which would be usable today. All that covers the finance commissariat, the budget and arms programmes is more or less ready for use and could be used for the continued building of Europe, with a few changes and adaptations, naturally. The question “where” — for instance in Eurogroup or in the framework of European political co-operation — certainly raises problems. First, because it is unlikely that all the members of these bodies would accept the defence framework. But there too we could bear in mind the six-power EDC and the close links it had with Britain through a special treaty. These seven countries are the nucleus of Western Europe. They are grouped in the EEC. They have common interests in the defence field and are the members of Western European Union, which was the only outcome of the EDC disaster in the field of European policy. This is where a sort of metempsychosis might take place, if only we wanted it.”

60. Without sharing General von Kielmansegg’s regrets about the EDC, of which the least can be said is that it was premature, your Rapporteur willingly concedes that some elements of the draft treaty to establish the EDC might now be suitable for a European defence organisation. Above all, he does not think it necessary to seek new institutions to carry out what can be done in existing institutions and he wonders what grounds there may be for wishing to hand over to vague institutions involving hardly any commitments for those taking part in them activities which should be handled in sound institutions based on treaties involving firm commitments for their signatories, as is the case of the Brussels Treaty. There would be no point in calling for more European co-operation if the very basis of that co-operation — Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty — were allowed to fade away.

V. Conclusions

61. Your Rapporteur therefore believes that the rôle of WEU can and must be viewed from two different angles, depending on whether one is considering the short or longer term.

62. (i) In the short term, the modified Brussels Treaty exists and in its present form has a number of advantages which it would be most dangerous to scorn:

- (a) it ensures automatic military assistance in the event of an attack on one of its signatories and therefore places the British and French nuclear weapons at the service of Europe ;
- (b) it is the only treaty which commits the Western European countries to close concertation in foreign policy questions ;
- (c) it associates France with the NATO defence system ;
- (d) it provides for co-operation in arms production which can easily be geared with the NATO machinery ;
- (e) it associates parliamentarians from all the member countries with continuing examination of defence matters.

63. For all these reasons, there is ample justification for maintaining WEU while the European union is being worked out. The Council should

even be asked to keep a closer watch on the strict application of the treaty than it did in 1974.

64. (ii) Looking towards a future European union, the Brussels Treaty may still have an important rôle to play:

- (a) because it exists and present differences between its signatories may make it most difficult to draw up a new treaty on the joint defence of Europe ;
- (b) because it is not far removed from the direction the Nine wish to follow in their union ;
- (c) because there is nothing to prevent WEU being integrated in this union once it has the same members as the EEC, a prospect which some Committee members admittedly considered remote and uncertain.

65. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to underline that he considers these conclusions are fully in line with a number of recommendations adopted by the Assembly in recent years, particularly Recommendation 145 adopted on 15th December 1966 by 44 votes to 0 with 4 abstentions. This recommendation was submitted by Mr. Peter Kirk on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. With few exceptions, your Rapporteur feels it corresponds to the present situation and it has provided a useful basis for preparing the conclusions to the present report.

European union and WEU

AMENDMENT No. 1¹

tabled by Mr. Richter and others

1. In paragraph 6 of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out the words "regularly and".
2. Leave out paragraph 7 of the draft Recommendation proper and insert :
"7. Particularly in the examination it has been instructed to effect, to bear in mind the tasks of the Standing Armaments Committee in respect of the need to preserve and develop Europe's industrial potential with special reference to advanced technology."

Signed : Richter, Ahrens, Mrs. von Bothmer, Abens, Adriaensens, Treu, Tanghe, Warren

1. See 6th Sitting, 28th May 1975 (Amendment amended and adopted).

Rational deployment of forces on the central front

STUDY

**by General Ulrich de Maizière (Retd.),
arranged by the Committee on Defence Questions
and Armaments, in implementation of Order 43**

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Preface

(by Mr. Dankert, member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, appointed by the Committee to be associated with the expert entrusted with the essential drafting of the study)

1. In a report adopted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in 1970¹, the Rapporteur, Mr. Max van der Stoel, was led to remark :

“41. A detached observer of the European defence scene, his mind uncluttered with the preconceptions that have accumulated over the years, might well conclude that the present manner in which the not negligible contributions of the European countries in cash and manpower are translated into fighting units on the ground are about the least rational and least efficient that could be devised. After all, the whole of the defence effort of most European NATO countries is concerned solely with providing defence in the NATO framework. Of the total of the defence budgets of all European NATO countries, probably more than 90 % is spent on NATO related defence. Yet twelve sovereign defence ministries are maintained, many with three often autonomous armed services within them. The largest European defence budget is ten times that of the smallest².

The position of the troops on the ground on the central front still reflects very largely the pattern of the allied landings on the Normandy beaches 26 years ago, and for this reason bears little relation to a desirable optimum deployment in the present circumstances.”

2. The Committee, in conclusion, called for a high-level review of the whole concept of national European defence efforts, and sought to be associated with a preliminary study of the problems involved. On the Committee's report, the Assembly adopted Order 36, instructing the Committee “to examine the possibility of organising a conference on the rationalisation of the defence efforts of the European countries, members of the Alliance”. In implementation of this order, the Committee, having first established a sub-committee which held extensive hearings and discussions throughout 1971, finally recom-

mended¹ that five preliminary studies be undertaken prior to any decision on the convening of a conference :

- (i) (a) a rational distribution of defence tasks between countries ; and
- (b) a rational deployment of forces on the central front ;
- (ii) (a) a concerted long-term programme for standardised armaments procurement ; and
- (b) collective logistical support ;
- (iii) a comparative study of the structure of national defence organisations.

3. The Assembly endorsed this proposal in Order 40 and Resolution 50 adopted on 1st December 1971, but the Council, in 1972, declined to make available the necessary finance for the five studies.

4. The report adopted by the Committee in the spring of 1973² dealt in part with the then proposed negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions ; the report recommended “that if some American withdrawals are agreed, then Western Europe should urge upon the United States changes which would improve its reinforcement, supply and deployment capabilities” in Europe (paragraph 24). The MBFR negotiations had not then begun, and the Committee proposed that the earlier proposed study on the rational deployment of forces on the central front, in abeyance through lack of funds, should be initiated urgently. On the report of the Committee, the Assembly, on 21st June 1973, adopted Order 43³, instructing the Committee “to arrange for the study of the rational deployment of forces on the central front, proposed in Document 559, to be carried out forthwith... and to be printed

1. Document 599 : “A conference on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts”, Rapporteur Mr. Rivière, adopted by the Committee on 16th November 1971.

2. “European security and relations with the countries of Eastern Europe”, Document 604, Rapporteur Mr. Critchley, adopted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on 3rd May 1973.

3. Text at Appendix I to the Preface.

1. Document 527, adopted on 3rd November 1970.

2. Or 760 times that of Luxembourg.

and published on completion", and deciding that the cost of the single study should be met from the ordinary budget of the Assembly. The terms of reference of the study, as set out in Document 559, are reproduced at Appendix ¹.

5. On 7th December 1973, in implementation of Order 43, the Presidential Committee, on the recommendation of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, appointed General Ulrich de Maizière, former *General Inspekteur der Bundeswehr*, as the expert to undertake the study on the rational deployment of forces on the central front. The Defence Committee appointed me to be associated with General de Maizière in the study, in accordance with the procedure envisaged in Document 559. Accordingly, General de Maizière and I, in the course of 1974, visited the capitals of countries maintaining forces on the central front, and the various NATO headquarters concerned, for discussions with Ministers, senior officials and officers concerning the subject of the study ².

6. The first, classified, draft of General de Maizière's study was completed by 31st October 1974, and has been communicated to the Ministries of Defence of the countries maintaining forces on the central front. The text has now been amplified in some particulars and prepared for publication as an unclassified document.

7. The study now published is a comprehensive document. In accordance with the terms of reference, the study examines the present deployment of forces on the central front and the historical reasons which led to the pattern of deployment; and then considers its suitability from the point of view of current NATO strategy of forward defence and flexible response. General de Maizière concludes that the peacetime locations of NATO units are in many ways not ideally suited to the rôle the units would be required to play if called upon to implement NATO's defensive strategy. After considering certain alternative deployment possibilities, the study concludes that on the grounds of cost, and in view of the changing nature of any defence plans, there would be no overall advantage to the defence effort in undertaking major relocation of units in peacetime. Certain minor adjustments are however advocated, and recommendations are made concerning improved reinforce-

ment capabilities and facilities for receiving reinforcements. The need for binding agreements with France concerning the circumstances and time in which French forces would be available to NATO command is also mentioned.

8. General de Maizière goes on to consider other ways to make more economic use of the funds provided for defence, through rationalisation in three broad fields. He considers first an improvement of national defence structures, including unification of the three services, modernisation of service equipment, and the need to ensure a proper balance between the three services. The study then discusses rationalisation through specialisation on a multinational basis, and finally deals with rationalisation by standardisation, including logistics, the procurement of equipment, and standardisation of training and procedures. The study draws particular attention to the lack of interoperability and compatibility in equipment in service with the NATO forces, quoting General Goodpaster to the effect that NATO loses about 30 to 50 % of its potential capability merely by lack of standardisation. General de Maizière concludes that rationalisation by standardisation is the most promising and most convincing way to achieve greater effectiveness from the funds made available for defence.

9. It is noteworthy that the other areas for rationalisation of the defence efforts to which General de Maizière draws attention at the conclusion of his study of the deployment of forces on the central front are precisely the four remaining topics for study — enumerated in paragraph 2 above — which the Committee proposed in its initial report on the rationalisation of European defence efforts.

10. The following study is the responsibility of General de Maizière, although in accordance with the procedure envisaged by the Assembly in adopting Order 43 I have been associated with him chiefly in the fact-finding interviews which we undertook together. It was always the Committee's intention, however, in proposing the five studies in the first place, that the essential drafting should be entrusted to an expert, who would be free to express his own views. This General de Maizière has done, and the study has not been submitted to the Committee prior to publication.

11. I myself do not entirely share all the views expressed in General de Maizière's study. As Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, I am responsible for a

1. Text at Appendix II to the Preface.

2. Names of those consulted at Appendix III to the Preface.

chapter on the same subject in the Committee's forthcoming report on the state of European security to which reference should be made for a statement of the Committee's views. I do, however, commend the whole study by General de Maizière as a most authoritative basis for discussion of a subject of great urgency.

12. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments considers itself fortunate in having secured the services of such a distinguished soldier as General Ulrich de Maizière. Drawing on his own extensive experience and that of his many friends in the armed forces of the NATO

countries, General de Maizière has been able to provide a wealth of information in the study which would not otherwise have been readily available. On behalf of the Committee and in my own name, I take this opportunity of expressing our thanks to him for all the hard work that has gone into this authoritative document, and for his kindness in co-operating with a layman like myself during our fact-finding travels.

Pieter DANKERT

2nd April 1975

APPENDIX I

ORDER 43¹***on the rational deployment of forces on the central front***

The Assembly,

Recalling Resolution 50 and Order 40 on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts ;

Recalling that the letter from the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of 30th March 1972 asserted that the Council shared the Assembly's aims in this connection ;

Considering the results of certain meetings that governments, in implementation of the foregoing letter, have arranged with their parliamentarians who are members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ;

Aware of the need to study fully the particular problems and requirements of European defence with undiminished security at any lower force levels that may be agreed in the course of negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions,

1. Instructs its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to arrange for the study on the rational deployment of forces on the central front, proposed in Document 559, to be carried out forthwith in accordance with paragraphs 20 to 24 of the explanatory memorandum and Appendix III (i) (b) of that document and to be printed and published on completion ;
2. Decides that the cost of the study shall be met from the ordinary budget of the Assembly.

1. Adopted unanimously by the Assembly on 21st June 1973.

APPENDIX II

Terms of reference*(from Appendix III to Document 559)***Rational deployment of forces on the central front**

The study should first describe the present relationship between the permanent locations of forces assigned to Allied Forces Central Europe and their war locations called for by the policy of forward defence. The contribution of recent history, such as the second world war and earlier patterns of NATO deployment, should be mentioned.

The study should then consider whether the order in which the broad areas of the war locations are allocated to assigned national units, both from right to left of the central front and from front to rear, corresponds to the optimum when account is taken of :

- military effectiveness for a strategy of flexible response and forward defence, and the relative military capabilities of different national units and their weapons systems ;
- political effectiveness and the need to demonstrate the cohesion of the Alliance in all situations ;
- possible future levels of the different national units ; the possible impact of any negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions.

The study should suggest possible models for optimum deployment, not eschewing innovations such as the creation of highly-mobile multinational units in reserve positions, or the possibility of a pattern of deployment designed to facilitate agreement on MBFRs without prejudicing military effectiveness at any stage.

The study should examine any changes in the permanent location of assigned units which present or possible optimum war locations make desirable, taking account of :

- the need for a high standard of accommodation and amenities for allied forces and their dependents ;
- the need for access to local training areas ;
- the provision of logistic support, and lines of communication in reinforcement and supply ;
- the cost of any changes.

The study should finally review any proposals advanced for optimum deployment in war locations, in the light of the feasibility of adapting permanent locations accordingly.

APPENDIX III

List of persons with whom General de Maizière and Mr. Dankert had interviews

<i>Canada</i>	Associate Deputy Minister (Policy), Department of National Defence, Mr. D. H. Kirkwood	} 24th-25th June 1974
	Chief of the Defence Staff, General J. A. Dextraze	
	Vice-Chief, Lt.-General A. C. Hull	
	Director General, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of External Affairs, Mr. E. P. Black	
<i>France</i>	Chef d'Etat-Major des Forces Armées, Général d'Armée Aérienne François Maurin	20th May 1974
<i>Germany</i>	Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Mr. Georg Leber	} 20th June 1974
	Leiter des Planungsstabes im Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Vice-Admiral Steinhaus	
	Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr, Admiral A. Zimmermann	
	Konteradmiral Trebesch im Führungsstab der Streitkräfte	
<i>Netherlands</i>	Defence Minister, Mr. H. Vredeling	} 29th August 1974
	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff, Lt.-General Wijting	
<i>United Kingdom</i>	Minister of State for Defence, Mr. William Rodgers, MP	} 17th-18th June 1974
	Chief of General Staff, Sir Peter Hunt	
	Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Marshal Sir Peter Le Cheminant	
	Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff, Rear-Admiral Morton	
<i>United States</i>	Assistant Secretary of Defence/ISA, Mr. R. Ellsworth	} 27th-28th June 1974
	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer	
	J 5 of the Joint Staff, Lt.-General Elder	
	Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, State Department, Mr. James G. Lowenstein	
<i>NATO</i>	Chairman of the Military Committee, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Norton (UK, RN)	8th July 1974
	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Andrew Goodpaster (USA)	} 4th June 1974
	Deputy Chief-of-Staff, SHAPE, Lt.-General Franz Josef Schulze (GEA)	
	Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe, General Ernst Ferber (GEA)	5th June 1974
	Commander Central Army Group, General Davidson (USA)	} 1st July 1974
	Chief-of-Staff, HQ Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force, GM Barkhorn (GEAF)	
	Commander Northern Army Group, General Sir Harry Tuzo (UK)	} 12th July 1974
	Commander Second Allied Tactical Air Force, Air Marshal Sir Nigel Maynard (UKAF)	

Study

(by General Ulrich de Maizière)

A. 1. Introduction

1. In accordance with the terms of reference laid down by the Assembly of Western European Union this study deals with the rational deployment of forces on the central front. The author assumes that the term "central front" is to be interpreted as covering the area of the NATO central region under the command of CINCENT whose headquarters are located at Brunssum in the southern part of the Netherlands.

2. Therefore, the study will be concerned primarily with the allied forces deployed in the central region which are at the disposal of SACEUR, or CINCENT respectively, for operational planning and control. However, it will not disregard the forces still under national control which are deployed in the central region and adjacent areas to the extent that they are important for the combined defence of the central region.

3. So, considering his task in the light of the explanations given in the terms of reference, the author feels that the sponsor does not expect analysis and presentation of an alternative to the actual concept for defence in Central Europe which is based upon the North Atlantic Alliance. Besides, the author fails to see which alternative could offer Europe similar security, or even adequate security, as long as the USSR and the nations allied with her in the Warsaw Pact have at their disposal military capacities which by far exceed their actual defence requirements and thus obviously have an offensive character, and as long as the strong military confrontation in the heart of Europe continues to exist.

4. Furthermore, in order to set the frame for the study and the proposals resulting from it, the author has based his considerations upon the following suppositions in regard to security and defence policy :

- a dramatic change in the political configuration between East and West is not to be expected ;
- the Atlantic Alliance will retain its solidarity. All member nations will continue to base their policy on the agreed twin concept of détente and security.

This implies that a "relative" military balance can be maintained ;

- the results of the negotiations on mutual balanced force reduction (MBFR) will not change the existing "relative" balance in Central Europe to the disadvantage of the West. Quick results are not to be expected from these negotiations ;
- in the years to come the member nations will not reduce their financial contributions to military defence but will provide for defence budgets which at least maintain the purchasing power ;
- the United States will maintain a substantial conventional and tactical nuclear military presence in Europe ;
- the member nations which take part in an integrated military defence organisation will continue to do so ;
- the strategy of flexible response which includes forward defence will remain the basis of common defence planning ;
- French forces will continue to be stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. The President of the French Republic will continue to reserve to himself the right to decide whether and at what time French forces shall participate in the combined defence against a military aggression by the Warsaw Pact.

5. Finally, the author presumes that a breakthrough in technical development comparable in dimension to the first employment of nuclear weapons is not to be expected. On the other hand, the further development of conventional and nuclear weapon systems will bring forth remarkable improvements in regard to range, accuracy and lethality. The importance of electronic means of command and control and combat will grow rapidly.

6. The problems associated with nuclear weapons, especially the question as to what principles should govern their use and how these would affect defence planning, have been considered only inasmuch as they have direct bearing on the subject discussed, i.e. the study of a rational deployment in the central region.

A. 2. Description of the area treated in this study

7. The central region, in the area of responsibility of CINCENT, covers the territories of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Benelux countries (subject to limitations in regard to the latter) from the river Elbe in the north to the boundaries of Austria and Switzerland in the south. Federal German territory north of the River Elbe (Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg) falls within the AFNORTH area. The boundaries with the two eastern neighbour countries, i.e. the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic — both of them Warsaw Pact members — are approximately 800 km long.

8. The neutral countries of Austria and Switzerland separate the areas of responsibility of CINCENT and CINCSOUTH from one another. If, in case of an aggression, the neutrality of Austria should not be respected by the Warsaw Pact forces, the boundaries would be extended by about 170 km.

9. NATO's strategic concept and SACEUR's mission require CINCENT to defend as far forward as possible against any type of aggression in a flexible response.

10. For the accomplishment of this mission, forces from six nations are stationed in the AFCENT area and earmarked for assignment to CINCENT :

Belgium (BE)

Canada (CA)

Federal Republic of Germany (GE)

Netherlands (NL)

United Kingdom (UK)

United States of America (US)

11. In addition, and in accordance with a bilateral agreement, French troops are stationed in the south-west of the Federal Republic of Germany. They are not incorporated in the NATO integrated command structure.

12. The presence of armed forces of seven allied nations on the territory of one country and their assignment in advance to multinational command authorities for operational planning and inspection (exclusive of the French units, of course) in peacetime has no precedent in history. It has far-reaching political and military-technical consequences.

13. For command and control of operations, the central region is divided into two sectors :

— the *Northern Army Group* (NORTHAG) in the area between the Elbe river and the Harz mountains, with units from Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

It is associated with the *2nd Allied Tactical Air Force* (TWO ATAF) with assigned units from the same nations ;

— south thereof the *Central Army Group* (CENTAG) with units from Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. The associated 4th Allied Tactical Air Force (FOUR ATAF) also has assigned units from the same nations.

14. The boundaries between the army groups and ATAFs are identical.

15. For regional responsibility from east to west the central region is divided in a different way.

16. The whole territory of the Federal Republic of Germany is designated as *combat zone* (CZ) ; it is subdivided into the forward combat zone (FCZ), i.e. the zone in which — beginning at the frontier — one can expect to find the division area and, west thereof, the corps rear area. West of the FCZ is the rear combat zone (RCZ) with the majority of the supply installations of all nations — ending at the western frontier of the Federal Republic of Germany.

17. The territory of the Benelux countries falls within the *communication zone* (ComZ). It also includes supply installations of all nations.

B. Description of the present deployment

B.I. Permanent locations of forces in the central region

B.I.1. Present situation

18. The M-day ground and air forces in the central region, which are earmarked for assignment to CINCENT, are deployed as follows (see also the attached map, Enclosure 1), (status 1st April 1974) :

(a) *Ground forces* (from North to South)

NORTHAG (HQ Mönchen-Gladbach)

I (NL) Corps (HQ Apeldorn) with 2 M-day divisions comprising 6 brigades

<i>Division</i>	<i>Brigade</i>	<i>Peacetime deployment area</i>
4 Div	11 Mech	Scharsbergen /NL
(HQ Harderwijk)	12 Mech	Nunspeet /NL
	13 Mech	Oirschot /NL
1 Div	41 Armd	Seedorf /GE
(HQ Scharbergen)	42 Mech	Assen /NL
	43 Armd	Kallenkote /NL

I (GE) Corps (HQ Münster) with 4 M-day divisions comprising 11 brigades
1 abn bde
1 tk regt

<i>Division</i>	<i>Brigade</i>	<i>Peacetime deployment area</i>
3 Div	7 Armd	Hamburg-Neugraben
(HQ Buxtehude)	8 Armd	Lüneburg
	9 Armd	Münster
11 Div	31 Mech	Oldenburg
(HQ Oldenburg)	32 Mech	Schwanewede
	33 Armd	Lingen
1 (GE) Div	1 Mech	Hildesheim
(HQ Hannover)	2 Mech	Braunschweig
	3 Armd	Langendamm
7 Div	19 Mech	Altahlen
(HQ Unna)	21 Armd	Augustdorf
	27 Abn	Lippstadt
	100 Tk regt	Hemer

I (UK) Corps (HQ Bielefeld) with 3 M-day divisions comprising 6 brigades with
2 tk bn and
2 arm inf bn each

<i>Division</i>	<i>Brigade</i>	<i>Peacetime deployment area</i>
1 Div	7	Soltau
(HQ Verden)	11	Minden
4 Div	6	Soest
(HQ Herford)	20	Detmold
2 Div	4	Münster
(HQ Lübbecke)	12	Osnabrück

I (BE) Corps (HQ Köln) with 2 M-day divisions comprising 4 brigades

<i>Division</i>	<i>Brigade</i>	<i>Peacetime deployment area</i>
1 Div (HQ Bensberg)	1 Mech 7 Mech	Siegen Spich
16 Div (HQ Neheim)	4 Mech 17 Armd	Soest Düren

*CENTAG (HQ Heidelberg)**III (GE) Corps (HQ Koblenz) with 2 divisions comprising 6 brigades
1 abn bde*

<i>Division</i>	<i>Brigade</i>	<i>Peacetime deployment area</i>
2 Div (HQ Kassel)	4 Inf 5 Mech 6 Armd	Göttingen Homburg Neustadt
5 Div (HQ Diez)	13 Mech 14 Armd 15 Armd 26 Abn	Wetzlar Koblenz Koblenz Saarlouis

*V (US) Corps (HQ Frankfurt/M.) with 2 divisions comprising 6 brigades and
1 armd cav regt*

<i>Division</i>	<i>Brigade</i>	<i>Peacetime deployment area</i>
3 Div (Armd) (HQ Frankfurt)	1 Armd 2 Armd 3 Armd	Kirchgoens Gelnhausen Friedberg
8 Div (HQ Bad Kreuznach)	1 Mech 2 Mech 3 Mech 2 Armd cav regt	Gonsenheim (Mainz) Baumholder Sandhofen (north of Mannheim) Fulda in covering force mission

*VII (US) Corps (HQ Möhringen) with 2 divisions comprising 6 brigades with
1 cav regt*

<i>Division</i>	<i>Brigade</i>	<i>Peacetime deployment area</i>
1 Div (Armd) (HQ Ansbach)	1 Armd 2 Armd 3 Armd	Illesheim Erlangen Bamberg
3 Div (HQ Würzburg)	1 Mech 2 Mech 3 Mech 2 Cav regt	Schweinfurt Kitzingen Aschaffenburg Nürnberg in covering force mission

II (GE) Corps (HQ Ulm) with 4 divisions comprising 10 brigades and
 1 abn bde
 1 tk regt

<i>Division</i>	<i>Brigade</i>	<i>Peacement deployment area</i>
12 Div (HQ Veitshöchheim)	35 Mech 36 Mech	Hammelburg Bad Mergentheim
4 Div (HQ Regensburg)	10 Inf 11 Inf 12 Armd	Weiden Bogen Amberg
1 Div (Mountain) (HQ Garmisch)	22 Mountain 23 Mountain 24 Mech	Mittenwald Reichenhall Landshut
10 Div (HQ Sigmaringen)	29 Armd 30 Armd 25 Abn 200 Tk regt	Sigmaringen Ellwangen Calw Ulm

19. In addition CENTAG has at its disposal :

- the 4 (CA) Bde Gp in Lahr ;
- the 1 (US) Division (Mech) (dual-based), 2 brigades of which are stationed in the United States (Fort Riley, Kansas) while the third brigade is permanently stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany with its home station at Göppingen ;
- one armoured cavalry regiment (dual-based) at Fort Bliss (United States).

(b) *Air forces*

20. The *flying units* (as opposed to the static, i.e. air defence and missile Pershing units of the air forces) for reconnaissance, air attack and air defence are stationed on airfields located within, and west of, the semi-circle described by the line Schleswig-Holstein - Oldenburg - Rheine - Köln - Kaiserslautern - Baden-Baden - Augsburg. To the front of this line there are only a few permanently occupied airfields.

21. The number of combat aircraft stationed in the central region is approximately 1,350. Another 146 dual-based aircraft stationed in the United States will relocate to the central region in times of tension or upon the calling of appropriate alert measures.

22. The air defence surface-to-air missiles are deployed at prepared sites extending from north to south in the form of blocking positions, their effective radii overlapping so that the entire front of the central region is covered provided that the United States will leave their units in these belts.

23. The Hawk belt against low-flying aircraft extends farther to the east following more or less the line Rendsburg - Cuxhaven - Bremen - Herford - Marburg - Frankfurt/Main - Würzburg - Ingolstadt - München - Rosenheim.

24. That belt is backed by the Nike belt set up against aircraft flying at high altitudes. It runs along both sides of the line Wilhelmshaven - Osnabrück - Dortmund - Wiesbaden - Mannheim - Stuttgart - Ravensburg.

25. Deployed within the Hawk belt are units of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and the United States, and within the Nike belt units of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and the United States.

26. In peacetime all units employed in air defence, including their command and control organisations, are already under the operational command of SACEUR.

27. The air forces are under the command of TWO ATAF (HQ Mönchen-Gladbach) and FOUR ATAF (HQ Ramstein) respectively.

28. The *French ground forces* stationed on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany which are not included in the integrated NATO command structure are stationed as follows :

II (FR) Corps (HQ in Baden-Oos) with 2 divisions (comprising 6 brigades)

1 Div in the area Landau-Trier - Wittlich (HQ for Trier)

3 Div in the area Konstanz - Offenburg - Tübingen (HQ in Freiburg/Breisgau).

29. In addition the French have the I (FR) Corps west of the German-French border with HQ in Nancy.

30. Two of its divisions are stationed in the north-eastern part of France, in the area between its borders with Switzerland and Belgium :

7 Div (comprising 3 brigades) with HQ in Mulhouse.

4 Div (comprising 3 brigades) with HQ in Verdun.

31. Another division, i.e. the 8 Div (comprising 3 brigades), is deployed in the area north and east of Paris with HQ in Compiègne. Both French corps are under the operational command of the 1 (FR) Army in Strasbourg.

32. All the tactical air forces of France which are to co-operate with the 1 (FR) Army are stationed on French territory. They are under the command of the 1 FATAAC with HQ in Metz.

33. Finally it should not be overlooked that the United States, the United Kingdom and France have a limited number of occupation forces permanently stationed in the *western sectors of Berlin*¹. Their unimpeded ground and air lines of communication are ensured by agreement. These units are not part of the forces assigned to CINCENT.

34. However, in accordance with Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty the Atlantic commit-

1. United States : 1 inf bde ;
United Kingdom : 1 inf bde ;
France : 1 combat group.

ment for assistance expressed in Article 5 will take effect in case of an armed attack against these forces.

35. Pursuant to United States publications, about 5,000 *nuclear warheads* of different yields for different weapon systems are stored on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, i.e. within the central region. Due to the fact that all nations which have stationed forces in the combat zone of the central region and participate in the military integrated organisation dispose of delivery means of their own, the warhead storage sites are deployed throughout the entire Federal Republic of Germany where they remain as United States property under strict United States control.

B.I.2. Historical development of the peacetime deployment of allied forces in the central region

36. Only to a small degree are the permanent locations of the ground and air forces in the central region as shown above the result of long-range planning under operational aspects ; rather, their choice was considerably influenced by the political development in Central Europe after 1945 and by the state of the existing infrastructure.

37. At the end of World War II the defeated German Reich was divided into four zones of occupation and occupied by the forces of the four occupation powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union). The occupation forces were stationed primarily in accordance with the requirements for internal security and control of the occupied territory. The choice of locations was also determined by the availability of barracks, airfields and training areas. Number and size of the troops had to be in keeping with their occupational tasks. The United States and the United Kingdom withdrew the forces which were no longer required for such tasks in Germany and sent them home, where a considerable number of units were demobilised. The Soviet Union, however, did not follow suit.

38. The increasing tensions in the political situation, the expansion of the political and military power of the Soviet Union, and eventually the Berlin crisis, led to the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance as a defence treaty in 1949. In the same year the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was constituted from the three occupation zones of the United States, the United

Kingdom and France, though the occupation status was retained for the time being.

39. The communist invasion of South Korea caused the western governments to increase the strength of their occupation forces in the Federal Republic of Germany and accelerated the deliberations which had already begun in regard to the inclusion of the German capabilities in the common defence efforts. However, the endeavours to establish a European Defence Community failed in August 1954.

40. With the entry into force of the Paris Agreements and the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO and WEU — and the simultaneous termination of the occupation status in May 1955 — entirely new problems arose in regard to the stationing of forces. The build-up of German army, air force and navy units and their inclusion in the defence plans of NATO was to be accomplished within a short time. Even though operational aspects of their deployment were considered at the national level and within NATO, these considerations were not decisive in view of the necessity for a rapid build-up of German forces. The locations were primarily determined by the existence of facilities of the former *Wehrmacht* which could be made available for accommodating the units of the Federal armed forces. There were not nearly enough of these facilities. Many new facilities had to be constructed. As time was pressing most of them had to be erected either on real estate owned by the Federal Government or in communities which were prepared to make available real estate for the construction of buildings and the establishment of training facilities without lengthy previous negotiations.

41. At the same time, for reasons of internal politics and under economical and psychological considerations, it was in the interest of the Federal Republic of Germany that the garrisons of the Federal armed forces were distributed throughout the whole territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.

B.II. *Wartime positions*

B.II.1. *Development since 1949*

42. If then it must be stated that the deployment of the allied forces in the Federal Republic of Germany was developed to a small degree only under operational considerations, it should be added that the plans for the defence of Central

Europe have undergone several changes since 1949. After the establishment of NATO and the Allied Command Europe it became necessary to develop a defence structure and defence plans against a possible aggressor from the East on the basis of the actual deployment of forces which originally had been based on occupational considerations. As the forces were then small they only permitted the planning of delaying actions east of the Rhine river; the first lasting line of defence was envisaged on the Rhine.

43. For the Federal Republic of Germany the participation in a common defence was only reasonable, and it could only accept the responsibility for it, if, in doing so, a defence as far to the east as possible could be ensured. Such defence plans, which have generally become known under the term forward defence, were also in the interest of all partners in the Alliance, in particular of the member nations situated on the European continent.

44. When the then occupation troops were no longer increased and German units were built up which, having reached operational readiness, were assigned to NATO for operational planning and control, the basic conditions for a gradual realisation of the forward defence concept in the central region were established.

45. The first step was to advance the main line of defence to the rivers Weser, Fulda, Main and Lech. Finally, in the second half of 1963, a defence plan entered into force in the AFCENT area according to which territory in Central Europe should no longer be abandoned without combat, i.e. defensive combat should be taken up directly at the border of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Thus, the requirement for defence as far to the east as possible was met for the central region as well.

46. The strategy of flexible response, which was agreed upon by the NATO Council on 14th December 1967 and which includes the forward defence, is the basis for the presently valid defence plans from which the present war locations have been derived.

B.II.2. *The wartime positions in the general defence plan (GDP)*

47. The relationship between the permanent locations of forces earmarked for assignment to the central region and their wartime positions must be seen in two categories.

(a) Air forces

48. In case of war, the combat aircraft and the missile units employed in the air defence belts — with the exception of the mobile Hawk batteries — will operate from permanent air bases or sites.

49. All of these units can be brought to a high state of combat readiness in a few hours. The new HQ Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE), formed in summer 1974, will ensure that communications are improved and procedures simplified so that a cross-tasking of all tactical aircraft across the entire region will be possible and flexible use can fully be made of speed and radius of action.

(b) Land forces

50. The relationship of the land forces between peace and war locations looks quite different and therefore requires a more detailed description.

51. To begin with, only the M-day forces are considered. Each of 8 corps of 5 nations (Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States) has to take responsibility for its own combat sector of different width along the border with the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The two United States corps are committed side by side, whereas the three German corps are employed separately from each other in three different combat sectors. The diagram of the war locations — when looked at from north to south — resembles the layers of a layer-cake, each corps representing one layer.

52. A possible attack of the Warsaw Pact against Central Europe would therefore encounter from the beginning the forces of several member nations, including the United States and the United Kingdom ; thus, the whole Alliance would be involved.

53. The comparatively small *Canadian combat group* will be kept available for CENTAG in the rear of the corps.

54. The French forces can only be reckoned with when the President of the Republic of France has decided on the participation of France in the common defence. Therefore, no wartime positions have been preplanned for them by NATO.

55. When the wartime positions are compared with the permanent locations, it becomes clear that all divisions and brigades have to negotiate a shorter or longer distance to reach their opera-

tional areas. This deployment to wartime positions does not only take place from west to east, but partly also from north to south or from south to north. As a result, crossings and overlapping are inevitable. The deployment requires time as well.

56. However, before analysing in detail both the deficiencies and strong points of the peacetime and wartime deployment of the allied land and air forces assigned to CINCENT in the central region, the threat with which NATO has to reckon in Central Europe will be described. Without knowing the size and deployment of the Warsaw Pact forces and without considering the probable warning times for NATO and the main points of attack to be expected, an assessment of a rational deployment cannot be made.

C. The threat**C.1. General**

57. In the Atlantic Declaration of Ottawa, signed on 26th June 1974 by the Heads of Government of the 15 NATO member nations, it was confirmed that "the circumstances affecting their common defence have profoundly changed in the last ten years : the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union has reached a point of near equilibrium... The Alliance's problems in the defence of Europe have thus assumed a different and more distinct character". It was also stated in the declaration that now as ever the ultimate purpose of any defence policy is to deny to a potential adversary the political objectives he seeks to attain through an armed conflict and to use all necessary forces for this purpose.

58. To the Soviet Union military strength is indeed an important element of its world-wide strategy. Soviet *military science* teaches that the offensive is the sole decisive course of action in strategy, and the attack in tactics. According to Soviet doctrine, thrust, fire and movement are the typical features of modern combat, a combat involving all services and service branches. Large areas of operation, the lack of firm front lines, rapid development, change of action and massive fire are the characteristics of combat operations. The will to win, initiative as well as iron communist discipline are demanded of the Warsaw Pact forces as a prerequisite to victory.

59. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies have at their disposal a large military potential. Its deployment is clearly directed against the West. Facing the Allied Command Europe (ACE) in Eastern Europe (including the six directly adjacent military districts of Leningrad, the Baltic countries, White Russia, the Carpathians, Odessa and Transcaucasia) are roughly 90 Soviet *divisions* and about 60 divisions of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries. In addition, approximately 20 divisions deployed within the interior military districts of the Soviet Union have to be counted as reserves, which include 6 airborne divisions. The numbers of tanks, guns, anti-tank weapons and rocket launchers have been increased, and their effectiveness was improved.

60. On the other hand the Soviet build-up of forces at the Sino-Soviet border has slackened during the past 2-3 years ; but more than 40 divisions of ground forces are deployed there.

61. The *tactical air forces* of the Warsaw Pact have also been continuously reinforced. Older types of aircraft have been replaced by the latest models and the number of aircraft increased. In the area opposite ACE, the Soviet first-line flying units, the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact air units and the long-range and naval air force units of the Warsaw Pact comprise roughly 6,000 combat aircraft (fighters, fighter-bombers, reconnaissance and bomber aircraft). The relatively high number of fighter aircraft of the Soviet home air defence forces will probably not have an immediate effect at the beginning of a war.

62. The equipment of the *Soviet naval forces* with modern missile-carrying cruisers, destroyers, corvettes, landing ships and the necessary auxiliary vessels which started in the mid-sixties is being continued. Since 1968, the number of missile-carrying submarines, a considerable number of which are nuclear-powered, has more than doubled to approximately 110 at the present time, which is approximately one-third of the whole Soviet submarine fleet. A new type, the Delta class, is equipped with missiles having a range of 7,500 km. They are in a position to cover the entire NATO area. The construction of aircraft carriers has begun.

63. With regard to the *strategic armament*, the Soviet Union has reached equality with the United States, its intercontinental missiles outnumbering those of the United States. Only in technology does the United States still have an advantage.

64. The NATO Ministers of Defence have repeatedly shown concern about the continued expansion and modernisation of the Warsaw Pact forces in all fields. The communiqué of the ministerial session of the NATO Defence Planning Committee of 14th June 1974 includes the following statements :

“These provide the Soviet Union and her allies with a military power far in excess of that required for self-defence... (The Ministers) pointed out that such actions are difficult to reconcile with declared objectives of détente and disarmament...”

C.2. Degrees of readiness

65. In peacetime not all forces of the Warsaw Pact are kept in an equal state of readiness. This is true in particular in regard to the Warsaw Pact land forces ; however, the strategic missile forces, the bulk of the air forces and large parts of the naval forces are in a high state of readiness.

66. The units of the land forces are categorised in accordance with their peacetime strength in regard to both personnel and equipment. The Soviet forces in the western forefield of the Soviet Union (the German Democratic Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Poland and Hungary) are in a state of full operational readiness. The peacetime strength in regard to both personnel and equipment of the Soviet forces in the Soviet Union and of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact land forces varies considerably. Their degree of readiness mainly depends on their deployment, the availability of mobilisation reserves and wartime missions. Especially in the Soviet Union, large reserves of personnel and matériel will be available upon mobilisation at short notice.

67. The different degrees of readiness in peacetime affect mainly the combat effectiveness of the units, but not so much their availability in case of mobilisation, since the mobilisation system permits bringing the division support troops and parts of the supply troops up to strength within a few days. After mobilisation, especially those divisions which have only cadre-strength in peacetime will need a longer time for attaining an adequate degree of combat effectiveness. On the other hand, the other divisions will be in a state of operational readiness immediately or upon completion of fill-up.

C.3. Warsaw Pact forces confronting AFCENT

68. In detail the deployment of Warsaw Pact forces confronting the central region shows the following picture :

(a) Land forces

	Soviet divisions	Non-Soviet divisions
in the GDR	20	6
in Czechoslovakia	5	10 1/3
in Poland	2	15
Total	27	31 1/3
in Hungary	4	6
in the 9 western military districts of the USSR	62	—
Total	113	37 1/3

69. All Soviet divisions in the western forefield of the Soviet Union and the majority of the indigenous divisions of the German Democratic Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Poland and Hungary will be available either immediately or upon very short notice.

70. Generally, the personnel strength of the Warsaw Pact divisions is smaller than the strength of the NATO divisions. Dissimilarities are mainly due to the different organisation of the supply troops which are smaller in the Warsaw Pact divisions. On the other hand the

Warsaw Pact divisions have a comparatively larger contingent of combat troops. Not counting the existing reserves there are at least 15,500 battle tanks to be reckoned with in the German Democratic Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and in Poland; about 7,000 in the German Democratic Republic alone. Equipment which was replaced in the course of modernisation, including battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery and anti-air weapons, was partly used to activate new units and partly stored on site in depots in the forefield of the Warsaw Pact countries.

71. Strategic mobility was enhanced considerably by increasing the use of air transport means since 1972. For instance, the exchange of personnel in spring of each year is now effected by air transport means. The special air transport capacities are adequate for transporting simultaneously the combat elements of two airborne divisions including their personnel, weapons and equipment.

72. There are sufficient large transit roads and through railroads from east to west by which troops can be brought up expediently from the depth.

(b) Air forces

73. The Soviet first-line tactical air units, the tactical air forces of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries, the Soviet long-range and naval air forces of the Baltic fleet must be considered as a threat to Central Europe¹. Due to the flexibility of air forces the aforementioned forces can be reinforced from or else be employed in other areas.

74. There are roughly 4,000 combat aircraft confronting NATO in Central Europe, excluding the forces in Hungary and the Soviet home air defence forces :

Tactical aircraft in operational service	Northern and Central Europe			Southern Europe		
	NATO	Warsaw Pact	(of which USSR)	NATO	Warsaw Pact	(of which USSR)
Light bombers	165	250	200	8	30	30
Fighter ground-attack	1,250	1,500	1,100	450	225	50
Interceptors	350	2,100	1,100	225	600	200
Reconnaissance	275	500	350	125	50	40

Table reproduced from IISS "Military Balance 1974-75", page 100.

1. AFCENT and BALTAP.

75. Since 1968 the number of combat aircraft confronting Central Europe has increased by approximately 10 %. The Fishbed and Flogger aircraft of the fighter units are also suited for the attack rôle ; they are a considerable reinforcement of the attack capabilities of the Warsaw Pact. Consequently, also the Warsaw Pact air forces outnumber the forces which are available in the AFCENT area.

76. The *air defence forces*, in particular those of the land forces, have been equipped with mobile air defence missile systems and anti-aircraft guns, weapons which have already stood the test during the Yom Kippur war in October 1973. As a result, fighter units which are equipped with aircraft equally suited for air attack and air defence can be employed increasingly for offensive tasks.

77. The number of *airfields* available to the Warsaw Pact is large. A high number of airfields are permanently or temporarily used in the German Democratic Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and Poland. On the permanently used airfields, numerous shelters have been constructed for the accommodation of aircraft. Many airfields are protected by air defence systems.

(c) *Nuclear weapons*

78. There are nearly 600 ground-based medium-range ballistic missiles in fixed sites in the north-western part of the Soviet Union. They cover the entire AFCENT area including the communication zone (ComZ). Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact land and air forces possess numerous carriers for tactical nuclear weapons. So far, it has not been confirmed that nuclear warheads are stored in the forefield.

C.4. *Warning times*

79. It may well be assumed that a conflict will be preceded by a period of tension which may last for a few days or even several months. However, abrupt changes cannot be ruled out entirely. In general, changes in the political climate alone will probably not be taken for symptoms of a possible conflict unless they are corroborated by corresponding indications from the military sphere. On the other hand, without the background of a deteriorating East-West climate, purely military incidents will also not be sufficient warning in order to warrant the preparation of defence measures. It may be assumed

that even in a critical situation of strained East-West relations it will be the military indications which will eventually lead to military measures being taken on our side. However, the detection of military indications will to a great extent depend on the form of attack chosen by the Warsaw Pact as well as on the capabilities of the intelligence services of the NATO nations.

80. The *warning time* question is one of the most important and also most complicated problems which is extremely hard to judge.

81. It may be useful, for the considerations, to begin with two extreme situations.

Situation A

82. Strategic surprise ranks above strength. In this case the attack will be initiated only by the forces deployed near the area of attack. In order to ensure surprise, there will be no deployment to wartime positions or movement of identifiable reinforcements before the attack is launched. Movements of forces from garrisons situated near the front and assemblies in the attack areas could be masked as "exercises" and it would be difficult to recognise them as genuine preparations for an attack. Indications could at best be gathered from certain preparations of the forces deployed in the depth which could probably be alerted to be brought up as the second echelon.

Situation B

83. In this case the conditions are reversed. Strength ranks above strategic surprise. In this case the Warsaw Pact will mobilise and accomplish full deployment to wartime positions of all available forces before launching an attack. After these preparations the bulk of the Warsaw Pact forces will be deployed in their areas of attack along the frontier or in the assembly areas in West Poland and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic respectively. The forces of the strategic reserve, including the airborne divisions, are available in the western part of the Soviet Union and in East Poland when the attack begins.

84. There will be more warning within a longer period of time available then.

85. There are many other possibilities which lie between these two situations.

86. At that it must be taken into consideration that the mobilisation and the deployment to wartime positions of strong forces could be accomplished within a few days. The reinforcement would be considerable as compared with Case A.

87. The combat force strength will not be very different from Case B. Merely the logistic deployment will not have been completed, the cadre divisions will not have had sufficient time for training and a number of general economic preparations for war will not have been concluded.

C.5. Modes and main directions of attack

88. NATO is a defensive alliance. A military conflict can arise only if one or more NATO countries are attacked from the outside. NATO can merely react. The military initiative rests with the potential aggressor. He can determine the date, the area, the employment of forces and the political objective of an aggression. He has the advantage of the element of surprise.

89. Therefore, the defender must be prepared to defend against all kinds of aggressions. On the other hand, it is wise, as well as justifiable, to examine which modes of attack are to be considered likely and which appear to be less probable. The defender will base his operational planning on the modes of attack which he considers likely, but will not altogether lose sight of the other possibilities.

90. To most experts it appears improbable that the Soviet Union and its allies will start a war with a great, world-wide nuclear strike or even a limited one against Europe, as long as the United States possesses an effective second strike capability. The risk of unimaginable ravages caused in their own country by the immediate nuclear retaliation of the United States would be too great. The aggressor himself would be exposed to annihilation.

91. If, in spite of all endeavours for the maintenance of peace and for deterrence, a military attack should be launched in Central Europe, it is highly probable that, during the first phase, it will be limited to the employment of non-nuclear weapons.

92. I see two basically different possibilities and objectives for an aggression in Central Europe :

- It will either be a limited aggression, politically as well as in the military sense, which will aim at the seizure of one or more objectives for use as a basis for negotiations.

Such pawns might, for example, be : the North-East Canal or the cities of Ham-

burg, Hannover, Kassel, Nürnberg, München. Within and east of the area along the line connecting these cities live roughly one-third of the population of the Federal Republic of Germany and lie approximately 20 % of its industrial potential.

- Another possibility would be an attack on the total frontage between the Baltic Sea and the Danube river, with the objective of seizing the whole territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, or even to break through to the Atlantic Ocean.

Such a war would hardly remain limited to Central Europe. This would be the most dangerous form of aggression against the central region. Under the present conditions it must be assumed that the Warsaw Pact will launch a premeditated attack only if such an attack promises results of strategic significance.

93. The main attack may be expected in such a major aggression :

- (i) in the northern area an attack as a part of a tri-service operation could be aimed at opening the Baltic approaches and against Northern Germany ;
- (ii) two directions could be expected in the central area :
 - (a) the strongest thrust could be made from the area west of Berlin, leading westward through the North German plain with the objective of seizing the Ruhr area and the area north of it ;
 - (b) another direction of main attack to be expected is from the Thuringian bulge towards Frankfurt and the Palatinate ;
- (iii) other directions could be from Bohemia via Nürnberg towards Stuttgart-Strasbourg and via Regensburg towards München-Freiburg-Belfort. In violation of the Austrian neutrality it could be accompanied, and reinforced later on, by another force brought up from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic or Hungary via Vienna-Linz.

94. The point of main effort of operations in the central region could be expected in the central sector formed almost exclusively by Soviet forces through the North German plain and from the Thuringian forest towards Frankfurt. It is in this area that the Warsaw Pact has assembled the strongest offensive force.

D. Evaluation of the present deployment

95. From the military and security policy point of view, the present deployment of allied forces in the central region reveals some remarkable assets, but also numerous considerable deficiencies.

D.1. Assets

96. The greatest asset of this deployment is that — a fact without parallel in military history — in Central Europe the land and air forces of 7 nations (including France), which have joined in a defensive alliance, have been deployed in a relatively small area to fulfil a common mission ; 6 of these nations have delegated the responsibility for the operational planning and control to integrated NATO commands. As already mentioned above one combat sector extending up to the Warsaw Pact borders was assigned to each of the land forces of 5 nations (Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States) in the general defence plan (GDP) (layer-cake). Thus, a military attack of the Warsaw Pact forces between the Baltic Sea and the Danube river would not be an attack against the forces of one country alone, but would encounter the forces of several allies, among them the United States and the United Kingdom, engaging them from the beginning. This defence planning consolidates the cohesion of common defence. It results from and at the same time guarantees the close solidarity within the Alliance. Its deterrent effect is one of the most important elements for the maintenance of peace in this part of the world.

97. Although the *French troops* cannot be included in the common forward defence planning and therefore have not assumed direct responsibility at the border, the fact remains that the presence of a French corps with 2 divisions on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and of another corps in North-Eastern

France clearly adds to the deterrence of the Alliance. In any case, when developing his operational plans, the potential aggressor has to reckon with the participation of the French forces in the common NATO defence efforts.

98. Of similar importance for the deterrence is the fact that, already in peacetime, the whole *air defence* system has been placed under the operational command of SACEUR. This includes both the operational early warning system developed at great expense on the part of NATO and the interlacing links of the chain of Sam sites which, supported by NADGE (NATO air defence ground environment), guard against any surprise attack.

99. Far too seldom mention is made of the deterrent effect which is produced by the presence of occupation forces of three member nations of the Alliance (the United States, the United Kingdom and France) in *West Berlin*. A major attack could not be directed against the central region of NATO without touching West Berlin in the rear of the offensive front. The mere encirclement or isolation of West Berlin would interrupt the agreed land and air lines of communication of the allies and would call for political reactions of the Berlin powers. A military occupation of Berlin, however — though presenting no difficulties from the military point of view — would put into effect the mutual assistance clause contained in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and would thus have severe political consequences, although or just because the occupation troops of West Berlin are not assigned to CINCENT but are under the national command of the Berlin occupation powers.

100. One of the positive aspects of the deployment in Central Europe is the deployment of *nuclear warheads* on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. Their number is remarkably large. It is certainly larger and of greater variety than that of the Soviet nuclear warheads stored in the German Democratic Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and Poland.

101. Further advantages of the common NATO defence in the central region are :

- the common *NATO pipeline system* ;
- the *NATO integrated communication system (NICS)*, which is being established ; and
- the system of *forward storage sites (FSS)* which is also being established.

102. They are among other the most essential elements of the common NATO infrastructure which will be discussed in detail in chapter G. 4. (1) (page 106).

D.2. Deficiencies

103. Besides the advantages which are not to be underestimated, there are considerable deficiencies.

(a) "Relative" balance only

104. It has already been pointed out that the conventional Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe greatly outnumber the NATO forces and that they are still being increased. As to numbers, there is no balance between East and West, neither in respect of manpower nor in regard to the available weapon systems. The present balance of power between East and West can at best be called a "relative" balance taking into account the defensive concept of the Alliance ; it is just adequate to prevent an aggression by presenting an incalculable risk which the aggressor would hesitate to take. With the available forces the deterrent effect demanded by the strategy of flexible response can only be produced if nuclear means are included. With purely conventional means only an attack limited in regard to area and objective can be warded off with a chance of success. But, in conventional warfare, a major aggression can only be resisted for a limited period of time without reinforcement of the available land and air forces. Any *unilateral* reduction of the conventional defence forces decreases the chances of successful conventional defensive operations. Since it cannot be assumed that the nuclear threshold will be lowered, for that would considerably increase the risk for the United States, such a development would lead to a perforation of the complete deterrence¹.

(b) Operational problems regarding deployment

Lack of balance between the command areas

105. The area to be defended in the central region is divided into two *unequal* parts by the boundary between the command areas of NORTHAG/TWO ATAF and CENTAG/FOUR ATAF. While NORTHAG has to cover a front line of about 210 km, the front to be defended

by CENTAG is approximately 590 km long. If an aggressor should disregard the neutrality of Austria, another 170 km would be added to this front.

106. NORTHAG must be prepared to face the greatest impact of attack on both sides of the Autobahn Helmstedt - Dortmund, since the Warsaw Pact has earmarked numerous armoured divisions for that purpose which in the lowlands of Northern Germany will find a terrain suited for tank operations. CENTAG, however, is responsible for the defence against the dangerous wedges of attack directed from the Thuringian bulge towards the Palatinate at the narrowest place of the Federal Republic of Germany ("wasp-waist") as well as from Bohemia via Nürnberg towards Karlsruhe. In addition, CENTAG is faced with the problem of the uncovered south-east flank of the central region.

107. In terms of figures, the deployment of the M-day divisions and brigades in these two areas approximately corresponds to the importance of the mentioned defence tasks.

108. The reinforcements of land forces¹ to be expected in a period of tension, upon mobilisation or after the beginning of an attack, will be more to the advantage of CENTAG. While NORTHAG can only expect some reserve brigades from the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom, CENTAG can count on considerable reinforcements from the United States. The French 1 Army, too, will probably be employed mainly in the CENTAG area — after the President of the French Republic has decided on its employment.

109. However, in this estimate the unsafe situation at the south-east flank of CENTAG must not be disregarded. Even now, the II (GE) Corps has to defend a sector of the area of the Bayrische Wald which despite the favourable terrain is far too large. The border with Austria is virtually exposed. If the Warsaw Pact should disregard Austrian neutrality, part of the operational reserves available to CENTAG would probably be contained along this border.

110. The deployment of the *air force units*, too shows some differences. The greater number of the available combat aircraft are placed under the command of FOUR ATAF. In case of war, substantial reinforcements with regard to combat aircraft can only be expected from the United

1. See also page 95.

1. See Chapter E.4., pages 91 *et seq.*

States¹. According to present plans, these will mainly be to the advantage of FOUR ATAF. In case the French tactical air forces (1 FATAF) should be released, they will primarily be employed in support of the French land forces, that is also in the FOUR ATAF area. TWO ATAF, however, can only reckon with the support of the combat aircraft operating from the air bases of the United Kingdom, unless these are needed in other combat areas, e.g. AFNORTH.

111. However, as soon as the new AAFCE air force command has been established and the procedures standardised this disproportion will be considerably corrected by centralised command and control of air operations and by the possibility of facilitated cross-tasking.

112. But there is another disadvantage which, for the time being, even the establishment of the new command AAFCE will not remedy. All flying units assigned to AAFCE are deployed to *air bases* in Germany and the Benelux countries, all of which are located west of the line Lübeck-Hamburg-Bielefeld-Frankfurt-München within a belt of varying but insufficient width which extends from north to south. This deployment *lacks depth*. In addition, the air bases are limited in number. In many cases the *occupancy surpasses their capacity*. This applies to some of the air bases which are used by the United Kingdom but, above all, to those airfields occupied by United States squadrons.

113. Up to 1966, the United States Air Force could still use air bases in France. But when the French Government withdrew their forces from the NATO integrated structure and all non-French headquarters and units of the Alliance were made to leave France, the United States was compelled to redeploy its squadrons previously stationed in France; some of them were transferred to the United Kingdom while the bulk was redeployed to the Federal Republic of Germany. The United States squadrons concerned were under the command of FOUR ATAF and, at that time, only the FOUR ATAF area in the Federal Republic of Germany, i.e. the southern part of the country, was available for this purpose. Therefore, a great number of air bases used by the United States are more densely occupied than would be appropriate and desirable. Consequently, there is a risk that the air traffic control and radar facilities may be overloaded and the maintenance and supply facilities

1. See also Chapter E.4., pages 94 *et seq.*

become inadequate. To ensure survivability more shelters must be built on the air bases. After all, if a home base is no longer available, the possibilities of using alternative bases are very limited.

114. These difficulties will even increase considerably when the prepared United States Air Force reinforcements are to be transferred to Central Europe in case of tension. This matter will have to be discussed later on¹.

115. In contrast, the unequal distribution of nuclear *delivery means* can hardly be changed. Only a small number of them are deployed in the NORTHAG area.

Boundary between AFCENT and AFNORTH

116. Mention must also be made of the problems regarding the boundary between AFNORTH and AFCENT. It runs along the river Elbe between Lauenburg and Cuxhaven. Thus, Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein are part of the AFNORTH area (BALTAP).

117. On the Warsaw Pact side command and control over the attacks against the Baltic approaches including Schleswig-Holstein/Jutland and over the attack directed against the German and Netherlands North Sea coasts would be centralised in one hand. From the Soviet point of view this is quite logical. Both attacks must be regarded as an operational unity which aims at the opening of the Baltic approaches and the occupation of the North Sea coast, that is the conquest of the German and Danish coasts. The more difficult thrust into Schleswig-Holstein will be facilitated by an operation south of the Elbe river. Supply support of all operations at this front is accomplished from the same area (Mecklenburg).

118. As regards the defence — i.e. on the part of NATO — the defence of the Baltic approaches, that of Denmark and that of Schleswig-Holstein are closely interrelated, but they are separated from NORTHAG by the wide lower part of the Elbe river. The defensive combat of the weak forces in Schleswig-Holstein can neither be supported by land forces nor be given logistic support from the area south of the Elbe river. The command and control and supply channels to the north of the Elbe river run from south to north, whereas south of the Elbe river they extend

1. See also Chapter E.4., pages 91 *et seq.*

from east to west. Thus, a change of the boundary between AFNORTH and AFCENT should not be considered even though disadvantages are connected with that boundary. Elements of the German Federal armed forces, in particular almost the entire navy, are placed under the command of remote headquarters which have different missions and interests.

French forces

119. Although the French forces on both sides of the Rhine river are an important factor of the common strategy of deterrence, it has to be regarded as a great disadvantage that NATO commanders responsible for operational planning and command and control do not know if and at what time the French forces will join the allies in their defensive combat in the central region, or what will be the mission of the French forces. It is true that, already in peacetime, French liaison staffs are attached to the higher NATO headquarters, and that there are regular staff conferences for a possible operational employment of French land and air forces in the CINCENT area of responsibility. The military staffs do their best in this respect. However, it cannot be foreseen whether in case of war the political conditions will actually exist and the developments in the military situation will actually take place upon which the considerations are based. In particular the time of a possible intervention of the French forces remains uncertain. Therefore, their employment will always have to be improvised to a certain extent, a disadvantage to both the French forces and the common operational command. The remaining uncertainty is a handicap for the overall planning, in particular with regard to flexible decision-making on the employment of the operational reserves.

120. Last but not least, there is the open question of a possible employment of French tactical nuclear weapons in the presumable combat area.

Deployment to wartime positions

121. The difficulties of the deployment to wartime positions, the danger of crossing and overlapping movements and the required time have already been mentioned earlier¹.

122. When reviewing the details, the following picture is revealed.

1. See page 75.

123. The longest distance has to be covered by the *I (NL) Corps*, the units of which — with the exception of the 41 Brigade in Seedorf — have to be brought up from the Netherlands far to the north-east.

124. The greater parts of the *I (GE)* and *I (BR)* *Corps* require much less time for deployment to wartime positions. However, parts of their major formations have to perform disturbing movements from north to south.

125. The *I (BE)* *Corps*, too, has to cover a long distance for deployment to wartime positions. Most of its units must move from the area on both sides of the Rhine river and from the German-Belgian border area far eastward. Since the terrain through which the movements will have to be made is mountainous and rich in forests, the time required will very much depend on the prevailing weather conditions. The time required for bringing up units from Belgium is comparable to that needed for the Dutch units.

126. The *III (GE)* *Corps* again requires less time. The armoured brigades of the 5 (GE) Division deployed at the Rhine river have to overcome similar difficulties with regard to terrain and weather as their neighbour in the north, the *I (BE)* *Corps*.

127. The *V (US)* *Corps* will reach its wartime positions within the same time as the *III (GE)* *Corps*. One (US) division, however, needs more time. With the exception of some smaller units, it must cross the Rhine river and is dependent on intact Rhine bridges.

128. The *VII (US)* *Corps* meets with the most favourable conditions.

129. The *II (GE)* *Corps*, however, has to overcome greater difficulties. One division has to move from south to north, though the danger of crossing other movements is not as great as in the NORTHAG area.

130. Thus, with regard to their wartime positions, the following forces are particularly unfavourably deployed :

- the greater part of the *I (NL)* *Corps* and large parts of the *I (BE)* *Corps* ;
- parts of the *I (GE)* *Corps* and of the *I (BR)* *Corps* ;
- one (US) Division ;
- one (GE) Division of *II (GE)* *Corps*.

131. The deployment to wartime positions has been prepared by the NATO commands with special care. All necessary movements are co-ordinated, are laid down in detail and are updated continuously. However, it can only be carried out smoothly if all forces receive movement orders at the same time, i.e. all nations agree to appropriate alert measures, and if the movements are not disturbed by enemy action.

132. The most favourable solution would be, of course, if the deployment to wartime positions could already be accomplished and completed in a period of tension before an aggression occurs. This, however, presupposes early political decisions¹.

(c) *Logistic supply routes*

133. Apart from the problems connected with moving the divisions into their respective wartime positions the logistic supply routes must also be considered.

134. For the Belgian, Netherlands, United Kingdom and German forces in the central region inconvenient crossings of logistic supply routes are to be expected in exceptional cases only. As a rule, their logistic supply routes run from west to east within their assigned sectors. The separation of military and civil roads is ensured in such a manner that the requirements of both the NATO armed forces and the civil defence forces are adequately met as long as spontaneous, uncontrolled movements can be prevented.

135. The conditions are more critical where the United States forces are concerned. In wartime, Bremerhaven will hardly be available for use as a supply base for the United States forces. For then the supply routes would run from north to south within the FCZ. Shifting the supply base to ports in Belgium and the Netherlands will become necessary. However, this will result in very disturbing lateral movements, and crossings as well as an accumulation of supply movements within a comparatively small geographical area. This situation could be alleviated by means of bilateral agreements to be concluded between the United States and France which — similar to existing German-French agreements — make French territory available for the landing and storage of supplies.

1. See also page 91.

136. There are other aggravating circumstances affecting the logistic supply routes in the central region which must be taken into consideration :

- The main depots for the Belgian and the Netherlands forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany are located in their respective home countries. The result is rather long supply routes.
- The 7th United States Army has concentrated large quantities of supplies in the Palatinate area.
- In both cases the barrier formed by the Rhine river and sometimes, in the northern area, also the river Meuse, must be negotiated on the way from west to east. Special attention is called to the necessity of providing adequate ferrying equipment.

137. The fact that logistics is a national responsibility does not make it easier to overcome the aforementioned difficulties. Logistic support for the land forces of different nations assigned to CINCENT could be improved considerably, especially during the initial phase of a military conflict, by increasing the stock levels of vital supplies in the depots located east of the Rhine river. This could also include, as a precautionary measure, the stockage of matériel required by the land and air reinforcements which are to be brought up in wartime.

(d) *Close anti-aircraft weapons and anti-tank weapons*

138. The Yom-Kippur war in 1973 has drawn the world's attention to the importance of the close anti-aircraft weapons and anti-tank weapons. The considerable superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces in terms of tanks and tactical air forces gives weight to the requirement for such weapon systems in the defence-oriented central region. Therefore, they are considered in detail.

(aa) *Close anti-aircraft weapons*

139. In examining the means of anti-aircraft defence it must be admitted that the *present systems* integral to the corps are mostly *obsolete*. This is due to the relatively low priority accorded to this subject for a long time. However, this situation will improve during the next few years.

140. *The United States forces* are well equipped with the Redeye missiles (one-man infra-red

homing weapon) which are distributed to all of their armour and mech inf bns, including the div AA bns and the non-divisional commands. The divisional AA bns have the mixture of the 20 mm Vulcan M-167 (6 barrels) and the infra-red guided Chaparral missile MIM-73 A.

141. *The German forces* deployed the Redeye to the divisional AA bns to supplement their 40 mm guns. The guns themselves will be replaced from 1976 onwards by the self-propelled all-weather capable Gepard system (35 mm L/90 twin-barrel).

142. The corps AAA bns are presently equipped with the 40 mm L/70 ; in about 1980, they will receive the GE/FR Roland system (with all-weather capability and radar control) which, incidentally, will also be introduced into the United States forces.

143. *The British forces* also plan an increase in their air defence capability. The one Thunderbird medium-level bn will remain and the 40 mm L/70 guns in the other two bns will be replaced this year by the mobile Rapier missile system (with optional blind-fire radar).

144. In addition, three other reserve AAA bns, earmarked for I (UK) Corps, will be equipped with the Redeye-type weapon Blowpipe in 1977.

145. *The Netherlands forces* have four battalions of 40 mm guns and in addition will include one Gepard battery in each of their six mechanised brigades.

146. *The Belgians* will replace their two battalions of 20 mm guns with four batteries of Gepard after procuring 55 systems.

147. In addition to the foregoing, the forces of all nations possess varying numbers of heavy anti-aircraft machine guns of various calibres.

(bb) *Anti-tank weapons*

148. Due to the efforts made in the past the equipment of the central region with anti-tank weapons has somewhat improved.

(1) *Tanks*

149. The most important tank destroyer is the battle tank itself. With the exception of the M-48 A2 Patton within the II (GE) Corps which will be replaced in 1978 all other tanks are being retrofitted with improved fire control systems.

150. In the NORTHAG area the British have the heavy Chieftain Mk. 2 with the 120 mm gun. There are over 2,000 Leopard 40 t tanks within the German, Belgian and Netherlands corps. CENTAG disposes of:

- the modern M-60 48 t tank with the 105 mm gun or the 152 mm Shillelagh missile, to which about 500 armoured reconnaissance/airborne assault tanks General Sheridan M-551 in the United States corps are to be added ;

- the M-48 and the Leopard tanks in the II (GE) Corps ;

- 32 Centurion tanks of the Canadian 4th Mech Bde Group.

(2) *Tank destroyers*

151. Three of the NORTHAG corps have tank destroyers, the Netherlands the AMX-13/105 mm, the Germans and the Belgians Jagdpanzer-Kanone 90 mm, whereas in the CENTAG area the United States forces provide a large number of rifles 90 mm (self-propelled and lightly-armoured) and the II (GE) Corps for a great number of Jagdpanzer-Kanone.

(3) *Non-guided anti-tank systems*

152. There is a good variety of static, non-guided, anti-tank weapon systems. At the lower end of the scale there are many thousands of anti-tank mines that the corps intend to lay if sufficient time is available.

153. The infantry in all corps possesses large numbers of short-range weapons : rifle grenades, M-72 and Leichte Panzerfaust 44 (which will be replaced by Lance). In NORTHAG the British, German and Netherlands units have over 3,500 84 mm Carl Gustav between them. The Belgians use the 83 mm Blindicide to be replaced by Carl Gustav and Milan, which will also be introduced into the German motorised infantry (Jäger) bns. The United States corps provide a considerable number of individually-fired light anti-tank weapons.

154. Finally, in the non-guided weapon field, the Canadian, Netherlands and British units have recoilless rifles of 90 mm, 106 mm and 120 mm L-6 Wombat respectively, which, however, can no longer be considered to be modern equipment.

(4) Guided anti-tank systems

155. In this field the situation is continually changing and improving as second-generation systems are introduced.

156. *The United States corps* are totally equipped with the new Tow MGM-71 A missile. Their anti-tank helicopters will be equipped with the same Tow system beginning this year.

157. *The German corps* still have a variety of systems. Some of the infantry bns have the 810 Kobra. The anti-tank coy of the airborne bdes just received the United States Tow. The anti-tank companies in brigades have Jagdpanzer-Rakete with the SS-11/B1 (800-3,300 m). A new system Hot is being developed in co-operation with France.

158. *The British* have at present Vigilant in the reconnaissance battalions and Swingfire in the armoured and infantry battalions. Vigilant will be replaced completely by Swingfire shortly.

159. In the infantry the 120 mm recoilless rifle and some of the Carl Gustavs are to be replaced. Milan, amongst other systems, is being evaluated for this. Hot is being evaluated against the British Hawkwing as the successor to the SS-11 on anti-tank helicopters.

160. *The Belgians* use the Entac missile in their infantry and in the brigade anti-tank companies. This will be replaced by Milan.

161. *The I (NL) Corps* has introduced the Tow system for all brigade anti-tank companies.

162. The Tow also will replace the 106 mm recoilless rifles in the infantry.

163. Occasionally endeavours are made to calculate the average numbers of tanks and anti-tank weapons per front kilometre and to draw conclusions regarding the defence capabilities in the different sectors. This procedure does not yield a reliable picture. An assessment of the overall effectiveness of the anti-tank defence must also take into consideration a number of other factors, above all the terrain, the organisation and the number of units operating on the front and kept in reserve, respectively.

164. However, the following conclusions may be drawn from a general assessment of the present status of equipment :

Tanks :

165. Measured against the number of units NORTHAG is somewhat inferior to CENTAG in terms of equipment.

Anti-tank weapons :

166. In spite of the efforts made during the past few years the anti-tank weapons are still insufficient in number. In particular a backlog exists in the Belgian and Netherlands forces. The multiplicity and the lack of uniformity of the present equipment are serious disadvantages. Therefore, priority should be given to the requirements for modernising, standardising and increasing the numbers of anti-tank weapons.

(e) Personnel availability and matériel readiness

167. The problem of the personnel actually available to the M-day units is closely connected with the time required for their deployment to wartime positions. Only the United States units and the Canadian combat group are independent of mobilisation measures. In peacetime, the corps of the European member nations do not have their full wartime personnel strength. They are in a state of so-called graduated availability. As a rule, the combat forces, i.e. the brigades, are maintained at full personnel strength or require only minor augmentation in regard to personnel which hardly affects the attainment of immediate operational readiness. The combat support and supply troops of the divisions and corps, however, depend in most cases on smaller or larger contingents of personnel which must be brought up before or after deployment to wartime positions ; as a result, they will not reach full operational readiness in their areas of operation until hours or even days after the respective measures have been taken.

168. The readiness to move is also dependent on the time required for loading the combat and supply vehicles with ammunition, fuels, subsistence and other basic load supplies. If ammunition and fuels of the unit loads are not in the immediate vicinity of the barracks — which sometimes is the case for security reasons — the transport of this matériel, its distribution and loading will take much time.

169. Thus, a limited availability of personnel and unfavourable conditions in regard to the attainment of the matériel readiness to move affect the time of full operational readiness in a similar way as an unfavourable deployment ; often they will even increase the disadvantage of an unfavourable deployment.

170. Matters are rendered even worse when entire battalions are employed in areas outside

the central region for a longer period of time, even if it is only a temporary employment as, for instance, that of the battalions of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) in Northern Ireland. Even though the heavy equipment of these units remains in the Federal Republic of Germany and preparations are made for their prompt return in times of tension, their availability can hardly be considered to be greater than that of the dual-based forces to be brought up from the United States.

(f) Lack of interoperability

171. Last but not least, the flaws of the deployment are still aggravated by the fact that the interoperability of the units of different nations is very limited. This is mainly due to the fact that the logistics of the NATO-assigned forces is still a national responsibility. Thus, the allied units in the central region are dependent upon their national logistic facilities and on their national logistic lines of communication. If peacetime and wartime locations are separated by a large area, the logistic support, too, is rendered very difficult, particularly during the initial phase of an armed conflict. Due to the lack of standardisation of weapons and equipment a cross-servicing is possible only to a limited extent, or in many fields not possible at all. If one further considers the lack of uniformity with regard to the organisational structure of the major units, the procedures for operational control on the battlefield which have not yet been fully co-ordinated, and the different tactical doctrines and training methods, the limits of interoperability become evident. They reduce flexibility in regard to the operational decisions of the NATO commanders.

172. These problems will have to be discussed in a separate chapter¹.

E. Studies on the improvement of the deployment

E.1. Maintaining the advantages of the present deployment

173. An evaluation of the present deployment has revealed that certain flaws do indeed exist

¹. See Chapter G.

and that, above all, there is no optimum relation between the peacetime deployment in the central region and the envisaged wartime positions. Therefore, one is justified in speaking of a "maldeployment" which delays the attainment of complete defence readiness.

174. It must now be examined under what conditions and by what measures the maldeployment could be eliminated or at least reduced.

175. However, before giving thought to this problem, it should be made clear that under no circumstances would it be reasonable to initiate or to permit any actions which would aggravate the existing maldeployment, including the readiness posture of the forces. Decisions which are apt to worsen the present situation and to have a negative effect on the reaction and defence capability include :

- redeployment of forces from comparatively advantageous positions to garrisons located farther to the rear as, for instance, it is planned, and already initiated, for two Belgian brigades. Such redeployment will increase the time that will be required for the deployment to wartime positions ;
- withdrawal of air defence missile units from the common Mike and Hawk belts as announced by the Netherlands White Paper on Defence ;
- a possible extension of the principle of dual-based forces for United States or United Kingdom forces ; it would weaken deterrence, especially against surprise actions ;
- any further weakening of the readiness posture in regard to personnel and matériel of the M-day forces stationed in the central region. This refers e.g. to the planned reorganisation of the Netherlands army units. The standby readiness as envisaged for the Federal armed forces would have a similar effect if it were to exceed a balanced scope.

E.2. Improvement of maldeployment through relocation of units

176. Already in 1966, SHAPE commented on the question of maldeployment within the scope of the force planning studies for the seventies.

Later on SHAPE submitted a study which contained a detailed analysis of the problems involved and offered possibilities for a solution.

177. The Defence Planning Committee and the NATO Council had reservations regarding these recommendations. Though not underrating the disadvantages of the existing maldeployment, they realised the infrastructure problems associated with redeployment and were reluctant because of the expenses involved. This must be explained in more detail.

178. "Infrastructure" is "a term generally applicable for all fixed and permanent installations, fabrications or facilities for the support and control of military forces".

179. Generally we distinguish between :

— *national infrastructure*

which is provided and financed by a NATO nation on its own territory for its own forces (including those forces assigned to or designated for NATO) ;

-- *common infrastructure*

this is the infrastructure essential to the training of NATO forces or to the implementation of NATO operational plans owing to its degree of common use or interest and its compliance with criteria laid down from time to time by the North Atlantic Council. It is commonly financed by NATO members¹ ;

— *bilateral infrastructure*

it concerns only two NATO members and is financed by mutual agreement between them (e.g. facilities required for the use of forces of one NATO member in the territory of another).

180. Therefore, a redeployment of units of the land forces in the central region affects only the national or the bilateral infrastructure.

181. On the other hand, the governments concerned are not free in their decisions regarding the stationing of their forces assigned to NATO.

182. Among other things, the following principles were laid down in the resolution of the North Atlantic Council on the implementation

of the final act of the London conference dated 24th October 1954 :

- the forces assigned to SACEUR will be deployed in accordance with the NATO strategy ;
- the location of these forces will be determined by SACEUR in consultation and agreement with the national authorities concerned ;
- these forces shall neither be redeployed nor operationally used without the consent of SACEUR which must be based on political guidance furnished by the North Atlantic Council.

183. The strong concentration of forces in the central region has resulted in large requirements for military infrastructure facilities which had to be financed nationally or on a bilateral basis. This gave rise to a number of problems. Not only were the existing infrastructure facilities occupied to capacity as a result of the augmentation of the former occupation forces, the build-up of the Federal armed forces and the accommodation of allied forces which had not been part of the former occupation forces, but considerable new constructions had also become necessary. Garrisons for at least one battalion each had to be established in approximately 350 towns and communities for the Federal armed forces alone. Only some of these could make use of existing facilities. Most of the new garrisons of the Federal armed forces are situated in the eastern part of the Federal Republic of Germany.

184. From the beginning the provision of training areas presented particular difficulties. In regard to layout and size many of the existing garrison training areas no longer met the requirements of technically saturated armies. But in a highly industrialised and densely populated country their expansion presents almost unsurmountable difficulties. Still less adequate are the large training areas which do not permit large-scale exercises of major units or tank, artillery or air-to-ground firing. For location and size of the training areas in the Federal Republic of Germany see attached map (Enclosure 3). In the Benelux countries the situation is even worse. The forces must use foreign training areas — even in the United States and Canada. Special air bases on Sardinia and the NATO missile range for all three services on Crete are used for firing practices with live ammunition.

1. See also pages 107 et seq.

185. The accommodation and the training activities of forces cause inconvenience to the population which must also not be neglected. I am referring in particular to disturbances by aircraft noise and firing practice as well as obstructions to traffic as a result of military road movements.

186. No NATO standards have been developed for the construction of barracks. Therefore — and this appears to be legitimate — barracks are laid out and constructed in accordance with the requirements of the service, the service branch and the nation concerned. The non-German forces need special facilities such as schools, shops, clubs, sports facilities, libraries. Their wishes in regard to accommodation for the dependents of the servicemen, preferably in separate housing complexes, must be met as far as possible.

187. Thus, as a rule, military installations are laid out for specific units and for certain nations. Therefore the garrisons cannot be exchanged at will. In almost every case an exchange of garrisons would involve reconstruction measures or the construction of supplementary buildings. They cost money and time and do not always increase the value of the existing facilities.

188. The following figures may illustrate the costs involved in the relocation of forces to garrisons with an existing infrastructure, or in the construction of new garrisons. They only apply to army forces, since a redeployment of any other forces in connection with the existing maldeployment is not being considered. The figures are based on the experiences of the German Federal armed forces.

(a) The following costs are anticipated for the relocation to another garrison with similar infrastructure facilities :

Relocation of one armoured battalion over a distance of 300 km	1.4 million DM
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Relocation of one armoured infantry battalion over a distance of 300 km	1.7 million DM
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189. These sums include the costs for the rail transport of tracked vehicles and the road transport of wheeled vehicles as well as an average amount for relocation costs and other personnel expenditures involved.

190. The figures do not include any expenditures on infrastructure.

(b) At the present time, the capital investments on infrastructure for a new garrison amount to :

— about 50 million DM for one armoured battalion ;

— about 53 million DM for one armoured infantry battalion ;

— about 50 million DM for one armoured artillery battalion.

191. The expenditures for the purchase of real estate, if government-owned real estate is not available, are not included.

192. The costs involved in the purchase of 300 hectares (740 acres) of land for a garrison training area are 30 million DM.

193. The construction of a garrison firing range costs approximately 5 million DM.

(c) The following examples show the financial order of magnitude of the construction of new welfare and recreation facilities : Enlisted personnel clubs, non-commissioned officers' clubs and officers' clubs cost about 1 million DM each.

194. Under the housing programme for married military personnel, roughly 80,000 DM are required for each housing unit. If one brigade, complete with headquarters, 4 battalions and a few self-supporting brigade units, is to be relocated into two garrisons to be newly constructed, the expenditures on infrastructure alone would amount to approximately 350 to 450 million DM, provided that the necessary ground can be provided at all and must not be purchased at an excessive price. However, experience has shown that, in the area of the central region, this is highly improbable.

195. The above examples are sufficient to make it clear that considerable costs would be involved in eliminating the maldeployment by redeploying the forces to garrisons to be newly constructed or to existing garrisons which would require major alterations and supplementary constructions. It is true that such measures would reduce the time required for deployment to wartime positions but they would not produce new combat power.

196. In addition, they would also reduce the capital investment portion of the defence budgets, considerably diminishing the already limited possibilities for the procurement of

weapons and equipment. Therefore they cannot be recommended. The resulting improvements in the deployment are out of all proportion as compared with the disadvantages in regard to the continuous modernisation of the armed forces.

197. Relocation expenditures could only be justified under special circumstances as, for instance, in the case of the covering forces or of certain forces, such as reconnaissance units, which will be quickly needed at the frontier in wartime but are at present in particularly unfavourable locations — i.e. in locations far to the west. The same applies to such logistic installations which would considerably facilitate operations and enhance flexibility especially during the initial phase of defensive combat.

198. Redeployment may also be justifiable under financial aspects if they involve merely an exchange of garrisons between locations where the necessary infrastructure exists and no major alterations or supplementary constructions are required. However, the expected advantages will only materialise if more combat troops in a state of immediate operational readiness can be redeployed to locations closer to the frontier and within their assigned zones of action. Primarily, this might be considered for parts of the I (NL) Corps and parts of the I (BE) Corps. A solution might be found in a kind of "ring barter" whereby Netherlands and Belgian brigades would be relocated to the eastern part of the Federal Republic of Germany, and training units or service support and supply units of the Federal armed forces which would be needed later would be moved to the vacated infrastructure facilities in the Netherlands and Belgium. However, there are not only political obstacles that would have to be overcome — current Belgian policy actually shows a different tendency — but also serious human problems would have to be solved in regard to long-term personnel and their families as, for instance, their separation from familiar environment, occupational opportunities for the wives, schools for the children, etc. If these problems are neglected, the servicemen's willingness to re-enlist will soon be affected.

199. Finally, I propose to discuss part of a problem the solution of which appears possible. The Netherlands army and air defence forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany are deployed in such a manner that some of them require separate supply and welfare facilities as well as logistic supply channels. If the Nether-

lands Nike and Hawk batteries could be exchanged with the German batteries stationed farther north in the belt — the infrastructure facilities are more or less similar — it would be possible to save funds by simplifying the upkeep of the Netherlands army and air defence units. Similar considerations have already played a part, a few years ago, in connection with the concentration of the Canadian contingent in southern Germany.

200. Even though the previous arguments concentrated on the financial consequences, there are still other considerations which make the author hesitate to recommend a relocation as a remedy for the maldeployment — apart from some exceptions.

201. There is a natural and recurring tension between the permanent locations and the wartime positions. Operational plans and thus the areas of operation of the units at the outbreak of combat actions are apt to vary, that is to say they are of a dynamic nature. The change of strategic doctrines and the development of the defence plans in the central region from a main line of defence on the Rhine river to the principle of forward defence have already been mentioned on page 74. Even though it appears improbable that the present strategic concept including the principle of forward defence is going to be revised in the near future, a change in the number and the composition of the available forces could make new planning inevitable. There have been examples in the recent past such as :

- the reorganisation of the Canadian contingent and its concentration in the CENTAG area ;
- the withdrawal of the French divisions from integrated planning ;
- the introduction of the principle of dual-based forces by the United States.

202. In the future, defence planning can be influenced by, for instance :

- agreements reached in the MBFR negotiations ;
- political decisions taken by individual member nations with regard to the number of forces to be stationed outside their national borders ;
- or merely by drastic changes in the force structure of the individual nations.

203. Infrastructure facilities, however, are permanent, that is static ; once they are established at great expense, they can only be altered at renewed high costs, and only to a limited extent.

204. If, by taking appropriate measures, an optimum relation between peacetime locations and operational areas were established — which would take years — one could still not be sure that, despite all efforts, new defence plans or other unforeseeable changes which had become necessary in the meantime, would not cause a new maldeployment. Although a complete conformity of peacetime garrisons with the respective areas of operation would be an ideal solution, its realisation remains more or less an illusion.

E.3. Relation between deployment and political decisions in a period of tension

205. If one accepts an unavoidable degree of maldeployment and thus recognises that the units of the land forces always need a certain period of time to reach their areas of operation, it is all the more imperative to use the warning time¹ most probably preceding an aggression to improve the operational readiness in regard to personnel and matériel by taking political decisions in time and by granting the armed forces the time required for deployment to wartime positions.

206. Therefore, already in peacetime, the political leaders will have to decide for one of the two alternatives :

- either to increase the funds for the infrastructure in order to achieve an optimum deployment and to provide for the possibility of taking political decisions at a later date, which means, however, that there will be less capital investment for modern matériel ;
- or to provide financial means primarily for weapons and equipment, putting up with deficiencies in deployment and the necessity of taking early political decisions.

207. Thus, in the last analysis, the problem of deployment becomes a matter of taking timely political decisions in times of increasing tension.

1. See page 78.

208. However, it would be wrong to assume that early measures for the improvement of the defence readiness would automatically aggravate a crisis and thus jeopardise peace. On the contrary, if it is recognised that the enemy plans an aggression and his intent is confirmed by indications, it will have a deterrent effect and thus subdue the crisis and preserve the peace, when at an early date NATO shows its determination not to be intimidated and, if necessary, to offer resistance to pressure or aggression even by military means.

209. There are, however, limits to the choice the political leaders have between both alternatives. If the presence of forces is reduced to such an extent and their deployment becomes so unfavourable that the time required for the deployment to wartime positions is no longer reasonable, a quick military response — at least with regard to surprise attacks — is no longer ensured. Such a situation would be nothing short of inviting the potential aggressor to take possession of a pawn by surprise — i.e. without a warning time and any early indications — and to establish a *fait accompli*. Things must not get that far.

210. Therefore, it must be repeated that, in view of the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact to the central region and the present "relative" balance of power in the conventional field which is just sufficient to achieve deterrence, a one-sided reduction of the available forces and a further degradation of the present deployment by relocating units to the west cannot be tolerated. For this would mean deliberately putting up with a considerable reduction of the deterrent effect, a disproportionately long time required for attaining the movement readiness and for the deployment to wartime positions, and thus with an obviously greater risk. The military expert cannot but warn against such a development.

E.4. Reinforcements in periods of tension and in case of mobilisation

211. The time factor also plays an important part in assembling and moving up those forces which bring the M-day forces up to full wartime strength, are newly activated in case of mobilisation or are redeployed into the central region from outside. Their timely arrival also depends upon an early declaration of alert and mobilisation measures. Decisions regarding these measures must be taken on a national basis and by the Alliance as a whole and therefore require a

functioning consultation and decision-making capability of the political machinery of the Alliance.

212. The reinforcements of forces which can be expected in periods of tension and in case of mobilisation differ widely in regard to type, combat effectiveness and time of availability.

213. Details are given in the description below :

(a) *Augmenting the M-day forces*

214. The *United States and Canadian forces* in the central region need not be augmented. As expeditionary forces, they normally have their full strength so far as personnel and matériel are concerned.

215. The *British forces*, however, have to move a remarkable amount of personnel from Great Britain to bring their service support units to full wartime strength and to redeploy their reinforcement reserves into the zone of action of the I (BR) Corps. This will take up to two weeks. However, the combat effectiveness of the British divisions is not jeopardised at that time.

216. The M-day forces of the *continental European allies* — which in most cases are organised according to the principle of graduated availability¹ — must also be augmented to a certain extent to reach their wartime strength. The number of reservists and vehicles required for that purpose is in keeping with the criteria determined by SHAPE for M-day forces. It is limited and the distances to be covered are comparatively short.

(b) *Reserve units*

217. The M-day forces of the central region will be reinforced by reserve forces to be newly activated as late as during mobilisation using reservists and available matériel or matériel to be requisitioned from civil stocks. They include :

- *from the Netherlands* : One div with 3 bdes and, in addition, one inf bde, that is a total of 4 bdes. They will be ready for call in their deployment areas within a few days.
- *from Belgium* : One mech bde, one light inf bde, ready for call later.

218. Furthermore, in all nations on the European continent, the territorial defence forces

which are under national military command will be brought up to wartime strength or will be newly activated during mobilisation.

219. The *territorial defence organisation and forces of the Federal Republic of Germany* play a special rôle in the central region. Their wartime strength amounts to about 330,000 men. According to NATO plans they will accomplish important support tasks for all NATO forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany irrespective of their nationality. These include above all the maintenance of the freedom of operations, i.e. taking over of tasks, usually local, which facilitate and support the operations such as target defence, movement control, construction of barriers, engineer tasks at the Rhine river, provision of fixed communications links.

220. The territorial defence organisation furnishes support to the NATO forces by making use of available local and other German resources. An essential element of this support is the provision of the civil manpower required to organise and initiate logistic support. This applies to all NATO units stationed in the Federal Republic which have submitted their requirements for German manpower to the territorial defence organisation. It will take several days until supply support can get started. A delayed call-up of civil manpower in a period of tension can seriously jeopardise follow-on supply support if the combat operations begin at short notice.

221. Some elements of the territorial defence forces of the Federal Republic of Germany, as for instance the 6 home defence groups, each of which has approximately the strength of a brigade, could be temporarily assigned to the NATO commands in a crisis situation to accomplish limited tasks which are in keeping with their equipment and training. But this should be an exception.

222. Although the Federal Republic of Germany makes an important additional contribution to the common defence in the combat zone in the form of its non-assigned territorial defence organisation and forces, it still has a large number of well-trained reservists at its disposal, who are not earmarked for mobilisation. Therefore, the Federal Republic of Germany should seriously consider to what extent it is possible to activate additional reserve units by making use of these reservists and the matériel which has become available in the course of modernisation. This can also be realised step by step ; one can begin with the activation of a few reserve battalions,

1. See page 84.

in particular armoured battalions to be used as reinforcements for the home defence groups, or reserve regiments equipped with relatively light weapons; at a later date, these could be developed into brigades or even divisions.

223. By analogy the proposal to expand the activation of reserve units in case of mobilisation — of course *without reducing* the number and presence of the M-day forces — applies to the Netherlands and Belgium as well, although they have already made allowance for this idea by organising some reserve brigades. Every reinforcement, no matter how small it may be, is a contribution to improved deterrence and more effective defence. The respective preparations can be made at comparatively small cost, but require a careful planning of the organisation and, above all, political determination.

(c) *Dual-based forces*

224. A few years ago, the *United States* developed the system of the dual-based forces aiming at a reduction of their foreign exchange losses and supported by their increasing airlift capabilities.

225. The greater part of the division headquarters and two brigades of the 1 (US) Mech Div — the third brigade of this division is still stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany (Göppingen) — as well as 146 combat aircraft (7 squadrons) were withdrawn from the central region and relocated to the United States; but they continue to be assigned to SACEUR. The heavy matériel of the army units has been stored in the Federal Republic of Germany, and suitable air bases have been prepared for short-term reception of these aircraft. The redeployment of the dual-based forces is not dependent upon certain political prerequisites; it is exercised once a year.

226. Of course, the dual-based forces do not have the same deterrent effect as the units permanently stationed in the central region. However, since they can be quickly brought up, are clearly assigned to SACEUR and are constantly kept up to date by exercises in their presumed zone of action, they are valuable reinforcements which are rapidly available and can be employed immediately, they can be firmly included in the defence plans.

227. Due to the exceptional situation in Northern Ireland, the British Government felt bound to withdraw temporarily by way of rotation *some battalions from the British forces*

assigned to NORTHAG for employment in *Northern Ireland*, without officially labelling them as dual-based forces. These units, too, have left their heavy matériel and even their families in the Federal Republic of Germany; they continue to be assigned forces. Preparations for their return have been made. However, it will be difficult to disengage them from their employment in Northern Ireland as quickly as the dual-based forces in the United States which are not committed for other tasks as long as the tense political situation in Northern Ireland continues and the British Government does not find other solutions to master it.

(d) *Strategic reserves from overseas*

228. The *Federal Republic of Germany* and the *Benelux countries* are not in a position to make available, in addition to the units mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b), forces as strategic reserves. In all probability, reinforcements for the central region cannot be expected from *Canada* either.

229. The *United Kingdom*, however, disposes of the following strategic reserves which are stationed in Great Britain and which are available at short notice:

- United Kingdom Mobile Force, comprising some brigades and transport and combat aircraft. The United Kingdom Mobile Force is earmarked for SACEUR.
- United Kingdom Joint Airborne Task Force and United Kingdom Amphibious Force. These are national units; their assignment to SACEUR is dependent on an explicit political decision to be taken by the British Government.

230. In any event, all these forces are ready for employment within the entire ACE area. Their employment at the flanks of the Alliance (Norway or Mediterranean) seems to be more probable than their employment in the central region.

231. Major strategic reserves are available in the *United States*.

Land forces

232. For two divisions the heavy matériel has already been stored in Europe. One can definitely reckon with their availability.

233. In addition, the *United States* is in a position to make available some more divisions. Their

airlift and sealift capabilities permit the redeployment of these divisions to Europe within some months, parts of them within 30 days.

234. From the European point of view the forces that can be expected to arrive within a short period of time are of primary importance. In a longer period of time, the situation in Europe can undergo decisive changes in view of the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact, before the United States divisions which are not available until a later point in time will arrive ; this the more as the Warsaw Pact is capable of activating and deploying considerable strategic reserves in a much shorter time. It is therefore understandable that the Europeans place less importance on reinforcements which will arrive in Europe after several months. They are practically without value for the principle of forward defence.

Air forces

235. Thus, the air force reinforcements intimated by the United States are of particular importance to Europe, since they can be redeployed to Europe in a much shorter time and thus result more rapidly in a substantial increase of the combat strength. Irrespective of the dual-based squadrons, several hundred combat aircraft can be taken into account within one month.

236. The redeployment of these units is made dependent by the United States on the condition that these units can be received, i.e. that air bases are available, supply and maintenance are ensured and minimum requirements for survivability are met — a condition which is understandable.

237. This still requires great efforts.

238. Although it is possible to a certain extent to make additional use of the air bases which are already used and operated by the United States Air Force, the problem of reception is only partly solved. Therefore, the United States has proposed the "*collocated operating bases*" programme. This proposal provides that some air bases in the Federal Republic of Germany, in the Benelux countries and in the United Kingdom which are used by the allies should be occupied by an additional United States squadron each.

239. The prerequisites for this would be special stocks for the respective type of aircraft, the provision of maintenance and repair capabilities, command and control facilities and last but not least the construction of additional shelters.

240. In the opinion of the United States, 100 % shelter protection for combat aircraft is indispensable. However, this requirement seems to be slightly excessive. Not all aircraft are always in a state of operational readiness ; even in the first days of combat one must reckon with failures. In all probability, shelter protection of 70-75 % will be acceptable. At the time being, about 1,800 shelters are already available ; France will construct 40 of these installations each year.

241. Apart from making additional use of air bases, it should also be examined if the bases which were completely or partly inactivated in the past could not be reactivated for the reception of modern combat aircraft or what the prerequisites and conditions are for making them quickly operational in a period of tension. A good example for this is the air base Geilenkirchen situated in the Federal Republic of Germany (north-west of Cologne). The necessary repair of the runway could be initiated at reasonable cost in advance in peacetime. Since the air base is continuously used by military units, it could be made operational in a period of tension within a relatively short time.

242. Such favourable conditions cannot be found at all inactivated airfields. It is therefore recommended that this compromise be thoroughly examined.

243. The preparations for a reception that ensures the rapid employment of the announced reinforcement by the United States Air Force cannot be accomplished without financial means. At the time being, bilateral negotiations are conducted with the host nations concerned on the programme of collocated operating bases. Results have been achieved only in part.

244. However, this programme is of great importance to the entire Alliance, if one considers the fact that the conventional forces in the central region can be reinforced by several hundred combat aircraft within a rather short time.

245. The financial means that must be provided for the reception of the United States aircraft are far less than the costs that would be involved if the European partners were to provide only part of this additional combat power by themselves.

246. Considering the cost effectiveness aspect, great additional combat power could be achieved at comparatively low cost.

247. Thus, a one-time effort of the Alliance seems to be justified. For this purpose a special NATO infrastructure programme comparable to the NICS programme is proposed to ensure the reception of United States Air Force reinforcements including an extension of the shelter construction programme. Such a programme would have to be provided in addition to the current agreed infrastructure measures. It could be partly financed by savings from the national air force procurement programmes. However, such an effort can only be expected from the European partners within the scope of binding commitments on the part of the United States Government with regard to the number of aircraft and the time of their redeployment to Europe. Apart from its purely military importance, the part that such a programme would play in maintaining concord between the United States and Europe and in strengthening the solidarity within the Alliance cannot be overemphasised.

(e) *French forces*

248. The French forces, too, may be regarded as being part of the strategic reserves. The French Government has hardly left any doubt that in case of a major aggression directed against the central region, which would also be a threat to the security and integrity of France, its troops would participate in the common defence.

249. For this purpose the following forces are available under the command of the 1 *French Army*¹:

- the II (FR) Corps with 2 divisions which are already stationed on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany; they are immediately available;
- the I (FR) Corps with 2-3 divisions which are largely ready units but have to be brought up from North-Eastern France or from the area north and east of Paris, respectively; they will be available at a later date;
- the tactical air forces under the command of the 1 FATAC; they are immediately available.

250. For the defence of the French mother country large additional reserve units will be activated in case of mobilisation.

E.5. *Summary*

251. For deterrence and defence both types of forces are required in the central region.

252. Those which are already available in peacetime and can be brought into a state of operational readiness at very short notice and those which have to be activated on the spot by mobilisation or have to be redeployed to the central region from the outside.

253. The combat-ready forces in the central region are the most obvious manifestation of military defence capability and also convincingly warn the potential aggressor in peacetime against seeking military adventures. Only the readily available forces are capable of effectively resisting surprise actions of the enemy. In most cases, a high degree of availability and modern weapons will have to be given priority over an ideal deployment. The forces available at the present time are the minimum forces required for implementing the strategy of flexible response and forward defence in view of the present threat. The potential aggressor is well-informed about these available forces and will take into account their strength and type in his estimates when preparing his own possible military actions. He will also register exactly any unilateral reduction of the military presence and will draw his conclusions.

254. Reinforcements which are brought up from the outside or which have to be activated by mobilisation have a smaller warning or deterrent effect. As far as land forces are concerned, it takes rather a long time before these forces are combat-ready or can be brought up.

255. Proceeding on the assumption that in all probability an attack will be preceded by a prolonged period of political tension, during which the potential aggressor could first of all try to use his military strength to exert political pressure, military reinforcements of all kinds are among the most effective means of crisis management. However, a possible warning time must also be used with determination from both the political and military point of view. A redeployment of several hundred combat aircraft from the United States, the airlift of the dual-based personnel of the 1 (US) Div or even merely of parts of the divisions, the weapons of which are already stored in the Federal Republic of Germany, the mobilisation of reserve units in the nations on the European continent or comparable

1. See also page 73.

measures taken in the United Kingdom would be such a forcible political warning that, considering the present balance of forces, any potential aggressor would probably be deterred from taking the risk of a conventional armed conflict. When, at the same time, the French forces are making visible preparations to participate in the common defence, the warning would be even more impressive. For the enemy's intelligence service it is more difficult to determine exactly in advance the number and types of the various reinforcements than determining that of the available forces, and in particular to determine the time of their availability. Thus, it is also more difficult for the aggressor to calculate the risk.

256. By appropriate exercises in peacetime (such as the Reformer and Crested Cap exercises of the United States) the possibilities which the Alliance has and its preparedness to make use of them can be made clear already in peacetime; thus, they increase the deterrent effect without revealing the total strength of the possible or planned reinforcements. For this very reason it is strongly recommended to intensify such redeployment and mobilisation exercises.

257. Should, however, peace be broken by an attack in spite of that, our conventional defence capability would be considerably increased by the improvements proposed in this chapter. These proposals can be realised at no or only little cost as compared with their effect of an increased deterrence and defence capability. A successful defence would then be possible for a certain period of time even without the use of nuclear means. It would take very much longer before one would inevitably be forced to employ nuclear means. However, the Central European nations could gain nothing but profit by every further day on which they can defend themselves with merely conventional means without abandoning areas of a size worth mentioning. This leaves a greater margin for political and even military measures in other parts of the world which, as a whole, could result in the suspension of the hostilities before nuclear weapons would have to be used.

258. In conclusion, however, it must again be emphasised that the possibilities of reinforcing the conventional combat power have to be carefully prepared, must be regularly exercised in peacetime and must be actually used in a period of tension by taking appropriate and timely political decisions.

F. Possible other patterns of deployment

F.1. Establishment of a barrier zone between the Baltic Sea and Danube river

259. The previous investigations dealt with the possibilities of improving the deployment in the central region on the basis of the present deployment situation and the military-political conditions; in the following chapter it is to be examined whether there are still other patterns of deployment, and thus of defence planning, which conform better to the threat and to the requirements for deterrence and defence which can be deduced from that threat — without exceeding the scope determined by the strategy of flexible response and forward defence. In this context, the possibility of realising such models will for the present be neglected.

260. For this purpose, a proposal will first be taken up which again and again has been submitted for discussion by different sides during the last twenty years. The advocates of that proposal believe that it has gained renewed actuality due to the experiences gained during the Yom-Kippur war of October 1973.

261. The proposal in question is a defence plan which aims at attaining success in defence by establishing a continuous barrier between Lübeck and Passau, parallel to the border of the Warsaw Pact countries. This barrier is to be reinforced by obstacles, mines and field fortifications taking advantage of terrain suitable for that purpose. The troops permanently employed within the barrier are to be equipped with a great number of anti-tank weapons and low-level air defence weapons. Thereby the barrier is to be provided with a high defensive capability, particularly against armoured and mechanised units supported by tactical air forces.

262. The advantages of this solution are seen as follows:

263. A barrier mainly armed with defensive weapons would make evident, also to the outside, the deliberate limitation of NATO to defence. At the same time it would give evidence — which can be overlooked by neither friend nor foe — of the implementation of the requirement for a forward defence.

264. The barrier would force the aggressor to employ stronger forces and to prepare his attacks more carefully. It would thus prevent a broad surprise attack and give the defender the time

required for achieving the full operational readiness of his own mechanised and tank divisions at the rear of the barrier, which, from an operational point of view, can be employed in a manifold way, for the mobilisation of reserve units and for bringing up further reinforcements from outside. The time gained as a result of the existence of the barrier could therefore also compensate for existing deficiencies in the peacetime deployment.

265. The proposal seems fascinating but it cannot stand a critical analysis.

266. If it should be based on the assumption that the barrier zone were to be occupied by German troops only, it would forego the fundamental advantage of a deterrent effect which is based on the fact that nearly all allies have taken over a combat sector in the central region, extending up to the border, and that consequently an aggressor would encounter from the very beginning not only German troops but forces from the whole Alliance. If, however, all nations are to participate in the barrier in the sense of the "layer-cake", their corps would have to be reorganised into a static and a mobile part. This limits interoperability.

267. There are other serious reasons which speak against the proposal.

268. In recent military history, static defence barriers — and even consolidated lines of fortresses — were not able to protect the area to be defended from occupation by an aggressor. A barrier in the described form — however great its fire-power — can always be broken up locally, in a confined area, by a concentration of fire of the aggressor. This does not even require the employment of nuclear weapons. Airborne troops — nowadays in the size of major units — are in a position to leap over the barrier in the air and to break it open from the rear. But once the barrier is pierced at individual points, the aggressor will advance his armoured units through the gaps into the depth. It is true that the friendly mobile forces placed in readiness in the rear can oppose him there, but they would be weaker than in the case under the present deployment, for large parts of the available friendly forces must be employed within the barrier if it is to have an effective fire-power. They are therefore contained there and it will not be possible to withdraw them in time, not even from those parts of the barrier which are not attacked. Moreover they are neither equipped nor trained for mobile combat in another area.

269. Still, the old experience has always proved true that, the lower one's number of forces, the greater mobility with which one must operate. Thus defence is not limited to rigid holding of specific areas, nor does it mean rapid evacuating or even abandonment of terrain without fighting. Defence as properly understood signifies flexible reaction to the enemy's plan of attack whilst holding specific areas and concentrating in time one's own forces for counter-attack at operational or tactical points of main effort one has chosen oneself.

270. A defence plan placing its hopes upon static defence in rigid barriers cannot be recommended, in view of the modern technical equipment and the manifold possibilities of flexible interaction of fire and movement.

F.2. Redeployment of United States units into the North German lowlands

271. The discussion of the question as to if and in what way a reinforcement of NORTHAG is necessary and practicable is not new, for it is NORTHAG that has to expect the strongest thrust on both sides of the Autobahn Helmstedt-Dortmund. Under classical aspects, the open terrain well suited for tanks offers precisely the conditions required for rapid surprise tank operations. For that purpose, a great number of tank units have been deployed in the northern part of the German Democratic Republic by the Warsaw Pact countries¹. There are only a few reserves available to NORTHAG; in case of mobilisation, essentially only the augmentation of the M-day forces with personnel and matériel is to be expected. The earmarked reserve units — 4 Dutch and 2 Belgian brigades — do not decisively alter the force ratio. Besides, they will not be available for several days after the initiation of mobilisation².

272. In recent time, the discussion on the reinforcement of NORTHAG has gained renewed momentum due to a study prepared by the Americans Richard D. Lawrence and Jeffrey Record (The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.) dealing with the United States force structure within NATO. The authors base their consideration on the fact that "the presumption of a short, intensive war as the most likely threat in Europe has recently received official recognition in

1. See page 80.

2. See page 92.

Secretary of Defence James R. Schlesinger's Annual Defence Department Report, Fiscal Year 1975". They raise the question as to what extent the concentration of the United States forces in southern Germany which dates back to the end of World War II in 1945 can still be valid at the present time. The combat effective mechanised and armoured United States divisions are, in their opinion, not optimally employed in the terrain of the woody hills between Kassel and Hof — especially in view of the conversion of their tanks to the new 152 mm tank gun (guided missile Shillelagh/high-explosive shell). Therefore the redeployment in *peacetime* of parts of the United States land forces stationed in the central region — up to two divisions — to the North German lowlands is proposed. The *advantages* are obvious.

273. Such a redeployment would mean an important reinforcement of NORTHAG which would essentially increase the deterrence and defensive strength in the North German area. Another element of great operational importance would be added to the British-German bloc employed concertedly on both sides of the presumable axis of main attack of the enemy. The lack of reserves in the NORTHAG area would thus be remedied.

274. Last but not least, in case of a conflict limited solely to North Germany, United States troops would also be immediately affected by an enemy attack.

275. In contrast to these advantages there are also serious *objections*.

276. The considerable costs which would be incurred by such large-scale regrouping have already been reported on in chapter E. 2. They would be increased even more by the necessary build-up of a new logistic system. In the study prepared by R. D. Lawrence an attempt is made to balance these costs by an extension of the principle of dual-based forces and rotation. A reduction of the American presence to 60 % and the permanent stationing in the United States (CONUS) of the other 40 % after withdrawal is proposed. "The rotation of units in CONUS to their parent divisions in Europe every four months would approximate a Reforger airlift three times a year."

277. Such a weakening of the presence of the United States M-day forces at a time when the Warsaw Pact forces are continuously reinforced is, however, not acceptable to NATO. It would shift the relative military balance in Central

Europe one-sidedly to the disadvantage of the West. An essentially worsened initial situation for the MBFR negotiations would result.

278. Finally, the reinforcement of NORTHAG in such a way would create a weakening of deterrence and defence in the CENTAG area. It would lead to a further over-extension of the combat sectors of those corps left to CENTAG and would increase the danger at the open south-east flank of AFCENT.

279. But if one thinks of the redeployment of United States troops to North Germany on condition of exchange for other forces within this area, the British, the Dutch and the Belgians would not come into question for that purpose. The distances from their bases would become too great. Besides it cannot be expected of those nations that they let their corps be employed in an area not situated immediately forward of their homelands. But an exchange of American for German units would largely deprive the North German area of German garrisons. The ensuing effects on internal policy and in a psychological respect would be most undesirable. They might even provoke a reciprocal effect.

280. The disadvantages caused by a redeployment of United States troops in peacetime to the NORTHAG area outweigh the possible advantages.

281. Such a solution cannot be recommended.

282. A more favourable picture results as to the possibilities of employing units of the United States land forces in the NORTHAG area only in times of tension and in case of war, respectively.

283. Certainly, then it will not be possible to weaken CENTAG by withdrawing United States units from the combat sectors envisioned in the general defence plan. The smooth progress of the build-up of the forward defence just in the critical initial phase of a conflict must not be disturbed or even endangered. But an allocation to North Germany of the divisions to be brought up from the United States may be taken into consideration. They would enable a substantial reinforcement of NORTHAG.

284. The reception of such forces in that area must be carefully planned and prepared. For example, depot space would have to be made available in peacetime for the equipment to be

stored; likewise, airfields for the landing of large transport units would have to be prepared — unless one accepts a landing in hitherto prepared areas and a longer road march into the operational areas situated farther to the north.

285. The possibilities of logistic support of American troops, and thus of the fifth nation in the North German area, are, however, limited. American logistic lines of communication in an east-west direction do not exist there. The United States base in the Bremerhaven area — situated east of the Weser river — is not prepared to effect direct issues of supplies to field units.

286. These complications show once more the serious disadvantages of national responsibility in regard to logistics and of the lack of standardisation.

287. For the time being the allocation of United States forces — remote from the mass of the 7th United States Army — promises success only if the most logistic problems are at first solved, but it will then offer political as well as, in particular, military advantages. Therefore such a solution should definitely be prepared right now. For if, for example, in case of a conflict, an unfavourable development of the situation should render a reinforcement of NORTHAG indispensable, CINCENT will have to think of such dispositions in any event.

288. But until the abovementioned conditions are met, another solution must be looked for. An immediate solution can be seen in withdrawing German forces from the CENTAG area for employment within NORTHAG. German forces can be employed anywhere within the combat zone of the central region. For them, the logistic prerequisites can be fulfilled more easily.

289. To the extent they are allocated as operational reserves in the CENTAG area, they will be available comparatively quickly. Their tasks can be assumed by the arriving United States reinforcements. If, however, German units must first be withdrawn from the front line, the time required is considerably longer, if the situation still permits a relief by new United States units at all.

290. In summary, the following can be stated :

291. Should a reinforcement of NORTHAG become necessary in case of defence, the safest and quickest way of achieving this would be the

employment of German units from the operational reserve of CENTAG and the assumption of their tasks by newly brought up United States units. In a later phase, other United States reinforcements which are brought up could set free additional German forces, or these reinforcements could be employed themselves in North Germany — after the most urgent logistic prerequisites have been ensured.

F.3. Consequences ensuing from possible MBFR (Mutual balanced force reduction) agreements

292. Finally, brief mention should be made of the effects which might occur if the MBFR negotiations that are being conducted should lead to positive results and bring about a reduction of the allied forces stationed in the central region. For the time being, the deliberations are of a hypothetical nature. The opinions of the negotiating partners from East and West still differ considerably. Practical results are not to be expected in the near future. The extent of possible reductions cannot be predicted. For this reason it is also not possible to submit concrete proposals. The brief statements are limited to general considerations. They presuppose that the central region as a whole will be part of the area of reduction which is under negotiation.

293. Balanced force reductions on both sides in the area of reductions are to lead to a more stable situation from both a military and military-political point of view with a lower level of forces. This presupposes force reductions on both sides which must be accomplished in East and West and balanced in such a way that they lead to an approximate equilibrium between both sides on the basis of a common ceiling to be negotiated anew.

294. NATO has proposed that a first phase is to be limited to American and Soviet land forces. A second phase could also include the land forces of other nations directly participating in the negotiations. For the time being, the air forces and tactical weapons are not to be the subject of negotiations.

295. As to the determination of the scope of a new common ceiling the military side must point out that there are limitations also to balanced force reductions on both sides. The military commanders responsible for operational control must remain in a position to maintain in case of war

the cohesion between the operations, i.e. a coherent defence. The figures proposed at Vienna by NATO for a common ceiling can be considered to be the lowest possible limit which would ensure a coherent defence against the adversary still to be expected after a force reduction. If one accepts a lower limit, there would be a danger of defence being split up into individual engagements and, as a result, the Alliance having to do without centrally exercised operational control. Moreover, the asymmetry which already exists anyhow between NATO and Warsaw Pact will be so much more to the disadvantage of the West the lower the common ceiling will be. Reinforcements can be brought up from the Soviet Union by surface transportation more quickly than from the United States by sea and air. Due to their favourable geographical situation and due to the fact that the initiative is in their hands, the Warsaw Pact countries are able to establish a *new* unilateral military preponderance more quickly than the West would be able to react.

296. If one starts from the assumption that the common ceiling hitherto proposed would become the basis of an agreement, this means practically that the reductions of all land forces stationed in the central region will scarcely exceed 10 %. At first this does not call for a fundamental change of the present concept of deployment. Barracks becoming unoccupied due to the reduction might, however, be used for offsetting minor deficiencies in the present peacetime deployment.

297. But the picture might change if, within the total number of the reductions to be effected in the central region, that of the United States forces were greater than that of the British and the continental European — the so-called indigenous — forces. Finally, also other political reasons — independent from MBFR — for example developments in the domestic policy of the United States, might lead to a drastic reduction of the United States forces in the central region. Should then the remaining United States forces be attributed a new rôle fundamentally differing from their present one ?

298. Two possibilities will be submitted for discussion in this context :

(a) Relief of the American forces stationed in the central region from their task as "front-line troops", and their provision as *operational reserves*. Instead, employment at the front of the previous tactical and operational reserves, as far

as they are made available by continental European countries or by Great Britain, while broadening the combat sector of these nations.

299. The limitations of this solution are again governed by the necessity of maintaining a coherent defence. But the solution would have the advantage of free use of the combat effective United States units which are stationed in the central region or are to be transported there, at the developing points of main efforts of defence — however under the condition that the logistic problems can be solved. The decisive disadvantage would, however, be due to the fact that the confrontation between Soviet and United States land forces would only occur in a later phase of a military aggression, namely when the front line was not able to hold out. In the initial phase an attack would only encounter European troops, primarily those of the Federal Republic of Germany.

300. Once more it must be made clear — even at the risk of repetition — that the deterrent effect originating from a commitment of United States forces immediately at the border of the Warsaw Pact countries is more important than the possible advantage which might accrue to the operational control by a free operational availability of American units. The prerequisites and conditions of a promising planning of operations and operational control must, of course, not be excessively limited or even neglected. But on principle those deliberations should be given priority which result in an increase of the deterrent effect — at least as long as it remains the primary common strategic goal to preserve peace by deterrence.

(b) The idea of deterrence would be better made allowance for if a proposal were made providing for the formation of *several multinational mobile forces* which in case of a local conflict — wherever it might occur within the central region — could be employed quickly, thus making evident the presence of the Alliance as a whole.

301. As such that idea is not new. SACEUR already disposes of a multinational force (ACE Mobile Force — AMF). This is a brigade-size unit composed of combat battalions, supply elements and air transport units of the armed forces of several nations in the central region. This force can be organised rapidly in times of tension and be redeployed to trouble areas of NATO, above all at the flanks in the south and north, thus showing the possible intruder that

a military adventure in these areas, too, would encounter the forces of several partners of the Alliance. For such a purpose, the multinational composition even of a relatively small force is justified from a political and a military point of view. But the limitation to brigade strength makes it quite clear that the importance to be attributed to AMF is mainly of a political nature in the sense of deterrence. Its military value is comparatively small as it is too insignificant from a military point of view to generate an effective increase of combat power in the operational areas.

302. As long as the principle of the "layer-cake" is maintained in the central region, additional multinational units cannot contribute a new political element to deterrence. But for defensive combat in the strict sense of the word, a combination of units from contingents of several nations at a very low level — i.e. below division or even brigade level — is less effective than the employment of nationally homogeneous divisions or even corps.

303. The formation of multinational units — for example one each in North and South Germany — can only present a feasible auxiliary solution if for compelling political reasons, neglecting the advantages of a presence at the border and contrary to expert advice, individual nations, above all the United States, should in fact no longer be committed at the border. It must, however, be ensured that such multinational units will really be available for operation in the central region in case of a crisis or in wartime and will not be employed outside Central Europe, for example at the flanks, such as AMF. For then the deterrent effect and the defence capability in the central region would not be increased but decreased.

304. In summary, it must be realised that eventual MBFR agreements will only exercise a lasting influence on the concept of deployment if the reductions are of a greater extent — much more than 10 % — or if an individual nation were affected to an essentially higher degree than others in the same area of reductions.

F.4. Reduction of the number of tactical nuclear weapons in the central region

305. From time to time doubts are expressed, not only in the United States but also in some European circles, as to whether it is necessary and justified that in Europe about 7,000 American nuclear warheads are stored to be used for

tactical purposes, several thousands of them on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany — these include weapons of all types and yields, among them atomic demolition munitions (ADM) and warheads for air defence missiles.

306. In fact, nobody would wish that such a large quantity of nuclear weapons be actually employed, turning Central Europe into a desert. Therefore the question suggests itself whether the tasks assigned to the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe could not be accomplished with a smaller number of them, and whether their total number could not be drastically reduced by returning them to the United States.

307. And yet warning must be given of such a conclusion.

308. The strategy of flexible response is based on gapless and uncalculable deterrence. It presupposes a broad spectrum of all defence forces — of the conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear means. Isolated, without the other two, one of these three large fields can accomplish the tasks of deterrence, defence and threatening with escalation.

309. Thus the existence of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe is an important and indispensable element of deterrence. But this element is only effective if the number of warheads and their decentralised storage make credible to the potential aggressor that they are sufficient for the accomplishment of any tasks which might become necessary within the scope of strategy, and that at the same time they can be quickly employed. In this context a long-lasting tactical nuclear war limited to Europe only is not envisaged. Such a war cannot be in the interests of Europe. Nuclear weapons in Europe serve other tasks.

310. First of all, the warheads required for the European share in the great retaliation must be kept available. Certain flying units and the Pershing missile units will be equipped with such warheads. The awareness of a well-planned and effective nuclear second strike will prevent the Soviet Union from launching a nuclear surprise attack — first strike — and thus render improbable this most terrible form of armed conflict, the consequences of which can hardly be imagined.

311. The employment of tactical nuclear weapons may, however, also become necessary if, as a result of an attack with superior conventional

means, there is a danger that vital parts of the NATO territory might be lost. Then the time for an employment of nuclear weapons — limited in the beginning — as a means of threatening with escalation would have come. That employment is intended to show the aggressor that the whole Alliance is determined to defend themselves with all means and thus to induce him to decide to cease the aggression in order to avoid a further escalation. It cannot be planned beforehand when, where, with what delivery means and with what strength a limited employment must be accomplished. For such a serious step fundamentally changing the character of a war, the political and military leaders must rather insist on maintaining a high degree of freedom in decision-making, of flexibility and of quick reaction. But this presupposes a decentralisation of SAS (special ammunition sites) as well as the storage of different types of nuclear warheads for various weapon systems and of different yields in these sites. It is only by a broadly dispersed nuclear presence in the entire combat zone that a form of nuclear weapon employment for tactical defensive purposes can be ensured which corresponds to the respective political and military situation — a selective and well-graduated form which, however, will become quickly effective at the same time. Only then will the nuclear deterrence remain credible on all levels.

312. Thus, it will not be feasible to make a considerable change to the number of nuclear weapons stored in Europe. But it will be possible — and even necessary — to adapt their composition in regard to type and effects to the technical developments, to the new organisations of the weapon systems and to the refinement of the nuclear strategy.

313. But apart from the military objections, the negative political-psychological effect of a possible reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe must also not be ignored. The Warsaw Pact countries as well as great portions of the European population would consider such a reduction — whether justly or unjustly — as the beginning of a denuclearisation of Europe and thus of a decreasing readiness of the United States to commit itself for Europe. This would encourage the Warsaw Pact, but weaken the will of the European peoples to defend themselves. French or British nuclear weapons cannot replace those of the United States — neither in number nor in variety.

G. More effective employment of funds (rationalisation)

G.1. Introduction

314. The studies conducted so far have shown that a basically new concept for the deployment within the central region would either not result in a considerable increase of deterrence and defence capability or else would require such large funds that the possible advantages would not be in proportion to the disadvantages involved. This does not preclude partial improvements of the present deployment. Several proposals have been submitted in this respect.

315. However, one should not resign oneself to this state of things. Strictly speaking, it may widen the scope of this study, but this last chapter shall deal with the question of how to make more economic use of the funds provided for defence purposes. On a national level as well as by co-operation between the allies it will be possible not only to improve combat effectiveness, but also to eliminate *one of the serious weaknesses* of the defence structure, namely the *lack of interoperability and compatibility*.


316. In all countries the defence budgets have undergone a similar development. The operating expenditures, especially those on personnel and matériel maintenance, are rising rapidly. Their proportionate share in the total defence budget has increased steadily and will continue to do so. This will unavoidably lead to a reduction of the capital expenditures so that their share will decline in proportion. But it is precisely the capital expenditures which, among other things, serve to support progress to ensure the modernisation of weapon systems and other equipment of the armed forces :

- research, development and testing ;
- military procurements ;
- national and NATO common infrastructure.

317. An extension of the programmes for development and procurement projects over longer periods of time can only bring temporary relief. In the long run, this is no suitable method to overcome the dilemma of the operating costs and the capital expenditures.

318. All NATO partners are aware of this fact.

319. The search for newer and better methods may be characterised by the following terms interrelated as indicated below :



320. There have been attempts to tackle these difficult problems. But only partial results have been achieved so far. On the national level, the adherence to obsolete traditional ideas and the inertia of existing organisational structures stand in the way of rationalisation. In the international sphere it is necessary to overcome the dissimilarities of existing defence concepts and military doctrine. Further handicaps are national economical egotism and international industrial competition.

321. Recently, in view of the continuously increasing pressure of rising costs, the Ministers of Defence have made it clear that they are determined to support with energy a policy of rationalisation. NATO and Eurogroup have taken important steps in this direction.

322. The co-operation between the United States and Europe has also received new impulses. Long-term objectives, including as an ultimate goal the complete standardisation of all matériel, have also been defined. But it is very doubtful, indeed, if such an ideal standard can be achieved within the foreseeable future.

323. It is more reasonable to consider *concrete, separate steps* which can be realised on a short-term or medium-term basis and at the same time mark the right course to be followed. The idea of rationalisation can be served best in a pragmatic manner if such steps are taken energetically, supported by the political determination of the Ministers and the parliaments. The following comments shall not, and cannot, cover the entire complex field of rationalisation. They merely endeavour to contribute towards a solution by offering a few constructive ideas and concrete proposals.

G.2. Rationalisation by improvement of national defence structures

324. Not all possibilities for a rational organisation and functional equipment of the armed

forces have as yet been exploited by all countries, i.e. on a national level. In this respect the following suggestions are made :

(1) *Development towards a unification of forces*

325. In this regard Canada has ventured farthest into new territory. Against strong opposition it has taken the plunge and realised complete unification — its outward mark being like uniforms for all services — and has reorganised its forces under purely functional aspects. In other countries the organisational changes are less conspicuous or noticeable but one can observe a continuous, although slow, development towards solutions on a unified armed forces basis. These developments should be accelerated. The smaller the size of the armed forces, the easier the consolidation of its different services and the more cogent is the requirement for unification. On the other hand, the services of numerically large armed forces will probably retain more independence for some time to come.

326. However, the following principle should apply to all :

“The tasks which can be carried out jointly should be centralised.”

327. This implies centralisation on a joint services basis of all those tasks which can be accomplished this way more economically and more effectively. In many cases it will be possible for one service to assume a kind of “pilot function” for the others. A higher military joint services command and control organisation with a clearly defined authority of direction should ensure that the pilot function is exercised so as to serve the interests of all concerned.

328. Some examples should be mentioned:

- a military territorial joint services organisation down to garrison level ;
- a military joint services administration down to garrison level ;
- a “pilot service” of the air force for all types of pilot training, air security and matériel maintenance, no matter in which service the individual aircraft are flown ;
- a pilot service of the army for small arms and motor vehicles — including their maintenance — no matter by which service they are employed ;

- a joint services medical service organisation, especially with regard to the fixed medical treatment facilities ;
- centralised joint services training in disciplines common to all services at joint schools, one for each discipline.

329. In the top structure (Ministries of Defence and General Staffs) the tasks which are common to all services could be concentrated and centrally performed.

330. This would include, for instance :

- preparation, implementation and control of budgets ;
- armament ;
- administration for the armed forces ;
- force planning and operational planning ;
- personnel matters ;
- questions of discipline and order of the armed forces ;
- intelligence ;
- common problems of logistics.

331. Without neglecting the specific demands made by the elements of earth, air and water on command and control, organisation and technology, many possibilities offer themselves for economising on personnel, funds and time by joint efforts.

(2) *Main efforts of modernisation*

332. The modernisation of matériel depends on the tasks which are assigned to the forces of the various countries within the scope of common defence. Therefore, it must be considered and decided jointly within the Alliance. However, it must also be in keeping with the possibilities and the interests of the member nations. Once they are made, decisions on force structures and equipment of forces have long-lasting effects. They determine the capabilities of the forces for a period of 10-15 years. Therefore, it would be a mistake to organise the forces merely in view of the current political situation or under the impression of some recent — possibly one-sided — experiences from a regional theatre of war.

333. It would also be risky to rely too much on certain weapon systems which are expected to work miracles if put to use. One single weapon

system will neither decide the battle, nor a war. Only a well-balanced system of mixed weapons is in a position to cope with any situation. At the latest, overemphasis on one single weapon will become a definite disadvantage as soon as the adversary has developed a new anti-weapon.

334. However, the emphasis placed on certain arms could vary within the system of mixed weapons. In view of the superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces in numbers of battle tanks and combat aircraft the following priorities are recognised for the modernisation of the forces in the central region :

- *anti-tank weapons* for fighting battle tanks at different ranges and in any weather ;
- *air defence weapons* for low and medium altitudes with all-weather capability and radar control, if possible ;
- *provisions for aircraft survival* by construction of shelters and airfield defence ;
- improvement of *command and control* systems ;
- *electronic warfare* means, including electronic reconnaissance and remotely-piloted vehicles (RPV) ;
- improvement of the *floating and fording capabilities* of army combat vehicles.

335. It must be understood that the priorities for the modernisation of matériel in the central region as set forth above do not imply that the classical combat means such as tanks, artillery, fighter and reconnaissance aircraft have lost in importance.

(3) *The balancing of the services*

336. One of the most difficult and far-reaching decisions in regard to the structure of the armed forces is the allocation of funds, personnel and matériel to the services.

337. A review of the costs per serviceman shows that the army soldier is the least expensive in terms of capital expenditures and operating expenditures. An airman costs at least one and a half times as much and a sailor more than twice as much as the army soldier.

338. Therefore, it is reasonable to ask whether the combat effectiveness of the air force and the navy which is achieved at these higher costs is

proportionate to the tasks of defence which they are expected to perform on a national level and in the common interest of the Alliance. However, in posing this question we already exceed the scope of national responsibility and arrive at the problem of specialisation among the members of the Alliance.

G.3. Rationalisation by specialisation on a multinational basis

339. Specialisation as an element of rationalisation is still rather new. In a certain sense it has been practised within NATO from the beginning. Not every nation was, or is, in a position to contribute all types of weapon systems to the common defence. There are countries which possess their own nuclear weapons and other countries which have none. Only a few member nations are in possession of strategic bombers and aircraft carriers. Some countries have always attached more importance to their navies and air forces while others are putting more weight in their armies. Most of these differences in emphasis have their origin in national histories and national and geographical interests and are in very few cases the result of deliberate combined planning.

340. More specialisation among the European partners will contribute to a more effective use of the defence budgets for the benefit of common defence.

341. Various models could be developed for this purpose.

342. The most comprehensive form of specification would be the so-called *service solution*, which means that individual partner nations would give up one of their services in order to place more emphasis on the remaining services. This solution would indeed open vast possibilities for rationalisation. Logistics and training could be considerably reduced and become less expensive. On the other hand, for some partners the system would result in a high degree of dependence on the solidarity of the Alliance, a circumstance which they could not change at short notice. Considering the fact that an established common foreign security policy does not exist this would hardly be justifiable. Meeting this requirement should be considered as an important political goal. But to ask for specification to such an extent at the present time would be unrealistic.

343. However, a gradual realisation of the service solution, e.g. with regard to mobilisation and

reinforcements in wartime, is also conceivable. For instance, the continental European partners could concentrate their efforts on the activation of reserve army units while the United States could take care of the air force reinforcements. A similar line of thought was already developed in Chapter E.I.4.

344. The less ambitious proposals, which could be called *intra-service-solution*, are to be considered as being more realistic. It is not necessary for all services of every nation to be in possession of all weapon systems. For instance, it is conceivable that one nation might altogether renounce establishing and arming units with the new Lance rocket launcher system while a neighbouring nation organises additional Lance units in support of the former. Similar methods could be applied to certain types of heavy artillery, air reconnaissance and electronic reconnaissance, to mention just a few examples. Such solutions are less likely to affect sovereignty, will involve less political dependence and will consequently be easier to realise. Of course, the renouncing nation must not divert to other departments the funds thus released. On the contrary mutual solidarity requires that such funds will be used in addition to the amounts spent on those defence tasks on which the nation concerned places particular importance.

345. The functioning of such specialisation could be facilitated — and this is probably a basic requirement — by clear mutual commitments laid down in bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded for a duration of several years and on a clear monetary basis. Perhaps the proved NATO annual review procedure could be further developed so that it can serve as a general umbrella for such agreements.

346. *Support by host nations* for allied troops stationed outside their home countries must also be considered as a partial aspect of specialisation. In the central region this task is performed to a considerable extent by the national territorial defence organisations. But this applies mainly to wartime. As far as the peacetime deployment is concerned this principle could be further developed.

347. Finally, the use of a *leasing system* should be discussed in this context, a concept which is not new in recent military history.

348. Especially the smaller nations, for which the procurement of even a limited number of indispensable new weapon systems would mean

non-recurring costs that are too high and must be paid within a short period, might find it easier to use a modern type of leasing system for obtaining the equipment required by their forces.

349. There are, for instance, the following possibilities :

350. *Weapon leasing* : The weapon systems to be procured are leased by one nation to the other against payment of an annual lease. The duration of the lease payments must not exceed the foreseeable lifetime and modernness of the respective weapon system. The lessee must get full control over the weapons let to him. The lessor will, however, retain a reservation of property — in particular with regard to a possible transfer of the weapons to other users by the lessee — until the total rent paid is equivalent to the purchase price.

351. *Finance leasing* : A modern business method of which many flexible and customer-oriented variants are nowadays used commercially. For instance, in our case, the manufacturing industries could take a share in the financing of a weapon leasing which, however, would probably have to be guaranteed by government indemnity bonds.

352. As unusual as this proposal may seem, it might — upon closer examination — open a new way for mutual support. It would enable the financially strong countries to contribute to increasing the defensive power of smaller countries without having to make additional demands on their own defence budgets.

353. In summary, it can be stated that progress in specialisation can also be achieved by individual measures if there is appropriate political determination and if clear financing arrangements are worked out in conformity with the possibilities of both parties concerned. A political union would facilitate specialisation. But we need not wait for it in every case. On the other hand, each step towards a political union should be accompanied by another step towards more military specialisation.

G.4. Rationalisation by standardisation

354. Rationalisation by standardisation is the most promising and most convincing way to achieve greater effectiveness of the funds made available for defence. Standardisation should be the aim particularly in two major fields, that is logistics and training.

(1) Logistics

(a) Definition

355. By logistics, NATO understands the provision and use of all means required for support in regard to personnel and matériel and for the maintenance of the combat effectiveness of the forces as well as all measures taken in relief of the forces to avoid any impairment of their operational readiness. To use understandable working terms, which however are not to be regarded as official terms, logistics can be seen as consumer logistics — referring to the consumer — which is a task of military command and control, and as producer and procurement logistics (production), which is a government task.

356. *Consumer logistics* includes :

- provision of weapons and ammunition, all types of equipment, vehicles and individual clothing ;
- storage, transportation, distribution and supply of ammunition, fuels, spare parts and subsistence ;
- maintenance of matériel¹, including vehicles ;
- evacuation of personnel, supplies, defective equipment and empties ;
- infrastructure ;
- medical service.

357. Whereas *producer and procurement logistics* in the broadest sense means armament which is closely interrelated with the civil economy.

(b) National responsibility for logistics and its dependence on geographical conditions

358. As stated before² the allied commanders are responsible for the operational planning and operational command and control for all military units assigned to them in case of an armed conflict, in order to accomplish their defence mission according to the general defence plan (GDP). Within the scope of the authorities delegated to them, they issue orders which are obligatory down to the smallest unit within the military hierarchy.

1. Matériel is the collective term used for weapons and equipment.

2. See page 87.

359. However, each nation itself is responsible for the logistic support of its assigned units. The allied commanders confine themselves to place requirements, to make recommendations or to co-ordinate, if necessary. They have neither allied stocks nor logistic troops and thus no logistic command elements at their disposal. This restricts the flexibility of the operational command. It may even result in the deferment or even abandonment of a military operation that appears necessary, since the required logistic support for one or several participating allied units cannot be ensured by the responsible nation. This arrangement is inconsistent with the proved principle of the indivisibility of military command and control.

360. However, in the Warsaw Pact forces which are almost exclusively equipped with matériel of Soviet origin the logistic command and control rests with the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact forces ; it can be planned, ordered, prepared and carried out in accordance with his operational plans.

361. Compared with the dimensions of modern armed conflicts the Central European territory including France and Great Britain is rather narrow. From the logistic point of view it lacks in depth.

362. The supplies and supply facilities required by the forces for the direct support of their combat actions are stored or situated in the combat zone¹. The supplies flow from the communication zone¹ depots and from the depots in France and Great Britain to the depots in the combat zone. Depending on the national supply system, this is accomplished either by the delivery or pick-up method, respectively.

363. As a rule, the war reserves — except those of the United States forces — are adequate only to satisfy the requirements of a limited time. As they are located in the combat zone, the production plants for military matériel in the central region are endangered to such an extent that an undisturbed continued production cannot be expected in case of an armed conflict. Therefore, Central Europe is dependent upon supplies of all kinds from outside. These have to be brought up by sea. The United States virtually is the only country that comes into question as a supplying country. Thus, nobody will fail to realise the dependence of Central Europe on the United

States, if a conflict should last longer than a few weeks.

(c) *Areas already integrated and standardised*

364. The national responsibility for logistics requires national logistic command and control organisations and encourages national decisions on the procurement of matériel without prior co-ordination.

365. However, one would not do justice to the complex of questions under consideration if one were to omit those functional areas of logistics in which extensive co-operation and even full integration have been realised.

366. They include :

(aa) *NATO common infrastructure*¹

367. According to their gross national product the member nations pay proportionate shares into an infrastructure fund for the construction of military installations serving the employment of the forces in case of a conflict or the training of the forces in peacetime. The installations to be constructed are proposed by the allied commanders and approved by the NATO Council after discussion by the Infrastructure Committee. Upon completion of an installation the user is responsible for its maintenance.

368. Among the most important installations of NATO common infrastructure are :

- *airfields* on which all NATO aircraft can land ;
- an *early warning system* against enemy aircraft and missiles extending in a semi-circle from the North Cape to Anatolia. It is augmented by the more modern *NATO air defence environment system* (NADGE), by which recognition and reporting are improved and at the same time defence is released semi-automatically within a very short time ;
- *Nike and Hawk anti-aircraft missile sites* for defence against high- and low-flying aircraft, including the respective depots ;
- a *pipeline system* which — as far as Central Europe is concerned — extends as an integrated network from the

1. Definition see page 69.

1. Definition see page 88.

Atlantic and Channel coasts to the line by the river Weser-Schwäbische Alb. It still requires augmentation ;

- a *long-line communications system* that interconnects all peacetime and war headquarters independent of the national PTT networks. It is expanded by the *NATO integrated communications system (NICS)* which is being organised and, in addition to the headquarters, includes all corps command posts and corresponding air force command posts, as well as all political NATO authorities and the national governments. It has been provided with automatic computerised data links ;
- a system of *forward storage sites (FSS)* is planned and in some cases already under construction. These sites are to provide storage space for different types of essential supplies such as ammunition, various types of fuels, active items of supply and spare parts ; 10 FSS have already been completed in Central Europe. They will be filled in such a way that a brigade can be supplied with all types of supplies required at short notice. They operate on the principle of common use and common interest.

(bb) The infrastructure installations are augmented by multinational logistic *organisations and headquarters*. These include :

- The *Central European Pipeline Organisation* which is responsible for the operation and financing and is under the command of CINCENT in organisational respects, in wartime also in tactical respects. An *Agency* composed of allied and national officers is responsible for control. This agency allocates to the national forces the POL quantities to which they are entitled according to the quantities they have filled into the system. In wartime and if required by the operational situation, CINCENT may intervene and assume control. Since almost all NATO airfields in Central Europe are connected to the pipeline system, the aircraft can be supplied with jet or aviation fuel on the spot. The land forces draw their gasoline or diesel from the filling stations established at all intermediate depots or terminals for railroad tank cars, tank trucks and jerry cans.

- In wartime, a *Joint Logistics Organisation and Information Centre (JLOIC)* is planned at AFCENT while it is already established jointly with NORTHAG/TWO ATAF. These centres are tested regularly during the major NATO exercises Wintex (former Fallex) which are conducted every two years. They are composed of allied personnel of the logistics divisions of the headquarters concerned and of officers from the participating nations. It is the logistic means of command and control of the commanders. The centres prepare the logistic situation report on the units assigned and develop the requirements and recommendations with regard to logistic command and control, taking into consideration the planned operational measures. National logistic representatives act as liaison staffs between AFCENT and the national Ministries of Defence or general staffs, respectively. They receive the logistic requirements of CINCENT and forward them to their national agencies. They inform the Commander-in-Chief about the logistic situation of their own assigned units and advise him on specific national logistic matters.

- The *NATO Maintenance and Supply Organisation (NAMSO)* (including the Hawk Supply Section), and the *Hawk Management Office (HMO)* — two NATO agencies in Luxembourg and Paris, provide the national forces with spare parts from a NATO depot for various types of aircraft and guided weapons systems (e.g. Nike, Hawk and the Lance system which is about to be introduced). They are responsible for the procurement, storage, delivery and administration of funds.

(cc) *Cross-servicing*

369. In practice, even today every aircraft can be refuelled at any NATO airfield, even if it is occupied by units of one nation only ; it can also be serviced, if the necessary technical facilities and appropriately-trained personnel are available. Reimbursement is effected at a later date. Similar procedures apply to the land forces and the navy. In a critical situation the allied commander in the combat zone may order a readjustment of supplies of the same type between units of different nations.

(dd) A storage of supplies in neighbouring European countries is provided for by numerous bilateral logistic agreements. Thus, the Federal Republic of Germany has concluded one agreement each with France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark and there are agreements between Great Britain and both Belgium and the Netherlands as well as agreements between the allied stationed forces and the Federal Republic of Germany on the basis of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement.

(ee) For about 20 years the *Military Agency for Standardisation* (MAS) founded by NATO, formerly located in London and moved to Brussels in early 1970, has exercised its functions which exceed the scope of logistics. The results are modest. The NATO 7.62 mm cartridges, which can be fired with all rifles and machine-guns of the NATO forces, have been standardised¹. In addition, all fuels and lubricants (gasolines, aviation fuels, diesel oils, lubricants), the 155 mm artillery ammunition and some electronic spare parts have been standardised. Certain signs and markings and procedures were standardised as well, including, for instance, among other things the road signs indicating the carrying capacities of bridges, the signs posted in depots, the issuing of operational orders and the NATO command and reporting system. The results were laid down in several hundred agreements (STANAGs). With regard to logistics, however, they are hardly of any importance.

(ff) Finally, there are *co-productions* of weapon systems on a bilateral and multilateral basis between two or more European nations or between individual European nations and the United States of America. There are for example: the aircraft Starfighter, Phantom, Jaguar, the Transall transport aircraft, the light training aircraft Alpha-Jet and the multi-rôle combat aircraft (MRCA) which is under development. As regards the land forces, there are: the battle tank Leopard, certain types of artillery, anti-tank missiles, engineer equipment, etc. In recent years, however, there has apparently been a retrograde movement.

370. The interim results of the past integration and standardisation efforts in the field of logistics within NATO or just within Europe definitely reveal some valuable first achievements. The

1. Unfortunately, there is information that some nations intend to introduce a non-standardised short-case cartridge.

greatest efforts are made in the field of infrastructure. Even though the procedures from the planning to the completion of the infrastructure projects are complicated and time-consuming, they have been remarkably successful in strengthening the defence capability of the West by the establishment of joint military installations. However, in other fields within the large scope of logistics, the results achieved so far are rather poor.

(d) *Gaps in standardisation*

371. Especially in the field of matériel the lack of standardisation is a serious factor. It is the primary source of many an avoidable deficiency of NATO defence. A few examples will illustrate that:

372. To begin with, there is not even an agreed common measuring system. In addition to the metric system used in most of the European countries, other measuring units such as foot, inch, miles, gallons and pounds are still used. The armed forces of the four most important NATO nations (United States, United Kingdom, France and Federal Republic of Germany) use cross-country vehicles of their own construction. Within NATO there are several types and a great variety of makes in the different load classes for trucks of 3 to 15 tons. Medium and heavy battle tanks of a great variety of models are used by the land forces of the central region alone; they include the German Leopard, the British Chieftain Mk. 2, the French AMX-30 and the American M-48 A2 and M-60 A1 and A2. The air forces fly different types of aircraft of United States, British, French or Italian construction for comparable tasks. Further examples were stated by the former Chairman of the Military Committee, General Johannes Steinhoff, in his presentations and publications. According to his statements there are a hundred different types of ships in the classes above the destroyer class, 36 different fire-control radars, 40 different ship's guns of bigger calibre. There is a parallel development of 13 anti-tank rockets in 12 member nations of the Alliance. However, only 2 or 3 are required within the Alliance. In the countries of the Atlantic Alliance the enormous sum of \$20 billion is spent every year for research and development projects. Up to 50 % of them are duplicating efforts or parallel developments made three or four times.

373. General Andrew Goodpaster, Supreme Allied Commander Europe until December 1974, is of the well-founded opinion that NATO loses

about 30-50 % of its potential capability merely by lack of standardisation.

374. The Secretary General of NATO, Dr. Luns, was quite right when he recently called the improvement of standardisation and specialisation within the Alliance "the need of the hour".

(e) *Difficulties encountered with standardisation*

375. The realisation of standardisation meets with a great variety of obstacles and difficulties which are partly due to practical reasons which must be taken into account, but partly are merely due to pertinacity, prestige-thinking and national egotism.

Economic/industrial problems

376. In the economic system of the free world there is no strict separation between the armaments industry and the civil economy. Apart from a few exceptions, their boundaries are not fixed. Thus, cross-country vehicles are used in agriculture, forestry and by the construction industry. The heavy trucks of the armed forces largely correspond to the commercial types. The firms of the textile industry produce uniforms in addition to normal men's clothing. The interlocking is particularly evident in the industries producing electronic, communications and electric equipment.

377. Therefore, industrial reorganisations in the armament sector in most cases affect the civil production as well. The problem of employment which is of great importance to employment policy must be taken into account by ensuring the greatest possible continuity of production. Finally, the principle of free competition, a prerequisite for a free market, must not be abandoned.

Time of procurement of matériel

378. Particular difficulties in regard to the introduction of standardised matériel are caused by the time factor. As a rule the obsolete matériel to be phased out by the forces of the various nations has so far been replaced at different times, since it had been procured at different times. As regards expensive weapon systems, which must be newly procured, the nations have to ensure that the requirements of the three services (e.g. tanks, aircraft, boats) do not coincide; otherwise excessive demands for investment would be made on the national budget. Thus, the standardisation of matériel requires careful co-

ordination in regard to timing and mutual consideration.

Doctrines and technical requirements

379. The individual nations still have different ideas regarding tactical command and control doctrines and the resulting technical requirements. As long as these result from the special missions of the forces, they may be justified. However, comparable missions in a comparable terrain should result in common tactical and technical concepts. This particularly applies to the central region.

Prestige of the experts

380. Last but not least it is often necessary to subdue the national or professional craving for prestige of military and technical experts. It is understandable that an expert who believes to have found a convincing solution from the professional point of view wishes to carry his point in the interest of the matter. In this connection, he often meets with contradictory opinions of experts from other nations. Often an understanding can only be reached by the intervention of higher military or political leaders. A second-best technical solution which is accepted by all concerned can be more effective for the common defence than several so-called best solutions, in particular, if the latter are incompatible.

(f) *Full standardisation as a long-term goal*

381. Thus experience shows that complete standardisation of matériel cannot be achieved within a short time. But it has to remain the long-term goal to be striven for which must not be lost sight of. All measures to be taken now and in the future in the field of logistics must continuously be directed towards that goal.

382. In this context, all bodies dealing with standardisation, no matter whether on an international or on a national level, should adhere to the following principles, partly already taken up by Eurogroup :

- common elaboration of analyses of trends in military technology and common development of strategic-operational goals and of tactical-technical requirements ;
- unlimited open exchange of information under consideration and guaranteeing the national patent applications ;

- for any development to be newly initiated an attempt is to be made to find partners for a standardised solution ;
- as far as a NATO-wide standardisation cannot be achieved, at least bilateral or multilateral solutions must be searched for. They must remain open to other nations that wish to join them later ;
- step-by-step adaptation of target dates for the phase-out of obsolete matériel and the introduction of new matériel ;
- combined research and development efforts with proportionate sharing of costs from the very beginning ;
- participation of the industries of all user nations by co-production, taking into account the respective industrial situation and the conditions of employment. Co-production includes participation in technical know-how, in the tests and test facilities ;
- European and United States interests are to be balanced against each other and harmonised. Due consideration must be given to the offset problem. In this respect, the United States should not expect a unidirectional stream of matériel flowing from the United States to Europe or a stream of money flowing from Europe to the United States ; nor must Europe concentrate on purely European solutions in the armament sector. In regard to armament, too, the solidarity of NATO between the United States and Europe must hold true.

(g) *Proposals for further steps towards standardisation*

383. From a political point of view, there is agreement as to the goal of maximum standardisation. But the abovementioned difficulties of realisation result far too often in limiting oneself too easily to political declarations as regards the desirability of standardisation — postponing, however, to a more distant future measures for practical implementation.

384. And yet, also under the present conditions, there are sufficient concrete possibilities of continuing the development of standardisation in the logistic field in small steps and phases, if the political determination to do so is distinctly accentuated. Very often the highest military

representatives have made clear that they want to support energetically any approaches in that direction.

385. The following proposals which are intended to serve as examples in this regard are submitted ; it is not claimed that this listing of proposals is complete. These proposals are based on the measures which have already been taken since the mid-fifties for the standardisation of logistics. They may only be considered as suggestions which in any case need pertinent examination. They refer to the logistic command and control organisation of the high allied commands as well as to the matériel sector in the strict sense of the word. They were sub-divided into measures which can be implemented within a short time (immediate measures), and in medium-term and long-term phases — without establishing a time schedule.

Short-term measures (immediate measures)

(1) Extension to CENTAG of the combined logistic command and control organisation, as it is already being tested in the NORTHAG area by direction of Eurogroup.

(2) Authority to dispose of all logistic supplies already stored or still to be stored in the forward storage sites, for NORTHAG and CENTAG respectively. Development of a simplified procedure for supplementary financial compensation (reimbursement).

(3) Activation of an allied motor vehicle transport command with assigned, multinationally composed units disposing of large means of transportation¹ for increasing the logistic flexibility. These means would also enable CINCENT to rapidly transport to the users concerned the logistic stocks made available to CINCENT.

(4) The concentration of part of the national means of air transport for logistic purposes in a multinational unit under allied command should also be carefully studied.

(5) Establishment of stocks of already standardised supplies, especially bulk consumables (certain types of ammunition, fuels, active spare parts, medical supplies²) amounting to 3-4 days of supply (supply rates) for exclusive disposal by CINCENT as an operational logistic reserve. This stock is to be stored in one or two NATO

1. Including civilian transportation capacities to be mobilised.

2. Regulated items.

depots already in existence or to be constructed with NATO infrastructure funds. By means of these stocks, CINCENT will be able to establish logistic focal points and bridge critical situations.

(6) Delivery, storage, testing and follow-on support for the rockets of the new artillery rocket launcher Lance by NAMSA (as already existing for Nike, Hawk and other missile weapon systems).

(7) Development and introduction of uniform exterior auxiliary fuel drop tanks for the various types of aircraft in service with the air forces of the individual nations, at least for the Starfighter and Phantom aircraft flown by several nations, in order to facilitate cross-servicing.

(8) Differing installation units in major weapons and equipment should, starting right now, be replaced without delay by standardised parts (e.g. mountings for batteries of the same voltage, couplings for trailers of all kinds, track pads for tracked vehicles, aircraft mountings for bombs and rockets, etc.). The military technical experts will find numerous other possibilities in this respect.

Medium-term phases

(1) Establishment of a common system of electronic identification (FFS) for unequivocal distinction between friend and foe in the air.

(2) Standardisation of the medical service for all services, including the fixed medical treatment facilities — with the exception of special installations peculiar to one service. That includes the procurement and storage of common interchangeable medical supplies. (For instance, any stretcher should fit into the rails of any ambulance truck.)

(3) Establishment of common blood banks which may be disposed of by allied senior medical officers as required.

(4) Relocation of the Agency of the Central European Pipeline Organisation (CEPO), which in case of war will be subordinated to CINCENT, from the Paris area to the Brunssum area and conversion of its telecommunications to NATO-owned carrier means.

(5) Grant to CINCENT of the right to draw bulk expendables (regulated items) from national depots in cases of crisis.

(6) Parallel to the step-by-step transfer of logistic authorities to CINCENT and the subordinate

higher NATO authorities, their logistic staff divisions must be activated with appropriate personnel and communications.

(7) Binding renunciation of purely national solutions in regard to development, production and introduction of new weapon systems and major equipment.

386. The measures to be proposed for the *long-term phases* follow from the principles outlined on pages 110-111. They are to be supplemented by the requirement for an adaptation of the logistic supply systems and the logistic command and control systems in all fields within the individual nations, with the ultimate goal of transferring the entire logistic responsibility for the assigned units to the NATO commanders, and thus of establishing the uniformity of operational command. An important prerequisite for achieving this is, however, the development of an uncomplicated financial accounting procedure (reimbursement) or — what would be still better — the setting up of an allied logistic fund to be maintained by the nations concerned. In any case I have the impression that in the long run integrated logistic command and control as well as full standardisation can hardly be achieved without *common funding*. But this necessitates a far-reaching renunciation of rights of sovereignty hitherto carefully guarded. It can only be realised with the consent and assistance of the national parliaments. That renunciation can hardly be imagined without progress on the way to a political and monetary union of Europe, a goal the governments have set themselves for the eighties.

(2) *Training*

(a) *General*

387. A greater interoperability and thus a more flexible operational control do not only depend on standardised matériel and on consequently standardised logistics. They also require a high degree of agreement in military doctrines and thus in training. There is altogether a close relation between command and control doctrines, logistics and training. The more the principles and the procedures of command and control are in agreement with one another, the more quickly will the nations be able to come to terms about common tactical-technical requirements in regard to matériel, and the easier will it be to find technical solutions acceptable to all partners. Standardised matériel in turn enables a rationalisation of training beyond the frontiers.

388. In order to begin with a closer co-operation in specific fields of training, one need, however, not wait until full standardisation in the matériel sector is reached. The advantages which can thereby be attained justify any effort in this direction. They consist in :

- exchange of experiences ;
- increase of operational flexibility by agreement on tactical principles and procedures of command and control ;
- monetary savings by rational common use of training facilities ;
- closer solidarity between the military personnel of the various nations.

(b) *Common training already practised in a multinational scope*

389. Although the training of the assigned and earmarked units is a responsibility of the individual nations as well, as is the case with logistics, there are already a number of common training projects within the scope of NATO and of Eurogroup.

390. Each year, numerous multinational NATO exercises are conducted, be they field manoeuvres of the land and air forces or command post exercises at the various command levels. The Wintex exercises (formerly called Fallex) play a special part in this context. Not only allied commands participate in these exercises, but also the national general staffs, representatives of the governments and parliaments as well as delegates of the civil administrative authorities.

391. At the NATO Defence College in Rome (formerly Paris), about 2,500 senior officers and civil servants have hitherto undergone an instruction in matters of security policy and policy of the Alliance, qualifying them for employment in responsible positions within the organisation of the Alliance.

392. Besides, there are training centres used likewise by several NATO members, e.g. the NATO range at Bergen/Hohne in the Federal Republic of Germany for tank firing, Decimomannu on Sardinia for the training of flying units of the air force in live firing, and a centre in the Suda Bay on Crete where missile units of the army and the air force can conduct their firing practice.

393. As to individual training and unit training down from brigade level the common elements

are, however, still few. Although regular EURO/NATO training conferences have taken place, there have not been any tangible results. Some projects were raised and discussed, and the execution of further studies was promised. But no positive decisions were made to start one or other common training project.

394. Since about 1970 Eurogroup has developed some promising initiatives. As to the results so far achieved in this respect, in most cases only a few nations join in common solutions in individual fields.

395. Two of these projects under way shall be mentioned here :

"Leopard" training

396. This is a combined effort for training tank crews and technical personnel on the Leopard battle tank at the Combat Troops School II of the Federal armed forces at Munsterlager and at the Ordnance School in Aachen. Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and Norway participate in that training.

Eurospeak

397. Combined classroom instruction in the Polish, Russian, Czech and German Languages at the German Federal Languages Office located in Hürth near Cologne. Participating nations : Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, United Kingdom.

(c) *Further development of combined training*

398. On the whole, the results achieved are still insignificant. In many fields, there is nothing but declarations of intention.

399. But also in regard to standardisation of training better results are attainable if — as in the case of logistics — one proceeds in steps and phases and overcomes too narrow objections of those who are "mere experts".

400. As to *individual training*, the following proposals are submitted for discussion in this context :

- initially, extension of the currently-practised form of participation of guests in certain courses and of the joint use of specific national training facilities by units of other nations ;
- in a second phase, certain model courses might be conducted by one nation each

on behalf of the European partners. They serve the testing of clearly-outlined training in partial fields, make it possible to gain experience and furnish indications for possible cost savings ;

- in a third phase one could pass on to combined training for entire specialities. In this respect, especially suited are those fields which as to their nature play an important part for co-operation within the scope of the Alliance — such as command and control services concerned with gathering, transmitting and evaluating information ;
- in a fourth phase, common schools for selected training fields could be established. Here, too, one should begin with specialities. As a rule, the training of troopers, infantrymen and gunners must remain the competency of the troops on account of the great number of these soldiers.

Some examples of training fields which might be organised on a multinational level (in the sequence of the assessed possibilities of implementation) :

- (1) helicopter pilots ;
- (2) survival training of pilots at sea ;
- (3) training of air controllers ;
- (4) training of flight controllers ;
- (5) programmers and technicians for electronic data processing ;
- (6) training technology, such as combined development and utilisation of programmed training aids, trainers, etc. ;
- (7) training for the artillery rocket launcher Lance (as already initiated at the missile school at Geilenkirchen in the Federal Republic of Germany) ;
- (8) training for the NADGE air defence system and the NATO integrated communications system NICS which is being developed ;
- (9) NBC defence training of all troops ;
- (10) combined training of pilots for aircraft of the same type (e.g. MRCA), perhaps including the possibilities of training in the United States ;

- (11) qualified radio training, radio intelligence and intercept service ;
- (12) extension of exchange for training in general staff service by sending a larger number of officers to the national academies of the various countries ;
- (13) finally, European special schools could be established — e.g. signal, anti-aircraft missile, engineer and technical schools of the land and air forces as well as naval ordnance schools.

401. The rationalisation of *unit training* is more difficult. Besides, it is more complicated to divide it into specific phases.

402. The conduct of large-scale operational and strategic exercises with the aim to practise the interaction of the units of various nations and the training of the integrated staffs remains a task of the allied commands. Such exercises are expensive ; therefore they can only be conducted at greater intervals of time.

403. The European efforts should be concentrated on making available to NATO units which are well-trained from a tactical point of view and act according to uniform doctrines. One of the main difficulties in this respect is the lack of training areas. In the densely populated, highly industrialised central region it will not be possible to envisage an increase in the number of training areas or an enlargement of existing training areas. Even the maintenance of the training operations in the existing areas is more and more criticised by the population of the adjacent regions or by city inhabitants seeking recreation in the open country.

404. Therefore, only a few possibilities are left :

- full utilisation of the training areas existing in the central region, i.e. training in daytime and at night, including weekends ;
- joint use of training facilities in those countries of the Alliance where comparatively large training areas can be made available more easily, e.g. Canada, Turkey, perhaps also France. The associated higher costs, above all for transportation, are compensated by the advantages in training and by the strengthening of solidarity in the Alliance ;

- establishment of model facilities for joint use. An example is the Flag Officer Sea Training Centre for destroyers and frigates at Portland (United Kingdom). An extension to other training facilities in various countries should be studied ; a start was already made with the training centre for mountain troops in the High Alps in France (Mont Galibier).

405. A concentration of all European training areas and training facilities — possibly including the United States facilities located in Europe — might be strived for as an ultimate goal. But this necessitates a small, technically well-equipped central agency which would have to accomplish the allocation to all users according to the principle of optimum joint utilisation.

406. If a standardisation of training really is to lead to a more rational utilisation of the financial means and is to improve at the same time the interoperability, certain prerequisites must, however, be fulfilled.

407. They include :

- the development of common principles of command and control for operations ;
- the overcoming of language difficulties ;
- the production of modern training aids for programmed training ;
- fully or partly standardised matériel, at least matériel which is compatible ;
- common funding for which all participants have to make a contribution corresponding to their share, the host nation concerned being granted an appropriate compensation for the facilities it has made available.

408. Last but not least it must be ensured that national training facilities which have lost their tasks due to the creation of common institutions or whose activities have been diminished considerably will then be dissolved or at least drastically reduced in size. Otherwise this would only result in a duplication of training establishments, and thus an increase of the overhead structure. The success strived for would turn into just the opposite.

H. Conclusions

409. The examinations conducted in the course of this study have shown that — as long as the present threat by the Warsaw Pact forces exists — *the allied land and air forces, including the nuclear means, which are now stationed in the central region are just adequate to confront a possible aggressor with an incalculable risk and thus to ensure the deterrence* required by the strategy of flexible response. But any unilateral reduction in strength and availability levels of the combat-ready forces will jeopardise the fulfilment of that mission. In determining their defence budgets and deciding on the modernisation of the matériel of their forces, the NATO nations must take into account the continuous reinforcement of the Warsaw Pact forces if the relative balance of power between East and West is to be maintained.

410. If, as a result of an erroneous assessment of the power of deterrence and the defence determination of NATO, there should be a military conflict, a defence promising success is possible against a conventional attack limited in regard to area and objective. However, in conventional warfare, *a major aggression can only be resisted for a limited period of time, unless the currently available land and air forces are reinforced.*

411. Therefore, it is indispensable to make preparations for a conventional *reinforcement of the combat-ready forces* in times of tension or in wartime. This end is served by the following measures :

- establishment of army *reserve units* by the continental European partners of the Alliance. The study suggests *greater efforts* in this respect ;
- moving in air force and army *reinforcements from overseas*. Besides the limited strategic reserves from the United Kingdom these include in particular those forces which can be made available and moved across the Atlantic by the United States. Special attention must be given to their reception in the central region so as to ensure that they can be employed expeditiously and will receive full logistic support.

412. In this respect the study suggests a *special NATO infrastructure programme* mainly for the purpose of preparing *the reception of air force reinforcements* to the extent that the United

States is willing to commit itself in regard to numbers of aircraft and their time of arrival in Europe.

413. The relation of the peacetime deployment of the allied land forces in the central region and their wartime positions according to the GDP is not altogether advantageous. A *maldeployment* of certain forces is *undeniable*. In order to reach their wartime positions the land forces will have to perform movements varying in duration during which crossings and overlappings will be unavoidable. It may well be possible to improve the peacetime deployment by redeploying certain units to more favourable locations. But the necessary expenditures on infrastructure alone would reduce the time needed for deployment to wartime positions, they would not increase the combat power. Therefore — except for certain individual adjustments — the advantages gained by a relocation of garrisons would not be in proportion to the disadvantages caused by the reduction of capital expenditures on the continuous modernisation of the matériel. Furthermore, considering the fact that the GDP, on which the wartime positions depend, is subject to continuous changes, it must be said *that a complete coincidence of peacetime locations and wartime positions cannot be achieved*.

414. All the more important is the *factor of time*.

415. It is justified to assume that any conflict will be preceded by a period of tension. Therefore, the political and the military leaders may count on a certain warning time which, however, at worst, may only consist of a few days. This *warning time must be used with determination* for taking those measures which are necessary to overcome the deficiencies of the deployment and to initiate the reinforcement of the actually available conventional forces. Early decisions that increase deterrence and defence readiness will demonstrate the determination of the Alliance to resist all political pressure or military interference. Therefore, they will not have an aggravating effect on the crisis but on the contrary will help to abate the crisis and to preserve the peace.

416. Although the *French forces* stationed on both sides of the French-German border play an important rôle as a part of the common deterrence, the uncertainty as to when, in what number and with what mission the French units will join in the common defence is a serious handicap for the NATO commanders in their operational planning. Therefore, the military

expert must emphasise over and over again the necessity of binding commitments and agreements in the operational sphere. Not only will they have a favourable effect on common defence, but on the French forces as well. The problems caused by the absence of arrangements for the possible employment and the control of French tactical nuclear weapons in the central region are undeniable, the more so since any attack against the central region will activate the extensive assistance commitments of the WEU agreement.

417. The deterring effect of the present deployment is mainly due to the fact that in the GDP combat sectors are assigned to the forces of five NATO nations, charging each of them with direct responsibility at the frontier to the Warsaw Pact countries. This system — often called the “layer-cake” principle — must not be changed under any circumstances.

418. The political and military significance of the “layer-cake” *has priority* over all other operational considerations as long as it remains the main strategic objective to preserve peace by deterrence.

419. This also detracts from the significance of those deliberations which are concerned with basically different patterns of a peacetime deployment in the central region. In spite of its undeniable shortcomings *the present deployment and the current GDP are still the most favourable solution under the aspect of deterrence*. To say it again: this does not preclude individual adjustments.

420. Any changes in the disposition of forces in the central region which may be considered necessary under operational aspects — e.g. a reinforcement of NORTHAG — could be made more effective if the operational reserves or the reinforcements to be brought up were employed for such purposes, subject, however, to the condition that the respective logistic prerequisites can be established in practice.

421. This condition makes clear the *decisive deficiency* of the defence structure of the central regions, i.e. the *lack of compatibility and interoperability of the forces*. The point is that since the forces of various nations depend on national lines of communication and since their matériel — and often their doctrine too — are not standardised they cannot be operationally employed at a chosen place. The integration of operational planning and command and control has no equivalent in the field of logistics. This

puts a narrow limit on the flexibility of operational command and control.

422. Only in September of this year SACEUR stated in Ottawa :

“We must have the flexibility to employ our forces wherever they might be needed. This flexibility requires a greater degree of interoperability of the various national forces than we presently enjoy.”

423. The way to reach this goal within the forces of NATO is *by rationalisation through specialisation and standardisation*. More effective rationalisation would not only result in greater interoperability but also in better employment of the funds provided for defence purposes and in a considerable improvement of combat strength on a “no cost or low-level cost” basis.

424. The study comes to the conclusion that *the ideal aims to be pursued are the complete standardisation of matériel, an extensive specialisation within the Alliance and the integration of logistic responsibility with the NATO commanders*. However, it will take a long time before these goals are reached, if they are reached at all. Therefore, ways and means of taking *concrete individual steps* must now be found *which lead in the right direction and can be realised in the near future*. The following *suggestions* contained in the study are submitted for discussion.

425. They concern in particular :

- *an improvement of the national defence structures*. This includes among other things a greater effort regarding the concentration of functions common to all three services and the clear orientation of the modernisation of matériel towards the weapon and command and control systems required for the common *defence mission* ;
- *specialisation to be realised step by step on a multinational level* beginning with an intra-service solution¹. The possibility of applying a leasing system adapted to the present conditions should be examined¹ ;
- *standardisation to be realised step by step in the field of logistics*, i.e. standardisation of matériel and integration of the logistic command and control organisation ;

— *standardisation of military doctrine and training to be realised step by step*.

426. However, progress will only be possible if the Ministers of Defence, supported by their governments and parliaments, express their *firm intention to pursue a policy of co-operation and rationalisation*. It must be stated in plain terms — especially for the benefit of sceptics and the hesitating experts — and must then be put into practice. Clear *funding arrangements* are just as important. As long as there are no multi-lateral defence budgets every single measure of rationalisation will be endangered unless it is backed up by binding agreements that include the financial commitments. As far as possible such arrangements should also include the French partner.

427. With the invasion of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in mind the members of the Alliance have worked out the impressive study on Alliance defence problems in the seventies (AD 70). In this document they decided to eliminate by combined effort identified deficiencies of their common defence system. The result was a work programme for the future with clear priorities. Not all of the objectives have been reached, but there has been a marked progress.

428. In view of the pressure exerted by the financial burden and the continuously increasing operating costs at the expense of capital expenditures, the development of an AD 75 should now be initiated *with the objective* of giving a decisive impulse for promoting the idea of *rationalisation*.

I. Prospects

429. It may be considered to be a weakness that in Europe several institutions of different compositions deal with problems of foreign, economic, security and defence policy. They include : Western European Union, the European Community and Eurogroup within the Atlantic Alliance.

430. None of these institutions is concerned with all political fields and in every one of them only part of the European countries are represented. This diversity, and in most cases also the lack of competence in questions of defence policy and in military matters, have rendered it more difficult to find solutions that are promising for the future.

1. See page 105.

431. It is not within the terms of reference of this study to develop solutions for a political unification of Europe. But it cannot be denied that a *political union* of all Western European nations with a supranationally controlled and common foreign, security and defence policy would create the decisive prerequisites for combining the military efforts of all European partners. In such a way an effective rationalisation by specialisation and standardisation will lead to an optimum utilisation of the means expended for defence purposes, thus enhancing the defence effectiveness on the continent.

432. The fact that this long-term objective will probably not be attained in the near future must not prevent us from making a *concrete start*, utilising the appropriate political and military organisational structures suited for the purpose.

433. Any possible approach should be taken. There is no time to be lost. The study has shown that there are plenty of possibilities to take steps which can be put into practice if they are governed by political determination. Each one of these individual steps should include as many European partners as possible. But each individual step should also be examined so as to ensure that it will not diminish but strengthen the *European-American solidarity*. For the foreseeable future, security for Europe is not imaginable without strategic nuclear coverage. Western Europe itself is not in a position to make available the means required for that purpose. There-

fore Western Europe will remain dependent for security on *firm ties with the United States*. Thus it goes without saying that no isolated action on the part of Europe must be taken.

434. But Europe may only expect a credible protection from the United States as long as it is also indispensable as a partner to the interests of the United States and as long as it remains a trustworthy ally. In this connection, the Americans expect Europe firmly to commit itself in the defence sector and to make a contribution in concert with the military efforts of the United States.

435. Therefore, *Europe* must play a *more active part* than before, both from a political and a military point of view. And, of course, this can only be a Europe which fully and equally includes France and Great Britain.

436. The more firmly such a Europe speaks the same language the more effectively will it be able to represent its interests, and the more willingly will the United States wish to maintain its ties.

437. But the political determination of the governments must also be directed towards keeping alive in the peoples themselves the consciousness of the increasing threat to our freedom, and towards strengthening the *readiness to defend this freedom*. Otherwise, all military defence efforts might be undermined and might consequently be useless.

The following Annex 1
map has been
divided into:
NW¹, NE², SW³, SE⁴
Annex 2 and 3 are
kept whole.

ENCLOSURE 1

*Permanent locations of land forces
in the central region
on 1st April 1974*

ANNEXE 1

*Positions permanentes des forces terrestres
dans la région Centre-Europe
(à la date du 1^{er} avril 1974)*

**Key
Légende**

xxxxxx Army group
Groupe d'armées

xxxxx Army
Armée


xxx Corps
Corps d'armée


xx Division

x Brigade

III Regiment
Régiment

— NL
— GE
— BR
— BE
— US
— CA
— FR





18 X

16 X

17 X

8 X XX 3 GE

9 X

7 X

2 X


4 X

BERLIN

10° 11° 12° 13° 14° 15° 16°

51° 52° 53°

2



3

BRUXELLES
(BRUSSELS)

17

7

1

6

LILLE

XX 8

XX 4

IFRR
XXX

XX 1

XX 26

XX 3

XX 14

XX 15

XX 13

XX 11

XX 2/8

XX 3/8

XX 7/8

XX 1/3

XX 2/3

XX 3/3

XX 5

XX 25

XX 12

XX 4

XX 7

XXX VHUS

XX 29

XX 13

XXX 3ER

XX 8 US

XXXXX CENTJAC

XXX 3US (ARMD)

XXX EAGE

XXX STUDIAIT


XXXX IFR


XXXX IFR

PARIS

LUXEMBOURG

LUXEMBOURG







ENCLOSURE 2

*Deployment of Warsaw Pact
land forces facing the
central region*

ANNEXE 2

*Déploiement des forces terrestres
du Pacte de Varsovie faisant face
à la région Centre-Europe*





-----	Staatsgrenze
-----	Landesgrenze
-----	Innerdeutsche Grenze
○	BERLIN
○	KÖLN
○	MAINZ
○	Gießen
○	Passau
○	Städte über 1 Mill. Einwohner
○	500 000 bis 1 Mill. Einwohner
○	100 000 bis 500 000 Einwohner
○	50 000 bis 100 000 Einwohner
○	unter 50 000 Einwohner

ZEICHENERKLÄRUNG
LEGENDE

Bundesautobahnen
Autobahnen in the FRG
Autoroutes en R. F. A.
Im Verkehr
In use
En service

Bis 1975 fertiggestellt
Under construction; completed by 1975
Terminées en 1975

Tankstelle mit Raststätte
Filling station with rest house
Station-service avec restaurant

Tankstelle / Raststätte
Filling station / Rest house
Station-service / Restaurant

Autobahnmeistereien
Autobahn maintenance station
Station d'entretien d'autoroute

Nebelhäufigkeit
High incidence of fog
Brouillard fréquent

Calde

Truppenübungsplatz
Training area
Champ de tir et de manoeuvre

Grundlagen: Der Bundesminister für Verkehr, 1. Fünfjahresplan
Compiled from: für den Ausbau der Bundesfernstraßen, Bonn 1971
Documentation: Serie M 841-U-Tr, 1:25 000

Replies of the Council to Recommendations 256 to 259

RECOMMENDATION 256¹

*on European security and the situation
in the Eastern Mediterranean²*

The Assembly,

Deploring the loss of life and human suffering in Cyprus ;

Believing that any solution to the crisis in the island depends on improved relations between Greece and Turkey and between the communities in Cyprus involving mutual concessions on several issues ;

Recalling the continued increase in Soviet military power, especially at sea ;

Aware that European security is endangered by any weakening of the links between NATO and its member countries and by any deterioration in relations between NATO countries ;

Believing that the continued presence of British defence installations in Cyprus, in accordance with international agreements to which representatives of the Cyprus communities are parties, contributes to the defence of Europe as a whole ;

Convinced that the United Nations force in Cyprus, to which three members of the European Community have contributed, is playing an essential rôle in the return to normal conditions in the island ;

Calling for satellite observation capability to be made available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations ;

Reiterating its earlier recommendation for the correct application of the Montreux Convention to prevent the passage of aircraft-carriers through the Dardanelles,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Request member governments of WEU to examine to what extent humanitarian aid for the refugees on Cyprus could be enhanced, particularly, whether through rapid deliveries from reserve defence stocks the survival of those concerned through the winter could be ensured ; furthermore to appeal to the responsible States to dissolve the refugee camps and to house the refugees in civilised quarters ;
2. Endeavour to ensure that the good offices of their partners and allies and in particular of the members of the European Community continue to be available to all parties in order to secure a general settlement of the Cyprus problem through negotiations between the two communities ;
3. Impress upon all parties to the conflict the manifold advantages which active membership of NATO bestows on each and every member ;
4. Recognise the importance of the continued presence of British defence installations in Cyprus ;
5. Develop the association agreements of Greece and Turkey towards the objective of their full membership of the European Community.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1974 during the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session (9th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Critchley on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 651).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹**to Recommendation 256**

1. The Council share the deep concern expressed by the Assembly about the loss of life and human suffering in Cyprus. They agree that a lasting solution to the present crisis depends on an improvement in the relations between Greece and Turkey and between the two communities in Cyprus. The Council are also aware of the implications for the security of the Eastern Mediterranean of the present unstable situation in Cyprus.

2. The Council would like to point out that several member governments of WEU have already contributed substantially to the humanitarian aid being provided for refugees in Cyprus, particularly in response to two appeals issued by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in autumn 1974. The UNHCR issued a further appeal for funds in January 1975 and certain member governments of WEU have already responded to this latest request. It is the hope of the Council that negotiations between the two communities in Cyprus will eventually result in an agreement which will permit a long-term solution to the refugee problem and the rehabilitation of the refugees themselves.

3. The Council affirm their continuing concern for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. They wish to draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that, at their meeting in Dublin on 13th February 1975, in the framework of political co-operation, the Foreign Ministers of the nine countries of the European Communities considered recent events in Cyprus. Recalling their previous statements on the subject and particularly the importance they attach to the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, as well as the relevant United Nations resolutions, they decided to approach the Governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, through the Chairman, to inform them :

- that they continue to regard as highly desirable the search for a just and lasting negotiated settlement through consultation between the two communities in Cyprus ;
- that, in order to facilitate the achievement of this aim, the Nine are ready to hold talks with the representatives of all the interested parties.

4. The Council have no doubt that all members of the North Atlantic Alliance are fully aware of the importance of the Alliance to European security. The Republic of Cyprus is not, of course, a member of the Alliance.

5. British forces have been in the sovereign base areas in Cyprus since 1960. But as a result of the recent defence review, these forces will be reduced ; there will be cuts both in the number of British soldiers and in the number of strike aircraft stationed there in support of CENTO. In deciding these cuts, due account has however been taken of common security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. The bases themselves will of course remain.

6. The proposal that the association agreement of Greece and Turkey with the Community should be developed towards full membership of the EEC is a matter for the Council of the European Communities. Nonetheless the member countries of WEU by their signature of the Treaty of Athens and the Treaty of Ankara are committed to the objective of increasing development of relations between the EEC on the one hand and Greece and Turkey on the other, which should lead to full membership of the Communities for these two countries.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1975.

RECOMMENDATION 257 ¹
on the state of European aviation activities ²

The Assembly,

Concerned about the consequences of the oil crisis for the European civil air transport market and hence for the aviation industry ;

Aware of the part played by air transport in Europe's prosperity and the development of its advanced technology ;

Considering the interdependence of military and civil markets,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite the member countries to :

1. Agree on joint specifications for all military aviation procurement ;
2. Take particular account in the formulation of these specifications of the aircraft, engine and equipment capability of European aviation companies ;
3. Ensure that export market requirements are incorporated in the specifications ;
4. Give preference, wherever reasonable and possible, to the products of European aviation factories so that a self-sustaining design and manufacturing capability able to compete in world markets can be retained in Europe ;
5. Agree with the United States Government on equality of opportunity for the export and import of civil and military aerospace products between member countries and the United States and, until such agreement is reached, establish such commercial protection of the European market as is necessary to protect the jobs of European aerospace workers and the balance of payments of member countries ;
6. Recognise and establish Western Europe as a unified, single market for air transport operations and aircraft sales ;
7. Establish a strong and co-ordinated government- and EEC-backed programme of commercial, financial and diplomatic support for all aviation export sales.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1974 during the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session (10th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Warren on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 658).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹**to *Recommendation 257***

The Council refer to their earlier replies to Recommendation 244 on an aviation policy for Europe, and to Written Question 151.

The views expressed in Recommendation 257 have been brought to the notice of member governments. The Council can assure the Assembly that all aspects of the important problem about which it is concerned continue to receive their fullest attention.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1975.

RECOMMENDATION 258 ¹
on national parliaments and the WEU Assembly ²

The Assembly,

Regretting that the work of WEU is little known in the parliaments of member countries ;

Anxious to develop a sense of European solidarity in the parliaments of member countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the governments of member countries to present a report, during debates on foreign policy, on their position on matters considered by the Council or Assembly of WEU and the action they intend to take on Assembly recommendations.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1974 during the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session (11th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments (Document 653).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 258

The Council attach great importance to the Assembly's relations with national parliaments. These relations contribute indeed to strengthening the spirit of European solidarity.

Member governments will as in the past and in accordance with their established practice inform their parliaments on international developments considered by the Council or the Assembly of WEU and on the progress of co-operation in WEU. Furthermore WEU parliamentarians are at liberty to question their governments whenever they want a more detailed consideration of foreign policy matters which are of particular concern to WEU.

Finally, members of the Assembly may make statements in their national parliaments and may refer, as necessary, to their own or their colleagues' statements at the WEU Assembly.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1975.

RECOMMENDATION 259¹
on advanced technology in Canada —
the consequences for Europe²

The Assembly,

Sharing the regrets expressed by the Canadian Senate Special Committee on Science Policy in its report on science policy for Canada regarding the absence of international co-operation ;

Considering the Canadian Senate's proposal to create an interparliamentary association for scientific and technological affairs open to all OECD member countries and its wish to hear opinions on this proposal ;

Considering also Canada's wish to develop its foreign policy and overseas trade in new directions ;

Aware of the need to collaborate with Canada on :

- (a) the development of V-STOL aircraft ;
- (b) nuclear research and development ;
- (c) other energy resources within the framework of the overall energy policy ;
- (d) computer communications,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments :

1. To afford the interparliamentary association — as proposed by the Canadian Senate — their assistance in the study of the abovementioned subjects ;
2. To instruct the European Space Agency to seek co-operation with Canada on :
 - (a) remote sensing systems in satellites to further environmental monitoring, oceanography, new reforestation methods and worldwide crop assessment ;
 - (b) domestic satellite communications systems.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th December 1974 during the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session (12th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. van Ooijen on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 649).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 259

1. Immediately after the second world war, attention was directed to the research and development of nuclear energy as a possible auxiliary solution for the energy problems which seemed to be threatening the international community; but the subsequent progress of events and the present energy crisis have transformed solutions for these problems into a pressing need on which the economic future of our continent largely depends.

2. Consequently, the progress achieved in the field of nuclear research and development over the last twenty years, in both Canada and Europe, represents a major contribution to solving these problems. Co-operation along the lines urged in Recommendation 259 is therefore even more to be desired.

3. This is not, however, a new issue; the Canadian agencies concerned and national commissions in a number of European countries are already co-operating bilaterally for the development of joint research programmes on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The whole energy problem is the subject of close collaboration in various international bodies.

4. Co-operation is already taking place with Canada on space matters. The Canadian Government joined in the programme, adopted by the European Space Research Organisation in 1971 for the testing and development of a satellite air-navigation control system (Aerosat programme).

Canada also has observer status with the European Space Conference and its subordinate agencies. She is therefore in a position to make her views known within the ESC working group which keeps in touch with the work of the United Nations. This group is the forum in which the member States concert their space policies for their relations with other organisations. Consequently, Canada can co-ordinate and harmonise her own space policy with that of the European States, whenever she considers this desirable.

This applies particularly to the activities of the committee on the peaceful use of outer space and its two sub-committees, which are at present considering the problems of direct radio transmission by satellite and prospecting the earth's resources by satellite, not only from the political and legal points of view, but also on the economic and technical level.

The transatlantic links so established should facilitate the conclusion of any new agreements between the future European Space Agency, successor to ELDO/CECLES and ESRO/CERS, and its Canadian partners for the development of space monitoring and communications systems.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1975.

Relations with Parliaments

INFORMATION REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Relations with Parliaments ²
by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mrs. *Miotti Carli* (Chairman); Mr. *Enders* (Vice-Chairman); MM. *Cermolacce*

(Substitute: *Rivière*), *Cohen*, *Delorme*, *Farr*, *Hengel Müller*, *Peijnenburg*, *Schugens*, *Spautz*, *Stoffelen*, *Tanghe*

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Information Report

(submitted by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur)

1. This report, in two parts, covers the period November 1974 to May 1975. Part one reviews the reports on the activities of Western European Union submitted to the parliaments of member countries by their respective governments. Part two analyses parliamentary action on Assembly recommendations with a view to drawing the attention of governments to the work of the Assembly.
2. It is recalled in this respect that relevant texts communicated to the Office of the Clerk are given in Collected Texts 21.

I. Reports on the activities of WEU submitted to the parliaments of member countries

3. Recommendation 258, adopted by the WEU Assembly on 5th December 1974, urged the governments of member countries "to present a report, during debates on foreign policy, on their position on matters considered by the Council or Assembly of WEU and the action they intend to take on Assembly recommendations". Further to Order 44, which sought to promote this recommendation by means of parliamentary action, your Rapporteur wrote to the seven delegation Chairmen on 23rd January 1975 enquiring what action the governments were taking on this recommendation.
4. So far, only the Chairmen of the Belgian and French Delegations have replied, and in accordance with Order 41 only Mr. de Bruyne spoke in the debate in the Belgian Senate on the budget of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs¹.
5. However, it is noted that on 12th December 1974 the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany issued a report (Document 7/2966) on the activities of Western European Union for the period 1st April to 30th September 1974. This government considers WEU to be an important element of western cohesion.
6. The Netherlands Government devoted three paragraphs to WEU in the explanatory memo-

¹. See end of part two.

randum to the draft budget of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs published on 17th September 1974 (Document 13100, Chapter IV, No. 2, page 37).

7. On 24th September 1974, the German Delegation published a report by its Chairman, Mr. Amrehn, on the first part of the twentieth session of the Assembly (June 1974) (Document 7/2558) with the text of Recommendations 248 and 255 at appendix.

8. In application of Rule 29 of its Rules of Procedure, the French National Assembly issued an information report on the activities of the WEU Assembly during its nineteenth ordinary session, prepared by Mr. Radius, Chairman of the French Delegation (Document 1461, 19th December 1974). The Committee welcomes the publication of this report but trusts that the report on the twentieth session will include as an appendix the texts transmitted to the French parliament.

II. Action taken on texts adopted

9. Your Rapporteur is glad to be able to inform the Assembly that for the first time since 1972 the number of interventions in the parliaments of the various WEU member countries¹ rose thanks to eight members (out of a total of 178). He hopes that this progress heralds a return to a more normal situation: more than fifty interventions a year should be possible if members of national delegations continue, in their parliaments, to show interest in the texts they have adopted. Similarly, Committee Chairmen, Rapporteurs and Chairmen of Political Groups might intervene in their parliaments in support of Assembly recommendations.
10. The Committee urges members of the Assembly to implement the suggestions set out in the first thirteen paragraphs of Document 653 on improving relations with the national parliaments. It also reminds all delegates wishing to

¹. See Collected Texts 21.

take action on the work of the Assembly that the Committee can be of assistance and to this end they should contact the Committee secretariat.

Recommendation 247

11. In reply to a letter from Senator Bonaldi dated 9th August 1974, Mr. Andreotti, Italian Minister of Defence, said that Italy was applying the provisions of this recommendation and that Italy was still endeavouring to reactivate the WEU Standing Armaments Committee.

Recommendation 248

12. On 25th February, the Italian Minister responsible for co-ordinating scientific research and technology gave his opinion on this recommendation, which deals with the European Space Agency.

Recommendation 252

13. In reply to a written question put on 9th August 1974 (see Collected Texts 20, page 14), Mr. Moro, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, replied that the Italian representatives to the appropriate international bodies, and particularly WEU, have been instructed "to promote or activate procedure for consultation whenever appropriate or necessary".

Recommendation 253

14. On 20th February 1975, Mr. Cattanei, Italian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied in great detail to the question put by Mr. Bonaldi and with regard to the peaceful use of nuclear energy gave a full list of Italian programmes or international programmes in which Italy is participating.

Recommendation 254

15. In reply to a letter from Senator Bonaldi, the Italian Minister of Defence sent a note on the creation of a United Nations observation satellite, the usefulness of lessons learned from the Israeli-Arab conflict, the balance of forces in the Indian Ocean, respect for the Montreux Convention and improving defence arrangements in the Mediterranean.

Recommendation 255

16. On 22nd November 1974, Mr. Hengel, a Luxembourg member of parliament, put a written question to his government. Mr. Thorn, Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs, replied on 7th January 1975 that he very largely agreed with the trend and general concept of this recommendation. Luxembourg was still in favour of creating the European union decided on at the Paris summit conference in 1972. With regard to the participation of the Secretary-General of WEU in consultations in the framework of the EEC or NATO, such a practice would be incompatible with the basic principles of these organisations.

Recommendation 257

17. The Committee having selected this recommendation for transmission to the parliaments of the WEU member countries, your Rapporteur put a written question on 22nd February 1975. He is surprised to be the only person so far to draw attention to the only text selected by the Committee for transmission to parliaments.

Document 655 (Report by Mr. Small on the state of European nuclear energy programmes)

18. Although the Assembly did not vote on the relevant recommendation, this report has led to several written questions being put on the ratification of the conventions it mentions.

19. On 18th December 1974, Mr. van Ooijen and Mr. Waltmans put a question to the Netherlands Minister. On 28th January 1975, Senator Minnocci put a question to the Italian Minister and, finally, on 8th February 1975, Mr. de Montesquiou put a written question to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

20. The first reply was from Mr. den Uyl, Netherlands Prime Minister, explaining the situation with regard to the ratification of two conventions by the Netherlands and promising that bills providing for their ratification and implementation would be tabled shortly. So far, the Committee has seen no relevant bills.

Other action

21. In France, Mr. de Montesquiou spoke in the debate on the civil aviation budget on 18th November 1974. He called for the creation of a WEU aeronautical group for liaison between all

competent bodies and with foreign countries. Mr. Cavaillé, Secretary of State, said that he was bearing in mind the suggestion for co-operation in the framework of WEU.

22. In Belgium, on 15th January 1975, Mr. de Bruyne asked for the Belgian Government's opin-

ion on the rôle of WEU. Mr. Van Elslande, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressed his interest in the work of WEU. He referred to his attempts to revive the Council's ministerial meetings and added that he would attend the Assembly's sessions with pleasure if the occasion arose.

APPENDIX I

*Table of action in the parliaments of member countries**(Totals by country for each session)*

Recommendations adopted in	Member countries							Total
	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	
1956	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
1957	4	0	1	0	0	5	2	12
1958	2	0	3	0	0	4	3	12
1959	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
1960	3	12	2	8	0	3	1	29
1961	0	2	0	3	0	6	0	11
1962	2	4	4	6	2	3	10	31
1963	0	0	13	22	1	2	3	41
1964	4	14	9	11	1	5	2	46
1965	0	11	12	24	0	5	28	80
1966	2	12	12	49	1	4	18	98
1967	14	9	22	29	2	6	16	98
1968	6	14	20	22	1	16	47	126
1969	11	15	17	8	0	4	36	91
1970	3	15	15	7	2	3	10	55
1971	0	4	19	9	0	6	10	48
1972	0	6	2	1	0	1	0	10
1973	0	4	2	6	1	0	0	13
1974	0	1	0	13	2	0	0	16
1975	2	4	1	1	0	2	0	10
Total	53	127	166	219	13	75	186	839

APPENDIX II

Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1973

Session	Recommendation	Transmitted to parliaments	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total	Total for each part session
June 1973	233									—	4
	234									—	
	235					1				1	
	236					1				1	
	237					1				1	
	238	x				1				1	
	Res. 52	x								—	
Nov. 1973	239					2				2	9
	240									—	
	241	x		2						2	
	242									—	
	243									—	
	244									—	
	245	x			2				2		
	Other action			2			1			3	
June 1974	246					1				1	15
	247					2				2	
	248	x				2				2	
	249									—	
	250									—	
	251					1				1	
	252					2				2	
	253					2				2	
	254					2				2	
255	x				1	2			3		
Dec. 1974	256									—	1
	257	x		1						1	
	258									—	
	259									—	
1975	Other action		2	4	1	1		2	10	10	

**OPINION ON THE BUDGET OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1975¹**

*submitted on behalf of
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur*

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on the budget of Western European Union for the financial year 1975

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION
on improving the status of WEU staff

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submitted by Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur

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Proposed expenditure and income
National contributions
- II. Details regarding the duties of the members of the staff of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
- III. Details regarding the duties of the staff of the Office of the Clerk of Western European Union
- IV. Table of establishment of Western European Union
- V. Recommendation 250 on improving the status of WEU staff and the reply of the Council
- VI. The pension scheme

Draft Opinion

*on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU
for the financial year 1975*

The Assembly,

Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;

Having taken note of the contents,

Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated.

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Dequae (Chairman); Mr. Legaret (Substitute: *Pignion*), Lord Selsdon (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Ahrens, Alber, de Bruyne, Castellucci, Depietri, Hengel (Substitute: *Spautz*), Kauffman, de Koster (Substitute: *Peijnenburg*), Lewis, Page, Lord Peddie

(Substitute: *Sir John Rodgers*), MM. Prearo, Santalco, Schleiter, Talamona, Vohrer, Waltmans, Mrs. Wolf (Substitute: *Kempfer*).

Also present: Mr. Adriaensens.

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on improving the status of WEU staff

The Assembly,

Aware of the effort made by the Councils of the co-ordinated organisations to establish a pension scheme for the staff of these organisations ;

Deploring nevertheless the fact that the governments have not yet been able to set up a joint management body for all the organisations, a single appeals board or guarantee the payment of pensions should one of them withdraw or an organisation be wound up ;

Deeply regretting that the Co-ordinating Committee has been unable to agree to a reversionary pension being granted to widowers of female staff in the same way as to widows of male staff ;

Welcoming the action taken on Recommendation 200 and the definition of principles to be implemented with regard to the secondment of national officials to the co-ordinated organisations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

- I. In the framework of the co-ordinated organisations :
 1. Establish a joint management body for the pension scheme ;
 2. Set up a single appeals board ;
 3. Guarantee the full and uninterrupted payment of pensions even in the event of a government withdrawing or an organisation being wound up and to this end apply the provisions set out in Recommendation 250 of the Assembly ;
 4. Grant widowers of female staff a reversionary pension in the same conditions as for widows of male staff ;
 5. Afford officials who have obtained home loans from the provident fund a means of continuing those loans should they opt for the pension scheme ;
 6. Ensure that serving officials who do not opt for the pension scheme continue to benefit from the social advantages linked with the present provident fund system ;
 7. Grant officials of equal grade and length of service, regardless of the date of their retirement, a pension calculated on the basis of salaries payable to serving staff ;
 8. Take note of the problems arising from the introduction of the United Kingdom Social Security Act in April 1975 ;
 9. Establish a system for readjusting emoluments whereby the co-ordinated organisations may :
 - hold general reviews every four years or more frequently if circumstances warrant it ;
 - assess trends in the standard of living in the middle of the period between general reviews ;
 - examine cost-of-living trends every six months ;

- take the necessary steps to adjust salaries in accordance with the trend of the cost of living as quickly as possible by abolishing the two-month observation period.

II. Invite the Public Administration Committee to submit to it as soon as possible a first report on the way member States have implemented the principles defined by the special group of experts set up in October 1971 to study conditions for seconding national officials to international organisations, on the difficulties encountered in this respect and, as appropriate, ways of alleviating such difficulties

Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur)

I. Budget of the ministerial organs of WEU

1. *Approval*

I have studied the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1975 and have, for the time being, no comment to make

thereon. I therefore submit the attached draft opinion and draft recommendation to the Committee for its approval.

2. *The budget*

The total budget of WEU for 1975 as compared to 1974 is as follows :

	<i>1974 Budget</i>		<i>1975 Budget</i>	
	£	F	£	F
Secretariat-General	359,800	—	397,810	—
Standing Armaments Committee ..	—	3,011,188	—	3,550,895
Agency for the Control of Armaments	—	6,551,198	—	7,634,310
Office of the Clerk	—	5,030,000	—	6,065,000
TOTAL BUDGET OF WEU	359,800	14,592,386	397,810	17,250,205

3. *WEU establishment*

The total establishment of WEU for 1975 is as follows :

Secretariat-General	49
Standing Armaments Committee	28
Agency for the Control of Armaments	52
	129
Office of the Clerk	28
	157
TOTAL ESTABLISHMENT OF WEU FOR 1975	157

In order to avoid submitting supplementary budgets during the year, the Council had decided that the draft budgets of each branch of WEU should take account of the foreseeable effects of inflation during the budgetary year.

The increased estimates in the budgets of the ministerial organs and of the Assembly for this year as compared with 1974 are thus due not only, as is customary, to the rise in prices and salaries during the previous financial year, which was higher in 1974 than during previous years, but also, for the first time, to an estimate of the probable effects of inflation during the current financial year.

II. Pensions

1. *Government guarantee — Joint fund*

1.1 The pension scheme having reached its final stage, one important point is still outstanding, i.e. a government guarantee. As with the proposed pension scheme as a whole, this problem has not yet been submitted to the Councils for decision. However, it has been dealt with in what may be considered a final form at the level of the Co-ordinating Committee and the text approved by that Committee will be incorporated in the pension scheme rules now being drawn up. This text lays down that :

“Article 40 — Charge on budgets

1. Benefits paid under this pension scheme shall be charged to the budgets of the organisation responsible for the assessment of these benefits pursuant to Article 31.

2. The member States of the organisation jointly guarantee the payment of these benefits.

3. In the event of merger, reconstitution or other transformation or in the event of

dissolution of the organisation, the Council or any ad hoc body set up, where required in one of the aforementioned cases, shall take the necessary measures to ensure uninterrupted payment of the pension scheme benefits until the cessation of entitlement of the last beneficiary."

1.2 These provisions are certainly well-intended, but they fail to offer the guarantees which may be rightfully expected in such an essential field, particularly as regards the regular payment of the sums due, whatever the circumstances and without prior discussion and decision.

1.3 Moreover, several members of the Co-ordinating Committee were aware of this shortcoming since, when the above article was being finalised, it was pointed out by several delegations that, in the two cases envisaged of the withdrawal of a member State or the dissolution of an organisation, a delicate financial problem might arise if the measures to be taken in such an event were not determined now. Although, in fact, Article 40 provides that member States jointly guarantee the payment of pensions, yet were a number of them to withdraw from an organisation *it would obviously be inconceivable that the countries still remaining should alone bear the total cost of the scheme.*

1.4 The Co-ordinating Committee, while recognising the importance of this problem and the need for countries joining or withdrawing from an organisation to honour their commitments, considered that the measures to be taken should be included in the general financial arrangements concomitant with admission or withdrawal but should not appear in the pension scheme rules.

1.5 These comments are significant : they bring out the ambiguity in the minds of certain delegations which may be dangerous in such matters and may deter a number of officials who might otherwise wish to join the scheme.

1.6 It is evident that the only solution to this problem lies in the proposals made in the recommendation adopted by the Assembly during its Twentieth Session (Document 631) for creating a joint management body with its own legal status in respect of which each government would enter into financial commitments which would remain unaffected in the event of a country withdrawing from one of the co-ordinated organisations or an organisation being wound up.

1.7 Such a solution could probably not be applied immediately since time would be required for it to be worked out, formed and agreed to by governments.

1.8 It has been objected that the creation of such a body would involve further expenditure. In this connection, reference has been made to the creation of another co-ordinated organisation ; such an argument cannot stand close scrutiny, since in the long run it would cost far more if management of the scheme were dispersed than if it were centralised.

1.9 The Councils should therefore adopt a formal declaration of intent coupling joint management with adoption of the scheme itself. Moreover, several governments are in favour of this. It would be necessary to convince those who are reluctant and also, it must be admitted, certain organisations which are over-jealous of their prerogatives at the expense of the true interests of their staff. However this may be, and in view of the time required to establish joint management, the pension scheme might at the outset be managed by each organisation concerned.

2. *Revaluation of pensions*

2.1 According to the rules now being drawn up, the pension payable is calculated on the basic salary for the last grade held by the official for not less than one year before retirement and the appropriate step in that grade.

2.2 It is also stipulated that should the Council of the organisation responsible for the payment of benefits decide on an adjustment of salaries in relation to the cost of living, it shall decide at the same time on an identical adjustment of pensions. Should salary adjustments be made in relation to the standard of living, the Council shall consider whether an appropriate adjustment of pensions should be made.

2.3 However unreservedly welcome may be the automatic adjustment of pensions in accordance with the trend of the cost of living, it is regrettable that there should be such clear reservations where adjustments in the light of improvements in the standard of living are concerned.

2.4 Is it fair to deprive, or envisage depriving, a retired person of the improved standard of living from which all serving officials would benefit ? Any such solution would be quite unfair and most difficult to apply.

2.5 Nor would it be very fair since the pension of an official retiring at a given time would be calculated inclusive of an increase in salary which may have been granted to meet an increase in the standard of living granted say a month before, whereas a colleague who had retired two months earlier might not qualify for such an increase.

2.6 It would be difficult to apply since it might entail the use of a number of pension scales for a specific grade and step, reflecting arbitrarily the various decisions taken in this field over the years.

2.7 To sum up, retired officials, regardless of the date of their retirement, should be granted a pension which, for equal grade and length of service, is calculated on the basis of salaries actually paid to serving officials.

3. *Reconsideration of the option for married women*

3.1 The rules now being drawn up state that in the event of the death of a male official his widow may claim a reversionary pension. This right does not apply to the widowers of women officials of the co-ordinated organisations.

3.2 Such discrimination is surprising in organisations which have recently adopted a series of often generous measures concerning equal treatment for men and women and may well deter a number of women from joining the scheme now being prepared.

3.3 Should the course be one of no return, female officials ought to be allowed an opportunity of changing their decision in the event of the rules being modified.

3.4 It has been argued that to insert such a provision in the rules would be difficult insofar as it might presuppose a subsequent modification. When adopting the pension scheme, the Council should at least discuss the matter and reassure those concerned.

4. *Loans for purchasing accommodation*

4.1 The disappearance or at least considerable reduction of the credits available to officials opting for the pension scheme will make impossible or considerably reduce the granting of loans from the provident fund for purchasing or improving accommodation.

4.2 Nevertheless, such loans are a particularly useful social measure since international officials often do not have access to national facilities in this respect.

4.3 Member States might consider earmarking a small part of the large sums they will recover for the validation of past service to finance such operations in the future at a reasonable interest rate and provided satisfactory guarantees are given. In any event, this situation calls for an early and fair solution.

4.4 In the same context, serving officials who have been granted a loan to purchase or improve accommodation in the framework of the existing rules and who do not have available the entire sum necessary to validate their past service must be allowed reasonable time in which to reimburse their debt. Arrangements must also be made to allow them to continue their home loans at an acceptable rate of interest.

5. *Position of serving officials who wish to continue with the provident fund*

5.1 The rules now being prepared provide that officials in service when the pension scheme is introduced will be able to continue with the provident fund for up to one year as from the date on which the Council approves the new scheme before opting for one or the other.

5.2 This provision is satisfactory since it respects the principle of acquired rights.

5.3 But it must be ensured that this principle is applied not only to the main aspect, i.e. the maintenance of the provident fund in its present form but also to subsidiary problems such as the granting of loans from this fund and the full maintenance of the guarantees offered by complementary insurance schemes, some aspects of which may be modified to avoid overlapping with benefits under the pension scheme.

5.4 It must also be underlined that the conditions for reimbursement of medical, surgical, hospital and pharmaceutical expenses after retirement which must be maintained for retired officials should also cover officials now in service who do not opt for the pension scheme, provided they fulfil the necessary conditions which, for instance, might be to leave the organisation at retiring age after not less than ten years' service. This provision is already applied in two co-ordinated organisations: NATO and OECD.

III. Appeals Board

6. Appeals

6.1 Two recent conflicting judgments by two appeals boards — in OECD and NATO — on an identical text (rules on equal treatment for men and women employed in the co-ordinated organisations) clearly show, if proof were needed, the dangers foreseen by the Assembly¹ which led it to recommend having an appeals board capable of harmonising juridical decisions and of guaranteeing the parties every desirable legal guarantee.

6.2 It is regrettable that no action was taken on this recommendation and that it was not even submitted to the Councils of the co-ordinated organisations for consideration. The forthcoming introduction of the pension scheme, which will no doubt give rise to a number of disputed claims, makes such harmonisation even more necessary.

IV. Salary adjustments

7. Adjustment procedure

7.1 There has been criticism of procedure for adjusting salaries.

1. Document 561, Recommendation 214 adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1971 during the Second Part of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session (Extract):

"3. Instruct the Secretary-General to seek, together with his colleagues of the other co-ordinated organisations, harmonisation in the rules governing the appeals board for staff in the organisations;"

Reply of the Council:

"3. The Council recognise that, under the existing procedures, differing interpretations of texts could be given by any one of the appeals boards of the co-ordinated organisations, resulting in divergent decisions. They will therefore arrange that the other co-ordinated organisations be consulted with a view to harmonising the rules to the extent required to eliminate such divergences."

Document 584, Recommendation 230 adopted by the Assembly on 7th December 1972 during the Second Part of the Eighteenth Ordinary Session (Extract):

"3. (b) to consider, together with the Secretaries-General of the other co-ordinated organisations, the possibility of instituting one appeals jurisdiction for all staff."

Reply of the Council:

"3. (b) As requested by the Assembly, the Secretary-General has invited his colleagues from the other co-ordinated organisations to consider the possibility of instituting one appeals procedure for all staff."

7.2 The level of salaries of officials is decided by means of general reviews. Criteria taken into account for grades A and L consist essentially of comparisons with salaries payable in other international organisations, and more particularly the EEC, and in national civil services, with due attention to the trend of the cost of living.

7.3 For grades B and C, levels are fixed on the basis of enquiries into salaries paid in good private firms in the country of employment. The statistical experts who established procedure for these enquiries more than ten years ago set up a coherent system which has proved effective. It should however be brought up to date so as to avoid arguments about the choice of reference firms and the alignment of a specific grade in the organisations with a specific post in the private sector.

7.4 The general reviews also provide an opportunity for dealing with all matters concerning the granting of allowances and the possible creation of new allowances.

7.5 A general review is thus a very cumbersome exercise, involving careful preparation and much discussion. Representatives of the organisations and member States devote a considerable amount of time to it, and although the cost has never been assessed, there is no doubt that it is high.

7.6 When the present co-ordination system was instituted in 1958, general reviews were held every four years. This interval was reduced to three and then two years. It may be considered that there is little reason for such frequent reviews and that general reviews should again be held every four years.

7.7 In the period between two general reviews (at present two years), provision is made for an *annual review* dealing solely with the trend of the cost of living.

7.8 However, if the cost-of-living index rises by more than five points during the year under review, an *exceptional review* is made.

7.9 The inflation which is rife in all the countries of employment has led to many reviews in the last two years which have sometimes overlapped and involve an excessive amount of administrative work.

7.10 The present system might be replaced by two annual reviews on a fixed date to deal with the adjustment of salaries in the light of trends in the cost of living.

7.11 Further, every two years — i.e. in the middle of the period between two four-yearly general reviews — consideration might be given to whether a standard-of-living adjustment should be made.

7.12 The present system is cumbersome, costly and very slow. While it is normal for a general review to require three or four month's discussions, adjustments due to the cost of living should be made without delay because they are intended to alleviate a drop in purchasing power which has been noted objectively. This is not the case; when the cost-of-living index in a specific country rises by more than five points, thus justifying an exceptional adjustment, there is a pause of two months to ensure that the increase was neither seasonal nor fortuitous. The cost-of-living index for the second month is available only a month or six weeks later. The Co-ordinating Committee is thus able to approve salary increases only after a period of three to three and a half months. Approval is submitted to the Councils of the co-ordinated organisations which include the matter in their agendas. Only after four to four and a half months can the adjustment thus be made with retroactive effect. There is little justification for such slowness.

7.13 There would be no serious drawback to abolishing the two-month observation period since experience has proved the deplorable fact that nowadays falling price indices are a textbook theory.

7.14 In short, it is proposed :

- (i) to lighten the present complex procedure by replacing it by :
 - four-yearly general reviews ;
 - consideration of the trend of the standard of living in the middle of the period between general reviews ;
 - half-yearly consideration of the trend of the cost of living ;
- (ii) to take the necessary steps to make adjustments corresponding to the trend of the cost of living as soon as possible and to abolish the two-month observation period.

7.15 This reorganisation would considerably ease the strain of reviews by the co-ordinating bodies and administrative work. It would probably reduce the number of readjustments now enjoyed by staff but would at the same time ensure quicker application of measures adopted.

V. *United Kingdom Social Security Act of 1973*

8.1 The introduction of the United Kingdom Social Security Act of 1973 in April of this year, entailing substantially increased contributions both from employers and employees, raises a number of problems concerning WEU staff, both those serving in the Secretariat-General in London and those British nationals serving in Paris who have, up to now, contributed regularly to the Social Security services on a voluntary basis. A number of questions in this respect need to be settled :

- (a) the readiness of member governments in WEU to subscribe to both an international and a national pension scheme ;
- (b) the amount and conditions of retirement benefits to which WEU staff may be entitled under the United Kingdom Social Security Act. These need to be clarified ;
- (c) the possibility for non-British WEU staff employed in London to opt out of the United Kingdom Social Security scheme ; having been obliged to contribute up to now to the former scheme, would any benefit so far acquired be lost ?
- (d) a clarification of the position of non-British WEU staff serving in London who contribute voluntarily to their national pension scheme ; a new reciprocal agreement between WEU member countries may be required ;
- (e) similarly, the position of British nationals serving in Paris who have up to now contributed to the United Kingdom Social Security scheme on a voluntary basis.

8.2 The Assembly should be kept informed of the negotiations with the British Government in this respect.

VI. *Seconded national officials*

9. *Conditions for secondment*

9.1 In Recommendation 200 adopted on 27th November 1970, the Assembly recommended that the Council :

“Instruct its Public Administration Committee to study the harmonisation of con-

ditions for seconding national officials to the co-ordinated organisations with a view to submitting recommendations to the member governments."

9.2 In its twentieth annual report, the Council indicates :

"The studies carried out on this subject by a special group of experts set up by the Council in October 1971 originated from Assembly Recommendation 200 of 27th November 1970.

The Assembly was kept continuously informed of the progress of these studies, which concluded with the approval by the Council in July 1974, of the principles worked out by the experts for application in fixing the conditions for secondment.

These principles are as follows :

1. In view of the particular importance attaching to the secondment of national officials to international organisations, the States should be guided by a minimum of common principles in fixing the conditions for the secondment of these officials. Officials subject to these rules would be on European seconded service.
2. Each of the governments of the member countries of WEU shall determine the categories of officials who can be placed on European seconded service and shall decide in each individual case whether this system shall apply.
3. The proposed system envisages the secondment of national officials to international organisations and, in particular, the co-ordinated organisations.
4. Officials on European seconded service will not be regarded as having left their national civil service ; they will be placed in the appropriate administrative position under their terms of service as national officials.
5. Without prejudice to the principle that each member State is free to establish the duration of secondment, the following points might be considered :
 - (i) the normal period would be from three to five years ;
 - (ii) possibility of extension ; ten years appears to be the normal maximum,

any exceptions would be left to the discretion of governments ;

- (iii) governments would still retain the option, in certain special cases, of applying either a formula other than secondment (e.g. "temporary release" for very short periods, particularly for technical work in international organisations of a scientific or a technological nature) or the national secondment rules which can vary from one country to another.

6. Any official or member of staff to whom the benefit of European seconded service had been granted would, at the end of his period of secondment, automatically be reintegrated into his national civil service.

7. Officials on European seconded service should suffer no discrimination, at least on being reintegrated into the national civil service, as regards progression in that service and, for this purpose, a period served in an international organisation should be counted as service with the home civil service ; there should be no delay in progression based on seniority and seconded officials should be entitled, like other officials in their civil service, to compete for promotion by selection based on merit.

Such promotion by selection may be granted according to the rules of each State, either during secondment or when officials return to their home civil service, with retroactive effect where applicable.

8. Respect for the essential independence of an official on European seconded service implies that, subject to the principles set forth below regarding retirement pension, he cannot, in principle, during the time of his secondment, accept any kind of fee, gift, reward or emolument from any source other than the international organisation to which he has been seconded.

9. Although, because of the independence of officials on European seconded service, governments are not, in principle, informed of the reports on their seconded staff, an organisation can forward a report and the government can request one, if necessary, especially at the end of the period of

service, in order to consider its official's suitability for promotion.

10. Years of service counting for a retirement pension or a capital sum paid by an international organisation are not, in principle, also counted for the pension payable to the same official by his own State.

However, there should be no disadvantage for an official on European seconded service in comparison with his national colleagues.

The members of the Council transmitted the text of these ten principles to their

governments with a recommendation for their application.

It was further agreed that the Public Administration Committee should follow the implementation of these principles by member States.

The Public Administration Committee¹ therefore has to consider how this duty is to be carried out and will have to report to the Council in due course."

9.3 The Assembly wishes to be kept informed of the work of the Public Administration Committee.

1. At the September meeting, the Public Administration Committee noted that the Council had decided to entrust it with the task of following the implementation by member States of the principles defined by the special working group set up by the WEU Council in October 1971 to study the secondment of national officials to international organisations. These principles, which the Council have transmitted to member governments with a recommendation for their application, are reproduced above.

The Public Administration Committee plans to report to the Council on this matter during the summer of 1975.

APPENDIX I

WEU BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR 1975

Proposed expenditure and income

	A*	B*	C*	TOTAL B + C
	£	Francs	Francs	Francs
Salaries and allowances	481,305	4,850,790	10,609,960	15,460,750
Travel	13,360	72,700	229,000	301,700
Other operating costs	61,605	270,925	396,620	667,545
Purchase of furniture	3,210	13,500	18,300	31,800
Buildings	—	—	—	—
Total expenditure	559,480	5,207,915	11,253,880	16,461,795
WEU tax	154,355	1,645,020	3,602,970	5,247,990
Other receipts	7,315	12,000	16,600	28,600
Total income	161,670	1,657,020	3,619,570	5,276,590
NET TOTAL	397,810	3,550,895	7,634,310	11,185,205

* A - Secretariat-General.

B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C - Agency for the Control of Armaments.

National contributions

	600ths	A*	B* C*	Office of the Clerk
		£	Francs	Francs
Belgium	59	39,117.98	1,099,878.49	596,391.67
France	120	79,562.00	2,237,041.00	1,213,000.00
Federal Republic of Germany .	120	79,562.00	2,237,041.00	1,213,000.00
Italy	120	79,562.00	2,237,041.00	1,213,000.00
Luxembourg	2	1,326.04	37,284.02	20,216.66
Netherlands	59	39,117.98	1,099,878.49	596,391.67
United Kingdom	120	79,562.00	2,237,041.00	1,213,000.00
	600	397,810.00	11,185,205.00	6,065,000.00

Total WEU budget

£397,810.00
Francs 17,250,205.00

* A - Secretariat-General.

B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C - Agency for the Control of Armaments.

APPENDIX II

In accordance with Opinion 9 adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1963, the Council has communicated details to the Assembly regarding the duties of the members of the staff of the ministerial organs of Western European Union.

A. Secretariat-General

Post No.	Grade	Function
1	HG	Secretary-General
2	»	Deputy Secretary-General
3	»	Assistant Secretary-General
4	A6	Legal Adviser
5	B4	Personal Assistant to Secretary-General
6	B3	Bilingual Shorthand-typist
7	B5	Personal Assistant to Deputy Secretary-General
8	B4	Personal Assistant to Assistant Secretary-General
9	B4	Personal Assistant to Legal Adviser
<i>General Affairs Division</i>		
10	A5	Head of Division
11	A3	Deputy Head of Division
12	A3	Committee Secretary
13	B4	Assistant/Verbatim Writer
14	B3	Secretary/Assistant
<i>Administration and Personnel Division</i>		
15	A5	Head of Division
16	A3	Deputy Head of Division
17	A2	Administrative Officer
18	B4	Assistant (Personnel)
19	B4	Assistant (Administration)
20	B3	Secretary
<i>Linguist Division</i>		
21	L5	Head of Division
22	LT4	Reviser
23	LT3	Translator F/E
24	LT2	Translator E/F

Post No.	Grade	Function
<i>Registry and Production Services</i>		
25	A2	Head of Registry
26	B4	Documentation Clerk
27	B4	Head of Typing Pool
28	B3	Bilingual Shorthand-typist
29	B3	»
30	B3	»
31	B3	»
32	B2	Shorthand-typist
33	B2	»
34	B2	»
35	B2	Assistant (distribution)
36	B2	Assistant (reproduction)
<i>General Services</i>		
37	B1	Telephonist
38	B1	»
39	C3	Chauffeur Mechanic
40	C3	»
41	C3	Maintenance Supervisor
42	C2	Messenger
43	C2	»
<i>Security</i>		
44	C4	Senior Security Guard
45	C3	Security Guard
46	C3	»
47	C3	»
48	C3	»
49	C3	»

B. International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee

Post No.	Grade	Function
1	HG	Assistant Secretary-General <i>Private Secretariat, Mail, Documentation</i>
2	B4	Assistant responsible for the private secretariat
3	B3	Secretary/Shorthand-typist
4	B4	Archivist, responsible for distributing documents
5	C4	Driver Mechanic
		<i>Committee Secretariat</i>
6	A5	Assistant to Head of International Secretariat
7	A4	Committee Secretary
8	A4	» »
9	A4	» »
		<i>Linguistic Staff</i>
10	LT4	Reviser
11	LI3	Interpreter
12	LT3	Translator and Minute Writer
13	LT3	» »
		<i>Clerical Staff</i>
14	B4	Assistant
15	B3	Bilingual Shorthand-typist
16	B3	» » »
17	B3	» » »
17 bis	B3	Telephonist
18	B3	Bilingual Shorthand-typist
19	B3	» » »
		<i>Administrative and General Staff</i>
21	B4	Administrative Assistant
22	A4	Deputy to Head of Finance and Administration Section, Head of Finance and Account Office
23	C4	Roneo Operator
24	C4	Storekeeper and Technician
25	C4	Security Guard
26	C3	» »
27	C3	» »
28	C3	» »

C. Agency for the Control of Armaments

Post No.	Grade	Function
1	HG	Director
2	A2	Director's Assistant
3	A7	Deputy Director
4	B4	Assistant
<i>Director's Office</i>		
5	A4	Head of the Office and Assistant to the Director, Security Officer
6	A3	Head of Central Documentation
7	A2	Assistant to the Head of Central Documentation
8	B4	Assistant Documentation Clerk
9	LT3	Translator E/F
10	LT3	» F/E
11	B3	Secretary
12	B2	Shorthand-typist
13	B4	Assistant, Head of Central Registry, Assistant to the Security Officer
14	B3	Secretary
<i>Information and Study Division</i>		
15	A6	Head of Division
16	A5	Head of the Industrial Section
17	A5	Expert on biological and chemical weapons
18	A4	Logistics Expert on armaments for land forces
19	A4	Logistics Expert on armaments for air forces
20	A4	Logistics Expert on naval armaments
21	A4	Assistant to the Head of Division for General Questions
22	B4	Assistant
23	B3	Bilingual Shorthand-typist
24	B3	» »

Post No.	Grade	Function
<i>Inspection and Control Division</i>		
25	A6	Head of Division
26	A5	Expert on artillery and tanks
27	A5	Expert on guided missiles
28	A4	Expert on biological weapons
29	A5	Expert on armaments for air forces
30	A4	Expert on artillery
31	B4	Assistant
32	B3	Bilingual Shorthand-typist
<i>Administration and Legal Affairs Division</i>		
33	A6	Head of Division
34	B4	Assistant
35	A4	Legal Expert
36	A5	Head of Finance and Administration Section
37	B3	Chief Clerk
38	B4	Assistant Accountant
39	B2	Senior Clerk
40	B4	Head of Group responsible for General Services
41	B3	Chief Clerk, Assistant to Head of Group responsible for General Services
<i>Other services and Security Service</i>		
42	C5	Head Designer and Duplicator Operator
43	C3	Driver Mechanic
44	C3	Security Guard
45	C3	» »
46	C3	» »
47	C3	» »
48	C3	» »
49	C3	» »
50	C3	» »
51	C3	» »
52	B3	Telephonist

APPENDIX III

*Office of the Clerk*¹

Grade	Function
HC	Clerk
HC	Clerk Assistant
A5	Counsellor in charge of defence questions and armaments
A5	Counsellor in charge of political questions
A5	Counsellor in charge of scientific, teehnological and aerospace questions
A5	Counsellor in charge of finance and administration
A5	Counsellor in charge of Press Department
A4	First Secretary/Head of the Publications and Translations Department
A4	First Secretary Reviser /Publications
A3	Secretary Head of Archives and Committee Secretary
A2	Secretary-Translator /Publications
A2	»
A2	Administrative Assistant /Assistant Translator
B6	Chief Accountant
B4	Secretary to the President and the Clerk
B4	Secretary to the Clerk Assistant/ Assistant Sergeant-at-Arms Office
B4	Proof Reader and Assistant Translation Department
B4	Assistant to the Archives and Mail Department
B3	} Assistants to Committees
B3	
B3	
B3	Assistant to the Administrative and Financial Department
B3	Assistant to the Translation Department
B3	Assistant to the Press Department
B3	Switchboard Operator
C6	Head of Roneo Section /Storekeeper
C3	Roneo Assistant /Messenger
C3	Messenger

1. On 1st January 1975.

APPENDIX IV

Table of establishment
WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

	A ¹	B ¹	C ¹	Total A, B, C	Office of the Clerk	
Secretary-General	1	—	—	1	Clerk	1
Deputy Secretary-General	1	—	—	1		—
Director of the Agency	—	—	1	1		—
Assistant Secretary-General	1	1	—	2	Clerk Assistant	1
A7	—	—	1	1		—
A6	1	—	3	4		—
A5	2	1	6	9		5
A4	—	4	8	12		2 ²
A3	3	—	1	4		1
A2	2	—	2	4		3 ²
L5	1	—	—	1		—
L4	1	1	—	2		—
L3	1	3	2	6		—
L2	1	—	—	1		—
B6	—	—	—	—		1
B5	1	—	—	1		—
B4	8	4	8	20		4
B3	7	7	8	22		7
B2	5	—	2	7		—
B1	2	—	—	2		—
C6	—	—	—	—		1
C5	—	—	1	1		—
C4	1	4	—	5		—
C3	8	3	9	20		2
C2	2	—	—	2		—
	49	28	52	129		28

1. A - Secretariat-General.

B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C - Agency for the Control of Armaments.

2. Including four secretaries Translations/Publications.

APPENDIX V

RECOMMENDATION 250¹*on improving the status of WEU staff*²

The Assembly,

Congratulating the government budgetary experts for expressing the will, in the 94th report of the Co-ordinating Committee, to work out a pension scheme similar to that in force in the Communities and for making proposals, in the 93rd report of that Committee, for ensuring equal treatment for male and female staff in the co-ordinated organisations;

Aware of the problems raised by fluctuating exchange rates for non-resident officials with commitments in their countries of origin;

Considering the discrimination between officials of nationalities other than that of the country in which they are employed according to whether they occupy grade C posts on the one hand or grade A, L or B posts on the other;

Regretting finally the extreme difficulty or even impossibility of promotion for WEU officials

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. In the framework of the co-ordinated organisations :

1. Ensure that a pension scheme which is truly similar to that in force in the European Communities is introduced with provision, *inter alia*, for the establishment of a system of internal taxation of salaries and pensions, bonuses for officials remaining in service after the normal age of entitlement to a pension and the creation of a joint management body with its own legal status separate from the organisations in respect of which each government would enter into financial commitments which would thus remain unaffected in the event of a country withdrawing from one of the co-ordinated organisations or an organisation being wound up;

2. Provide further for :

- (i) introducing a system of separation allowances which would not be affected by currency depreciations for officials not remaining in service long enough to qualify for a pension;
- (ii) maintaining the possibility for officials to obtain loans for building or renovating accommodation;
- (iii) establishing for retired officials — particularly those who do not have medical coverage in the country to which they retire — a system providing suitable coverage and which shall be partly financed by their contributions;
- (iv) granting widowers of female officials the reversionary rights allowed in the case of widows of male officials;

3. Seek a means of allowing non-resident officials to meet financial commitments in their countries of origin by authorising — subject to specific justification — the payment of a portion of their salaries in their national currencies on the basis of salary scales applicable in the countries concerned;

4. Grant grade C officials who are not nationals of the country in which they are employed the right to home leave and education allowance on the same basis as non-resident grade A, L and B officials;

II. In the framework of WEU :

5. Give urgent consideration to dual grades at every level in order to offset promotion difficulties.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1974 during the First Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session (3rd Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 631).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 250

I. *Measures recommended by the Assembly in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations*

1. In their reply to Assembly Recommendation 240 on improving the status of WEU staff, the Council informed the Assembly of the progress of the initial work by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts on the establishment of a common pension scheme for the staff of the co-ordinated organisations.

This work has been continued at subsequent meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee on the basis of the report submitted to the Committee by the specialist working group on pensions. The taxation arrangements to be applied to pensions have yet to be agreed and there are a small number of other points of lesser importance still to be resolved. These problems will be the subject of further discussion in the Co-ordinating Committee at its meetings in the course of the next few months. The Council are not yet, therefore, in a position to reply in full to all the points raised in Recommendation 250.

It can be stated, however, that agreement is near on the establishment of a system of bonuses for officials remaining in service after the normal age of pension entitlement, but that this may be applied only to staff serving in the co-ordinated organisations prior to 30th June 1974.

The form which the joint management body suggested by the Assembly might take has still to be studied in detail.

2. No decision has been taken by the Co-ordinating Committee on points (i), (ii) and (iii).

The Co-ordinating Committee was unable to agree that, at the present time, widowers of female officials should be granted a reversionary pension on the same conditions as widows of male staff.

3. Proposals to enable non-resident officials to meet financial commitments in their countries of origin through the payment of a portion of their salaries in their own national currencies, were submitted by the Secretary-General of WEU to the Co-ordinating Committee in 1973. The Committee decided, however, that such proposals could only be considered if submitted by the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General following normal procedure. Should the Secretaries-General of the other co-ordinated organisations agree on an appropriate formula, fresh proposals will be submitted after current work on the pension scheme has been completed.

4. This point has not yet been considered by the Co-ordinating Committee, but the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General are at liberty to put forward appropriate proposals should they consider them justified.

II. *Measures recommended by the Assembly in the framework of WEU*

5. While recognising that the position of WEU staff gives rise to certain special problems as regards promotion prospects, the Council feel unable to act upon the Assembly's recommendation for the introduction of a general system of dual grading at every level. They consider that individual special measures should be sufficient to resolve the difficulties arising in this connection.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th October 1974.

APPENDIX VI

The pension scheme**I. General features**

1. The scheme is similar to the one in force in the European Communities and is based on the same principles.
2. It applies to the permanent staff of all the co-ordinated organisations.
3. It is to be financed out of budgets, the cost of the pensions being borne entirely by the budgets of the co-ordinated organisations, into which the contributions of serving staff will be paid.

II. Benefits

1. Entitlement to a retirement pension comes after ten years of effective service in one or more of the co-ordinated organisations.
2. Pensionable age is 60. Those retiring earlier may however draw an early pension from the age of 50 onwards, the amount of the pension being reduced according to the age at which it starts to be paid.
3. The amount of the retirement pension is 2 % of latest basic salary for each reckonable year of service, the maximum being 70 % of such salary.
4. Anyone who has served for less than ten years will receive a *severance grant* comprising :
 - repayment of pension contributions deducted from salary, with compound interest at the rate of 4 % per annum ; and
 - a grant equal to one and a half months' final salary multiplied by the number of reckonable years of service.
5. Those whom a Disablement Board recognises as suffering from permanent disablement preventing them from performing their duties will receive a *disablement pension* equal to the retirement pension which would have been paid at age 65. If the disablement arises from work the disablement pension will be 70 % of final salary.
6. A survivor's pension is payable to widows (and former wives) on the death of a serving staff member, former staff member, and those entitled to a disablement pension. Survivors' pensions are in principle 60 % of the pension to which the

staff member would have been entitled at the time of death, but must be not less than 35 % of final salary.

7. An exception to the principle of equality as between male and female staff : a survivor's pension cannot at present be paid to widowers except those with no possibility of obtaining gainful employment.

8. Payment of *pensions to orphans* and dependants.

9. Retired staff and those receiving disablement pensions will also receive family and household allowances.

10. Pensions are calculated according to the scale ruling in the country in which the staff member was last serving. If however he subsequently settles :

- in the country of which he is a national ;
- in the country of which his spouse is a national ;
- in a country in which he has served for at least five years in one of the organisations ;

he may opt for the scale applicable to that country.

11. Pensions are indexed to the cost of living. The question of their adjustment to the standard of living is to be decided by Councils.

12. The pension scheme will come into force on 1st July 1974, with special arrangements for staff who have left the organisation since 1st January 1973.

III. Transitional arrangements

The purpose of the arrangements is to provide for the transition from the present provident fund scheme to the new pension scheme.

A. Staff still serving or having left the organisation since 1st January 1973

Staff in this group may opt for any one of the following three alternatives (and have one year in which to decide) :

1. To join the pension scheme with effect from 1st July 1974 and to be credited irrevocably with periods served in one or more organisations. They must then forgo their provident fund holdings, but,

(a) for the period prior to the setting up of the provident fund they may keep the difference between (i) the amounts paid by the organisation plus their yield up to the day the service was credited, and (ii) those amounts plus compound interest at 4 % per annum up to 1st July 1974 ;

(b) for the period subsequent to the setting up of the provident fund, they may keep that part of their holdings, if any, in excess of 21 % of salaries paid during that period plus compound interest at 4 % per annum up to 1st July 1974.

2. To join the scheme only with effect from 1st July 1974 and not receive credit for service before that date.

Those exercising this option will receive, in addition to a retirement pension calculated with effect from 1st July 1974 (or a severance allowance if they have completed less than ten years' service starting from that date), their assets in the provident fund in respect of service prior to 1st July 1974 plus compound interest at the rate earned by the fund from that date onwards.

3. To remain in the provident fund scheme in respect of both past and future service.

4. A staff member opting for a pension and continuing to serve beyond the age of 60 will receive an annual increase of 5 % of the rights accumulated at the age of 60, provided

(a) the pension does not exceed 70 % of final salary and

(b) the increase does not exceed 2 % of salary per annum.

B. Staff who retired before 1st January 1973

1. Former staff who left the organisation after completing at least ten years' service, and their widows and orphans, the widows and orphans of staff who died while serving, and staff disabled before 1st January 1973 and their widows and orphans, may as a transitional measure be paid a pension on refunding by them of the amounts in the provident fund due to them at the time of their retirement, death or disablement. The refund must also include any sums withdrawn from the fund but not repaid. It is limited to the amount of the contributions paid by the staff member concerned and by the organisation plus compound interest at 4 % per annum. The repayment is reduced where appropriate to take account of the years already elapsed since ceasing employment.

2. A relief allowance has been foreseen for those unable to make the refunds called for by the previous Article, if the organisation considers it justified in consideration of their total resources.

3. The options available under the transitional arrangements must be exercised within one year.

4. The increases mentioned in paragraph A.4 above do not apply to staff in this category.

**

Arrangements still have to be worked out in detail, especially concerning the composition and responsibilities of a Pensions Advisory Committee which would see that the pension scheme was uniformly applied in all the co-ordinated organisations.

**Political activities of the Council
Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council**

REPORT ¹

**submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur**

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DRAFT RECOMMENDATION
on the political activities of the Council

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
submitted by Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur

I. Introduction

II. Relations between the Council and the Assembly

III. Political evolution of the Council

IV. The Secretary-General

V. Conclusions

1. Adopted in Committee by 14 votes to 0 with 4 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. *Sieglerschmidt* (Chairman); Mr. *Krieg* (Substitute for Mr. Grangier), Sir *John Rodgers* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Abens*, *Amrehn*, Sir *Frederic Bennett*, Mr. *Bettiol*, Mrs. *von Bothmer*, MM. *Brugnon*, *Cermolacce*, *Fletcher* (Substitute: *Lewis*), Mrs.

Godinache-Lambert (Substitute: *de Bruyne*), MM. *Leynen* (Substitute: *de Stezhe*), *Mende* (Substitute: *Vahrer*), *Minnocci*, *Nessler*, *de Niet*, *Peijnenburg*, *Péridier*, *Portheine*, *Preti*, *Quilléri*, *Schmidt*, *Steel* (Substitute: *Lord Beaumont of Whitley*), *Urwin*, *Van Hoeylandt*, *Reale*.

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on the political activities of the Council

The Assembly,

Noting that the Council is holding far fewer meetings at ministerial level ;

Considering that the Permanent Council has therefore become the only body of WEU working at that level ;

Regretting that the member countries have not taken account of this new situation to delegate to the Permanent Council more of the duties which the Council of Ministers is not in a position to carry out ;

Noting that despite repeated promises the Council fails to keep the Assembly well informed of matters affecting the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, in particular by refusing to hold a joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee and also by replying evasively to recommendations and written questions from the Assembly ;

Considering that in any event the Council is still responsible for supervising the application of the modified Brussels Treaty ;

Thanking the Council for having set out frankly in its twentieth annual report the reasons for its inactivity ;

Considering that the new situation gives added importance to the duties of the Secretary-General ;

Deploring, in these circumstances, that the governments have been unable to terminate the interim situation which has prevailed since September 1974,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Include regularly in its agenda consideration of the various problems raised by the application of the modified Brussels Treaty ;
2. In the light of its deliberations, remind governments whenever necessary of the implications of this treaty ;
3. Draw up a list of problems connected with the application of the treaty over which the governments of the seven member countries are divided so that they may be considered at ministerial level or that attention be drawn to them in the North Atlantic Council or in the European Council ;
4. Provide the Assembly with meaningful information on all matters affecting the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even if they are dealt with in the framework of other institutions ;
5. Appoint to the Secretariat-General a personality carrying sufficient authority with the governments of the seven member countries and terminate the present interim situation without delay by appointing a Secretary-General with full powers.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In considering the twentieth annual report of the Council, and hence the activities of WEU in 1974, greater care must be taken than in the past to determine what the Council has done in the framework provided by the governments of the seven member countries and the policy these same countries have pursued. When the Council was meeting four times a year at ministerial level, it played a political rôle on which it could report in its annual report, in replies to recommendations and written questions and during joint meetings with the Committees of the Assembly.

2. The Council no longer plays this rôle since, in 1974, it met only once at ministerial level, and it is an open secret that this meeting in The Hague on 11th March 1974 was short and had little political content. This is due to the deliberate intent of the seven member governments and the blame cannot be laid at the door of the Council in the form in which it actually meets, i.e. at the level of Ambassadors and under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General.

3. First, therefore, consideration must be given to how far the Council is carrying out the rôle allotted to it by the governments and, secondly, to what extent this rôle meets the requirements of the modified Brussels Treaty. Finally, the Assembly will have to consider how far the Council allows it to carry out its rôle by informing it of all that affects the application of the modified Brussels Treaty by its signatories in the framework of bodies other than WEU and, particularly, in nine-power political consultations.

4. On several occasions since its reply to Recommendation 221 on 6th November 1972, the Council has undertaken to provide the Assembly with detailed information in this respect. The twentieth annual report of the Council implies that this has effectively been done in 1974. However, its replies to the Assembly's recommendations and written questions and its reluctance to agree to joint meetings would infer that it is taking a very restrictive view of its commitments, despite the absence of any new factor which might allow it to go back on its statement that WEU is "at

present the only European organisation with defence responsibilities"¹.

5. It must therefore be ascertained whether the Committee considers that the Council can continue as a remnant of a political organisation rendered obsolescent by the evolution of political co-operation in Europe — condemned by the growing practice of summit meetings, nine-power political consultations and the statement repeated at the summit meeting in Paris in December 1974 of the Nine's intention to form a European union without delay with responsibilities extending to foreign policy.

6. In previous discussions, some Committee members stated that on the contrary they believed WEU was an appropriate nucleus for a defence organisation and that there should therefore be no question of the Council abandoning consideration of political questions which might affect the organisation of European defence. This seems to conform to statements made by the Council itself, *inter alia* in its reply to Recommendation 221.

7. However this may be, the Council is still responsible for keeping watch over the application of the modified Brussels Treaty and the Assembly for ensuring that the Council fulfils its rôle effectively. As long as the Brussels Treaty remains intact, it is the Assembly's duty to warn the Council against anything which might be a relinquishment of any of its prerogatives, unless they have been officially taken over by other bodies.

8. But even so the Council must ensure that these bodies actually carry out the task assigned to the Council under the treaty.

9. The Council sent the Assembly the report on its activities in 1974 in good time. One very valid point, at least, in Chapter I is that the reasons for its conduct are set out with unusual frankness and clarity. Any criticism from the Assembly will therefore bear on the Council's activities as portrayed in the report rather than on the report itself.

¹ Reply to Recommendation 221.

II. Relations between the Council and the Assembly

10. As in previous annual reports on the activities of the Council, the present report for 1974 accords great importance to maintaining good relations between the Council and the Assembly.

11. However, one may wonder whether some of the Council's efforts in this direction really had the support of all seven governments or whether, on the contrary, some of them made it difficult to maintain a dialogue between the two sides of WEU.

12. In order to determine the situation in this respect, your Rapporteur put the following written question to the Council :

"In view of paragraph 4 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 255 and of the Council's present activities, what are the tasks of the Secretary-General of WEU?

What rôle does he play in preparing replies to recommendations or questions of the Assembly ?

How can he contribute to the preparation of these replies when they deal with subjects which, although within the purview of the modified Brussels Treaty, are dealt with by the seven member countries in the framework of organisations other than WEU?"

13. The Council's reply was relatively detailed, since it indicated that :

"...The Secretary-General's contribution to the preparation of draft replies to recommendations and written questions from the Assembly varies according to the nature of the problems dealt with. He is generally invited by the Council to study texts on administrative questions concerning the organisation and to submit draft replies. Replies on other subjects and, in particular, on those which are discussed by member governments in bodies other than WEU, are normally drafted by the delegations of member countries whose administrations have access to the necessary sources of material.

.....

Replies to recommendations or written questions are finally approved by the Council which, as already mentioned, meets under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General."

14. Since the Council considered very few political matters in 1974, this is tantamount to saying that most of the replies to recommendations or written questions in this field must have been prepared by the delegations of member countries. This probably explains the considerable disparities between the various replies from the Council this year. It is evident that discussions in the working group or Council must result in anything which might not suit one or other government being deleted from the replies rather than an insufficient initial draft being completed. So if the draft is weak, there would appear to be little chance of the Council going into more details in order to reinforce and complete it.

15. The situation described in the annual report no doubt makes such procedure inevitable, at any rate as long as the Secretary-General of WEU does not take part in intergovernmental discussions on important political matters, be they in the framework of the Nine or NATO. However, one may wonder how the Secretariat-General views its rôle, particularly with regard to the chairmanship of the working party or the Permanent Council. Does it consider that it merely has to note the positions adopted by the governments, or, on the contrary, that it should spur on their discussions in order to reach the highest possible common denominator of agreement ?

16. The Secretary-General should not merely record draft replies prepared by national administrations. He should submit specific proposals to the Council in order to substantiate the replies to the Assembly. In short, he should defend the prerogatives of the Assembly in its relations with the governments. Your Rapporteur can but encourage the Council to follow this course if it really wishes to maintain good relations with the Assembly, for it is quite evident that the Assembly sees its relations with the Council as something more than polite exchanges and is entitled to expect the Council to keep it properly informed.

17. The action of each specific government, shown *inter alia* by the presence of a large number of Ministers or Secretaries of State at the Assembly's last two sessions and the often detailed, substantial and interesting statements they have made on those occasions, indicates that — apart from possible reservations some may make about a particular policy of one or the other — the attitude of most governments towards the treaty can still secure the approval of the General Affairs Committee.

18. The twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Paris Agreements modifying the Brussels Treaty afforded certain government representatives an opportunity of giving their views on both the Brussels Treaty and the functioning of WEU. The very positive nature of the statement by Sir John Killick, representing the British Foreign Secretary, quoted in the annual report, is noteworthy, and particularly the following passage :

"...The revised Brussels Treaty remains as valid today as when it was signed twenty years ago. It brings our seven countries together in a fifty-year alliance in which we accept the most binding obligation any country can assume with regard to another : the commitment to mutual defence..."

19. Similarly, the Italian Permanent Representative, Ambassador Raimondo Manzini, adopted a very positive attitude towards the rôle of the Council :

"...In celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the union, we therefore express the hope that over the next thirty years it will continue to provide an important forum for the member countries, not only for consultations and political co-operation but also for achievements of a practical nature.

To achieve this purpose, the member countries will clearly have to use WEU and its agencies in the most effective manner possible and to co-ordinate their activities rationally with those of other joint institutions..."

20. However, compared with this action by specific governments, there is a total absence of collective action by the Council, even in relations with the Assembly to which the Council claims to attach great importance. In 1974, replies to Assembly recommendations, at least in questions concerning the General Affairs Committee, were more threadbare than ever. This has also often—though admittedly not always—been the case for replies to written questions put by members of the Assembly.

21. In this connection, the considerable differences in the standard of these replies should be noted. Thus, the reply to Written Question 148 on the implications of the Cyprus affair for WEU (communicated to the Assembly on 28th October 1974) may be considered highly satis-

factory. It analyses the problems confronting the Seven as a whole as a result of a serious international crisis, and it is extremely positive that the seven governments should have managed to agree on a common position. But such a reply is exceptional and replies to Written Questions 144, 145, 146, 147 and 149 can in no way be considered acceptable nor can they satisfy the members of the General Affairs Committee who put serious and specific questions to the Council.

22. Finally, the General Affairs Committee, which had intentionally not requested a joint meeting with the Council whilst developments in Europe were leaving the member governments with particularly delicate problems to solve, felt during the summer of 1974 that such meetings might be resumed. It felt that the moratorium on economic and political discussions in WEU due to the rejection of Britain's application to join the European Communities had been raised and, on the surface at least, the differences between the seven member countries were far less than theretofore. Yet in November 1974 the Council informed the General Affairs Committee that it was not in a position to hold a joint meeting with it on the basis of the questionnaire drawn up by the Committee.

23. Following this refusal, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, met Sir John Killick, British permanent representative on the WEU Council, during the December 1974 session and at the request of the Council. He proposed radical changes to the questionnaire so that a joint meeting could be held at a relatively early date. He also urged the Council to reply in writing to the Committee's request. The Assembly has now received this reply, which holds little hope of a real joint meeting being held between the Council and the Committee in the foreseeable future. The argument invoked was that there was not sufficient agreement between the WEU member countries on the four main topics which the Committee wished to discuss at a joint meeting with the Council, i.e. prospects of European union, relations between Europe and the United States, evolution of East-West relations and Mediterranean questions, all of which quite evidently come within the purview of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. The proposal to hold an "informal meeting" at an unspecified date can in no event be accepted in the stead of a joint meeting, since it would place no obligation on the seven member countries to seek even the lowest possible common denominator of agreement.

24. The fact that the General Affairs Committee finally accepted the Council's proposal to hold an informal meeting must be interpreted as a sign of its desire to maintain a dialogue with the Council at all cost. This does not mean that it has abandoned the principle, accepted by the Council for many years, of holding joint meetings at which the Council as such replies to questions put by the Committee before holding an informal discussion on them.

25. The Assembly, to which all the Ministers readily paid tribute in recent statements, cannot exist on its own. Statutorily it holds a dialogue with the Council which means that the Council must be able to express itself as such and not only through the individual voices of its members. It is hardly conceivable that the Assembly should continue to adopt recommendations which lead to no political action other than a Ministry for Foreign Affairs drafting a reply which is as vague as possible, and rendered still more vague by the intervention of officials from the other six Ministries.

26. There is no question of calling upon the Council to increase the number of ministerial meetings which it considers pointless; it should rather, in its present form, make the effort to specify, in the light of intergovernmental discussions which may be held in fora other than WEU, how far the seven governments are able to express a common political view on matters raised by the Assembly.

27. Your Rapporteur has no reason to think that the differences between the various WEU member countries on these matters were greater in 1974 than in other years since the creation of WEU. Quite the contrary; on several matters, particularly East-West relations and European union, the seven member countries have reached agreement on joint action in frameworks other than WEU.

28. If, therefore, the Council uses such an argument to turn down the Committee's request for a joint meeting, it is because it is reluctant to inform European parliamentarians of current differences between its members. This is a disturbing consideration at a time when the shape of a European political union is beginning to emerge.

29. Thus, however cordial relations may be between each member government and the Assembly, one might wonder whether relations

between the Council as such and the Assembly are not seriously threatened by the political attitude adopted by these same governments towards European union.

III. Political evolution of the Council

30. This evolution is marked by four restrictions which the Council has imposed on its tasks as a whole.

31. (i) Its relations with the Assembly are deliberately restricted as discussed above.

32. (ii) It has placed a deliberate restriction on its own activities. The Assembly has always accepted the principle of such a restriction in that a large part of the Council's former political activities has been transferred to other fora, with particular regard to nine-power political consultations. It is indeed logical that whatever can be done in a wider framework than WEU should not be confined to a relatively limited framework. Nevertheless, such a restriction is acceptable only if the full application of the Brussels Treaty is really envisaged in the framework of the Nine. *A priori*, this seems hardly feasible insofar as two of the Nine did not wish to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty. This was of course because they did not wish to accept all the commitments. Hence there is every indication that the political aspects of questions affecting European defence cannot be dealt with fully in the nine-power framework.

33. Moreover, the Council's report does not conceal the fact that this is so, since it states:

"In the case of defence policy which both the Assembly and the Council look upon as WEU's essential concern, it was even more apparent that the Council could not reply to the Assembly in the desired manner because co-operation in European defence policy had not yet reached a stage at which governments could state a joint view to the Assembly."

34. In these circumstances, could the Council of Ministers not be asked to instruct the Permanent Council to consider precisely how the political aspects of the modified Brussels Treaty are being applied? Your Rapporteur feels this to be the only way of reconciling the two elements of the situation: the maintenance of WEU and its Assembly and the development of nine-power

political consultations. This would mean the Permanent Council taking the initiative of deciding which foreign policy or defence matters concern it and examining the implications for the modified Brussels Treaty in each case without any special steps being taken by governments. The Secretary-General would then have to take the initiative of regularly including on the agenda of the Permanent Council consideration of a specific aspect of the implementation of the Brussels Treaty.

35. Such a decision would make the Permanent Council WEU's advocate in relations with the governments whereas everything indicates that it merely speaks for the lack of political will on the part of governments.

36. The Council should in fact promote the application of the treaty as a collegiate body and not just as a group of persons who defend their own governments' policies. As such, it could be a real intermediary between the Assembly and the seven governments. The example of the permanent representatives to NATO shows that this is not impossible.

37. (iii) A deliberate restriction on its own responsibilities is evident from some of its texts, particularly its reply to Recommendation 254 in which it is stated that "the Indian Ocean is outside the area... of Western European Union".

38. In reply to a question by Mr. Leynen on this subject at the December 1974 session, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, representing the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, had to admit that, while Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty concerned only Europe itself, the application of Article VIII was subject to no territorial limit. Yet Recommendation 254 quite obviously referred to the application of Article VIII and not Article V.

39. Your Rapporteur therefore put the following written question to the Council :

"In its reply to Recommendation 254, the Council stated that the Indian Ocean was outside the area of WEU. In his reply to an oral question put by Mr. Leynen in the Assembly on 5th December 1974, Lord Goronwy-Roberts admitted that the notion of the area of WEU concerned the application of Article V and not Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, even if other

organisations, including NATO, could be called upon to study matters within the field of application of the latter article.

Can the Council indicate in what framework the seven member countries gave joint consideration to possible threats to peace in the Indian Ocean in 1973 and 1974?"

40. The Council's reply admits that the treaty does not limit the area of responsibilities of either the Council or, *a fortiori*, the Assembly :

"The member of the Assembly is right in pointing out that under the provisions of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty no restrictions are placed upon the Council's competence to discuss any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise. However, in answer to his question, the Council inform the member of the Assembly that they did not discuss possible threats to peace in the Indian Ocean in 1973 or 1974. This question was occasionally discussed among member governments in other contexts."

41. However, such a reply cannot be considered satisfactory since, although satisfying the Assembly as regards the principles, the Council gives no reply to the specific question put. It also runs counter to the principle of the Council reporting to the Assembly on matters discussed in other frameworks if they concern the application of the modified Brussels Treaty.

42. Like the refusal to hold a joint meeting and like most replies to recommendations, it portrays lack of will on the part of the governments, as if they were resigned not to take seriously either the application of the modified Brussels Treaty or the work of the Assembly which Ministers often seem to inundate with praise in order to keep it quiet.

43. Finally, the exact meaning of the word "occasionally" should be clarified. Does it not mean in reality that attentive consideration of this matter has not been on the agenda of any meaningful intergovernmental discussions ?

44. In the same reply to Recommendation 254, the Council also stated that it was :

"not in a position to express an opinion on a point concerning France's relations with the military command structure of the Atlantic Alliance".

45. But is it not precisely the rôle of WEU to deal with relations between its members and the Atlantic Alliance? Although the exercise of some of its responsibilities has been transferred to the North Atlantic Council, the Council has never legally relinquished them and an essential task is thus to watch over relations between each of its members and the Alliance. The Assembly should not agree to the *de facto* relinquishment by the Council of rights and duties assigned to it by the modified Brussels Treaty and the appended Protocols.

46. (*iv*) Finally, the Council appears to go too far in taking a deliberately restricted view of its political rôle. This emerges from its reasons for refusing a joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee since it thus admitted to making no attempt to find elements of agreement between the Seven, even on matters where there were still considerable differences between its members.

47. Conversely, one of the Council's tasks might be to draw up a list of problems on which its members hold differing views and at least try to set them out in a concerted manner.

IV. The Secretary-General

48. At its meeting on 17th March 1975, the General Affairs Committee devoted a large part of its discussion on this report to consideration of problems raised by the prolonged interim period without a Secretary-General. The last Secretary-General, Georges Heisbourg, left to take up a new post in the Luxembourg diplomatic service in September 1974. There had been several months' warning of his departure. However, the seven member countries have still not managed to appoint a new Secretary-General. The Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. F.-K. von Plehwe, is thus acting as Secretary-General, and the present annual report bears witness to his ability.

49. It is common knowledge — the press has referred to the matter on several occasions — that two member governments have nominated candidates and that the unanimity rule which governs Council decisions will prevent one of them being appointed until the other country agrees. Your Rapporteur does not wish to go into the question of persons or nationality.

50. The General Affairs Committee first underlined the abnormality of prolonging this interim situation and made it clear that parliamentarians could not remain aloof from a matter which was particularly important since at the present juncture the Secretary-General effectively carries out the duties of Chairman of the Council which now meets practically never at ministerial level. It seems difficult to ask the Permanent Council to extend the scope of its activities if the Chairman has not been appointed to the post. This situation is evidently detrimental to the authority of WEU and shows a disregard for the European institutions on the part of the seven governments which the Committee wishes to underline.

51. Secondly, the Committee wishes to recall that it has asked several times that a prominent personality be appointed Secretary-General. Present circumstances appear to make such an appointment more necessary than ever. The General Affairs Committee strongly reiterates this suggestion since the governments have not yet appointed a full Secretary-General.

52. The maintenance of an interim situation for almost a year casts serious doubts on the governments' determination to pursue the task entrusted to the Council in the modified Brussels Treaty. The Assembly cannot remain indifferent to such a state of affairs which, at a time when it is celebrating its twentieth anniversary, may well become symbolic.

V. Conclusions

53. Your Rapporteur therefore considers the Council must be congratulated for the unusual frankness with which, in its twentieth annual report, it records its total inactivity in political matters. This is largely due to developments in Europe and cannot be remedied in the framework of WEU alone. However, your Rapporteur feels the Council in its present form, i.e. barely existing except at the level of the Permanent Council, might and should take certain steps which, as matters now stand, would inject some new life into WEU and allow the Assembly to pursue its work. To do this, the seven governments would have to show willing, and the kind words of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs must take the form of instructions to the Council.

Political activities of the Council

AMENDMENT No. 1¹
tabled by Mr. de Niet

1. In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft Recommendation, after the word "Noting" insert the words "and regretting".
2. Leave out the second and third paragraphs of the preamble to the draft Recommendation.
3. In paragraph 5 of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out the words "with full powers".

Signed: de Niet

1. See 6th Sitting, 28th May 1975 (Amendment negatived).

East-West relations

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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on East-West relations

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submitted by Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman and Rapporteur

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1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 1 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Sieglerschmidt (Chairman); Mr. Krieg (Substitute for Mr. Grangier), Sir John Rodgers (Substitute: Channon) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Abens, Amrehn, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Bettiol, Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Brugnon, Cermolacce, Fletcher

(Substitute: Lewis), Mrs. Godinache-Lambert (Substitute: de Bruyne), MM. Leynen (Substitute: de Steche), Mende, Minnoci, Nessler, de Niet, Peijnenburg, Périquier, Portheine, Preti, Quillieri, Schmidt, Steel (Substitute: Lord Beaumont of Whitley), Urwin, Van Hoeylandt, Reale.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on East-West relations

The Assembly,

Considering that détente should be accompanied by a balanced reduction in the level of forces and armaments in the countries of the Atlantic Alliance only in the framework of reciprocal agreements with the Warsaw Pact countries ;

Concerned that present economic difficulties in Western Europe may tempt the Soviet Union to take advantage of them with a view to extending its influence ;

Considering that the fight against inflation may incite the democratic countries to reduce their defence budgets to an extent which might endanger their security ;

Welcoming the development of bilateral relations between EEC and Warsaw Pact countries ;

Recalling nevertheless that those trends require close and continuing consultations between the western countries if their joint security is not to be jeopardised ;

Noting the Soviet Union's desire for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe to be concluded without delay ;

Considering that to achieve this end many divergencies still have to be overcome, particularly with regard to the movement of persons and ideas ;

Noting that the German Democratic Republic, followed to a great extent by the Soviet Union, still adheres to a most restrictive interpretation of the basic agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany and the quadripartite agreement on Berlin,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that the development of bilateral relations between individual members and members of the Warsaw Pact is not allowed to undermine the positions adopted jointly by the western countries towards the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, trade and the attendant financial arrangements ;
2. Ensure that the wish to bring the conference on security and co-operation in Europe to a speedy conclusion does not lead to the principal positions adopted jointly by the Nine at this conference being weakened or abandoned ;
3. Propose that the North Atlantic Council review in a liberal manner the agreements concluded for limiting credits granted by its members to member countries of the Warsaw Pact in the framework of trade agreements ;
4. Ensure that in their relations with the German Democratic Republic its members take account of the special situation resulting from the existence of two States in Germany and the responsibility of the four powers towards Germany as a whole ;
5. Continue to consider the full application and strict maintenance of the quadripartite agreement on Berlin by the countries concerned as a condition for pursuing détente in Europe.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman and Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. As with relations between individuals, international relations, whether bilateral or multi-lateral, are by nature more dynamic than static. Only by taking account of this fundamental lesson of history can a valid definition be made of the three concepts which for several years have been playing a decisive rôle in East-West relations, i.e. *détente*, peaceful coexistence and the *status quo*.

2. *Détente* was and still is the goal of a policy which, since about 1960, has been seeking to bring East-West relations out of the confrontation of the cold war and steer them into the calmer waters of limited co-operation, and in the meantime it has indeed managed to do so. There are two elements in the policy of *détente*: content and method, the two being connected. The joint effort to discuss the interests of both sides through traditional diplomatic channels or meetings between responsible statesmen could be pursued only because there was some agreement on the content. However, this partial concordance of interests called for forms of contact other than those practised during the cold war.

3. The policy of *détente* as just described could not and still cannot succeed unless it is quite clear what the concepts of peaceful coexistence and recognition of the *status quo* mean in Soviet terminology. Here, *peaceful coexistence* certainly does not mean ideological coexistence. In this respect, there is full agreement between all responsible political forces in both East and West. Nor, according to the Soviet concept, does peaceful coexistence mean abandoning attempts to transform, by means other than war, the balance of strength in the world, particularly in Europe, to the advantage of the bloc dominated by the Soviet Union. Admittedly there are signs that the Soviet Union's present policy — first bearing in mind the conflict with China — is primarily concerned with maintaining the present balance of strength. But there is nothing to indicate that the Soviet Union is ready to make any fundamental change in the interpretation of peaceful coexistence which has prevailed so far.

4. However, this also means that insistence on recognition of the *status quo* must not be taken as a wish to maintain the present situation for an

indefinite period. Moreover, this is also true of the western definition of this concept. In view of the conflicting interests which still exist between East and West, it would be running against the current of history and unrealistic to think that the present situation might be kept unchanged for an indefinite period. This is not only true of the division of Germany; it would also contradict the policy of *détente* as understood by the West, because the pursuit of *détente* means that differences between East and West must be reduced. Thus, the *status quo* was not "recognised" in the Moscow treaty between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union. On the contrary, Article 1 stated that the High Contracting Parties "affirm their endeavour to further the normalisation of the situation in Europe and the development of peaceful relations among all European States, and in so doing proceed from the actual situation existing in this region". The *status quo* is thus defined as a starting point and not as the aim of the policy of *détente*. One may of course have the impression that the Soviet Union considers the *status quo*, at least in the foreseeable future, as an aim and not a starting-point. But this does not alter the substance of the text quoted.

5. In this sense, the policy of *détente* of the western countries is to establish normal relations between States and also between peoples, i.e. the simultaneous opening of frontiers for the free movement of goods, persons and ideas.

6. It is to be hoped that free exchanges, not a Soviet aim, can to a certain extent become a lesser evil for them, this being a condition for *détente* based on compromise.

7. As long as the Eastern European countries consider such opening to be dangerous for their survival or in any event for the survival of their economic régime, the policy of *détente* will remain a rather empty formula, as it is today, and prospects of disarmament will remain limited. There are still many and often insuperable differences over essential matters. Nevertheless, the United States and the Soviet Union have managed to reach effective agreement on a number of aspects of their foreign policy.

8. In recent years, co-operation in bilateral economic relations between the West and Eastern European countries or the Soviet Union has pro-

gressed considerably. Differences are narrowing between CMEA¹ and the EEC and although no concrete results have yet been achieved the very fact that these two organisations seem determined to continue considering a number of problems together is a hopeful sign that real co-operation between the two European economic organisations might be achieved in the next few years.

9. However, détente is already an undeniable fact: international tension has fallen considerably since 1954. Even the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 did not raise tension in Europe to the same degree as the Hungarian revolution. This is perhaps due to the fact that all the western countries have at least tacitly accepted the permanent nature of the extension of Soviet influence within the limits defined however vaguely and in not very clear conditions at the Yalta conference. Although the West was unanimous in expressing disapproval of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, it was equally unanimous in wishing to avoid any measure liable to cause a major conflict on that occasion. The West's lack of firmness in this connection is to be deplored, but one may also wonder whether better results would have been achieved had they been firmer. Finally, it must be noted that the western powers' conduct was not very different from that of the Soviets at the time of the earlier Cuban crisis when they were forced to respect the reciprocal restrictions agreed to by common agreement at Yalta.

10. This reduced tension has allowed very real progress to be made in a number of agreements:

11. (i) In the SALT I agreements, some balance of nuclear forces between the United States and the Soviet Union was achieved.

12. (ii) In numerous bilateral agreements, the first being concluded between France and the Soviet Union at the time of General de Gaulle, but which now extend to almost all the Eastern and Western European countries, co-operation has increased considerably, mainly in economic matters. These agreements are of a permanent nature thanks to the creation of bilateral committees to supervise their application.

13. (iii) Trade between the two parts of Europe has increased. The energy crisis and the rise in prices of oil, coal, raw materials and agricultural produce helped to re-establish a balance of trade

which was weighted against the Eastern European countries as importers of manufactured products and the way is now open for further progress in this field. Until now, in fact, insufficient purchases by the western countries had limited the application of the trade agreements with the eastern countries.

14. (iv) Finally, in a wide range of bilateral and multilateral international talks in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and in other relevant fora, many technical problems are discussed and often solved.

15. However, reduced tension is not always advantageous for the Western European countries and there is a danger of their efforts to ensure their collective security being relaxed. It is indeed difficult in a democratic society to convince public opinion that important sacrifices must still be made to ensure its defence when the threat seems more remote and vague than it used to be.

16. Conversely, with State control of information media the Eastern European nations seem less affected by such thinking and find it easier to continue a large-scale defence effort despite the process of détente.

17. In fact, in the military field, the positive results of détente are confined to a slowing down in the strategic arms race. Where ideological confrontation is concerned, no positive results have been achieved and the fact that the conference on security and co-operation in Europe has been marking time for more than a year bears witness to the obstacles to the preparation of an agreement.

18. It must also be noted that Soviet foreign policy is no longer very clear. First, observers thought in recent months that there were signs heralding a change in the leadership of the Soviet communist party. It is a moot point whether this possible shift is due solely to the age and state of health of the present leaders or whether it also stems from differences within the communist party over the country's economic development or foreign policy. Past experience has shown us that it is often a mixture of such considerations that is behind changes on the Soviet political scene.

19. One might wonder what is the Soviet view of the serious economic recession now facing the West. Is it thought to be a limited, temporary crisis or on the contrary a serious and possibly protracted one which may considerably weaken

1. Council for Mutual Economic Aid set up after the reform of COMECON.

the western position? Is serious unrest expected in the western countries? All this is very difficult to know. However, Europe must fully realise that the more it is affected by economic difficulties the more Soviet leaders will be tempted to strengthen their own positions and take advantage of any breach they may discover in the western economic and political system. This means that it would be extremely dangerous for the western countries to make budgetary savings at the expense of their defence policy in order to solve domestic problems.

20. It is in any event too soon to say whether there are signs of a shift in Soviet foreign policy or even in the general policy of the international communist movement because of the changing situation. The West's attention has nevertheless been aroused by the annulment of the trade agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union as a result of the United States Congress's insistence that the Soviet Union must adopt a more liberal attitude towards Jews wishing to emigrate. It is moreover evident that the oil crisis has served the Soviet Union which, in December 1974, became the world's leading oil producer and has derived important benefits from the policy of high prices pursued by the OPEC countries, since the oil it sells to the West is paid for at world rates and in 1974 it doubled the price of the oil for the people's democracies from some \$3 to \$6 per barrel. With the exception of Romania, the European people's democracies are all major oil importers and their economies are now even more dependent on the Soviet Union because of the oil crisis.

21. Finally, developments in Portugal and the way in which the Portuguese communist party seems to be taking advantage of the situation resulting from the fall of the dictatorial government which had held power in Portugal for more than fifty years make one follow most closely the evolution of the situation in Portugal.

22. The holding of elections is a first step towards democracy and demonstrates that a large majority of the Portuguese people wishes a democratic régime. However, Ferdinand Lassalle's remark that constitutional matters are a question of the balance of force also applies here. Because of the so-called pact and the armed forces movement, constituent power is still mainly in the hands of the AFM. It will be seen in the next few months how far this movement is prepared to respect the results of the 25th April elections in political practice. This will largely depend on the attitude of the European Communities and

whether they will be able to afford Portugal early and effective assistance to meet its serious economic difficulties. This country, whose geographical position makes it particularly vulnerable strategically, must also remain a reliable partner in the Western Alliance. Above all, the WEU member countries must see that the military balance in Europe is not jeopardised by outside interference in Portuguese internal affairs. It must be realised that anything of this nature would deeply disturb East-West détente.

23. In short, East-West relations must now be considered in the light of an extremely fluid situation which makes long-term forecasts very difficult. Such a situation is hardly favourable for the conclusion of political or military agreements likely to secure a lasting solution for European problems. This prospect must not be overlooked in considering developments in the ongoing multilateral negotiations.

II. The ongoing negotiations

24. A feature of the first stage of détente was the development of bilateral relations between eastern and western countries. In the military field, the Soviet Union and the United States set the example after President Kennedy had shown, during the Cuban crisis, that the United States would not tolerate Soviet action which might upset the balance of strategic forces. At the economic level, General de Gaulle took steps which allowed considerable progress to be made. Multilateral relations have since made good headway due *inter alia* to the affirmation of the EEC's rôle in economic matters and the development of political consultations between the Nine and in NATO. These relations are reassuring all round since progress cannot be made without general agreement and they do not call in question the system of alliances on which the security of both sides and peace in Europe are based. Negotiations are conducted in a framework which is not purely European. The Western European countries did not wish to face a group of powers which included the Soviet Union without being accompanied by the United States and Canada, as the North Atlantic Council stipulated in Reykjavik in June 1968. This means that multilateral relations cannot be developed without the agreement of the United States and the Soviet Union on the aims of the negotiations.

25. It cannot however be claimed that this situation has reduced the margin of independence of

the Western or Eastern European countries within their respective alliances. Quite the contrary, there is every indication that this margin is now much wider as can be seen from initiatives taken by some of the people's democracies in the conference on security and co-operation in Europe and also in the affirmation of the rôle of the European Community in both trade and political negotiations, thanks to the nine-power political consultations.

26. It is clear that the economic difficulties now facing the European countries stimulate the development of economic co-operation and emphasise interdependence which, in the long run, is an important factor of détente.

27. In the last few years, the international balance has been changed considerably by the growth of Chinese strength, the emergence of a nuclear capability in India, increasing Middle Eastern independence of the great powers and the new means wielded by the OPEC countries due to the rise in oil prices. All these factors have led the Soviet Union and the United States to seek agreement which is very necessary if they do not wish to become involved in hostilities which might degenerate into a nuclear exchange. The United States took advantage of its improved relations with the Soviet Union and China to terminate its military engagement in Vietnam, which was essential for the reorientation of American foreign policy and the pursuit of détente.

28. In addition, the oil crisis has allowed Atlantic solidarity to be tightened and co-operation between the non-communist industrialised countries in financial and energy matters to be extended to Japan. It may now be said therefore that détente can be developed without endangering the balance on which international peace is based and it might even strengthen it.

A. Soviet-American rapprochement

29. Since achieving a degree of nuclear parity, the United States and Soviet Union have been seeking agreement on limiting the dangers of nuclear war. Here they have made meaningful progress since, after the 1963 Moscow treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere and the non-proliferation treaty signed in 1968, the treaty of 26th May 1972, prepared by the SALT I negotiations, established their first agreement on limiting strategic arms. The agreement of 22nd June 1973 provided an institutional framework

for continuing consultations between the Soviet Union and the United States in political matters. Finally, on 23rd and 24th November 1974, President Ford and Mr. Brezhnev, accompanied by their Foreign Ministers, Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Gromyko, held talks near Vladivostok on the conditions in which this rapprochement might be pursued. The Vladivostok talks did not produce radical changes but confirmed that the periodical consultations between the two great powers were working outside periods of crisis when the red teleprinter would facilitate the solution of problems and above all avert the possibility of recourse to force.

30. Thus, this is a continuous process of consultation, not intended to make either side give up the guidelines of its foreign policy but to find compromise solutions to matters on which there might be conflicting views at any given time. There is no reason to think that the Soviet Union and the United States are at present considering concluding a real disarmament agreement or bringing their economic systems and ideological positions closer together. They are merely preparing a set of rules to govern the inevitable rivalry between the two States and their economic systems, ensuring that it is peaceful, while increasing confidence in each other.

31. In this context, measures concerning nuclear weapons play an essential part in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union as the subject of their negotiations and the risk of proliferation of nuclear arms in the world can but strengthen their desire to achieve results. Although modest, the results of the SALT I negotiations have demonstrated to public opinion in each country and throughout the world the concrete results of a concerted policy regarding the control of nuclear arms. The treaty of 26th March 1972 allowed the United States, thanks to the superiority of its MIRV system, to agree to the number of vehicles deployed on each side to be frozen in conditions particularly advantageous to the Soviet Union. In 1974, the Soviet Union, in view of its technical progress with multiple warhead vehicles, agreed to start the SALT II negotiations in order to restore a qualitative and quantitative balance of nuclear weapons.

32. It is not for the General Affairs Committee's Rapporteur to go into the details of these nuclear negotiations, but what he considers essential in the Vladivostok talks is the public demonstration that the replacement of President Nixon by President Ford did nothing to change the procedure

for permanent consultations set up in 1973 or attempts to limit conventional and nuclear forces.

33. This is the more important in so far as one may wonder whether the growing possibility of a proliferation of nuclear weapons will not induce the two great powers to make sacrifices which they had so far always refused, i.e. to pass from the limitation of strategic weapons to real disarmament in order to avoid further proliferation.

34. Finally, the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union were able to discuss the evolution of the situation in Vietnam and the Middle East certainly helped to clear the way for American diplomacy to seek a political solution to the differences which have been bringing Israel into conflict with the Arab countries since 1949. Mr. Kissinger, the United States Secretary of State, has devoted considerable efforts to these matters since the October 1973 war and despite possible setbacks it is to be hoped that the re-establishment of friendly relations between the United States and Egypt will be sufficiently important to allow concrete results to be achieved in the end, either through Mr. Kissinger's bilateral talks or through multilateral negotiations in the framework of another Geneva conference on the Middle East. This is possible only because of Soviet reserve in this field, due most certainly to renewed confidence between the two great powers.

35. Although some Europeans have on occasion been rather fearful lest the two great powers agree to settle world affairs over their heads, one may wonder what contribution Europe could make to a solution if no such agreement existed.

B. Political conditions for reducing conventional forces

36. Negotiations on mutual force reductions in Europe were proposed by the West at the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Reykjavik in June 1968 because it did not wish a conference on security and co-operation in Europe, then being proposed by the East, to start until there had been some attempt to find a solution to the problem of force levels on the central European front. The aim was to avoid the risk of a political settlement which might mask an increased military threat.

37. The invasion of Czechoslovakia having delayed the opening of preliminary negotiations, the mutual and balanced force reduction talks in Vienna did not start until January 1973. With

the exception of France, all the Warsaw and Atlantic Pact countries are taking part either as observers or as participants.

38. On 28th June 1973, the conference described its aim as being to achieve a more stable balance of forces in Central Europe, with lower levels of forces, without reducing security. It had been accepted that the area considered would comprise the territories of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Poland. There was a reservation in respect of Hungary, which the West wished and the East refused to include.

39. These negotiations are being held in camera and in any event it is not for the General Affairs Committee to examine any news which may filter through in this connection. The indications are, however, that the negotiations are marking time and that the offer made by the Soviet Union and its allies at the end of 1974 for freezing forces in Central Europe in their present positions cannot be accepted by the western countries because it would put the seal on a situation which is unfavourable to them.

40. Progress will probably be extremely slow and the prospect of simultaneously disbanding the two alliances, which initially some had set as a goal, is likely to be abandoned. It is highly improbable that the Soviet Union will agree to break up an alliance on which its domination of Central Europe is based and, should it do so, it would probably be because it had other means of exercising its influence. Conversely, if NATO were to be dissolved, the western countries would lose their only instrument for global political and military consultation and their only guarantee of security.

41. The only realistic prospect is a cut in force levels, starting with a cut in the level of Soviet and American forces stationed on the territory of their allies, with a view to eliminating or at least reducing the imbalance between the forces on each side.

C. The conference on security and co-operation in Europe

42. The conference on security and co-operation in Europe probably offered the best prospects of far-reaching changes in relations between Eastern and Western Europe.

43. This conference was an aim of the Soviet Union and, perhaps even more, of its allies. However, it could not start until, first, the Soviet Union and its allies had agreed to the United States and Canada taking part and, second, the Federal Republic had settled differences with the Soviet Union, Poland, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia going back to just after the second world war. Finally, the western powers insisted that the status of Berlin be the subject of a four-power agreement and this was done on 3rd September 1971.

44. The preparatory stage of the conference started in Helsinki on 22nd September 1972 for working out procedure. It was concluded on 10th June 1973 with final recommendations that the conference be held in three stages :

- (i) a meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs (which was held in Helsinki from 3rd to 7th July 1973) ;
- (ii) committee work (which has been going on in Geneva since the end of 1973) ;
- (iii) a high-level meeting in Helsinki to record the results achieved and decide on further action to be taken by the conference.

45. There were three items on the agenda of the conference :

- (i) statement of the main principles of policy and security which all participants undertake to observe ;
- (ii) development of economic relations and co-operation in all fields ;
- (iii) a more liberal approach to the free exchange of ideas and persons.

46. The military aspects of the first item concern the Defence Committee. It also includes recognition of existing States and frontiers. The western powers were prepared to accept this and undertake not to resort to force to obtain changes in the political map of Europe. However, the Soviet Union and its allies also asked for recognition of the political régimes, which was tantamount to making the Brezhnev doctrine, announced immediately after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, a principle of European law.

47. At the Geneva talks, the Soviet Union and its allies finally gave in to the West's insistence that the possibility of changing frontiers by means of agreements be specifically mentioned in the declaration of principles of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

48. The western countries would also have had to give up two aims to which they had so far been attached : the reunification of Germany, to which all the Federal Republic's allies were committed, and the reunification of Europe. Since there is still disagreement about the application of military measures too, the Geneva negotiations on the first item on the agenda of the conference are still far from a conclusion.

49. On the other hand, the development of economic relations raised no problems of principle for the West, which was prepared to improve all forms of co-operation with the Eastern European countries, whether bilateral or multilateral. No decision has yet been taken on the question of introducing a most-favoured-nation clause to meet the wishes of the eastern countries, but the EEC countries are prepared to invite members of the CMEA to hold talks on preferential tariffs on a reciprocal basis once the conference on security and co-operation in Europe is over. This also seems to be the wish of the eastern countries, which are anxious to obtain the equipment items necessary for their industrialisation programmes.

50. In view of the development and importance of the European Economic Community, however, the Soviet Union and its allies, which were fundamentally and unswervingly hostile to any economic organisation of Western Europe, had to take account of this new fact. This it now seems to have done, and the second CSCE basket is presenting the fewest difficulties.

51. The greatest difficulties were raised by the question of the free movement of ideas and persons. The Soviet Union and its allies clearly consider that watertight frontiers are essential for the maintenance of their régimes and they are hardly prepared to make concessions in this respect. Progress has therefore been very limited. The western countries, however, believe that substantial improvements in the exchange of persons and ideas is a primary aim of the CSCE. Germany particularly cannot accept the political division of the country unless the effects are alleviated at cultural and human level.

52. From the outset, the western countries have maintained that the conference could not be successful unless worthwhile results were obtained in respect of each of the three baskets. At the stage now reached in the Geneva negotiations, this seems likely for the first two baskets, but, unfortunately, nothing can be said about the free movement of ideas and persons. In this respect, it would not be realistic at this first conference

to expect concessions from the communist countries which might jeopardise the maintenance of their constitutional and social systems. But within these limits there is an area in which negotiations are possible and the West must make the most of this.

53. But the main point perhaps lies outside the agenda: it is the question of follow-up action. Here there is no common front, either in the East or elsewhere. At the Helsinki consultations, a compromise was reached linking progress achieved during the conference with consideration of procedure for implementing the decisions taken. Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries and Spain were in favour of setting up a permanent all-European body, but no special committee was set up to deal with this matter during the second stage of the conference and the question was considered in private, bilateral or group negotiations.

54. The following are the main arguments quoted for setting up such a body:

55. (i) Although the Swiss plan for the peaceful settlement of disputes, linked with the first item on the agenda of the conference, was generally agreed to, the necessarily very vague undertaking not to resort to force but to use peaceful means of settlement must be accompanied by a compulsory arbitration clause to which the eastern countries are not very favourably inclined although they willingly accept the principle of arbitration in trade matters. If lasting results are to be achieved in the security field it might seem wise to introduce compulsory legal procedure to avoid recourse to force in the event of disputes.

56. (ii) Spain submitted a proposal to the conference for the creation of a diplomatic committee for security and co-operation in Europe. This proposal appears to have been welcomed by the smaller countries and particularly the non-aligned countries for which procedure adopted by the CSCE is the only means of making themselves heard at the side of the great powers on matters affecting European security. Further, some eastern countries such as Romania and Czechoslovakia have asked for a consultative committee to be set up to promote the application of decisions taken at the CSCE and if necessary to convene other conferences. On 3rd July 1973, Mr. Gromyko too referred to the creation of a permanent security body.

57. It is certainly not by chance that, apart from the Soviet Union, the non-aligned European countries were the most in favour of such a body,

whereas the members of the Atlantic Alliance were rather sceptical about it. In practice, if this plan were to be implemented, it might lead to the Soviet Union and its allies attempting to exploit their position in the affairs of members of the Western Alliance, whereas the latter would find it difficult to act to the same extent in relations within the eastern bloc. Moreover, the Soviet Union, invoking the existence of an all-European organisation, would probably oppose any strengthening of European integration in the framework of the Nine and even co-operation between democratic countries in the framework of the Council of Europe.

58. However, your Rapporteur considers that the creation of such a body must not be rejected outright. Substantial concessions in fields covered by the third basket might open the way to reconciling views on this matter. However, great caution seems necessary to avoid negative effects. At the present stage therefore there can be no question of setting up an institution but at the most machinery for consultations, which is less binding. The western countries have opted for a Danish proposal for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe to be followed by an interim period. Participants would meet again in 1977 to discuss the next stage. There are signs that the eastern countries are considering convening a second conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

59. It should be noted that the third basket is one matter on which major results have been achieved in nine-power political co-operation. Whereas the United States seems prepared to give up trying to obtain from the Soviet Union and its allies the opening which was the main reason why the western countries agreed to the principle of an all-European conference, the Nine have agreed to maintain their requirements in this field.

60. Advantage should therefore be taken of the fact that many countries are anxious for the CSCE to conclude its work in order to press with renewed strength the unchallengeable arguments of the Nine for promoting the free movement of ideas and persons.

61. It is now important on the one hand not to discourage those in the Soviet Union who are in favour of détente but to provide them with the means they need and, on the other hand, to consider carefully and favourably the problem of the follow-up to the conference, taking account *inter alia* of the wishes of the smaller powers,

the neutral countries and certain people's democracies. But it would be disastrous for the West to give its official blessing to a settlement which in fact covered only recognition of so-called "security" frontiers and strengthened the division of Europe and the burden of Soviet domination over part of our continent. This means the West must not succumb to lassitude and the Soviet wish for a hasty conclusion.

III. *The development of bilateral relations*

62. Although it has been seen that current multilateral negotiations may be very long drawn out and not produce very important results, this is not so for bilateral relations which until now at least have provided the most substantial progress in détente. International conferences have been held only insofar as the development of bilateral relations has allowed. In this respect mention has already been made of the major importance of the SALT negotiations for agreement between East and West and the extremely positive nature of the regular consultations between American and Soviet leaders on problems which might jeopardise world peace.

63. In recent weeks the most serious setback to Soviet-American relations was in economic matters when, in view of the objections raised by the United States Congress to ratification of the trade agreement concluded between the two powers in 1973, the Soviet Union unilaterally decided to break the agreement in protest to what it called intrusion in its internal affairs.

64. At least this may be to the advantage of the countries of Western Europe in developing their own relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. In General de Gaulle's time, the French Government took spectacular steps in this field leading to the conclusion of a treaty of agreement and co-operation providing for regular meetings between Heads of State, Ministers, or delegations from the two countries to examine all bilateral problems and the international situation. This policy was continued, although perhaps to a lesser degree, by successors to General de Gaulle but the economic content of Franco-Soviet relations has steadily been developed. The United Kingdom's relations with the Soviet Union and several countries of Eastern Europe which had deteriorated after a series of cases of spying by Soviet or allied agents on British territory have recently taken a new turn. The British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold

Wilson, went to the Soviet Union in February 1975 and held important conversations with the Soviet leaders leading to wider economic co-operation and co-ordination of views on major questions of world policy. This is probably the point of departure for closer, lasting relations between the United Kingdom and Eastern Europe.

65. It is essential however to ensure that the multiplication of bilateral exchanges does not allow the Soviet Union or its allies to obtain from one or other of their western partners concessions or advantages which have been refused in wider groupings, whether in terms of credits or political gains. Rightly or wrongly, this fear has been expressed in respect of recent bilateral meetings, particularly as regards future stages of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

66. During Chancellor Brandt's term of office, the Federal Republic started the policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union and with the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia. These discussions led to the drawing up of a political agreement on important outstanding questions in Central Europe and the development of economic and trade relations between the Federal Republic and its eastern neighbours.

67. Other members of WEU such as Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands have also tightened their links with the Soviet Union and increased economic and trade agreements with the people's democracies. This has led to a considerable development of trade between Eastern and Western Europe in 1974 and it is expected to increase still further in the future. Trade between Eastern and Western Europe had been hampered by the unbalanced position of the eastern countries. Their main exports are energy, raw materials and agricultural products; they import manufactured goods including both equipment items and consumer goods. Recent increases in the cost of oil, most raw materials and agricultural produce seem to be re-establishing a trade balance which will allow trade to develop throughout Europe in the next few years.

68. There are limits to this trade however, some of which stem from agreements negotiated in the framework of NATO on the loans members of that organisation are authorised to grant to their clients in the East. Thus the Federal Republic has so far been encouraged not to grant Poland

the increased loans it had requested following the German-Polish agreement in which the Federal Republic recognised the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's eastern frontier. Poland had then asked for a loan of DM 1,000 million at some 4 %. Subsequently it asked for this sum to be increased to DM 3 or 4,000 million, but the Federal Government has not yet been able to meet this request with the result that the full economic benefits expected of the German-Polish treaty have not yet been reaped.

69. In addition to these purely bilateral relations are those the EEC intends to develop with the CMEA. For many years the Soviet Union and its allies insisted on not recognising any Western European organisation, restricting their economic relations to the bilateral level. In 1974, however, the CMEA invited Mr. Ortoli, President of the EEC Commission, to visit Moscow in order to examine the possibility of a global agreement between the two economic organisations.

70. There must be no mistake about the nature of such agreements whose aim can but be limited. The organisations are obviously not of the same type for while the aim of the CMEA is purely economic and commercial, the EEC for its part seeks to integrate the economies of Western Europe in a global system. This difference was not a major obstacle for the EEC however and it can be considered as a major step forward that by agreeing to open trade negotiations the CMEA countries recognised the economic reality of the EEC today.

71. However, the visit by a CMEA delegation to Brussels in February 1975 failed to produce the results expected because, although it was in a position to negotiate on the programme of Mr. Ortoli's visit, it was not authorised to take any steps regarding the subject of the negotiations that might be conducted on that occasion. Negotiations will probably be long and difficult before agreements are concluded between the two organisations. Caution is therefore required in respect of any mention of the possibility of an all-European organisation in this context. But at the same time it is gratifying that all the countries of Eastern Europe are showing so much goodwill towards the improvement of their economic and trade relations with Western Europe. Here, one must be highly pragmatic and not seek advantages on questions of principle but rather endeavour to use every means of developing trade of all kinds.

72. Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States have developed mainly in the

political sphere. Conversely, relations between the Eastern European countries including the Soviet Union and the countries of Western Europe have developed considerably in recent years in the field of economic co-operation. There might be some danger in this situation if there were not close and effective co-ordination between Europe and the United States in NATO for political and military matters and more difficult co-ordination of economic matters which lack a framework in which continuing discussions can be held. Co-ordination must be developed, however, if European trade is not to suffer from the ups and downs of Soviet-American relations and is to free itself of the restrictions which are still applied today under the regulations adopted in NATO at a time when they were fully justified by East-West tension but which no longer correspond to the situation today.

IV. *The German problem*

73. Since the serious Cuban crisis in September 1962, contacts established between the two great world powers on that occasion have developed considerably and East-West relations have evolved fairly steadily towards greater détente. This trend has made the so-called German problem one of the main obstacles to a rapprochement between Eastern and Western Europe. It embraced all the problems raised by the division of Germany after the second world war by the unilateral and arbitrary establishment of frontiers between the German Democratic Republic and its eastern neighbours and by the maintenance of an occupation statute in Berlin.

74. As far as it was able, the Federal Government's *Ostpolitik* mastered this obstacle to the policy of détente in Europe by concluding treaties with the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia and the basic treaty with the German Democratic Republic. Furthermore, the conclusion of the four-power agreement on Berlin, linked with the *Ostpolitik*, ensured greater security for West Berlin and also allowed greater freedom of movement and more possibilities for contacts in Berlin and its neighbourhood, mainly between inhabitants of Berlin but also between all inhabitants of the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. The Federal Government and the governments of the three western powers which share responsibility for Germany as a whole with the Soviet Union were well aware that these treaties provided no solution to Germany's problems arising from the

second world war. It was merely a matter of finding a *modus vivendi* which would allow a peaceful settlement of this question to be worked out in agreement with all the powers concerned.

75. Just as the legal texts calling for co-operation will remain mere pieces of paper until the citizens of the countries concerned bring them to life, it will be possible to apply such treaties and agreements smoothly only if the contracting countries are prepared to show their trust in co-operation.

76. From the outset, it was clearly evident to the Federal Government that the signing of these treaties and agreements was but a first step along the long road towards their implementation. It was therefore no surprise either for the Federal Republic or for your Rapporteur who, as a Berliner, does his best to understand his eastern counterparts and ascertain whether attempts have been or will be made by the East to interpret the treaties and agreements unilaterally. In this connection, it is sometimes claimed that the negotiations were not conducted with sufficient care or energy to avoid ambiguity. This can be argued about indefinitely since no one can or needs to show whether or not it was possible to obtain more. Anyone with experience of international agreements knows full well that practically no text of this kind is safe from some form of querable interpretation. This is equally true of the treaties mentioned here. But as to whether it might have been better not to conclude one or other of them rather than have something questionable, your Rapporteur is very much in favour of the conclusion of the treaties.

77. In any event, the question is whether the Federal Republic and its allies, and above all the three great western powers, are doing their utmost to oppose such attempts to extend the commitments entered into and to ensure the full application of the treaties and the strictest respect for their wording. This policy will certainly not be sheltered from future difficulties and attacks, but it has already obtained far more for the inhabitants of Germany than they had before the treaties were concluded.

78. One may also wonder what alternative there was to the policy of understanding between the Federal Republic of Germany and its eastern neighbours. Had it remained inflexible, the Federal Republic might have cut itself off from its own allies, which would have been in the interests neither of Germany nor of Europe nor of the Western Alliance.

79. A problem which has not yet been solved in Germany is the question of nationality on which, as specifically stated in the treaty, the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic could not agree. As an example for future difficulties, this problem must be described in detail. Over eight years ago, the German Democratic Republic introduced separate citizenship for its inhabitants by law. However, the Federal Republic, in accordance with its Basic Law, continues to abide by the principle that there is only one German citizenship for all Germans, which implies that there is no separate citizenship of the Federal Republic. It is fully aware that it cannot compel the German Democratic Republic to recognise this point of law. But several countries recognise the right of subjects to dual citizenship, although this naturally requires the agreement of those concerned. As matters stand, all that concerns the Federal Republic is that Germans from the German Democratic Republic who are outside the eastern bloc should be able, if they so wish, to place themselves under the consular protection of the Federal Republic and leave the country in which they happen to be with a Federal German passport. In this respect, moreover, there have so far been no difficulties. Nor does it require special provisions in a consular agreement between the German Democratic Republic and the country concerned. In any event, consular agreements between the Federal Republic and certain countries with which it is on friendly terms include a specific provision in this sense.

80. It is generally believed in the Western Alliance that the most decisive test of whether the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic want détente is still their attitude towards Berlin. If these two countries continue to interpret the four-power agreement in such an obviously false manner in favour of the eastern side, or deprive it of substance as they have done with regard to the establishment of the Federal Office for the Environment and the proposed creation of a European Community vocational training centre in Berlin and, contrary to the treaties, by imposing controls on transit routes, this cannot fail to have an effect on the pursuit or outcome of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe. In the latter negotiations, reference is made in another context to measures for establishing confidence. This is certainly no way to establish the confidence which is an essential basis for all-European co-operation.

V. Conclusions

81. As a result of this analysis détente seems uncertain and the economic crisis through which the West is now passing is creating new dangers, not the least being a weakening of the West and of its determination to resist any infringement by the Soviet Union and its allies, another possibility being that the Soviet Union might speculate on the division of the West to improve its positions in Europe.

82. The development of economic relations between Eastern and Western Europe, however, may help the western countries to overcome their present economic difficulties by providing new outlets. It may also improve détente and help to overcome this crisis more than international conferences. Today, entente and co-operation are becoming more than ever the true means of consolidating détente which alone is no longer sufficient. Entente and co-operation, however, mean that the West must retain its full defensive powers and not relinquish the positions it has held so far in the conference on security and co-operation in Europe and in the negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces. There must also be greater co-ordination between the European and North American members of the Atlantic Alliance in regard to their economic and financial relations with Eastern Europe and political matters too.

83. Despite all the uncertainty and dangers, a retrospective glance at the period of the cold war makes it clear that much has been gained by the policy of détente. On both sides, determination to contain hostilities and thus prevent a chain reaction which might lead to a third world war has gained ground. In this respect both East and West are thus on the right road. But assured peace is still a long way away. This must be faced squarely with courage and firmness if pro-

gress is to be made towards détente with imagination and willingness to reach understanding.

VI. The discussion in the General Affairs Committee

84. The present report has been discussed twice by the General Affairs Committee, on 17th March and 28th April 1975. Although comments by Committee members on 17th March have to a large extent been taken into account by the Rapporteur, this is not so for comments made on 28th April, partly because they arose from fairly conflicting views on the development of East-West relations. Several Committee members found the report too pessimistic, others, on the contrary, considered it over-optimistic. Furthermore, many comments concerned fields which your Rapporteur had deliberately left out of his explanatory memorandum because they touched on defence matters which are the responsibility of another committee, or relations between Europe and the United States, which are being dealt with in another report of the General Affairs Committee.

85. Nevertheless, your Rapporteur felt that many Committee members were rather more pessimistic than he was about the future of East-West relations. They did not expect any substantial change in Soviet policy and considered that the only possible outcome of the ongoing negotiations, whether on limiting arms of various kinds or on European security, could but be to strengthen the Soviet position in Europe.

86. Your Rapporteur thought it was essential to mention the kind of remarks made before having his text published, although he is unable to elaborate further on each of the points made. He trusts that the public debate on this report will allow a wide-ranging exchange of views on these matters.

East-West relations

AMENDMENT No. 1¹
tabled by Mr. Amrehn

In paragraph 3 of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out the words "in a liberal manner" and insert the words "under present circumstances".

Signed : Amrehn

1. See 2nd Sitting, 26th May 1975 (Amendment adopted).

Co-operation with the United States

REPORT ¹

**submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. de Koster, Rapporteur**

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1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Sieglerschmidt (Chairman); Mr. Krieg (Substitute for Mr. Grangier), Sir John Rodgers (Substitute : Channon) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Abens, Amrehn (Substitute : Schwencke), Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Bettioli, Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Brugnon, Cermolacce, Fletcher, Mrs. Godinache-Lambert (Substi-

tute : de Bruyne), MM. Leynen (Substitute : de Stezhe), Mende, Minnoci, Nessler, de Niet, Peijnenburg, Périquier, Porthoine, Preti, Quilleri, Schmidt, Steel (Substitute : Lord Beaumont of Whitley), Urwin (Substitute : Lewis), Van Hoeylandt, Reale.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on co-operation with the United States

The Assembly,

A

Considering that the WEU member countries, like most other European countries and the United States, are threatened by continuous, dangerous and increasing inflation, encouraged by high energy prices (which in themselves have negative effects on the economy), resulting in unacceptable unemployment ;

Considering that continuous and, in many countries, accelerated inflation is a challenge to all democratic countries and may even endanger the survival of democracy ;

Considering that inflation is also threatening the budgetary position of western countries, thus having repercussions on the level of defence budgets ;

Noting that co-ordinated economic, social, financial and monetary policies are essential if imminent danger to our society's structure is to be tackled ;

Questioning the will of the democratic countries to co-ordinate policies sufficiently ;

Considering it essential for the western world to present a united front in the field of energy requirements ;

Taking into account the fact that the countries concerned are already co-operating in the framework of OECD ;

Considering that OECD does not have adequate machinery for parliamentary supervision ;

B

Considering that the security of Western Europe is ensured by the North Atlantic Treaty and the integration of European and American armed forces ;

Considering that the United States (approaching its bicentennial) and the Soviet Union (preparing for its Twenty-Fifth Party Congress) have achieved and will each try to maintain a military balance on a very high level ;

Considering that it must be regarded as a positive factor for détente that a number of major problems are being discussed regularly by the two super powers in purely bilateral negotiations ;

Considering however that doubts must be expressed as to whether today's complex problems can still be handled by a small number of persons in the two countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

A

1. Urge member governments to :
 - (a) hold frequent exchanges of views leading to real co-ordination of long-term policy and research into the economic use of and substitutes for energy resources ;
 - (b) consider OECD as a permanent forum for discussing energy problems ;
 - (c) should OECD not be able to play this rôle, set up a special organisation for this purpose ;
 - (d) strengthen the powers of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to supervise OECD ;

2. Consider that western co-operation would be better ensured if France joined the International Energy Agency ;

B

1. Ensure that frequent exchanges of views between member countries and the United States, particularly in the framework of NATO, lead to increased participation and influence of European States in respect of all major problems ;
2. Study the possibilities of truly European decision-making on all security matters, including the strategic arms limitation talks, the Middle East, Cyprus and the French nuclear deterrent.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. de Koster, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Your Rapporteur notes that the General Affairs Committee has followed the evolution of relations between Europe and the United States closely for a number of years. This report is thus one of a series and your Rapporteur will refrain from reverting to matters which the Assembly has already discussed.

2. He will therefore deal briefly with the evolution of earlier relations between Europe and the United States and at greater length with the position at the beginning of 1975. But it is quite evident that between January, when this first text is being drafted, and April, when the Committee will have to adopt a draft report, many things will have changed.

3. Although suggestions were made for a visit to the United States it was decided that further contacts with members of the Administration and Congress should be postponed until 1976. Your Rapporteur has therefore confined himself to setting out a number of basic aspects of relations between Europe and the United States and will subsequently add to it in the light of events in the next few months, adding more detailed thoughts after studying the documents available more thoroughly.

*
**

4. It is quite evident that in recent years the world political balance has experienced a series of upheavals whose revolutionary nature cannot yet be fully assessed. The emergence of a large number of recently-independent States has considerably disturbed the balance and this is particularly clear in the United Nations where all countries are on an equal footing whatever their wealth and power. However, despite these changes, a number of elements have persisted since the second world war, particularly the near-monopoly of power of the United States — in the West at least — in the political, military and economic fields. The United States has therefore been playing a preponderant rôle for thirty years and for a long time it went practically unchallenged both at home and in the Atlantic world.

5. While it might have been thought after 1950 that Europe would assert itself as a lead-

ing political and economic entity on the world stage, it must now be accepted that our continent has been incapable of playing such a rôle. International life is still based on the national State and even the European countries which have constantly affirmed their desire to see Europe play an increasingly important part in foreign policy matters have proved singularly hesitant about agreeing to a transfer of national sovereignty to supranational bodies.

6. For several years, the United States has however no longer been the undisputed leader of the western world, although NATO has retained American nuclear power as its basis. United States economic power is no longer as overwhelming as it was and the Vietnam war provoked a number of reactions, sometimes quite serious, against American preponderance. American society has been passing through a serious crisis which has had an enormous effect on public opinion producing changes which had hitherto seemed impossible.

7. The discussion about democratic institutions has also had its impact on the decision-making process with certain repercussions on foreign affairs and the United States rôle in the world.

8. Although the Vietnam war and Watergate were the main reasons for a reappraisal, account must also be taken of race relations which concern a group which, although a minority, is nevertheless important since it represents more than 10 % of the population.

9. Finally, the recession, which turned into an economic crisis, also urged a review of the United States' rôle.

10. In your Rapporteur's view, these developments have only stressed the urgency for the countries with a democratic régime — and which are but a minority — to pursue co-operation as far as possible if they wish their liberal and democratic structure to survive. Centrifugal tendencies at the heart of the western world are too numerous and are already having a sometimes dangerous influence on the very delicate network of relations in the Atlantic world.

11. Above all, therefore, the Western European countries must consider their relations with the United States in the light of the common

aim of upholding a democratic society. Any other aim, whether it concerns national interests or the building of Europe, is secondary in relation to this overall aim in the light of which relations between Europe and the United States must be considered in the context of the major problems of the day.

12. The relative lack of decision-making by the political leaders of the free world is unacceptable. Proposals must be worked out that might help to create a better framework for co-operation in the democratic world.

II. Historical background

13. The study completed by William Watts and Lloyd E. Free¹ in 1972 reveals the following figures on American public opinion on internationalism:

- 13 % can be considered as real internationalists ;
- 41 % may be judged as accepting international relationships ;
- 33 % have no positive reaction to international commitments ;
- 13 % are completely isolationist.

14. Compared to earlier figures, the picture is less encouraging.

15. There seems to be a swing away from internationalism and your Rapporteur will therefore refer to a few historical facts about the United States' attitude towards isolationism and internationalism.

16. The history of the United States shows that both its independence and its national identity were based on the extent to which a nation born of European colonisation could break away from the United Kingdom first and then the whole of Europe. While until the 1812 war the Americans could be considered as English colonials revolting against their mother country, the destruction of public buildings in Washington by the British army in 1814 produced a feeling of profound unity among Americans and aroused their determination to found a real State.

1. State of the nation.

17. The Treaty of Ghent concluded between the British and the Americans on 24th December 1814 put an end to the war. It was a return to the *status quo ante* but this very fact meant that the treaty was a victory for the United States after a war which had made the British respect the Americans rather than love them.

18. Once the dispute between Britain and the United States was settled, President James Monroe, who had been elected in 1816 as a Democratic Republican, laid down the broad lines of what was to be United States policy for at least a century.

19. This definition was based on general disengagement from Europe and on an American continental view of United States policy. This became known as the Monroe doctrine. Promulgated largely by John Quincy Adams, the Secretary of State, this doctrine aimed primarily at keeping Europeans out of Latin America.

20. Thus, in his annual message to Congress in December 1823 President Monroe declared :

"The American continents... are henceforth not to be considered as subject for future colonisation by any European power."

21. In the nineteenth century therefore two fundamentally different international systems developed in the old and new worlds, the United States being careful not to interfere in any way with purely European affairs. The immense western territories then provided a vast area for developing the union whose interests only occasionally ran up against the designs of European powers. Foreign affairs therefore occupied only a small place in United States policy until well after the war of secession.

22. American isolationism, which emerged during this period, was based on the idea that American civilisation was a phenomenon unique in the world, that its task was to populate and develop an immense continent, while nineteenth century Americans considered the hazards of domestic history and international relations with European countries as liable to introduce dangerous and intolerable ideologies which were either revolutionary or conservative or imperialist. This idea was underlined *inter alia* during Benjamin Harrison's election campaign in 1888, when he expressed the popular feeling that the United States was a nation apart and should remain so. And as James Bryce said in his book "The American Commonwealth", "Happy America stood apart in a world of her own, safe even from menace."

23. However, although foreign affairs did not count and the State Department was not to play much of a rôle the United States always showed some interest in the fate of Latin America. Moreover, as from 1880, economic progress in the United States led it to pay more attention to its trade relations with the old world. Its trade, which amounted to slightly over \$500 million annually between 1851 and 1860, exceeded \$1,000 million as from 1871 and reached \$2,500 million at the beginning of the twentieth century. The development of European colonial imperialism during the same period induced the Americans to concern themselves with their own expansion. They were afraid that a division of the world between European imperialists at a time when trade protectionism was emerging might close very large parts of the world to rapidly expanding American trade.

24. Thus, as from the mid-nineteenth century, the United States intervened in the Pacific Ocean and the Far East, first to compel Japan and China to pursue the open door trade system and then, particularly following the Spanish-American war of 1898, to bring the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii and also Porto Rico within their sphere of influence.

25. An imperialist ideology then appeared in the United States, influenced in particular by Darwin's theories of evolution. In his message to Congress in December 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt stated the "corollary to the Monroe doctrine", which was in fact an affirmation of the new American policy. He stated that "in the western hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power".

26. Nevertheless, the United States, like many other nations throughout the world, was not at all prepared psychologically for the outbreak of the first world war in 1914. The war did not seem to concern the Americans, despite the fact that of a population of almost 100 million more than a third consisted of immigrants or children of immigrants from the belligerent countries. President Wilson began by proclaiming United States neutrality.

27. However, the Americans gradually realised that they could hardly remain aloof from a conflict in which the freedom of the seas was at stake and which threatened to upset the balance in Europe at a time when technical progress was

placing limits on the security which the breadth of the Atlantic had hitherto afforded the United States.

28. However, it needed the profound emotional shock caused by the torpedoing of the Lusitania in which many Americans perished to prepare American public opinion for war. Even after the outbreak of total submarine war, President Wilson hesitated for some time before deciding to commit his country. In the end, it was in the name of justice and humanity that he presented to the American people his decision to declare war — a state which events had forced upon him. But immediately after the war American public opinion struck away from the course advocated by Wilson whereby the United States would have been permanently committed to pursue an active foreign policy in the framework of the League of Nations for the maintenance of a balance and peace in Europe and throughout the world, and eventually Wilson failed to obtain a majority in Congress to ratify the Treaty of Versailles.

29. Isolationism again dominated American policy during the period between the two world wars. In 1937, a Gallup poll showed that 94 % of Americans thought United States policy should be to keep out of all foreign wars rather than try to prevent such wars.

30. Also during the second world war Congress passed several laws affirming United States neutrality and imposing embargo measures. Isolationism triumphed until Franklin D. Roosevelt's declaration in 1941 that aid to the United Kingdom was to be considered as part of the United States defence effort.

31. Whether or not the United States would have entered the war if the Japanese had not attacked Pearl Harbour is a moot point. President Roosevelt probably wanted to do so, but on 11th December 1941, four days after the Japanese attack, Congress adopted a declaration of war on Japan but not on Germany or Italy. It was the Axis powers which honoured their obligations to Japan and declared war on the United States.

32. It is evident that after the second world war, particularly under the influence of such historians and political scientists as Hans Morgenthau, the United States Government came to pay greater attention to the implications of the power deriving from the economic development of the United States. These considerations were behind the American desire to foster the econo-

mic recovery of Europe through the Marshall plan and the defence of free Europe through the Atlantic Pact. The Truman doctrine defined a world policy as one of containing the grip of communism within the area already controlled by the Soviet Union.

33. However, a section of American public opinion, first discouraged by the setbacks encountered by plans for European union and subsequently by the United States' difficulties in various parts of the world and particularly Vietnam, still considers that American intervention in other parts of the world should be temporary and that the long-term aim should be disengagement.

34. This historical background must be borne in mind in studying the state of relations between Europe and the United States. Isolationism is a tradition of the past but is still, at least on occasion, a force to be contended with which the United States' partners should still take into account.

35. The undermining of the American administration following the Watergate affair has certainly made it necessary for American foreign policy to take greater account of the reactions of public opinion, however momentarily. Proof lies in the weakness of American policy in Cyprus and Vietnam and the European partners fully realise this and weigh up the danger of systematically opposing the United States.

III. *The situation today*

36. On 6th December 1974 the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, John Scalin, informed the General Assembly that the United States would be reviewing its policies towards the United Nations.

37. Consideration was being given to means of reversing the current tendency to adopt biased unrealistic resolutions.

38. This United States review also covered the thirteen associated United Nations agencies. Congress had reduced the American contribution to UNESCO by \$19 million since Israel was barred from some of its activities.

39. Without doubt developments in the United Nations are having a negative effect on the rôle the United States might play as a leading nation.

40. At the same time it has become clear that the rôle of Western European nations in the

United Nations has likewise been diminished by the unexpectedly close co-operation on the part of the third world.

41. One might expect the United States and Western Europe's voting behaviour in the United Nations to be similar. In reality, western votes have been split on a number of problems. Differences were not limited to the United States on one side and Europe on the other. It should be noted that consultations between the members of WEU have not always led to harmonised opinions.

42. As Mr. Kissinger wrote in "The Troubled Partnership" :

"The availability of resources does not guarantee an interest in assuming worldwide responsibilities as is demonstrated by United States policy prior to World War II...

In other words, we are now the only member of NATO with worldwide interests, and this produces unavoidable differences in perspective."

43. Mr. Kissinger reiterated this idea in a statement at the end of 1973 concerning the Middle East question and it was not always well received in the European capitals. It nevertheless expresses a profound truth. Because of changes in the world balance, the United States has a *de facto* monopoly of power, at least in the West, and all the European countries accept this. Europe as such has not become a world power and the Western European countries today hardly seem to wish this to be so. Since the end of the second world war, the United States has constantly supported or even provoked Western European attempts to unite in the hope, sometime at least, of gaining a partner capable of sharing responsibilities which it feels are too heavy. It has not succeeded and Mr. Kissinger seems to have accepted this situation better than others.

44. Yet European union would be the only way for Europeans to exercise some degree of power in the world. This aim has never been considered sufficiently important by the European States for them to feel they should play more than a limited rôle in the world in pursuit of national aims with a singularly narrow outlook.

45. NATO, the security system of the western world, is largely based on United States nuclear power. Although public opinion does not seem in favour of a European deterrent, we cannot permit ourselves not to establish the machinery for decision-making which is needed. The British

nuclear forces integrated in NATO and the French independent forces could together form a European deterrent. Whether or not the existing nuclear forces are integrated depends on the future of NATO and the relationship between the United States and Western Europe on the one hand and between the European States, especially France and Britain, on the other. The negative attitude resulting from the imminent danger inherent in any nuclear force understandably leads to hesitation about discussing the related problems. As long as nuclear forces exist, it is essential to discuss and prepare for possible future changes.

46. There should be no illusions about the long drawn-out war waged by the United States in Vietnam. Adverse comments by certain European governments or political parties about United States policy in the Far East went, in certain cases, hand in hand with unawareness of the world-wide responsibilities of the United States.

47. Insofar as Europe was determined not to intervene in Vietnam, it was difficult to insist that the United States take account of a European point of view which, moreover, was never expressed as such.

48. However, this war was not without consequence in so far as it aroused doubts among the people of America regarding the moral value of the cause defended by the United States and hence encouraged the re-emergence of isolationist feelings. But whatever errors may be attributed to American policy in Vietnam, they cannot justify an overall condemnation of United States policy.

49. However this may be, some Committee members underlined that the Vietnam war and the Watergate crisis had served to demonstrate that American society had reacted in a democratic manner devoid of imperialism and they considered the democracy of American society to be the best guarantee of continued United States participation in the defence of Europe.

50. Although for a long time some Europeans had the illusion that Western Europe might one day form an entity capable of ensuring its own defence, this is no longer true today. In an interview with the IPU on 14th January 1975, Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO, stated that :

“What you heard a couple of years ago about Europe going it alone with a European defence has completely disappeared in all countries of the Alliance.”

51. In present circumstances this remark is fully justified. Some Committee members, however, felt that there was uncertainty about the future trend of American foreign policy and its defence policy, particularly in the conventional field. They considered it essential for Europe to provide itself with the wherewithal to pursue a true defence policy so as to be able to face whatever situation might arise.

52. Your Rapporteur entirely agrees with them that the Western European countries' defence effort should not be relaxed, but he believes that their fears concern only the long term and that in any event preparation for remote and questionable situations should in no case be allowed to call in question what will for long remain the only possible basis for European security: the integration of its defence with that of the United States and Canada.

53. Even history cannot supply the answer to the following question : If Mr. Luns as Foreign Minister of the Netherlands had not blocked the de Gaulle proposals for political co-operation in the sixties, would Europe today have been united, and would this have prevented France from opting out of NATO's integrated military structure?

54. In this hypothetical and theoretical case the British electorate would not have been given the chance to vote in a positive way to continue EEC membership. The United Kingdom would not have been invited to discuss membership.

55. In any event, some Committee members stressed that western co-operation and European defence would be served better if France resumed its place in NATO, as the WEU Assembly has already urged on several occasions.

56. In fact, the United States has taken in hand a cause which is not only its own but that of the western world. This was evidenced again recently when President Ford, taking up Mr. Kissinger's remarks, affirmed that the United States would do its utmost to prevent the West being strangled by the oil-producing countries.

57. United States world-wide policy is at present concerned with three essential questions : relations with the Soviet Union, the problem of the third world and defence policy. There is also increasing restlessness about the rôle of the United Nations.

58. (i) *Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union* have in recent years been

traversing a period of what has frequently been called *détente*. There should be no illusions about this word. In fact, since 1945, the basis of relations between the two great powers has hardly changed. Whether one spoke of peaceful coexistence or *détente*, the aim was to avoid armed conflict between two powers which did not conceal their fundamental antagonism. The Soviet Union has definitely not given up its ideology aimed at terminating the capitalist system throughout the world. Similarly, the liberal countries consider western-type democracy to be a particularly highly-developed political and economic system which alone can ensure individual freedom and well-being.

59. Nevertheless, in the last five years, it was thought that meaningful progress could be made with *détente* and that international peace could be based on agreements and organised international relations which excluded war from the competition between the two economic and political systems.

60. Several series of negotiations were launched between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other. While it was possible for a time to hope that these negotiations would lead to far-reaching changes in relations between the two groups of countries, this seems unlikely at the present juncture, at least for the foreseeable future.

61. (a) *In the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT)*, the United States and the Soviet Union reached a number of agreements on limiting their strategic nuclear weapons and it is to be expected that a forthcoming SALT II agreement will complete the agreements already reached. However, such agreements are of fairly limited scope since they allow both sides to maintain nuclear means capable of destroying the whole planet and their sole aim is to limit by common agreement the expenditure which the two major nuclear powers might have had to make to increase their armaments still further.

62. (b) *The talks on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR)* which might have led to real disarmament in Europe are still a long way from completion since after more than two years no agreement has been reached on the aims of the talks. On 13th December 1974, the North Atlantic Council reaffirmed the commitment of member countries "to the establishment of approximate parity in the form of an agreed common ceiling for the ground force manpower

of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the area of reductions. They considered that a first phase reduction agreement covering United States and Soviet ground forces would be an important and practical first step in this direction".

63. The same day, Mr. Kissinger said he did not have the impression that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept the common ceiling for the reduction of forces in Central Europe and hence the principle of parity for strategic weapons decided on between the Americans and the Soviets at the Vladivostok meeting.

64. It is not therefore to be expected that the MBFR talks will allow armed forces in Europe to be reduced in the near future. From the European viewpoint, however, they have the advantage of allowing the United States Government to withstand pressure to cut back American forces in Europe. Thus, the North Atlantic Council reaffirmed "that NATO forces should not be reduced except in the context of a mutual and balanced force reduction agreement with the East".

65. (c) *The conference on security and co-operation in Europe* has also been marking time for some months and no agreement has been reached on the main questions, whether they concern measures to re-establish confidence between the two great powers or to encourage the exchange of persons and ideas between the two blocs.

66. (d) Finally, in January 1975, Mr. Kissinger had to announce that the Soviet Union had denounced the *trade agreements* concluded with the United States as a result of Congress's insistence on linking them with the liberalisation of Soviet policy in respect of Jewish immigration.

67. All these facts lead to the conclusion that *détente* can now hardly go beyond purely technical measures designed to limit the two great powers' expenditure on armaments and that any attempt to establish understanding or co-operation between East and West will be difficult because of radically opposite political and economic systems.

68. Furthermore, some observers are now wondering whether the West's present economic difficulties may not make the pursuit of *détente* still more difficult inasmuch as they may give the Eastern European countries the impression that international capitalism is facing a serious and perhaps fatal crisis and consequently the

march towards world revolution might be accelerated in the next few months. In the circumstances, the Soviet Union would have little interest in stabilising the present situation and this has so far been the constant aim of its foreign policy.

69. The Soviet Union has very probably not taken a definite decision in this connection, but rumours of coming changes in the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party indicate that East-West relations, a subject of much effort by Mr. Brezhnev, will be entirely reconsidered and in the meantime will be frozen for a fairly long transitional period. However this may be, it seems difficult to speak of détente before agreement has been reached on a major programme of arms reductions, including tactical nuclear weapons, by the Warsaw Pact in Europe.

70. (ii) In the last twenty years, the underdeveloped countries have provided a breeding ground for the rivalry between the two economic and political systems. Whereas fronts were frozen in Europe, abrupt and far-reaching changes were possible in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia at both economic and political level, not to mention the military level.

71. The people's struggle to free themselves from the aftermath of colonialism allowed the Soviet Union to increase its influence considerably in these immense areas. The balance was re-established with the emergence of independent States with pressing economic demands which could not be met without their markets being opened to the great industrial powers of the West or even direct financial and technical assistance from these countries. The rapid rise in the price of oil and certain raw materials as from the end of 1973 caused further upheavals. There is no longer one third world but two, for there are countries which are both wealthy and underdeveloped, i.e. which have sometimes vast monetary reserves and which have been growing at a very fast rate since the oil crisis in October 1973 but which are unable to advance quickly towards economic development because of the state of their society. They are short of technical experts, have insufficient consumer markets and experience difficulties in converting the population, most of whom are engaged in primitive farming, to modern industrial activities.

72. The West had decided to earmark 1 % of the gross national product of each industrialised country for assistance to the third world. In view of the balance-of-payments crisis now facing

most of these countries, it is quite probable that many of them will not manage to attain this aim. In any event, only very few have done so. On the other hand, the wealthy underdeveloped countries could allocate a far greater proportion of their gross national product to assistance to other underdeveloped countries because they cannot invest very much of their revenue from oil or raw materials in their own countries. This is all the more essential since the increased cost of oil and raw materials has added to the already insupportable burden on the balance of payments of the poorest underdeveloped countries. The position of India, for instance, may quickly become absolutely catastrophic, whereas a country such as Indonesia has difficulty in finding immediate and useful investments for its profits from the marketing of its metals and oil. Some form of mutual assistance already exists, particularly in the Arab world where Saudi Arabia and Kuwait hand out large sums to Egypt and Jordan. Moreover, the only way to allow the whole world to benefit from the considerable increase in the monetary reserves which the OPEC countries are in the process of accumulating would be a widespread transformation of international trade aimed *inter alia* at encouraging these countries to purchase more from other countries of the third world.

73. All these problems call for a considerable increase in international co-operation and trade of all kinds. But this may well be hampered by the economic difficulties now facing the OECD countries since they may be obliged to take protectionist measures to curb their balance-of-payments deficit.

74. This is a field in which it would perhaps be possible for the Western European countries to bring considerable influence to bear on the United States in organisations which work satisfactorily such as OECD, IMF or the World Bank. They will be able to do so, however, only insofar as they have agreed on their own doctrine and aims in this field and if their overall economic, monetary and trade policy has been closely concerted with the United States. As opposed to what has only too often been the case in the past, the IMF should no longer be taken for a debating society in which various economic doctrines are eloquently defended. It is certain that in this connection the United States has done much to achieve results in the past year.

75. (iii) In the defence field, Eurogroup clearly showed at its meeting on 9th December

1974 that the European members of the Atlantic Alliance were not being taken in by prospects of détente and affirmed that they were determined to maintain their armaments effort in order to preserve NATO's deterrent capability to which Europe owes thirty years of peace.

"In the light of the constantly increasing military capability of the Warsaw Pact, Ministers noted with concern the adverse effects of inflation and cost escalation on western defence programmes, which could be seriously weakened. They stressed the need for closer co-operation within the Eurogroup, particularly in the field of equipment procurement.

.....

Ministers reaffirmed their determination to improve co-operation in the Eurogroup, thus developing a strong and cohesive contribution to Alliance defence as a whole and strengthening public awareness of the need for an effective defence posture in the West's search for genuine détente."

76. It is abundantly clear, however, that the western economic situation is making it increasingly difficult for governments to pursue an armaments effort, although this is more essential than ever now that future Soviet policy is arousing serious doubts.

77. The "Europackage 1974" appended to the Eurogroup communiqué at least shows that on one essential point the European members of NATO have given the United States the satisfaction it needed since it specifies that :

"... Recent calculations suggest that the net foreign exchange costs incurred by the United States during United States fiscal year 1974 in basing their forces in Europe were offset by European purchases of United States military equipment and bilateral United States / Federal Republic of Germany offset arrangements."

78. Cost was in fact one of the main objections from a large section of Congress to maintaining American forces on the mainland of Europe. It is obviously essential for the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent for these troops to remain on European territory since their presence assures the Soviet Union that the United States will be committed in the event of aggression in Europe. Europe must therefore give absolute priority to the financial effort which

will ensure the continued presence of these troops whatever the difficulties in a period of recession.

IV. *The consequences of the energy crisis*

79. In a report which he submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee in 1968, Mr. Peter Kirk wrote :

"The position of the world economy in 1968 is in many respects reminiscent of that in 1929. Monetary conditions are similar and the recession setting in almost everywhere may well lead to catastrophic consequences if monetary confidence is undermined at the same time."

80. There is no point in stressing the prophesy of this remark, although it may seem premature to have envisaged in 1968 a situation comparable to that of 1929.

81. In fact, it was the oil crisis which came to a head in autumn 1973 and triggered off a succession of events not confined to oil and which will probably have a far-reaching effect on the structure of the western economy.

82. Because the crisis arose from the increased price and reduced output of oil, Europe was particularly affected because it had only very limited oil and energy resources. But the whole world is now affected and the search for solutions seems even harder since a major recession is now looming up throughout the world. A distinction must however be made between the oil — or energy — aspect of the crisis and its financial aspects, however closely linked they may be.

(i) *The oil crisis*

83. The oil crisis started at the beginning of 1973 when certain countries such as Kuwait reduced their output and restrictions were placed on the consumption of oil products, apparently because the refining and distributing systems were not well organised in several western countries.

84. However, it gathered its full momentum after the Israeli-Arab war in October 1973, with the twofold decision taken first by the Arab countries and then by all the oil-producing countries, to limit output and increase the price of oil considerably. World production has since stagnated, increasing by only 0.8 % in 1974. Prices have levelled off at about \$10 per barrel

at source and consumption has also been reduced in most western countries.

85. The crisis thus has both political and economic roots and the measures which must be taken affect both fields.

86. (a) *In the political field*, the aim of all the oil-consuming countries is to avoid being boycotted, as was the case beginning in October 1973, and to put an end to the inconsiderate rise in oil prices. This implies :

87. (i) Immediate measures to meet the most serious supply problems. At the end of 1973, the United States Government suggested that the industrialised countries concert their policies of reserves and organise mutual assistance to help any countries which might be boycotted. The Washington conference on 15th January 1974 resulted in decisions in this field which afford some form of guarantee for all member countries of the International Energy Agency.

88. (ii) Nevertheless, it is essential to seek peace and stability in the Middle East if situations such as existed in that area in October 1973 are to be avoided. This is probably one of the reasons why the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, devoted much time and effort in 1974 and at the beginning of 1975 to attempting by every means to reconcile the views of the 1973 belligerents and induce them to reach compromises on which lasting peace might be established in the Middle East.

89. At the beginning of April 1975, these attempts seem to have failed. The very serious consequences which may ensue at a time of possible internal unrest in the Arab world and when the Geneva conference is emerging as the only forum in which Middle East affairs can be considered — but with the Soviet Union — render the cohesion of western policies in the area even more essential.

90. It is quite evident that some aspects of United States policy in the area do not meet with the full approval of the European allies of the United States. However, Europe has too much interest in the success of the United States' peace efforts to do anything which might thwart this policy. Europe and the United States must therefore work closely together on matters affecting the Middle East, and the NATO framework seems the most appropriate place to do so. It is known that much of the North Atlantic Council's meeting in December 1974 was devoted to these matters

91. (iii) The search for stable prices does not necessarily mean a reduction in present prices, for the maintenance of relatively high prices can but encourage research for and the development of new energy resources, whether they be high cost oil drawn from American oil-shale and tar-sands or from the bed of the North Sea or nuclear energy. Stabilisation of prices implies agreement between producer and consumer countries and perhaps indexation of the price of oil as is claimed by the producer countries. But if the consumer countries do not wish to start global negotiations with the producer countries at a disadvantage they must first reach a degree of agreement among themselves. Here too the United States Government has made a considerable effort since autumn 1973 and the Group of Twelve has directed most of its work towards such an agreement between the industrialised countries.

92. Some European governments felt that a conference of producer and consumer countries would be better able to reach general agreement on prices, although the United States Government was not very much in favour of the idea. However, it fell in with the proposal and a preparatory meeting was held in Paris at the beginning of April 1975. The difficulties encountered stem less from opposition between the United States and the Western European countries than from divergencies between producer countries, between producers and consumers and, finally, between the EEC member countries. There are differences mainly over the preparation of the agenda and the list of participants. They prove, if proof were necessary, the risk of holding conferences on a world scale when western views have not been harmonised by means of serious consultations.

93. (b) *In the economic field*, it is evident that the increased price of oil and of some raw materials and agricultural produce must lead the industrialised countries to follow a new course.

94. (i) Energy savings have been made in the industrialised countries. Because, on the one hand, the low price of energy had encouraged a certain amount of waste and, on the other, a depressionary economic situation has led to a slow-down in industry, it has been possible to reduce oil consumption in the West in 1974, varying, among the EEC member countries, from 3.7 % in Ireland to 25.7 % in Denmark. While it seems necessary to combat waste, it may be suspected that should the economic situation recover energy consumption would again rise

and the economy measures, which have moreover not usually been very stringently applied by the governments, will have no lasting effect.

95. Moreover, it must be realised that savings were mainly due to a reduction in economic activity throughout the West and, accessorially, to the particularly mild winter of 1974-75. It would therefore be wrong to attribute them to the successful policies pursued by the various western governments.

96. (ii) Most western countries decided in 1973 and 1974 to increase oil drilling and production. However, the expected results do not yet appear to have materialised. A typical example is that although President Nixon had asked the United States in his speech on the state of the union in January 1974 to speed up oil drilling and production, American oil output was in fact 3.78 % lower in 1974. Similarly, in Western Europe production of North Sea oil does not seem to have been so successful as had been expected.

97. There is every reason to fear that the temporary reduction in oil consumption and the relative easing of prices at the beginning of 1975, together with measures taken by many European countries to support their currencies, may further delay a policy of large-scale investment, however necessary.

98. It should be added that world oil output rose by only 0.8 % in 1974 and that it fell by 26.4 % in Libya, 18 % in Kuwait, 11 % in Venezuela, 4.4 % in Iraq and 3.1 % in Canada.

99. (iii) This is probably why the United States Government is now considering fixing a lower price for oil as well as a ceiling. A sharp fall in oil prices would discourage efforts to prospect for and extract oil in North America, offshore or in the Arctic since its cost price would inevitably be high. Similarly, the search for alternative sources of energy might be slowed down considerably, and this would be a serious threat for the future.

100. In 1974 and particularly in the first months of 1975, there was a noticeable reduction in demand for oil on the world market. While this reduction has so far had favourable repercussions since it has led to a stabilisation or even a slight lowering of Middle East oil prices, there is now considerable uncertainty about the future of the oil market. For instance, in February 1975, it was learnt that although the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, with a population of

60,000, an oil output of 68 million tons and revenues of \$4,000 million in 1974, seemed certain of having a high income, it was in reality experiencing serious financial difficulties. The Emir apparently thought he could speculate on an increase in oil prices and subsidise Bangladesh, Somaliland, Egypt, Syria and Jordan, as well as nationalist movements in the Philippines and Eritrea, lend the IMF \$100 million and invest large sums on the spot. An unforeseen reduction in the quantities of oil extracted on its territory and a slight lowering of prices sufficed to reverse the situation. A similar situation has also been reported in Oman which earned about \$1,000 million in 1974 with an output of 14.2 million tons of oil.

101. Producer and consumer countries therefore seem to have a common interest in reaching agreement on stabilising demand and prices for oil. The United States, after initial reservations about the European proposal for a world energy conference, seems to have rallied to the idea in February 1975. This should allow the western countries to move forward together in preparing this conference which may be of considerable importance for the future of the world economy in the next few years.

(ii) *The financial crisis*

102. This is closely linked with the oil crisis although, to a large extent, it started earlier. The over-rapid devaluation of western currencies was one of the reasons why the oil-producing countries reduced output and sharply increased prices. On the other hand, the oil crisis led to huge transfers of money to countries which had no means of investing large sums on the spot and brought an influx of speculative capital into the West at the same time as payments were being thrown out of balance in a number of industrialised countries. Thus, measures which had for a long time been considered essential if the international monetary system was to be put in order have now assumed even greater importance and additional measures must also be taken to correct the balance-of-payments deficit and reintroduce into the economic cycle money accumulated by the oil-producing countries.

(a) *Balance-of-payments problems*

103. There are wide variations in the way in which the western countries are affected by increased oil prices. Some, such as the Federal Republic and the Netherlands, have managed to

maintain a surplus balance of payments. Others, such as France, had extremely large deficits in 1974, but have hopes of correcting the situation fairly quickly. In others, such as Italy and the United Kingdom, the deficit has worsened and they may soon be in an extremely difficult position.

104. According to statistics for July 1974, Italy, the United Kingdom and Denmark have sufficient reserves to meet the deficit in their balance of payments for eight months, France for sixteen months, Ireland seventeen months, Canada four years and four months, the United States fifteen years and Belgium forty-four years. Although these forecasts improved during the second half of 1974, the situation is still serious.

105. In general, the western countries have had to try to increase their exports in order to buy the oil they needed and curb their consumption in order to reduce their balance-of-payments deficit and retain a surplus production for their exports. Measures to limit consumption have generally increased unemployment which few countries will be able to stand for long. There is also a danger that in order to meet the situation countries with the greatest difficulties may be tempted to resort to protectionist measures which would inevitably extend the crisis to the supplier countries and break down the economic solidarity of the West.

106. When the Group of Ten met in Washington in January 1975 it therefore decided to set up a solidarity fund as soon as possible, open to all OECD countries, with \$25,000 million available for a period of two years.

107. The aim is to allow countries which have completely exhausted all other sources of loans to draw on the fund if the situation becomes too serious. Although there is still some uncertainty about the conditions in which assistance will be granted, it is quite obviously in the general interest of the West for the solidarity of the members of the Atlantic Alliance to be brought into play to save the West from a crisis which might soon become catastrophic.

(b) Recycling petrodollars

108. The very sharp rise in the price of oil caused far-reaching upheavals in the distribution of wealth throughout the world. This happened so quickly that a large number of oil-producing countries are now incapable of rein-

vesting anything more than a small part of their revenues in their own countries. In 1974, for instance, Libya was able to spend only 50 % of its income from oil on its own development, Iran 45 %, Saudi Arabia 25 %, Kuwait 20 %, the Emirates 9 % and Qatar 10 %. Even the more populated countries do not have nearly enough outlets on the spot for their oil income.

109. For instance, in 1974 Venezuela was able to invest only 45 % of its income on the spot, Nigeria 70 % and Iraq, Indonesia and Algeria 90 %.

110. Thus from year to year these countries are building up sizeable monetary reserves. On 30th November 1974, Saudi Arabia had reserves of \$12,730 million, the fourth highest in the world after the Federal Republic, the United States and Japan, and before France. Iran is in seventh place with more than \$7,000 million and Venezuela tenth with \$5,570 million. Nigeria, Libya and Kuwait also hold large monetary reserves.

111. The fact that in 1973 Saudi Arabia had only \$2,500 million demonstrates the extent of the revolution in the distribution of monetary reserves throughout the world. A reasonable supposition was that, if the present tendency continued, within the next ten years the oil-producing countries would have accumulated almost all the international monetary reserves despite their efforts to use their oil income to purchase heavy equipment from the industrialised countries in order to develop their overall economic structure. It now seems that large-scale requirements in the OPEC countries are increasing steadily.

112. The problem therefore remains how to increase recycling of the vast sums which the oil-producing countries are now accumulating. If this problem is not solved the industrialised countries will be forced to slow down production structurally in order to reduce their purchases of oil and raw materials and this will have disastrous effects on the countries of the third world. In short, a major crisis would then threaten the whole world.

113. Assistance by oil-producing countries to other underdeveloped countries with the greatest investment needs can naturally help to make the world economy work. It is nevertheless clear that the oil-producing countries will retain large surpluses and will seek, as they are already doing, to make worthwhile investments in the industrialised countries. In many respects, it is important to attract this new wealth to the possibilities of investment in the industrialised countries, and it

is in the interest of the western countries to facilitate such investment of petrodollars.

114. However, the search for the highest returns when currencies are fluctuating means that these investments are often unstable and large-scale movements of capital lead to the excessive inflation of some western currencies and the collapse of others. Thus, at the beginning of 1975, the decision of the Kuwait Government not to accept the pound as payment for the oil it sold led to a fall in the pound whereas the flow of dollars into Switzerland compelled the Swiss Government to take drastic measures to prevent speculation inflating the value of the Swiss franc on a scale which the Swiss economy could not bear.

115. The influx of petrodollars is thus forcing the West to take a whole series of measures to maintain monetary stability and to allow the poorest countries to meet the crisis. Thus, at its meeting in January 1975, the International Monetary Fund decided to open a special account with funds provided jointly by the oil-exporting countries and the industrialised countries in order to lend money to the poorer countries at fairly low interest rates.

116. It was also necessary to give the oil-producing countries, which now hold a large proportion of the world's monetary reserves, a much larger share than before in the IMF itself. The IMF therefore decided to raise the total quotas of member countries by 32.5 % by doubling the quota of the oil-producing countries and limiting the quota of countries whose monetary reserves had fallen the most as a result of the crisis, as in the case of the United Kingdom. At the same time, the IMF decided to abolish the official price for gold and its members' obligation to guarantee part of their contribution to the fund in gold. Thus, the rôle of gold in the international monetary system should gradually be reduced, perhaps to disappear altogether in the very near future.

117. This is probably a wise step for there is no longer much connection between the value of national currencies and gold reserves held by the central banks. However, gold played a major rôle in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in forcing States to accept monetary discipline since they could not create new currency if they did not have corresponding reserves of gold, otherwise the exchange rate for their currency would collapse.

118. One of the IMF's main tasks should be to find means of imposing such discipline without

recourse to gold. This is particularly important since the United States Government, which obviously plays a leading rôle in the world economy, seems to be relaxing the measures it had taken to stamp out inflation.

(c) *The United States and the crisis*

119. In his speech on the state of the union in Washington on 16th January 1975, President Ford stressed the need to revive the American economy to combat stagnation, a declining gross national product, the falling value of the dollar and growing unemployment.

120. The deflationary measures taken by the Nixon government produced a sharp fall in American economic activity in the last months of 1974. During the fourth quarter of 1974, the American gross national product, calculated in constant dollars, shrank at an annual rate of 9.1 % as compared with 1.9 % in the previous quarter, making a total of 2.2 % for 1974 as a whole, whereas in 1973 the gross national product, at constant value, had risen by 5.9 %. This is the largest reduction since the American reconversion crisis in 1946.

121. Further, during the last quarter of 1974 inflation in the United States reached a record 13.7 %, the highest since the second world war, giving an inflation rate of 10.2 % for 1974, the highest since 1947. A budgetary deficit of \$60,000 million has been announced for the financial year 1975, which might stimulate the inflation which so far had been contained.

122. But consumption expenditure fell by \$4,500 million during the last quarter of 1974. Stocks of unsold goods rose by \$14,400 million during the same quarter, while productive investment slowed down considerably to only \$1,800 million compared with \$2,700 million during the previous quarter. There is every indication that this reduction in the gross national product will continue for some months.

123. These various factors of United States domestic policy have thus led the American Government to give priority to resuming industrial activity over defending its currency. The immediate result was a further fall in the dollar on the international market and resumed speculation in certain European currencies. It is still difficult to assess the full consequences.

124. It is evidently in the interests of the whole western world for the United States to take steps to contain the crisis and prevent it from spread-

ing. It is nevertheless obvious that the anti-inflationary policies hitherto pursued by these countries will have to be completely revised to meet the new situation. Any great increase in the exchange rate of certain currencies will cause export and production problems for Western Europe.

125. The question now facing the western world as a whole is what rate of inflation it can stand and for how long. It has proved capable of bearing the consequences for a short time at the price of very high unemployment. The liberal economy is being put to the test, also as regards a minimum of essential co-operation and harmonisation in order to tackle the dangers on a multilateral basis. Any relapse into inflation threatens other economies. Harmonisation should not be limited to government co-operation alone. In our democracies, parliaments have to play a most important and responsible rôle. The European parliamentary assemblies can also promote an exchange of information between members of national parliaments.

126. It therefore appears that the international monetary situation as it has developed since the October 1973 crisis calls for urgent and close co-ordination between the United States and its European and Japanese partners so that the safeguard measures each country takes in turn do not increase the rate of inflation throughout the world even more than in 1974 nor aggravate and extend the crisis and underemployment and further reduce the gross national product.

127. The majority of the OECD countries decided to take effective measures to meet oil supply emergencies by establishing an international energy programme to be implemented through an International Energy Agency.

128. They are to maintain reserves sufficient to meet consumption for at least sixty days.

129. Each participating country is to prepare a programme of contingent oil demand restraint measures.

130. They are determined to reduce their dependence on imported oil in the longer term by developing alternative sources of energy, finding ways and means of reducing the growth of consumption and combining research and development efforts.

131. Although it is regrettable that no agreement has been reached on a unified policy for all OECD countries, the international energy

programme certainly provides a means of making a multilateral effort to tackle future energy problems.

V. Conclusions

132. A cursory analysis of the international situation in the political, defence, economic and financial fields leads to the conclusion that the West is now facing dangers more serious for its survival than any since 1955.

133. In the relatively calm period of steady economic progress from 1965 to 1973, the building of Europe appeared to be an essential aim of the Western European countries. In view of the gravity of present-day problems and the increasing interdependence of Europe and the United States in face of a crisis whose proportions may soon become catastrophic for the very survival of the West and the values which are the basis of its liberal and democratic political system, absolute priority must be given to agreement between Europe and the United States on meeting security problems and those raised by the energy crisis and the redistribution of the world's wealth.

134. Recent developments in Vietnam and the statement on behalf of President Ford that "this is not our war" have created further hesitations about the fulfilment of United States commitments towards its allies throughout the world. There is a fall in public support for any kind of commitment. Will the United States continue to be one of the two powers competing in Asia, Africa and elsewhere? Your Rapporteur believes that Americans will first look after their own interests. A threat to Europe is also a threat to the United States. Even when world leadership is no longer accepted, the Atlantic Alliance will still be able to count on full American support. It is essential for President Ford to reassure the allies as to the NATO commitments.

135. Although it is desirable to strive for European union, particularly so that Europeans may assert their views within the western world, union alone is not capable of solving the problems facing the West. A global effort is essential to meet the dangers now looming up and it cannot wait for Europeans to reach agreement on the often mythical matters which divide them.

136. This priority is in no way intended to maintain the privileges enjoyed by the industrialised countries but rather to allow the har-

monious development of the world economy for the particular benefit of the underdeveloped countries which have no natural wealth in the form of oil or raw materials.

137. A question which arises is whether or not the West requires a different framework for the latter part of the seventies and for the eighties.

138. The decision-making centres of the West should make arrangements which take account of shifts of military and economic power and the

need for the democratic nations to co-operate in an expanding world.

139. Europe was the cradle of the major political systems deriving from Christianity, liberalism and Marxism.

140. Europe should again demonstrate its creative abilities and develop a framework for preserving peace and for internationalism furthering the spirit of co-operation.

Co-operation with the United States

AMENDMENT No. 1¹

tabled by Mr. Piket

In the draft Recommendation proper, delete paragraphs 1 (b) and (c) and replace them by the following :

“(b) promote the extension of OECD’s activities in the energy field ;”

Signed : Piket

1. See 7th Sitting, 29th May 1975 (Amendment adopted).

Co-operation with the United States

AMENDMENT No. 2¹

tabled by Mr. Reale

1. In the draft Recommendation proper, delete paragraph 1 (c).
2. Alternatively : in paragraph (c), leave out "played this rôle" and insert "play its rôle", and reverse the order of paragraphs (c) and (d).

Signed : Reale

1. See 7th Sitting, 29th May 1975 (Amendment negatived by the adoption of Amendment No. 1).

Co-operation with the United States

AMENDMENT No. 3¹
tabled by Mr. Bettiol

Leave out paragraph B.2 of the draft Recommendation proper.

Signed : Bettiol

1. See 7th Sitting, 29th May 1975 (Amendment negatived).

The European Space Agency
Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council

REPORT ¹

submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ²
by Mr. Richter, Rapporteur

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on the European Space Agency

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submitted by Mr. Richter, Rapporteur

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Recommendation 248 on the European Space Agency and the reply of the Council

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee: Mr. de Montesquiou (Chairman); MM. Warren, Richter (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, Boucheny, Carter, Cornelissen, Fletcher (Substitute: Brown), Göller, Lenzer, Lewis (Substitute:*

Lester), Mammi, Mart, van Ooijen, Pecoraro, Schmitt (Substitute: Cerneau), Schwencke, de Stexhe (Substitute: de Bruyne), Treu, Valleix.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on the European Space Agency

The Assembly,

Congratulating the governments of the member countries of the European Space Agency on the establishment of a new European space organisation ;

Aware of the need to give priority to the European space activities pursued within the Agency and noting governments' willingness to integrate their future national programmes in a joint European programme ;

Considering the agreed programme on scientific and application satellites and the Ariane launcher and the vast sums of money involved ;

Convinced of the need to devote the closest attention to the application of space research and development in preparation for subsequent commercial use ;

Considering that in the early 1980s space activities will leave the experimental phase and start a new era of operational utilisation ;

Considering especially Europe's present rôle in the new space transportation system : the American shuttle and the European development of Spacelab ;

Impressed by the importance of the American military space programme and its applications which will revolutionise existing strategic and tactical concepts,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments :

1. To define Europe's common space policy for the future in world-wide application satellite systems and the ways and means of collaborating with the United States in the use of Spacelab and its successors ;
2. To use the good offices of ESA for concerting, harmonising and co-ordinating the policies of the member States in all their space activities in the United Nations and other agencies, including in particular the United Nations Outer Space Committee ;
3. To complete the programmes already agreed to and undertake not to query their validity which would create uncertainty in industry ;
4. To formulate a policy with regard to the new era of easier and cheaper access to space through Spacelab ;
5. To formulate an industrial policy on application satellites with a view to exporting European satellite systems and other space hardware especially to the developing countries ;
6. To preserve Kourou not only as a launch base for the Ariane development phase but as a general launch facility for Europe in the future ;
7. To work out a European military space programme and provide the means for its implementation in parallel with the United States military space programme.

Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Richter, Rapporteur)

CHAPTER I

**Reply to the twentieth annual report
of the Council**

1. As your Rapporteur was unable to participate in the Committee's visit to the United States from 16th to 23rd March 1975, he is not in a position to incorporate in his report all the findings and information acquired by the Committee during the visit. However, the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. de Montesquiou, who will report on the visit in a separate document, has kindly provided your Rapporteur with certain American policy statements of interest for this report.

2. Your Rapporteur has noted with satisfaction that American political leaders are convinced of the need for close co-operation between NASA and the European Space Agency. At its meeting on 15th April 1975 the ESA Council appointed the Director-General. The agreement setting up the Agency has now been signed and ratification can take place in the national parliaments. Your Rapporteur is glad that the wish expressed in many of the Assembly's recommendations has now materialised and that a European "NASA" has been born. At last a competent authority and organisation has been established to implement both at home and abroad the programme agreed to at the European Space Conference on 31st July 1973.

3. Europe can participate in the post-Apollo programme by constructing the Spacelab. ESA will also design and construct a European maritime orbital test satellite and develop the Ariane launcher. It will continue the general studies as well as the scientific programme started by the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO).


4. Your Rapporteur therefore welcomes the positive attitude shown in Chapter II of the twentieth annual report of the Council where it is stated that the Council welcomes the Agency and the wider participation which has now been agreed to. Once solutions are found to political difficulties, the Agency will have every chance of making a good start. One of the problems which still had to be solved was that of Kourou. The solution found is that the Kourou base will

be maintained for launching Ariane ; the other members of ESA will contribute towards its upkeep.

5. In its report the Council also discussed, within the framework of scientific, technical and space questions, civil and military aviation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On both questions your Rapporteur has to remark on the lack of co-operation between Western European governments: no coherent European energy programme has been established and your Rapporteur regrets that the Council of Ministers has not shown more concern about military aviation in Europe, one of the main pillars of successful defence. The European military aircraft must be standardised and the industry kept in being in order to ensure a constant flow of new aircraft should there be a demand for them. Time and again history has shown that it is not possible to rely solely on external resources if a speedy resupply becomes necessary.

6. To say that the importance of the military sector has been recognised in the context of an overall nine-power industrial policy does not indicate the urgency with which your Rapporteur feels this matter should be dealt. It is all very well to formulate the principle of a concerted approach in national policies but experience in NATO and WEU has clearly shown that this is not enough. It has often been stated both inside and outside the Assembly that the formulation of a European military procurement policy is a desirable goal and that a study should be made of the procurement of defence equipment, including military aircraft. However, your Rapporteur is of the opinion that military aircraft should not be considered within the overall framework of defence equipment procurement but as a separate item in view of their high cost and sophisticated technology. Even relatively simple fighter aircraft now cost \$5-8 million, while the cost of the B-1 bomber, for example, is estimated by the Pentagon at some \$80 million. A country's aviation budget is often so high that it affects most of its industrial, social and economic policy and it should therefore be examined separately. As no individual European country is able to bear the research and development as well as the production costs of such an item of military hardware, a European approach is essential.

SPACELAB PROGRAMME – EUROPEAN PARTICIPATING MEMBERSTATES AND FUNDING



**ESRO
SPACELAB BUDGET ALLOCATION**

	<u>MAU*</u>
DEFINITION STUDIES	13
MAIN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CONTRACT	191
ESRO INTERNAL COST	66
PROGRAMME CONTINGENCY AND TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT	66
TOTAL	336
(APPROX. MILLION US \$)	(420)

* MID-1974 PRICES
1 AU ≈ 1.26 US \$

FIG. 3

7. Your Rapporteur found the Council's report lacking in expression of serious concern with regard to the problems of civil and military aviation and energy problems which are vital for the economic future of Europe and extremely important for its defence and independence.

CHAPTER II

The new space transportation system

(a) Spacelab developments

8. In 1973 and 1974, practical details were being worked out for the establishment of the European Space Agency. The ESRO structure has been transformed and three programme directorates have been set up: Spacelab, communications programmes, and science and meteorological programmes.

9. The Spacelab programme is midway between science and applications. Spacelab itself is a highly sophisticated vehicle and a very expensive one — 300 million accounting units — and its exploitation will be extremely interesting. In order to have a better idea of Spacelab, on 30th October 1974 the Committee visited VFW-Fokker in Bremen where Spacelab is being constructed. It was briefed on its development and inspected the Spacelab mock-up.

10. The Fokker group has a 100 % subsidiary company — ERNO — which deals with all problems related to space technology and system engineering for VFW-Fokker. In mid-1973 the European Space Conference decided to pursue the Spacelab programme and last year ESRO entrusted the building of Spacelab to ERNO. With the Spacelab programme Europe has entered into a real partnership with the United States. ESRO's ten member States¹ are participating in this programme together with Austria. The main share, over 50 %, and the system management are the responsibility of the Federal Republic.

11. With ERNO as the prime contractor, a consortium has been formed with sixteen companies from the participating European countries.

1. Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.

Development started in June 1974 and will be completed in 1979 with the delivery of the first flight unit. The initial flight is scheduled in 1980.

12. Current plans call for the production of several Spacelabs. Planned experiments are in the scientific and economic fields. Under space conditions experiments will be conducted in the following fields: astronomy, atmospheric physics, earth observation, communication/navigation, space processing, technology, life science. The current planning of NASA shows Spacelab flights to 1989 with approximately 500 missions and 682 payloads, i.e. various experiment combinations that will be self-contained, of which 346 are automatic and 336 are Spacelab payloads. It is estimated that approximately 10 % of the economic and scientific experiments for Spacelab will be supplied by European countries.

13. In the first half of this year the user community in Europe and the United States will be invited to propose specific experiments for Spacelab's first mission within the framework of the experimental objectives defined by ESRO and NASA. The selection of experiments will begin around July this year.


14. Spacelab — Europe's contribution to the post-Apollo programme — is the largest and most ambitious European space project ever undertaken and provides a means for entry into the manned spaceflight field. It also demonstrates true co-operation between the United States and Europe with the present alignment of responsibility as follows: NASA will build the shuttle, Western Europe the Spacelab and, later, NASA will build the tug.

(b) The shuttle developments

15. In Mr. de Montesquiou's report on an earlier visit to the United States (18th-22nd October 1971)¹ he described the shuttle as consisting of two vehicles, each with a two-man crew: the launch vehicle and the orbiter which straddled the booster. This was the design most favoured by NASA but it had to be abandoned for budgetary reasons. In January 1972 NASA decided that it should be replaced by a solid rocket booster, which would be retrieved after use and refitted for use again. The external tank providing fuel for the shuttle's main engine will be the only expendable element of the shuttle system.

1. Document 564.

SPACE SHUTTLE MISSION PROFILE




16. The orbiter too will be fully reusable and about the size of a DC-9. It will carry a crew of two, plus two passengers, and will be capable of carrying more passengers in special modules in the payload bay. The flight environment will not require special training. The orbiter will stay in orbit for periods ranging from a week to a month. Its tasks will be to ferry people and supplies, or to act as a rescue ship.

17. By replacing most existing launch vehicles, the shuttle is expected to reduce the launch cost per kilo of payload from the present minimum of \$1,300-1,500 to about \$330.

18. With the shuttle, NASA will be able to continue a manned programme and use the shuttle for unmanned flights too. The Spacelab will be placed in low orbit by the shuttle system.

19. The shuttle is the largest item in the present American space programme and dominates the NASA budget. When NASA began the space shuttle programme, research and development costs were estimated at \$5.15 billion in 1971 dollars. Because of budgetary constraints the programme has been slowed down by 13 to 15 months and the cost estimate in 1971 dollars has been increased to \$5.2 billion, i.e. 6.35 billion of

SPACE SHUTTLE USES



The uses of the space shuttle will include launching of unmanned spacecraft into orbit for missions such as those indicated.

today's dollars. Although the space shuttle programme is encountering technical problems they are not of such magnitude as to cause a delay in the programme or otherwise increase the cost.

20. The basic purpose of the space shuttle is to make it easier and less costly to go from the earth into space. The promise of space is such that space operations will become routine and the space shuttle is a step in that direction.

21. The United States Department of Defence is committed to support and utilise the NASA space shuttle.

(c) The tug and the interim upper stage

22. From the very beginning it was clear that the space tug should be built as the third element of the post-Apollo programme. The tug will be used to bring satellites from low earth orbit into high synchronous orbit — a task which goes beyond the capability of the shuttle. The main reasons for developing the space tug are the high traffic rate to synchronous orbits, the high energy requirement of planetary payloads and the payload bay space availability with long payloads.

23. For budgetary reasons NASA will not build an operational space tug before 1983. However, the Department of Defence needs such a vehicle to continue its satellites programme and it therefore decided to develop an interim tug which is now called the interim upper stage. It has six contractors studying this element of the space transportation system which, as forerunner of the space tug, will have to handle all missions from 1979 to 1983.

24. The NASA space tug will incorporate advanced technology and be designed to handle all the NASA, Department of Defence and non-United States Government space missions.

CHAPTER III

The Ariane launcher

25. During the Committee's previous visit to the United States in 1971 it had a number of discussions on the possibilities of using American launchers for European satellites. The result of

these discussions can be found in the report by Mrs. Walz¹.

26. The situation on the availability of American launchers was set out in September 1971 in an exchange of letters between the then United States Under-Secretary of State, Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, and the then Chairman of the European Space Conference, Mr. Théo Lefèvre, Belgian Minister for Scientific Policy and Planning. Mrs. Walz summarised the position in paragraph 53 of her report as follows :

"Your Rapporteur is of the opinion that the recent American proposals give more assurance to the Europeans that American launch facilities will be available ; they are certainly a step forward compared to earlier proposals. Nevertheless, if the European governments agree to act on the basis of Mr. Johnson's latest letter, there will still be a certain risk. However, in order to collaborate one must have confidence in one's partner. The American authorities have already made it clear that the existing plan for an operational regional system of communication satellites, as proposed by the European Space Conference, is acceptable to them ; it would 'cause measurable but not significant economic harm to INTELSAT'."

27. During the Committee's recent visit to the United States this question was again raised. Senator Moss, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, made a statement on this subject, and pointed out that he supported the United States policy of providing launch assistance on an appropriate reimbursable basis to other countries and organisations where the spacecraft were intended for peaceful purposes. He referred to the White House press release of 9th October 1972 and said :

"In this respect I will make a number of points :

- (i) there has never been an occasion when the European Community, collectively through ESRO, or a European government singly, has been denied United States launch services ;
- (ii) the United States experience in working with the Europeans has been

1. Document 562, 29th November 1971, paragraphs 45 to 52.

good and the launch vehicle policy to date has wide acceptance ;

- (iii) the Congress has never insisted on any restriction other than fair and equitable reimbursement ;
- (iv) the President of the United States has declared that United States launcher capability is available to all nations on a non-discriminatory reimbursable basis to launch spacecraft which are intended for peaceful purposes."

28. It is logical to suppose that European countries have to implement international treaties such as the INTELSAT agreement once they have acceded to them. Senator Moss ended his statement by declaring that he did not foresee any situation in which a serious problem would arise for any of the European States.

29. The American position is therefore less rigid than it was some years ago.

30. In the meantime, on 28th December 1973, the ESRO countries decided to start the Ariane launcher programme. The execution of the programme was entrusted to the French space agency (CNES) which would bear 62.5 % of the cost of the programme, which was estimated at 371 million accounting units. The participants in the programme would contribute, in their national currency, the following percentages or fixed contributions :

Belgium		5.0 %
Denmark		0.5 %
France		62.5 %
Federal Republic of Germany	DM.	320 m. ¹
Italy	Lire	5,000 m. ²
Netherlands		2.0 %
Spain		2.0 %
Sweden		1.1 %
Switzerland		1.2 %
Other countries		1.37 %

31. The United Kingdom would not make a direct contribution but reached a bilateral agreement with France whereby it contributed indirectly.

1. Fixed contribution, subject to revision in 1978.

2. Fixed contribution.

32. The Ariane launcher project definition was completed at the end of 1973 and in February 1974 CNES was authorised to initiate the development activities.

33. On 16th October 1974 the French Government agreed that CNES could go ahead with the Ariane programme but at the same time several French national experiments were reduced. The French Government hoped that the other governments would agree to implement the decisions taken in Brussels in July 1973 concerning the Europeanisation of the national programmes, i.e. that the nine other ESRO countries would participate in the maintenance of the French base at Kourou.

34. As the Ariane launcher programme has been agreed to, Europe will need Kourou as the launching base. There is no point in having Ariane without Kourou since the Agency cannot negotiate an agreement with NASA to launch Ariane from Cape Kennedy. Even if this were politically possible, the building of the launch tower at Cape Kennedy would be extremely complicated and in the long run the Agency would still be dependent on the United States.

35. During the Committee's visit to the United States it became clear that many American authorities believed that in the last two years Europe had made great strides in building satellites. In general they are equal to the American satellites and in some respects have a superior technology, although of course in certain other fields of satellite technology the Americans are ahead. However, useful collaboration is possible only if both sides are able to contribute a significant level of technology. This is the main difference between now and several years ago. The satellites launched have been successful, their cost quite reasonable and management by both the Agency and industry adequate.

36. Proof of this is that Comsat General (a subsidiary of Comsat) has invited the Agency to collaborate in maritime satellites. The infrastructure for space activities in industry and in the Agency now exists in Europe. Consequently, the European governments having agreed that the Agency would handle application, telecommunications, air navigation, marine and meteorological satellites, the system should be exploited outside member countries and outside Europe and the Agency should therefore support European industry in its efforts to find markets for the system.

37. There is no doubt whatsoever that to find these markets Europe should offer a complete system, i.e. launchers, launch facilities, satellites and ground stations.

Conclusions

38. When your Rapporteur submitted Recommendation 248 on the European Space Agency to the Committee in April last year, he stressed the political reasons for losing no time in providing this Agency with the wherewithal to fulfil its task. The recommendation was adopted by the Assembly on 18th June 1974. The Council replied on 16th September 1974¹ that negotiations on the appointment of a director-general and on other outstanding issues were taking place at the European Space Conference. However, it was a year before solutions were found for the questions outstanding. This again shows the slowness with which the European governments act on relatively minor points and how difficult it is to set the decision-making machinery in motion. However, in the meantime ESRO has set up a new organisation and programme directorates have been established.

39. Europe's rôle in the development of the new space transportation system, especially in Spacelab, has been confirmed and thoughts should now be given as to how to widen collaboration with the United States and what form it should take in the long term. What is Europe going to propose with regard to the future management of the shuttle? How should Europe's rôle be defined in the use of future Spacelabs? The present agreements should be extended in the 1980s. A new policy should therefore be established. The governments must now begin to discuss the long-term programme of collaboration with the United States.

40. The ten participating countries of ESA have agreed that the Agency should be a forum for concerting, harmonising and co-ordinating the space policies of member States. The new organisation has a mandate to integrate new national programmes into a common European space programme. The drop in the amount of money which the national governments are prepared to spend on space will force them to eliminate overlapping. This is possible only if all national activ-

ities are openly discussed within the Agency. Duplication and rivalry could then be avoided. In the new era of easy and cheap access to space this will be more necessary than before.

41. Your Rapporteur wishes to point out that in the United Nations, and in particular in its Outer Space Committee, serious discussions are being held on space law. Significant space treaties have already come into being. This work will assume even greater importance with full recognition of the usefulness of television broadcasting by satellite to community receivers and remote sensing. It is in Europe's highest interest for the member countries of ESA to speak insofar as possible with one voice and to this end they must hold discussions amongst themselves before adopting a public stand in the United Nations.

42. In the days of ELDO and ESRO, the validity of programmes was sometimes queried after they had been agreed to. The governments of the member countries should undertake not to give grounds for a renewal of such uncertainty for the new organisation and for industry. Vast sums of money are involved and if governments go back on decisions already taken, money, time and opportunities will be lost.

43. By replacing most existing launch vehicles, the shuttle is expected to reduce the launch cost per kilo of payload from the present minimum of \$1,300-1,500 to about \$330. Although the consequences of this cost reduction cannot yet be foreseen, it is likely that, just as with any other new transportation system, the demand will increase very quickly and become many times greater than with the old expensive system. Application satellites will be in demand by many countries and Europe should therefore formulate an industrial policy with a view to external markets. The European space industry will wish to reap the benefits of its space research and development and governments should create an atmosphere in which this legitimate desire can be fulfilled.

44. Without Kourou it would be extremely difficult to have an independent industrial policy and to offer third countries a complete application satellite system.

45. In his statement to the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, the Director of Defence Research and Engineering of the Pentagon declared that the new navigational

1. See Appendix.

satellite system called NAVSTAR was leaving its research and development stage. The highly accurate position and velocity measurements to any element of the United States forces equipped with NAVSTAR receivers would have a revolutionary effect on the strategic and tactical forces.

46. On the Soviet Union's defence space programme he declared that the Soviet Union was spending very important sums on its military space programme — considered far more than is included in the American budget. For fiscal year 1976 the United States space programme budget amounts to about \$2,700 million, which is higher than for fiscal year 1974.

47. As the European space effort in the military field cannot be handled by the European Space Agency because of its membership, a common European military space programme should be discussed between the defence ministers and other competent ministers of the member countries. In view of existing links between the United States and these countries, such a programme should be in line with the United States military space programme. This could also be important for the aerospace industry in Europe.

48. Your Rapporteur has presented these thoughts in the preliminary draft recommendation attached to this report.

APPENDIX

RECOMMENDATION 248 ¹
***on the European Space Agency* ²**

The Assembly,

I. Taking note of the parts of the nineteenth annual report of the Council on scientific, technological and space questions and considering the time taken by the Council in answering the Assembly's recommendations on aviation and nuclear policies ;

**

II. Welcoming the draft convention for the establishment of a European Space Agency ;

Noting that it did not prove possible to bring the European space activities into the framework of the European Communities and hence into that of the future European political union, but considering that the situation might be turned to better account by promoting a wider membership of the agency ;

Regretting that through delays in nominating a director-general and other senior officials the European Space Agency could not start work on 1st April 1974 ;

Aware of the draft resolution on the establishment of relations between the agency and the Council of Europe, appended to the final act ;

Conscious of the need made evident by the energy crisis to accelerate study, research and development on European earth resources satellites to conduct surveys, *inter alia*, for deposits of concentrated minerals,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. Answer in an appropriate manner and with greater alacrity the Assembly's recommendations on topical questions such as "an aviation policy for Europe" and "nuclear policies" ;

**

II. Invite all free Western European countries to join or be associated with the European Space Agency and its scientific and technological work or its application satellites ;

Convey to the governments concerned the political reasons for losing no time in providing the agency with the wherewithal to fulfil its task and urge the immediate appointment of a director-general and other senior officials in order to assure that the programme will be executed as foreseen ;

Seek to include in the abovementioned convention a commitment by the European Space Agency to co-operate with the Assemblies of the Council of Europe and Western European Union as well as with the national parliaments of the member countries, and to submit to them an annual report for information or an opinion and, if it is not possible to include this in the convention, to amend the resolution accordingly ;

Urge the Council of the European Space Agency to implement its programme without forgetting to promote in the near future, in the framework of its application satellites programme, research and development of earth resources satellites.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 18th June 1974 during the First Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session (2nd Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Richter on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 639).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 248

1. On the substance and speed of replies to Assembly recommendations, the Council draw attention to their reply to Assembly Recommendation 249.

2. The Council would welcome wider participation in the European Space Agency as suggested in the first sub-paragraph of paragraph II of the recommendation. Those participating in the European Space Conference, from which the European Space Agency will be formed, include all member governments of the European Communities (with the exception of Luxembourg) and several other governments. The draft European Space Agency Convention contains provision for new membership, associate membership and participation by non-member States in particular programmes.

The Council share the Assembly's concern about the delay in the appointment of a Director-General and other senior officials to the European Space Agency. Negotiations on this and other outstanding issues are at present taking place at the European Space Conference.

As for co-operation with parliamentary bodies, draft Resolution No. 5 appended to the draft Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries set up to establish the European Space Agency is designed to maintain the arrangements which have applied hitherto to ELDO and ESRO. Parliamentary discussion of the work of these organisations was facilitated by an arrangement by which their annual reports were sent for information to the Council of Europe where they were debated in the Consultative Assembly. The texts of the draft convention and the draft resolution are the product of much negotiation between all the member States of the European Space Conference, some of whom are members of neither the European Communities, nor the Council of Europe nor Western European Union. Consequently, the Council do not consider it desirable to amend them.

The programme agreed at the ministerial meeting of the European Space Conference on 31st July 1973 for creation of the European Space Agency, participation in the United States post-Apollo programme by the construction of the European Space Laboratory (SPACELAB), design and construction of a European Maritime Orbital Test Satellite (MAROTS) and development of a European heavy rocket launcher (Ariane), is already well under way. The importance of the research and development of earth resources satellites is recognised by most member States of the European Space Conference, several of which are developing their own earth resources surveying facilities. It is expected that earth resources satellites will be discussed when future programmes for applications satellites are discussed in the Council of the European Space Agency.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 16th September 1974.

State of European security
General report for the twentieth anniversary of the Assembly

REPORT ¹

submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Critchley, Chairman, and MM. Dankert, Duvieusart, Wall and Lemmrich, Rapporteurs

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1. Adopted in Committee by 8 votes to 4 with 4 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Critchley (Chairman) ; MM. Klepsch (Substitute : Haase), Dankert (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Averardi, Beauguitte (Substitute : Delorme), Bizet, Bouulloche, Kempinaire, Konen, de Koster, Lemmrich,

Ménard, Pawelczyk, Pendry, Prescott (Substitute : Faulds), Richter, Rivière, Roper, Schugens, Tanghe (Substitute : Duvieusart), Vedovato, Wall, de Niet, Schmidt.

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

- D. Future developments for the 1980s and 1990s
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Introductory note

In preparing this report the Rapporteurs had interviews as follows :

Mr. Dankert (Chapter III)

<i>Canada</i>	Associate Deputy Minister (Policy), Department of National Defence, Mr. D. H. Kirkwood	} Ottawa 24th-25th June 1974
	Chief of the Defence Staff, General J. A. Dextraze	
	Vice-Chief, Lt.-General A. C. Hull	
	Director General, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of External Affairs, Mr. E. P. Black	
<i>France</i>	Chef d'Etat-Major des Forces Armées, Général de l'Armée Aérienne François Maurin	Paris 20th May 1974
<i>Germany</i>	Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Mr. Georg Leber	} 20th June 1974
	Leiter des Planungsstabes im Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Vice-Admiral Steinhaus	
	Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr, Admiral A. Zimmermann	
	Konteradmiral Trebesch im Führungsstab der Streitkräfte	
<i>Netherlands</i>	Defence Minister, Mr. H. Vredeling	} 29th August 1974
	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff, Lt.-Gen. Wijting	
<i>United States</i>	Assistant Secretary of Defence/ISA, Mr. R. Ellsworth	} 27th-28th June 1974
	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer	
	J 5 of the Joint Staff, Lt.-General Elder	
	Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, State Department, Mr. James G. Lowenstein	
<i>NATO</i>	Chairman of the Military Committee, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Norton (UK, RN)	8th July 1974
	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Andrew Goodpaster (USA)	} 4th June 1974
	Deputy Chief-of-Staff, SHAPE, Lt.-General Franz Josef Schulze (GEA)	
	Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe, General Ernst Ferber (GEA)	5th June 1974
	Commander Central Army Group, General Davidson (USA)	} 1st July 1974
	Chief-of-Staff, HQ Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force, GM Barkhorn (GEAF)	
	Commander Northern Army Group, General Sir Harry Tuzo (UK)	} 12th July 1974
Commander Second Allied Tactical Air Force, Air Marshal Sir Nigel Maynard (UKAF)		

Mr. Wall (Chapter V)

- Brussels* *NATO*
- United Kingdom Delegation to NATO :
 H. E. Sir Edward Peck, Permanent Representative, and
 Mr. William Perry
 Dr. Gardiner Tucker, Assistant Secretary-General for Defence
 Support
 Mr. G. Schöner, Director of Armaments and Defence Research
 Mr. J. Stone, Director of Planning and Logistics
 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Norton, Chairman of the
 Military Committee
- 21st November 1974
- Paris* *Aérospatiale*
- Monsieur R. Chevalier, Directeur, Engins-Espace, General Crépin,
 President, Euromissile, and General Chaboreau
- 2nd December 1974
- London* *British Aircraft Corporation*
- Colonel H. Lacy, London Director, Guided Weapons Division
Hawker Siddeley Dynamics
 Mr. J. B. Waite, Sales Manager, SRAAM Division
- 19th December 1974
- Paris* *Engins Matra*
- Monsieur Jean-Luc Lagardère, General Manager, General van
 Hinh, Military Division, Mr. Robert Wimphen, Military Division
- 20th February 1975
- Rome* *Selenia*
- Dr. P. Pique, Director, Radar and Missiles
 Dr. Della Chiesa
 Dr. Marra
 General Pandolfini
Oto Melara and Breda Meccanica Bresciana
 Admiral Glicerio Azzoni
 Dr. Andrea Francavilla
Sistel
 Professor Giovanni Malaman, Managing Director
 Dr. M. Bartoli, Technical Director
- 5th - 6th March 1975
- Mr. Lemmrich (Chapter VI)*
- Paris* *Ministry of Defence*
- Monsieur Gérard Hibon, Minister Plenipotentiary in the Private
 Office of the Minister
- 21st April 1975

The Committee as a whole met at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 18th February where it met with the Chairmen of the Defence Committees in the national parliaments of the WEU countries, and was briefed by Mr. R. Chevalier, Directeur Engins-Espace, of Aérospatiale, and by Mr. L. A. Sanson, Sales and Service Director, assisted by Mr. J. P. Corbett, Europe Sales Manager of British Aircraft Corporation. The Committee then held a joint meeting with the WEU Standing Armaments Committee (the joint body being known as the Liaison Sub-Committee on the Joint Production of Armaments), attended by :

Colonel J. Quaniers (Belgium), Général P. Brindeau (France), Colonel R. Acker (Federal Republic of Germany), General V. Campana (Italy), Mr. R. P. M. van Wensen (Netherlands), Mr. W. Perry (United Kingdom), H. E. Mr. F.-K. von Plehwe, Acting Secretary-General of WEU, H. E. Mr. Alain Plantey, Assistant Secretary-General of WEU, Head of the Standing Armaments Committee Secretariat.

On 19th February the Committee with the Chairmen of the national defence committees visited the ballistic missile submarine base of the French Force Océanique Stratégique, where it was briefed by Rear-Admiral Pierre Emeury, commanding the Force Océanique Stratégique, and by Capitaine de Vaisseau Fages, commanding the ballistic missile submarine base. Members visited the French ballistic missile submarine Foudroyant and the missile assembly shop.

The Committee as a whole visited Athens on 18th March where it was addressed by H. E. Mr. D. Bitsios, Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, and held a discussion with H. E. Mr. Constantin Stavropoulos, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the following members of the Greek Parliament : MM. Theocharis Rendis, André Andrianopoulos, Démètre Franghos, Constantin Ghiatracos, Jean Mineos, Zacharias Kratsas, Agnelos Pnevmatikos, Achilles Papaloucas, Georges Iordanides, Constantin Coniotakis, Anastas Minis, Jean Charalambopoulos. The Committee much regretted that the address by H. E. Mr. E. Averoff, Greek Minister of Defence, had to be cancelled because of travel difficulties arising from an airport strike.

The Committee visited Ankara on 20th and 21st March where it was addressed by H. E. Mr. İlhami Sançar, Minister of Defence, General Olçay, Under-Secretary, Ministry of Defence, with Mr. Erecüment Yavuzalp, Director-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Committee was then addressed by H. E. Mr. M. Esenbel, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and held a discussion with the following members of the Turkish Parliament : Mr. Hasan Isik, Chairman ; Senator Orhan Alp ; Senator Ahat Alpan ; General Muksin Batur ; Senator Celikleas ; Mr. Kemalettin Crökakin ; Mr. İlyas İnlic ; Mr. Özer Ölçmen ; Mr. Hasan Tosyali ; Mr. Sirri Turanlı ; Senator Ahmet Yıldız.

The Committee visited the CENTO Secretariat-General where it was received by General Ali Karimloo (Iran), Chairman of the CENTO Permanent Military Deputies Group, and the Permanent Military Deputies of Pakistan, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States, and by Major-General Colin C. Hamilton (USAF), Chief of Staff, and briefed on CENTO and its activities.

The Committee visited the Makina Kimya Kurumu small-arms ammunition factory, where it was welcomed by Mr. Reçi Baturalp, Director General, and briefed by Mr. Nejat Akyak, Marketing and Export Manager.

On 22nd March the Committee visited HQ Allied Land Forces South-East Europe and HQ 6 Allied Tactical Air Force at Izmir, where it was briefed by General Melvin Zais (US Army), Commander Allied Land Forces South-East Europe, and by Lt.-General Sanford K. Moats, Commander 6th Allied Tactical Air Force, and their staffs.

The Committee met finally at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 29th April 1975, when it discussed and adopted the present report.

The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials and senior officers who addressed it and replied to questions. The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the Committee.

Draft Recommendation
on the state of European security

The Assembly,

- (i) Having debated the state of European security in the light of the report of its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ;
- (ii) Believing that satisfactory détente through the various East-West negotiations can be achieved only if the real military capability of the Soviet Union is borne in mind, if the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance is assured, and if sufficient collective defences are maintained by the NATO powers through the allocation of adequate resources and their most rational joint use ;
- (iii) Calling for certain organisational and planning changes on the central front ;
- (iv) Stressing the importance of the northern and southern flanks to the security of Europe, and the need for political and military measures to prevent their isolation from the centre ;
- (v) Calling for practical measures to achieve much greater joint production of armaments, especially tactical missiles ;
- (vi) Calling for the collective defence commitment of the Brussels Treaty to be retained in any future European union, and stressing the importance of Eurogroup meanwhile, as the framework for practical expression of the European defence identity,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

1. That it bear in mind the need for greater cohesion in the Atlantic Alliance at a time when parity between the superpowers has made international relations as a whole more complex and less predictable ;
2.
 - (a) That it welcome the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at summit level to prepare the conference on security and co-operation in Europe ;
 - (b) That all proposals advanced by NATO countries in the MBFR negotiations should be subject to prior agreement in NATO, and that any reductions agreed in the MBFR negotiations should
 - (i) concern first the forces of the superpowers, and (ii) be asymmetric so as to reduce the present Warsaw Pact conventional superiority ; (iii) may include theatre nuclear weapons ;
3. That it request the North Atlantic Council to take note of the study by General de Maizière and :
 - (a) to consider the availability of new and reserve formations to make any improvements in the deployment pattern of forces on the central front ;
 - (b) to improve political decision-making procedures to make full use of available warning time in the event of threatened aggression ;
 - (c) to revise the dictum that logistics are a national responsibility ;
 - (d) to modify the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons ;
 - (e) to press for greater specialisation in defence tasks by country ;
4. That it ask member governments to urge :
 - (a) in the North Atlantic Council (i) that full support be given to all political and military measures necessary to prevent the isolation of the flanks, and to ensure the necessary conditions for maintaining a regular supply of armaments to all allied countries ; (ii) that advantage be taken of the May summit meeting to facilitate a settlement of the differences between Greece and Turkey ;

(b) in the International Civil Aviation Organisation, that Greece and Turkey be invited to withdraw their respective NOTAMs that prevent aircraft flying freely between the two countries ;

5. That it request the North Atlantic Council to ensure that all bodies concerned with arms production concentrate on the immediate need for the introduction of standardised tactical missile systems, and that it adopt the following procedures: (i) make the Military Committee responsible for determining the standard military characteristics to be applied in deciding on the development and the procurement of weapons systems, beginning with tactical missiles ; (ii) make initially 1% of national research and development budgets available for NATO development projects to be decided by the Military Committee and Defence Support Division ;

6. (a) That it draw the attention of all members to the importance of Eurogroup as the most appropriate organ at present in which to arrange practical matters of European defence co-operation that are not effectively dealt with in NATO, on the understanding that problems of nuclear defence are the responsibility of the Alliance as a whole ;

(b) That it instruct the Secretary-General to submit to Mr. Tindemans before the end of June 1975 the views of the Council on the place of defence in a future European union, with the request that such union retain the mutual defence commitment of the Brussels Treaty.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Critchley, Chairman, and MM. Dankert, Duviolsart, Wall and Lemmrich, Rapporteurs)

I. Introduction

(submitted by Mr. Critchley, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1.1 To mark the twentieth anniversary of the WEU Assembly, the Committee has produced a comprehensive report on the state of European security comprising a draft recommendation with several distinct paragraphs, and an explanatory memorandum with correspondingly numbered chapters by different Rapporteurs, which comment on some of the chief problems, but by no means all the problems, of European security today.

1.2 In 1961, after the first six years of its activity, the Committee submitted a similar comprehensive report¹, on which the Assembly, in December 1961, adopted Recommendation 69². In this introduction it is instructive to recall the points made in that recommendation, and compare them with the problems dealt with in the present report. Many of the Committee's preoccupations are the same today; some have changed because of changed circumstances in European and world relations.

1.3 The year 1961 was a year of confrontation. The Soviet Union had unquestioned superiority in conventional forces in Europe. President Kennedy took office in the United States after an election campaign in which the "missile gap" figured prominently. Despite, or because of, the shock to the West in 1957, when the Soviet Union became the first country to launch a satellite, the United States missile programme proved to be far more sophisticated and was already providing "hardened" second-generation "second strike" missiles that were to ensure clear United States strategic superiority in the 1960s. The Soviet navy, except for submarines, was a negligible force, operating close to its own coasts. In June 1961 came the Soviet threats to Berlin leading to the most serious confrontation between the two alliances. The next year Mr. Khrushchev

had to back down, but after confronting the United States over Cuba the Soviet Union immediately started its large naval construction programme, the consequences of which have only recently been felt. Both countries launched a man into orbit for the first time in 1961, and the Soviet Union shattered hopes for a test ban with a new series of nuclear tests in the atmosphere. Britain had nuclear weapons; France had conducted nuclear tests; China did not do so until 1964.

1.4 In 1975 there is more emphasis on détente than on confrontation between the superpowers and the two military alliances. The basic policy of NATO today is declared to be "based on the twin principles of defence and détente". International treaties have banned, with varying degrees of success: nuclear tests in the atmosphere; nuclear weapons in outer space and Latin America; military installations and nuclear tests in Antarctica; and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In 1975, half a dozen different international conferences are dealing with various aspects of arms control, disarmament and the relaxation of tension. Yet the Soviet Union now has a formidable navy operating in the world's oceans, and strategic nuclear parity with the United States; it has maintained its conventional superiority in Europe. With stalemate between the superpowers, their ability to influence events in the rest of the world has declined. The bargaining power of the third world has increased through its control of raw materials.

1.5 In 1961, in Recommendation 69, the Assembly first stressed the need to bring NATO land forces on the central front up to the agreed minimum of thirty divisions; today the Committee calls for the allocation of adequate resources to defence, and for asymmetric reductions in any MBFR agreement designed to reduce Warsaw Pact superiority. Recommendation 69 called for genuine standardisation and common develop-

1. State of European security, Document 215, 10th November 1961.

2. Text at Appendix I.

ment and production, and for development projects to be put into production only if adopted by at least three countries ; the Committee has to make a similar recommendation today ; the large number of national weapons projects competing for procurement bears pathetic witness to the failure to achieve real progress. Recommendation 69 called for "nuclear anarchy" to be avoided, as the Committee's report devoted a chapter of its report to the problems of ensuring the availability and political control of nuclear weapons ; the Committee today is less urgently concerned with these problems — no doubt the Nuclear Planning Group and participation of SHAPE officers from European countries in the United States strategic planning in Omaha have solved some of them — and it now recommends that the deployment of theatre nuclear weapons be modified and reduced, preferably through East-West agreement. Recommendation 69 called for revisions in the command structures ; today the Baltic Command structure has been reorganised but the Committee has other more urgent recommendations concerning the flanks. In Recommendation 69 the Assembly called for the full application of the Brussels Treaty ; today the Committee, in another report¹ calls attention to the same shortcomings. In 1961, the Assembly called for the better provision of defence information to the Defence Committee,

and for better parliamentary control of defence expenditure ; today the Committee finds informal arrangements enable it to be better informed than in its earlier days. Finally, in 1961 the Committee's report expressed concern at the development of space capabilities by the Soviet Union and the prospect that they might affect the defence posture of the West ; today space problems do not concern the Committee — satellites now play a vital part in military communications, observation and navigation, and may have contributed indirectly to détente.

1.6 In 1975 the unsolved problems of the Middle East with the permanent risk of conflict ; the inevitable suffering that accompanies United States disengagement from South-East Asia ; world-wide inflation and recession ; the differences between two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey ; and the reduction in real terms of defence expenditure in the countries of the West at a time of rising Soviet expenditure, all these problems leave many uncertainties in any assessment of the state of European security. But since its inception NATO has served the interests of European security well. If the effort is maintained and the defence resources of the European members are used in common, the Committee should be able to make a more favourable report when next it undertakes a comprehensive review.

1. Application of the Brussels Treaty, Document 673.

CHAPTER II

*The Warsaw Pact and East-West negotiations**(submitted by Mr. Critchley, Chairman and Rapporteur)*

2.1 We can measure Soviet power, but what of its intentions? Despite détente, the Russians continue to strengthen the forces of the Warsaw Pact, which enjoy a superiority both in ready-forces and reinforcements way beyond what is necessary for defence. At the same time the West is faced by a three-way erosion of its security: military, economic, and political.

2.2 In the West, a high rate of inflation, growing balance-of-payments deficits and industrial recession are compelling reductions in defence spending, and at a time when defence costs are themselves rising rapidly, thus eroding the margin of technological superiority vitally important for the weaker side. As living standards fall, limited public support for spending on defence against a threat which is neither readily perceived nor broadly understood could also fall.

2.3 At one level the "era of negotiation" continues. The Soviet-American entente has been reconfirmed by the meeting at Vladivostok in November 1974, and their agreed framework for a possible SALT agreement.

2.4 At Vladivostok, President Ford and Mr. Brezhnev reached agreement on the principles to be included in a ten-year treaty to replace the May 1972 five-year interim agreement on strategic offensive arms. Under the Vladivostok principles, each side will be limited to a ceiling of 2,400 for the total of ICBMs, SLBMs, airborne ballistic missiles with a range exceeding 600 km, and heavy bombers in service; of that total, not more than 1,320 missiles will be fitted with MIRVs. The 1972 restrictions on new launching sites are maintained. No other limitations are placed on improvements to existing missiles, or the introduction of MIRVs, and no on-site inspection is provided for. This agreement would permit the United States to increase its present total of some 2,150 strategic systems, but whether it does so will depend on Soviet actions as the United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. Schlesinger, has made clear in his annual report for the financial years 1976 and 1977:

"Assuming that the Soviet leaders exhibit restraint in their application of the agreement's principles, we are prepared to exercise restraint as well. However, until we

obtain solid evidence of Soviet restraint, we shall plan for deployment of approximately 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles and 1,320 MIRVed missiles. How we proceed on these accounts will depend essentially on the actions of the Soviet Union. They currently have the initiative, and it is up to them to decide how much additional effort the two sides should put into these programmes. In making their decision, they should remember that the tortoise won because the hare did not try very hard very often. This hare may be different."

The outcome in the immediate future is likely to be the introduction of MIRVed systems in the Soviet Union to add to the numerical missile advantage that country already enjoys.

2.5 The MBFR talks appear to have made little if any progress while the Soviet Union, which seeks an early "summit" in order to conclude the conference on security and co-operation, may be at the point of making modest concessions both on basket three, the freer movement of people, ideas and information, and on the confidence-building measures (CBM) which might enhance security by the notification of military movements and manoeuvres in advance. It has been often asserted that the Russian motive for calling for a European security conference was the ratification of the status quo; given recent changes in the comparative position of the West, which has been much weakened by a series of events, this could turn out to be of greater advantage than was originally thought!

2.6 The West must avoid reaching agreements which provide an illusion of security. With regard to CBM, it is important that the West extracts from the Soviet Union several weeks' notice of manoeuvres that take place within 700 km of frontiers, notice which covers military formations down to divisional size; and that information of this kind be given to all European States. On basket three, we should seek freedom for individual travel. With regard to any permanent machinery that might be set up, the most advantageous arrangement would be the calling of a review conference after two years have elapsed. Finally, the West should not sign four separate

documents, but a single document only, in order to demonstrate that all baskets rank equally in importance.

2.7 Historians love dates. If so, then October 1973 is a date of quite remarkable importance. The oil embargo, and the rise in oil prices at the insistence of a cartel, OPEC — not an act of trade — marks the end of the post-war period. It has put an end to the inevitability of progress in the West. It was an act of force, the effect of which was to accelerate inflation, and endanger international monetary and economic co-operation. It implies that the threat to Europe's financial stability is to be considered more important than the threat to Europe's security. By its action, OPEC has raised the spectre of conflict within Western Europe between two kinds of security: military security which is a factor of the American commitment to Europe; and economic security, which is dependent upon supplies of oil. The Arab oil embargo has become the central fact of Europe's existence.

2.8 In Europe, the inability of governments to cope with the economic crises, the threat of subversion, a growing sense of cultural pessimism, and a lack of progress towards unity, are combining to create a crisis of confidence in our political leaders and in our institutions. Democracy is seen either as having failed to respond effectively to the demands of a changing economic or political situation or to safeguard an established way of life. Greece has returned to democracy but is embroiled with Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean, and wishes to quit the military organisation of NATO. Portugal may be in the process of exchanging one form of authoritarian rule for another. The economic situation has put considerable pressure on defence budgets in all Western European countries (and in some, including Britain, this has led to decisions to make significant reductions). In which case we ought to focus our attention upon the concentration of military power in Eastern Europe.

2.9 While accepting a legitimate Soviet interest in its security, a fact which of itself would justify a proportion at least of its contribution to the Warsaw Pact, there are two distinctively different views as to the objectives of Russian foreign policy. It can be argued that a self-confident Soviet Union seeks only to safeguard its interests, and those of its allies. Thus, Russia is prepared to move cautiously from confrontation to détente, providing that the West responds in similar fashion. The Russian leaders need assurance that the West is without aggressive intent, and does

not seek to "intervene" in the internal affairs of either the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. A sizeable Soviet armoury can serve both to defend Russia, and to permit it to control the rate of political change among its allies. Soviet strategic nuclear power is sufficient to deter either the United States or China and, given this fundamentally defensive character, it seeks only to further its own development by peaceful means.

2.10 The rival opinion as to the objectives of Soviet foreign policy is based upon the belief that Russia is seeking to consolidate and enhance its status as a superpower, and to extend its influence world-wide. Thus, while fully aware of the penalties of nuclear warfare, the Russians pursue those policies, including blackmail, which fall short of war but which further their expansionist aims. They follow a policy of accommodation with the United States, and of advantage elsewhere. They pose as the upholders of the existing order in Europe, where they pursue their objectives through conference politics at Vienna, Geneva and Helsinki, while playing the revolutionary in the Middle East. They gave full support to OPEC, and are partisans of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, whose inclusion in the discussion of the Arab-Israel dispute can only make a settlement less likely. They talk of security but practice hegemony. They talk of détente but follow the politics of advantage. They have no need to exploit present western discontents. They have only to play a waiting game. The sword of Damocles has been responsible for more victories than the sword of Caesar.

2.11 In any event, whatever Russian intentions may be, détente and peaceful coexistence will be the means it will adopt. To threaten Europe directly would be to strengthen NATO's resolve, an act that would be counter-productive. Dr. E.M. Chossudovsky, Representative in Europe of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, writing in a personal capacity in the London Times of 3rd July 1974, but no doubt reflecting a Soviet "establishment" viewpoint, defined peaceful coexistence as follows: "a form of historic conflict on a global scale between capitalism and socialism, linked with the revolutionary process and the concomitant class struggle, though it implies, at the same time, the possibility of mutually advantageous co-operative inter-systems' transactions in diverse fields." As a means of ideological and economic conflict, peaceful coexistence should be recognised as "the guiding principle of a new international system that might emerge from the

process of détente" but it is "ultimately bound to be superseded by an era of socialism". Faced with this definition, it would be naive for the West to believe that it implied a "live and let live" attitude.

2.12 If the Russians are seeking to extend their influence when the opportunity occurs, they could be constrained by a policy of détente. Any Soviet initiative would need to be weighed in the balance against its effect upon the Americans and upon Europe. Such considerations must have been taken into account at the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, of the October war, of the Cyprus crisis, and of the continuing crisis in Portugal. If Mr. Cunhal still keeps Portuguese officers in NATO, and sends a representative to Radio Free Europe in Munich, it is only because he has received Russian advice to do so. Even so, there are western fears that by using détente as a means and not an end — as a tactic and not a goal — the Soviet Union could successfully shift the world balance of power in its favour. A sense of false security is a situation in which security is no longer seen as a factor of military and political power. By neglecting defence, the West may come to relearn this lesson were Russia to re-apply military and political pressures upon an adversary weakened in power and resolution.

2.13 Herein lies the rub. Arguments over intentions and capabilities are well-rehearsed; although intentions can change overnight, the power to achieve these intentions takes a great deal longer to create. Whether the aims of the Soviet Union be peaceful or expansionist, the *strength* of the Warsaw Pact cannot be ignored. In Central Europe, in general terms, the Warsaw Pact has 20 % more soldiers than NATO; 30 to 40 % more soldiers in fighting units; two-and-a-half times the number of tanks, and twice as many guns. An overall ratio of two to one against NATO in combat aircraft hides more significant imbalances when specific aircraft rôles are taken into account, particularly those of air defence and ground attack. Overall, the trend is one of a continuing shift in favour of the East, for not only is the quantitative gap increasing, the weapons systems of the Warsaw Pact forces are also becoming more sophisticated. Moreover, with lines of communication which are shorter than those of NATO, thus facilitating the reinforcement of Warsaw Pact forces — another factor where they enjoy a short- and middle-term superiority — and with the added advantage of the initiative, the asymmetry in force levels could be tilted even more in favour of the eastern bloc should a

crisis occur and NATO be slow to respond to political warning.

2.14 One can only conclude that should the Soviet Union have expansionist aspirations, and be content to permit the consequences of détente to weaken the forces of NATO before exerting pressure on individual members of the Alliance, then the force levels maintained at present by the Pact have a rational basis. On the other hand, if Russian aims are solely peaceful, if it is a "satisfied power", then Warsaw Pact forces appear far in excess of those required only for defence. What is fundamental to a revision of the foreign policy objective of the Soviet Union is that it has a military capability which could enable it to adopt a policy of expansionism (power commands respect: respect commands obedience) whenever it might wish to do so — no matter what it may proclaim its intentions to be in the meantime.

2.15 Soviet Russia, national and revolutionary, has one dominant political ideology and strategy; but all the practical problems of NATO, as a collective defence organisation, derive from the variety and mutability of interests and opinions in its fifteen different States. It is hard to arrive at common positions. The beginnings of a joint approach to the problems of inflation, finance and energy have only been achieved after a series of summit meetings. Nevertheless, in their dealings with the eastern bloc, the aims of western nations have a similar basis and that is a desire for stability conducive to rational and business-like discussions, and where proper account is taken of the views of the participants. By jointly involving both sides in an increasing number of contacts and arrangements, in which each has a clearly-defined incentive for their continuance, a system may be developed for further progress and closer co-operation in East-West relations. Thus, any dissension may be kept within bounds, and resolved without recourse to force. However, the West believes that further progress should now come from a freer interchange of people, information and ideas. At present, the Soviet Union seems to accept that it should be free to disseminate its views in the West but that a reciprocal freedom constitutes an interference in the internal affairs of the communist countries.

2.16 Unless the Warsaw Pact agrees to asymmetrical reductions in military strength between the two sides in Central Europe, while itself taking the larger cuts so that the present asymmetry in force levels is corrected, then the West

is faced with the task of arresting a trend which must lead, if unchecked, to an increasing imbalance. The basic resources of the West in terms of manpower, gross national product, technical inventiveness are, if not superior to the Pact, at least comparable. Furthermore, as the Alliance has no intention whatever of being the aggressor in a European conflict, it should not be necessary to maintain more forces than the Warsaw Pact, nor even to match them. NATO's military power needs to be sufficient to deter an attack against it, and manifestly to reflect the political resolve to do so. The dilemma arises in squaring this vital necessity with the political pressures to reduce defence spending in most allied countries. In short, the Alliance must make better use of its defence resources.

2.17 Western aims may be summarised as the "pragmatic development of a dynamic balance of power", recognising the political, economic and strategic elements of that power. Should the

equilibrium be upset, then the restraint and moderation upon which the balance of power depends for its maintenance may disappear. It is already feared that continuing inflation, or a fifth round in the Arab-Israel conflict, could have the most serious repercussions upon our social, economic, and political security. With its present military superiority, the Soviet Union could then be tempted to further its interests by coercion, if not by the actual use of force. Therefore, to maintain an effective balance of power, it is necessary to counter Soviet military strength, and the possible weakening of other political and economic constraints only gives emphasis to this need. Without the military capacity to deter possible Soviet expansionist policies, the security of Western Europe could be put at risk. Whereas Russia has the capacity to match a variety of intentions, the West could find many of its options foreclosed if it cannot maintain its strength and cohesion should the balance of power be destabilised.

CHAPTER III

The central front*(submitted by Mr. Dankert, Rapporteur)***A. Introduction**

3.1 As your Rapporteur has said in his preface to the study "Rational deployment of forces on the central front" by General Ulrich de Maizière (ret.)¹, that study contains a wealth of information on the general situation on the central front and some of the particular problems of that area. It is not useful therefore to repeat that information in a chapter on the same subject for largely the same group of readers, although responsibility for this chapter rests with the WEU Assembly's Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and with its Rapporteur in particular, while the responsibility for the contents of the study on the rational deployment of forces on the central front is General de Maizière's exclusively.

3.2 The purpose of this chapter on the central front is therefore more limited. It will incorporate some of the conclusions drawn by General de Maizière, comment on others and, more generally, provide a framework in which the rational deployment of forces on the central front and some new related developments have to be seen.

B. Change or no change?

3.3 In order to set the frame of this study and the proposals resulting from it, General de Maizière has made a number of suppositions in regard to security and defence policy. Within the terms of reference laid down by the Assembly — which is to concentrate on the rational deployment of forces on the central front — it was inevitable for the author to proceed as he did, but it must be recognised that his study, because of these necessary suppositions, is as speculative as a study with a somewhat different starting-point.

There are therefore valid reasons for examining, on the basis of actual developments and trends, how speculative General de Maizière's suppositions may be.

These suppositions are :

- " (i) A dramatic change in the political configuration between East and West is not to be expected.
- (ii) The Atlantic Alliance will retain its solidarity. All member nations will continue to base their policy on the agreed twin concept of détente and security. This implies that a relative military balance can be maintained.
- (iii) The results of the negotiations on mutual balanced force reduction (MBFR) will not change the existing relative balance in Central Europe to the disadvantage of the West. Quick results are not to be expected from these negotiations.
- (iv) In the years to come, the member nations will not reduce their financial contributions to military defence but will provide for defence budgets which at least maintain the purchasing power.
- (v) The United States will maintain a substantial conventional and tactical nuclear military presence in Europe.
- (vi) The member nations which take part in an integrated military defence organisation will continue to do so.
- (vii) The strategy of flexible response which includes forward defence will remain the basis of common defence planning.
- (viii) French forces will continue to be stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. The President of the French Republic will continue to reserve to himself the right to decide whether and at what time the French forces shall participate in the combined defence against a military aggression by the Warsaw Pact.
- (ix) Finally, the author presumes that a breakthrough in technical development comparable in dimension to the first employment of nuclear weapons

1. Document 663.

is not to be expected. On the other hand, the further development of conventional and nuclear weapon systems will bring forth remarkable improvements in regard to range, accuracy and lethality. The importance of electronic means of command and control and combat will grow rapidly.

The problems associated with nuclear weapons, especially the question as to what principles should govern their use and how these would affect defence planning, have been considered only inasmuch as they have direct bearing on the subject discussed, i.e. the study of a rational deployment in the central region.”¹

3.4 (i) Is a dramatic change in the political configuration between East and West not to be expected? The current negotiations between East and West, whether bilateral like SALT or multi-lateral like CSCE and MBFR, do not make one expect such a change. If there is progress it is extremely limited and these negotiations do not really threaten the cohesion of the blocs even if from time to time western political commentators express anxiety about United States-USSR “collusion” in SALT at the expense of Western European interests. However, these anxieties, provided there are broadly accepted United States-European policies in other fields, do not really threaten Atlantic solidarity as long as the agreements are of a very limited character or serve in a very clear way the wider global interests of peace and security (as, for example, the non-proliferation treaty).

3.5 (ii) Whether the nations of the Atlantic Alliance will maintain their solidarity is a question far more difficult to answer in a positive way. From that point of view, 1974, notwithstanding a high-sounding declaration on Atlantic relations, was a bad year for NATO. There was :

- the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus and the Aegean — two allies which nearly went to war with each other ;
- anxiety over developments in Portugal leading also to doubts about the continued availability of the Azores (the southern flank continues to be of the utmost importance to the security of

NATO as a whole, and hence to the central region).

On the other hand, the difficulties with Iceland are over since the Icelandic elections.

3.6 There are also the problems in Atlantic relationships, as seen from the United States, and identified by Dr. Kissinger in his speech of 23rd April 1973 :

“The problems in Atlantic relationships are real. They have arisen in part because during the 1950s and 1960s the Atlantic community organised itself in different ways in the many different dimensions of its common enterprise.

- In economic relations, the European Community has increasingly stressed its regional personality ; the United States, at the same time, must act as part of, and be responsible for, a wider international trade and monetary system. We must reconcile these two perspectives.
- In our collective defence, we are still organised on the principle of unity and integration, but in radically different strategic conditions. The full implications of this change have yet to be faced.
- Diplomacy is the subject of frequent consultations, but is essentially being conducted by traditional nation States. The United States has global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests. These are not necessarily in conflict, but in the new era neither are they automatically identical.

In short, we deal with each other regionally and competitively in economic matters, on an integrated basis in defence, and as nation States in diplomacy.”

These problems have not been solved, the declaration on Atlantic relations notwithstanding. The United States Administration is well aware of the difficulties and the need to solve them — but what of Congress and United States public opinion? Is the new Congress more responsive to the mood of America? Opinion polls indicate that things are not going the right way : in a 1964 poll on the priorities of the United States citizen, the first six subjects concerned international relations and defence : in a 1974 poll the first item relating to international relations and defence

1. Document 663, page 68.

came sixteenth, and referred only to the need for the United States to have a strong defence.

3.7 *In Europe* also, nationalism is on the increase. The aftermath of the oil crisis, economic difficulties, political instability in some countries, all have made their contribution. Atlantic solidarity is still there — but it no longer seems to be the emotional solidarity of the late forties and the fifties but a *Realpolitik* solidarity of a rather different character. There are no indications so far that the agreed twin concept of détente and security will suffer from these new circumstances. But it might well be that this is a consequence more of the lack of progress with détente than of general consensus on that twin concept.

3.8 (iii) MBFR — As long as the twin concept of détente and security holds and Mansfield continues to be defeated in the United States Congress, General de Maizière's supposition is probably right.

3.9 (iv) As far as the financial contribution to military defence is concerned, the ability to maintain the real purchasing power of defence budgets, this is a field where uncertainty is great, because of :

- the economic difficulties of the western world ;
- the high rate of inflation which endangers military investment in the United States and in Europe (the United States defence report for the financial year 1976-77 shows inflation on defence budget outlays of 9.4 % from 1973 to 1974 ; 14.4 % from 1974 to 1975) ;
- the United Kingdom defence review and the reductions announced in the 1975 statement on the defence estimates.

It is still too early to conclude that General de Maizière's supposition will not be borne out — but actual developments give no grounds for optimism on this point.

3.10 (v) The United States' conventional and tactical nuclear presence in Europe is subject to certain pressures. There is pressure from Senator Mansfield and his allies — so far resisted by the Senate — for the large-scale withdrawal of United States forces. There is the Nunn amendment calling for a review of the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and the conditions in which they are maintained there. There

is a recent report¹ from the Brookings Institution which concludes, *inter alia*, that such weapons should be reduced from 7,000 to 2,000 and deployed in a less vulnerable manner.

3.11 Nevertheless, there is not much doubt as to the continuing importance of Europe for the security of the United States ; even the disengagement from South-East Asia is unlikely to change this perception of United States interest. However, there are indications that the quality of the security relationship will change, mainly because of the changing strategic balance of power. To quote again from Dr. Kissinger's speech of 23rd April 1973 :

“Today we remain united on the objective of collective defence, but we face the new challenge of maintaining it under radically changed strategic conditions and with the new opportunity of enhancing our security through negotiated reductions of forces.

The West no longer holds the nuclear predominance that permitted it in the 1950s and 1960s to rely almost solely on a strategy of massive nuclear retaliation... The collective ability to resist attack in Western Europe by means of flexible responses has become central to a rational strategy and crucial to the maintenance of peace.

.....

A great deal remains to be accomplished to give reality to the goal of flexible response :

.....

There are still unresolved issues in our doctrine, for example, on the crucial question of the rôle of tactical nuclear weapons.”

This problem is mentioned in paragraphs 3.18 et seq. below.

3.12 Supposition (vi) that members now participating will continue to participate in the integrated military defence organisation presents no problem for your Rapporteur.

3.13 In general, your Rapporteur supports supposition (vii) that flexible response, inclusive of forward defence, will remain the basis of common defence planning, but not unimportant changes in flexible response are highly probable. There is the nuclear problem. Professor Lawrence Martin

1. “United States nuclear weapons in Europe” — Record assisted by Anderson, October 1974.

has suggested¹ a new approach to theatre nuclear weapons designed first to reduce this present vulnerability to sabotage or pre-emptive strike, and second to permit early decision from above, in the event of loss of ground, on interdiction strikes within 200 to 300 km of the battle. This proposal is probably close to the views of Mr. Schlesinger².

Secondly, there is the need of increased flexibility in the land forces in order to be able to deal rapidly with the problem of closing the gap in case of a possible breakthrough (North German Plain — Fulda Gap).

3.14 As for supposition (*viii*) concerning the position of the French forces, a number of questions arise. The declaration of Atlantic relations, signed by the fifteen NATO countries on 26th June 1974, recognised that two of the European members "possess nuclear forces capable of playing a deterrent rôle of their own, contributing to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance...". The communiqué issued after the meeting between Presidents Ford and Giscard d'Estaing on 16th December 1974 said "... they agreed that the co-operation between France and NATO is a significant factor in the security of Europe". The French press attached political significance to the appointment of General Chesnais, a former member of the SHAPE staff, as head of the French Military Mission to NATO. There is no information concerning concrete changes in French relations with NATO, however.

Are these developments indications of a change in French policy or are they not? The question cannot yet be answered. Certainly change is needed. Some American opinion has been highly critical of the previous situation³:

"Thus, as a practical matter, France by its policies reduces the possibility of a conventional defence, and significantly lowers the nuclear threshold by refusing to collaborate in advance for a strong conventional defence. In addition, by refusing to allow use of French territory for practice or detailed planning for dependent evacuation, France jeopardises the safety of some 250,000 United States women and children

1. "Theatre nuclear weapons and Europe", Survival, November/December 1974.

2. United States Defence Department report for the financial years 1976 and 1977, pages III 2 and 3.

3. "Policy troops and the NATO Alliance", report by Senator Nunn to the United States Senate Armed Services Committee, 2nd April 1974, page 3.

who are dependents of United States personnel in Europe.

Actual French participation with NATO is an entangled deal, and includes some limited co-operation on a military but not a political level. Evidently the situation within the French Government is also confused, with some senior Frenchmen talking about increased co-operation but without any action.

Paradoxically, the French insist that United States conventional forces must remain in Europe. However, without French conventional military co-operation and with unilateral French planning and control of their nuclear capability French tactical nuclear weapons, if used in the midst of a conventional engagement between NATO (including United States) and Warsaw Pact forces, could force the United States into a nuclear war. The Alliance has been able to tolerate this bad situation during the period of United States nuclear superiority, but strategic parity makes the French position totally at odds with the best interest of NATO and stability in Central Europe. The French position is also incompatible with a long-term United States commitment in Europe and the Alliance must find ways of resolving this dangerous situation."

3.15 Your Rapporteur accepts supposition (*ix*) that fundamental technological changes of the magnitude of that brought about by the introduction of nuclear weapons are unlikely.

C. Rational deployment

3.16 General de Maizière's study makes it quite clear that present deployment is far from rational. Yet he believes that "in terms of figures, the deployment of the M-day divisions and brigades in these two areas approximately corresponds to the importance of the mentioned defence tasks".¹

To him the main problem is that, in contrast to CENTAG, NORTHAG can rely on only a few reserve brigades for reinforcements. This is well illustrated in a report by Lawrence and Record²:

1. Document 663, paragraph 107.

2. "United States force structure in NATO — An alternative", Brookings Institution, May 1974, Table D-1, page 132.

TABLE D-1

Current and proposed NATO division disposition in the central region opposing Warsaw Pact divisions, and their projected augmentation, M-day to M + 120

Group, country, or requirement	NATO														Axis of attack or country	Warsaw Pact (c)						
	Current disposition of divisions (a)							Proposed disposition of divisions (b)								M day	M+7	M+15	M+30	M+60	M+90	M+120
	M day	M+7	M+15	M+30	M+60	M+90	M+120	M day	M+7	M+15	M+30	M+60	M+90	M+120								
<i>Northern Army Group</i>															<i>Major axis (North German Plain)</i>							
Netherlands	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	3	3	3								
West Germany	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	6	6	6	6	6	6	East Germany	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
United Kingdom	3	3	3	4	5	5	5	3	3	3	4	5	5	5	Poland	2	10	10	10	10	10	10
Belgium	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	Soviet Union	15	17	20	30	37	37	41
United States	2	3	4	6	8	8	11	Total	20	30	33	43	50	50	54
Total	11	12	12	15	16	16	16	13	16	17	22	25	25	28								
Divisions required (d)	11	16	17	22	25	25	27	11	16	17	22	25	25	27								
Surplus or shortage	0	-4	-5	-7	-9	-9	-11	+2	0	0	0	0	0	+1								
<i>Central Army Group (northern sector)</i>															<i>Minor axis (Fulda Gap)</i>							
West Germany	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	East Germany	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Canada	½	½	½	1	1	1	1	½	½	½	1	1	1	1	Poland	...	3	3	3	3	3	3
France	2	2	2	4	4	4	Soviet Union	10	12	14	20	25	25	27
United States	2	3	4	8	10	10	11	2	3	3	5	5	6	7	Total	13	18	20	26	31	31	33
Total	6 ½	8 ½	9 ½	14	16	16	17	6 ½	10 ½	10 ½	13	15	16	17								
Divisions required (d)	7	10	10	13	16	16	17	7	10	10	13	16	16	17								
Surplus or shortage	-½	-1 ½	-½	+1	0	0	0	-½	+½	+½	0	-1	0	0								
<i>Central Army Group (southern sector)</i>															<i>Secondary zone (south)</i>							
West Germany	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	Czechoslovakia	10	10	10	12	12	12	12
France	2	5	5	7	10	10	10	2	3	3	5	6	6	6	Soviet Union	2	2	3	5	5	5	6
United States	2	3	3	3	3	4	7	Total	12	12	13	17	17	17	18
Total	7	12	12	14	17	18	21	5	6	6	8	9	9	9								
Divisions required (d)	6	6	7	9	9	9	9	6	6	7	9	9	9	9								
Surplus or shortage	+1	+6	+5	+5	+8	+9	+12	-1	0	-1	-1	0	0	0								

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(a) For non-United States NATO countries, NATO build-ups use national command forces as postulated in Table A-1 (Case II). Nations on line deploy forces to current corps areas. The French and the Canadians are considered deployed near their current locations. For United States deployments, divisions are allocated to current United States corps dispositions with more weight to northern corps.

(b) For non-United States NATO countries, NATO build-ups use national command forces as postulated in Table A-1 (Case II). Nations on line deploy forces to corps areas shown. Canadians are deployed in vicinity of current location near the centre. French forces are initially deployed in southern sector; some French reinforcements are postulated for deployment to the central sector. For United States deployments, it is recommended that one corps be deployed to the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) and reinforced with greatest weight. The West German corps in NORTHAG gets an additional division.

(c) Disposition shown postulates tactical plan to conduct major attack in the north (North German Plain) with minor attack in the centre (Fulda Gap-Frankfurt axis) and economy-of-force operations in the secondary zone (along the Czech border). Consequently about 55 % of Soviet divisions are disposed in the north, 35 to 40 % in the centre, and 5-10 % in the south.

(d) NATO divisions required are based on the definitions of Condition 2 for M-day and M+7 and on Condition 3 for M+15 to M+120, which were described in Appendix C. United States divisions deployed are based on assessed requirements in Appendix C.

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3.17 What can be done about this situation ?

(a) Peacetime deployment

The Committee shares General de Maizière's conclusion that, in view of the cost, major peacetime redeployment should be avoided ; only minor adjustments should be undertaken :

- (i) those advocated in General de Maizière's study ;
- (ii) combat elements resulting from teeth to tail ratio revision in the United States army should, at least in part, be deployed in the NORTHAG area. Press reports following Mr. Schlesinger's visit to Germany on 4th November 1974 suggested that a new United States brigade would be stationed in the Hanover area¹ ;
- (iii) General de Maizière stresses the need for full use to be made of any warning time by making early political decisions². The Committee endorses the second option which calls for financial resources to be devoted primarily to weapons and equipment, while compensating bad deployment through early political decisions.

(b) Reserves — reinforcement

3.18 Table D-1 of the Brookings study reproduced above clearly illustrates the size of the problems of reserves and reinforcements, even if there has been some limited improvement. The Netherlands white paper on defence (which brings down the size of a division from eleven battalions to nine) introduces a new division (the 5th Mechanised) which will be available between M and M + 7, instead of the former 5th Division, with four tank and seven infantry battalions, available at M + 30. Two-thirds of the divisions can be mobilised without cumbersome political procedures, merely by decision by a ministerial sub-council, because of what is known as its RIM status.

3.19 The Committee concludes first that better procedures should be introduced to secure early political decisions in the event of aggression or threat of aggression — the Netherlands RIM system is an example. Secondly, there is a need to maintain conscript armies (because of the need for reserves) in the countries close to the

likely battlefield (Benelux, Germany) because volunteer armies do not automatically provide the well-trained readily available reserves that conscript armies do. Thirdly, redeployment of ready forces is difficult and costly — it is far more easy to reconsider the deployment of reserves, augmentation forces and other reinforcements. The possibilities are greatest in the case of United States forces, and possibly the German forces (cadre brigades, etc.). Lastly, a more common or integrated logistic system must be achieved.

D. Central Europe and tactical nuclear weapons

3.20 The indications are that Warsaw Pact tactical nuclear warheads are deployed rather far to the East, in Western Russia or possibly Poland. The United States tactical nuclear weapons, on the other hand, are very unevenly spread. The nature of their deployment poses problems of command and control, as Mr. Schlesinger has admitted¹. The concentration of tactical nuclear weapons in special storage sites — albeit over 100 — invites a pre-emptive strike by Warsaw Pact forces. Professor Martin² has proposed the regrouping of tactical nuclear weapons into a centrally controlled covering force, based on existing systems such as Lance and a more accurate Pershing, equipped in time with lower-yield warheads designed to reduce unwanted damage. This arrangement would prove a valid option in defence, prevent unauthorised use, yet still provide the essential linkage with the United States' strategic deterrent. It would require fewer warheads than are now deployed.

Care must be taken, however, to ensure that such a covering force did not develop into an independent European nuclear force in the event of political disagreement between Europe and the United States.

3.21 The Rapporteur consequently recommends :

- (i) that levels of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe be raised in the MBFR negotiations ;
- (ii) that tactical nuclear weapons be deployed further to the rear with emphasis on surface-to-surface missiles.

1. United States Secretary of Defence, first annual report to Congress on the United States defence position, 3rd March 1974.

2. "Theatre nuclear weapons and Europe", Survival, November-December 1974.

1. Daily Telegraph, 5th November 1974.

2. Document 663, page 91.

CHAPTER IV

The flanks

(submitted by Mr. Duviolsart, Rapporteur)

A. Introduction

4.1 European security requires a stable military situation on both flanks of the European command and on the central front. The flanks include Denmark, Norway and their surrounding waters, and the Mediterranean countries and sea.

4.2 The Committee reported on the situation on the northern flank in 1972¹. The lack of military balance in that area is still a matter of concern. The recently announced cuts in the United Kingdom's defence effort concerned in particular two airborne brigades, two parachute battalions and one Royal Marine brigade originally assigned as reinforcements for the northern flank, but they will thus no longer be available. However, the forces on the ground in that region remain unchanged. The political situation is stable, but Norway's decision not to join the European Community is a factor which weakens political cohesion in the area. In the absence of significant changes in the overall situation, the Committee has not visited the area since 1972 and, for the time being, has not prepared a special report on the northern flank.

4.3 Conversely, there have been continual and sometimes surprising changes on the southern flank. On 14th November 1974, the Committee adopted its last report on the Mediterranean², devoted to the Cyprus crisis. Recommendation 256 subsequently adopted by the Assembly advocated, *inter alia*, that "the good offices of their partners and allies and in particular of the members of the European Community continue to be available to all parties", and urged the Council to "impress upon all parties to the conflict the manifold advantages which active membership of NATO bestows on each and every member". The Committee welcomes the Council's reply of 24th March 1975, affirming its continuing concern for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of

1. Document 568, Rapporteur Mr. Vedovato, adopted on 25th April 1972.

2. Document 651, European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Cyprus and drawing attention to the fact that at their meeting in Dublin on 13th February 1975 the Foreign Ministers of the nine countries of the European Communities asked the Chairman of the Council of the Communities to approach the Governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey to inform them :

- that they continue to regard as highly desirable the search for a just and lasting negotiated settlement through consultation between the two communities in Cyprus ;
- that, in order to facilitate the achievement of this aim, the Nine are ready to hold talks with the representatives of all the interested parties."

B. Greece and Turkey

4.4 Aware of the seriousness of the situation in this area, the Committee visited Greece and Turkey in March. It had already visited Turkey in 1971, but it was the first time the whole Committee had visited Greece since it felt this would have been inappropriate during the colonel's régime. In both countries, the Committee was received most courteously by the Ministers, members of parliament and generals listed in the preliminary note. The Committee was able to have very frank and useful talks, and much regrets that a transport strike forced it to cancel its appointment with Mr. Averoff, the Greek Minister of Defence. The Committee also visited the secretariat-general of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in Ankara and the NATO headquarters in Izmir. The Committee wishes to thank everyone with whom it had talks.

C. The military situation

4.5 In strategic terms, Greece and Turkey comprise a land mass of about 2,200 km from east to west and 800 km from north to south which has common frontiers with Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Iraq and Syria, on the one hand, and Iran, on the other, this latter forming a link with CENTO. At military level,

this area is thus very exposed to possible threats of attack, and since it controls the passage for the Soviet Union's Black Sea fleet it is of capital importance for NATO.

4.6 The Committee learnt that in the event of attack the Warsaw Pact forces would be able to deploy some thirty-one mechanised and armoured divisions against Northern Greece and Turkish Thrace. NATO has only twenty-six divisions in the area (sixteen of which are Greek and not all up to strength), most of them infantry divisions. The Warsaw Pact has a 2 to 1 superiority in tanks in this area.

4.7 In Eastern Turkey, military operations would be more difficult and the ten available Soviet divisions would probably be delayed by the seven Turkish divisions opposite them, but in this area Soviet tank superiority is 2 1/2 to 1.

4.8 Finally, in the southern sector, there are four divisions of the Iraqi and Syrian armies compared with four Turkish divisions, but there again, Iraq and Syria, which have Soviet matériel, have a 2 to 1 superiority over Turkish forces.

4.9 The possibilities of defending this area have been considerably enhanced by NATO infrastructure projects costing \$1,200 million, i.e. 20% of all SHAPE infrastructure projects.

4.10 With regard to air forces, although the position has improved somewhat since the Committee's last visit to Turkey by the introduction of a few F-4 and F-104 S (new version) aircraft, modernisation needs to be pursued, and the suspension of spare part supplies is detrimental to the maintenance of aircraft in service. Greece and Turkey will always need matériel from their allies, particularly tanks, anti-tank weapons and communications equipment. Both countries, members of Eurogroup and Euronad, take part in that framework in preparations for the joint production of certain armaments. When sharing sub-contracts among the European countries which are the principal armaments manufacturers, it would be desirable to take account of existing capabilities in these countries, and, wherever possible, facilitate the communication of new technology.

D. The navy

4.11 The Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean has on average some sixty fighting and support craft. Its Black Sea fleet has a total of 500

ships. Two Soviet helicopter-carriers have been in service for several years and regularly pass through the Turkish Straits to the Mediterranean. Two conventional aircraft-carriers are also being built in the Crimea and the first is to be commissioned in 1975. However, it is not clear whether the Soviet Union has suitable aircraft. In Recommendation 256, adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1974, the Assembly reiterated "its earlier recommendation for the correct application of the Montreux Convention to prevent the passage of aircraft-carriers through the Dardanelles". The Council's reply contains no reference to this reminder.

4.12 The Committee considered the naval aspects of the situation in the Mediterranean in the report on security and the Mediterranean adopted on 21st May 1974¹. The Committee noted that the on-call force of ships from several NATO countries had still not been made into a permanent naval force as in the Atlantic and Channel. However, it continues to operate from time to time, and the United Kingdom, despite the cuts announced in its defence effort, has agreed to NATO's request that it maintain its contribution to this force during national deployments.

E. Indian Ocean

4.13 On 31st March, President Sadat announced that the Suez Canal would be reopened on 5th June, which will certainly lead to an increased Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Soviet naval units are more or less permanently present off Mauritius and visit Beira and the Malagasy Republic more frequently. The Soviet Union has naval and air installations in Aden, on the island of Socotra at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden, and in Berber Somalia.

4.14 The Committee has already drawn attention to the need for the total naval presence maintained by NATO countries in the Indian Ocean to be commensurate with that of the Soviet Union. It regrets the United Kingdom's decision in the defence review to abandon the staging post on Gan and the naval communications' station on Mauritius, but notes with satisfaction that the installations in Diego Garcia, to be built up by the United States, will be used by the United Kingdom if need be.

1. Document 637.

F. CENTO

4.15 In Ankara, the Committee was satisfied to learn that military co-operation between the CENTO countries — Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States — had improved considerably since the Committee's previous visit. The Midlink-74 naval exercise was held in November 1974 with units from all the CENTO countries taking part in naval manoeuvres in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf led by the American aircraft-carrier Constellation. Nuclear submarines, a helicopter-carrier, 21 destroyers, 6 supply ships and 143 aircraft also took part. The force was based in Karachi for these manoeuvres.

4.16 The Committee welcomes the improvement in official links between NATO and CENTO, particularly in respect of radar, which allows NATO cover to be extended far to the east and south, and naval communications. It hopes it will be possible to implement further projects.

G. Relations between Greece, Turkey and NATO

4.17 In both Athens and Ankara, the Committee, during its visit, found itself in countries with democratic parliamentary régimes which belong to NATO, are associated with the European Community and are anxious to take part in nine-power political consultations through the Community's Council of Association and through permanent contacts by their ambassadors in the capital of the Community's President.

4.18 Turkey is very attached to NATO and its military structure, and is also aware of its own strategic importance and contribution to the defence of Europe. It is very concerned about the suspension of deliveries of American equipment. Turkey also has a military alliance with Iran and Pakistan in CENTO, as mentioned above, but nevertheless has good relations with Iraq, some economic interdependence having been established through their sharing the waters of the Euphrates and the fact that Iraqi oil will soon start flowing through the pipeline crossing Turkey. It also maintains good relations with Syria without, however, breaking off relations with Israel.

4.19 An important consequence of the state of relations between Greece and Turkey, which were

considered in the Committee's last report¹, is the almost complete breakdown of communications — particularly air — between Turkey and Greece, and consequently between Turkey and the other NATO countries and Western Europe. Aircraft have to make a wide detour by the Southern Mediterranean or overfly communist territory. Turkey is thereby isolated from NATO and the Committee particularly regrets that it has therefore been unable to take part in NATO manoeuvres. There are also serious economic drawbacks for both countries, tourism being considerably reduced. It appears that during the period of tension in 1974, Turkey, in NOTAM No. 714, required aircraft in the Aegean FIR to report their positions to Turkish air control when crossing the mid-point of the sea. (Radar cross-telling between Greece and Turkey had been suspended at the time.) Greece then issued a NOTAM declaring the Aegean a dangerous area. Since then, all flights over the Aegean have been suspended.

4.20 Greece, very disappointed over NATO's inability to prevent a second military intervention in Cyprus following the fall of the colonels' régime in Greece, withdrew its forces from NATO and announced its intention of negotiating its withdrawal from the integrated military structure although maintaining its political participation. It is planned to hold negotiations with NATO to this end, which will probably follow the negotiations now getting under way with the United States on bilateral military co-operation.

4.21 It is clearly difficult for Greece at present to agree to the military integration of its forces when in reality this implies, in the geographical area concerned, integrating them only with Turkish forces. But the NATO military structure concerns all the member countries and contains many other elements than the mere assignment of national forces. In these other aspects of military co-operation in the Alliance Greece plays a vital rôle for the functioning of the defence structure as a whole. Well-prepared negotiations between Greece and NATO should lead to solutions allowing all NATO defence forces to operate normally and affording Greece all the resulting military advantages.

4.22 It is not for the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to propose solutions

1. Document 651.

to the problems of Cyprus and relations between Greece and Turkey. These problems were described in the last report. It notes, however, that as a consequence of the Cyprus crisis the whole of the defensive arrangements of the Alliance have been weakened, with militarily disadvantageous effects for both Greece and Turkey. Having visited the area, the Committee can report that both countries expressed their well-known positions very firmly. However, normalisation of relations is of major importance for these countries and the Alliance as a whole.

4.23 The Committee can but list the positive indications which it noted :

- negotiations between representatives of the two Cypriot communities — alone capable of finding the basis for a lasting solution — were resumed in Vienna on 28th April in the presence of Mr. Waldheim ;
- in Athens, it is recognised that a price will have to be paid for the Cyprus coup d'état organised by the former military government in Greece ;
- in Ankara, it is recognised that the position of the present demarcation line of the *de facto* Turkish Cypriot area can be negotiated ;
- Greece and Turkey have agreed to submit their dispute over the Aegean Sea to the International Court in The Hague through the consensus procedure (requiring a meeting between representatives of the two countries, which would be facilitated by an improvement in the situation).

4.24 The Committee considers that the summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council which is to prepare for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe will provide a useful opportunity for Greece and Turkey to meet in the framework of the Alliance. The Committee also considers that the WEU countries should arrange, in the framework of ICAO, for Greece and Turkey to withdraw the NOTAMs which led to the suspension of commercial flights over the area of the Aegean Sea.

H. The Iberian Peninsula

4.25 The Committee considered the situation in the Iberian Peninsula in its report on security

and the Mediterranean adopted on 21st May 1974¹. This area is also capital for the defence of Europe since it controls the western outlet of the Mediterranean. The Committee hopes that after the elections to the Constituent Assembly on 25th April it will be possible to visit the country for talks with the Portuguese authorities and the Commander of the IBERLANT area which has its headquarters near Lisbon. It would be premature to consider the situation in Portugal in this report.

4.26 In the abovementioned report, the Rapporteur noted that :

“Spain is fully conscious of its European identity and would no doubt welcome an invitation to join both the European Community and NATO. But Spain does not consider itself a suppliant...

.....

For Spain to play a more active and direct part in the defence of Europe as a whole as well as in its immediate Mediterranean region, it would no doubt be necessary for the European countries to extend an invitation to Spain to join both NATO and the European Community. While your Rapporteur sees a positive evolution in European opinion as far as Spain is concerned, he recognises that there is no immediate prospect of such invitations being forthcoming and that such proposals would certainly have a detrimental effect on public support for NATO in many member countries. The evolution of the political régime in Spain is a matter for that country alone, but it cannot fail to have a determining effect on the closer association of Spain with the rest of the European Community...”

4.27 Mr. Genscher, Federal German Minister for Foreign Affairs, who visited Madrid on 3rd April 1975, told the press that the aim of his visit was to discuss with the Spanish Government how to bring the country closer to the European Community and NATO. The Committee follows the evolution of the political situation in Spain with great interest, and notes with satisfaction certain statements by the Prime Minister, Mr. Carlos Aris, who, on 18th February 1975, in the first interview ever granted to foreign journalists

1. Document 637.

by a Spanish Prime Minister, said that political reforms in Spain should go "very far and very high". He saw no objection to Christian Democrat or Socialist groups playing a part in the country's politics.

I. Conclusion

4.28 In the draft recommendation the Committee stresses the importance of the flanks and the

need to avoid their being isolated. Among the political and military measures concerned, the Committee has in mind the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force, to which Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom contribute, and which can be deployed in Norway, Greece or Turkey. The Committee also stresses the need for a concrete study to be made of the legal and political aspects of the arms embargo imposed by the United States Congress and its compatibility with the functioning of the Alliance.

CHAPTER V

Production of missiles in Europe*(submitted by Mr. Wall, Rapporteur)**Object*

5.1 Your Rapporteur was asked to review existing missile production capability in the European NATO countries for the whole range of military missiles from short-range anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles to strategic missiles, and to make recommendations concerning the equipment of NATO forces and the future development of missile production in Europe.

Method

5.2 The method adopted is to examine and classify the existing and next generation of missiles and the companies manufacturing them; inter-company and international arrangements for co-operation in missile production are also described. From this data recommendations are made as to the requirements for European missiles in 7 to 10 years' time, and possible consortia for their production are suggested.

*Summary of missile classification
(see Appendix II)*

5.3 Missile in this chapter is used in the sense of guided missile — a missile whose trajectory can be modified after the moment of launch, either by an inertial or homing guidance device contained within the missile itself, or by commands transmitted to the missile from the ground. This definition therefore excludes simple rockets and various bazooka-type weapons. At Appendix II to this report is a comprehensive classification of missiles in service or under development, by principal manufacturing country and by type. While the table lists missiles by country of production, it should be noted that many NATO countries which do not produce particular categories of missiles have procured them from other producing countries. This is particularly true of nuclear capable tactical missiles in service with the European NATO countries other than France, and with the submarine-launched ballistic missiles Polaris A. 3 in service with the British-built Polaris submarines. France alone of the European NATO countries has a national production capability in these areas, and also produces IRBMs.

5.4 True guided missiles have almost all been developed since the end of the second world war. In that thirty-year period, some countries have produced as many as three generations of missiles for certain applications. Earlier versions of Soviet surface-to-air missiles and various United States airborne missiles were used in Vietnam, and in the 1973 Middle East hostilities the more sophisticated Soviet SAM.6 and the Sagger and Snapper anti-tank missiles were used. Losses in that war are said to have been: 2,800 tanks, 500 aircraft, 80 helicopters and 20 ships. Missiles are reported to have accounted for 70 % of the aircraft losses, a large proportion of the tank losses, and many of the naval losses. The lessons for Europe are inescapable¹.

5.5 The missiles currently available to the NATO forces, listed at Appendix II, vary enormously in size, weight, sophistication and cost, depending first on the rôle for which they are intended, and secondly the degree of sophistication built into them. At one end of the scale is the very heavy intercontinental ballistic missile fitted with very accurate inertial guidance systems, and which are produced only by the United States and the Soviet Union. The somewhat smaller SLBMs and IRBMs are produced also by France. At the other end of the scale are the relatively short-range and inexpensive anti-tank missiles, the earlier generations of which depended on continual guidance by the operator from the firing position up to the time of impact. Such missiles have been produced by several European countries.

5.6 The few operational details given in Appendix II — chiefly range and a very brief description of the guidance technology — are intended solely as a guide to classification of missile types, and do not provide sufficient information to judge the suitability of a missile to meet particular military requirements. Moreover, information concerning cost of missiles is not readily available and has not therefore been included.

1. A proper mix of tactical missiles and guns is essential; rates of consumption are far higher than previously thought. Both the densities of missiles in service with units and the levels of reserve stocks need to be increased.

Together with the detailed military capabilities of a missile, cost is inevitably a major factor in determining a choice between competing missile systems, as, where defence budgets are as always limited, cost must determine the numbers of missiles that can be procured.

5.7 The following is a summary table of missiles which are produced or are under development in the European NATO countries, together with United States missiles (shown in brackets), which are either produced under licence in Europe for the forces of certain European NATO countries, or which have been or may be procured directly from the United States by European NATO countries.

(A) <i>Ship-borne</i>	
SLBM	SAM
MSBS M1	Masurca
M2-M20	Crotale
M4	Seaslug II
(Polaris A3)	(and SSM)
SSM	Sea Dart
Otomat	(and SSM)
Exocet MM38	Albatross
MM40	Sea Cat
SS 12 M	SLAM
Penguin	Sea Wolf
Sea Killer II	Roland 2M
Sea Killer III	
<i>Helicopter</i>	<i>Anti-submarine</i>
Marte	Malafon
AM 39	Ikara
Sea Skua	<i>Submarine-launched</i>
Helleat	<i>anti-ship</i>
Hawkswing	USGW (Harpoon)
(B) <i>Land-based</i>	
IRBM	SSM
SSBS S2	Pluton (Sergeant)
SSBS S3	(Lance)
SAM	<i>Anti-tank</i>
(Hawk)	Acra
Bloodhound II	Entac
Thunderbird II	SS 11
(improved	SS 12
Hawk)	Harpon
Spada	
Roland	
Rapier	
Crotale	
Indigo	
Blowpipe	
(Red Eye)	
Tigercat	
(Stinger)	

Hot
Swingfire
Milan
Cobra

Mamba
Vigilant
Mosquito
Sparviero

(C) *Airborne*

<i>Air-to-ground</i>	<i>Air-to-air</i>
AS 11	R 511
12	R 530
20	Super 530
30	550
AM 39	Aspide
Jumbo	(Sidewinder)
Helleat	(Sparrow)
Martel	Firestreak
CL 834	Red Top
Hawkswing	SRAAM
Otomat	XJ 521
Kormoran	
Airtos	

Apparent duplication in European missiles

5.8 The foregoing table reveals, in the case of the cheaper types of missile, many different types in service at present, which has, of course, resulted in a serious lack of standardisation throughout the NATO forces, as well as much duplicated, and hence wasted, research and development effort in the past. In the case of more recent, more sophisticated (second generation) weapons, just entering service or at present in research and development, there is still much duplication, both between weapons developed by European NATO countries and between European production and certain United States weapons which are likely to be procured by European countries. The following particular cases of duplication have been noted by your Rapporteur :

A. *Ship-borne missiles*

Long-range ship-borne surface-to-surface missiles

(a) *Exocet MM.38* : Produced by Aérospatiale, France. Fitted to FPBs up to cruisers. Missile weight : 735 kg. Range over 40 km (normal limit of ship-borne radar acquisition). Reaction time : 100 seconds. A sea-skimming missile, inertial guidance to proximity of target, with active radar homing thereafter. 160 kg warhead detonated by impact and proximity fuze. May be fired when the (fixed) launcher-container axis is within $\pm 30^\circ$ of the direction of the target. Development from 1968, entering service with

French, British and German navies from 1972 onwards. Derived versions AM39 and MM40 (greater range) offer other possibilities.

(b) *Otomat* : Produced by Oto Melara (Italy) and Engins Matra (France) to be fitted to Italian navy hydrofoils and frigates. *MK.I* missile weight about 700 kg. Range up to 60-80 km if target position data available (propulsive endurance about 200 km). Reaction time : 30 seconds.

A sea-skimming missile with a terminal "pop-up and dive" trajectory, pseudo inertial guidance to proximity of target with active radar homing thereafter, with additional capability to home on any source of jamming. 210 kg warhead. May be fired when the (fixed) launcher-container is within about $\pm 300^\circ$ of the direction of the target.

Development from 1969, in production 1975. Sold to Italian and one non-NATO navy. Shore-to-ship and air-ship versions can make greater use of missile's inherent range.

(c) *Harpoon (United States)* : Has comparable characteristics to *Otomat* and is intended to enter service with the United States navy in 1975.

Shorter-range ship-borne surface-to-surface missiles

(a) *Sea Killer Mk.II* : Produced by Sistel, Italy. A simple beam-riding missile ; range about 20 km. Missile weight 270 kg ; warhead 70 kg. Operational in non-NATO countries. Said to cost one-third of *Exocet* or one-quarter of *Otomat* missile.

(b) *Penguin* : Produced by Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk, Norway. 20 km range. Inertial guidance ; infra-red homing. Missile weight : 330 kg. Warhead : 120 g. Operational on Norwegian navy patrol boats and frigates.

Ship-borne surface-air missiles — long-range

(a) *Sea Dart* : (replacing *Sea Slug*). Produced by Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics, United Kingdom. Can be fitted to frigates upwards. Missile weight : 550 kg. Range over 35 km. Semi-active radar homing. Development from 1962. Operational in British destroyers 1972 ; sold to Argentina ; has an anti-ship capability.

(b) *Masurca* : Produced by French navy and Matra. Range : 40-50 km. Semi-active radar homing. Operational with French navy.

(c) *Standard* : Produced by General Dynamics, United States. Various versions in service with

United States navy since 1969, or under further development. Extended range version over 55 km. Weight : 1,060 kg (said to be anti-ship and, in some versions, anti-missile capability).

Ship-borne surface-air missiles — medium-range

(a) *Marine Roland II* : Proposed navalised version of army SAM (see below) being developed jointly by Aérospatiale (France) and MBB (Germany). Missile weight : 63 kg. Range : 6 1/2 km. Anti-missile capability said to be under investigation (see *Sea Wolf* below).

(b) *Naval Crotale* : Proposed version of the army SAM (see below). Developed by Matra (France). Missile weight : 80 kg. Range : 8 1/2 km.

(c) *Albatross* : Air defence system produced by Selenia, Italy, using *Sparrow III* (United States) (see below) or *Aspide* multi-rôle missile developed by Selenia. Weight : 200 kg. Production scheduled later.

Ship-borne anti-missile missiles

Sea Wolf : Being developed by British Aircraft Corporation (United Kingdom) for Royal Navy for short-range anti-ship missile interception ; could be operational in the mid-1970s. Line-of-sight auto-guidance. France reported to be interested in a larger-range system (see naval *Roland* above).

Ship-borne anti-submarine weapons

(a) *Malafon* : Produced by Latécoère (France) for French navy. Weight : 1,500 kg. Range : 13 km airborne. A command guidance missile-delivered homing torpedo. Operational since about 1965.

(b) *Ikara* : Developed by Australian navy. Fitted to ships of 1,500 tons upwards. Command guidance missile delivering a homing torpedo. In service with Australian, United Kingdom navies ; ordered by Brazil. Operational since about 1972.

Helicopter-borne anti-ship missiles

(a) *Marte* : Produced by Sistel (Italy) for Italian navy. Helicopter-borne version of *Sea Killer II* (see above). Beam-riding missile employing helicopter search radar. Under development since 1969. Operational 1977 ?

(b) *AM.39* : Produced by Aérospatiale (France). A helicopter-borne version of Exocet (see above). Weight : less than 650 kg. Range : 50 km from helicopter launch (more from fixed-wing aircraft). Production expected to begin 1976.

(c) *Sea Skua* : Under development by BAC for United Kingdom navy since 1972 as helicopter-borne missile with anti-ship capability against light vessels — FPBs and hydrofoils. Weight : 200 kg. Range : to be greater than size of FPB anti-aircraft systems. Sea-skimming missile ; semi-active radar homing.

(d) *Hellcat* : Manufactured by Short Bros. (United Kingdom). Helicopter-borne version of ship-air missile. Weight : 68 kg ; range : 3 1/2 km. Introduced into Royal Navy 1968.

(e) *Hawkwing* : A development of Swingfire anti-tank missile with an anti-FPB capability.

B. Land-based missiles

Army (tactical) SSMs

(a) *Pluton* : Produced by Aérospatiale (France) for French army. Tactical nuclear warhead. Range : 120 km. Weight : 2,350 kg. Solid propellant, inertial guidance. In service since 1974.

(b) *Lance* : Produced by LTV Aerospace (United States) for United States army. Tactical nuclear warhead ; range about 110 km ; weight : 1,500 kg. Pre-packed storable liquid propellant, inertial guidance. Ordered by most Eurogroup countries to replace Sergeant and Honest John. In service since 1972.

Surface-air missiles :

Long-range

There appears to be no European weapon system under development to replace the longer-range United States Nike, or British Thunderbird and Bloodhound systems. The United States *SAM D*, under development since 1965, is expected to replace Hawk and Nike. Engineering development began after initial firings in 1972.

Improved Hawk : To be produced by Raytheon and, under licence, the SETEL Consortium in Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany ; also Japan. Range (altitude) : 11,000 m ; weight : 580 kg. Semi-active radar homing.

Medium-range

(a) *Roland* : Produced jointly by Aérospatiale (France) and MBB (Germany). All components can be mounted on single tank chassis for forward defence of mobile army units. Missile launch weight : 62.5 kg. Range over 6,000 m up to 3,000 m height. Reaction time : 6-8 seconds first engagement, 2-6 seconds subsequent. Automatic command guidance from IR missile data to optical line of sight or automatic radar command guidance to line of sight. Warhead : 6.5 kg. Development since 1964. Shortly to enter service with French and German armies ; also to be produced under licence in the United States.

(b) *Rapier* : Produced by BAC (United Kingdom). Lightweight system carried on two Landrovers and trailers for forward unit air defence. Missile launch weight : about 65 kg. Range : about 7,000 m. Similar automatic optical command guidance to Roland. Optional blind fire radar tracking available. Development since 1963. In service with British army and Iran. Sold to other non-NATO countries. SP tracked vehicle being developed. Modular system, i.e. additional units can be controlled by the same man.

(c) *Crotale* : Produced by Matra, France. System can be carried on two tracked vehicles. Missile launch weight : 80 kg. Range : 8,500 m. Reaction time : 6 seconds. Radar tracking command guidance from IR missile data. Warhead : 15 kg. Development since 1964. In service with French air force and South Africa since 1971.

(d) *Indigo* : Produced by Sistel, Italy. SAM for Italian army. Missile total weight : 120 kg. Range 10 km. Beam riding or command guidance with optical tracking. Production 1977.

(e) *SPADA* system produced by Selenia, Italy. Low-altitude system for permanent target defence. Modular shelter mounted air transportable elements. Missile launch weight (*Aspide*) : 220 kg. Range 15 km. Reaction time : 9 seconds. Semi-active radar homing. Optical tracking available. In development since 1969. In service Italian air force late 1978.

Short-range infantry SA missiles

(a) *Blowpipe* : Produced by Short and Harland (United Kingdom). Man-portable, fired from the shoulder. Total weight : 21 kg. Very short range. Manual radio command on line of sight with automatic gathering. Incorporated IFF available. Development since 1967. In service with British army and sold to Canada.

(b) *Red Eye* : Produced by General Dynamics (United States). Man-portable, fired from shoulder. Total weight : 13 kg. Range about 3 km. Passive infra-red homing, no IFF, receding targets only. Development since 1959. In service with United States forces, Australia, Sweden.

(c) *Stinger* : Under development by General Dynamics (United States) since 1970, to replace Red Eye. More sensitive IR homing to engage approaching targets, fitted with optional IFF ; total weight : 15 kg.

Anti-tank missiles

Heavy, vehicle-borne

(a) *Swingfire* : Produced by BAC (United Kingdom). Tank- or vehicle-carried system ; the only missile that can be fired from behind cover (possible helicopter version under development would be called *Hawkswing*). Range : 4,000 m. Manual wire guidance with automatic guidance. Operator can be separated from launch point. Development since 1958 ; in service with British army since 1969, and with Belgian army.

(b) *Hot* : Produced jointly by Aérospatiale (France) and MBB (Germany). Tank- or helicopter-mounted system. Launch weight : 22 kg. Range : 4,000 m. Automatic wire guidance to optical line of sight. Development since 1964. Now in limited production for French and German armies. Said to have anti-helicopter capability.

(c) *Harpon* : Produced by Aérospatiale (France). A precursor of Hot, in service with France and Germany. Range : 3,000 m.

(d) *Tow* : Produced by Hughes Aircraft (United States). Vehicle- or helicopter-mounted or 2-man portable. Total weight : 78 kg. Missile launch weight : 18 kg. Range : 3,000 m. Automatic wire guidance to optical line of sight. Development since 1962. In service United States army. Sold to Italy, Netherlands, Israel.

Light-weight anti-tank missiles

(a) *Milan* : Produced jointly by Aérospatiale (France) and MBB (Germany). Man-portable, fired from tripod. Total weight : 12 kg. Missile launch weight : 6.7 kg. Range : 2,000 m. Automatic wire guidance to optical line of sight. Development since 1963. Operational with French and German armies.

(b) *Sparviero* : Developed by Breda Meccanica Bresciana (Italy). Man-, vehicle- or helicopter-

mounted. Total weight : 69 kg. Missile launch weight : 16 kg. Range up to 4,000 m. Automatic infra-red guidance to optical line of sight. Could be in production by 1978.

(c) *Vigilant* : Produced by Vickers (United Kingdom). Man-portable or vehicle-mounted. Total weight : 22 kg. Missile launch weight : 15 kg. Range : 1,300 m. Manual wire guidance. Development since 1956. In service with British army since 1963. Sold to non-NATO countries.

(d) *Cobra, Mamba* : Produced by MBB (Germany). Weight : 11 kg. Range : 2,000 m. Manual wire guidance. In service Germany 1972. To be replaced by Milan.

(e) *Mosquito* : Produced by Contraves (Italy). Total weight : 22 kg. Missile weight : 14 kg. Range : 2,300 m. Manual wire guidance. In service with Italian army.

C. Airborne missiles

Air-to-surface — long-range

(See also helicopter-borne and other anti-ship missiles, and helicopter-borne anti-tank missiles, above.)

(a) *Martel* : Produced jointly by Matra (France) and Hawker-Siddeley (United Kingdom). Weight : 550 kg. France produces only the anti-radar version with passive homing. United Kingdom produces TV guidance version guided from launching aircraft. Under development since 1964. In service 1973 — anti-radar version in France, both in United Kingdom.

(b) *Otomat* : (See anti-ship missiles above.)

Air-to-surface — medium-range

(a) *AS.30* : Produced by Aérospatiale (France). Range : 12 km. Weight : 500 kg. Warhead : 230 kg. Manual radio command guidance from launch aircraft (automatic line of sight, radio command guidance in service with French air force). In service with French, German, United Kingdom air forces and non-NATO countries.

(b) *Bullpup* : A range of missiles produced by Martin Marietta (United States). Range : 11 to 17 km. Weight : 110 to 450 kg. Conventional or nuclear warhead. Visual radio command guidance. Development since 1954. Operational since 1959 with United States forces. Manufactured under licence by NATO Consortium under Kongsberg

Vaapenfabrikk for Denmark, Norway, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

(c) *Sea Skua* : (See anti-ship missiles above.)

(d) *Kormoran* : Produced by MBB (Germany) ; jointly designed with Aérospatiale (France). Anti-ship missile ; range : 35 km. Weight : 580 kg. Inertial guidance and radar homing head. Development from 1964. Test firings since 1971.

Air-to-surface — short-range

AS.20 : Produced by Aérospatiale (France). Weight : 140 kg. Range : 7 km. Manual radio command guidance. Produced by MBB (Germany) under licence. In service France, Germany, Italy. Used as training missile for AS.30.

Air-to-air — medium-range

(a) *Super 530* : Developed by Matra (France) from earlier R530. Range : 18 km, operational over 10,000 m difference in altitude. Weight : 200 kg. Semi-active radar homing. Mach. 4.5. Development launches for French air force scheduled from 1974 to 1977.

(b) *XJ521* : Developed by Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics (United Kingdom) in co-operation with Raytheon (United States) — an improved United States Sparrow. Performance better than Sparrow (see below). Semi-active radar homing. Speed over Mach. 3.5. Development since 1973. In production.

(c) *Aspide* : Developed by Selenia (Italy). S-A or A-A missile. Range : 15 km in S-A rôle — operates from aircraft up to 30,000 m. Weight : 220 kg. Semi-active radar homing. Deliveries expected later.

(d) *Sparrow* : Produced by Raytheon (United States). Range : 44 km. Weight : 230 kg. Semi-active radar homing. Also anti-ship capability, semi-active doppler radar homing. In service in United States, British and Italian air forces, and non-NATO countries.

(e) *Red Top* : Produced by Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics (United Kingdom). Range : 11 km. Weight : 150 kg. Passive infra-red homing. Developed since 1957. In service with British and non-NATO air forces.

Air-to-air — close combat

(a) *R550 "Magic"* : Developed by Matra (France). Range : 400 m-2 1/2 km or 10 km at

high altitude. Highly manoeuvrable up to 50 g. Weight : 80 kg. Passive infra-red homing. Development from 1968. Delivery to French air force expected shortly.

(b) *SRAAM* : Developed by Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics (United Kingdom). Passive infra-red homing. In 1975 United Kingdom ordered reduced rate of development only.

(c) *Sidewinder* : Various versions produced by Philco-Ford (United States) and NATO Europe Consortium in Germany. Weight : 75 kg ; range : 1.1 km sea-level. Mach. 2. Passive infra-red homing. In service since late 1950s with many countries.

D. Future developments for the 1980s and 1990s

5.9 The missiles described above are mostly in service or in a late stage of development. Most of the possible advantages of joint development and standardised production have already been lost. Looking ahead to missiles that would enter service in the late 1980s, it appears that at least one crucial decision about a future development programme may be taken in 1975.

(a) *Underwater-to-surface guided weapon (USGW)*

Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics (United Kingdom) with Aérospatiale and Matra (France).

Hawker-Siddeley has a United Kingdom Government project definition contract for an anti-ship USGW which would be based on the Martel missile, designed to be launched from a submarine's torpedo tubes. The United States is also developing the Harpoon anti-ship missile for underwater launch, possibly ready by 1978.

(b) *Future anti-ship missile*

The NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNADs) (composed of government representatives) is harmonising requirements for a single research, development and procurement programme for a new anti-ship missile for the mid-1980s, the need for which CNAD has recognised. The NATO National Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) (composed of representatives of the arms industry) is examining a pre-feasibility study from multinational industrial groups. Aérospatiale (France) is interested in working with MBB (Germany) on a super Exocet MM.40 with a range of 100 to 120 km and speed of

Mach. 2, and has also approached BAC (United Kingdom) in this connection.

(c) *Future anti-tank missile*

BAC (United Kingdom) is interested in developing a replacement for Swingfire, which is probably obsolescent compared with the Franco-German Hot. It would be a "fire and forget" homing system, obviating any need for post-launch tracking. A joint development contract could be awarded to British, French and German consortia.

CNAD decided at the end of 1974 to encourage NATO countries to restrict immediate procurement to a very few specific models of anti-tank missiles in the 1,000 to 4,000 m range.

CNAD is defining a single family of four future missiles in this range, requirements for which will be harmonised by the Army Armaments Group.

(d) *Future long-range surface-air missiles*

In addition to an immediate choice on a short-range army system such as Roland or Rapier, CNAD air defence experts are looking for a single missile to replace Hawk, improved Hawk and Nike in the late 1980s. The United States SAM-D research and development programme, based on a proper "track-via-missile" guidance system, will not complete tests of the associated controlled test vehicle until 1976. Engineering development is planned after that.

E. Companies and their missiles

5.10 France

Aérospatiale (Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale — SNIAS).

A nationalised company exporting 50 to 70 % of its missile production.

Co-operates with MBB in the international consortium "Euromissile" on S-S and S-A missiles. Wider co-operation envisaged with Hawker-Siddeley for submarine-launched missiles. Turnover (tactical missiles only) : F.fr.s. 960 million in 1974, representing 20 % of total *Aérospatiale* turnover.

Missiles

Ship-borne

SSM SS 12 M
Exocet¹
MM 40¹

SAM Roland 2M¹ (with MBB)
Helicopter AM 39¹

Land-based

SSM Pluton¹
SAM Roland¹ (with MBB)
Anti-tank Entac
SS 11 and 12
Harpon¹
Hot¹ (with MBB)
Milan¹ (with MBB)

Matra

An independent public company ; controlling interest owned by Floirat-Chassagny Finance Group. 4,500 employees. 55 % military production, 15-20 % space, 20 % cars, 5-10 % civil engineering. Exports 47 % of missile production.

Turnover (1975) (estimated) : F.fr.s. 1,000 million (of which 550 million military).

Missiles

Ship-borne

SSM Otomat¹ (with Oto Melara)

Ship/land

SAM Crotale¹/Cactus

Air-to-ground

Martel with Hawker-Siddeley

Air-to-air

R.511 in Vautour aircraft
R.530 in Mirage III aircraft
Super 530¹
550¹

5.11 Germany

Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm

Independent company owned by Blohm, Messerschmitt and Bölkow families. Boeing (United States) and *Aérospatiale* (France) own 8.9 % each.

Missiles

SAM Roland¹ with *Aérospatiale*

Anti-tank

Cobra and Mamba
Armbrust¹

1. Second-generation missiles.

Hot¹ with Aérospatiale
Milan¹ with Aérospatiale

Air-to-ground

Kormoran with Aérospatiale
Jumbo

5.12 *Italy*

Selenia

Controlled by government through IRI, the State-owned holding company which has interests in more than 130 industrial or utility companies.

Selenia employs 5,200 persons. Turnover 1975 : Italian Lire 70 billion.

Missiles

Ship-borne

SAM Albatross with Sparrow or Aspide

Land-based

SAM improved Hawk with Raytheon
Spada with Sparrow or Aspide

Airborne

Air-to-ground

Jumbo with MBB

Air-to-air

Aspide¹

Oto Melara

Part of the State-controlled EFIM Group which operates through five incorporated finance companies including Finanziaria Ernesto Breda (capital 50 % EFIM and 50 % private) which controls, among other companies, Oto Melara and Breda Meccanica Bresciana.

Oto Melara is specialised in army and naval artillery, and in heavy and light tanks. Employs 1,800. Turnover 1975 : Italian lire 45 billion.

Ship-borne

SSM Otomat¹ with Matra.

Breda Meccanica Bresciana

Employs 750. Turnover 1975 : Italian lire 15 million. Specialises in automatic anti-aircraft weapons and multiple rocket launchers.

1. Second-generation missiles.

Ground-based

Anti-tank

Sparviero.

Sistel

Owned 35 % by Montedison, 20 % Contraves Italiana, 20 % Finmeccanica, the latter being controlled by the State holding company IRI.

Employs directly 243 on headquarters, management and design staff. Research, development and production carried out by parent companies.

Missiles

Ship-borne

SSM Sea Killer II
Sea Killer III¹

Ground-based

SAM Indigo¹

Airborne

Air-to-ground

Marte¹

Air-to-air

Airtos — project only.

5.13 *United Kingdom*

Note : The government, early in 1975, announced its intention to nationalise BAC missile division, and Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics, which will be merged.

British Aircraft Corporation

Capital : £21 million.

Owned 50 % by GEC and 50 % by Vickers.

Guided weapons division, one of three divisions of BAC, employs 8,100 people.

Missiles

Ship-borne

SAM Sea Wolf¹
Helicopter Sea Skua¹

Land-based

SAM Bloodhound 2
Thunderbird 2
Rapier¹

1. Second-generation missiles.

Anti-tank

Vigilant
Swingfire¹

Helicopter

Hawkswing¹

Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics

Wholly-owned subsidiary of Hawker-Siddeley Group Ltd. Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics employs 7,500 people. Turnover 1975 : £40 million.

*Missiles**Ship-borne*

SAM Sea Dart¹ with SSM capability
Sea Slug II with SSM capability
A/S Ikara¹

Submarine-to-ship

USGW¹

*Airborne**Air-to-ground*

Martel with Matra

Air-to-air

Firestreak
Red Top

SRAAM¹

XJ 521¹

F. Future development*(a) Present position of companies*

5.14 Most companies agree that international co-operation is essential for the development of the next generation of European missiles. Existing co-operation is as follows :

Aérospatiale — *MBB* : e.g. Roland, Hot, Milan ;

Hawker-Siddeley — *Aérospatiale* — *Matra* : e.g. USGW ;

Matra — *Oto Melara* : e.g. Otomat ;

Matra — *Hawker-Siddeley* : e.g. Martel.

British, German and French companies seem to find co-operation relatively easy but all demand clear specification as to the type and capability for the European missiles required. At present there are ten basic types (excluding ICBM land and submarine and air nuclear) in which fifteen companies are involved as prime contractors.

However, five companies carry out the majority of this work, as shown :

	France		Germany	United Kingdom	
	Aérospatiale	Matra	MBB	BAC	Hawker-Siddeley
<i>Ship-borne</i>					
SSM	SS 12 M Exocet MM 40	Otomat	—	—	Sea Dart
SAM	Roland 2 M	Crotale	Roland	Sea Wolf	Sea Slug II
Sub-ship	USGW	—	—	—	USGW
A/S	—	—	—	—	Ikara
Heli-ship	AM. 39			Sea Skua	
<i>Land-based</i>					
Army SSM	Pluton	—	—	—	—
Army SAM	Roland	—	—	Thunderbird 2 Bloodhound 2 Rapier	—

1. Second-generation missiles.

	France		Germany	United Kingdom	
	Aérospatiale	Matra	MBB	BAC	Hawker-Siddeley
<i>Army anti-tank</i>	Entac SS. 11 SS. 12 Harpon Hot Milan	—	Cobra Mamba Armbrust 300 Milan Hot	Vigilant Swingfire	—
<i>Airborne</i>					
Air-to-ground	AS. 11 AS. 12 AS. 20 AS. 30	—	Kormoran Jumbo	Hawkswing	Martel TV
Air-to-air	—	R. 511 R. 530 Martel AR Super 530 550	—	—	Firestreak Red Top SRAAM XJ. 521
TOTAL	17	7	8	8	9

A grand total of 46 different missiles out of a European production of 70 different missiles.

(b) *Intergovernmental planning*

5.15 NATO has made several attempts to achieve a general NATO-wide solution to the problem of joint production. Earlier formulae have been abandoned.

5.16 The present preferred solution is through the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), established in 1966 and supported by the Defence Research Group, the tri-service Group for Air Defence and the Industrial Advisory Group. CNAD has had some effects on standardisation but members tended to be national- and service-minded and not enough has been achieved. There has, however, been a recent success in that CNAD decided in October 1974 to harmonise requirements for the next generation of SSM with a view to a single research, development and procurement programme for the mid-1980s. They had also decided to persuade NATO countries to restrict procurement to specific models of anti-tank missiles in the 1,000 to 4,000 m range and to define a single family of four missiles in this range for the next generation. This compares with the 13 different anti-tank missiles in the central region today. CNAD would then discuss the future generation of short-range

SAM ground defence installations and a large medium- and long-range SAM.

5.17 Progress is being made by the NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Support, Dr. Gardiner Tucker. A questionnaire asking about national projects in the field of short-range surface-to-air missiles and anti-tank missiles has been sent out to governments and the replies are now being analysed. Assistance is also being given by the Advisory Group on Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD) in NATO in analysing future technologies available for missile production.

5.18 NATO national Defence Ministers are committed not to start to develop national equipment without first checking whether similar equipment from another NATO country exists or will be developed. This, however, is not always done and, in any case, does not go far enough.

The companies require a clear basic design study but there are, as yet, no European facilities to prepare such a study. At present the Military Committee of NATO could not undertake this work.

5.19 The key requirement appears to be the need for co-ordination at the top in order to achieve agreed basic design studies. The Com-

mittee proposes that this should be initiated by the NATO staff and they should be given adequate facilities and manpower. Companies on receipt of the design study would then form their own international consortia for development.

As far as research and development is concerned, the waste on duplication has been estimated at 50 %. This could be checked by each member country allocating 1 % of its proposed research and development expenditure to a common-funded NATO budget in a similar manner to the existing SACLANT ASW Research Centre, the SHAPE Technical Centre and AGARD.

5.20 A recent United States study has pointed out that the United States spends \$5 billion a year on weapons research and development, while NATO spends \$2.6 billion. As all European research and development projects are duplicated at least once over by United States projects, this represents a net waste in NATO of at least \$2.6 billion a year, which could be far more effectively devoted to *procurement*. What is required is research and development and procurement assigned on a NATO-wide basis, *but this must not involve the loss of research and development capability in Europe* — it may, however, mean certain European NATO countries specialising in particular fields of weapons research and development with actual production more widely shared. The recent United States decision to produce the Franco-German Roland SAM under licence is a sign of a new United States willingness to rely on European research and development. In his annual Defence Department report for the financial years 1976 and 1977, the United States Defence Secretary, Mr. Schlesinger, has stated :

“Last year we had proposed to evaluate the results of United States-conducted preliminary firing tests of three short-range air defence missile systems... the French Crotale, the German Roland II and the United Kingdom Rapier, with the view of selecting one of them for production under licence in the United States. We proposed this approach because a major improvement in our low-altitude, all-weather, mobile SAM capacity for our forces and bases is urgently needed and the development of these foreign systems had already been completed.

The reaction of the Congress to this proposal ranged from very favourable to very unfavourable. The conference report of the

House and Senate Armed Services Committees states explicitly that ‘it is (not) necessary to procure a foreign developed SHORAD system... (simply) because of the earlier availability of test firing data’. The Senate Appropriations Committee, however, stated that ‘it will not tolerate a drawn-out SHORAD research and development programme’ and directed that ‘the most economical and easily deployed system under consideration’ be selected. To complicate the problem further, the Congress in the Department of Defence Appropriation Authorisation Act of 1975 (PL 93-365) directed : ‘The Secretary of Defence shall undertake a specific assessment of the costs and possible loss of non-nuclear combat effectiveness of the military forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries caused by the failure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation members, including the United States, to standardise weapons systems...’.

Let me say at the outset that I fully agree with the intent of the provision incorporated in PL 93-365. Given the ever-rising costs of defence, we and our NATO allies simply can no longer afford any unnecessary duplication of effort. While I certainly agree that key weapon systems used by our forces should be produced in the United States as a matter of prudence, I can think of no logical reason why we cannot produce in this country suitable weapon systems developed by our allies. Indeed, this is the one area where the greatest degree of mutual exchange and co-operative effort should take place. We have no monopoly on good ideas or inventiveness. Some of our allies, and it should be acknowledged, even some of our adversaries, are ahead of us in certain fields of military technology. It is in our interest, as well as in the interest of our NATO allies and the Alliance as a whole, to make maximum use of each other’s inventiveness. And where feasible, weapon systems should be selected and standardised for use NATO-wide. Suitable arrangements can be made for joint production in the United States as well as in Europe. We have had such joint programmes in the past, and there is no reason why we cannot have even more of them in the future.

The United States is pre-eminent in certain fields such as aircraft, but our allies have

developed some outstanding guns, surface-to-air missiles and armoured vehicles. Where these systems meet our needs it is sheer waste to duplicate the development effort in the United States, just as it is sheer waste for our allies to duplicate our development efforts."

(c) *Future European requirements*

5.21 The total numbers of types of missile in service somewhere in Europe¹, or projected, are as follows (see Appendix II) :

	European-built	Purchased from United States
Naval SSM/SAM	18	2
Submarine ICBM	3	1
Submarine anti-ship	1	1
Anti-submarine	3	—
Helicopter anti-ship	5	—
ICBM/IRBM	2	—
Army SSM Tac Nuc	1	3
Army SAM	10	2
Army anti-tank	16	1
Air-to-ground	15	2
Air-to-air	9	2
TOTAL	84	14

5.22 While there must be some duplication, this is clearly excessive. The loss of available productivity and increased cost must be eliminated.

First categories should be standardised. The following suggested :

Navy surface-to-surface Sea-skimming
 Underwater-to-surface

Navy surface-to-air Area self-defence
 Point defence

Army ground-to-ground Tactical nuclear
 Anti-tank

Army ground-to-air
 Medium-range area self-defence
 Short-range — point defence
 Short-range — vehicle-mounted

1. "Europe" here includes European countries not members of NATO (listed in Appendix II).

Air-to-ground

Long-range — stand-off missile
 Short-range — anti-tank

Air-to-ship

Long-range — stand-off missile
 Short-range — anti-FPB

Air-to-air

Medium-long-range — all-weather
 Short-range — dog fight

In these categories your Rapporteur draws attention to the following missiles which already exist whose life could be prolonged for over ten years :

Navy sea-skimming
 Exocet and developments ; Otomat

Navy underwater-to-surface
 USGW or United States Harpoon

Navy area self-defence
 Sea Dart ; Roland M

Navy point defence
 Sea Wolf

Army ground-to-ground
 Tac Nuc anti-tank ; Atlas ; United States Lance

Army ground-to-air medium/short-range
 Roland/Rapier

Air-to-ground long-range
 Martel

Air-to-ground short-range anti-tank
 Hot ; Milan ; United States Tow

Air-to-ship long-range stand-off
 Martel ; Otomat ; United States Harpoon

Air-to-ship short-range anti-FPB
 Sea Skua ; Exocet AM 39

Air-to-air medium/long-range
 Super 530

Air-to-air short-range dogfight
 550

5.23 It would seem, therefore, that the first requirement is to standardise on these existing missiles and to arrange for a European development. Second, to decide in which category to purchase United States missiles and to make this conditional on United States purchase of European equipment. Thirdly, to give priority

to development of European missiles in the following categories :

Army ground-to-air — Medium range ;

Air-to-ship anti-FPB in which category some European projects already exist ;

Ground-to-air — single man-portable missile ;

Anti-tank — single man-portable missile.

5.24 It is recommended that these suggestions be examined on a high priority and an approx-

imate life of each missile selection estimated. Planning for the next generation of missiles must be performed at a high level and on a European basis in harmony with the United States (i.e. by NATO) and companies must be given basic design studies when they will then form their own international consortia for development and production. The objective should be to produce if possible only one European missile in each category, the development being controlled by international consortia, appropriate sub-contracts being shared by all NATO nations, particularly the small States.

CHAPTER VI

Future organisation of European defence*(submitted by Mr. Lemmrich, Rapporteur)***A. Introduction**

6.1 The Committee last reported on the future organisation of European defence in November 1971¹, i.e. before the enlargement of the European Community had taken effect.

It is necessary to review the situation at the present time, if only for the sake of completeness in a report devoted to the state of European security, but the many political uncertainties in the Atlantic world at the time this chapter is drafted make your Rapporteur's task especially difficult. The long-term effects of the present tragedy in South-East Asia cannot now be foreseen. The forthcoming British referendum on the Common Market inhibits authoritative comment on British policy in this field. There are signs but little tangible evidence of a changed attitude in France to relations with NATO. Two members of NATO, Greece and Turkey, have been on the verge of hostilities, and are still far from settling their differences. The Committee believes it useful, nevertheless, to review the situation since the last report was adopted.

6.2 At the beginning of 1973, the Americans, our partners in the Alliance, said that it would be the year of Europe. They were impressed by the prosperity of the countries of the European Economic Community which had increased over the years, though with a tinge of anxiety towards their unprecedented economic strength and competitiveness. Finally, they cherished the hope that the process of European political unification would be speeded up, which was far from a dream immediately after the Paris summit conference of October 1972, when a Europe with new dimensions seemed possible. The United States had ample reason to proclaim 1973 the year of Europe, to quote the most famous American of the seventies, Dr. Kissinger. The North Atlantic Alliance, aware of the many new facts facing it in the next decade, was to have a new structure to revive it. There were great expectations of the creativeness of Europe, which was again called a real partner for sharing tasks in the framework of the Alliance.

1. Document 557, Rapporteur: Mr. Boyden.

6.3 This was the position during the first half of 1973, but now, two years later, it is quite different. High hopes of the prospects offered by Europe's quick advance towards political union (hitherto almost uninterrupted) have subsided. Unfortunate incidents have arisen in relations between the United States and Europe through economic, monetary and political disagreements. Europe's paralysis during the energy crisis triggered off by events in the Middle East and the return by some European countries to a deliberately nationalist policy for reasons of "special interests", have certainly discouraged those who thought a European identity was close at hand. In the meantime, it has become normal to refer to the "stagnation of European unification", and rightly so, in view of the serious economic setbacks encountered. In the circumstances, one may well wonder how European unification can be pursued.

6.4 The question of European defence comes immediately to the fore, since it depends on unification. The European defence identity, about which there has been so much talk (i.e. a European Defence Minister), is certainly the last stone to crown a politically-united European edifice. Therefore, it can but be the consequence — and not a precondition — of a joint European foreign policy. No one who considers the failure of the efforts in 1955 to set up a European Defence Community (EDC) — however promising at the outset — could think otherwise. Since then, calls for greater integration of European defence have certainly not diminished since everyone realises that it is necessary, but everyone likewise knows that to entrust national defence to a supranational body means giving up a very special piece of sovereignty, which States are hardly prepared to do as long as they are independent.

6.5 The fact that fully-integrated European defence is hardly possible without prior political unification and that there are still many obstacles to be overcome on the road to European union does not imply resignation of European security and defence policy. The security of Western Europe is a constant which must be taken into account, however adverse the situation. It was

therefore realised that Western Europeans have to strengthen and improve their practical defence co-operation independently of organisational and institutional matters. This is both possible and necessary and must not await the unification of Europe.

6.6 If we do not manage in years to come — whether in the short or in the long term — to improve co-operation between the European members of the Alliance and hence maintain and strengthen its defence posture, European security will run up against serious difficulties. The tremendous defence effort made by the Warsaw Pact may disturb the balance in Europe, with consequent repercussions on the stability of European security. Those who speak of détente and its results — for instance, in the framework of the mutual and balanced force reduction talks, the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, the strategic arms limitation talks — to justify a relaxation of European or NATO efforts have not understood the position. Everyone expects positive results from efforts to achieve a détente, but results must first be obtained if they are to be taken as a basis for our security policy. It is rightly stated in paragraph 2 of the declaration on Atlantic relations¹ that :

“The allies share a common desire to reduce the burden of arms expenditure on their peoples. But States that wish to preserve peace have never achieved this aim by neglecting their own security.”

B. Requirements

6.7 Thoughts on European defence co-operation and its organisational aspects must take account of the following basic requirements :

(i) The Atlantic Alliance is the basis of European security. Member countries' security depends on the combined and harmonious action of the North American and European partners. According to the declaration on Atlantic relations, members of the Alliance consider their *common* defence to be one and indivisible (paragraph 3) and the United States states its resolve, *together* with its allies, to maintain forces in Europe at the level required to sustain the credibility of the strategy of deterrence and to main-

1. Declaration agreed to by the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa on 19th June 1974 and signed by the Heads of State in Brussels on 26th June 1974.

tain the capacity to defend the North Atlantic area should deterrence fail (paragraph 7).

It is thus certain that in this respect Europe cannot turn its back on the United States in its co-operation in the military field. It would be presumptuous and rash to think that Europe might be able to act alone.

(ii) To guarantee the security of the whole Alliance, large numbers of American troops must be stationed in Europe. Only in the framework of the talks on mutual and balanced force reductions could troop levels possibly be cut, otherwise there would be doubts about the credibility of our strategy of deterrence. Here, too, the declaration on Atlantic relations is unequivocal (paragraphs 5, 7 and 9).

(iii) Since NATO's strategy of deterrence accords the same importance to tactical and strategic nuclear weapons as to conventional weapons, the American nuclear shield will continue to be important for Europe. Two European NATO countries (Britain and France) admittedly have their own nuclear strike forces which are of value as a deterrent but not enough to offset Soviet means. European contributions cannot replace the United States' nuclear umbrella. On present knowledge, this will also be so during the period after European unification, even if then — and only then — there were to be European co-operation in the nuclear field.

6.8 This report therefore covers the period during which the political unification of Europe is also expected to be developed. Parallel to efforts to achieve European union, other efforts are being made to protect Western Europe's external security. These military efforts call for *practical* co-operation with an eye to integration and which can be effected in a variety of fields. The main aims of such co-operation are to strengthen the Western European pillar of the Alliance, and thereby strengthen the whole Alliance.

6.9 Consideration will now be given to the practical conditions for co-operation and the opportunities which are or should be taken.

6.10 The conditions are mainly determined by three factors :

- the threat from the potential enemy ;
- national budget restrictions on troops and armaments in periods of inflation ;
- cuts in troop levels.

The threat

6.11 In the German Democratic Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Poland and the three western military regions (Baltic, White Russia and Carpathians), the Warsaw Pact has 90 divisions of *land forces* ready to intervene at short notice. These divisions, of some 8,000 to 12,000 troops each, have about 22,300 tanks. In Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany and Benelux, NATO land forces consist of 28 2/3 divisions¹ with 6,200 tanks. The Warsaw Pact also has more *air forces* in Europe than NATO.

6.12 The enormous development of the Soviet *navy* in recent years has made it a very powerful instrument constituting a considerable threat.

6.13 Soviet weapons have also increased. Admittedly, the Soviet Union is also facing the pressing need to increase civil production, but the thirst for consumer goods in the Warsaw Pact countries is not so strong as in the West, where it is in danger of getting out of hand. This allows the Soviet Union to earmark 10 % of its GNP for defence², which is high compared with the average of 5.6 % for NATO as a whole and 4.4 % for the European NATO countries.

6.14 Thus, the military capability of the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Pact produces a strong defence posture and allows them, when necessary, to use this power at least to back up their overall policy.

The financial position

6.15 One must learn to live with the price explosion in the West. Claims on the national budgets come from all sides. They compete with each other and each one is more important than the others. In this battle defence expenditure is easily the loser on the grounds that it is no longer necessary at a time when the policy of détente is so prominent. Personnel costs are continually rising in every field, including defence. They have gone past the 50 % mark or even 60 % in countries with a professional army. Conversely, in the Soviet Union, expenditure on personnel amounts to only 25 % to 27 % of the total defence budget. The situation is still worse where investments for the development of matériel and weapons are concerned, and

no significant improvement can be expected in the immediate future. No country will vote for any great increase in defence expenditure.

Strengths

6.16 In his report on foreign policy, President Nixon pointed out that by 1980 all the allies would be confronted with enormous costs for the maintenance of complex armaments, and would also have to face personnel costs and maintain a high level of operational readiness, while compulsory military service would have been largely abolished or the period of service reduced.

6.17 What is implied in this statement, i.e. the impossibility of maintaining force levels and consequent cuts in combat force levels, makes one wonder how the same fighting strength can be maintained with fewer troops. There is admittedly some truth in the reply so often given that quality compensates for quantity, but improved quality, thanks to progress in armaments technology giving greater technicality and mechanisation of the armed forces, means that the best possible use must be made of the means available in view of budgetary restrictions.

C. Closer co-operation

6.18 Two requirements make closer co-operation inevitable. *Rationalisation* and *standardisation* are magic terms, which should and could be the hub of co-operation and which would solve many of our troubles. By these means, the maximum economic use can be made of limited resources.

6.19 The *armaments sector* is a case in point. The European members of NATO, like all the members of the Alliance, are sovereign States with their own economic requirements, plans and achievements. This has led, for instance, to a widespread proliferation of weapons systems which are perhaps all good in themselves but in the long run neither in quantity nor quality can they be maintained at the level required by the Alliance to offset the military capability of the Warsaw Pact and consequently maintain the balance of forces in Europe between East and West. This matter has been dealt with in the study by General de Maizière¹ and in another of the Committee's reports².

1. NATO divisions have from 7,000 to 17,000 men.

2. GNP for the Soviet Union is calculated differently from western GNPs.

1. Study on the rational deployment of forces on the central front, Document 663.

2. Application of the Brussels Treaty, Document 673.

The specific question of tactical missiles is dealt with in Chapter V of the present report. A few examples will suffice to illustrate the problem raised by the lack of standardisation.

— *Air forces* have no common system for friend or foe identification. In air defence, such systems involve the use of radar images representing friendly or enemy aircraft allowing anti-aircraft defence weapons to be deployed quickly and *effectively*.

— In the *navy*, the number of types of combat units is increasing; there are, for instance, more than 100 classes of ships of destroyer-size and above. There are 36 different types of radar installations for directing fire and 40 models of heavy artillery, which means 40 different sorts of munitions.

— Similarly, mention must also be made of excessive requirements regarding modification of existing or planned weapons systems. On delivery, buyers generally start converting them to meet German, Netherlands, Italian or other requirements, thus involving further expenditure which could be avoided. Good management means above all buying equipment which is compatible with national logistic systems.

6.20 Well-thought-out standardisation by the Western European partners of the Alliance means the participation of *national industries* and their views must be taken into account in compromise solutions, which is difficult. Industries in all countries are mainly concerned with making as much profit as possible. Sufficient attention has not yet been paid to finding balanced solutions and making international co-operation attractive. As Mr. Leber said at the last Eurogroup ministerial meeting in June 1974, nations and their industries should be brought to admit that a joint project which meets only 85 % of a nation's requirements is preferable to a national project meeting its requirements 100 %.

6.21 In this connection, consideration must be given to sharing weapons production out among the European partners, making *one country* responsible for the requirements of all the others in a given sector of production. This would undoubtedly involve difficulties at the outset. The question of employment in a country which was to give up a branch of weapons production would raise problems which could be solved only in the event of greater European integration in *all* fields.

6.22 In this connection, standardisation in Europe should always be viewed from the standpoint of strengthening the Alliance. Co-operation with the North American partners must not therefore be forgotten. A balance of armaments procurement between Europe and the United States and vice versa must be guaranteed.

6.23 Another field is closely linked with armaments, i.e. *logistics* (supplies and stockpiling), with which General de Maizière deals at length in his study¹. Like armaments, logistics is a purely national matter which each State organises in accordance with different plans and systems. This means that allied armed forces which, for instance, would have to carry out integrated operations on German territory in the event of war, could not draw on German depots failing interchangeability and ability to co-operate between different national elements. Integration of logistics is a means of increasing fighting strength while lowering costs.

6.24 Finally, training is an area in which co-operation can be tested with a view to achieving rational results. General de Maizière has devoted a section of his study to this matter¹. Joint training of soldiers of various nationalities with the same tanks and weapons should give tangible shape to a modern European defence system.

6.25 Another possibility for practical co-operation between the Western European partners is the harmonisation of strategic and tactical concepts with particular regard to long-term armaments planning. So far, each country has followed different national principles for the command and deployment of armed forces in the event of war. Thus, military requirements for weapons and matériel differ from one country to another. If joint concepts could be agreed to, perhaps only in certain sectors at the outset, such as anti-tank defence or the conduct of air operations, a decisive step would be taken. In the event of war, armed forces could then be deployed without incident and joint long-term armaments plans could be co-ordinated from the outset and the action of troops integrated subsequently. Joint tactics presumes agreement on military requirements which should constitute a guideline for weapons technology.

6.26 *Rationalisation by task-sharing between countries — specialisation* is recently being dis-

1. Document 663.

cussed more and more. Thoughts on this matter are at least an attempt to plan the future organisation of the Alliance's forces and hence European defence from a more economical standpoint. Without mincing words, this means that States must pay growing attention to essential tasks in order to make the best use of the means available to them. General de Maizière studies the possibilities in detail¹.

6.27 Specialisation also has a definite impact on each country's sovereignty, however. It requires greater military integration. The political repercussions of greater integration depend on the tasks earmarked for specialisation in the conventional and nuclear fields and hence the weapons systems adopted. Specialisation and integration must be decided on in conjunction and as far as possible be developed in a balanced manner. Everyone will benefit from this, particularly the smaller States, which find it totally out of the question to cover the full range of necessary tasks.

D. Options

Options available in organising Western European defence co-operation

6.28 So far, the requirements of future European defence have been described. Concrete means of making European defence dynamic and effective have been set out. It is obviously quite impossible to overlook the institutionalisation of European defence efforts any longer. However, it must not be concluded that problems are easier to solve when studied in a formal and bureaucratic organised framework.

6.29 European forces need to be merged, but the kind of organisation is of secondary importance. It is more important to recognise that independent national defence is an anachronism. Ever greater integration — first limited and subsequently total — should in the long run lead to the merging of economic, military and political interests and tasks.

6.30 There are groups which, from the outset, have adopted a pragmatic approach :

(a) *Eurogroup*

1. Document 663.

(i) This is an unofficial group consisting of the Ministers of Defence of the European members of NATO except France, Portugal and Iceland. It has no fixed framework, little bureaucracy, no statute and no costly administrative hierarchy. This allows Ministers to commit themselves personally and directly when a particular project has to be dealt with quickly.

(ii) It works on *four levels* :

- Ministers, who usually meet twice a year (in the spring and December) ;
- permanent representatives of the Eurogroup countries to NATO in Brussels ;
- Staff Group, a working group of the military and political advisers of the permanent representatives in Brussels ;
- sub-groups responsible for specific projects for practical co-operation.

(iii) The aim of Eurogroup is to strengthen the whole Alliance by means of a greater European contribution. At the start, this aim stemmed mainly from the wish to help the United States Government to maintain troops in Europe. Demonstrating an increase in European defence expenditure was a concession to the American request for burden-sharing.

(iv) In December 1970, Eurogroup drew up a three-part European defence improvement programme (EDIP), a *five-year* programme involving expenditure of about \$1,000 million. This additional expenditure for the Eurogroup members was mainly earmarked for NATO infrastructure. This programme is practically completed but European expenditure is continuing in other fields. Since December 1971, such expenditure has been set out in Europackage and is *published* as an appendix to the communiqués issued after ministerial meetings.

(v) An important aspect of Eurogroup's work is the practical co-operation between its members. The aim is to make the maximum joint use of the means available. The sub-groups referred to above are active in this field, and particularly :

- (a) *Euronad* : a group of Eurogroup national armaments directors ;
- (b) *Eurolongterm* : a group responsible for working out joint tactics and strategy prior to joint long-term armaments planning ;
- (c) *Eurotraining* : a sub-group for co-operation in respect of training ;

- (d) *Eurolog* : a sub-group responsible for co-operation in respect of logistic support for troops assigned to NATO.

6.31 For some time, these sub-groups have been dealing with rationalisation, standardisation, harmonisation and specialisation, particularly in respect of armaments, training, long-term planning and logistics, as referred to in Section C. Success does not come overnight. Obstacles continually needed to be removed. These obstacles largely stem from the fact that States are not yet ready to pass from nationalism to supranationality. There is considerable political will, but more is needed.

- (b) *Western European Union (WEU)*

6.32 This organisation has seven member countries, including France, which are all members of NATO (the six members of Eurogroup plus France) and of the European Communities. Not all the European members of NATO belong to WEU (particularly the flank countries), nor do all the members of the enlarged European Community. The exercise of its military responsibilities was transferred to NATO a long time ago. Its specific activities are mainly the control of armaments and work carried out in the framework of the *Standing Armaments Committee (SAC)*.

6.33 During President Pompidou's term of office, France tried to root European defence co-operation in WEU. It sought to reactivate the SAC to make it the forum for European co-operation in defence matters, starting with armaments. The other Eurogroup partners showed little enthusiasm. Armaments co-operation in Eurogroup and the SAC might have drained Eurogroup of its substance or led to overlapping, both of which had to be avoided at all costs. Ways were sought of linking Euronad and the SAC on the grounds that France might thus be induced to co-operate in joint projects, but to no avail.

Because of government changes in France and Britain, work is again at a standstill.

- (c) *The enlarged European Communities*

6.34 The Nine — eight European members of NATO plus Ireland, or the seven members of Eurogroup plus France plus Ireland — are the nucleus of attempts at European unification. The

summit conferences in Paris in October 1972, Copenhagen in December 1973 and in Paris again in December 1974 marked the course of the Nine's aims in terms of Europe's identity.

6.35 For a long time, the EEC completely refrained from dealing with security and defence policy. It confined itself to economic, monetary, social and industrial integration and security policy remained in the hands of NATO. Only since the abovementioned summit conferences has it shown interest in fields linked with security policy, due to the fact that, since then, political questions in general, and particularly those relating to foreign policy, have been discussed in greater detail by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs with a view to drawing up guidelines for all relations between the EEC countries up to 1980. In the meantime, European political co-operation through "travelling" Ministers for Foreign Affairs has become well-established, i.e. ministerial meetings are held in turn in the respective capitals of the nine countries. In this framework, discussions have been held, *inter alia*, on preparing the conference on security and co-operation in Europe and the implications for European unification of the talks on mutual and balanced force reductions, i.e. matters directly relating to security policy.

6.36 Addressing the Assembly on 5th December 1974, Mr. Van Elslande, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, said :

"But transcending these studies, projects and cogitations, a common armaments policy soon comes to imply that decisions must be taken at the political level... Undoubtedly the proposed European union bears within it a political design. It must be woven around the existing institutions of the Common Market and of political co-operation. It is therefore undoubtedly at this level that the centre of gravity of a European armaments policy should be situated. Of course, European union is only in a rough-hewn state and European defence is in the clouds, but among the Nine there is a political orientation aimed at incorporating all Community and inter-State relations. A European armaments policy, therefore, forms an integral part of this design. In addition, such a project is by its nature closely associated with substantive issues that fall within the competence of the Common Market. But the Treaty of Rome excludes armaments from common policies.

It remains true that any attempts at integration, because of its consequences in the economic and industrial fields, and in that of exports, can only be conceived as closely related to the European Economic Community. To sum up, at the moment when we shall proceed to implement a genuine plan of standardisation, and independently of the sectoral activities which are mainly pursued within Eurogroup and which should continue to receive our full support, we must act in as close association as possible with the political activities of the Nine. It is there that the focus of political decisions regarding unification, including military integration, will normally be situated."

E. Consideration of the options

(a) Eurogroup

6.37 This group has never claimed to be a model for identity in European defence. Its political (external policy) basis is not sufficient for that and this was intentional since there was no question of Eurogroup being an organisation in the legal sense. Now as in the past, its aim is to strengthen the Alliance by improving the European contribution. One advantage of Eurogroup is that Ministers of Defence in person meet twice a year in this framework. Pragmatic action is its motto, as is testified by the Federal German Government's statement of 18th January that :

"The Federal Government will endeavour to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance ; Eurogroup is a realistic starting-point for this."

6.38 The abovementioned aim of Eurogroup has not changed. In this group, practical measures for European military co-operation must be pursued and intensified pending a better solution. Should the occasion arise, there would be no difficulty in merging Eurogroup, whose links are loose, in another form of organisation. Since it has no official stamp, it is no obstacle to parallel action or other forms of organisation which might emerge at a later date. However, fruitless overlapping must be avoided in the security and defence policy field.

6.39 The great weakness of Eurogroup is that France is not a member. Without France, European efforts are difficult and incomplete. France is most important for Western Europe in the

security policy field, in view of its geographical situation (lines of communication and supply routes with the Atlantic), its military potential, including nuclear capability, and its important armaments industry. French co-operation would be an advantage, even if at the outset it related to only some of Eurogroup's activities. The Euronad sub-group should also be quite interesting for France, whose excess armaments production must be used.

6.40 *Armaments*, moreover, are likely to be the hub of European defence co-operation. Here are the greatest requirements and the most striking possibilities of effective co-operation. All the States are interested for perhaps selfish but understandable reasons. A flourishing armaments industry spells the well-being of industry as a whole. Better use must be made of these factors to increase co-operation in the field of armaments, which should be a nucleus extending to other fields leading to wider co-operation (logistics, training). It has therefore been suggested on several occasions that the Euronad sub-group should be institutionalised as a European *armaments agency*. Such a pool might be organised in two ways:

- the agency might become a supranational body in which decisions are taken by majority, or
- member States might take decisions unanimously in the framework of multinational co-operation.

6.41 Only the first alternative would have an obvious advantage, since it would allow joint solutions to be defined through majority decisions which each State would accept.

Conversely, the second alternative is but another form of the present situation, coupled with what would certainly be a more costly administrative and bureaucratic system. The introduction of a system of common funding would make little difference. Difficulties might arise from the unanimity rule for choosing armaments to be manufactured or procured. If therefore the first solution cannot be adopted since there is not yet sufficient political will for such full integration, the present situation should be maintained. A good start has been made, from which further progress is possible.

(b) WEU

6.42 The fact that WEU has transferred the exercise of all its military and defence policy

responsibilities to NATO — apart from arms control and the definition of methods of armaments co-operation in the SAC — and that it includes only seven of the thirteen European members of NATO limits its possibilities for practical European co-operation in security and defence matters. In this respect it must be emphasised that the States situated on the flanks (Turkey, Greece, Norway and Denmark) are not members, although they are obviously important for the security policy of Western Europe's defence. However, WEU is still of political importance for the future, because of its secretariat and Assembly, which for the time being is the only European parliamentary assembly dealing with security and defence matters, and because of the assistance commitments embodied in the treaty. The full importance of these facts may be felt when the institutionalisation of European defence seeks official guidelines.

(c) *EEC*

6.43 An ideal solution would be for the EEC to become a *federal* European political union. Europe would thus find its identity, including a defence identity represented by a *single* European Minister of Defence.

6.44 The North Atlantic Alliance would still be necessary and would consist of :

- the European federal State ;
- other European States, members of the Alliance but not of the EEC ;
- the transatlantic partners.

The structure of the Alliance should be re-examined. *Integration* of the armed forces of the European partners, on the one hand, and of the North American partners, on the other, would not be in the present NATO form, where there is still an American Supreme Commander of the Alliance's integrated forces. With a federal European State, including France, which would emerge as a "new" member of the Alliance, this would no longer be automatic.

6.45 Close to the federal solution would be a European structure allowing political sovereignty and integration in certain fields (*confederation*). Should foreign and security policy be transferred from the States to the confederation, the practical consequences for defence would be virtually the same as in the federal solution. A confederation *without* federal responsibility for foreign and

security policy would be little different from the present situation where defence is concerned.

6.46 Despite many recent setbacks in the EEC compromising its original high aims, matters relating to the organisation of Western European defence will also be discussed in this framework.

6.47 It is already being said that, apart from political consultations between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, there should be European co-operation on defence policy in which the Ministers of Defence would take part. Apart from organisational problems — lack of permanent secretariat and fixed headquarters — there are other problems : Denmark is not particularly anxious for questions of this kind to be discussed in the framework of the Nine ; Ireland is a member of the EEC but not of NATO. The interests of States on the flanks and their importance for European and Atlantic defence must be borne constantly in mind. The Cyprus crisis and its possible repercussions on western security are evidence of this.

F. Conclusions on the future organisation of European defence

6.48 These may be summarised as follows :

6.49 The creation of a European defence identity is a worthwhile aim. It increases the importance of Europe's contribution to western defence and should be a decisive improvement, but much ground still has to be covered.

6.50 *Parallel* to attempts to achieve this in the evolution towards European political union, a practical approach to the Alliance's policy and military matters must shape Western European defence co-operation according to the following criteria :

- as far as possible, *all* the European members of NATO should take part ;
- nothing should prejudice the future institutionalisation of European defence.

6.51 Eurogroup amply meets these conditions in the interim pending the development of the European Community.

6.52 The Committee therefore recommends (i) that the Council again draw the attention of all members of WEU to the importance of Eurogroup as the most appropriate organ at present

in which to arrange that closer practical European defence co-operation that is now essential — especially in the fields of joint production and standardisation of armaments ; common logistics ; common training ; and specialisation by countries in certain defence tasks. Recalling that Mr. Tindemans, the Belgian Prime Minister, has been invited by the Nine to collate the views of the governments, the organs of the Community and other interested parties, and to prepare before

the end of the year a report on European union, the Committee recommends (ii) that the Council instruct the Secretary-General to submit to Mr. Tindemans, before the end of June, the views of the Council on the place of the Brussels Treaty, and its mutual defence obligations, in the European union into which “the whole complex of the relations of member States” is to be transformed by 1980 “with the fullest respect for the treaties already signed”¹.

1. Words of the summit communiqué of the Nine, Paris, 21st October 1972.

VII. Conclusions

7.1 The Committee's chief conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation. For ease of reference, the various chapters of the explanatory memorandum are numbered to correspond with the paragraphs of the preamble and of the operative text to which they refer.

Preamble

7.2 *First paragraph.* The introduction (I) of the explanatory memorandum recalls the previous comprehensive report of 1961, comparing it with the present report. The remaining paragraphs (ii) to (vi) introduce the various proposals emanating from the corresponding chapters of the explanatory memorandum.

Operative text

7.3 *Paragraph 1.* The introduction (I) compares the world of 1975 with that of 1961, reaching a short conclusion in paragraph 1.6.

7.4 *Paragraph 2(a).* The prospects for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe are described in Chapter II, paragraphs 2.5, 2.6 and 2.15 ; the need for cohesion in the Alliance in the face of Soviet power is stressed in paragraph 2.16.

7.5 *Paragraphs 2(b) (i) and (ii).* The lack of real progress in the MBFR negotiations is mentioned in Chapter II, paragraph 2.5, the need for reductions, to be acceptable to the West, to be asymmetrical, in paragraph 2.15.

7.6 *Paragraph 2(b) (iii).* The problem of theatre nuclear weapons is discussed in Chapter III ; the possibility of introducing them into the MBFR negotiations is mentioned in paragraph 3.21.

7.7 *Paragraph 3.* General de Maizière's important study¹ (to which reference should also be made in connection with paragraph 3 of the recommendation), and the particular problems of the central front are discussed in Chapter III.

(a) The conclusions of that study concerning

deployment are largely supported, but with different emphasis, in paragraphs 3.16 to 3.19. (b) Warning time is mentioned in paragraph 3.17(a) (iii). (c) Logistics are dealt with by General de Maizière in Document 663, paragraphs 355 to 386. (d) Tactical nuclear weapons are mentioned in paragraphs 3.20 and 3.21 of the explanatory memorandum. (e) Specialisation is mentioned in Document 663, paragraphs 339 to 353.

7.8 *Paragraph 4(a) (i).* The problems of the flanks are discussed in Chapter IV. (a) The particular problems of isolation and means of overcoming them are discussed in paragraphs 4.2, 4.16, 4.19 to 4.21 and 4.28 ; the problem of the supply of armaments in paragraph 4.10 (ii) ; the differences between Greece and Turkey are discussed in paragraphs 4.17 to 4.24. (b) The problems of aviation in the Aegean are described in paragraph 4.19.

7.9 *Paragraph 5.* The problems of standardisation and joint production of tactical missile systems are described in Chapter V of the explanatory memorandum. Particular choices concerning tactical missiles are discussed in paragraphs 5.9 and 5.22 to 5.24. (i) Responsibility for the Military Committee and NATO staff is mentioned in paragraphs 5.19 and 5.24. (ii) The 1 % proposal is mentioned in paragraph 5.19.

7.10 *Paragraph 6.* (a) The value of Eurogroup at the present time is described in paragraphs 6.30, 6.31, 6.37 to 6.39 and 6.49 to 6.51. (b) The importance of European union in the future and the collective defence commitment of the Brussels Treaty are mentioned in paragraphs 6.32 to 6.35, 6.42 to 6.49 and 7.52.

7.11 The report as a whole was adopted by the Committee by 8 votes to 4 with 4 abstentions. Members unable to support the report included those who objected to references to Spain in Chapter IV, paragraphs 4.26 and 4.27, those who felt that in Chapter VI too much emphasis was placed on the United States contribution to the defence of Europe, and also those who objected to the European Community referred to in the same chapter.

1. Document 663.

APPENDIX I

RECOMMENDATION 69¹
on the state of European security²

The Assembly,

I

Taking note of the conclusions reached by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, after surveying its work over the past five years and studying the attitudes of the free western countries to the key issues of defence ;

Aware that, owing to recent acts of the Soviet bloc in resuming massive atomic tests in the atmosphere and attempting to intimidate the free world, the threat to world peace has increased ;

Calling on all members of the western alliance to bear their full part in facing these threats ;

Recognising that, in spite of the danger, the same deficiencies have been allowed to enfeeble western security for too many years ;

Convinced that these deficiencies would disappear if the member governments of the western alliance were willing to abandon outmoded nationalistic concepts of defence in favour of common defence ;

Equally convinced that, to be efficient, common defence must be effectively supervised by national and international parliamentary bodies, which are essential features of western defence itself ;

Stressing the need for a dynamic political will to achieve results,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that, in accordance with their undertakings to NATO, member governments bring their armed forces in the European theatre up to the full strength necessary to avoid automatic recourse to nuclear weapons, namely to bring their land forces assigned to NATO up to the agreed minimum figure of 30 divisions on the central front ;
2. Impress on the NATO Council the need to give greater authority to allied commanders in the deployment of these forces and at least the right to determine their supply requirements ;
3. Invite member governments :
 - (a) to call for NATO strategic planning to be extended to the pooling of the technical and industrial resources of the alliance, with a view to achieving genuine standardisation and the common research, development and production of armaments, taking full account of European views and experience ;
 - (b) to put into production only those armaments projects adopted for joint production by at least three member countries ;
4. Take every step to ensure that western nuclear anarchy is avoided at all costs ;
5. Recommend to the North Atlantic Council that the deficiencies in the allied command structure be remedied in the Baltic approaches, the Channel and the Mediterranean, basing the reform not on prestige considerations but on military efficiency ;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 13th December 1961 during the Second Part of the Seventh Ordinary Session (12th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by MM. Fens, Bourgoin, Goedhart, Cadorna, Kershaw, de la Vallée Poussin and Kliesing on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 215).

6. (a) Observe in every respect the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty, and in particular determine the levels of internal defence and police forces of member countries on the mainland of Europe ;

(b) Instruct national representatives of member States in the North Atlantic Council to press for the implementation of the resolution adopted by that Council in October 1954 providing, in particular, that the levels of forces for the common defence which member countries retain under national command be determined by that Council ;

(c) Request the governments of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to ratify forthwith the convention signed in December 1957, the failure to do which has prevented the provisions of the treaty relating to the control of armaments being implemented for four years ;

7. Invite the North Atlantic Council to revise the present NATO ruling on the provision of information to the Defence Committee of the Assembly, thus enabling it properly to discharge its duties ;

8. Propose that the North Atlantic Council examine the possibility of satisfying the need for democratic parliamentary supervision of common defence expenditure, in particular expenditure on infrastructure.

II

Convinced that the cold war, which is threatening to reach out into space, constitutes a serious threat to world peace ;

Equally convinced that peaceful co-operation between the two great powers in this scientific adventure could benefit all mankind ;

Considering that this peaceful co-operation could better be guaranteed if a greater number of countries participated ;

Considering also that the scientific resources of the European countries are such that co-operation with the United States in this field would constitute an important contribution to further peaceful development of space research,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

9. Make every effort to promote the conclusion of a world-wide convention on peaceful co-operation in space ;

10. Promote between the United States of America and the European States the joint preparation of a western space programme, meanwhile combining the technical and financial resources of the European countries in this field.

APPENDIX II

(see Chapter V)

Missiles 1975**A comprehensive list of guided missiles in service or under development by principal countries of manufacture¹***(missiles of foreign design, procured abroad or produced under licence, are shown in brackets)*

- | | | |
|--|----------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. General list of missiles by country | 5. Navy anti-submarine systems | 9. Army SSM |
| 2. Naval SSM/SAM | 6. Helicopter-launched anti-ship | 10. Army SAM |
| 3. Navy SLBM | 7. Land-based strategic missiles | 11. Army anti-tank |
| 4. Submarine-launched anti-ship | 8. Anti-ballistic missiles | 12. Airborne missiles |

Abbreviations

ABM	Anti-ballistic missile missile
ASM	Air-to-surface missile
SSM	Surface-to-surface missile
SAM	Surface-to-air missile
SLBM	Submarine-launched ballistic missile
ICBM	Intercontinental ballistic missile
IRBM	Intermediate-range ballistic missile

1. All information is from published sources and cannot be guaranteed.

1. General list of missiles by country

Country	Naval SSM/SAM	SLBM	A/S	Strategic	ABM	Army SSM	Army SAM	Anti-tank	Air-to- surface	Air-to-air	Air nuclear
China		Sark									
France	Exocet MM.38 MM.40 Maurusca	MSBS-M1 MSBS-M2 MSBS-M4	Malafon	SSBS S2 SSBS S3		Pluton	Crotale Roland	Atlas Acra Entac	AS-20 AS-30 AS-11 AS-12	R511 R530	

	SS-12M Naval Crotale			SS11 Harpon SS-12	AM-39 (anti-ship)	Super 530 550		
France / Germany	Roland 2M			Milan Hot				
France / Italy	Otomat				Otomat			
Germany			(Hawk)	Cobra Mamba	Kormoran Jumbo (Bullpup)	(Sidewinder)		
United Kingdom	(Exocet)	(Ikara)	Blowpipe	Vigilant Swingfire	Hellcat Sea Skua (anti-ship)	Firestreak	Blue Steel	
Israel	Gabriel		Jericho					
Italy	Sea Killer II Sea Killer III Albatross		Indigo Spada	Mosquito Sparviero	Airtos Marte (anti-ship)	Aspide (Sparrow)		
Japan				KAM 3 KAM 9		AAM 1 AAM 2		
Norway	Penguin	Terne 8						
Sweden	RBO 8A			Bantam	RBO4 RBO5			
United Kingdom	Seacat Sea Dart Sea Slug Sea Wolf SLAM		Rapier Tigercat Bloodhound 2 Thunderbird 2		CL 834 Hawkswing	Red Top SRAAM X.J. 521		
United Kingdom / Belgium				Atlas				
United Kingdom / France	USGW				Martel			

Country	Naval SSM/SAM	SLBM	A/S	Strategic	ABM	Army SSM	Army SAM	Anti-tank	Air-to-surface	Air-to-air	Air nuclear
United States	Talos	Polaris	Asroc	Minuteman	Spartan		Redeye	Dragon	Bullpup	Agile	Genie
	Tartar	A.2		1	Sprint 1	Sergeant	Stinger	Tow	Condor	Falcon 4	Hound Dog
	Advanced Terrier	Polaris A.3		2	Sprint 2	Pershing 1A	Chaparral (Roland)	Schillelagh	Harpoon	Falcon 26	SRAM
	Aegis	Poseidon	Subroc	Minuteman		Lance	Hawk	Shrike	Maverick	Falcon 47	
	Harpoon	ULMS		3			Sparrow	Walleye		Phoenix	
	ISSM	Harpoon		Titan 2			SAM-D	Standard		Sidewinder	
	Sea Sparrow	(anti-ship)					Nike Hercules	ARM		1A	
	Standard ARM							Tow		Sidewinder	
	Standard 1							Hellfire		1C	
	Standard 2							Harm		Sparrow	
										III D	
										Sparrow	
									III E		
USSR	Goa	Sark	Saddler		Galosh	Frog 1-7	Grail	Snapper	Kennel	Alkali	Kipper
	SAN 1	SSN 4	SS 7			Scud A	Gainful SA 6	Swatter	Kelt	Anab	Kangaroo
	Guideline	Serb	Sasin SS 8			Scud B	Ganef SA 4	Sagger		Ash	Kitchen
	SAN 2	SSN 5	Scarp SS 9			Scud C	Goa SA 3			Atoll	
	Goblet	Sawfly	Scrag				Guideline SA 2			Awl	
	SAN 3	SSN 6	SS 10								
	Scrubber	SSN 8	SS 11								
	SSN 1		Savage								
	Styx		SS 13								
	SSN 2		SSX 16								
	Shaddock		SS 17								
	SSN 3		SS 18								
	SSN 7		SS 19								
	SSN 9										
	SSN 10										
SSN 11											
SSN											

2. Navy SSM/SAM

Country	Name	Manufacturer	Range	Propulsion	Guidance	In service	Remarks
France	Exocet						
	MM 38	Aérospatiale	23 miles	Solid	Inertial/active homing	1972	SSM only
	MM 40	Aérospatiale	40 km	Solid	Inertial/auto pilot	Project	

	Masurca	DTCN	31 miles 46 km	Solid	Command or semi-active homing		
	SS 12M	Aérospatiale		Solid			
	Naval Crotale	Matra	8 km	Solid	Radio command	1976	
France / Germany	Roland 2M	Aérospatiale/MBB	19,700 ft 6 km	Solid	Radio command	Development	SAM
France / Italy	Otomat	Oto Melara / Matra	37 miles 60 km +	Turbojet solid boosters	Inertial/active homing	1975	SSM
United Kingdom	Exocet	See France				1974	SSM only
	Seacat	Short Bros. Harland	2.2 miles 3.5 km	Solid	Radio also radar and TV	1970	SAM only in many navies
	Sea Dart	Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics	20 miles 35 km +	Ramjet with solid boosters	Semi-active homing	1974	SSM and SAM
	Sea Slug II	Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics	30 miles 45 km	Solid	Beam riding	1970	SAM with SSM capability
	Sea Wolf	BAC		Solid	Auto-radio command — radar and TV trailing	1976	SAM anti-missile
	SLAM	Vickers /Shorts		Solid	Radio command, TV trailing	Development	SAM with SSM capability for sub- marines and FPBs
Italy	Sea Killer II	Sistel	17 miles 20 km	Solid	Beam rider or command	1970	SSM
	Sea Killer III	Sistel	50 miles + 60 km +	Solid	Radar homing	Development	SSM
	Albatross	Selenia		Solid		Development	SAM with Sparrow or Aspide
Israel	Gabriel	Israel A/C Industries	12.6 miles 22 km	Solid	Command plus homing	1970	SSM
Norway	Penguin	Kongsberg Vaapen- fabrikk	17 miles 27 km	Solid	Inertial/IR homing		SSM
Sweden	RB 08 A	SAAB	135 miles	Turbojet solid booster	Auto pilot plus active radar homing	1968	SSM

Country	Name	Manufacturer	Range	Propulsion	Guidance	In service	Remarks
United States	Advanced Terrier	General Dynamics	20 miles 32 km	Solid	Beam riding /semi-active homing	1963	SAM
	Talos	Bendix	70 miles 112 km	Ramjet with solid booster	Beam riding /semi-active homing	1968	SAM
	Tartar	General Dynamics	10 miles 16 km	Solid	Semi-active radar homing	1960	SAM
	Aegis	USN System Command		Solid	Semi-active homing	Development	SAM
	Harpoon	McDonnell Douglas	60 miles 95 km	Turbojet solid booster	Inertial active radar homing	1975	SSM air- or submarine-launched
	ISSM	General Dynamics	25 miles 40 km	Solid	Semi-active homing	An interim system	SSM
	Sea Sparrow	Raytheon Canada	6.2 miles 10 km	Solid	Semi-active radar homing	1973	SAM
	Standard ARM	General Dynamics	15.5 miles 25 km	Solid	Passive homing	1968	SAM
	Standard I	General Dynamics	15 miles 24 km	Solid	Semi-active homing	1971	SAM will replace Terrier and Advanced Terrier
	Standard II	General Dynamics	35 miles 56 km	Solid	Semi-active homing	1971	SAM
USSR	Goa SAN 1	USSR Government	15 miles 24 km	Solid	Radar command Radar homing		SAM similar to SAM 3
	Guideline SAN 2	USSR Government	25 miles 40 km	Liquid with solid booster	Command		Dzerzinski SAM
	Goblet SAN 3	USSR Government		Solid	Radar homing		Moskva class and Kresta II SAM Destroyers SAM
	Scrubber SSN 1	USSR Government	150 miles 240 km	Turbojet solid booster	Command /IR homing		
	Styx SSN 2	USSR Government	29 miles 46 km	Turbojet solid booster	Auto pilot active homing		Patrol boats SSM
	Shaddock SSN 3	USSR Government	100 to 350 miles 160 to 560 km	Ram or turbojet solid booster	Radio command / active homing		General service — SSM

SSN 7	USSR Government	30 miles 50 km	Turbojet solid booster	Mid-term guidance at long range Auto pilot active homing	Submarines under- water launch SSM
SSN 9	USSR Government	150 miles 240 km	Ram or turbojet solid booster	Command/active homing	DEs SSM
SSN 10	USSR Government	25 miles 40 km			Kresta II class Destroyers. Supersonic. SSM
SSN 11	USSR Government	25 miles 40 km			Patrol boats High subsonic SSM
SSN	USSR Government	400 miles 640 km		Development	High supersonic SSM

3. Navy SLBM (all two-stage)

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Country	Name	Manufacturer	Range	Propulsion	Guidance	In service	Remarks	
China	Sark			See USSR				
France	MSBS M 1	Aérospatiale	1,400 miles 2,250 km	Solid	Inertial	1970 Development	500 KT	
	MSBS M 2		2,000 miles 3,200 km				500 KT	
	MSBS M 4		2,000 miles 3,200 km				Development	
United Kingdom	(Polaris A3)			See United States			3 × 200 KT MRV	
United States	Polaris A2	Lockheed	1,750 miles 2,800 km	Solid	Inertial	1974		
	Polaris A3		2,880 miles 4,600 km					
	Poseidon		2,880 miles 4,600 km					10 × 50 KT MIRV
	ULMS		Lockheed					Development

Country	Name	Manufacturer	Range	Propulsion	Guidance	In service	Remarks
USSR	Sark SSN 4	USSR Government	380 miles 500 km	Solid		Obsolescent	1 MT
	Serb SSN 5	USSR Government	750 miles 1,200 km	Solid		1965	1 MT in G and M class submarines
	Sawfly SSN 6	USSR Government	1,750 miles 2,800 km	Solid		1966	1 MT in Y class submarines
	SSN 8	USSR Government	4,500 miles 7,200 km	Solid		Development	MIRV

4. Navy submarine-launched anti-ship missiles

Country	Name	Manufacturer	Range	Propulsion	Guidance	In service	Remarks
United Kingdom / France	USGW (Sub Martel)	Hawker-Siddeley Aérospatiale / Matra		Solid	Full active homing	Study	Alternative to Harpoon Decision 1975
United States	Harpoon	McDonnell Douglas	110 km	Turbojet solid booster	Inertial active radar homing	Development	

5. Navy anti-submarine systems

Country	Name	Manufacturer	Range	Propulsion	Guidance	In service	Remarks
France	Malafon	Latécoère	11 miles 18 km	Solid boosters	Command	1965	
Norway	Terne 8	A/S Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk		Solid	None		Rocket-propelled depth charge
United Kingdom	Ikara	Australian Department of Supply	10 miles 18 km	Solid	Radio-Radar	1972	Torpedo dropping boosted cylinder
United States	Asroc	Honeywell	6 miles 9 km	Solid	Unguided	1961	
	Subroc	Goodyear	30 miles 48 km	Solid	Inertial	1965	

6. Anti-ship helicopter-launched missiles

Country	Name	Manufacturer	Range	Propulsion	Guidance	In service	Remarks
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France	AM 39	Aérospatiale	50 km	Terminal homing	Development	A development of Exocet
Italy	Marte	Sistel	10 km	Beam riding	1977	
United Kingdom	Sea Skua	BAC		Semi-active housing	Development	Long-range stand-off for Lynx helicopter
	Hawkswing	BAC				
	Hellcat	Short Bros.	3.5 km		1968	A development of Swingfire

7. Land-based strategic missiles

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Country	Name	Manufacturer	Range	Propulsion	Guidance	In service	Remarks	
ICBM								
China			3,500 miles 5,600 km			1975		
United States	Minuteman 1	Boeing	7,500 miles 12,000 km	Solid	Inertial		250 to 300 of 1 MT	
	Minuteman 2	Boeing	8,000 miles 12,800 km	Solid	Inertial		500 of 1-2 MT	
	Minuteman 3	Boeing	8,000 miles 12,800 km	Solid	Inertial		200 to 250 of 1-2 MT of 3 x 200 KT	
	Titan 2	Martin Marietta	7,250 miles 11,600 km	Liquid	Inertial	Obsolescent	54 of 5-10 MT	
USSR	Saddler SS7	USSR Government	6,000 miles 9,600 km	Storable liquid			100 of 5 MT	
	Sasin SS8	USSR Government	7,000 miles 11,200 km	Storable liquid		Obsolescent	100 of 5 MT	
	Scarp SS9	USSR Government	7,500 miles 12,000 km	Liquid		1967	290 of 25 MT MRV. World's most powerful weapon	
	Scrag SS10	USSR Government	Global	Storable		Development	None ? In production ?	
		SS11	USSR Government	6,500 miles 10,400 km	Storable			970 of 1-2 MT
		Savage SS13	USSR Government	5,500 miles 8,800 km	Solid		1966	60 of 1 MT. To replace SS11
		SS16	USSR Government	5,500 miles 8,800 km			1978	Replaces SS13 not MIRVs
	SS17	USSR Government	5,500 miles 8,800 km			1978	Replaces SS11 — 4 MIRVs	

Country	Name	Manufacturer	Range	Propulsion	Guidance	In service	Remarks
USSR (cont.)	SS18	USSR Government	7,000 miles 11,200 km			1978	Replaces SS11 — 4 MIRVs
	SS19	USSR Government	4,500 miles 7,200 km			1978	6 MIRVs
<i>IRBM</i>							
China			2,500 miles 4,000 km	Storable			15 to 20 KT range
France	SSBS S2	Aérospatiale	1,800 miles 2,900 km	Solid	Inertial	1970	18 + of 150 KT
	SSBS S3	Aérospatiale	1,900 miles 3,200 km	Solid	Inertial	Development	1 MT
USSR	Skean SS5	USSR Government	2,300 miles 3,700 km	Liquid		Obsolescent	100 of 1 MT
	Scapegoat SS14	USSR Government	2,000 miles 3,200 km	Solid		1965	Mobile. 1 MT
	Scrooge SSX2	USSR Government	3,000 miles 4,800 km	Solid			Mobile. 1 MT ?
<i>MRBM</i>							
China			1,200 miles 1,900 km	Liquid			About 50 of KT range
USSR	Sandal SS4	USSR Government	1,200 miles 1,900 km	Liquid		Obsolescent	450 of 1 MT

8. Anti-ballistic missiles

Country	Name	Manufacturer	Range	Propulsion	Guidance	In service	Remarks
United States	Spartan	Western Electric	400 miles + 640 km	Solid	Radio command	Production	MT range
	Sprint 1	Martin Marietta	25 miles 40 km	Solid		Production	25
	Sprint 2	Martin Marietta	25 miles 40 km	Solid		Development	
USSR	Galosh SA 7		200 miles + 320 km +	Solid			64 of MT range

9. Army SSM

Country	Name	Manufacturer	Range	Propulsion	Guidance	In service	Remarks
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France	Pluton	Aérospatiale	75 miles 120 km	Solid	Inertial	1974	10-15 KT
Israel	Jericho		280 miles 450 km		Inertial		Nuclear
Italy			25 miles 40 km		Inertial	Study	
United States	Sergeant	Sperry Road	45 miles 72 km	Solid	Inertial	1962	KT range. About 500 deployed High KT range. About 250 deployed KT range. Replace Honest John and Sergeant
	Pershing 1A	Martin Marietta	450 miles 720 km	Solid	Inertial	1962	
	Lance	LTV Aerospace Corp.	70 miles 112 km	Storable liquid	Inertial	1972	
USSR	Frog 1-7	USSR Government	10-45 miles 16-72 km	Solid	None	1966	About 600 of KT range
	Scud A	USSR Government	50 miles 80 km	Storable liquid	Command	1966	About 300 of KT range
	Scud B	USSR Government	185 miles 300 km	Storable liquid	Inertial	1966	
	Scud C or Scaleboard	USSR Government	500 miles 800 km		Inertial		

10. Army SAM

Country	Name	Manufacturer	Range	Propulsion	Guidance	In service	Remarks
<i>Man-portable</i>							
United Kingdom	Blowpipe	Short Bros.	Short	Solid	Optical radio command	1974	Also in Canada
United States	Redeye	General Dynamics	Short	Solid	IR homing	1964	
	Stinger	General Dynamics	Short	Solid	IR homing	Development	
USSR	Grail	USSR Government	3,500 m	Solid	IR homing		

Country	Name	Manufacturer	Range	Propulsion	Guidance	In service	Remarks
<i>Mobile fast reaction</i>							
France	Crotale / Cactus	Matra / Thomson-CSF	3 km	Solid	Radio command	1972	Also in South Africa, etc.
France / Germany	Roland	MBB / Aérospatiale	6 km	Solid	Radio command IR tracking	1974	Also in Brazil
Italy	Indigo	Sistel	10 km	Solid	Beam riding	1977	
United Kingdom	Rapier	BAC	7 km	Solid	Radio command	1971	Also in Iran, etc.
	Tigercat	Short Bros.	Medium	Solid	Radio command	1970	
United States	Chaparral	Philco-Ford	48 km	Solid	IR homing	1967	
	Hawk	Raytheon	35 km	Solid	Semi-active homing	1960	In many countries
	Improved Hawk	Raytheon	40 km	Solid		1974	
272	Land Sparrow	Raytheon	10 km	Solid	Semi-active homing	Development	
	SAM-D	Raytheon	Long	Solid	Command and semi-active homing	Development	
USSR	Gainful SA-6	USSR Government	Medium	Solid	Semi-active homing	1973	
	Ganef SA-4	USSR Government	70 km	Ramjet with solid boosters	Command	1964	
	Goa SA-3	USSR Government	Medium	Solid	Radar homing		
<i>Semi-static HAA</i>							
Italy	Spada	Selenia		Solid booster	Semi-active radar homing		With Aspide
United Kingdom	Bloodhound 2	BAC	Long	Ramjet with solid boosters	Semi-active homing	1964	Also Sweden and Switzerland
	Thunderbird 2	BAC	Long	Ramjet with solid boosters	Semi-active homing	1967	Also Saudi Arabia
United States	Nike Hercules	Western Electric	140 km	Solid	Command	1958	

USSR	Guideline SA-2	Western Electric	45 km	Liquid with solid booster	Command	1957	Also many Soviet allies
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11. Army anti-tank missiles

Country	Name	Manufacturer	Range	Propulsion	Guidance	In service	Remarks
<i>One-man portable</i>							
Belgium	Atlas	BAC/Fabrique Nationale d'Armes de Guerre			Laser	Development	
Belgium / United Kingdom	Vigilant	BAC	200-1,375 m	Solid	Wire	1963	Also other NATO countries
Germany	Cobra	Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB)	400-1,600 / 2,000 m		Wire		Also many western nations
	Mamba	Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB)	300-2,000 m		Wire	Production	Development of Cobra
Italy	Mosquito	Contraves	360-2,300 m		Wire	Production	
Japan	KAM-3	Kawasaki	350-1,800 m	Solid	Wire	1966	
Sweden	Bantam	Bofors	300-2,000 m	Solid	Wire	1970	
<i>Heavier portable</i>							
France / Germany	Milan	Aérospatiale / MBB	25-2,000 m	Solid	Wire (semi-auto)	1973	French and German armies
Italy	Sparviero	Breda	4,000 m	Solid	Infra red	1978	
Japan	KAM-9	Kawasaki		Solid	Wire (semi-auto)	Development	
United States	Dragon	McDonnell Douglas	1,000 m	Solid	Wire (semi-auto)	1973	
	Tow	Hughes	25-2,000 m	Solid	Wire (semi-auto)	1972	

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Country	Name	Manufacturer	Range	Propulsion	Guidance	In service	Remarks
<i>Vehicle-mounted</i>							
France	Aora	DTAT	3,000 m 4,000 m	Solid	In beam riding (gun launch)	Development	
	Entac	Aérospatiale	400-2,000 m	Solid	Wire	1957	
	SS-11	Aérospatiale	500-3,000 m	Solid	Wire		
	Harpon	Aérospatiale	400-3,000 m	Solid	Wire (semi-auto)	Production	A precursor of Hot
	SS-12	Aérospatiale	6,000 m	Solid	Wire (semi-auto)	Production	
France / Germany	Hot	Aérospatiale/MBB	4,000 m	Solid	Wire (semi-auto)	Development	
United Kingdom	Swingfire	BAC	4,000 m	Solid	Wire, automatic gathering	1969	
United States	Shillelagh	Philco-Ford	500-2,300 m	Solid	Wire + homing	1967	Gun launch
USSR	Snapper	USSR Government	500-2,300 m	Solid	Wire	1966	
	Swatter	USSR Government		Solid	Wire + homing	1971	
	Snagger	USSR Government			Wire		

12. Airborne missiles

Country	Name	Manufacturer	Range	Propulsion	Guidance	In service	Remarks
<i>Air-to-surface</i>							
France	AS-20	Aérospatiale	7 km	Solid	Radio command		Also Germany and Italy
	AS-30	Aérospatiale	12 km	Solid	Radio command		Also RAF, Germa- ny, Israel, South Africa and Switzerland
	AS-11	Aérospatiale	3 km	Solid	Wire		of SS-11 helicopters
	AS-12	Aérospatiale	6-8 km	Solid	Wire		of SS-12/AS
	AM-39	Aérospatiale	75 km	Solid	Inertial and active	1976	Anto-ship; stand- off
United Kingdom	Hellcat	Short Bros.		Solid	Command	Development	of. Seacat
	CL834	BAC	15 km	Solid	Semi-active homing	Development	
	Hawkswing	BAC	4 km	Solid	Wire	Development	Helicopter-mounted Swingfire

	United Kingdom / France	Martel	Hawker-Siddeley / Matra	about 60 km ?	Solid	Autopilot + passive homing or TV guidance	1973	
	Germany	Kormoran	Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm	37 km	Solid	Inertial various homing	1974	
		Jumbo	Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm		Solid	TV	Development	
	Italy	Airtos	Sistel	11 km	Solid	Active homing	Project	
	Italy / France	Otomat	Oto Melara / Matra	60-80 km	Turbojet	Inertial / active homing	Development	
	Sweden	Rb04 Rb05	SAAB SAAB		Solid Solid	Auto pilot active homing Radio command	1959	
	United States	Bullpup	Martin Marietta	11-17 km	Storable liquid	Radio command	1959	Also many western air forces
		Condor	Rockwell Int.	60-80 km	Solid	TV	Development	
		Harpoon	McDonnell Douglas	90 km +	Turbojet	Inertial / active homing	1978	
		Maverick	Hughes		Solid	TV	1972	
		Shrike	Texas / Sperry	18 km	Solid	Passive homing	1964	
		Walleye	Martin Marietta		None	TV	1971	
		Standard ARM	General Dynamics		Solid	Passive homing	1968	
		Tow	Hughes	2 km +	Solid	Wire	1970	Helicopters
		Hellfire	United States army	2 km +	Turbojet	Command homing		
		Harm	Naval Weapons Centre				Development	
	USSR	Kennel	USSR Government	90 km	Turbojet	Command homing		Anti-shipping in TU16 (Badger)
		Kelt	USSR Government	180 km	Liquid	Radar homing		Anti-shipping in TU16 (Badger)
	<i>Air-to-air</i>							
	France	R-511 R-530	Matra Matra	8-10 km 18 km	Solid Solid	Radar homing Semi-active or EM or IR homing	Obsolescent 1963	Also Australia, Israel and South Africa

Country	Name	Manufacturer	Range	Propulsion	Guidance	In service	Remarks
France (cont.)	Super 530	Matra	18 km	Solid	Semi-active X-band homing	1977	Interception missile
	550	Matra	2.5-10 km	Solid	IR homing	1976	For close combat
Italy	Aspide	Selenia		Solid	Semi-active radar guidance		
Japan	AAM1	Mitsubishi		Solid	IR homing	1970	
	AAM2	Mitsubishi		Solid		Development	
South Africa		South African Ministry of Defence		Solid		Development	
United Kingdom	Firestreak	Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics	1.2 to 8 km	Solid	IR homing	1958	
	Red Top	Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics	12 km +	Solid	IR homing	1961	Improved Firestreak
	SRAAM	Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics	Short	Solid	IR homing		Close combat
	X.J.521	Hawker Siddeley Dynamics	Short	Solid	Semi-active radar guidance	1975	Improved Sparrow
United States	Falcon 4	Hughes		Solid	IR or semi-active homing	1955	Also Sweden and Switzerland
	Falcon 26	Hughes		Solid	Semi-active homing		
	Falcon 47	Hughes	185 km	Solid	Semi-active homing	Development	
	Agile	Hughes	915 m		Infra red	Development	Close combat
	Phoenix	Hughes	110-165 km	Solid	Radar homing	1973	For F-14
	Sidewinder 1A	Philco-Ford	1,100 m	Solid	IR homing	1956	Most NATO nations
	Sidewinder 1C	Raytheon/Philco- Ford/Motorola	18 km	Solid	Semi-active radar homing		
	Sparrow IIID	Raytheon	15 km	Solid	Semi-active radar homing		Several NATO nations
Sparrow IIIE	Raytheon	26 km	Solid	Semi-active radar homing		Several NATO nations	
USSR	Alkali	USSR Government	6-8 km	Solid	Passive radar homing		MIG-19
	Anab	USSR Government	8-10 km	Solid	Radar or IR homing		SU-9 and YAK-28
	Ash	USSR Government	Long		Radar or IR homing		TU-28
	Atoll	USSR Government	Medium	Solid	IR homing		MIG-21
	Awl	USSR Government		Solid	Radar? or IR homing		

*Air-
launched
nuclear*

United
States

Genie	McDonnell Douglas	9-10 km	Solid	Unguided	1951	
Hound Dog	North American Aviation	600 miles 960 km	Turbojet	Inertial	1959	600
SRAM	Boeing	100 miles 160 km	Solid	Inertial	Production	500 to 1 to 2 MT

USSR

Kipper AS2		100 miles 160 km	Turbojet		1961	From TU-20 (Bear) bomber
Kangaroo AS8		300 miles 480 km	Turbojet		1961	From TU-16 (Badger) bombers
Kitchen AS4		300 miles 480 km	Rocket or ramjet		1961	From TU-22 (Blinder)

A. FINANCIAL EFFORT

Country	National currency unit	Defence expenditure (national currency) current prices					Defence expenditure (US \$ million) ^a					GNP at factor cost (US \$ million) ^a					Population (million)					Defence expenditure as % of GNP (f.c.)					Defence expenditure per head ^a (US \$)					Defence expenditure as % of total WEU				
		1970	1971	1972	1973	1974 ^f	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974 ^f	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974 ^e	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974 ^e	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974 ^f	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974 ^f	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974 ^f
		(-5)	(-4)	(-3)	(-2)	(-1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
Belgium	Million Frs.	37 502	39 670	44 140	49 075	57 315	750	814	1 003	1 258	1 472	22 971	25 799	32 144	41 204	47 322	9.6	9.7	9.7	9.7	9.8	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1	78	84	103	129	151	3.37	3.19	3.26	3.37	3.55
France	Million Frs.	32 672	34 907	37 992	41 460	47 570	5 882	6 285	7 435	9 466	9 880	121 189	135 004	164 686	214 164	228 401	50.8	51.3	51.7	52.2	52.6	4.9	4.7	4.5	4.4	4.3	116	123	144	181	188	26.42	24.59	24.18	25.36	23.81
Federal Republic of Germany	Million DM	22 573	25 450	28 720	31 597	35 964	6 167	7 291	8 912	11 928	13 899	165 019	192 158	227 585	306 714	339 313	58.5	59.2	59.6	60.0	60.1	3.7	3.8	3.9	3.9	4.1	105	123	150	199	231	27.69	28.52	28.99	31.96	33.50
Italy	Million Lire	1 562	1 852	2 162	2 385	2 676	2 499	2 990	3 705	4 106	4 120	83 536	91 923	107 555	126 547	136 301	53.7	54.0	54.4	54.9	55.3	3.0	3.3	3.4	3.2	3.0	47	55	68	75	75	11.22	11.70	12.05	11.00	9.93
Luxembourg	Million Frs.	416	442	517	575	677	8	9	12	15	17	980	1 013	1 234	1 657	1 954	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.8	0.9	1.0	0.9	24	26	35	43	48	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	
Netherlands	Million Guilders	3 968	4 466	4 974	5 651	6 437	1 096	1 313	1 535	1 954	2 392	28 572	34 127	40 747	53 530	62 546	13.0	13.2	13.3	13.4	13.6	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.6	3.8	84	100	115	145	176	4.92	5.14	4.99	5.24	5.77
United Kingdom	Million £ Sterling	2 444	2 815	3 258	3 481	4 148	5 865	6 853	8 145	8 595	9 707	104 282	119 105	137 235	154 456	166 145	55.5	55.7	55.9	56.0	56.2	5.6	5.8	5.9	5.6	5.8	106	123	146	153	173	26.34	26.82	26.49	23.03	23.40
TOTAL WEU							22 267	25 555	30 747	37 322	41 487	526 549	599 129	711 186	898 272	981 982	241.4	243.4	244.9	246.6	248.0	4.2	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.2	92	105	126	151	167	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Canada	Million \$	2 061	2 131	2 238	2 391	2 770	1 967	2 111	2 259	2 403	2 832	70 413	79 503	89 698	102 515	122 186	21.3	21.6	21.8	22.1	22.4	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.3	92	98	103	109	126	8.83	8.26	7.35	6.44	6.83
Denmark	Million Kr.	2 757	3 195	3 386	3 711	4 343	368	431	487	582	713	13 104	14 496	17 428	23 226	26 646	4.9	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.1	2.8	3.0	2.8	2.5	2.7	75	87	98	116	141	1.65	1.69	1.58	1.56	1.72
Greece	Million Drachmas	14 208	15 480	17 211	19 478	24 126	474	516	574	670	804	8 409	9 407	10 942	14 418	16 983	8.8	8.8	8.9	9.0	9.0	5.6	5.5	5.2	4.6	4.7	54	58	65	75	89	2.13	2.02	1.87	1.80	1.94
Norway	Million Kr.	2 774	3 022	3 239	3 621	4 081	388	430	491	602	739	9 639	10 882	12 681	16 319	19 880	3.9	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.9	3.7	100	110	125	152	185	1.74	1.68	1.60	1.61	1.78	
Portugal	Million Escudos	12 538	14 699	16 046	15 528	20 910	436	511	589	651	820	5 490	6 129	7 384	9 420	12 729	8.7	8.6	8.6	8.6	8.5	7.9	8.3	8.0	6.9	6.4	50	59	69	76	97	1.96	2.00	1.92	1.74	1.98
Turkey	Million L.	6 237	8 487	9 961	12 483	15 831	549	585	718	870	1 140	11 657	11 910	15 291	19 465	27 894	35.3	36.2	37.0	37.9	38.9	4.7	4.9	4.7	4.5	4.1	16	16	19	23	29	2.47	2.29	2.34	2.33	2.75
United States	Million \$	77 854	74 862	77 639	78 462	84 332	77 854	74 862	77 639	78 473	84 332	897 370	967 018	1 064 012	1 190 989	1 285 554	204.9	207.0	208.8	210.4	212.5	8.7	7.7	7.3	6.6	6.6	380	362	372	373	397	349.64	292.94	252.49	210.26	203.26
TOTAL NON-WEU							82 036	79 446	82 757	84 251	91 380	1 016 082	1 099 345	1 217 436	1 376 352	1 511 872	287.8	291.1	294.0	297.0	300.4	8.1	7.2	6.8	6.1	6.0	285	273	281	284	304	368.42	310.88	269.15	225.74	220.26
TOTAL NATO							104 303	105 001	113 504	121 573	132 867	1 542 631	1 698 474	1 928 622	2 274 624	2 493 854	529.2	534.5	538.9	543.6	548.4	6.8	6.2	5.9	5.3	5.3	197	196	211	224	242	466.42	410.88	369.15	325.74	320.26

e = Preliminary estimate

f = Forecast

GNP (f.c.): Gross national product at factor cost, current prices. (The decimal point is used throughout this table.)

a. Figures affected by change in exchange rate.

Source: Defence expenditures according to NATO definition from NATO press release M/DPC/2(74)9.

Notes: GNP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States \$ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GNP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency conversion.

For the period 1970-74, the following rates of exchange have been applied:

Country	Unit	\$ US per unit	Units per \$ US	Country	Unit	\$ US per unit	Units per \$ US
Belgium & Luxembourg	Franc			Italy	1,000 Lire		
— 1970		0.0200000	50.0000	— 1970		1.6	0.625000
— 1971		0.0205184	48.7367	— 1971		1.614380	0.619433
— 1972		0.0227221	44.0100	— 1972		1.713473	0.583610
— 1973		0.0257069	38.9000	— 1973		1.718502	0.582580
— 1974		0.0256739	38.9500	— 1974		1.537728	0.650310
Canada	Canadian Dollar			Netherlands	Guilder		
— 1970		0.954510	1.047658	— 1970		0.276243	3.62000
— 1971		0.990369	1.009725	— 1971		0.294046	3.50083
— 1972		1.009427	0.990661	— 1972		0.308642	3.24000
— 1973		0.999454	1.000546	— 1973		0.357143	2.80000
— 1974		1.022495	0.978000	— 1974		0.370370	2.70000
Denmark	Kroner			Norway	Kroner		
— 1970		0.133333	7.50000	— 1970		0.140000	7.14286
— 1971		0.134912	7.41224	— 1971		0.142295	7.02766
— 1972		0.143895	6.94949	— 1972		0.151682	6.59274
— 1973		0.165229	6.05220	— 1973		0.171821	5.82000
— 1974		0.164077	6.09470	— 1974		0.181169	5.52000
France	Franc			Portugal	Escudo		
— 1970, 1971		0.180044	5.55419	— 1970, 1971		0.0347826	28.75
— 1972		0.195695	5.11000	— 1972		0.0366972	27.25
— 1973		0.223864	4.46700	— 1973		0.0388954	25.71
— 1974		0.207697	4.81470	— 1974		0.0392157	25.50
Fed. Rep. of Germany	Deutschmark			Turkey	Lira		
— 1970		0.273224	3.66000	— 1970		0.0879432	11.37097
— 1971		0.286465	3.49083	— 1971		0.0688942	14.51500
— 1972		0.310298	3.22271	— 1972		0.0720721	13.87500
— 1973		0.373134	2.68000	— 1973		0.0713267	14.02000
— 1974		0.384615	2.60000	— 1974		0.0719683	13.89500
Greece	Drachma			United Kingdom	£		
— 1970, 1971, 1972		0.0333333	30.00	— 1970		2.40000	0.416667
— 1973		0.0337268	29.65	— 1971		2.43420	0.410813
— 1974		0.0333333	30.00	— 1972		2.50000	0.400000
				— 1973		2.45098	0.408000
				— 1974		2.34192	0.427000

B. MANPOWER CONTRIBUTION

	Country	Period of compulsory military service — Months —	Total in armed forces (thousands)	Total employment (millions)	Total in armed forces as % of total employment
		1974	1974	1973	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1	Belgium	12 ⁷	90	3.82	2.4
2	France	12	503	20.95	2.4
3	Germany	15	490	26.20	1.9
4	Italy	15 ²	421	18.31	2.3
5	Luxembourg	nil	0.55	0.15	0.37
6	Netherlands	16-18 ³	114	4.56	2.5
7	United Kingdom	nil	355 ⁵	24.64	1.4
8	TOTAL WEU		1,973	98.63	2.0
9	Canada	nil	83	8.76	1.0
10	Denmark	9	37	2.39	1.5
11	Greece	24	161	3.28	4.1
12	Norway	12 ⁶	35	1.65	2.1
13	Portugal	24 ⁴	217	3.11	7.0
14	Turkey	20	453	14.55 ^e	3.1
15	United States	nil ¹	2,174	84.41	2.6
16	TOTAL NON-WEU		3,160	118.15	2.7
17	TOTAL NATO		5,133	216.78	2.4

1. Selective draft calls were terminated on 27th January 1973; those previously drafted complete 24 months service.

2. Navy 24.

3. Air force 18-21; navy 18-21.

4. Navy 48; air force 36.

5. Including forces enlisted outside Britain (9,300).

6. Air force 15; navy 15.

7. If serving in Germany a reduction to 10 months will take place from end 1974.

Sources: Numbers in armed forces and period of military service: Institute for Strategic Studies "The Military Balance, 1973-74".

Labour Force: OECD Labour Forces Statistics, 1961-73, total employment.

e - Estimate.

State of European security

AMENDMENT No. 1¹

tabled by Mr. Roper

In paragraph 6 (b) of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out the words "before the end of June 1975" and insert the words "as soon as possible and at the latest by September 1975".

Signed: Roper

1. See 5th Sitting, 28th May 1975 (Amendment amended and adopted).

State of European security

AMENDMENT No. 2¹

tabled by Mr. Tanghe

At the end of the draft Recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

“7. That it follow up the proposals made by Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, in the Assembly in December 1974 on a European armaments policy and in particular :

- (a) undertake a detailed study of the armaments sectors of industry in the economies of each member country ;
- (b) study the possibility of pooling research work and its financing ;
- (c) examine what is the best course to follow towards progressive integration.”

Signed : Tanghe

1. See 5th Sitting, 28th May 1975 (Amendment adopted).

27th May 1975

Document 671
Amendment No. 3

State of European security

AMENDMENT No. 3¹

tabled by MM. Radius, Valleix and La Combe

1. In paragraph 6 of the draft Recommendation proper, in sub-paragraph (a), leave out the words "Eurogroup as the most appropriate organ at present in which", and insert the words "the mission of the Standing Armaments Committee which could usefully undertake, in co-operation with Eurogroup,"
2. In paragraph 6 of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (b) and insert :
“(b) that it examine with Mr. Tindemans the place which defence could take in a future European union.”

Signed : Radius, Valleix, La Combe

1. See 5th Sitting, 28th May 1975 (Amendment negatived).

Proliferation of nuclear weapons

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur***

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on the proliferation of nuclear weapons

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1. Adopted in Committee by 15 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Critchley (Chairman), MM. Klepsch (Substitute: Haase), Dankert (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Averardi, Beauguitte (Substitute: Delorme), Bizet, Bouloche, Kempinaire, Konen, de Koster, Lemmrich,

Ménard, Pawelczyk, Pendry, Prescott (Substitute: Faulds), Richter, Rivière, Roper, Schugens, Tanghe (Substitute: Duwieuxart), Vedovato, Wall, de Niet, Schmidt.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Introductory note

In preparing this report your Rapporteur had interviews as follows

Geneva, 12th and 13th March 1975

Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

H. E. Mr. Joseph Martin, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the United States ;

Mr. Y. K. Nazarkin, Deputy Head of the Soviet Union Delegation ;

H. E. Mr. W. H. Barton, Ambassador, Representative of Canada ;

H. E. Mr. B. C. Mishra, Ambassador, Representative of India ;

H. E. Mr. Masahiro Nisibori, Ambassador, Representative of Japan ;

Dr. Valeriu Tudor, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Romania ;

Mr. R. Björnerstedt, Acting Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations ;

H. E. Mr. Mark Allen, Ambassador, United Kingdom Representative.

The Committee as a whole met at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 18th February where it met with the Chairmen of the Defence Committees in the national parliaments of the WEU countries, and was briefed by Mr. R. Chevalier, Directeur Engins-Espace, of Aérospatiale, and by Mr. L. A. Sanson, Sales and Service Director, assisted by Mr. J. P. Corbett, Europe Sales Manager of British Aircraft Corporation. The Committee then held a joint meeting with the WEU Standing Armaments Committee (the joint body being known as the Liaison Sub-Committee on the Joint Production of Armaments), attended by :

Colonel J. Quaniers (Belgium), Général P. Brindeau (France), Colonel R. Acker (Federal Republic of Germany), General V. Campana (Italy), Mr. R. P. M. van Wensen (Netherlands), Mr. W. Perry (United Kingdom), H. E. Mr. F.-K. von Plehwe, Acting Secretary-General of WEU, H. E. Mr. Alain Plantey, Assistant Secretary-General of WEU, Head of the Standing Armaments Committee Secretariat.

On 19th February the Committee with the Chairmen of the national defence committees visited the ballistic missile submarine base of the French Force Océanique Stratégique, where it was briefed by Rear-Admiral Pierre Emeury, commanding the Force Océanique Stratégique, and by Capitaine de Vaisseau Fages, commanding the ballistic missile submarine base. Members visited the French ballistic missile submarine "Foudroyant" and the missile assembly shop.

The Committee as a whole visited Athens on 18th March where it was addressed by H. E. Mr. D. Bitsios, Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, and held a discussion with H. E. Mr. Constantin Stavropoulos, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the following members of the Greek Parliament : MM. Theocharis Rendis, André Andrianopoulos, Démètre Franghos, Constantin Ghiatracos, Jean Mineos, Zacharias Kratsas, Agnelos Pnevmatikos, Achilles Papabolouicas, Georges Iordanides, Constantin Coniotakis, Anastas Minis, Jean Charalambopoulos. The Committee much regretted that the address by H. E. Mr. E. Averoff, Greek Minister of Defence, had to be cancelled because of travel difficulties arising from an airport strike.

The Committee visited Ankara on 20th and 21st March where it was addressed by H. E. Mr. İlhami Sançar, Minister of Defence, General Olçay, Under-Secretary, Ministry of Defence, with Mr. Erecüment Yavuzalp, Director-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Committee was then addressed by H. E. Mr. M. Esenbel, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and held a discussion with the following members of the Turkish Parliament : Mr. Hasan Isik, Chairman ; Senator Orhan Alp ; Senator Ahat Alpan ; General Muksin Batur ; Senator Fetin Celikleas ; Mr. Kemalettin Crökakin ; Mr. İlyas İnliç ; Mr. Özer Ölçmen ; Mr. Hasan Tosyalı ; Mr. Sirri Turanlı ; Senator Ahmet Yıldız.

The Committee visited the CENTO Secretariat-General where it was received by General Ali Karimloo (Iran), Chairman of the CENTO Permanent Military Deputies Group, and the Permanent Military Deputies of Pakistan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, and by Major-General Colin C. Hamilton (USAF), Chief of Staff, and briefed on CENTO and its activities.

The Committee visited the Makina Kimya Kurumu small-arms ammunition factory, where it was welcomed by Mr. Recı Baturalp, Director-General, and briefed by Mr. Nejat Akyak, Marketing and Export Manager.

On 22nd March the Committee visited HQ Allied Land Forces South-East Europe and HQ 6th Allied Tactical Air Force at Izmir, where it was briefed by General Melvin Zais (US Army), Commander Allied Land Forces South-East Europe, and by Lt.-General Sanford K. Moats, Commander 6th Allied Tactical Air Force, and their staffs.

The Committee met finally at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 29th April 1975, when it discussed and adopted the present report.

The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials and senior officers who addressed it and replied to questions. The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the Committee.

Draft Recommendation
on the proliferation of nuclear weapons

The Assembly,

Regretting that despite a certain progress in arms control negotiations, and the acceptance of "essential equivalence" in strategic armaments by the superpowers, the numbers of nuclear weapons have continued to grow ;

Considering that the nuclear explosion conducted by India threatens the stability of relations in the area, undermines the basis on which nuclear technology can be made available by one country to another, while doubtless adding nothing to the security or economic resources of India ;

Aware of the vital importance, in view of the energy crisis, of nuclear power being available to all countries for civil applications ;

Believing that the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons still offers the best basis on which the peaceful applications of nuclear energy can be made available in full to all countries, while avoiding total nuclear anarchy,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

That it urge member countries :

1. To adhere to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, where possible, to deposit their instruments of ratification before the end of the review conference ;
2. In all their foreign relations to encourage universal accession to that treaty ;
3. To accept the full application of controls provided for under that treaty, and to concert their policies with other supplying powers to make the supply of civil nuclear assistance of any sort to third countries dependent on their acceptance of full IAEA controls on all nuclear installations and material on their territory or under their control ;
4. Subject to the foregoing overriding consideration, to provide the maximum possible assistance to third countries in all civil applications of nuclear energy ;
5. To consult with their allies in the North Atlantic Council with a view to achieving, through the various arms control negotiations, a genuine reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons without diminishing the essential basis of their security.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The Committee has asked your Rapporteur to prepare a report to follow earlier Committee reports on the non-proliferation treaty, and dealing in particular with certain major events which have occurred since the treaty was signed. The report is to deal with both vertical and horizontal proliferation.

2. On 19th September 1968, the Committee adopted the report on the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons¹, analysing the provisions of the treaty and its implications for western defence, the European Community, world stability, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and safeguards. But East-West relations having seriously deteriorated following the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, shortly after the treaty was signed, it was not until 4th December 1969 that the Committee adopted a report on the same subject², the draft recommendation of which advocated, *inter alia*, the signature of the treaty by all the WEU countries at the earliest possible date and ratification of the treaty by all the Euratom countries immediately after the conclusion of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

3. Many events have since occurred directly affecting the treaty provisions. There has been very extensive vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons in the United States and the Soviet Union, and to a lesser degree in France, the United Kingdom and China. Horizontal proliferation at political level has been most important because of the explosion of a nuclear device by India on 18th May 1974. On 1st December 1974, the President of Israel announced that his country was capable of producing nuclear weapons. Various statements have been made by Egypt, Iran and Libya.

4. On the positive side, however, two other events can be recorded. A further treaty on the partial suspension of underground tests has been concluded by the United States and the Soviet Union, and negotiations between those two countries on the problems raised by nuclear tests

for peaceful purposes have continued. A conference of parties to the non-proliferation treaty is to open in Geneva on 5th May 1975 to consider its application, but in view of the events mentioned above the prospects of this conference are not very encouraging.

II. International regulation of nuclear weapons

(a) Post-war efforts

5. The first United States' proposals in the United Nations in June 1946 for giving a world monopoly of all activities in this field and a right of inspection and supervision to an international atomic development authority *were not accepted by the Soviet Union*, which called for the destruction of all nuclear weapons and a ban on their use prior to any further agreement on the subject. The cold war and armaments race — particularly nuclear — was threatened. In December 1959, for the first time provisions restricting nuclear weapons were incorporated in an international treaty, the *Antarctic Treaty*, banning military installations of any kind whatsoever and the holding of nuclear tests in the Antarctic. In August 1963, the *treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water* was concluded. In January 1967, the *outer space treaty* banning the placing in orbit of nuclear weapons and their installation on celestial bodies was signed.

(b) Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

6. Proposals for banning the spread of nuclear weapons seem to have been made for the first time by the United States in 1956 in the United Nations Disarmament Committee, but the proposal took more definite shape in 1958, when Ireland tabled a draft resolution on this subject in the United Nations General Assembly. The proposal made very slow headway but finally, after some four years of negotiations, mainly in the eighteen-nation disarmament conference in Geneva, the *treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons* was signed simultaneously in London, Moscow and Washington — the capitals of the three depository States — on 1st July 1968.

1. Document 454, Rapporteur Mr. Housiaux.

2. Document 499, Rapporteur Mr. Mart.

7. The provisions of the treaty were considered in great detail in a report by the Committee the same year¹; in the present report, it will suffice to recall the main provisions². Under Article 1, each nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty undertakes not to transfer "to any recipient whatsoever" nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices. The nuclear powers *also undertake* not to assist or encourage a non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or devices. Under Article II, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty undertakes not to acquire such weapons or explosive devices. Thus worded, Article I does not forbid a nuclear-weapon State to assist another nuclear-weapon State. Thus, the treaty does not ban nuclear co-operation for military purposes between the three nuclear-weapon States of the Atlantic Alliance, although such co-operation seems to exist only between the United States and the United Kingdom.

8. Article IX of the treaty defines a nuclear-weapon State as "one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1st January 1967". Thus the five present nuclear powers are all defined as nuclear-weapon States although two of them — France and China — have not yet signed the treaty. India, too, if it had exploded its so-called peaceful device before the time-limit, would have been included in the definition of a nuclear-weapon State.

9. All peaceful applications of nuclear energy are specifically authorised in Article IV, except for the ban in Articles I and II, i.e. on nuclear explosions. Under the treaty, therefore, non-nuclear-weapon States are free to establish a civil nuclear industry with reactors, fabrication of fuel elements, reprocessing of irradiated fuel and uranium isotope enrichment. The possession of fissile material suitable for use in the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices is not banned when used for civil purposes. However, all the nuclear activities of the non-nuclear-weapon States are subject to control by the International Atomic Energy Agency which has to be satisfied that the fissile material is not diverted to military purposes. The nuclear powers are not subject to IAEA supervision.

10. Furthermore, Article V requires nuclear-weapon States to make available to non-nuclear-weapon States by means of bilateral agreements or international procedure any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions.

11. Under Article VI, the parties undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. These provisions are strengthened by those of Article VIII which provides that five years after the entry into force of the treaty a conference of parties to the treaty shall be held in Geneva "in order to review the operation of this treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the treaty are being realised". It was in fact in the preamble that the parties recalled that the treaty on the partial banning of nuclear weapon tests expressed the determination of the parties "to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time". The provisions on nuclear disarmament and assistance in the field of civil applications of nuclear energy are the *quid pro quo* for the renunciation accepted by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty.

12. The treaty was signed on 1st July 1968 and came into force on 5th March 1970 when 43 ratifications had been deposited, including those of the three depository powers, all of them nuclear-weapon States — the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. On 31st March 1975, 87 States had acceded to the treaty, a further 23 had signed but not ratified it¹.

(i) *The position of the WEU and European Community countries*

13. To date, three Community countries have acceded to the treaty — the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland. The Benelux countries, Germany and Italy have all signed the treaty and concluded safeguard agreements with the IAEA. They are thus all in a position to ratify the treaty, and the necessary constitutional procedure has been completed in all these countries except Italy, where it is under way. It is hoped that these five countries will deposit their instruments of ratification at the latest during the conference which is to open on 5th May.

1. Document 454, Chapter II.

2. Text of the treaty at Appendix I.

1. List of parties and other signatories at Appendix II.

14. France, a nuclear-weapon State according to the treaty, has not signed the treaty, which it considers discriminatory. The French representative nevertheless told the United Nations General Assembly on 12th June 1968 that his country "will behave in the future in this field exactly as the States adhering to the treaty". More recently, Mr Sauvagnargues, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated in an interview in *Le Monde*¹ that :

"We do not intend to accede to the non-proliferation treaty. We consider the problem of proliferation with due seriousness. We are fully aware of our responsibilities as a nuclear power and act accordingly in all the nuclear co-operation agreements which we have concluded with other States. Moreover, as the President of the Republic has underlined, it is important to create a situation which reduces the temptation for non-nuclear-weapon States to acquire a nuclear potential."

The United Kingdom, a depository country, and The Netherlands in particular, have spoken for the treaty, Mr. Wilson having signed a bilateral declaration on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Moscow on 17th February 1975.

15. Sixteen countries which supply fissile material, including the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, have agreed on a joint interpretation of their undertakings in the framework of the IAEA concerning safeguards to be applied in the event of supplies of fissile material to non-nuclear-weapon States². According to various press articles of 15th January 1975, President Giscard d'Estaing is also believed to have agreed with President Ford on this subject when they met in Martinique.

(ii) *The position of certain possible adversaries*

16. In the Middle East, Israel has not signed the treaty, but most Arab States have acceded, i.e. Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Egypt and Libya have signed it, but not Saudi Arabia.

17. India, China, Bangladesh and Pakistan have not signed the treaty, Iran has ratified it. In Japan, the government has initiated the ratification procedure in parliament, but there is some opposition.

1. *Le Monde*, 19th-20th January 1975.

2. Foreign Office statement reported in *Le Monde* on 18th September 1974.

18. South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia have not signed the treaty but most of the other black African States have adhered to it.

(iii) *Safeguards provided for in the non-proliferation treaty*

19. Article III of the treaty provides that non-nuclear-weapon States accept safeguards as set forth in an agreement to be concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the statute and safeguards system of that agency. Safeguard agreements with the IAEA may be negotiated "either individually or together with other States." These provisions allowed the non-nuclear-weapon members of Euratom to negotiate a collective agreement with the Vienna Agency providing for the application of safeguards by staff of Euratom itself under the supervision of the IAEA. Japan subsequently took advantage of this model agreement to conclude a similar one with the IAEA providing for Agency supervision of inspections carried out by Japanese officials.

(iv) *The conference to review the operation of the non-proliferation treaty*

20. The conference mentioned above is to open in Geneva on 5th May 1975. The work of the preparatory committee has been completed. It has been agreed that parties to the treaty will participate fully in the conference and that countries which have signed but not yet ratified it will have almost the same rights at the conference. Non-signatory countries may attend as observers. It is to be expected that the same discussions will be heard at the conference as accompanied the negotiation of the treaty, i.e. the assertion by non-nuclear-weapon States that nuclear-weapon States are violating the treaty by increasing their stocks of nuclear weapons ; the assertion by the nuclear-weapon States that the acquisition of such weapons or explosive devices by other States cannot strengthen their security and might be detrimental to world peace. It is hoped that before the conference opens several other States will have acceded to the treaty. But it is undeniable that there is a big gap, difficult to bridge, between the nuclear States and the others, especially after the *modus vivendi* adopted by the United States and the Soviet Union at Vladivostok.

(c) *SALT*

21. The chapter on the international regulation of nuclear weapons would not be complete

without mention of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, this matter is dealt with in another of the Committee's reports¹.

III. Proliferation of nuclear technology

(a) Civil and military nuclear technology

22. To understand the close relationship between the civil nuclear industry and the technology of nuclear explosions — the only technology renounced by the non-nuclear-weapon parties to the non-proliferation treaty — seven separate processes must be identified, the first six of which are necessary to the civil nuclear industry, although all six are only rarely to be found on the territory of an individual State, if only because uranium deposits do not exist everywhere :

- (i) extraction of uranium ore ;
- (ii) refining of natural uranium metal ;
- (iii) manufacture of fuel elements for reactors from natural uranium or from enriched uranium produced by an enrichment plant (see (vi)) or plutonium derived from reprocessing plants (see (v)) ;
- (iv) nuclear reactors fuelled by natural uranium (not very economical) or slightly enriched uranium or plutonium (future generations of breeder reactors) ;
- (v) plant for reprocessing irradiated fuel elements (having been used in reactors) — extraction of plutonium ;
- (vi) isotope enrichment plant (by the gaseous diffusion or centrifuge system, a process now being developed) with production of uranium slightly enriched in isotope 235, or highly enriched (more than 80 %).

23. The seventh process concerns only the technology of nuclear explosions :

- (vii) manufacture of nuclear explosive devices from fissile material, either

plutonium (from process (v)) or uranium highly enriched in isotope 235 (from plant (vi)).

24. The safeguards provided for in the civil nuclear industry are mainly intended to control and to follow the fissile material produced in reactors and extracted in reprocessing plants or produced in isotope enrichment plants. Only very accurate accounting for fissile material can offer a guarantee that it has not been diverted to use for explosions.

25. With regard to the possibility of using nuclear explosions for civil purposes, several tests have been made, mainly in the United States but also in the Soviet Union. According to American experts, it would appear most difficult to use such devices to excavate canals or ports. The radioactive fallout from explosions of this kind, which would necessarily be released into the atmosphere, would be too dangerous. Experiments have also been carried out with underground nuclear explosions to crush oil-bearing layers of rock in order to increase the yield of oil wells.

(b) Proliferation of the civil nuclear industry

26. With the energy crisis, the civil nuclear industry is becoming an urgent necessity for many countries. Electricity-generating reactors are therefore becoming widespread throughout the world. But a country acquiring nuclear reactors will be tempted to set up on its territory all the installations needed for the full fuel cycle, i.e. elements (iii), (v) and (vi) mentioned above, because otherwise it would depend on other countries for the supply of reactor fuel and might thus risk being deprived of nuclear energy in the event of a world shortage of fissile material.

27. Hence, in addition to the five so-called nuclear powers, fifteen to twenty other countries have nuclear installations and know-how which would allow them to manufacture nuclear explosive devices, including Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Power reactors also exist in Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Greece, South Korea, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and Yugoslavia. Egypt also has nuclear research installations and certainly has the necessary technological know-how. The Stockholm International Peace Research

¹ State of European security, Document 671, Chapter II.

Institute considers that twenty countries now have the necessary know-how, plant and material to manufacture nuclear bombs and that this figure will rise by one or two countries each year¹.

28. Proliferation in the civil nuclear industry followed the "Atoms for Peace" programme announced by General Eisenhower at the end of 1953. Canada, which had been associated with nuclear research programmes since the second world war military programme, France and the United Kingdom have become exporters of nuclear reactors and the technology required for their construction. The Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden are in the same position, and India now has reactors of its own design and might well think of exporting such technology. The Soviet Union has followed the example of the United States, but to a far lesser extent. Although a safeguard system to avoid fissile material being diverted to the manufacture of bombs is included in earlier contracts between exporting and importing countries, market conditions soon produced competition between supplying countries which led them to reduce their safeguards requirements — a profoundly regrettable development.

29. The non-proliferation treaty provided for the conclusion of subsequent agreements to give non-nuclear-weapon States access to the possible advantages of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. Explosions in the atmosphere, even if experimental, would require prior modification of the 1963 treaty on the suspension of nuclear tests. Article III of the treaty limiting underground tests, signed in Moscow on 3rd July 1974 by President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev, stipulates that the treaty does not cover underground nuclear explosions by the two parties for peaceful purposes. Such explosions are to be governed by an agreement to be negotiated by the two parties as soon as possible. Negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States for settling the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions were resumed in Moscow on 10th February.

30. Addressing the general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna on 16th September 1974, the Director of the Agency, Mr. Elkund, invited the five nuclear powers to accept international observers voluntarily when conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

1. "The Nuclear Age", published by SIPRI, Stockholm.

(c) Proliferation of military nuclear technology

(i) Horizontal proliferation

31. On 18th May 1974, India carried out an underground nuclear test concerning which the President of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Professor Sethna, held a press conference in Bombay two days later. The Professor stated that the aim of the test was purely peaceful, the purpose being to study the dynamics of craters and rocks and how to use this knowledge for peaceful purposes such as building dams. He added that India wished to use this knowledge to obtain gas and oil. He pointed out that the United States and the Soviet Union had carried out similar tests, that it would take India six months to analyse the results, and that the data obtained from the test would be published later. Asked whether there would be another test, Professor Sethna said information from the first test would have to be studied first.

32. The political and military importance of the test in India is that it is the only one to have been carried out by a country which does not claim to have nuclear weapons and that it completely upsets the fundamental principle of the non-proliferation treaty that a non-nuclear-weapon State renounces both nuclear weapons and "nuclear explosive devices". India has, of course, not signed the treaty. It asserts that it does not intend to use explosive devices for military purposes, but this mere assertion of intention is no substitute for pure and simple renunciation of the technology which allows it to do so. India has sixty Canberra bombers perfectly capable of transporting nuclear explosive devices and dropping them on military objectives. *India's neighbours will no longer be able to assume in their military contingency planning that India has no nuclear weapons.*

33. Mr. Aziz Ahmed, Pakistani Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs, told the conference of Islam Ministers for Foreign Affairs, meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 24th June 1974, that India had surreptitiously accumulated enough plutonium to manufacture seventeen nuclear bombs. There is no doubt that the plutonium was extracted from irradiated fuel elements from the reactor at Trombay, supplied by Canada. The elements were probably manufactured in India and the reprocessing plant is of purely Indian design. Mr. Ahmed added that "the bomb has been exploded right outside our door. We know who are the target countries".

34. World reactions to the Indian explosion were curiously restrained. Mr. Ahmed had to add, when addressing the Kuala Lumpur conference, that "nevertheless, in deference to the wishes of some of my colleagues, we have very considerably toned down our draft resolution, which merely 'notes the fact that India exploded a device.' This is a fact. In fact, India is very proud of it. I mention this because some members are not willing even to mention the fact".

35. Mr. Mitchell Sharp, Canadian Minister for External Affairs, announced in Ottawa on 22nd May 1974 that there would be no further consignments of installations or nuclear material for India and that exchanges of nuclear technology with India would be suspended. India did not deny that it was the Trombay reactor, supplied by Canada, which it used to produce the plutonium needed for the explosion. Negotiations between Canada and India about safeguards at the time the reactor was supplied proved difficult. It is evident that the safeguards finally accepted by India were not sufficient to prevent fissile material being diverted for explosive purposes.

36. Reactions from other countries were moderate. Although some western powers regretted the Indian test, the Soviet Union preferred to take note of the Indian assertion that the explosion had purely peaceful aims. Your Rapporteur called on the leader of the Indian Delegation to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, who reaffirmed the peaceful aims of the Indian explosion.

37. On 1st December 1974, Professor Katzir, President of Israel, stated that: "It has always been our intention to provide the potential for nuclear weapons development. We now have that potential. We will defend this country with all possible means at hand." Israel has not carried out a nuclear test but at Dimona, in the Negev desert, it has a small power reactor supplied by France which has been operational since 1963. Israel extracts uranium from phosphate in the Negev and it is quite possible for it to build its own reprocessing plant for irradiated elements.

38. During his visit to the Middle East in June 1974, President Nixon concluded agreements of principle with Israel and Egypt for the supply of nuclear power reactors to each country and the necessary enriched uranium fuel — 83 tons for each country. These agreements of principle provide for the negotiation of a co-operation agreement subject to agreed guarantees. On 26th June, only ten days after President Nixon's visit

to the Middle East, contracts for the supply of uranium were signed in Washington, Israel and Egypt having paid deposits of \$725,000 and \$660,000 respectively. However, in October 1974, the Washington press reported difficulties in the negotiation of safeguards to be applied in the framework of the nuclear co-operation agreements with the two countries. The United States is said to have insisted on the application of IAEA safeguards to all nuclear installations existing in the two countries; but it was not certain that Israel would accept such conditions as it has never signed the non-proliferation treaty. Egypt, on the other hand, has signed the treaty but not ratified it.

(ii) *Vertical proliferation*

39. The strategic nuclear weapons of the two superpowers have increased considerably since the non-proliferation treaty was signed. In 1968, the United States had 1,710 strategic missiles and 595 strategic bombers. The Soviet Union had 1,375 strategic missiles, about 700 intermediate-range missiles and 1,250 strategic bombers. With the introduction of independent warheads (MIRV), the number of United States warheads now exceeds 6,000, although there are fewer bombers. The number of Soviet strategic missiles has reached 2,835. The ceiling for a future SALT agreement recently approved by President Ford and Mr. Brezhnev in Vladivostok provided for a total of 2,400 launchers of all kinds (missiles and bombers) for each country, with the possibility of mounting MIRVs on not more than 1,320 missiles. With the present United States MIRV capability, these figures would allow each country to bring the number of independent warheads up to no less than 10,000 without transgressing the Vladivostok agreement. During the same period (1968-74), the number of strategic missiles in China rose from 0 to 75, in France from 0 to 66, and in the United Kingdom from 0 to 64. It is hard to make the non-nuclear-weapon States believe that since the non-proliferation treaty was signed the nuclear powers have really pursued negotiations in good faith on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, as they agreed to do on adhering to the treaty.

40. Admittedly, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded a treaty on limiting underground nuclear tests in Moscow on 3rd July 1974. But this treaty only bans underground explosions of more than 150 kilotons and takes effect only as from 31st March 1976. This agreement is

hardly likely to impress the conference to review the operation of the non-proliferation treaty, which opens in Geneva on 5th May 1975.

41. The other nuclear powers continue to carry out tests. On 24th June 1974, the British Prime Minister told parliament that a British underground test had been carried out in Nevada (United States) a few weeks earlier. France's programme of atmospheric explosions continued in June 1974, but the future programme provides for underground tests.

IV. Conclusions

42. Despite events since the non-proliferation treaty was signed in 1968, the Committee reiterates the opinion which it expressed at the time. The non-proliferation treaty, although establishing some degree of discrimination between the contracting parties and thereby involving certain disadvantages for the non-nuclear-weapon countries, nevertheless presents substantial advantages for world stability and the prospects of progress towards disarmament. As regards the Atlantic Alliance and the WEU countries, the treaty does not preclude mutual nuclear assistance between countries which already have a nuclear capacity. Nor does it "bar accession by a new federated European State to the nuclear status of one of its former components. A new federated European State would have to control all of its external security functions, including defence and all foreign policy matters relating to external security, but would not have to be so centralised as to assume all governmental functions." This was the interpretation of Mr. Rusk, then United States Secretary of State, on 10th July 1968; Mr. Mulley, British Minister of Disarmament, expressed himself in almost identical terms in the House of Commons on 8th July 1968. The Committee hopes that all the WEU countries will accede to the treaty as soon as possible and stresses the importance of accessions announced during the conference to examine the application of the treaty, which opens on 5th May 1975.

43. The Committee considers that in their external relations member countries should

encourage the largest possible number of countries to accede to the treaty. This policy must be completed by a policy of accepting the necessary safeguards and not providing assistance or nuclear technology to countries which have not fully accepted IAEA safeguards. Subject to this reservation, the Committee considers that all countries have the right to benefit from civil nuclear energy but that this right involves an obligation for non-nuclear-weapon States to accept formally the necessary safeguards and for all countries to accept responsibility for keeping radioactive nuclear waste in adequate security conditions on their own territory, and to abandon dumping it in the seas and oceans.

44. The Committee would not be consistent if it failed to point out the importance of the bilateral strategic arms limitation talks and the reduction, subject to appropriate safeguards, of nuclear weapons in general. It considers that the nuclear balance should be established at levels lower than those allowed in the Vladivostok agreement. In another report¹, the Committee advocates negotiations on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in the framework of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions.

45. After the conversations your Rapporteur had in Geneva with the Ambassadors or representatives of Canada, India, Japan, Romania, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, it is his duty to report to the Committee his feelings concerning the conference of 5th May which should make it possible to review the operation of safeguards applied by the Vienna Agency and their effectiveness.

46. The Committee cannot underestimate the seriousness of infractions of the treaty that could be committed by non-nuclear nations, nor can it but regret the increase in the nuclear armouries of the nuclear powers, in contradiction with the terms and spirit of the treaty.

47. These considerations raise problems which our Assembly cannot ignore.

1. State of European security, Document 671, Chapter III.

APPENDIX I

Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons¹
signed in London, Moscow and Washington
on 1st July 1968

1. The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",
2. Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,
3. Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,
4. In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,
5. Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,
6. Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,
7. Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,
8. Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
9. Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,
10. Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,
11. Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,
12. Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
13. Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources ;

Have agreed as follows :

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly ; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or

¹ Paragraph numbers have been added to the official text of the preamble for ease of reference.

otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply

with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organisations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accord-

ance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all

nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America¹, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty

¹ The names of the three countries appear in this order in the version signed in London.

and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1st January 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have

jeopardised the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardised its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a Conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised, have signed this Treaty.

Done in triplicate at London, Moscow and Washington¹, this first day of July 1968.

1. The names of the three capitals appear in this order in the version signed in London.

APPENDIX II

Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 1968

*List of signatures, ratifications and accessions
as at 31st March 1975*

Country	Date of signature			Date of ratification/accession		
	London	Moscow	Washington	London	Moscow	Washington
** Afghanistan	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	5. 3.70	5. 2.70	4. 2.70
Albania						
Algeria						
Argentina						
** Australia	27. 2.70	27. 2.70	27. 2.70	23. 1.73	23. 1.73	23. 1.73
** Austria	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	27. 6.69	27. 6.69	27. 6.69
** Bahamas				10. 7.73		
Bahrain						
Bangladesh						
* Barbados			1. 7.68			
* Belgium	20. 8.68	20. 8.68	20. 8.68			
Bhutan						
** Bolivia			1. 7.68			26. 5.70
** Botswana			1. 7.68	28. 4.69		
Brazil						
** Bulgaria	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	3.11.69	18. 9.69	5. 9.69
Burma						
** Burundi					19. 3.71	
Byelorussia						
** Cameroon		18. 7.68	17. 7.68			8. 1.69
** Canada	23. 7.68	29. 7.68	23. 7.68	8. 1.69	8. 1.69	8. 1.69
** Cent. Afr. Rep.						25.10.70
** Chad		1. 7.68		23. 3.71	11. 3.71	10. 3.71
Chile						
China						
* Colombia			1. 7.68			
Congo, P. R. of						
** Costa Rica			1. 7.68			3. 3.70
Cuba						
** Cyprus	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	5. 3.70	10. 2.70	16. 2.70
** Czechoslovakia	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	22. 7.69	22. 7.69	22. 7.69
** Dahomey			1. 7.68			31.10.72
D.R.V.						
** Denmark	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	3. 1.69	3. 1.69	3. 1.69
** Dom. Republic			1. 7.68			24. 7.71
** Ecuador			9. 7.68			7. 3.69
* Egypt, A.R. of	1. 7.68		1. 7.68			
** El Salvador			1. 7.68			11. 7.72
Equatorial Guinea						
** Ethiopia	5. 9.68	5. 9.68	5. 9.68	5. 3.70	5. 2.70	5. 3.70
** Fiji				14. 7.72	29. 8.72	18. 7.72
** Finland	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	5. 2.69	5. 2.69	5. 2.69
France						
** Gabon						19. 2.74
* The Gambia	4. 9.68	24. 9.68	20. 9.68			
* Germany (Fed. Republic)	28.11.69	28.11.69	28.11.69			

Country	Date of signature			Date of ratification/ accession		
	London	Moscow	Washington	London	Moscow	Washington
** Germany (Dem. Republic)		1. 7.68			31.10.69	
** Ghana	24. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	4. 5.70	11. 5.70	5. 5.70
** Greece		1. 7.68	1. 7.68			11. 3.70
** Grenada				19. 5.74		
** Guatemala			26. 7.68			22. 9.70
Guinea						
Guyana						
** Haiti			1. 7.68			2. 6.70
** Holy See				25. 2.71	25. 2.71	25. 2.71
** Honduras			1. 7.68			16. 5.73
** Hungary	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	27. 5.69	27. 5.69	27. 5.69
** Iceland	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	18. 7.69	18. 7.69	18. 7.69
India						
* Indonesia	2. 3.70	2. 3.70	2. 3.70			
** Iran	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	5. 3.70	10. 2.70	2. 2.70
* Iraq		1. 7.68			29.10.69	
** Ireland	4. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	4. 7.68	2. 7.68	1. 7.68
Israel						
* Italy	28. 1.69	28. 1.69	28. 1.69			
** Ivory Coast			1. 7.68			6. 3.73
** Jamaica	14. 4.69	14. 4.69	14. 4.69	5. 3.70	5. 3.70	5. 3.70
* Japan	3. 2.70	3. 2.70	3. 2.70			
** Jordan			10. 7.68			11. 2.70
** Kenya			1. 7.68		11. 6.70	
** Khmer Republic						2. 6.72
* Korea (South)			1. 7.68			
Korea (North)						
* Kuwait	22. 8.68	15. 8.68	15. 8.68			
** Laos	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	5. 3.70	20. 2.70	5. 3.70
** Lebanon	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	15. 7.70	15. 7.70	20.11.70
** Lesotho			9. 7.68			20. 5.70
** Liberia			1. 7.68			5. 3.70
* Libya	18. 7.68	23. 7.68	19. 7.68			
Liechtenstein						
* Luxembourg	18. 8.68	14. 8.68	14. 8.68			
** Madagascar			22. 8.68			8.10.70
Malawi						
** Malaysia	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	5. 3.70	5. 3.70	5. 3.70
** Maldives			11. 9.68			7. 4.70
** Mali		15. 7.69	14. 7.69		10. 2.70	5. 3.70
** Malta			17. 4.69			6. 2.70
Mauritania						
** Mauritius			1. 7.68	14. 4.69	25. 4.69	8. 4.69
** Mexico	26. 7.68	26. 7.68	26. 7.68	21. 1.69	21. 1.69	21. 1.69
Monaco						
** Mongolia		1. 7.68			14. 5.69	
** Morocco	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	30.11.70	27.11.70	16.12.70
** Nepal	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	3. 2.70	9. 1.70	5. 1.70
* Netherlands	20. 8.68	20. 8.68				
** New Zealand	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	10. 9.69	10. 9.69	10. 9.69
** Nicaragua	1. 7.68		1. 7.68			6. 3.73
Niger						

Country	Date of signature			Date of ratification/accession		
	London	Moscow	Washington	London	Moscow	Washington
** Nigeria	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	27. 9.68	14.10.68	7.10.68
** Norway	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	5. 2.69	5. 2.69	5. 2.69
Oman						
Pakistan						
* Panama			1. 7.68			
** Paraguay			1. 7.68	5. 3.70		4. 2.70
** Peru			1. 7.68			3. 3.70
** Philippines		18. 7.68	1. 7.68	16.10.72	20.10.72	5.10.72
** Poland	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	12. 6.69	12. 6.69	12. 8.69
Portugal						
Qatar						
** Romania	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	4. 2.70	4. 2.70	4. 2.70
Rwanda						
Salvador						
** San Marino	29. 7.68	21.11.68	1. 7.68	10. 8.70	20. 8.70	31. 8.70
Saudi Arabia						
** Senegal	26. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	15. 1.71	17.12.70	22.12.70
** Sierra Leone				26. 2.75		
* Singapore	5. 2.70	5. 2.70	5. 2.70			
** Somali, D. R. of	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	5. 3.70		12.11.70
South Africa						
Spain						
* Sri Lanka	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68			
** Sudan		24.12.68		10.12.73	22.11.73	31.10.73
** Swaziland	24. 6.69			11.12.69	12. 1.70	16.12.69
** Sweden	19. 8.68	19. 8.68	19. 8.68	9. 1.70	9. 1.70	9. 1.70
* Switzerland	27.11.69	27.11.69				
** Syria		1. 7.68		24. 9.69		
** Taiwan			1. 7.68			27. 1.70
Tanzania						
** Thailand				7.12.72		
** Togo			1. 7.68			26. 2.70
** Tonga				7. 7.71	24. 8.71	7. 7.71
* Trinidad and Tobago	22. 8.68		20. 8.68			
** Tunisia	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	26. 2.70	26. 2.70	26. 2.70
* Turkey	28. 1.69	28. 1.69	28. 1.69			
Uganda						
UAE						
Ukraine						
** Upper Volta		11. 8.69	25.11.68			3. 3.70
** Uruguay			1. 7.68			31. 8.70
* Venezuela			1. 7.68			
** Vietnam (South)			1. 7.68			10. 9.71

Country	Date of signature			Date of ratification /accession		
	London	Moscow	Washington	London	Moscow	Washington
** Western Samoa				26. 3.75		
* Yemen Arab Republic		23. 9.68				
* Yemen (PDRY)		14.11.68				
** Yugoslavia	10. 7.68	10. 7.68	10. 7.68	5. 3.70	5. 3.70	4. 3.70
** Zaire	17. 9.68	26. 7.68	22. 7.68			4. 8.70
Zambia						
** UK	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	27.11.68	29.11.68	27.11.68
** USA	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	5. 3.70	5. 3.70	5. 3.70
** USSR	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	1. 7.68	5. 3.70	5. 3.70	5. 3.70

At 31st March 1975

Parties : 87 (including Taiwan)

Signatories : 23

NB ** States that have signed and ratified or acceded

* States that have signed but not ratified

Proliferation of nuclear weapons

AMENDMENT No. 1¹

tabled by Mr. de Stexhe

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft Recommendation, add the following two paragraphs :
“Noting with keen satisfaction that, after the United Kingdom, five other member States of WEU have adhered to the treaty and deposited on the same day their instruments of ratification ;
Aware that the adoption of parallel if not identical attitudes on the part of the member States of WEU would be fruitful for Western Europe ;”

2. At the end of the draft Recommendation proper, add the following three paragraphs :
“To speak with one voice now in the Geneva conference responsible for considering the application of the treaty and subsequently adopt joint attitudes towards the depository countries of the treaty and of the IAEA;
With this in view, to convey strongly to the USSR and the United States the urgency of meaningful progress towards vertical non-proliferation in accordance with the commitments entered into lest the treaty lose its credibility and become merely an instrument of discrimination ;
To increase IAEA guarantees and safeguards and in particular :
 - (a) invite the nuclear States to follow the example of the United Kingdom and of the United States by making their civil installations subject to IAEA safeguards ;
 - (b) extend IAEA safeguards to the physical protection of nuclear material throughout the whole nuclear fuel cycle.”

Signed : de Stexhe

1. See 4th Sitting, 27th May 1975 (Amendment adopted).

Application of the Brussels Treaty
Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the
*Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*²
by Mr. de Niet, Rapporteur

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on the application of the Brussels Treaty

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submitted by Mr. de Niet, Rapporteur

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Chapter III : Armaments Control Agency

Chapter IV : Standing Armaments Committee

Conclusions

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. *Critchley* (Chairman); MM. *Klepsch* (Substitute : *Haase*), *Dankert* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Averardi*, *Beauguitte* (Substitute : *Delorme*), *Bizet*, *Boulloche*, *Kempinaire*, *Konen*, *de Koster*, *Lemmrigh*,

Ménard, *Pawelczyk*, *Pendry*, *Prescott* (Substitute : *Faulds*) *Richter*, *Rivière*, *Roper*, *Schugens*, *Tanghe* (Substitute *Duvieusart*), *Vedovato*, *Wall*, *de Niet*, *Schmidt*.

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation**on the application of the Brussels Treaty**

The Assembly,

Welcoming the prompt action by the Council which enabled the twentieth annual report to be communicated by 28th February and congratulating the Secretary-General on introducing the "appropriate administrative procedures to ensure that the preparation of its annual report is carried out on a current basis";

Stressing the close interest which the Council of WEU must necessarily take in the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, since all organs of WEU are required by the modified Brussels Treaty to work in close co-operation with it;

Aware that the modified Brussels Treaty is a supranational treaty in that Council — decisions concerning the force level and arms control provisions of Protocols Nos. II, III and IV are not subject to a unanimous vote, and that no usage or agreement has formally modified the majority voting procedures of those protocols;

Aware that the credibility of any future East-West agreements on arms control, especially in the framework of the conference on European security and co-operation, or mutual and balanced force reductions, may be undermined by the failure to apply the controls provided for by the modified Brussels Treaty;

Regretting that since 1966 annual reports have omitted the numbers of inspections, by category of establishment visited, that have been carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments;

Congratulating the Agency for the Control of Armaments on the way in which it has carried out in difficult circumstances the regrettably still too limited tasks assigned to it by the Council;

Recalling its recommendation that full use be made of the Standing Armaments Committee as a study and review body to eliminate duplication in other international bodies concerned with the standardisation and joint production of armaments, and endorsing the proposal of the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to entrust that Committee with a study of the armaments production capabilities existing in Europe,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Apply each year the new procedure for the prompt communication of the annual report;
2. Include in annual reports a statement of the numbers of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, both by category of installation and by country visited;
3. Include in the conclusions of the arms control chapter of the annual report a full and clear statement of all those aspects of the arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty which are not fully applied;
4. Continue to press for ratification by the remaining member of WEU of the Convention on the due process of law signed on 14th December 1957;
5. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to study and report on the arms production capabilities existing in the European NATO countries;
6. Advise the North Atlantic Council to revise the terms of appointment of its Chairman and Secretary-General, limiting it to four years in the first place.

Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Niet, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. In examining the twentieth annual report of the Council covering the year 1974, it is interesting to recall the significant change of content compared with earlier reports. Those defence questions with which the Council routinely deals (see paragraph 14 below) account for the bulk of the present report, whereas the first report covering the period 1st June to 15th October 1955 inevitably reflected the earlier activities of the Brussels Treaty Organisation prior to its modification in 1954, and included sections on the cultural and social activities of the Council. During periods in the intervening years, the Council has had responsibility for political consultation and for informing the United Kingdom about the activities of the European Community in the days before the United Kingdom acceded to it.

2. The fact that the twentieth annual report has to concentrate on the routine defence matters with which the Council still deals, merely reflects the transfer of the Council's other functions to wider fora mentioned in paragraph 6 below.

Regrettably, that part of the annual report which deals with the control of armaments — the most important statutory aspect of the annual report, in that it is the only aspect singled out in Article IX of the modified treaty as being a particular feature of the annual report — still has to record the failure of the Council to apply any of the more essential arms control provisions of the treaty. This matter is discussed in Chapter III below.

3. Nevertheless, as has been pointed out in the Council (see paragraph 10 below), the importance of the Brussels Treaty remains unchanged, and the Committee stresses that it provides an important basis, along with the North Atlantic Treaty, for the collective defence of the West. The Committee also welcomes the Council's readiness to prepare replies on many recommendations and questions from the Assembly concerning matters, including the more important defence matters, which the member countries deal with in fora other than that of WEU — chiefly NATO, the European Communities or the nine-power political consultative machinery.

Annual report of the Council

CHAPTER I

Relations between the Council and the Assembly

4. Rather curiously, the twentieth annual report points out (page 2) that the previous report was transmitted to the Assembly "within the shortest time compatible with the procedures of the Council". Yet last year the Committee, in its reply, had to complain that the vital chapter on the control of armaments had been received only on 19th April that year, giving the Rapporteur and the Committee insufficient time to consider it in preparing their reports for submission to the first part of the Assembly's session. This year the Committee notes with satisfaction that the whole of the annual report was communicated to the Assembly before the end of February. The Committee wishes to congratulate the Secretary-General for introducing the "appropriate administrative procedures to ensure that the preparation of its annual report is carried out on a current basis", advocated by the Assembly in Recommendation 183¹. This early communication has made it possible to give it the study and attention that it merits.

5. The annual report points out (page 2) that :

"When asked by the Assembly to provide information or state their attitude on current political questions, the Council had to refer, more often than in the past, to other agencies dealing with these matters, because their own activities in these fields have diminished as political co-operation between the Nine has developed. In the case of defence policy which both the Assembly and the Council look upon as WEU's essential concern, it was even more apparent that the Council could not reply to the Assembly in the desired manner because co-operation in European defence policy had not yet reached a stage

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 18th June 1969, on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 482, Rapporteur Mr. Vedovato.

at which governments could state a joint view to the Assembly.”

6. The Committee welcomes the fact that the growing cohesion of Europe has enabled matters which might at one time have been discussed within the framework of WEU, to be transferred to other fora such as the North Atlantic Council, Eurogroup, the European Community, and the political consultation machinery of the nine members of the European Community, where they can be more effectively dealt with than in the restricted framework of WEU. The Committee notes the Council's assertion (page 2) that co-operation in the field of European defence policy has not reached the stage where governments could adopt a common position before the Assembly. The Committee reports elsewhere on the future organisation of European defence ¹.

7. The Committee welcomes the Council's acceptance of the proposal in Recommendation 247 calling for the inclusion in annual reports of certain information concerning the method whereby the Council determines the appropriate levels of the armed forces of the member States (see paragraph 16 below).

8. While the Council, during the peak of its political activity in the period prior to the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Community, met at ministerial level four times a year, it now appears to be the practice to meet once only at that level. In 1974, the Committee did not have occasion to meet the Council informally in conjunction with the single ministerial meeting held on 11th March.

9. The meeting between the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee is referred to in Chapter IV below.

CHAPTER II

Activities of the Council

Twentieth anniversary of the modification of the Brussels Treaty

10. The Committee endorses the statement by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council (see page 4

1. See the report on the state of European security, Chapter VI, Rapporteur Mr. Lemmrich.

of the Council's report), made at the anniversary meeting on 23rd October 1974:

“... The revised Brussels Treaty remains as valid today as when it was signed twenty years ago. It brings our seven countries together in a fifty-year alliance in which we accept the most binding obligation any country can assume with regard to another : the commitment to mutual defence. Not least, it is the origin of the Assembly which has since made such an important contribution to our work...”

11. It is for this reason that the Committee believes that the residual defence functions of the Council (paragraph 14 below) should be actively pursued. The credibility of any treaty declines with the passage of time when there is no regular and effective activity under its terms.

East-West relations

12. The Committee welcomes the continued discussion at ministerial meetings of the Council of the state of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic (see page 5 of the Council's report). The annual report recalls the Council's reply to Recommendation 252¹ concerning the concertation of allied positions in the three important East-West conferences. The Committee has welcomed the common position which the allies continue to adopt at these conferences. The annual report further comments on the Defence Committee's recent report on European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean ².

The Council states in its report (page 6) that :

“In the course of many discussions in the North Atlantic Council, the desire of the representatives of the member governments of WEU and of those of their allies, has all along been to maintain the coherence of the Alliance, to avoid conflict between two of its members, and to find an acceptable settlement to the humanitarian problems of Cyprus ;”

It is difficult to discover how much substance there is in this assertion. Your Rapporteur is

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1974, on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Documents 635, Rapporteur Mr. Critchley.

2. Document 651, adopted by the Committee on 14th November 1974, Rapporteur Mr. Critchley.

unaware of any reference in public statements or the media to any helpful steps taken by the North Atlantic Council as such or by its Chairman. The same inaction has been apparent over events in Portugal after the end of the Caetano régime.

Relations between Europe and the United States

13. The annual report similarly comments on the Committee's report on consultation and decisions in the Atlantic Alliance¹. The Committee welcomes the Council's assertion (page 6) that "Europe's development towards political unity was by no means inconsistent with the maintenance of solidarity within the Alliance", and (page 7) that "during 1974, informal practical arrangements for consultation between the Nine and the United States were worked out and put into effect... Such consultation in no way derogated from the importance of the bilateral channels of information and consultation between each of the European partners and the United States to which the Assembly had referred".

Defence questions

14. The Council having transferred to NATO in 1950 everyday responsibility for implementing the mutual defence obligations of the Brussels Treaty, a decision subsequently enshrined in Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty in 1954, the Council was led, in its second annual report², to define the scope of its residual defence and related activities. The seven governments considered that the activities of the Council in the field of defence questions and armaments should relate only to :

- "(a) matters which the contracting parties wish to raise, especially under Article VIII ;
- (b) the level of forces of member States ;
- (c) the maintenance of certain United Kingdom forces on the continent ;
- (d) the Agency for the Control of Armaments ;
- (e) the Standing Armaments Committee."

15. As far as the Committee is aware, no member State has ever, so far, chosen to raise matters under Article VIII of the treaty ("... any situa-

tion which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise...") so that the effective activities of the Council in the field of defence now relate to items (b) to (e) above. Items (d) and (e) are dealt with separately in Chapters III and IV of the annual report.

Levels of forces of member States

16. Under Protocol No. II of the Brussels Treaty, the Council has important functions concerning the determination of the levels of forces to be maintained by member countries. The Committee welcomes the full details now given by the Council in the annual report (pages 9-10) of the various procedures, all of which were correctly applied during the year under review. The Committee particularly welcomes the inclusion of information concerning the parallel procedure involving the representatives of six of the member countries in the NATO framework. This information has been incorporated in response to Written Questions 130 and 141 and Recommendation 247 of the Assembly.

17. Under Protocol No. II, the United Kingdom undertook to maintain specified levels of forces on the continent. In response to Written Question 122¹, the Council stated that :

"... The level of British forces on the mainland of Europe approved by the Council is therefore once more (subject to the temporary redeployment referred to above) 55,000 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force."

In response to Recommendation 213², the United Kingdom undertook to state in the annual report each year the current actual level of British forces on the continent. The Committee notes with great satisfaction that the level duly reported at 30th November 1974 amounted to 60,136 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force. Allowing for the temporary redeployment of some 4,000 men to Northern Ireland and 310 to Cyprus, there is no longer any doubt that the United Kingdom's obligation has been met.

Amendments to the list of prohibited weapons

18. On some twelve occasions since the conclusion of the modified Brussels Treaty in 1954, the Council has amended the list at Annex III to

1. Document 635, adopted by the Committee on 21st May 1974, Rapporteur Mr. Critchley.

2. Document 37, 26th February 1957.

1. Put by Mr. Vedovato on 13th April 1971.

2. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1971, on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 558, Rapporteur Mr. Vedovato.

Protocol No. III which specified the weapons which the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes not to manufacture on its territory. No amendments to this list have been reported by the Council during 1974, the year covered by the annual report.

19. On 15th May 1974, Mr. Tanghe put the following Written Question 139 to the Council :

"139. The annual report of the Council for 1973 states that Protocol No. III to the modified Brussels Treaty was amended on 26th September 1973 'to take account of technical developments' whereas previous references to such amendments have stated that they were designed 'to enable the Federal Republic of Germany to fulfil her NATO commitments'.

Can the Council make the same statement on this occasion ?"

The Council, in its reply communicated on 13th June 1974, failed to assert that the amendment in question was designed to enable Germany to fulfil her NATO commitments. The full text of the reply is as follows :

"139. In their nineteenth report to the Assembly, the Council stated that their resolution of 26th September 1973 had been adopted 'following the procedure laid down in Protocol No. III to the modified Brussels Treaty'.

This procedure was also referred to in the preamble to the resolution in question, the text of which was communicated to the President of the Assembly on 27th September 1973.

While the Council made no further reference in their annual report to the concept of the NATO commitments of the Federal Republic of Germany, they nevertheless made a point of informing the Assembly of a factor which had played an important part in arriving at their decision, namely, the need to take account of technical developments."

This wording of the Council's reply leaves unanswered questions in the Committee's mind.

20. The amendment made by the Council on 26th September 1973 raised the tonnage of submarines which Germany is authorised to manufacture on its territory from 450 to 1,800 tons. Under the previous limit, Germany had also been authorised to manufacture up to six submarines

not exceeding 1,000 tons, and this quota of six submarines had subsequently been exported — four to Greece and two to Turkey — as the Committee has previously reported¹.

21. The Committee finds the situation concerning the revised limit of 1,800 tons to be unclear. Article II of Protocol No. III states that amendments to the list of prohibited weapons are to be made "if in accordance with the needs of the armed forces², a recommendation is made by the competent Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation..." The Committee would be interested to know to what extent the amendment in this case was made to permit the export of submarines by Germany rather than to meet the requirements of the German armed forces assigned to NATO. There appears to be no other explanation for the Council's inability to state that the amendment was made "to enable the Federal Republic of Germany to fulfil her NATO commitments".

Other written questions — The Montreux Convention

22. In Written Question 133, which Mr. Zamberletti put to the Council on 12th June 1973, the question of the Montreux Convention regulating the passage of ships through the Turkish Straits was raised. France and Britain are parties to that convention. The Council was unable to give a substantive reply to that question and, in reply to Written Question 140, put to the Council by Mr. Tanghe on 15th May 1974, the Council stated that the two WEU member governments concerned were "still unable to give a final reply and indeed are unlikely to be able to do so until they have more substantive information concerning the vessel in question". The Assembly, in Recommendation 256³, reiterated "its earlier recommendation for the correct application of the Montreux Convention to prevent the passage of aircraft-carriers through the Dardanelles". In paragraph 36 of the explanatory memorandum to Document 651, the Committee stated its view that "the passage of these carriers [two Soviet

1. Report on the application of the Brussels Treaty adopted by the Committee on 21st May 1974, Document 638, paragraph 11, Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe.

2. In the French text the words "*qui lui sont affectées*" [assigned to the NATO supreme commander] appear here.

3. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1974, on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 651, Rapporteur Mr. Critchley.

aircraft-carriers under construction in the Black Sea] through the Straits could not be reconciled with the Montreux Convention..."

In a written reply to a question covering the Assembly's recommendation put by Mr. Bonaldi in the Italian Senate, the Italian Ministry of Defence stated :

"Scrupulous respect for the Montreux Convention and in particular for the clause relating to the ban on aircraft-carriers passing through the Turkish Straits, is in the interests of the Alliance.

In this context, the Assembly's suggestion that appropriate representations be made to ensure that the convention is correctly applied is acceptable, since it is mainly a matter of urging Turkey to ensure that the convention is scrupulously applied."

CHAPTER III

Armaments Control Agency

23. The Assembly has always stressed the importance of the application of the arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty. Article IX of that treaty makes it clear, in fact, that the chief reason why the Assembly was set up was precisely to watch over the way in which the Council carried out its responsibilities in this respect. The provisions of the treaty concerning the control of weapons have been summarised on numerous occasions, most recently by the Committee in its report last year¹. In Recommendation 247, adopted on 18th June 1974, the Assembly called on the Council to "include in its annual reports a prominent, full and clear statement of all aspects of the arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty which are not fully applied..." The following statements are to be found in various parts of Chapter III of the annual report now under review : Concerning the determination by the Council of the appropriate levels of armaments for the forces of the WEU countries, the report (page 13) makes the following comment :

"... the term 'armaments', whenever used with reference to levels in this report, should be understood to mean :

1. Report on the application of the Brussels Treaty adopted by the Committee on 21st May 1974, Document 638, paragraph 15 *et seq.*, Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe.

armaments declared by the member States as being held by their forces on the mainland of Europe, with the exception of armaments with nuclear capability and of the armaments of what one member State calls strategic forces, that is to say, the armaments over which the Agency has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate of controlling levels."

24. Mr. Zamberletti put Written Question 131 to the Council on 16th April 1973, asking which categories of armaments were covered by the expression "the armaments of what one member State calls 'strategic forces' ". The Council replied on 14th June 1973 that "the Armaments Control Agency has no knowledge of the categories of armaments included in the expression 'strategic forces'... The Agency is, therefore, unable to report on them in any way to the Council". It is thus clear that the Council itself is unaware of the categories of armaments over which it declares itself unable to exercise control by virtue of the foregoing comment.

25. The annual report further states (page 14) :

"As the convention for due process of law has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns take the form of agreed control measures.

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency must give some six weeks' notice..."

Protocol No. IV of the treaty makes provision for the process of law in respect of private interests (which might suffer damage by inspections) and for members of the Agency to be accorded free access to plants and depots and the relevant accounts and documents. In application of these two provisions, the member States drew up the :

"Convention concerning measures to be taken by member States of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954,"

which is the convention here referred to in the annual report.

Signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 by the seven member countries, this convention has been ratified by only six of them : Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

The serious situation arising from the convention not having come into force is made clear by more ample information contained in previous annual reports but omitted from the present report. Thus, the report for 1972 (Document 598) states, in Chapter III, Section D, that :

"In the absence of a due process of law, it cannot be claimed that the Agency's methods, particularly in the case of chemical weapons, have reached a fully satisfactory state of development."

and earlier reports that "one of the principal reasons for this situation [non-application of controls on biological weapons] is the absence of any legal guarantees to protect private interests".

26. The annual report further comments (page 15) :

"(b) In present circumstances, the Agency's activities do not extend to atomic weapons or, in one member State, to what that State calls 'strategic forces'. Nor does the Agency apply any controls to biological weapons.

(c) As the convention for due process of law, signed on 14th December 1957, has not yet entered into force, control operations carried out by the Agency in private establishments had to be applied in accordance with the 'agreed control' procedure, as in previous years."

The report finally comments (page 18) :

"6. Atomic weapons

Since the situation regarding these weapons remained the same as in previous years, the Agency is not in a position to engage in any control activities, or even to carry out preparatory studies with regard to atomic weapons."

27. The Committee remains deeply concerned at the serious gaps in the application of the control

provisions provided for by the treaty. It has to be recognised that they completely vitiate the whole principle of control. In the Committee's view, these shortcomings do not warrant the complacent assertion in the conclusion to Chapter III of the annual report (page 19):

"In 1974, the Agency applied controls effectively in those fields which are open to it."

The conclusion to the arms control chapter of previous annual reports always mentioned the reservations included in the body of the chapter. The Committee recommends that the general conclusion of Chapter III of the annual report should list clearly all the areas in which the Agency has not been enabled to apply the controls provided for in the treaty.

28. The Committee finds the Council's complacency over the failure to apply the arms control provisions particularly dangerous for two reasons:

(a) Application of the arms control provisions remains one of the very few activities left to the Council in the defence field. The Council has recently reiterated the importance of the defence provisions of the Brussels Treaty (paragraphs 10 and 11 above). These will inevitably lose credibility if the Council is unable to take action under the treaty.

(b) If the member countries of WEU are unable to apply among themselves those arms control measures on which they were agreed in 1954, there is little or no hope of reaching agreement on serious arms control in an East-West context such as SALT, MBFR, and the confidence-building measures to be associated with CSCE, or in a world-wide context such as the non-proliferation treaty, on both of which topics the Committee reports elsewhere¹.

29. The Committee is aware of the problems which the Council claims make it impossible to apply the treaty fully at the present time, and the Assembly, on the report of the Committee, has

1. Reports on the state of European security (Document 671) and on the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Document 672).

adopted various recommendations proposing alternative solutions over the years. These have been most recently summarised in the previous report of the Committee on this subject¹. None of these alternative proposals has been found acceptable by the Council. The Committee therefore recommends that annual reports should state unequivocally the areas in which controls are not applied, and that the Council should continue to press for the entry into force of the convention on due process of law.

Activities of the Agency

30. The Committee's criticism of the Council is in no way to be construed as criticism of the Agency, which has continued to carry out its task efficiently in difficult circumstances.

31. It may be said that controls are applied in respect of conventional weapons on the mainland of Europe (including aircraft) and various missile systems capable of carrying nuclear bombs and warheads — although, of course, the warheads concerned remain in United States' custody and are not subject to control by the Agency. The Council confirmed the situation in reply to Written Question 142, put by Mr. Tanghe on 27th May 1974:

“(a) Is it correct that the Agency for the control of Armaments carried out inspections of certain of these missiles [i.e. missiles with a nuclear capacity], as well as tactical aircraft with a possible nuclear capability?”

The Council replied :

“(a) It is correct that the Armaments Control Agency carried out both documentary and field controls on sections of missiles and on aircraft covered by the terms of Protocol No. III, Annex IV, 2, 3, 4 and 11.”

Statement of the number of inspections

32. Annual reports of the Council up to and including the eleventh, covering the year 1965, gave details of the number of inspections carried out by the Agency. Those reported for the years 1961-65 inclusive are summarised in the following table :

1. Document 638, paragraph 22, Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe.

*Numbers and types of inspections
carried out by the Agency for the Control of
Armaments
(from the corresponding annual reports
of the Council)*

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Inspections in military depots and central records offices	29	26	35	39	26
Inspections of national units	15	20	13	19	16
Agreed controls of levels at production plants (including shipyards)	12	11	13	13	11
Agreed non-production controls at factories	7	7	10	9	7
TOTALS	63	65	74	80	60

It will be noted that totals do not always tally with the figures given ; it is understood that there are errors in the figures reported by the Council, but they are only minor.

33. Annual reports of the Council covering the years 1966 onwards have omitted figures concerning the number of inspections carried out. The Assembly, in Recommendation 183 adopted in June 1969, demanded the reinstatement of these figures in the annual reports of the Council. It reiterated this demand on a number of occasions in 1970 and 1971¹. The Council finally agreed² to comply with the Assembly's repeated requests, but on a confidential basis only, and the detailed figures for inspections in the years 1970-74 have been duly communicated to members of the Assembly by the Secretary-General.

34. Officially, the figures for the years 1966-69 have not been communicated, but in fact your Rapporteur understands that the Agency's activities continued unabated as follows :

1. See reply to the fifteenth annual report adopted on 1st June 1970, Recommendation 213 adopted on 30th November 1971 and Written Question 123 put by Mr. Vedovato on 13th April 1971.

2. See reply to Written Question 123 dated 1st June 1971, reply to Recommendation 213 dated 20th March 1972, and subsequent letters from the Secretary-General of 17th March 1972, 19th April 1972, 12th March 1973 and 22nd April 1974 on the same subject.

	1966	1967	1968	1969
Control measures at depots (including central accounting offices)				
Control measures at units under national command		****		
Control measures at production plants (quantitative control measures)				
Control measures at production plants (non-production control measures)				
Total control measures	78	70	79	77

**** Confidential material deleted from the published report.

35. When communicating the (confidential) figures for 1971, the Council reported that the Agency had adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections and was thenceforth counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of inspections resulted that in fact reflected no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of figures (old and new style) for the years 1970 and 1971. The following table shows the numbers of inspections reported (confidentially) for the years 1970-74.

36. The Committee continues to regret that the Council refuses to publish the detailed figures of inspections since 1965, because the unnecessary secrecy can only lead the uninitiated to suspect that the activities of the Agency have been curtailed. From the confidential information available to it the Committee is able to state that this is not the case ; the activities of

*Numbers and types of inspection carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments
(Communicated confidentially by the Council)*

		1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Control measures at depots	Old style					
	New style					
Control measures at units under national command	Old style					
	New style					
Control measures at production plants (quantitative control measures)	Old style		****			
	New style					
Total quantitative control measures	Old style					
	New style					
Control measures at production plants (non-production control measures)	Old style					
	New style					
Total control measures (all categories)	Old style	82	****	—	—	—
	New style	****	72	66	66	71

**** Confidential material deleted from the published report.

the Agency have continued at broadly uniform levels for the last ten years. The apparent fluctuations in the total numbers of inspections is due only to the change in accounting methods. The Committee is of course aware that these figures are administrative and do not give a full picture of the Agency's activities, but in the absence of fuller information they provide the only quantitative indication available.

The Committee recommends that future annual reports state clearly numbers of inspections carried out, both by category, as was done in the years prior to 1966, and by country, so as to give a clear picture of the Agency's activities.

"No effective production of nuclear and biological weapons" statement

37. For some years annual reports of the Council have stated that "the replies received from member countries which have not renounced the right to produce chemical weapons show that no effective production has yet been undertaken on the mainland of Europe". (The countries concerned are all member countries except Germany.) No corresponding statement is made in respect of bacteriological and nuclear weapons, despite the fact that the provisions of the treaty concerning control of these weapons are identical to those for chemical weapons. In Recommendation 209 the Assembly therefore called on the Council to incorporate in annual reports similar "no effective production" statements in respect of bacteriological and nuclear weapons, but in its replies the Council did not agree to these proposals.

CHAPTER IV

Standing Armaments Committee

38. The Standing Armaments Committee was established by a decision of the Council dated 7th May 1955. In this framework governmental delegates meet: "to encourage... agreements or arrangements on such subjects as the development, standardisation, production and procurement of armaments".

39. As previous annual reports have noted, the Council has been engaged since 15th February 1973 in a comprehensive review of the rôle of the Standing Armaments Committee, on the

understanding that there should be no duplication of the work of other collaborative fora. In this connection, the deputy national armaments directors of the member countries met in Paris on 29th and 30th January 1974 and duly reported to the Council. In its reply to Recommendation 244, dated 13th May 1974, the Council stated:

"... The Permanent Council devoted several meetings to studying the report of the deputy national armaments directors. Having reached no joint conclusion, they submitted a summary of their discussions to the meeting of the Ministerial Council of 11th March 1974. The Ministerial Council had an exchange of views about the question; no unanimous agreement was reached on any concrete proposal and the Ministers were therefore only able to request the Permanent Council to consider their study on the basis of the various proposals which had been made. The question is therefore still before the Permanent Council."

40. The annual report states (page 10) that "this situation has not altered and the Council have not discussed this question in depth for several months. Nevertheless, it is still before the Council who will bear in mind the possibility of reporting to the Assembly as soon as more substantive results have been obtained".

41. The present activities of the Standing Armaments Committee and its working groups relate chiefly to study of operational research in member countries and to a study of new means of hindering enemy action.

42. On 18th February 1975, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments met the delegates to the Standing Armaments Committee together with the Secretary-General of WEU and the Assistant Secretary-General, Head of the Standing Armaments Committee Secretariat. Known as the "Liaison Sub-Committee on the Joint Production of Armaments", this joint meeting between the Defence Committee and the Standing Armaments Committee was the ninth to be held since such meetings were instituted in 1959. To the regret of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, out of four questions it submitted concerning armaments production the Council had agreed to only a single question being discussed at the meeting: "What are the present activities of the sub-groups and of the working groups of the Standing Armaments Committee?"

43. Nevertheless, the Committee found the occasion a useful opportunity for a frank exchange of views with the delegates to the Standing Armaments Committee, all of whom represent their countries on the various NATO and Eurogroup working groups dealing with the production of armaments. The Committee expresses its thanks to the delegates to the Standing Armaments Committee, to the Secretary-General and to the Assistant Secretary-General who attended the meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on 18th February.

44. The Committee is aware that active co-operation between countries on the joint production of armaments is chiefly arranged on an ad hoc basis as in projects such as the MRCA, Alpha-Jet and Jaguar aircraft, or the production in Europe of United States' equipment such as the Hawk and improved Hawk surface-to-air missiles. The principal international fora concerned with the joint production of armaments are the NATO conference of national armaments directors (CNADs), and its Eurogroup counterpart, Euronad. The Assembly, on the report of the Committee, has recommended in the past: "... that full use be made of the Standing Armaments Committee as a co-ordinating and review body responsible for detecting and making proposals for eliminating duplication in other international bodies concerned with the standardisation and joint production of armaments"¹.

45. The Council, in its reply, and in its present review of the future activities of the Standing Armaments Committee, has borne in mind the need to avoid duplication with the work of other comparable fora. In this connection, the Committee draws attention to the proposal made by Mr. Van Elslande, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, when he addressed the Assembly on 5th December 1974. Mr. Van Elslande proposed that WEU should undertake a study of the armaments production capabilities existing in the member countries, their possible specialisations and the possible pooling of their research activities and finance. It could also study the problem of arms exports to non-NATO countries, which often hampered agreement on the joint production of armaments. In reply to questions, Mr. Van Elslande added:

"... So long as we have national armaments factories, we shall have for purely economic and technical reasons to combine production

with export. I would be very glad if we could give up exporting weapons. This is something that I believe would be possible if we tackled the problem on a European scale. What we need to do, inside this Alliance of ours, is to create enough economic opportunities to be able to limit weapons production to meeting our own defence requirements. Bearing in mind the areas of territory we have to defend, our economic potential and the equipment we need, I think it must be possible to set up an integrated European armaments industry which would serve only our own defence needs. When I say 'our own defence', I mean, of course, the two pillars of the Atlantic Alliance, standing on either side of the Atlantic Ocean.

.....

... I believe I said that if we achieved an integrated weapons production I would not rule out any exporting of weapons, but that first of all this would certainly become marginal compared to the present-day total of exports from the various countries, and that secondly this would no longer be to meet economic needs but could become an instrument of diplomacy for us, and an instrument of our joint policy..."

Conclusions

46. The Committee's chief conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation:

Preamble

First paragraph

47. The Committee expresses satisfaction at the action taken by the Secretary-General to implement part of Recommendation 183 of the Assembly (quoted here in the preamble). See paragraph 4 of the explanatory memorandum above.

Second paragraph

48. This paragraph introduces operative paragraph 6 (see below).

Fourth paragraph

49. The Committee's concern at the possible repercussions on East-West negotiations, of the

1. Recommendation 234, adopted on 19th June 1973.

shortcomings in the application of the arms controls provided for in the treaty, is described in paragraphs 28 and 29 above.

Fifth paragraph

50. Omissions of numbers of inspections are referred to in paragraph 32 *et seq.*

Sixth paragraph

51. The scope of the Agency's activities in difficult circumstances are described in paragraphs 30 to 37 above.

Seventh paragraph

52. A previous recommendation of the Assembly concerning the Standing Armaments Committee, and Mr. Van Elslande's recent proposal, are referred to in paragraphs 44 and 45 above.

Operative text

Paragraph 1

53. See comment on first paragraph of the preamble above.

Paragraph 2

54. In paragraph 36, the Committee recommends that full information concerning numbers of inspections be given.

Paragraphs 3 and 4

55. The omissions concerned, and the need for a clear statement of the situation and the importance of the convention are explained in paragraphs 23 to 29 above.

Paragraph 5

56. Mr. Van Elslande's recent proposal concerning the Standing Armaments Committee is mentioned in paragraph 45 above.

Paragraph 6

57. Attention is drawn to the inaction of the North Atlantic Council in certain matters in paragraph 12 above.

***The European aeronautical industry
and civil aviation***

REPORT ¹

**submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ²
by MM. Warren and Valleix, Rapporteurs**

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee: Mr. de Montesquiou (Chairman); MM. Warren, Richter (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, Boucheny, Carter, Cornelissen, Fletcher (Substitute: Brown), Göller, Lenzer, Lewis (Substitute:*

Lester), Mammi, Mart, van Ooijen, Pecoraro, Schmitt (Substitute: Cerneau), Schwencke, de Stexhe (Substitute: de Bruyne), Treu, Valleix.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on the European aeronautical industry and civil aviation

The Assembly,

Aware that the recession in air transport and aircraft construction has compelled governments to consider the economic, social and financial problems facing the industries concerned ;

Also aware that, since they provide subsidies, governments now follow more closely the activities of airlines and aircraft industries in order to obtain better returns for their subsidies through more rational management of the firms concerned ;

Considering that the Council's reply to Recommendation 257 that all aspects of European aviation continue to receive its fullest attention evades the question and demonstrates its complete inability to take the necessary political action ;

Aware of the study undertaken within the Communities on civil aircraft production, to be ready by 1st October 1975 ;

Aware that the scope of Eurocontrol's activities is shrinking,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments :

1. To call upon European airlines to agree on the characteristics of their future equipment and European manufacturers to co-operate in the manufacture of such equipment ;
2. To ensure that the study undertaken by the Communities includes a detailed chapter on means of allowing effective decision-making machinery to be established in Europe, including a European aviation agency after the fashion of the European Space Agency ;
3. To seek practical ways to help the European aircraft industries to harmonise their concepts and methods of work in the civil and military sectors so that they may develop in satisfactory conditions ;
4. To acknowledge that the weakening of Eurocontrol would be most detrimental to Europe and ensure that that organisation is developed in accordance with its charter.

Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by MM. Warren and Valleix, Rapporteurs)

PART I

State of the European aeronautical industry
(submitted by Mr. Warren, Rapporteur)

1. In December 1974 your Rapporteur had the honour to present to the Assembly of Western European Union a report on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions entitled "State of European aviation activities". In the five months which have passed since the presentation of that report, which was adopted unanimously by the Assembly, there has been no action by any member government to implement any of the report's recommendations¹. Thus we have an illustration of Western Europe's extraordinary inability to take political action, which everyone agrees is essential, because the issues involve technology and result in a paralysis of political action.

2. Indeed, two major events have occurred in Western European aerospace in 1975 which clearly illustrate this paralytic process proceeding. Firstly, there is the indigestion which is developing in the four nations seeking to select a Starfighter replacement as they try to swallow the vast American offsets which have become more a political than an economic condition of the purchase of foreign aircraft. It is incredible to witness Europeans proposing to commit themselves to a mass production programme for an American fighter aircraft larger than that to which the Americans have committed themselves to date. Without doubt the General Dynamics F-16 aircraft is an extremely fine aircraft and it appears that it may win the United States navy's acceptance as opposed to the Northrop F-17. The European solution of purchasing the Marcel Dassault F-1E, with or without a mixed force of Jaguars, may yet pass the F-16 in the selection choice. However, what is really incredible is that Europe should have allowed itself to get into a position where there should be any doubt whatsoever about its ability to supply 350 aircraft from its own resources. Such a production run would have been more than the level required to justify indigenous design and production to meet a European specification. But

the years passed without the essential political initiatives being taken.

3. The second symptom of our problems concerns our continued inability in Western Europe to see our aerospace industry as a European entity and not as a series of separate national aircraft industries. Whereas every nation in Western Europe still has the right to make its own decisions affecting its industrial policy, one would have expected Western Europe to have measured the effect on its economy which was likely to arise from political action being taken within an individual country which could affect the security and industrial power base of all of us. Whatever one's political beliefs, there can be no doubt that the United Kingdom Government's proposals on defence cuts should be considered in the light of the effect which they will have upon Western Europe¹.

4. The United Kingdom always has been a very substantial contributor to the defence of Western Europe. This capability has stemmed from the fact that the nation was able to afford to bear more than its fair burden of defence costs. It is the belief of the present British Government that these charges are more than the nation can afford at present. Therefore it has decreed that there shall be reductions in current programmes and future research and development. Europe's misfortune is that it now should take into account a reduction in the strength of the British defence industries and therefore in its capability to supply its defence from its own resources.

5. No one can quantify the effect of the proposed nationalisation of the airframe manufacturing resources of Hawker Siddeley, British Aircraft Corporation and Scottish Aviation. Although the bill has been delayed several months in its presentation to the British parliament, it is the government's plan to carry out this nationalisation during 1975.

6. The magnitude of the effect of these twin actions on the security of Western Europe can-

¹. See Recommendation 257 and the Council's reply at Appendix I.

¹. See Addendum.

not be measured. Your Rapporteur would be failing in his duty if he did not issue a warning that the consequences could be dangerous and that he believes Western Europe must make such arrangements as it feels necessary to ensure that there is a sufficient design and manufacturing capability for military aircraft on the mainland of Europe.

7. Britain's aircraft equipment industry still remains the strongest in Europe and there is no proposal, at present, to nationalise that sector of the industry nor is it proposed to interfere with the substantial helicopter capability of Westland Limited.

8. During the discussion in Committee on the second of the two major events that have occurred in Western European aerospace in 1975, namely the British Government's intention to reduce its defence expenditure and to nationalise the airframe industry, several members believed the Rapporteur's wording pointed to an internal British dispute which should not be taken up in the framework of a European parliamentary committee.

9. While your Rapporteur made some changes in the original text, he did not wish to delete an important part which to his mind was not ideologically antagonistic.

10. Other members felt that a common attitude should be adopted by governments and parliaments in order to help the aeronautical industry to overcome its present difficulties.

11. However, your Rapporteur would stress that many people in the United Kingdom do not believe that the effect of the measures taken by the United Kingdom Government will be other than beneficial. These are certainly matters of domestic debate but your Rapporteur's views must be recorded as they have a direct influence on the European aeronautical structure.

12. Europe has a remarkable inventiveness and genius in the construction of aircraft. But if Europe is ever to develop its own foreign policy then it has to learn how to maintain and encourage strategic industries such as those required for the defence of Western Europe before it can assure itself it has the power to make its own policy.

13. Developments in civil air transport since last December have been chiefly marked by further substantial increases in air fares. Europe's passengers continue to remain in the hands of airlines which, with the backing of bilateral agreements between governments and the safety net of IATA, are virtually free to set any fare levels they want to. Air fares on the London-Paris sector, for instance, have been increased by 25 % since last December and it now costs each passenger 12.5 pence per mile to be carried over this sector. This story of high charges persists throughout Western Europe with the persistent excuse that conditions in Western Europe are not as favourable as those available to airlines operating the same types of aircraft in the United States. The recommendations of the last report indicated several clear actions which Western European governments could take immediately to establish Western Europe as a single unified air transport market. One would have expected initiatives to be taken promptly by our governments to offset the effects of inflation by the simple legislative actions which are required to do so. The passenger who also happens to be the voter has not yet, luckily, appreciated what is being done to him !

14. Europe's civil air transport manufacturing capability is still suffering and regrettably will continue to suffer from the slowing down in demand for air transport¹. There are clear indications however that recovery in this demand is appearing on a wide scale throughout the world and it could well be that aircraft such as the European Airbus will prove, fortuitously, to be ideal vehicles for the changed pattern of demand.

15. This year Europe looks forward to the introduction of Concorde into passenger service. Objections from the other side of the Atlantic now seem to be based more on nationalistic than realistic grounds. It is worth reflecting that the total cost of getting this magnificent aircraft into service will be equivalent to that which the Americans spent on producing a wooden mock-up of their proposed SST before it was cancelled.

16. European engineers have proved that they can meet the most stringent tasks set for them. As politicians we still have to match their determination and their vision.

1. See Appendix II.

PART II

Civil aviation

(submitted by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur)

(a) *Airlines*

17. In its twentieth annual report¹ the Council indicated that it had noted questions raised by the Assembly concerning European co-operation in the field of civil aircraft: the development of a European network, the balanced development of air and other forms of transport, the harmonisation of airworthiness standards and the standardisation of equipment. Broadly speaking, the Council shared the Assembly's preoccupations: it stressed the importance of the contribution made by the European Civil Aviation Conference to co-operation on European air transport questions; it underlined the need for development of inter-city transport systems; it agreed that a study of the requirements of airline companies should be made by the Association of European Airlines and praised the work of AECMA².

18. In his speech to the World Affairs Council of San Francisco on 11th November 1974, the President of IATA, Mr. Knut Hagrup, who is also President of SAS, stated that the airlines today are in trouble. A series of difficulties have arisen, one of which he called the airlines' "revolution of rising expectations". In the first two decades after the second world war demand was so great that more and more services were established. Some governments were tempted to consider that if one airline on a route was a good thing, two, four or five were even more desirable. Prices were cut and where reductions were not considered sufficient charter carriers moved in. The downhill road went so far that a large percentage of passengers was literally travelling below cost on both scheduled airlines and charters.

"For example, on the North Atlantic, the world's heaviest and most competitive route, the average yield per economy class passenger dropped inexorably from 3.6 cents per passenger kilometre in 1963 to 2.55 cents in 1970. More than twenty scheduled airlines on the route between them eked out an

operating profit of only \$145 million all told for the three years of 1968 through 1970. And since then, our cumulative losses on the route have been almost four times as great, or \$550 millions — \$300 million of it in this year alone.

While the established profitability standard for the airlines is 12 %, the industry as a whole fell short of 5 % in 1968 and 1969. It slid down to 2 % in 1970 and went to minus 1.1 % in 1971. It had clawed its way back up to 2.3 % last year when the fuel crisis hit. This year, the world-wide operating loss is forecast to be 3.2 % — the worst in history.

We were not helped by the fact that in the days when the going was good, many airlines felt that the best answer to rising operating costs and threatened saturation of airports was a very sizeable quantum jump in individual aircraft capacity. The jumbo airplane was a seductive one, to the passenger because of its wide-bodied comfort, and to the airline, because its seat-mile and ton-mile costs, with a proper cabin factor, were very good indeed. We knew that it would take some time for demand to catch up with this new out-pouring of supply, but with the market for travel still yeasting under us the risk seemed entirely acceptable.

What we could not foresee, of course, was the recession of 1971 and the creeping inflation which accompanied it. We were not alone in this, for governments and economists were equally unprepared for this unusual combination. Anyway, the quantum jump was too great for most of us and we ended up flying more empty seats than filled ones a good deal of the year.

During 1972 and 1973, many companies exerted vigorous effort to rationalise administration, reduce overheads and cut costs. As I have indicated, the industry managed to crawl back into the black and our world-wide situation was improving somewhat when the energy crisis hit us — and the world turned upside down.

1. Document 661, pages 21 and 22.

2. See Recommendation 244 and the Council's reply at Appendix III.

Our great expansion had been based in large part on an almost unlimited supply of energy at a moderate cost. Within a very short time, however, jet fuel soared from 13 cents a gallon to an average of 42 cents, with prices as high as 66 and 88 cents a gallon at some points. And there they have stayed, to constitute more than a quarter of our total operating cost, as against 12 % a year ago.

The impact of the energy crisis on the rest of the economy triggered off a further sharp inflation, and we now find that personnel costs, pushed upward by escalating consumer prices, come to as much as 40 % of our operating cost. We have managed to get some fare increases to compensate for these escalated costs, but they have been leapfrogging ahead of us and, at this moment, we estimate that we are between \$700 and \$800 million behind, on a cumulative basis, on fuel alone. Of course, each time we increase fares we are cutting out a bit of the market, which is being further diminished by rising ground costs and diminishing disposable consumer incomes. To top it all off, the supply of credit has been falling off and its price increasing, so that many of us are having severe liquidity problems.

.....

... While we must obviously slow down the buying of new airplanes to expand capacity for the next couple of years, we are still replacing less economical types with aircraft which will be more efficient, more economical and more compatible with today's concerns for the environment.

Moreover, the fuel crisis itself has provided a new challenge which is full of promise for the manufacturer. By changing the economic parameters of air transport, it has opened up whole new vistas of design specification and opportunity.

I feel certain as well that as the rest of the economy adjusts, as it must, to the new parameters of cost, the markets which support us will regain their momentum. The forecasts by market experts tell us that combined IATA passenger traffic will be up about 40 % by 1980. It seems high, but I hope they are right."

19. The Association of European Airlines to which nineteen European airlines belong is of

the same opinion. For two decades the European airline carriers had an average annual traffic growth of 14.4 % on intra-European services. At the same time air fares remained basically stable, despite general inflation. In the AEA document on the general development of air transport in Europe, the Association accounted for roughly 20 % of world scheduled passenger kilometres between 1963 and 1972.

20. It became clear everywhere that new forms of collaboration were essential if European companies wished to stop running at a loss.

21. At the beginning of April 1975 the Benelux Ministers of Transport agreed that the possibility of a common aviation policy should be studied. The main aim of this study will be to strengthen the position of the national airlines: KLM, Sabena and Luxair. The three governments wish to terminate the companies' losses as soon as possible, improve the exploitation of the three national airlines, avoid unnecessary harmful competition, reach a higher productivity and start co-ordination and rationalisation of the activities of the three companies.

22. The Ministers wish the market position of the three companies to be strengthened in the air transport and financial fields, and to co-ordinate procurement. Landing rights, old as well as new, will also come within the framework of the study and it is hoped that a better social climate will be established between the three companies.

23. The Commission in Brussels will help the three countries as well as the three airlines in trying to find solutions to their difficulties and financial losses.

24. The fact that KLM belongs to KSSU and Sabena to ATLAS will not make it easy for these two companies to find a solution to their problems as KSSU was specially established for the supply and maintenance of the DC-10 and ATLAS for the Boeing 747.

25. Your Rapporteur is aware that there is a great difference between the abovementioned companies and companies like British Airways, Air France, Lufthansa and Alitalia. The latter can manage fairly well with passengers from their own countries, whereas the former also depend on foreign — i.e. American — custom, and sometimes for a large percentage.

26. Since 1954 it has proved too difficult to organise anything like an "Air Union". The national carriers are considered national repre-

sentatives and governments and parliaments would be extremely reluctant to forego this symbol of sovereignty. They all want to defend their own flag, with taxpayers' money if necessary. This being the case, your Rapporteur still thinks that a distinction should be drawn between European Community countries and other European or American countries as far as airline collaboration is concerned. The Common Market should extend to the airlines, the more so as they influence the general economy. Your Rapporteur will therefore follow the Benelux experiment with great interest.

(b) *Community action*

27. On 4th March 1975 the Ministerial Council of the European Communities adopted a resolution on the industrial policy with regard to aircraft construction. This resolution provides for the various governments to consult each other on new programmes if civil aircraft fleets in Europe are to be renewed. In addition, member States have indicated that they are in favour of a structural alignment for aircraft firms in the various Community countries. The Commission is preparing a report on the situation in the European aviation industry and will be forwarding it to the Council of Ministers before 1st October 1975. This will make it possible to pinpoint precisely the measures which are needed to develop an industry which is at present passing through a world-wide crisis¹.

28. On the other hand Article 84, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Rome still limits the Community's activities in the air transport field. It is not likely that the Council of Ministers will take a unanimous decision in order to extend the articles of the treaty to cover maritime and air transport.

29. One day the governments of the Community will have to decide whether they wish to maintain a modern aeronautical industry capable of developing the most advanced civil and military aircraft. Full economic and industrial capacity cannot be used if the most important enterprises are becoming subcontractors to the American aircraft industry in an atmosphere of every man for himself.

(c) *The American attitude*

30. Well known are the difficulties now facing American international airlines and especially

Pan Am. In order to remain in operation Pan Am made a financial agreement with Iran and was forced to make a route exchange agreement with TWA, the latter having been approved by the United States Government. It is also proposing a similar agreement with American Airlines regarding its Caribbean and Pacific lines.

31. On the other hand, several authorities are expressing the idea that the United States Civil Aeronautics Board should stop protecting an inefficient industry which is overcharging the travelling public. They consider the present American air regulatory structure to be outdated, inefficient, uneconomical and irrational and it appears that the new Administration led by President Ford might be willing to listen to these arguments. They hope that if freedom of entry is accepted the public will be offered improved service and reduced fares. There is no doubt that competition would force many companies to relinquish some of their regular lines, but it is equally doubtful whether present-day markets can be maintained.

32. Aircraft companies such as McDonnell-Douglas, now in the process of defining market needs between 1980 and 1994, are proposing to build planes with capacities ranging from 30 to 70 passengers.

33. A market study carried out by NASA also concluded that a new aircraft with a passenger capacity of between 30 and 120 was required. The NASA study was also prompted by the fact that in Europe the VFW-Fokker 614, Hawker Siddeley HS.146 and Dassault Falcon 30 seemed good aircraft for medium-density air transportation. Such a plan might also meet a military requirement, in which case a common military/civil design could be worked out.

34. Instead of an annual passenger growth rate of nearly 15 %, NASA estimated the growth rate to be 6 % for the period 1974-80, 5 % for the period 1980-88 and 4 % for the period 1988-94.

35. On the other hand a reduction in the number of seats on existing aircraft is also being considered, for instance the Jumbo-Jet 747. The space gained would be used for freight or for extra equipment and fuel and would enable the 747 to cover longer distances than in its original configuration.

1. See Appendix IV.

(d) Eurocontrol

36. During the colloquy held on 17th and 18th September 1973, the Director-General of Eurocontrol, Mr. R. Bulin, discussed the organisation and its goals. He expressed the hope that an air traffic control organisation covering the whole of the upper and lower European air space would be established. If this were the case, savings in terms of effort and cost could be made.

37. Since then, however, the authorities in several member countries have been considering reverting more to national systems. Instead of gradually transferring air traffic control to Eurocontrol in Brussels, they are tending to deal with it on a national basis. The Netherlands has developed a new radar system called SARP and wants to resume control of its air space, with the exception of overflying aircraft; Germany is considering taking over the Eurocontrol centre in Karlsruhe when this becomes operational; France also wishes to keep control over nearly all its air space for military reasons, and the British Government is opposing the joint purchase of European control and navigation equipment.

38. Your Rapporteur hopes that this tendency will not be allowed to grow as it would seriously affect the Europeanisation of aviation.

39. In 1983 the Eurocontrol convention will have to be reconsidered and the member countries might well take this opportunity either to strengthen or to weaken the organisation. It is therefore important for this issue to be discussed in time.

Conclusions

40. In Recommendation 257 on the state of European aviation activities¹ certain measures were suggested for improving the European situation in aviation matters such as the aviation industry, the relationship with the United States and the export of aviation products, but the Council was unable to give a documented reply.

41. The situation is still serious. In 1974 only two of the fifty-one aircraft sold in the civil European market were of European origin². The very existence of the industry would have been

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1974, see Appendix I.

2. See Appendix II.

in jeopardy had military production not been considerable. Military production may well have to be cut back since Europe has been unable to produce the aircraft of which some 350 are needed for its own defence and this will certainly influence foreign military buyers.

42. How often must it be said that Europe needs a European agency for armaments procurement? If one is not set up, deterioration within the industry might lead to increased competition between European firms and consequently nullify all efforts made in the organisation of the civil aircraft market.

43. The present situation is that governments are urging aircraft industries to collaborate in the civil sector and compete in the military sector with the result that production runs are too short and Europe is in a weak position vis-à-vis its American competitors.

44. The three main European companies — Air France, Lufthansa and British Airways — have agreed to consider the types of aircraft they would need within five to ten years.

45. When a common procurement policy is discussed, it is important to discuss a common aviation policy at the same time. The six major industrial European aircraft industries which are also discussing future procurement policy should meet the airlines in order to agree on a common programme.

46. There is no doubt that European industry cannot compete with Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas if no permanent European industrial groupings have been established.

47. As indicated in the report, the American Government has asked NASA to make studies of a small commercial aircraft. This could be a serious competitor to existing small European aircraft, especially if the military as well as airlines and other civilian users order the NASA-developed aircraft.

48. It has often been stated that a European aircraft industry cannot be established without a European Government. Nevertheless, an organisation could be established if the European decision-making machinery began to function. The real problem is that neither in the Communities nor in any other European framework is decision-making efficient.

49. Your Rapporteur wishes to point out that the construction of the Airbus was an important

step in the right direction and the European Civil Aviation Conference is gaining in importance which shows that there are still possibilities if the political will is present. A difficulty of course remains that the civil and military aspects of the aircraft industry are inextricably linked but governments fail to afford the industry full encouragement by not agreeing on joint procurement in the absence of a common defence policy.

50. In the European Space Agency machinery has now been set up which, although slow, may prove itself able to take decisions. Why should it

not be possible to establish a European aviation agency or a European agency for armaments procurement? Such agencies could assist the European aeronautical industry to achieve unity.

51. The deterioration of the European political situation can be clearly deduced from the process which is weakening Eurocontrol. Here is a technical agency which can control European air space more efficiently and at less cost but its position is nevertheless being weakened and national agencies wish to take over the work which this organisation is doing so well.

APPENDIX I

RECOMMENDATION 257¹***on the state of European aviation activities²***

The Assembly,

Concerned about the consequences of the oil crisis for the European civil air transport market and hence for the aviation industry ;

Aware of the part played by air transport in Europe's prosperity and the development of its advanced technology ;

Considering the interdependence of military and civil markets,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite the member countries to :

1. Agree on joint specifications for all military aviation procurement ;
2. Take particular account in the formulation of these specifications of the aircraft, engine and equipment capability of European aviation companies ;
3. Ensure that export market requirements are incorporated in the specifications ;
4. Give preference, wherever reasonable and possible, to the products of European aviation factories so that a self-sustaining design and manufacturing capability able to compete in world markets can be retained in Europe ;
5. Agree with the United States Government on equality of opportunity for the export and import of civil and military aerospace products between member countries and the United States and, until such agreement is reached, establish such commercial protection of the European market as is necessary to protect the jobs of European aerospace workers and the balance of payments of member countries ;
6. Recognise and establish Western Europe as a unified, single market for air transport operations and aircraft sales ;
7. Establish a strong and co-ordinated government- and EEC-backed programme of commercial, financial and diplomatic support for all aviation export sales.

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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL³***to Recommendation 257***

The Council refer to their earlier replies to Recommendation 244 on an aviation policy for Europe, and to Written Question 151.

The views expressed in Recommendation 257 have been brought to the notice of member governments. The Council can assure the Assembly that all aspects of the important problem about which it is concerned continue to receive their fullest attention.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1974 during the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session (10th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Warren on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 658).

3. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1975.

APPENDIX II

***New European and American equipment
purchased by European airlines¹******(Orders placed between 1st January 1959 and 31st December 1974)***

The following tables show year by year the type of equipment and numbers of new commercial aircraft ordered from manufacturers by European airlines or leasing firms acting on behalf of the airlines with a breakdown by European country or group of countries.

To determine the value of the respective shares of the market held by European and United States manufacturers, the scale of average unit prices without replacements calculated for each year in the light of the various versions ordered has been applied. The figures obtained, which have been cross-checked with American aircraft export statistics per country and year, do not give an exact picture of order books, but nevertheless allow a reasonably accurate comparison to be made.

Graph I illustrates the comparative trend of total and American orders expressed in current dollars and graph II gives the percentage trend of European and United States shares in the European market.

For 1974, the European manufacturers' share fell to less than 1% if account is taken of the value of new equipment ordered by regular and occasional European carriers.

It should be noted that sales of new aircraft to regional airlines have not been included in these calculations, since although they have increased recently (Corvette) they are still very slight in absolute value. In general, these carriers have so far used only second-hand equipment.

Notes on the tables

1. Since Luxembourg ordered no new equipment, Benelux means here only Belgium and the Netherlands
2. When an order is reduced or cancelled subsequently, this is taken into account in the column for the year corresponding to the signing of the initial contract.

1. Source : Aérospatiale, Suresnes, 7th January 1975.

Table I

Recapitulation of orders by type of aircraft

	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	Total 1959-74
<i>European aircraft</i>																	
Caravelle	9	23	22	18	5	12	10	20	7	10	18	4	5	—	—	—	163
Nord 262	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	2	6	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	14
A300-B	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	3	1	—	10
Mercure	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	—	—	10
Concorde	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	—	9
F-27	—	2	2	2	5	2	5	7	37	4	2	5	2	—	—	—	75
F-28	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	3	6	3	8	—	—	—	27
Comet 4	3	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12
Herald	—	9	—	—	4	4	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	18
AW-650	—	3	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8
Trident	24	—	—	—	—	—	15	—	5	26	—	—	—	—	—	—	70
HS-748	5	—	—	—	—	—	4	2	—	1	1	1	1	—	2	2	19
Super VC-10	—	17	2	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	21
Viscount	—	6	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7
BAC-111	—	—	10	—	4	1	8	4	24	23	6	3	2	—	—	—	85
Total	41	69	36	21	22	24	44	36	86	67	34	17	24	22	3	2	548
<i>American aircraft</i>																	
B-707	3	13	6	5	1	19	4	9	6	7	6	1	—	—	3	—	83
B-727	—	—	12	—	—	1	8	22	6	7	8	6	14	24	13	10	131
B-737	—	—	—	—	—	—	25	3	7	13	3	—	2	2	14	11	80
B-747	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	17	13	8	9	6	4	4	5	7	73
DC-8	9	2	4	6	5	6	18	20	6	3	7	1	1	—	—	—	88
DC-9	—	—	—	—	—	10	48	48	22	24	12	10	20	3	42	11	250
DC-10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	14	2	16	8	4	58
L-1011	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	7	3	6	18
CV-990	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8
TOTAL	20	15	22	11	6	36	103	119	60	62	59	38	45	56	88	49	789
GRAND TOTAL	61	84	58	32	28	60	147	155	146	129	93	55	69	78	91	51	1 337

Table II

European aircraft : Breakdown of orders by European country

	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	Total
<i>Caravelle</i>																	
France	—	11	7	—	—	2	3	7	4	2	2	1	5	—	—	—	44
FRG	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	5
Italy	4	4	6	2	2	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	19
Benelux	4	2	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	13
Switzerland	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	5
Spain /Portugal	—	4	2	5	—	2	1	8	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	27
Austria	—	—	—	2	1	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5
Scandinavia	1	1	1	—	2	5	1	2	2	4	7	3	—	—	—	—	29
Finland	—	1	—	6	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9
Yugoslavia	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	1	1	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	7
Total Caravelle	9	23	22	18	5	12	10	20	7	10	18	4	5	—	—	—	163
<i>N-262</i>																	
France	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6
FRG	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
Italy	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
Scandinavia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	4
Total N.262	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	2	6	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	14
<i>A300-B</i>																	
France	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	6
FRG	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	3
Benelux	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
Total A300-B	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	3	1	—	10
<i>Mercure</i>																	
France	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	—	—	10

<i>Concorde</i>																	
France	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	4
Britain	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	5
Total Concorde	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	—	9
<i>Fokker F-27</i>																	
France	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	24	—	2	3	—	—	—	—	—	29
FRG	—	1	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
Italy	—	—	—	—	3	—	3	3	3	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	15
Benelux	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	2	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	4
Switzerland	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4
Spain/Portugal	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8
Scandinavia	—	1	1	1	1	—	1	—	—	1	—	2	1	—	—	—	9
Iceland	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
Total F-27	—	2	2	2	5	2	5	7	37	4	2	5	2	—	—	—	75
<i>Fokker F-28</i>																	
FRG	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	1	3	2	5	—	—	—	13
Italy	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	1	—	—	—	—	3
Spain	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3
Scandinavia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	8
Total F-28	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	3	6	3	8	—	—	—	27
<i>Comet 4</i>																	
Britain	1	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8
Greece	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4
Total Comet 4	3	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12
<i>Herald</i>																	
FRG	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
Britain	—	7	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9
Italy	—	2	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
Switzerland	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4
Total Herald	—	9	—	—	4	4	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	18

Table II

European aircraft : Breakdown of orders by European country (continued)

	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	Total
<i>HS Trident</i>																	
Britain	24	—	—	—	—	—	15	—	5	26	—	—	—	—	—	—	70
<i>HS-748</i>																	
France	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	3
FRG	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
Britain	5	—	—	—	—	—	4	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	13
Portugal	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	2
Total HS-748	5	—	—	—	—	—	4	2	—	1	1	1	—	1	2	2	19
<i>BAC VC-10</i>																	
Britain	—	17	2	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	21
<i>Viscount</i>																	
FRG	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Austria	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6
	—	6	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7
<i>BAC-111</i>																	
FRG	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	2	3	2	—	—	—	9
Britain /Ireland	—	—	10	—	4	—	8	4	24	16	4	—	—	—	—	—	70
Romania	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	6
Total BAC-111	—	—	10	—	4	1	8	4	24	23	6	3	2	—	—	—	85

Table III

American aircraft : Breakdown of orders by European country

	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	Total
<i>B-707 /720</i>																	
France	—	3	4	2	—	2	—	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15
FRG	—	8	2	—	—	10	1	3	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	25
Britain /Ireland	3	—	—	3	1	4	1	4	—	2	4	—	—	—	—	—	22
Benelux	—	2	—	—	—	1	2	—	1	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	9
Portugal	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	1	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	5
Greece	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	4
Romania	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	3
Total B-707 /720	3	13	6	5	1	19	4	9	6	7	6	1	—	—	3	—	83
<i>B-727</i>																	
France	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	5	1	6	4	—	—	—	—	20
FRG	—	—	12	—	—	1	8	6	—	—	2	2	1	5	11	—	48
Benelux	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5
Spain /Portugal	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	13	16	—	4	39
Scandinavia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	5
Greece	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	6
Yugoslavia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	6	8
Total B-727	—	—	12	—	—	1	8	22	6	7	8	6	14	24	13	10	131
<i>B-737</i>																	
FRG	—	—	—	—	—	—	21	—	3	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	30
Britain	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	3	1	7	3	—	—	2	3	4	25
Benelux	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	7	18
Scandinavia	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	3	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	7
Total B-737	—	—	—	—	—	—	25	3	7	13	3	—	2	2	14	11	80


Table III

American aircraft: Breakdown of orders by European country (continued)


	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	Total
<i>B-747</i>																	
France	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	4	—	3	3	1	1	16
FRG	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	2	2	1	—	—	—	8
Britain/Ireland	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	2	6	—	—	—	1	2	2	19
Italy	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	5
Benelux	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	2	3	1	—	—	—	2	11
Switzerland	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
Spain/Portugal	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	2	—	—	1	2	8
Scandinavia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
Greece	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	2
Total B-747	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	17	13	8	9	6	4	4	5	7	73
<i>DC-8</i>																	
France	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	3	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	7
FRG	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	3
Italy	2	2	2	3	—	2	4	2	2	—	2	1	—	—	—	—	22
Benelux	4	—	1	—	3	—	3	3	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	15
Switzerland	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	4	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8
Spain	3	—	—	3	—	—	1	4	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	14
Scandinavia	—	—	—	—	2	4	6	2	2	1	1	—	1	—	—	—	19
Total DC-8	9	2	4	6	5	6	18	20	6	3	7	1	1	—	—	—	88
<i>DC-9</i>																	
FRG	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	4
Italy	—	—	—	—	—	—	28	—	12	3	6	—	—	—	—	3	52
Benelux	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	11	5	1	3	—	—	—	—	—	26
Switzerland	—	—	—	—	—	10	2	3	3	6	2	—	—	—	10	—	36
Spain	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	12	—	—	—	—	11	—	8	2	45
Austria	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	2	—	11

Scandinavia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	20	2	14	—	—	—	—	16	—	52
Finland	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	6
Yugoslavia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	—	3	6	—	18
Total DC-9	—	—	—	—	—	10	48	48	22	24	12	10	20	3	42	11	250
<i>DC-10</i>																	
France	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	—	1	—	1	6
FRG	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	5	—	—	9
Britain	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	3
Italy	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	4	—	8
Benelux	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	2	—	1	—	3	12
Switzerland	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	1	1	—	8
Spain	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	2	—	5
Scandinavia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	3	—	—	5
Finland	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	2
Total DC-10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	14	2	16	8	4	58
<i>L-1011</i>																	
FRG	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
Britain	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	6	3	6	17
Total L-1011	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	7	3	6	18
<i>Convair 990</i>																	
Switzerland	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8

**I. Trend of annual orders in Europe (in millions of current dollars)
Proportion of American aircraft and total amount of orders**



II. Trend of the percentage breakdown of sales of European and American aircraft to European airlines



APPENDIX III

RECOMMENDATION 244 ¹

*on guidelines for an aviation policy for Europe
drawn from the colloquy on 17th and 18th September 1973* ²

The Assembly,

Believing, in agreement with the governments of several member countries, that early political decisions should be taken setting out essential guidelines for ensuring the future of the aeronautical industry in Europe ;

Considering that Europe's strength and prosperity can be preserved and increased only if it masters advanced technology, particularly in the aeronautical field, and at the same time ensures the best conditions of employment for highly-qualified manpower at all levels ;

Considering that, notwithstanding the rapid rate of growth of its economy over the past twenty-five years, Europe has not achieved the full technological potential of its population ;

Considering that in the civil European market the number of passengers is expected to increase sharply during the years to come ;

Considering also the size of the European military market which, in the period 1968-80, can be estimated as representing some \$35.4 billion including more than 2,000 aircraft

Aware of the interdependence of the civil and military markets ;

Aware also of the need for harmonisation and standardisation in the technological field,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite the member governments :

1. To agree that civil programmes will be the subject of prior concertation between the member governments and that State assistance should be granted only to projects meeting the interests of the aeronautical industry in Europe as a whole ;
2. (a) To speed up decision-making processes by establishing close and continuing collaboration between all European governmental air transport agencies and thereby also contributing to the formulation of coherent decisions ; and
(b) To have, as a goal, the creation of a European Aviation Agency ;
3. To agree, as a long-term project, to reshape the existing European air network and improve its efficiency by inviting the European Civil Aviation Conference and the Association of European Airlines to afford their assistance ;
4. (a) To conclude new aviation agreements with a view to encouraging the development of regional or provincial inter-city links which in itself is an essential element of European regional policy ;
(b) To consider financial incentives to accelerate the introduction of such links ;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd November 1973 during the Second Part of the Nineteenth Ordinary Session (13th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 618).

5. To instruct their Ministers of Aviation and of Transport to review with the airlines and aircraft companies on the one hand, and the railways and transport organisations on the other hand, the correct balance between civil aviation and land and sea transport, bearing in mind the energy crisis in the short term, and the rising cost of energy in the middle and long term and the need to provide transport systems which are economical and attractive to mass markets ;
6. To take the necessary action to define aircraft and other aeronautical equipment requirements in the light of the prospects of developing the abovementioned intra-European networks and extra-European international lines, in liaison, *inter alia*, with European airlines or any groups they have formed ;
7. (a) To speed up current work by national bodies responsible for airworthiness — in close co-operation with the appropriate committee of the European Association of Aerospace Equipment Manufacturers — with a view to eliminating differences concerning rules relating to airworthiness certificates ;
(b) To instruct these bodies to prepare the creation of a European agency specialised in certification of airworthiness ;
8. To ask national and European standardisation committees to speed up work on the standardisation of aeronautical equipment in close co-operation with the standardisation Committee of the European Association of Aerospace Equipment Manufacturers ;
9. To endeavour to draw up a European policy for the procurement of military aircraft with a view to reducing costs and, to this end, to ask the Standing Armaments Committee for assistance ;
10. To define a common policy for the expansion of the aeronautical industry enabling it to compete equitably through the adoption of appropriate measures of compensation producing parity in world competition, it being understood that the purpose of such a policy is not to be antagonistic but to safeguard the European aeronautical industry ;
11. To encourage collaboration between the Community and the European Civil Aviation Conference.

**
*

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 244

The Council agree that a major contribution to the future prosperity of Europe lies in the development of her advanced technology and exploitation of this capability on a greater scale than that achieved in the past. The importance of the aeronautical industry has long been recognised by Ministers and in the past year, the countries of Europe, both at industry and government level, have been engaged in wide-ranging discussions on the industry's future. Much of this effort has taken place within the framework of the European Economic Community. Although the efforts in the Community have been concentrated on the civil side of the industry, the importance of the military sector has been recognised in the context of an overall aeronautical industry policy.

1. Paragraph 2 of the Council's reply to Recommendation 231 referred to a communication from the Commission of the European Communities on the European airframe industry. This proposal for Community policy on industrial and technological development in the aeronautical sector has been examined in detail since that reply. The first of the implementing texts of the policy proposals provides for a mutual exchange of information between member States to allow aircraft industry policy to be co-ordinated, with particular reference to civil aircraft programmes and the structure of the industry, and recognises the principle of concertation of policies of the member States.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th May 1974.

Groups of experts have discussed the different facets of government assistance for civil projects with the aim of reaching agreement on the harmonisation of existing methods of support. The Council consider that government support should be channelled towards those projects which would strengthen the competitive position of European industry. Such projects should by definition therefore be researched thoroughly from the market point of view, and be economically viable affording good prospects of a reasonable rate of return to the governments on their investments.

2. (a) The European Civil Aviation Conference provides a forum in which national air transport agencies already collaborate on a wide range of air transport questions. The organisation operates with a considerable degree of flexibility and in recent years, significant progress has been made in achieving a common approach, while taking into account the differing circumstances of the air transport industries of member countries.

(b) The Council appreciate that there are some functions currently exercised by governments and their agencies which in the long term (assuming a commonality of policy objectives) might usefully be put in the control of a single agency. There would, however, be considerable difficulty in setting up an organisation which would carry out any substantial part of existing governmental functions, other than within a completely integrated European legal framework. Amongst the functions which do lend themselves to closer integration are the regulation of air safety and air traffic control. The Eurocontrol Organisation already exercises responsibilities in these areas and the Council, while not ruling out the eventual integration of other functions in a separate organisation, recognise the importance of building on the foundations provided by Eurocontrol in its own sphere of activity.

3. The present European air network has grown over the years within a system of bilateral arrangements between governments. Within this system, airlines have been free to arrange their services in accordance with their judgment of potential traffic opportunities. It is however in no way a rigid framework, and large numbers of services are operated by mutual agreement on routes which are not covered by any formal agreement. The replacement of point-to-point operations by multisector services, while possibly attractive on fuel and resource grounds, would inevitably involve longer journey times and the greater risk of delays and inconvenience to passengers on longer routes.

4. (a) A feature of recent years has been the growth of international operations serving provincial points, a trend which has reflected the increasing number of commercial contacts throughout the Community. The Council welcome this development in furthering European economic co-operation particularly where such services are firmly based on the needs of the market.

(b) While a number of States at present give subsidies to domestic air services to outlying regions which are particularly dependent on air transport, it is not usual for financial incentives to be given by governments in respect of international services between provincial points. Such action might well be discriminatory and thus contrary to the country's international obligations. While the significance of the economic infrastructure, including transport, in the context of regional development is recognised, any specific link between the provision of air services and regional development has yet to be established. The possible contribution of such a policy towards European regional development would therefore require further examination.

5. In 1971 a meeting of nine European Ministers of Transport, including those from most WEU countries, endorsed a proposal that an OECD study of the future development of inter-city transport systems within Europe should be carried out in liaison with the EEC and the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT). This project, known as COST (*Co-opération européenne dans le domaine de la recherche scientifique et technique*) project 33, has been in progress since 1971 under terms of reference which are very similar to those suggested in the recommendation. The governments concerned, together with many transport firms and organisations, are providing a great deal of information for use in the project, which should be completed in 1976. The Council are convinced of the value of COST 33 and believe it necessary to await its findings before instituting further studies. In this way the experience gained and the conclusions reached will be of value in future work.

6. The Association of European Airlines (AEA) is to undertake a study this year of airline requirements. The Council consider that this organisation with its wide European membership is the most appropriate body to undertake such a study. When requirements are known it is for the aircraft industry in consultation with the users to formulate precise project proposals. The Council recognise the importance of developing aeronautical equipment on an international basis and note the effective work carried out by EUROCAE (European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment) in its area of responsibility, in collaboration with its United States counterpart.

7. (a) Member countries recognise the great importance of eliminating differences in national rules relating to airworthiness. The Council note the considerable work programme under the auspices of the Joint Airworthiness Requirements Committee of the manufacturing countries and that progress is thought to be satisfactory.

(b) The Council approve the principle of a European Agency specialising in certification and airworthiness, and believe that as soon as the national bodies can report that they have reached a degree of commonality which would enable a central agency to be set up with the prospect of operating successfully, the necessary action should be taken by governments. The immediate creation of an agency, before agreement that this stage has been reached, might slow up current negotiations, and the Council therefore accept this as a medium-term goal.

8. The Council recognise the great benefit to the aircraft manufacturing industry resulting from the work undertaken by the Standardisation Committee of AECMA (*Association Européenne des Constructeurs de Matériel Aérospatial*) and therefore welcome the agreement reached between AECMA and the *Comité Européen de Normalisation* (CEN) which will rationalise the formulation of European aerospace standards. The Council agree with the Assembly that this work should be expanded where possible.

9. The Council accept that, because of the escalating costs of research, development and production and the continuing and increasing pressure on national defence budgets, it will be both desirable and necessary for there to be an even greater degree of collaboration in the military aircraft field than hitherto; and the Council therefore see the eventual formulation of a European military aircraft procurement policy as a desirable goal. Substantial work is already being done to further European co-operation in defence equipment procurement.

The Ministers of the member countries of Eurogroup announced, after their meeting on 6th December 1973, that they had directed that special effort be made by their national armaments directors to identify project areas offering the greatest prospects for collaboration so that Ministers could give appropriate and early instructions; the project areas to be examined include military aircraft.

The question of an approach to the Standing Armaments Committee in this field is related to the current study of proposals for reactivating this body. In this connection, the Council organised a meeting of deputy national armaments directors, held on 29th and 30th January 1974, to review, as a first step, the current collaborative arrangements between European allies and to submit to the Council their conclusions and recommendations on fields of activity and projects of European interest which could be given to the Standing Armaments Committee on the understanding that there should be no duplication of the work of other collaborative fora. The terms of reference stated that, on the basis of this report, the Council would give the national armaments directors the necessary directives for continuing this work. The Permanent Council devoted several meetings to studying the report of the deputy national armaments directors. Having reached no joint conclusion, they submitted a summary of their discussions to the meeting of the Ministerial Council on 11th March 1974. The Ministerial Council had an exchange of views about the question; no unanimous agreement was reached on any concrete proposal and the Ministers were therefore only able to request the Permanent Council to continue their study on the basis of the various proposals which had been made. The question is therefore still before the Permanent Council.

The Council consider that these collaborative fora, together with the numerous bilateral and trilateral arrangements which exist, provide ample means of identifying further collaborative projects and see the existence of these bodies as a step on the road towards a European system of defence equipment procurement consistent with the aim of European construction.

10. The Council accept the aim of a European aeronautical industry which is economically viable and competitive on world markets and believe that any policy of support for the industry should be considered against these objectives. The Council consider that the size of the industry must be matched to the markets it is able to secure.

11. The Council recognise both the importance of the contribution which the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) makes to co-operation on European air transport questions and the fact that the EEC will have an increasingly important rôle in the wider transport field. At present, however, Community action in the field of air transport is limited by Article 84 (2) of the Treaty of Rome. Under this article the extension of the treaty's transport provisions to sea and air transport needs a unanimous decision of the EEC Council of Ministers. Scope for collaboration between ECAC and the Community will necessarily be limited until such a decision is taken. Meanwhile the Council hope that co-operation between European countries on air transport questions, both in and outside the EEC, will continue under the auspices of such organisations as ECAC and its airline counterpart, the Association of European Airlines (AÉA).

APPENDIX IV

*The European aircraft industry*¹

Despite the fact that the number of aircraft in service and on order throughout the world continues to increase, the European aircraft industry's share of the market in civil aircraft is declining steadily. In the face of direct competition from the American aircraft industry, its share of the world market has dropped to less than 5% for long-haul and less than 10% for short- and medium-haul aircraft.

An exact picture of the situation of fleets is afforded by the number of aircraft in service and on order at a given date. The change in position between June 1973 and May 1974 is shown below.

	Number of aircraft				Value (Mio EUR)			
	1973	%	1974	%	1973	%	1974	%
Long-haul (US)	1 624	35.5	1 711	35.2	13 447.7	49.5	17 543.5	51.9
Long-haul (European)	63	1.4	66	1.3	465.6	1.6	513.7	1.5
Short- and medium-haul (US)	2 315	50.6	2 482	51.1	11 930.3	43.9	14 258.8	42.2
Short- and medium-haul (European)	572	12.5	602	12.4	1 343.6	4.9	1 466.5	4.4
	4 574	100.0	4 861	100.0	27 187.2	100.0	33 782.5	100.0

1 EUR = US \$ 1.2

The value distribution of fleets varied a great deal between 1970 and 1974: there was a 15.9% decline in the relative value of the United States fleet, a 4.7% increase in the relative value of the European fleet and an 11.2% increase in the relative value of the "rest of the world" fleet.

The world market was shared as follows in 1970 and 1974:

	Market size			Market share of aircraft from					
	1970	1974	Change	EEC			United States		
				1970	1974	Change	1970	1974	Change
EEC	14.7	17.9	+ 3.2	33.0	20.2	- 12.8	67.0	79.8	+ 12.6
Other European countries	6.3	7.8	+ 1.5	23.1	6.7	- 16.4	76.9	93.3	+ 16.4
Europe	(21.0)	(25.7)	(+ 4.7)	30.1	16.1	- 14.0	69.9	83.9	+ 14.0
United States	63.9	48.0	- 15.9	2.1	—	- 2.1	97.9	100.0	+ 2.1
Rest of the world	15.1	26.3	+ 11.2	12.2	6.3	- 5.9	87.8	93.7	+ 5.9
Total	100.0	100.0		9.5	5.9	- 3.6	90.5	94.1	+ 3.6

1. Source: Industry and Society, No. 14/75, 8th April 1975.

The opinion expressed at the end of 1973 still holds good in the spring of 1975. It was felt then that, since the situation had continued to deteriorate, the logical consequence of the endeavours of the European aircraft industry and of the governments of member States to offer a range of new civil aircraft must be to respond to the competition by exploiting the large relative importance on the world scale of the value of the European market. It is not enough to say that the size of the European market warrants the existence of a European aircraft industry ; it is necessary for the industry to take advantage of the size of the market.

This is true not only in the short term but also in the long term : with the stabilisation of European percentage demand, the increase in percentage demand by the rest of the world and the fall in United States percentage demand, the negative trade balance on new civil aircraft from the Community will tend to increase in the next decade.

For long-haul aircraft, the disproportion between the size of the European market (28.8% of the world's long-haul fleet) and the European aircraft industry's share of the world market (2.8% for long-haul aircraft) is astounding.

The following table shows the situation for long-haul aircraft :

	Market size		Market share of aircraft from			
	1973	1974	EEC		United States	
			1973	1974	1973	1974
EEC	22.0	21.3	10.1	8.8	89.9	91.2
Other European countries	8.0	7.5	—	—	100.0	100.0
Europe	(30.0)	(28.8)	7.4	6.6	92.6	93.4
United States	44.4	39.0	—	—	—	—
Rest of the world	25.6	32.2	4.3	2.9	95.7	97.1
Total	100.0	100.0	3.3	2.8	96.7	97.2

The situation is equally alarming for short- and medium-haul aircraft :

	Market size		Market share of aircraft from			
	1973	1974	EEC		United States	
			1973	1974	1973	1974
EEC	14.3	14.0	47.4	40.0	52.6	60.0
Other European countries	8.1	8.1	14.0	13.9	86.0	86.1
Europe	(22.4)	(22.1)	35.3	30.4	64.7	69.6
United States	62.1	58.4	0.1	0.1	99.9	99.9
Rest of the world	15.5	19.5	13.4	12.7	86.6	87.3
Total	100.0	100.0	10.1	9.3	89.9	90.7

The military aircraft market has hit the headlines recently. The two tables below show the position of the European fleet and the fleets of the main regions of the world on 31st December 1972 :

	European-designed aircraft		American-designed aircraft		Total (Mio EUR)
	Value (Mio EUR)	%	Value (Mio EUR)	%	
Belgium	154.9	33.6	305.8	66.4	460.7
Denmark	49.2	32.9	100.5	67.1	149.7
France	1 661.3	93.1	122.2	6.9	1 783.5
Germany	1 347.6	29.3	2 077.4	60.7	3 425.0
Ireland	1.4	100.0	—	—	1.4
Italy	690.0	63.0	405.2	37.0	1 095.2
Netherlands	87.2	23.6	282.3	76.4	369.5
United Kingdom	1 680.5	69.4	740.1	30.6	2 420.6
EEC	5 672.1	58.5	4 033.5	41.5	9 705.6

	European-designed aircraft		
	Number of aircraft	Value (Mio EUR)	% of total European aircraft
United States	26	108.3	3.7
Canada	5	4.6	0.2
Latin America	480	170.4	5.9
Europe other than EEC	2 868	1 445.6	49.8
Middle East and North Africa	979	482.8	16.6
Africa south of Sahara	322	75.9	2.6
South Africa, Rhodesia	484	351.6	12.1
Asia	822	161.4	5.6
Australia	207	83.3	2.9
Oceania	48	18.7	0.6
Total	6 211	2 902.6	100.0

The Council of Ministers, on a proposal from the European Commission, has decided that there is to be concerted action and consultation between the member States of the Community on industrial policy in the aircraft industry (see I and S No. 11/75). The launching of construction programmes by undertakings obviously depends on public funds. Member States must therefore co-ordinate their national policies to avoid unnecessary duplication, improve the choice of programmes and find the best means of ensuring their realisation.

ADDENDUM

to

PART I

State of the European aeronautical industry

(submitted by Mr. Warren, Rapporteur)

At the seventh sitting of the Assembly on Thursday, 29th May 1975, Mr. Brown and Mr. Carter proposed amending the explanatory memorandum from the end of paragraph 3 to paragraph 7 inclusive as shown below. The Rapporteur agreed to add the proposed text as an addendum to his report.

3. ... Whatever one's political beliefs, there can be no doubt that the United Kingdom's defence cuts should be considered in the light of the effect which they will have upon Western Europe.
4. The United Kingdom always has been a very substantial contributor to the defence of Western Europe. This capability has stemmed from the fact that the nation was called upon to bear more than its fair burden of defence costs. It is the belief of the present British Government that these charges are more than the nation can afford at present. Therefore it has decreed that there shall be reductions in current programmes and future research and development. [Text deleted]
5. [Text deleted]
6. [Text deleted] Your Rapporteur would be failing in his duty if he did not issue a warning that the consequences could be dangerous and that he believes Western Europe must make such arrangements as it feels necessary to ensure that there is a sufficient design and manufacturing capability for military aircraft on the mainland of Europe.
7. [Text deleted]