

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-THIRD ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1977

I

Assembly Documents

W E U

PARIS

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TWENTY-THIRD ORDINARY SESSION

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Assembly Documents

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The Proceedings of the First Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume I : Assembly Documents.

Volume II : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
BONNEL Raoul	PLP
DEQUAE André	Chr. Soc.
LEYNEN Hubert	Chr. Soc.
SCHUGENS Willy	Socialist
de STEXHE Paul	Chr. Soc.
TANGHE Francis	Chr. Soc.

Substitutes

MM. BREYNE Gustave	Socialist
de BRUYNE Hektor	Volkunie
DUVIEUSART Etienne	FDF-RW
Mrs. GODINACHE-LAMBERT Marie-Thérèse	PLP
MM. HULPIAU Raphaël	Chr. Soc.
PLASMAN Marcel	Chr. Soc.
VAN HOEYLANDT D. Bernard	Socialist

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BOUCHENY Serge	Communist
BOULLOCHE André	Socialist
BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
BURCKEL Jean-Claude	RPR
CERMOLACCE Paul	Communist
CERNEAU Marcel	Centre Union
DELORME Claude	Socialist
GRANGIER Edouard	Dem. Left
KAUFFMANN Michel	UCDP
NESSLER Edmond	RPR
PÉRIDIER Jean	Socialist
PÉRONNET Gabriel	RCDS
RADIUS René	RPR
RIVIÈRE Paul	RPR
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SCHMITT Robert	RPR (App.)
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
VITTER Pierre	Ind. Rep.

Substitutes

MM. BEAUGUITTE André	Ind. Rep.
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BIZET Émile	RPR (App.)
BOURGEOIS Georges	RPR
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DAILLET Jean-Marie	Soc. Dem. Ref.
DEPIETRI César	Communist
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
LA COMBE René	RPR

MM. du LUART Ladislas

MÉNARD Jacques

PIGNION Lucien

ROGER Émile

SOUSTELLE Jacques

VADEPIED Raoul

WEBER Pierre

RIAS

Ind. Rep.

Socialist

Communist

Non-party

UCDP

Ind. Rep. (App.)

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
AMREHN Franz	CDU/CSU
BARDENS Hans	SPD
Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM. EVERS Hans	CDU/CSU
GESSNER Manfred	SPD
HANDLOS Franz	CDU/CSU
von HASSEL Kai-Uwe	CDU/CSU
President of the Assembly	
LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU/CSU
LEMP Hans	SPD
MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
MENDE Erich	CDU/CSU
MILZ Peter	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hermann	SPD
SCHWENCKE Olaf	SPD
VOHRER Manfred	FDP

Substitutes

MM. ALBER Siegbert	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
GÖLTER Georg	CDU/CSU
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
KLEPSCH Egon	CDU/CSU
KOHL Helmut	CDU/CSU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHEFFLER Hermann	SPD
SCHMIDHUBER Peter	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
Freiherr SPIES von BULLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
MM. UEBERHORST Reinhard	SPD
ZEBISCH Franz Josef	SPD

ITALY

Representatives

MM. ARFÉ Gaetano	Socialist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BOLDRINI Arrigo	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CALAMANDREI Franco	Communist
CORALLO Salvatore	Communist
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
GONELLA Guido	Chr. Dem.
MAGGIONI Desiderio	Chr. Dem.
MINNOCCI Giacinto	Socialist
ORSINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PECORARO Antonio	Chr. Dem.
ROBERTI Giovanni	DN
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SEGRE Sergio	Communist
TREU Renato	Chr. Dem.

Substitutes

Mrs. AGNELLI Susanna	Ind. Rep.
MM. ANTONI Varese	Communist
ARIOSTO Egidio	PSDI
AVELLONE Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
BORGHI Luigi	Chr. Dem.
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DEL DUCA Antonio	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FACCIO Adele	Radical
MM. GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MARAVALLE Fabio	Socialist
Mrs. PAPA DE SANTIS Cristina	Communist
MM. PINTO Biagio	Republican
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
ROSSI Raffaele	Communist
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SGHERRI Evaristo	Communist
TREMAGLIA Pierantonio Mirko	MSI
URSO Salvatore	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. ABENS Victor	Soc. Workers
MARGUE Georges	Chr. Soc.
MART René	Dem.

Substitutes

MM. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
KONEN René	Dem.
SPAUTZ Jean	Chr. Soc.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. CORNELISSEN Pam	Pop. Cath.
DANKERT Pieter	Labour
de NIET Maarten	Labour
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
REIJNEN Johannes	Pop. Cath.
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	Anti-Revolut.
VOOGD Joop	Labour

Substitutes

MM. van KLEEF Dik	Radical
de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
van OOIJEN David	Labour
PEIJNENBURG Marinus	Pop. Cath.
PIKET Frederik	Chr. Hist.
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Paul CHANNON	Conservative
William CRAIG	Ulster Unionist
Julian CRITCHLEY	Conservative
John FARR	Conservative
Andrew FAULDS	Labour
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Arthur LEWIS	Labour
John PAGE	Conservative
Lord PEDDIE	Labour
Sir John RODGERS	Conservative
MM. John ROPER	Labour
Thomas URWIN	Labour
John WATKINSON	Labour
Philip WHITEHEAD	Labour

Substitutes

MM. Gordon BAGIER	Labour
Robert BANKS	Conservative
Alan BEITH	Liberal
Robin COOK	Labour
John CORDLE	Conservative
Jim CRAIGEN	Labour
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Eric HEFFER	Labour
Lord HUGHES	Labour
Mr. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Mrs. Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr. Kevin McNAMARA	Labour
Dr. Colin PHIPPS	Labour
Mr. George REID	Scottish Nation.
Lord SELSDON	Conservative
MM. Frank TOMNEY	Labour
Kenneth WARREN	Conservative

AGENDA
of the First Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session
Paris, 20th-23rd June 1977

I. Report of the Council

Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council
to the Assembly

II. Political Questions

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Treu on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 2. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems — the Western Mediterranean | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Mendelson on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 3. Application of the final act of the CSCE | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Segre on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |

III. Defence Questions

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 2. European security and East-West relations | <i>Report tabled by Mr. de Koster on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 3. Anti-submarine warfare | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 4. Strategic mobility | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Duviolsart on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 5. A European armaments policy | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Dankert on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |

IV. Technical and Scientific Questions

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| 1. Scientific and technological co-operation in Europe — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |
| 2. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new maritime sources of energy | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Jessel on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |
| 3. Review of advanced technology in Israel | <i>Report tabled by Mr. van Ooijen on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |

V. Budgetary and Administrative Questions

Draft Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1977	<i>Report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i>
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VI. Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

Motion for a Resolution on the designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly	<i>Report tabled by Mr. Piket on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges</i>
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VII. Relations with Parliaments

Relations with parliaments	<i>Information report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments</i>
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ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the First Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session
Paris, 20th-23rd June 1977

MONDAY, 20th JUNE

Morning 9.30 a.m.

Meeting of the General Affairs Committee.

10.30 a.m.

Meetings of the Political Groups.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Opening of the Session by the Provisional President.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
5. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the First Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session.
6. Twenty-second annual report of the Council :
presentation by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
7. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Treu on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
8. Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
9. Scientific and technological co-operation in Europe — Reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate on the annual report of the Council and the replies of the Committees.

Votes on the draft recommendations.

TUESDAY, 21st JUNE

Morning 9.30 a.m.

Meetings of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

10 a.m.

A European armaments policy :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Dankert on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 2.30 p.m.

Meeting of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

3 p.m.

1. European security and East-West relations :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Koster on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. Motion for a resolution on the designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Piket on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Debate.

Vote on the motion for a resolution.

WEDNESDAY, 22nd JUNE

Morning 9.30 a.m.

Meetings of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

10 a.m.

1. Draft opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1977 :

presentation of the report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Debate.

Vote on the draft opinion.

2. Anti-submarine warfare :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems — the Western Mediterranean :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Urwin on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

3.30 p.m.

Address by Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

THURSDAY, 23rd JUNE

Morning 9.30 a.m.

Meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

10 a.m.

Application of the final act of the CSCE :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Segre on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new maritime sources of energy :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Jessel on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. Review of advanced technology in Israel :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van Ooijen on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

3. Relations with Parliaments :
presentation of the information report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE TWENTY-THIRD ORDINARY SESSION

*Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly
of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period
1st January to 31st December 1976*

INTRODUCTION

1. The Council of Western European Union transmit to the Assembly the Twenty-Second Annual Report on their activities, covering the period 1st January to 31st December 1976.
2. The main questions considered by the Council are dealt with in the following chapters :

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IV. Standing Armaments Committee	30
V. Public Administration Committee	32
VI. Budgetary and administrative questions	34

CHAPTER I

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY

In his address to the Assembly in June 1976, the Chairman-in-Office reiterated that it was the Council's constant concern to maintain good relations with the Assembly.

A. Annual report of the Council to the Assembly

The Council noted with satisfaction that the Assembly had appreciated their early transmission of the twenty-first annual report.

This document had been drafted with the same care as in previous years. In the case of armaments control, certain further details requested by the Assembly had been provided in accordance with the procedure applied by the Council since their reply to Written Question 123 in 1971.

The Council also answered the various points raised in Assembly Recommendations 284 and 285 concerning the twenty-first annual report.

B. Assembly recommendations to the Council and written questions put to the Council by members of the Assembly

The Council gave careful consideration to the reports presented by Assembly Committees and followed with interest the subsequent debates in plenary sessions on a number of important questions concerning European security and integration.

They gave close attention to the eighteen recommendations¹ which the Assembly adopted during the second part of the twenty-first ordinary session and the first part of the twenty-second ordinary session. They gave the same close attention to the eight written questions² put by members of the Assembly during 1976.

In accordance with the undertakings given, the Council made every effort to answer all these recommendations and questions promptly.

The preparation of replies to some of these texts, which dealt with developing questions, did in fact take rather a long time because the Council wished to be in a position to report the

most recent developments to the Assembly. This applied in particular to problems primarily within the province of other organisations; the Council then waited until they had details of consultations between Western European governments in the organisations concerned, so that they could supply the information sought by the Assembly in furtherance of its work.

In all cases, the Council, assisted by national administrations, the working group and the Secretariat-General, made every effort to reply to the Assembly as fully and substantially as possible. They noted the Assembly's comments on certain replies. In this connection, they wish to recall that their replies reflect the common view of the seven member countries, in accordance with the principle of unanimity which governs their work. It is only in the most exceptional circumstances that the Council may find it necessary to indicate that members' positions differ as, for example, when those positions are a logical consequence of the differing relations which member States have with a particular outside organisation.

C. Speeches by ministers of member governments to the Assembly

The Council fully understands the Assembly's frequently expressed wish to be better informed of member governments' positions on the subjects with which it deals.

In 1976, therefore, as in previous years, several ministers attended the Assembly's plenary sessions (see Annex). They stated or explained their government's views in their speeches which covered a wide range of topics.

D. Meetings between the Council and Assembly bodies

Two informal meetings were held in Brussels on 31st May 1976, after the ministerial session of the Council. In the course of a working lunch, arranged in accordance with the agreement reached in 1968 and presided over by Mr. Van Elsandé, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, the members of the Council had discussions with the Presidential Committee. Later, at a meeting held early in the afternoon under the chairmanship of Mr. Destremau, Secretary of

1. Numbered 273 to 290.

2. Numbered 165 to 172.

State for Foreign Affairs of France, they had an exchange of views with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

As the Council reiterated in their reply to the request for a joint meeting made by the General Affairs Committee in autumn 1976, they consider that informal meetings provide an appropriate means of fulfilling the parliamentarians' desire for information because member governments' positions on the questions raised can be more freely expressed. The Council wish to repeat that they favour contacts of this nature, and are prepared to make their full contribution to them.

E. Speeches by members of the Assembly in national parliaments

The Council, who attach great importance to relations between the Assembly and national parliaments, because they help to strengthen the spirit of European solidarity, were pleased to note the opportunities taken in 1976 by members of the Assembly to put questions or to speak in their parliaments on subjects of particular interest to WEU.

ANNEX

Speeches by Ministers of member States made during the twenty-second ordinary session of the Assembly

First part (14th-17th June 1976)

Mr. Bernard Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-in-Office of the Council ;

Mr. Max van der Stoep, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands ;

Mr. Jos Chabert, Minister for Communications of Belgium ;

Mr. Hermann Schmidt, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Second part (29th November-2nd December 1976)

Mr. Pierre-Christian Taittinger, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-in-Office of the Council ;

Mr. Gaston Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg ;

Mr. Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany ;

Mr. A.E.P. Duffy, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom.

CHAPTER II

ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL

In 1976, the Council met at ministerial level in Brussels on 31st May under the chairmanship of the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Renaat Van Elslande.

In addition, the permanent representatives met fifteen times and the working group regularly as in the past.

On various occasions during the year under review, the Council re-stated to the Assembly the importance which they attach to the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols. Moreover, the determination of each of the WEU partners to fulfil the obligations entered into was reaffirmed in the speeches made by several ministers of the member governments to the Assembly.

The Council continued to pay close attention to the implementation of the treaty and its protocols. The various related problems were regular items on their agenda. Thus, the different aspects and stages of implementation of the Paris Agreements appeared on the agenda for their meetings thirty-four times.

However, as indicated in their reply to Recommendation 285, the Council are not the only international body empowered to deal with the questions covered by Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. The member States of WEU are also members of the European Community, the North Atlantic Council and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which also have authority to discuss some of these problems. The Council continued to take account of the work in hand in those organisations when arranging their own activities.

The Council kept the Assembly informed of their work relating to the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee. Developments on this matter throughout the year under review are summarised in Part B of this Chapter.

Finally, as the Council stated in the reply to Recommendation 285, they noted with interest Assembly Resolutions 55 and 59 and the report of the General Affairs Committee to the Presidential Committee, in March 1976, on European union and WEU.

A. Political questions

1. East-West relations

On 31st May 1976, in Brussels, Ministers discussed East-West relations in depth. They dealt mainly with the development of bilateral

relations between the member countries of WEU and those of the East since the previous ministerial meeting.

Statements were presented on bilateral contacts made during the period under consideration.

As in previous years, the German Delegation gave a detailed account of the latest developments in the various aspects of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the member countries of the Warsaw Pact and made particular reference to human problems.

The Ministers discussed the follow-up to the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

They reaffirmed the necessity for western countries to continue to consult together regarding their bilateral and multilateral relations with the countries of the East.

In their reply to Assembly Recommendation 276, the Council recalled that the maintenance of continuing consultations between members of WEU on all matters raised by the implementation of the final act of the CSCE was assured by the regular meetings of a working group set up for this purpose within the framework of the political co-operation of the Nine, as well as through the discussions on the subject under the aegis of the North Atlantic Council.

Sharing the Assembly's concern on certain points, the Council stated that member countries would insist on the full implementation of all the provisions of the final act of the CSCE, in particular those relating to the free movement of persons, ideas and information. They also stated that the principles set forth in the declaration on principles guiding relations between participating States were all of primary significance and that each of them would be interpreted taking into account the others; they added that there existed no intention on the part of member States of WEU to adopt any position or accept any interpretation contrary to any of the principles listed in the declaration.

The importance which the member countries of WEU and their partners in the Atlantic Alliance attach to the full implementation of the final act of Helsinki was reaffirmed in point 4 of the communiqué published after the North Atlantic Council's ministerial meeting on 9th and 10th December 1976. With regard to the third basket, the Assembly will note that "Ministers recalled that the final act acknowledges that wider human contacts and dissemination of

information would contribute to the strengthening of peace" and "expressed the hope that the Warsaw Pact countries would take measures leading to significant progress in the pace of implementation of the final act in the months to come".

In their reply to Recommendation 276 mentioned earlier, the Council reiterated their assurance that they entirely shared the Assembly's view regarding strict compliance with and full application of the quadripartite agreement on Berlin. Point 7 of the communiqué quoted above has since confirmed the position of all member governments of the Atlantic Alliance on this subject.

2. Other foreign policy questions

During 1976, the member governments of WEU played an active part in consultations in various fora on matters of common interest to the western governments.

Wishing to maintain the dialogue with the Assembly on all questions concerning the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, the Council gave close attention to the recommendations on foreign policy questions transmitted to them by the Assembly.

In their reply to Recommendation 278 on developments in the Iberian Peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance, they recalled that it was the guiding principle of the western democracies in their foreign relations not to intervene in the affairs of other countries. They stressed that they have at all times adhered to this principle and, whenever advisable, have incorporated it in the texts of agreements and declarations governing their international relations. At the same time, however, this attitude could not constitute an obstacle to any expressions of sympathy by the western democracies for trends of opinion now emerging in favour of a pluralist democracy in countries where it had not yet been fully established.

The Council welcomed developments which were taking place in Western European States previously under authoritarian régimes. They also referred to the emergency EEC aid agreed upon as early as October 1975 to help Portugal.

In reply to the concern expressed by the Assembly in Recommendation 282 on the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in November 1975, the Council stressed that their members considered the equation of Zionism with racism unacceptable and recalled that they had all therefore voted against the resolution. In common with their partners of the European Community, the member countries of WEU would seek to ensure that the adoption of

this text did not jeopardise the legitimate struggle against racism and racial discrimination, in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter and of the 1965 Convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination; the Nine would hold close consultations whenever reference was made to the resolution in connection with the work of the United Nations.

Finally the Council reaffirmed the great importance attached by member countries to the early achievement of a negotiated settlement in the Middle East. They fully agreed with the Assembly that the development of economic, cultural and political co-operation between Western Europe and all the Eastern Mediterranean countries could have a favourable influence on the course of events in the region. They drew attention to the efforts which the EEC was making, as part of an overall Mediterranean approach, to establish close economic relations with the countries concerned. They also noted the general political significance of the Euro-Arab dialogue bringing together the EEC countries and the members of the Arab League.

B. Defence questions

As stated in the introduction to this chapter of the annual report, the questions deriving from implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols continued, in 1976, to form the central part of the Council's work.

The importance of these activities was emphasised by the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when presenting the twenty-first annual report to the Assembly in June, in his capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Council. On that occasion, Mr. Destremau, in reminding the parliamentarians that the modified Brussels Treaty was one of the keystones in the security of the signatory States, affirmed that the Council attached the same importance as heretofore to the application of the provisions of the treaty and its protocols on the levels of forces and armaments of the member States.

Moreover, the Council gave a clear answer to Recommendation 284 on the application of the Brussels Treaty, and have assured the Assembly on many occasions that the mutual defence commitment enshrined in Article V of the treaty remains entirely valid.

With regard to European armaments co-operation, the Council of Ministers, at their meeting on 31st May 1976, in Brussels, instructed the Standing Armaments Committee to submit a detailed outline programme for a study of the armaments industries in member countries (see B. 3 below and Chapter IV).

1. *Level of forces of member States*

With the assistance of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the Council have followed, during 1976, as in previous years, the procedures required of them by the modified Brussels Treaty.

(a) *Forces under NATO command*

The maximum levels of ground, air and naval forces which member States of WEU place under NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty. Article III of the Protocol provides for a special procedure, if necessary, to enable these levels to be increased above the limits specified in Articles I and II.

So that they may satisfy themselves that the limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II are not exceeded, the Council receive information every year, in accordance with Article IV of that Protocol, concerning the levels of forces placed under NATO command by member States of WEU which take part in the integrated structure. This information, which is transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking officer designated by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, is based on force inspections carried out by SACEUR.

The above information, as at the end of 1975, which was conveyed by this high-ranking officer at the appropriate time, was presented to the Council by his representative on 2nd March. Information indicating the status as at the end of 1976 was requested in December.

Furthermore, the Council have taken the necessary steps to implement the procedure laid down in their Resolution of 15th September 1956, whereby the levels of forces under NATO command are studied in the light of the annual review.

Thus, for the year 1975, a meeting was held in Brussels on 16th January 1976 of the permanent representatives (or their substitutes) to the North Atlantic Council of the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The Council examined the report from this meeting on 11th February 1976 and noted that the level of forces of these member States, as set out in the NATO force plan, fell within the limits fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty. The Council also took note at the same time of a declaration on French forces by the permanent representative of France. The same procedure has already been set in train, for 1976, by the end of the year under review.

(b) *Forces under national command*

The strength and armaments of forces of member States on the mainland of Europe

remaining under national command — internal defence and police forces, forces for the defence of overseas territories, and common defence forces — are fixed in accordance with the procedure laid down in the agreement signed in Paris on 14th December 1957, implementing Article V of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty.

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By means of the methods set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the Council have been able to fulfil in 1976 their obligations under Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty concerning levels of forces.

2. *United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe*

In accordance with the undertaking given in paragraph 2 of the Council's reply to Recommendation 213, the United Kingdom Government declares that the total level of British forces on the continent of Europe at 30th November 1976 amounted to 60,985 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force.

The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty there. At 30th November 1976, there were some 4,419 men from BAOR in Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated, these units could be speedily returned to their duty stations in an emergency affecting NATO.

3. *Mandate given to the Standing Armaments Committee to prepare an outline programme for a study of the armaments industries in member countries*

In 1976, the Council, desiring to make a contribution to efforts to improve European armaments procurement and standardisation, instructed the Standing Armaments Committee to submit to them a detailed outline programme for a study of the armaments industries in member countries. This decision, taken by the Council meeting at ministerial level on 31st May in Brussels, was conveyed to the Presidential Committee and Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the Assembly that same day.

Detailed study in the Council earlier in the year had led up to approval of a mandate for the Standing Armaments Committee, the text of which was subsequently transmitted to the Assembly and to NATO. The exchanges, which continued during the later part of the year, culminated on 9th February 1977 in the submission to the Council of the SAC's detailed draft outline programme.

Throughout 1976, the Council, who have noted the Assembly's keen interest in its dialogue

with them, have provided the parliamentarians with the fullest possible information, both in replies to recommendations and written questions, and on the occasion of ministerial addresses at sessions, particularly by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council. This they will continue to do.

4. Assembly recommendations and written questions

(a) The Assembly sessions of December 1975 and June 1976 presented the Council with a number of recommendations and questions on defence topics.

Questions relating to European armaments standardisation and procurement figured prominently in these texts. In answer to Recommendation 281, the Council stressed the importance of building and maintaining a sound and sophisticated armaments industry in Europe, and asserted that European armaments co-operation would provide impulses for further European unification. The Council declared that all member governments attached particular importance to activities aimed at co-operation and standardisation in the armaments field since they lead to a strengthening of the defence potential and to rationalisation of procurement. They further declared their resolve to press on with this task, despite the difficulties involved. Other aspects of defence co-operation in this sector were dealt with in the replies to Recommendations 273, 280 and 283.

With regard to a European defence policy, the Council noted, in answer to Recommendation 273, the need for careful study of the long-term prospects for achieving such a policy as a logical completion of European union. Replying to Recommendation 285, they stated that no realistic approach could be made to the question of a European defence policy until substantial progress had been made towards political union. Yet, on the other hand, developments of a common foreign policy of the Nine could not stop short of common security and defence issues.

The governments of member States availed themselves of the opportunity afforded by Recommendation 273 to underline that defence problems are a major concern of the Council, and that the modified Brussels Treaty, which commits the member States to come to each other's assistance in the event of aggression, forms a fundamental element in the security system of Europe.

Furthermore, the members of the Council noted, in their reply to Recommendation 288, the relevance of the Mediterranean basin to their security responsibilities.

(b) During 1976, the Council answered six written questions on defence matters. These dealt with implementation of the modified Brussels

Treaty, the Standing Armaments Committee and the independent European programme group, British forces on the mainland of Europe, French forces in Germany and aerial surveillance.

5. Symposium on a European armaments policy

The Council noted with interest details concerning preparation of this symposium, organised by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, which would be held on 3rd and 4th March 1977, in Paris.

C. Scientific, technical and space questions

The Council noted with interest Recommendation 286 on scientific, technological and aerospace questions, sent to them by the Assembly in reply to the twenty-first annual report. In their reply of October 1976, they made the following comments concerning the prospects for a European policy in this field :

"The Council share the view expressed in the recommendation that the promotion of technological co-operation in a European framework continues to be of great importance. They note with satisfaction that progress towards a common medium- and long-term policy has already been achieved in several sectors. With regard to space applications, the European Space Agency has been entrusted with the elaboration and implementation of a long-term European space programme. In the field of research, the European Communities continue to carry out medium-term programmes, with special emphasis on energy and environmental protection. The Council agree with the view that the effort to co-ordinate and harmonise national medium- and long-term programmes should be encouraged."

The Council were also greatly interested by the very full reports prepared by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, on three subjects to the study of which the Assembly has made a major contribution over a number of years : European aviation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and co-operation between Europe and the United States. They gave careful consideration to Recommendations 274, 275, 277 and 289 on these subjects, and replied to them in as much detail as possible.

The Council also answered Recommendation 279 on the International Institute for the Management of Technology.

1. European aviation

The Council appreciated the quality of the report prepared by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace questions following

the colloquy which it organised in Toulouse on 2nd and 3rd February 1976.

As they stated in their reply to Recommendation 289 in November, the Council are concerned by the uncertainties which hang over the future of Europe's aeronautical industry and airlines, both as regards maintenance of their production, marketing and operating capacity and as regards research and advanced techniques. In their view, closer co-operation is needed between the national aeronautical industries.

The introduction of a concerted European policy designed to safeguard these industries, and to limit competition and encourage co-operation between them is the subject of detailed bilateral and multilateral discussions between member countries of the Community and at Community level. In particular, the ideas put forward in the action programme for the European aeronautical industry, proposed by the Commission of the Communities on 1st October 1975, are being studied, together with the conclusions of the colloquy organised at Toulouse.

In the Council's opinion, any such policy should aim not at creating a protected European market, but at ensuring the continued activity of this major sector of industry and, therefore, at expanding its international markets.

The Council made a close study of the various suggestions contained in Recommendation 289 and would like to draw attention to the following points from their reply :

— The creation of a national aeronautical council in each of the member countries concerned might help to initiate concerted action at national level by the various interests concerned. At the same time such national councils might duplicate the work of other institutions and their establishment does not seem to be essential as a first step.

From this standpoint, the idea of setting up a special European institution to promote the policy of concerted action has its merits. However, in the present state of the aeronautical industry in Europe, its problems are unlikely to be resolved by such an institution. Moreover, its establishment seems out of the question until major progress has been made towards European union. Consequently, it is too soon to consider setting up a European aeronautical council based on national councils.

— The Council favour the harmonisation of national aeronautical policies. However, they believe that a pragmatic approach should be adopted in the matter.

In present circumstances, therefore, they feel it would be unrealistic to consider formulating

a joint European air transport policy or adopting a joint European position in negotiations with the rest of the world.

— In the military field, the Council recognise the need for member countries to determine their aircraft requirements and study the question jointly. On the other hand, as the independent European programme group is already in existence, with tasks which include military aircraft problems, they feel that there is no need to promote the creation of a special study group in WEU.

2. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

In their reply to Recommendation 277 on second-generation nuclear reactors, the Council recalled that the member countries of the Communities are pursuing a common policy based on the treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. They further observed that decisions taken by the OECD Council or the Steering Committee of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD are carried out by member countries with due regard to their obligations under the Euratom Treaty.

The Council also recalled that member governments have, for many years, been promoting the development of the nuclear energy industry so as to meet the growing requirements not only of their own countries, but also of the rest of the world. They added that European firms are perfectly capable of meeting the requirements for nuclear power plants on the world market.

3. Co-operation between the United States and Europe

The Council agree with the Assembly on the need to seek an overall policy in the field of advanced technology, designed to guarantee Western Europe's place in the world, and to foster fruitful co-operation with the United States on an equal footing.

As was recalled in the reply to Recommendation 275, European policies in this field are co-ordinated through several international organisations such as the European Communities and the European Space Agency. European policies are already formulated through these organisations, which provide the opportunity for strengthening Europe's technological base and co-ordinating with other States. The Council consider that the work done in these various organisations represents a not inconsiderable effort in the direction sought by the Assembly.

As regards collaboration on space questions between Europe and the United States, the Council pointed out to the Assembly that the

Director-General of the European Space Agency was in constant touch with the competent United States authorities and, in particular, with NASA, for the purpose of implementing the Spacelab programme as at present laid down and, ultimately, of establishing permanent co-operation based on the practical results of the first common space experiments.

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Contacts with other international organisations

In the course of the year, the principal officers of the Secretariat-General, representing Western European Union, attended a number of meetings of other international organisations as observers when questions of concern to WEU were under discussion. As in previous years, the most frequent of these contacts were made with NATO and the Council of Europe.

CHAPTER III

ARMAMENTS CONTROL AGENCY

A. Introduction

Under the terms of Article VII of Protocol No. IV, the Agency is required :

- firstly, to control the level of stocks of armaments held by member countries on the mainland of Europe, this control extending to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective ;
- secondly, to satisfy itself that the undertakings given by the Federal Republic of Germany not to manufacture certain types of armaments on its territory are being observed.

In 1976, the Agency's activities continued very much along the same lines and at the same rate as in previous years.

Subject to the comments made under point B.2 below, the programme drawn up by the Agency for 1976, the twenty-first year of control, was carried out satisfactorily.

B. General problems**1. General operating methods**

Within the Agency's terms of reference, controls from documentary sources serve mainly for checking levels of armaments as a whole. They also contribute to the preparation of field measures for the control of levels and of the non-production of certain categories of armaments. This aspect covers all activities concerned with processing, for the purposes defined above, any useful documentary material including, in particular, countries' replies to the Agency questionnaire, and the results of field control measures carried out earlier.

The execution of test checks, visits and inspections, and all that is linked with these functions, constitutes that part of control carried out physically wherever there are activities and stocks subject to control and, more generally, wherever this is necessary to ensure that the information supplied is correct and that undertakings not to manufacture certain types of armaments are observed.

The control system is based primarily on controls from documentary sources, the purpose of field control measures being to verify, physically, the accuracy of all the information collected in implementation of Part III of Protocol No. IV.

Documentary and field control measures are complementary, and equally essential for the accomplishment of the Agency's task.

Traditionally, the annual report has always presented documentary and field control measures separately, in the interests of both convenience and clarity. However, it must not be forgotten that these measures together make up a single control function.

The Agency's operating methods, the main lines of which are set out above, did not change during the year under review.

Although the principles of the present methods, which have proved their worth, remain unchanged, their applications are under constant examination with a view to improvement.

The Agency draws great benefit from the continuity of its methods ; by its steadily-growing knowledge of the organisation of the forces of each member State, of the progress of armament production or procurement programmes, the Agency develops its control activity efficiently and logically, both in the fixing of levels and quantities of armaments and in the choice and assessment of its control measures.

2. Fields where the Agency is or is not authorised to exercise its mandate

The situation described in previous annual reports, regarding certain armaments, remained unchanged in 1976.

In present circumstances, the Agency's activities do not extend to atomic weapons or, in one member State, to what that State calls "strategic forces".

Nor does the Agency apply any controls to biological weapons.

The control activities dealt with in this chapter do not, therefore, concern these categories of armaments.

In the case of chemical weapons, only non-production controls take place ; no quantitative controls are made in this field since none of the member States concerned has declared possessing such armaments.

C. Controls from documentary sources

In this field of control, the Agency studies the relevant documents with the main purpose of comparing the quantities of armaments held by the member States with the levels fixed by

the Council and thus establishing whether these constitute appropriate levels within the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty.

1. Information processed by the Agency

(a) Annual Agency questionnaire and replies by member States

The questionnaire sent to member States for 1976 was broadly the same as those of previous years.

As in all previous years, follow-up action on the replies was twofold. It is recalled that some of the facts reported are checked physically by means of field control measures. In addition, all the replies are studied by the Agency experts, and compared with the other sources of information available, including member countries' earlier replies to Agency or NATO questionnaires and budgetary documents.

(b) Request for annual information

Control of undertakings by one of the member States regarding the non-production of certain types of armaments takes the form of field control measures.

These measures are partly prepared from a study of documents which, in 1976 as in the past, was based, in particular, on the replies of the country concerned to the Agency's request for annual information.

(c) Information provided by NATO

See point 2(a) below.

(d) Information provided by the United States of America and Canada (Article XXIII of Protocol No. IV)

The Agency received, through the Council, information supplied by the Governments of the United States and Canada concerning their programmes of external aid in military equipment to the forces of member States stationed on the mainland of Europe. Since 1966, these countries have provided no aid to the forces concerned.

(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information (Article VII, 2 (a) of Protocol No. IV)

In 1976, the defence budgets published by member States and their replies to the Agency questionnaire on this subject were studied in the same way as in previous years.

The national authorities also gave additional information, whenever necessary, in response to the Agency's requests.

The scrutiny of budgets confirmed the findings of other studies carried out by the experts to determine quantities of armaments.

2. Verification of appropriate levels of armaments

(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces placed under NATO command

After receiving and processing the member States' replies to the annual questionnaire and studying the statistical reports furnished by the authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Article VII, 2(a) of Protocol No. IV) and, in particular, by the NATO International Staff, the Agency arranged, as each year, for the annual consultations with the NATO military authorities called for by Article XIV of Protocol No. IV.

As in previous years, these consultations included a joint study session at Casteau, on 25th November 1976, attended by Agency experts and the appropriate officers of SHAPE, and concluded with a meeting in Paris on 10th December 1976, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Director of the Agency; this meeting was attended by the representatives of the Director of the International Military Staff of the NATO Military Committee, and of the Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics, Armaments and Administration, SHAPE, as well as by the Agency experts. There were no comments on the total quantities of armaments declared as held by the member States (Article XIII of Protocol No. IV), and presented by the Agency for study by these authorities.

In consequence, the total quantities of armaments declared to the Agency by the member States for forces placed under NATO authority and stationed on the mainland of Europe can be considered as appropriate levels for the control year 1976 within the terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV.

(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe

The quantities of armaments declared to the Agency by the member States as being required on 31st December 1976, for their forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe have been accepted or approved by the Council, who have taken note of these figures of maximum levels of armaments for these forces in 1976. The quantities notified to the Agency can thus be considered as appropriate levels of armaments for the current control year within the terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV.

D. Field control measures

1. Principles governing the application of field control measures and general methods of execution

(a) As recalled in the introduction to this chapter, the treaty requires the Agency :

- to satisfy itself that the undertakings not to manufacture certain types of armaments are being observed ;
- to control the level of stocks of certain armaments.

Field control measures continued during 1976 on the same basis as during previous years, as an essential part of the Agency's work, in accordance with Article VII of Protocol No. IV.

The Agency's basic assumption in this respect, which is supported by the observations of previous years, is that the undertakings and declarations of member countries are being honoured. Clearly, if any doubt existed on this point, control measures would have to be increased. In any case, the measures taken by the Agency must provide a sufficiently high probability of detecting any contravention.

In the case of its primary task of non-production controls, the Agency once again relied, in 1976, on a comparatively small number of field control measures. However, these measures must be viewed in the context of wide and continuing studies, relying upon a continuing pattern of inspections. Taken overall, these provide a solid basis for the Agency's confidence.

For the second of its tasks, the basic information on levels of stocks of the types of armament subject to control by the Agency is provided by member countries in their replies to the annual questionnaire. This information is cross-checked not only against earlier declarations, but also against other information received from a variety of sources, including the findings of previous field control measures. On the basis of these analyses, a provisional programme of field control measures is worked out, covering an appropriate sample of the various establishments and sources contributing to the overall levels of stocks.

This draft programme, involving units, depots and factories, varies in composition from year to year as equipment programmes and other defence policies take effect. Care is taken to maintain the correct balance, while ensuring that the Agency's resources are directed in the most effective manner. For example, inspections at factories are planned for what is considered to be the most informative stage of the production cycle, and a reasonable balance is aimed at in the distribution of control activities between member countries. In addition, due weight is given to such special factors as policies for the concentration of stocks to reduce management costs or for their dispersal for reasons of vulnerability. The final programme is modified to take account of the latest information available. Accounting checks and physical inspections are then strictly applied by experienced teams of

experts. As a result of this thorough check of the figures selected for scrutiny, the accuracy of the remainder can be accepted with every confidence.

Although the Agency's two tasks are separate and specific, the field control measures involved are not considered and programmed in isolation. Thus, at a single factory, control of the quantities of arms being produced may be combined with a non-production control of certain proscribed weapons.

(b) Article VIII of Protocol No. IV is of considerable assistance to the Agency in carrying out its mission. It states that to avoid duplication of effort, control measures in respect of forces under NATO authority shall be undertaken by the appropriate NATO authorities. The percentage of forces to be inspected by the Agency therefore varies between member countries, and this must be taken into account in the preparation of its programme. Special considerations apply to the depots also covered by the same article. In peacetime, each country is wholly responsible for the logistic support of forces placed under NATO authority. It is therefore difficult to determine which of the material in depots is or will be assigned to forces under NATO authority and which is or will be assigned to forces under national command. The system of combined Agency/SHAPE inspections, introduced in 1957, was again applied in 1976.

(c) As the Convention for the due process of law¹ has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1976, as in previous years, to take the form of "agreed control measures".

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency must give some six weeks' notice. This agreement has never been withheld.

2. Type and extent of field control measures

In 1976, the programme drawn up by the Agency was carried out in accordance with the well-tried procedure of previous years.

The total number of control measures was seventy-one. It should be noted, in this connection, that this pattern of control activities carried out by the Agency is entirely satisfactory: it enables some 80 % of existing armaments to be checked in four years for the air force,

1. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member States of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957).

five years for the navy and six to seven years for army munitions.

These measures fall broadly into the following categories :

- (a) quantitative control measures at depots ;
- (b) quantitative control measures at units for forces under national command ;
- (c) control measures at production plants :
 - (i) quantitative control measures :

In 1976, these control measures were carried out at aircraft and aircraft engine plants, at plants manufacturing armoured equipment, at plants manufacturing missiles and ammunition, and at shipyards.

- (ii) non-production control measures :

These control measures related to chemicals and submarines.

3. Conclusions

(a) In the fields where it is authorised to exercise its mandate, the Agency was able effectively to carry out its task of applying control measures. Such problems as arose from the very complex nature of the inspections were dealt with satisfactorily through good relations with the national authorities.

(b) On the basis of all the field control measures carried out in 1976, the Agency was able to report to the Council :

- the measures taken for the control of the levels of stocks of armaments at depots, units under national command and production plants confirmed the data obtained from documentary control measures ;
- the measures taken for the control of non-production revealed no production contrary to undertakings.

E. State and problems of control in certain particular fields

1. Armaments for land forces

(a) Current production and purchases

Land forces armaments modernisation schemes and reorganisation programmes are in hand in all member countries.

With regard to armoured material, the derivatives of the Leopard and AMX-30 battle tanks are still being built, including, in particular, recovery vehicles, bridge layers and dozers. However, the main battle tank purchasing

programmes have now been completed in most countries.

The programmes for other armoured vehicles (AMX-10, M-113 and derivatives) are continuing. On the other hand, the Marder armoured vehicle programme in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the tank destroyer programme in Belgium, were completed in 1976. Production of armoured reconnaissance vehicles is proceeding in the Federal Republic of Germany with the wheeled Luchs (8 × 8) type and, in Belgium, jointly with the United Kingdom, with the Scorpion, the Scimitar and their derivatives.

As regards anti-aircraft equipment, two major programmes are in hand: the Guepard anti-aircraft tank (developed from the Leopard), equipped with a twin 35 mm. gun, has been in series production in the Federal Republic of Germany since summer 1976 and the Roland missile launcher is being jointly produced by the Federal Republic of Germany and France.

Most member countries of WEU are interested in this equipment and total production under these programmes will amount to about one thousand units.

In the case of artillery, several member countries have purchased the Lance missile system from the United States to replace their first-generation weapons systems.

In addition, production of the Pluton missile launching is continuing in France.

Lastly, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom signed a contract in September 1976, for the joint production of several hundred FH-70 155 mm. towed howitzers over the next few years.

(b) Control activity in 1976

Control measures were carried out at several depots, at several units under national command, and at plants manufacturing armaments for land forces.

2. Guided missiles and other self-propelled missiles

(a) Current production

The following modern guided missiles mentioned in last year's annual report are in production in member States : Milan and Swingfire anti-tank missiles ; Crotale, Masurca, Blowpipe, Rapiet and Sea Dart surface-to-air missiles ; Martel AS-37 air-to-surface anti-radar missile, jointly produced by France and the United Kingdom ; Matra Magic R-550 air-to-air missile ; Exocet sea-to-sea missile ; Malafon ASM missile.

In addition, the following guided missiles of the previous generation are still being produced :

SS-11 surface-to-surface missile ; Cobra anti-tank missile ; AS-12 and AS-30 air-to-surface missiles.

Production of Zuni air-to-ground rockets continued in Belgium.

(b) *Exports*

Guided missiles exported include Cobra, SS-11, Exocet MM-38, Crotale, Milan, Matra Magic R-550, AS-12 and the Zuni air-to-ground rocket.

(c) *Control activity in 1976*

Control measures were carried out at a number of depots containing guided and other self-propelled missiles or launchers, at units under national command equipped with these weapons, and at one plant manufacturing guided missiles.

3. Military aircraft

(a) *Current production and purchases*

Work continued on the two major programmes referred to in the previous annual report : joint production of the Jaguar A/E by France and the United Kingdom, and the Mirage F-1 programme in France. In Italy, production of the F-104G was nearing completion by the end of 1976 ; the same applies to the additional number of G-91Y aircraft, for which the original programme was completed in 1975.

The German air force received the remainder of their Phantom F-4F aircraft ordered from the United States.

Following the decision taken by Belgium and the Netherlands to adopt the F-16 aircraft to replace their F-104G, the first contracts for production of this aircraft were placed with the firms concerned.

(b) *Future prospects*

Two major aircraft construction programmes were mentioned in the previous annual report : the MRCA 75, built jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy, and the Alpha-Jet by France and the Federal Republic of Germany. Eight MRCA prototypes of the nine planned have already flown. Industrial-scale production of the Alpha-Jet started in 1976.

The United Kingdom programme of Hawk trainer aircraft is progressing.

(c) *Control activity in 1976*

Control measures were carried out at depots holding aircraft or aircraft engines, at air force units under national command, and at plants manufacturing aircraft or aircraft engines.

4. Warships

(a) *Current construction*

Work was continued in 1976 on the modernisation and new construction programmes mentioned in the two previous annual reports as being in progress in member countries on the mainland of Europe.

(b) *Control activity in 1976*

Quantitative control measures were carried out at naval shipyards. An agreed non-production control was carried out at the same time at one of these plants ; it revealed nothing contrary to the undertakings given by the country concerned.

5. Chemical weapons

(a) *List of chemical weapons subject to control*

As in previous years, the Agency asked member countries whether they wished to renew in 1976 the list of chemical weapons subject to control.

The member countries agreed to this renewal. This was reported to the Council, who noted the fact.

(b) *Control activity in 1976*

In application of Article III of Protocol No. III, which lays down the conditions to be met to enable the Council to fix the levels of chemical weapons that may be held on the mainland of Europe by those countries which have not given up the right to produce them, the Agency, as in previous years, asked the following questions in its questionnaire : "Has the production of chemical weapons on the mainland territory of... (member State) passed the experimental stage and entered into the effective production stage ?"

In 1976, as in the past, the member States concerned replied in the negative.

The case could arise of stocks of imported chemical weapons being held by a member State that had replied in the negative to this question. In any such case, these weapons would have to be reported in the reply to the questionnaire. However, no member State reported the existence of any chemical weapons in its reply to this questionnaire.

As in previous years, the Agency also addressed to the appropriate authorities of the State concerned a "request for annual information to facilitate the non-production control of chemical weapons". The reply received to this request was, as in the past, of great assistance to the Agency in selecting chemical plants at which to carry out agreed control measures in 1976.

The supplementary procedure designed to increase the effectiveness of the Agency's action, which has been tried out since 1973, was again applied successfully in 1976.

For each control measure carried out, a delegation from the national authorities was present.

None of these measures revealed any indication of production of chemical weapons within the terms of Annex II to Protocol No. III.

6. *Biological weapons*

All member countries reported to the Agency their agreement to renew in 1976 the list of biological weapons subject to control. This was reported to the Council, who noted the fact.

However, it will be recalled (see point B.2 of the present chapter) that the Agency exercises no control in the field of biological weapons.

7. *Atomic weapons*

Since the situation remained the same as in previous years, the Agency is unable, as stated in point B.2 of this chapter, to exercise any control in the atomic field.

F. *Technical information visits (TIVs) and other means of improving the proficiency of the experts*

1. In 1976, technical information visits again contributed significantly towards keeping the Agency's experts informed of latest developments. They covered the procurement programmes of all three services, aspects of naval and air force research and development, as well as logistic problems and chemical and biological subjects.

TIVs were made as follows :

— to naval, army and air shows organised mainly for sales purposes, such as :

- (i) the new British army equipment exhibition at Aldershot ;
- (ii) the Farnborough and Hanover international Air Shows ;
- (iii) the first Italian naval exhibition ;
- (iv) the fifth exhibition of naval equipment at Le Bourget.

— to establishments where programmes had been specially arranged for the Agency, such as :

- (i) in France, the aircraft test centres at Istres and Brétigny, and the technical trials establishment at Bourges ;
- (ii) in the Federal Republic of Germany, the air force control and

reporting centre at Visselhövede, and the naval test centre at Eckernförder ;

- (iii) in the United Kingdom, the Central Inventory Control Point RAOC at Bicester, and the RAF Supply Control Centre at Hendon.

In the fields of chemistry and microbiology, a number of technical information visits were organised by the national authorities to scientific centres and industrial establishments. On these occasions, the Agency experts met highly qualified biologists, chemists and engineers who gave them information on the theoretical aspects and the latest technical developments of the specialities concerned ; they were also able to examine some remarkable scientific equipment and a number of industrial plants equipped with very modern production facilities.

Visits on chemical subjects were carried out in Belgium and France. In Belgium, Agency experts visited two chemical factories, one of which concentrated specifically on all forms of polystyrene, while the other produces a very wide range of chemicals. In France, a TIV was organised to a plant producing halogen compounds.

Technical information visits on biological subjects were carried out in Belgium, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. In Belgium, the Agency experts obtained valuable information on various infectious diseases, including smallpox and psittacosis and on the appropriate prophylactic measures. In France, the main emphasis was on the industrial production of vaccines and therapeutic sera, and on the culture of micro-organisms required for such production.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, conversations were directed mainly to exotic diseases, insects and other animal vectors of pathogenic germs, and the possibility of epidemics of rabies and influenza. Demonstrations of the detection and identification of micro-organisms were also organised.

2. The Documentation Office continued to collect and collate for the benefit of the experts, both specialised and other published documents on military subjects (research and development, introduction of new weapons, reorganisation of the armed forces, etc.), as well as on financial and economic subjects (budgetary decisions of member governments, general economic trends, the growth of certain specific sectors of the economy and of certain firms working on defence, imports and exports of armaments).

Close contact was maintained between the office and the experts, who, by defining subjects of interest and providing unclassified data

obtained during their inspections, contribute to the preparation of reference documents for their own use.

G. Miscellaneous contacts

1. Contacts with the national authorities

As in the past, the Agency maintained its contacts with national authorities whenever the opportunity arose, as, for example, when discussing improvements to control measures, organising technical information visits, conducting budgetary studies, etc. In addition to their main purpose, these contacts frequently produce solutions to certain topical problems and lead to improvements to Agency procedures.

The Agency continues to regard them as being of particular value.

2. Contacts with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

Contacts were maintained with the appropriate NATO authorities in accordance with the provisions of the revised Brussels Treaty.

Mention should be made, in particular, of the two meetings held to fix the level of armaments of the forces under NATO command, already referred to in point C.2 (a) of this chapter. In addition, contacts made by experts when on duty trips to Brussels and Mons made possible unofficial exchanges of views on matters of common interest.

H. General conclusions

In accordance with Article XIX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency was able to report to the Council that, as a result of the control exercised in 1976, the figures obtained in accordance with Article XIII of Protocol No. IV :

- for armaments of forces under NATO command under the terms of Article XIV of Protocol No. IV ; and
- for armaments of forces maintained under national command under the terms of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of Protocol No. IV and the Agreement of 14th December 1957, concluded in execution of Article V of Protocol No. II,

represented for the control year 1976 and for each of the member States, the appropriate levels of armaments subject to control for those categories of armaments over which the Agency has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate.

As required by Article XX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of field control measures at production plants, it did not detect for the categories of armaments which it controls :

- either the manufacture in these establishments on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany of a category of armaments that the government of this member State has undertaken not to manufacture ;
- or the existence, on the mainland of Europe, of stocks or armaments in excess of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of Protocol No. IV) or not justified by export requirements (Article XXII of Protocol No. IV).

In 1976, the Agency again applied controls effectively in those fields which are open to it.

In this, relations between the Agency and the national authorities and services of the member States, and also with those of NATO and SHAPE, continued to play an important part.

CHAPTER IV

STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE

A. Activities of the Standing Armaments Committee

The SAC held ordinary meetings on 4th March, 25th June, 24th September and 15th December 1976. Its main subjects of discussion were the up-dating of WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 (technical trials programme: wheeled transport vehicles: 1970-1980), co-operation with FINABEL, exchanges of information between WEU and NATO, and the supervision of the work of Working Group No. 8 on operational research and on the methods of evaluating military equipment.

In addition to these ordinary sessions, the SAC met three times as an ad hoc group, to draft the detailed outline programme for a study of the European armaments industries in the member countries, in implementation of the mandate adopted by ministers at the Council meeting held in Brussels on 31st May 1976 (cf. Chapter II, B).

1. Up-dating of WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 (technical trials programme: wheeled transport vehicles: 1970-1980)

Having been approved in January 1975 by the SAC, WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 is now being up-dated by a group of national experts, with the United Kingdom as pilot country. The annual review for 1975-76, drafted by the co-ordinator of the pilot country with the advice of the national experts of the member countries, was approved by the SAC at its meeting on 25th June 1976. The same procedure will be followed for the 1976-77 period.

2. Relations with FINABEL

The SAC took note of a summary of the FINABEL catalogue of joint armaments and equipment requirements prepared in 1975. In this summary, prepared by the SAC's International Secretariat, only equipment susceptible of joint development is mentioned.

After a preliminary discussion, the SAC agreed to study any specific questions on this subject officially put to it by FINABEL.

3. Outline programme for a study of the armaments industry in member countries

The SAC has drafted an outline programme; it has been submitted by each member of the Committee to his national authorities

for approval and subsequent transmission to the Council¹.

In the meantime, the Head of the International Secretariat gave a progress report to the Council in October.

B. Activities of the working groups**1. Working Group No. 8**

During 1976, Working Group No. 8 on operational research met twice, the first meeting being coupled with a symposium and the second with a visit to Belgium.

The work of the group has followed the usual pattern, including the communication of new study subjects, declarations of interest, bilateral exchanges of reports and the consultation of studies in the WEU library.

When translation of the five-language glossary of operational research terms was finished, decisions were taken regarding the form and publication of a one-volume dictionary. Computerisation and publication are expected to follow in 1977 with the help of the interested countries, the International Secretariat and the French Armaments Documentation Centre (CEDOCAR); the CIRO (French Interarms Operational Research Centre) will co-ordinate this work.

A symposium on the methodology used in the determination of ammunition stocks, held the day after the group's spring meeting, resulted in interesting discussions following the presentation of studies by the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom.

At the invitation of the Belgian authorities, the group attended a series of presentations by the GSRO Section in Brussels on their operational research studies; they also visited the Belgo-Netherlands school of mine warfare at Ostend.

2. Methods of evaluating military equipment

In pursuance of the terms of reference given to it by the SAC, a group of experts on the evaluation of military equipment, working under the supervision of Working Group No. 8, undertook a critical, comparative study of a German report on the evaluation of a recovery vehicle.

Delegations submitted comments on this report and detailed discussions took place at the first meeting of the group of experts.

1. This document was transmitted to the Council on 25th January 1977.

At the group's second meeting, the French delegation presented a study on the application of another method to the selection of the Bundeswehr's recovery vehicles. It was agreed to discuss this at the next meeting of the group of experts, planned for the beginning of 1977.

C. International Secretariat

1. Contacts with member countries and the Council

On the invitation of the Netherlands Government, the Assistant Secretary-General paid a visit to the Netherlands in January and had talks with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kooijmans, and with senior officials of the Ministry of Defence. During the year he also had talks or working meetings with senior officials of the Foreign and Defence Ministries of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. In addition, he was invited to visit armaments factories in the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy.

The Assistant Secretary-General was also invited to the air fair at Hanover; finally, representatives of the International Secretariat attended the international air fair at Farnborough.

On 28th April, the Assistant Secretary-General presented his customary annual oral report to the Council on the activities of the SAC, its working groups and its International Secretariat.

2. WEU Assembly

The Assistant Secretary-General reported to the SAC on the discussions on armaments questions which had taken place during both parts of the twenty-second ordinary session of the Assembly. As in previous years, extracts from speeches, reports, discussions and recommendations relating to armaments questions were collected into a single document, distributed to members of the SAC.

In addition, the International Secretariat was represented at the colloquy on European aeronautical policy organised by the WEU Assembly, which was held at Toulouse on 2nd and 3rd February 1976.

3. Contacts with NATO

The International Secretariat of the SAC was represented by observers at the two meetings of the Conference of National Armaments Directors, held at the NATO Headquarters, Brussels, in April and October.

As in the past, a representative of the International Secretariat attended the two meetings of the NATO Naval Armaments Group.

4. Liaison with FINABEL

Three liaison meetings were held with the FINABEL Secretariat during the period under review.

CHAPTER V

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE

A. Meetings of the Committee

The Public Administration Committee held its two annual meetings in Luxembourg from 5th to 7th May and in Bath from 20th to 22nd October.

As usual, the Committee devoted a considerable part of these meetings to exchanges of information on new developments in the public administration of the member countries over the preceding six months. During the year under review, the choice of some of the subjects dealt with was naturally governed by the economic and financial problems which are confronting the various member countries and are affecting the administrative machinery of the State. In some cases, reductions in the strength of the civil service are taking place or are planned; in others, a partial solution to the unemployment problem is being sought by the creation of posts in the administration; civil service structures and salary levels are being generally reviewed. The Committee also noted the effects of spending cuts on initial and further training programmes.

With regard to conditions of employment for civil servants, exchanges of information related mainly to the elimination of discrimination and to lowering of the retirement age for certain categories of senior civil servants.

Finally, the Committee noted changes in the pattern of administration resulting from changes of government or forming part of longer-term developments: reduction of the number of local authorities and problems of local authority organisation, questions of decentralisation and devolution of powers.

During the year, the Committee concluded the studies on systems of adjusting payment in public administration and on the organisation and methods of informing the public about the administration. These two studies were referred to in greater detail in the twenty-first annual report. The Committee now intends to exchange information on the scope and limits of the concept of confidentiality in the civil services of member countries.

B. Multilateral course for government officials

In 1976, it was the turn of the Federal Republic of Germany to host the course organised each year for officials from the seven national administrations. This course, which was the

twenty-fifth of the kind held under the auspices of the Public Administration Committee, took place in Boppard from 6th to 17th September.

It brought together eighteen young senior-category civil servants, with the aim of enabling them to study methods and problems of work in international groups, and to acquire a wider knowledge of the main characteristic features of the administrations of the member countries. These are indeed two basic elements which make it possible to broaden the horizon of a young civil servant and prepare him better for the international negotiations in which he may be required to take part in the course of his career.

The programme for the course, based on the recognition that many problems can no longer be solved exclusively within the national framework, called upon participants to study at what stage and under what conditions international implications should be taken into account. The subject selected to focus discussions on a concrete example, was: "The international aspect of the water pollution problem". The majority of participants were "generalists", not specialists on the subject, and the technical data necessary were provided by specially invited experts. Three working groups were formed to deal with the various problems raised by water pollution in relation to use, types of pollution, and technical and legal means of combating and preventing pollution. This method of working, in small groups of six persons where three or four nationalities were represented, was considered particularly valuable.

As at courses in previous years, each national delegation presented a statement on the characteristic features of their administration, which was followed by discussion. This exercise was also judged to be useful by the participants, who even recommended that in future, more time should be devoted to this aspect of the programme.

This last comment touches on a point to which the Public Administration Committee has paid some attention during its recent meetings, namely, the duration of courses for civil servants. Originally planned and organised to last three weeks, they were subsequently shortened to two weeks. The increasing difficulty of finding suitable participants who could be away from their office for two weeks, and the financial burden imposed on the host country, led the Committee to wonder whether courses should not be limited to one week. To judge from the views of both the organisers and the participants, experience of the 1976 course suggests that two weeks (the

weekend between the two was most successfully employed for an information trip to Berlin) represent a minimum, at any rate, for courses of this type.

C. Study visits

As already stated in previous annual reports, the general economic situation and the concern of governments to effect economies in most sectors are not conducive to the development of activities such as study visits, however useful they may be for the officials who undertake them. For this reason, the programme of visits arranged under the auspices of the Committee continued roughly as usual, but without any increase.

These visits enable an official to spend a week or two in the administration of one of the other member countries, studying the question on which he is himself an expert. Naturally, they cover a wide variety of subjects, as is shown by the following examples of study visits carried out or in preparation during the year under consideration: the suspended sentence — its current use and effectiveness; the administration of value added tax, in particular, in sole proprietorships and small businesses; administration and organisation of primary health care; institutional structure and functioning of the public sector oil industry; methods used

to assess performance level and advancement potential of civilian administrative and specialist staff, etc.

D. Secondment of national officials to international organisations

The Public Administration Committee concluded the study called for by the Council on the implementation in member countries of the principles recommended by the Council for the secondment of national officials to international organisations. The Council were thus able, during 1976, to study the documentation collected and to decide what further measures should be adopted regarding the study of this question.

Replies to the questionnaire submitted to the member countries contained gaps in some cases, and the Council requested those delegations which had been unable to collect some part of the information (particularly in the statistical field) to take the necessary steps to make the required information available in future.

Secondly, the Council agreed that a further survey should be undertaken to review the situation after an interval of five years.

The Council will not fail to keep the Assembly informed of all further developments.

CHAPTER VI

BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS

A. Budget

Summaries of the main budgets for 1976 and 1977 are shown in the Appendix to this report.

B. WEU administrative meetings

The practice was continued of bringing together periodically the administrative officials of the Secretariat-General, the Armaments Control Agency, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Office of the Clerk to ensure uniform application of administrative policies and to study questions of common interest.

It is evident that the necessity and frequency of these meetings will increase with the introduction of the pension scheme which raises extremely intricate problems of calculation and application.

C. WEU provident fund

The policy which had been adopted in 1974, and continued in 1975, of investing the fund in currencies on a short-term basis was maintained. In so doing, the advisory panel confirmed their opinion that, in view of the sharp fluctuations in currency parities, this policy provided the most effective safeguard against capital losses. The advisory panel considered that such a policy was in the best interests of the staff concerned and also of member governments to which a substantial proportion of the fund would ultimately revert as a result of members of the staff opting for the pension scheme.

D. Introduction of new British social security scheme

The question of WEU's participation and, if so, to what extent, in the British social security scheme, to which reference was made in the twenty-first annual report, had not been resolved at the end of 1976. Negotiations with Her Majesty's Government are continuing.

Until an agreement is reached and as a holding measure, the contributions of both the organisation and staff members to the scheme continue to be set aside and held by the organisation.

E. Activities within the framework of the co-ordinated organisations**1. Committee of Secretaries-General**

The gravity of certain problems facing the co-ordinated organisations made it necessary for the Secretaries-General of the five organisations to meet together on four occasions during 1976. The practice of holding meetings between the Secretaries-General themselves had been discontinued since 1968, but they felt that the difficulty in overcoming a number of problems of vital interest to their staffs — particularly over the introduction of the pension scheme and of an agreed procedure for the adjustment of salaries — required their personal intervention.

Under their direction, the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General and the Committee of Heads of Administration met on numerous occasions to prepare proposals for submission to the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts. In addition, the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General held a number of joint meetings with the Standing Committee of Staff Associations.

2. Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts

The Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts, which met seventeen times in 1976, issued nine reports, Nos. 127-135, in the course of the year.

Those which affected WEU were the following :

127th report : The pension scheme rules for the co-ordinated organisations. These were approved by the WEU Council on 23rd November 1976 with effect from 1st July 1974.

129th report : Procedure for adjusting the remuneration of staff of the co-ordinated organisations including a recommendation for an ad hoc cost-of-living advance to staff to cover the period 1st July 1975 to 31st December 1975. The WEU Council approved the report but amended the recommendation for an advance so that B and C grades should receive 100 % of the cost-of-living increase (13 % in the United Kingdom ; 5.7 % in France) and A and L grades 80 %.

130th report : Request by the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts for membership of the co-ordination system. Approved by the WEU Council.

131st report : Annual review of daily rates of subsistence for staff travelling on duty in

member countries from 1st May 1976. Approved by the WEU Council.

132nd report: Adjustment of pensions. Approved by the WEU Council.

133rd report: Procedure for adjusting the remuneration of staff of the co-ordinated organisations¹.

134th report: Implementing provisions regarding tax arrangements for the pension scheme¹.

135th report: Cost-of-living advance with effect from 1st July 1976¹.

In addition to completing their recommendations concerning the pension scheme the Co-ordinating Committee's main activities centred round the elaboration of a procedure for adjusting staff remunerations. In adopting the 123rd report, Councils had agreed to the Committee's recommendation to discontinue the adjustment procedures which had been practised up to 30th June 1975. However, in attempting to work out a new formula satisfactory to both governments and Secretaries-General, the Committee encountered considerable difficulties. A proposal by the Secretaries-General that the salary adjustment procedure should for a two-year period be based on the same principles as those applied by the EEC was not accepted by the Committee although, in finally submitting its 133rd report to Councils, it explained the reasons for its inability to adopt the Secretaries-General's proposals.

Owing to the delay incurred in finding an agreed adjustment procedure, the Secretaries-General proposed that, as an interim measure, an advance should be granted to staffs to meet cost-of-living increases between 1st January and 30th June 1976. While ready to accord 100 % of the cost-of-living increase to B and C grades the Committee could only agree that A and L grade staff should be granted 60 % of the

increase during that period on an ad hoc basis and conditional upon the Councils' prior approval of the 133rd report.

The elaboration of practical provisions for implementing the tax arrangements to be applied to the pension scheme also gave rise to problems owing to the highly complex and widely differing taxation systems applied in the twenty-six member countries of the co-ordinated organisations.

As stated in paragraph 2 of the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 287, the Co-ordinating Committee is currently discussing the question of joint management of the pension scheme within the context of each organisation's estimated staff requirements to operate the scheme. Developments have not yet reached the state to give detailed consideration to the Assembly's idea for the creation of a legally endowed body to be responsible for the management and payment of pensions.

The Co-ordinating Committee decided, in the course of 1976, to set up a working group to review the system of allowances, in particular the expatriation allowance. The working group had not completed its studies by the end of 1976.

A new departure, during 1976, was the admission of a delegation from the Standing Committee of Staff Associations to meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee whenever the interests of staff were directly affected. Delegates are afforded the opportunity to express their views.

F. WEU Staff Association

The WEU Staff Association has, through the Chairman of the Permanent Council, called the attention of member governments to the deep concern of staff over the delays in approving the pensions system and in introducing a procedure for the adjustment of salaries.

1. The 133rd, 134th and 135th reports were approved by the Council in January and February 1977.

APPENDIX

Summary of WEU main budget for 1976

	A *	B *	C *	Total B + C
	£	Frs.	Frs.	Frs.
Salaries and allowances	591,510	5,239,270	11,549,010	16,788,280
Travel	15,245	72,700	297,400	370,100
Other operating costs	70,995	349,200	423,120	772,320
Purchase of furniture, etc.	1,915	13,000	20,800	33,800
Buildings	—	—	—	—
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	679,665	5,674,170	12,290,330	17,964,500
WEU tax	192,635	1,771,220	3,925,820	5,697,040
Other receipts	3,750	21,200	34,960	56,160
TOTAL INCOME	196,385	1,792,420	3,960,780	5,753,200
NET TOTAL	483,280	3,881,750	8,329,550	12,211,300

National contributions called for under the WEU main budget for 1976

	600ths	£	F. frs.
Belgium	59	47,522.53	1,200,777.84
France	120	96,656.00	2,442,260.00
Germany	120	96,656.00	2,442,260.00
Italy	120	96,656.00	2,442,260.00
Luxembourg	2	1,610.94	40,704.32
Netherlands	59	47,522.53	1,200,777.84
United Kingdom	120	96,656.00	2,442,260.00
TOTAL	600	483,280.00	12,211,300.00

* A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Armaments Control Agency.

Summary of WEU main budget for 1977

	A *	B *	C *	Total B + C
	£	Frs.	Frs.	Frs.
Salaries and allowances	709,165	5,814,370	12,677,220	18,491,590
Travel	19,645	86,000	335,300	421,300
Other operating costs	80,865	370,500	449,800	820,300
Purchase of furniture, etc.	3,395	10,500	19,400	29,900
Buildings	—	—	—	—
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	813,070	6,281,370	13,481,720	19,763,090
WEU tax	237,430	2,006,850	4,337,700	6,344,550
Other receipts	5,800	31,200	54,960	86,160
TOTAL INCOME	243,230	2,038,050	4,392,660	6,430,710
NET TOTAL	569,840	4,243,320	9,089,060	13,332,380

National contributions called for under the WEU main budget for 1977

	600ths	£	F. frs.
Belgium	59	56,034.27	1,311,017.37
France	120	113,968.00	2,666,476.00
Germany	120	113,968.00	2,666,476.00
Italy	120	113,968.00	2,666,476.00
Luxembourg	2	1,899.46	44,441.26
Netherlands	59	56,034.27	1,311,017.37
United Kingdom	120	113,968.00	2,666,476.00
TOTAL	600	569,840.00	13,332,380.00

* A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Armaments Control Agency.

Application of the final act of the CSCE

REPORT¹

**submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Mr. Segre, Rapporteur**

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1. Adopted in Committee by 17 votes to 1 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mrs. von Bothmer (Chairman); Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Abens, Amrehn, Ariosto, Beith (Alternate: McNamara), Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Brugnon (Alternate: Forni), Cermolacce, Faulds (Alternate: Lewis), Gessner (Alternate:

Schwencke), Mrs. Godinache-Lambert, MM. Gonella (Alternate: Pecoraro), Grangier (Alternate: Rivière), von Hassel, Leynen, Mende, Minnacci, Nessler, de Niet, Peijnenburg, Péridier, Porthoine (Alternate: Voogd), Segre, Urwin-Van Hoeylandt.

N. B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on the application of the final act of the CSCE

The Assembly,

Considering that the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe held in Helsinki opened the way for a process which is intended to lead towards international peace, freedom of peoples and the fulfilment of human rights ;

Considering that the development of this process will inevitably be slow but that a start has been made ;

Considering that in each field jointly-planned developments must be acceptable to all ;

Considering that the maintenance of the alliances is essential for the preservation of balance and peace in Europe ;

Considering that the achievement of a further step towards détente at the Belgrade meeting is essential for the pursuit of the process started in Helsinki ;

Considering that such a stage cannot be completed unless all the participants are firmly determined to achieve positive results,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue to examine the preparation and conduct of the Belgrade meeting in parallel with the other intergovernmental consultative bodies ;
2. As a priority, endeavour to promote the process of détente with a view to improving understanding and co-operation between European States ;
3. Respect in all events and promote respect for the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of every State defined in Helsinki ;
4. Carefully prepare the measures necessary for adapting the defence policies and strategies of member countries to the new situation ;
5. Ensure that member countries apply all the principles laid down in Helsinki and ask the Eastern European countries to pursue a similar policy.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Segre, Rapporteur)

I

1. The heat of the ongoing debate preliminary to the follow-up conference at Belgrade between the countries signatories to the final act of the Helsinki conference, and the very fluidity of the situation, render difficult, in the Rapporteur's view, the presentation at the present juncture of any preliminary draft report capable of providing with a sufficient degree of approximation a snapshot of the situation that will arise when the WEU Assembly is called upon next June to pronounce a substantive opinion. In the words of Mr. Kurt Waldheim, Secretary-General of the United Nations, we are in fact "in a period of transition and uncertainty". There are many variable factors on the international scene. Among the more important, mention should be made of the international running-in of the new Carter Administration and developments in the SALT II negotiations. Other factors play an important rôle such as the strife in Africa, the continuing Middle East crisis and the question of civil rights. The first meeting between the two great powers in Moscow, immediately after the American elections, was a failure. However, both parties hastened to underline that this was just a mishap not to be interpreted as a change of policy and discreet contacts were immediately established in order better to prepare the talks to be held by Mr. Vance and Mr. Gromyko in Geneva in May.

"I do not think", said Mr. Waldheim, "that this incident can bring détente to a halt... Both the Americans and the Russians are still just as interested in continuing the policy of détente."

2. It is clear that the state of American-Soviet relations has and will have far-reaching repercussions on the state of international relations and consequently on the preparation and work of the Belgrade conference. Hence the present uncertainty. It is impossible to foresee the length of this "period of transition and uncertainty". Rather than go back over the controversies of that period and the points of view which have been and still are decisive, your Rapporteur feels he should try to bring out the basic tendencies and then highlight the other recurring variables which must not be overlooked or underestimated. The main constant is still the conviction that there is no rational alternative to the policy of détente and peaceful coexistence, although there may be adjustments and differences in approach compared with other years. Thus it can be seen that there have been pauses and difficult periods, but it is not realistic

today to expect this universal awareness of a common destiny which in so many respects has been a feature of recent years to be seriously challenged or undermined. Admittedly, each time relations between the two superpowers enter a difficult stage, the first negative consequence is the breach in the barriers which had been raised against the Manichean habit, characteristic of the cold-war period, of considering international questions not on a rational basis but primarily in ideological terms and, in extreme cases, from a purely propaganda point of view. A hint of such a phenomenon, fortunately not yet general, has also been ascertained in recent weeks. To believe certain newspapers in both East and West, we seem to have gone back to the fifties. But an immediate denial has been reported — after the failure of the Moscow talks — in statements by the leaders of both countries who are convinced that, while it is difficult to build up confidence, it is easy to restore mistrust, with the evident negative consequences which this implies. To quote a correct methodological viewpoint given recently (March 1977) in a Soviet review, *New Times* :

"The question of confidence is most delicate. Decades of hostility and opposition have created stereotypes in East and West which judge each other primarily through the prism of mistrust. At the beginning, détente was in a sort of vicious circle: mistrust stood in the way of constructive talks and the absence of results prevented mistrust being overcome. The circle has been broken thanks to political lucidity and, perhaps, the political courage of those who were able to resist the inertial force of the cold war and progress towards détente."

3. It is now a matter of preventing a return to the vicious circle and avoiding a repetition of the state of affairs in which mistrust would stand in the way of constructive negotiations and the absence of results would not allow mistrust to be overcome. In a "period of transition and uncertainty" in international relations, and as the Belgrade conference draws near, this appears to be the central issue. It obviously includes an objective analysis of what Helsinki has produced to date, and as realistic an assessment as possible of the process which started with the CSCE.

II

4. It is a concrete fact, in the current international situation, especially in Europe, that we find ourselves, in this preparatory phase of

the Belgrade conference, at one of those critical moments (exaggerated as it may be in the present state of affairs to speak of an actual crisis) which recurred on several occasions during the years and the months which preceded the conclusion of the final act in Helsinki during the summer of 1975 and, time and again, called into question, more in form than in substance, the process of détente which has, for almost the past ten years now, been at work throughout our continent. For, let it be asseverated right at the outset of this report, what is at issue is not some casual occurrence but a long-term process, with all the typical complexities and contradictions which this sometimes implies, including even its moments of standstill and backsliding. A process which, for all that, seems fated to set its mark on the whole of Europe's political, economic and social development. While this undoubtedly throws up very knotty problems of the relationship between this evolutionary process and that of other world regions and other continents, it should nevertheless be clear to everyone, even to those who now have the profoundest doubts about the progress of détente, that the only alternative hypothesis would carry with it dramatic consequences for the future of the European continent.

5. Over and above the polemics that have marked the past weeks, the belief that this is the case still continues to emerge sufficiently clearly from the pronouncements of the principal statesmen responsible for international affairs.

"I think that détente does exist today", said the new United States Secretary of State, Mr. Vance, at a press conference on 4th March, "and I believe and hope that it will continue to exist".

6. With particular reference to American-Russian relations, he went on to say :

"I note a continuing, deep and abiding interest in the Soviet Union and among Soviet leaders for pursuing with us the questions relating to arms control, particularly in the nuclear area, and in a variety of other matters."

7. On the prospects for détente in United States-Soviet Union relations, he added :

"I think it is in the interest of both of our nations to search for common ground, and to lessen the tensions which divide the nations. In this process, I think it is necessary to try and work out a clear understanding of what the meaning of détente is as between the two nations. In a sense, it is the setting down or arriving at a set of ground rules which permit competition side-by-side with the resolution of outstanding questions. And it is not, again, a simple

task. It is one that has to be worked out by discussion and by action ; and I hope that as we get into closer dialogue on a face-to-face basis, we may develop a clearer understanding amongst us of what will be acceptable conduct on both sides."

8. In this manner Mr. Vance seemed to be replying to some of the assurances and pledges given, in his latest public speech (Tula, 18th January), by Leonid Brezhnev :

"Statements to the effect that the Soviet Union is going further than necessary for its defence and aiming at arms supremacy so as to be able to 'get in the first strike', are absurd and absolutely groundless. Our policy is not aimed at arms supremacy but at reduction of armaments, attenuation of warlike confrontation."

9. Among other things he said that "détente is a specific trust, and the ability to take account of one another's legitimate interests".

10. Indeed, the ability to take account of one another's legitimate interests is the central and trickiest crux of a balanced relationship that is undoubtedly never assured once and for all, but has to be constantly reaffirmed through a dialectic, an antagonism that has certainly never vanished from the international scene.

11. In this connection, the United States President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, recently remarked that :

"The ideological as well as political conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union will go on for a long time but we should strive to moderate it gradually. To achieve that moderation both co-operation as well as vigilance will be necessary. Consequently, the maintenance of a strong American military deterrent is a necessary precondition for a stable and increasingly comprehensive as well as reciprocal détente — a détente which will remain both competitive as well as co-operative."

12. Indeed, it is now plain that we have once more arrived at a difficult point in time for achieving such a balance of relations, not least by reason of the fact that the United States and its Democrat Administration have announced that concern for civil and human rights throughout the world "will be threaded through our foreign policy" (Vance). The Secretary of State was asked : "Do you have a rule in your mind at what point does legitimate concern with human rights in other countries become unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of another country, either adversary or ally?", and his reply was : "There is no precise black-and-white rule that I can set down. It is a much

more complicated process than that. It is a balancing process." The point of equilibrium has still to be reached, and most likely never will be once and for all, which is precisely one of the reasons for the uncertainty that currently looms over the international outlook. Yet the proceedings in Geneva of the United Nations Commission for Human Rights indicate and confirm how seriously the diplomacy of the various countries is engaged in this search for an equilibrium.

III

13. It is necessary here — because it forms part of the ongoing debate between governments and political forces on what the follow-up conference in Belgrade should be about — to refer back to the final act of Helsinki and what may be termed its philosophy. In this context, it is practically impossible to review all the elements of the debate (and of the controversies) which in recent months have mainly been concerned with the importance accorded to the campaign for civil rights in American foreign policy and also the East's reactions to actions and signs which have been interpreted as pure and simple interference in internal affairs. Consequently, there is a wall of misunderstanding and mistrust and a growing and bitter confrontation of ideologies and internal propaganda around the correct interpretation of the Helsinki final act and its three baskets, the provisions of which, on the one hand, ban (section I, paragraph VI) "any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations" and, on the other, stipulate (section I, paragraph VII) that :

"The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development."

14. Not only since Helsinki but for far longer, there have been discussions the world over to determine where intervention in the internal affairs of another State actually starts. An accurate answer has never been found. There is a margin of interpretation which always and above all depends on the state of relations and hence of confidence between the various countries. This margin of interpretation also applies to the Helsinki final act which, as a declaration of intention and not a treaty, makes no provision

for penalties against defaulting contracting parties. It nevertheless sets a precedent in international law since it is central to matters concerning relations between States and also their domestic affairs. This makes it difficult to find and define an appropriate code of conduct. The ensuing discussion included comments on the existence of a degree of contradiction noted by several commentators in the general principles of the Helsinki final act between the said section VI establishing the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the participating States and section VII calling for respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The contradiction, if it does in fact exist, stems from the real state of international political relations on which the Helsinki act was erected ; what we must realise above all is that the contradiction can only be resolved by maintaining and fostering the process of détente, and in any case only in the longer prospect. Your Rapporteur thinks it obvious that violations of such rights are committed in both East and West. President Carter's comment at his press conference on 23rd February is significant in this respect. He said :

"We have, I think, a responsibility and a legal right to express our disapproval of violations of human rights. The Helsinki agreement, so called basket III provisions, ensures that some of these human rights shall be preserved. We are signatory to the Helsinki agreement. We are, ourselves, culpable in some ways for not giving people adequate right to move around our country, or restricting unnecessarily in my opinion visitation to this country by those who disagree with us politically."

15. It is, on the other hand, an incontrovertible fact that what has caught the notice of public opinion in recent months has been chiefly new items emanating from some of the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, and reflecting a great variety of situations and behaviours in a context which, while demonstrating, to say the least, the continuance of "contradictions and limitations which have so far prevented those societies from achieving that full measure of freedom, democracy and participation which is an essential characteristic of the socialist ideal" (Enrico Berlinguer, Secretary-General of the Italian Communist Party), also indicates, with due allowance for exceptions, that things are no longer the same as they were in the 1950s. With respect to that period there has moreover been a growing demand on all sides for democracy and effective participation in decision-making. This is as true of the East as it is of the West, within the framework of the deep-seated processes which are everywhere at work.

16. It is plain to most observers that this has also, and largely, depended upon (a) the new climate of international relations that has set in

with the transition from the cold war to détente, (b) the new interdependencies that have been growing up in the contemporary world, (c) the weight and influence of a public opinion that lives in an ever-smaller and intercommunicating world. These are factual circumstances to which every country is, and will increasingly find itself, compelled to pay heed, whether it likes it or not, given the interconnections which exist in effect between its own internal behaviour and its external relations, and more generally between its own behaviour and the prospects ahead for détente. This had led to the growing conviction, particularly in Europe, about the nature of the process for applying the Helsinki agreements and the fact that détente, apart from being essential to coexistence in the world, is also the necessary framework for gaining major sectors of democracy and freedom within each of the individual countries.

17. It is not merely a question of Helsinki. International pacts on civil and political rights and on economic, social and cultural rights had already been approved even before the conference on security and co-operation in Europe (and have often not yet been ratified by the United States and many western countries). The various articles of these pacts define a perfect world, a sort of radiant city, very remote in any event from circumstances in any given country. "The right to employment is a human right", said the communiqué of the conference of European Social Democrat parties and trade union organisations held in Oslo from 1st to 3rd April 1977. Nothing would be easier than an exchange of accusations and counter-accusations between the various States about their respective abuses, for instance as regards the application (or non-ratification) of the two pacts endorsed unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly at its meeting on 16th December 1966. But such a performance would bring us neither civil and political rights nor economic, social and cultural rights. The only real result — in a world formed of countries destined to live together in peace, to co-operate and to solve common problems — would be to unleash a spirit of crusades. Mistrust, not confidence, would govern relations between States, with all the serious consequences that involves. It is therefore evident that the discussion in recent months — although it has undeniably had its bitter moments — has certainly not been useless and will perhaps have a positive influence on the preparation and conduct of the Belgrade conference. This discussion is indeed an important stage in an overall process and of more detailed thinking about all the complex interdependent features of the world today which the Helsinki final act in fact confirmed. As one of the principal representatives of christian-democracy in Italy, Luigi Granelli, head of the party's international office and former Under-Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs, recently remarked, it is essential, in view of the complexity of this process "to take any action which would avoid culpable inaction or sterile provocation : ... to do this, and we say so quite clearly, we oppose those who, under the illusion of better defending their own convictions, may suddenly revert to the logic of the Manichean struggle between East and West, ultimatums, demonstrations of force, in short, to the more or less covert spirit of the cold war... And for the very reason that we must firmly uphold the right of the opponents, we must not maintain a complacent silence, which would amount to complicity, but act", added the representative of the christian-democrats, "with determination and a sense of measure in calling for respect for the principles of human rights adopted in Helsinki and upheld by the United Nations Charter. At the same time we must avoid provocation or pure propaganda which might bring a few short-lived results which would soon come back like a boomerang". Indeed, "the return to inflexible opposition between the two blocs, a split between the United States and the Soviet Union, the abandonment of dialogue and of the search for understanding" would impede any possibility of positive developments either in international relations or in each country progressively gaining ever wider areas of freedom and democracy. Fairly similar opinions were expressed at the meeting of Socialist and Social-Democrat Parties in Amsterdam on 16th and 17th April 1977 to review implementation of the Helsinki final act and consider prospects for Belgrade. *Inter alia*, it is stated in the final communiqué that :

"Abuses of human rights, wherever in the world they occur, should be met by adequate action.

The member parties of the Socialist International do not see any contrast between these efforts and the policy of détente. Therefore they are opposed to conservative forces putting into danger in the name of human rights what has been initiated in the field of humanitarian reliefs by the policy of détente."

18. The need for "the full application, by all States, of all the provisions of the final act of the Helsinki conference" and for "positive work at the Belgrade meeting" was also stressed recently by the Secretaries-General of the Italian, French and Spanish Communist Parties when they met in Madrid on 2nd-3rd March.

19. In short, in Western Europe, there is now a major convergence of political forces of various leanings on the fundamental difficulties raised by the approach to problems arising since the Helsinki conference and prior to the Belgrade meeting. This is a political fact whose importance must not be underestimated.

20. And here we come to the real difficulty : on the eve of the Belgrade conference, the dialectical relation between (a) the process set in train at Helsinki, (b) the satisfactory or unsatisfactory state of its progress (and here, to be able to give an overall picture, the analysis will have to determine how far the contracting States have "paid due regard", unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally, to the provisions of the final act), and (c) the best way to be taken, at the follow-up conference in Belgrade and more generally in intergovernmental relations in general, to ensure that the process can come to full fruition in a climate of trust. Hence, it is obvious that an appraisal of the status of implementation of the Helsinki act, critical to be sure, but historically, indeed historically balanced, is one of the factors that can contribute effectively to the promotion of co-operation and détente.

IV

21. In the face of such a factual situation, in that part of Europe in which we are chiefly interested, i.e. Western Europe, two substantially diametrically-opposed attitudes have emerged. One, advocated by a minority, starts from the postulate that the Soviet Union has now emerged upon the international scene not merely as a superpower in its global characteristics but as a country nurturing more or less overt intentions of seeking world dominion. For countries endorsing this view the policy of détente would therefore be, for the Soviet Union, a mere tactical expedient having as its object to lull the western democracies into a false sense of security and make them drop their guard, thus enabling the USSR to achieve the more easily its imperialistic ends. The result is a deeply-pessimistic evaluation of the Helsinki act as such and of the initial phase of its implementation, an emphasis on the latest Soviet policy for nuclear and conventional armaments, a refusal to develop East-West economic co-operation, a highly polemical denunciation of the non-application by the socialist countries of the provisions of the third basket, and a substantial opposition to any broadening or stabilisation of the policy erected around the Helsinki act. In short, the upshot is a unilateral appreciation ignoring, to such an extent as to turn it completely inside out, the example provided by the difficult and laborious process at work in Spain, and the responsibility of the attitudes taken by the various countries and political formations towards it.

V

22. The alternative hypothesis starts from the premise that Europe is now, and probably will for a long time to come remain, in a situation

characterised by the existence of two blocs (inside which at present the United States and the Soviet Union objectively play a dominant rôle, if only by reason of their own specific weight) and a great many neutral and non-aligned countries. Simply taking note of this reality means regarding the European situation not solely in terms of a bipolarity and recognising the greater room for autonomy and initiative which, at any rate in the abstract, the progress of détente opens up for the various countries. Yet nonetheless the two alliances, of the Atlantic and Warsaw Pacts, still constitute the principal factor in the pattern of post-war Europe. The dominant trend in recent years, in a Europe organised with sufficient stability to stand up to a confrontation not involving any conflicts, has been to go beyond the idea, still very obvious for reasons we do not propose to go into here, that we are all strangers to each other. In short, what is proposed is to endeavour, by accepting the process begun at Helsinki, to introduce more normal relations between Eastern and Western Europe, better able to take account of human factors in a new spirit of co-operation, to the benefit of both sides. This interpretation, which of course lays stress on the overriding importance of the political aspect, carries as a corollary a continuing search to find common ground for co-operation, and as a premise, based on compulsory reciprocity, maximum good faith in implementing "measures aimed at increasing mutual trust". While the criteria for determining the degree of respect and activation of the provisions of the final act may differ and these criteria are themselves at present a bone of contention, your Rapporteur believes it is clear that this kind of approach is capable not so much of "saving Helsinki" (for in fact, and luckily, it has not yet come to that), as of allowing the CSCE to realise in future, and more and more as time goes on, all its great potentialities. Hence the fact that :

"At the meeting of representatives of the CSCE participating States to be held in mid-June 1977 at Belgrade, it will not be a question of fending off accusations, but first and foremost of ascertaining what it has been possible to put in train on the lines of the common resolutions, and secondly, of examining what can, more realistically, more quickly and more rationally, be attempted." (Willy Brandt)

23. Developing this viewpoint in his opening speech at the conference of Socialist and Social-Democrat Parties in Amsterdam on 16th April, Willy Brandt added :

"The chances of détente must not necessarily be considered with pessimism ; on the contrary, dangerous errors of appreciation must be fought and illusory ideas opposed.

The policy of détente has never sought to eliminate differences between States and types of society in East and West. Now as before, it is far more a matter of learning to live with these differences, abolishing or mastering possible tension and at the same time developing fields of joint interest. The policy of détente and the defence of human rights are not contradictory. If we do not manage to eliminate tension, thereby making peace more stable, it is not worthwhile or possible to talk seriously about human rights. Reference to human rights is then merely a slogan and ineffective if it moves too far from reality. Anyone who nurtures illusions about the policy of détente does not help to ensure peace but encourages an atmosphere of insecurity, instability and tension."

24. On the prospects of Belgrade, Willy Brandt noted in the same speech that it was necessary to :

"pursue what was started in 1975 through European co-operation. The Belgrade conference is certainly not intended to add to the already ambitious Helsinki catalogue.

All participating States must naturally have an opportunity of expressing critical opinions in the context of this provisional review. To this end, a sufficiently clear picture must be obtained of the positive developments noted since Helsinki, particularly in the humanitarian field. But in Belgrade the representatives of the thirty-five governments concerned would not get very far if they were asked to put each other on trial as if they were in court.

One thing to be attempted must be to define two or three concrete tasks under a few major headings. These projects, which would encourage closer co-operation, might be launched in the economic field to solve the problems of energy and raw materials supplies, in the field of environmental policy and transport."

VI

25. To attempt to define more precisely the areas in which one or other of the alternative hypotheses prevails, it would have to be acknowledged (with all the defects always inherent in any generalisation, and all the natural shifts of emphasis and concept) that the governments of Western Europe, in general, espouse the second hypothesis in the context of an effort, whose importance should be underlined, with a view to preventing the Helsinki process becoming bogged down and seeking the bases and broad lines of its subsequent development. In view of

the relations between them, particular attention should be paid to the EEC countries and the neutral and non-aligned countries.

26. A few examples will suffice to demonstrate this orientation.

27. In the case of *France*, the declarations by the Prime Minister, Mr. Barre (16th March), define the principles which guide government action :

"Détente is a lengthy process which will inevitably encounter difficulties. But we still consider it to be the only means of tackling opposition between blocs and avoiding a split between countries with different social systems... As for the long-term prospects of détente, no country is more attached to it than France which, since the beginning of the last decade, has made it one of the essential bases of its foreign policy."

28. Referring to the new American leaders, Mr. Barre then said :

"We trust that, without prejudice or dogmatism, they will view the world as it is. They will see that each country has its problems, its interests, its policy, and that if each one's independence and dignity is respected, there is every chance that the international co-operation which the world needs will be intensified."

29. All these views were subsequently developed more fully by President Giscard d'Estaing in his televised talk on 12th April, during which he gave some interesting indications about France's general attitude. *Inter alia*, the French President said with regard to political and methodological problems :

"First, what is our concept of the policy of détente which is being talked about ? For me, the policy of détente is an effort to improve relations between countries of East and West, accepting their reciprocal existence on a basis of equality. Fundamentally, therefore, the policy of détente is an attempt to improve relations between the countries of East and West. It is not a policy for the ideological conquest of the West by the East or of the East by the West. To this policy of détente, which calls for patience since it aims at improving relations, are to be added certain fundamental concerns which for us are human rights and application of the Helsinki agreement.

First, where human rights are concerned, I would remind you that France, in all its fundamental texts, in its constitution, insists on the recognition of human rights, freedom in all its forms and the full exercise thereof, and when President Carter wishes to intro-

duce a clearer and stronger affirmation of human rights into world politics, he will find an active part being played by France. Then there are the Helsinki agreements, in which a number of principles are laid down. They were laid down by all the countries which signed the agreements, including the Soviet Union. I brought the Helsinki agreement with me, thinking this question would be raised. It reads as follows: 'The participating States' — and thus the Soviet Union — 'will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development.' And a little further on the agreement reads: 'They confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field.' France therefore considers that application of the Helsinki agreements does in fact include the exercise of civil rights and freedoms and France will express or recall this each time there is a question of applying the Helsinki agreements. In this connection, France disapproves of action which seeks to ill-treat or persecute individuals or groups of individuals because they are urging their countries to apply the agreements. You asked whether, in view of this attitude, France — and I myself — should receive a specific individual, from the Soviet Union or another country, who considers he is being persecuted. There are relations between States and personal relations. Where relations between States are concerned, France will continue to stress the need to recognise the effective exercise of freedoms. If freedoms are not exercised, it will pass judgment accordingly. Conversely, it will not intervene in particular situations within other States. Why not? First, because we would not agree to others taking such action towards us. How would the French people react if, with regard to a trial or contestation, the leaders of another State were to express opinions on the position of a French citizen? We would not accept it. Second, we will not do so because I am not sure that it is the most effective way of encouraging respect for human rights and freedom. I can tell you that each time we have an opportunity, with the principal leaders of the eastern countries, we raise and solve personal problems, i.e. persons wishing to leave their country or families wishing to be reunited or situations to which our attention has been drawn because they are distressing, and we solve a large number of problems.

Conversely, to want to intervene in public in particular cases is imagining that by

doing so a country such as the Soviet Union can be made to go back on its own decisions. Those who know the Soviet Union know that it would consider this a setback or humiliation and it is not by such methods that the problems arising will be solved."

30. He subsequently made his own thoughts clear in the following terms:

"To revert to what I was saying earlier, détente is not a means of conquering each other but of improving relations by recognising the existence of both sides in present circumstances. Of course we stand by our ideology and attachment to our political and economic system. We know the same is true for the Soviet Union. We are not trying to make use of this occasion to substitute our's for their's, nor the contrary; we are trying to improve our relations in the world of today. I believe that, in view of the considerable threat to humanity from nuclear means — we shall not have time to speak about this — because of the volume of armaments, détente must continue to be the course to be followed in our efforts."

31. In the case of the *Federal Republic of Germany*, Chancellor Schmidt, on 17th February, commented on the prospects for Belgrade in the following terms:

"There, a kind of interim balance-sheet will be drawn up of what Helsinki has actually achieved. On this occasion, the Soviet Union is likely to put forward three proposals, for international conferences on the environment, transport and energy. Possibly conferences on other topics will be proposed by the West. But Belgrade ought not to become an occasion for confrontation, as the CDU would like it to be. Such mischievous talk can only be indulged in by members of the opposition who have no responsibility of office."

32. More recently, in a speech in Amsterdam on 16th April during the conference of Socialist and Social-Democrat Parties, Chancellor Schmidt *inter alia* summed up the position of the Federal Government towards the trend of East-West relations since the Helsinki conference as follows:

"1. The Helsinki agreements represent a tremendous progress compared to the situation thirty years ago. While their implementation has not yet produced satisfactory results, there have already been positive consequences for Europe, i.e. with regard to economic co-operation and the reunification of families.

2. However, governments must recognise that there is still a danger of the dialogue on détente becoming bogged down.

Development of the policy of force in other parts of the world confronts the process of détente with other problems. Africa, the Indian Ocean and other regions must not remain outside the attempt to eliminate tension. It is essential to maintain the dialogue on détente and to deepen and enlarge it geographically.

3. The Belgrade follow-up conference could be a major intermediary stage. The thirty-five governments should adopt as their intermediary aim support for the joint decision taken in Helsinki to renounce solving disputes by means of arms. The western bloc must be careful not to play the rôle of public prosecutor and leave itself open to a situation in which it would only react to proposals emanating from communist States. A joint western position can be discussed beforehand with member and non-aligned countries.

4. In the long run, the discussion on human rights will play a capital rôle in the ideological confrontation between democratic and communist societies. The true meaning of the policy of détente is to ensure respect for human dignity. To this extent, there is no contradiction between the policy of détente and action in favour of human rights. This trend should not therefore be compromised by verbal violence; the discussion should be conducted so as to ensure the maximum chance of success for the individuals concerned.

5. Détente is a long-term process whose two main aims are :

- progressively to defuse hostilities ;
- to bring together the elements for better co-operation, for instance in the economy, production and trade, energy policy, raw materials supplies or environment policy."

33. Certain statements by the SPD's spokesman for foreign affairs, Mr. Horst Ehmke, during the debate in the Bundestag on 19th January, are also significant :

"But let everybody be clear that at Helsinki far-reaching measures were laid down that it will take a great deal of patience to implement. The Helsinki resolutions are only two years old. The EEC treaties are twenty years old, and even these have not yet been fully applied. Helsinki is no legal instrument whose execution can be enforced. It is the starting point of an arduous political process in Europe."

34. Still more recently (6th April), Mr. Ehmke said :

"The Federal Republic must now make an active contribution to avoiding a return to East-West confrontation and allowing the two great powers to pursue their policy of détente in Europe."

35. In the case of the *United Kingdom*, the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. David Owen, having noted in a speech on 3rd March that "the present relationship is essentially unstable. It still carries the risk of miscalculation and disaster. We have to reduce this risk", underlined "the Jekyll and Hyde nature of détente — competition on the one hand, co-operation on the other" and described the outlook as follows :

"Public opinion in the West has tended to display an increasing scepticism both towards the final act and by extension towards the process of détente itself. But it is equally true that some of this scepticism and disappointment has been misconceived, and that expectations have outstripped by far the limits of what détente could have reasonably delivered.

For while détente has substantial achievements to its credit, the process started from a low threshold and represents to date only a limited, though vitally important, accommodation in Europe and between the superpowers. We are witnessing the early stages of this process, not its culmination. Détente has solved some of the most urgent and obvious problems in East/West relations and it has established a basic framework for the solution of those which remain. But there is still a long way to go.

The blunt truth is that the first and easier stage of détente is over. The issues which are today on the agenda of East/West relations are more complex, more contentious and far more intractable. We are beginning to encroach on fundamental attitudes on human behaviour, and the issues go to the heart of each side's perception of itself and its interests. Inevitably we cannot expect to maintain the momentum of the early 1970s.

This makes it all the more important that we should be realistic. Détente on its own could not, and was never intended to, stop the Soviet Union from being a world power, still less to convert the Russians and their allies from communism. Already in the last century it was clear that it was only a matter of time before a country of the size, population and resources of Russia emerged as a global power. Any idea that détente could or should have reversed this process is absurd. The basic premise from which we in the West must start is that the Soviet Union is a world power with national interests and ambitions to match, which

inevitably bring it into competition, and sometimes confrontation, with the West. To this we must add that communist ideology invests the natural rivalry between East and West with a dynamic of unceasing struggle.

Détente is an immensely complex process, comprising innumerable strands and relationships on different levels: political dialogue, commercial and technological exchange, cultural contacts, ideological debate and military vigilance. There is no magic formula which will enable us, East or West, to strike the right balance in our relations at all times. Both sides are still feeling their way. All we can say is that balance there must be between the elements of confrontation and co-operation, whether we are talking of the détente process as a whole or of its constituent parts.

These considerations apply with particular force to the Helsinki final act. While the act marked an important stage in the development of co-operative relations between East and West, there is no denying that several of its provisions contain the seeds of confrontation.

It is important therefore that we should clearly understand its significance. The final act is not a treaty which has given the sanction of international law to the status quo in Europe. It is, on the contrary, a declaration of purpose which looks to the future, not to the past. It provides specifically for peaceful change. Its value is fundamentally long-term: as a charter and code of behaviour for what we hope will in time become a more normal and open relationship between both governments and peoples in East and West. It reflects détente's highest aspirations.

Anyone judging the final act in terms of quantifiable, concrete results, would conclude that progress so far has been extremely limited. But the government never expected the provisions of the final act to be implemented immediately or all at once. Those in this country who have already dismissed the final act as not worth the paper on which it is written are at best short-sighted, at worst all too ready to substitute short-term political rhetoric for long-term political progress. In pressing for the implementation of the final act, we are in many areas dealing with entrenched attitudes which in the nature of things will not change overnight. But recent events in Europe have shown that the final act has already begun to be an inspiration and a point of reference for those who want to see their societies evolve peacefully and constitutionally in a more open direction."

36. The Prime Minister, James Callaghan, in turn defined Britain's position in a speech to the conference of Socialist and Social-Democrat Parties on 17th April:

"You will see that Britain looks towards Belgrade with a determination that it should be a further positive development of détente. We shall not go there to win propaganda victories, but to have a businesslike and constructive discussion if at all possible. We do not nurse expectations which are too high — of what can be achieved at Belgrade. We are both realistic and patient. European security and co-operation is essentially a long-term process. Nevertheless we are convinced of the political importance of the Belgrade meeting for its long-term value in continuing the dialogue which has opened between East and West, and in emphasising the seriousness of the political commitment which all the signatory States have assumed. It will not be the task of the Belgrade meetings to rewrite or prejudice the final act. This remains a central and fundamental document, and we should satisfy ourselves that the final act is working effectively before we plan sequels or supplements to it. The implementation of the final act is a continuing process, and at Belgrade we shall be looking for steady and measured progress towards the equal implementation of all three baskets, which in our view constitute a balanced whole. I must point out that public opinion in Britain is concerned about the freer movement of peoples and ideas, and respect for human rights. We will draw attention at Belgrade to shortcomings where there is good evidence that they exist. We have never denied that abuses of human rights, wherever in the world they occur, are a legitimate subject of international concern. Concern for human rights — whether voiced at international fora like Belgrade or in private bilateral representations — is an integral part of British policy, and not a diversionary tactic, hastily conceived and as quickly forgotten. The CSCE process has already achieved a number of gains; it has opened a dialogue from which we work for improvements in many fields; it has enabled us to develop habits of co-operation; it is serving as a source of encouragement to those who seek to make their own societies more open. These gains, and the many opportunities which CSCE may provide us in the future, are not lightly to be abandoned. We in Britain attach real importance to the development of the CSCE process, and we intend to play an active rôle in the Belgrade meetings."

37. In the case of *Italy*, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Arnaldo Forlani, in statements in Strasbourg (28th January) and London (meeting

of EEC Foreign Ministers, 1st February), emphasised that :

“The principles of Helsinki cannot be implemented by the wave of a magic wand. Radically different institutional systems stand confronted : yet there is no lack of ferments at work and new developments indicating a possibility for evolution. These ferments will have greater possibility to mature the more we advance along the path of détente and collaboration, even if only on a sector-by-sector basis.”

38. Mr. Forlani remarked in London, of the exchange of persons and ideas between East and West, albeit in the context of a critical appraisal, that :

“There is, at certain levels in the USSR and other Eastern European countries, a new ferment at work allowing the tentative assertion of personal autonomy. This is possible for few people only, and carries with it very high risks : it is nevertheless a sign and indication that the path of discussions and negotiations may open upon some new gleams of hope... We should”, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs went on, “take this fact as a reason to go to Belgrade with a common attitude : clear, to be sure, on the invocation of principles, but also realistic and constructive as regards further progress on the road of détente, within a process of searching that can only be gradual and slow.”

Mr. Forlani also said, at that forum, that :

“The optimism of willpower must prevail over causes of pessimism. I think the conviction is steadily gaining ground that any hardening of the international situation would not only bring with it the grave perils that we already knew in the dark years of the cold war. It would also stifle, perhaps for good, the hopes we cherish of a gradual process of liberalisation in Eastern Europe... The way towards détente is narrow and rough, but is in any case the only one we can travel.

If we really want to arrive at a different relationship of trust, we must aim at achieving a balance of armed forces and weaponry at lower levels, and resume the nuclear disarmament talks between the United States and the USSR. Only if tangible results are achieved in this sense will the goal of general disarmament appear less utopian.”

39. In the case of *Finland*, the Prime Minister, Mr. Martti Miettunen, said :

“In the implementation of the principles of the final act of the European conference at Helsinki promising results have already been

achieved. To assist towards further progress, constant efforts must be exerted in all directions. To this end we should like the Belgrade follow-up conference to become a constructive phase in the same process, so vital for the peace and security of the nations. Maintenance of the positive spirit of collaboration should not be jeopardised by choosing to tread the path of exchanges of abuse. In my opinion the final act forms a single whole and is to be regarded as such throughout the implementation of its provisions.”

40. In the case of *Sweden*, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said in his report to the Riksdag on 30th March 1977 :

“The question at present arousing the greatest interest in international politics is that of the immediate prospects of détente. Efforts at détente have now been a feature of East-West relations for more than half a decade. Considering earlier relations, particularly during the cold war, the results achieved are significant. This does not mean that fundamental differences and suspicion between the great powers are no longer there. But a network of contacts has been established, the practice of exchanging views has developed and confidence has been strengthened and this should gradually lead to the realisation that security can be obtained by means other than a constant increase in armaments.”

41. On the preparation of the Belgrade conference, Sweden's position was defined as follows :

“The government is now carefully preparing its participation in the Belgrade meeting which, in accordance with a decision taken at the Helsinki conference almost two years ago, is to verify how the commitments entered into in the final act have been fulfilled and lay down guidelines for the pursuit of co-operation. These preparations are being made in close co-operation with other participating States, including in particular the Nordic countries and the group of neutral countries which, apart from Sweden, also includes Austria, Finland and Switzerland.

The Helsinki text sets out at length the undertakings and recommendations intended to promote co-operation in a host of fields and facilitate détente in the long term. The various parts of the text have an internal relationship and together form a balanced entity. The achievement of the aims which participating States set themselves means that they must move clearly and energetically in the agreed direction but with patience and caution. They have no reason

to conceal their feelings about the way a State, or group of States, fulfils its undertakings.

There is nothing to prevent them from criticising objectively situations which they consider contrary to these undertakings. Such criticism is obviously not contrary to the wish to pursue efforts towards détente and peaceful co-operation.

In the light of these considerations, Sweden believes that the Belgrade meeting should not be transformed into a forum for exchanging accusations and charges which might obscure the ultimate aim, the promotion of peace.

We shall endeavour to make the work at Belgrade look to the future. The Helsinki text provides a good basis. We hope that understanding will be established on this basis with a view to pursuing co-operation. *Inter alia*, we are considering submitting proposals to allow participating States to draw greater benefits from so-called confidence-building measures. The purpose of these measures is to give real information about certain troop movements and military manoeuvres so as to avoid any unjustified suspicion about their aim and direction.

We shall strive to ensure that the discussions in Belgrade on economic and cultural co-operation lead to real progress. We know that in this respect there are particular difficulties in the way of co-operation stemming from differences between systems applied in the various countries. But we feel that there will be sufficiently strong joint interest to allow agreement to be reached on certain worthwhile measures. It might be a matter of affording greater facilities for economic contacts between the partners, opening the way for a wider exchange of information and more widespread reporting by the mass media or allowing countries to become better acquainted, in a free manner, with their respective cultures.

In this connection, it is particularly important to be able to continue work to reunite divided families. This work is closely connected with the destiny of individuals. We shall persevere in finding solutions for cases still unsolved and for new cases which arise.

Much attention will be paid at the Belgrade meeting to matters affecting the protection of human rights. This is both natural and necessary. We have great sympathy for those who are subjected to humiliation and persecution because they wish to express their opinions on matters concerning the community, for instance, because they wish

to practise their religion because they wish to meet and work together for political, trade union or other aims. We admire the heroism of those who are fighting for these fundamental freedoms in Eastern Europe. Pursuit of the process of détente lies in governments' respect for and satisfaction of individual needs and rights. That is why we consider that criticism of the violation of human rights is beneficial rather than harmful to détente.

The Helsinki final act specifically mentions the connection between protecting human rights and developing peaceful relations between States. When, by statements and measures, we endeavour to protect human rights, our action is not only beneficial to specific individuals; it also consolidates the foundations of peace.

But although this is our attitude, we must also ensure that our words and deeds have the desired effect and do not run counter to the goal sought. Our criticism must be such as not to jeopardise the cause we wish to defend. This balance is often difficult to achieve.

All countries are very sensitive about anything which might be considered as interference in their internal affairs. The fact that at international level human rights are no longer considered to be the exclusive concern of each separate State is naturally a very significant achievement."

42. For reasons of space, it is impossible to give a complete review of the judgments and orientations formulated in the different Western European capitals. One political-geographical exception must, however, be permitted, in order to illustrate the opinion of the government of the host country for the follow-up conference, *Yugoslavia*. The Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council, Anton Vratusa, wrote recently that :

"Over the past two years there has been discernible a favourable development in line with the final act of Helsinki. Such changes for the better are even more impressive if we compare current trends and relations in Europe with the situation prevailing in 1967 when, on the initiative of nine European countries, the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly was barely beginning to encourage regional action 'with a view to improving good-neighbourly relations among European countries having different social and political systems'."

He went on :

"It is all the more essential that the coming Belgrade conference should examine, as well

as the results of the activities deployed following adoption of the final act of the CSCE, the essential measures to be taken in order to liquidate more speedily any foci of crisis and causes of antagonistic division in Europe and the world, and ensure the progress of the processes initiated, of reconciliation among the nations and consolidation of peace. This is no time for vying with one another, for propaganda purposes, in denouncing *whatever some people have failed to do* in implementing the final act of Helsinki, but a time for conducting an honest and responsible analysis of what must be done in order for the democratic processes set in motion in Europe and the rest of the world by the Helsinki conference to be continued with as few impediments as possible, and lastingly consolidated. The final act of Helsinki forms a balanced whole, but is still a compromise. Consequently it cannot be implemented unless account is taken of the interests of all the participants. There can be no question of scrutinising the attitude of the participating States to any one particular basket, but only of surveying political security and economic and cultural relations as a whole, and the need for firmer reciprocal commitments guaranteeing continuity of effort. It would be no use judging things in a spirit of winners and losers. Everyone will be a winner if we resolutely address ourselves to removing the obstacles impeding free contacts between the independent peoples of Europe, and everyone will be a loser if we obstinately strengthen the exclusive attitudes and barriers of separate blocs. In that case the real loser is the cause of world peace and security, and the real winner the forces of violence and passion. Undoubtedly, by reducing the issue to one of the stance of individual members of the intellectual élite of one country or another, we distract attention from the big, urgent, socio-economic and political problems, a settlement of which is a prerequisite for the achievement of democratic freedoms for all, in the different countries and among nations with equal rights."

VII

43. Having thus briefly summarised the opinions which have emerged, or are emerging in the position of the western governments, and which are logically founded on a comprehensive and complex analysis of the status of implementation of the final act of Helsinki, the next problem is to identify what steps forward have been taken, bilaterally and multilaterally, in application of the provisions of Helsinki. The balance-sheet at the end of the early months of 1977

cannot be termed wholly negative. It would have been foolish to expect much more progress to have been made in such a short time. And it would, in any event, be misleading to fail to perceive, or ignore, the nature of the implementation of the final act as an ongoing process. However, there are two general aspects that deserve to be underlined. The final act looms considerably larger now on the international scene, compared with the time of signature, and more and more references to it are being made, albeit for very different reasons. Moreover, and this is my second comment, the Central European set-up which some may have seen as underlying its conception is in rapid transformation: partly for negative reasons, such as the macroscopic breach of the act constituted by the Cyprus question, but also for a number of positive ones, such as the Italo-Yugoslav agreement, the beginnings of technical collaboration among the Balkan countries, and the growing demand for extending the system to take in the Mediterranean region.

VIII

44. As regards the concrete achievements connected with the first basket, mention should be made of certain bilateral co-operation agreements which have assumed fundamental importance for the signatory countries: the agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia, the one between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany for the repatriation of families. The conclusion of the Osimo treaties between Italy and Yugoslavia represented for both countries the final settlement of a dispute dating back to the birth of the two States and in fact completed in Europe the fundamental process of recognising frontiers which started with the *Ostpolitik* and was confirmed by the Helsinki final act. Nor is its importance political only, but economic and cultural too, given that these agreements, by putting paid to a past fraught with hostility (we need only recall the boost of aggressivity the question of the Adriatic for so long supplied to fascism and neo-fascism), open the way to a future of co-operation, in some ways highly-innovating compared with previous international experiments carried out in this field. It is extremely significant that this agreement should be connected with the Helsinki act, and at the same time noteworthy that, within the framework of this multilateral approach, it should stem from a fully-independent decision by both countries. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Forlani, specifically drew attention to this aspect when winding up the debate in the Chamber of Deputies:

"I note that the Osimo treaties consistently conform to the spirit of the letter of the conference on security and co-operation in

Europe, to which Italy wholeheartedly subscribes.”

45. The same could be said of the agreement between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany for the repatriation of families, which also gratified the wishes of tens of thousands of people of German origin, at the same time offering them a free choice of going back to their homeland or definitely staying on in their country of adoption. In this case too, the independent decision of the two governments, unrelated to any question of blocs, contributed as we believe very profoundly to rapprochement and friendship between the two countries. It is worth remembering, too, the concrete use by the Vatican of the Helsinki act for normalising the situation of the church in Hungary and, more recently, regularising the Berlin bishops' conference, the communiqué concerning which (27th October 1976) explicitly refers to the Helsinki act.

46. On the multilateral plane we have witnessed interesting developments like the inauguration of technical co-operation between the Balkan countries, whether, like Greece and Turkey, members of NATO or, like Romania and Bulgaria, members of the Warsaw Pact, or again, like Yugoslavia, one of the non-aligned. Such co-operation gives hope of an expansion within the Helsinki framework of détente and agreement among the European countries of the Eastern Mediterranean basin. Another notable result of the Helsinki act has been the co-operation established among countries bordering on the Mediterranean for collectively combating the pollution of its waters, which led in February 1977 to their signing an agreement at Split. In this case too Helsinki seems to have opened a way that could be followed by countries belonging to both military blocs as well as neutral and non-aligned countries, and bring about tangible results beneficial to all the populations concerned.

47. Steps forward of some importance have also been taken in the field of confidence-building measures (point 2 of the first basket). Important manoeuvres have been notified, by one side or the other, to the adjacent countries, which have generally been able to send observers. There was at first some grumbling on the NATO side, but things have settled down subsequently in patterns apparently satisfactory to all. True, these are measures of limited scope, in that the territories in which they are compulsory are limited so that it is still possible for either side to engage in large-scale manoeuvres without giving notice, while only a non-aligned country like Yugoslavia is, in practice, obliged to notify all the manoeuvres carried out on its territory (nor has it made any attempt to evade this obligation). Whether these are actually measures sufficient to the end of strengthening mutual trust is

another matter, hence the necessity for genuine progress in the MBFR talks in Vienna, but within the scope of the Helsinki act provisions, it does represent a real achievement.

48. Some see as the main obstacle to greater progress in the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe the continued existence of the two military blocs whose strategies are still offensive, even if the political lines accompanying them are defensive. Others instead argue that the existence of blocs themselves may in fact facilitate, at least in the present stage, a balanced and controlled reduction of armaments.

49. Certainly there are firm, albeit contested, statistical grounds for asserting that the Warsaw Pact countries have a growing preponderance in Central Europe. But we know that in the other camp statistics compiled on a different basis point to a totally opposite conclusion. According to whether forces in the Mediterranean theatre, where the West has a marked preponderance, are or are not included, radically different conclusions are reached about the balance of forces in Europe. Depending on whether numbers of divisions or numbers of men are counted, whether this or that definition of an armoured vehicle, strategic or tactical nuclear weapons is adopted, opposite results are reached, with the result that either side, considering itself to be in a state of inferiority, could think itself threatened and seek to restore or alter the balance of forces in its own favour.

50. Plainly, methods like these cannot produce any results in the area of détente and disarmament, and are largely responsible for the protracted dragging out of the MBFR negotiations the last round of which terminated unsuccessfully on 15th April.

51. These talks are in turn influenced, positively or negatively, by the course of American-Soviet strategic negotiations. In addition to this obstacle, it should be noted how the question of the Vienna talks has been viewed recently, at a very important political juncture. In his speech to the conference of Socialist and Social-Democrat Parties in Amsterdam on 5th and 6th November 1976, Willy Brandt, Chairman of the SPD, said in this connection :

“In 1975, almost \$300,000 million were spent throughout the world for military purposes, of which 80 % by States taking part in the CSCE. According to expert estimates, *tactical* nuclear weapons stockpiled in Europe alone represent a destructive power equivalent to 10,000 times that of the Hiroshima bomb. These figures show to what extent material, financial, technological and human resources are being wasted for destructive purposes, whereas if they were used for improving the condition of mankind, this could relieve considerable poverty.”

Mr. Brandt also said :

“A balanced reduction in these destructive forces is of capital importance for the future of détente and the establishment of mutual confidence in East-West relations, but success cannot be achieved by one side alone.”

And he added :

“The aim of the policy of détente in this field is to move gradually towards a situation in which a surprise attack is impossible. This will take time ; it will unfortunately be a long time before savings are felt in the budgets. However, it is possible, without being unrealistic, to agree in the coming years on two measures to be implemented, one being an initial limitation of armed forces in the same context.”

52. More recently (*Europa Archiv*, 25th January 1977), the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Disarmament and the Control of Armaments of the Bundestag Defence Committee, Mr. Alfons Pawelczyk (SPD), noted in Vienna that :

“The process of clarification is making such good progress that a first agreement seems possible. At this stage of development, it might include the following elements : all States playing a direct part in the negotiations would undertake to reduce their armed forces ; the process of reduction would be divided into two stages. To strengthen and improve confidence in the policy of détente, a first measure might be limited to the reduction of American and Soviet forces. Ways to reduce the forces of the other direct participants would then have to be agreed upon. This reduction might cover land and air forces and to a certain extent conventional and nuclear weapons. A limited reduction of the forces of both parties would not endanger security but could be an essential part of the process of détente. Such an agreement would help to ensure that the policy of détente led not only to the establishment of confidence but also to an effective reduction of forces. In this way we should be approaching the goal, which is to find a means of making it increasingly impossible to use military means to impose political aims.”

In mid-April, Mr. Pawelczyk again underlined that :

“At the present stage in the Vienna talks, it is possible to negotiate a first agreement preventing the conventional armaments race and allowing a first reduction measure. At the present international juncture, what really counts for security policy is not the size of the first reduction but the very fact that there is a reduction.”

53. The difficulties encountered in the Vienna negotiations already show that while the dismantling of the military blocs may possibly be a long-term goal, it is quite out of the question at present. Now, the disappearance at this time of the existing military blocs would, in the opinion of many experts, present a number of perils (in particular, a multiplication of disputes among smaller powers with the consequence of one or more larger ones being moved to intervene to settle the dispute and thus bring to an end the period of peace, armed peace certainly, but still peace, that Europe has known since 1945). It would therefore be a very tricky path that Europe would have to tread, at least initially, once effective action is begun, to open up the prospect of dismantling the blocs. Most likely, the time is not yet ripe, but already it should be possible to imagine a number of changes in foreign policy and defence policy by one or other side with a view to paving the way for such a future development.

IX

54. As regards the problems of the second basket, considered the easiest sector at Helsinki, there are also considerable difficulties, though not so serious as those in other sectors. We have tabled before us the three Soviet proposals concerning energy, transport and ecology. These are long-term projects in areas which have made little progress to date, among other reasons because the promoters have lately shown little sense of urgency, and which are still under study in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

55. With more specific reference to trade, there is a series of both general problems (non-discrimination and most-favoured-nation treatment, reciprocity, the abolition of quantitative restrictions and administrative obstacles, the indebtedness of the eastern countries and their shortage of capital), and particular problems concerning concrete conditions for business contacts and commercial information. Certainly, we find ourselves at present in a difficult pass, but the fact remains that there is still a steady flow of western businessmen towards the socialist countries, since the problem of the growing interdependence of the capitalist and socialist economies, especially in the current international economic situation, is clearer to both parties than ever before in the past. Long-term co-operation programmes in various fields including energy and exploitation of the sea are now prepared in both East and West in different economic and government circles. The highly favourable fact must also be stressed that this year for the first time EEC contacts have been established between the EEC and Comecon and genuine discussions between the two economic

areas, Comecon and the Common Market, have been opened with the multilateral negotiations about fishing.

56. These programmes provide for co-operation agreements in trade (long-term agreements, joint companies, compensatory trade and related problems), agreements on joint production (with the possibility of joint ventures and triangular co-operation), agreements on technological co-operation including the joint development of specific technologies, aimed at supplying technical equipment to third countries, and agreements on recourse to the international financial system.

X

57. The third basket is the section of the final act which has roused, and continues to rouse, the fiercest controversy, for the reasons stated above. The problem is particularly delicate in that it involves in fact each country's internal legislation and not merely problems of governments' behaviour. Nor can the question be strictly localised in its incidence. It is quite true, as already said, that for the last few months public opinion has been mainly focused on the USSR and the various socialist countries of Eastern Europe, in which persons and groups of persons have invoked the final act to denounce breaches of its provisions and claim wider freedoms. But the question arises elsewhere too. We have already alluded to what President Carter has said about entry visas. Other situations can also be cited (the transition phase through which Spain is passing; the controversy about *Radikalenerlass* and telephone monitoring in the Federal Republic of Germany; Cyprus and Northern Ireland). Therefore the problem has two aspects: one internal to each country and one international, in view of the growing importance the question of human rights has assumed in international relations. The Helsinki act has in this respect been certainly innovative, as the first of its kind devoting so much space, albeit with no compulsory force, to economic, social and cultural questions of universal impact.

58. However, a philosophy of conduct has still to be formulated. As Mr. Vance says, "It is a balancing process". But already one element seems to emerge with sufficient clarity, the more and more commonly-held conviction — already mentioned above — that there is a close connection between progress in détente and co-operation and the creation on all sides of wider and wider areas of freedom and democracy. Any pause, or worse still backsliding, would certainly not encourage a growing and widespread assertion of human rights. On the contrary, it is precisely progress towards détente that will, in an inter-communicating world, render more and more difficult any transgressions of the major goals

which the final act of Helsinki sets for Europe. An apt illustration is the remarks by Marshall D. Shulman, Director of the Russian Institute of Columbia University, and now President Carter's adviser on Soviet affairs (Foreign Affairs, January 1977, pages 333-334) :

"It should be clear that the effort to compel changes in Soviet institutions and practices by frontal demands on the part of other governments is likely to be counterproductive. Yet external pressures may well be marginally effective, provided they take into account a scale of reasonable feasibility; for example, demands for humane measures in reuniting families may be feasible, whereas demands for measures which threaten to undermine the system's monopoly of political authority are not.

We cannot predict which way the Soviet system will evolve in the future. But it seems reasonable to believe that easing of repression is more likely to result from evolutionary forces within the society under prolonged conditions of reduced international tension than from external demands for change and the siege mentality they would reinforce."

He added the basic consideration that :

"For governments, therefore, the first order of business must be to regulate the military competition" and that "the objective of the United States and other democratic governments to seek to reduce the danger of nuclear war by negotiations with the Soviet leaders is a moral obligation."

59. Still more, the achievement of agreements to ensure for the world the possibility of living under a system of peaceful coexistence, détente and co-operation, is increasingly coming to be seen as a path for which there are no rational alternatives: the only one that can, at the same time, lead the world onwards toward the more advanced goals of democracy and freedom.

XI

60. Lastly, there are two problems that remained marginal at Helsinki but on which the Belgrade conference cannot abstain from taking a stand. One is that of the Mediterranean. From the foregoing it is clear that this area with its Middle East extension is now one of the world's "hot-spots" and there is a growing body of opinion, even among governments which opposed its inclusion among the topics for discussion at Helsinki, that genuine security in Europe cannot be achieved without a solution to Mediterranean problems and crises being found. Here too, we must tread softly, with a realistic appreciation that the blocs and their bases and fleets do exist, and cannot be wished away. But there is already during the

current phase broad scope for action and initiation by way of bilateral and multilateral co-operation, and extension to the Mediterranean of confidence-building measures in the longer prospect of stable security arrangements in that area. The other question is that of the follow-up of the Belgrade conference. A theme which already made heavy weather during the preparatory discussions for the Helsinki conference, it lies particularly close to the hearts of the smaller and uncommitted countries, which see in it a possibility of their making a more effective contribution to intra-European relations and securing a better safeguard of their own independence. At all events, Belgrade can definitely not be left without a sequel, and it would not suffice merely to decide on a further conference once it is over.

XII

61. The experience of Helsinki and the follow-up actions for the first two years allow us to advance certain considerations in connection with the coming Belgrade meeting. It is undoubtedly too early yet to attempt to convert a declaration of intent and informal commitments into legal obligations. With the exception of a few precise and clearly-defined points, any attempt to do so would end up in failure, or in a retreat from the results achieved at Helsinki. These are still substantial. A process has been set in train (both in relations between States, and in inducing the latter to adapt to this new philosophy of inter-relations and interdependence), and it is only logical that this process should become increasingly irreversible, unless the way is barred by a serious international crisis. It follows that the Belgrade meeting must be a success, and every effort made to reduce the danger that the polemics now in course be turned into an exchange of accusations and insults between the two blocs which could seriously compromise the results of the conference and diminish, *de facto*, the importance, function and independence of the neutral and non-aligned countries. At the same time we cannot but recognise the limitations stemming from an attempt to achieve an overall balance of concessions and advantages of the sort that was, to some extent, striven for or accepted at Hel-

sinki. This sort of tendency will not allow us to advance very far, and carries some risk of strengthening the bloc mentality, with a consequently greater importance and influence of the bigger powers over the smaller. The search for realistic and balanced solutions to the major problems must instead leave more room for the autonomy of the individual States, starting from those which are not members of the blocs, so as to permit the flexible and open-ended solutions which alone can secure genuine progress along the guidelines laid down at Helsinki.

62. As Mr. Luigi Granelli, leader of the International Department of the Christian Democrat Party and former Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, recently wrote :

“There is no sense whatever in taking an ‘all or nothing’ attitude, when the subject matter of the negotiations is, objectively, extensive and complex, and demands, by its very nature, a strictly gradualist procedure. Helsinki and Belgrade, at different levels of course, are not final goals and as such subject to definitive criticism as concerns their limitations or to empty triumphalism as concerns their partial successes. They constitute the meaningful stages along a laborious road where there would be nothing to gain from stoppages occasioned by more grandiose ambitions or wishful thinking. A breaking off of the dialogue, or a specious search for pretexts for not reaching a conclusion on questions that can be solved through frank and honourable agreement, lead in the best of cases to preserving the status quo, and in the long run to the inevitable erosion of relationships, in a climate of growing mistrust. Would not this be the opposite of détente ?”

63. Wisdom and realism dictate that we should foresee a slow and uneven progress, depending on the different sectors. There is no use wringing our hands over this. On the contrary, we must allow for it, and not incur the risk of jeopardising this intricate and interdependent growth process which, in its underlying guidelines, answers the true interests and aspirations of all the peoples of our continent and all the countries signatory to the Helsinki final act.

APPENDIX 1

Opinion of Sir Frederic Bennett on the application of the final act of the CSCE

1. If the final act of Helsinki is to be regarded as an integral feature of détente the same basic considerations surely have to apply to the former as to the latter.

2. Détente itself has become increasingly regarded with a sense of disillusionment throughout the western world, the best that can be said of it being that it is preferable to the era of cold war that preceded it, the worst that it has proved an invaluable opportunity for the USSR to advance its own expansionist aims.

3. Such strong feelings have been aroused in the West in this context that both candidates in the recent American presidential election decided to drop the word détente from their political vocabulary.

4. Yet there never should have been any such misunderstanding if there had been an *initially* agreed interpretation of détente, which was *not* the case.

5. The West, for their part, until events forced on them a more realistic appreciation, believed that the introduction of détente in place of cold war would lead, and was intended to lead, through relaxation of East-West tensions, to meaningful, peaceful coexistence, entailing mutual respect, but without approval of each other's differing political, economic and social systems.

6. From the Kremlin's point of view however the Marxist-Leninist principle of international relations as interpreted and exploited by the Kremlin for Soviet nationalist purposes, dictates that there can be no real enduring peace, either externally or internally, in an inexorable thread of contemporary history, between the so-called capitalist world, including social democracies on the one hand and a global communist hegemony on the other.

7. Consequently, peaceful coexistence, which is, or purports to be, the real basis of détente, is in Soviet eyes not really peace, but an indulgence in continuing expansionist imperialism, without resort to war, leading ultimately to the establishment of such a hegemony, under Soviet domination.

8. If the early high hopes of the final act are not in their turn to follow détente into disappointment and cynicism, there must be no repeti-

tion of differing interpretations of the stated aims of Helsinki, nor a failure to appreciate the different motivations of the various signatory powers.

9. For their part, at least until the arrival of Mr. Carter on the scene, the Americans never attached great importance to the final act, supporting, rather than initiating, positions adopted by the European democracies.

10. These latter mostly felt that the agreements, however limited, contained in the act, in all three baskets, did open windows in the iron curtain, which in the long run could lead only to a lessening of totalitarian excesses and distrust and in consequence create greater East-West tolerance and so lessen tension, not only in Europe but anywhere else in the world where Soviet ambitions threaten long-established vital western interests.

11. The neutral and the non-aligned signatories of Helsinki quite simply felt that *any* measure which made them feel less insecure, however flimsy the guarantees offered to them, was worthwhile. Most probably the first test of the effectiveness or otherwise of such guarantees will sooner, rather than later, arise in Yugoslavia.

12. Finally, the USSR has never concealed its dislike of basket III on human rights and associated matters, or parts of basket I for that matter, from the very start of the negotiations; and only reluctantly agreed to the relevant provisions being included in the act as a price that had to be paid for their main ambition being achieved: the legitimisation of the present frontiers of Europe, irrespective of the wishes of their various inhabitants. Even so, to obtain the inviolability clauses the Kremlin had to accept a western reservation that the denial of any future changes in these frontiers was limited only to the *use* of force, not to negotiation: but Soviet political leaders have never regarded this reservation as a valid one.

13. Other areas where undoubted different, indeed conflicting, interpretations are increasingly becoming apparent are the provisions regarding non-interference in the internal affairs of another State. These are not seen by the Kremlin (the Brezhnev doctrine) as applying to subversion of democratic countries inside or outside Europe that show possibilities of conversion to communist rule, as part of what Soviet leaders have described as an inescapable progress towards a world-wide acceptance of Russian-type Marxist-Leninism, as the only enduring form of government. Pursuant to the same reasoning of course any attempt by the western countries to combine to strengthen their defences against

1. In a vote on 9th May 1977, the General Affairs Committee by 11 votes to 3 with 2 abstentions decided, in application of Rule 42(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, to append to the report submitted by Mr. Segre and adopted by the Committee the text in which Sir Frederic Bennett set out a minority opinion.

communist penetration (and even more so to try to reverse trends or situations in favour of pluralism in countries already regarded by the USSR as won over to the cause of Marxism-Leninism) is decried as aggressive interference with a natural inevitable course of events, contrary both to Helsinki and, for that matter, détente too! Be that as it may, it was also hotly denied in Moscow that Russian intervention in Angola came within the purview of Helsinki because the latter was not a signatory of the final act and therefore did not thereby earn any right of protection against external intervention. The same claim is being made as each successive attempt to increase Soviet influence in Africa is undertaken.

14. Clarification on this latter point is therefore or should be a major western objective at Belgrade.

15. With so many separate and often incompatible strains of thought existing among the Helsinki signatories about the *raison d'être* of the final act it is not surprising that different estimates should also exist about the progress, if any, of steps towards its implementation, in regard to all the baskets.

16. The difficulties of obtaining a consensus under such conditions have been compounded by the emergence of an increasingly significant and articulate element in the original calculation, not directly represented in Helsinki, i.e. the dissidents within both the USSR and the satellite States that have achieved a prominence and an influence never envisaged in August 1975.

17. Those behind the iron curtain who are philosophically, ideologically or culturally opposed to totalitarianism, whatever its colour, have seized on Helsinki as a drowning man clutches at a straw in order to support and justify their aspirations for another way of life; and with a considerable degree of success such dissidents have enlisted popular sympathy and support for their dissent, within the western democracies, which their governments cannot or dare not afford to ignore.

18. Thus an admittedly embarrassing situation has arisen for the USSR, and to a differing extent for each of the other Warsaw Pact governments too.

19. The more they indulge in repressive measures to hold back the new forces of dissent in their midst the more they contravene the provisions of Helsinki basket III which they have signed, and the more they increase doubts in the West about the validity of the whole concept of détente.

20. If on the other hand they adopt a soft line with the dissidents these latter accentuate their voices of protest and reach an ever-increasing audience in the West, proving that criticism of Soviet tyranny is *not* limited to reactionary

capitalist circles abroad but is shared by men and women living *inside* the Warsaw Pact — and who, after all, should know better than these latter the truth? In the result too the millions of those who in the aftermath of the last war and during the last thirty years that have decided to live in exile, voluntary or enforced, in the West — Ukrainians, Armenians, Poles, Hungarians, Czechs and East Germans and many others deriving from East and Central Europe — have found a new public focus for their unchanging disapproval of the régimes now in power in their homelands.

21. Under circumstances when there is such wide variance about objectives and differing interpretations of some of the most important provisions of the final act, it is impossible to draw up a *single* balance-sheet of what has been, or has not been, attained at the end of the treaty's first two years of operation. Selective quotations aimed at lowering the political temperature, drawn from speeches by political leaders from East and West alike will not and cannot resolve this dilemma.

22. For none can alter, even if they manage to obscure, the fact that our Rapporteur, despite his gallant and sincere efforts, has been asked to reconcile the irreconcilable. Once again it has been shown that a joint international declaration of high principles and laudable aspirations can have little validity, if it requires for fulfilment an abandonment not just of different forms of government, but wholly incompatible outlooks on a way of life. To urge the Soviet Union to accept our ideals in the West is something we are bound to do if we are true to our own faith in the basic purposes of Helsinki; but for the Russians to make any substantial concessions would imperil the whole system and structure of their society — unlikely to receive their concurrence — and which in this context could even turn out to be counterproductive.

23. Belgrade can therefore be expected to achieve little more than a restatement of standpoints by the various signatories. The USSR will claim that active overt western concern about human rights in the eastern bloc represents interference in the internal affairs of another State and is contrary to Helsinki, despite the terms of basket III. The United States and most, if not all, the western nations will deny this premise, and also assert that non-interference in what form of government the people of a country freely choose is not a one-way privileged process; and furthermore emphasise that restraint should be observed right across the global board and not just in Europe.

24. So by the time the Belgrade conference ends, it is reasonable to assume that the ideological conflict between Marxist totalitarianism and those who will have none of it will continue, as heretofore.

Application of the final act of the CSCE

AMENDMENT No. 1¹

tabled by Mrs. von Bothmer and others

1. In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "Helsinki" insert "together with earlier treaties between eastern and western countries".
2. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble, leave out all the words after "achievement" and insert "of further steps towards détente at the Belgrade meeting and in other negotiations, especially at the Vienna talks on mutual balanced force reductions, is essential for the pursuit of the process of détente";
3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after "meeting" and insert "in parallel with relevant European and Atlantic organisations";
4. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "European States" and insert "participating States".
5. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.
6. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper.
7. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper :
 - (a) insert before "principles" the words "provisions and";
 - (b) leave out "a similar policy" and insert "similar policies".

Signed : von Bothmer, Dankert, Roper

1. See 6th Sitting, 23rd June 1977 (Amendment referred back to Committee).

Application of the final act of the CSCE

AMENDMENT No. 2¹

tabled by MM. Leynen and Bonnel

1. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.
2. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "principles laid down in Helsinki" and insert "clauses of the Helsinki final act".

Signed: Leynen, Bonnel

1. See 6th Sitting, 23rd June 1977 (Amendment referred back to Committee).

Application of the final act of the CSCE

AMENDMENT No. 3¹

tabled by Mr. Pecoraro and others

In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "détente" insert "and, in parallel, the progressive and effective effort to ensure respect for human rights by all the participating States".

Signed: Pecoraro, Cavaliere, Treu

1. See 6th Sitting, 23rd June 1977 (Amendment referred back to Committee).

Application of the final act of the CSCE

AMENDMENT No. 4¹
tabled by Mr. Pecoraro and others

Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed : Pecoraro, Cavaliere, Treu

1. See 6th Sitting, 23rd June 1977 (Amendment referred back to Committee).

Application of the final act of the CSCE

AMENDMENT No. 5¹

tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and others

1. Leave out the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :
"Regretting that the development of this process has been disappointing ;"
2. Leave out the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.
3. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "détente" insert "and respect for human rights".

Signed : Bennett, de Koster, Page, Channon

1. See 6th Sitting, 23rd June 1977 (Amendment referred back to Committee).

Application of the final act of the CSCE

AMENDMENT No. 6¹

tabled by Mr. Roberti

1. At the end of the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert "in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Charter of Human Rights ;".
2. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert "and with the Atlantic powers, i.e. the United States and Canada ;".
3. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.
4. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed : Roberti

1. See 6th Sitting, 23rd June 1977 (Amendment referred back to Committee).

Application of the final act of the CSCE

AMENDMENT No. 7¹

tabled by Mr. Leynen and others

This Amendment replaces Amendments Nos. 1 and 2.

1. In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "Helsinki" insert "together with earlier treaties between eastern and western countries".
2. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out all the words after "achievement" and insert "of further steps towards détente at the Belgrade meeting and in other negotiations is essential for the pursuit of the process of détente";
3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after "meeting" and insert "in parallel with governments and relevant European and Atlantic organisations";
4. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "European States" and insert "all the signatory States and affirming human rights and fundamental freedoms".
5. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.
6. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper :
 - (a) leave out "necessary" and insert "of the member countries";
 - (b) leave out "of member countries".
7. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper :
 - (a) leave out "principles laid down in Helsinki" and insert "clauses of the Helsinki final act";
 - (b) leave out "a similar policy" and insert "similar policies".

Signed : Leynen, Beaumont of Whitley, Dankert, Segre, Urwin

1. See 6th Sitting, 23rd June 1977 (Amendment referred back to Committee).

Application of the final act of the CSCE

AMENDMENT No. 8¹

tabled by Mr. Rivière

1. Replace paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper by the following text :
"3. Ensure in all events the application by all the signatory States of the ten principles to govern relations between States defined in Helsinki, particularly those on respect for fundamental freedoms and non-intervention in the internal affairs of all States ;".

2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "member countries" and insert "signatory countries" and at the end of the paragraph insert "in order to create the conditions for effective, general, full and controlled disarmament ;".

Signed : Rivière

1. See 6th Sitting, 23rd June 1977 (Amendment referred back to Committee).

**Political activities of the Council
Reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council**

REPORT ¹

**submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Treu, Rapporteur**

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III. Activities of the Council

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mrs. von Bothmer (Chairman); Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Abens, Amrehn, Ariosto, Beith (Alternate: McNamara), Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Brugnon (Alternate: Forni), Cermolacce, Faulds, Gessner (Alternate: Schwencké);

Mrs. Godinache-Lambert, MM. Gonella (Alternate: Roberti), Grangier, von Hassel, Leynen, Mende, Minnocci, Nessler, de Niet, Peijnenburg, Périquier, Portheine, Segre, Urwin, Van Hoeylandt.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on the political activities of the Council — reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council

The Assembly,

Welcoming the positive statements on the present and future prospects of WEU made by several ministers at the Assembly's twenty-second session ;

Thanking Mr. von Plehwe for so ably leading the WEU secretariat during a particularly difficult period ;

Noting that the Council has appointed a titular Secretary-General in the person of Mr. Longerstaey ;

Regretting that the Council is allowing certain procedure essential to its relations with the Assembly to lapse ;

Recalling that the Council has frequently undertaken to report to the Assembly on the application of the Brussels Treaty, even if it is exercised by bodies other than WEU,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that a joint meeting is held with the General Affairs Committee in the near future allowing a true dialogue to be held on essential matters concerning the future of WEU and the development of international relations, particularly between Eastern and Western Europe ;
2. Ensure that, in accordance with customary procedure in national parliaments, governments provide substantial information on the aspects of their foreign policy raised in recommendations of the Assembly ;
3. Continue to include in the annual report a detailed account of its work as was its practice until the twenty-second annual report ;
4. Report more fully to the Assembly on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty in other bodies ;
5. Maintain its activities in accordance with the assurances given to the Assembly.

Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Treu, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. When in 1976 Mr. Péridier submitted, on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, the reply to the annual report of the Council on its activities in 1975, he had to note that the political situation in Western Europe and the Atlantic Alliance left open a number of options. His report and the one submitted by Mr. de Bruyne on European union and WEU proposed a number of courses for terminating this state of uncertainty. The main proposal was probably that WEU would one day take its place in the framework of the European union, which implied that in the meantime all the responsibilities incumbent on it under the modified Brussels Treaty should be maintained in full and that no changes whatsoever should be made in its structure.

2. In 1976, the Assembly received encouragement in this sense from a number of sources, including the Ministers who addressed the Assembly during the second part of the twenty-second ordinary session.

3. For instance, Mr. Taittinger said that France :

“... attaches great importance both to the spirit and to the letter of the modified Brussels Treaty. Anxious that the treaty should not sink into obsolescence, France wishes to reaffirm strongly before you its permanence, its fundamental character.”

He went on to say that WEU :

“... constitutes a perfect forum for raising questions on security and defence in Europe and ... must ensure application of the revised Brussels Treaty and pursue, in its own particular field, the important task of concerting our efforts, reflecting on our problems and formulating proposals.”

4. Mr. Thorn, Luxembourg Prime Minister, said that :

“... this Assembly's powers to handle problems of the defence of Europe are not only politically and legally indisputable, but even unique of their kind, since no other European assembly has been specifically given such a remit. Moreover, being eminently competent in defence matters, it is also the only assembly having statutory powers to consider as a whole interlinked problems of policy and strategy.”

5. Mr. Thorn then turned to Mr. Tindemans' proposal that the European Parliament discuss matters devolving to the future European union

but outside the scope of the Paris or Rome Treaties and said :

“This idea, too, was rejected by the Foreign Ministers. Moreover, as the Ministers nowhere propose to invest the European union with new powers in defence matters, it seems clear that there will be no substantial change in the foreseeable future in the European Parliament's occasional forays into security matters during debates on co-operation by the European union. It may therefore be inferred that a European union having full powers in matters of defence and security is not about to see the light of day.

Western European Union is therefore called upon to continue its mission on the same basis as in the past. I am convinced that it will do so with the same authority and competence as before.”

6. Finally, Mr. Wischniewski, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, said :

“The modified Brussels Treaty which set up WEU combines in a very constructive way the two objectives which must guide Europeans in their efforts to strengthen the European component of NATO — consolidating the Atlantic Alliance and uniting Europe.”

7. At the end of 1976, it was therefore to be expected that the Assembly would receive from the Council the clarification it had been seeking for some time. But the Council's twenty-second annual report fails to confirm in any way what was asserted by the Ministers. Examination of the information it gives about relations between the Council and the Assembly and about the Council's political activities proper causes even greater concern in that the practice of certain governments differs, sometimes considerably, from the solemn utterances of those responsible for their foreign policy.

II. Relations between the Council and the Assembly

8. As usual, the Council affirms its constant concern to maintain good relations with the Assembly. It is in fact evident that the Council has made a great effort in this sense by transmitting its annual report in good time and by the rôle its members have played in the work of the Assembly at the two part-sessions in 1976. The importance of the addresses made by several Ministers, members of the Council, was noted

by all the parliamentarians and the information given by these Ministers on the views of several member countries on the future of WEU was particularly valuable. The Assembly was able to group extracts from these speeches in an information document published for the symposium on a European armaments policy held in March 1977.

9. Nevertheless, your Rapporteur feels that there is still some ambiguity in relations between the Council and the Assembly as can be clearly seen from the Council's report for 1976.

(a) Joint meetings

10. The first ambiguity lies in the confirmation that the Council refuses to hold a joint meeting, in the strict sense of the word, with the General Affairs Committee. The very wording of the annual report in this respect gives the impression that this refusal might become permanent since it is said that the Council :

"... consider that informal meetings provide an appropriate means of fulfilling the parliamentarians' desire for information because member governments' positions on the questions raised can be more freely expressed..."

11. The Council is not therefore invoking circumstances to justify its refusal but is setting it out as a principle. The General Affairs Committee could of course recall that it was the Council itself that proposed a new procedure for joint meetings, which has moreover never been applied in the form proposed, and that the Council also believed at one time that the "formal" procedure which it now rejects was essential. The Committee for its part had always in the past wanted a true dialogue with the Council, without insisting on one procedure or another.

12. However, it felt the procedure proposed by the Council had the great merit of obliging the Council as such, i.e. with the unanimity of the seven governments, to express what might be a joint Western European position on questions put in writing by the Committee while at the same time retaining the possibility of a freer dialogue with representatives of each country.

13. Experience of earlier procedures, the major part of which was "formal", proved that at joint meetings where only the country of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council was represented by a Minister or a Secretary of State, the others being represented only by Ambassadors, the Chairman-in-Office alone actually spoke, even during the so-called "informal" part of the meeting. The General Affairs Committee therefore has discouraging memories of the "informal" part of its past joint meetings with the Council, although it agrees with the Council that the "formal" procedure is most cumbersome.

14. For these reasons, the Committee approved the letter in which Mr. Sieglerschmidt, then Chairman of the Committee, asked the Council in December 1976 that there be several Ministers at the joint meeting if it were to be "informal". The Council gave no specific answer to this point but, when it fixed the date of 26th April 1977 for a joint meeting with the Committee, it again adopted an ambiguous stand. The choice of date gave hope that since the Ministers were there several of them would attend the joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee. But on the other hand, since the Council must have known that the parliamentarians would be unable to be in Paris on that date, one might wonder to what extent the Council wished to entertain the Committee's request.

15. The Council now proposes that the meeting be held in the autumn. There is nothing against this provided several Ministers will be able to attend and a real exchange of views is possible between the Committee and the Council. If the choice of date were to mean the joint meeting having all the disadvantages of a "formal" meeting plus those of an "informal" one, such a meeting would be pointless.

(b) National parliamentary procedure

16. The second reservation which the Committee feels it must express concerns the implication of the paragraph of the report on speeches by members of the Assembly in national parliaments.

17. The Council says that it was :

"... pleased to note the opportunities taken in 1976 by members of the Assembly to put questions or to speak in their parliaments on subjects of particular interest to WEU."

But certain government practice quite obviously makes it impossible to use this procedure which had, however, produced fairly satisfactory results in the past.

18. On several occasions, the Belgian and French Governments have stated in reply to questions concerning their countries' application of recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly that the reply given or to be given by the WEU Council is the only one these governments will make. The Belgian Government has sometimes merely reproduced the reply of the WEU Council. Perhaps such replies were due to certain written questions being put late, thus obliging the government concerned to answer after it had expressed its position in the WEU Council. In any case, this would be justified only if the policy of the country concerned corresponded exactly to views expressed unanimously by the Council. This is possibly quite a rare occurrence and in general each member country also pursues its own independent aims, apart from the joint aims of the Seven.

19. But the reply published in the French *Journal Officiel* of 8th March 1977 to Question 22,548 put by Mr. Schmitt, Senator, on 22nd January 1977, refers to a recommendation to which the WEU Council has not yet replied. Moreover, this question concerned French policy and not the policy of WEU as a whole. But according to the French Government's reply :

"... it is for the Council of Western European Union alone and not each government to work out the answer to be given to a question put to it. The French Government cannot therefore express an open opinion on Recommendation 296."

20. There is thus a flagrant contradiction between such a reply and the relevant paragraph in the Council's report, particularly since in Section B of Chapter I of the report the Council recalls that replies to Assembly recommendations :

"... reflect the common view of the seven member countries, in accordance with the principle of unanimity which governs their work. It is only in the most exceptional circumstances that the Council may find it necessary to indicate that members' positions differ as, for example, when those positions are a logical consequence of the differing relations which member States have with a particular outside organisation."

21. This is tantamount to saying that in its replies the Council can express only the unanimous opinion of the governments and that the individual opinion of each of them may be communicated to the Assembly only in the framework of questions put in national parliaments. But if the governments refuse to answer such questions, the possibilities for a dialogue between the Council and the Assembly become very limited. It will therefore be understood that the Assembly cannot be satisfied with its relations with the Council and that it has the impression that the latter is increasingly evading a dialogue which it nevertheless claims to be seeking.

III. Activities of the Council

22. For a long time, it has been clear that in political matters the Council allows a number of its responsibilities under the modified Brussels Treaty to be exercised by other bodies which *inter alia* have the merit of including more countries than WEU. This must not therefore be held against it and even if it has to be recognised that the Council's activities in the political field have remained on a very small scale, it is not on this aspect of its work that the Assembly's main criticism will be brought to bear, although it remains to be seen whether all the problems raised by the application of the modified Brussels Treaty are effectively dealt with by the Seven in other institutions.

23. However, the Council, as it has often undertaken to do, should report as fully as possible to the Assembly on the results of these deliberations, in whatever forum, and above all, as the Assembly has continuously urged — and the Council has always agreed — it should distinguish clearly between the responsibilities devolving to it, particularly under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, and the exercise of these responsibilities as it may be effected in the framework of other bodies.

24. But in the fifth paragraph of Chapter II of the annual report, the Council says that it is not the only international body empowered to deal with the questions covered by Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. This raises the question of what is meant by "empowered". Article VIII defines the rôle and responsibilities of the WEU Council in the framework of the alliance instituted by the modified Brussels Treaty. But neither the European Community nor the OECD is empowered to apply a defence alliance. This is obviously not so for the North Atlantic Council, but in that WEU is considered the nucleus of Europe in defence matters it cannot be replaced by an organisation based on another treaty and not truly European. Moreover, the Council notes that these bodies are empowered to discuss only some of the matters covered by Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. The Council cannot therefore be criticised for taking account of work in these bodies in exercising its own activities, but it must be stressed that taking account of such work does not imply such a restrictive limitation of its responsibilities under the Brussels Treaty as the Council claims.

25. If this fifth paragraph is compared with the third paragraph of Chapter II of the Council's annual report for 1975, the impression is given that the Council's position in 1976 is far more restrictive than it was in 1975 regarding the division of responsibilities and activities between the various consultative bodies in which the seven member countries take part.

26. This is a most important matter and the Assembly is entitled to know whether the Council still considers its 1975 definition of its responsibilities to be valid. There seems to be further justification for this question in that Chapter II, Section A, of the annual report on political questions is much shorter than in previous years, although the Council's activities in 1976 do not appear to have differed significantly compared with 1975. For instance, political questions as a whole are now covered in only two sub-paragraphs compared with four in 1975, and a number of details included in the annual report for 1975 have been left out of the 1976 report.

27. For instance, no mention has been made of the points covered by bilateral relations between

the WEU member countries and the eastern countries in 1976 nor of ministerial meetings between WEU countries and eastern countries. Similarly, the nevertheless essential question of relations between WEU countries and the United States has totally disappeared from the annual report for 1976, whereas it occupied considerable space in the report for 1975. Is this to be considered as illustrating a deliberately restrictive view adopted by the Council towards its own duties? This question is worthy of serious consideration.

28. Incidentally, another detail has been noted which is perhaps not without significance: the Council has so far always informed the Assembly of the number of meetings of the working group, but now it merely indicates that the working group met "regularly as in the past". Does this mean that there were fewer meetings in 1976 than in previous years, i.e. 26 in 1975? If so, there is no need to conceal the fact from the Assembly. If not, why should the Council not say so?

29. In short, the introduction and Section A of Chapter II do not perhaps show that the Council's activities in 1976 were even less than in 1975 but it is felt that the Council is increasingly determined to provide the Assembly with as little information as possible and there is a hint that the Council is in fact envisaging the possibility of eventually relinquishing the application of its responsibilities under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and the withholding of information apparent in the twenty-second annual report is intended to facilitate the transition. If this is not the case, the Council should say so clearly and act accordingly in all its relations with the Assembly. One way or the other, there is a striking difference between the comments of Ministers in the Assembly and the tone of the annual report describing the Council's political activities in 1976.

IV. Conclusions

30. It can thus be seen that there is a wide gap between the good words of the Ministers and

the practice of the Council. To what is this due? Is it merely a question of reluctance or unwillingness on the part of the officials who represent the governments on the WEU Permanent Council, the real author of the Council's annual report? But the Council has often emphasised that the Assembly need draw no distinction between the Council meeting at ministerial level and the Permanent Council. Or do the governments speak one language in official pronouncements but fail to practise what they preach?

31. Consideration of the twenty-second annual report of the Council brings these questions to the fore, particularly since government practice seems to be concentrated increasingly on depriving parliamentarians of the means of expression available to them in the past. This is probably the nucleus of what the General Affairs Committee will be asking the Council at a joint meeting if the Council agrees to hold such a meeting in circumstances allowing a true dialogue.

32. Finally, the appointment with effect from March 1977 of a titular Secretary-General — Mr. Longerstaey — has terminated a long interim period which the Assembly always deplored, although welcoming the unswerving ability with which Mr. von Plehwe has directed the WEU secretariat. It can but trust that this appointment, less than a year after giving a new mandate to the Standing Armaments Committee, is a sign of the determination of the seven governments to apply the modified Brussels Treaty to the full. The personality of the new Secretary-General and the reputation he earned as Belgian Ambassador to Italy and Permanent Representative to the United Nations give hope that he will co-operate with the Assembly in encouraging the Council to play the full rôle assigned to it by the treaty. Having urged the appointment of a politician as Secretary-General for so long, the Assembly is prepared to extend a warm welcome to an ambassador insofar as the Council allows the Secretary-General enough initiative to ensure that the Council's activities conform more closely to the options expressed by the government authorities of member countries.

**Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems —
the Western Mediterranean**

REPORT ¹

**submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Mendelson, Rapporteur**

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mrs. von Bothmer (Chairman); Sir John Rodgers (Alternate: *Channon*), Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Abens, Amrehn, Ariosto, Beith (Alternate: *McNamara*), Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Brugnon (Alternate: *Forni*), Cermolacce, Faulds, Gessner, Mrs. Godinache-Lambert, MM. Gonella (Alternate:

Roberti), Grangier, von Hassel, *Leynen*, Mende, Minnoci (Alternate: *Treu*), Nessler, *de Niot*, *Peijnenburg*, *Péridier*, Porthoine (Alternate: *Voogd*), *Segre*, *Urwin*, Van Hoeylandt.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems — the Western Mediterranean

The Assembly,

Having surveyed the present political situation in Spain ;

Noting the decision of the Spanish Government to hold elections in June 1977 ;

Recognising the important constitutional and political changes which have occurred in Spain during the last sixteen months ;

Welcoming the moves towards a more liberal system of government which have taken place since the death of General Franco, in particular the legalisation of political parties and of free and independent trade unions ;

Recognising the important advances made in the new preliminary constitution of Spain, and expressing the hope that after free and completely unfettered elections Spain will proceed on its way towards a full system of parliamentary democracy,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Give every encouragement and assistance to Spain, looking forward to the day when the new Spain can be welcomed in the various joint parliamentary and democratic European organisations.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Mendelson, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Your Rapporteur visited Spain from 9th to 14th January 1977 to examine future possibilities of co-operation between Spain and Western Europe, this being an essential part of European policy in the Western Mediterranean in view of Spain's importance and its place at the western limits of the Mediterranean. Spain's internal situation has so far prevented it from taking part in the Council of Europe, the European Economic Community and NATO because the members of these organisations expect countries wishing to join to be governed by a democratic parliamentary system.

2. The death of General Franco, after more than thirty-five years of dictatorship in Spain, left the way open for new developments. The choice before the people of Spain was between "rupture with the old régime and reform from within".

3. In the long run, the action of the countries of Western Europe will depend above all on these developments and their opinion of them, since the main lines of Spain's foreign policy seem but little affected by the changes now taking place.

II. Basic facts

4. General Franco died on 20th November 1975 after appointing a member of the former Spanish royal family, Prince Juan Carlos, as his successor. This was not a full restoration of the monarchy insofar as Prince Juan Carlos was not the first successor to the Crown but became King by the will of the dictator, Franco, and not by right of primogeniture. The present régime in Spain is thus still the one instituted after the civil war and the system established by the Franco dictatorship will remain in force until another takes its place.

5. It is quite certain however that King Juan Carlos wishes to introduce important political changes in Spain and the country is now passing through a period of transition. But the outcome of this transition is still uncertain: will it merely be a more liberal edition of the Franco régime or will the State be reorganised on a new and truly democratic basis? The trend so far is towards liberalisation without as yet any decisive measure indicating a radical change in the régime. If there were to be a radical change, the transitional period would be a long one.

6. It should be noted however that present conditions in Spain are no longer those in which

General Franco was able to overcome democratic forces thanks to a military uprising. More than 60 % of the Spanish population today is less than forty years old and has therefore known no other régime than that of Franco. But the civil war left deep scars and the population as a whole is mainly concerned with avoiding any recurrence of such hostilities.

7. Spain's economy has made rapid progress in the last ten years. It has had one of the highest growth rates in Europe. There has been a flow of population from the countryside towards the towns, reducing the percentage of those employed in agriculture to less than 25 % of the population. Education has been improved and illiteracy has been considerably reduced. The development of tourism has increased contacts with people from other parts of Western Europe which is that part of Europe to which Spain has traditionally belonged. The standard of living has risen and the gross national product per inhabitant is now over \$2,000, which is bringing it close to the least favoured of the EEC member countries and it had an annual growth rate of over 7 % from 1968 to 1974. The way of life, interests and civilisation are increasingly similar to those of other western countries.

8. There are therefore no longer any fundamental obstacles to that country's participation in all the joint activities of the Western European countries, whether in economic matters or in terms of civilisation. The remaining difficulties are mainly political, although many delicate problems may arise for the integration of certain sectors of the Spanish economy in the overall economy of the community.

III. The economic position

9. Although Spain's economic progress has been particularly remarkable in recent years, General Franco died at a particularly difficult time for preparing a new course for Spain.

10. In 1976, Spain began to feel the crisis which had been affecting the industrialised countries of Western Europe since 1973. This delay is explained by the special characteristics of the Spanish economy, there being a sharp recession in tourism, a major factor in the Spanish balance of payments and employment.

11. The peseta suffered from rampant inflation as testified by a tremendous increase in prices in 1976. Official statistics set the increase in cost of living in Spain in 1976 at over 20 % compared with 16.9 % in 1975 and 15.7 % in

1974. Unemployment also increased considerably, the official figure being 800,000 unemployed. The above figures are challenged by the opposition, however, who consider that the increase in consumer prices and the number of unemployed must be much higher than official statistics show.

12. There has been a marked drop in investment due to industry working well below capacity.

13. A provisional government with its sights set on legislative elections which are essential for the future of the country is hardly in a position to launch a valid cleaning-up policy and implement an economic recovery programme. The fact that the economic crisis coincides with the political crisis inevitably makes more difficult the search for solutions to the economic problems of the country and, insofar as the political crisis is expected to be a long one, it is to be feared that Spain will take a long time to overcome the economic crisis whose social and political effects cannot be measured accurately at the present time.

IV. The government

14. At the present time the King has full powers. On acceding to the throne, he was sworn in under the Spanish Constitution in the same way as all his ministers. It was he who appointed the two successive prime ministers: Mr. Arias Navarro who was already Prime Minister towards the end of the Franco dictatorship and then, with effect from July 1976, Mr. Adolfo Suarez Gonzales who had been national secretary of the only legal Spanish political organisation under the Caudillo.

15. The powers of the King and of the government are limited, however, by the existence of the Cortes appointed during General Franco's time. In several respects the Cortes amended in a conservative sense reformist bills presented by the government. The renewal of the Cortes is therefore of decisive importance because only then will it perhaps be possible to speak of a true change in the régime. The indications are that this will occur between May and July 1977, although no date has yet been fixed, and the responsibilities of the new assembly have not yet been finally spelt out.

16. The members of the government, including the Prime Minister, are all relatively young. However, they all have their roots in the Falangist Party, the Franco administration or the army which makes one wonder to what extent they want changes and are prepared to accept the fundamental changes sought by the opposition parties.

17. It is a general — General Gutierrez Mellado — who occupies the post of Deputy Prime Minister and three other generals are members of the present government as Ministers of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The question is therefore how far military leaders are in a position to influence government decisions and to what extent they are prepared to encourage or tolerate a true change in the régime.

18. On 18th November 1966, on a proposal by the government, the Cortes adopted a political reform bill which was the subject of a referendum on 15th December and then endorsed by 94 % of those taking part in the vote (77.4 % of the electorate). This bill established a transitional régime under which the Cortes henceforth was composed of two chambers, thus confirming its democratic nature with greater and specific powers in legislative matters, although without true supervisory powers over the executive. The government remains responsible only to the King. In addition, the King has the right to resort to a referendum in the event of differences between the government and the Cortes. However, the fact that in the future the Cortes will have constituent powers implies that the régime established under the new bill will be provisional. It is expected that the main task of the new assembly to be elected in the forthcoming general election will be to frame a new constitution.

V. The political parties

19. Throughout the Franco era there was a single-party system. The political parties of Republican Spain went underground and new political groups were formed illegally, which denied them a wide audience. These illegal political parties were too small to be strong enough to present themselves successfully at the polls once democratic consultation became possible.

20. The result is that recent political trends that have shaped Spanish opinion are represented by a multitude of parties whose following cannot be assessed since most of them have never stood for election and there are only vague indications of the number of members or sympathisers. For the elections to be held at the beginning of the summer of 1977, it would be essential for these parties, which alone are truly democratic, to regroup themselves according to general trends, perhaps even forming electoral alliances.

21. Any such regrouping or alliances, however, is most difficult since nothing is yet decided about the conditions in which elections will be held. Further difficulties stem from the fact that political parties have only just been legally authorised in Spain. Only a few right-wing parties have taken advantage of the authorisation granted since Franco's death to form political

associations in accordance with the law. Most of the democratic parties have preferred to remain under the cloak of illegality as long as they were not legally authorised to exercise their political activities in full. Until very recently they were tolerated, but to varying degrees, depending on the parties' political leanings — for instance the communist leader, Santiago Carrillo, was again arrested for a few days at the end of December 1976. Some parties still had to take refuge behind names destined to conceal their nature or their political leanings. They have very few means at their disposal. Since radio and television are State-controlled they do not have access to them. It is even difficult for them to publish and distribute newspapers. The régime is not therefore one of freedom of parties but one in which democratic parties are merely tolerated without any guarantee of the limits of tolerance. Their leaders were until recently in danger of being arrested since their activities were *ipso facto* against the law. Admittedly, negotiations are being conducted between the Prime Minister and the political parties but they are particularly difficult because the government cannot negotiate with all the parties, little being known about what each one represents. They have therefore been obliged to organise themselves to conduct these negotiations. They have appointed a group of nine persons, joined informally by Santiago Carrillo for the Spanish Communist Party, to prepare the negotiations which are conducted by four representatives for all the opposition parties and the Prime Minister. The aim of the negotiations is to draw up legislation granting political parties a status and right to a normal activity.

22. On 11th January, an important step was made in these negotiations since the Prime Minister, by making them formal, indirectly recognised the existence and the right to exist of the political parties. It was even possible to issue a joint communiqué after that meeting.

23. The purpose of that sitting was to define the conditions of an amnesty and to spell out the freedom of the political parties. The negotiators agreed to no longer make the existence of political parties subject to a government decision but merely to registration by statement as for public companies. Should the programmes, principles or activities of these parties not be in conformity with the law, they could be taken to court but not made subject to a government decision.

24. Following upon these negotiations several political parties have since been legalised, i.e. the Christian Democrats, the Liberal Party, two Socialist Parties, and the Socialist Party of Catalonia. But the application of the Communist Party to be legalised has not been approved, but referred to a court of law for a decision. This, in spite of the demands by all the opposition parties

that the Communist Party should also be made legal.

25. The main political parties may be classified in a number of main groups. The referendum on 15th December 1976 allowed an assessment to be made of the numbers opposing any change in the country. This figure is less than 3 % of the electorate since only 2.6 % voted no in the referendum. This represents the most conservative element of Francoism, the main party of this tendency being the "new force" led by Mr. Blas Pinar.

26. The major right-wing grouping of Spanish politics is represented by the Popular Alliance Party, led by Mr. Fraga Iribarne, which has the considerable advantage of being authorised as a political association and, consequently, of being able to exercise influence on society and the electorate. It has widespread and valuable backing among the ruling classes. It represents a will to prolong in a more liberal manner the régime instituted by General Franco and it is clear that it has a wide following in Spanish society.

27. A former member of the Falangist Party and Minister of Information under Franco, Mr. Fraga Iribarne, was the author of one of the rare reforming laws under Franco introduced in 1966 abolishing prior censorship of the press. Since leaving the government in 1969, he has been very outspoken in calling for further limited reform measures. On Franco's death he became Minister of the Interior in the Arias Navarro government but is not a member of the Suarez government. In the Cortes he voted for the reform bill on 18th November 1976. He calls himself liberal but members of the Liberal Party do not agree. Mr. Fraga Iribarne's Popular Alliance Party includes five other former Franco ministers among its leaders. In his interview with *Der Spiegel*, Mr. Fraga Iribarne said that the liberalisation of Spain was still his aim but it would take at least four years to achieve. Throughout that period he called for the maintenance of the ban on the Communist Party and on the Basque or Catalan separatist organisations.

28. On the other hand, the three traditional branches of western democracy — liberal, christian democrat and socialist — are very widely dispersed because of their semi-clandestine existence. Finally, there are the Spanish Communist Party, several extreme left-wing groupings, and a number of regionalist parties, particularly in the Basque country, Catalonia and Galicia.

29. A very wide range of parties will therefore be standing for election in Spain. The Popular Alliance Party might well obtain many of the votes from those who do not want to break with Francoism, whilst their opponents will be fragmented into a number of different groups.

30. The opposition parties have shown true solidarity with the Spanish Communist Party by refusing to negotiate freedom for their own parties which did not allow equal treatment for the Communist Party.

31. This active solidarity produced results since a representative of the Communist Party is taking part in the discussions between the opposition parties to prepare the negotiations with the government on this essential question. The Communist Party for its part seems intent on preserving this solidarity and not jeopardising the liberal trend in Spain by pushing itself to the fore or by adopting positions which might disturb public opinion.

32. The strength of the democratic parties which, in principle, have remained clandestine, is extremely difficult to assess. Most of them had recommended abstaining in the referendum on 15th December 1976, but abstentions numbered only 23 %, all of which are obviously not due to the instructions of these parties. The inference is probably that even if they represent the inner feelings of many Spanish people, the democratic parties cannot expect a sweeping victory in the spring elections and they will no doubt have to find an acceptable compromise with other political forces if they wish to play an active rôle in establishing a democratic Spain.

VI. Trades unions

33. There are similarities between the position of the trades unions and of the political parties, but a number of problems are peculiar to the unions. Under the Franco régime, an official union was set up associating employers and employees. Membership of and consequently subscriptions to this union were compulsory. It was responsible for various welfare services.

34. Nowadays, trades unions are again tolerated, although not officially recognised. However, the official, compulsory trade union still exists, thus considerably hindering recruitment by democratic trades unions since workers can hardly be asked to subscribe to two trades unions at once. The result is that the trades union bodies which have been formed or reformed in recent months can give only very partial and approximate indications of the number of their members.

35. Here we must mention the special place occupied by the workers' commissions, set up clandestinely. They have endeavoured to use the possibilities made available to the official national labour organisation and the electoral procedures applied by the Franco system at plant level for the appointment of representatives of that organisation. The national labour front has been infiltrated by many militants from the workers' commissions, in order to find a basis

for their influence in the framework of the Franco system.

36. This tactic brought them into conflict with the trades union bodies which had been officially disbanded under the Franco régime but continued covertly, refusing any form of co-operation with the official trades union and the Franco régime.

37. A serious drawback of this situation is that it prevents the trades union unity which they all say they want. The workers' commissions have said they want immediate trades union unity, even before forming a confederation themselves.

38. The traditional union bodies, particularly the General Workers' Union (UGT), wished to reorganise themselves first before embarking on negotiations on unification. Since their reorganisation is far from complete, early unification seems unlikely and the workers' commissions too have had to form a confederation. To these difficulties are added political issues as in many other countries, the UGT seeming to be linked with socialism whereas the communist element plays a greater rôle in the workers' commissions.

39. There is every reason to think that trades union rights could be recognised in a similar manner to those of political parties. However, the problem raised by the existence of the official union is still serious. Will workers still be obliged to belong and subscribe to this union? What will happen to the large sums invested by this union in forty years of contributions by workers? The democratic trades union bodies seem in no way inclined to abandon such considerable wealth, which belongs to the workers, to an organisation which they consider to be in no way representative.

VII. Regional problems

40. Although the Spanish Republic had granted considerable independence to the provinces, some of them, such as Catalonia, having a real government, Francoism was very much in favour of centralisation. In a number of regions a large proportion of the population considers that the restoration of freedom means re-establishing regional and local autonomy. In the case of the Basque country and Catalonia, there are very strong claims for autonomy. Many Basques and Catalans consider that they are true nations which should constitute States federated within a Spanish confederation. Regionalism also seems quite strong in Galicia.

41. Basque nationalism led to a series of acts of terrorism, attacks and demonstrations, as in Pamplona on 16th January 1977. Basques were to the forefront of the fight against Francoism and are the only ones to have carried out attacks since Franco's death. The Basque prob-

lem is therefore there for all to see, both in Spain and abroad. Everyone knows it can be solved only through substantial concessions to Basque nationalism. But demands are being made for an immediate extension of the amnesty granted by the new régime to political prisoners, there still being about 180, most of them Basques.

42. In the negotiations on 11th January, the representatives of the opposition parties appear to have obtained from the government a number of measures which, although not granting amnesties in the case of crimes involving bloodshed, would nevertheless lead to all political prisoners being freed before the elections.

43. The left seems far stronger in the Basque country and Catalonia than in the rest of Spain and if local governments are set up it can hope to have considerable influence, which might not be the case in other regions. For instance, the Catalan Socialist Party claims to have ten times more members at present than the Spanish Socialist Party in Catalonia, and it seems clearly in favour of the claim for very wide autonomy in Catalonia.

44. Whatever sympathy there may be for a federalist concept of the State and the right of cultural communities to govern themselves, it must be borne in mind that the importance of regionalist movements may be considerable in the next elections, since although they may bring a large number of electors to vote for the democratic parties, they may also lead those who oppose regionalism, which some may consider as a threat to the unity of Spain, to vote for the Democratic Alliance or other nationalist parties.

VIII. Elections

45. No date has yet been fixed for the general elections, but they can hardly be held before 10th May and must be held before the end of July 1977. The date is of some importance because of the disorganisation of the democratic parties, which need several months to reorganise themselves and prepare the elections. If the elections were to be held earlier it would in no way imply that Spain would be progressing more quickly towards democracy. Again, it is not yet known what electoral system will be applied, although the law provides for regional representation. The future electoral law has yet to be negotiated by the four representatives of the parties and the government.

46. One aspect of uncertainty about the coming elections is the extent to which they will be influenced by the authorities. Strict government neutrality in electoral matters would not be enough to ensure an independent ballot. Local, municipal and provincial authorities are still those set up by the Franco régime and they still

have great authority. The terror on which their authority was based in Franco's day has left many traces and without far-reaching changes in the administrative staff it is to be feared that many electors may be influenced by staff many of whom have every interest in preventing genuine radical changes in the political life of Spain.

IX. Future of the régime

47. It now seems an accepted fact that the Cortes to be elected at the beginning of the summer will play a constituent rôle, although this has not been stated with absolute clarity. It might be just a question of revising the present constitution and not drawing up a new one. This means that perhaps the break with the past and the Franco régime may be held up by the procedure for forming the new assemblies, since the new Cortes is to be composed of a Chamber elected in accordance with the principle of proportional representation and a Senate elected by majority ballot for four-fifths of its members, the remaining fifth being appointed by the King.

48. Furthermore, it would appear that the political system on which the Spanish State will be based after the elections will not be a parliamentary one. There is nothing to oblige the King to choose his ministers from a parliamentary majority and, while the next Cortes will be far more democratic than earlier ones, it does not mean that the next Spanish Government will be more liberal or democratic than the present one. However, it may be expected that if the elections are held correctly and the parties are able to express themselves freely, the King will have to take account of the results of the ballot and of the majority in each of the two assemblies in forming the government. But there is a risk of conflict between the government and the Cortes which the army would still be in a position to arbitrate, particularly if the economic crisis and unemployment were to become worse or if there were unrest, especially in the Basque country.

X. Foreign policy

49. The democratic parties show no signs of wishing to make radical changes in the present course of Spanish foreign policy, which will continue to be directed towards maintaining and improving links between Spain and Latin America and between Spain and other Mediterranean countries, particularly the Arab countries. It would be normal to think that a more democratic régime would look for partners in Latin America and the Mediterranean among countries which are more democratic than those which have been Spain's partners in recent years.

50. Moreover, Spain considers itself to be a wholly European country and all the parties, from the Popular Alliance to the Communist Party, have expressed a keen desire for Spain to join the Common Market as early as possible, although they may have certain illusions about the political and economic difficulties which this might encounter. They know that some countries, including the Federal Republic and France, have shown their desire for Spain to join the European Community without delay, but that other countries, including the Netherlands, insist on a truly democratic régime being established in Spain before opening negotiations. But what would be the reaction of the EEC countries towards Spain's application for membership if there were no major changes in the Spanish régime ?

51. Moreover, present economic difficulties in Spain, the competitiveness of much of its agricultural produce with that of France and Italy, the fact that its per capita gross national product is lower than that of the EEC member countries and the vast disparities between the regions will inevitably raise problems which will become worse if the present recession continues, in Spain as in the rest of Europe, particularly because the problem of Spanish manpower would then become acute.

52. More controversial is the question of Spain acceding to the Atlantic Alliance. Spain is at present associated with western defence through special agreements with the United States, by which American bases have been set up on Spanish territory. Some parties wish Spain to join NATO and the Atlantic Alliance as a whole to take over the place now occupied by the Americans alone.

53. Conversely, other parties consider that the maintenance of present agreements would be preferable and this is the position *inter alia* of Mr. Santiago Carrillo of the Spanish Communist Party.

54. In an interview in the International Herald Tribune of 9th January 1977 he said : "We are in favour of an ever-stronger Europe that is independent of the Soviet Union and the United States, a Europe that can contribute to ending bipolarity and create a multipolar world". But at the same time he considers that the present

balance in Europe is a guarantee of peace. He does not wish Spain to join NATO but would not oppose it outright. The idea that Spain's membership might change the balance and consequently endanger peace was expressed by several Spaniards with whom your Rapporteur spoke. Very few of them showed a real desire to join NATO, although some of them considered that this might be the price that Spain would have to pay to join the EEC.

55. However, it must be realised that Spain does not consider itself isolated in the military field. The Spanish army already carries out combined manoeuvres with the French army and the new direction some people feel its defence policy should take is mainly seen as a means of better ensuring Spain's security while reducing the military effort it would have to make.

XI. Conclusions

56. All the information obtained by your Rapporteur during his visit to Spain leads him to believe that premature steps should not be taken as regards relations between Spain and the Western European countries. Developments in Spain since Franco's death are still uncertain in too many respects and, until the next elections at least, Spain is still a country with a basically authoritarian régime even if the government pursues a relatively liberal policy. Only when Spain has worked out the new régime under which it intends to live will it be possible to examine how democratic that régime is.

57. Secondly, it became clear that the increasing number of interventions from without might have the contrary effect on developments in Spain to that which was expected, such interventions possibly leading to an anti-European and anti-democratic reaction, which is precisely what must be avoided.

58. This in no way means that material assistance and expression of solidarity with the Spanish democratic parties must be avoided, but such assistance and solidarity must be cautious insofar as the political forces have not yet organised themselves and it is difficult to ascertain which groups supporting which tendencies are the most representative of Spanish society.

Review of advanced technology in Israel

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions²
by Mr. van Ooijen, Rapporteur*

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on a review of advanced technology in Israel

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- I. Programme of the visit to Israel — 6th-13th February 1977
- II. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 — 22nd November 1967 and 338 — 22nd October 1973

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Warren (Chairman); MM. Valleix, Lenzler (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, Bernini, Bouilloche (Alternate: Bizet), Cavaliere, Cornelissen (Alternate: van Kleef), Hawkins (Alternate: Craigen), Lewis, Mart, Müller, van Ooijen, Péronnet (Alternate:

Cerneau), Dr. Phipps (Alternate: Jessel), MM. Pinto (Alternate: Pecoraro), Schmitt, Schwencke, de Stexhe, Treu, Ueberhorst.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on a review of advanced technology in Israel

The Assembly,

Considering Israel's wish to establish closer links with Western European countries in the research and development of advanced technology ;

Aware that in various fields such as the desalination of water, Israeli research and development might be of great benefit to several Western European countries ;

Convinced that collaboration between Israel and Western European countries would be mutually advantageous, especially in :

- (a) new sources of energy such as solar energy ;
- (b) oceanography, desalination engineering and pisciculture ;
- (c) aircraft construction and space programmes ;

Considering that Israel, although not geographically part of Europe, is already co-operating with such European organisations as CERN and Euratom ;

Conscious of the need for Europe to play a more important geo-political rôle and to act as a balancing factor for the world superpowers ;

Aware of the necessity to have good relations with all Middle Eastern countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member countries :

1. To intensify co-operation between Western European and Israeli scientific and technological communities ;
2. To promote greater co-operation with Israel in aircraft construction, oceanography and the development of new sources of energy ;
3. To instruct the European Space Agency to seek co-operation with Israel in its work on scientific and application satellites ;
4. To promote a permanent discussion with all Middle Eastern countries in the field of science and technology.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. van Ooijen, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. After visits to the United States, Japan, Canada and a number of European countries, the Committee decided to visit Israel when it became apparent that the Israeli authorities would welcome such a visit. From members' contacts with Israeli parliamentarians, especially those with an interest in technological questions, it was clear that Israel has much in common with the member countries of WEU, especially in such fields of advanced technology as aircraft construction, nuclear energy, oceanology and electronics.
2. Once the Presidential Committee had agreed to the visit, the Israeli National Council for Research and Development in the Prime Minister's Office drew up a programme which was communicated to the Committee through the good offices of the Israeli Embassy in Paris. The Chairman of the Committee was received by the Ambassador, Mr. Gazit, and having explained the wishes of the Committee the programme was finalised¹ with the help of the Embassy staff.
3. Your Rapporteur wishes to express his and the Committee's gratitude to the Israeli officials of the National Council for Research and Development and especially its international affairs division, the Embassy officials in Paris and all ministries and private industries involved in the organisation of the visit.
4. The Committee's discussions with officials from several ministries on the Israeli Government's general policy in scientific and technological matters were extremely interesting.
5. The Committee was highly honoured to be addressed by His Excellency Professor E. Katzir, President of Israel, who received the Committee at his residence. Professor Katzir is also a scientist of renown and chaired the 1966 Committee set up to examine the organisation and management of government research.
6. The visit started at "Yad Vashem — Remembrance Authority", a memorial to Jewish victims of the second world war who had been subjected to Nazi persecution. Of the sixteen million Jews in the world at that time some six million met their deaths during the holocaust in Europe. The Chairman of the Committee laid a wreath by the eternal flame.
7. Afterwards the Committee was received by Mr. G. Hausner, a Cabinet Minister and Chairman of the Council of "Yad Vashem". In his

address to the Committee the Minister pointed out that the Israeli Government and its people could never again accept a situation where there was no refuge in the world for Jews who were being persecuted only because they were Jews. They could never forget what had happened during the second world war in Germany and German-occupied territories, considering also that no other countries inside or outside Europe had been willing to do anything to save European Jews from their terrible fate.

8. After this ceremony the Committee was received by the Speaker of the Knesset who expressed the Israeli people's desire for peace. He was sure that during its visit the Committee would be aware of this general feeling. Moreover, the Committee had come at an important moment as the Knesset elections would be held shortly. The Knesset had 120 members; according to the Speaker, this number had been chosen because in ancient times the tribes of Israel had constituted a 120-member council to discuss important events affecting their people.

9. The Knesset also had seven non-Jewish members: Arabs, Christians and one Bedouin member.

10. The Speaker then explained a number of constitutional rules and facts of Israel.

I. General policy on research and development

11. In the Knesset building the Committee met the Director and Deputy Director of the National Council for Research and Development and discussed procedure for research and development, its structure and functioning in Israel, and Israel's scientific relations with Europe.

12. Dr. E. Tal, the Director, explained the historical development of the ministerial committee for science and technology which had been set up in 1965. This committee had replaced the scientific council whose chairman in 1949 was the then Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion. The main reason for setting up the council was to handle the research requirements of the defence forces. Prior to independence some defence research had been conducted as an underground activity. Another reason for setting up the council was the need to foster scientific research for the development of the economy and especially industrial and agricultural research.

13. From the very beginning the council entrusted the universities with basic research. Seven institutions of higher education were set up from 1949 onwards.

1. See Appendix I.

14. During the first decade, the pressure of urgent national requirements had resulted in fragmentary development of the research system. In the second decade, the government became more involved and the scientific council was replaced by the National Council for Research and Development which was entrusted with the formulation of an overall policy. Special emphasis was placed on applied research for industry and agriculture and applied research institutes were set up for this purpose; industrial enterprises were encouraged to do in-house research. As the implementation of government policy had to be supervised, direct links were established between these research institutes and the national ministries. In many ministries chief scientists were appointed who were *ex officio* members of the National Council for Research and Development.

15. The council co-ordinated different interests and supervised the long-term interests of science and technology. Major projects such as sea water desalination and the technology involved in the development of potassium mining in the Dead Sea were examples of applied research and development which could be undertaken only with direct collaboration between the council and local State industries.

16. The seven universities, including the Weizmann Institute, were all private organisations subsidised by the government for about 80%. Their main task was to train young people and promote basic research.

17. In order to indicate the structure and overall level of the national research effort, Dr. Tal gave a number of figures of interest in this connection. He pointed out that 2.2% of the gross national product was invested in civil and military research and more or less equally divided between the two sectors. This was the same level of research and development expenditure as in most developed countries, i.e. the United States and West Germany.

18. In Israel, 49% of the funds for civilian research were allocated to institutions of higher education and 51% to institutes of applied research and development. The government was the main sponsor of research and development in Israel and its rôle was more important than that of other governments in comparably developed countries since it reflected the Israeli Government's policy of promoting intensive research and development.

19. As far as graduates were concerned, the Israeli figure per 10,000 population was 155, the same as that of Sweden, compared to 380 in the United States. The continued growth of scientific research and the necessary future manpower were therefore assured.

20. Furthermore, it was the government's policy to obtain as much spin-off as possible for civil purposes from military research and development. The knowledge acquired therefrom was exploited to the greatest possible extent without jeopardising the defence effort. The government wished to promote more research and development in industry. For the moment few companies reached a level of commercial turnover which enabled them to maintain an intensive research activity comparable to that of large European and American companies.

Relations with Europe

21. Mr. Y. Saphir, Deputy Director for International Affairs of the National Council for Research and Development, pointed out that scientific relations with other countries and with Europe existed prior to the formation of the State of Israel. One of the difficulties was of course that it was impossible for Israel to have scientific relations with its neighbours; relations with Europe had therefore been essential from the very beginning. There was a network of bilateral and multilateral links with all Western European countries and with Romania, as well as with international organisations. Israel could not rely on its industries having scientific contacts because, generally speaking, they were too small and therefore government responsibility for international contacts had to be established.

22. Formal arrangements had been concluded with some twenty countries for holding exchanges between scientists, joint projects and symposia. So far some six hundred scientists had been exchanged, fifty research projects had been launched in various fields and Israeli scientists had taken part in some fifty joint symposia. Although geographically Israel was not part of Europe, it would appreciate nevertheless participating in or becoming a member of European scientific organisations. In the field of science, geography did not really play an important part.

23. In spite of the fact that it consumed much of Israel's badly-needed foreign currency, the government had accepted the system of the sabbatical year which enabled scientists to go abroad and thus further strengthen relations between Israel's scientific community and the scientific world outside. At the same time many scientific journals were distributed in Israel to keep information flowing.

24. In general scientists heeded the government's wishes in directing scientific research towards the main interests of the country.

The Scientific Research Foundation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

25. Dr. H. Z. Tabor, Scientific Director, explained to the Committee that for political, social and economic reasons it was very difficult

to solve the energy problem. Energy consumption was increasing rapidly and present electricity output of some 1,800 megawatts would be 5,000 megawatts in 1980. The heating load in Israel was of course smaller than in Europe but the cooling load in summer was much higher. As the standard of living rose, more and more energy would be needed. Alternatives were the conservation of energy, hydroelectric power, solar and wind energy.

26. The Ministry of Housing was doing its best to make people aware of the need to conserve energy by redesigning buildings and applying conservation measures.

27. Hydroelectric power had been studied for a long time and a tunnel-plus-canal system between the Mediterranean and the Dead Sea might offer a solution. The Dead Sea had to be replenished and it might be possible to build a canal and tunnel under the mountains to link the two seas. There was a 600-metre altitude difference and such a project could include a 300 megawatt power plant. Another benefit might be the use of such a canal for cooling a nuclear power station.

28. Hydroelectricity might also be used for a desalination plant. Detailed studies were being carried out to take account of all the problems connected with this project. However, there was no doubt that the Dead Sea's water level was too low and this could endanger the potassium plants in the area.

29. In this connection, Dr. Tabor mentioned the use of solar energy which could be stored as heat in a solar pond filled with salt water. The Dead Sea could possibly be used for this purpose; heat was absorbed from sunlight and stored at the bottom while the surface acted as an insulator greatly reducing overnight heat loss. A solar pond of one square kilometre could replace fifty million tons of fuel. Fifty square miles of the Dead Sea would provide enough energy to double Israel's water resources through a desalination process, using the heat thus stored.

Solar energy

30. For years Israelis have taken advantage of solar energy water heaters to produce hot water for their homes. Studies were being carried out to develop a technique involving the direct conversion of solar energy into heat. Another approach was the direct conversion of solar energy to electricity. Equipment was being developed for using solar energy for air conditioning buildings.

31. Studies were being undertaken to produce an efficient photoelectrochemical cell. Solar energy might also be used for the development of algae in highly saline water from which oil could be produced.

32. Other possibilities were the establishment of a peat power station which could produce some 1,000 megawatts. This technology was well-known but involved certain engineering complications. Israel also had some brown coal and oil shale.

33. However, all these possibilities did not solve the problem of liquid fuels for transport. Research was therefore being carried out on new electric vehicles. There was a possibility that batteries might be developed giving a 100-km range for such vehicles. Government scientists would enlist the help of industrialists to overcome the problems of large-scale production.

II. Oceanography

34. On Tuesday, 8th February, one half of the Committee, Group A, visited the Israel Oceanographic and Limnological Research Institute near Haifa, where it was received by the Director-General, Admiral Yohay Ben-Nun, and where all government-inspired research in oceanography and limnological problems is conducted. One current project is mapping the seabed in the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Eilat, the Dead Sea and the Sea of Galilee. This should provide vital information regarding the possibilities of discovering oil in this region. In addition, geothermal studies on the Sea of Galilee and the Dead Sea are being carried out with an eye to discovering possible sources of exploitable geothermal energy.

35. The aim of the institute is to study the immediate needs of the country in terms of applied research. Basic oceanographic research is carried out at the universities. To find minerals in the continental shelf which extends in the north up to five miles and in the south of Israel up to twenty miles, drilling is being carried out at various points. Actually there is no reason why the neighbouring Arab countries should find oil and not Israel. It should not be forgotten that France spent fifty years looking for oil in Algeria and finally found it.

36. Another main aspect of the institute's work is the study of methods of spawning edible fish. Fish farming (bream) is extremely important for Israel because of its long coastline and favourable climate in the Red Sea near Eilat. The institute has already been able to cultivate fish three times faster than in normal circumstances. There is close collaboration on this project with CNEOX in France. Fish are made to spawn in captivity and are then placed in cages of 5m × 5m in open sea water; a similar operation is also conducted in ponds. The institute hopes that in three or four years' time the project can be handed over to fishermen as an aquaculture means of production.

37. A special task of the institute is to advise local municipal councils on the coast how to

preserve the coastline which is of great importance for the tourist industry.

38. On marine pollution, preliminary surveys have been undertaken and analyses have been made of tar pollution to identify the sources of tar balls that pollute the Israeli coastline. It is possible to establish their origin as different crudes have different concentrations of tar.

39. Of special interest for Israel is the Sea of Galilee which is its only fresh-water reservoir. The sea is now being studied in an attempt to understand the physical processes to which it is subjected and now, with eight years' experience, many aspects of the sea's behaviour are understood. The sea has a number of underwater saline sources and special measures have to be taken to reduce salinity. The main fish stocks have been assessed and the fish productivity of the sea has been improved.

40. Special studies are also being made at the institute on hyperbaric physiology, diving techniques, decompressing problems, the construction of offshore rigs and problems submitted to the institute by the navy. The institute has a team of civilian divers. It employs some 120 people, 70 % of whom are scientists. Four research vessels are in operation and two laboratories — one in the Red Sea and the other in the Sea of Galilee — have been established. Its budget is some ten million Israeli pounds (\$1 million), half of which is a government grant, the other half being earned by selling the institute's services to local authorities or industry.

III. ELBIT Computers

41. Also on Tuesday, 8th February, Group A visited ELBIT Computers where it was received by the President, Mr. U. Galil, who described the development of his company which had grown from Elron Electronics Industry, now the holding company of ELBIT Computers Limited and Scientific Data Systems Israel. Elron started with eight people and now employed 2,300. It had developed and produced many computers and computerised military and industrial systems and had two production lines: one military and the other civil. The system produced by ELBIT was compatible with IBM systems. Great emphasis was placed on exports of both civil and military products.

42. A special branch of Elron was Elscint which produced nuclear medical equipment.

43. In the electronic field sensors for fighter aircraft and ships, inertial navigation systems, radar signal processing equipment and radar signals analysis equipment were being produced. Last year sales had amounted to \$100 million.

44. After this introduction, the Committee visited the plant.

IV. Agricultural research organisation

45. On Tuesday, 8th February 1977, Group B of the Committee went to the Volcani Agricultural Research Centre at Bet Dagan where it was received by Professor Va'adia, Chief Scientist of the Ministry of Agriculture and Director of the centre.

46. The Volcani Agricultural Research Centre was set up in 1921 by Professor I.E. Volcani. The major research problems regarding Israel's agriculture during the 1960s included the need for saving water through development of more efficient irrigation systems, raising the yield and quality of crops, increasing production and reducing agricultural imports. The centre is organised in the following sections and divisions: soil and water, garden and field crops, fruit tree plantation, livestock, plant protection, mechanisation, food technology and afforestation. The centre has three large research farms in the north, centre and south of the country.

47. The centre employs 1,300 persons and in 1975 had a budget of 73 million Israeli pounds (\$1 = 10 Israeli pounds).

48. The major part of the land belongs to the State or the National Jewish Fund. The Ministry of Agriculture directs and co-ordinates all the economic agricultural activities. Apart from cereals, most products are produced locally and large-scale exports of certain products, especially vegetables and fruit, cover the import of cereals.

49. The main problem is the scarcity of water and irrigation farming is a necessity. Over 90 % of the total water resources in the country are fully utilised. Water comes from the north from the Sea of Galilee and the River Jordan. It flows through a national pipeline from north to south. Without desalination on a large scale, no more arable land can be made available. The rural population in Israel is 17.4 % of the total population, i.e. about 540,000 people in some 800 villages.

50. Israeli agricultural policy is directed towards the production of high-quality products, such as citrus fruits, which require a minimal amount of water. In view of the scarcity and hence high price of water in Israel, it is advisable to import such necessities as fodder which require a great deal of water.

V. The Weizmann Institute of Science

51. Group B also visited the Weizmann Institute of Science at Rehovot. This institute was originally set up as the Sieff Institute in 1933 and expanded in 1949 when it became known as the Weizmann Institute. Your Rapporteur will only refer briefly to the institute as a detailed docu-

ment on this subject has been produced by the Council of Europe's Committee on Science and Technology.

52. The institute is a member of a relatively large number of European scientific bodies: the European Seismological Commission, the European Cell Biology Organisation, the European Association for Cancer Research, the European Federation of Chemical Engineering, the Federation of European Biochemical Societies, the Federation of European Immunological Societies, the European Association of Leukemia, the European Association for Theoretical Computer Science, the European Peptide Committee, the European Brain and Behaviour Society, the European Committee for Carbohydrate Chemists, the European Federation of Chemical Societies, the European Committee for Microcirculation, the European Molecular Biology Organisation, and many others.

53. It also co-operates with such scientific bodies as the Max Planck Society, the Institut Pasteur, the Basel Institute for Immunology, the Institut de Biologie Physico-Chimique (Fondation Edmond de Rothschild), the International Atomic Energy Commission in Vienna, etc.

54. The Weizmann Institute serves as an indispensable reservoir for Israel's industry and teaching institutions. It is in no sense a coincidence that institute scientists serve in policy-making and advisory capacities in most of the nation's ministries, i.e. the Ministries of Development, Defence, Health, and Agriculture, in addition to Israel's Atomic Energy Commission and the National Council for Research and Development.

55. Moreover, this pattern has held true since the first days of the State of Israel. It is enough perhaps to recall the institute's involvement-in-depth with Israel's initial search for phosphates, uranium and copper which led, in turn, to the creation of Israel's mining industries and the geophysical survey carried out by institute groups that drilled successfully for oil in Israel's Heletz area. Nor has the institute's response to Israel's needs lessened in any way in the intervening years.

56. Extensive studies are now being conducted in the energy field, including research and development of new sources of energy.

VI. Israel Desalination Engineering

57. Mr. N. Berkman, Director of Israel Desalination Engineering, briefed the Committee on the desalination process of his company which was set up in 1965. It specialises in the research and development of saline water desalination processes and the engineering and construction of plants based on these processes.

58. The company had sought a process that would at the same time be economical and effective. In order to avoid corrosion of the pipes and equipment it had to reduce the temperature of the process as much as possible. For this purpose it utilised a conventional steam jet compressor and a horizontal tube connecting a number of evaporative condenser units.

59. After a number of years the process had been developed and small plants of 50 to 500 m³ water per day had been built in various foreign countries. In 1971 a large plant was built in Ashdod: 40,000 m³ water per day. So far the firm had reserved most of its production for export. The Israeli Government did not wish to place any orders until the process had been proven on the export market. In order to get the Ashdod plant started, financial assistance had been needed from the United States. This had been obtained after approval by Congress on the condition that American companies be allowed to employ this process. The company had accepted this condition because it could not manage without the \$20 million and also hoped to get many more orders with American assistance.

60. The water thus far produced has been used for drinking. If plants for irrigation had to be built they would need a capacity of 200,000 to 500,000 m³ per day. The cost of the water depended mainly on three factors: energy, equipment and labour. Before 1973 the cost of fuel was about 40%, the capital cost also about 40% and labour about 20%. Since then fuel costs had risen to about 60% and the price of the water had therefore risen accordingly. If nuclear energy could be used for these desalination plants the original percentages would apply and the price of water would be about \$0.75 per m³.

61. After discussion, the Committee visited the plant, near Tel Aviv.

VII. Nuclear energy

62. On 9th February the Committee visited the Soreq Nuclear Research Centre where it was received by the Director, Dr. Yona Ettinguer, who was representing Mr. Uzi Eilam, Director-General of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission. He welcomed the Committee and explained that the Atomic Energy Commission, founded in 1952, was composed of twenty-two scientists and politicians; the Chairman was the Prime Minister. The Atomic Energy Commission advised the government on nuclear research, development and power.

63. A special committee on nuclear safety advised the Director-General of the Commission.

64. Nuclear research and development activities were concentrated here and at the Negev Nuclear Research Centre. In certain research areas close co-operation had been established with universities in Israel, Euratom, the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and with corresponding institutions in other countries.

65. The Commission had three main divisions: licensing, power and water, and radiation and radioisotope applications.

66. The centre had a nuclear reactor using enriched uranium fuel with a maximum output of 5 megawatts. This reactor had been built in 1958 with the help of the United States and its research was directed towards medical, agricultural and industrial applications.

67. After the Committee had visited the centre, Mr. Uzi Eilam, Director-General of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, spoke on Israel's need to use nuclear energy as an alternative to oil. However, Israel was not among the most advanced countries in the field of nuclear energy research and it hoped to draw on the experience of other countries. Problems of nuclear safety and the disposal of nuclear waste would not arise in Israel before other countries had had to find solutions. Solutions would certainly have been found in Europe and the United States within about ten years and Israel might then profit from them.

68. Mr. Eilam next gave the floor to Mr. Amnon Einav, Director of the Water and Power Division, who stated that the demand for electricity in Israel was increasing rapidly. For its electricity production it had needed fifteen million barrels of oil in 1961, thirty million barrels in 1970 and fifty million barrels in 1975. It was evident that Israel needed to drill for oil on its own territory and to use alternative sources of energy.

69. However, the main alternative to oil was nuclear power and in ten years' time 46% of Israel's electricity requirements would have to be met by nuclear energy. Its nuclear policy was based on five major considerations: (a) to use only proven technologies, i.e. light-water reactors supplied by the United States; (b) to involve Israeli designers of power plants as much as possible; (c) to maximise the buying of Israeli hardware; (d) to develop assured nuclear fuel supplies; (e) to develop a level of mature competence in nuclear technology.

70. The Israeli Government had decided that the best solution for meeting its requirements would be a light-water reactor in the range of 900 megawatts. Sixty-eight per cent of the engineering could be done in Israel and Israeli participation would raise the industrial level of the country. Long-term contracts would be concluded with the United States for nuclear

supplies and enrichment services would also be provided by the United States. Special scientific teams would be formed to master the necessary techniques.

71. Israel was especially interested in using nuclear energy for desalination projects and the two problems would be studied together.

72. Mr. Joseph Alter, Director of the Licensing Division of the Atomic Energy Commission, addressed the Committee on aspects of licensing nuclear power plants in Israel. His address was divided into two parts. The first part dealt with legal bases and organisation and the second part with problems of locating and licensing sites for nuclear power plants in Israel.

73. In the first part, he said that the need to make laws and regulations in the nuclear area and to force constructors and operators to abide by such rules, emanated historically from the production of nuclear materials and their exploitation in industry, agriculture, medicine and research. This need was by no means specific to reactors. The aim of these laws and regulations was to create a framework for the safe working of the nuclear industry, the safe handling of nuclear material and the safe operation of nuclear reactors without risk to the population at large.

74. A decision taken in 1973 to provide organisational means for coping with the possible harnessing of nuclear energy to supply power in Israel had prompted the Israel Atomic Energy Commission to set up a licensing body and immediately sponsor nuclear legislation. The formulation of nuclear legislation and its approval was a lengthy process. Gaining from the experience of other countries, an all-embracing nuclear law covering all aspects of nuclear energy for medicine, agriculture and industry additional to nuclear power generation would take about five years' study.

75. In order to fill a gap in legislation the IAEC had had recourse to an order regarding supervision of nuclear reactors. This order entitled "Order concerning the supervision of nuclear reactors" had been published in November 1974.

76. Overriding the need to fill this loophole in legislation was the consideration of the relative ease with which an order could be modified compared with a law. It should also be remembered that in this new area of licensing in Israel, allowance should be made for future amendments in the light of experience.

77. The Director of the Atomic Energy Commission acted as supervisor at the various phases of approval of the nuclear reactor by the Licensing Division (a technical group of experts) and the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety (ACNS). The Prime Minister acted as a court of appeal.

78. The Licensing Division, created in December 1973, drew on local manpower for vocational training. The total staff today numbered twenty-four. The Licensing Division also employed outside experts and consultants from both home and abroad.

79. Licensing was nowadays mainly concerned with problems affecting the Nitzanim site, two-thirds of the staff being engaged on environmental, geotechnical, geological, seismic and hydrological issues.

80. The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety was a high-level group of scientists and engineers representing the many aspects of nuclear power plant technology. Each member of ACNS was personally appointed by the Prime Minister on the recommendation of the Director of the AEC.

81. The law for planning and building provided for the licensing of each building erected in the country. Nuclear reactors had to be approved by one of the planning and building committees. The site for a nuclear power plant had to fit into the central planning envisaged by the Planning and Building Council.

82. This council reviewed aspects of rural and urban master plans with particular regard to environmental and ecological issues.

83. The Israel Electric Corporation included in its application for the construction of nuclear power plants a preliminary safety analysis report and an environmental report to the appropriate planning and building committee and to the Atomic Energy Commission.

84. Throughout the construction period plants were subject to inspection and control by the licensing staff. After installation of equipment, operational tests of systems commenced. Tests were carried out under surveillance, and conditional to partial permits for fuel loading, criticality and gradual load raising. Following these tests the electricity authorities had to apply for an operating licence.

85. In the second part of his speech on Israel's problems in locating and licensing sites for its nuclear power plants, Mr. Alter said that two factors had been obvious in the early stages of planning for Israel's first nuclear power plants: the lack of inland cooling water, which meant a coastal site to use sea water, and the limited space still available on the densely-populated coast. These two considerations had dominated the preliminary site selection, and thus in the mid-sixties four coastal sites had been administratively reserved for nuclear power stations: the Habonim site, south of Haifa; the site of the Soreq experimental reactor (Palmahim); the Nitzanim site, between Ashdod and Asqelon; and the Siqim site, just north of the Gaza strip. Among these sites, population densities clearly

pointed to the relative advantages of the Nitzanim site, which was therefore chosen for the planned dual-purpose (desalting) reactor. Today, for various reasons Nitzanim remained the only site actually available at the coast.

86. Unfortunately, in the early days, it had not been fully realised that certain geological factors might make a site unpractical, and no detailed site investigations had been concluded at that time. The geological problem was aggravated by difficulties in investigations: the coastal area was overlain by a thick sediment cover of semi-consolidated sandstone and marly layers, making poor foundation material and hampering geological fact-finding.

87. A second problem was that Israel was a seismically active area, though less than the United States west coast, but more than Central Europe.

88. A third problem was that liquefaction might occur, due to earthquake shock lowering the strength of the semi-consolidated soil, causing a problem in foundation engineering.

89. The last of the major problems was that of safeguarding against attack. Various avenues had been explored, among them underground construction or protecting vital parts of the plant. However, the nature of the soil and a high water table combined to make the problem even more difficult to solve.

90. In many respects site investigations were still being conducted or planned. The Israeli licensing authorities scrutinised incoming site information and compared licensing procedures and criteria from various countries and agencies.

91. Much could be said for adopting the United States Code of Site Licensing as the most detailed and comprehensive body of criteria and guidelines, yet unequalled. However, United States rules and guidelines might need modification to conform to Israeli conditions.

92. In summary, Israel was beset by great and unusual problems, even in such technical fields as siting and licensing nuclear power plants.

VIII. *Israel Aircraft Industries*

93. The Committee visited Israel Aircraft Industries on 10th February and was received by Brigadier-General Israel Roth, Vice-President of the company. He apologised for the absence of the Director-General, Mr. A.W. Schwimmer, who was abroad.

94. He stated that the dominant effort in the present defence research and development programme was being made by Israel Military Industries and Israel Aircraft Industries, both affiliated to the Ministry of Defence.

95. Israel Aircraft Industries Limited had been established in the early 1950s and originally provided only aircraft maintenance facilities. It had since been reorganised several times and its main aim was to reduce Israel's dependence on outside aircraft production, maintenance and accessories. It was one of the few companies in the world in which all aspects of aircraft production, including engine parts, aerospace equipment and missiles, were dealt with under one roof.

96. It was a normal commercial shareholding company with all shares in government hands. The situation was peculiar in that the shareholder, the Minister of Defence, was also the largest customer as 50 % of the company's work was for that ministry.

97. The company employed 18,500 workers of whom 2,500 were scientists or academic personnel. The industry had three main divisions: engineering, aircraft manufacturing and missiles.

98. As Israel had a population of only three million it could not support a large aircraft industry and therefore had to opt firmly for the course to follow.

99. It produced the Arava transport aircraft for military or civil use under rough conditions. The Arava, a short-take-off-and-landing aircraft, was powered by two Canadian Pratt and Whitney PT-6 engines and needed no ground support. It had been selling quite well, especially in Latin America: fifty were on order and twenty-eight had been delivered. It would also be useful in Africa but could not be sold there for political reasons.

100. When the Israeli navy lost a destroyer in the 1967 war the naval staff had to find weapon systems which could out-maneuvre the Soviet missile Styx. The system developed by the Israel Aircraft Industries and the navy was called the Gabriel weapons system. This was manufactured entirely in Israel and already had a follow-up: the Gabriel II. The missile's range had increased the sea-to-sea potential from twenty to forty kilometres. As it could be installed on existing ships it was quite economical, the more so as it could be integrated with other than its own fire control systems.

101. As Israel Aircraft Industries had been developed from a maintenance and repair facility the building of its own combat aircraft was a natural follow up. This aircraft was called the Kfir (lion cub). One could call it the result of a marriage between the French Mirage-type airframe and the American General Electric J-79-type engine.

102. The electronic part was also Israeli-designed and manufactured. The aircraft cost about \$5 million and was a multi-rôle aircraft: it had a

fighter as well as a reconnaissance rôle. It was equipped with advanced integrated weapon delivery and navigation systems. It was used in the Israeli air force and could be sold abroad. Production was five aircraft per month.

103. Israel Aircraft Industries also built a business aircraft, the Westwind 1123. It was sold in the United States by Atlantic Aviation and its success there had assured its place on the world market. It had been developed from an American plane called the Jet Commander.

IX. Israel Military Industries

104. Having visited the plant of Israel Aircraft Industries, the Committee visited Israel Military Industries. During the tour of the plant the Committee saw the production of different types of rifles, automatic weapons, artillery, cannons and missiles.

105. The Committee was addressed by the Vice-President, Mr. Jacob Lihor, who said that Israel Military Industries had twenty-four plants spread across the country, their main purpose being to supply the armed forces. They manufactured new types of rifles, pliable and made of plastic, sub-machine guns, guns and all types of ammunition and employed some 10,000 people producing 500 different products. They also manufactured spare parts for four different types of tanks: British, Russian, American and Israeli.

106. Some civil industries worked as subcontractors for certain types of weapons. An important part of the work in Israel Military Industries was the training of newcomers and immigrants who had never worked in an arms industry.

X. Political-military discussions with Israeli authorities

107. During its visit to the Knesset on Monday, 7th February, the Committee had a discussion with Mr. Abba Eban, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, and member of the Knesset, who pointed out that for many years Israel had already had contacts in the field of science and technology with such European organisations as CERN, Euratom and the European Communities. It would be to the advantage of both sides for this relationship to be developed further.

108. For Israel, it was most important to have a balance of power in the Mediterranean as well as elsewhere in the world. The geopolitical predominance of the United States was therefore of the greatest importance as Israel had to create an equilibrium between itself and the 100 million Arabs who occupied an area of 4.5 million square

miles. Israel therefore needed the United States to guarantee its existence, but an equilibrium cannot be created by allies alone. For this reason the people realised from the outset that this should also be pursued through the development of science and technology, which could give a small sparsely-populated country like Israel autonomy in defence as well as in economic matters. It helped Israel to convert from a largely agricultural society to an industrial society. Israeli scientists and industrialists had many close relationships with their colleagues in the United States as well as in Europe and this helped considerably.

109. Mr. Eban believed that after the frozen positions in 1976 there might be some progress towards peace in 1977. The Lebanese conflict was perhaps nearing solution. The United States elections had introduced a new government; the United States could now act as a negotiator between Arabs and Israelis. This mediation might lead to fruitful steps towards peace. The USSR could not be a negotiator as it was not accepted as such by both parties. The United Nations was so biased in favour of the Arab cause that not much could be expected from that side. Moreover, it was unbalanced by the weight of the developing world. Europe still had not found a political or strategic rôle in the Middle East because of its internal divisions. Only the United States could break the deadlock between the two opposing parties.

110. Military action had been taken in 1973 when there was a diplomatic vacuum. If diplomatic discussions were resumed and Israel acquired full peace and security, the Arabs would certainly be given territorial satisfaction. However, interim settlements should pave the way to an overall settlement which might not be possible in 1977 or 1978.

111. Although Europe would not be able to play a rôle in the discussion, its presence was nevertheless relevant as it might help to rectify the imbalance of power in a geopolitical sense.

112. The Arab world was not monolithic and the Israelis had no choice but to discuss with their neighbouring Arab countries. A settlement of the Palestinian problem would have to be found in the context of a Palestinian-Jordanian composite State. In this context he referred to United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338¹. The Arab governments had not yet replied to these resolutions.

113. The Israeli Government was not in favour of two Palestinian States: one with Jordan and the other on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The latter would be irredentist, weak, in the hands of the PLO and dominated by the Soviet

Union. There was no advantage for Israel in the creation of such a situation.

114. In case of a composite Palestinian-Jordanian State demilitarisation of certain areas would still be necessary to ensure the integrity of Israeli frontiers.

115. On Thursday, 10th February, at a dinner given at a government guest house in Tel Aviv, the Committee was addressed by Major-General I. Tal on the use of tanks in present-day warfare. General Tal stated that the rôle of tanks in modern warfare would remain extremely important. They would be used wherever necessary to make a surprise attack on the enemy. Tanks could well be used in combination with helicopters to back infantry attacks at certain points.

116. He said that western countries had always deployed less troops than the eastern countries. The East had always been able to amass numerous divisions which placed them in a static position vis-à-vis the West which had always had to employ a mobile strategy. Israel's position was similar to that of the West as it had relatively few people to withstand possible attacks by the Arab masses. Therefore tanks would always be needed to provide mobility for a surprise attack.

117. On Friday, 11th February, the Committee had a working breakfast with Major-General S. Inbar, Chief of Defence Research. He explained that his organisation was a unified organisation for all three services and came directly under the Defence Minister. This was possible in Israel since its small size allowed immediate reaction to a given requirement.

118. As everybody in Israel had to do military service, many people in universities and research institutes had military experience and easy access to all possible research activities helped the organisation in fulfilling its task. Contributions to defence needs were almost spontaneous. Since everyone, including high-ranking people, had to serve a follow-up of one month a year in the forces after completing their military service, they remained in constant touch with military requirements.

119. Even so, it was not an easy task to be the head of a research and development organisation for defence purposes as many difficult choices had to be made which might strengthen or weaken the Israeli defence posture. It was extremely difficult to know what the new war theatre would look like in a few years' time.

120. General Inbar believed that armour would play an important rôle in the field of new tanks, personnel carriers and weapons systems. Moreover it would be used in great quantities. If, therefore, mobile capabilities were developed this implied the acceptance of a mobile front. How-

1. See Appendix II.

ever, in certain areas static defence might be necessary which meant finding new tactical solutions. One of the great difficulties was the continuing development of anti-tank obstacles and missiles. Where Israel was concerned brute force was not possible because of the numbers and cost involved and therefore it had to plan tactical manoeuvres to make a breakthrough. This meant air mobility using helicopters and three-dimensional warfare. Israel had to concentrate on helicopters as a means of transport and as utility and special-purpose vehicles. The development of helicopters would necessitate new electronic warfare equipment as fronts would be broader and deeper. If helicopters became an important factor in modern warfare, anti-helicopter weapons systems would be developed which would require special means of detection.

121. Another future development would be in the electro-optical spectrum. The development of the laser might bring a revolution in military thinking as wars which so far could only be fought in daytime could now also be fought at night using the new electro-optical instruments. This meant deploying all military capability twenty-four hours a day; the problem here was that the units had to be permanently on the move, and at the same time provided with their necessary rest. Israel first experienced this type of warfare during the Yom Kippur war; it was extremely difficult to determine the enemy's night capabilities, how much equipment they had for night fighting and where.

122. The new electro-optical instruments and the laser also gave nearly 100 % target accuracy, which had a direct influence on the amount of ammunition to be carried. In the old days much ammunition was lost and therefore large supplies were needed. This might change in the future.

123. The laser range-finder also made for much smaller anti-tank rifles. This and the smaller amounts of ammunition required would make units equipped with these advanced weapons far cheaper. Modernisation of the armed forces also meant modernising the industrial infrastructure.

124. General Inbar had often pointed out to politicians that refusal to modernise the forces would in the long run make them more expensive, less effective and leave the country with an obsolete industrial infrastructure.

125. On the other hand, new weapons could only be introduced gradually in the armed forces in order not to impede their fighting ability.

126. New ships were necessary for the naval forces as they would increasingly be used as platforms for missile systems. The same was true for aircraft which were also platforms for missiles and were therefore becoming so expensive that they raised procurement difficulties. For instance, the F-15 cost \$25 million, but for

a country like Israel a cheaper plane might be more advantageous. The F-16 cost approximately \$6 million and the Kfir multi-rôle aircraft had a fly-away price of \$5 million. The goal was to have a platform for launching a missile with maximum destruction capability. The best solution was to construct platforms from which varying types of missiles could be launched.

127. Helicopters could be used for many purposes and for this reason Israel should have its own helicopter industry. Moreover, piloting a helicopter was not as complicated as piloting an aircraft because a helicopter pilot was more like a tank commander in a three-dimensional battle area. In order to make full use of helicopters a communication system had to be developed together with protection against ground-to-air missiles. Missile guidance systems had been greatly improved.

128. Finally General Inbar pointed out that comparisons between the different wars during the last ten years were not really very valuable as, for instance, the Vietnam war was totally different to the Yom Kippur war. It was dangerous to draw parallels where they did not exist. The main factor in winning a war was still the morale of the men conducting it.

129. Major-General B. Peled, Commander of the Israeli air force, then addressed the Committee. He declared that the main reason for Israel winning the 1948 war against the Arab armies was the morale of the men, the level of culture, civilisation and superior leadership. At that time the Israeli forces had neither tanks nor planes but nevertheless they had beaten armies at least five times their size.

130. In the year 70 A.D. the kingdom of Israel had lost against the Roman legions because it did not have the means and the morale to win. Today, according to General Peled, Israel would do everything to avoid this type of situation. He pointed out that when the British had left in 1948 Israel had accepted the territorial arrangements but had been attacked by the Arabs. In 1956, in the Suez war, the Arabs had again attacked, ignoring the Rhodes armistice agreement. Twice Israel had given up occupied territories and twice the Arabs had attacked. This time Israel would not accept any withdrawal from occupied territory unless a lasting peace was assured. He was of the opinion that the Arabs were asking too much if they wished to go back to the 1947 frontiers; the Jews could tell the Egyptians that they built the Pyramids, but they were not asking to have them back.

131. In the 1973 war the Egyptians had been able to attack because the Israeli Government had ordered that under no circumstances should a preventive war be started. At the same time it was the Israeli air force which finally made it

possible to win the war by beating the Arab air forces.

132. The build-up of the Israeli forces had gone hand-in-hand with the social and economic build-up of the country as a whole. Since 1948 all kinds of community achievements, i.e. schools, social centres, etc., had been established and this had encouraged the people to fight for these achievements.

133. At the end of the morning the Committee met Mr. S. Peres, Minister of Defence, who was accompanied by Mr. Ben Nathan, former Ambassador to Bonn and Paris, and by General Salomo Gazit, Chief of Military Intelligence. The Minister said he was prepared to answer questions by the Committee on politico-military subjects. He stated that the industrial backwardness of the Arab countries could be explained partly by the fact that they were rich enough to buy ready-made all the equipment they needed for their military forces ; in this way oil production was an enemy to industrial development in their countries. For reasons of prestige the armies wanted the best equipment available on the world armaments market. This had led to an imbalance in the structure of their societies as the armies had become the most modern and strongest institutions of these countries. Therefore economic development had taken second place and this had led to general dissatisfaction amongst the civilian population.

134. One could consider the world situation in military terms as follows : the United States, the USSR and Europe were in a post-belligerent phase, Latin America was in a pre-belligerent phase, and the Middle East was in a belligerent phase. Israel therefore had to spend a large part of its resources on military equipment, i.e. some 40 % of the budget. The government needed to increase the real value of the budget which was possible as the average Israeli worker's production level was \$10,000 a year. In Europe it was \$15,000 and there was no reason why the Israeli worker should not achieve the same level of production. Keeping the defence budget at 40 % of the total budget, it would be possible to increase the real amount of military spending if production were increased.

135. Israel would be extremely glad if it could reduce its defence budget but peace was not likely to come in 1977. There might be chances for peace in two or three years' time, but in this area no major event had ever been foreseen with accuracy.

136. First and foremost, according to the Minister, the Israeli Government was responsible for the Israeli people.

137. Of course there was a Palestinian problem but this had arisen because the Arab leaders — especially the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem — had

invited the population, some 900,000 or one million people, to leave the country. It should not be forgotten however that the same number of Jews had emigrated from the Arab countries and settled in Israel. The Arab countries were rich enough to absorb their fellow Arabs if they so wished.

138. He believed that where Jordan was concerned, it, like Palestine, was a geographical not ethnical notion. The people living in these areas had never considered themselves other than Arabs. In the period between 1948 and 1967 they could have set up a Palestinian State on the west bank of the Jordan, but they had not done so. The best solution would be to set up a federated Jordanian kingdom. The Israeli Government refused to accept the PLO as representative of the Palestinian Arabs. It did not wish to deal with this terrorist and Russian-oriented organisation.

139. The main problem remained the existence of Israel and its recognition by neighbouring countries. Once peace had been established the Israeli Government was willing to discuss all essential problems with its Arab neighbours. It should not be forgotten that the Arab countries had about eleven million square kilometres of land.

140. The Minister believed that in fields of advanced technology Israeli co-operation with Europe could be extremely useful for both sides. There was no limitation to co-operation on their side but there was a political limitation on the European side. Since the oil boycott, European countries were giving in to Arab threats as they were afraid to jeopardise their oil supplies.

141. As the PLO now had an office in Brussels, one could not say that Europe would be of any assistance in the negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries. The Soviet Union had lost much of its influence over the Arab countries and especially Egypt. The only real negotiator could be the United States.

142. General Gazit said he had been in charge of military intelligence for three years. The main question was whether the Israeli forces could again be taken by surprise. Various measures had been taken to prevent this but one never knew what might happen.

143. A new element was terrorist action, taking hostages, to blackmail the authorities concerned into taking measures advantageous to the terrorists. No civilised government should accept such terrorist warfare even if it meant that innocent persons might be killed. However, the world had not yet found a solution to this problem. Action by the Israeli forces in Entebbe was an exception to the rule that direct action could be taken by the country concerned. The world as a whole should take measures to punish this type of ter-

rorist, but many governments were not in fact inclined to condemn terrorist action.

144. A chief of military intelligence had first to assure that good intelligence information reached the central organisation and second to evaluate the information. The second was more difficult as attitudes and ways of thinking differed from one country to another. During the Yom Kippur war the Israelis were completely surprised as all information had led the Israeli authorities to think the Arab countries were not strong enough to attack as they did not have the necessary air cover.

145. The position of the Syrian troops as they were deployed in the Lebanon at the moment did not constitute a threat to the security of Israel, but this deployment might change and the Syrian military position vis-à-vis Israel might grow stronger. However, for the moment they were experiencing difficulties as an occupation force which was bound to antagonise the Lebanese people. The Israeli authorities were keeping a close watch on the situation, especially to see if there would be a concentration of Syrian forces in the Lebanon.

146. To the outsider the present political situation in Israel's neighbouring countries might look quite reassuring, but from the Israeli point of view a peace offer, for instance from President Sadat, had to be checked and analysed to estimate to what extent it was sincere or whether it was merely a tactical political manoeuvre.

147. As head of military intelligence he received certain indications, but judging the sincerity of, for instance, President Sadat was extremely difficult. This was not just political science but a question of life or death for Israel.

Conclusions

148. Relations between Israel and the European countries are based not only on political, trade or other such tangible links but on common religious and secular historical grounds and acceptance of common values, especially for Israelis of European origin. The sentiments deriving from these factors are the source of continuing and powerful relationships between Israel and the Western European countries. These relationships are strong and firmly rooted but not static and should therefore be developed.

149. The Israeli attitude and wish to establish continuing close links with Western European countries in advanced technological research and development has also been shaped by the recognition of the European Communities as a world trade power. The EEC has had a series of spectacular successes in its relations with the outside world. A pattern of trade and aid deals now covers almost the entire developing world. Although the EEC has not significantly altered

the world's political balance of power, it nevertheless represents a real economic power. Israel's wish to establish closer links with the Western European countries is also due to the fact that it has no relations at all with its neighbouring countries, the Arab world, and with most of the African countries. The absence of neighbourly relationships with the Arab world and most African countries is unnatural and contrary to the interests of both Israel and the Arab world. Israel is and remains a Middle Eastern power and will, as such, have to be integrated in that region. Your Rapporteur recalls the statement by Mr. van der Stoep, Dutch Foreign Minister, that the continuing existence of Israel should be accepted. The PLO should do what Egypt has done and accept this continuing existence. The creation of a Palestinian State incorporating the present State of Israel would be unacceptable, particularly since Israel in its present form would actually disappear. Negotiations on this basis would be unacceptable.

150. Your Rapporteur considers that both sides will have to sit down at a conference table after the Israeli elections in May. He is convinced that a new Arab-Israeli war would be far more destructive than any in the past. Both sides now possess surface-to-surface missiles and cities and civilian populations will almost certainly be targets and the resulting carnage will far exceed that of former wars. Moreover, the likelihood of the superpowers being involved will be far greater than before.

151. The Committee visited several Israeli industries and installations and was deeply impressed by their state of development. It was amazed that a small country was able to build a fighter bomber with a speed of more than Mach 2.3, surface-to-surface (Gabriel) and air-to-air (Shafir) missiles. In no other country in the world had it seen so much solar energy used as in Israel. Large scientific and technological strides have also been made in oceanography, desalination and pisciculture.

152. Israel's political and military leaders are very concerned about future co-operation with Western European countries as they want Europe to play a more important rôle in this part of the world and they do not wish to depend wholly on the United States and the possibly changing relationship between the two superpowers.

153. Your Rapporteur believes that the best way to promote active co-operation is to foster collaboration between the scientific, technological and industrial communities. The European Space Agency could play a significant rôle in such collaboration, especially once peace has been restored in the Middle East — hopefully in the near future.

154. Collaboration would be beneficial to all the countries concerned and relations with Israel could be most rewarding.

APPENDIX I

Programme of the visit to Israel

6th-13th February 1977

Sunday, 6th February

Arrival at Ben-Gurion Airport.

Met by representatives of the Knesset and the National Council for Research and Development.

Drive to Jerusalem.

Monday, 7th February

7.45 a.m. Leave the hotel.

8.15 a.m. "Yad Vashem — Remembrance Authority" memorial to the victims of the holocaust. Meeting with Mr. G. Hausner, Cabinet Minister and Chairman of the Council of Yad Vashem.

9.45 a.m. *The Knesset*
Meeting with the Speaker, Mr. Yisrael Yeshayahu.

10.30 a.m. Meeting with Dr. E. Tal, Director, and Mr. Y. Saphir, Deputy Director, International Affairs, of the National Council for Research and Development. Discussions on the scientific set-up in Israel and Israel's scientific relations with Europe.

11.30 a.m. Meeting with Dr. H.Z. Tabor, Scientific Director, Scientific Research Foundation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Discussion on energy research in Israel.

12.30 p.m. Meeting with Mr. A. Eban, Member of Knesset.

1.45 p.m. Lunch given by Mr. Z. Shek, Assistant Director General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, at the Plaza Hotel.

Lunch will be followed by a tour of the city of Jerusalem.

6.00 p.m. Return to the hotel.

7.15 p.m. The delegation received by His Excellency Professor E. Katzir, President of Israel, at his residence.

8.30 p.m. Dinner at the Knesset given by the Speaker, Mr. Yeshayahu.

Tuesday, 8th February

The delegation will split into two groups :

Group A

8.00 a.m. Leave the hotel — drive to Tel Shikmona (near Haifa).

10.30 a.m. Israel Oceanographic and Limnological Research. Admiral (Res.) Y. Ben-Nun, Director General.

12.15 p.m. Lunch.

1.30 p.m. "Elbit Computers Ltd."
Received by Mr. U. Galil, President.

5.30 p.m. Leave the campus — drive to Tel Aviv.

7.30 p.m. Arrival at the hotel.

Group B

- 8.00 a.m. Leave the hotel — drive to the Volcani Agricultural Research Centre, Bet Dagan.
- 9.00 a.m. Agricultural Research Organisation.
Professor Y. Va'adia, Chief Scientist of the Ministry of Agriculture and Director of the Centre. Briefing on arid zone irrigation and irrigation techniques.
- 11.00 a.m. Leave the Centre.
- 11.30 a.m. The Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot (including visits to science-based industries).
Lunch at the Institute.
- 5.00 p.m. Drive to Tel Aviv.

Wednesday, 9th February

- 9.00 a.m. Discussion, in the Dan Hotel, with Mr. N. Berkman, Director, "Israel Desalination Engineering (Zarchin Process) Ltd." (IDE) on the subject of desalination. Visit to IDE Headquarters.
- 11.30 a.m. Leave for Nahal Soreq.
- 12.00 noon Soreq Nuclear Research Centre (the visit will include lunch).
- 5.00 p.m. Return to the hotel.

Thursday, 10th February

- 10.00 a.m. Leave hotel.
- 10.30 a.m. Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd. Meeting with Brigadier General (Res.) Israel Roth, Vice-President.
Tour of the production line of the "Kfir".
Lunch.
- 1.30 p.m. Leave Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd.
- 2.00 p.m. Israel Military Industries. Meeting with Mr. Jacob Lihor, Vice-President.
- 3.30 p.m. Return to hotel.
- 8.00 p.m. Dinner with Major General (Res.) I. Tal.

Friday, 11th February

- 8.30 a.m. Working breakfast with Major General S. Inbar, Chief of Defence Research.
- 11.15 a.m. Meeting with Major General B. Peled, Commander of the Israeli Air Force.
- 12.00 noon Meeting with Mr. S. Peres, Minister of Defence.
- 12.30 p.m. Meeting with General Salomo Gazit, Chief of Military Intelligence.
- 1.15 p.m. Leave for Galilee.

Saturday, 12th February

- 9.00 a.m. Atar Sapir Pumping Station of the Mekorot Water Co. Ltd. Talk on the National Water Carrier by Mr. Z. Stuhl, Regional Engineer.
Touring in Galilee.
Return to Tel Aviv.
Leave for Rehovot.
Dinner given by Professor M. Sela, President of the Weizmann Institute of Science.

Sunday, 13th February

- Departure from Israel.

APPENDIX II

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242**22nd November 1967**

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasising the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasising further that all member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

(1) Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles :

- (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict ;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force ;

(2) Affirms further the necessity

- (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area ;
- (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem ;
- (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarised zones ;

(3) Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution ;

(4) Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 338**22nd October 1973**

The Security Council,

(1) Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than twelve hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy ;

(2) Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts ;

(3) Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under the appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Scientific and technological co-operation in Europe
Reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions²
by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur

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Statement by President Carter on nuclear power policy — 7th April 1977

1. Adopted in Committee by 12 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Warren (Chairman); MM. Valleix, Lenzer (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaenssens, Bernini, Bouulloche (Alternate: Bizet), Cavaliere, Cornelissen (Alternate: van Kleef), Hawkins (Alternate:

Craigien), Lewis, Mart, Müller, van Ooijen, Péronnet (Alternate: Cerneau), Dr. Phipps (Alternate: Jessel), MM. Pinto (Alternate: Pecoraro), Schmitt, Schwencke, de Stexhe, Treu, Ueberhorst.

N. B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

***on scientific and technological co-operation in Europe —
reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Gratified to note that the Council agrees on the need to seek an overall policy in the field of advanced technology designed to guarantee Western Europe's place in the world and to foster fruitful co-operation with the United States on an equal footing and that the Council favours the harmonisation of national aeronautical policies ;

Considering that in the military field the Council recognises the need for a joint approach by member countries in studying and determining their aircraft requirements ;

Regretting the Council's decision not to draw up guidelines for a long-term European policy in sectors of advanced technology,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments :

1. Further to their consideration of the construction of civil aircraft, to consider making a combined study of their civil and military requirements and programmes with particular regard to the possibility of developing a transport aircraft, different versions of which could be used for civil or military purposes ;
2. To continue to give a high priority to the operational utilisation and commercialisation of application satellites developed in Western Europe ;
3. In the field of a common European energy policy, which remains of the highest priority, to seek the closest possible co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy ;
4. To advance the interests of fusion research in Europe by taking an early decision on the siting of the Joint European Torus.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions has read with interest mingled with disappointment the parts of the Council's twenty-second annual report to the Assembly dealing with scientific, technical and space questions. It regrets that the Council failed to mention the guidelines requested last year for a long-term European policy in sectors of advanced technology and that it did not agree on the need for effective decision-making machinery to be set up in Western Europe. The Committee is convinced that without such machinery Western Europe's position in advanced technology will deteriorate further to the detriment of its internal and external security.

2. In view of the terms of this report, your Rapporteur will restrict himself to three main areas of European co-operation: aviation, space and nuclear energy. Co-operation is to a considerable extent influenced by the attitude of the United States in these matters, a point clearly emphasised in the Council's report.

I. European aviation

3. Many important decisions will have to be taken in the next few years, particularly in the field of aviation. European aerospace manufacturers are facing a period of uncertainty, with nationalisation in Britain and the prospect of a shrinking domestic market in France and the other member countries.

4. European industry's sales were \$10 billion in 1976 and are estimated at some \$11 billion in 1977. When these figures are compared to those of the United States the possible danger of the European aircraft industry being crushed by that of the United States is evident. Total United States aerospace sales in 1976 were \$32 billion and might approach \$35 billion in 1977. Overall United States aerospace exports in 1977 are expected to reach some \$8.4 billion, as compared with \$7.6 billion in 1976. United States aerospace imports for 1977 are estimated at \$441 million, which will give a favourable trade balance of some \$8 billion.

5. The dangerous position of the European aircraft industry, with no effective decision-making machinery, is becoming more acute although the long-term outlook for new civil aircraft is improving on the world market; traffic is now growing after a decline during the recession years of the early 1970s and the manufacturers must complete development plans for a new generation of aircraft for the 1980s.

6. European manufacturers have to be ready to play their rôle in this world market, but how can they do this financially or otherwise?

7. For the moment the market is saturated by American aircraft and it seems extremely difficult to achieve a greater share of the market for European firms. Nevertheless, important measures could be prepared for the future to improve the prospects of sales, at least in Europe. Your Rapporteur would like to list six such measures:

- (i) co-ordination of European financial means for promoting European aircraft products;
- (ii) harmonisation of aircraft importation regulations;
- (iii) harmonisation of customs regulations;
- (iv) harmonisation of export regulations, especially for military aircraft;
- (v) standardisation of national companies' air fleets;
- (vi) establishment of a common company law.

8. In the civil field the Concorde supersonic transport programme remained at a standstill in 1976-77.

9. The Airbus Industrie A-300B aircraft failed to pierce the export market and sluggish sales are leading to a slowdown in production from 2 to 1.5 a month. Airbus Industrie will probably not be able to find DM 1,500 million to develop the smaller Airbus B-10. The Common Market is providing 30 million units of account for a preliminary study of this project.

10. Prospects of launching an advanced version of the Dassault-Bréguet Mercure 200 in collaboration with McDonnell Douglas are rather uncertain.

11. On 16th March 1977, the German-Dutch firm Fokker-VFW announced plans to build a super F-28, 115-passenger transport plane. The great advantage of this type of plane seems to be its ease of maintenance and very low infrastructure costs. The developing countries, which were therefore quite willing to buy the F-28, might show an equal interest in the new super F-28. Fokker-VFW intends to make this a European project and discussions have already started with Aerospatiale. The VFW-614 involved high infrastructure investments and therefore did not find a market in the developing countries, nor did it find an easy market in the industrialised countries.

12. It has been reported that no large jet transport plane will be developed in the United Kingdom. Lord Beswick, who headed the British Aerospace Organising Committee, and who has become Chairman of the British Aerospace Corporation, apparently does not wish to spend money on projects where there is no chance of a worthwhile return. The new company might wish to become a partner in the Airbus Industrie if the A-300B aircraft promised good sales in the export market.

13. In the field of medium jet transport British aerospace industries might seek association with Boeing for developing a new 140-180 seat transport aircraft.

14. In the military field the situation is better in view of 1976 export sales: for the United Kingdom \$1.5 billion, for France \$1.6 billion. The French are developing a fighter-interceptor — the Mirage 2000 — and the first flight may take place in 1978. The Mirages III and V and the Mirage F-I are still being produced, while production is beginning of the Dassault-Dornier Alpha-Jet ground attack training aircraft. Production of the Franco-German C-160 Transall transport aircraft may be started again if there are enough orders for it, including about fifty export orders.

15. In the United Kingdom military aircraft development is focused on the RAF's requirement for a short-take-off-vertical-landing strike fighter to replace the Harrier and the Jaguar. The most important programme is the Tornado where the United Kingdom, Italian and German industries are tooling up for production deliveries of 805 aircraft, beginning in 1979. The British Aerospace Corporation is also planning to build a military transport aircraft. The production line of the Harrier VTOL strike fighter will remain open until 1980.

16. Although in the military field problems are not so pressing as in the civil field, decisions on new aircraft will have to be taken fairly soon.

17. During the symposium on a European armaments policy on 3rd and 4th March 1977, Mr. Greenwood, Chairman of British Aircraft Corporation, said that the Council's reply to Recommendation 289 on a European aeronautical policy resulting from the colloquy in Toulouse on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 made "dismal reading". He further said that:

"The European industry can no longer afford the luxury of partnerships which are based upon short-term national advantage — be that advantage commercial or political. I have no hesitation in repeating my belief that in the long term Europe has two alternatives. Either we so arrange our industrial and political affairs to give us a considerable degree of independence and self-

sufficiency — or we become wholly reliant upon the United States of America, both for our defence and for our industrial well-being. That degree of domination would reduce our defence industries to the level of subcontractors."

18. In order to arrange our industrial and political affairs effective decision-making machinery is required, but on 8th March 1977 the Council of Ministers of the European Communities only discussed these matters piecemeal. In its latest document dated March 1977 it talks only about large civil transport aircraft. Nevertheless, it has been pointed out time and again that co-ordinated action on the part of European manufacturers is possible only if all civil and military programmes are discussed together, and this again is possible only if a long-term European policy on aerospace matters has been established. If the Council of the Communities is agreed on a common goal it still has not identified the means of reaching that goal.

19. Eurogroup, established in 1968, consisting of the European members of NATO without France, has not succeeded in obtaining standardisation in aircraft production and a new body, the independent European programme group, established in 1975, has now started to work in the field of standardisation. Its purpose is to maintain a sound European defence industry.

II. European space activities

20. On 14th and 15th February 1977 the first meeting of the Ministerial Council of the European Space Agency was held at the new seat of the agency in Paris. In addition to Ministers or their representatives from the eleven member States and Ireland, it was attended by observers from Canada, Austria and Norway. The Council adopted a declaration on an overall programme in the field of communications satellites, a resolution on the Earthnet programme, one on a European remote sensing satellite programme, a declaration on the Ariane launcher programme production phase, a resolution on the agency and its external relations and one on the agency and operational space systems.

21. The Ministers also expressed their views on the agency's resources for the period 1978-80, emphasising that the level should be fixed in the light of the economic capabilities of each member State. The Council will therefore hold budgetary discussions in the next few months.

22. The ESA budget for 1977 is some \$500 million, 3 % more than in 1976, of which \$70-75 million are for extending its current communications satellite programme for which ESA has proposed a three-year budget of \$220-260 million to cover the period 1978-80.

23. Because of the failure of the second stage of the Delta launch vehicle, ESA's Geos magnetospheric research satellite could not reach the required orbit and the main experiments could not be carried out. It is not sure what influence this part-failure will have on ESA's budget.

24. A decision on an initial production order for Ariane launchers should be taken at the same time as the final decision on the extension of the communications satellite programme as both programmes are closely linked.

25. The applications satellite programme is intended to lead to the introduction of European communications satellites in the world market and launch services for these and other types of satellites. The agency itself cannot enter into contracts for the development or provision of space systems for external markets except in the case of launch services. This was stated in the resolution of 15th February 1977 on the external relations of the agency. The American example has shown that the selling of satellites can be good business.

26. Although your Rapporteur is afraid that competition from the United States and the member countries will certainly continue to become more evident and therefore make unanimous decisions more difficult, he feels it is impossible to sell satellites to other countries or groups of countries without having all the diplomatic, economic and commercial means to help the European States to conquer a market for their products.

27. The next meeting of the ESA Council will be of the highest importance since an overall package deal will have to be concluded for ESA's work to start a new phase. The governments will have to decide how much money they are willing to spend in the coming years and for what purposes.

28. Funds have been earmarked for the first maritime communications satellite (Marots) but financing has to be found for future generations of this satellite. The Marots satellite is an advanced spacecraft which Comsat may buy for its worldwide maritime communications system. This would demonstrate the superiority of Marots over the existing American Marisat maritime satellites.

29. A financial decision will have to be taken on the ESA communications satellite programme, which would include point-to-point telecommunications and could possibly compete with Intelsat.

30. The third element in the telecommunications package deal would be the development of a heavy platform leading to a pre-operational television broadcast satellite which might be ready in the first half of the 1980s.

31. Your Rapporteur considers that financial decisions in these matters should be taken as early as possible in order to develop new satellites which might find their place in the world market.

32. Another new development is the European remote sensing space programme. Earth resources and environmental monitoring satellites will be extremely important in the future. The Americans have so far used optical techniques whereas micro-wave techniques might provide more accurate and detailed information. The main European emphasis might be on the management and conservation of known resources, rather than on exploration. These satellites could give statistical information on agricultural products, the use of land, water resources and coastal zone surveys. They could also be important in giving technical assistance to developing countries. If the Council of Ministers gave the green light for such a programme and provided the necessary funds, the ground and space segments could be prepared by ESA.

33. Another important decision will have to be taken on the production phase of the Ariane programme. How many Ariane launchers will have to be built between 1981 and 1983? It is considered that two launchers per year should be built for a "demonstration programme" during that period. At the same time a decision will have to be taken on the satellites to be launched by the Ariane launchers.

34. The Spacelab utilisation programme will also have to be adopted and financed. The aim is to promote a rapid growth in the use of the Spacelab shuttle system by Europeans. A considerable part of the space budgets of the ESA member countries and of the organisation itself should be earmarked for the Spacelab programme. Experiments should be prepared and followed up operationally. By the time the first flight of Spacelab has been successfully concluded the scientific and technological communities in Europe and America should have worked out a programme of scientific experiments and practical applications. It seems certain that Spacelab will play an important part in future communications programmes. The Americans have abandoned the Aerosat programme which planned two satellites for communications to guide civil aircraft over the oceans. This task as well as the meteorological satellite programme could also be fulfilled by Spacelab.

35. If no decisions are taken, in a few years' time ESA's activities may well no longer justify its continued existence.

36. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to point out that the military potential of satellites and of Spacelab will become increasingly important. The same will be true for the remote sensing space programme.

III. Nuclear energy

37. On 4th December 1975 the Assembly adopted Recommendation 277 on second-generation nuclear reactors¹ in which it recommended that the Council formulate a long-term common nuclear energy policy, act immediately on decisions already taken in the Community and define the extent of co-operation with the United States. On 17th May 1976 the Council replied :

“As regards the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the member countries of the European Community are pursuing a common policy based on the treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. Decisions taken by the OECD Council or the Steering Committee of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD are carried out by member countries with due regard to their obligations under the Euratom treaty. Co-operation between the member countries and the United States of America and between the Community and the United States has been resting for years now on the basis of co-operation treaties. Under the present circumstances and in the light of experience, the member governments deem the extent of that co-operation to be adequately defined.”

38. Since then the situation has clearly changed as there are now doubts about co-operation between the United States and Europe.

39. The new American Administration has developed a new energy strategy which might mean that more and more fissionable material will be needed for the United States domestic programme and less will be available for export. In his message to a joint session of Congress on 20th April 1977, President Carter said : “The heart of our energy problem is that our demand for fuel keeps rising more quickly than our production.”²

40. The United States now has 63 nuclear power plants and about 70 more are licensed for construction. The new administration is of the opinion that there is no need to enter the plutonium age by licensing or building a fast-breeder reactor. It will however increase its capacity to produce enriched uranium for light-water nuclear power plants using the new centrifuge technology

which, according to the administration, consumes only about one-tenth the energy of existing gaseous diffusion plants.

41. Your Rapporteur believes that this may lead to a possible contention between Europe and the United States because it seems logical that if the United States itself does not want to use plutonium for nuclear energy purposes it will try to persuade other countries to do likewise.

42. Apart from the technical hazards of plutonium, there are also the political hazards such as theft and terrorism, plus the proliferation of nuclear weapons as a result of expanding plutonium production. This change in American nuclear policy, a revision of its non-proliferation policy, together with growing concern over the export of reprocessing technology and installations, could have an impact on Europe's supplies of nuclear material. The member countries will have to react with a common policy.

43. Within the Community, the Council of Ministers agreed in April 1977 that the Joint Research Centre would have a budget of 346 million units of account (1 u.a. = US \$1.1 approximately) for its next four-year research programme. Sixty per cent of the new budget is to go towards energy research and an important part of the remaining 40% for environment research.

44. Although your Rapporteur is satisfied that the Joint Research Centre budget has been adopted, there is disagreement in the Council of Ministers on the siting of the Joint European Torus (JET). The building of JET is a decisive stage in any nuclear fusion research programme ; it will be the first step towards a fusion reactor. The advantages of the fusion process are widely recognised : it is less dangerous and cleaner than the fission process and the fuel required for the process is found in almost unlimited quantities. Your Rapporteur considers it unthinkable that the Nine will be unable to take a firm decision, especially as it has been agreed that if a large majority agreed on a site the others would follow.

45. In the recommendation to this report the Committee has therefore included a paragraph on nuclear energy policy and another on this last question.

1. See Document 686.

2. See Appendix.

APPENDIX

Statement by President Carter on nuclear power policy

7th April 1977

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The second point I would like to make before I answer questions is concerning our nation's effort to control the spread of a nuclear explosive capability. As far back as thirty years ago, our government made a proposal to the United Nations that there would be tight international controls over nuclear fuels and particularly those that might be made into explosives.

Last year during the presidential campaign, both I and President Ford called for strict controls over fuels to prevent the proliferation, further proliferation, of nuclear explosive capability.

There is no dilemma today more difficult to address than that connected with the use of atomic power. Many countries see atomic power as their only real opportunity to deal with the dwindling supplies of oil, the increasing price of oil and the ultimate exhaustion of both oil and natural gas.

Our country is in a little better position. We have oil supplies of our own and we have very large reserves of coal. But even coal has its limitations, so we will ourselves continue to use atomic power as a share of our total energy production.

The benefits of nuclear power, particularly to some foreign countries that do not have oil and coal of their own, are very practical and critical. But a serious risk is involved in the handling of nuclear fuels — the risk that component parts of this power process will be turned to providing explosives or atomic weapons.

We took an important step in reducing this risk a number of years ago by the implementation of the non-proliferation treaty which has now been signed by approximately 100 nations. But we must go further.

We have seen recently India evolve an explosive device derived from a peaceful nuclear power plant, and we now feel that several other nations are on the verge of becoming nuclear explosive powers.

The United States is deeply concerned about the consequence of the uncontrolled spread of this nuclear weapon capability. We have no authority over other countries. But we believe these risks would be vastly increased by the further spread of reprocessing capabilities of the

spent nuclear fuel from which explosives can be derived.

Plutonium is especially poisonous and, of course, enriched uranium, thorium and other chemicals of metals can be used as well.

We are now completing an extremely thorough review of our own nuclear power programme. We have concluded that serious consequences can be derived from our own laxity in the handling of these materials and the spread of their use by other countries, and we believe that there is strong scientific and economic evidence that a time for a change has come.

Therefore, we will make a major change in the United States domestic nuclear energy policies and programmes which I am announcing today.

We will make a concerted effort among all other countries to find better answers to the problems and risks of nuclear proliferation, and I would like to outline a few things now that we will do specifically.

First of all, we will defer indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and recycling of the plutonium produced in United States nuclear power programmes.

From my own experience, we have concluded that a viable and adequate economic nuclear programme can be maintained without such reprocessing and recycling of plutonium. The plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, for instance, will receive neither federal encouragement nor funding from us for its completion as a reprocessing facility.

Second, we will restructure our own United States breeder programme to give greater priority to alternative designs of the breeder other than plutonium, and to defer the date when breeder reactors would be put into commercial use.

We will continue research and development, but shift away from plutonium, defer dependence on the breeder reactor for commercial use.

Third, we will direct funding of United States nuclear research and development programmes to accelerate our research into alternative nuclear fuel cycles which do not involve direct access to materials that can be used for nuclear weapons.

Fourth, we will increase the United States capacity to produce nuclear fuels, enriched

uranium in particular, to provide adequate and timely supplies of nuclear fuels to countries that need them, so that they will not be required or encouraged to reprocess their own materials.

Fifth, we will propose to the Congress the necessary legislative steps to permit us to sign these supply contracts and remove the pressure for the reprocessing of nuclear fuels by other countries that do not now have this capability.

Sixth, we will continue to embargo the export of either equipment or technology that could permit uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing.

And seventh, we will continue discussions with supplying countries and recipient countries, as well, of a wide range of international approaches and frameworks that will permit all countries to achieve their own energy needs while at the same time reducing the spread of the capabilities for nuclear explosive development.

Among other things, we have discussed this with fifteen or twenty national leaders already, we will explore the establishment of an inter-

national nuclear fuel cycle evaluation programme so that we can share with countries that have to reprocess nuclear fuel the responsibility for curtailing the ability for the development of explosives.

One other point that ought to be made in the international negotiation field is that we have to help provide some means for the storage of spent nuclear fuel materials which are highly explosive, highly radioactive in nature.

I have been working very closely with, and personally with, some of the foreign leaders who are quite deeply involved in the decisions that we make. We are not trying to impose our will on those nations like Japan, France, Britain and Germany, which already have reprocessing plants in operation.

They have a special need that we do not have in that their supplies of petroleum products are not available. But we hope that they will join with us, and I believe that they will, in trying to have some worldwide understanding of the extreme threat of the further proliferation of nuclear explosive capability.

Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new maritime sources of energy

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ²
by Mr. Jessel, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Warren (Chairman); MM. Valleix, Lenzer (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, Bernini, Bouloche (Alternate: Bizet), Cavaliere, Cornelissen (Alternate: van Kleef), Hawkins (Alternate: Craigen), Lewis, Mart, Müller, van Ooijen, Péronnet (Alter-

nate: Cerneau), Dr. Phipps (Alternate: Jessel), MM. Pinto (Alternate: Pecoraro), Schmitt, Schwencke, de Stexhe, Treu, Ueberhorst.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on safeguarding Europe's energy supplies —
new maritime sources of energy

The Assembly,

Concerned that, although Western Europe's energy supplies are far from being adequately guaranteed, only 12% of the European Communities' energy research budget is allocated to new sources of energy and only very small percentages of the member countries' research and development budgets are earmarked for this purpose;

Deploring the continued absence of consensus on a common energy policy and, therefore, the fact that no concrete measures can be agreed upon in the Community and OECD frameworks;

Convinced that a common Western European policy should advocate long-term measures to reduce dependence on imported energy and therefore promote research and development on maritime sources of energy, inexhaustible supplies of which are available to the Western European countries;

Aware of the United Kingdom's research and development in the field of wave power, and of France's tidal power plant and its further research and development on tidal energy,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Request member governments to seek political agreement on a European energy policy in the Community framework and on the assignment of a higher percentage of its research and development budget to new sources of energy, in particular to maritime sources of energy;
2. Promote a joint working group on tidal and wave-power energy of French and British scientists and engineers, together with experts from other interested countries, to study — in the light of experience already acquired in setting up oil rigs in the North Sea and elsewhere — the future possibilities of this kind of energy and problems of corrosion and ocean behaviour;
3. Foster the harmonisation of policies to achieve practical results through joint action in developing maritime sources of energy in view of their future importance;
4. Review the possibilities of exploiting the resources of the ocean for energy supplies.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Jessel, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. In this report your Rapporteur will deal in particular with maritime sources of energy which, although not a new subject, is of growing interest at present. The prospect of inexhaustible supplies of energy from tides and waves grips the imagination. Devising schemes and mechanisms for harnessing this energy in a usable manner has occupied the minds of inventors for generations. Special attention is now being given to these sources. They need not be detrimental to the environment and do not require entirely new technologies as work already done on oil rigs has provided a great deal of spin-off in respect of the technologies for mastering tides and waves.

2. At the last session of the Assembly, in December 1976, Mr. Cornelissen asked Mr. Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, whether the European Council would promote a common European energy strategy and whether the Council was aware of the dangers to European security if Europe's energy supplies were not safeguarded in the future.

3. Mr. Thorn replied that the European Council was fully aware of the problems arising from the absence of a common energy policy especially with regard to a possible increase in oil prices which could lead to a political-economic crisis. The Nine were nearly unanimous in deploring the absence of a consensus and the fact that concrete measures had not been agreed upon in The Hague.

4. The Community is still trying to find a common denominator for the divergent interests of the member countries. This is extremely difficult as some countries (the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) are already self-sufficient in energy resources or will be in the early 1980s. Some countries have large reserves of coal (the United Kingdom and Germany) and will therefore spend money on research on coal gasification or liquidation processes. It is believed that such processes could be conducted above or below ground. Finally, several countries are almost wholly dependent on imported energy resources (Italy, France, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland).

5. The Commission's strategy should be to reduce dependence on imported energy and improve the security of supplies which have to be imported. There is also the question of sharing resources which exist within the Community but this too is a difficult problem to solve. For instance, in the early 1980s North Sea oil will

still represent only 20 % of European requirements. Several European countries have therefore started major nuclear programmes and at the end of 1975 in Belgium, for instance, 25 % of its electrical energy was provided by nuclear plants equipped with light-water reactors. In France, 8.9 % of its electricity is produced by nuclear means. For the United Kingdom the figure is 11.26 %, 2.26 % for Italy, 7.34 % for the Netherlands, and 7.59 % for Germany.

6. Future Community policy should therefore propose measures to help reduce dependence on imported energy by encouraging Community oil and gas exploration and production, coal production and consumption, nuclear energy and new energy sources.

New energy sources

7. New energy sources will not gain great importance until the end of this century or the beginning of the next. As was stated in Mr. Cornelissen's report¹:

"supplies of oil and gas appear to have reached their sixty-year peak and their respective shares in the energy market are expected to decrease with time. It now seems impossible to wait another sixty years to complete the next transition. A major technological development programme should expedite this process."

8. However, so far, governments of member States have shied away from a common energy strategy and are unwilling to establish a major Community research and development programme. The two-year Community programme adopted for 1977-79 is financed to the tune of 55,000 million units of account (pre-devaluation dollars) covering measures for economising energy, the production and utilisation of hydrogen, solar energy and geothermal energy. On the other hand, taken together, individual countries are already investing very large sums in energy; in the Communities this amounts to about 25 % of all industrial investment. The total amount of energy investment in the Community between 1976 and 1985 will be 210,000 million units of account.

9. In order to secure vital supplies individual countries have made arrangements with individual OPEC countries. The latest is the contract signed on 24th January 1977 between France and Saudi Arabia for delivery of 36 million tons of oil over a three-year period; this contract

¹ Document 721, paragraph 41.

replaces a similar three-year contract which expired at the end of 1976. The agreement provides France with oil at the official price and therefore with a 5 % increase which is only half the increase decided upon by most of the other OPEC countries in December 1976. However, the price will rise in accordance with future official increases.

10. In Mr. Cornelissen's report on new sources of energy, which dealt in particular with solar, wind and geothermal energy, he discussed the work of the International Energy Agency, the position of Western Europe and the North-South dialogue. This dialogue has come to a standstill and no changes have been reported since Mr. Cornelissen's report was written.

I. Wave power

11. In Japan, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom there is a growing interest in the possibility of using the motion of ocean waves to generate power. The International Energy Agency has added wave energy to its list of energy research and development projects and has designated the United Kingdom as the lead country for wave energy research and development.

12. For Britain, with its long coastline and extremely rough seas, wave energy is a particularly enticing prospect, not only because waves are plentiful but also because they are at their most powerful when energy demand is at its highest, i.e. during the winter.

13. In the United Kingdom, the Department of Energy's Advisory Council on Research and Development for fuel and power (ACORD), under the Chairmanship of Dr. W. Marshall, examined the possibilities of wave power in June 1975. The Council noted that it was an indigenous self-renewing energy source which, in principle, could furnish the United Kingdom with an amount of energy equivalent to an important fraction of current demand and that the modular nature of the wave-energy devices meant that development costs could be kept low while the economic and technical viability of the system was being established. Wave energy could in principle produce about 50 % of Britain's present electricity requirements, equivalent to about fifteen nuclear power stations of 1,000 megawatts each capacity.

14. Consequently, the United Kingdom Government agreed to invest £1.01 million for research and development in 1976-78. This has now been raised to £2.5 million. The various wave-energy collector systems were to be investigated in four different centres.

15. Devices for the extraction of wave energy fall into two categories : mechanical and hydrau-

lic. The mechanical projects are the contouring rafts invented by Sir Christopher Cockerell at the British Hovercraft Company's factory on the Isle of Wight, and the so-called Salter's ducks invented by Mr. Stephen Salter at Edinburgh University.

16. The Cockerell device consists of a series of hinged floats that contour with the waves, i.e. they follow the shape of the waves, so that the adjacent rafts rotate relative to each other. Hydraulic motors or pumps between each raft convert this rotation into hydraulic pulses.

17. Your Rapporteur was able to visit the laboratories of the British Hovercraft Company on the Isle of Wight. There it was pointed out that the wave power project was still in the research stage although scientific research was finished. The main problem was the engineering studies which might be finalised in 1978 by which time it would be known what types of metal could be used and how much the device would cost. Although normal operation should not be extremely costly, extreme weather conditions had to be reckoned with, especially in the sea west of Scotland. The assessment was that within ten years development would reach the stage where electrical energy could be produced.

18. In the case of the Salter's ducks, their rocking motion can be converted to useful energy and transmitted ashore in the form of electricity or hydraulic pulses. This device has a string of vanes extracting energy from waves.

19. In the hydraulic category are the wave rectifiers and the oscillating water column device. The British hydraulics research station is experimenting with a system developed by its Director, Mr. Robert Russell, which is a wave rectifier device consisting of a large structure divided into two reservoirs with valves arranged so that waves drive sea water into a high-level reservoir and empty a low-level one. This creates a "head" between the two reservoirs which can be used to drive a turbine.

20. The National Engineering Laboratory in the United Kingdom is experimenting with an oscillating water column, a device which has been developed by Masuda in Japan. This system has been put into operation by a Japanese firm which uses wave action for the power supply in navigation buoys.

21. If the Isle of Wight's present two-year programme is completed, large-scale models of the Cockerell device will have to be built for open-water trials off the coast near the Isle of Wight ; some £200,000 will be needed to cover this phase. If this sea-going experiment is successful, quarter-scale demonstration models will be commissioned for bigger experiments in the North Sea. The east coast has the necessary engineering workshops and workboats for repairs and main-

tenance. Finally, test devices will be erected near the Hebrides off the west coast of Scotland where much of the final system will eventually be placed. Other sites where these devices could be used are off the north and south coasts of Cornwall in the United Kingdom and Brittany in France, off the west coasts of Eire, Portugal and Spain, and possibly off the coast of Israel.

22. Although not all the technologies of these systems are new, many problems remain to be solved. On the other hand, waves represent a fairly concentrated energy source. In fact, the sea acts as a giant wind-power collector absorbing wind energy over thousands of square miles and concentrating it in the form of waves. Engineering problems will also be great; any wave-energy collector-converter system and its anchorage will have to be tough and sturdy enough to survive exceptionally heavy storms, not least because floating devices going adrift could be a danger to navigation. Securing these devices will be a major cost factor.

23. During your Rapporteur's visit to the Community headquarters in Brussels, it was pointed out that even if all the technology involved worked on a laboratory scale it did not mean that full-scale prototypes would work as efficiently. In many respects the oceans are still unknown quantities and it will certainly be extremely difficult to fight corrosion of the devices used. Those who are in favour of wave power believe that eventually wave energy will become a practical proposition and will contribute to the world's energy demands. There is so much of this energy available that, according to those who believe in this new source, sooner or later it will be used.

24. The time required to arrive at functional wave-power electricity production might be from ten to thirty years. If this device were given high priority and the necessary financing, electricity could be produced at a relatively early stage, but might involve high risks and expensive mistakes. All in all, long-term development might therefore cost less.

II. Tidal energy

25. In the United Kingdom interest in tidal power dates back to the Middle Ages when primitive tidal mills were installed on the shores of England. Interest in tidal energy was revived each time traditional energy supplies were threatened.

26. Tidal energy, like wave energy, has a very long history dating back to the time of the ancient Greeks. However, only in the course of this century has its use on a large scale been envisaged with projects being studied in Canada,

France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR. Advantages of tidal energy are that the movement of the tides is continuous and predictable and the potential energy inexhaustible.

27. As from 1920, studies were made for building tidal power plants in Passamaquoddy Bay in the United States and the Bay of Fundy in Canada. Although considered technically feasible, these projects were abandoned because they were felt to be unsound economically.

28. In the Soviet Union, an 0.4 megawatt experimental plant was built near Murmansk and has been in operation for four years. Other plans are being studied for building 160 megawatt plants on the White Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk.

29. In the United Kingdom, the Bristol Channel appears to be a favourable site¹, and the French have a 240 megawatt pilot plant on the Rance estuary, near St. Malo.

30. Tidal energy derives from an interaction of gravitational forces exerted by the moon and the sun. Although wholly predictable, the resulting wave form is complex and the availability of energy varies over a 12.4-hour cycle.

31. The energy available varies in quantity and timing and there are some seasonal variations over the year, but the greatest variations are in a 14-day cycle during which the high tide changes from day to day, the maximum range being during what are known as spring tides and the minimum range during neap tides.

32. It appears that there are only some twenty sites in the world suitable for extracting tidal energy as the tide level needs to be at least seven metres high.

33. There are essentially two ways of extracting tidal power from an estuary. The first is to use a single-basin scheme which involves putting a dam across the estuary, installing turbines in the dam and generating electricity from the flow of water either on the ebb alone or both while the tide is flooding and while it is ebbing. The power is then regulated by moon time. Since the turbines of a tidal power plant can operate in both directions of flow, to a very great extent the generating period can be chosen at will. For instance, the turbines are generally switched on shortly after high tide and electricity is generated as the tide goes out and the basin is emptied. In periods of very high tides electricity is also produced as the tide rises and fills the basin. A scheme producing steady power might be more attractive. This could be done with a two-basin scheme, a high-level one and a low-level

1. See Appendix I.

one. Continuous generation by turbines between the high-level and low-level basins would then be possible. However, the two-basin system has many drawbacks including high cost and effects on the environment.

34. The United Kingdom Department of Energy believes that tidal power is a less interesting proposition than wave power, the main reasons being the need to build a vast barrage for the former and the fact that wave power could provide five times as much electricity. This would be the case for the so-called Severn barrage in the Bristol Channel. An outlay in the region of several £1,000 million would be required for this estuary. In view of the long construction period interest rates could well constitute a substantial addition to the final bill. It is not possible to build a small-scale barrage in the Severn and no half-measures are possible; nobody is able to guarantee the successful operation of a large-scale barrage. If it were built and worked satisfactorily, there are indications that it could provide something in the order of 4 % or so of the United Kingdom's electrical power requirements from an inexhaustible source. This would be the equivalent of one or two nuclear reactors of 1,000 megawatts capacity each or some 4 million tons of coal equivalent.

35. The Energy Resources Sub-Committee of the House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology held a series of hearings from November 1975 to May 1976 on the possibilities of building such a barrage and several members of parliament appeared to be strongly in favour of its construction. However, the Department of Energy feels there are still too many uncertainties and very extensive and costly studies will have to be made to resolve them. In the end, it remains largely a question of judgment.

36. One thing is already quite clear — that a future Severn barrage would offer no prospect of producing electricity more cheaply than other means. For the United Kingdom, therefore, it has a relatively low priority as a source of energy. At the moment the Department of Energy is conducting two small studies to shed further light on what have emerged as the two key technical issues: the first is the effect of the barrage itself on the tidal régime in and around the Severn, the second is the problem of closing the barrage.

The Rance tidal power plant

37. Through the good offices of the French Delegate for New Sources of Energy, Mr. Jean-Claude Colli, and the French electricity authorities, your Rapporteur was able to visit the Rance power plant in Brittany, France, on 24th February 1977. In this area many ancient mills were operated by tidal power. The operating principle of these mills was as follows: a dyke

closing off a cove created a storage basin; gates permitted this basin to fill up during flood tide and a wheel emptied the basin during ebb tide producing a driving force in the process.

38. In 1961, after twenty years of study, the French electricity authorities decided to build the Rance estuary power plant. This 750-metre long structure goes down to 13 metres below sea level and has the same operating principle as the tidal mills. However, the turbine action is such that power may be produced while the basin is filling as well as emptying. The so-called "bulb units" also permit pumping and it is therefore possible to super-elevate the basin level compared to sea level at the end of the filling, thus increasing power production.

39. Work was started in January 1961 and the plant became fully operational in December 1967. As it was considered a prototype plant, extensive research and development work had to be done. Special care had to be taken to avoid corrosion problems, all of which have been overcome. Your Rapporteur saw some of the bulb-type units being overhauled and no signs of corrosion were discernible.

40. The great success of this work has enabled French industry to build up an export market for these units; there are now some 800 all over the world. The French electricity authorities also use these units in other hydraulic power plants on rivers on plains, since bulb-type units can be used only in low-drop plants, i.e. in flat areas. They therefore constitute an important spin-off from the construction of the power plant.

41. The plant's installed power is 240 megawatts (24 identical power-generating units of 10 megawatts each) and its net annual output is 544 million kilowatt hours (not deducting pumping energy). This amounts to about 0.3 % of French electricity consumption. The plant employs a staff of fifty.

42. The cost of the electricity per kilowatt hour is about 13 centimes, which is about the average price of electricity produced by other power plants used by the French electricity authorities.

43. Your Rapporteur asked whether the fact that no new barrages had been built meant that the French electricity authorities did not consider it advisable to build another plant of this type. The answer was that only very few places in France or Europe were suitable for this type of installation. There was no doubt however that the new nuclear energy power plants were more economical.

44. On the other hand, extensive studies had been carried out on the building of a similar plant in the Mont St. Michel Bay; this was called the Chausey Islands project. Already in the early 1950s there were plans to build this

power plant and it was then thought wiser to build the Rance power plant first as a prototype for the second much more important Chausey power plant.

45. This plant could replace ten nuclear power stations of about 1,000 megawatts. However, ten such nuclear power stations could produce two or three times more electricity for about the same financial outlay as the tidal power plant.

46. Your Rapporteur also asked to hear the views of the French electricity authorities on wave power. In their opinion, with the prevailing swell off the French coast, the catchment front would be enormous (some 100 km for an annual output equivalent to that of a 250 megawatt thermal power station), which would lead to prohibitive costs and raise extremely serious environmental problems. Industrialists are almost unanimous in considering that such energy is not nearly concentrated enough to become profitable and hence to be used on the scale of a country's requirements. On the other hand, it seems suitable for providing small quantities of power at isolated sites such as buoys or off-shore lighthouses.

The AUR prime mover

47. In February 1977, while your Rapporteur was preparing this report, Mr. A.U. Reid informed him of his scheme for a tidal power prime mover. He claims that with this scheme a high percentage of the energy available in the tidal water of an estuary can be extracted; existing tidal power plants extract far less total energy.

48. The scheme is currently being evaluated by the British National Engineering Laboratory. The North of Scotland Hydroelectric Board is interested in it for meeting the increasing demand for electricity in the Hebrides. A design exercise is being prepared at Little Loch Roag, a sea loch in the Outer Hebrides. A desk-top comparison will then be possible with a turbine-operated scheme of similar status which has been tried earlier by the board at this location.

III. Thermal sea power

49. Thermal sea power should be considered in the framework of marine sources of energy although it will never be an important alternative energy source. It is a question of generating power from temperature differences between tropical surface waters and colder currents flowing directly beneath. A major condition is the existence of two broad currents of water — one warm and one cold — in close proximity. There are many places where ocean currents flow within 2,000 to 3,000 feet of each other with a temperature difference of some 40°F. The cold water in the deeper regions of tropical seas could

provide a source of energy and thermal sea power generation has been proved possible.

50. This process, suggested by d'Arsonval in about 1900, was tested by a French engineer, Georges Claude, between 1928 and 1935 on fixed and floating installations of several tens of kilowatts. Plans for a 10 megawatt coastal power station were studied as from 1940 for a site near Abidjan (Ivory Coast) by the firm *Energie thermique des mers*.

51. The Americans have begun research and development in this field and believe that, if successful, the cost of power from this source could be competitive with that of a fuel-fired plant.

52. In the quarterly review *Economic Impact*¹, Mr. John L. Wilhelm wrote about the new dimensions of the technology of solar energy and energy from the ocean as follows:

“A typical ocean thermal-power plant could be anchored off Florida. Heat from the constantly flowing warm Gulf Stream surface water, with a temperature of about 28°C, would vaporise a working fluid such as ammonia, and the vapour would drive a low-pressure turbine to generate electricity. The ammonia would then be recondensed to a liquid by cold water pumped from depths of 500 metres. The process would be continuous, since ocean temperature differences are constant, whether the sun shines or not.

The electricity produced by the offshore plant could also be used to break down sea water into hydrogen and oxygen by the process called electrolysis. The hydrogen could be stored in large container ships for transport, or piped ashore to be used for fuel or for synthesising hydrocarbons.

This scheme seems like science fiction. Yet Carnegie-Mellon Professor Clarence Zener declares that ‘the probability of economic feasibility of ocean thermal-power stations is so high that they will make obsolete today's advanced nuclear reactors before the reactors' development is completed.’”

53. The French electricity authorities indicated that Georges Claude had tried to use ocean thermal power before the 1939-45 war, but without success.

54. They believed that the forecast by Professor Clarence Zener just mentioned takes no account of objective facts. Just as today's nuclear reactors do not make yesterday's hydroelectric power stations obsolete, tomorrow's generating plants (which will not be ocean thermal-power stations) will not make today's nuclear reactors obsolete.

1. No. 16, 1976.

55. Finally, it should be pointed out that Carnot's theoretical output for an ocean thermal-power station will never exceed 5 % which is an insuperable obstacle.

IV. Other energy sources from the seas and oceans

56. Your Rapporteur does not wish to study oil in detail as the subject is so vast that it would require a separate report. He will therefore restrict himself to the Communities' work in connection with seabed oil deposits. At present, 1.2 million tons of oil are extracted daily from the seabed and this represents some 20 % of the world oil production. Only 25 years ago oil had never been exploited at sea. Exploration of the 500-600 metre zone is already being prepared and the oil companies are of the opinion that drilling at depths of 1,000 and even 3,000 metres might be possible. However, this development is very costly; for instance, investment at the so-called Ekofisk field in the North Sea has risen to over \$2,000 million.

57. In order to promote technological development projects directly connected with prospecting for, extracting, storing or transporting hydrocarbons in order to improve the security of energy supplies for Western Europe, the Commission and the Ministerial Council of the European Communities decided to give financial support of some \$75 million for a three-year programme. The Commission believes that large new undersea deposits of oil and natural gas are likely to be found in particular on the continental shelf. Technological developments must therefore be concentrated especially on processes and equipment designed to allow hydrocarbons to be extracted from deep underwater deposits, if possible at economically-acceptable cost.

58. According to the United Nations, marine oil reserves are estimated at 350 billion tons, of which 200 billion are located on the continental shelf. As it is not possible for divers to work at a depth of more than 200-400 metres below the surface of the sea, remote-controlled and even automated equipment must be used to extract hydrocarbons from deposits located at greater depths.

59. During the search for hydrocarbons in the seas around Western Europe extensive oil deposits have been found which cannot be extracted by current processes. New methods have therefore to be developed but the costs involved are so high that for some years to come the companies concerned cannot embark upon them without Community support. In selecting the projects preference was given to those which would result in technological innovation. The Community will grant money only if the companies concerned agree to contribute 60-70 % of the cost involved.

60. The Community is also very much aware of the need for wise energy use and conservation. It will therefore undertake a study of energy, required to produce goods or services, of problems related to energy use efficiency and of energy resource management.

Israeli plans for hydroelectricity

61. During the Committee's visit to Israel it was informed that the Israeli Government had already approved a feasibility study on digging a tunnel from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea, in the south of Israel, to produce hydroelectricity. The cost of this project would be some \$400 million and a result would be to replenish the Dead Sea.

62. Another plan which Israeli engineers have put before the government is much more ambitious and would cost some \$800 million. It calls for digging a canal from the Mediterranean, near Haifa, to the River Jordan. The canal would pour sea water into the river which in turn runs into the Dead Sea and would also replenish it. The idea would involve Israel and Jordan in mutual regional development, joint engineering and financing and could be one of the elements in Israel's definition of true peace in the Middle East.

63. Two hydroelectric power stations, one each for Jordan and Israel, could produce 1,150 megawatts for each country.

Conclusions

64. With rising oil prices, and public opinion becoming more apprehensive about the nuclear alternative, Europe will nevertheless have to find a means of meeting its growing energy requirements in the near future. On 23rd March 1977, the German Minister for Economic Affairs gave a solemn warning that if the growth rate of energy failed to keep pace with industrial development the number of unemployed in the Federal Republic could rise from 1.2 million to 2.5 million.

65. The high and increasing level of dependence of the industrialised world on oil from the OPEC countries has been a crucial problem since 1973. Over the next decade world demand for oil is expected to increase by one-third to something in the region of 30-40 million barrels per day. But it also has to be recalled that the resources of the OPEC countries will fall off within fifteen to twenty-five years. This will put considerable pressure on the oil-producing countries to increase their prices. Governments should therefore be conscious of the need to diversify the energy requirements of their countries while at the same time saving as much energy as possible.

66. Your Rapporteur believes that the member governments should make greater efforts to seek political agreement on a common energy policy and, in the framework of such an agreement, assign a higher percentage of their research and development budgets to new sources of energy. It is true that at present-day prices the capital costs of solar energy, wave and tidal-power installations are higher per unit than for conventional or nuclear power plants¹. But account has to be taken of the fact that oil prices will not remain at today's level. Tomorrow's energy problems need to be looked at as intensively as today's economic problems. Tides, waves, ocean thermal gradients and ocean currents are sources of renewable energy supplies resulting from solar energy. They are largely undeveloped at present but their technical feasibility has already been demonstrated.

67. In the United Kingdom and France a joint working group of British and French scientists and engineers should be established to study the future possibilities of these new sources of energy. Duplication could then be avoided and solutions to problems found in one country could thus benefit others.

68. The European Commission has made some 500,000 units of account (\$575,000) available to finance research projects on solar energy. These projects are concentrated on the use of solar heat to produce power and on the improvement of low-power installations (1-10 kilowatts).

69. In future budgets in the Communities and the member countries, larger sums should be set aside for research and development of maritime sources of energy.

70. As your Rapporteur stated in his report, the United Kingdom Department of Energy considers that wave energy could in principle produce about 50 % of Britain's present electricity requirements, equivalent to about fifteen nuclear power stations of 1,000 megawatts each capacity. The French authorities believe a tidal power plant in the Mont St. Michel Bay could replace ten nuclear power stations of about 1,000 megawatts. These are important percentages of energy requirements for those two countries. It is therefore certainly worthwhile to spend larger sums of money on research and development in this field.

1. See Appendix II.

APPENDIX I

**Possible sites for tidal energy
development in the United Kingdom¹**

The Severn Estuary is the United Kingdom's largest single potential source for harnessing tidal energy, and has the largest tidal ranges, averaging up to 8 or 9 metres according to exact location. However, there are many other sites where power developments appear practicable. Many of these are inlets too small to be of interest except perhaps for an experimental or pilot project, but among the others are several which might each yield between one-tenth and one-half as much energy as the Severn. Relatively few schemes have been put forward for these other sites, and data are therefore lacking beyond the obvious tidal statistics and known topography.

Most sites of interest are on the west coast, where large tidal ranges are most common. However, some sites not outstandingly endowed in this respect may offer other attractions or opportunities, relating for example to port development or coastal protection.

The other sizable tidal power development possibilities include:

	<i>average tidal range (metres)</i>
Solway Firth	6
Morecambe Bay	7

Mersey Estuary (above Liverpool) ..	7
Dee Estuary	6
Carmarthen Bay	6
Humber	5

Like the Severn Estuary, some of these sites would involve ports and would require locks. There have also been proposals for construction of freshwater storage reservoirs in the Solway Firth and in Morecambe Bay (as for the Wash): there is no reason why such schemes if needed should not be combined with tidal power development. A barrage project at any of these sites would obviously offer very interesting possibilities for new and direct road or railway links.

Viewed solely as prospects for electricity generation, these sites appear less promising than the Severn Estuary due to their lesser tidal ranges which, other things being equal, would be somewhat more costly to develop than higher ranges. In the context of comprehensive regional planning, development of some might nevertheless be found worthy of consideration: there is however at present no mechanism likely to uncover such a situation.

1. Appendix 3 to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee on Science and Technology (Energy Resources Sub-Committee), 19th May 1976.

APPENDIX II

Energy economics — characteristic features

Apart from the Netherlands, which exports a quarter of its energy production, all the WEU countries are dependent on foreign supply for their energy requirements: the United Kingdom 43.2 %, Germany 55 %, France 73.8 %, Italy 79.1 %, Belgium 85.7 % and Luxembourg 99.5 %.

The balance sheet of electrical energy for 1975 in gigawatt hours (1 gigawatt hour = 10⁶ kilowatt hours) is: 272,219 gWh in the United Kingdom, 310,802 gWh in Germany, 186,008 gWh in France, 147,333 gWh in Italy, 54,259 gWh

in the Netherlands, 41,066 gWh in Belgium and 1,483 gWh in Luxembourg.

In the United Kingdom, the central electricity generating board's figures for 1975-76 show that each unit of electricity (1 kWh) from nuclear power stations cost on average 0.67 pence, while coal- and oil-fired stations produced electricity at 0.97 pence and 1.09 pence respectively. Domestic electricity consumers were paying 2 pence per kWh at the time.

A European armaments policy

REPORT¹

**submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr. Dankert, Rapporteur**

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Introductory note

In preparing this interim report your Rapporteur has drawn on the proceedings of the symposium on a European armaments policy which the Committee organised in Paris on 3rd and 4th March 1977. He gratefully acknowledges the assistance in the preparation of the report provided by Mr. John Wilkinson, Assistant to the Chairman of British Aircraft

Corporation, who was appointed by the Clerk as an outside expert, at the request of the Rapporteur.

The Committee intends to prepare a further report, incorporating the results of further enquiries, for submission to the second part of the twenty-third session of the Assembly on 28th November 1977.

1. Adopted in Committee by 19 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Critchley (Chairman); MM. Klepsch, Dankert (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Ahrens, Beauguitte, Bizet, Boldrini, Bonnel, Boucheny, Fosson, Grant, Handlos, Hardy, Konen, de Koster (Alternate:

Piket), Lemmrich (Alternate: *Scheffler*), *Maggioni*, Ménard, Pawelczyk (Alternate: *Lemp*), Pecchioli (Alternate: *Calamandrei*), Rivière, Roberti (Alternate: *Pecoraro*), Roper, Scholten, Schugens, Schmidt, Tanghe, Whitehead.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on a European armaments policy

The Assembly,

- (i) While wishing for a mutual and balanced reduction of armaments in Europe, believing that the increasing cost of future generations of weapons systems makes it urgent and imperative for the European countries of the Alliance to secure the economic and military advantages of standardisation through joint production ;
- (ii) Noting
 - (a) that the proliferation of equipment types reduces the operational capacity and the cost effectiveness of the defence of Western Europe ;
 - (b) that the growing complexity of modern weapons systems causes a large increase in equipment costs ;
- (iii) Considering the inherent political dangers of any armaments industry which relies on exports to third world countries or areas of conflict ;
- (iv) Welcoming recent indications that the United States will increasingly seek standardisation of equipment in the Alliance ;
- (v) Stressing the need for satisfactory parliamentary control both at European as well as at a national level of the defence procurement process, and resolving itself to play a rôle until the European Parliament is invested by statute with defence functions,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments, severally and jointly in all appropriate bodies, to pursue the following objectives :

1. Ensure the maintenance of a viable defence production industry in Europe taking account of the needs of national defence plans and of the Alliance :
 - (a) by giving first priority to the joint production of standardised equipment in Europe while ensuring the interoperability of existing equipment throughout the Alliance ;
 - (b) by pursuing secondly further standardisation in the Alliance as a whole ;
2. Streamline the institutional basis of joint production :
 - (a) by concentrating on the independent European programme group ;
 - (b) by ensuring that military characteristics of equipment are determined within NATO ;
3. Inform the Assembly accurately and fully of the nature and extent of the terms of reference given to the Standing Armaments Committee on 26th April 1977.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Dankert, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. The Committee organised a symposium on a European armaments policy in Paris on 3rd and 4th March 1977¹. This report will analyse the guiding concepts and principles which emerged. During the two days of the symposium a number of eminent experts read papers and discussions took place between parliamentarians, representatives of the armaments industries, of military procurement and headquarters staffs and of government departments about European armaments manufacture and procurement and the consequences of modern weapon technology.

2. As many speakers reminded the symposium, the need for co-operation in weapon procurement has been widely understood and repeatedly emphasised for over twenty-five years. However, in spite of limited progress towards greater standardisation of equipment and interoperability of weapon systems within the Alliance, proliferation of equipment types and incompatibilities of ammunition and supplies persist and even increase, degrading the operational capability and the cost effectiveness of the defence of Western Europe. Joint production has been successful in a number of areas, but industrially this has tended to be an *ad hoc* process and for consequent collaborative arrangements, joint companies and consortia have not usually been maintained once the programme in question has been completed.

3. The need for co-operation in the weapon procurement field is based on three imperatives — financial, military and socio-economic.

4. Recession and, as Mr. Greenwood² reminded the symposium, the political unpopularity of high defence spending among the populations of Western Europe unused to war for over a generation, have squeezed defence budgets to the point where they are in many instances static in real terms. At the same time the increased complexity of modern weapons systems has caused a dramatic escalation in equipment costs.

5. For example, as Ingénieur Général Cauchie¹ explained, at constant prices and weight for weight, the cost of a tank has doubled and that of an aircraft has quadrupled over the past fifteen years. Inflationary pressures have augmented manpower costs also.

6. It is therefore in Général Cauchie's words "economically essential to contain the unit costs of these modern systems by amortisation over long runs of the overhead costs of research, development and tooling". This is only possible through collaboration and joint weapon production programmes. Fortunately in this respect military and financial considerations coincide.

7. Militarily the benefits of collaboration in the procurement field are considerable. The benefits were assessed by Général Major P. Dirix¹, in the following terms: "We believe that co-operation in the research, development and production of armaments by preventing the proliferation of separate national projects might avoid wasteful duplication, encourage standardisation, and at the same time increase operational efficiency and reduce production and maintenance costs".

8. The military significance of low production costs was emphasised by General de Maizière's² advice that "it would be very unwise to equip them (the armed forces) for only one type of conflict because this type seemed the most probable at a given time. In reality, types of warfare could change very quickly and far more quickly than the armies themselves. They must therefore be equipped to meet various types of attack". Such a spectrum of capability — inherent in the strategy of flexible response — is costly and enhances on military grounds the importance of collaborative weapon procurement.

9. The other clear military benefits of co-operation in this field are the twin operational advantages of standardisation and interoperability. The first predicates the second but this did not preclude a marked divergence of expert opinion on these subjects at the symposium.

10. On the one hand Ingénieur Général Cauchie explained in forthright terms his country's views that "whereas some of our partners swear by standardisation, we in France think that, if we have to operate together, our equipment has to be interoperable and we prefer to lay the main emphasis on interoperability. It is our belief", he continued, "that while standardisation may in one way offer the same advantages as interoperability... it has drawbacks at the operational, industrial, political and financial levels".

11. On the other hand General de Maizière argued the contrary case. He personally thought

1. See official record of the symposium.

2. Chairman of British Aircraft Corporation.

3. Directeur adjoint à la Direction des Affaires internationales, Délégation Générale pour l'Armement (France).

1. Assistant Chief of Staff, Belgian Land Forces, Chairman of the FINABEL Committee of Principal Military Experts.

2. Former General Inspektor der Bundeswehr.

interoperability of only passing use and that it was more expensive than standardisation. He, therefore, pleaded in favour of standardisation at least where new weapon systems were concerned.

12. Finally, the economic grounds for co-operation in the procurement field were reiterated by many speakers at the symposium. In the words of Mr. Edmond Nessler, President of the Assembly of Western European Union, "the maintenance of our armaments industries remains essential for the domestic and social balance of our countries and for upholding our position in the world and safeguarding our independence. The armaments industries of most of our countries employ a large number of workers and make a major contribution to our exports; they are also instrumental in keeping us in the civil and military industrial race at international level".

13. Most speakers saw co-operation in the military field as being the only way for Western European nations to avoid — in Julian Critchley's¹ graphic phrase — either "being disarmed by inflation" or being forced to become wholly reliant upon the United States of America, both for our defence and for our industrial well-being. As Mr. Greenwood warned the symposium, "that degree of domination would reduce our defence industries to the level of sub-contractors".

14. Dr. Ingénieur Gustavo Stefanini², explained that an armaments industry provides an appreciable contribution to national wealth, especially in terms of export revenue. In this connection Mr. Nessler's observation that the French armaments industry exports some 30 % of its production was noteworthy. Arms manufacture employs a highly skilled workforce, it acts as a motor for technological progress with "spin off" into valuable civil applications and extends the range of the national economy into a field of industrial activity less susceptible to cyclical economic recessions and reduces the vulnerability of the economy to sectoral market crises. At the same time the Committee stresses the political dangers inherent in any armaments industry which is dependent on exports to countries outside the Alliance in order to amortise research, development and "start-up" costs, or to reduce the unit cost of production for national use. Foreign policy can be distorted as arms sales considerations come into play; potential conflicts may be sparked off in unstable situations in the third world.

1. Chairman, Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and official Chairman of the symposium.

2. Chairman of Oto Melara (Italy).

15. The Committee believes that together the European countries of the Alliance provide an arms market large enough for economic production that would be independent of exports to the third world, thus enabling such exports to be terminated or limited to those deemed to be in the interest of Europe according to a commonly defined external policy¹. At the present time, however, budgetary constraints have tended throughout Western Europe to lead to reductions in the appropriations earmarked for equipment. In this instance Mr. Nessler quoted the example of France whose expenditure on equipment was 52.2 % of the defence budget in 1967 and has fallen to 41 % in 1977, while the portion of the defence budget earmarked for research has fallen from 8.9 % in 1971 to 6 % in 1976. Corresponding figures for other countries show marked fluctuations but no particular trend. Thus the United States expenditure on research and development as a percentage of its defence budget ranged from 9.6 % in 1968 to 9.9 % in financial year 1978; its expenditure on procurement ranged from 29.8 % in 1968 to 28.5 % in financial year 1978, with a low of 20.6 % in 1974. For Germany the total of research and development and procurement as a percentage of the defence budget ranged from 26.3 % in 1970 to 25.2 % in 1976 with a low of 22.4 % in 1971. In financial year 1977 the United Kingdom spent 12.4 % of its defence budget on research and development alone.

16. Logic therefore has long encouraged industrial co-operation in arms manufacture. Research and development costs can be shared and unit costs minimised through long production lines but the obstacles remain. A number of speakers alluded to them.

17. Ingénieur Général Cauchie warned against the alarmingly monopolistic results which a *de facto* specialisation of industries or countries in arms manufacture could have. He preferred the parallel development of several competitive systems within Europe with the attendant incentive to innovation and design capability. Likewise, Dr. Stefanini reminded the symposium that "the improved utilisation of military budgets should be conditioned by consideration of its collateral negative effects on the European industry as a whole".

18. He pointed out that "in most economic sectors European co-operation had been implemented in the context of specifically-created institutions and according to clearly-defined regulations which, in varying measure, take account of the possible socio-economic consequences of jointly-reached decisions and which

1. See speeches by Mr. Van Elslande, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Assembly on 5th December 1974 and on 28th May 1975.

provide, where necessary, for corrective action or agreement on appropriate compromise".

19. He feared that the IEPG working explicitly outside the EEC and also outside NATO "could prove to be a body with an outlook concentrated on military budgetary interests and relatively disinterested in other aspects". These socio-economic difficulties of joint arms production and specialisation described by Dr. Stefanini as problems of "human ecology" emphasise the importance of the initiative taken by the WEU Council in May 1976 when it decided to assign a study to the Standing Armaments Committee¹.

I. Existing institutions

A. Independent European programme group

20. The independent European programme group (IEPG) originated from a decision taken by Eurogroup Ministers in special session in November 1975 to seek to establish a new forum, in which France could participate, for collaboration in defence procurement and the development of a common European position from which to begin a dialogue with the United States on defence equipment matters.

21. As a result of this decision, representatives of the Eurogroup nations (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and the United Kingdom) and France assembled in Rome for the first meeting of the IEPG on 2nd February 1976. They resolved to work, in the spirit of the Alliance and without jeopardising national responsibilities, towards the aims of more effective use of funds for research, development and procurement, increased standardisation and interoperability of equipment, the maintenance of a healthy European defence industrial and technological base and the strengthening of the European factor in the relationship with the United States and Canada.

22. Since its inception the IEPG has proceeded, under Italian chairmanship, in a flexible and pragmatic manner without setting up any permanent machinery. On 22nd and 23rd November 1976 the second plenary session of the IEPG took place once again in Rome. The Italian chairmanship of the group was renewed since; although it was felt that the system of annual rotation of chairmanship should be retained, it was preferable for Italy to continue its work of co-ordination and preparation for another year. There have been meetings at a number of levels, including two at "State Secretary" (Junior Minister/Permanent Secretary) level and two at national armaments director level. Meetings at

1. See section C below.

official "expert" level have been more frequent. Initial progress has been made simultaneously on the harmonisation of national equipment programmes, the examination of possible joint projects and the consideration of certain aspects of procedures and practices affecting collaborative projects. Three panels were established to co-ordinate work as follows and their work was confirmed and approved by the second plenary session:

- (a) Panel I, under United Kingdom chairmanship, has compiled and agreed a comprehensive schedule of equipment in service and replacement intentions. This is an essential base for the comparison of national needs and the formulation of joint plans, and goes beyond anything hitherto produced in other collaborative fora. The schedule will be updated at regular intervals.
- (b) Panel II, chaired by Belgium, co-ordinates the work of ten equipment sub-groups which have been set up to examine the opportunities for collaboration in specific areas. Six of these sub-groups were established as a result of comparison of national contributions to the replacement schedule prepared by Panel I.
- (c) Panel III, the Defence Economics and Procedures Panel (DEPP), under German chairmanship, has identified and set up sub-groups to study five general areas: project procedures, arms exports, multi-project compensation, competition and industrial co-operation. The panel has been authorised to use the results of the study assigned by the WEU Council to the Standing Armaments Committee.

When the IEPG's equipment sub-groups are further advanced in their deliberations, industry will of course need to be involved in the resulting pre-feasibility studies¹.

23. Until the formation of the IEPG, there had been no purely European forum for the discussion of the production of equipment in co-operation that was open to all the European members of the Alliance and in which France participated. France has been unwilling to join or be associated with Eurogroup; while the Standing Armaments Committee of Western European Union, which has not in any case been active as a forum for stimulating co-operation, excludes the European flank countries (Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Turkey).

1. See paragraphs 85-97.

24. With the accession of Portugal in November 1976, the IEPG now includes all the European members of NATO who maintain armed forces, and its members have explicitly reaffirmed their intention that it should continue to act as a principal European forum for collaboration in the defence equipment field.

25. Nevertheless, this European context does not disregard the Atlantic framework. The resolution which established the group linked both aspects in a single vision.

26. As Admiral Mainini¹ reminded the symposium, the IEPG has not failed to study the question of relations with the Alliance, and has seen the Conference of National Armaments Directors as the appropriate forum for exchanges of views and experience.

27. Admiral Mainini was insistent that although the members of the IEPG have been preoccupied with their urgent problems of industrial co-operation and of harmonising requirement time scales, they "have not neglected the wider consideration of relations with the countries on the other side of the Atlantic, particularly since the United States is increasingly and practically disposed to envisage standardisation as an aim to be achieved through a more balanced exchange between the two components of the Alliance".

28. In its work to date the IEPG has done much to reconcile what Julian Critchley described as "the twin aims of the Alliance, standardisation and the preservation of European defence industries". However, Admiral Mainini's speech did not make clear precisely how much progress IEPG is making. The Committee would wish to know what *new* joint production projects are to be embarked on, and what institutional arrangements are envisaged for joint production. It would like assurances that there is no deadlock in any area of the IEPG discussions.

B. Eurogroup

29. Eurogroup was established in 1968. Its members are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Created in order to further a greater identity of interest in defence matters between the European members of the Alliance, it soon provided an impetus for European co-operation in equipment matters. It functions through the armaments experts on the national delegations to NATO in Brussels and has no secretariat of its own.

1. Deputy Chief of the Italian Defence Staff, Chairman of the independent European programme group at National Armaments Director level.

30. It has acted as an important ministerial forum for the Defence Ministers of the European NATO nations.

31. Its sub-groups have been engaged for a number of years in the field of tactical harmonisation, armaments, training and logistic co-operation¹. For example, in December 1972 the Defence Ministers of Eurogroup passed a "Declaration of principles" on equipment collaboration and in May 1975 the Eurogroup Defence Ministers recommended a much more vigorous approach to standardisation through military trade between the United States and Europe which was endorsed at the NATO Defence Ministers' meeting.

32. Nevertheless, in spite of the progress made and real achievements of Eurogroup to date, it has suffered from a fatal defect in that France did not participate. This has long been recognised by the Assembly and by the Committee¹. Attention was also drawn to this in Resolution 16 of the North Atlantic Assembly (October 1973) which noted that "France does not participate in the activities of the Eurogroup and that consequently insufficient use is made of the considerable technological potential of the French armaments industry and that furthermore this non-participation will not facilitate a standardisation of armaments so frequently recommended with regard to European defence".

33. The resolution urged Eurogroup and France to seek a solution to this problem.

C. Standing Armaments Committee

34. The Standing Armaments Committee was established by decision of the Council of Western European Union (7th May 1955) but is not actually referred to in the Treaty of Brussels itself.

35. "The Standing Armaments Committee shall, in close relation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, seek to improve consultation and co-operation in the sphere of armaments with a view to finding joint solutions which would assist governments of member countries in meeting their equipment requirements. To that end it shall encourage, on a case by case basis, agreements or arrangements on such subjects as the development, standardisation, production and procurement of armaments."³

- 1. Eurotraining — (Training);
- Euronad — (Equipment co-operation);
- Eurocom — (Battlefield communications);
- Eurolog — (Logistics);
- Eurolongterm — (Agreement of basic tactics concepts);
- Euromed — (Medical services).

2. See e.g. Recommendation 269, 28th May 1975.

3. Paragraph 10 of the decision.

36. Staffed by an international secretariat, members of which also attend meetings of the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors as observers, the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU meets four times a year in Paris. Representatives on the Standing Armaments Committee are drawn from members' NATO delegations, usually at colonel or civilian official level, except in the case of the French and Italian representatives who are generals.

37. The Standing Armaments Committee also maintains a close liaison with the NATO Military Agency for Standardisation (MAS) and the FINABEL Committee of Principal Military Experts.

38. Despite the hopes placed in it in its earlier years, the Standing Armaments Committee has not proved to be a framework within which joint production projects have been undertaken. But as Mr. Nessler rightly pointed out in his opening speech at the symposium, the Council of WEU, in May 1976, took an important decision in assigning to the Standing Armaments Committee a study of the armaments industries in member countries¹.

39. This decision, if followed up positively by the WEU Council on 26th April 1977, could

1. Text of the mandate approved by the Council of Ministers at its meeting in Brussels on 31st May 1976

1. The Standing Armaments Committee is instructed to submit to the Permanent Council, before the end of 1976, a detailed outline programme for a study as set out in the Annex, and a description of its proposed method of work ;

2. The Permanent Council will study carefully the outline programme and the proposed method of work submitted to them by the SAC, taking account of the determination of governments to avoid all duplication and any encroachment on work in progress elsewhere. The aim of the Council's consideration of the SAC's outline programme will be to specify the terms and define the scope of the study to be assigned to it. They will take account, in particular, of the tasks undertaken by the European programme group at their meeting in the autumn of 1976 ;

3. The Permanent Council are authorised to take decisions on the proposals thus submitted ;

4. The Permanent Council will follow the development of the work and will report to Ministers at their next meeting ;

5. The Permanent Council have also been authorised to consider at a later stage the possibility of including the following points in the study :

Inventory of capacities

Here, the aim would be to identify, by main categories, the weak and strong points of the European industry, together with the sectors where it can compete on favourable terms.

Inventory of relations between industries in different European countries

At industrial level, there is already a network of contacts and various forms of occasional or systematic co-operation. These experiments should be analysed with a view to possible rationalisation on a European scale.

restore a useful rôle to the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU which in the past has been overshadowed by other organisations.

D. FINABEL

40. The FINABEL Co-ordinating Committee was set up in 1953 (i.e. before any other similar European body) by agreement of the chiefs of staff of the land forces of member countries approved by their Ministers of Defence. Its permanent secretariat is located in the Belgian Ministry of Defence with a French colonel as secretary and a Belgian lieutenant-colonel as assistant secretary.

41. It was at first composed of the representatives of France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, but was joined by representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1956 and the United Kingdom in 1972 after Great Britain's accession to the EEC.

42. FINABEL is an international association whose members are appointed by their respective governments. Its proposals are transmitted through them, i.e. through the chiefs of staff (army) to governments. FINABEL cannot negotiate as an entity with a government.

43. The aim of FINABEL is to encourage military co-operation among the NATO member States whose defence concerns and requirements are comparable particularly in the following fields in respect of land armaments :

- definition of qualitative requirements of military equipment and joint definition of the military characteristics of such equipment ;
- joint testing of equipment and procedure ;

Annex

The Standing Armaments Committee, acting under the authority of the Council, is instructed to make a descriptive analysis of the situation of the armaments industry in member countries. The purpose of this analysis is to gain a clearer insight into the industrial and economic implications of the standardisation of armaments. It shall be directed to formulating a diagnosis.

(a) Definition of the armaments sector

The concept of armaments should be defined by distinguishing between armaments as such and the production of goods and services for national defence.

(b) Collection of economic data

One purpose of the study will be to assemble figures showing the relative scale of armaments production in each of the countries and between them, and covering such points as amount of investment, research, sources of funds (public and private), manpower and exports (divided into the European, Atlantic and other areas).

(c) Legal status of firms and domestic legislation

The study should also identify the various legal statuses of arms firms.

- tactical and logistic studies ;
- exchange of information.

44. FINABEL's mandate does not cover the joint production of equipment since this is outside the responsibilities of chiefs of staff. Nevertheless, the joint positions set out in the agreements on the military characteristics of land army equipment have a direct influence on its development.

45. NATO recognises FINABEL as a regional group and the NATO Army Armaments Group (NAAG) of CNAD frequently uses FINABEL's work as a basis for its own studies.

46. The WEU Standing Armaments Committee and FINABEL exchange documents and their respective secretariats are in constant contact.

47. Official liaison procedure has just been introduced with Eurolongterm, a Eurogroup committee responsible for tactical concepts. Eurocom is informed of studies conducted by FINABEL and the members of the independent European programme group, although having no official link with FINABEL, are aware of its existence and work.

E. NATO

48. As Dr. Walter LaBerge¹ made clear in his address, "the established administrative machinery of the Alliance offers general major assets which may be of an especial use to the European Community in its programme for co-ordinated armaments development".

49. Dr. LaBerge cited three parts of the organisational machinery of the Alliance which can be useful for the formulation of a European armaments policy. First, there are the staff specialists of the allied military commanders. Secondly, there are the civilian organisation and supporting staff. In this area the best known body is the Conference of National Armaments Directors which facilitates co-operation by an elaborate network of groups for the interchange of technical information or formation of projects. Thirdly, there exist under the Military Committee an international staff and certain agencies, such as the Military Agency for Standardisation (MAS).

50. The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is the senior civil body under the North Atlantic Council concerned with defence equipment, and all NATO countries, including France, participate in its work. The CNAD has under it five groups of governmental representatives. These are the NATO Naval Armaments Group, the NATO Army Armaments

Group, the NATO Air Force Armaments Group, the Defence Research Group and the Tri-Service Group on Air Defence. A sixth group, the Tri-Service Group on Communications and Electronic Equipment, has been approved in principle by CNAD, but its exact scope and responsibilities have not yet been fully agreed.

51. Under each of the CNAD main groups there are numerous specialist panels and sub-groups. These working groups and panels have access to information from the United States and Canada. It is primarily through the mechanism of the CNAD bodies that this information becomes available to the European members. The CNAD working groups provide an effective two-way street in information between the European and American NATO countries.

52. Likewise on the military side a body which facilitates the exchange of technical information among Alliance nations is the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD). Also under the aegis of the Military Committee is the Military Agency for Standardisation (MAS) which issues Standardisation Agreements (STANAGs) on procedures, doctrines and equipment characteristics to provide interoperability or compatibility. Most STANAGs are established through MAS bodies although some of the work on equipment STANAGs originates in bodies under the CNAD.

53. These STANAGs can in some cases provide a point of departure for the development of future armaments to be produced by European nations.

54. As Dr. LaBerge pointed out "any policy for European armaments must undoubtedly recognise the value of the work of the MAS, and any multinational grouping of nations for co-operative equipment projects must take results of its work into account".

55. Lastly, there is one temporary activity which it is important to mention. The ad hoc Committee on Equipment Interoperability was established by the NATO Ministers in December of 1975 and has now finished one year of operation. This body of political representatives of nations has brought strong pressure to bear for the solution of problems of interoperability in communications, fuels, tank gun ammunition, cross-servicing of aircraft and of the implementation of standardisation agreements. Furthermore, it has by its actions generated a general commitment to interoperability which must surely form one of the bases for any European armaments policy. Dr. LaBerge's paper cited the following weapons projects under NATO CNAD aegis :

- Azores fixed acoustic range (AFAR)
- Mobile acoustic communications study (MACS)
- AN/USD-501 surveillance system
- FH-70 155 mm towed howitzer

1. NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Support.

Puma, Gazelle and Lynx helicopters
 Jaguar tactical and training aircraft
 NATO maritime patrol aircraft
 Seasparrow point defence ship missile system
 Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (tracked)
 (VRT)
 MK-20 RH-202 rapid-fire gun and anti-aircraft
 field mount HS-669N
 Mark 44
 Underwater acoustic communication system
 FORACS (fleet operational readiness accuracy
 check site)
 SP-70 (155 mm self-propelled howitzer)
 Milan PHM (NATO hydrofoil fast patrol ship,
 guided missile)
 NATO frigate for the 1970s
 NATO conventionally-powered submarine for
 employment in European waters
 Tornado multi-rôle combat aircraft
 F-16 air combat fighter
 Sea Gnat

II. Industrial arrangements

Industrial aspects of European co-operation in weapons production

56. The most striking feature of European industrial co-operation in armaments manufacture is in Mr. Greenwood's¹ words to the symposium "the quite remarkable variety of forms which international co-operation has taken".

57. The position was well summarised in the action programme for the European aeronautical sector of the EEC: "the immense size of development expenditure and the need for economies of scale in production have prompted the development of a series of collaborative European projects...".

58. "... The structures of this collaboration", the EEC Commission report continues, "have evolved and been most varied: from the agreement between separate companies on the Transall, to the 'light' company (SEPECAT) set up to develop the Anglo/French Jaguar, to the common development company to develop and produce the MRCA".

59. The advantages and disadvantages of industrial co-operation were set out by Mr. Kuhlo² in his report to the symposium. He listed the advantages as:

- (a) sharing of development cost;
- (b) sharing of development risk;
- (c) broadening of background: experience, capacity;
- (d) reduction of procurement cost: larger quantity and cadence;
- (e) advantage in logistics and readiness to act,

and the disadvantages as:

- (i) co-ordination of different national regulations, standards and procedures;
- (ii) only partial activation of industrial potential.

60. Mr. Kuhlo cites the cost and complexity of modern precision-guided munitions such as missiles, rockets, projectiles and bombs together with the importance of maximum standardisation in their development among inventories of the armed forces of the Alliance as arguments for co-operation in their development, production and use.

61. Collaboration in this field, once very much *ad hoc* as between Engins Matra and Hawker Siddeley Dynamics over the Martel Missile, is now more institutionalised.

62. The Euromissile organisation and administrative structure between the German MBB and French SNIAS companies created on the foundation of the BPPA and DFPB (respective sponsoring ministries) for the development and production of the Milan, HOT and Roland missile systems was given by Mr. Kuhlo as an example of the kind of joint industrial/ministerial organisation required in this high technology area. (See Diagram 1)

63. It is noteworthy that in the space field not only is there a supranational European Space Agency (ESA) but also that the satisfactory work of the three international consortia MESH, COSMOS and STAR has shown, as the General Rapporteur Mr. Cristofini explained in his summing-up of the symposium, that "the extension of bilateral experience to multinational co-operation in consortia is not a figment of the imagination". Indeed, the General Rapporteur considered that "it is relatively easy to pass from the Euromissile-type of bilateral organisation to a COSMOS-type consortium".

64. Likewise in the military aerospace sector we have had a number of relatively straightforward industrial partnerships and collaborative arrangements to produce specific projects such as the Atlantic, Alpha-Jet, Transall, Puma, Lynx and Gazelle helicopters and Jaguar. The SEPECAT organisation to manufacture the Jaguar (see Diagram 2) is typical of such *ad hoc* arrangements.

1. Chairman, British Aircraft Corporation.

2. Head of Dynamics Division, Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm GmbH.

65. The Panavia joint industrial company between Aeritalia, BAC and MBB produce the multi-rôle Tornado aircraft with its corresponding joint engine company Turbo Union and attendant management agencies NAMMA/NAMMO represents the kind of industrial and official administrative collaborative evolution which could set the pattern for future joint weapon development and production in Europe. (See Diagram 3)

66. It is just the type of successful military collaborative consortium which Mr. Greenwood warned the symposium should not be broken up when its own particular programme is completed. He advised the addition of further partners to such consortia and the assignment to them of additional programmes as they occur.

67. It is difficult to quantify the cost effects of collaboration. However, it seems that by doubling the market due to collaboration, a saving on the mean unit cost in the order of 20 % is achieved on a major military aircraft programme. On smaller projects, the saving might be about 10 % per unit. These figures are based on estimates for national bilateral programmes in which although the total development bill in collaboration is one and a half times that of the unilateral bill, each sponsoring government has to find only two-thirds of the money required to do the job on its own. At the same time, a 5 % increase in manufacturing costs arises from the difficulties of geographical distance, language difference and so on¹. In its next report the Committee will seek to include more recent figures.

68. Yet as the EEC action programme for aerospace pointed out "this healthy evolution (towards collaboration) has been marred by weakness ; by lack of systematic collaboration on procurement at European level ; by lack of pooling of the basic research infrastructure ; by the fact that industrial production structures and development capabilities have not yet been fully rationalised to render them capable of exploiting the European dimension ; above all perhaps by a failure of basic political strategy in the 1960s."²

69. The result has been that following the withdrawal of France from the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom combined to build the Tornado multi-rôle combat aircraft, leaving France a non-participant in Europe's important military project. In the strike/trainer field, the Alpha-Jet

and Hawk¹ are in direct competition in export markets as are the Anglo-French Jaguar and the purely French Mirage F-1 although the French Dassault-Bréguet company is engaged in the manufacture of both F-1 and Jaguar.

70. It is scarcely surprising that such divisions of interest and the consequent lack of any genuinely European alternative to the United States F-16 allowed the replacement order for the F-104s of Belgian, Danish, Dutch and Norwegian air forces to go to the General Dynamics F-16 fighter rather than to a European aeroplane.

71. Nevertheless, there is no reason, given the necessary political determination on the part of the European members of the Alliance, for them not to be able to fulfil most of their requirements for defence equipment.

72. While American military research and development expenditure dwarfs that of its European NATO partners, the gap, as Richard Burt points out², is narrowing. Whereas between 1955 and 1965 the combined military research and development spending of Britain, France and Germany was 10 % of the American total, by 1970-74 this proportion had reached 27 %.

73. Moreover, Richard Burt argues that "the research and development gap should not obscure the fact in several areas such as anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW), low-level surface-to-air guided missiles (SAMs), anti-shipping missiles and target-acquisition aids — advanced systems are undergoing development and deployment by Europeans".

74. In listing all the joint European programmes in which France alone was involved Ingénieur Général Cauchie demonstrated the range and capability of Europe's armaments industries. If to these are added the weapons systems listed in Appendix II to WEU Document 689 (Report of the Committee on European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments of 1st December 1975), it will be seen how exceptionally technologically advanced the European industries are and how wide-ranging are their capabilities.

75 It is not surprising that in a number of areas (V/Stol aircraft, low-level SAMs and ship-borne guided weapons in particular) European weapons outperform those of the United States, and in a global context today European equipment accounts according to Ingénieur Général Cauchie for some 12 % of the market.

1. See Sir George Edwards, OM, CBE, FRS, "Partnership in major technological projects", 7th Maurice Lubbock Memorial Lecture — 14th May 1970, Oxford University Press, pages 23-24.

2. EEC Commission — Action programme for the aeronautical sector, Com. 75 (475), page 9.

1. A British basic and advanced jet trainer with close support capability.

2. New weapons technologies — debate and directions by Richard Burt, IISS Adelphi Paper No. 126, London, 1976, pages 20-21.

Bilateral Organization MILAN HOT ROLAND

DIAGRAM 1





DIAGRAM 2



GOVERNMENTS

FRG

ITALY

UK

DIAGRAM 3

GOVERNMENT AGENCY

NAMMO
NAMMA

PRIME CONTRACTORS

MAUSER
IWKA

PANAVIA
AIRCRAFT
GMBH

TURBO
UNION
LTD

FIRST LINE
CONTRACTORS

BAC

AIT

MBB

EASAMS

CO-PRODUCERS

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EQUIPMENT
SUPPLIERS

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DOCUMENT 738

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III. Institutional aspects of European co-operation

A. Political problems of rationalisation

76. The principal difficulty in arranging European armaments co-operation has always been the reconciliation of the institutional machinery for European armaments co-operation with the overall strategic necessity to preserve the Atlantic partnership.

77. However, two and a half years after the publication for the United States State Department of Thomas Callaghan's report on United States/European economic co-operation in military and civil technology, the "two-way street" it advocated is as far away from realisation as ever. As Ingénieur Général Cauchie demonstrated, there is an imbalance in the United States' favour of approximately 10:1 between the United States' exports to and imports from Western Europe of defence equipment and in the case of France the ratio is as high as 40:1.

78. This imbalance in armament purchases is not for a lack of transatlantic dialogue. France, for example, although not now involved in the integrated military structure of NATO, participates in the consultations of the North Atlantic Council and the Conference of National Armaments Directors and at a working level there are numerous exchange agreements on research and development between France and the United States and Canada.

79. So far the United States has persisted, both for strategic reasons and as a result of political and industrial pressure, in a policy of near autarchy in weapons procurement. The Buy American Act in the case of defence equipment protects the United States market to the level of 50 % of domestic costs. In the rare instances in which the United States does purchase European equipment as in the case of the Roland guided weapon and AV8B Advanced Harrier V/Stol aircraft, agreements for manufacture under licence in the United States are demanded.

80. Nevertheless, recent trends in the United States towards a policy of standardisation and joint production in NATO should be noted :

(a) Legislation introduced in particular by Senators Culver and Nunn in 1975 and 1976 has led to legislation declaring it to be "the policy of the United States that equipment procured for the use of personnel of the armed forces of the United States stationed in Europe under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty should be standardised or at least interoperable with equipment of other members of NATO". The Defence Secretary is authorised, for the purpose of the Buy American Act, to certify that procurement from a domestic source is inconsistent with the public interest. Weapon systems developed primarily for the NATO theatre shall conform to

a common NATO requirement ; the sense of Congress is stated to be that expanded inter-allied procurement would be facilitated by more licensing and co-production agreements if economies of scale are preserved ; finally, it is recognised that a two-way street in defence procurement can work only if Europe operates collectively, "accordingly the Congress encourages the governments of Europe to accelerate their present efforts to achieve European armaments collaboration among all European members of the Alliance."¹

(b) The United States Department of Defence Directive No. 2010.6 of 11th March 1977 on standardisation and interoperability of weapon systems and equipment within NATO lays down responsibilities for implementing the policy expressed in the legislation quoted above.

(c) The compensation arrangements made under the F-16 programme are more satisfactory than those of previous joint production agreements. They will bring new technologies into the European factories concerned, and provide the four purchasing countries with approximately full compensation for the dollar value of the F-16 contract. Limited production capability in some countries has sometimes made it difficult to arrange suitable participation in the shared production scheme.

81. However, the problems encountered with the proposed new German-United States battle tank show still enormous obstacles to be overcome before a two-way street can be effective. The two-way street concept can be criticised, as Ingénieur Général Cauchie did, but it has to be recognised that there is as yet no European basis for it, and political and industrial efforts to create one have met with little success. The F-16 deal will perhaps speed up the political efforts.

82. But transatlantic projects should not be held up until the European structures have been built and begun to operate satisfactorily. Certain areas where two-way co-operation is possible can already be defined, and could work, given the political will on each side of the Atlantic. But a two-way street that satisfies European aspirations is still far off and depends on other factors besides the European capacity to build European structures that will work.

83. In an ideal world the best institutional machinery in which to concert European efforts in the armaments field would be NATO or Eurogroup, since the benefits of interoperability, standardisation, collaborative or joint production could be achieved on the basis of agreed tactical doctrines, but French participation is essential.

1. United States military procurement authorisation bill 1977. Public Law 94-361, sections 802, 803.

84. In the view of French spokesmen, progress towards co-operation in the field of armaments and hence towards a more effective European defence effort depends upon an institutional basis which, as Mr. Cristofini observed, respects "relevant national interests" and whose proceedings can, as Ingénieur Général Cauchie remarked, be "conducted on pragmatic and flexible lines, with no hard and fast structure and no cumbersome and sterilising mechanisms".

85. It was against this background that the independent European programme group (IEPG) was established. To quote Ingénieur Général Cauchie again: "it means that in the group we find ourselves among fellow Europeans untrammelled by the familiar official structures, whether of NATO or WEU".

86. Hitherto the plethora of institutions have, in the field of European armaments procurement and co-operation, done scant justice in their achievements to the good intentions of their founders. In the instance of the IEPG, the proliferation of agencies and institutions must be no obstacle to real progress as the IEPG must work eclectically taking care to avoid duplicating the efforts of other bodies but utilising the results of their work where appropriate.

87. For example, liaison with NATO is automatically assured through the co-membership of NATO of the participants in the IEPG. In this way a close relationship between armaments projects and military operational needs should be even more surely achieved.

88. Also the lack of industrial participation in the IEPG to date can be offset to some extent if, as Ingénieur Général Cauchie suggests, the IEPG follows up the interest of France in ensuring that the IEPG utilises the current study of the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU into the present state of the European armaments industries.

89. In this connection, and in view of French support for WEU which is after all the only all-Western European political forum purely devoted to defence questions, the Standing Armaments Committee could be given an enhanced rôle as an expert study centre. At present the Standing Armaments Committee is responsible to the Council of WEU only. Its studies should be systematically utilised by the IEPG. To extend a degree of parliamentary scrutiny to the IEPG, consideration could be given to having the latter submit an annual report to the WEU Assembly.

90. Furthermore, if the Standing Armaments Committee had this wider rôle, it could undertake studies on behalf of the Assembly in the field of weapon procurement and collaboration which could not only satisfy current political demands but also be of benefit perhaps to the IEPG.

91. In conclusion, it should also be noted that industry is showing increasing interest in the IEPG. Your Rapporteur nevertheless agrees with the conclusion of the IEPG that a European Defence Industry Group or any similar industrial body should not participate fully in the work of the IEPG. But industrial observers at selected sub-group meetings should not be ruled out.

92. The multiplicity of existing agencies and institutions has been a subject of frequent adverse comment and long held to be a brake upon real progress to European armaments co-operation. Furthermore, as eventual European union edges very gradually nearer to reality, it seems in the words of Mr. van der Stoep, Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the WEU Assembly of June 1976 "... to be a logical sequel ... that ultimately defence too should be a matter for the union".¹

93. "Although", as Mr. Destremau, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, also rightly observed on the same occasion, "in sound logic there cannot be a unified European operational defence without there being a unified European political power, there is no reason why, to save time, we should not conceptualise here and now the conditions for establishing such a defence. In this area and until such time as the strategic concept takes shape, the setting up of a programme group for the standardisation of armaments designed and manufactured by Europeans might prove the desired trigger for developing a European armaments industry. In the same prospect may be viewed the Council of Ministers' remit to the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU to conduct an in-depth survey of our countries' armaments industries. This is being done at Belgium's instigation firmly backed by ourselves. Moreover it was your Assembly which, on a report I had the honour to submit to it on 8th November 1972, advocated reactivating the Standing Armaments Committee".²

94. In developing a truly European armaments industry, there is a marked dichotomy between those agencies concerned with the industrial aspects and those concerned with the purely military.

95. In view of the success of the IEPG to date, the time has surely come for overdue rationalisation of their functions. In particular, as the IEPG is now successfully established and concerns itself primarily with the harmonisation of operational requirements, FINABEL's functions as regards army equipment and logistics might

1. Official Report, Sixth Sitting, 17th June 1976, page 193.

2. Official Report, Second Sitting, 15th June 1976, page 86.

come to be assumed by the IEPG which could form any extra sub-committees as required.

96. Both the IEPG and FINABEL are specifically European bodies without any of the political disadvantages in French eyes of the NATO agencies or even Eurogroup and its sub-committees¹. Indeed France is an active participant in both the IEPG and FINABEL.

97. A drawing together of FINABEL and the IEPG would have the further advantage that FINABEL, unlike the IEPG, maintains close liaison with the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU.

B. Interoperability and standardisation

98. The Eurogroup communiqué issued at The Hague on 5th November 1975 stressed that "in order to make better use of the limited defence resources available within the North Atlantic Alliance, it is of the greatest importance to increase the interoperability and standardisation of military equipment within the Alliance while maintaining an effective and viable European defence industry".

99. There is no doubt of the military need for both interoperability and standardisation. In a lecture to the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies in London on 22nd October 1975, Dr. Gardiner C. Tucker, the Assistant Secretary-General of NATO for Defence Support, cited the example of the ACE Mobile Force². "There are seven nations who contribute units to that force ... it has seven types of combat aircraft. It has six different types of recoilless rifles ... four different types of wire-guided anti-tank missiles, three different types of mortars, three different rifles and three different machine-guns ... seven logistic trains must be established."

100. Even more horrifyingly, Dr. Tucker related how, in a recent naval exercise, of over fifty NATO aircraft shot down over 50 % were credited to NATO armaments owing to the impossibility of intercommunication with ground or shipborne air interception control systems³. The current lack of harmonisation of equipments is indeed fratricidal in not only the economic sense.

101. The United States on the one hand tends to emphasise standardisation. The French on the other stress the paramount importance of interoperability. Ingénieur Général Cauchie in his paper went so far as to suggest that the ultimate logic of standardisation is monopoly and special-

isation, probably on a national basis, with all the economic and even social disadvantages which could ensue.

102. Certainly Thomas Callaghan is right to point out that the military and logistic inefficiencies of the present situation seriously degrade the operational capabilities of the Alliance. "In varying degrees", he writes, "neither the land, nor the sea nor the air forces of NATO can operate effectively together for any significant period of time"¹ and he goes on to cite the multiplicity of logistic support systems.

103. "The weakest link", Callaghan continues, "in the entire allied defence chain is thus this NATO vulnerability to sustained conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces. There should be no such vulnerability. There is no lack of resources. Over \$90 billion per year is spent on general purpose forces : over 70 % of the American defence budget ; over 80 % of our European allies' defence budget".

104. In the short term, interoperability is the first essential as far as existing weapon systems are concerned. For example, at least the Jaguars of the Armée de l'Air and RAF should be made as genuinely as possible interoperable as should the Phantoms of the Luftwaffe, RAF and USAF and the Tornados in British, German and Italian air force service. These initiatives should be extended across the spectrum of army and naval armaments as well.

105. In the longer term Callaghan's European defence procurement agency (in fact the IEPG) should be tasked with a functional assessment of Europe's defence equipment requirements. Rationalisation of procurement, and, wherever possible, of production to assure standardisation would have major industrial and economic repercussions, but :

- (a) we have to contain the explosion of defence cost — interoperability can be very expensive ;
- (b) from the military operational point of view the advantages are great.

IV. Industrial aspects of European defence procurement

106. The General Rapporteur, Mr. Cristofini, laid down four guidelines for success in European industrial armaments policy. First, the institutional framework had to be sound to ensure that relevant national interests were preserved (to which the Italian contributors to the symposium so eloquently referred) while working out

1. Cf. WEU Document 689, European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments — minority opinion presented by Mr. Rivière, paragraphs 8.3(ii) and 8.3(vi) (a).

2. See R.U.S.I. Journal — March 1976, page 8.

3. *Op. cit.* page 9.

1. See Survival — IISS London — May/June 1975, page 130.

joint industrial programmes. Secondly, profitability had to be ensured in co-operative projects. Mr. Greenwood suggested in this regard that "common commercial identity of purpose" was necessary. Thirdly, a degree of protection had to be introduced at least in the early stages and fourthly, resources had to be adequate to bring Europe nearer to the level of the major powers in this field.

107. Flexibility would be essential in applying these policies. For example, there would have to be "weighting" in favour of the smaller nations in the allocation of armament work packages. The forms of industrial co-operation might vary from simple subcontracting in some instances to the formation of transnational companies like Panavia in others.

108. Europe should aim to establish itself in a position of approximate parity with the United States, even in the most modern weapons. A degree of pooling of resources for research would help in this respect as is occurring through the EEC for civil aerospace but overall an element of "competition" in research is healthy.

109. There is no reason why a determined effort on the part of the Europeans to build up their continent's indigenous capability to provide for its own defence equipment should preclude the purchase of American armaments. However, the establishment of Thomas Callaghan's "Common market for Atlantic defence" or former Defence Secretary Schlesinger's "two-way street" is a longer-term project.

Conclusions

110. The Committee's principal conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation.

111. The Committee sees no economic or industrial reason why Western Europe should not provide for the greater part of its defence equipment within its own resources, provided the political willpower exists and adequate finance is made available. Technologically Europe is capable of manufacturing the latest conventional weapons such as precision-guided anti-tank and short- and medium-range anti-aircraft missiles. In areas of specific weakness the existing facilities for the exchange of technical information with the United States will continue to be of value.

112. But to keep abreast of the growing and technologically more sophisticated Soviet defence production effort, and to compensate for the increasing cost of future generations of weapons systems, it will be essential for the European countries to reap the economic advantages which ensue from the longer production runs of jointly-produced standardised equipment. While the Committee is aware that some at least of the

military advantages of standardisation may be achieved by ensuring that different weapons systems are interoperable, it does not believe that interoperability alone is a sufficient objective for European armaments co-operation.

113. While stressing the need for standardisation, the Committee does not overlook the innovative advantages of some competitive research and development. Within Europe, however, a concerted effort must be made to reduce competing research and development to a maximum of two concepts for any weapons system, and to ensure that one only is selected for advanced development and production before vested industrial interest in conflicting systems can arise.

114. The Committee welcomes recent indications of an increasing desire on the part of the United States to seek standardisation of equipment in the Alliance. It believes however that first priority must be given to ensuring the maintenance of a viable European production basis.

115. The Committee stresses the need for more parliamentary control over the whole defence procurement process. It is itself fitted by the terms of the Brussels Treaty to play such a rôle at the European level until such time as the inclusion of statutory defence functions in the powers of the European Community makes it appropriate for the European Parliament to assume that rôle.

116. The Committee further recommends that the institutional basis of European defence production co-operation be streamlined, firstly by concentrating on the independent European programme group. At the same time, it is essential that the military characteristics of equipment continue to be discussed and determined within NATO, as it is within the framework of the military command structure of the Alliance that weapons would have to be used if a conflict broke out.

117. Lastly, the Committee seeks precise information from the Council concerning the terms of reference for the study of the European defence industry entrusted to the Standing Armaments Committee. In a future report the Committee hopes to pursue the suggestion that the Standing Armaments Committee should be further developed as an expert study centre for the whole defence procurement process. Such an important new function for the Standing Armaments Committee would avoid the problems of duplication which, in the past, have inhibited member governments from making proper use of it. Thus the Standing Armaments Committee could be available to produce studies at the request of the IEPG, and, for this purpose, its staff could be enlarged through the recruitment of experts, including nationals of those IEPG countries which are not members of WEU. The Standing

Armaments Committee could also be available to prepare specific studies at the request of the Assembly or its bodies — it is pointed out in this connection that, unlike the staff of the European Parliament, or of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly has no study and research staff, apart from its very limited committee services.


Opinion of the minority

118. The report as a whole was adopted in Committee by 19 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions. In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation a minority of the Committee would have replaced the words "... makes it urgent ... joint production;" with the words "makes it necessary for the European countries of the Alliance to secure the advantages of standardisation through joint production in the fields where it is justified from the operational, economic and political standpoint" on the grounds that standardisation is a difficult, long-term objective, its advantage being established in certain specific sectors only. For the same reason paragraph 1 of the operative text would have been reworded by deleting "first priority" for standardisation in sub-paragraph (a) and deleting the whole of sub-paragraph (b).

119. In the third paragraph of the preamble the minority would have deleted the words "until the European Parliament is invested by statute with defence functions", claiming that defence was a purely national responsibility, not to be delegated to supranational authority, and that a European defence policy could arise solely from concertation between States.

120. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble, the minority would have added at the end the words "but stressing the need for balanced and mutually-advantageous concessions" with a view to stressing the need for Europe not to be reduced to a rôle of supplier of low-technology armaments.

121. Lastly the minority would have replaced paragraph 2 of the operative text with the words: "Ensure good co-ordination of the work of the Standing Armaments Committee with that of the independent European programme group", because it held that common European weapons characteristics should be determined *outside* NATO, and that the Council had assigned an important rôle to the Standing Armaments Committee in approving on 26th April the terms of reference of a study of the European armaments industry which it is to carry out.



Relations with Parliaments

INFORMATION REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Relations with Parliaments ²
by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. Members of the Committee : Mr. *Radius* (Alternate for Mr. Delorme) (Chairman) ; MM. *Enders*, *Schlingemann* (Alternate for Mr. *Peijnenburg*) (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Arfé*, *De Poi*, *Farr*, *Hengel*, *Jeambrun*, *Reddemann*,

Roper, *Schugens*, *Spautz*, *Stoffelen* (Alternate: *Voogd*), *Tanghe*.

Also present : MM. *Bonnel*, *Leynen*, *Reid*, *Treu*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Information Report

(submitted by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. As indicated in the fifteenth report of the Committee¹, the present report is divided into three parts of very different length, the first dealing with members of parliament and defence, the second with action taken in the parliaments of member countries on texts adopted by the WEU Assembly and the third with the activities of the Committee.

I. Members of parliament and defence

2. Following the preliminary report presented at the last session, the Committee agreed to send the parliaments of all member countries a questionnaire on the rôle of parliamentarians (and thus parliaments) in their countries' defence policy.

3. All the parliaments questioned answered in full and they should be thanked sincerely for this effort.

4. The questionnaire was divided into four main sections :

- general responsibilities of parliament in defence matters ;
- defence and parliament's legislative rôle ;
- defence and parliament's supervisory rôle ;
- defence and parliament's information rôle.

5. A number of conclusions can be drawn from a study of all the replies to these four questions.

I. General responsibilities of parliament in defence matters

6. The first feature common to all the countries is that specific constitutional provisions govern the defence responsibilities of the parliaments. The exception in the case of the United Kingdom is more apparent than real since it has no formal constitution. However, the principle of the supremacy of law emanating from parliament forms just as valid a basis for the legislator's power in defence matters as a written constitution.

7. Second, except in the United Kingdom for the abovementioned reason, the responsibility

attributed by constitution to parliaments in the field in question is ascribed. Parliaments are not wholly responsible for all aspects of defence and their decision-taking powers are shared to a very large extent with the executive. Even in the United Kingdom, where parliamentary power is almost absolute, practice has limited parliament's action to specific areas. Such a situation is perfectly understandable in view of the special nature of defence : secrecy surrounding some aspects of defence policy, speed for implementing the means, need to concentrate the decision-taking authority, close and sometimes conflicting relationship between defence and individual freedom.

8. In the analysis hereafter of the replies to the second question, it will be possible to define parliament's exact rôle, but it should be underlined that the constitutional principle of parliamentary action is obviously based on the close link between the principles of the people's sovereignty and national sovereignty and the very principle of defence. Insofar as the latter is materialised by the use of force, it is for the parliaments to ensure that it is used effectively at the same time avoiding it being turned against democratic sovereignty.

9. For these reasons, with few exceptions the defence responsibilities of parliaments are not set out in specific laws. Admittedly, in Belgium laws have extended parliament's prerogatives with regard to information in defence matters through the compulsory tabling of progress reports by certain bodies which depend on the Ministry of Defence. The same is true in France. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the law on the Bundestag parliamentary commissioner for defence grants parliament certain powers in defence matters. Finally, in the United Kingdom, it is through supervision of delegated legislation that parliament finds legal justification for its defence prerogatives, and attention should be called here to the important rôle that individual parliamentarians can play in implementing this supervision.

10. In all cases, parliamentary rules of procedure add no powers to those held by parliament in accordance with the constitution or particular laws. They merely organise procedure for implementing such powers.

11. Their provisions are thus more or less extensive depending on the scope of parliament's defence responsibilities. In certain cases, the rules of procedure merely provide for a defence committee and specify the extent of its responsibilities. This is so for Italy, for instance. In Belgium

¹. Document 724, paragraphs 9 and 10.

and the Netherlands, the rules of procedure merely state that there shall be a parliamentary committee for each ministerial department which *ipso facto* implies the existence of a defence committee.

12. Conversely, because of the wide and specific powers of the Bundestag, its rules of procedure deal very extensively with procedure for their exercise.

13. In this respect, France and the United Kingdom are in an intermediary position. In France, the rules of procedure of the National Assembly and Senate provide for the existence of a committee specialised in defence matters and lay down its responsibilities. They also set out the procedure in accordance with which a state of war or of siege may be declared and stipulate that in both cases it can act only on a proposal from the government.

14. In the United Kingdom, although the rules of procedure of the House of Lords contain no particular provision, those of the House of Commons mention the dates on which defence expenditure must be discussed, as for all other sections of the budget, moreover.

15. Parliaments therefore derive their responsibilities and powers in defence matters basically from formal constitutional provisions or practice. The extent of these responsibilities and powers, starting with the legislative field, will now be examined.

II. Defence and parliament's legislative rôle

16. Traditionally, there are three main fields of action in defence matters :

- the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace ;
- providing the State with the necessary human means for protecting the nation ;
- granting the government financial means for applying defence policy.

1. Declaration of war and conclusion of peace

17. The principle of the compulsory prior authorisation of parliament for declaring war or concluding peace is not general. However, most constitutions make direct or indirect provision for parliament to veto the engagement of hostilities decided on by the government on its own authority. These remarks are also valid for the return to peace. Consideration should also be given to parliamentary powers in situations midway between a state of peace and a state of war.

A. States in which prior parliamentary authorisation is necessary for a declaration of war or a return to peace

(a) Declaration of war

18. Four States grant parliament the power to give prior authorisation for declaration of war, i.e. France, the Netherlands, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany. Although apparently identical in scope and implementation, this power has particular characteristics in each country.

(i) Common characteristics

19. In the countries concerned, the government's power to declare war has three characteristics in common.

The initial step

20. First, who submits the proposed declaration of war to parliament ? In this respect, have parliamentarians the same power of initiative as in other legislative matters ?

21. As is logical, the answer is no.

22. Article 115a-1 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany specifically lays down that parliament declares the country in a state of defence (or of war) at the request of the Federal Government.

23. In France, the constitutional provision is set out in the rules of procedure of the two chambers, where it is underlined that a proposal to declare war must emanate from the government (Article 35 of the 1958 constitution, Article 131 of the rules of procedure of the National Assembly, Article 49 of the rules of procedure of the Senate).

24. Government initiative seems implicit in the Italian constitution since the chambers "discuss the state of war and confer on the government the necessary powers" and the President of the Republic then declares war.

25. The same applies in the Netherlands under Article 59 of the constitution.

Competence

26. It should be pointed out that in the four States which have a two-chamber parliamentary system, the two chambers have equal powers in the decision to declare war. In the Netherlands, the two chambers even discuss the matter at a joint sitting. Consideration will be given later to the special case and existence in the Federal Republic of a constitutional body, the Joint Committee, which may take the place of the two chambers, and the application of Article 16 of the French constitution.

27. In Italy, France and the Netherlands, the decision to declare war is subject to no specific conditions. It is therefore taken in the same way as other legislative decisions. Conversely, the constitution of the Federal Republic requires a qualified majority in the Bundestag of two-thirds of the votes cast and not less than a majority of the members of the Bundestag.

Scope of the declaration of war

28. In France, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, the vote on the declaration of war automatically brings into force constitutional or legislative provisions governing such circumstances. In the main, these provisions increase the government's powers in matters relating in particular to personal property and freedom and transfer of certain powers from the civil to the military authorities.

29. It should be noted that in the Federal Republic the powers of the Federal parliament are increased by the transfer to it of some of the legislative responsibilities of the Länder.

30. The Italian constitution makes no provision for automatic consequences resulting from a state of war. On the contrary, it appears that at the same time as authorisation is given by members, the government must be granted the necessary powers to conduct hostilities.

31. Regarding the consequences of declaring war, the extent of the relevant constitutional provisions in the Federal Republic should be underlined. This juridical situation is probably due to the federal nature of the German State. It may also be due to a desire to limit increases in the powers of certain political authorities to what is strictly necessary. The apparent unity of texts governing the declaration of war in fact conceals actual differences over the reality, practical effect and content of the declaration.

(ii) Differences

32. Differences mainly concern the real extent of parliamentary power, the implementing bodies and the rôle of parliaments after war has been declared.

The real extent of parliamentary power

Notion of war and parliamentary power

33. The real extent of parliamentary power depends on what is meant by war.

34. On this point, the constitution and laws of application are silent in Italy and France. It is apparently the government which has every right to consider a military operation as war and therefore ask parliament for authorisation to declare war. Thus the executive is able to

engage armed forces in armed actions or civil protection tasks on its own authority. This has been done in France several times and each time the decision has been questioned.

35. In France, the army may also be engaged in keeping internal order but this is governed by legal procedure which sets strict limits on such operations.

36. In the Netherlands too the notion of war seems to be based on an assessment which is left to the executive, although Article 202 of the constitution assigns parliament a rôle in defining this state of affairs.

37. On the other hand, the German constitution specifically defines the cases in which armed forces may be used directly by the government when a state of war has not been declared. These are mainly civil defence operations in the event of natural catastrophes or serious accidents (Article 35 of the constitution) or a question of maintaining order in the event of threats to freedom (Article 87 of the constitution). In the latter case, operations must be halted if one of the two chambers of the Federal parliament so requires.

The restrictive nature of the notion of war

38. In the preamble to the French constitution which dates back to 1946 and was taken up again in 1958, war is repudiated as a means of political action. Nevertheless, articles relating to the declaration of war make no mention of the offensive or defensive nature of such a declaration. Parliament might therefore be asked to authorise a war of aggression. The situation is identical in the Netherlands, but not the same in the constitution of the Federal Republic, Article 115-a of which does not refer to declaration of war but to "noting a state of defence" by parliament when "Federal territory is the object of an armed attack or such an attack is imminent". *A contrario*, it must be concluded that parliament is not empowered to authorise taking the offensive.

Bodies authorised to declare war

39. In this connection, mention has to be made here of an original institution under the constitution of the Federal Republic.

40. In peacetime, a Joint Committee is set up (Article 53-a of the constitution) two-thirds of whose members are members of the Bundestag and one-third members of the Bundesrat. This Committee has a single rôle: defence matters. It has no powers in peacetime and does not encroach on the attributions of parliament but is kept informed of Federal defence plans.

41. In the event of an emergency, if it is impossible to convene the Bundestag, the committee may note the existence of a state of war in place of the chamber by a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast and not less than a majority of its members (Article 115-a).

42. If by the same majority the committee notes that the Bundestag and the Bundesrat cannot be convened, it assumes the exercise of legislative power in their stead. This power and the ensuing acts cease and are abrogated if the Bundestag and the Bundesrat together decide.

43. The concern of the constitution of the Federal Republic to maintain a nucleus of parliamentary power, even if in a limited form, may be compared with the solution adopted by France in the 1958 constitution. When the operation of constitutional public authority is interrupted, Article 16 of the constitution allows the temporary transmission of all powers to the President of the Republic. An early return to normal operation of the institutions is guaranteed by parliament meeting with full rights and the impossibility of dissolving the National Assembly. However this may be, there is nothing to prevent the President of the Republic declaring war without the authorisation of parliament in the event of a serious and sudden emergency threatening the nation.

44. Similarly, Article 59 of the Netherlands constitution allows the Queen to declare war without the prior approval of parliament if the latter cannot be consulted.

Rôle of parliaments after the declaration of war

45. In France, the Netherlands and Italy, a declaration of war does not change the powers of parliament, which remain those of common law laid down by the constitution.

46. Conversely, the constitution of the Federal Republic defines a full constitutional status for the Federal parliament in wartime. It first settles the respective relations between the Federal parliament and the Joint Committee.

47. Secondly, it forbids the dissolution of the Bundestag for the duration of the state of defence and extends its period of office should it be due to expire during the state of defence.

48. It also makes specific provision for the possibility of the Federal parliament abrogating measures taken by the Joint Committee at any time.

49. Finally, the Bundestag, with the agreement or at the request of the Bundesrat, may at any time terminate the state of defence. This decision is binding on the Federal President. The decision must be taken immediately the reasons for the state of defence no longer exist. This procedure

should be mentioned insofar as it defines the rights of parliament in maintaining the state of war, which is not the case in France, Italy or the Netherlands.

(b) Return to peace

(i) End of hostilities

50. As just shown, only the German constitution makes specific provision for parliament to terminate the state of war at any time.

51. In France and Italy, in the absence of specific constitutional provisions the initiative of ending hostilities appears to be the prerogative of the executive, generally the government. It should be specified that the question here is only that of ending military operations and not one of returning to peace in the legal sense. In other words, the parliament of the Federal Republic may note that there is no longer a state of war and the French and Italian Governments may terminate hostilities. This does not mean a return to a situation of peace, which is a new legal situation in international law for the State, drawing consequences from the result of military operations.

(ii) Peace

52. In general, therefore, peace results from a treaty concluded between the former belligerents defining new rules in international law applicable to the status of the States and their relations.

53. The constitutions of France, Italy and the Federal Republic make the ratification of peace treaties subject to parliamentary authorisation. In France, this is covered by Article 53 of the constitution and in Germany by Article 115-1 of the fundamental law ; it is implicit in Article 80 of the Italian constitution.

B. States in which prior parliamentary authorisation is not necessary to declare war or note a return to peace

(a) Declaration of war

54. In two WEU member States, the United Kingdom and Belgium, parliamentary authorisation is not legally necessary before war is declared, but parliament in fact exercises a very strict right of control.

(i) Who declares war ?

55. In Belgium, as in the United Kingdom, it is the sovereign as head of the armed forces who declares war. This is a purely formal power. Since they are both parliamentary monarchies, this power is in practice exercised by the government.

56. Article 68 of the Belgian constitution merely requires the King to inform parliament as soon as possible.

(ii) *Parliament's power of control*

57. Parliamentary power of control over a declaration of war is exercised in accordance with the principle of the government's responsibility to parliament. It is therefore an *a posteriori* control.

58. In the United Kingdom, this responsibility can be engaged only in the House of Commons. According to the reply to the questionnaire, it is essentially through votes on laws granting special powers to the government that the House of Commons can exercise control and what even amounts to a veto over the engagement of hostilities.

59. In Belgium, constitutional practice has established that the King's military powers cannot be separated from political problems. Consequently, the ministerial responsibility established in Articles 63 and 64 of the constitution may come into play when the King exercises the duties (particularly that of declaring war) attributed to him in Article 68. Such responsibility is to both chambers of parliament.

(iii) *Consequences of the situation*

60. The consequences of this situation are not fundamentally different from those already considered in the case of States in which parliament plays an effective prior rôle in the declaration of war but others are peculiar to the two countries under consideration.

61. The first consequence is that in the United Kingdom and Belgium, as in France, the Netherlands and Italy, the notion of war is by law left to the executive power. Military operations may be undertaken by the government without it declaring a state of war.

62. There is one exception. In Belgium, the King may allow foreign troops to be stationed in the country or cross it only in accordance with a law (procedure used when NATO was installed in Belgium). A declaration of war may be offensive or defensive.

63. A government decision to go to war may be accompanied by the application of special legislation already existing in peacetime — as is the case in Belgium — or necessitate the vote of special powers by parliament — as is the case in the United Kingdom. It is evident that in the latter case parliament's *a posteriori* powers of control will be strengthened.

64. The rôle and status of the Belgian and United Kingdom parliaments are not changed

by a declaration of war. They stay the same as in peacetime.

65. However, certain legislative powers may be transferred to the executive either by wartime legislation or by specific laws. Such transfers are always limited to the period of hostilities.

(b) *Return to peace*

66. In both the United Kingdom and Belgium, the sovereign is empowered to halt hostilities and make peace by negotiating the necessary treaties (Article 68 of the Belgian constitution, for instance). This power is obviously exercised by the government.

67. Parliament exercises *a posteriori* control over such action either because government responsibility is involved or when a peace treaty comes up for approval which, in certain cases in Belgium, is a prior condition to ratification (cession of territory).

2. *Parliament and the population's military liability*

68. On the population's liability to defend the nation, three main facts emerged from the answers to the questionnaire: here there is real legislative power, it is exercised with full parliamentary rights and is more or less extensive depending on the country.

(a) *Real legislative power*

69. In most WEU countries, the fixing of the defence liability of the population is a parliamentary responsibility embodied in the constitution. The only exception is the United Kingdom, which has no formal constitution. In France, Article 34 of the constitution makes subject to law the fixing of rules concerning "the obligations imposed on the persons and property of citizens by national defence".

70. In Italy, Article 52 of the constitution stipulates that: "Military service shall be compulsory within the limits and according to the methods laid down by the law."

71. In the Netherlands, Article 195 of the constitution provides that "the law shall govern compulsory military service. It shall also govern the liability for the defence of the country of those who are not in the army". Furthermore, Article 196 specifies that "the law shall determine the conditions in which exemption from military service may be granted for serious conscientious reasons".

72. In the Federal Republic, Articles 4 and 12-a of the constitution determine the conditions in which the law governs the fulfilment of military service.

73. In Belgium, Articles 118 and 119 of the constitution state that "the method of recruiting the army shall be determined by the law" and that "the army call-up shall be decided annually. The law fixing it shall remain in force for only one year."

74. Although the United Kingdom has no formal constitution, the overriding supremacy of the law means that parliament necessarily has to decide on military liability and the method of recruitment.

(b) *A fully-exercised power*

75. It is understandable that the military liability of the population should be governed by law insofar as it is closely linked with individual freedom. This is why, when the laws on liability are debated and voted, parliaments and their members may exercise their full powers, particularly through amendments. Answers to the questionnaire show no limits to this right of amendment.

76. Conversely, it seems unlikely that parliamentary initiative in the form of a motion for a bill can be exercised in this field, although there is nothing to prevent it. In this connection, some answers mention the technical difficulties involved in preparing bills which leave the government the initiative or the application of general rules limiting the initiative of members of parliament (as in the United Kingdom).

77. Nevertheless, in certain countries parliamentary initiative in the form of motions for bills is used to mark either a desire for change or opposition to certain existing measures. Its aim is to prompt a government response.

(c) *The extent of parliamentary power*

78. In general, the very extensive responsibilities of parliaments in legislation on liability to military service must be stressed.

79. There are differences from country to country however.

80. In Belgium, for instance, the annual intake is decided by the law, whereas in other States such as France it is decided by the government authorities.

81. In the Netherlands, mobilisation decreed by the sovereign has to be confirmed by the law fixing the duration of its validity.

82. However, it is in the Federal Republic that parliament has the widest responsibilities, which are exercised mainly for the protection of the rights of those who are called up.

3. *Parliament and the status of regular servicemen*

83. What has been said about the general military liability of the population is valid for the status of regular servicemen.

(a) *Legislative responsibility*

84. The general status, rights and duties of regular servicemen are laid down by law in all the WEU countries.

85. However, in the Netherlands the pay system is the sole responsibility of the government.

(b) *Full legislative responsibility*

86. The responsibility of parliaments being very extensive, it is exercised in all the usual forms: right to make proposals and right to amend.

87. Here too government initiative, because of the complexity of the problem, tends to exclude parliamentary initiative which can nevertheless be expressed through amendments.

(c) *Extent of legislative power*

88. Here mention should be made of the special power of the United Kingdom parliament, which votes a five-yearly law on the armed forces submitted for annual review in the form of a white paper which is debated, voted and possibly amended by both houses of parliament.

4. *Parliament's powers in respect of defence budgets*

89. Where the debate and vote on military budgets are concerned, WEU member States may be divided into three groups: those where parliamentarians have the same sovereign powers in respect of the military budget as for other budgets; those where parliamentarians have the same limited powers as for other expenditure; and finally the Federal Republic, where the military budget is the subject of a special study.

(a) *The widest powers in common law*

90. It is in the Federal Republic, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy that parliamentarians have the widest powers in the debate and vote on budgets. Amendments may increase or reduce expenditure.

91. This ability is applied to both military and other budgets. The Netherlands reply to the questionnaire emphasises that it is used frequently.

92. In Belgium, the parliamentary rules of procedure provide merely that proposed increases

in the defence budget must be communicated to the President of the Chamber before they are debated.

(b) *Limited powers in common law*

93. In France and the United Kingdom, parliamentarians have the same powers in respect of military and other expenditure. However, amendments may not seek to increase expenditure further to constitutional or legislative provisions which place a general limit on the powers of parliamentarians to take budgetary initiatives (Article 40 of the French constitution, for instance). In the United Kingdom, the House of Lords has had no budgetary powers since 1911.

(c) *General limits on the financial rights of parliaments*

94. All in all, the answers to the questionnaire underline that the parliaments' ability to modify military expenditure through budgetary procedure is relatively theoretical.

95. In fact, the vote on the military budget cannot be isolated from adhesion to a policy which dominates the debate. In the circumstances, governments are not inclined to accept changes in military expenditure and parliamentarians, particularly those who support the government, hesitate to table amendments which might fundamentally affect the defence system. Moreover, military financial commitments are fairly inflexible because of their size (pay) or continuing nature (equipment). It is therefore difficult to change government proposals, except in very minor respects.

III. Defence and parliament's supervisory rôle

96. Three questions were put in the questionnaire: what was the procedure for general supervision and for more technical supervision and how were certain forms of supervision exercised.

1. *General supervision of defence policy*

97. Two means seem to be used in the parliaments of the six countries to supervise defence policy: the means afforded by common law applicable in every sector of government policy and procedure specific to defence matters.

(a) *General means*

98. General means cover all those by which parliamentarians may question the government on its policy and action.

99. They consist mainly of debates on the government programme, interpellations, written and oral questions and budget debates.

100. While all the means exist, parliamentarians do not have the same latitude in every country to exercise them, and their supervision does not have the same political value.

101. In France, for instance, the right of interpellation was dropped from the 1958 constitution. Parliament's ability to initiate a debate is thus limited and can be exercised only in agreement with the government.

102. In France as in the United Kingdom, this agreement is particularly evident in the participation of the executive in preparing the parliamentary agenda. This is also the case in the Federal Republic.

103. There seems to be a greater guarantee of parliamentary initiative in three other countries, i.e. Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy.

104. The extent of the general supervisory ability of parliamentarians is not enough to define it and its scope must also be assessed.

105. Certain procedure is more a question of information than real supervision; this applies mainly to questions and it is normal for replies not to be endorsed politically.

106. Conversely, the debate on the government's general policy or votes on laws (on the budget for instance) receives political endorsement in approval of the government statement or proposed text.

107. The question is whether there can be other means of giving the executive political endorsement, particularly in defence policy.

108. Here parliamentary rights vary considerably from one country to another.

109. In France they have been strictly limited since 1958. Only the government may call for a vote after a debate on its defence policy. It has been shown that it is very difficult for deputies or senators to initiate such a debate. It can be endorsed by a vote of approval only in the National Assembly and on the initiative of the government. Only by invoking government responsibility through a motion of censure can deputies recover their full right of initiative.

110. In the United Kingdom, an interpellation must be included in the agenda and it is accepted that it may be concluded by a motion expressing parliament's feelings in a vote. The same is the case in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and the Federal Republic.

111. What may be the consequence of such a vote? In all countries where it is possible, it seems accepted that it is not a vote of confidence

and that a majority against certain aspects of government policy would not automatically lead to the resignation of the government.

112. It may be said that these votes are rather guidelines which provide the executive with valuable indications as to the opinion of the representatives of the people and nation.

(b) *Specific means*

113. Specific means imply particular procedure allowing parliament as a whole to exercise specific supervision of military policy.

114. Some of these means are a matter of practice. In France, if, apart from the budget, no law has been passed on defence allowing a debate on military policy, it is customary to organise a debate on military policy during the first session of the year (April-July). There is generally a government statement followed by a debate but not endorsed by a vote.

115. Other debates are more organised. They are generally held when the government tables one of its more or less regular white papers on defence, which is then considered by parliament and may or may not be endorsed by a vote. As has already been said, this is an annual practice in the United Kingdom where the white paper is the annual up-dating of the five-year defence policy.

116. In the Netherlands, most governments submit a memorandum to the two chambers on long-term defence policy leading to a debate in the upper chamber.

117. The white paper practice is also used in the Federal Republic.

118. It should be noted that in France the explanatory memorandum to the last financial programme-law (1976) relating to the armed forces included a definition of long-term military policy and thus came close to the white paper system.

2. *Procedure for more technical supervision*

119. The answers to the questionnaire show that most of the more technical supervision, generally in preparation for a political debate in plenary sitting, is exercised by the committees.

120. Although in France, for instance, parliamentary rules of procedure may authorise the hearing of a senior official by the whole parliament, this procedure does not seem to be general. It is therefore important to consider what powers the committees have and what they can do.

121. There are fairly wide differences between the WEU parliaments in these two respects.

(a) *The powers of committees*

122. Committees responsible for defence matters do not have the same legal powers in all countries. In some they have very wide powers at all times; in others only exceptionally; in yet others they have ordinary powers only, and other bodies may be entrusted with wider tasks on specific matters.

(i) *Committees with wide powers*

123. In two countries, committees have wide supervisory powers in accordance with the constitution or constitutional practice.

124. In the Federal Republic, the Bundestag Defence Committee enjoys a special position under Article 45 of the constitution. First, it continues to exercise its duties between two legislatures. Second, it has the powers of a committee of enquiry on a continuing basis, i.e. almost jurisdictional powers, at least for conducting investigations. Finally, an enquiry becomes compulsory if a quarter of the members of the committee so request.

125. Furthermore, under Article 43 of the constitution and the rules of procedure of the Bundestag, the committee exercises the powers of committees in common law. It examines texts, may ask the government for information and has the right to hear members of the executive or officials as representatives of the government or as experts on a specific subject.

126. Although there is no real permanent defence committee in the United Kingdom, the House of Commons empowers the committee or sub-committee which may be made responsible for defence matters to hear persons and be given any document it requires. It may therefore hold the necessary hearings and be given all the written information it needs. In particular, it may question officials. These powers may be assimilated to those of a committee of enquiry. They reflect the principle of the primacy of legislative power in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, this is why the House of Lords has no similar powers, nor does it set up specialised committees.

(ii) *Committees with possible exceptional powers*

127. In Italy, the standing committees of both chambers have the full range of powers in common law to which committees are entitled in parliamentary systems. They may put questions, ask the government for information or enlightenment and obtain all the elements of information needed for examining bills. They may hear members of the government and their representatives, which appears to imply the possibility of hearing senior officials. The Italian

committees also seem to have the power to initiate consideration of certain matters and to set out their conclusions in motions or resolutions tabled in the chamber to which they belong, which may be debated.

128. However, the most interesting power of the committees is undeniably to sit as committees of enquiry on any matter within their terms of reference. The two chambers may even decide that their respective committees acting as committees of enquiry may work together.

(iii) *Committees without exceptional powers*

129. In France, the Netherlands and Belgium, the powers of defence committees are no different to those of other committees.

130. Although important, their powers are subject to limitations.

131. In general, committees may obtain full information about bills submitted to them for consideration. They may hear ministers and senior officials. In France, the latter possibility is in practice limited by the prior authorisation of the minister.

132. Committees have wide powers of information: study missions, which may lead to the tabling of a report and conclusions. Such reports and conclusions are not debated or voted on in parliament.

133. This does not mean that parliaments in these countries have no right to enquire into certain facts or situations. This right is in fact separate from the existence of specialised committees. It is a general right exercised by special committees of enquiry set up to consider specific matters and they are disbanded once a report has been tabled.

134. The extent of the power of enquiry therefore depends on the power granted to parliament in this field. It seems fairly wide in Belgium and the Netherlands and is strictly regulated in France by the constitution.

(b) *How committees exercise their powers*

135. Apart from the collective powers of enquiry of certain committees, is there in some parliaments other specific investigatory procedure for exercising parliamentary supervision? Answers to the questionnaire indicate four means in France, the Federal Republic, the United Kingdom and Belgium.

136. In France, it should first be noted that the defence committees of the two chambers, as well as being able to call upon parliamentary officials, may also have the permanent technical assistance of senior ranking military experts. These experts may not conduct supervisory or investigatory tasks on behalf of the committee

but they may provide the latter with technical assistance when it studies specific matters.

137. Second, deputies and senators have individual powers under the procedure for studying and debating the French budget. Parliamentarians in both chambers responsible for preparing the budgetary debate — the rapporteurs — may by law “exercise documentary and on-the-spot verification of the budget of the ministerial department for which they are responsible”. In this capacity, they may visit administrations, receive accounting and departmental documents and question the appropriate officials. The result of this verification is set out in the report which they table first in committee and subsequently in parliament.

138. In the Federal Republic, Article 45-b of the constitution established a defence commissioner, appointed by the Bundestag, with the task of “safeguarding fundamental rights and assisting the Bundestag in the exercise of parliamentary supervision”. The commissioner works on the basis of indications from the Bundestag and the Defence Committee. He may also act on his own initiative. He tables a report in parliament and speaks in support of it. This is an original institution which has added to the determination of the legislative power to exercise permanent supervision over the implementation of military defence means.

139. In the United Kingdom, committees may appoint experts to advise them on matters which they wish to study and this also applies to defence matters.

140. In Belgium, parliamentarians who are members of the Defence Committee of the Chamber or Senate are authorised to visit military headquarters and other military installations without the prior authorisation of the Ministry of Defence, provided there are at least three of them, each with a special permit issued by the Ministry of Defence for the duration of the legislature.

141. In conclusion, it may be noted that the supervisory powers of parliaments are sometimes greater in the military sphere than in other sectors. They are however not as extensive as those of the United States Congress which not only exercises very wide powers but also has a real administration to implement them. This difference stems from the European concept of people's sovereignty which allows only the elected member to entrust its exercise to a non-elected representative.

IV. Defence and parliament's information rôle

142. Finally, parliaments are a source of reciprocal information for both population and government on the consequences of defence policy at national and European level.

(a) *Parliament as a source of information for the public*

143. Two questions were put about the rôle of parliament and parliamentarians as a source of information for the public: the impact of parliamentarians' personal contacts with the population and the importance of audio-visual means. It is striking to note a lack of harmony in the replies to these two questions.

(i) *Parliamentarians' personal contacts with the population*

144. All the answers show the interest of the population in defence matters. Parliamentarians are frequently questioned on the subject and the political parties have to give them prominence in their electoral undertakings. Here, the Bundestag reply is the most explicit: "Public interest in defence matters is relatively great. Parliamentarians not specialised in these questions therefore have to inform themselves about such matters in order to answer their electorate, for instance about conscientious objection, equipment supply problems, stationing of troops, etc."

(ii) *Reports on defence debates by news media*

145. Although the population shows interest in defence matters, the news media do not appear to attach particular importance to these questions.

146. In countries where radio and television broadcasting of parliamentary debates is authorised, no particular place is reserved for defence matters.

147. General policy matters are sometimes considered more interesting for the public, which indicates that there is a degree of demagogy in this respect.

148. In this connection, it is noted that in the United Kingdom the broadcasting of parliamentary debates has not been authorised so far but will soon be allowed in both houses.

149. The written press also reports on defence policy debates at the discretion of press bodies and account being taken of their independence. Here too answers to the questionnaire indicate that defence policy is not the one that interests the information media the most. This attitude is perhaps due to reticence in face of the technical nature of the subject and probably also to the desire to place defence over and above short-term political controversies.

(b) *Parliament as a source of information for the government*

150. It is abundantly clear that through their legislative and supervisory work the parliaments of the various countries provide the govern-

ments with valuable information on the repercussions of their defence policy. However, in certain countries there are additional means of associating parliamentarians more closely with government action.

151. The most significant example is in the Netherlands, where the Defence Council attached to the government includes representatives of both chambers. In the long run, it is no longer a matter of information but the true association of parliament with the overall preparation of defence policy.

152. In France and Italy, parliamentarians may take part in various technical bodies attached to the government. In France, these bodies are limited in number: committee on the cost price of armaments production, permanent council on military service. In Italy, such participation seems to depend more on circumstances and is effected in government bodies set up to study specific matters. All these bodies are essentially technical.

153. Apart from these exceptions, it would appear that the planning of defence policy is the prerogative of the executive and even of the government (president of the republic or sovereign) assisted by committees of experts.

154. This raises a fundamental question. Does not the nature of modern warfare, unannounced, short and total, make the parliamentary powers considered above illusory?

155. To safeguard a real consensus of national representation in the defence effort, is it not essential for parliaments (majority and opposition) to be associated with the definition of defence policy? The example of the Netherlands is certainly worthy of consideration.

156. For France, where the President of the Republic is wholly responsible for preparing and implementing a nuclear deterrent, the question is particularly acute. The socialist opposition in particular wishes parliament to be associated with decisions at this level.

(c) *Parliament and information on European defence*

157. Answers to the questionnaire show that the resolutions and reports of Western European Union are made available to national parliaments in very varying conditions which in reality do not allow parliaments to question governments about the way they are taken into consideration.

158. There are three main courses for transmitting these texts to the parliaments:

- directly to all parliamentarians by the secretariat of the WEU Assembly (in the case of the Netherlands);

- through the delegations which inform either all members or the committees (France, Federal Republic, United Kingdom) ;
- through the presidents of parliaments who may announce them in public sitting and refer them to committees for study (Belgium, Italy).

159. The diversity of the methods of transmission has an unfortunate consequence. WEU Assembly recommendations are not examined systematically by parliaments nor are they discussed with governments. In fact, everything is left to the initiative of individual parliamentarians or of the committees, but with no obligation.

160. In France, where the delegation to WEU reviews the activities of the Assembly in an annual information report, there is in practice no debate on this text, whose only value is that it merely constitutes a reference document.

161. If the present study were to be limited to practical conclusions, the proposal would be to adopt a unified procedure for transmitting WEU Assembly recommendations to national parliaments, to have them discussed systematically and to send the reports of the three main Committees to the corresponding committees in the national parliaments.

Conclusion

162. Consideration of the rôle of parliaments in defence policy allows three main conclusions to be drawn :

163. The first is that in spite of differences between countries parliaments have important legislative and supervisory powers. As already said, this is quite normal in democracies where defence requirements have to be reconciled with individual freedoms which paradoxically in some circumstances have to be limited in order to afford them better protection. The intervention of parliaments is thus a sign of a national consensus regarding the defence effort and a guarantee that this consensus will not be diverted from its goal.

164. The second conclusion is that certain parliamentary powers seem to have become a dead letter and are now only nominal. Has the solemn declaration of war any meaning in an era of nuclear and subversive warfare ? Would it not be desirable for the people's sovereignty to be associated more closely with the preparation of defence policy ? Otherwise it may have no alternative but to approve without a real discussion a policy whose complexity allows the government to impose its options without too much difficulty, although such options may be the

wrong ones, an example being France's military policy between the two wars. The creation of a national defence council attached to the executive including both technical experts and parliamentarians would allow the legislature to be associated with defence planning from the outset. By including representatives from the parliamentary opposition, a national consensus would also be maintained without which there can be no real military policy.

165. The third conclusion is that the effort of organisation, reflection and co-ordination which has developed at European level is not very well known at national level. Without questioning the fundamental principle of State independence in defence policy, it should again be emphasised that if such independence is not channelled into an orderly European policy Western Europe, like the Curiatti, State by State in face of a united and determined enemy, might lose the freedom which is its most precious asset.

II. Action taken on texts adopted

166. The Committee selected the following recommendations for transmission to parliaments of member countries at the close of the second part of the twenty-second ordinary session of the Assembly :

- 293 on European union and WEU ;
- 295 on safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy ;
- 296 on Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems.

167. In the five-month period (December 1976 to April 1977) between the adoption of these texts and the preparation of this report, your Rapporteur has been able to record only twelve questions and replies which is a meagre sum, but others will follow during the year.

168. In his report in reply to the political activities of the WEU Council¹, Mr. Treu, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, mentions replies given in Belgium and France which in fact amount to refusals to answer written questions on recommendations adopted by the Assembly.

169. The number of interventions has returned to a normal level, the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly having recorded thirty-six between 1st December 1976 and 30th April 1977, making a total of ninety for texts adopted in 1976².

1. Chapter II (b) : National parliamentary procedure.
2. See Appendix I.

170. Furthermore, the number of interventions on WEU in general has increased considerably in recent years :

Year	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Total	3	3	1	28	32

171. This again shows that WEU is more than ever mentioned in debates in our parliaments.

III. *Activities of the Committee*

172. On 9th and 10th May 1977, the Committee visited the Italian parliament.

173. It met the Senate Committee for European Affairs and the Parliamentary Committee for Regional Affairs. The corresponding texts are given at Appendix III.

APPENDIX I

Table of action in the parliaments of member countries
(Totals by country for each session)

Recommendations adopted in	Member countries							Total
	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	
1956	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
1957	4	0	1	0	0	5	2	12
1958	2	0	3	0	0	4	3	12
1959	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
1960	3	12	2	8	0	3	1	29
1961	0	2	0	3	0	6	0	11
1962	2	4	4	6	2	3	10	31
1963	0	0	13	22	1	2	3	41
1964	4	14	9	11	1	5	2	46
1965	0	11	12	24	0	5	28	80
1966	2	12	12	49	1	4	18	98
1967	14	9	22	29	2	6	16	98
1968	6	14	20	22	1	16	47	126
1969	11	15	17	8	0	4	36	91
1970	3	15	15	7	2	3	10	55
1971	0	4	19	9	0	6	10	48
1972	0	6	2	1	0	1	0	10
1973	0	4	2	6	1	0	0	13
1974	0	1	3	13	2	0	0	19
1975	10	28	8	19	3	11	3	82
1976	16	40	12	9	2	3	8	90
1977	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	3
Total	77	192	190	246	18	87	197	1,007
Annual average	3.67	9.05	9.05	11.57	0.86	4.13	9.38	6.83

APPENDIX II

Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1975

Session	Recommendation	Transmitted to parliaments	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total	Total for each part session
June 1975	260									—	28
	261									—	
	262			2		2		4		8	
	263					2				2	
	264					2				2	
	265									—	
	266	x	4					2		6	
	267									—	
	268	x				2				2	
	269	x				2			2	4	
	270	x				2				2	
271								2	—		
272	x		2						2		
Dec. 1975	273	x	2			1		3		6	54
	274	x	2	2		1				5	
	275			4						4	
	276	x	2			1				3	
	277									—	
	278									—	
	279									—	
	280									—	
	281									—	
	282									—	
	283									—	
	Res. 55		2	1		3	2			8	
	Res. 56									—	
Res. 57									—		
Res. 58									—		
Other action			2	17	4	1	1	2	1	28	
June 1976	Res. 59		2	4				2		8	46
	284									—	
	285	x	2	5	2	1				10	
	286									—	
	287			2	2	1		1	2	8	
	288	x								—	
	289	x	4	5	2	2				13	
290	x	4	2		1				7		
Nov. 1976	291									—	44
	292									—	
	293	x	2	2		1				5	
	294									—	
	295	x			1	1	2			4	
	296					1				3	
Res. 60			2						—		
Other action			5	15	5	1		6		32	
1977											3
Other action				1	2					3	

APPENDIX III

(a) Visits by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments

22nd February 1963	Paris
10th October 1963	Rome
11th-12th November 1964	Bonn
28th-29th April 1965	The Hague
15th-16th December 1965	Brussels
30th October-1st November 1966	London
23rd-24th November 1967	Berlin (Regional parliament of Land Berlin)
2nd-3rd April 1968	Luxembourg
26th-27th March 1969	Rome
27th-28th October 1969	Paris
14th-15th April 1970	Bonn
1st-2nd April 1971	Rome
4th-5th November 1971	Bonn
24th-25th February 1972	The Hague
18th-19th September 1972	Florence (Regional parliament of Tuscany)
1st-2nd May 1973	St. Hélier (Regional parliament of the States of Jersey)
15th-18th October 1973	Munich (Regional parliament of the Free State of Bavaria)
8th-10th July 1974	Palermo (Regional parliament of Sicily)
27th-28th October 1975	The Hague
11th-12th May 1976	Luxembourg
25th-26th November 1976	Brussels
9th-10th May 1977	Rome

(b) Statements on regionalisation in Italy**Committee for European Affairs (Giunta)**

(Rules on the constitution, functioning and powers of the Giunta based on the new regulations of the Senate, 1971)

1. Constitution

The Giunta shall comprise 22 senators designated by the President of the Senate following nominations proposed by the parliamentary groups under the proportional representation system (Article 23, paragraph 1).

2. Powers

The provisions concerning the powers and activities of the standing committees at sessions

other than deliberative or drafting, i.e. the provisions concerning referral sessions, shall by analogy be applicable to the Giunta. The sole exception shall be non-applicability of Article 50, paragraph 2, concerning the voting of resolutions following the examination of matters submitted by the appropriate committees. *Therefore the Giunta is not able to pass any resolutions* (Article 23, paragraph 2, and Article 50, paragraph 2).

(a) Power of referral

The Giunta shall examine the annual report by the government (Ministry for Foreign Affairs) on the activities of the European Communities, presented as a rule towards the end of December, and shall draft its own report to the Assembly (Article 142, paragraph 3). The

opinion of the Foreign Affairs Committee may be appended to the Giunta's report. In carrying out its referral function, the Giunta shall co-opt any members of the Italian Delegation to the European Parliament not members of the Giunta itself. Such senators shall not have deliberative voting powers (Article 142, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4).

The Giunta shall be able to place before the Assembly, on its own initiative, reports and proposals concerning matters within its competence (Article 50, paragraph 1).

(b) Consultative power

(i) The Giunta shall express its views on draft legislation concerning implementation of the agreements relating to the European Communities (Article 23, paragraph 1).

(ii) The Giunta may express, in the event of a request by the committee competent in the matter, through the intermediary of the President of the Senate, its views on resolutions passed by the European Parliament, formally transmitted for communication to the Senate and forwarded by the President, after announcement in the House, to the competent committees that may decide to call for a debate (Article 143, paragraphs 1 and 2).

(iii) The Giunta may express, by the same procedure as that set out in the preceding subparagraph, its views on resolutions passed by international assemblies in which Italian parliamentary delegations take part (Article 143, paragraphs 1 and 2). This refers to resolutions adopted by the Council of Europe and WEU.

(iv) The Giunta may request, or be requested, to express its own view on statutory enactments emanating from the Council of Ministers and Commission of the European Communities, published in the Official Journal of the European Communities. Such enactments may be examined by the committees competent in the matter, with the purpose of conveying in a document their own view on the advisability of any initiatives by the parliament or government (Article 144, paragraph 1). The document drafted by the competent committee, presumed to convey also the Giunta's opinion, shall be announced by the President of the Senate in the house and forwarded to the President of the Council of Ministers, and for information to the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies (Article 144, paragraph 2).

(c) Power to call a debate, with intervention by the minister concerned

At the request of the government, 8 senators or one-fifth of the senators members of the Ita-

lian Delegation to the European Parliament, *the Giunta may call a debate, with intervention by the appropriate minister (Article 142, paragraph 1), in the following cases :*

(i) Concerning proposals by the Commission of the EEC, published in the Official Journal of the Communities, with a view to their being placed on the agenda for the Council of Ministers of the Communities (Article 142, paragraph 1).

The members of the Italian Delegation to the European Parliament who are not also members of the Giunta shall attend this meeting, without deliberative voting powers (Article 142, paragraph 2) ;

(ii) In the case of given topics on the agenda of the Council of Ministers of the Communities (Article 142, paragraph 1).

The members of the Italian Delegation to the European Parliament who are not also members of the Giunta shall attend its meeting without deliberative voting powers (Article 142, paragraph 2) ;

(iii) In respect of matters pertaining to agreements of the Communities (the wording of the regulations is broad, and enables all matters envisaged in the treaties to be discussed) (Article 142, paragraph 1).

The members of the Italian Delegation to the European Parliament who are not also members of the Giunta shall attend its meeting without deliberative voting powers (Article 142, paragraph 2).

(d) Powers to hold hearings and enquiries for taking cognizance

These are governed by Article 23, paragraph 2, on the basis of which the provisions concerning the powers and activities of the standing committees at sessions other than deliberative or drafting shall, so far as possible, apply to the Giunta.

Hence it seems possible to apply to the Giunta Article 46, paragraph 1, on fresh information and clarifications requested of the government by the committees on questions, including political questions, relating to the matter for which they are competent.

It is also possible, and a precedent has already been created by the Fifth Legislature, to hold hearings for taking cognizance on the strength of Article 47 of the regulations which recognises, in respect of parliamentary bills and in general matters within their competence, the committees' right to request the ministers to arrange for fresh information and the requisite administrative or technical elements for completing their information on the issues under discussion, to be supplied by the respective

administrations and corporations subject to their control, including personal attendance at sessions of individual officials and administrators.

For fuller elucidation of given problems, the Giunta may also hold, on the basis of Article 48, enquiries for taking cognizance, with the agreement of the President of the Senate, for the purpose of acquiring facts, information and documentation. For conducting these enquiries the committees may hold sittings to which may be summoned the relevant ministers, departmental officials and administrators of public corporations. Representatives of territorial bodies, private concerns, professional associations and other persons *expert in the matters under examination* (Article 48, paragraphs 1 and 5) may also be requested to attend. For the enquiries for taking cognizance, joint proceedings with the other house may also be arranged.

Meeting of the office of the Chairman of the Committee for Regional Affairs with the WEU Committee for Relations with Parliaments

As is known, regional law in Italy is laid down in the republican constitution of 1947, which devoted a whole chapter (about twenty articles) to the division of the Republic into regions, provinces and communes. There are two kinds of regional autonomy, special and ordinary. The first kind is enjoyed by Sicily, Sardinia, Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Val d'Aosta, which have been given wider legislative powers to be exercised on the basis of statutes adopted by means of constitutional laws rather than approved by ordinary laws as in the case of the other fifteen regions. In the regions of special autonomy the region's legislative power in specific matters is merely required to observe constitutional principles and the general principles of the legal system. The regions of ordinary status, in contrast, have legislative powers exercised within the limits of the fundamental principles laid down by the State in appropriate laws, topic by topic, or even if not enacted *ad hoc*, able to be at any rate deduced from the mass of legislation on a given issue.

Then there is a third legislative power, that of issuing rules for implementing State laws; it is a power which, besides being constitutionally a matter for the region, may be attributed at discretion to the region by the State parliament. The State may also delegate by law other administrative functions to the region in matters in which it has no legislative power of its own and can assume none by virtue of the delegation which, we repeat, solely concerns administrative functions. This task may be noted as usefully applicable for supplementing vis-à-vis

the region an organic sector of actions which otherwise, on the basis of division of responsibilities, would not devolve upon the region. Still on the plane of administrative functions, we note the close interconnection made under the constitution between the positions occupied by the region and the lesser local authorities (communes and provinces), involving a configuration of the region as rather a planning body than one of detailed administration. It is provided in consequence that the region "normally" exercises its administrative functions by delegating them to the provinces, communes and other local entities or by making use of their instrumentality. Moreover, the State directly assigns to these latter functions "of solely local interest". In this way the region tends to be seen as a body "for necessary indirect administration", i.e. not acting through an organisation of its own, which would end by promoting a new regional centralisation of both local government and planning. This has affected the system of financial relations whereby, besides liquid funds assigned to the regions as their share of tax revenue, much more substantial resources are distributed among the regions themselves out of a fund for financing regional development programmes. However, the implementation of this plan is running into a series of difficulties both of a political nature, stemming from the fact that there is at regional level a certain reluctance to divest itself of its own specific functions, and especially of a technical nature, arising from the serious organisational and financial difficulties with which the communes and provinces are having to contend. For the latter in particular there arises precisely the problem of justifying their own existence inasmuch as their dimensions are considered artificial and ill-suited for having organic powers delegated to them. There is talk therefore of new bodies, chiefly termed "development areas", to take their place by combining more communes, based on a more suitable size of territory for planning purposes, both town-planning and economic. As for the powers delegated to the regions to date, it has been endeavoured to use them as an instrument for inducing a process of organic re-ordering of functions at local level, e.g. by making the grant of finance or even the actual attribution of functions conditional on their being administered by the communes in a structured and co-operative manner.

As regards supervision of regional laws, if there is no opposition from the government they are reviewed by a government inspector within thirty days of their notification; should the government consider, however, that a regional law goes beyond the region's writ or clashes with national interests or those of other regions, it sends it back to the regional council, and if the latter again approves it by an absolute majority it may appeal against it on grounds of legitimacy

in the constitutional court or, on the merits as a conflict of interests, before both chambers of parliament. This last hypothesis has not yet materialised, in that the government has preferred to subsume aspects on points of substance under questions of constitutional legitimacy. On the other hand grounds of legitimacy are fairly often invoked even if it has to be said that the regions, which might in their turn challenge State laws they hold to be encroachments on their jurisdiction, seem more and more disinclined to wield this instrument because they think the constitutional court more sensitive to the arguments of the central government, and anyhow prefer to try and get laws unfavourable to themselves altered by way of political "horse trading".

Administrative control of enactments is exercised (by the State over the regions and by the regions over smaller local authorities) on grounds of legitimacy, with the possibility of having them voided, and of expediency with a view to collaboration and in a form respectful of the autonomy of the body concerned, designated "request for review"; the supervisory authority draws attention to the matter, but if the party subject to supervision again approves the enactment, it becomes enforceable without further ado.

Moreover, the relation between State and the regions has in recent years undergone a rather interesting process of maturing whose chief effect has been to give precedence to the political and substantive issue instead of the formal question of the precise division of powers. And so, even if by changes of direction, whereby some cabinets have been more meticulous in their supervision while others have shown greater leniency, there has gradually grown up a concept of the region being allowed to operate as a genuine territorial government unit, and as a consequence the powers relating to it are inter-

preted evolutionally and extensively so as to enable an organic performance of its functions.

This requirement has been given tangible form by an act (Law No. 382 of 1975) under which, to supplement the legal structure of the region by incorporating the transfers of functions already effected in 1972 and now regarded as insufficient, the government has been charged with issuing rules for transferring and delegating functions in order to arrive at the exercise of regional powers in organic sectors. At present the text prepared by the government, which should be promulgated by 25th July, is being examined by the appropriate parliamentary committee for regional matters which I have the honour to preside over, and which is to express an opinion on the text also on the basis of comments by the regions. This phase is a particularly delicate one because the government's proposed bill has been judged inadequate for supplementing the regions' legal structure in the way intended, and the government will therefore certainly be invited by the Committee as well to make a great many essential additions. For the Committee this is one of the most important opportunities for action afforded to it under ordinary laws, whereas the constitution provides (Article 126) that it give an opinion only in the hopefully unlikely case of dissolution of a regional council (incidentally the case has never arisen yet) and parliamentary rules ordain consultative action by the Committee in the event (also not yet arisen, for the reasons stated) of a substantive conflict between government and the regions. Nevertheless, these indications help to give some idea of the Committee's rôle of mediation between government and regions, and of initiating proper and fruitful relations in the perspective of a system which, while it should remain unitary (the Republic is, as Article 5 of the constitution has it, one and indivisible), ought still to be functionally unshackled in the harmonious interplay of all its component elements, obviating breaches of trust at the centre, and dislocations at the periphery.

**Motion for a resolution on the designation of
Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly**

REPORT¹

**submitted on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges²
by Mr. Piket, Rapporteur**

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Piket, Rapporteur)

1. During the last session, MM. Burckel, Radius, Treu, Valleix, Amrehn, Tanghe, Lewis, McNamara, Schwencke and Mende tabled a motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure on inviting the Greek and Turkish parliaments to be represented at each session of the WEU Assembly by their delegations to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, whose members would have observer status.

In a vote the same day, the Assembly decided not to adopt urgent procedure and the motion for a resolution was referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

The responsibility of the Committee on Rules of Procedure is not to consider the political aspect of the problem but merely to analyse the proposed procedure and determine its possible repercussions.

2. The motion for a resolution tabled by Mr. Burckel would make the participation of Greek and Turkish observers in the work of the Assembly permanent. They would be convened to each session, even if the agenda did not include questions connected with the Eastern Mediterranean.

It should be noted, however, that Greek and Turkish observers have never yet asked to take part in debates which did not concern their countries and it is therefore not certain whether their parliaments would wish to be represented at every session.

3. If the motion for a resolution were adopted, there would not be the same number of Greek and Turkish observers because of the weighting system governing the attribution of seats under Article 25 of the Statute of the Council of

Europe: the Greek Delegation would have five representatives and five substitutes and the Turkish Delegation ten representatives and ten substitutes.

These delegations would obviously never attend in full. There is even a danger that absenteeism would be even more rife in the delegations of observers than in the delegations of countries which signed the Paris Agreements and whose members are entitled to vote, in which case the prestige of the Assembly might suffer from what would appear to be a sign of indifference.

Moreover, since observers have no voting rights, it would seem illogical to allow Turkey twice as many representatives as Greece. A weighting system based on the size of the population is significant only if the delegations may vote, but it is not justified for merely giving a national point of view during a debate.

In fact, to obtain the views of the parliament of a country which is not a signatory of the treaty, it should be enough to invite two of its members.

4. Finally, if the motion for a resolution were adopted, the problem of other countries being given the right to delegate parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly would inevitably arise. For instance, Denmark is a member of the European Community and will take part in the European union. The fact that it is not represented by permanent observers would not pass unnoticed. If this situation were due to the Danish parliament turning down an invitation, the Assembly would find itself in a delicate position.

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Grieve (Acting Chairman); Mr. Abens (Vice-Chairman); MM. Borghi (Alternate: Pecoraro), Burckel (Alternate: Périquier), Cerneau, Craigen, Duvieusart, Mrs. Faccio (Alternate: Treu), MM. Giust, Hulpiau (Alternate: Leynen), Jessel, Konen, du

Luart, Marquardt (Alternate: Scheffler), Dr. Phipps (Alternate: Cordle), MM. Pignion, Schmidhuber, Scholten (Alternate: Piket), Sgherri, Voogd, Zebisch (Alternate: Lenzer).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

The range of parliaments invited to be represented by a permanent delegation might be extended even further. Portugal, and probably soon Spain, are also among the countries which might be interested in having permanent parliamentary observers associated with the work of the Assembly. Finally, it might similarly be felt that the WEU Assembly, as the European assembly with defence responsibilities, should also welcome permanent observers from member countries of the Atlantic Alliance such as the United States and Canada, which are often invited to be represented in the Assembly and which make a leading contribution to European security. However, since the latter are not European countries, a delegation of permanent observers would have to be formed on an *ad hoc* basis.

In short, there would be a risk of the WEU Assembly being submerged by observers and its work being slowed down considerably.

5. In conclusion, it would appear that the aim of those who tabled the motion for a resolution,

i.e. to associate representatives of the Greek and Turkish parliaments closely with the work of the Assembly, would be better attained by maintaining present practice.

In general, a flexible pragmatic approach to the question of parliamentary observers allows parliaments of non-signatory countries wishing to be represented in the Assembly's debates to be satisfied without wearing some of them down by invitations which the Assembly, bound by a new provision in its Rules of Procedure, would have to renew time and again. It is therefore considered preferable to abide by this approach and leave the Assembly full and unrestricted responsibility for its policy of invitations.

Consequently, the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges proposes that the Assembly not adopt the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr. Burckel and others on the designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly.

*Replies of the Council to Recommendations 291 to 296***RECOMMENDATION 291 ¹*****on détente and security in Europe* ²**

The Assembly,

Affirming that true East-West détente can be achieved only through substantial mutual, balanced and controlled reductions in armaments by both blocs ;

Considering the growing preponderance of troops and weapons on the side of the Soviet Union and its allies in Central and Northern Europe ;

Noting that the Soviet Union has up to now interpreted the commitments entered into in the final act of the CSCE in a restrictive manner ;

Regretting that no recent progress has been made in the SALT and MBFR negotiations ;

Condemning the Soviet Union's policy to take advantage of crises outside Europe to strengthen its political position by direct or indirect military means ;

Concerned that in face of increasingly powerful Warsaw Pact forces the members of the Atlantic Alliance will no longer deploy sufficient strength to guarantee their continuing collective security ;

Noting that while the Soviet Union and its allies fail to accept the main implications of détente, as this concept is interpreted in the West, a relative reduction of military strength in Western Europe has occurred vis-à-vis the Soviet military threat ;

Satisfied that matters emerging from the CSCE have played a large part in the Council's discussions in 1975 ;

Considering that the application of the provisions of the final act of the CSCE on the movement of persons is one of the vital elements by which one can judge the Soviet Union's desire for détente ;

Considering that there is still some uncertainty about the operation of NATO in the event of some members of the Atlantic Alliance falling prey to subversion directly or indirectly sustained by external military intervention ;

Regretting that South Africa's widely-condemned racial policies and intervention provided a pretext, although unjustified, for massive Soviet and Cuban military intervention in Angola,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine regularly the consequences of the CSCE ;
2. Inform the Assembly of any reported infringements of the provisions of the final act of the CSCE ;
3. Examine how great an effort each member country has to make to maintain a continuing adequate balance to ensure peace with security ;
4. Ensure that its members concert their views in the appropriate framework on any crisis arising outside Europe in order :
 - (a) to avoid hasty action which might serve as a pretext for interference by the Soviet Union or its allies ;
 - (b) to deter any further Soviet interference ;
5. Report to the Assembly on any implications for Western Europe of developments in the political, economic and military balance in Europe and the world ;
6. Give timely consideration to the conditions in which the modified Brussels Treaty could be applied should one of the member countries fall prey to direct or indirect military intervention from outside.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1976 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session (7th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 703).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 291

1. The Council, fully aware of the importance of giving full effect to the results of the CSCE and of assuring, among the signatory States and throughout Europe, the benefits deriving from those results, will continue to examine the consequences of the final act of Helsinki as they have done in the past.
2. The Council are, furthermore, paying due regard to the implementation of the provisions of the final act by the signatory States and will keep the Assembly informed about developments, bearing in mind that the signatory States of the final act will have a thorough exchange of views both on the implementation of the provisions of the final act and on the tasks defined by the CSCE at the follow-up conference in Belgrade in 1977.
3. In the Declaration of Ottawa, the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance reaffirmed their obligation "to maintain and improve the efficiency of their forces and that each should undertake, according to the rôle that it has assumed in the structure of the Alliance, its proper share of the burden of maintaining the security of all". They consult each other in the North Atlantic Council and the other institutions of the Alliance on the contributions which each of them makes towards the common defence, making allowances in that process for all developments that affect their security. Accordingly, the final communiqué issued after the ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council on 9th-10th December 1976 reads: "Faced with this persistent growth in military might (of the Warsaw Pact), Ministers reiterated their determination to take the measures necessary to maintain and improve their own defensive military forces, in order to ensure credible deterrence and to safeguard their countries from any risk of military aggression or political pressure."
4. In the Declaration of Ottawa, the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance stressed their firm resolve "to strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations by all means which may be appropriate on matters relating to their common interests as members of the Alliance, bearing in mind that these interests can be affected by events in other areas of the world". The possible repercussions on collective security of crisis-laden developments outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty assume increasing importance in the permanent practice of allied consultations. In the final communiqué issued after the ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council on 9th and 10th December 1976, Ministers stressed that "if détente is to progress, with the necessary public support, and not to falter, there must be real improvements across the entire range of international relations. It should not be assumed that heightened tensions in one area of relations would not have repercussions on other areas".
5. The Council are aware of the Assembly's interest in all international developments influencing the strategic equilibrium in Europe and in the world. They will therefore continue to provide the Assembly with all necessary information.
6. A strong Atlantic Alliance is the surest guarantee that no member country will fall victim to direct or indirect military intervention from outside. Thanks to the security policy of the Alliance, such a danger is at present hypothetical. With regard to the modified Brussels Treaty, it can be said that the automatic mutual assistance clause in Article V in particular is an important contractual element of relations between member countries on matters concerning their security. But in order that this danger may remain hypothetical, all members of the Atlantic Alliance will have to sustain their efforts in the political and military spheres.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th April 1977.

RECOMMENDATION 292¹
on the rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today²

The Assembly,

Recalling the decisive rôle constantly played by the United States (and Canada) in ensuring security and peace in Western Europe ;

Considering the maintenance and cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance to be the only military guarantee of lasting peace in Europe ;

Considering that its maintenance and cohesion require continuous and frank consultations in many fields between the European and American members of the Alliance ;

Considering that it is the duty of the European and American members to help each other effectively avoiding any policy or undertaking contrary to the principles of democracy ;

Considering that since the second world war member States of the Atlantic Alliance have not always managed to fulfil the obligations to adhere to such principles ;

Recalling, finally, that next to the alliance for the necessary military defence a genuinely comprehensive policy for security and peace should consist of relevant and fully adequate components in the field of social-economic solidarity between the rich and the poor parts of the world population, as well as in the field of elimination of all discrimination on grounds of race, colour or creed,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Encourage its members to initiate or consistently afford their support in the appropriate frameworks to the following policies which are essential components of a comprehensive security policy :
 - necessary military defence and mutual, balanced and controlled disarmament ;
 - defence and the promotion of parliamentary democracy ;
 - respect for the equivalence of men and peoples ;
 - recognition of the fact that all men are entitled to a fair share of this earth's wealth and its possibilities of well-being ;
2. Constantly remind its partners in the Atlantic Alliance and elsewhere (notably in the OECD) of these guidelines ;
3. Ensure that NATO, like the Council of Europe, WEU and the European Communities, groups only countries with democratic régimes ;
4. Give the Assembly a fair assessment of relevant difficulties and dangers facing the Atlantic Alliance as such or individual member countries and, if possible, the means for meeting them.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1976 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session (7th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. de Niet on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 711).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 292

1. The Council are alive to the concern expressed by the Assembly in the preamble to Recommendation 292. This is in fact not unconnected with the action taken and the results obtained by the allies in various fields as evidenced in particular by the Ottawa declaration and the communiqués issued after ministerial sessions of the North Atlantic Council.

As regards disarmament and arms control, WEU member countries represented in the competent international bodies have played and are continuing to play an active rôle, with a view to the adoption of multilateral measures subject to adequate control. This action has been combined, as and when required, with consultations, both as part of European political co-operation and in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. Such contacts take place at frequent intervals.

2. The importance of defence and of the promotion of parliamentary democracy has frequently been reflected in the emphasis laid on these subjects during contacts between the representatives of the member countries and those of other members of the international community. In this context, the member countries of WEU have been specially attentive to their relations with the new parliamentary democracies which have recently come into being in Southern Europe. There is a growing likelihood that these democracies will take an increasing part in the process of European integration.

3. The terms of the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty and, in particular, respect for fundamental human rights, for the dignity and worth of the human person and for the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations have been a constant inspiration and guide to member countries of WEU since the Council was first formed. This was the spirit in which they made their contribution to the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

Member governments have stated repeatedly that they regard the Helsinki document as a major contribution to détente and mutual understanding in Europe and have stressed the importance of this text in the matter of respect for human rights.

Thus, they have kept in contact with each other over the period leading up to the forthcoming meeting in Belgrade, in order to determine how far the provisions of the final act have been implemented and, possibly, to seek improvements which may be both desirable and expedient.

4. The Council recognise the disturbing nature of the elements of instability and uncertainty hanging over Europe and détente as a result of the continuing growth in the strength of offensive capabilities of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries particularly in the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, including the Mediterranean.

The Council therefore consider that the greatest vigilance must be exercised in order to ensure stability in the area and that an effective common defence must be maintained as in the past in spite of the effects of the persistent economic crisis.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 17th June 1977.

RECOMMENDATION 293 ¹
on European union and WEU ²

The Assembly,

Welcoming the decision taken by the European Council to elect the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage as from 1978 ;

Regretting the European Council's slowness in considering and implementing the Tindemans report ;

Recalling its Resolution 59 ;

Considering that the decision taken by the WEU Council on 31st May 1976 can help to develop the activities of the future European union in the field of armaments industries ;

Noting that this undertaking requires close co-operation between WEU and the European programme group ;

Considering that the co-ordination of European armaments industries can produce satisfactory results for the European economy and for the common defence in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance only if started without delay,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Study at an early date the outline programme which is to be submitted to it by the Standing Armaments Committee in order to be able to determine that body's new tasks as soon as possible and at the latest at its ministerial meeting in 1977 ;
2. Pay close attention to co-ordinating this undertaking with the work of the European programme group and have the latter's decisions communicated to it or be kept informed, through the international secretariat of the SAC, of the activities of that body in matters affecting the mandate of the SAC ;
3. Report to the Assembly in the appropriate manner on the results of the studies conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee and the decisions it takes in pursuit thereof ;
4. Invite the signatory countries of the North Atlantic Treaty who are members of the EEC or associated with it under Article 238 of the Rome Treaty to take part in the study to be undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1976 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session (7th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. de Bruyne on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 720).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 293

1. The Council are now studying the outline programme prepared at their request by the Standing Armaments Committee. In this context, governments of member States will ensure that the SAC's activities do not duplicate the work undertaken by the independent European programme group. The Assembly will be duly informed of their conclusions.

2. As stated in Article 10 of the Council decision of 7th May 1955 setting up the SAC, agreements or arrangements drawn up within the framework of the Standing Armaments Committee remain open to participation by other allied countries. The Council have noted the statements made on this subject during the last session of the WEU Assembly.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 4th April 1977.

RECOMMENDATION 294¹
on *European oceanographic activities*²

The Assembly,

Noting the Council's reply to Recommendation 275 that no European oceanographic authority should be set up, even in the framework of an existing European organisation ;

Noting also the total absence of a common overall European policy with respect to mining seabed minerals, prospecting for and exploitation of other marine resources, marine pollution and scientific oceanographic research ;

Expressing satisfaction however with European co-operation during the negotiations of the Law of the Sea Conference in New York ;

Aware of the existence of numerous oceanographic organisations and *ad hoc* bodies in worldwide, Atlantic, Western European and smaller regional frameworks ;

Aware of the defence aspects of many oceanographic activities,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments :

1. To define their own national maritime policies ;

2. To try to work out a general European strategy while at the same time proceeding with co-operation in practical and specific oceanographic subjects and to consider setting up a standing steering committee of national authorities for this purpose ;

3. To study possible means of co-operation in a regional framework, such as the North Sea area, between all countries interested in :
 - (a) the defence by national coastguard forces or navies of oil rigs and other installations which come within that area but which are outside territorial waters ;
 - (b) the establishment of a common programme and strategy for policing the 200-mile economic zone ;
 - (c) reaching agreement on the joint implementation of all conventions on pollution ;
 - (d) collaboration on basic maritime research and development.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1976 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session (9th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Craigen on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 722).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 294

1. The Council endorse the Assembly's satisfaction with European co-operation during the negotiations of the law of the sea conference in New York.
2. The Council confirm the desire of member States to pursue possibilities for co-operation where defined national policies indicate the benefits of such co-operation.
3. The Council believe that considerable progress has been made in European co-operation in oceanography, but consider that a balance must be maintained between co-operation within Europe and that which is more broadly based. They consider that the proposal to set up a standing steering committee of national authorities merits further consideration. It would be important to ensure that the work of such a committee did not overlap with the functions of existing bodies.
4. There is close contact between North Sea States (particularly in the forum of the regional conference on the peacetime protection of offshore installations in the North Sea) on the problems of protecting oil rigs and other installations in the North Sea in peacetime against malicious or accidental damage. In time of war, members of the Atlantic Alliance would rely on that organisation as a whole to defend them.
5. Not all member States have established an economic zone: most have extended or plan to extend their fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles. The arrangements for policing these extended limits are the responsibility of coastal States though the EEC Council recognises the importance and value of co-operation between coastal States on policing.
6. The decision whether to sign and ratify a convention on pollution must be for individual States. It is premature to discuss joint implementation of all the pollution conventions relating to the North Sea. The Paris convention on land-based sources of pollution is not yet in force and the work of the regulatory body, the Interim Paris Commission, is likely to affect the implementation of this convention. There are however regular consultations which take place both in this body and the regional convention for the North Atlantic, and this makes for increased co-operation and co-ordination between European and other countries in the field of pollution control. Furthermore, steps are being taken to activate the Bonn agreement on co-operation in dealing with oil pollution of the North Sea.
7. The Council confirm the intention of member States to study further possibilities for regional collaboration on maritime research and development, for which arrangements and bodies such as CREST and COST already exist, as well as on a broader basis through bodies such as the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, the World Meteorological Organisation, the Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th April 1977.

RECOMMENDATION 295¹
on safeguarding Europe's energy supplies
— new sources of energy²

The Assembly,

Considering that there is a close link between Europe's security and safeguarding its energy supplies ;

Aware that even so the Western European governments are unwilling to establish a common energy supply policy within a European framework ;

Considering that no nuclear programme on a large scale is acceptable without a solution being found for the hazards posed by nuclear power, stringent safety measures being established to eliminate these hazards and special attention being paid to the problems of the disposal of radioactive waste ;

Acknowledging the need to reduce consumption of all forms of energy by using them more efficiently and thereby lessening the need to resort to nuclear power ;

Convinced that alternative sources of energy, especially solar energy, could be used more widely instead of nuclear means,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments :

To promote a worldwide convention on both primary and energy resources, equal consideration being given to the interests of the developing and developed countries ;

2. To establish a common strategy here and now since oil prices will increase by 10 or 15 % by the end of this year ;

3. To accept joint planning for the improved use of energy resources, increase investments, particularly in coal production including the gasification process, and promote action by industry by guaranteeing long-term security for the development of coal power ;

4. To accord greater attention and financial means to research and development of alternative sources of energy in general, and to solar energy in particular, at both national and European Community levels ;

5. To draft further safety regulations for nuclear energy production, harmonised at Western European level, which should allow any population concerned, especially in frontier regions, to be involved in a democratic decision on the siting of nuclear plants ;

6. To hold a wide-ranging conference with the concurrence of the OECD and in the framework of the EEC covering all aspects of energy-saving through oil conservation programmes, invitations also being extended to parliamentarians and representatives of employers' and employees' organisations and other civic groups such as consumers' and women's organisations in order to elaborate a common energy-saving strategy.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st December 1976 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session (11th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Cornelissen on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 721).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 295

The 1973-74 oil embargo and the increases in the price of oil since 1973 have highlighted Europe's dependence on imported energy sources, especially oil. This dependence is not only of great significance from the point of view of the security of Western European countries but, because of the high price of oil, it also has important consequences for their economic and social development.

Furthermore, there has been an increasing awareness that supplies of hydrocarbon fuels are limited and are rapidly being exhausted. It is therefore necessary that the world community and particularly the countries of the western world as the largest consumers of oil should gradually reduce the proportion of hydrocarbon fuels in their total energy supplies. To accomplish this, existing sources of energy need to be used in a more economical and efficient way and alternative sources of energy must be developed vigorously.

An additional consideration is the fact that the initial expectation that a solution to the problem of a future energy shortage could be found in the more rapid development of coal power or nuclear power or both has declined somewhat because of the problem of safety and environmental and infrastructural difficulties. In other words, Western Europe will continue to depend on imported oil for a very large part of its energy requirements for the foreseeable future.

1. It is debatable whether a worldwide convention on energy resources is feasible in the near future.

The Conference on International Economic Co-operation is discussing the possibility of instituting regular consultations on energy problems in which oil-producing countries, non-oil-producing developing countries and industrialised oil-importing countries could participate.

2. It would seem best not to anticipate any future decisions the OPEC countries may take on oil prices in terms of actual figures.

Furthermore, it should be remembered that on 17th December 1974 the EEC Council of Ministers adopted a resolution setting out a number of common objectives with regard to energy policy.

3. An EEC recommendation concerning the economical use of energy already exists but further efforts for joint planning in relation to the better use of energy resources should be made.

The EEC Council of Ministers will shortly consider possible ways of promoting the use of coal in electricity power stations.

4. Considerable attention and increased efforts must be directed to encouraging the saving of energy and to developing alternative sources of energy. The research this requires must be vigorously undertaken, both nationally and internationally. In addition to the efforts which are being made within the EEC, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is also active in these fields.

5. Member governments continue to attach great importance to safety regulations for nuclear energy production, harmonised at Western European level.

6. Although this paragraph put forward an interesting suggestion it is doubtful whether the proposed conference could make any significant contribution to solving the energy problem as outlined. The question is of such complexity and has such far-reaching consequences in socio-economic terms that it will be extremely difficult to work out a consistent national or international energy conservation policy. This is confirmed by the limited progress of international consultations on the subject.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd May 1977.

RECOMMENDATION 296¹

on Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems²

The Assembly,

Considering the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean to be an essential part of European security ;

Recalling that WEU is the only European organisation with responsibilities in defence matters ;

Welcoming the opening of negotiations for the early accession of Greece to the EEC ;

Recalling that the agreement of association between Turkey and the EEC provides for the accession of Turkey after a period of adaptation ;

Considering it essential to associate Greece and Turkey here and now with examination of matters affecting the security and the building of Europe ;

Recalling that paragraph 10 of the decision of the WEU Council of 7th May 1955 setting up a Standing Armaments Committee provided that the undertakings of that Committee "would remain open to participation by other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation" ;

Gratified that the three member countries represented in the Security Council have acted jointly to encourage Greece and Turkey to seek together a solution to the points at issue between them ;

Deploring the wait-and-see policy pursued by the United Nations towards the Lebanese tragedy and the increasingly systematic deviation of world-wide organisations from their original tasks,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Draw up a programme forthwith to strengthen Europe's share in the joint defence of the Eastern Mediterranean ;
2. Invite the Greek and Turkish Governments to be associated with the work of the Standing Armaments Committee, including the study on European armaments industries ;
3. Make every effort for Greece and Turkey to be associated ever more closely with the building of Europe ;
4. Continue its work towards settling issues between Greece and Turkey ;
5. Co-ordinate the efforts of member countries with a view to finding a fair solution to the Lebanese conflict ;
6. Invite member States in the United Nations and other world-wide organisations to adhere firmly to the commitments they entered into on joining, particularly as regards the Middle East conflict and the situation in the Mediterranean.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st December 1976 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session (11th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Burckel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 719).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹**to Recommendation 296**

1. The Council share the Assembly's concern regarding the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and its possible consequences for European security.

However, they feel that it would be inappropriate for them to "draw up a programme to strengthen Europe's share in the joint defence of the Eastern Mediterranean", since the defence of that region is at present ensured by the Atlantic Alliance.

2. Like the Assembly, the Council welcome the fact that Greece and Turkey wish to be more closely associated with the construction of Europe. In this connection, the Council would like to remind the Assembly that their reply to its Recommendation 256 included a passage stating that the member countries of WEU intended to encourage the increasing development of relations between the EEC on the one hand and Greece and Turkey on the other. They would recall, however, that this is a matter for the Council of the Communities.

The Council have noted with interest the desire expressed by the Greek and Turkish authorities for closer links with Western European Union and in particular with its Assembly. They feel, however, that it is too soon to consider the possibility of associating the Greek and Turkish Governments with the work of the Standing Armaments Committee. At the same time, they wish to point out that under paragraph 10 of the decision of 7th May 1955 setting up the SAC, agreements or arrangements concluded within the framework of the SAC remain open to participation by other allied countries.

3. The Council, who are concerned at the dispute between Greece and Turkey, remind the Assembly of the action taken by the WEU member States individually, within the Community or within the Atlantic Alliance, to encourage the two countries to resolve the issues between them peacefully, by direct negotiation.

4. The Council are convinced that a continuation of the Lebanese conflict would have had serious consequences for security in the Eastern Mediterranean and welcome the fact that the fighting has been stopped and that a settlement is being worked out.

In this context, they would draw attention to the efforts made by the WEU member States both individually and within the Community to further the settlement of a conflict which must be resolved primarily by the parties involved.

5. Finally, the Council, who are anxious that machinery for settling the Middle East conflict should be rapidly set in motion, note with satisfaction a number of favourable signs suggesting that the peace conference may be convened in the near future. They are however aware that the obstacles preventing the parties concerned from ending the conflict in such a way that the legitimate rights of each of them are respected have not yet all been removed.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 4th April 1977.

**OPINION ON THE BUDGET OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1977¹**

*submitted on behalf of
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur*

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Draft Opinion

*on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU
for the financial year 1977*

The Assembly,

Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter ;

Having taken note of the contents,

Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated.

1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Dequae (Chairman) ; Lord Selsdon (Vice-Chairman) ; MM. Alber (Alternate : Reddemann), Antoni, Bonalumi, de Bruyne (Alternate : Adriaensens), Del Duca, Depietri, Evers, Hengel (Alternate : Margue), Kauffmann, van Kleef, de Koster, Lemp (Alter-

nate : Schwencke), Lewis (Alternate : Lord Beaumont of Whitley), McNamara, Orsini, Page (Alternate : Sir John Rodgers), Schleiter (Alternate : Schmitt, Vice-Chairman), Vadepped, Vohrer.

Also present : Lord Peddie.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on the status of WEU staff

The Assembly,

Welcoming the decision by the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to introduce a pension scheme ;

Deploring nevertheless that the governments did not take an immediate decision to set up a joint body to manage the pension scheme for all the co-ordinated organisations ;

Regretting that the pension scheme regulations do not provide for a reversionary pension to be granted to the widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for the widows of male staff ;

Noting the slowness in reforming the procedure for co-ordination,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

- I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations :
 1. The early establishment of a joint body to manage the pension scheme ;
 2. The granting of a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for widows of male staff ;
 3. The creation of a voluntary savings system for granting loans for the purchase of accommodation ;
 4. The establishment as soon as possible of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy ;
- II. Invite the Public Administration Committee to transmit to the Assembly its study on conditions for seconding national officials.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur)

I. Budget of the ministerial organs of WEU

(i) *Approval*

1. I have studied the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1977 and have, for the time being, no comment to make

thereon. I therefore submit the attached draft opinion and draft recommendation to the Committee for its approval.

(ii) *The budget*

2. The total budget of WEU for 1977 as compared to 1976 is as follows :

	<i>1976 Budget</i>		<i>1977 Budget</i>	
	£	F	£	F
Secretariat-General	483,280	—	569,840	—
Standing Armaments Committee ..	—	3,881,750	—	4,243,320
Agency for the Control of Armaments	—	8,329,550	—	9,089,060
Office of the Clerk	—	6,559,000	—	7,236,000
TOTAL BUDGET OF WEU	483,280	18,770,300	569,840	20,568,380

(iii) *WEU establishment*

3. The total establishment of WEU for 1977 is as follows :

Secretariat-General	48
Standing Armaments Committee	28
Agency for the Control of Armaments	52
	128
Office of the Clerk	28
TOTAL ESTABLISHMENT OF WEU FOR 1977	156

II. Pension scheme

4. The Assembly welcomes the fact after long negotiations the councils of the co-ordinated organisations have finally approved the setting up of a pension scheme as from 1st July 1974. The Council of WEU decided that the option period of one year allowed to members of the staff should commence on 1st March 1977. Nevertheless, the Council should give urgent consideration to widowers of female staff of the co-ordinated organisations being granted a reversionary pension in the same conditions as widows of male staff.

5. In the ensuing paragraphs your Rapporteur would like to outline his suggestions for setting up a pension unit and joint management fund for pensions for the staff of the co-ordinated organisations.

6. In its Recommendations 240, 250, 265 and 287 on improving the status of WEU staff, the Assembly recommended the "setting up of a joint management fund for pensions for the staff of the co-ordinated organisations".

7. The importance of setting up such a fund cannot be sufficiently stressed, particularly to guard against the possibility of a government or governments withdrawing from one or more of the co-ordinated organisations, or the winding up of an organisation.

8. A pension fund is a continuing process and it is for this reason that we must seek to set up an organisation which will be in existence for many years to come. As an example, an official recruited this year at the age of 25 would be drawing his pension at the latest in 40 years' time ; assuming a life expectancy of 85 years, the fund would have needed to be in existence for 60 years (more in the case of a surviving widow) in order to pay the official's pension.

9. It can safely be said that many of the co-ordinated organisations will undergo transformations in the next decade but the continuity of a pension fund, unharmed by political upheavals, must be ensured.

10. On the assumption that the councils of all the co-ordinated organisations are in agreement, it will take several years before this goal can be achieved. Two phases might be envisaged to this end.

First phase — pension unit

11. One of the larger organisations, with a computer at its disposal, should be responsible for setting up a small unit to deal with pensions. The OECD should be considered for this purpose since it is by far the best equipped to deal with this administrative problem and already has an "Inter-Organisation Study Section on Salaries and Prices". A small staff would naturally have to be recruited or seconded from other organisa-

tions to handle the work of the unit but if each organisation had to deal with the pensions of its respective staff members, the staff requirement would be even greater.

12. The administrations of the co-ordinated organisations would be required to set up a standard "pension file" for all staff having opted for the pension scheme and for all staff recruited since July 1974. This file, with its contents, would be identical for the staff of all the co-ordinated organisations. On retirement of a staff member having opted for the pension scheme, the administration of the organisation to which he or she belonged would be required to send his or her pension file to the pension unit. The latter would assess the basis on which the official's pension should be calculated and the file would thereafter remain with the unit. The unit would, in turn, inform the organisation concerned of the amount of the monthly pension to be paid and keep it advised of any modifications to be made to this amount as a result of increases in cost-of-living and standard-of-living allowances. Conversely, the organisation would inform the pension unit of any elements liable to modify the pension, i.e. death of the pensioner, conversion into a widow's pension, change in the number of children's allowances or place of residence, etc.

13. The pension unit would inform all the co-ordinated organisations of the estimates to be included in their respective budgets for the payment of pensions to those already retired or due for retirement in a given financial year.

14. An important aspect is that of taxation and this also would be calculated by the pension unit.

15. Should a pensioner have recourse to arbitration, this would have to be dealt with by the organisation to which he had belonged, pending the creation of a joint appeals board for all the co-ordinated organisations.

16. In order to assess the number of staff required for the pension unit, an approximate estimate would have to be made of the number of officials due for retirement (or already retired) in the co-ordinated organisations over the next three years. Such figures would of necessity be approximate since it is only after the option period of one year following the date of the decision of the councils to set up such a unit that the exact number of pensioners would be known.

17. The cost of running the pension unit should be in proportion to the number of pensioners in each of the co-ordinated organisations.

18. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the setting up of a pension unit, the long-term objective of a joint management fund within the next three years must be urgently pursued.

Second phase — joint management fund

19. The fund should be an entirely independent body, set up by governments who are members of the co-ordinated organisations. This would require the ratification of protocols by all the governments concerned. It would thereafter follow that this organisation would have its own budget, with its own independent staff; its head should have both financial and legal experience.

20. A joint arbitration committee should be set up to deal with all litigation. The organisation should, if possible, be housed in the OECD in order that contact with the "Inter-Organisation Study Section on Salaries and Prices" might be maintained and access facilitated to the OECD computer.

21. The joint management fund should be governed by a board comprising one or two senior officials from each of the co-ordinated organisations.

22. Once the organisation had been set up, it would follow that all the pensions previously paid by the co-ordinated organisations would be paid by the joint management fund. The new organisation would take over all administration in respect of pensioners, including the problem of taxation.

23. The budget of the joint management fund would make provision for all retired staff. The budget would also include the normal running expenses of the organisation. Contributions to this budget would be levied from all present and former member governments of the co-ordinated organisations, who have an implied debt to the pensioners of these organisations. It should be stressed that the setting up of the joint management fund would not entail a staff establishment very much larger than that of the pension unit.

24. The creation of a reserve fund should also be envisaged since the organisation would have only the aforementioned contributions at its disposal and it would appear essential for some funds to be available for emergencies, i.e. late payment of contributions, a government or governments withdrawing from an organisation, etc. It would be for member governments to calculate the amount to be held in such a reserve fund.

III. Conditions of employment and remuneration of staff of the co-ordinated organisations

25. On several occasions the Assembly's attention has been drawn to the shortcomings of co-operation procedure¹.

1. Documents 584 and 701.

26. Nothing has happened in the past year to change the views expressed in this respect. Admittedly, a pension scheme for staff of the co-ordinated organisations has been introduced after more than three years of negotiations, but it is accompanied by such a complex taxation system that even the experts who worked it out doubt whether it can be applied. The abnormally long time taken to reach agreement has been one of trial for retired officials who have often had to manage on a very small income pending payment of the promised pension. In addition, the delay has also caused tremendous administrative complications.

27. For salary adjustments, the new procedure approved by the councils of the co-ordinated organisations now involves a long and difficult exercise starting on 1st July each year, demanding the collection of a mass of information which may be interpreted in many different ways. This calls for three comments :

28. First, almost a year has passed since 1st July 1976 and salary levels operative on that date have not yet been fixed. The secretaries-general were therefore compelled to ask for a provisional salary increase as from 1st January 1977 to take account of the rise in the cost of living during the second half of 1976 although the scales for calculating this increase were not yet known.

29. Second, the new procedure which no longer makes any distinction between increases for the cost of living and increases for a possible improvement in the standard of living is not in conformity with the procedure for adjusting pensions as set out in Article 36 of the pension scheme regulations which is based on such a distinction. The result is that in less than a year the Co-ordinating Committee has submitted to the councils two texts on this important matter which, if not contradictory, are, to say the least, difficult to reconcile without resorting to subtle interpretations, which are always debatable and subject to appeal.

30. Third, without going into the actual level of salaries applicable in the co-ordinated organisations, there is no escaping the fact that during the period of reference for assessing the change in the cost of living the purchasing power of staff progressively diminishes, and in addition several months elapse after the end of this reference period before compensation is granted, with the result that staff are always at least nine months behind in a vain attempt to adjust salaries to prices.

31. It is urgent to judge the situation as a whole and this judgment can but be severe. Whatever its past record, the procedure for co-ordination now seems irremediably paralysed. It is becoming increasingly bogged down in futilities, sterile

technical complications and ineffectiveness ; the representatives of the secretaries-general and the government experts no longer speak the same language and their discussions are hampered by growing mutual distrust ; senior administrative staff from the organisations have to devote more and more time to discussions which are generally of no practical effect. The time of the secretaries-general themselves is increasingly taken up by the need to examine and solve these problems and they also have to protect themselves against the continual infringement of their duties by experts with no real responsibilities. Only too often councils have to settle technical problems which could not be solved by those appointed to find solutions. Finally, staff feel that their views are not being heard and there is growing unrest ; strike movements, virtually unknown before in international organisations, are now developing.

32. The situation now seems so disturbing that perhaps a solution might be found by seeking an outside opinion which might be more enlightened, impartial and acceptable to all concerned.

33. There is a precedent for this: in 1957, the OEEC Council proposed to the WEU and NATO Councils and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe that they appoint a committee of five wise men to report to them on the harmonisation of conditions of remuneration in these organisations¹. After six months' work, this committee made recommendations which led to the present system of co-ordination.

34. The time now seems ripe to renew this worthwhile experience and re-examine the prob-

1. *Extracts from the terms of reference of the Serres Committee :*

.....

1. A committee of experts, comprising not more than five members, will be set up to examine all aspects of the problems relating to the emoluments of the staff of the OEEC, of NATO (international staff and civilian employees of military headquarters located in France), of WEU and of the Council of Europe...

These experts will be selected jointly by the four organisations from a list of experts submitted by the member governments of any of the organisations.

The experts will act in a personal capacity and, with respect to the tasks assigned to them, will be independent of the organisations and of governments. They will appoint their chairman and establish the committee's rules of procedure. In the event of the committee being unable to reach unanimous conclusions, it shall submit minority views.

.....

2. ... The report of the experts, which shall contain an analysis of its budgetary implications, will be submitted to each of the councils or committee of ministers of the organisations through their respective secretaries-general. It should give precise and detailed proposals, supported by explanatory statements and such documentary material as the experts consider to be essential to the understanding of their report.

lems raised by the conditions of employment and remuneration of staff.

35. But the 1957 terms of reference should be broadened since they were then limited to problems relating to staff remuneration. (This was how the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts came into being.)

36. Experience has proved, however — and the WEU Assembly's recommendations testify to this — that, while the budgetary aspect of the problems was essential, it was not the only aspect; in fact, there has never been, at the level of each organisation nor at co-ordinated level, any effective body with responsibility for working out and promoting an overall staff policy in the widest sense, and this lack has proved, and is still today, detrimental to the efficient operation of the organisations, the justified interests of their staff and, in the long run, the interests of the governments themselves.

37. Now therefore is the time to give meaningful and detailed consideration to the whole system of remuneration, recruitment, conditions of employment, career possibilities and every other facet of international civil service in order to determine the rightful place of these officials in society and in the overall framework of international organisations.

IV. Loans for the purchase of accommodation

38. The introduction of the pension scheme will raise a special problem in connection with the facilities previously available to staff for drawing on their individual accounts with the provident fund in order to purchase accommodation¹. Members of the staff who opt for the pension scheme and decide to validate past service will, depending on their length of service, be using much or virtually all of their provident fund balances for this purpose. In addition, provident fund arrangements no longer apply to staff joining the co-ordinated organisations after 1st July 1974, since they are compulsorily affiliated to the pension scheme. Finally, a large part of the interest-bearing housing loans granted to staff has been secured by the provident fund accounts, a guarantee that will no longer exist with the pension scheme.

39. It is important to offer assistance to staff for accommodation, and alternative schemes for offering housing loans at an acceptable rate of interest should be examined as a matter of urgency. One practical scheme which would provide an acceptable alternative would appear to be a staff savings and loan service.

40. Under such a scheme, which operates in the United Nations and has been working well in UNESCO for nearly twenty years, loans are financed from a staff savings fund. The organisation would intervene only in the investment of the fund and the practical arrangements for deductions from staff salaries.

41. A co-ordinated scheme for all the organisations would obviously be the best solution since such a scheme requires large numbers of staff in order to make it viable. Your Rapporteur is aware that the OECD has been studying this problem and would urge the secretaries-general of the co-ordinated organisations to give this matter urgent consideration.

V. Seconded national officials

42. In its Recommendation 200 adopted on 19th November 1970, the Assembly recommended that the Council:

“4. Instruct its Public Administration Committee to study the harmonisation of conditions for seconding national officials to the co-ordinated organisations with a view to submitting recommendations to the member governments.”

43. On 18th May 1971, the Council replied as follows:

“4. The Council have noted with interest the Assembly's suggestion that the harmonisation of conditions for seconding national officials be studied. They propose to create a special working group for this purpose which would study the question on the basis of research into national practices which has already begun.”

44. Over the years, the Assembly has continued to press, in its recommendations, for this study to be completed and in its reply to Recommendation 287 the Council stated:

“II. The survey carried out by the Public Administration Committee at the Council's request, on the implementation in member countries of the principles recommended by the Council for the secondment of national officials to international organisations, has now been completed. The relevant documents have been transmitted by the Secretariat-General to the Clerk of the Assembly.”

45. The information to which the Council refers can be found in its annual report to the Assembly, Chapter V (D), which reads as follows:

“The Public Administration Committee concluded the study called for by the Council on the implementation in member countries of the principles recommended by the Coun-

1. Documents 666 and 701.

oil for the secondment of national officials to international organisations. The Council were thus able, during 1976, to study the documentation collected and to decide what further measures should be adopted regarding the study of this question.

Replies to the questionnaire submitted to the member countries contained gaps in some cases, and the Council requested those delegations which had been unable to collect some part of the information (particularly in the statistical field) to take the necessary

steps to make the required information available in future.

Secondly, the Council agreed that a further survey should be undertaken to review the situation after an interval of five years.

The Council will not fail to keep the Assembly informed of all further developments."

46. The Assembly feels that, after a period of six years, the foregoing information cannot be considered sufficient and requests that more details be submitted to it.

APPENDIX I

WEU BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR 1977

Proposed expenditure and income

	A*	B*	C*	TOTAL B + C
	£	Francs	Francs	Francs
Salaries and allowances	709,165	5,814,370	12,677,220	18,491,590
Travel	19,645	86,000	335,300	421,300
Other operating costs	80,865	370,500	449,800	820,300
Purchase of furniture	3,395	10,500	19,400	29,900
Buildings	—	—	—	—
Total expenditure	813,070	6,281,370	13,481,720	19,763,090
WEU tax	237,430	2,006,850	4,337,700	6,344,550
Other receipts	5,800	31,200	54,960	86,160
Total income	243,230	2,038,050	4,392,660	6,430,710
NET TOTAL	569,840	4,243,320	9,089,060	13,332,380

National contributions

	600ths	A*	B* C*	Office of the Clerk
		£	Francs	Francs
Belgium	59	56,034.27	1,311,017.37	711,540
France	120	113,968.00	2,666,476.00	1,447,200
Federal Republic of Germany .	120	113,968.00	2,666,476.00	1,447,200
Italy	120	113,968.00	2,666,476.00	1,447,200
Luxembourg	2	1,899.46	44,441.26	24,120
Netherlands	59	56,034.27	1,311,017.37	711,540
United Kingdom	120	113,968.00	2,666,476.00	1,447,200
	600	569,840.00	13,332,380.00	7,236,000

Total WEU budget

£569,840

Francs 20,568,380

* A - Secretariat-General.

B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C - Agency for the Control of Armaments.

APPENDIX II

Table of establishment
WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

	A ¹	B ¹	C ¹	Total A, B, C	Office of the Clerk	
					Clerk	Clerk Assistant
Secretary-General	1	—	—	1	1	—
Deputy Secretary-General	1	—	—	1	—	—
Director of the Agency	—	—	1	1	—	—
Assistant Secretary-General	1	1	—	2	1	—
A7	—	—	1	1	—	—
A6	1	—	3	4	—	—
A5	2	1	6	9	5	—
A4	—	4	8	12	2 ²	—
A3	3	—	1	4	1	—
A2	2	—	2	4	3 ²	—
L5	1	—	—	1	—	—
L4	1	1	—	2	—	—
L3	1	3	2	6	—	—
L2	1	—	—	1	—	—
B6	—	—	—	—	1	—
B5	—	—	—	—	—	—
B4	8	4	8	20	4	—
B3	7	7	8	22	7	—
B2	5	—	2	7	—	—
B1	2	—	—	2	—	—
C6	—	—	—	—	1	—
C5	—	—	1	1	—	—
C4	1	4	—	5	—	—
C3	8	3	9	20	2	—
C2	2	—	—	2	—	—
	48	28	52	128		28

1. A - Secretariat-General.

B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C - Agency for the Control of Armaments.

2. Including four secretaries Translations/Publications.

APPENDIX III

RECOMMENDATION 287¹*on improving the status of WEU staff*²

The Assembly,

Recalling Recommendations 250 and 265 ;

Deploring the slow progress of work in the Co-ordinating Committee ;

Regretting that the governments have still not introduced a pension scheme for all the co-ordinated organisations ;

Regretting the governments' decision to abandon present procedure for adjusting salaries before introducing new procedure ;

Noting the ensuing unrest among staff members of the co-ordinated organisations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. In the framework of the co-ordinated organisations :

1. Endeavour to have the pension scheme brought into effect before the end of 1976, its provisions being applied as from the date of adoption of the regulations governing its application, but payment of pensions for retired officials still being made as from 1st January 1973 ;

2. Ensure that the scheme includes all necessary guarantees, based *inter alia* on joint management for all the co-ordinated organisations in accordance with the principles set out in Recommendations 250 and 265 ;

3. Amend the Staff Rules to avoid the widow or orphans of an official suffering hardship through a break in income during the period preceding payment of the first arrears of the pension ;

4. Introduce procedure for salary reviews similar to practice in the European Communities ;

5. Improve the speed and efficiency of co-ordination by tightening up procedure ;

6. Change the system of indemnities for loss of job on the lines of regulations in the European Communities and in the meantime improve the pension rights of officials who have become redundant by adding to their entitlement the period for which an indemnity for loss of job is granted ;

7. Make provision for a reinstatement allowance for officials terminating their service and who were granted an installation allowance at the time of recruitment, as is the case in the European Communities ;

II. Ask the Public Administration Committee to transmit to the Assembly as soon as available its study on conditions for seconding national officials.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1976 during the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session (4th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 701).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 287

I.1. The Council are in a position to inform the Assembly that, at their meeting of 23rd November 1976, they approved the 127th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts which contained at annex the rules implementing the pension scheme set up in the 94th report. This scheme, which for WEU staff is now in force, takes effect from 1st July 1974.

2. The Council believe that guarantees are provided by Article 40, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the draft pension scheme rules. The question of a joint management is currently under study in the Co-ordinating Committee.

3. Neither the WEU nor Assembly Staff Rules stipulate that payment of a staff member's salary should terminate on the day of his death. In practice, these emoluments have been paid by the Secretariat-General up to the end of the month in which the official died.

4. A procedure for salary reviews broadly comparable to that followed in the European Communities is at present under study by the Councils of the co-ordinated organisations. It is expected that the new procedure will be approved by Councils before the end of this year.

5. Consideration is at present being given to the reform of co-ordinating procedures. However, the Assembly will be aware of the difficulties in achieving this when in addition to the seven members of WEU, the interests of some eighteen other governments are involved within the co-ordinated framework.

6.-7. The present system of indemnities for loss of job has been in force since 1972. At that time, it represented a substantial improvement on the previous system. No proposals for improving the indemnities for loss of job, or for introducing a reinstatement allowance have, at the moment, been submitted to the governments of member countries.

II. The survey carried out by the Public Administration Committee at the Council's request, on the implementation in member countries of the principles recommended by the Council for the secondment of national officials to international organisations, has now been completed. The relevant documents have been transmitted by the Secretariat-General to the Clerk of the Assembly.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 29th November 1976.

APPENDIX IV

Breakdown of staff in the co-ordinated organisations on 1st January 1976

OECD			Council of Europe			NATO						Total NATO - SHAPE			ESA			WEU			Grand total		
						Secretariat Agencies Military Committee			SHAPE														
A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC
624	1016	1640	267	457	724	909	2062	2971	475	886	1361	1384	2948	4332	939	608	1547	55	94	149	3269	5123	8392

APPENDIX V

Membership of the co-ordinated organisations

Member country	Organisation				
	OECD	Council of Europe	NATO	ESA	WEU
EUROPE					
Austria	x	x			
Belgium	x	x	x	x	x
Cyprus		x			
Denmark	x	x	x	x	
Finland	x				
France	x	x	x	x	x
Germany	x	x	x	x	x
Greece	x	x	x		
Iceland	x	x	x		
Ireland	x	x			
Italy	x	x	x	x	x
Luxembourg	x	x	x		x
Malta		x			
Netherlands	x	x	x	x	x
Norway	x	x	x		
Portugal	x	x	x		
Spain	x			x	
Sweden	x	x		x	
Switzerland	x	x		x	
Turkey	x	x	x		
United Kingdom	x	x	x	x	x
AMERICA					
Canada	x		x		
United States	x		x		
ASIA					
Japan	x				
AUSTRALASIA					
Australia	x				
New Zealand	x				
TOTAL	24	19	15	10	7

***Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs
of Western European Union for the financial year 1977***

AMENDMENT No. 1¹
tabled by Mr. Piket

1. Replace the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation by the following text :
“Noting the slowness in reforming the procedure for co-ordination and the unacceptable delay in applying the adjustments proposed by the Co-ordinating Committee in May 1977,”.
 2. After Part I of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following :
“II. Avoid excessive delays in adjusting salaries in accordance with increases in the cost of living which lead to a progressive decline in the purchasing power of staff ;”.
- The present Part II will become Part III.

Signed : Piket

1. See 4th Sitting, 22nd June 1977 (Amendment agreed to).

Anti-submarine warfare**SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT¹**

**submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr. Roper, Rapporteur**

**Revised Draft Recommendation
on anti-submarine warfare**

The Assembly,

Aware that the large numbers of modern attack submarines in service with the Soviet navy pose a serious threat to allied communications, both across the Atlantic and between the different parts of Western Europe ;

Aware that a significant part of the Soviet nuclear threat arises from the Soviet strategic submarines ;

Believing that the European NATO countries must be able to provide an effective ASW capability from their limited resources,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments :

1. To ensure that their anti-submarine warfare forces are fully interoperable, with particular reference to communications, and in appropriate cases to increase the standardisation of these forces ;
2. To call on the independent European programme group or on Eurogroup to undertake an evaluation of European ASW requirements and capabilities with particular reference to shallow waters and the use of maritime patrol aircraft ;
3. To increase their support for the SACLANT anti-submarine warfare research centre at La Spezia through closer liaison with national centres and improved facilities for national research staff to spend time in the international allied environment of the SACLANT centre.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Roper, Rapporteur)

1. The Committee's original report on anti-submarine warfare (Document 725) was adopted in Committee by 14 votes to 1 with 3 abstentions on 29th November 1976. The debate on the report in the Assembly at the second part of the twenty-second ordinary session was taken at the end of the week, when few representatives were present. At the request of the Chairman it was referred back to the Committee.

2. The Committee takes this opportunity of submitting a revised draft recommendation — revised only in operative paragraph 1 where the words "with particular reference to communications" have been inserted, and in operative paragraph 2 which now calls for particular refer-

ence to "shallow" rather than "coastal" waters. Since the original report was prepared the Committee has in fact been briefed on anti-submarine warfare at NATO Headquarters by Vice-Admiral L.R. Bell-Davies, R.N., SACLANT's Representative in Europe. The Committee is aware of SACLANT's need to rely upon NATO European navies and maritime air forces both for shallow-water operations and for some escort duties across the Atlantic.

3. The Committee therefore makes the foregoing changes of emphasis in its original draft recommendation. Otherwise it re-endorses its original report.

1. Adopted in Committee by 15 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Critchley (Chairman) ; Mr. Dankert (Vice-Chairman) ; MM. Ahrens, Beauguitte (Alternate : Delorme), Bizet (Alternate : La Combe), Boldrini, Bonnel, Boucheny, Fosson, Grant (Alternate : Banks), Handlos, Hardy (Alternate : Lord Peddie), Konen,

de Koster, Lemmrich, Maggioni, Ménard, Pawelczyk (Alternate : Lemp), Pecchioli, Rivière, Roberti, Roper, Hermann Schmidt, Scholten, Schugens (Alternate : Dequae), Tanghe, Whitehead (Alternate : Watkinson).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Anti-submarine warfare

AMENDMENT No. 1¹

tabled by Mr. Farr

In paragraph 2 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out "with particular reference to shallow waters".

Signed: Farr

1. See 4th Sitting, 22nd June 1977 (Amendment negatived).

Anti-submarine warfare

AMENDMENT No. 2¹

tabled by Mr. Rivière

1. At the beginning of the revised draft recommendation proper, after "Recommends that the Council" insert "and its Standing Armaments Committee"; leave out "urge member governments".
2. In paragraph 1 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from "with particular reference" to the end of the paragraph and insert "to allow joint production for these forces wherever appropriate";.
3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the revised draft recommendation proper and insert :
"2. In liaison with the independent European programme group, evaluate European ASW requirements and capabilities in every field ;".
4. Leave out paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper and insert :
"3. Establish the necessary liaison with the SACLANT anti-submarine warfare research centre at La Spezia, maintaining close links with national centres, and examine the possibilities of starting joint research into anti-submarine warfare."

Signed : Rivière

1. See 4th Sitting, 22nd June 1977 (Amendment negatived).

European security and East-West relations

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr. de Koster, Rapporteur*

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Draft recommendation on European security and East-West relations adopted
by the Committee on 29th November 1976 and Amendments 1 to 5

1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 2 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. *Critchley* (Chairman); Mr. *Dankert* (Vice-Chairman); MM. *Ahrens*, *Beauguitte* (Alternate: *Delorme*), *Bizet* (Alternate: *La Combe*), *Boldrini*, *Bonnel*, *Boucheny*, *Fosson* (Alternate: *Del Duca*), *Grant* (Alternate: *Banks*), *Handlos*, *Hardy*, *Konen*,

de Koster, *Lemrich*, *Maggioni*, *Ménard*, *Pawelczyk* (Alternate: *Lemp*), *Pecchioli*, *Rivière*, *Roberti*, *Roper*, *Hermann Schmidt*, *Scholten* (Alternate: *Piket*), *Schugens* (Alternate: *Duvieusart*), *Tanghe*, *Whitehead* (Alternate: *Lord Peddie*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Revised Draft Recommendation
on European security and East-West relations

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that the military capability of the Soviet Union is continually increasing, as defence expenditure in real terms steadily rises, as considerable improvements in Soviet technology enhance the effectiveness of its unquestioned numerical superiority in manpower and equipment, and as new strategic nuclear missiles are prepared which could threaten Western Europe ;
- (ii) Believing that a policy of détente can be actively and safely pursued only on the basis of close consultation and cohesion in the Atlantic Alliance, backed by public support for a fully adequate defence effort ; and welcoming therefore the new resolve of all the Atlantic allies "to strengthen their mutual support efforts and co-operation" ;
- (iii) Welcoming the intention of the new United States Administration to secure significant reductions in the numbers of Soviet and American strategic nuclear weapons, provided always that the essential basis of mutual deterrence and the security of the Alliance is not jeopardised ;
- (iv) Considering that there are both positive and negative features in the application by the Warsaw Pact countries of existing East-West agreements affecting détente, and in the progress of other ongoing negotiations ;
- (v) Calling for all such agreements to be continuously and closely monitored in the Alliance, as well as in WEU, with a view to ensuring their strict observance by both sides, and to assessing the spirit in which the voluntary provisions of the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe are being interpreted by the Warsaw Pact countries ;
- (vi) Believing however that, properly conducted, the process of détente can bring advantages to both East and West in increasing stability and security at lower economic cost to both sides,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

That it urge member governments :

1. To seek to ensure that the North Atlantic Council continues its careful preparation for the meeting of representatives of Ministers to be held in Belgrade in 1977 in pursuance of the CSCE final act :
 - (a) by continuing to compile, on the basis of reports from member States, the record of the implementation by the Warsaw Pact countries of the CSCE final act, with particular attention to all items in the documents on "confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament", on "co-operation in humanitarian and other fields" as well as to co-operation in other fields ;
 - (b) by agreeing that the policy of all members of the Alliance with respect to the Belgrade meeting shall be :
 - (i) to ensure at the preparatory meeting now being held that the meeting at the level of representatives appointed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs is not delayed ;
 - (ii) to exclude from the agenda any proposed new items which seek to undermine Alliance policy ;
 - (iii) to present the full record of the implementation of the final act so far ;
 - (iv) to seek to strengthen and extend the voluntary provisions for confidence-building measures and to report on the progress or lack of progress of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions ;
2. To ensure that the MBFR negotiations are pursued with determination on the present lines until the Soviet Union is prepared to bridge the gap between Warsaw Pact and NATO positions ;
3. To seek to secure a moratorium on the further development by all countries of cruise missiles and strategic bombers, pending the outcome of the bilateral SALT negotiations ;
4. To propose that Soviet nuclear missiles based outside the MBFR guidelines area, but targeted on Western Europe, and other comparable forward-based nuclear weapons, be discussed in an appropriate East-West arms control forum.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. de Koster, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. The Committee prepared a report on European security and East-West relations for submission to the second part of the twenty-second ordinary session. The report (Document 726) was adopted on 29th November 1976 by 12 votes to 2 with 5 abstentions. The debate on this report in the Assembly took place at the end of the week when few representatives were present; five amendments to the draft recommendation in the report were tabled. At the end of the debate, at the request of the Chairman, the report was referred back to the Committee without a vote. The texts of the original draft recommendation and the five amendments are reproduced at appendix.

2. The Committee has taken this opportunity of preparing a revised draft recommendation which takes account of events since the first report was adopted. The new Carter administration has taken office in Washington, and adopted a significantly different line to the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT); the North Atlantic Council has met in London at the levels of Heads of State and of Government and been followed by the usual meeting of Defence Ministers in Brussels; lastly the postponement of the debate on the report to the first part of the twenty-third session of the Assembly means that the Assembly will be called upon to vote upon the new draft recommendation during the week beginning 20th June — i.e. actually during the course of the meeting in Belgrade of officials who will be preparing the subsequent meeting of representatives of Ministers who are to examine the workings of the final act of the Helsinki conference on security and co-operation in Europe (CSCE).

3. Reference should still be made to the explanatory memorandum of the original report (Document 726) as far as the original text of the recommendation is concerned. The comments below are designed to explain the modifications which the Committee has now made to the original text.

Preamble

4. The briefing given by the Chairman of the Military Committee to the Chiefs of State and Defence Ministers of the NATO countries in Brussels on 16th and 17th May drew attention to the financial basis of the Soviet defence effort estimated to be increasing at more than 4 % per annum in real terms, and to account at

present for at least 11 to 13 % of the Soviet gross national product. The ministerial guidance adopted by the Defence Ministers at that meeting estimates the annual increase of defence spending at 5 % in real terms. The Committee has drawn attention to this assessment by inserting in the first paragraph of the original preamble the words "as defence expenditure in real terms steadily rises".

5. The same briefing by the Chairman of the Military Committee states that the size of the Soviet IRBM/MRBM force remains the same, but that it is thought that the deployment of a new, and possibly mobile, mirrored IRBM is "imminent". It is for this reason that the Committee has re-worded the last line of the first paragraph of the preamble to read "and as new strategic nuclear missiles are *prepared* which could threaten Western Europe", instead of referring to missiles which are *deployed*.

6. In the second paragraph of the preamble the Committee has added at the end the quotation from the communiqué issued on 11th May after the meeting in London of the fifteen Heads of State and Government of the NATO countries (paragraph 3). The Committee welcomes the subsequent decision of the NATO Defence Ministers meeting in Brussels to undertake a long-term defence programme aiming at an annual increase in defence spending of 3 % in real terms in the years 1979-84.

7. Paragraph (iii) of the preamble is new, it reflects President Carter's approach to SALT which goes beyond the Vladivostok agreement described in paragraph 17 of Document 726. At his press conference on 30th March President Carter described his preferred approach as follows :

"It was to have substantial reductions in the level of deployment of missile launchers and the MIRV missiles below the 2,400 level and the 1,320 level that were established under the Vladivostok agreement. Secondly, to stop the development and deployment of any new weapons systems. A third point was to freeze at the present level about 550 intercontinental ballistic missiles — our Minuteman and their missiles known as the SS-17, 18 and 19. Another was to ban the deployment of all mobile missiles — their SS-16 and others or ours, that is, under the development stage the MX. Another is to have a strict limit on the deployment of the Backfire bomber and a strict limit of the range that would be permitted on cruise mis-

siles. Another element of the proposal was to limit the number of test firings of missiles to six firings per year of the inter-continental range and also of the medium-range missiles and to ask the Soviet Union to give us some assured mechanism by which we could distinguish between their inter-continental mobile missile the SS-16 and their limited-range mobile missile the SS-20."

8. President Carter described his proposal as "... much more far-reaching, and has profound consequences that are beneficial, I think, to our own nation and to the rest of the world". Paragraph 7 of the North Atlantic Council communiqué of 11th May, referred to above, states "The allies warmly welcome the efforts of the United States to negotiate with the Soviet Union an agreement to limit and reduce strategic arms which takes into account allied interests". Paragraph (iii) of the preamble has been drafted accordingly.

Operative text

9. Paragraph 1 of the operative text of the draft recommendation has been slightly re-worded to put it in the present tense, on the assumption that the Assembly will be voting on it during the meeting in Belgrade of the officials who are to prepare the meeting of representatives of Ministers to be held in Belgrade later in pursuance of the CSCE final act.

10. The Committee originally called for "a full record" of the implementation of the CSCE final act to be drawn up, with particular attention to confidence-building measures. The allied countries are in fact now busily engaged in compiling just such a record, and your Rapporteur has accepted Mr. Scholten's amendment (No. 4) to delete the word "full", so paragraph 1 (a) now reads "by continuing to compile... the record". Paragraphs 42 to 57 of Document 726 describe in some detail action taken by NATO and Warsaw Pact countries under the headings "Prior notification of major military manoeuvres" (mandatory) ; "Prior notification of other military manoeuvres" (optional) ; "Exchange of observers" (voluntary and bilateral) ; "Prior notification of major military movements" (optional) and "Other items" — which includes exchange visits of military personnel and delegations. That information in Document 726 was up to date to about September 1976.

11. The Committee presents the following summary information concerning action by NATO, Warsaw Pact and non-aligned countries up to the present time. It may be anticipated that more scope may arise for reporting military manoeuvres by the Warsaw Pact countries, if indeed

they are coming round to the view that such notification is not detrimental to their interests, in the fall of 1977 which is the traditional time for land army manoeuvres.

Prior notification of major military manoeuvres (over 25,000 troops)

	1975	
NATO		3
Warsaw Pact		nil
neutral and non-aligned		1
	1976	
NATO		3
Warsaw Pact		3
neutral and non-aligned		nil
	1977	
NATO		nil
Warsaw Pact		1
neutral and non-aligned		nil

Prior notification of smaller-scale and other manoeuvres

	1975	
NATO		3
Warsaw Pact		nil
neutral and non-aligned		1
	1976	
NATO		4
Warsaw Pact		2
(the notification for these manoeuvres was given at very short notice)		
neutral and non-aligned		2
	1977	
NATO		1
Warsaw Pact		nil
neutral and non-aligned		1

Invitation of observers to manoeuvres

	1975	
NATO		1
Warsaw Pact		nil
neutral and non-aligned		1
	1976	
NATO		4
Warsaw Pact		3
neutral and non-aligned		1
	1977	
NATO		nil
Warsaw Pact		nil
neutral and non-aligned		1

Prior notification of major military movements

Since the Helsinki summit of the CSCE there have been no notifications of such movements.

Other items

Since the Helsinki summit of the CSCE there have been a number of bilateral exchanges of military delegations and naval ship visits between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

12. The Committee now places more emphasis on the need "to strengthen and extend" the confidence-building measures, as explained in paragraph 57 of Document 726. Accordingly, the original phrase in the recommendation has been made a separate sub-paragraph 1 (b) (iv). Paragraph 1 of the operative text is otherwise unchanged. The status of the MBFR negotiations, explained in paragraphs 30 to 41 of Document 726 remains unchanged; they are not expected to progress until after some agreement is reached on SALT II. In December 1976 the NATO countries tabled in Vienna fresh figures put forward by the Warsaw Pact countries for the first time in June 1976. Your Rapporteur has accepted Mr. Scholten's amendment (No. 4) with one change — the end of paragraph 2 now reads "bridge the gap between Warsaw Pact and NATO positions", instead of "proposals" in the amendment.

13. Paragraph 3 of the operative text is new, but is already foreshadowed by the Committee's comments in paragraph 18 of the explanatory memorandum of Document 726, the last two sentences of which read: "An agreement in SALT II to ban the further development by either party [of cruise missiles] will not jeopardise western security. Experience shows that the only possible alternative in the longer run would be the full deployment of cruise missiles by both the United States and the Soviet Union, with greatly increased uncertainties in the nuclear equation..."

14. The publication "Aviation Week and Space Technology" on 23rd May, published after the three-day talks in Washington between the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Vance, and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, claimed that "US and Soviet strategic arms negotiators, meeting last week in Geneva, based their discussion on the proposed moratorium for cruise missile development for an interim period in exchange for possible restrictions by the Soviet Union on its Tupolev Backfire bomber and some reductions in the total number of strategic delivery vehicles". It was understood that the cruise missile moratorium would remain in effect until a third SALT agreement could be concluded, if SALT II was to be agreed in the relatively near future, and hence be limited to less far-reaching objectives.

15. The Committee is aware that a strategic cruise missile may prove an attractively inexpensive and effective replacement for the present generation of British and French submarine-launched ballistic missiles. At the same time it recognises that with arms control agreements relying solely on "national means of verification", verification of such missiles is possible only during the development stage when test flights can be observed by means external to the countries in which they are conducted. Once development is completed, it will not be possible to negotiate a verifiable agreement to restrict the numbers deployed or to ban them completely, because unlike strategic missiles in silos, cruise missiles cannot be observed by satellites or other external means. Thus the choice facing East and West alike at the present time is either to ban strategic cruise missiles completely, or to accept their ultimate deployment by both sides even though Soviet deployment might lag behind that of the West by five or more years. A moratorium on testing now would give time to assess the advantages or disadvantages to the western allies of full-scale deployment by both the allies and the Soviet Union.

16. In an unusually frank interview with Mr. William Beacher, reporter of the "Boston Globe" published on 10th May, two senior members of the Soviet "Institute for the Study of the United States" spoke of the type of SALT II agreement which might conceivably be possible from a Soviet point of view; it would include:

- a 10 % reduction in the Vladivostok ceiling of 2,400 long-range missiles and bombers;
- "some limitation" on Soviet deployment of the Backfire bomber;
- a ban on cruise missiles on attack submarines, surface ships and land launchers;
- and possible limitation on the numbers of tests of ICBMs.

17. The re-numbered paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation remains unchanged. The Committee's proposals for a suitable forum for East-West negotiations on Eurostrategic missiles ("Euro-SALT") are described in paragraphs 28 and 29 of Document 726.

Minority opinion

18. A minority of the Committee would have deleted paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation for the reasons stated in the minority opinion given at the end of Document 726.

APPENDIX

Draft Recommendation on European security and East-West relations***adopted by the Committee on 29th November 1976¹***

The Assembly,

Aware that the military capability of the Soviet Union is continually increasing, as vast improvements in Soviet technology enhance the effectiveness of its unquestioned numerical superiority in manpower and equipment, and as new strategic nuclear missiles are deployed which threaten Western Europe ;

Believing that a policy of détente can be actively and safely pursued only on the basis of close consultation and cohesion in the Atlantic Alliance, backed by public support for a fully adequate defence effort ;

Considering that there are both positive and negative features in the application by the Warsaw Pact countries of existing East-West agreements affecting détente, and in the progress of other ongoing negotiations ;

Calling for all such agreements to be continuously and closely monitored in the Alliance, as well as in WEU, with a view to ensuring their strict observation by both sides, and to assessing the spirit in which the voluntary provisions of the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe are being interpreted by the Warsaw Pact countries ;

Believing however that, properly conducted, the process of détente can bring advantages to both East and West in increasing stability and security at lower economic cost to both,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

That it urge member governments :

1. To seek to ensure that the North Atlantic Council make careful preparation for the meeting to be held in Belgrade in 1977 in pursuance of the CSCE final act :

(a) by compiling, on the basis of reports from member States, a full record of the implementation by the Warsaw Pact countries of the CSCE final act, with particular attention to all items in the documents on "confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament", on "co-operation in humanitarian and other fields" as well as to co-operation in other fields ;

(b) by agreeing that the policy of all members of the Alliance at the meeting shall be :

- (i) to ensure at the preparatory meeting to be held on 15th June that the meeting at the level of representatives appointed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs is not delayed ;
- (ii) to exclude from the agenda any proposed new items which seek to undermine Alliance policy ;
- (iii) to present the full record of the implementation of the final act so far, to seek to strengthen and extend the voluntary provisions for confidence-building measures, and to report on the progress or lack of progress of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions ;

2. To ensure that the MBFR negotiations are pursued with determination on the present lines until the Soviet Union is prepared to make acceptable concessions to the NATO position ;

3. To propose that Soviet nuclear missiles based outside the MBFR guidelines area, but targeted on Western Europe, and other comparable forward-based nuclear weapons, be discussed in an appropriate East-West arms control forum.

1. Document 726.

AMENDMENT No. 1¹***tabled by Mr. Rivière***

1. In the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "Atlantic Alliance" insert "Western European Union and the European Economic Community,".

2. In paragraph 1 (b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "the Alliance" and insert "WEU".

In paragraph 1 (b) (ii) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Alliance" and insert "jointly-defined".

Signed: Rivière

1. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back to the Committee).

* * *

AMENDMENT No. 2¹***tabled by Mr. Rivière***

1. At the end of the last paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert :

"and in permitting the division of Europe in antagonistic blocs to be attenuated,"

2. In paragraph 1 (b) (iii) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out :

"and to report on the progress or lack of progress of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions ;"

3. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed: Rivière

1. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back to the Committee).

* * *

AMENDMENT No. 3¹***tabled by Mr. La Combe***

In the draft recommendation proper, after the words "RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL" leave out "that it urge member governments : 1. To ensure that the North Atlantic Council make careful preparation" and insert "1. To make careful preparation".

Signed: La Combe

1. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back to the Committee).

AMENDMENT No. 4¹
tabled by Mr. Scholten

1. In paragraph 1 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "full".
2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "make acceptable concessions to the NATO position" and insert "bridge the gap between Warsaw Pact and NATO proposals".

Signed: Scholten

-
1. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back to the Committee).

* * *

AMENDMENT No. 5¹
tabled by Mr. Dankert

1. At the end of the last paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert :
"and in permitting the division of Europe in antagonistic blocs to be attenuated,"
2. In paragraph 1 (b) (iii) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out :
"and to report on the progress or lack of progress of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions ;"

Signed: Dankert

-
1. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back to the Committee).

European security and East-West relations

AMENDMENT No. 1¹

tabled by Mr. Roberti

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "until the Soviet Union is prepared to bridge the gap" and insert "until the gap is bridged".
2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed: Roberti

1. See 3rd Sitting, 21st June 1977 (Part 1 agreed to.; part 2 withdrawn).

**Application of the Brussels Treaty
Reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council**

REPORT ¹

**submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur**

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Conclusions

1. Adopted in Committee by 11 votes to 2 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Crichtley (Chairman) ; Mr. Dankert (Vice-Chairman) ; MM. Ahrens, Beauguitte (Alternate : *Delorme*), Bizet (Alternate : *La Combe*), Boldrini, Bonnel, Boucheny, Fosson (Alternate : *Del Duca*), Grant (Alternate : *Banko*), Handlos, *Hardy*, Konen,

de Koster, Lemmrich, *Maggioni*, Ménard, Pawelczyk (Alternate : *Lemp*), Pecchioli, *Rivière*, Roberti, Roper, Hermann Schmidt, Scholten (Alternate : *Piket*), Schugens (Alternate : *Duvieusart*), *Tanghe*, Whitehead.

N. B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation**on the application of the Brussels Treaty — reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council**

The Assembly,

Congratulating the Council on the content of its replies to Assembly recommendations when these emanate from the Council itself or from delegations ;

Thanking the Council for the welcome it gave the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments at the conversations on 31st May 1976 ;

Noting certain shortcomings in the application of the provisions of the Brussels Treaty concerning the control of armaments ;

Gratified that the Council has given the Standing Armaments Committee a mandate whose scope extends well beyond the field of activities hitherto conferred on that body,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that replies to Assembly recommendations furnished by other international organisations are no less precise than those prepared by the Council ;
2. Indicate in future annual reports :
 - (a) the total number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe ;
 - (b) the number of such forces assigned to SACEUR in accordance with the commitment contained in Article VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty ;
3. Ensure a fuller application of the provisions of the treaty concerning the control of armaments, with particular regard to biological and chemical weapons ;
4. (a) Ensure a continuing exchange of information between the independent European programme group and the Standing Armaments Committee ;
 - (b) Ensure that the number, status, qualifications and level of the representatives of the member countries on the Standing Armaments Committee are high enough to guarantee the effectiveness of the work undertaken ;
 - (c) Encourage national authorities to provide the Standing Armaments Committee with all the information it requires ;
 - (d) Ensure that the study undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee is extended to the field of research in order to ensure European co-operation in this sector ;
 - (e) Keep the Assembly regularly informed about the tasks entrusted to the Standing Armaments Committee, the time-table and successive stages and the results obtained.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. The Committee welcomes the determination to promote European co-operation in defence matters recently expressed by the Council of Ministers. Indeed, on 31st May 1976, the latter decided to instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to submit to it a detailed outline study of the armaments industries in the member countries. Once this had been done, the Council adopted it in a form which unfortunately has not been described to the Assembly, and this is regrettable. Today therefore WEU is in a position to develop considerably its work in co-ordinating and strengthening the armaments industries of the member States.

2. The urgency of such an undertaking aimed at rationalising and putting in order Europe's armaments production potential is keenly felt everywhere. There are three main reasons for this need for co-operation: the necessity for the European industries to have wider and better guaranteed outlets and resources, the need for joint protection against American competition and above all the productivity requirement to which the armaments industries are subjected in order to maintain the cost of new equipment at the lowest possible level. The symposium organised by the Assembly on 3rd and 4th March last bears witness to these concerns. It was then noted that co-operation in armaments is the basis on which it will be possible to define the rôle of the future European union in defence matters. To this end, the work of the WEU Council and of its Standing Armaments Committee warrant the greatest attention. Their work may help to build an effective coherent industrial framework in the military production sector and pave the way for a convergence of defence policies and security in Europe.

3. As before, the Committee welcomes the Council's promptness in communicating the annual report, i.e. by 11th March. The chapter numbers in the present report correspond to those in the Council's report.

CHAPTER I

Relations between the Council and the Assembly

4. With regard to the Council's replies to Assembly recommendations, the annual report points out that:

"the Council are not the only international body empowered to deal with the questions covered by Article VIII of the modified

Brussels Treaty. The member States of WEU are also members of the European Community, the North Atlantic Council and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which also have authority to discuss some of these problems. The Council continued to take account of the work in hand in those organisations when arranging their own activities."

5. When the Council transmits an Assembly recommendation to another organisation for a reply, however, the Committee would appreciate it if such replies were not less substantial than those prepared by the Council itself. With the assistance of the delegations of the seven countries to the other organisation in question, it should be possible to give satisfaction in these particular cases.

6. The Committee thanks the Council for having received it in Brussels on 31st May 1976 for an informal exchange of views under the chairmanship of Mr. Destremau, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and by a happy coincidence a former Chairman of the Committee. This meeting was held in the best conditions; representatives of several countries spoke, as did members of the Committee, which hopes it will be possible to renew the experience next year.

CHAPTER II

Activities of the Council

7. Prominent among the activities of the Council was the new life injected into the work of the Standing Armaments Committee. This new development in the work of the Council is examined in Chapter IV.

(a) *Level of British forces on the mainland of Europe*

8. Under Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty, the United Kingdom undertook to maintain on the mainland of Europe, "assigned to SACEUR", a number of troops which the Council has now fixed at 55,000 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force. This duty to fix the level of the British commitment is undeniably the most important part of the Council's present activities.

9. In its reply to Recommendation 213¹, the Council stated that the United Kingdom under-

¹ Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1971 on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 558, Rapporteur Mr. Vedovato.

took to state in the annual report each year the current level of British forces on the continent. The Committee notes that the level duly reported at 30th November 1976 amounted to 60,985 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force. But in its reply to Written Question 170¹ and Recommendation 284², the Council recognised that "the United Kingdom's commitment (under Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty) to maintain a certain level of forces on the mainland of Europe relates not to the total level of United Kingdom forces on the mainland (which includes personnel in Berlin and Gibraltar), but only to those which are assigned to SACEUR. For the purpose of this commitment the level approved by the Council is still 55,000 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force" and that "the figure of 60,066 men on the continent of Europe is, as stated in the twenty-first annual report, the total level of ground forces manpower. It therefore includes personnel in Berlin and Gibraltar, which are not reckoned in the commitment to maintain 55,000 men 'assigned to SACEUR'."

10. The Committee recommends that future annual reports indicate not only the total troop strengths of British land forces on the mainland but also the level of British land forces *included in the definition of the commitment*: "The figure of 55,000 includes not only BAOR but those United Kingdom personnel in the various allied headquarters and command organisations such as HQ NORTHAG and HQ AFCENT who may properly be reckoned as being 'assigned to SACEUR'."

11. The present annual report adds: "The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty there. At 30th November 1976 there were some 4,419 men from BAOR in Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated, these units could be speedily returned to their duty stations in an emergency affecting NATO." The Committee notes that the corresponding figure for last year was only 3,700.

(b) *Amendments to the list of prohibited weapons*

12. On some twelve occasions since the conclusion of the modified Brussels Treaty in 1954, the Council has amended the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III which specifies the weapons which the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes not to manufacture on its territory. No amendments to this list have been reported by

the Council during 1976, the year covered by the annual report.

13. The last amendment to this list, made by the Council on 26th September 1973, raised the tonnage of submarines which Germany is authorised to manufacture on its territory from 450 to 1,800 tons. Under the previous limit, Germany had also been authorised to manufacture up to six submarines not exceeding 1,000 tons and this quota of six submarines had subsequently been exported — four to Greece and two to Turkey — as the Committee has previously reported.¹

CHAPTER III

Agency for the Control of Armaments

(a) *Non-application of controls*

14. The Committee has always stressed the inadequate application of the provisions of the Brussels Treaty, and particularly Protocols Nos. III and IV, on the control of armaments. It is surprising to read in the Council's report that:

"On various occasions during the year under review, the Council re-stated to the Assembly the importance which they attach to the modified Brussels Treaty *and its protocols*.² Moreover, the determination of each of the WEU partners to fulfil the obligations entered into was reaffirmed in the speeches made by several ministers of the member governments to the Assembly.

The Council continued to pay close attention to the implementation of the treaty *and its protocols*.² The various related problems were regular items on their agenda. Thus, the different aspects and stages of implementation of the Paris Agreements appeared on the agenda for their meetings thirty-four times."

whereas the same report mentions fields where the Agency does not exercise these activities:

"The situation described in previous annual reports regarding certain armaments, remained unchanged in 1976.

In present circumstances, the Agency's activities do not extend to atomic weapons or, in one member State, to what that State calls "strategic forces".

Nor does the Agency apply any controls to biological weapons.

1. Put by Mr. Haase on 15th April 1976.

2. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1976 on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 700, Rapporteur Mr. Haase.

1. Report on the application of the Brussels Treaty adopted by the Committee on 21st May 1974, Document 638, paragraph 11, Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe.

2. Rapporteur's italics.

The control activities dealt with in this chapter do not, therefore, concern these categories of armaments.

In the case of chemical weapons, only non-production controls take place; no quantitative controls are made in this field since none of the member States concerned has declared possessing such armaments."

15. The annual report subsequently adds :

"(c) As the Convention for the due process of law¹ has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1976, as in previous years, to take the form of 'agreed control measures'.

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency must give some six weeks' notice. *This agreement has never been withheld.*"²

16. Agreement had always been given up to 1976, the year covered by the Council's report.

17. It is nevertheless necessary to underline the basic weakness of controls on chemical weapons to which the Council itself has drawn attention in earlier reports: "in the absence of a due process of law, it cannot be claimed that the Agency's methods, particularly in the case of chemical weapons, have reached a fully satisfactory state of development"³. A solution should therefore be found to allow satisfactory control of chemical and biological weapons. The governments concerned should ensure that the firms show greater willingness to accept the verifications undertaken by the Agency. The situation is more complicated where nuclear weapons are concerned. It is not very realistic to think that the French Government could be the only one to accept controls on its deterrent when this is not so for the United Kingdom or the United States. In fact, the juridical order instituted by the Brussels Treaty no longer corresponds in full to the new situation created by the formation of the French nuclear deterrent force. This is no doubt the reason why France has not thought fit to authorise the control by the Agency of the forces that France styles "strategic". The Council

1. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member States of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957). [Ratified by six States only: Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom.]

2. Rapporteur's italics.

3. Eighteenth annual report of the Council (for 1972), Document 598.

has taken note of the statement of the French representatives on this subject. It should however be appreciated that with the exception of these forces, the Agency, while not applying controls to nuclear weapons, because it has never received the Council's authorisation to do so, does apply controls to the other delivery vehicles (missiles, aircraft, guns, etc.), whether fitted with conventional or nuclear warheads.

18. In any event, according to the annual report :

"The Agency's basic assumption in this respect, which is supported by the observations of previous years, is that the undertakings and declarations of member countries are being honoured. Clearly, if any doubt existed on this point, control measures would have to be increased..."

(b) *Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments*

19. Although the political reticence of governments, or of some of them, limits the Agency's scope, it is active and efficient in the fields open to it and deserves the Committee's praise. It may be said that controls are applied in respect of conventional weapons on the mainland of Europe (including aircraft) and various missile systems capable of carrying nuclear bombs and warheads — although, of course, the warheads concerned remain in United States custody and are not subject to control by the Agency. The Council confirmed the situation in reply to Written Question 142, put by Mr. Tanghe on 27th May 1976.

20. The number of inspections carried out each year by the Agency shows no reduction in its activities.

CHAPTER IV

Standing Armaments Committee

(a) *General*

21. It is evident that an important factor in the activities of WEU in 1976 was the adoption by the Council of Ministers at its meeting in Brussels on 31st May of a mandate for the Standing Armaments Committee. The Committee was instructed to submit to the Permanent Council, before the end of 1976, a detailed outline programme for a descriptive analysis of the situation of the armaments industry in member countries. The purpose of this analysis was to define the various categories of equipment coming under the heading of "armaments", collect economic data on armaments industries and describe the various legal statuses of armaments firms in these countries.

22. The text of the mandate was transmitted by the Council to the Assembly on 25th October 1976. It may be wondered why it took the Council

*Numbers and types of inspections
carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments*

	Control measures at depots		Control measures at units under national command		Control measures at production plants (quantitative control measures)		Total quantitative control measures		Control measures at production plants (non-production control measures)		Total control measures (all categories)	
1961	29		15		12		66		7		63	
2	26		20		11		57		7		65	
3	35		13		13		61		10		74	
4	39		19		13		71		9		80	
5	26		16		11		53		7		60	
6	*		*		*		*		*		78	
7	*		*		*		*		*		70	
8	*		*		*		*		*		79	
9	*		*		*		*		*		77	
1970	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	82	72
1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	82	72
2		*		*		*		*		*		66
3		*		*		*		*		*		66
4		*		*		*		*		*		71
5		*		*		*		*		*		72
1976		*		*		*		*		*		71

Note a, b : from 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thenceforth counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of figures (old and new style — *a* and *b*) for the years 1970 and 1971.

Sources : Figures for 1961-65 are derived from the published annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the Committee. Those for 1970 to 1976 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213 of the Assembly, but permission to publish them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are without significance.

* Confidential information not for publication.

five months to communicate a text of this nature which, if read, is seen to contain nothing which cannot be revealed to the public. It is learnt from Chapter II.B.3 of the annual report of the Council that the outline programme was submitted to the Council on 9th February 1977. Moreover, the Council's reply to Recommendation 293 indicates that "the Assembly will be duly informed of their conclusions".

23. Finally, your Rapporteur concludes from the information gleaned in the course of the dinner given by the Council for members of the Presidential Committee of the Assembly on 26th April 1977 and at the press conference held on the same day by Mr. Taittinger, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Chairman-in-Office of

the Council, that the Council actually adopted the outline programme at its ministerial meeting on 26th April. He has not ascertained whether it was adopted in the form prepared by the SAC or whether the Council amended it.

24. It should in fact be underlined that so far the Council has given the Assembly *no specific information on what has happened about the SAC mandate since 31st May 1976*. It is essential that the Council let the Assembly know as soon as possible how it intends to inform the Assembly on the one hand of the substance of the outline programme submitted by the SAC at the beginning of 1977 and, on the other, what kind of decision it has taken on it: has the Council merely decided to apply it or has it been amended,

cut down or added to? Had the Council supplied this information earlier, your Rapporteur would probably not have had to tackle certain matters which may already have been settled to his satisfaction. In any event, it would have allowed him to be more specific in his suggestions on the mandate given to the SAC.

25. In its published form there is no explanatory memorandum to the SAC mandate. However, addresses to the Assembly by a number of ministers clarify to some extent the motivations of at least some members of the Council, particularly the address by Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium on 5th December 1976. Mr. Van Elslande stressed that the European Community was feeling it *increasingly necessary to develop its responsibilities in defence matters* in order to meet the ever greater economic and financial difficulties now being encountered by European armaments-producing firms. According to the Belgian Minister, it is therefore a matter of urgency to promote *a pooling of each member country's efforts* in this sector of the economy.

26. Mr. Taittinger, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking at the November 1976 session, defined the aims of the French Government as follows :

"We are awaiting the SAC's proposals with all the more interest since our governments must have at their disposal the fullest possible information before deciding on a real policy of co-operation. Such co-operation, as your Assembly knows, means something quite precise to the French Government : its purpose is that the States of Europe should jointly produce equipment that will meet their common needs ; and it must evoke a real will to act as Europeans in a field where each of us has a major interest in safeguarding his own technological and industrial capacity."

27. Thus in slightly different terms, the two ministers gave what were on the whole very similar indications about what they expected of the task given to the SAC. Although perhaps less explicit on these points, Mr. Thorn and Mr. Wischniewski expressed themselves in the same sense during the November session.

28. Moreover, all the ministers specified that the new task of the SAC should in no event duplicate the work of the independent European programme group for promoting co-operation on armaments matters between the European members of NATO from a military angle. Answering a question by Mr. de Bruyne, Mr. Taittinger defined the aims of the independent European programme group as follows :

"The basic aim of the independent European programme group is to study specific co-oper-

ation programmes. It was with this in mind that the independent European programme group set out to collect and analyse information relating to national armaments plans, which has enabled a number of areas for technological co-operation to be identified. In each of the fields deemed to be promising a group of experts has been set up to determine the real chances of working out joint projects involving several partners."

And he added :

"Even if the fields to be explored in the framework of the independent European programme group present some analogies with those which the SAC will be called upon to study, duplication will be avoided by co-ordinating the work. It has been agreed that the group would, in its own studies, take into account those being carried out by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee. As a matter of fact, I believe it may be affirmed that overlapping should be all the easier to avoid because, as you noted in your report on European union and WEU, the work of these two bodies is not conducted on the same plane. *The study which the SAC has been asked to carry out is more of an economic and legal nature than a military one, and differs from that of the European programme group, which is directed towards the implementation of concrete projects for equipping the armed forces.*"¹

(b) *Co-ordinating the work of the SAC and the IEPG*

29. When the problem is put in this way, one of the points on which the WEU Council must take a clear decision emerges, i.e. how to *co-ordinate the work of the SAC* and of the *independent European programme group*. It implies, to say the least, that there must be mutual information, essentially on the one hand to avoid duplication and on the other to ensure that the basic definitions of the two bodies' work are the same. However, for reasons which escape your Rapporteur, it would appear that the governments did not wish to set up an organic system of co-operation between the SAC and the independent European programme group.

30. But such exchange of information is essential. It can obviously be done by extremely flexible means involving no institutional measures. However, a consensus of all the participants is essential if any kind of procedure is to function satisfactorily. Naturally, it might be possible to manage with exchanges of information between the two delegations from each country, the delegations to the IEPG informing the delegation to the SAC and vice versa of

1. Rapporteur's italics.

what each body is doing. But such a procedure seems both unhealthy and fragile because should for any reason information not be transmitted with equal satisfaction in all countries, useless divergencies might arise between the interpretations of the various delegations. Only information given by one voice can produce satisfactory results.

31. On the other hand, two forms of co-operation appear both possible and desirable, particularly since one does not preclude the other. The first would be for the "pilot country" for each of the IEPG's activities to be made responsible for providing the international secretariat of the SAC with information on the work for which that country has responsibility. This procedure would have the advantage of avoiding duplication at every stage of work. It might present certain difficulties if countries which are not members of WEU were "pilot countries" in the IEPG, but this does not appear to be the case at present. Should the case arise, another country might be made responsible for informing the SAC.

32. The second solution would be to ask the chairman of the IEPG to keep the SAC informed. This would probably be a more cumbersome and less efficient procedure, but it in no way precludes the first solution. In any event, it is essential for the Council to indicate how it intends to avoid duplication which it says it wishes to avoid at all costs.

(c) *Means necessary for the SAC to operate*

33. Your Rapporteur's second remark is that, according to the documents transmitted to members of the Assembly, there is no indication that the Standing Armaments Committee will be granted additional credits for pursuing its mandate. This means that it cannot carry out major research work itself and will have to rely on the data supplied by member countries. This means that the value of its work *will depend very largely on the good will of the member governments*, since only they will be responsible for deciding how much information should be released to the SAC, what definitions they will use and the classification to be accorded to such information. Each government will thus retain the ability to minimise the work of the SAC, which will consequently depend solely on the degree to which governments and their staff wish to co-operate. Should any of them have the slightest thought of reducing the scope of the study, it would be hard to see how the SAC could win.

34. It is to be hoped that this is not and will not be the case in the future, but it is a point on which the Assembly must be particularly vigilant. The good will of the governments will

obviously be demonstrated in the level, status, number and ability of the persons representing them in the various activities of the SAC and the regularity of their participation in its work. For instance, the study undertaken by the SAC might be adopted at a meeting within that body of the Ministers of Defence who have never yet met in the framework of WEU. But before reaching this stage, the governments must show a necessary degree of flexibility and wish for continuity by having senior-ranking officials or officers take part in the work of the SAC, and also by ensuring that their representatives are particularly competent in each of the matters studied, particularly from the economic and legal points of view.

35. Nor should *armaments research* be neglected since it occupies an increasingly large place in the investment budgets of most European countries. The SAC's work would fall short of one of its essential aims if it failed to include consideration of the structure and financing of research with a view to achieving very close co-operation in this field. It would obviously further the cause of co-operation *to draw up statutes for a European research body* and prepare the way for a multinational financing system, which is essential if research is to be carried out on truly European lines.

36. Last but certainly not least, at every stage of the SAC's work its aims must remain clear to all participants. What counts is obviously not so much the study itself as the fact that it must lead to effective measures for protecting and strengthening Europe's economic and military defence capability.

37. The fact that the independent European programme group has no secretariat whereas the SAC has an international secretariat should allow the latter, while remaining a WEU body, to have a certain degree of independence of action in order to form a wider and more independent entity in the service of this cause. This is a prospect which has always been advocated by the WEU Assembly, particularly in adopting Recommendation 291, in which it stated that in the light of *present* mutual undertakings and institutions it considered WEU to be *the nucleus of the future European union in defence matters*.

38. There is no need to emphasise that in your Rapporteur's opinion there can be no question of envisaging this future European union in isolation from a defence policy defined and exercised by the Atlantic Alliance. The purpose is to strengthen the means available to the Alliance by consolidating its European pillar, which from every point of view conforms to the constantly-expressed wishes of the North Atlantic Council over the years.

Conclusions

39. The Committee's principal conclusions are set out in the draft recommendation.

Paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation

40. The problems of replies to Assembly recommendations is mentioned in paragraph 5 of this explanatory memorandum.

Paragraph 2

41. The problem of statistics on British force

commitments on the mainland of Europe is described in paragraphs 8 to 10.

Paragraph 3

42. The problem of controls is explained in paragraphs 14 to 18.

Paragraph 4

43. The Committee's recommendations on the Standing Armaments Committee are based on the conclusions of Chapter IV and in particular paragraphs 29 to 35.

*Application of the Brussels Treaty
Reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT No. 1¹
tabled by Mr. Critchley

1. Leave out the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :
“Noting that the more important arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty have never been applied and that those that are have become unnecessary ;”.
2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :
“3. Abrogate the arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty when the mutual defence obligations of that treaty are effectively incorporated in a treaty on a European union controlling all its external defence and foreign policy ;”.

Signed : Critchley

1. See 2nd Sitting, 21st June 1977 (Amendment negatived).

***Application of the Brussels Treaty
Reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council***

AMENDMENT No. 2¹

tabled by Mr. Roper

1. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :
"Continue to indicate in future annual reports the total number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe and consider whether in the light of the security requirement of the governments concerned it can indicate the number of such forces assigned to SACEUR in accordance with the commitment contained in Article VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty ;".
2. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed : Roper

1. See 2nd Sitting, 21st June 1977 (Part 1 agreed to ; part 2 negatived).

**Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems —
the Western Mediterranean**

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ¹

**to the report prepared by Mr. Mendelson, Rapporteur,
and adopted on 9th May 1977**

**submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Urwin, Rapporteur**

Draft Recommendation

on Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems — the Western Mediterranean

The Assembly,

Having surveyed the present political situation in Spain ;

Gratified that the elections on 15th June 1977 testified to the Spanish people's free choice in favour of a democratic parliamentary régime ;

Recognising the important constitutional and political changes which have occurred in Spain during the last sixteen months ;

Welcoming the moves towards a more liberal system of government which have taken place since 1975, in particular the legalisation of political parties and of free and independent trade unions ;

Recognising the important advances made in the new preliminary constitution of Spain, and expressing the hope that Spain will proceed on its way towards a full system of parliamentary democracy ;

Expressing the wish that Spain will soon be able to take its place in the process of building Europe ;

Noting that Spain is in fact already associated with western defence policy in Europe,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine closely the evolution of the Spanish political régime, the application of universal suffrage and guarantees of public freedom ;
2. Insofar as there are valid guarantees regarding the establishment of democracy, promote the early participation of Spain in Western Europe's economic and political activities ;
3. Study the possibility of close co-operation between Spain and the WEU member countries.

1. Adopted in Committee by 16 votes to 2 with 3 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mrs. von Bothmer (Chairman); Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Abens, Amrehn (Alternate: Reddemann), Ariosto (Alternate: Maggioni), Beith, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Brugnon, Cermolacce, Faulds, Gessner, Mrs. Godinache-

Lambert, MM. Gonella (Alternate: Pecoraro), Grangier, von Hassel, Leynen, Mende, Minnoci (Alternate: Treu), Nessler, de Niet, Peijnenburg, Péridier, Porthoine, Segre, Urwin, Van Hoeylandt (Alternate: Hulpiau).

N. B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Urwin, Rapporteur)

Since the General Affairs Committee adopted the report submitted by Mr. Mendelson, three events have led the Committee to amend the text it adopted on 9th May 1977.

1. Since Mr. Mendelson is no longer a member of the Assembly, another Rapporteur had to be asked to submit the General Affairs Committee's report.

2. In its reply to Recommendation 292 received by the Assembly on 17th June, the WEU Council defined its position towards the new parliamentary democracies which have recently come into being in Southern Europe as follows:

"The importance of defence and of the promotion of parliamentary democracy has frequently been reflected in the emphasis laid on these subjects during contacts between the representatives of the member countries and those of other members of the

international community. In this context, the member countries of WEU have been specially attentive to their relations with the new parliamentary democracies which have recently come into being in Southern Europe. There is a growing likelihood that these democracies will take an increasing part in the process of European integration."

3. The Spanish elections on 15th June 1977 confirmed that since 1975 a very large majority of the Spanish people chose to follow a liberal, parliamentary course. The results of the elections, as published in the press on 18th June, are given at appendix.

In view of these three events, the Committee felt it could express more detailed views on 20th June than it could on 9th May, and it has therefore decided to submit to the Assembly the draft recommendation herewith.

APPENDIX

Spanish general elections on 15th June 1977 — Results for 95 % of the votes cast ¹

	<i>Seats</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>%</i>
Democratic Centre Union	165	6,020,993	47.14
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	119	4,998,827	33.71
Spanish Communist Party	20	1,582,022	5.71
Popular Alliance	17	1,449,091	4.85
Catalan Democratic Pact	9	436,564	—
Basque Nationalist Party	8	274,521	—
Socialist Union	6	761,625	1.61
Centre Independents	2	91,094	—
Democratic Centre — Catalan Christian Democracy	2	160,966	—
Catalan Esquerra	1	133,803	—
Left-Wing Basque	1	59,335	—
Left-Wing Democratic Front	—	254,872	—
Christian Democrat Federation	—	243,566	—
Democratic Socialist Alliance	—	126,305	—
Other	—	939,511	1.9

1. *Source* : *Diario* 16, 18th June 1977.

