

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-THIRD ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

November 1977

IV

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

W E U

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tel. 723.54.32

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The Proceedings of the Second Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume III : Assembly Documents.

Volume IV : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
BONNEL Raoul	PLP
HANIN Charles	Chr. Soc.
MANGELSCHOTS Jan	Socialist
PEETERS Renaat	Chr. Soc.
TANGHE Francis	Chr. Soc.
VAN WATERSCHOOT John	Chr. Soc.

Substitutes

MM. BRASSEUR Guy	FDF
DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist
LAMBIOTTE Fortuné	Socialist
PERIN François	PLP
VAN AAL Henri-François	Chr. Soc.
VAN DER ELST Frans	Volksunie
VERLEYSSEN William	Chr. Soc.

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BOUCHENY Serge	Communist
BOULLOCHE André	Socialist
BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
BURCKEL Jean-Claude	RPR
CERMOLACCE Paul	Communist
CERNEAU Marcel	Centre Union
DELORME Claude	Socialist
GRANGIER Edouard	Dem. Left
KAUFFMANN Michel	UCDP
NESSLER Edmond	RPR
PÉRIDIÉ Jean	Socialist
PÉRONNET Gabriel	RCDS
RADIUS René	RPR
RIVIÈRE Paul	RPR
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SCHMITT Robert	RPR (App.)
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
VITTEZ Pierre	Ind. Rep.

Substitutes

MM. BEAUGUITTE André	Ind. Rep.
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BIZET Émile	RPR (App.)
BOURGEOIS Georges	RPR
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DAILLET Jean-Marie	Soc. Dem. Ref.
DEPIETRI César	Communist
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
LA COMBE René	RPR

MM. du LUART Ladislav

MÉNARD Jacques
 PIGNION Lucien
 ROGER Émile
 SOUSTELLE Jacques
 VADEPIED Raoul
 WEBER Pierre

RIAS

Ind. Rep.
 Socialist
 Communist
 Non-party
 UCDP
 Ind. Rep. (App.)

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
BARDENS Hans	SPD
Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM. ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
EVERS Hans	CDU/CSU
GESSNER Manfred	SPD
HANDLOS Franz	CDU/CSU
von HASSEL Kai-Uwe	CDU/CSU
President of the Assembly	
LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU/CSU
MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
MENDE Erich	CDU/CSU
MILZ Peter	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
PFENNIG Gero	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hermann	SPD
SCHWENCKE Olaf	SPD
VOHRER Manfred	FDP

Substitutes

MM. ALBER Siegbert	CDU/CSU
AMREHN Franz	CDU/CSU
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
KLEPSCH Egon	CDU/CSU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
MATTICK Kurt	SPD
PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHEFFLER Hermann	SPD
SCHMIDHUBER Peter	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM	CDU/CSU
Adolf	
UEBERHORST Reinhard	SPD
ZEBISCH Franz Josef	SPD

ITALY

Representatives

MM. ARFÉ Gaetano	Socialist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BOLDRINI Arrigo	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CALAMANDREI Franco	Communist
CORALLO Salvatore	Communist
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
GONELLA Guido	Chr. Dem.
MAGGIONI Desiderio	Chr. Dem.
MINNOCCI Giacinto	Socialist
ORSINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PECORARO Antonio	Chr. Dem.
ROBERTI Giovanni	DN
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SEGRE Sergio	Communist
TREU Renato	Chr. Dem.

Substitutes

Mrs. AGNELLI Susanna	Ind. Rep.
MM. ANTONI Varese	Communist
ARIOSTO Egidio	PSDI
AVELLONE Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
BORGHI Luigi	Chr. Dem.
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DEL DUCA Antonio	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FACCIO Adele	Radical
MM. GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MARAVALLE Fabio	Socialist
Mrs. PAPA DE SANTIS Cristina	Communist
MM. PINTO Biagio	Republican
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
ROSSI Raffaele	Communist
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SGHERRI Evaristo	Communist
TREMAGLIA Pierantonio Mirko	MSI
URSO Salvatore	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. ABENS Victor	Soc. Workers
MARGUE Georges	Chr. Soc.
MART René	Dem.

Substitutes

MM. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
KONEN René	Dem.
SPAUTZ Jean	Chr. Soc.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. CORNELISSEN Pam	CDA
van HULST Johan	CDA
KOOPMAN Bram	Labour
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
VOOGD Johan	Labour

Substitutes

Mr. ter BEEK Relus	Labour
Mrs. van den HEUVEL-de BLANK Ien	Labour
MM. KONINGS Martin	Labour
de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
PEIJNENBURG Marinus	CDA
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Paul CHANNON	Conservative
William CRAIG	Ulster Unionist
Julian CRITCHLEY	Conservative
John FARR	Conservative
Andrew FAULDS	Labour
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Arthur LEWIS	Labour
John PAGE	Conservative
Lord PEDDIE	Labour
Sir John RODGERS	Conservative
MM. John ROPER	Labour
Thomas URWIN	Labour
John WATKINSON	Labour
Phillip WHITEHEAD	Labour

Substitutes

MM. Gordon BAGIER	Labour
Robert BANKS	Conservative
Alan BEITH	Liberal
Robin COOK	Labour
Jim CRAIGEN	Labour
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
Mr. Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
Mr. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Mrs. Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
MM. Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Kevin McNAMARA	Labour
Cranley ONSLOW	Conservative
Dr. Colin PHIPPS	Labour
Mr. George REID	Scottish Nation.
Lord SELSDON	Conservative
MM. Frank TOMNEY	Labour
Kenneth WARREN	Conservative

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

EIGHTH SITTING

Monday, 28th November 1977

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes.
2. Examination of Credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session (Doc. 748).
5. Address by Mrs Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
6. Application of the final act of the CSCE (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 753).
7. European security and African problems (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 754).
8. Changes in the membership of Committees.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes

The President announced the resumption of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly.

The Minutes of Proceedings of the Seventh Sitting on Thursday, 23rd June 1977, were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Examination of Credentials

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stating that that Assembly had ratified the credentials of the Representatives and Substitutes given in Notice No. 8.

In accordance with Rule 6(2) of the Rules of Procedure, and subject to ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of:

- Mr. Peeters as a Representative of Belgium to fill a vacant seat;
- Mr. Pfennig as a Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany in place of Mr. Amrehn;
- Mr. Amrehn as a Substitute of the Federal Republic of Germany in place of Mr. Kohl.

4. Observers

The President welcomed to the Second Part of the Session as parliamentary observers:

- Mr. Camre and Mr. Haarder from Denmark;
- Mr. Fagerheim and Mr. Rønning from Norway;
- Mr. Oliveira Baptista and Mr. Costa Moreira from Portugal;
- Mrs. Fernandez España and Mr. Lazo Diaz, Deputies; Mr. Almodovar and Mr. Escudero, Senators, from Spain.

5. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session

(Doc. 748)

The Assembly adopted the draft Order of Business for the first day.

Speaker (point of order): Lord Duncan-Sandys.

7. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, addressed the Assembly.

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher replied to questions put by MM. Schweneke, Radius, Roper, Müller, Péridier, Boucheny and Vohrer.

8. International terrorism

(Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 761)

The President announced that a Motion for a Recommendation on international terrorism had been tabled by Mr. Müller and others with a request for urgent procedure in accordance with Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure.

The request for urgent procedure had been posted up and the text of the Motion circulated as Document 761.

The Assembly would decide on the request for urgent procedure at its next Sitting.

9. Application of the final act of the CSCE

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 753 and Amendments)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Segre, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : Mr. Roberti, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. De Poi, Cook, Mende, Grieve, Pecchioli, Müller, Urwin and Cavaliere.

The Debate was adjourned.

10. Changes in the membership of Committees

In accordance with Rules 8(3) and 14(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the following nominations made provisionally by the Presidential Committee :

COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium</i> :	MM. Bonnel Dejardin Tanghe	MM. Van Der Elst Lambiotte N...

GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

<i>Belgium</i> :	MM. Hanin Mangelschots Perin	MM. Van Aal Van Waterschoot Van Der Elst
<i>United Kingdom</i> :		Mr. McGuire (in place of Mr. Heffer)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS

<i>Belgium</i> :	MM. Adriaensens Van Waterschoot	MM. Brasseur Verleysen
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COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION

<i>Belgium</i> :	MM. Adriaensens N...	MM. Mangelschots Bonnell
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COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES

<i>Belgium</i> :	MM. Brasseur Van Aal	MM. Lambiotte Perin
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COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS

<i>Belgium</i> :	MM. Bonnel Tanghe	MM. Dejardin Hanin
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In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the following changes in the membership of Committees :

COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium :</i>		Mr. Verleysen (vacant seat)
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. ter Beek de Koster Scholten	MM. Koopman Cornelissen van Hulst

GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

<i>Netherlands :</i>	Mrs. van den Heuvel-de Blank MM. Peijnenburg Porthoine	Mr. Voogd Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra Mr. de Koster
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS

<i>Belgium :</i>		Mr. Peeters (in place of Mr. Verleysen)
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. Cornelissen Konings	MM. Porthoine Koopman

COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION

<i>Belgium :</i>	Mr. Peeters (vacant seat)	
<i>Netherlands :</i>	Mr. Koopman Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra	MM. Voogd van Hulst

COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES

<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. van Hulst Voogd	MM. Cornelissen Stoffelen
<i>United Kingdom :</i>		Mr. McGuire (in place of Mr. Heffer) Mr. Onslow (in place of Mr. Cordle)

COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS

<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. Schlingemann Stoffelen	MM. Peijnenburg Voogd
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11. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 29th November, at 9.30 a.m.

12. Message from the Spanish Parliament

Mr. Escudero, Observer from Spain, delivered a message from the Spanish Parliament.

The Sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹ :

Belgium	MM. Hermann Schmidt Schwencke Vohrer	Netherlands
MM. <i>Van Der Elst</i> (Adriaensens)		MM. <i>Konings</i> (Cornelissen)
Bonnel		van Hulst
<i>Van Aal</i> (Hanin)		Porthoine
<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	Italy	Mrs. <i>van der Werf-Terpstra</i>
<i>Verleyen</i> (Peeters)	MM. Arfé	(Scholten)
Tanghe	Bernini	MM. Stoffelen
	<i>Antoni</i> (Boldrini)	Voogd
France	Bonalumi	
MM. Boucheny	Calamandrei	United Kingdom
Kauffmann	Corallo	Lord Beaumont of Whitley
Péridier	De Poi	Sir Frederic Bennett
Radius	Fosson	MM. Channon
	Gonella	<i>Onslow</i> (Craig)
Federal Republic of Germany	Maggioni	Critchley
Mr. <i>Mattick</i> (Ahrens)	Minnocci	<i>Jessel</i> (Farr)
Mrs. von Bothmer	<i>Cavaliere</i> (Orsini)	<i>Bagier</i> (Faulds)
MM. Enders	Pecchioli	Grieve
<i>Alber</i> (Evers)	Pecoraro	Hardy
Gessner	Roberti	Hawkins
<i>Schmidhuber</i> (Lagershausen)	Sarti	<i>Tomney</i> (Lewis)
Marquardt	Segre	Page
Mende		<i>Cook</i> (Lord Peddie)
Müller	Luxembourg	Sir John Rodgers
Pfennig	MM. Abens	MM. Roper
Reddemann	Margue	Urwin
		Watkinson
		Whitehead

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

Belgium	MM. Nessler	Italy
Mr. Van Waterschoot	Péronnet	Mr. Treu
	Rivière	
France	Schleiter	Luxembourg
MM. Bouloche	Schmitt	Mr. Mart
Brugnon	Valleix	
Burckel	Vitter	Netherlands
Cermolacce		Mr. Koopman
Cerneau	Federal Republic of Germany	
Delorme	MM. Bardens	
Grangier	Handlos	
	Milz	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 29th November 1977

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Application of the final act of the CSCE (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 753 and Amendments*).
2. Communications and crisis management in the Alliance (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 757 and Amendments*).
3. International terrorism (*Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 761*).
4. Address by General Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. Change in the Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session

(Doc. 748)

The President informed the Assembly that the Presidential Committee had decided that the Session should finish on Wednesday, 30th November.

The Assembly accordingly approved the Order of Business as amended.

4. Application of the final act of the CSCE

(*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 753 and Amendments*)

The Debate was resumed.

Speakers : MM. Mattick, Channon, Gessner and Sarti.

Mr. Segre, Rapporteur, and Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett :

In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "is intended to lead" and insert "ought to lead".

Speaker : Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 3), part 1, was tabled by Mr. Cook :

1. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "negotiations" insert :

"particularly in the field of arms control and mutual reduction of forces in Europe".

A verbal amendment to part 1 was proposed by Sir Frederic Bennett to insert the words "and balanced" after the word "mutual".

Speakers : Mr. Cook and Sir Frederic Bennett.

Part 1 of the Amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 1), parts 1 and 2, was tabled by Mr. Roberti :

1. Leave out the last paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

2. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph :

"Considering however that the process of détente depends on guaranteed security for all concerned and that WEU is the only European assembly with responsibilities in European defence matters,".

Parts 1 and 2 of the Amendment were negatived.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by MM. Cavaliere and Roberti :

At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following two new paragraphs :

"Noting with regret that the need to respect the principles of the third basket of the final act of the CSCE is incorrectly considered by the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries to be unjustified interference in their internal affairs ;

Concerned at the serious and continuous violation of human rights still occurring in the Eastern European countries,".

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 1), part 3, was tabled by Mr. Roberti :

3. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert :

"in order to ensure *inter alia* that these negotiations in no event affect, directly or indirectly, Western European Union's conditions, possibilities and means of defence;".

Part 3 of the Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 3), part 2, was tabled by Mr. Cook :

2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "détente" insert :

"through arms control agreements".

Part 2 of the Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 1), part 4, was tabled by Mr. Roberti :

4. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

"3. Ensure that the Eastern European countries apply strictly the clauses of the Helsinki final act in the same manner and at the same time as the WEU member countries.".

Part 4 of the Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 3), part 3, was tabled by Mr. Cook :

3. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "clauses" and insert "provisions".

Part 3 of the Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Bonalumi :

At the end of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert :

", recognising that a reminder of the need to respect all the provisions of the final act in full does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of the signatory States.".

The Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 51 votes to 18¹. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 307)².

5. Communications and crisis management in the Alliance

(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 757 and Amendments)

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Watkinson, Rapporteur.

6. International terrorism

(Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 761)

In accordance with Rule 43(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the Motion for a Recommendation tabled by Mr. Müller and others.

Speaker : Mr. Müller.

Urgent procedure was agreed to.

The Motion for a Recommendation was referred to the General Affairs Committee.

The Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee would be held the next day.

7. Address by General Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe

General Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, addressed the Assembly.

General Haig replied to questions put by MM. Calamandrei, Périquier, Vohrer, Warren, Radius, Forni, Lord Duncan-Sandys, Mr. Watkinson, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Banks, Minnocci, Mattick, Critchley, Faulds, Sir John Rodgers and Mr. Dejardin.

8. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 2.30 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 12.30 p.m.

1. Voting figures announced in the Chamber were : Ayes 50 ; Noes 18 ; Abstentions 0. After verification of the vote, the result is : Ayes 51 ; Noes 18 ; Abstentions 0.

2. See page 20.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹ :

Belgium	MM. Müller	Netherlands
MM. <i>Van Der Elst</i> (Adriaensens)	Pfennig	Mrs. <i>van der Werf-Terpstra</i>
Bonnell	Reddemann	(Cornelissen)
<i>Van Aal</i> (Hanin)	Hermann Schmidt	MM. van Hulst
<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	Schwencke	Koopman
<i>Verleyen</i> (Peeters)	Vohrer	Stoffelen
Tanghe	Italy	<i>Konings</i> (Voogd)
Van Waterschoot	MM. Arfé	
France	Bernini	United Kingdom
MM. Boucheny	<i>Antoni</i> (Boldrini)	Lord Beaumont of Whitley
Brugnon	Bonalumi	Sir Frederic Bennett
Cermolacce	Calamandrei	Mr. Channon
<i>Forni</i> (Delorme)	Corallo	Mrs. <i>Knight</i> (Craig)
Kauffmann	De Poi	MM. Critchley
Péridier	Fosson	<i>Banks</i> (Farr)
Radius	Gonella	Faulds
Rivière	Maggioni	Grieve
Schleiter	Minnocci	Hardy
Federal Republic of Germany	<i>Cavaliere</i> (Orsini)	Hawkins
MM. <i>Mattick</i> (Ahrens)	Pecchioli	<i>Craigen</i> (Lewis)
<i>Scheffler</i> (Bardens)	Pecoraro	Page
Mrs. von Bothmer	Roberti	Lord <i>Hughes</i> (Lord Peddie)
MM. Enders	Sarti	Sir John Rodgers
<i>Alber</i> (Evers)	Segre	MM. Roper
Gessner	Treu	Urwin
<i>Schmidhuber</i> (Lagershausen)	Luxembourg	Watkinson
Marquardt	MM. Abens	Whitehead
Mende	Margue	
	Mart	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

France	MM. Péronnet	Federal Republic of Germany
MM. Bouloche	Schmitt	MM. Handlos
Burckel	Valleix	Milz
Cerneau	Vitter	Netherlands
Grangier		MM. Portheine
Nessler		Scholten

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 1 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on the application of the final act of the CSCE (Doc. 753)¹:

Ayes	51
Noes	18
Abstentions	0

Ayes :

MM. Abens	MM. <i>McGuire</i> (Faulds)	MM. <i>Verleysen</i> (Peeters)
<i>Van Der Elst</i> (Adriaensens)	Fosson	Péridier
<i>Mattick</i> (Ahrens)	Gessner	Radius
Arfé	Gonella	Roper
<i>Scheffler</i> (Bardens)	Hardy	Sarti
Bernini	Kauffmann	Hermann Schmidt
<i>Antoni</i> (Boldrini)	Koopman	Schwencke
Bonalumi	<i>Craig</i> (Lewis)	Segre
Bonnell	Maggioni	Stoffelen
Mrs. von Bothmer	<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	Tanghe
MM. Calamandrei	Margue	Treu
Cermolacce	Marquardt	Urwin
Corallo	Mart	Van Waterschoot
Mrs. <i>Knight</i> (Craig)	Minnocci	Vohrer
MM. <i>Forni</i> (Delorme)	Pecchioli	<i>Konings</i> (Voogd)
De Poi	Pecoraro	Watkinson
Enders	Lord <i>Hughes</i> (Lord Peddie)	Whitehead

Noes :

Lord Beaumont of Whitley	MM. <i>Alber</i> (Evers)	MM. Mende
Sir Frederic Bennett	<i>Banks</i> (Farr)	Müller
Mr. Channon	Grieve	<i>Cavaliere</i> (Orsini)
Mrs. <i>van der Werf-Terpstra</i>	Hawkins	Page
(Cornelissen)	van Hulst	Pfennig
Mr. Critchley	<i>Schmidhuber</i> (Lagershausen)	Reddemann
		Sir John Rodgers

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 307***on the application of the final act of the CSCE***

The Assembly,

Considering that the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe held in Helsinki together with earlier treaties between eastern and western countries opened the way for a process which ought to lead towards international peace, freedom of peoples and the fulfilment of human rights ;

Considering that the development of this process will inevitably be by successive steps ;

Considering that jointly-planned developments must be achieved by all ;

Considering that further steps towards détente at the Belgrade meeting and in other negotiations, particularly in the field of arms control and mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe, are essential for the pursuit of the process of détente ;

Considering that such a stage cannot be completed unless all the participants are firmly determined to achieve positive results,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue to examine the conduct of the Belgrade meeting in parallel with governments and relevant European and Atlantic organisations ;
2. As a priority, endeavour to promote the process of détente through arms control agreements with a view to improving understanding and co-operation between all the signatory States and affirming human rights and fundamental freedoms ;
3. Ensure that all signatory countries apply the provisions of the Helsinki final act, recognising that a reminder of the need to respect all the provisions of the final act in full does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of the signatory States.

TENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 29th November 1977

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 (Doc. 750, Addendum and Amendment); Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1976 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Doc. 749 and Addendum) (*Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts*, Docs. 750, Addendum and Amendment and 749 and Addendum).
2. Communications and crisis management in the Alliance (*Debates on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 757 and Amendments).
3. Contribution of WEU to the development of European union (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 756 and Amendment).
4. European security and African problems (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 754 and Amendments).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 2.30 p.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1978

(Doc. 750, Addendum and Amendment)

Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1976 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts

(Doc. 749 and Addendum)

(Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 750, Addendum and Amendment and 749 and Addendum)

The Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration were presented by Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur.

Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. von Hassel.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. von Hassel, Roper and Alber.

The Debate was closed.

An Amendment (No. 1) to the draft budget for the financial year 1978 was tabled by Lord Selsdon.

The Amendment was agreed to.

The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 in Document 750 and Addendum, as amended, was agreed to unanimously.

The Motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1976 in the Addendum to Document 749 was agreed to unanimously.

Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

4. Communications and crisis management in the Alliance

(Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 757 and Amendments)

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Grant, Critchley, Dejardin, Rivière and Brugnon.

Mr. Watkinson, Rapporteur, and Mr. Roper, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 4), parts 1, 2 and 3, was tabled by MM. Radius and Rivière :

1. Leave out the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :

“Noting the existence of procedures for exchanges of information and consultation between the member States of the Atlantic Alliance in the event of international crises but regretting the absence of comparable procedures in the European framework and deploring the fact that the governments of the WEU member countries do not make use of the possibilities offered in this respect by the Brussels Treaty;”.

2. At the beginning of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “That it urge member governments”.

3. Leave out paragraph 1(b) of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

“(b) by taking steps towards general, complete and controlled disarmament in the framework of all negotiations which respect the real equality of participating States ;”.

Speakers : MM. Rivière and Roper.

Parts 1, 2 and 3 of the Amendment were negatived.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Pawelczyk :

At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new sub-paragraph :

“(c) by ensuring that the arms control negotiations in which members of WEU are participating cover all categories of weapons (including the so-called grey-area weapons) which have an immediate impact on European security ;”.

A verbal amendment to the Amendment was proposed by Mr. Roper to replace the words “are participating” by the words “could participate”.

The Amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 4), part 4, was tabled by MM. Radius and Rivière :

4. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (a) and insert :

“(a) by calling on all member countries to participate fully in the most appropriate European framework (WEU or the European Community) :

(i) at an appropriate high official and, from time to time, at political level, with all relevant government departments, in crisis management exercises based on likely and realistic scenarios ;

(ii) in the provision and evaluation of information and in consultation covering any events that may involve European interests with a view to developing a collectively-agreed assessment of a crisis situation ;

(iii) in subsequent crisis management decisions as often as may be necessary, including the implementation of diplomatic and economic measures ;”.

Speaker : Mr. Rivière.

Part 4 of the Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Banks :

In sub-paragraph 2(a) (iii) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “the provision and evaluation of information, and in consultation, on a world-wide immediate and continuous basis, covering any events that may involve allied interests with a view to”.

Speakers : MM. Banks and Watkinson.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Stoffelen :

In sub-paragraph 2(a) (v) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “in the augmentation of” and insert “in assigning more elements of existing national forces to”.

Speaker : Mr. Roper.

The Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to, note being taken of four abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 308) ¹.

5. Contribution of WEU to the development of European union

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 756 and Amendment)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Forni, Rapporteur.

Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. von Hassel.

The Debate was opened.

1. See page 28.

Speakers : Mrs. Knight (point of order), Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Roper, Cermolacce, Forni, Roper (point of order), Forni, Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Cermolacce and Périquier (point of order).

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Roper :

In the penultimate paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "takes no" and insert "fails to take adequate".

Speaker : Mr. Roper.

The Amendment was agreed to.

Mr. Forni proposed that paragraph 7 of the draft Recommendation be referred to the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. Roper proposed that paragraph 7 also be referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and the Presidential Committee.

The President consulted the Assembly on the reference of paragraph 7 to the General Affairs Committee and for an opinion to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and the Presidential Committee.

The proposals were agreed to.

Mr. Forni, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 23 votes to 1 with 21 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 309) ¹.

6. European security and African problems

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 754 and Amendments)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Müller, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Page, Whitehead, Banks, Cermolacce, Hardy, Hawkins, Minnocci, Mrs. Knight, MM. Bagier, Stoffelen, van Hulst, Antoni and Sir Frederic Bennett.

1. See page 29.

Mr. Müller, Rapporteur, and Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 2), parts 1, 2, 3 and 4, was tabled by Mr. Whitehead and others :

1. Leave out the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

2. In the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "left by decolonisation" and insert "inherited from the colonial period".

3. In the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "can" and insert "should" and leave out all the words after "Africa".

4. After the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph :

"Reaffirming our condemnation of the systematic violation of human rights in certain despotic post-colonial régimes in Africa ;"

Speaker : Mr. Whitehead.

Parts 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Amendment were agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Page and others :

Leave out the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :

"Condemning the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the suppression of civil liberties by African governments ;"

Speakers : MM. Page and Whitehead.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 2), parts 5 and 6, was tabled by Mr. Whitehead and others :

5. In the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "practice" and insert "policy" and after "principles" insert "of democracy and human rights".

6. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph :

"Condemning the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the suppression of civil liberties by the white minority government of South Africa,".

Parts 5 and 6 of the Amendment were agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 2), part 7, was tabled by Mr. Whitehead and others :

7. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "members" insert "to establish peace and security in Southern Africa"; leave out "improve the effectiveness of measures to" and leave out "régime" and insert "transition to majority rule".

A verbal amendment to part 7 was proposed by Mr. Roper to leave out the word "establish" and insert the words "assist in establishing".

Speakers : MM. Müller and Whitehead.

Part 7 of the Amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 4), part 1, was tabled by Mr. Banks and others :

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "improve the effectiveness of measures to compel" and insert "convince"; and after "Republic" insert "of the need".

Speakers : MM. Banks and Whitehead.

Part 1 of the Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Roper :

In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "measures" in line 1 insert "(i)"; after "apartheid" in line 2 insert "(ii) to", and after "and" in line 3 insert "(iii) to".

Speaker : Mr. Roper.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 3), part 1, was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

1. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert "ensuring the departure of Mr. Ian Smith's illegal government";

Speaker : Mr. Cermolacce.

Part 1 of the Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 2), parts 8 and 9, was tabled by Mr. Whitehead and others :

8. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

"Initiate steps to reduce the present deplorable level of arms sales from external countries to Africa";

9. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "concerted" and insert "strict" and after "particular" insert "enforcing".

Parts 8 and 9 of the Amendment were agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 4), part 2, was tabled by Mr. Banks and others :

2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after "sales".

Part 2 of the Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 3), part 2, was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

2. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph :

"Reconsider policies of investment and technology transfer in South Africa and Rhodesia which might *inter alia* render ineffective the embargo on supplies of military equipment by strengthening the economies of these countries,".

Part 2 of the Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 3), part 3, was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

3. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, insert : "so as to foster the economic progress of the African countries and not the interests of multinational firms attracted by low wages and the absence of social guarantees".

Part 3 of the Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 2), part 10, was tabled by Mr. Whitehead and others :

10. In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after "rights".

Speakers : MM. Müller and Whitehead.

Part 10 of the Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 3), part 4, was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

4. After paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph 9 :

"Afford its support to the liberation movements in Namibia, South Africa and Rhodesia which are recognised by the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, i.e. the ANC, the SWAPO and the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front";

A verbal amendment to part 4 was proposed by Mr. Cermolacce to leave out the words after "Unity" to the end.

Speaker : Mr. Roper.

Part 4 of the Amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 3), part 5, was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

5. Insert the following new paragraph 10 :

“Condemn the repeated attacks by the South African and Rhodesian régimes on neighbouring States and particularly the military operation against Mozambique on 27th November.”.

Speaker : Mr. Page.

Part 5 of the Amendment was agreed to.

Speaker (point of order) : Mr. Page.

The President proposed that the vote on the amended draft Recommendation be postponed until the next Sitting.

Speakers (points of order) : Mr. Whitehead, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Roper.

The vote on the amended draft Recommendation was postponed until the next Sitting.

7. Communications and crisis management in the Alliance

(Doc. 757)

The President informed the Assembly that the amended draft Recommendation had been adopted, note being taken of abstentions by MM. Calamandrei, Bernini, Antoni and Corallo and, after the vote, MM. Brugnon, Dejardin, Forni and Rivière had informed him that they had intended to vote “No” and not to abstain.

8. Date and time of the next Sittings

The next Sittings were fixed for Wednesday, 30th November, at 9 a.m. and 2.30 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 7.25 p.m.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹ :

Belgium	MM. <i>Pawelczyk</i> (Marquardt)	Netherlands
MM. Bonnel	Mende	MM. van Hulst
<i>Van Aal</i> (Hanin)	Müller	Koopman
<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	Reddemann	Mrs. <i>van der Werf-Terpstra</i>
<i>Verleysen</i> (Peeters)		(Scholten)
Tanghe	Italy	MM. Stoffelen
Van Waterschoot		<i>Konings</i> (Voogd)
France	MM. Arfé	United Kingdom
MM. Brugnon	Bernini	Lord Beaumont of Whitley
Cermolacce	<i>Antoni</i> (Boldrini)	Sir Frederic Bennett
<i>Forni</i> (Delorme)	Bonalumi	Mr. <i>Banks</i> (Channon)
Nessler	Calamandrei	Mrs. <i>Knight</i> (Craig)
Péridier	Corallo	MM. Critchley
Radius	Fosson	<i>Grant</i> (Farr)
Rivière	Maggioni	Faulds
<i>La Combe</i> (Valleix)	Minnocci	Grieve
Federal Republic of Germany	<i>Cavaliere</i> (Orsini)	Hardy
MM. <i>Mattick</i> (Ahrens)	Pecoraro	Hawkins
<i>Scheffler</i> (Bardens)	Sarti	<i>Bagier</i> (Lewis)
Mrs. von Bothmer	Treu	Page
MM. Enders	Luxembourg	Lord <i>Hughes</i> (Lord Peddie)
<i>Alber</i> (Evers)	MM. Margue	Sir John Rodgers
Gessner	Mart	MM. Roper
		<i>Craigen</i> (Urwin)
		Watkinson
		Whitehead

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

Belgium	MM. Schleiter	Italy
Mr. Adriaensens	Schmitt	MM. De Poi
	Vitter	Gonella
France	Federal Republic of Germany	Pecchioli
MM. Boucheny	MM. Handlos	Roberti
Bouloche	Lagershausen	Segre
Burekel	Milz	Luxembourg
Cerneau	Pfennig	Mr. Abens
Grangier	Hermann Schmidt	Netherlands
Kauffmann	Schwencke	MM. Cornelissen
Péronnet	Vohrer	Portheine

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 2 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on WEU's contribution to the development of European union (Doc. 756)¹:

Ayes	23
Noes	1
Abstentions	21

Ayes :

MM. Arfé	MM. Fosson	MM. Nessler
Bernini	Koopman	<i>Cavaliere (Orsini)</i>
<i>Antoni (Boldrini)</i>	Maggioni	Péridier
Bonalumi	<i>Dejardin (Mangelschots)</i>	Stoffelen
Mrs. von Bothmer	Margue	Treu
MM. Calamandrei	Mart	<i>La Combe (Valleix)</i>
<i>Forni (Delorme)</i>	Minnocci	<i>Konings (Voogd)</i>
Enders	Müller	

Noes :

Mr. Cermolacce

Abstentions :

MM. <i>Mattick (Ahrens)</i>	MM. Hardy	Mr. Roper
<i>Scheffler (Bardens)</i>	Hawkins	Mrs. <i>van der Werf-Terpstra</i>
Bonnel	van Hulst	(Scholten)
Mrs. <i>Knight (Craig)</i>	Mende	MM. Tanghe
MM. Faulds	Page	<i>Craigen (Urwin)</i>
Gessner	Lord Hughes (Lord Peddie)	Van Waterschoot
Grieve	MM. <i>Verleysen (Peeters)</i>	Whitehead
	Reddemann	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 308***on communications and crisis management in the Alliance***

The Assembly,

Stressing that the Alliance's first purpose of preventing and deterring war, without prejudice to its vital interests, requires a system of crisis management to ensure that the Alliance and its members, acting in concert, take timely measures to prevent a crisis developing or to defend its interests ;

Calling for measures of crisis prevention to be strengthened and increased ;

Welcoming the development of the crisis management system centred on NATO headquarters and believing the loyal participation of all countries of the Alliance to be essential ;

Calling on the member governments never to shirk the burden of responsibility for the timely implementation of readiness measures whenever warning time is available,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

That it urge member governments :

1. To promote crisis prevention measures designed to improve stability and increase warning time of any real threat :
 - (a) in the OSCE negotiations by calling for the confidence-building measures agreed at Helsinki to be strengthened and augmented ;
 - (b) in the MBFR negotiations, by calling for progress to be made on NATO proposals for the reduction of forces and for associated measures ;
 - (c) by ensuring that the arms control negotiations in which members of WEU could participate cover all categories of weapons (including the so-called grey-area weapons) which have an immediate impact on European security ;
2. To seek to improve arrangements for NATO crisis management :
 - (a) by calling on all NATO countries to participate fully :
 - (i) in the early completion of the NATO Integrated Communications System ;
 - (ii) at an appropriate high official and, from time to time, at political level, with all relevant government departments, in crisis management exercises based on likely and realistic scenarios ;
 - (iii) in the provision and evaluation of information, and in consultation, on a world-wide immediate and continuous basis, covering any events that may involve allied interests with a view to developing a collectively-agreed assessment of a crisis situation ;
 - (iv) in subsequent crisis management decisions as often as may be necessary, including the implementation of diplomatic and economic measures ;
 - (v) in assigning more elements of existing national forces to the NATO mobile, standing and on-call forces to provide a greater range of deterrent options in periods of tension ;
 - (vi) in ensuring that full use is made of military warning time by making timely preparation through the implementation of the agreed alert measures ;
 - (b) by calling on the North Atlantic Council to establish an ad hoc group to review and make recommendations for the improvement of the existing NATO crisis management machinery and procedures ;
 - (c) by calling on the North Atlantic Council to study the possibility of establishing a permanent teleprinter link between NATO headquarters and the Government of the Soviet Union and of designating an authorised NATO spokesman to use the link on appropriate occasions.

RECOMMENDATION 309**on WEU's contribution to the development of European union**

The Assembly,

Considering that Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty contains a binding commitment to automatic military assistance ;

Convinced that application of this provision, as of Article VIII, calls for close and continuing consultations between its signatories on external policy and defence questions ;

Further convinced that only full application of the treaty can maintain mutual confidence, which gives full deterrent value to Article V ;

Considering that neither the North Atlantic Council nor, in present circumstances, the political consultations organised between members of the EEC are able to replace entirely the consultations provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly under Article VIII ;

Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty has introduced a new ethical dimension into relations between signatory States ;

Considering that the mandate given to the Standing Armaments Committee by the Council on 31st May 1976 should make a substantial contribution to :

- (a) paving the way towards a harmonisation of armaments with a view to protecting the production capability of industries which are essential for maintaining employment and safeguarding the independence of member countries ;
- (b) preparing a joint policy for member countries in respect of sales of arms, which might lead to disarmament ;

Deploring the fact that in practice the Council fails to take adequate account of these considerations ;

Convinced that a future European union can be based only on treaties and institutions associating member countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine to what extent the modified Brussels Treaty is really applied by organisations other than WEU ;
2. Implement Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty whenever the international situation so requires, i.e. consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace or to economic stability ;
3. Examine the implications of Article V for all member States, with the aim *inter alia* of harmonising strategic concepts and strengthening procedure for consultation ;
4. In the context of the search for universal, progressive and controlled disarmament, consider how WEU can contribute to the establishment of lasting peace ;
5. Ensure that the task given to the Standing Armaments Committee is pursued promptly and efficiently and is extended to cover the sale of arms with a view to making meaningful progress towards general and complete disarmament ;
6. Meet the wish regularly expressed by the Assembly to hold a true dialogue on the various aspects of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty.

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 30th November 1977

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
2. Spread of nuclear energy and defence problems (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and the Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 760, Addendum and Amendment*).
3. European security and African problems (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 754*).
4. Progress in aerospace (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 755*).
5. Address by Mr. Deniau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.
6. Strategic mobility (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 758 and Amendments*).
7. International terrorism (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 762 and Amendment*).
8. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 752*).
9. Procedure for electing the President of the Assembly when there is only one candidate (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft text, Doc. 751*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 9 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The President informed the Assembly that one candidate was proposed for the Vice-Presidency reserved for the Netherlands, namely, Mr. Stoffelen.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect Mr. Stoffelen Vice-President by acclamation.

4. Spread of nuclear energy and defence problems

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and the Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 760, Addendum and Amendment)

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Jessel, Rapporteur.

The Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Cook, Bernini, Konings, Dr. Phipps, MM. Cornelissen, Hawkins, Spies von Büllesheim and Treu.

Mr. Roper, Rapporteur for the Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, replied to the speakers.

Mr. Jessel, Rapporteur, and Mr. Warren, Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, replied to the speakers.

Speaker (point of order) : Mr. Roper.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Roper :

1. In the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out all the words after "with regard to" and insert "certain specific nuclear equipment and material imported under bilateral agreements, and nuclear material in or under the control of non-nuclear weapon parties to the non-proliferation treaty".

2. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph :

"To concert their policies with other supplying countries to make the supply of civil nuclear assistance of any sort to third countries dependent on the latter's acceptance of full IAEA safeguards on all nuclear installations and materials on their territory or under their control ;".

The Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 310) ¹.

5. Changes in the membership of Committees

In accordance with Rule 39(6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following nominations to Committees proposed by the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany :

- Mr. Mattick as an alternate member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to fill a vacant seat ;
- Mr. Amrehn as an alternate member of the General Affairs Committee to fill a vacant seat.

6. European security and African problems

(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 754)

Speakers (points of order) : MM. Müller, Roper and Urwin.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

Speakers (points of order) : MM. Stoffelen, Urwin, Roper, Müller, Mattick, Urwin, Faulds and Enders.

In the absence of a quorum, the vote was postponed until the next Sitting.

7. Progress in aerospace

(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 755)

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur.

1. See page 33.

8. Address by Mr. Deniau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic

Mr. Deniau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Deniau replied to questions put by MM. Reid, Cermolacce, Radius, Valleix and Roper.

9. Progress in aerospace

(Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 755)

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Adriaensens, Bernini, Cornelissen and Treu.

Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur, and Mr. Warren, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

A verbal amendment proposed by Mr. Valleix to add the words "for example" after the word "based" in paragraph 1 of the draft Recommendation was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to, note being taken of four abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 311) ¹.

10. Strategic mobility

(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 758 and Amendments)

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur.

11. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 2.30 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 1 p.m.

1. See page 34.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance :

Belgium	MM. <i>Mattick</i> (Marquardt)	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens	Mende	Mr. Cornelissen
Bonnell	<i>Spies von Büllesheim</i> (Milz)	Mrs. <i>van der Werf-Terpstra</i>
<i>Van Aal</i> (Hanin)	Müller	(van Hulst)
<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	Pfennig	MM. Koopman
<i>Van Der Elst</i> (Peeters)	Reddemann	<i>de Koster</i> (Porthoine)
Tanghe	Schwencke	Stoffelen
Van Waterschoot	Vohrer	<i>Konings</i> (Voogd)
	Italy	United Kingdom
France	MM. Arfé	Lord Beaumont of Whitley
MM. Cermolacce	Bernini	Sir Frederic Bennett
<i>Forni</i> (Delorme)	<i>Antoni</i> (Boldrini)	MM. Channon
Péridier	Calamandrei	<i>Reid</i> (Craig)
Radius	Corallo	Critchley
Valleix	Fosson	<i>Warren</i> (Farr)
	Maggioni	Faulds
Federal Republic of Germany	<i>Cavaliere</i> (Orsini)	Grieve
MM. Ahrens	Pecoraro	Hardy
<i>Ueberhorst</i> (Bardens)	Sarti	Hawkins
Mrs. von Bothmer	Treu	Lord <i>Hughes</i> (Lewis)
MM. Enders	Luxembourg	MM. <i>Grant</i> (Page)
<i>Alber</i> (Evers)	MM. Abens	<i>Cook</i> (Lord Peddie)
Gessner	Margue	Sir John Rodgers
		MM. Roper
		Urwin
		Dr. <i>Phipps</i> (Watkinson)
		Mr. Whitehead

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

France	MM. Schmitt	MM. Gonella
MM. Boucheny	Vitter	Minnocci
Bouloche		Pecchioli
Brugnon	Federal Republic of Germany	Roberti
Burckel	MM. Handlos	Segre
Cerneau	Lagershausen	Luxembourg
Grangier	Hermann Schmidt	Mr. Mart
Kauffmann		
Nessler	Italy	
Péronnet	MM. Bonalumi	Netherlands
Rivière	De Poi	Mr. Scholten
Schleiter		

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 310***on the spread of nuclear energy and defence problems***

The Assembly,

Considering that nuclear energy is a fact of international life which will provide a high percentage of the world's electricity by the end of the century, that several other energy options might eventually be available and that decisions regarding nuclear energy should take account of the major concern to avoid further proliferation of nuclear weapons capability ;

Aware that at present the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna exercises safeguard and control measures only with regard to certain specific nuclear equipment and material imported under bilateral agreements, and nuclear material in or under the control of non-nuclear weapon parties to the non-proliferation treaty ;

Welcoming the agreement reached by the fifteen nuclear exporting countries in London in September 1977 to prevent further sales of nuclear material, equipment and technology without adequate safeguards and controls ;

Stressing the need to avoid any form of safeguard and control measures which would undermine the existing non-proliferation treaty, which guarantees countries non-discriminatory access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments :

1. To promote world-wide co-operation in monitoring all the various activities in the field of nuclear energy ;
2. To make full use of diplomatic channels in order to strengthen world-wide international safeguards and controls, increase the responsibilities of the IAEA and establish multinational nuclear fuel centres ;
3. To concert their policies with other supplying countries to make the supply of civil nuclear assistance of any sort to third countries dependent on the latter's acceptance of full IAEA safeguards on all nuclear installations and materials on their territory or under their control ;
4. To give impetus to the development and international application of procedures and stringent measures to protect nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, in storage or in transit, from terrorist seizure or diversion.

RECOMMENDATION 311***on progress in aerospace***

The Assembly,

Considering its original aim of promoting a European aircraft industry to be ambitious in present circumstances but essential if the industry is to survive ;

Believing that the present national concentrations and nationalisations in Europe's airframe industries have not strengthened Europe's position vis-à-vis the United States aircraft manufacturing industries ;

Aware of the vast differences between the airframe industries in the various countries of the Common Market and considering that in the military field only those of the United Kingdom and France are economically, commercially and politically comparable since both countries have :

- (a) a large military production ;
- (b) a wide military export market ;
- (c) a comparable approach on several matters relating to defence policy ;
- (d) well-established helicopter and aero-engine industries ;

but aware also of the will of all member countries to widen their share of the civil market for medium-range aircraft at world level ;

Noting with regret that apart from some common research, development and finance activities the governments of member countries will not :

- (a) agree on a common aeronautical policy ;
- (b) promote a unified civil and military aircraft manufacturing and user market ;
- (c) set up a European military aircraft procurement agency ;
- (d) form a European aeronautical council ;

Convinced however of the need to sustain a European aircraft industry, but recognising that this calls for solidarity between participating industries and governments which are now omnipresent in elaborating aeronautical policy ;

Underlining that output for military purposes, which partly offsets a low level of civil production, involves a permanent risk since military orders depend largely on political factors,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge all member governments :

1. To establish a long-term relationship between their national airframe industries — alternating design leadership — in order to promote families of aircraft based for example on the Airbus and aircraft equipped with CFM-56 engines ;
2. To agree on a form of specialisation and rationalisation based on these types of medium-range aircraft ;
3. To open discussions on a permanent relationship for the construction of military aircraft and helicopters ;
4. To examine the advisability or otherwise and the possibility of a concerted military aircraft export policy to countries considered acceptable by WEU member countries and to seek this concertation in the framework of the Standing Armaments Committee ;
5. To seek a co-ordinated approach with a view to collaboration with American aircraft manufacturers on long-range civil aircraft.

TWELFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 30th November 1977

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Strategic mobility (*Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 758 and Amendments*).
2. International terrorism (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 762 and Amendment*).
3. European security and African problems (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 754*).
4. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 752*).
5. Procedure for electing the President of the Assembly when there is only one candidate (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft text, Doc. 751*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 2.30 p.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting would be adopted later.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. European security and African problems (Postponement of the Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 754)

The President informed the Assembly that the Presidential Committee had decided to postpone the vote on the amended draft Recommendation until the next session.

4. Strategic mobility

(Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 758 and Amendments)

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Corallo and Dejardin.

Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur, and Mr. Roper, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was opened.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 1), part 1, was tabled by Mr. Dejardin :

1. Leave out the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Part 1 of the Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Valleix :

In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after "Atlantic Alliance" insert, "with due respect for the different positions of the member States towards the integrated military organisation".

Speakers : MM. Valleix and Roper.

The Amendment was negated.

An Amendment (No. 1), part 2, was tabled by Mr. Dejardin :

2. In paragraph 1(a) of the draft recommendation proper, after "combat aircraft on" insert "exclusively".

Part 2 of the Amendment was agreed to.

Speakers : MM. Corallo and Roper.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

In the absence of a quorum, the vote was postponed until the next session.

5. International terrorism

(Reference of the Report to the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 762 and Amendment)

Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, proposed that the Report be referred back to the Committee.

The proposal was agreed to.

6. Relations with Parliaments

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 752)

Speakers (points of order) : Mr. Reid, Mrs. Knight and Mr. Hardy.

The Report of the Committee on Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Reid, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Whitehead and Mende.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Order.

The draft Order was agreed to unanimously. (This Order will be published as No. 47)¹.

7. Procedure for electing the President of the Assembly when there is only one candidate

(Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft text, Doc. 751)

The Debate was opened.

Speaker : Mr. Treu.

The Debate was closed.

The draft text was agreed to.

8. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

9. Close of the Session

The President declared the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly closed.

The Sitting was closed at 3.50 p.m.

1. See page 38.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹ :

Belgium	MM. <i>Alber</i> (Evers)	MM. Stoffelen
MM. Adriaensens	<i>Mattick</i> (Marquardt)	Voogd
Bonnel	Mende	
<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	Schwencke	
<i>Van Der Elst</i> (Peeters)		United Kingdom
Tanghe		Lord Beaumont of Whitley
Van Waterschoot		Sir Frederic Bennett
	Italy	Mr. Channon
	MM. Arfé	Mrs. <i>Knight</i> (Craig)
	Bernini	MM. Critchley
France	<i>Antoni</i> (Boldrini)	<i>Grant</i> (Farr)
MM. Cermolacce	Calamandrei	Faulds
Kauffmann	Corallo	Grieve
Valleix	Maggioni	Hardy
	Pecoraro	Hawkins
	Treu	<i>Jessel</i> (Page)
Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands	Sir John Rodgers
MM. Ahrens	MM. Cornelissen	MM. Roper
<i>Ueberhorst</i> (Bardens)	Koopman	<i>Reid</i> (Urwin)
Mrs. von Bothmer	<i>ter Beek</i> (Scholten)	<i>Bagier</i> (Watkinson)
		Whitehead

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Pecchioli
Mr. Hanin	MM. Enders	Roberti
	Gessner	Sarti
France	Handlos	Segre
MM. Boucheny	Lagershausen	
Bouloche	Milz	Luxembourg
Brugnon	Müller	MM. Abens
Burckel	Pfennig	Margue
Cerneau	Reddemann	Mart
Delorme	Hermann Schmidt	
Grangier	Vohrer	Netherlands
Nessler		MM. van Hulst
Péridier	Italy	Portheine
Péronnet	MM. Bonalumi	
Radius	De Poi	United Kingdom
Rivière	Fosson	Mr. Lewis
Schleiter	Gonella	Lord Peddie
Schmitt	Minnocci	
Vitter	Orsini	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

ORDER 47***on laws governing elections to the European Parliament
and the broadcasting of parliamentary debates on
radio and television***

The Assembly,

Having noted the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments on the laws governing elections to the European Parliament and the impact of radio and television on parliamentary debates and the public,

INSTRUCTS THE COMMITTEE

To up-date this report as decisions are taken in national legislatures and particularly in respect of :

- (i) voting systems, regional weighting, dual mandate and electoral rules and procedures ;
- (ii) laws governing the broadcasting of parliamentary debates on radio and television.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

EIGHTH SITTING

Monday, 28th November 1977

SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Examination of Credentials.
4. Observers.
5. Address by the President of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session (Doc. 748).
Speakers : The President, Lord Duncan-Sandys.
7. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Speakers : The President, Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*).
Replies by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher to questions put by : Mr. Schwencke, Mr. Radius, Mr. Roper, Mr. Müller, Mr. Péridier, Mr. Boucheny, Mr. Vohrer.
8. International terrorism (*Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 761).
Speaker : The President.
9. Application of the final act of the CSCE (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 753 and Amendments).
Speakers : The President, Mr. Segre (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roberti, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. De Poi, Mr. Cook, Mr. Mende, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Pecchioli, Mr. Müller, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Cavaliere.
10. Changes in the membership of Committees.
11. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.
12. Message from the Spanish Parliament.
Speakers : The President, Mr. Escudero (*Observer from Spain*).

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

I declare resumed the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union, which was adjourned on Thursday, 23rd June 1977, at the conclusion of the Seventh Sitting.

In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the Seventh Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Examination of Credentials

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the examination of credentials of new Representatives and Substitutes.

A first list of Representatives and Substitutes who have been appointed since our Assembly last met is given in Notice No. 8. This list includes particularly the new Belgian and Dutch Delegations which have been re-appointed following general elections.

The credentials of the Representatives and Substitutes on this first list have already been ratified by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe during its Twenty-Ninth Session from 5th to 12th October last.

But, in addition, the Belgian House of Representatives has, on 24th November, appointed Mr. Peeters to a vacant seat for a Representative. Furthermore, the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany has, on 24th November, appointed a new Representative, Mr. Pfennig, in place of Mr. Amrehn, who becomes a Substitute in place of Mr. Kohl, resigned.

The credentials of Mr. Peeters, Mr. Pfennig and Mr. Amrehn have not yet been ratified by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and it therefore falls to our Assembly to ratify these credentials in accordance with paragraph 2 of Rule 6 of our Rules of Procedure.

These credentials have not been contested.

If the Assembly is unanimous, it may ratify these credentials without first referring them for examination by the Credentials Committee.

Is there any opposition to this ratification ?...

1. See page 15.

The President (continued)

The credentials of Mr. Peeters as a Representative of Belgium, of Mr. Pfennig as a Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, and of Mr. Amrehn as a Substitute are ratified, subject to similar ratification which shall ultimately be made by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

I extend a cordial welcome to our new colleagues. (*Applause*)

4. Observers

The PRESIDENT. — I would also like to extend a very warm welcome to the parliamentary observers who are attending our debates: Mr. Camre and Mr. Haarder, members of the Folketing of Denmark; Mr. Fagerheim and Mr. Rønning, members of the Storting of Norway; Mr. Oliveira Baptista and Mr. Costa Moreira, members of the Assembly of the Republic of Portugal. And we are particularly happy to welcome for the first time parliamentary observers from Spain: Mrs. Fernandez España and Mr. Lazo Diaz, deputies, and Mr. Almodovar and Mr. Escudero, senators. If any of our observers wish to take part in the debates on the matters included in our Order of Business, we shall be most interested to hear their contributions.

I also draw the attention of the Assembly to the presence of the President of the North Atlantic Assembly, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, to our debates, and extend to him also a warm welcome. (*Applause*)

5. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, we are opening this session at a time when Europeans are uneasy. The international situation is full of dangers. The Soviet Union is stepping up still further its tough military and political pressure. The conflicts in Africa seem to be getting more and more acute. There is, however, a glimmer of hope in the Middle East, where Egypt and Israel have taken a major step towards re-establishing peace, a peace which can be built only on recognition of everybody's right to exist. We welcome this courageous step which has been taken by both sides.

But the real, deeper trouble is of a political kind. It involves the ability of our democratic institutions to find an appropriate response to the attacks to which our old European civilisations are exposed.

The most odious form taken by these attacks is terrorism. When the challenge to our liberal society takes the form of criminal acts, the laws which exist to protect that society must be applied in all their severity and the means of suppressing violence must be strengthened in line with the danger. As for us, members of the only parliamentary assembly statutorily qualified to discuss security matters, should we not urge the member governments of Western European Union to make a concerted response to this attack on social peace, acting under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty? This is a matter which concerns us all because terrorism is not a problem affecting just one or two member countries of WEU, but an international problem that is being faced by nearly all free countries.

The most insidious danger lies however in the spread of a kind of European defeatism. There are those who consider that in future only the superpowers will be able to conceive and implement a world policy, put pressure on the prices of raw materials, decide on a monetary policy, develop advanced technologies and decide on the fate of a collective security system. And yet, it seems to me, we are not in any way obliged to throw in the sponge. If Europe succeeds in uniting, it will be able to put through the most far-reaching plans. The political system in our countries, although it has the drawback of emphasising ideological controversy and personal quarrels, is one which, because of its flexibility, allows us to benefit very rapidly from technological advances and to keep abreast of the necessary social changes with a minimum of friction.

The only reason why 250 million Europeans cannot exercise the same influence as citizens of the superpowers is their lack of unity. This must end. The perils thus besetting us will help us to achieve our unity. Our efforts to ensure a future for our children in keeping with the ambitions we have for them make such efforts a compelling duty. We Europeans do not lack the institutions needed to reach agreement; it is the will to breathe life into them which is lacking. European organisations are too often looked upon as being merely a framework for haggling. They must be shaped into organs for working out common views and a common policy.

A common detrimental argument against European union is that Europe's security depends on the United States and that nothing must be done which might weaken our Alliance.

There is no doubt whatever that the Atlantic Alliance is the basis of our security. All members of this Assembly know that the presence of United States forces in Europe is the keystone in the deterrent against aggressors. However, this does not mean that Europeans must refrain from seeking agreement amongst themselves on

The President (continued)

their common problems. Never has an idea been more topical than that formulated by President Kennedy in Philadelphia in 1962: the Atlantic Alliance is based on two pillars, the one European, the other American. To neglect the build-up of Europe would therefore be to weaken the Alliance.

In order to strengthen the European pillar, its armaments industry must in the first place be enabled to remain in the forefront of progress. Here, Europe is encountering serious obstacles. The Defence Ministers of France, Luxembourg and Belgium, whom I visited in turn on taking up office, all told me of their concern in this respect.

At a time when the Soviet Union is constantly increasing its firepower and the cost of weapons is constantly rising, it is indeed necessary to lay down a European armaments policy in order to lighten and co-ordinate the efforts which Europe must make if it is to prevent the lack of balance from becoming even greater. The symposium organised by our Assembly last spring showed that, despite some measure of consensus, this aim would not easily be attained. Is it not possible to tackle this serious problem while leaving aside the ideological debates about an Atlantic or a European Europe and the comparative merits of integration or independence, so that we can concentrate our efforts on preserving and developing our armaments industries?

It seems to me that the crux of the matter is the need to bring the level of defence forces into line with the scale of the threat. Although every member of this Assembly — like any intelligent European — yearns for détente, objective observers know that the Warsaw Pact is continuing to build up its armaments in a way which is incomprehensible for us in the West. We must therefore make every effort to keep pace with it, but there we come up against insuperable financial obstacles which our States are not inclined to remove.

Consequently, we in WEU should strive ceaselessly to achieve, for the same money, a greater defence capability through joint development, joint production, joint procurement of arms and equipment systems, and joint supply arrangements. It has been estimated that, at the same cost, our defence capability would be increased by a factor of 1.3. Furthermore, this would give a steadier level of employment, help to keep people in their jobs and thereby stabilise the overall economic situation as well.

Another important point is that the purchase of American equipment inevitably constitutes a very large proportion of the orders placed by our forces, for the United States can sell on favour-

able terms equipment which has already been manufactured in long production runs. The different strategic concepts of the European countries, on the other hand, impose fairly narrow limits on the possibilities of joint production. In these circumstances, a powerful armaments industry will be maintained only if we exercise the necessary political will. Nothing but a stubborn refusal to accept decadence can justify the financial effort needed to procure European equipment. But the effort thus made will in the long term prove beneficial, as it will allow European industries to maintain employment, retain their inventive capability and lay the technical foundations for a future European union with defence responsibilities.

The Standing Armaments Committee can make a major contribution towards rationalising our governments' efforts through its studies on the legal, economic and social conditions prevailing in the armaments industry. At the meeting between the General Affairs Committee and the Council in Bonn on 3rd November — a meeting which I had the privilege of attending — detailed questions were put on the progress of the work done by the Standing Armaments Committee under its mandate. I trust that the Council will communicate in due course the information promised, because the Assembly, which has with its recommendations already demonstrated its interest in following the work of that organ of the Council, will continue to watch that this valuable instrument is not subjected to restraints in carrying out the tasks allocated to it.

Arrangements must be made to ensure that there is co-ordination between the independent European programme group and the WEU Standing Armaments Committee. I hope that the obstacles hampering this co-ordination will be removed and that the IEPG will be able to give a decisive impetus to a European armaments policy.

In that event, Europe will no longer appear to be a poor relation of the United States, and what the Americans call a two-way street will become a reality. It would in fact be absurd for the United States, as one person with whom I discussed the matter said to me, to continue asking us to buy an American tank and fit it with a European horn.

The difficulties we are encountering provide ample evidence of the need not only to maintain existing European institutions but to breathe fresh life into them. In defence matters, the undertakings entered into under the modified Brussels Treaty are particularly important. Article V provides for compulsory assistance to each other in the event of armed attack, and Article VIII for consultation "with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise". We in

The President (continued)

this Assembly have always maintained — and the point has been particularly well expressed in the recommendation adopted in 1975 on the basis of a report by our former colleague, Mr. Leynen — that the Council should “ensure that all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are applied in full until such time as the European union has the necessary powers and means of action to exercise defence responsibilities.” This is all the more important since the prospects of setting up a European union are still as vague as ever and the nine-power Community has so far not even been able to extend its field of action by the implementation of an economic and monetary union. One may also wonder what effect the enlargement of the Community will have on its political competence. In any event WEU provides the possibility, immediately the need is shown to exist, of concerting the European approach to security matters on the basis of reciprocal commitments recognised by all concerned. That is why, as was stressed in a resolution adopted by the Presidential Committee on 1st March 1976 and ratified by the Assembly in the following June, we must maintain WEU’s ability to function and the possibilities it provides till such time as the commitments entered into by its members have been subsumed in another European framework — and in equally binding form.

The signing of a treaty merging WEU in a European union with responsibility for security matters is not for the immediate future. The election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage is an event which is much closer. The powers of the European Parliament will not be changed as a result, but its prestige and consequently its influence will be enhanced. But till such time as the merger treaty just mentioned has become a reality or at least becomes discernible on the horizon, the WEU Assembly will, in accordance with the modified Brussels Treaty, remain the only European assembly with competence in defence matters and will continue to give its support to causes which it considers important.

I am convinced that in the execution of its tasks it can count on the support of our governments. The contacts I made during my recent courtesy visits to Paris, Luxembourg, Brussels and also Bonn have shown what importance our Ministers attach to the problem of maintaining our defence capability.

However, the Assembly cannot say it is satisfied with the dialogue with the Council on matters affecting Europe’s security. True, it is glad to be able to welcome a number of Ministers, and in particular the representative of the Chairman-in-Office who is with us today in the

person of Mrs. Hamm-Brücher. (*Applause*) But it wishes not only to be better informed about all these matters but to hold a more meaningful political dialogue than is possible in the framework of our public debates. It regrets that the last meeting in Bonn did not allow such a dialogue to take place since most of the members of the Council were absent. It was useful, however, to obtain detailed information from the officials present, and the Assembly is gratified that Mrs. Hamm-Brücher promised, for example, to call a halt to certain instances of pinpricks on the part of the Council in regard to the budget and undertook, on behalf of the Council, to ensure that meetings with the General Affairs Committee will be held annually and that we shall be sent a report on the work of the Standing Armaments Committee.

At a time when governments, faced with very harassing day-to-day problems, are unable to hold out to our peoples prospects for their future which will stimulate their relations with one another, the WEU Assembly still considers that its task is to draw up plans, make proposals and generally encourage action. If some of the solutions we have suggested for dealing with the problems we are all facing seem to be meeting with unforeseen resistance here and there, our Ministers should inform us of the situation. The projects which will give substance to the Europe of tomorrow can be worked out in free and detailed dialogue between representatives of governments and parliaments. Our Assembly for its part is determined to pursue its task earnestly and vigorously. It expects the Council to show the same desire for dialogue and action.

I trust that the work on which we are now about to embark will lead to achievements which will renew the faith of the European nations in their future. (*Applause*)

6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session

(Doc. 748)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the adoption of the draft Order of Business for this part of the session.

The draft Order of Business is contained in Document 748 dated 23rd November 1977.

Since there is a meeting of the Presidential Committee this evening at which certain changes in the draft Order of Business will be considered, I suggest that the Assembly confirms at this stage only the business proposed for the sitting this afternoon. A revised draft Order of Business for the remainder of the part-session will be proposed tomorrow morning.

The President (continued)

Is there any objection to the business proposed for the sitting this afternoon ?...

There are no objections, so it has been agreed that tomorrow morning we take up the problem again.

Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. Are we not to know until we arrive tomorrow morning what is to be the immediate business for tomorrow morning ?

The PRESIDENT. — As far as I can see, there will be no change tomorrow morning. It is a question only whether we take one item or the other from Wednesday into tomorrow afternoon's sitting. For the time between 9.30 and noon, as far as I can foresee, there will be no change.

7. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

The PRESIDENT. — I turn now to item 5 of the Orders of the Day. I am pleased to welcome you, Madam Minister, on behalf of the Assembly. I ask you to come to the rostrum. (*Applause*)

Mrs. HAMM-BRÜCHER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is scarcely six months since I first stood at this rostrum, new to the office of Chairman of the Council and without any detailed experience of WEU. Since then, I have had many opportunities of getting to know you and the work to which you give so much commitment. Only a few weeks ago I had an informal meeting with some of the members of various committees in Bonn. The meeting had been requested by the General Affairs Committee, and the Council was glad to comply. We had agreed on an informal meeting in order to encourage the freest possible discussion. I think we were not disappointed. The Council has shown its willingness, which I have repeatedly stressed, to discuss matters with members of the Assembly and has endeavoured to meet your need for rapid, direct information. I think everyone agreed on the usefulness of regular meetings of this sort. In my view the informal meeting was a very successful experiment, which I would like to see repeated. I shall gladly get the Council to examine the point of view just expressed by the President, Mr. von Hassel, and the desire for even better information and a more intensive dialogue. I hope, Mr. President, that it will be possible to deal with the object of your minor critical observation at a future informal meeting.

Let me now, for the information of Representatives who were not able to attend the informal meeting of the Council and General Affairs Committee, begin with a few words on what was discussed. In the second part of my address I shall have something to say, from the point of view of the Federal Government, about the way things have gone so far at the CSCE follow-up conference in Belgrade — a matter in which various members have expressed a great deal of interest.

The central issue at the informal meeting in Bonn was the rôle of WEU in connection with European union, security, and disarmament. The Council again assured the General Affairs Committee that the further development of the European Community would undermine neither the WEU treaty, which was concluded for a period of fifty years, nor the present WEU institutions. The Council again emphasised its full responsibility for ensuring compliance with the obligation accepted under the amended Brussels Treaty. It is nevertheless also in the spirit of the Brussels Treaty — and I would like to underline this once again here today — if governments, wishing to avoid duplication of work, agree among themselves that they will in practice fulfil a large part of those obligations through their activities in other organisations, in particular NATO and the European Community. European armaments co-operation, for example, is concentrated in the independent European programme group. The Council will give Representatives more specific information on the division of labour between the programme group and the Standing Armaments Committee in regard to studies on co-operation in this field — a point which you, Mr. President, expressly raised just now.

The member States of the European Community have fashioned an instrument of their own for closer co-operation on foreign policy in the form of "European political co-operation". At the informal meeting the point was again made that discussions about any rationalisation of European institutions in the field of security and defence must both keep in being the psychological basis of the Alliance and have an eye to further progress in European unification. The present form of co-operation in NATO, the IEPG and WEU reflects the state of development so far reached in the Atlantic Alliance and in the unification of Europe. Any transfer of security and defence functions to European institutions can only be the result of a long process of political maturation. There is no consensus for this among peoples and governments at the present time, and the achievement of the necessary consensus is primarily a matter for European parliamentarians and political parties. In regard to disarmament policy, the MBR negotiations in Vienna were described at the meeting as an important means of building up

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (continued)

confidence within the long-term East-West dialogue on the establishment and maintenance of military balance at all levels.

Finally Mr. Genscher, the German Foreign Minister, gave the General Affairs Committee a comprehensive review of European policy on Africa. In his view, a credible western policy for overcoming apartheid and achieving peaceful solutions in southern Africa was absolutely essential not only on ethical grounds, in terms of making human rights a reality, but also on grounds of security policy. Continued pursuit of the policy of apartheid would only prolong the artificial alliance between the communist States and the developing countries beyond the end of the decolonisation period. It would also hinder the western policy of promoting independence and partnership, which is geared to the growing awareness in African States that it is more important to co-operate with countries that supply tractors, and not just weapons. The prevention of military conflict in southern Africa, which would provide an opportunity for an expansion of Soviet influence in the area, is one of the fundamental conditions of our security in the West.

I would not like to conclude this report on our informal meeting in Bonn, Mr. President, without assuring you and your members that representatives of the Council have taken careful note of your remarks on WEU budgetary matters. As a member of parliament for many years, I am well aware of the problems raised for the Assembly by the present budget procedures. But a procedure which has obviously come into being as the result of an understanding between Council and Assembly cannot, unfortunately, be changed in a matter of weeks. I would, however, assure you that the Council will not fail to discuss this matter in the near future.

May I now attempt to give you a brief interim report, from the German point of view, on the situation so far in the CSCE follow-up conference in Belgrade. Up to now the conference has produced a spate of statements and proposals and lively rounds of discussion. But everyone is asking the same question: what has détente achieved for us so far, and in what way can the CSCE follow-up conference help to carry détente a step further? The desire for détente, which was surely shared by all who attended the Helsinki conference, should be seen against the background of the cold war era, when a policy of confrontation endangered world peace. The purpose of détente is to eliminate that threat to peace as far as possible, without the various parties sacrificing major political objectives or altering their basic ideological premises. For the western democracies, détente is a means of

making a reality throughout Europe of as many freedoms as possible. This wish is beating against the ideological frontiers of communist Eastern Europe, frontiers which we recognise, but which we do not consider to be rigid and immutable.

Seen from the East, détente can be only partial. Its purpose is a reduction in the military burden, but it must not be allowed to weaken the ideological front. The communist systems need that front to serve as a shield against the West; the communists still speak — and I am sure they mean what they say — of ideological offensives. The Warsaw Pact countries hope, too, that détente will promote economic co-operation with the West. Moscow and its allies need technology and technical know-how to make good their own lack of technical innovation. As happened in Geneva and Helsinki, these different approaches to détente policy are becoming apparent at the follow-up conference in Belgrade.

For a whole six weeks, using more and more examples, the western delegations have been bringing home to their eastern bloc partners the fact that the humanitarian declarations of the Helsinki final act have so far not been implemented in the Warsaw Pact countries. They have made this criticism clearly and unequivocally, while keeping within the bounds of what is possible. On the other side, the Soviet Union and its allies have attempted to side-step discussion of the implementation of the humanitarian aspects of the CSCE final act on the grounds that western criticism constitutes interference in their internal affairs and therefore leads towards confrontation rather than détente. Here we must point out that, by signing the final act of the Helsinki conference, the thirty-five CSCE participating States expressed the view that the declarations of intent contained in basket III are practicable, and that they therefore cannot form part of the inviolable ideological core of internal affairs. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that a reminder about the fulfilment of contractual obligations does not constitute "interference".

Despite all the differences of opinion on this matter, we can now say that the basis for constructive discussion in Belgrade has not been destroyed. I think we can already say that the Belgrade conference has made it quite clear that improvements in the humanitarian field are for all western democracies an essential element of détente, and one which we shall continue to pursue tenaciously even after Belgrade.

As a counter to western criticism on implementation of the final act, the Warsaw Pact countries in Belgrade are attempting to put forward measures designed to extend the easily controllable area of inter-State contacts. The basis of this conference strategy is, as we know, the Soviet concept of European détente, i.e. a kind

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (continued)

of flurry of détente activities between East and West, which would be trumpeted abroad in both directions, the aim being to weaken Western Europe's psychological and material readiness for defence and to ease the strain on the Soviet Union's western front.

At the same time, however, this concept has an ideologically dynamic aspect. The Soviet strategists believe that their model of socialism will be more attractive to people in the West if it is enhanced by a desire for peace and striving for détente. The détente policy of the Warsaw Pact countries thus has both defensive and offensive elements.

Mr. President, I can imagine that this sober appraisal of mine of the Belgrade conference might well be objected to in part by Mr. Segre. You will, however, have noticed that, in regard to the relationship between the principle of human rights and that of non-intervention, my emphasis differs somewhat from that of your Rapporteur. Like him we recognise that the western societies are not without fault. In his opening statement in Belgrade on behalf of the Federal Government, Mr. van Well, Secretary of State, pointed out that the faults are a matter of critical and democratic public discussion and that we are endeavouring to correct them.

What I have said so far about the CSCE follow-up negotiations might give the impression that the Belgrade conference was leading towards a polarisation of East-West positions. But here again, we see the importance of the rôle played by the neutral and non-aligned States. Many of their initiatives have helped to ensure that the meeting does not in fact polarise into two blocs. It is just these countries that have given very considerable support to our endeavours to use the CSCE as a means of securing increased rights and freedoms for the individual in all participating States.

What can we expect of Belgrade, what is the future of détente? The delegations in Belgrade already have before them over eighty proposals for a final document, the purpose of which will be to outline the future development of détente on the basis of the Helsinki final act and lay down specific areas for its further implementation. From among these many proposals, the conference will have to choose those which can bring us nearer, now and in the future, to the détente aimed at by the CSCE.

It is our conviction that the final document should take the form of a closely knit, forceful declaration on the central issues. In the interests of peace and détente in Europe that declaration must maintain and, if possible, increase the

momentum generated by the final act of the Helsinki conference until the next meeting, still to be agreed upon, by the States that participated in the CSCE.

In conclusion, Mr. President, may I, on behalf of the Council, wish the Assembly a successful meeting and thank everyone for their attention. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Madam Minister.

The Minister has kindly agreed to reply to questions from members of the Assembly.

Do you wish to reply to each question separately, Madam Minister?

Mrs. HAMM-BRÜCHER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*). — No. I prefer to reply to them all together.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Schwencke.

Mr. SCHWENCKE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would like to ask the Minister a question. She described the Helsinki document as one which is imbued with the will for détente yet, in the second part of her speech, gave an interim assessment of the situation in terms which were critical of this will for détente — at least she did not seem to rate it very highly.

Would she not agree and acknowledge that it was only on the basis of the Helsinki document that civil rights movements in the eastern bloc countries, which are attempting to engage in effective and regrettably still necessary campaigns on behalf of the citizens concerned, have obtained a certain degree of legitimacy? Would she not recognise the connection between this development and Helsinki, and so draw a more positive interim balance?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Radius.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like to ask two questions of widely-differing character.

Here is the first one. Does Mrs. Hamm-Brücher consider that acts of international terrorism constitute a threat to European security?

The second is a little more complicated. How are we parliamentarians in WEU to interpret the recommendation addressed to us by the Council in the annual report on its activities in 1976, that we should put questions to our governments on the recommendations adopted by the Assembly, when the reservations which the Council expressed in its reply to Recommendation 276 are taken into account?

Does the simultaneous abandonment of former practices by the Belgian and United Kingdom Governments — and, alas, by the French Govern-

Mr. Radius (continued)

ment as well — mean that the Council, which makes little effort at consultation on the matters which fall within its competence, nevertheless does so most effectively whenever it wishes to avoid a dialogue with the parliamentarians?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — The Minister of State has mentioned the agreement she has made with regard to the regular informal meetings which the Council of Ministers has agreed to hold with the General Affairs Committee of this Assembly. Would she not agree that, in view of the importance of defence questions for the Assembly, and, indeed, for Western European Union as a whole, there should also be regular meetings with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would like to follow up the question put by my colleague, Mr. Radius, concerning international terrorism, and ask the Minister if she sees any chance, in connection with the negotiations in Belgrade, of the question of international terrorism also being discussed across the ideological frontiers, since there can be no doubt that in the world of today differences of ideological orientation can be exploited for purposes of international terrorism? There are still forces on the international terrorist scene that — sometimes availing themselves of ideological differences — use this criminal means of blackmailing governments who could no longer be blackmailed if there were a really effective international agreement transcending frontiers.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Périquier.

Mr. PÉRIQUIER (*France*) (Translation). — I believe we are allowed to put to the Minister all sorts of questions provided they have a bearing on international affairs. It is in my capacity as a lawyer that I should like to put a question concerning the Klaus Croissant affair, which has aroused a great deal of feeling in the hearts of all French lawyers.

This feeling has not been aroused by the substance of the affair, since it is perhaps plausible that the lawyer Klaus Croissant committed acts which are a matter for the courts. In that event, it is not our intention to impede the course of justice.

The feelings aroused were due to the ultra-speedy procedure employed for his extradition, so speedy that certain people have drawn the conclusion that pressure had been exerted on the French Government by the Federal Government.

Our Minister of Justice has denied this. But I am not sure that he has convinced everybody, for it must be recognised that the procedure followed was not the normal one, in that Mr. Klaus Croissant was extradited without being allowed to make use of the appeal procedures open to him under French law.

No French lawyer — and I might say no lawyer in the free countries — could accept that there should be a failure to respect the relevant rules and that an accused person, whoever he may be and whatever acts he is alleged to have committed, should not be permitted to make use of the right to appeal.

We should not like to see any further instances of the rules of procedure being distorted. I would venture to remind you that the French courts authorised extradition on the basis of extremely precisely defined grounds.

And here is my question: does the Federal Government consider that the reservations expressed by the competent French court in approving the extradition of the lawyer Klaus Croissant limit the grounds on which a court in the Federal Republic of Germany may try him? In other words, will the courts in the Federal Republic judge Klaus Croissant solely on the facts of which the French courts have taken cognisance?

The PRESIDENT. — I did not interrupt you, Mr. Périquier, only to be polite, but this is a bilateral problem between France and Germany and not a matter to be handled by Western European Union. Therefore, the Minister need not reply to this question.

I call Mr. Boucheny.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — The presence of communist representatives at WEU has been very unfavourably received by the military authorities and the political authorities. I wish to take only two examples of this: the journey of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to the United States and the unhelpful attitude of the American authorities on that occasion, and the recent statements by senior officers of the Federal Republic of Germany to the effect that the presence of communist representatives was a threat to defence security.

I should like to hear your views: does the fact that a communist group is present at the WEU Assembly constitute a positive factor for European security or does it not?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Vohrer.

Mr. VOHRER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Since three Representatives, Mr. Radius, Mr. Müller and now Mr. Périquier, have broached the question of terrorism, I would like to ask the Minister whether she sees terrorism

Mr. Vohrer (continued)

principally as a threat to Europe, or is it not perhaps something of an opportunity for Europe to confront the problem jointly. It seems to me that the reply which we in the Council of Europe have given to the challenge of terrorism does provide such an opportunity for joint action. I would be interested to know whether the Minister agrees with this point of view and whether she sees some hope of Europe finding a joint reply to the challenge of terrorism.

The PRESIDENT. — As there appear to be no more questions, I invite the Minister to reply to the questions.

Mrs. HAMM-BRÜCHER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I shall be very pleased to answer the questions put to me, so far as I managed to hear and understand them. I am not quite sure, but I can always return to them in a conversation later.

The first question, from Mr. Schwencke, concerned civil rights movements in Eastern European countries and whether their existence has so far been sufficiently taken into account at the Belgrade conference.

In my address I pointed out that all representatives of the European democracies have constantly and emphatically insisted on respect for human rights and compliance with the agreements contained in the Helsinki final act. I also said that in the further course of the Belgrade conference we would continue to insist that the civil rights movements should be recognised in accordance with the spirit of the Helsinki final act and should no longer be subject to persecution.

In answer to Mr. Radius' question as to whether terrorism is a threat to European security, I would point out that co-operation between Community States, as indeed between member States of the Council of Europe, in regard to terrorism and the taking of hostages, has up till now been so encouraging and successful that, in the sense of Mr. Vohrer's last question, the joint measures envisaged by the western democracies to deal with terrorism and terrorist acts of violence can be successful so long as the declarations and agreements are adhered to and implemented when an actual case arises.

Mr. Radius' second question, concerning the demand by members of the Assembly to the Council that they should be able directly to put questions to their governments, can of course be answered in the affirmative. This practice has always been adhered to in the past and will continue to be followed in the future.

I am unable, at the present time, to answer the next question, from Mr. Roper, about regular

meetings between the Council and members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. I believe the answer will be affirmative but I must reserve the right, Mr. President, to give a more precise, written reply in due course.

In regard to Mr. Müller's question on international terrorism, as to whether it can and ought to be discussed at the Belgrade conference, I would refer to the step taken by the Federal German Foreign Minister, Mr. Genscher, at the United Nations. We consider that the United Nations is the proper forum for reaching international agreement on measures against terrorism and the taking of hostages. Belgrade alone would hardly be adequate as a forum.

If I understand correctly, Mr. President, you ruled the next question out of order.

I now come to the question concerning the visit by communist members to the United States of America. The honourable member asked me how I myself felt about the possible effects of participation by communist members in the work of the WEU Assembly and in such visits. It is not for me to give expression to my own feelings in this forum, and I would prefer to answer questions of fact.

I have already replied to Mr. Vohrer when answering other questions on the subject of terrorism. I would beg your indulgence for being unable at present to give a clear answer to the question concerning formal meetings between the Council and members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. — I thank the Minister for replying to all the questions except one, and we understand why she felt unable to answer that question. If it is possible, perhaps she will reply in writing.

Mrs. HAMM-BRÜCHER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*). — Yes.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

8. International terrorism

(*Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 761*)

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Müller and others have tabled a request for urgent procedure in connection with a motion for a recommendation relating to international terrorism in the hope of establishing a fair and lasting peace in the Middle East.

This request conforms with Rule 43 and is in accordance with the Rules of Procedure. I propose that the debate on the request for urgent procedure — that is, one speech pro and one

The President (continued)

contra — should take place at 10.55 tomorrow morning before the address by General Haig. If you agree to that, we will then print and distribute it.

There appears to be no objection to this proposal.

9. Application of the final act of the CSCE

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 753 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the application of the final act of the CSCE and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 753 and Amendments.

The Assembly will remember that on 23rd June, at our sixth sitting at the end of a long general debate, the previous report of the General Affairs Committee on this question and the amendments that had been tabled to it were referred back to the Committee at the request of the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the Committee.

I should first like the Rapporteur, Mr. Segre, to address the Assembly and to amplify his report. Afterwards, I shall throw the debate open. We shall then see how we get on this afternoon.

Mr. SEGRE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, our debate of last June during the first part of the twenty-third session, the pause for reflection and further consideration afforded by reference back to Committee, the additions to the explanatory memorandum, the discussion in the General Affairs Committee at Bonn in early November and the addition — with ten ayes, five noes and one abstention — of the new draft recommendation taking account of the several amendments tabled in Paris — all these form the background to our meeting today. We also meet against the background of developments, during the intervening time, on the international scene, and first and foremost, the proceedings of the follow-up conference at Belgrade. I have already had occasion, in the complementary material for the explanatory memorandum, to review the problems and vicissitudes of the Belgrade meeting. Are we now able to arrive at a fuller overview of its progress? It will certainly be no easy matter, as a concluding stage has still to be reached.

However, I think the summary of the status of progress and the various stances adopted, given recently by the Italian Minister for Foreign

Affairs, Arnaldo Forlani, in a speech to the Senate is very clear: "The Soviet Union and East European countries again confirmed their main interest in that part of the final act dealing with the principles governing relations between States, and the topics of disarmament; the United States emphasised the concept of the close interdependence of human rights, détente, peace and international collaboration; the neutral and non-aligned countries showed themselves particularly sensitive to security matters in all their manifold ramifications; the Nine, including Italy, with varying shades of emphasis dwelt upon the principle that the implementation of the final act needed to be well-balanced and extended to all its provisions, and that adequate attention should be devoted to human rights." He went immediately on to say that "the Helsinki final act inaugurated for the future of East-West relations a dynamic long-term process, setting targets and at the same time affording a new working method", and there was "a cardinal need for holding the scales even between the three main chapters of the document". In particular, he added: "Such balance should be observed in both the current review of progress and the adoption of fresh initiatives." It is to precisely such a balance that in my view the draft recommendation of the General Affairs Committee tabled before us today, specifically refers. Hence its importance and significance and its values as a contribution to the furtherance of a process which is, as it states, "intended to lead towards international peace, freedom of peoples and the fulfilment of human rights".

More recently still, on 22nd November, the set of problems we are dealing with today was examined at Brussels by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the nine EEC countries and a decision taken to instruct the countries' representatives to the Belgrade conference to participate "in an objective spirit" in the drafting of the final communiqué. Let me add that the same objective spirit pervades the General Affairs Committee's draft recommendation as tabled before our Assembly today, both the letter and spirit of which are fully attuned to the guidelines and actions deployed by our countries' diplomatic representatives, now as in the past, at Belgrade. Intervening in the debate at the Brussels meeting, the Italian Foreign Minister, Mr. Forlani, remarked that one and a half months before the opening of the Belgrade conference, a "moderately favourable" view could be taken of the work to date, although on a few particularly vital matters, such as human rights, the dialogue had not progressed as well as had been hoped.

There has indeed been, over the last few months, much discussion of the vexed problem of human rights and the fairly satisfactory, or in some cases unsatisfactory, way in which they have been upheld and substantiated in certain

Mr. Segre (continued)

of the countries signatories to the Helsinki final act. While in some instances such discussion had been tainted with one-sidedness or the existing pattern of political forces in one or other of our countries, it had nevertheless enabled each and all to appraise more and more clearly and deeply the innovatory force in this respect too of the Helsinki act, whose "historic importance" if you will allow me to quote once again the Italian Foreign Minister, "lies in the formulation, it may be embryonic, of the principles and ground rules whose implementation even outside the bounds of Europe might be a great step towards achieving one aspiration of the community of nations towards a uniform code of behaviour among States".

This debate has also enabled us to go more deeply into the identification and definition of human rights which, as stated at Belgrade by the head of the United States Delegation, Ambassador Goldberg, encompass "economic and social rights, as well as political and civil liberties". He went on to say that in their opinion: "One set of values cannot be stressed at the expense of the other. Rather, it is the combination of these rights and the respect in which governments hold them all which offer the best promise that all can be attained".

The debate has also helped us to a better understanding of the kind of process involved in such an endeavour towards at the same time greater peace, co-operation among the nations, and human rights. "A long-term process in which we are destined to become, once the initial phase is over, more and more involved", said the Italian representative at Belgrade. "We will need patience, perseverance and perspective", Ambassador Goldberg went on to say: "This Belgrade conference is one stage of a dynamic process and a continuing dialogue. That Helsinki process is part of an even larger effort to build more secure and humane relations among our nations and peoples." The American representative added: "We are nearer the beginning than the end of this process".

Consciousness of the time the process will take, of the fact that we are nearer its beginning than its end, demands of all, not by any means nervousness or impatience, but in fact "patience, perseverance and perspective". They are demanded of governments as well as of us politicians and members of parliament. This does not contradict another statement by Ambassador Goldberg to the effect that while "the overall record of participating States over the last twenty-six months shows encouraging evidence of progress, the progress displayed is not progress enough. It still falls short of the goals of the

final act and, just as important, of the high expectation the final act aroused". But we are now in a better position to measure the great weight attached, on the European plane and beyond, to the hopes and expectations to which it has given birth. It seems destined to grow even bigger and, in any case, represents a fixed point it will be increasingly hard to ignore, a point of reference and attraction calculated to have at national and international levels, through the active participation of public opinion, a growing influence on the behaviour of governments.

Herein lies the driving force of the Helsinki act, the nature of its challenge to each of the signatory countries, to our respective peoples, to us parliamentarians, and to societies and institutions. A democratic challenge and a spur to constant vigilance, in a world bristling with limitations and contradictions and new perils and problems, as to what ought to be done to ensure genuine continuance of a process capable of reconciling peace, the freedoms of nations and the rights of man. Herein lies also the novelty of the Helsinki act, in the relation established by it between all those forces, and in the responsibility and right which it lays on us for monitoring and safeguarding the extent to which every signatory fulfils the tasks voluntarily assumed.

Such responsibility and right are what the draft recommendation now tabled is about. It also at the present juncture, Ladies and Gentlemen, assumes a special importance in seeking, while the Belgrade conference is still being held, to articulate at one and the same time a firm appeal for the procrastination and impediments that are hindering implementation of the Helsinki final act to be swept away, coupled with an undertaking to remain vigilant and take action to ensure the onward progress of the balanced process stemming from the conference on security and co-operation in Europe. This is in the common interests of every one of our nations, our continent and the future of the international community. We want that future to be one of peace, co-operation, freedom, democratic growth and full assertion of all human rights.

The message of hope that went out from Jerusalem a week ago is a call for us all to act with patience, perseverance and perspective. In a world in which we are witnessing the unleashing of so many elements of mindlessness and blind violence, it is a call for the supremacy of reasonableness in history and politics. And a plea for our trust. Our debate here today, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may likewise contribute to inspire trust in this Europe of ours, and to the force of the ideas expressed at Helsinki, which are destined increasingly to become in the future, by dint of our steadfast and responsible action, everywhere a living and fruitful reality. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I thank the Rapporteur.

I now call Mr. Roberti to open the general debate.

Mr. ROBERTI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have listened, with interest and in a spirit of understanding, to Mr. Segre's presentation, and far be it from me to belittle the purity of his sentiments and intentions. Yet I am bound to say how sorry I am not to be able to agree to the conclusions of his draft recommendation, nor to many of the explanations given by him in support of it. I fully appreciate his difficulties, and his efforts to overcome them.

Mr. Segre, as an authoritative member of the Italian Communist Party's group — a party tied, like every other communist party in the world, ideologically, historically and in many cases politically, to that of the USSR — finds himself in the awkward predicament of having to adopt in respect of the Belgrade conference positions obviously at variance, or liable to seem so, with those defended by the Soviet Union. This is the case, even although the Italian Communist Party is going through a period of considerable effort towards the Eurocommunist position which I regard, by the by, as all the more credible in the eyes of the citizenry of Western Europe in so far as the Italian communists manage to take up a clear and definite stance on international problems, especially those of Western European defence.

However, I should like to leave aside the ideological stances, our Rapporteur's and all the others', and confine our attention to the reality of the phenomena we are called upon to examine. Above all, in order to state the problem in its true objective reality, I would take my stand on the true nature of our Assembly, which is, let us never forget, that of Western European Union.

Our distinguished President in his induction address, as in his opening speech at this sitting, reminded us of our Assembly's main task, that of ensuring the defence of Western Europe. No other assembly has been given the specific competence of ensuring Western Europe's defence.

Now, as Mr. Segre's draft recommendation speaks of endeavouring as an absolute priority to promote a process of détente as a preliminary to so many other forms, I would for the sake of objective truth point out that even greater priority should be attached to the needs of security. Détente presupposes that the defence of Western Europe, and therefore of security, are guaranteed; if it were not so, détente might spell the doom of Western Europe, and prove an inescapable necessity liable to turn into an element for its subjection instead of one of hope.

The first task is therefore to ensure the defence of the West vis-à-vis the Soviet line-up, which militarily hinges on the Warsaw Pact. And if, then, we interest ourselves, as WEU, in the Helsinki and Belgrade conferences, we should primarily set about it in such a way that ongoing negotiations, especially on disarmament, in no wise detract from the security of Western Europe; otherwise there would be no reason for us to bother about these conferences, whose protagonists would be other people. If Western Europe does concern itself with them, there is no getting away from such a requirement.

Turning to the substance of the Belgrade conference, the central problem, the most debated issue, is that of the third basket, i.e. the defence of human rights. I note that our first duty as WEU is, as we also heard the distinguished representative of the Council of Ministers assert, to send out a loud, unmistakable clarion call to those countries which have hitherto been unwilling or unable to implement the decisions of the final act in respect of human rights.

Instead, Mr. Segre's report starts from two premises that run counter to such a way of envisaging the problem. First, he reiterates the Soviet contention that the problem of human rights impinges on individual countries' domestic legislation, for whom it might constitute an interference in their internal affairs; second, he asserts that there are violations of human rights by both sides. I am bound to object to both premises. First of all, if the decisions of the Helsinki final act concerning human rights impinge on a country's internal relations, we cannot forget that the Soviet Union is one of the signatories thereto. Of course international relations, international treaties are a limitation of the absolute sovereign rights of the individual countries subscribing thereto. Odd that the Soviet Union and the Rapporteur should remind us that the human rights issue may constitute a breach of the East European countries' domestic legislation, as if they had not, in accepting the final act, underwritten the possibility of a limitation of their own internal will, in accordance with the principles of a higher ethic agreed to in an international forum through the Helsinki final act.

Then, as regard the second argument that Eastern and Western Europe are tarred with the same brush in respect of breaches of human rights, I invite the Assembly to show a little realism. Is there a joke somewhere? Do we really want to hide behind what is an obvious truth? The second Sakharov "hearing" is being held these days in Rome — the first was in Copenhagen two years ago; we have listened, in the course of it, to dramatic and tragic testimonies, fit to make the public shiver, concerning the situations still obtaining in the USSR and other East European countries. The exhibit about dissidence now being shown in Venice in connection

Mr. Roberti (continued)

with the Biennale confronts us with similar states of affairs. Can we ignore such truths, and agree to their being placed on the same footing as others? Should we not rather promote some heart-searching about such violations?

I do not think we can refrain from, as a first step, pronouncing upon such violations, which are still going on. Were we to agree to Mr. Segre's report and proposals, and to adopt the latter, in respect of the aspect of them I have referred to, we should, I believe, disappoint many expectations. What opinions would be formed on the subject by the peoples of Western Europe — those represented in WEU, founded for their defence? What might be the sorrow of those who in the Eastern European countries are the protagonists, at the cost of unspeakable sacrifices, of dissidence and who, it may be, look to our decision to stoke their own purpose, their courage and their hopes? (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roberti.

Will you take the floor, Sir Frederic?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — As the author of the minority report, and as one who has spoken before on this same report, I make no apology for returning to this theme today, even though it is one on which I expanded when I last had the privilege of addressing this Assembly. I should like to make it clear, as I did then, that a mere change of wording in resolutions or recommendations does not affect either my basic thinking or that of millions of people living in the West. There are two differences between the Rapporteur and those who think as he does and those who think the way I do.

Before expanding on this, I must tell my colleague Mr. Segre that when he reported the results of the General Affairs Committee vote he said that there were ten in favour of his report and five against. He will recall that one of those ten said that he was voting for the report only on the assumption that changes would be made not only in the wording of the recommendations but substantially in the body of the report itself. I have not seen those changes; perhaps Mr. Portheine has. Secondly, Mr. Segre did not remind us that there were also three abstentions on that occasion when the report came forward to this Assembly. Therefore, to say that it was a vote of ten to five is accurate in one sense but it certainly does not tell the whole story.

The two themes of the report are, first, that it still contains in its body and even in the recommendations in their general sense an attempt to equate the treatment of human rights on the

two sides of the iron curtain. I do not believe that there is one person in this Assembly who believes that. I do not believe that even Mr. Segre himself believes it. To suggest that there is an equality of interpretation of human rights between East and West is a fallacy.

The other theme is that a start has been made — a slow and disappointing one, as is mentioned twice in the report — towards the fulfilment of the ideals of the Helsinki final act. Certainly that has been true of some countries, and they are not all on one side of the iron curtain. I pay tribute to the fact that there are some countries in Eastern Europe that have made a start along the lines for which Helsinki gave a direction. But how could we, in view of the news that we read every day in every newspaper, really say that a start — except, putting it very harshly, a start backwards — has been made in the case of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and East Germany? If the Rapporteur is to reply, I would like him to give me just one example of how human rights have been advanced in any of the three countries to which I have alluded since we last debated this issue, when every day there is news of new abuses of human rights as we like to think of them.

One of the problems about this whole debate and about this whole report, as I said in my minority remarks, is that we have been trying to reconcile the irreconcilable. That is what has been happening. In Belgrade there has been a counter-attack by the Soviet bloc concerning alleged breaches of human rights in the western countries. Of course, in an absolute sense these breaches of human rights occur, but one thing that seems to have missed the observation of many of those who are studying this problem is that as regards employment, a fair standard of living and observance of law and order so that people can afford to go out free from fear of assault, a lack of observance of human rights has come about despite and not because of the best efforts of those governments to stop them.

In the Soviet Union, however, the breaches of human rights to which we are referring and about which we are talking today arise not from the failure of the Soviet Government to stop them but from the deliberate efforts day by day of the Soviet Government to enforce them. This is the difference between the two cases.

Throughout the report, in the wording of the resolutions and recommendations, Mr. Segre mentions freedom, and throughout the body of the report there is much talk in his remarks about peace and security, but peace and security without freedom are nothing. There is the peace of the graveyard for those who are vanquished and dead. There is the peace of the concentration camp for those who are defeated but still

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

alive. They are secure, they are at peace, but they are not free.

If I am to support a report of this sort, I want to see the day coming when the Rapporteur puts forwards equal emphasis not just on equal rights for human beings but on collective human rights for people to decide for themselves what their destiny shall be, whether on one side of the iron curtain or on the other. There is not a single mention in the report, from the first capital letter to the last full stop, of the collective right of human beings to decide what their destiny shall be and to which political system and to which country they shall adhere.

It was only last year that a Belgian Foreign Minister used these words: "For the West, détente is seen as peace without victory, but for the Soviet Union détente remains victory without war."

I say to you, Mr. President, that as long as I have any strength I shall not contribute towards a situation in which we confuse peace and security with human freedom without those three phrases accompanying one another in our deliberations and in the papers we produce. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. De Poi.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report we have just heard from Mr. Segre turns the last page of a long story during which have been debated, in Committee or in plenary session, not so much the validity and necessity of carrying further an action vital to the course of détente among the nations and of peace, as the genuine determination that all the talk on the subject, now common form in the chancelleries on both sides of the Atlantic, shall demonstrate the emergence of a mood of détente, however different the methods and purposes that may be proposed for achieving a goal we all hope will be attained.

It has indeed been a long story, nearly as long as the time of waiting that many western democratic forces have had to endure, patiently and tenaciously, to get within striking distance, at any rate in their formal pronouncements, of the aims already dreamed of by themselves and contested by others in the 1950s. It is certainly a positive sign that this should be happening, yet in too many sentences of the report tabled we seem to detect a kind of hagiographical pre-occupation, almost a determination to get lined up, somewhat uncritically, on the final act without wanting to dig down into the true underlying revolutionary significance of it. In our view the Rapporteur leaves unmentioned the sad events in which citizens, who ought to be free to express their political and democratic will, are still in

many cases being victimised in the East European countries.

In the attempt to make the situation in the West appear similar to that in the East, examples have been adduced which we find wholly unconvincing, such as incidents in Cyprus or Ireland, where simmer internal conflicts that do not fit into any framework of normality and have nothing to do with the prevalent "return to normal" in the socialist and communist countries of Eastern Europe. The Helsinki conference, in summoning us to observance of human rights, has bequeathed an important legacy; but its results go beyond this fact, just as they go beyond the principles enshrined in the constitutional charters of the United States and the Soviet Union. We cannot simply confine ourselves to theoretical assertions of human rights by the great powers. The truly determining aspect of the Helsinki act, capable of constituting a historic factor for the affirmation of the rights of nations, is the fact that for the first time ever an important instrument of unification is being placed in the hands of the common people themselves. The conference on European security conduces towards a regrouping of the nations, by the process deployed in WEU too.

The fact that the final act operates as an important detonator of freedom for so many peoples, aimed at their democratic unification rather than limitations of sovereignty, lies at the root of the treaty, gives it its outstanding character. For this very reason we do hope the Rapporteur has really taken account of the effort made to reconsider one particular kind of behaviour with a readiness which certainly does him credit. Many facts have been noted in this Assembly, such as what is happening these days at the Sakharov "hearings", what is going on in the realm of dissidence in the eastern bloc, what is afoot in the civil rights movement, which has now specifically been given sanction and safeguarded in the Helsinki final act. It had possibly not occurred to numerous countries that such an enactment would be liable to boomerang extremely dangerously more especially on their determination to restore "normality". After all, what is being asked of the representative of a political force that may indifferently convey the will of Carrillo, or the more ambiguous and uncertain will of Berlinguer, or that of the Greek communists — who have these days scored, not on their own but in Moscow's apron-strings, a significant electoral result — is: whether, as the Italian communists claim, there is in the new real state of affairs in Western Europe a will to achieve recovery, a supranational impulse, or whether there is, to the contrary, a closer relation to intangible national realities, "finlandised" by a dangerous power relationship, as Marchais seems to claim. So, we would like to know which side the Rapporteur is on, whether his state-

Mr. De Poi (continued)

ments, apt as they are, are subject to qualification by us or by himself.

These are facts which are too important for them to be hushed up or forgotten. Indeed I think that, aside from whatever we may say in this Assembly, the conference has in itself been an important one: it has been a formidable detonator and will have sequels, capable of serving like litmus-paper to detect any hegemonic velleities, as well as being a powerful weapon in the hands of any nations wishing to shake off oppression, of whatever kind. Détente is not only being sought after for the sake of restoring to normal the balance of power in the northern hemisphere, but is being incorporated into the problem of the defence of civil rights in the eastern bloc. We have to establish what we mean by "equality" between the positions of West and East in respect of civil rights, for otherwise the catchword of non-interference in a country's internal affairs would mean rejecting criticisms and checks.

The amendments moved to the draft recommendation represent an effort towards clarification of what we hope is the Rapporteur's true intent. The Segre report will then be able to have the force not merely of a fact of relevance to various international relations but also of a test of the genuine will of the political parties. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. De Poi but you took two minutes too long.

Mr. Cook is the next speaker.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — I hope that the two previous speakers will forgive me if I do not follow the line with which they began. I want to use my time by speaking to the amendments which have been tabled in my name this afternoon. There are three of these, and I shall endeavour to cope with all of them within the ten minutes to which you, Mr. President, have suggested that speakers should limit themselves.

The last amendment is a minor one which merely corrects the English text. The other two, however, are substantive amendments. The first of them would alter the fourth paragraph of the preamble so that it would read as follows:

"Considering that further steps towards détente at the Belgrade meeting and in other negotiations, particularly in the field of arms control and mutual reduction of forces in Europe, are essential"

and so on. The second would similarly amend paragraph 2 of the recommendation so that it would read:

"As a priority endeavour to promote the process of détente through arms control agreements with a view to improving understanding"

and so on. These amendments have the support of the Socialist Group. They are acceptable to the Rapporteur, I understand, and I hope they will be acceptable to the Assembly.

It is perhaps unfortunate that it is necessary to table these amendments in order to spell out that when we talk about détente we have in mind arms control. If we were to go back only a decade, we would find that most people then believed that if there was a process of détente and greater understanding between the two blocs it would inevitably produce a reduction in military tension between the two sides. Had it been possible to tell them then that in the subsequent ten years there would be major breakthroughs in diplomatic understanding such as the Helsinki final act, which formally recognised the frontiers of Europe, or that there would be the kind of economic interdependence between East and West of the past decade, few would have believed that it could have been accompanied by no reduction in military tension between the two sides.

The reality is that instead of there being any reduction in military tension, if anything there has been an increase in the level of military confrontation between East and West. It is well illustrated by the development during the preparatory talks leading to Belgrade that the eastern side, during that very period, deployed in Western Russia the SS-20 missiles intended to come down in Central Europe, and at the same time the United States dispatched to Britain further squadrons of the F-4, both of them carrying nuclear weapons intended for use in any confrontation in Central Europe, in complete paradox with the proposed negotiations in Belgrade. It is because of the failure to translate discussions towards détente into any kind of a military stand-off that there is so much popular cynicism about the process, a cynicism which has some foundation when we consider some of the disarmament negotiations going on at present. It is not unusual for the Standing Conference on Disarmament to meet for its bi-weekly meeting and to adjourn after five minutes because none of the eighteen nations present wishes to make a speech about disarmament. It is difficult to reconcile that kind of apathy with the spirit of détente.

In my amendment I refer in particular to the negotiations towards mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. These are the most important form of arms control negotiations in Europe. They are imperfect; they do not take account of the tactical nuclear weapons stationed within Europe. It is something of a bitter comment on the decade of détente that it has enabled us to

Mr. Cook (continued)

find ways of restraining the use of nuclear weapons on the seabed, in Antarctica or in outer space but in no way to limit their use within Central Europe, where their use is most likely and would be most devastating.

Despite these imperfections, the MBFR talks remain the most important negotiations for Europe, because this is the sole forum in which there are any current negotiations about the level of armaments and the level of armed forces within Central Europe. It is difficult to see that it has made even the kind of limited progress achieved within the CSCE discussions. After four years of preparatory talks and after three years of formal negotiations, we have still not achieved agreement on the common data and definitions within the negotiations.

Of course, there are a number of different reasons for this. It is quite extraordinary that the Soviet side should have entered the discussions on troop levels without being prepared to discuss what the troop levels in Eastern Europe were and, having conceded a figure, has declined to discuss how they are to be defined. The biggest single reason for the slow progress in MBFR is the lack of popular and political interest in the negotiations. I can speak only for my own country, but I suspect that this is true of the other countries as well, in saying that press and political interest has not been a fraction of the attention paid to the CSCE. This is very unfortunate, since the negotiations in Vienna are at least of equal importance and certainly complementary to the negotiations in Belgrade. Certainly, if we are to think in terms of progress towards security and co-operation we must recognise that the greatest threat to the security of Europe is the current level of armaments, which has obliged us to maintain more men under arms than at any time in the peacetime history of Europe. A process aimed at achieving security and co-operation in Europe which neglects that level of armament is bound to fail.

I hope that the Assembly will feel able to accept my two amendments so that we can make plain our belief that détente will succeed only if it is based as firmly in measures towards arms control as it is in diplomatic negotiations such as in CSCE. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Cook.

The next speaker is Mr. Mende.

Mr. MENDE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I was unable to support Mr. Segre's report in the General Affairs Committee and I shall not do so today in the plenary sitting. Mr. Segre — and other members of the Assembly — are entitled to know my reasons for this.

In my opinion the report does not give enough weight to the obligations resting on all participating States as a result of basket III of the Helsinki final act.

It is naturally not possible for the Rapporteur, however much he aims at making a report objective, to put aside all his political leanings, and I do admire the skill with which he has almost managed to keep duly in line with the views of the majority of the Committee.

In assessing the treatment of human rights we make the great mistake of always referring solely to Helsinki. We should not however forget, especially as we are here in Paris, that it is almost thirty years ago — on 10th December 1978 it will be exactly thirty years — that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was solemnly proclaimed. All United Nations member States celebrate Human Rights Day every year. It is therefore worth taking a look — as a supplement, so to speak, to basket III of the Helsinki final act — at the binding obligations laid down for all member States in the Declaration of Human Rights. The Soviet Union and the other communist States have themselves, in the treaties of the last ten years, including the treaties with Federal Germany, time and again wished to include a reference to the Charter of the United Nations.

One has only to call to mind three articles for the full extent of the political, intellectual and ethical contradiction between word and deed to be apparent.

“Article 12

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State.

2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 19

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression ; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”

This is the sort of basis on which we can start making an assessment of Helsinki's basket III. And on that basis, the real situation in the States that participated in the Helsinki conference and

Mr. Mende (continued)

are now at the Belgrade conference does indeed look bad if they are ruled by communist ideology.

In Section X of his report Mr. Segre refers to the controversy about the *Radikalenerlass* and criticises certain alleged contraventions of human rights in the Federal Republic of Germany. Again, Mr. Boucheny, writing on 11th August on paper of the Senate of the French Republic, forwarded to us an open letter from communist comrades in Hamburg, in which communist comrades of Mr. Boucheny addressed themselves to Chancellor Schmidt and the Mayor of Hamburg, Hans-Ulrich Klose, with regard to the so-called *Radikalenerlass*.

This immediately raises the question, Mr. President, of what this much maligned and frequently interpreted and misinterpreted *Radikalenerlass* actually says. I have a copy here. This is what it says :

“The heads of government of the *Länder* [of the Federal Republic of Germany] in consultation with the Federal Chancellor on 28th January 1972 [i.e. with the then Chancellor Willy Brandt] have laid down the following principles... :

1. Under the laws governing the employment of civil servants at national level and in the federated States, which stipulate that only persons affording a guarantee that they will at all times give their allegiance to the free, democratic order within the meaning of the basic law shall be admitted to public service, civil servants are obliged, both within and without the service, to give active support to the maintenance of that order.”

And then, in regard to candidates for the public service, it states :

“A candidate who engages in anti-constitutional activities shall not be appointed to a position in the public service.”

The relationship of civil servants to the State is, precisely, one of trust. A few days ago there was an article in one of the trade union newspapers, headed “Enemies of the constitution with a civil service pension behind them”, criticising those university lecturers who are today inciting young people in the universities against our free democratic State, but do so from the security of the pension rights guaranteed them by the Constitution and by legislation on the conditions of employment of public officials.

In any case, the proper title of this order is “Employment of right- and left-wing extremists in the public service”. It does not contain any “occupational prohibitions”, as asserted by a large section of the international press which

has twisted the meaning of the word. Rather, it simply provides for the non-employment of communist or nazi elements in the public service as civil servants, employees or workers at federal, *Land* or local authority level. What inspired this order, Mr. President ? It stems from the historical experience of the destruction of the Weimar Republic, for it was the communists and national socialists who, during the last years of the Weimar Republic, in the early thirties, jointly voted against the parties supporting the Weimar Republic in the Prussian parliament and the Reichstag, and thereby caused it to collapse.

It is our duty in the Federal Republic of today to learn from the mistakes made at that time and refuse to employ in the public service at federal, *Land* or local authority level extremists who seek to destroy the State and would undermine the liberal basis of the Federal Republic of Germany. They are free to choose any calling and to study any subject, but they cannot, as convinced communists or convinced fascists, stand in a relationship of trust to the State they wish to destroy. And in order to spare them the pangs of conscience we abstain from employing these destructive elements in the service of the Federal Republic of Germany.

That is what Mr. Segre calls a *Radikalenerlass*. It is not a decree aimed at extremists, but a measure by which the free democratic system seeks to defend itself. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Mende.

The next speaker is Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I shall be brief. I spoke on Mr. Segre's report at our June meeting. It is with considerable regret that I find myself unable to support it today as I was unable to support it then.

I am convinced, from perusing the report, that Mr. Segre has done his very best with a matter that really is intractable : to reconcile the attitude of the Soviet Union and East European countries towards human rights with the suggestion that the Soviet Union, if not sincere in the matter of human rights, can be sincere in any other matter concerned with détente.

Human rights are not only an integral and important part of the Helsinki agreement in themselves and for their own sake, but a touchstone by which we measure the integrity and sincerity of Eastern European countries when it comes to the other matters of force reductions and of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries which are equally important for détente in the world.

For those two reasons, I find myself unable to support Mr. Segre's report. It seems to me that those reasons go together.

Mr. Grieve (continued)

As my friend Sir Frederic Bennett said, we have case after case and daily evidence of the fact that Soviet Russia has done little, if anything — probably nothing — to make concessions to what we in the West consider elementary in the area of human rights.

One of the advantages of being a British member of parliament is how close one is to one's constituents by being directly elected. One goes regularly to one's constituency, one sees constituents and one hears about their problems. I know that that is true of all my colleagues, but in a constituency for which one alone is responsible it is particularly the case.

Only on Saturday I saw a Soviet Jewess, Mrs. Friedman, who had been allowed to leave Soviet Russia. Her husband, a distinguished engineer in his own right who obtained high remuneration, desired to emigrate with her. He was refused permission to leave Russia. She came away, but he is still there. In effect, he is a prisoner of the regulations which maintain him there. Not only has he not been allowed to leave, but he has been deprived of the right to earn his living in a way to which he was accustomed and to which his qualifications entitled him. Indeed, he is now obliged to earn his living as an ordinary labourer. I know that this is only one case, but we all know that it is one case among many.

We must judge sincerity and determination for détente not only by what we are able to achieve by reduction of forces, but by the behind-the-scenes activities of the Soviet Union in the western world by infiltration, for instance, in the United Kingdom, of some of our trade unions. We must also judge it, and judge it severely, by what is happening in human rights.

These matters go to the root of the appreciation that we must make today of the progress that has been made as a result of the Helsinki agreement. So far as that progress, or the lack of it, is concerned, alas it seems to me that we are obliged to say that Mr. Segre's report puts a gloss, which it does not deserve, on what has happened so far.

For those reasons, and with the utmost regret, I shall be obliged to vote against the report. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Grieve.

The next speaker is Mr. Pecchioli. He will be followed by Mr. Müller.

Mr. PECCHIOLI *(Italy)* (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Communist Group's reason for agreeing to the General Affairs Committee's decision to approve the report that has been tabled is a very simple

one. The report conducts a sober, cool, objective and realistic analysis of the stances adopted by Heads of State, government spokesmen, representatives of the major political groupings in various countries having signed the Helsinki act. What emerges from such analysis is in my view precisely the fact that, over and above the difficulties and obstacles, serious as these are, that still remain, the prevailing tendency on the international chessboard is to tackle the difficulties and obstacles with appropriate gradualness, as well as wisdom and firmness.

I think it is this spirit of goodwill and wisdom that imbues the draft recommendation and, too, the report we are discussing. I believe a differing attitude, one of wavering and unwisdom, liable to worsen the existing difficulties in countries' relations with one another, especially between East and West, one attempting to make political mileage out of such difficulties and oppose individual sections of the Helsinki final act to others, would do nothing but harm to the cause of détente, which all of us ought to have at heart.

I consider, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, that today is an important day for the Assembly, an opportunity to express, by approval of the draft recommendation, the will for peace of the countries of Western Europe whose representatives we are, and so give a boost and extend a helping hand to the success of the follow-up conference now being held in Belgrade. To hope, as the draft recommendation does, that further steps forward will be taken there in Belgrade, and new points of convergence patiently sought in the long-drawn-out process of implementing the Helsinki final act, certainly does not mean knuckling under to anything or throwing in the towel. All it signifies is that WEU too is a vital organism capable within the range of its competences of bringing its own contribution to the progress of détente. It means that ours is a body which realises that international security and co-operation represent a value surpassing all others, and form the essential vital basis for tackling and overcoming all other problems still outstanding.

The arguments of those who, in this Assembly and previously in Committee, still oppose approval of the draft recommendation are in my view ill-founded, they turn a deaf ear to the grand universal interests to which I have referred. Let me say that they seem rather to stem from the fact that the Rapporteur on this subject happens to belong to one particular political group. But if, as I believe, such be the case, we must simply take note that the people who stand in the way of détente, and even more so of understanding and the possibility of a dialogue among the parties concerned, are those who are incapable of breaking away from sectarianism

Mr. Pecchioli (continued)

and prejudice. They cannot or will not appreciate either the irreplaceable, objective contribution to the cause of peace in Western Europe made by the forces of the workers' movement and that form of it commonly referred to as Eurocommunism, or the decisive and fundamental value of unity among all European popular movements.

However, I would like to point out that we are not in this forum called upon to vote for Eurocommunism: that topic is not down on the agenda. What we have to pronounce upon is the best possible ways of fulfilling our function of carrying further the process initiated at Helsinki.

Then there is a question I should like to put to some of the people who oppose the report in the name of human rights. Certainly human rights are a question dramatically relevant to the eastern countries. Anyone who is willing to observe, objectively and realistically, and with a proper sense of responsibility, the position of the parties that take their stand on the so-called Eurocommunist current of opinion is bound to admit that the Italian and other European communist parties have taken a perfectly unambiguous stand on the question of the existing degeneracies in socialist countries.

To some who refuse in the name of human rights to approve the lofty and responsible report we are considering, so elevated in tone and responsibly drafted, let me just ask why on earth they have never dissociated themselves, at any rate openly from that notorious Bavarian political figure who in the last few days had a word of commendation for General Pinochet's régime and one of disparagement for the country's christian democrats who, together with all the other forms of democracy in Chile are suffering every sort of persecution and violence. I must point out that the Italian christian democrats have forcibly so dissociated themselves.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I wish to declare the WEU Communist Group's entire approval of the report and draft recommendation, to which a few amendments have been made. Among the latter, we accept Mr. Cook's and Mr. Bonalumi's, but reject those moved by Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Roberti. Let me, lastly, express the hope that this Assembly will, by a favourable vote, respond to the aspiration towards peace and security so deeply rooted in the minds of the European nations we represent here. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — The next speaker is Mr. Müller. He will be followed by Mr. Urwin.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am tempted to take up a theme already touched upon by our

Italian colleague De Poi, that is to say the special rôle played by the various communist parties and their ideologies today. I am also tempted to talk about Carillo and Berlinguer, and about Gramsci too. But I did that at the July session, so I shall refrain from doing so again. I shall limit myself to just two points in the report submitted by Mr. Segre, after which I must refer to something the last speaker has just said. I am very glad to be able to do so immediately after he has spoken.

First of all, however, I should like to clear up something for Mr. Pecchioli: those who speak here do not — and I make sure I do not — wear the blinkers of a political party. When for example I criticise the report, I do so in the spirit of the declaration of rights adopted two hundred years ago in the United States or as they have grown from the tradition of the great French revolution. I believe we can expect as much of everyone in a parliamentary assembly; indeed, parliamentarism as we know it in Europe has grown from this tradition. I am not biased, nor do I wear blinkers: I think the blinkers are rather to be found elsewhere.

Now I come to the two points which I would like to make. In paragraph 45 of his report Mr. Segre talks about the situation in Poland following the agreement between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany. In it he says that because of, and through, the CSCE the wishes of tens of thousands of persons of German origin have been gratified and that they have been offered the choice of going back to their homeland or staying on in their country of adoption. Of course it is important that the words used do in fact mean that tens of thousands have had their wishes fulfilled; but there are several other tens of thousands whose wishes have not been fulfilled. As for the semantics of the words used, I would like to add that the message conveyed by this sentence is not quite correct; for those of German origin in Upper Silesia are not emigrants to a foreign country who now want to return home; they were separated from their mother country as a result of the events of the second world war, found themselves part of another country and today would like to get back to what is really their mother country. As evidence of the fact that not all of them can do so, I would like to quote from the periodical *Der Spiegel*, which is not a local Hamburg edition of the *Bayernkurier* in Munich, but a weekly if anything close to or to the left of the socialist-liberal coalition. Even this magazine describes what difficulties the Germans meet with when they try to apply for permission to emigrate. They queue up in the early morning, are bundled into lorries by the militia, are taken twenty kilometres out into the countryside, dumped in the middle of a field and are then free to walk back to the town and start queuing again. By then the office has been closed

Mr. Müller (continued)

and they cannot lodge their application. These are undoubtedly awful cases, which do occur there. If one is going to mention the subject at all in a report, as Mr. Segre has done, then one ought to be more objective and describe the situation as it really is.

My second point concerns the question which Mr. Mende has already referred to, the *Radikalerlass*. Ladies and Gentlemen, what is this *Radikalerlass*, what is this so-called ban on access to certain occupations? Mr. Mende has explained it, and I can unreservedly endorse what he said. For example, the communist parties in France or Italy are protesting that Frau Gingold is not being allowed to become a civil servant, a teacher in the Federal Republic. In fact, Frau Gingold is teaching in schools in Hessen. She is working as an employee there but has not been established as a civil servant, because according to our laws, which Mr. Mende has just explained to you, it is not possible to do so. Why is it not possible?

Well, let me explain that too. In my country the *Rote Blätter*, the main publication of the communist students' organisation Spartacus, has carried an account of an interesting interview with a member of the executive of that organisation. This member was asked about human rights, free elections, free trade unions, etc. Do you know what the answer was? Why should it be possible in the GDR — which the member defended — to buy, for example, *Vorwärts*, the official organ of the SPD? If we allow *Vorwärts* of the SPD to be published, then we shall also have to allow a christian-democrat newspaper as well. Why should we have free trade unions in the GDR? If we allow trade unions, perhaps we shall have to allow an employers' association as well. The periodical continues: Why should we allow free elections, why should we allow social democrats to stand as candidates? Then we might even have to allow christian democrats to put up for election. That is the spirit which pervades the German Communist Party. I will not presume to express an opinion on the Italian Communist Party or the French Communist Party. I do not interfere in the internal affairs of another country. But as a German parliamentarian who has taken an oath of allegiance to the basic law, it is my bounden duty to note this situation clearly and to take up a clear position.

Let me quote another example. A few weeks ago I visited Italy. There were considerable disturbances in the streets, cars were being set on fire and political party offices being destroyed. I asked a communist colleague in Italy what it was all about. This communist colleague said: It is because an extreme left-wing radio station and

a leftist bookshop have been closed down. I asked him: Are you not protesting against this fascist act of closing down shops? He answered: No, it was necessary, and we are blaming the christian democrats for not doing something about it sooner. In Germany no radio station and no leftist bookshop has been closed down. In Germany you can buy any book you wish. The Italian Communist Party itself is involved in publishing in Germany, and publishes communist books which even I buy because they offer quite interesting reading. It is just that we believe that nobody can become a civil servant in a State who seeks to destroy that State.

When we are having a debate on human rights, however, I must say that I object to the fact — and herein lies the gravamen of the criticism of Mr. Segre — that, in the report, what is happening in the so-called socialist countries is here being compared, in another reference, with the *Radikalerlass* and with the monitoring of telephones, as it is euphemistically called, because there has been abuse. I would not like at this point to ask in what other countries there has been abuse. It was also compared with the problems in Cyprus and Northern Ireland. The situations are simply not comparable, and such a comparison bears no relation to the actual facts.

In this connection I would like to make one other remark. If there had been a *Radikalerlass* or if the law on civil servants that we have today, had been applied in the Weimar Republic, Hitler would not have become a *Regierungsrat* in Braunschweig; so he would not have been able to stand as a candidate in German elections, and perhaps the situation might then have been entirely different.

Does the house not believe that, in view of this situation, we should show a certain degree of objectivity and judge matters in the light of hard facts? With your permission I will now turn quite briefly to a problem touched on by Mr. Pecchioli when he was speaking of a Bavarian politician. He said he was speaking on behalf of the workers' movement and that the workers' movement must also be heard in this Assembly. Presumably it does make itself heard through Mr. Pecchioli, but it is heard through me too: for I too am an active trade unionist and in my constituency more than half the workers are certainly behind my party and behind me — and this means, to put it plainly, that I too am part of the workers' movement. The chairman of my party is the politician who has just been attacked: Franz Josef Strauss. What did he do in Chile? He took part in Chile in the 125th anniversary of the immigration of Germans to Chile. While in Chile he said: We demand free elections in Chile, we demand a change from military dictatorship to parliamentary demo-

Mr. Müller (continued)

cracy, we want to have free trade unions. Perhaps Mr. Strauss, should he be invited to Warsaw or Moscow, will be able to make a similar speech there ; because there they have the same problems as in Chile. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — The next speaker is Mr. Urwin. He will be followed by the last speaker at this sitting, Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — I make remarks as a member of the General Affairs Committee on the Segre report inhibited to some extent because I was, unfortunately, unable to attend the meeting of the Committee in Bonn two or three weeks ago because of my other responsibilities in the Council of Europe. It is within my knowledge that the initial report discussed by the General Affairs Committee was on that occasion substantially amended and to some extent refined.

I immediately divorce myself from some of the remarks made by some of my British parliamentary conservative colleagues. I want to make it clear that with the amendment tabled by Mr. Cook I am prepared to support the report. Not to be prepared to support a report on the ground that it was produced by a communist, merely because he was a communist, would constitute a complete negation of the belief in democracy on which my socialism has been founded.

It is not surprising that the debate so far has centred largely on the question of human rights. I suggest to the Rapporteur, Mr. Segre, that he does not project the true situation when he seems to develop the argument that the record of Eastern European countries in human rights is as good as that of the countries of Western Europe.

I also point out to Mr. Segre, as regards paragraph 1 of his recommendation, that he still appears to believe that the final act of Helsinki is a treaty rather than agreements on fundamental principles which were agreed within the final act.

I want to address myself to some of the comments which Mr. Segre has rehearsed in his report and which have been made by prominent political figures. I first call in aid paragraph 42 of the report, where Anton Vratusa of Yugoslavia is quoted as saying:

“There can be no question of scrutinising the attitude of the participating States to any one particular basket, but only of surveying political security and economic and cultural relations as a whole.”

I immediately say to Mr. Segre that that statement is in direct conflict with my interpretation and assessment of the final act of Helsinki, and it certainly does not accord with the British Government's policy towards Helsinki. The concern of Belgrade, rather than being a negation of the principles of Helsinki, surely was and is the study of all baskets of the final act and an uninhibited exchange of views between member States which are signatories of the final act of Helsinki, presaging a meaningful dialogue to the problems involving all the signatory countries to the final act and, indeed, others which are affected but which are not signatory nations. The final act does not seek to preclude inter-State discussion and negotiation, especially on the subject of human rights or whether the discussion strictly is between East and West countries or between countries within the two distinct power groups.

One can argue the close relationship between human rights and détente. As détente extends and develops, I think that human rights can be expected automatically to make some progress. Nevertheless, the extension of human rights is not and certainly ought not to be dependent itself upon détente. Progress in human rights can influence favourably the positive progress of détente.

Again I take the words of Mr. Vratusa, from paragraph 42 :

“It would be no use judging things in a spirit of winners and losers. Everyone will be a winner if we resolutely address ourselves to removing the obstacles impeding free contacts between the independent peoples of Europe, and everyone will be a loser if we obstinately strengthen the exclusive attitudes and barriers of separate blocs. In that case the real loser is the cause of world peace and security, and the real winner the forces of violence and passion.”

I am sure that all forward-looking politicians will be able readily to subscribe to those admirable sentiments. There are valuable prizes to be won in this field.

In paragraph 23 at the end of his report, the Rapporteur says :

“Belgrade can therefore be expected to achieve little more than a restatement of standpoints by the various signatories.”

That suggests to me that the signatories will be speaking from a heavily-entrenched position. I suggest that such an attitude is to be construed as being entirely against the spirit of the final act. Belgrade was surely regarded as a stepping-stone from Helsinki and was designed to measure the progress achieved since the final act was agreed at Helsinki.

Mr. Urwin (continued)

In the same paragraph, the Rapporteur continues :

"The USSR will claim that active overt western concern about human rights in the eastern bloc represents interference in the internal affairs of another State and is contrary to Helsinki, despite the terms of basket III. The United States and most, if not all, the western nations will deny this premise, and also assert that non-interference in what form of government the people of a country freely choose is not a one-way privileged process ; and furthermore emphasise that restraint should be observed right across the global board and not just in Europe."

One can argue for a long time about the merit of those words, especially the reference to freely elected governments in different parts of the world. One easily and readily recalls the fact that there are more freely and democratically elected parliaments within the membership of the Council of Europe and Western European Union than in the whole of the rest of the world.

Amongst the quotations that the Rapporteur has produced in his report, and especially in this context, I refer him to the words that he quotes of Dr. David Owen, the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, who has said — the quotation is in paragraph 35 :

"Détente on its own could not, and was never intended to, stop the Soviet Union from being a world power, still less to convert the Russians and their allies from communism."

Those are very sensible words and point to the absolute fact, as we know, that Dr. Owen went on to say this :

"All we can say is that balance there must be between the elements of confrontation and co-operation, whether we are talking of the détente process as a whole or of its constituent parts.

These considerations apply with particular force to the Helsinki final act. While the act marked an important stage in the development of co-operative relations between East and West, there is no denying that several of its provisions contain the seeds of confrontation."

We are less than realistic if we do not accept as responsible politicians that the very content of the final act of Helsinki involves us in a form of confrontation. It would be cowardly to try to run away from that fact. We as responsible politicians should face up to that fact and wish those responsible in Helsinki and Belgrade the best of luck in their future deliberations on this vitally important act. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Urwin.

The next speaker is Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I remind you that in my humble estimation we are not a diplomatic body but a political assembly. It is in that light that we should examine Mr. Segre's report.

I start with a quotation Mr. Segre made in support of his theses, in the shape of a passage from the speech of the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Mr. Minic, who said among other things : "We should examine its implementation [that of the Helsinki final act] in all its forms". I marvel that Mr. Pecchioli should, in his truth to say very tough speech, have tried to represent as trouble-makers those who want to discuss the final act in all its aspects and every possible form, even going so far as to say bluntly that anyone seeking to invoke the entire set of rules enshrined in the final act would create, by their partisanship and by the formation of splinter groups, the main obstacle to détente and recognition of civil rights. This is to me a verdict I am definitely unable to share. Moreover, Mr. Pecchioli tried to pass off this report and draft recommendation as the Italian and other communist parties' own work, even going so far as to say : "We reject the amendments", one of whose movers was myself.

Let me remind you that it is not the communist party that should accept or reject amendments proposed by a member of this Assembly, but, if anyone, the Rapporteur or Committee Chairman.

I also direct the Assembly's attention to my two amendments. I should take a very serious view of their being rejected. Which are the two most controversial points in the tenor of the Segre report ? The latter is an intelligent, smooth but definitely not objective or realistic disquisition, cool if anything, as Mr. Pecchioli described it. There are two main points of difference. Playing the eastern countries', and especially USSR's little game, people try and argue that any talk of civil rights, or claim that they be safeguarded, would mean undue interference in the internal affairs of the countries called to order. I do not think this is true. Woe betide the Assembly, if ever it fell in with such a line of argument ! It would spell the end, not only of the Helsinki final act but maybe of our Assembly. Well, the first part of my amendment proposes inserting at the end of the preamble the following : "Noting with regret that the need to respect the principles of the third basket of the final act of the CSCE is incorrectly considered by the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries to be unjustified interference in their internal affairs". All right, you want to delete this first paragraph ? To do so would be tanta-

Mr. Cavaliere (continued).

mount to admitting that talk about human rights, the claim they should be observed, is unjustified interference in other countries' internal affairs — and that would really be the end.

Another very important point is this : Mr. Segre strains every nerve to represent the human rights situation as strictly comparable in the Eastern and Western European countries. Allow me to remind you of the two places in the report where such a claim is made : paragraphs 14 and 17. After maintaining that it would in practice amount to undue interference in other countries' internal affairs, he blandly asserts : "Your Rapporteur thinks it obvious that violations of such rights are committed in both East and West. President Carter's comment [acknowledging that for the admission and right to move about of certain undesirable politicians, attitudes must change] is significant in this respect".

Mr. Segre comes back to the charge in paragraph 57 where he says that this is the case in the United States, Spain and Federal Germany.

Well, I put it to the Assembly, to all of you, including Mr. Segre : is there or is there not any difference in the situation concerning human rights between what happens in the Eastern European countries, and what happens in the West ? If we truly are unbiased and objective, we have to admit that the problem is greater in the East than in the West, so that the Assembly ought to accept the second part of my amendment, which runs : "Concerned at the serious and continuous violation of human rights still occurring in Eastern European countries". If it rejected this amendment, the Assembly would be admitting the non-existence of the problem of human rights in Eastern Europe, even after what happened, for example, to the "dissidence exhibition" organised by the socialist Mr. Ripa di Meana at Venice. The USSR tried to throw all its weight into interfering in Italy's internal affairs, at one time claiming that the Italian Government should intervene to prohibit the exhibition from being held.

These are the salient facts, Ladies and Gentlemen. We do not want to raise obstacles or difficulties ; we seek détente, but we also want to see all the principles of Helsinki honoured. Obviously paragraph 2 of the recommendation is opposed to such a principle, for it declares that we should look to détente, and that once this has been achieved, the respect of human rights will ensue.

May I conclude by declaring that dissidence will not perish through any repression wreaked upon dissidents, but it might die if we managed to isolate it. I think that if the Assembly approves

Mr. Segre's report in its present form it will have struck what might be a mortal blow against all who believe in and struggle for freedom and the rights of man. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the debate on the report is adjourned until tomorrow morning.

10. Changes in the membership of Committees

The PRESIDENT. — The last Order of the Day is the nomination of Committees and the ratification of provisional appointments made by the Presidential Committee.

During the adjournment, under paragraph 3 of Rule 8 and paragraph 2 of Rule 14, the Presidential Committee provisionally appointed members to Committees to fill places that had become vacant and authorised new members of the Assembly to participate in Committee proceedings. The Presidential Committee's nominations are published in the annex to Notice No. 8. They are submitted to the Assembly for ratification in accordance with the aforementioned rules.

Are there any objections ?...

There are no objections.

The provisional nominations are therefore ratified.

In addition, the Assembly must pronounce on the candidatures for membership of the Committees. They are submitted today in accordance with paragraph 6 of Rule 39. Those candidatures have been published in the annex to Notice No. 8.

Is there any objection to the candidatures ?...

There being no objection, it is accordingly agreed.

11. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday 29th November, at 9.30 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Application of the final act of the CSCE (Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 753 and Amendments).
2. Communications and crisis management in the Alliance (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 757 and Amendments).

3. International terrorism (Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Document 761).

4. Address by General Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

12. *Message from the Spanish Parliament*

The PRESIDENT. — Before closing today's sitting, I should like to ask a Spanish observer to make some final remarks.

Mr. ESCUDERO (*Observer from Spain*). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen. On behalf of the Spanish Parliament, I should like to thank

you very much for the invitation to attend as observers at the Assembly of Western European Union.

In the way that we in Spain are now progressing towards democracy, we want to contribute to European peace in future. Spain, as part of the western countries, has been European in its history and culture. Spain now is European and will be European in future.

Mr. President and members of Western European Union, thank you very much for your kind invitation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, and welcome again.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(*The Sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.*)

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 29th November 1977

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Change in the Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session (Doc. 748).
4. Application of the final act of the CSCE (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 753 and Amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Mattiok, Mr. Channon, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Sarti, Mr. Segre (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. von Bothmer (*Chairman of the Committee*), Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Cook, Sir Frederic Bennett.
5. Communications and crisis management in the Alliance (*Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 757 and Amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Watkinson (*Rapporteur*).
6. International terrorism (*Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 761*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Müller.
7. Address by General Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
Speakers: The President, General Haig (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*).
Replies by General Haig to questions put by: Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Périquier, Mr. Vohrer, Mr. Warren, Mr. Radius, Mr. Forni, Lord Duncan-Sandys, Mr. Watkinson, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Banks, Mr. Minnucci, Mr. Mattiok, Mr. Critchley, Mr. Faulds, Sir John Rodgers, Mr. De Jardin.
8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Change in the Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session (Doc. 748)

The PRESIDENT. — The Presidential Committee which met yesterday evening after the public sitting of the Assembly has thought it right to propose to the Assembly that this part-session be brought to a close on Wednesday evening because of the difficulties which will be encountered on Thursday.

1. See page 18.

The morning sitting on Wednesday will begin at 9 a.m.

A rearrangement of the order of business for Wednesday will be proposed to you in due course.

As for today, the morning sitting will begin with the resumed debate on Mr. Segre's report on the application of the final act of the CSCE. We shall then discuss communications and crisis management in the Alliance, the Watkinson report. Further to the decision which we took yesterday, we shall then deal with the urgent procedure on international terrorism and peace in the Middle East, and afterwards hear General Haig at about 11 a.m. At about 12 noon we shall take the votes which have not been taken previously.

At the afternoon sitting, which will begin at 2.30 p.m., we shall consider the budget and Mr. Forni's report on WEU's contribution to the development of European union and Mr. Müller's report on European security and African problems. The Assembly will sit until 7.30 p.m. tonight.

4. Application of the final act of the CSCE

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 753 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now resume yesterday's debate, and I have a problem. I was

The President (continued)

told that some members would not speak, but this morning I find their names on the list again. I have, therefore, a list of five members who wish to take the floor.

To accord with the decision from the Presidential Committee, I propose that in the circumstances the speaking time for each speaker be limited to five minutes in debates on reports and to three minutes on amendments.

Is there any opposition ?...

It is so decided.

I call Mr. Mattick to reopen the debate.

Mr. MATTICK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to come back to the CSCE and its results. From yesterday's debate one could have got the impression that by and large the CSCE decisions had changed nothing. Cast your minds back to 1968, the year in which the armies of the Warsaw Pact marched into Czechoslovakia, and picture the situation presented at that time by the eastern bloc countries and the Soviet Union. It was ten years after the Khrushchev ultimatum on Berlin. Compare that with the situation today. It would be an enormous task to compile the list of everything that has changed since then.

It is with this process that we are concerned, Ladies and Gentlemen. Basket III was rightly packed with western demands for action by the eastern bloc, especially in regard to liberty and freedom of movement. If you are trying to say what constitutes freedom, the most important element is, in my view, freedom of movement. But did anybody, knowing the ossified system of the eastern bloc, seriously believe that the people in charge there would be able to fulfil, with a stroke of the pen, the obligations they had put into basket III? Nevertheless, something is now moving, and we have made a notable contribution to getting it under way. Meetings between East and West have grown to such an extent in the last two years that the individual States in the Soviet bloc, as well as the Soviet Union itself, have been obliged at least to make major changes in their methods. They used to send people to Siberia — today, they expel them, so that they can live in the West.

All this must after all be taken into account when anyone asks what the CSCE has achieved so far.

It is in this light that we should consider the subsequent vote on this report. Anyone who says "no" to the proposed report is in fact saying "no" to continuation of the CSCE and forgetting what the CSCE — and I am speaking now as

a German — has achieved, especially for those who are the eastern bloc's immediate neighbours. Not everybody feels it like we do. I come from Berlin — you feel it even more strongly there. I therefore think it is time for us to concern ourselves with continuation of the CSCE. For this will force the eastern bloc rulers gradually to make more and more changes in their internal system and move from total lack of freedom at least to partial freedom of movement and partial liberty.

One more thing: at the last meeting of the Interparliamentary Union, the German Democratic Republic expressed the wish — and put forward a corresponding proposal — that the 1980 conference of the IPU should be held in East Berlin. Just imagine what it would mean for parliamentarians from all over the world to live for a few days or a couple of weeks in a walled-in city and experience real tension day in, day out. We ought to discuss the question whether such a conference can be held in East Berlin if the wall still looks like it does today. This is a task we could assign ourselves for the period up to 1980.

I would like to make one final remark, not directly relating to the subject under discussion. In yesterday's debate we unfortunately had to listen to certain comments about what is really an internal German affair. It is my view that when we travel to such countries as the one that Mr. Strauss has just visited, we ought to concern ourselves above all with the prisoners and those who have got into difficulties since the establishment of the dictatorship in Chile. We ought to act here in the same way as in the case of other countries. But what Mr. Strauss said at a meeting in Chile was "Maintain your freedom!" Nobody knows what freedom he was talking about. I have had to say this, as Mr. Müller was yesterday trying to play the whole thing down. In itself, it has nothing to do with our discussion, but I at least had to set the record straight. That is not how a democrat behaves in a country like the Chile of today.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I must ask that we all finish by saying "yes" to the CSCE and to its continuation. For its continuation means that the process now under way can lead to developments which will bring greater liberty and freedom of movement to the peoples of the eastern bloc. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Channon.

Mr. CHANNON (*United Kingdom*). — Like Mr. Mattick, I think we can all agree that we want a continuation of the CSCE because perhaps great benefits to the world will come out of that, but the doubts of those of us who are against the report — at least, my own doubts — spring from what some consider to be the double

Mr. Channon (continued)

standards which are inevitably expressed throughout the report in general. It was Mr. Pecchioli who yesterday described the report as a serious, objective and realistic analysis of the situation. If it were a serious, objective and realistic analysis of the situation I would support the report, but I cannot accept that, and that is why I cannot support the report this morning.

I make no criticism of Mr. Segre, who has shown himself throughout all the debates as being only too helpful and anxious to come to some accommodation with his colleagues, and we are all in his debt for that. When, however, one looks at paragraph 14 of the report, one sees that the Rapporteur states that violations of human rights are committed in both the East and the West, and he gives examples of what he considers to be the human rights violations in the West. People are not given adequate right, so President Carter says, to move about the United States of America, or perhaps the right of entry to that country of visitors who disagree with him politically is unnecessarily restricted, but is that to be weighed in the scale against the violation of those rights that are still going on in Eastern Europe at the present time? It strikes me that that is a proposition we cannot possibly accept when further examples are given in the report of other alleged violations of human rights in the West.

Of course mistakes are made in the West, and human rights are violated in the West, and no one denies that, but would one set that in the scales against the terrible repressions still going on behind the iron curtain? Mr. Mattick spoke of the Berlin wall, but the existence of the Berlin wall is hardly mentioned, if it is mentioned at all, in the report. How can we equate what is going on in the East and in the West at the present time with any degree of honesty whatsoever?

It would be a great mistake for this Assembly, with its responsibility for defence, to allow a report to go out from it in which some form of compromise between these points of view is put forward, or to allow it to go out in our name that we are prepared to accept a situation in which the violation of human rights in the East and the violation of human rights in the West are said to be more or less the same and that we should not worry about the differences. It must be quite wrong for this Assembly to do that, and it might have wide repercussions elsewhere. When we see examples of the treatment of dissidents behind the iron curtain, the refusal of visas to people who wish to emigrate and the oppression that takes place, I do not think we can do that.

Of course, human rights are not the only feature of Helsinki which is to be debated in Belgrade, but they are still a crucial factor for all of us. Although we have had an important debate and most of us could possibly accept many of the recommendations, I cannot accept the general tone of the report. I believe that it would be quite wrong for this Assembly to allow it to be passed this morning, and I shall join those of my colleagues who vote against it. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Gessner.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me say from the start that I disagree with many of the assessments and judgments made by Mr. Segre in his report. I might add that there is hardly ever a report with which I find myself in total agreement. It is in the nature of things that each of us would have prepared a different report.

Nevertheless, I would like to say just as clearly that in my view the report is perfectly acceptable, as it reflects in very large measure the various opinions expressed in Committee. I think it is an excellent thing that the need for détente and an improvement in the situation of people in countries where human rights have been violated should be backed by the votes of a large number of noteworthy politicians.

We must be clear that we are dealing here with a very lengthy process which has not only brought — and is still bringing — progress, but has also led to setbacks. If we approach détente with too many illusions we shall, I think, be all the more deeply disappointed. We must therefore make a realistic appraisal of what is actually possible. Progress there has been. For example, we learned not long ago that a bishop in the GDR had spoken of improvements in the situation of the church in that country which he ascribed to the CSCE, and this is a development which should not be underestimated. On the other hand, we have seen journalists hindered in the practice of their profession. These two examples show where there has been progress and where difficulties have arisen.

What matters is that we should draw up the balance-sheet correctly. When I do so, I come to the conclusion that in the sphere of détente and normalisation the world is indeed a better place and that our task today is to do everything we can to make sure this trend is reinforced. In doing so we should not be discouraged by the occasional setback. The task we have set ourselves is so enormous that we shall need courage, circumspection and perseverance — there is no room for pusillanimity.

I think we must also be clear about the fact that our efforts are running up against certain ideological frontiers. We interpret freedom quite

Mr. Gessner (continued)

differently from, for example, the communists. But freedom is not an abstract concept: it comprises a large number of specific rights. Since, however, freedom is interpreted in the eastern European constitutional systems differently from the way we interpret it, there are problems. Believe me, anyone who thinks that the leaders of the eastern European States are going to allow the Soviet-type constitutional system to be overturned via the CSCE final act is making a mistake, just as no one must expect that we would allow our system of government to be transformed by, say, an international treaty.

What we have to do is to gauge how much room for manoeuvre there is for bringing greater freedom of movement to the people living in the eastern European countries. It is, I believe, not too difficult — and if I had the time I would give details — to show that there are nonetheless things that have changed for the better.

We should not allow ourselves to be discouraged. We must continue to work energetically for détente. I believe that the people fighting to establish human rights in the eastern European countries will also be grateful for our efforts. For, Mr. President, there is not the slightest doubt in my mind that, if the process of normalisation, laborious as it is, should ever break down, the voices of those in the eastern European States who have spoken up for freedom would soon fall silent. Thank you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Sarti.

Mr. SARTI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Segre's report comes back this time to the WEU Assembly accompanied by a draft recommendation that has been considerably amended by many of our colleagues.

In detail the amendments have already been noted; they were accepted by the Rapporteur at the Bonn meeting and put to the vote in Committee.

I have to give the Rapporteur credit not only for accepting promptly and with great broad-mindedness the detailed amendments, but also for acknowledging their underlying logic, namely, to give the report a decidedly more balanced tone. Thus it appears to take greater account now than it did originally of the fact that there has been in the eastern bloc only a very limited implementation of the provisions of the third basket; and it seems mostly designed to insist upon all the main principles enshrined in the "philosophy" of the Helsinki act being placed on the same footing.

The most striking amendment concerns precisely the deletion from the operative clauses of a

dangerous form of words concerning the need to observe *en tout état de cause* the principle of non-intervention only. In so doing it also answers the misgiving expressed by Sir Frederic Bennett and many other speakers from the floor in the June debate — lest Helsinki should represent a success for Soviet diplomacy alone, whose interest it is to uphold the principle of the definitive character of the frontiers drawn after the second world war, and that of non-interference in individual countries' internal affairs, meaning by non-interference also the eventuality of civil rights being violated. Possibly this latter concept will be clarified later. Indeed, two amendments moved by several speakers are intended to show up the fact that severe injury would be done to the spirit of Helsinki if the eastern countries, or anyone else, clung to the unacceptable opinion that investigating or making critical remarks about the extent to which civil rights are safeguarded in a given country constituted illegitimate interference in its internal affairs.

It has been said that the Belgrade conference should not become a tribunal for arraigning countries of the eastern bloc. Not only has it not been one so far, but — if I may speak my full mind — caution and prudence have sometimes even taken precedence over the need to serve the truth.

The Sakharov "hearing" in Rome, the testimonies about dissidence made at the Venice Biennale, considered as being under the cultural wing of the left, and the very fact that Sakharov was prevented from travelling to Venice, are ominous signs for us all.

In one respect the West has in fact demonstrated its belief in the doctrine of non-interference in civil rights issues, as liable to infringe national sovereignty, and the communist wing inside and outside the eastern bloc has lost favourable opportunities of displaying open-mindedness and tolerance. While on the subject of Eurocommunism, do we have to shun the thought that the words are enticing and the facts less than elating?

It is a question I put to Mr. Segre. He was very accommodating in the drafting of his report and accepting some amendments. Some statements, like the one contradicting the appreciation given in Soviet circles of the good omens for peace at Jerusalem are, if you look at things without any ideological prejudice, at least as important as what was said by the Secretary of the Italian Communist Party, Berlinguer, who reconfirmed in Moscow his party's pledge for ever to give preference to the method of democracy and pluralism. But today it is a matter of appraising the Segre report in the context of this new debate and in the light of progress at the Belgrade conference which, as I said, is not going ahead so satisfactorily as has been claimed

Mr. Sarti (continued)

by authoritative diplomatic sources, even in my own country.

Of the Segre report as a whole I wholeheartedly say that many people in my own group take in advance a negative view, while paying tribute to the Rapporteur's efforts, skill and intelligence; others take a more favourable view of what it signifies, particularly in the history of the internal evolution of the western communist movement, which, let us not forget, barely a few years ago in the individual WEU countries held out for denunciation of the Atlantic Pact and of any proposal of European integration whatsoever. The clarification contained in the amendments I have mentioned may, if adopted, enable some of us to accept the report as well as the recommendation. Let me express what I hope, as follows: our national situations are important, so let us at national level too draw the consequences of how things turn out here today; but it is even more important to formulate in this Assembly a supranational appraisal, a task laid on us by our passion for the freedoms, cult of the truth and trust in the progress of democracy. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Sarti.

The list of speakers is completed. Does the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee wish to reply?

Mr. SEGRE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to thank the speakers from the floor who have, in my view, made a contribution of outstanding political and moral commitment, in spite of the different standpoints taken by each. I think I am able to meet them all, in response to the concluding request by Mr. De Poi yesterday and Mr. Sarti a few moments ago. Having asserted that this debate is an opportunity to test the real will of the political groupings, he wondered, if I did not misunderstand his meaning, what the Rapporteur had in mind.

I can reiterate, as far as this aspect is concerned, a firm pledge to further a process — here I use the words I heard a few moments back as I listened, with great interest, to Mr. Mattick, who spoke as a Berliner, and Mr. Gessner — capable of reconciling détente, national liberties and the upholding of every human right.

It is precisely in connection with such a pledge given by various political groups, about which the debate here has thrown up interesting and informed remarks — let me mention among others the speeches I quoted by Mr. De Poi, Mr. Sarti, Mr. Mattick, Mr. Gessner, as well as Mr. Cook and Mr. Hardy — that, as Mr. Sarti, Mr. De Poi and our other Italian colleagues can cor-

roborate, in our country convergent positions have been reached on international questions and on our country's foreign policy orientations.

But we are not in a national assembly here, and Mr. Sarti did, I believe, rightly call in his speech for a supranational appraisal, one European in its implications, and capable of expressing at one and the same time the commitment to détente and an affirmation of freedom and human rights.

We are in a supranational assembly, and it is, I think, not without significance that it should proclaim, through its independence and sovereign status, a comparable convergence upon responsible and firm positions, at this very moment when the countries whose parliamentarians we have the honour to be are defending and supporting them at the Belgrade conference. Should such convergence be proven to exist, it will be a fact of outstanding European importance and, I believe, exert a favourable impact on Belgrade. It will signify a commitment to such action as I have just been talking about.

Therein lies therefore, as Mr. De Poi was right to remark, this value our debate has had as a test of the various political party positions, of the fact, that is, in substance, over and above subjective evaluations, of being for or against the action our countries are pursuing and which the Foreign Ministers of the Nine corroborated at their meeting in Brussels on 22nd November, when charging the countries' representatives at the Belgrade conference with bringing an open mind to the drafting of the final communiqué.

To be sure, Sir, every political party and every member of parliament is entitled to dissent, to a greater or lesser extent, from such action. Every day we see what a fierce debate rages on the subject in one country or another. All the more necessary therefore do I think it is for us to be clear on the subject, for in substance what we are debating is whether we want to support our countries' responsible commitment in Belgrade to furthering the process I have referred to, or whether we should prefer propagandistic emphasis and polemics about such commitment and political action.

In that case, I am afraid we should not be helping détente nor, as various speakers said, ensuring the upholding of the rights of man, human rights, and I think that it was in this connection and on such a premise that the General Affairs Committee has conducted its proceedings. Hence the importance of the draft recommendation being synchronised with our countries' guidelines and action in Belgrade.

The General Affairs Committee's patient and sagacious effort — I pay tribute to the lady

Mr. Segre (continued)

chairman's wise conduct of the proceedings — has been specifically aimed at such synchronisation and balance in a task which has, as always in the case of teamwork, benefited from the contribution made by each and all, regardless of what convictions they held at the outset.

This being said, Mr. President, I now express an opinion on the amendments. I will explicitly commend to you the hint Mr. Sarti made in his intervention, which I greatly appreciated. I think he particularly alluded to two amendments. I would like to consider a fifth that was submitted this morning, and start off with Sir Frederic Bennett's — with whom there has been so much discussion these days — to the effect that we should put "ought to lead" instead of "is intended to lead". I wish to propose a third alternative, that we should say: "should lead" so as to convey a trust, a will, a pledge to proceed in such a manner that the ongoing process is increasingly successful in conciliating the three end objectives of the political work in hand, the political construction of our continent today.

On this basis, I fully agree to Amendment No. 3 by Mr. Cook, which, I feel, happily supplements the draft recommendation with due regard, too, to the specific institutional aspects of the WEU Assembly. I also think it meets the essential idea of Amendment No. 1 by Mr. Roberti, especially when it states that the process of détente depends on guaranteed security for all concerned.

Finally, I agree to Mr. Bonalumi's Amendment No. 4, which I think strongly conveys the conviction that the reminder of the need for all signatory States to the Helsinki final act to respect all its provisions in full, does not constitute interference in their internal affairs because it is a reminder of pledges freely entered into. This was what I was emphasising in my speech yesterday, that the draft recommendation placed before our Assembly confirmed each of our countries' responsibility and right to test and control the extent to which each signatory State implements the pledges freely given.

I think Mr. Bonalumi's amendment conveys this idea firmly and positively, in full harmony therefore with the objective spirit the governments of the Nine instructed their representatives to bring to the concluding stages of the Belgrade conference. I also feel it appropriately meets the concerns expressed in Mr. Cavaliere's Amendment No. 2. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to speak?

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should once again like to draw attention to the fact that the CSCE is a difficult subject because as a process of relaxing tension it requires a great deal of patience. To Mr. Roberti I would say that you cannot separate détente and security: the one depends on the other, and this is naturally implicit in what we are discussing. The whole process requires a great deal of patience, and we must expect to suffer setbacks, to meet cases which arouse deep scepticism and uncertainty, and we must accept that the slowness of the process contrasts with the pace of life today and the speed with which many other decisions are reached. This is a difficulty we shall have to live with.

Several speakers have expressed the view that the Rapporteur was obviously in difficulties because of his political position. I wonder, Mr. President, whether my christian democrat and conservative friends in this house might not themselves be in just as difficult a situation. I have my doubts whether they would, on reading the recommendation attached to the report, have voted against it had it been presented in Strasbourg during the summer. They ought to remember our total agreement in Strasbourg on the points which reappear in this recommendation.

In his report the Rapporteur has attempted to cover in one broad sweep all the contradictions which, as I have pointed out, permeate the whole CSCE process. I would however like to make it quite clear that I do not accept that part of the report which lists violations of human rights in East and West and seeks, as it were, to equate them. That, in my view, simply cannot be done: what is going on in the USSR, Czechoslovakia and the GDR cannot be equated with the examples from the West, as is done in the report. I would agree with the Rapporteur that there is no single country in the world where there is, as we would all wish, absolute respect for human rights.

As in earlier debates, the problem here is to respect opposing views, convictions and deeply divided opinions without ever losing sight of the fact that, if we look at the CSCE as a whole, some progress is definitely to be seen. We established all this together in Strasbourg, we all agreed on it. I do not think anybody here thinks otherwise. Only a few years ago the existence of a forum like the CSCE would have been impossible.

In regard to the course of the negotiations and the accusations which are inevitably being brought concerning misdeeds that are being totted up and disputed, the Rapporteur seems to me to side with those who believe that the Belgrade conference is not meant to be a place for accu-

Mrs. von Bothmer (continued)

sations and counter-accusations which would bog down the whole proceedings and, if pursued in the way favoured by some of our colleagues here, would bring us to the verge of cold war. None of us wants that, Mr. President.

Approval of the report will of course involve the disappointments and hopes of a lot of people. I would like to add something about the fact that here we have, for the first time to my knowledge, included a minority opinion in a report. We can be grateful that Sir Frederic's dissenting opinion makes the point that détente does not simply mean a peaceful situation between two different systems in the sense that there will be a happy state of complete confidence on both sides. This is simply not feasible: it is contrary to human nature, and incompatible with the different political concepts that each holds about transforming society according to his ideas and capabilities. It is my conviction, shared by the majority of the Committee, that pessimism should not prevent us from doing all that is humanly possible to sustain and develop what has been set in train at Helsinki and Belgrade. As William of Orange said, "It is not necessary to hope in order to venture...". That is an extremely sobering dictum, but it is also one that is imbued with strength. I think we should bear it in mind when beset by doubts, and act accordingly.

As to the recommendation itself, I would ask you to support the amendments to which Mr. Segre has already referred and which he considers acceptable. What we have in this work is something that far transcends the things which separate us. We must try and find a common position; in my opinion, and in that of the majority of the Committee, it is the position expressed in the recommendation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Madam Chairman.

The debate is closed.

Five amendments have been tabled to the draft recommendation in Document 753. We shall consider these amendments in the order in which they relate to the paragraphs of the draft recommendation.

As far as I can see — but perhaps those who are responsible for the amendments might ask leave to take the floor — the amendments have already been covered in the debate and we have heard the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the Committee. Anyhow, if need be, one can speak to an amendment. In that event, please take care not to exceed three minutes, as was decided in the Presidential Committee last night.

We start with the preamble. I take first Amendment No. 5 tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett. The amendment is as follows:

In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "is intended to lead" and insert "ought to lead".

Do you wish to speak to the amendment, Sir Frederic?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — Yes, Mr. President. I shall not need three minutes.

I think that, partly due to the interpretation, Mr. Segre and I did not completely understand one another because the same word was repeated.

I want to make it clear that I have used the phrase "ought to lead" rather than "is intended to lead" because throughout the debate it has been generally accepted that the motivation for Helsinki and for détente are by no means necessarily the same. I do not believe that the motivation of some countries in the East has been "intended to lead".

I am prepared to give them the benefit of the doubt and say "which ought to lead", which, I think, correctly describes the position of all the members in this Assembly. In other words, we do not make a statement of fact on a highly controversial matter on which we have differing intentions, but we state what it is proper for this Assembly to do, which is to use the phrase "which ought to lead".

I ask my colleagues of all political parties to accept my sincerity and brevity in moving this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Is anyone against the amendment?..

No. We shall therefore decide by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment No. 5 is agreed to.

We now come to part 1 of Amendment No. 3 tabled by Mr. Cook:

1. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "negotiations" insert:

"particularly in the field of arms control and mutual reduction of forces in Europe".

Mr. Cook has already spoken about this yesterday. Does he wish to say anything now?

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — I spoke at length on this yesterday and need not repeat myself. The amendment represents a simple attempt to give emphasis to arms control as an important aspect of détente. I hope that the Rapporteur will accept it.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you for your brevity, Mr. Cook.

Is anyone against this amendment?...

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I am against the amendment, but not because I oppose the spirit of what Mr. Cook is trying to do. I shall willingly withdraw my opposition if he agrees that between “mutual” and “reduction” the word “balanced” should be inserted. This is in complete accord with the policy in this matter of every country represented in WEU. If Mr. Cook would agree with that, I would certainly withdraw my opposition and support his amendment.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — I am happy to accept that alteration.

The PRESIDENT. — Is it agreed that the amendment should be altered in this way?...

That appears to be accepted.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 1 of Amendment No. 3, as amended, is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment No. 1, tabled by Mr. Roberti. The first part seeks to leave out the last paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Mr. Roberti spoke on this yesterday. Is he present? It appears that he is not.

We shall now take a vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Since it has received no votes at all, *part 1 of this amendment is not agreed to.*

The second part of the amendment seeks to insert a new paragraph at the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Does anyone wish to speak in favour of or against this amendment?...

Apparently no one wishes to do so.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 2 of Amendment No. 1 is negatived.

We turn now to Amendment No. 2, tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Roberti, which is to insert two new paragraphs, which appear on the printed paper, at the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Does anyone wish to speak in favour of or against this amendment?...

No one wishes to do so.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment No. 2 is negatived.

We turn now to amendments to the draft recommendation proper.

First, we shall take part 3 of Amendment No. 1 by Mr. Roberti to insert at the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper the words:

“in order to ensure *inter alia* that these negotiations in no event affect, directly or indirectly, Western European Union’s conditions, possibilities and means of defence;”.

Does anyone wish to speak in favour of or against this amendment?...

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 3 of Amendment No. 1 is negatived.

We now turn to part 2 of Amendment No. 3 by Mr. Cook, which is in paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “*détente*” to insert “through arms control agreements”.

Mr. Cook spoke in favour of this yesterday.

Does anyone wish to speak against it?...

If not, we will proceed to vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 2 of Amendment No. 3 is agreed to.

We come now to part 4 of Mr. Roberti’s Amendment No. 1 — that is to say to leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“3. Ensure that the Eastern European countries apply strictly the clauses of the Helsinki final act in the same manner and at the same time as the WEU member countries.”.

Does anyone wish to speak in favour of this amendment?...

Does anyone wish to speak against it?...

We have already debated it, so we can vote on it.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 4 of Amendment No. 1 is negatived.

We come now to part 3 of Mr. Cook’s Amendment No. 3 — that is to say, in paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “clauses” and insert “provisions”.

This has already been discussed in the debate.

Does anyone wish to speak against it?...

If not, we can proceed to vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The President (continued)

Part 3 of Amendment No. 3 is agreed to.

The final amendment is No. 4, tabled by Mr. Bonalumi, which seeks, at the end of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, to insert:

“, recognising that a reminder of the need to respect all the provisions of the final act in full does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of the signatory States.”.

Does anyone wish to speak in favour of this amendment?...

Does anyone wish to speak against it?...

As no one wishes to speak, we can vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment No. 4 is agreed to.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the situation is as follows. According to the time scheduled to General Haig, we must start with his speech at roughly 11 o'clock. Five minutes before that we shall have to deal with a request for urgent procedure on the motion for a recommendation on international terrorism in the Middle East. Before that we must have the report of Mr. Watkinson, because General Haig will refer to it. That means that I should close this Order of the Day at 10.45.

I think that we can deal with the roll-call on the draft recommendation in Document 753 within fifteen minutes.

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Cermolacce.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote, after rectification, is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	69
Ayes	51
Noes	18
Abstentions	0

The draft recommendation is adopted².

1. See page 19.

2. See page 20.

5. Communications and crisis management in the Alliance

(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 757 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on communications and crisis management in the Alliance and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 757 and Amendments.

I call the Rapporteur of the Committee, Mr. Watkinson.

Mr. WATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). — The fundamental purpose of the report is to draw attention to the management of crises in an age of flexible response. In an era in which massive nuclear retaliation is not considered as the first option, it is vital that the Alliance has clear-cut and positive attitudes to the problems of crisis which could arise.

Consideration of these problems immediately draws us to the interface between the military and political sides of NATO. It is the business of our governments to provide the necessary armed forces and command infrastructure which they regard as necessary to maintain the peace, but, having provided those forces, it is vital to stress that any major decision in a crisis has to come from the politicians. The rôle and responsibilities of governments is clear and unmistakable.

In the report, I have thought it appropriate to deal at some length with crises which have been of significance to the Alliance. The study of such crises can help us to form opinions on the best manner to deal with such events in the future. Indeed, it was as a result of the crisis in Czechoslovakia in 1968 that the Alliance determined to set up an appropriate management structure. I stress, however, that no two crises are ever the same and we cannot rely upon historicism to give us a complete answer to tomorrow's crises. Nevertheless, from this study I draw certain conclusions and, although these conclusions are not exhaustive, I hope that they delineate the main areas of concern.

I emphasise, first, that the onset of a crisis may be difficult to perceive and then to accept. There may well be many warning signals which almost certainly will be ambiguous in nature, and, of course, it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of political judgment in these contexts.

It is imperative, therefore, that we seek to maximise the capacity of the Alliance to obtain, to interpret and to act upon those warning signals. Warning time must be used as preparation time. It may be that no action will be neces-

Mr. Watkinson (continued)

sary, but preparation time may also involve politicians in taking very hard and difficult decisions.

Secondly, I draw attention to the necessity for the cohesion and solidarity of the Alliance. Consisting as it does of fifteen separate sovereign States, the Alliance always has within itself the seeds of disagreement and inability to act. I draw attention to the fact that no such problem exists for the monolithic Warsaw Pact.

Thirdly, we should recognise that the Alliance cannot cut itself off from events outside its immediate area. There may well be spillover effects which can have serious repercussions for the Alliance.

I thought it appropriate also to point to certain destabilising factors which could provoke a crisis, and I enumerate these in Part IV of my report. We in this Assembly have debated on a number of occasions the build-up of Warsaw Pact forces, and particularly in the central region. There have been alarmist warnings of the impact and significance of this build-up. For myself, I do not consider that a pre-emptive strike from the East is likely, but it is necessary to realise that this build-up in quantity and quality has severely reduced the possible warning time for a crisis manager. Hence the need to encourage crisis prevention measures and the efficient working of crisis-management machinery.

The structure of NATO itself positively ensures that it is the politicians who control the decision-taking machinery. The supreme body — the North Atlantic Council or Defence Planning Committee — is the body which must ultimately take the decisions which will affect the Alliance, and on it sit the civilian representatives of the fifteen member countries.

It may meet at Head of State level, ministerial level or, which is more likely, ambassadorial level. It is from that body that decisions flow down the pyramid of command to NATO field commanders.

To serve the Council or the DPC there is now in Brussels a machinery to provide the means to manage crises. There is a situation centre permanently manned. There is a Military Committee consisting of top-ranking military personnel to advise the DPC or Council. There are, too, improving means of communication, though there is still a long way to go in this area. There is also a committee structure of specialised committees to assist in the decision-taking process.

I would stress, however, that NATO itself has no means of collecting information, and it is therefore necessary for member countries to be

prepared to provide a steady flow of information. It is clear that NATO has the means to analyse and disseminate that information, but without the raw material the machinery is valueless.

As regards the recommendations in the report, the Committee considered it advisable to include a section on crisis prevention. It is, therefore, natural to draw attention to the CSCE and MBFR talks, and in particular we would welcome the strengthening and augmentation of confidence-building measures. We set out the lines on which we are thinking, which, I am pleased to see, are being brought to the attention of the Belgrade talks. We would also welcome some progress on the becalmed MBFR negotiations.

On improving crisis-management arrangements, I stress the need for political involvement at the highest level in exercises. It is clear that exercises such as WINTEX and HILEX are treated with varying degrees of importance, and it is vital for us to realise that if these exercises are to have their true significance politicians at the highest level should be involved in the decision-taking there.

I should hope also that the recommendations that we make on the NATO integrated communications system and on the need for information speak for themselves.

Recommendation 2(v) — namely, the augmentation of NATO mobile standing and on-call forces to provide a greater range of deterrent options in periods of tension — does not call for a massive increase in the number of troops presently within the NATO area. The recommendation asks that existing troops should be assigned specifically to these NATO forces in order to enable them to act and work both in the north and in the south of our area. The Committee proposes that the Council should consider the possibility of a teleprinter link between the NATO headquarters and the Soviet Union. This may be a contentious recommendation because it would add to the number of hot lines, but it is worth remembering that the majority of member countries in NATO do not have any direct link comparable to that of the nuclear powers.

We urge, too, the creation of an *ad hoc* group to study crisis management. Personally I am against proliferation of committees, but I consider that this matter of crisis management is so important that it would be worth while to set up within NATO a committee to consider this problem in depth.

I conclude by urging the Assembly to accept the recommendations. I stress the overriding and inescapable rôle that the politicians must play in crisis management. (*Applause*)

6. International terrorism

(Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 761)

The PRESIDENT. — Before we turn to the speech to be made by General Haig, whom I welcome, we will deal with the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a recommendation on international terrorism. Document 761 has been distributed to the Assembly. May I point out that speakers to this motion must not enter into the substance of the question.

I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, what I have to say will take less than three minutes. I consider that the urgency of this whole matter emerges quite clearly from the text. The question of combating international terrorism is a problem which in fact we ought to have tackled yesterday. There can be no doubt of its urgency and I would beg the Assembly to acknowledge the fact.

The PRESIDENT. — The member who wished to speak against this proposal is not present.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The motion is carried.

I propose to have the whole matter brought up in the General Affairs Committee. I hope that the Committee will try to find time, either tomorrow or this afternoon, to go through the whole question. I hope that it will then meet tomorrow, be it in the morning or the afternoon, in order to reach a decision.

Does the Assembly agree ?...

That is agreed.

7. Address by General Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe

The PRESIDENT. — I have pleasure in inviting General Haig to the rostrum. *(Applause)*

General HAIG (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). — Excellencies, distinguished guests. I thank you all for the very warm welcome you have extended to me. It is the kind of welcome that I so richly deserve but seldom receive. One wise statesman once advised me that some applause at the end of a speech is common currency ; applause before one speaks is frequently a manifestation of blind faith. Recognising that Western Europeans seldom indulge in that kind of excess, I am all the more impressed by the welcome I have received today.

I am extremely pleased to have the opportunity of speaking to this Assembly this morning. I

say that for at least three reasons. The first is that I recognise that Western European Union, since its foundation in 1954, has been in the vanguard of the imperative of western unity, European unity, and associated European security concerns. Anyone who bears the responsibilities which I bear today cannot but harbour a sense of great gratitude to WEU, and especially its predecessor Western Union, which planted the seeds which have grown into the NATO Alliance which I represent here this morning.

Secondly, I am extremely pleased to have an opportunity to make an intervention on the occasion of your consideration of the question of armaments and the study of crisis management and communications. I have read the report and was extremely impressed by it. I must add that on two occasions in the past two years I have raised this issue in the Defence Planning Committee. The sense of urgency on this crucial subject must be maintained.

Thirdly, given my political half-life and the changes which took place in my own capital last January, I am very glad to be anywhere in an official capacity these days.

As I mulled over the remarks I might make this morning, conscious of the great level of experience and accomplishments of this body, my thoughts went back to an experience I had some years ago in Washington as Henry Kissinger's aide. I rushed into his office one day and reminded him that he was due at the Washington Press Club to give a speech on détente. He was very upset because he felt that I had not managed his time properly and had not given him sufficient preparation time. So he went into one of those classic Kissinger tantrums. In an effort to restore peace, I said "Henry, I reckon you can go over there and tell these gentlemen all you know on the subject of détente in fifteen minutes". His eyes narrowed. He looked at me and said "I can go over there and tell those gentlemen all we both know, and it will not take a second longer."

Conscious of that experience, I shall not this morning over-extend my verbosity. I shall make some comments with respect to the narrower subject of crisis management which I believe have application to our overall security need. Because I have not been here for two years, I shall conclude with a brief status report, a personal assessment if you will, of the state of health of the allied command in Europe for which I am responsible. I shall leave the bulk of the time for your questions, from which I benefit because of the nature of those questions, and by which I hope you will benefit because of the nature of the response.

In dealing with the subject of crisis management, or even the subject of the broader requirements in Western Europe and Atlantic Com-

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munity security, from time to time I am concerned by the degree of myopia or exclusive concentration on the asymmetries in force capabilities in the central region of Europe.

I introduce my remarks this morning with the provocative statement that I believe that were we to correct these imbalances tomorrow we would not have begun to solve the security challenges facing the western world in the period ahead. As you mull over that admittedly provocative statement, I ask the Assembly to join me in a very brief assessment of those factors in the strategic environment today which must shape not only our concerns for crisis management but, perhaps even more important, our overall forces posture requirements in NATO Europe.

When I was here two years ago I touched upon some of the changes in the strategic environment that had to influence our assessment of future security needs. Today, I should like to focus on the three most important changes that have occurred since the birth of this Alliance that must also impinge upon our crisis management posture in terms both of the flexibility available to western nations and of the likelihood of potential crisis in the period ahead and the nature of these crises and the challenges that they will pose for us.

First, I shall touch upon the shift from bipolarity to multi-polarity, or what Dr. Brzezinski has more recently termed "international pluralism". Indeed, it is this fragmentation in an internal sense of marxist socialist power that has provided, and will continue to provide, if we adopt correct policies, additional flexibility for western crisis management.

In simple military terms, clearly today we derive additional flexibility from the realisation and the reality that almost one-third of Soviet forces is deployed against communist China. Were that picture to change, our crisis management potential — indeed, our security potential — would be gravely changed.

I think that today, as we observe a changing leadership in Peking, which some in the western press have described as tending towards moderation and which I would more accurately, hopefully, describe as tending towards greater pragmatism, we must understand that increasingly this leadership will be less constrained by dogmatic considerations and increasingly influenced by their perception of what they term strategic reliability in establishing their own relationships in a global concept.

Surely the term "strategic reliability" encompasses Peking's perception of western reliability, consistency, unity and strength, and perhaps

above all, from a crisis management point of view, western relevance to global outcomes. If we fail to project this kind of collective image, surely we leave the emerging leadership in Peking with no alternative but to draw its own policy courses exclusive of our concerns.

Two factors of increasing importance in crisis management terms — in fact two additional issues, two changes — which provide the spawning ground for the crisis of tomorrow deserve our attention this morning. The first is that we observe not only a certain fragmentation, if you will, of those areas formerly under external Soviet influence, but a corresponding phenomenon internally within those areas remaining under Soviet hegemony today. I am talking about centrifugal pressures within the Warsaw Pact. I do not think that anyone could speak with accuracy this morning as to how or, indeed, even whether these pressures will manifest themselves in the months ahead. Clearly, they are the consequence of at least unrequited social economic expectations by peoples in Eastern Europe and of a historic global resurgence of nationalism as a phenomenon. Whether or not we shall be confronted with sharp manifestations of the centrifugal pressures in the days ahead remains problematic. But certainly, without any change in long-standing Soviet policies with respect to these areas, or with any sudden abrogation of long-standing western moral responsibility for global outcomes — I see no evidence of that in your debates thus far or in the policies pursued in Washington — these pressures will continue to grow in the months ahead.

Again, western relevance, unity of purpose and consistency of policy must inevitably have a major impact on the direction in which these pressures will manifest themselves.

The second area or spawning ground, if you will, for tomorrow's crisis — they have indeed been the spawning ground for crisis in the decade of the 1960s and the early 1970s — is what I refer to for want of a better term as third world dynamics. I eschew that collective terminology to describe a number of ancient nation States which are probably characterised more by the differences that exist between them than by the common threads that bind them. Some are rich in resources and demographic assets. Some are almost completely devoid of them. For want of a better term and for brevity this morning, however, I use the term "third world dynamics".

We had great hopes of this emerging third world, certainly in the decade of the 1960s and in the so-called post-colonial era. We hoped that proper policies on the part of the West and their former domineering mentors, if you will, would encourage them to opt for moderate political formulas for the future. Whatever the cause of

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our failures today, almost without exception these entities have opted for dictatorial models of the right or the left.

As we set our agenda for the future and seek continually, as we must, to establish a just and responsible relationship with these emerging States, we must understand that, because they are essentially dictatorial in character, they are going to be capable of the most precipitate shifts in alignments and policies in the period ahead. Certainly the contradictions today in the Horn of Africa, where two nation States are at each other's jugulars at the sufferance of Soviet arms, are a manifestation of the contradictory character of what will face us.

Again, in a shrinking world in which western industrial nations are, for the first time, faced with definitive limitations on the raw materials that have spawned their growth, we must clearly understand that this emerging third world problem and western relationships with the third world demand a concert of action — a collective of consumers, if you will — to establish a just and responsible relationship with it.

Clearly we must understand that we have a relevance in these events which are occurring in the third world today and a responsibility for their outcome. I am not suggesting interventionism in the classic sense, I am not even suggesting additional military activity; but I am suggesting that, whether or not we deem to engage ourselves in these events, we shall be affected increasingly by their outcome. Because that is so, let us be sure that in the months ahead we attempt to work together more effectively and that whatever we do is the product of a conscious decision and will not face us with consequences brought about by default.

Clearly, that would be an anguishing and antagonising task for western nations, because each of them is affected in varying degrees by the outcome of third world events.

Some may be highly dependent on the consequences of a particular crisis and others only marginally dependent. That is what makes the task so difficult in crisis-management terms. That is what it imposes on us in the Atlantic Community, whether we are dealing with tri-lateralism in its broader sense, Atlantic Community life or European unity. It demands a degree of communication and consultation which has heretofore never been as imperative as it is now.

All these factors — multi-polarity or international imperialism, if you will, centrifugal pressures within those areas under Soviet hegemony, or third world dynamism — are certainly the key strategic factors on which we must base

crisis management in the Alliance today. As a military man, I must be concerned about the force balances available to western diplomacy to deal with these situations. For that reason, I should like to turn now, very briefly, to an assessment of these current force balances so as to help you sharpen, if you will, your own deliberations on the study before you.

Major debates about Soviet intentions are raging on both sides of the Atlantic. Our Secretary-General has suggested that it is essentially an irrelevant question because intentions can change with incumbencies or international atmospherics. But I would suggest that it is also irrelevant in crisis management terms because the kinds of crisis with which we may be faced are more likely to be the product of ambiguous situations developing on our flanks or in the areas peripheral thereto — the third world — which in the first instance might not have been the product of a conscious decision by one of the superpowers.

They may, because of the very dynamics of the situation itself, arise because we are drawn in continuously in our vital interests, and they may in the final analysis confront us with the consequences of superpower confrontation just as simply as though they had occurred here in the central region of Europe which guards the gateway to the heart of Europe.

I use the term "relentless growth" in Soviet power in a considered way. It means that what we have been observing here is not the product of some prestigious change in mood in Moscow which has suddenly begun to allocate increasing resources to the defence sector. It is just the opposite. What we have observed is the consequence — year in, year out, for more than a decade — of increased allocation of resources to the defence sector at the rate of 3-4 % real-term increases each year to the point that 1975 represents a 14-15 % allocation of their gross national product.

I am not going to belabour you with a litany of statistics which confirm the nature of the Soviet growth in power, but it is important, especially in crisis management terms, to summarise the implications of this change in the Soviet threat. Because it has been relentless, what we are observing today is an expansion or maturing of the military industrial complex of the Soviet Union so that they are spewing out in increasing numbers third- and fourth-generation modern equipments throughout their military structure.

This means, firstly, that the qualitative edge that we in the West have so long enjoyed and that has enabled us in the past to accept risks in quantity is being steadily eroded. It means, secondly, that we in the West who have long since relied heavily on wartime mobilisation of

General Haig (continued)

our vast military industrial complex are increasingly deprived of our ability to do so. There is a great deal of wisdom in the suggestion made by an American legislator that the next conflict may indeed be a "come as you are" party.

What has this enabled the Soviets to do? It has enabled them to build up and modernise those forces facing us here in Western Europe and, without skipping a beat, simultaneously to build up to something like forty-five divisions, one-third of their overall potential, against communist China; and it has left them with a large residue of modern military equipment with which to respond to the plaintive calls of nascent leaders in the third world. It is indeed their ability to react responsively and immediately to these plaintive calls which constitutes the cutting edge of Soviet influence in the emerging world today. We frequently overlook this.

From 1952 to 1974, the Soviet Union shipped some 12% more armaments to the third world, but in 1974 alone they shipped 50% more than the United States to the third world. Today they have active military assistance programmes in over twenty African States, and the presence of their proxies is increasingly evident throughout the African continent.

Today, I suppose that we can take some comfort, at long last, from the reported willingness of the Soviets to indulge in negotiations on the limitations of the export of armaments in a global context, and I welcome that. I hope that it is fruitful.

The second change which this relentless growth in Soviet power has brought about is the reality that it is balanced. There are those who suggest that this is almost a mindless feeding of a hunger in the Soviet bureaucracy which cannot be denied. A more careful analysis will confirm that it is precisely the opposite: it is a very systematic movement on the part of the Soviet leadership to eliminate the anomalies which existed in their defence posture a decade ago and which restricted their ability to operate effectively in global terms.

What am I saying? I am saying that we have observed the elimination of deficiencies in the central strategic area and we have observed simultaneously the elimination of deficiencies in the nuclear area. The Soviets, of course, enjoy today a rather worrying superiority in conventional terms. To us in the West, this means once again that the days are gone when we could exploit the Soviet anomalies by leaving vast areas of our own capability untended while we exploited them. That is what massive retaliation was all about; that is why we flirted in the late sixties with "tripwire" strategies. However, now that we have arrived at parity in both central

and nuclear capabilities, the forces in being in these conventional balances become increasingly important in both general and crisis management terms.

The third and perhaps most significant aspect of this change in Soviet power is that it has transformed the very nature of the threat itself. At the outset of this Alliance, we could afford to be preoccupied with force balances here in the central region of Europe, the gateway to the heart of Europe, and our primary concern was for classic, traditional onslaughts across those boundaries. Today, as Soviet power has become global in nature and offensive in character, we must understand that we are no longer merely faced with classic, traditional, military concerns in the central region of Europe but are rather concerned with threats which involve the political, the economic and the security nexus of western industrialised nations' vitality, the entire area of our assets.

Because this is so, I felt justified in suggesting to you at the outset of these remarks that myopia or exclusive preoccupation with central region force balances does not begin to solve the problems with which we shall be faced. By that, I do not mean to suggest that these central region force balances and the asymmetries that exist there today are any less important. Indeed they are vitally important, but not in purely war-fighting terms. Rather, it is because if we leave them untended they affect the confidence with which western nations can concert themselves and move together to deal with the more ambivalent, ambiguous situations with which they will be inevitably faced in the period ahead. It is for that reason that we must tend these central balances, as indeed we must continue to tend our balances in the flank regions as well.

Let us not delude ourselves, however, as to the purposes for which we are indulging in this activity. If we do so, we will be sadly disappointed in the decades ahead.

Speaking about crisis management, my general remarks thus far have dealt with the character or the kind of crisis with which we shall be faced. The agonising questions associated with this and involved in it stem from the area of vital interest in the first instance. Here, consultative communication must result in favour of wisdom and sound response. Secondly, the question will always be whether we should involve ourselves. Here again, concerted consultation must bring about and become a political, economic or perhaps military response in the final analysis.

There are two additional questions which must be dealt with in crisis management today. I would refer to them as mutually contradictory requirements in crisis management. The first is the need to respond in deterrence terms, which is always contrasted against the need to ensure a

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war-fighting posture. Any diversion of scarce resources to a flank area or even outside an area involves the acceptance of risks to our war-fighting posture in times of tension, and this is an agonising problem for military and political leadership.

I suggest that if I were to lean in any single direction it would be to keep foremost in mind that the purpose of our military capability in the first instance is to prevent the outbreak of conflict. That means that we must accept risks to war-fighting posture, to respond in timely and effective fashion to the crisis with which we shall be faced.

The degree to which we can lessen these risks generally involves two things. The first is the maintenance of early reinforcement capability and mobilisation capability, and the second is timely political decisions to take the necessary reinforcing steps as tensions grow.

There is a second question which is even more agonising in dealing with the question of crisis management as a whole, and that is the great contradictions with which we in my own country were so badly served in the decade of the sixties. It is the belief that in time of crisis ambivalent situations are best tended by ambivalent response. How frequently have we been deluded by that syndrome? If ambivalence is indeed a characteristic of crisis in the first instance, does not an ambivalent response generate escalatory action by the other side, and are we not better served by a clear manifestation of our assessment of the vital importance of the issue to our interests? I leave this to your consideration.

I very much welcome that this body has done such a professional and clear job in dealing with this emerging question of crisis management for Western States. I will not indulge in prognostications about the desirability of expanding zones of responsibility of the Alliance. Those are political questions which must be dealt with by political authorities.

Because it has been some time since I addressed this Assembly, and because I am this month completing my third year as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, I thought that it would be valuable to give my own personal assessment on the state, health and welfare of Allied Command Europe.

When I came here three years ago, I was somewhat appalled as I moved from capital to capital and spoke with Defence Ministers and Ministers of State, and, indeed even Heads of Government, to find a lack of consensus in respect of the nature of the threat or whether or not the threat existed at all. Today I can take

some quiet but certainly not complacent comfort from the recognition that that picture has changed. Indeed, we had a growing consensus of concern in all western nations about the dangers with which this growth of Soviet power is facing us. It has enabled us in Allied Command Europe initially to do studies in which we found some nine hundred remedial steps that had to be taken to provide additional military flexibility to our political leadership. It enabled me to develop and promulgate and start the implementation of a remedial programme to improve the readiness of our in-place forces, rationalising and getting greater efficiency from the multinational contributions, and working dramatically to improve our ability to reinforce and mobilise in time of crisis. We have had considerable success. We have used a revised exercise programme — the so-called Autumn Forge series — whereby for the first time we are beginning to exercise in peace as we would be expected to operate in war as a multinational integrated Alliance.

We have had great success, but I would be less than frank if I were to suggest to you that that success was supported by a political unity of purpose — a political consensus to get on with that task. In fact, for the first two years I was here that was lacking and it was not until last spring that finally, at long last, the Heads of State agreed first to the relentless character of the Soviet growth in military power in unequivocal terms — I refer you to their communiqué — and secondly, and perhaps more importantly, to generate and broaden a necessary consensus for the two-pronged improvement programme. The first involved the importance of the efficiency of those scarce resources provided by hard-pressed taxpayers in this Alliance today. The second, and perhaps most important of all, was the acceptance at least of an aim — to increase the allocation of resources to this task.

Clearly, I recognise that we in the Alliance, in the NATO structure, political and military as well, certainly have a prime obligation to present our people with improved efficiency, the better utilisation of those resources with which they are providing us. But I would suggest today that you, parliamentarians of the member nations, have an equal responsibility to be sure that the crystallisation of this consensus for increased allocation of resources at a modest level is indeed realised on a long-term basis. It is for that reason that I very much welcome this opportunity to speak to you today and I look forward to your questions, which I hope will range far and wide based on the rambling context of my delivery. (*Prolonged applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I thank you very much, General, for the way in which you have spoken to the Assembly and on your agreeing to reply to questions. Do you wish to reply question by question or to wind up at the end?

General HAIG (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). — I think that it would be preferable to take all the questions first.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. The first questioner is Mr. Calamandrei.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — I wish to thank General Haig for his presentation, which has undoubtedly given us food for thought.

My question is whether, in his judgment, there is any possibility of fresh proposals for balanced reduction of forces in the Central European theatre being made by the Atlantic Alliance countries at the Vienna conference, and what probabilities there are of their being taken into account by the Warsaw Pact countries at that conference, any more than on any previous occasion?

The PRESIDENT. — The next question is to be asked by Mr. Périquier. He will be followed by Mr. Vohrer.

Mr. PÉRIQUIER (*France*) (Translation). — I too would thank General Haig for his very interesting statement, and should like to put two questions to him.

The first, which he may be expecting, is this: does he stand by the statement attributed to him, which he has not disclaimed, that if the communists came to power in Europe in a government of a union of the left, NATO and the United States might possibly review their position?

Does he not on the contrary believe that the communists, when placed before their responsibilities in a government, might perhaps contribute to the détente to which we all aspire?

My second question really concerns military strategy.

Does General Haig think that, so long as Cyprus remains in the position in which it at present finds itself, it is possible to contemplate Mediterranean security in this region? I will be more specific: what would happen if the authorities in Cyprus — that is, the Cyprus which was that of Archbishop Makarios and which is now that of President Kyprianou — were to allow the USSR to establish a military base on its territory?

Are we relying solely on the possibility that Turkey could offset the strategic position which the USSR would then enjoy? In short, if this situation were to arise tomorrow, what attitude would NATO then expect to adopt?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Vohrer.

Mr. VOHRER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — In Germany there is a good deal of discussion about the neutron bomb, and

people are asking themselves whether because of it the nuclear threshold is being lowered still further. May I ask General Haig how far there are, in his view, perceptible developments leading to a reduction in the efforts made by the NATO countries in the field of conventional weapons because people are realising that conventional weapons are being replaced by neutron-nuclear weapons.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Warren. He will be followed by Mr. Radius.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — May I ask the General whether he sees a date of maximum danger ahead at the point when the escalation of the Soviet forces upon which he has remarked will be such that they will have to use them, otherwise obsolescence will take over and their strength will decline?

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Radius.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — Does General Haig consider that under the sign of the two-way street the United States can contemplate relying on European producers for the manufacture of weapons essential to defence?

Does he consider it conceivable that, in the future, a major outlet might be provided in the United States for the products of Europe's advanced technology, in particular in the realm of aeronautics and missiles?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Forni to ask the next question. He will be followed by Lord Duncan-Sandys.

Mr. FORNI (*France*) (Translation). — I have a twofold question to put. First, I should like General Haig to be good enough to say whether he considers it desirable that those responsible for defending the countries of Europe should, on questions peculiar to the defence of Europe, consult together without American participation.

Secondly, I should like to know the General's opinion about the definition of joint European positions on determination of the nuclear threshold and on co-operation in the armaments field.

I should like to hear whether he considers that both the definition of joint positions and co-operation in armaments would be timely and helpful.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Lord Duncan-Sandys. He will be followed by Mr. Watkinson.

Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (*United Kingdom*). — In view of the much higher state of readiness of the forces of the Warsaw Pact, can the General say what action is being taken to increase the state of readiness of the forces of NATO and also the speed of reinforcement?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Watkinson.

Mr. WATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). — As Rapporteur for the report, I thank General Haig for so eloquently enlarging the scope of our debate, and I put to him three matters, the first following on from what was said by Lord Duncan-Sandys. Would he agree that as a result of the build-up of Warsaw Pact forces in the central region, both in terms of quantity and of quality, there has to be considerable readjustment in warning times available and, hence, this must have major repercussions for crisis managers?

Secondly, all of us here on many occasions have bemoaned the slow progress in the MBFR talks. Is it the General's view that if we can get a SALT agreement we can look forward to some progress in these talks? Are they becalmed indefinitely?

Thirdly, General Haig raised the question of third world dynamism. Can he enlarge somewhat on what he has put to us? He called for a consistency of attitude, yet the whole experience in Africa seems to indicate the dangers of taking a consistent line with all member countries. In other words, does not the General think that there is necessity for a pragmatic approach as far as concerns Africa? Does not that pragmatism conflict with his view on consistency?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — Does the General now agree that, apart from improving the efficiency of the Alliance, to which he devoted a large part of his remarks — efficiency, speed of reinforcement and so on — if we are to get back to a situation of balance, or sufficient strength, so that our present apprehensions need no longer be so well founded, there will have to be, in addition, extra devotion of effort by all the member countries of the Alliance in order to improve efficiency?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Banks.

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). — I am an alternate member for Mr. Farr. Would the General favour the sale of conventional weapons to China from the West?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Minnocci.

Mr. MINNOCCI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, may I ask General Haig whether in regard to the increase in the military strength of the USSR over the last few years, he has also noted any greater or lesser cohesion of the Warsaw Pact?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Mattick.

Mr. MATTICK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — May I ask General Haig whether, according to his observations, Soviet rearmament is a sign of efforts being made by

the Soviet Union to achieve superior strength, and of its readiness to use the means at its disposal, or is it a sign that Soviet leaders are worried about our superior strength? He ended by saying — if it was correctly interpreted — that at present there is parity. The Soviet Union is always claiming that it is trying to achieve parity. What I would like to know is how General Haig judges the situation in this respect.

I have a second question. General Haig mentioned a certain figure for Soviet arms deliveries to the third world and, of course, to the Arab area too. Did he include Egypt in this figure? Does not the example of Egypt show that we cannot assume that the Soviet Union is able to control the use made of all the arms it delivers to foreign countries?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Critchley.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — Is the General concerned about the vulnerability and status of theatre nuclear weapons in the Alliance? May we ascertain his view of the deployment of the neutron warhead? Does he share the view expressed recently in London by Admiral Sir Peter Hill-Norton that he was against this deployment? Would the General favour its development in NATO?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Faulds.

Mr. FAULDS (*United Kingdom*). — My question is probably the simplest of the morning. How can we expect public opinion throughout the West to take the Soviet Union seriously and be prepared to fund the necessary response while every single western politician pays lip service to the benefits and the need of détente?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Sir John Rodgers.

Sir John RODGERS (*United Kingdom*). — Can the General tell us whether there have been studies in depth to analyse what effect the increasing intervention in African affairs by the Soviet Union may have on the supply of raw materials that are essential for the free world, in terms both of defence and of the economies of free world countries? Is there no ambivalence in the attitude of the West in such matters as the economic sanctions against South Africa?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like to ask General Haig two questions.

Here is the first: it seems to be accepted that no military power would be effective in Europe without broad popular support. This being so, does General Haig not think that statements such as those quoted by Mr. Périquier are in themselves apt to provoke crises within the Alliance, since they will be taken as military

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

interference in the internal affairs of a member country?

My second question is as follows: General Haig has dwelt more specifically on the problems arising in Africa, and he has cited the massive deliveries of armaments to third world countries by the Soviet Union.

Does General Haig not think that the western world is largely responsible for such a situation, owing to the fact that it has always refused to lend its support to national liberation movements, thus obliging the latter to knock at the only door open to them — that is, the eastern world — which we may regret.

Does General Haig not consider that the recent firmer attitudes of the western world towards South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia are calculated to restore third world confidence in the western world?

The PRESIDENT. — We have come to the end of the list of members wishing to ask questions. Will the General please take the rostrum to answer them?

General HAIG (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). — Having heard these questions, I have the option of either destroying a promising career by attempting to answer them or eliminating those which are political and those which are military, which would leave me about three questions. I shall therefore not follow either of those courses.

The first question dealt with mutual balanced force reductions with reference to Belgrade and the CSCE and suggested that the onus might be on the West to make proposals. The basic objective of MBFR is clearly the elimination of asymmetries in force balance in the central guidelines area. It is the western conviction that the arrival at parity with respect to central guidelines area forces in place will be stabilising and, therefore, would be welcomed by the West. I know that our military authorities have supported our efforts to do that.

As the Assembly will know, we have made some interventions in the nuclear area designed on a one-time basis to assist the Soviets to accept that premise, but from the outset of the Vienna discussions these provisions have been rejected by the Soviet Union.

As a military man, I would not be in favour of any departure from the western position which would hold as its objective equivalence in the central guidelines area. Such proposals would, perhaps, suggest percentage reductions, which would merely aggravate the current imbalances at lower levels, thereby aggravating them in the

aggregate. I cannot make a political prognostication of what the future of MBFR will be.

There was another question in respect of the linkage between SALT and MBFR. Some people have rejected the fact that there is such a linkage. It is probably a subjective judgment at best. At present we are told that progress has been made in SALT. We welcome this. It yet remains for us to find out what the final details of such an agreement will be. Whether that would influence progress in MBFR would be a highly speculative thing for me to attempt to answer.

I knew that I should get that wonderful question on marxist participation in NATO governments. I have been quoted extensively in various capitals on this subject. Most of those quotes have been wrong. I have never indulged in a political assessment of what is profoundly a political question.

I have generally expressed agreement with the statement by the United States Government that this is essentially a political question, that it involves the internal affairs of the nation concerned and that it is up to that nation to make the decision. I think that they have gone beyond that and suggested that a nation that would so decide should do so with the understanding that it will have an impact on subsequent relationships for that nation with the United States. I am not uncomfortable about that. The suggestion has been that it would perhaps be deleterious.

As a military man, however, I think that I have both the right and the obligation to comment on the subject in purely military terms, and that is what I shall do today.

From that point of view, I would be concerned by two consequences. The first is the impact that it would have on our ability to process, handle, transfer and communicate highly sensitive security information within our NATO apparatus. Indeed, we have been exposed to these dangers in the past, and they are not meaningless.

Secondly — this question does not involve the adherence of a particular party to the sovereignty of East Germany or Moscow tutelage — it is the fact that, as a military man who today is primarily concerned with the priority paid by our member governments to our security needs, I should be concerned that any marxist influence, Moscow-related or not, by doctrinal conviction would place our security needs on the lowest step of national priorities. Therefore, I would again be concerned as a military man.

I shall terminate my military comments on a political subject with that intervention.

There was a question on Cyprus and the south-eastern flank. It was exclusively political in character, and I am not about to put my pinky into this anguishing problem. I shall reiterate

General Haig (continued)

what I have repeatedly said in the past. We have two member nations which have long since found themselves, for different reasons, less than full participating members of the Alliance: Greece, because it is partially withdrawn from our integrated structure, and Turkey, because it has been deprived of the military assistance essential for it to maintain its necessary contribution.

I believe that the leadership in both Athens and Ankara, during any analysis of their strategic geopolitical reality, continues to understand that their adherence to the Western European community of nations is essential for their future. Therefore, I am optimistic that, despite the anguishing problems involved, both will muster the necessary wisdom and patience to work out in the foreseeable future the differences which currently cause the problem that raised the question.

The question of the neutron bomb was raised. Clearly I can address myself to this question from a military point of view, and I shall do so. Clearly, however, the question is also now political in essence.

Military authorities in NATO, notwithstanding observations made by former members of the Alliance or those currently involved, have unequivocally advised the political leadership of the Alliance, first, that the neutron weapon, which is a modernisation step long under consideration, would enhance the Alliance's deterrence and, secondly, that it would in no way change the essential political control with respect to the employment of that weapon or facilitate the anguishing questions that politicians must address in any resort to nuclear response.

I am sometimes concerned that the decibel level of complaint about the acquisition of this modernisation capability by the West has not been accompanied by any expressions of concern about the deployment this year of a solid-fuel, mobile, MIRVed warhead intermediate-range theatre strategic system by the Soviet Union which will place in jeopardy all the populations, cities and facilities of Western Europe, including Great Britain.

I sometimes wonder whether unilateral restraint on the part of responsible, serious-minded western politicians deprives us of the incentives that must be available to negotiate successfully with the Soviet Union, which is continuing to build. (*Applause*)

The question was: will the Soviet build-up continue to a point where it must be used or become outmoded? That is a tough, strong-man question. I do not wish to indulge in intentions other than to state that there remain profound

differences between East and West with regard to political, economic, cultural, ethical and a whole range of values that we enjoy together. Regardless of intentions, as long as these differences remain, they will inevitably provide the grist for confrontation on one or another international situation. Therefore, we must always view these inevitable confrontations in the context of force balances.

The Soviet Union, for whatever reason, whether it is historic emergence into an imperialist phase, whether it is malignancy of intention or whether it is being driven by competition with western superpowers, has in at least ten years increased its spending on the defence sector. That has changed the threat. It is now global. The character of the threat, if we analyse the systems procured, is offensive in nature. That is an irrefutable fact by the most professional of judges.

Secondly, by any criterion of measurement you care to apply, it exceeds what the Soviet Union would need for defensive purposes today. We must not deceive ourselves about that. As to whether they are driven by the desire not to become outmoded in the efficiency of their machine, I would be inclined not to be so concerned about the question you asked, because I have noted that the Soviet Union is now indulging in mass production of third- and fourth-generation equipments and that they have fifth-generation equipment soon to be on the board. Did you know that we have fielded one tank in the United States since 1960 and have seen the Soviet Union produce four models? I am not, therefore, particularly concerned about the problem of obsolescence. They merely apply more resources to solve that problem and drive their forces forward.

When I was last here, I suggested that a "two-way street", which was interpreted here in Europe as a "made in America" formula for relegating western defence industries to a sub-contractor rôle, had no hope at all. I was very encouraged by President Carter's intervention in London and subsequent actions which he instructed our Minister of Defence to take; and the support that has been achieved from the American legislature, which, after all, in the final analysis must dominate this question, has been most encouraging. I believe that there is a genuine desire to establish the kind of two-way street that your question suggested.

The heart of this question is something which it is very important for us to realise. We are not seeking a two-way street necessarily for balance; we are doing it to ensure that we have the proper kind of equipment for the Alliance. It certainly serves no American interest if Western European defence industries, whether they be aerospace, rocketry or some of the more or less sophisticated areas, are less than competent. We have procured

General Haig (continued)

European systems. Our F-16 joint production is a good step. I hope that we shall see progress in the days ahead on transportation, communications, equipment and armaments. What is required is care and patience and a steady and constant dialogue between my own nation and European nations. I am more optimistic now than at any time in the last three years that in my own country the necessary will exists to bring this to fruition.

I hoped that the question of whether European unity *per se* was in conflict with the broader aspects of Atlantic Community unity or NATO unity had long since been put to rest. They are not mutually exclusive; rather they are mutually inclusive. Policy in one should not conflict with policy in the other. I know of no responsible American official who would suggest otherwise.

I am not sure that I have really understood the nuclear question. I assume that what it meant is whether our consultative arrangements for employment of nuclear weapons are satisfactory today. That is, of course, again a very difficult question to answer. In political terms, I feel that it is. In physical communication terms, it becomes somewhat difficult because one can conceive of situations where instantaneous response might be called for. In that context, those nations which have nuclear forces are adequately prepared to take the necessary steps. In general, I think our arrangements are satisfactory today. I am looking for modernisation of communications and technical improvements of the system which would enhance them.

There is also a profound political point in your question in which I would prefer not to indulge other than to say that I am completely confident on that subject or I would not be occupying the chair which I occupy today.

As far as readiness is concerned, we have a number of programmes under way to improve it. First of all, we must try to place our ammunition and supplies as far forward as possible, to the point where they are responsive to our units in times of crisis. Secondly, we have instituted, for the first time in the history of the Alliance, a measurement of the national forces by the international commands. I am talking about the same kind of tactical evaluations as we applied to our air forces. We are now applying them to our ground forces. We go round and see that they meet our minimum readiness requirements. We did this for the first time last spring and it was highly successful.

We are working on a whole range of improvement programmes, such as the up-loading of ammunition on combat vehicles. Three years ago, with respect to the American forces, I found that some eighteen battalions were converging on a

single supply point in time of crisis. They had to distribute that ammunition while the forces moved forward and occupied their forward positions with the ammunition, and sometimes it would take up to seventy hours to get it to forward-placed forces. You cannot operate in that way in this modern world, so we have started to up-load. Where we cannot do this because of different national restrictions, we are putting ammunition forward and closer.

We have standardised in the central region our covering force tactics, strategy and doctrine. We are all conducting the covering battle with identical terms of reference and with the same density of force forward. We have done the same thing with central region main-line defences. This does not mean that we are protecting every blade of grass; it does mean that sound military considerations will determine the conduct of defence. We are, after all, a defensive Alliance, and because we are defensive we must understand that in-place force readiness will determine how much territory may be lost in the early period of a battle. That is why we are emphasising so strenuously our readiness.

We are improving communications. We have centralised central region air command and control. We are running exercises designed to improve readiness. A range of activities is under way. For example, the short-term proposals that were agreed to by the Defence Ministers in the spring involved improved readiness, improved tank capability and improved war stockage. These are all readiness measures. We have reached agreement on over 140 major steps to be taken this year by the nations, and I am very pleased and encouraged by their reactions.

The longer-term studies which we are undertaking and which will project us into the 1990s will for the first time, I hope, start to shape national Ministry of Defence planning considerations to be affected by our Alliance needs instead of proceeding along nationalistic lines and making purely national judgments in this area. This is a momentous undertaking but I am optimistic in that thus far we are achieving the benchmarks we sought.

The question of warning time has been of great importance here in Europe. I should like to discuss this from two points of view. This is an issue on which there are two diverging influences. On the one hand, we are acquiring greater ability through overhead photography, electronic intrusion and a whole range of technological and human improvements to pick up indicators of attack on the part of the Warsaw Pact and to warn ourselves in timely fashion. On the other hand, as a consequence of the relentless growth in Soviet power, we are observing an increased capability of those forces which are in place to launch attack without reinforcement.

General Haig (continued)

If you take these two converging trends and make a net assessment, it is in the direction of the compression of our traditional warning time that we have anticipated. NATO has an agreed warning time of forty-eight hours. We have conducted numerous studies to assess whether or not this is a valid warning time figure, and I can assure you that it is at the lowest edge of warning time we would be likely to get. I would not want to see it changed, because it would provide a vehicle for nations to say "We can step down certain air defence and other measures such as radar coverage", which we currently employ. But it is at the lowest edge, and I think that a more likely warning time would be a question of days and up to a week.

This has been a major factor in our need to improve our readiness today, and that is why we can no longer anticipate reinforcement in a thirty- or sixty-days' time frame. We must make our reinforcement probably within the first two or three weeks to make our impact felt in the initial hours of conflict. I think that I have discussed SALT and MBFR.

The next question is third world consistency versus pragmatic approach. I hope that my remarks did not suggest a uniformity and a brittleness of policy in respect of the third world. I do not think that that would be achievable if I were to promulgate such an objective. Clearly, our dealings with this crisis situation must remain in essence pragmatic. My point was whether or not we care to consult and discuss together on these problems. Whether or not we decide as a consequence to try to deal with the problem politically, economically or militarily, we shall be affected by the outcome. I believe that it is in our interests in the West to try to develop a consensus approach. Even if it is an agreement to disagree, that is preferable to untending by default. I have said enough on that, because it is essentially a political question, and I know that you know that.

Someone asked about the sale of arms to the People's Republic of China. I have no opinion.

Someone else asked "How much more do you military fanatics want?" My answer is very simple. Each year we analyse the evolving military threat in great detail. We then assess our force requirements to meet that threat. It is a two-year cycle for a six-year time frame. Each year we come up with what we call realistic objectives and they are constrained by the practical limitations on our member governments, sometimes in the direction of great risk. It is what we call pure capability planning as distinct from requirement planning in which we have a golden platter where we can say: "We want this and that."

I do this with the utmost anguish and care each year. The general order of magnitude for increased spending has been in the neighbourhood of zero to 5% increased real terms spending each year. In the past spring, the Defence Ministers established a name for it — say, anything from 3% to 5% as long as the Soviet Union continues to add 4% to 5% spending in real terms each year. How in God's name do we expect ever to be able to negotiate successfully with them when we are unilaterally providing without negotiation any objective they might seek?

My answer to the question is that this is a doable objective. If you look at the diversion of resources in most industrialised western nations over the past decade, the trend has been steadily down from the defence sector. I do not know of a member nation to which that would not apply, with some exceptions on our south-east flank. Simultaneously, Soviet defence spending has been rising at a steady 4% to 5% each year. Anyone who suggests that these are mutually influencing phenomena — in other words, that Soviet spending is driven by western defence spending — has not read the statistical data. Soviet spending has proceeded unaffected by corresponding western defence policy.

Someone has asked when that time will come. I can tell you that the deterrent remains valid and viable, but we are clearly increasing risks in the conventional area which could be terribly deleterious in war fighting terms and catastrophic in crisis management terms. The time has come to reverse this downward trend in western spending until there are acceptable negotiating caps, and we shall not get those caps while we are providing fundamental disincentives to arriving at them. I hope I have answered that question.

Is the pact stronger? I have confidence in our deterrent today. It remains viable. If the trends continued on which we have relied for twenty-eight years, our position would be in jeopardy shortly after the turn of the 1980s if we did not take responsible steps now.

What about the balance? We use in our book-keeping a number of terms such as "reserve equivalents" and "strategic parity". Each of them goes in the direction of greater flexibility, and that is clearly SALT-driven. The simple factor associated with central strategic systems is that, if a cap is not applied to SALT, we in the West will be faced with increased spending for supreme strategic systems. That burden rests primarily, but not exclusively, on the United States.

The second question of the balance is our theatre nuclear balance. Three or four years ago, whether it was by the Brookings Institute in Washington or some of our pundits here in Europe, the suggestion was made that our

General Haig (continued)

theatre nuclear systems today were so vastly in excess of our needs in quantity and in quality that we could afford some massive thinning out.

I reject that thesis because, of course, a careful analysis of the changes in the Soviet theatre nuclear force posture would place it in jeopardy, first because we see an increase in the density of Frog-Scud scale war through support systems in the Soviet Union. We see the development of the nuclear warhead in conventional artillery which, we anticipate, will soon be deployed, but we have no hard evidence that it has been.

We see a fundamental change in the character of the Soviet air arm facing us here in Western Europe with double the range and treble and quadruple the payload; and these are nuclear-capable aircraft that are being turned out at the rate of about 100 a month. They are being increasingly introduced in the Warsaw Pact posture, thus enabling the Soviet Union to deliver conventional or nuclear armaments deep into western territory, whereas in the past by qualitative limits they were restricted to an air defence rôle over Warsaw Pact territory.

Finally, today we have observed the deployment this year of the so-called SS-20, to which I have already referred.

All of that suggests to me that we are in a position of near parity with the Soviet Union on theatre nuclear capabilities but with a growingly worrisome situation developing in longer-range theatre nuclear systems here in Western Europe. That is the basis for the increasing interest in Western Europe in cruise missiles.

Finally, I would be less than frank were I to suggest to you that we were not in a situation of inferiority in our conventional capabilities vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. They outnumber us by 2 to 1 on the ground, 2 to 1 in the air, and 4 to 1 in tanks. Clearly we are deficient, and to the degree to which we remain deficient we increasingly realise that nuclear systems in an equivalent situation make such a decision increasingly difficult for any responsible political leader. Therefore, our main emphasis today is on the improvement of our conventional forces.

On the question of Egypt's being in the third world category, I would not put it in that category today, but I think that at the time of some of the figures I gave it is likely that it was included in the 1950-74 shipment area.

There are two aspects to the question regarding world ability of weapons. As regards our central strategic systems, I think that the experts would be the first to verify that, as Soviet fourth-generation and the soon-to-be fifth-generation intercontinental rockets are deployed, because of

their accuracy and precision they place in increasing jeopardy our silos in the United States or wherever else we may have them.

This is one of the very anguishing questions associated with the B-1 decision and the option for an air-launch cruise missile. It suggests that our submarine launch systems, now and in the future, are the most invulnerable although they lack a certain degree of clout and a counter-silo rôle. Therefore, the answer in strategic systems is — yes, we are becoming increasingly vulnerable. That is true also of the Soviet Union. That is why everyone is placing such great attention today on mobile intercontinental capabilities, whether it be the MX or the counterpart Soviet systems.

Here in the theatre we are vulnerable in some respects, but I think we have sufficient dispersion of capability that it is not a problem of highest priority.

On the question of détente and the confusion associated with it, as one who participated in the evolution of the phenomena in another rôle I would leave you with this thought. I believe in general terms as a citizen that the ability to negotiate with the Soviet Union, and the effort to do so to achieve greater stability on the international scene, is far preferable to a climate of confrontation which is essentially sterile.

However, having said that, I would remind you that, at least in my personal experience, in those instances where we have achieved personal breakthroughs in détente it has inevitably been the product of western unity, strength and solidarity.

Détente can never be a substitute for that. Indeed, if we, either by political exposition or by public writing, suggest that to our peoples we are doing them a terrible disservice — and I am not giving value judgments on current atmospherics.

As to the status of Africa, if not within NATO, I suspect that national capitals have indulged at some length in discussions on the implications of the deprivation of raw materials, minerals and so on, as well as energy. We have done some peripheral military-type studies, but they are not of the type that would compare with a sophisticated national study in this area and I have nothing to offer to distinguished representatives on that.

I think that the last question was the most difficult. It was essentially political, and I am not going to seek to cross the line and go further than the extent to which I have already dealt with this subject. It had to do with national liberation movements and western policies vis-à-vis Africa and the creation of vacuums and single sources. Clearly, these are profound political questions.

General Haig (continued)

I shall leave you with one thought. It is this. I have frequently been accused of indulging in plaintive calls for a return to eighteenth century power politics in which we seek to juxtapose one powerful bloc against another and in which at the same time each State proceeds from day to day to seek to gain tactical advantage one over the other.

I suggest that what I am discussing here is far more valuable than that. What I am suggesting is that, in a period of inevitable and desirable historic change, we in the West have every right to insist that this change takes place within the context of the accepted mores of international law and international behaviour while we seek to establish a more ephemeral rôle of a consensus among all nations that in the nuclear age a resort to force is no longer acceptable. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I must tell the General that the Assembly has followed his address and his answers to the questions with the greatest of interest. I must, however, announce that I have been given to understand that the interpretation system is not working. As the system is not operating and, as far as I can hear, all the channels are being pushed into one, I propose that we now adjourn the Assembly.

**8. Date, time and Orders of the Day
of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 2.30 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 (Document 750, Addendum and Amendment) ; Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1976 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Document 749 and Addendum) (Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Documents 750, Addendum and Amendment and 749 and Addendum).
2. Communications and crisis management in the Alliance (Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 757 and Amendments).
3. Contribution of WEU to the development of European union (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 756 and Amendment).
4. European security and African problems (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 754 and Amendments).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(*The Sitting was closed at 12.30 p.m.*)

TENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 29th November 1977

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 (Doc. 750, Addendum and Amendment); Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1976 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Doc. 749 and Addendum) (*Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts*, Docs. 750, Addendum and Amendment and 749 and Addendum).
Speakers: The President, Lord Selsdon (*Rapporteur*), Mr. von Hassel, Mr. Roper, Mr. Alber (*Chairman of the Committee*).
4. Communications and crisis management in the Alliance (*Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 757 and Amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Grant, Mr. Critchley, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Rivière, Mr. Brugnon, Mr. Watkinson (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roper (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Rivière, Mr. Roper, Mr. Rivière, Mr. Banks, Mr. Watkinson, Mr. Roper.
5. Contribution of WEU to the development of European union (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 756 and Amendment).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Forni (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. Knight (point of order), Mrs. von Bothmer (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Roper, Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Forni, Mr. Roper (point of order), Mr. Forni, Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. Cermolacce (point of order), Mr. Périquier (point of order), Mr. Forni.
6. European security and African problems (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 754 and Amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Müller (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Page, Mr. Whitehead, Mr. Banks, Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Minnoci, Mrs. Knight, Mr. Bagier, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. van Hulst, Mr. Antoni, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Müller, Mrs. von Bothmer (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Whitehead, Mr. Page, Mr. Whitehead, Mr. Müller, Mr. Whitehead, Mr. Banks, Mr. Whitehead, Mr. Roper, Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Müller, Mr. Whitehead, Mr. Roper, Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Page, Mr. Whitehead (point of order), Sir Frederic Bennett (point of order), Mr. Roper (point of order).
7. Communications and crisis management in the Alliance (Doc. 757).
Speaker: The President.
8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 2.30 p.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

1. See page 26.

3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1978

(Doc. 750, Addendum and Amendment)

Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1976 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts

(Doc. 749 and Addendum)

(*Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts*, Docs. 750, Addendum and Amendment and 749 and Addendum)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call the first Order of the Day, the presentation of and debate on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1978, Document 750, Addendum and Amendment, and the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1976 — the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts, Document 749 and Addendum.

The President (continued)

I call Lord Selsdon as Rapporteur of the Committee.

Lord SELSDON (*United Kingdom*). — Thank you, Mr. President. I hope that this will not take long. My first point concerns approval of the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1976, Document 749. I have no comments to add other than that our Committee would like to recommend these accounts for approval by the Assembly.

My second point is a minor, technical one. There is before the Assembly an amendment in my name, Amendment No. 1 to Document 750, concerning the draft budget for 1978. As the Assembly will know, it is normal procedure for the Assembly to draft and approve its own budget, but it is not empowered to vote moneys. In normal circumstances everything would have proceeded according to plan, but this time certain amendments to the draft budget were proposed by the Council. These essentially are the two aspects of the amendment. One refers to pensions and provident funds and the other appears to be a rather vicious attempt to make an arbitrary cut in expenditure.

I begin with the question of the provident funds and the pensions as such, because these are amendments which we would accept. It will be recalled that the whole object of producing budgets is that we should know where we shall stand in the future, particularly in relation to pensions. For a long time we advocated that there should be a decent pension scheme. We pointed out that in the short term this would reduce the commitment by the Council to WEU. You will know from the documents, Mr. President, that the reduction in this financial year is of the order of 219,000 francs, which appears under Head I, expenditure for staff. Therefore, we would recommend that this amendment or alteration to the budget be approved with the reduction in expenditure under Head I, expenditure for staff, from 5,026,000 francs to 4,807,000 francs.

It may be of interest to point out that during the coming year, or the year after next year, the actual saving on provident funds could be of the order of 2 million francs and that the overall repayments by the co-ordinated organisations to the Councils, or to members of the co-ordinated organisations, could be of the order of some \$50 million equivalent. We see no objection to those and recommend that they be approved.

Suddenly, however, I was confronted, almost overnight, with a suggestion that there should be a reduction in the draft budget of 10,000 francs. This 10,000 francs related to Head IV and Head V and, surprisingly enough, was concerned with paper and stationery, official cars

and expenses for representation including official journeys by members of the Office of the Clerk.

It may be a bit embarrassing to you, Mr. President, but, from the point of view of our Committee, it seems outrageous that an Assembly such as WEU should be so petty as to suggest that the President should not have a car to transport him while in office and that he should be forced to take taxis.

I cannot understand why these petty reductions should be put forward. It may be worth pointing out that the mere cost of debating them probably exceeds the total amount involved. I am not sure what step we can take other than, as a Committee, to recommend that the Assembly accepts the amendment that is in my name and wholeheartedly rejects the proposal that there should be a reduction.

Some of my conservative colleagues have suggested that the British socialist delegation should perhaps offer to make available its car to the President during the time he is in office. However, it is an outrageous state of affairs when, without any warning and with no advice or thought in advance, we should be asked to put forward a petty reduction of 10,000 francs.

I cannot comment on the effect of such a reduction in terms of paper work or in other ways. We are all aware that there is far too much paper work involved, but with inflation continuing despite a genuine reduction with regard to provident funds and other items in the course of the coming year, all I can do is to ask the Assembly to reject the proposed reduction of 10,000 francs and accept my amendment.

That is all I have to say, Mr. President.

(*Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. von Hassel*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Lord Selsdon.

I now call Mr. von Hassel.

Mr. von HASSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*). — Mr. President, I should like to take this opportunity to say a few words as regards the items on the agenda.

I believe that I am creating a precedent by taking the floor in the budget debate. Nevertheless, since the budget is the responsibility of the President, I feel that it is my duty to give you my views on a question of principle affecting budgetary procedure.

The budget which we are now considering for the financial year 1978, like all previous budgets, moreover, was carefully drawn up by the Assembly's administration and submitted to our Chairman, whom we all know as a very capable man. He went through it and then we discussed

Mr. von Hassel (continued)

the whole thing in the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and in the Presidential Committee. We then presented it, in accordance with our rules, to the Council.

According to a regulation which was made in 1960, we sent the budget through the Secretary-General to the Council and the Budget Committee for it to be discussed there. That is a committee of civil servants. This is where the trouble begins, and the Rapporteur has already spoken of it.

Despite the fact that great care was taken in drafting the budget to keep as low as possible the inevitable percentage increase to take account of the steady rise in the cost of living, that committee of civil servants has arbitrarily decided to reduce the budget by 10,000 francs as we have just heard.

Members will realise that this reduction is absolutely negligible and in fact concerns stationery, which has been reduced by this committee of civil servants by 3,000 francs from 150,000 francs to 147,000 francs. In addition, they reduced the item for the hire of a car for the President by 3,000 francs from 40,000 francs to 37,000 francs. The expenses for representation have been reduced by 2,000 francs from 100,000 francs to 98,000 francs.

My purpose in going into detail is to underline the pettiness of the reductions.

We as parliamentarians are all aware in our national parliaments that increases in national budgets must be kept to a minimum and that this must also be the case in our European Assembly. But in this Assembly we operate with a budget of 7,700,000 francs and a total staff of twenty-eight. Can we really accept that when the various organs of the Assembly have approved the draft budget the Council should decide to make a token reduction of 10,000 francs without any valid reasons being given? Why not 100,000 francs?

I am deeply concerned by the fact that the Council seems to find such a practice normal and does not invite its Budget Committee of national officials to show greater circumspection and tact in its scrutiny of the sums necessary for the operation of a European Assembly which itself exercises every desirable internal control.

The Assembly's Budgetary Committee and the Presidential Committee, which met yesterday, were of the opinion that the reduction of 10,000 francs should not be accepted. I hope that the Assembly will agree and adopt the budget as initially drawn up, subject to an amendment covering pensions which seems reasonable. This would therefore mean that the draft budget for 1978 would amount to 7,780,000 francs.

I trust that I have not wasted valuable debating time, but it seemed important to inform you of the way the European Assembly is being treated by officials of national treasuries, who, I fear, are only too happy to diminish the rôle of the parliaments.

I think that the President must stress, on behalf of the parliamentary Assembly, that it is a case of principle that parliaments should decide their own budgets themselves. I know of only one Assembly which differs from this rule, and that is ours. We must tell the Secretary-General and the Council that we will decide from 1979 onwards and that we hope that the civil servants from the other side of the table will agree that the decisions will be taken by the parliamentarians.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone else wish to speak?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I wish to speak only briefly. My colleagues on the Presidential Committee are all, of course, in total agreement with what Mr. von Hassel, the President of the Assembly, has said. We feel that on a matter of this kind it is very important for it to be brought to the attention of the Council. That is why we are all delighted that the President of our Assembly has taken it upon himself to make this point so clear.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roper.

The Chairman of the Committee has the floor.

Mr. ALBER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as there is little time left I will add only a few sentences. I should like first of all to thank Lord Selston most heartily for his report and take the opportunity of thanking him sincerely for all his work, for he will unfortunately be leaving us at the end of the year after five years as a member of this house. We shall greatly miss him, since he has always been the budget Rapporteur for our Committee and has done a splendid job every year. Let me once again express my heartiest thanks. (*Applause*)

It is, Mr. President, indeed rather curious that a parliamentary Assembly should be deliberating over the sum of 10,000 francs. If we work it out in relation to the budget as a whole, it is only some 0.13%. It could be said that this is a trifling amount. Well, it is, but when you are short of money, 10,000 francs less makes a lot of difference, for you then find that in certain budget areas you simply cannot do any more work.

So I am most grateful to you, Mr. President, that you yourself are going to follow up this matter. I especially thank you for the sug-

Mr. Alber (continued)

gestion that what we need to achieve is for the Assembly's budget to be decided by the Assembly itself, and not by some officials or other whose incomes, during the time they were working out this 10,000-franc reduction, probably amounted to considerably more than this sum. This is something that needed to be said.

I think that eventually we shall have to get to a situation in which the moneys for the Assembly entered in the national budgets are removed from the overall head for WEU, perhaps even from the "Foreign Office" vote and placed in the vote covering "Parliament" in each country, for it would then be the national parliaments that decided, in their own right, about the funds going to international parliamentary organisations. At the same time, it would be possible to create a situation in which a different rate of increase was applicable to funds for the Assembly, which would no longer be absolutely dependent on the overall subsidies to international organisations. I think we should take up the President's suggestion and for once raise the matter in the national parliaments, if it is not indeed possible to have the treaty itself amended in this respect.

In conclusion, I would ask you to support Lord Selsdon's two proposed amendments.

The PRESIDENT. — The debate is now closed.

(The President continued in French)

(Translation). — An amendment has been tabled by Lord Selsdon to the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 in Document 750.

The purpose of this amendment is, on the one hand, to reduce the estimates of expenditure shown in Sub-Head 2(B) (c) social charges — provident fund, from 437,000 francs to 218,000 francs, that is, a reduction of 219,000 francs; and, on the other, to increase the contributions (7%) shown in line (a) of paragraph (B) pensions from 17,000 francs to 126,000 francs in the estimates of income, that is, an increase of 109,000 francs.

Does anyone wish to speak to the amendment? ...

I put the amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amendment is agreed to.

As a result of the adoption of this amendment, the total figure for the draft budget of the

administrative expenditure of the Assembly for 1978 is reduced from 8,106,000 francs to 7,778,000 francs.

The Assembly now has to vote on the draft budget, as amended.

If the Assembly is not unanimous, the vote on the draft budget, as amended, will be taken by roll-call.

Are there any objections to the draft budget? ...

Are there any abstentions? ...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1978, as amended, is adopted unanimously.

No amendment has been tabled to the motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1976 in the addendum to Document 749.

Are there any objections to this motion? ...

Are there any abstentions? ...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

The motion is adopted unanimously.

(Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

4. Communications and crisis management in the Alliance

(Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 757 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — The Orders of the Day provide for the debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on communications and crisis management in the Alliance and votes on the draft recommendation, Document 757 and Amendments.

To open the debate I call Mr. Grant.

May I point out that we have decided to allot no more than five minutes to each speaker?

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). — I shall certainly endeavour, Mr. President, to keep within my five minutes. I should like first of all to congratulate my colleague John Watkinson on his admirable report. I must apologise for the fact that I missed not only his opening speech but also that of General Haig as I had to keep a very urgent dental appointment. If I speak in a rather curious manner, the reason will, I hope, be understood.

The historical survey which Mr. Watkinson sets out in his report is particularly valuable

Mr. Grant (continued)

and helps a great deal to focus our minds on what is, after all, one of the greatest problems facing the world today. This survey shows that, with the exception perhaps of the Middle East, nearly all the crises which have arisen since the second world war have involved either direct action initiated by the Soviet Union or Soviet meddling in other countries' affairs. We can, therefore, have no doubt at all where the danger lies.

Of course, the Russians start with an enormous advantage over the West. In a tyrannical dictatorship, decisions can be made instantly and secretly, unhampered by the press and other media, and imposed upon a docile and uninformed public.

Freedom, public debate and general access to information present western leaders with a much more difficult task in coming to conclusions and giving the necessary instructions to the military.

I should like to draw attention to one aspect which is not adequately covered in an otherwise splendid report — that is, civil defence. If political leaders in the Alliance are to be able to make vital decisions at a time of crisis, there must be the maximum calm and confidence in the civilian population if they are to be able to carry out these decisions efficiently. Although paragraph 83 of the report refers to civilian emergency plans, it seems to suggest that these plans have a destabilising effect. If they are wrongly carried out, this is to some extent true, but to have to rush through panic measures in a crisis could seriously disrupt civilian morale and have disastrous consequences in impeding the capacity of the political leaders to make the necessary decisions and give appropriate instructions to the military in time.

The Soviet Union recognises this. Over the past five or ten years there has been a massive build-up of civil defence, coinciding with the vast increase in offensive arms. Their civil defence activities cost something like four times those of the United States, there is compulsory civil defence involving the entire Soviet population, some 30 million people are employed in civil defence, and 60 % of new industrial plant is deliberately dispersed as part of a home defence policy. The stockpiling of essential materials is increasing, shelters are being built and every worker in the Soviet Union has a gas-mask.

I am not suggesting that we should slavishly follow this really extraordinary policy of the Soviet Union, but we cannot ignore the necessity for a much better civil defence capacity in the West if we are to be able to make the decisions which have to be made very suddenly and very bravely in a crisis.

One of my constituents in Harrow is chairman of the Inter-Allied Confederation of Reserve Officers. This body has been recommending countries of the Alliance to increase civil defence capacity in view of what is going on in Russia, and to do this particularly with regard to Great Britain. I know all about the arguments and the dangers of creating panic and disturbance among civilian populations, but a calm, quiet and much greater emphasis and effort to provide effective civil defence in the Alliance, especially in the United Kingdom, is necessary.

Having said that with regard to an important point in an otherwise uncontroversial report, I believe that it is absolutely vital to adopt the report.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Critchley, who will be followed by Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — The Watkinson report in its third paragraph stresses the problems raised by Soviet rearmament, including that of reduced warning time, which is a most serious matter, thoughtfully treated in one of the best reports ever to come before the Assembly. The remorseless speed of Soviet rearmament coupled with the effect of inflation on defence spending in the West, to say nothing of a growing disenchantment with, and even hostility to, the need for defence itself in western societies, can only lead to the collapse of allied strategy — the so-called flexible response — because that strategy can only hope to work provided that the balance of forces between East and West is kept.

Soviet rearmament, if unchecked, will force NATO to reconsider the use and deployment of its battle-front nuclear weapons, and not before time. Let us examine Soviet choices. These are their two possible strategies. They could either launch a nuclear and conventional strike followed up with armour, supported by helicopter-borne infantry, and at the same time strike at NATO airfields, supply dumps, and command and control installations, or they might conceivably attack with conventional forces alone, with or without the pre-emptive nuclear strike.

The first alternative is much the more likely. To protect against it, NATO must adopt a strategy that relies upon the effective use of its theatre nuclear weapons, but in order to do so we must modernise and redeploy our theatre nuclear weapon arsenal.

But to defend against conventional attack, which would be far less likely — the Soviets are not loyal to the ideas of the Rand Corporation but are loyal to their own concepts — NATO would need to use its own nuclear weapons first and early. We would also need larger reserves,

Mr. Critchley (continued)

more skilful deployment and, when one looks at the United Kingdom forces in particular, vastly increased stocks, especially of ammunition. Command and control centres and communications must be "hardened" and improved. Seventy per cent of NATO's theatre nuclear weapons have short ranges and would be fired only within the boundaries of the Federal Republic under a strategy of flexible response. The remaining 30 % are vulnerable to surprise attack. We need new weapons which combine range with mobility and certainly we need to deploy in Europe the cruise missile, as SACEUR perhaps suggested this morning.

We must also deploy in Europe the neutron bomb. The neutron warhead with its enhanced radiation effect would be the ideal weapon against armour. Its diminished blast would make it more suitable for use within friendly territory. The neutron warhead would strengthen deterrence in several important ways. Its deployment in Europe would make the Russians even less likely to succumb to the temptation of easy victories, while the reduction of damage and casualties would make NATO's decision to use it in the event of a Soviet conventional attack much easier.

This new weapon is beginning to attract emotional and even hostile response in the West, but we should never forget that it is our purpose and our real aim to prevent wars which would be the ultimate catastrophe, and to do so we must deter our enemies and not deter ourselves.

I have one final suggestion to make. The Watkinson report stresses the vital importance of the politicians acting on warning time. Yet the lessons of history show that warnings are almost invariably disregarded, because they are filtered through the preconceptions of the watcher.

We would not be able to give the decision to use theatre nuclear weapons to General Haig, to SACEUR, because of the fragility of public opinion and the allied governments, but what we might do and what we should perhaps do is to transfer the power of decision for first use of theatre nuclear weapons to SACEUR on receipt of some level of warning. This would in itself constitute a clear signal of NATO's determination to defend itself, and to do so according to military as opposed to political criteria. But this would not be sensible or be believed by the Soviet Union unless we took steps to redeploy, harden, protect and improve NATO's theatre nuclear weapons. To do that would re-establish the validity of NATO's strategy of deterrence. The filling up of war stocks, hardening and protecting headquarters and the introduction of new conventional weapons for use against armour

would restore the validity of NATO's strategy of defence and of deterrence. Will we in Europe, in face of Soviet rearmament, be able to keep the balance on which we must depend?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, we can only congratulate Mr. Watkinson on the high quality of his report; and it may be said at the outset that it will provide excellent reference material for all those concerned with defence problems. In the course of the debate, however, we learnt in addition that since the distressing Prague affair there have been within NATO other bodies which also concern themselves with the same problem of crisis management.

I will say straight away that for me, since at the present juncture in Western Europe and its political and economic structures such bodies exist, they are in my view sufficient. And I shall not conceal my distrust concerning the structures it is proposed we should adopt in the realm of integrated communications.

This morning I listened to General Haig and noted the tone of his reply to Mr. Péridier's question, which also constitutes a reply to a question I myself had asked. General Haig specifically stated that the presence of marxist elements — I did not say communists — in our governments would give rise to problems in the military sphere, particularly as regards transfer of highly secret information.

I venture to protest at the accusations levelled at certain parliamentarians with regard to their moral integrity when acting in accordance with their ideological convictions. I do not accept that a soldier should cast doubt on my moral integrity. I profess to be a marxist. In marxist governments there are highly competent people deserving the confidence of all. And when I likewise note all the psychosis surrounding these regrettable, these reprehensible acts of terrorism, I am worried. For it leads one to suppose that, behind even the draft recommendation submitted to us, there lie certain moves to strengthen the police system — or at all events authority — by methods which do not seem to coincide with my idea of democracy.

Of course, Mr. Watkinson has assured us that this integrated system would in fact be placed under political control, since NATO's political structure would be responsible for deciding how to react to any crises which might arise.

I do not follow Mr. Watkinson's reasoning when he makes this assertion, for the system will not in fact be controlled by the politicians, but will be under the technical control of those

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

who installed the system and who will maintain it ; so it is more than probable that a large American multinational, which has played a criminal rôle — especially in Chile four years ago — may be no stranger to the management and maintenance of this system, which is to engage — and I quote the words of the draft recommendation — in the provision and evaluation of information... covering any events that may involve allied interests.

What are these allied interests ? Are they the interests of our peoples or are they those of international capitalism, which might see its privileges threatened by working-class movements or perhaps by working-class forces gaining power ?

We must know what constitutes a crisis. I have deep apprehensions about the statements made by General Haig, and also about Mr. Ford's remarks concerning the presence of the left at the seat of power in some countries — in particular, in the Latin countries of Europe.

I consider that the recommendation presented to us constitutes a new stage in the advance of the computer, of informatics in the lives of our citizens. When we speak of information, I should not be surprised to find myself, together with some of my colleagues and friends, appearing in the card indexes connected with the system, possibly as someone considered to be an element that might upset the fine balance which we at present know in Europe — a balance that is fine for some, but deplorable for others.

I would remind you that this system should be in permanent contact with various defence ministries and the general staffs. My confidence in the military intelligence set-up in my own country is not perfect. I have had enough problems in Belgium in this connection during the past four years to say that I distrust the items of information which might be communicated through the integrated system.

One final remark, Mr. President. I am a newcomer to this Assembly and am obviously unfamiliar with its traditions and customs ; but I will not conceal the fact that I feel somewhat surprised by the constant references to NATO which I find in all the documents. I sometimes wonder whether we are meeting in the Assembly of Western European Union or in that of the North Atlantic.

I could have wished that we Europeans would clearly show our determination — that is in any case my hope — to see a collective defence system which is exclusively European being built up in Europe, without thereby of course

rejecting American friendship, and that we could nonetheless demonstrate our resolve to conduct our own defence without always having to proclaim our allegiance to our great western ally.

I have expressed my hope — and that of many European socialists — of seeing Europe take its destiny into its own hands, especially in the realm of defence. Let nobody believe it possible to create a Europe that is united in the political and economic spheres in accordance with the workers' wishes without necessarily passing through the stage of integrated European defence.

In my view, the system which it is at present proposed that we should adopt will tend to increase American supremacy, both in practice and in the technological field ; and I greatly fear, too, that it will tend to facilitate the control of European political life by our great friend, the United States of America. For that reason, I shall vote against the draft recommendation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Rivière.

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have just been listening to Mr. Dejardin, who has declared his marxist faith. As for me, I am certainly not a marxist, and yet I am going to speak more or less on the same lines as Mr. Dejardin.

The report submitted by Mr. Watkinson provides an answer to the problems the gravity of which is obvious. The strengthening of the military capacity of the Warsaw Pact and the strategic parity between the United States and the USSR bring within the bounds of possibility an armed confrontation in Europe between the two blocs.

The United States and the USSR, whose own territories will in future be sacrosanct, may as a result of the present tensions and excessive armaments in Europe find themselves involved in a trial of military strength on this continent.

The most daunting hypothesis is that recently put forward by General Close of an attempt by the USSR to exert military pressure by seizing territory as a hostage, without mobilisation of the reserves and without warning.

In such a dangerous situation it is becoming more and more urgent that Europe should seek the means of defending its security and independence, and so escape not only an armed confrontation which, even if it were exclusively conventional or tactical-nuclear, would be disastrous for Europe, but also a change in the balance which at present guarantees its freedom.

Mr. Rivière (continued)

Unfortunately, although he sets out the problem quite correctly, Mr. Watkinson offers not a single element on which to base a solution. In order to remedy the particular difficulties besetting Europe which I have just mentioned, he advocates the integration within NATO of our defence policies and even the suppression of all freedom for the European States to choose the counter-measures that would be taken.

That is not the way to secure effectively the protection of Europe's interests, since such an agreement would virtually amount to submitting without demur to the guidelines laid down by the United States, guidelines which cannot entirely correspond in all respects to the vital needs of our States, in that the situation of the United States, a world power which has achieved strategic parity with the USSR, is, by its very nature, completely different from our own.

In analysing more closely the shortcomings of the recommendation, I will confine myself to setting out briefly the reasons why MM. Radius, La Combe, Rivière and other members of the French Delegation have tabled amendments which I would like to see adopted.

First, it is rather surprising to note that even where Mr. Watkinson welcomes, and to a certain extent rightly, the existence of certain procedures for exchanging information and concerting action amongst the member States of the Atlantic Alliance before international crises arise, he makes no proposals at a European level for structures which would enable our States to concert their action and to take action when their particular situation calls for a specific response. We have, however, the modified Brussels Treaty. We have, too, political co-operation within the framework of the Nine. All these structures, all the progress made on the legal plane are due to the need for Europe to have its own means of action with which to meet any challenge.

Secondly, Mr. Watkinson is content to address his recommendations not directly to the Council of WEU, in order that it may take such measures as it sees fit, but indirectly to the Atlantic Alliance. However, the rôle of this Assembly is not to draw up recommendations as regards the Alliance but to attempt to define the elements of a European defence policy.

Thirdly, Mr. Watkinson not only comes out in favour of the MBFR negotiations, which are laborious and inefficient as well as being dangerous for the European balance of power, but he asks for the negotiations on disarmament to be based from the very beginning on the NATO proposals, that is, on the American proposals. Now, how can one negotiate if one announces in

advance that agreement must be reached on the basis of proposals which one has laid down unilaterally? It seems to me more reasonable to recall that it is in the interest of Europe to search for general and complete disarmament within a framework that offers effective equality to the States taking part and does not discriminate against the European powers.

These then are, briefly, the points concerning the text before us which it seems must be made in the interests of Europe.

If this text were adopted, it would be an act of defiance on the part of the Assembly and would represent a serious absence of the will to create Europe. The Assembly would give up the progress made on the legal plane in connection with the Brussels Treaty, which specifically provides for the introduction of machinery for crisis management in a specifically European framework. It would also be giving up the attempts at concerted action of which we see examples every day in the European Communities. It would be admitting that the divisions within Europe when faced by external pressures, either during the energy crisis or the crises in the Middle East, to cite only two examples, are inevitable and that Europe is incapable of defining its own interests when the latter, in however small degree, run counter to current American policy.

I therefore hope that this recommendation will either be amended in a European sense or be rejected.

The time is past when our continent, lying in ruins and weakened in its political and social structures, was completely dependent on external protection. We are now quite capable, while still remaining faithful to our alliances, of looking after our own interests, and it is the particular rôle of the WEU Assembly to reaffirm to governments this basic principle of European solidarity and of confidence in the future. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Brugnon, who is the last speaker on my list.

Mr. BRUGNON (*France*) (Translation). — The text before us seems to include negative aspects which lead me to express some feelings of concern.

In the first place, the Rapporteur draws the conclusion from his analysis of a number of crises which have occurred recently that it is necessary to strengthen the military machinery of NATO, so as to be in a position to provide immediate armed retaliation in any crisis involving the Alliance. The proposal to increase the standing and on-call forces of NATO with a view to influencing the course of events in situations of tension flows from this conclusion.

That is a dangerous approach, since it will inevitably lead to strengthening the integrated

Mr. Brugnon (continued)

military organisation for a purpose which would no longer be exclusively defensive. Indeed, it must not be forgotten that the primary task of the Alliance, as clearly emerges from the treaty on which it is built, is purely defensive. Now if we were to follow the Rapporteur's proposals, any difficulty, any misunderstanding and any case of friction between the eastern and western blocs might give rise to the deployment of considerable forces on the part of NATO. That could not fail to take on the guise of an attempt to exert military pressure, and the possibility of such a policy being pursued could only serve to keep alive among the countries of the Warsaw Pact feelings of hostility which would doubtless lead them to develop still further their already formidable military potential. The proposal before us would, therefore, if it were followed, drag Europe into the dangerous spiral of the armaments race.

That leads me to voice my second objection to the report presented by Mr. Watkinson. Crisis management is, in fact, merely a problem stemming from a more fundamental issue: that of creating an atmosphere of confidence and security in Europe.

From that standpoint, the Rapporteur is right to call for the confidence-building measures adopted at Helsinki to be strengthened and increased. In my view, however, he shows regrettable timidity about disarmament. Indeed, he foresees no favourable outcome to the Vienna negotiations concerning force reductions except on the basis of the western proposals. Well, the characteristic feature of negotiations is really that they should lead to mutual concessions. Moreover, the Rapporteur does not put forward any proposal on the definition of a possible European disarmament policy. He fails to analyse the steps that could be taken within the United Nations, at the Geneva conference and in all the other appropriate international forums in the endeavour to arrive at the only satisfactory solution to the military problems which Europe is at present facing: the achievement of balanced disarmament, extending to all types of weapons, encompassing all the countries concerned, and guaranteed by satisfactory machinery for its supervision. Many discussions have been held on this subject at the United Nations. Proposals are made by the East and by the West — not all of them realistic — and they are often inspired by obvious propaganda motives on the part of the eastern countries. It is nonetheless essential that our Assembly should consider and discuss in depth that vital question for Europe: disarmament.

Lastly, the report submitted to us presents a difficulty which, in my view, renders it somewhat

unrealistic and will doubtless prevent the recommendations contained therein being followed up, for the Rapporteur asks that all the member governments of WEU should closely co-ordinate the whole of their military policy within the Atlantic Alliance. This means that there would no longer be any possibility of independent reaction by the States when faced with crisis situations. That removes all flexibility from the adaptation of policies to be pursued in such periods and would, for example, compromise any efforts at mediation, negotiation or discussion which one European country might undertake, for the benefit of the Alliance as a whole, with a view to re-establishing an atmosphere of confidence and security in cases of tension.

If our Assembly wishes to reaffirm the defensive and peaceful character of the Atlantic Alliance, and if it wishes to lend its support to the process of détente, as it did by voting in favour of the Segre report, it would seem undesirable for our Assembly to adopt those parts of Mr. Watkinson's recommendation which diverge from that approach. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — The list of speakers is completed. Does the Rapporteur wish to reply?

Mr. WATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). — Thank you, Mr. President. I thank those members of the Assembly who have congratulated me on the report.

Turning first to the remarks of Mr. Grant, of course I acknowledge that civil defence measures are a necessary requirement for any State to undertake. I think it may sound paradoxical, but it is possible for civil defence measures to be both defensive and offensive. This is the point I was attempting to draw out in my report. I do acknowledge, however, the importance of this aspect.

I thank Mr. Critchley for his remarks, expressed with his usual eloquence. It would seem that Mr. Critchley was developing a worst-case thesis in terms of the possibilities that could arise for the Alliance. He prefaced his remarks by saying that if we fail to maintain some form of balance we shall be driven back towards a trip-wire philosophy. That is something that, I suspect, the whole of the Assembly would not wish to happen, but it is appropriate that this almost dire warning should be presented to us.

As regards Mr. Dejardin's remarks, it is a matter of interpretation and for him to decide what the communications system within NATO should be used for. I do not see it as a capitalist plot, nor do I see it being used by any multinational. It seems a sensible and legitimate means whereby the Alliance can attempt to inform itself on a collective basis of what is going on.

Mr. Watkinson (continued)

I should like to take up Mr. Dejardin and Mr. Rivière on the proposals they put forward about the rôle of WEU and a separate European rôle in defence arrangements. I respectfully refer them to Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty :

“In the execution of the treaty, the high contracting parties and any organs established by them under the treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.”

Under the modified Brussels Treaty, we are invited to co-operate with and work through NATO itself. I take the point underlined by Mr. Rivière regarding warning time. General Haig dealt with that matter this morning. It cannot be gainsaid that warning time has almost certainly been diminished as a result of the build-up on the central front.

Mr. Brugnon referred to recommendation 2 (a) (v), which asks for the strengthening of the mobile and on-call forces. I should point out to Mr. Brugnon that this morning I spelt out clearly that this was not an invitation to increase the number of troops in the NATO area. It was merely asking for the transfer of troops from national to NATO forces in order that those mobile troops might be used in a crisis situation to help damp down the crisis. I am not calling for increased military personnel in any way, and I hope that Mr. Brugnon will accept this.

I accept, as Mr. Brugnon made clear to the Assembly, that NATO is a defensive organisation. That appears in the very first sentence of the report.

Of course, we must pursue disarmament negotiations in every forum available to us in the world, notably the United Nations at Geneva. But the forum where the negotiations hopefully should be being conducted on a realistic basis is in Vienna in terms of conventional weapons. That is why I have sought to mention, as many other reports have done, the need to get the MBFR talks moving and to see some progress made there.

Mr. Brugnon referred to the possibility of autonomous action by nations. Clearly, we want Europe and NATO to act together, but this does not take away from individual countries the right to defend themselves if attacked. In no way is that right denied to them. We are seeking co-operation in a crisis situation. We believe that

that is the best way to deal with any crisis which may confront us.

I thank the members of the Assembly who have usefully contributed to the debate. I hope that, despite what Mr. Dejardin said, the Assembly will adopt the report.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I shall be extremely brief, not because this is not an important subject, nor because this is not a good and valuable report — indeed, in view of what was said by General Haig this morning about the professional quality of Mr. Watkinson's report, there is no need for me to add any words of praise — but because we as a Committee are proud to have been able to submit this report to the Assembly.

I hope that members who have not yet had a chance to read the whole of the explanatory memorandum will take an early opportunity to do so.

I am glad that Mr. Watkinson, in his final remarks, drew attention to Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty. It is important that we in this Assembly should remember that that is the formation of this organisation. The close links between WEU and NATO were clearly spelt out in the modified Brussels Treaty, which makes it quite clear that it is undesirable for us and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to duplicate matters.

Members have heard the remarks which have been made by various members of my Committee. From those remarks it will be gathered that there were lively debates in the Defence Committee in which colleagues such as Mr. Dejardin from the left and Mr. Rivière from the right were able to introduce their own independent analyses of the problems. However, I must make it clear that the Committee as a whole is unable to accept the illusion of European independence in defence matters. We believe that we can be defended only as part of the Atlantic Alliance. That is certainly the view of the Committee as a whole, and it is reflected in the report.

It is also worth pointing out that when our Rapporteur visited a number of the countries of the Alliance he found confirmation there for the belief that the mechanism of NATO was the correct one for dealing with crisis management.

I believe that this has been a useful debate. It is right that in our Assembly we should have the opportunity of discussing and debating critical matters of this kind. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roper.

The debate is closed.

Four amendments have been tabled to the draft recommendation in Document 757. I propose that the Assembly should consider them, as we did this morning, in the order in which they affect the text. If the Assembly agrees, I shall start with Amendment No. 4, part 1 by Mr. Radius and Mr. Rivière which proposes to leave out the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert a new paragraph commencing "Noting the existence of procedures".

Does anyone wish to speak in favour of Amendment No. 4, part 1 ?...

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I think it essential that we should vote on each part in turn, as the several parts in this amendment relate to different subjects.

The PRESIDENT. — This first paragraph of Amendment No. 4 is part of the amendment to the preamble. That is why I called only part 1 of Amendment No. 4.

Does anyone wish to speak against part 1 ?...

We shall take a vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 1 of the amendment is negatived.

We turn now to the amendments to the draft recommendation proper. We start with Amendment No. 4, also by Mr. Radius and Mr. Rivière, part 2, at the beginning of the draft recommendation proper, to leave out "That it urge member governments".

Does anyone wish to speak in favour of this ?...

Does anyone wish to speak against it ?...

We shall therefore take a vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 2 of the amendment is negatived.

We now come to part 3 of Amendment No. 4 to leave out paragraph 1 (b) of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

"(b) by taking steps towards general, complete and controlled disarmament in the framework of all negotiations which respect the real equality of participating States ;".

Does anyone wish to speak in favour ?...

Does anyone wish to speak against it ?...

Do you wish to speak, Mr. Rivière ?

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — The negotiations on MBFR are negotiations between

the United States and the USSR. Consequently, we do not have to take part in them. For that reason, I propose that paragraph 1 (b) of the draft recommendation proper be replaced by the words : "by taking steps towards general, complete and controlled disarmament in the framework of all negotiations which respect the real equality of participating States". The United States and the USSR are particularly concerned, but not ourselves.

The PRESIDENT. — No one has asked to speak against the amendment, so we shall proceed to vote.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am sorry to intervene, but I think that Mr. Rivière's error should be put right. The MBFR negotiations are not solely the responsibility of the United States and of the Soviet Union ; six of the seven WEU countries are taking part, and the seventh could do so if it wished.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, on behalf of the Assembly, for making that correction.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 3 of the amendment is negatived.

We turn now to Amendment No. 1 by Mr. Pawelczyk.

Do you wish to have a word on this amendment ?...

Is there anyone who wishes to speak against it ?...

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — We could accept it with a drafting amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — What is the drafting amendment ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — In the second line, if it were to read "in which members of WEU could participate" rather than "are participating".

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to reject this amendment ?...

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment No. 1 as amended, is agreed to.

The next amendment is part 4 of Amendment No. 4, which begins : "in paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (a) and insert : "(a) by calling on all member countries..."

I must point out that if we adopt part 4 of Amendment No. 4, Amendments Nos. 3 and 2 by Mr. Banks and Mr. Stoffelen will fall.

Does anyone wish to speak in favour of this part of the amendment ?...

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — We should be in agreement with the wording proposed by the Rapporteur provided it were in a European framework and not an Atlantic framework. That is the purpose of my amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 4 of the amendment is negatived.

We come now to Amendment No. 3 tabled by Mr. Banks.

Mr. Banks, do you wish to speak to the amendment ?

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). — My amendment in no way conflicts with the report itself, which I thoroughly applaud and support. I seek merely to alter the wording for the sake of simplicity, which is something we ought always to pursue in reports and recommendations. I should like to take out part of sub-section (iii) and simplify matters by saying "to seek to improve arrangements for NATO crisis management... in developing a collectively-agreed assessment of a crisis situation ;".

The words "developing a collectively-agreed assessment of a crisis situation" would automatically take into account the provision and evaluation of information, consultation, and the fact that it has to be world-wide, immediate and, for that matter, continuous, covering any event which might occur, which is the wording in the original sub-section.

I hope that, for the sake of simplicity, the Assembly will accept my amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Does the Rapporteur wish to say anything ?

Mr. WATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). — I thank Mr. Banks and appreciate his desire to simplify wherever possible, but I must tell him that this sub-section was drafted with a good deal of care and was deliberately set out in this way in order to emphasise the importance of information to the Alliance, particularly because the Alliance itself has no means of collecting information and has to rely on member governments for it. We wish, therefore, to stress each and every word in this recommendation. I ask the Assembly to reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — It seems that the Rapporteur would like the Assembly to reject the amendment.

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). — In view of what the Rapporteur has said, I feel that it would be sensible to withdraw the amendment, which I now do.

The PRESIDENT. — Very well. You have withdrawn Amendment No. 3, so we need not vote on it.

We turn now to Amendment No. 2 by Mr. Stofelen.

Does anyone wish to speak in favour of this amendment ?...

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — It is accepted by the Committee.

The PRESIDENT. — The Committee accepts it. I think that we can adopt it.

Is there any objection to it ?...

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment No. 2 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 757, as amended.

If there are no objections and no abstentions, and if the Assembly were to agree, we could save the time required for a roll-call vote, with one provision. I have been informed that three members will give their names later on but will make it clear that they abstain.

Can the Assembly agree that we vote by sitting and standing ?...

That appears to be agreed.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

If those who have now risen insist on saying that they are against the recommendation, we must have a vote by roll-call, but if they sit down and abstain they can inform me and we can take it as a substantive vote.

We have, I think, agreed to the document and take note of the abstentions of Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Bernini, Mr. Antoni and Mr. Corallo. They can hand in their names, and we can take it as we agreed. I did not see any abstentions.

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted*¹.

5. Contribution of WEU to the development of European union

(*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 756 and Amendment*)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the

1. See page 28.

The President (continued)

contribution of WEU to the development of European union and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 756 and Amendment.

I call Mr. Forni.

Mr. FORNI (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report I was asked to compile comprises, to begin with, a stocktaking of what WEU represents today in a world racked with crises, in which the dominant economic and political system seems to be cracking up on all sides in a Europe sick with its own capitalism. Secondly, the report was to consider to what extent the institution which brings us together here might be able to contribute to restoring this Europe to health and to building up a new more peace-oriented world; a difficult and delicate task which the General Affairs Committee nonetheless agreed to recommend. If today the Europe of our dreams has yielded place to the Europe of illusions, it is because of the downright failure of all attempts over the past twenty-five years to build such a Europe. It has not been a total failure. The institutional machinery, which is perhaps as good as any other, has not been a failure, but the inability of all our governments to use the instruments ready to their hand has been, because of their lack of will to labour at the new world to which they profess to aspire, although everything goes to show that in fact they dread it.

The modified Brussels Treaty is one, and not the least, of these instruments which have the merit of being there, but which governments do not or will not use. All are agreed that Western European Union should be maintained, but all are equally agreed to void it *de facto* of its substance by not fulfilling the obligations which they entered into in 1954. We find glaring proof of this in the current paralysis of the Council. We have had several recent instances of this in the way a person who addressed the General Affairs Committee at the joint meeting just held in Bonn was unable or unwilling to give a serious and politically reliable answer to questions put by the parliamentarians. In any case could he have done so? We have observed a case of that same inability to meet the wishes of the Assembly in the debate which followed the address given yesterday by the German Minister of State, representing the Council.

As you are aware, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Assembly has always asked for a prominent politician to be appointed as Secretary-General. It failed to obtain satisfaction on that point, but welcomed the appointment of Ambassador Longerstaey, whose earlier brilliant diplomatic career permits the hope that he will bring to the permanent Council a fresh impetus that is abso-

lutely essential today if we want WEU to have more than a purely ectoplasmic existence.

We may well wonder to what extent the Ministers are satisfied with the lethargy in which the permanent Council seems to be so complacently sunk. Do the infrequent ministerial meetings even allow them to be aware of the fact? In any case, it is for the parliamentarians to bring home in both this Assembly and their national parliaments that the Ministers are in all circumstances responsible for its being so.

It may be regretted that the Minister who spoke to us on behalf of the Council should in the end only have tried to dissimulate the truth and not answer the questions put. Application of the treaty is bedevilled by such spinelessness on the part of the permanent Council. In the application of how many protocols, as for example Article V of Protocol No. II on the forces of WEU, does the Council do more than rubber stamp decisions taken by the member countries?

Yet the joint meeting at Bonn will not have been unproductive of results, if the Council were to fulfil the promises made there on its behalf. I have noted four.

The first, which is perhaps only formal, but does in fact contain some political substance, is that of reverting in the presentation of its next annual report to the form used by the Council prior to 1976.

The second is the promise to provide the Assembly with a document showing the status of progress in the Standing Armaments Committee under the mandate it was given on 31st May 1976. The Council has also undertaken to notify the Assembly of the follow-up action to its work.

Thirdly, the Council has undertaken to give the Assembly a freer hand in the use of its budget.

Fourthly and lastly, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council has proposed that the joint meetings between the General Affairs Committee and Council should continue at annual intervals. From this we see that only very modest concessions have been made to meet the Assembly's wishes. Nevertheless, the way in which these commitments are honoured in the future will show whether the Council is genuinely determined to breathe real life into an institution, one of whose original features is its parliamentary character.

The fact remains that the parliamentary Assembly cannot consider itself satisfied with a meeting at which its interlocutors, I would almost say its only genuine interlocutors, were officials, which means there was no genuine political dialogue between parliamentarians and the senior politicians members of the Council.

Mr. Forni (continued)

Although the present functioning of WEU can in no way satisfy our Assembly, the fact remains that the modified Brussels Treaty provides a set of instruments which are and will continue to be more and more essential to Europe, if it wishes to advance along the road to union.

The first of these means is the fact that WEU offers Europe a number of possibilities in the vital area of its security and defence. It offers the possibility of an independence which cannot be national, but cannot either rest content with a situation in which the fate of Europe is *de facto* determined by a country external to it. There can of course be no such independence unless Europe has means of deterrence at its disposal, since the alternative to deterrence is the ability to wage war; now Europe has no choice, whereas the United States can, or at any rate imagines it can, exercise such a choice. In the present state of affairs, only nuclear weapons can provide the wherewithal for such deterrence — a temporary situation, as I for my part hope — and this is obviously a source of difficulties to the extent that these instruments of deterrence remain in the hands of one or perhaps two countries.

In this connection, I should like to state the positions adopted by the French Socialist Party of which I am a member. One saying of our Secretary-General, François Mitterrand, has often been repeated: "I do not believe in a national deterrent". I think it is precisely because he believes in alliances and considers that a national deterrent can only be meaningful in so far as it fits into a system of alliances and solidarity that this formula assumes its full significance. It means that a deterrent is unthinkable in the service of a national policy, but not of course that this signifies relying on American protection.

If I have stated the position of one of France's major political parties, it is because France's peculiar position is obviously one of the factors hindering the proper application of the modified Brussels Treaty. It is not the only one, but is partly the reason why certain international obligations are not honoured, especially those concerning the paragraph in Protocol No. III whereby the signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty undertook to submit their nuclear forces to control. France does not submit to such control and, so far as we are concerned, everything goes to show that its WEU partners have never called upon it to do so.

The reason is what everyone has had to admit, at any rate implicitly, that in present circumstances the atomic weapon can act as a deterrent only if it is wielded by a national authority; and, furthermore, this is due to the disagreement

prevailing between France and its NATO partners on questions affecting the internal balance of the Atlantic Alliance.

This in no wise means that the control machinery provided for in the Brussels Treaty has outlived its usefulness. On the contrary, it will play an even more important part as the other aspects of the treaty also come to be respected, and help to maintain the mutual confidence that is essential to the very existence of Europe, whilst at the same time giving it credibility as a partner in disarmament negotiations.

I shall not dwell, as others have frequently done over the past few years, on the advantages of a joint armaments production organisation, but the report I am presenting dwells on the need to extend all undertakings for organising European armaments production to cover sales of arms — especially to the developing countries — so that our nations may desist from helping to arm conflicts between African or Asian countries, as they do today.

Such are the reasons which lead me to believe that WEU can contribute in its own special field to building up a genuine Europe which, freed from the external and internal constraints imposed upon it by a world dominated by capitalism, will contribute positively and efficiently to establishing a fresh balance guaranteeing the freedom, independence and economic advancement of each and all.

There can be no European Community, Ladies and Gentlemen, nor any construction of Europe, if there is no blueprint, no foundation for joint European defence.

Turning to a point of detail, I should like to inform you in conclusion that the last paragraph of the recommendation which I am submitting to your Assembly was added by our General Affairs Committee following a somewhat hurried debate, and that in my view its full implications were insufficiently considered by our Committee. The Committee implicitly acknowledged as much in instructing a Rapporteur to go more deeply into the question in preparation for the June session of our Assembly. I would therefore propose to you, in order to give this other Rapporteur full freedom of action and avoid putting any pressure on him, that we should drop the last paragraph. That does not, of course, mean that I disapprove of it, either in the spirit or the letter. (*Applause*)

(*Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. von Hassel*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Roper.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. I ask you, without necessarily asking for a ruling, to place on record

Mrs. Knight (continued)

my protest that it was possible to read full details of this report in the Paris newspaper *Le Matin*, not today, but yesterday. It is a discourtesy to this Assembly that whole details of a report are given to the press two days before the Assembly is able to discuss it.

Further I ask you to place on record my objection to the fact that there are gross inaccuracies — for instance, that France is not a member of NATO. Surely, France still is a member of NATO.

The PRESIDENT. — I take note of your declaration, Mrs. Knight.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — As you know, Mr. President, the report was no longer confidential once it had been presented to the press in Bonn.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I do not want to get involved with the earlier debate, though I confess that I, too, have a point of detail which I found slightly extraordinary in paragraph 12 of the report and to which the Rapporteur may be able to reply in due course. I am not sure what were the many economic activities which WEU had prior to the United Kingdom joining the European Communities and which it was supposed to have lost. Perhaps there were large parts of this building which were closed down on 1st January 1973, or perhaps it was part of the London building. I did not notice it, but perhaps someone else did.

That apart, I congratulate Mr. Forni on his stimulating and interesting and, dare I say, provocative report, which puts before the Assembly a range of important issues that we as an Assembly should consider. Indeed, some of the views he put forward, as he said, are those of himself and of one part of his party. They are, therefore, of great interest to those of us in this Assembly. I believe that the matter contained in the report requires more full debate and perhaps further consideration. I must give notice that at an appropriate time I may be moving a procedural motion in order that such further consideration could be given either in Committee or elsewhere. I always feel it courteous to give the Chair some notice of my tricks.

This report shows us one thing clearly: the importance of the modified Brussels Treaty as distinct from the importance of Western European Union as an organisation. The modified Brussels Treaty is a document of extreme importance in international law for at least four reasons which are clearly outlined in the report.

First — and I put it first because it affects my country and is something of which I am much aware — it enshrines the obligation of the British Government to keep 55,000 troops and a tactical air force on the continent of Europe in time of peace. This is a most serious obligation which any British Government has to respect and it is obviously the centre of our defence policy at present.

Secondly, as Mr. Forni quite rightly pointed out in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10, the treaty includes an automatic obligation on the seven members of Western European Union to come to the defence of each other if attacked. This automaticity, which I believe is considerably stronger than the obligation which our countries have accepted under the Atlantic Alliance, makes one wonder a little what is meant by "liberty of national action" in this sphere. There is an automaticity here which it is important we should all realise.

Thirdly, the area of arms control supervision incorporated in the treaty was an important innovation in its time. Although one might argue that part of it is now outdated, nonetheless an important pioneering effort has been made in showing how an international organisation can carry out an arms control function. Most important for us, this is the first time in history that an alliance, primarily defensive but still a military alliance, was linked with parliamentary assembly participation. That parliamentarians should be brought in on the discussion of the matter is of great importance. I shall return later to Article IX. I was sorry to hear what Mr. Forni had to say about that and I shall wish to say more about it later. This time, however, parliamentarians have the right in the context of WEU to discuss foreign policy and defence matters. That is something which in general the executive guards jealously to itself.

In spite of the importance of the modified Brussels Treaty, if we come to consider WEU as an organisation we have a rather different picture, because, in spite of our own natural prejudice in favour of the organisation in which we play a part, we have to admit the relative unimportance of WEU as an organisation in terms of public regard in our countries, or even by our governments.

Why is that? I believe it is because, unlike Mr. Forni's paragraph 4 of the "considering" paragraphs, our governments believe that NATO and the independent European programme group provide the main forum for discussion of defence matters. I believe that they are right in that. Now that Britain is a member of the Community, discussions on co-operation can take place better within the context of the Community than in the Council of WEU. Much as we might want this discussion, and much as officials of this

Mr. Roper (continued)

organisation might want it, I am sorry to say that there is a shortage of Foreign Ministers.

There are only twenty-four hours in the day of a Foreign Secretary. He cannot spend all his time away from his national capital. We have seen how the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany has been laid low by illness as a result of all his work. Mr. Simonet is unable to be with us because of the strain of his enormous task as a Foreign Minister. One cannot have an undue proliferation of bodies. If our Foreign Ministers believe that they can adequately deal with these matters within the NATO framework and within the framework of political co-operation in the Community, we must carefully consider their judgment before we adopt the recommendation as it stands.

Of course, there are specific tasks which this Assembly and organisation and no other can undertake. I agree with the suggestion made by Mr. Forni that perhaps the Standing Armaments Committee could play a rôle as far as conventional arms transfers are concerned. This is one matter which should be examined and in which there is possibly an important rôle to play.

I should like to spend my remaining moments dealing with the interesting final recommendation 7. Mr. Forni disappointed me by saying that he wished to withdraw the only part of the resolution which I liked. It is an extremely interesting recommendation, because Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty is an archaic anomaly in stating that the Assembly should necessarily be identical with the Assembly of the Council of Europe. At the time it was set up, it was appropriate that that should be the case, but I am not convinced that this is necessarily the case now.

I draw to the careful attention of the Assembly the fact that Article IX states that the representatives to the two bodies should be the same. It does not say anything about the substitutes for those representatives. Could we not consider using an interpretation of Article IX whereby parliaments, if they so wished, could send different substitutes to the Council of Europe and to the WEU Assembly so that those especially interested in matters of defence could take part in the work of this Assembly, and those interested in the subjects which are the special concern of the Council of Europe could take part in the work of that Assembly? This would go some way to meeting the objective which I understood to be in paragraph 7 of the recommendation of Mr. Forni, without necessarily opening Pandora's box and attempting to modify or amend the modified Brussels Treaty.

In conclusion, we as an Assembly have an important rôle as the only statutory body in Western Europe able to discuss the essential problems facing our continent. I believe that after the direct elections to the European Parliament we shall have a more important rôle, because we will be the only Assembly bringing together parliamentarians from national parliaments to discuss these key problems facing our countries. Perhaps in the Presidential Committee or elsewhere we need, as an Assembly, to look at the way in which we are using our time and resources. Are our traditional methods of working necessarily the best? Is passing resolutions the most satisfactory output for an organisation of this sort? Could our eight million francs be used more effectively? These are important questions because, quite clearly, our Assembly could do a great deal of good if it used those resources properly.

Although, as I have said, I have some reservations about the report of Mr. Forni, and I believe it may be necessary to try to find ways of continuing the debate, the report has served a useful function in leading us to concentrate our attention on important questions and in providing as a basis for future discussion an opportunity for us to develop in a useful way the future work of our Assembly. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roper.

(Translation). — I now call Mr. Cermolacce.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Forni has undeniably set himself positive goals in his report. It seems to answer reasonable preoccupations and deal realistically with the current status of European security problems.

The Rapporteur's goals are stated in paragraph 4 of the recommendation. They seek an agreed definition by the European States of an active policy of disarmament which alone can bring lasting peace to this continent. As Mr. Forni says, Western Europe today stands as one in face of a vital need: to avoid at any cost a war which, whatever arms are used, would bring total ruin.

The subject matter of the report reminds us moreover that the object of any European policy of concertation in security matters should be to create and foster a climate of mutual trust among all European States, whatever their political and social régimes.

The report's correct analysis of the conditions of European security is as thorough as it is interesting. It may be summed up under three headings: solidarity of the peoples of Europe, the necessity of a sovereign defence policy capable of preserving national independence, and

Mr. Cermolacce (continued)

observance of the armaments limitations imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany.

Unfortunately, the Rapporteur seems in a way to contradict his own principles when he comes to drafting the policy recommendations submitted to us today.

How is it possible to advocate the strengthening of Western European Union and in the same breath claim to be defending the European countries' freedom of choice in economic, social and commercial, and indeed defence policy? In this respect paragraph 14 of the report is bound to arouse uneasiness. It refers to the possibility of countries following a political line more in keeping with their own interests. In such case the United States would undoubtedly adopt a reserved, if not openly critical, attitude towards them. The same thing would probably hold true of other EEC States.

The Rapporteur admits as much. Yet he proposes that Western European Union should play a rôle in getting States with an over-venturesome policy back into the Atlantic Pact in order to preserve western cohesion. That is what he says quite clearly in the sentence: "The Western European Union Council may have to resume its rôle as a link between one country of Western Europe and the principal European members of the Atlantic Alliance". Not only, then, does the Rapporteur come out in favour of strengthening WEU, which would seem to contradict his avowed intention of defending the independence of the European States, but he also wants member States to harmonise their strategic concepts in WEU while bringing the French nuclear force within the scope of the Brussels Treaty.

What would be the consequence of such a proposal? It would give Federal Germany access to France's nuclear weapons. The *Bundeswehr* is already the biggest Western European conventional army. It would need only the slightest move towards a common defence of Western Europe to give Federal Germany an equal say in that nuclear armament from which it is, and remains, formally barred in the very interest of peace and international security.

True, Mr. Forni does stress the need to define a security policy for Europe not subordinated to American directives. But by calling for the strengthening of Western European Union and in general of all the structures for co-operation of the States of Western Europe in defence matters, and by suggesting the working-out of a common strategy at Western European level, is he not, in the last analysis, easing the way to American hegemony through Europe's intermediary?

Indeed, we cannot talk about the construction of Europe in the abstract. The construction of Europe is still today increasingly dominated by the multinational companies of American origin and by the growing influence of West German imperialism.

Another aspect of Mr. Forni's report is unfortunately open to the same objection, where it proposes that the task given to the Standing Armaments Committee be pursued promptly and efficiently: is he not harking back to the projects for co-operation in armaments production and the strengthening of Western European military capacity, which we have had to condemn on so many occasions in this Assembly? Such a proposal for a European military community would deal a severe blow to détente. It would be a threat to the independence of the European States who would thus find themselves deprived of any control over the means of ensuring their own security.

Therefore, in spite of the many positive elements in Mr. Forni's report, I am unable to vote for it for the very reason of the ambiguities in the text as tabled, and the dangerous implications it harbours.

I would hope that a study in greater depth, and perhaps more thorough-going, of the problems will persuade the Rapporteur to tone down somewhat his judgments and his recommendations which I consider on the whole, as they now stand, unacceptable. That is why, Mr. President, under Rule 29, paragraph 5, I would ask that the text be referred back to the Committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does the Rapporteur wish to amend the report as a result of Mr. Cermolacce's remarks?

Mr. FORNI (*France*) (Translation). — I feel it would be difficult for me to amend a report following Mr. Cermolacce's speech especially as he has not himself made any proposal in the shape of amendments. It was my understanding that he made certain remarks about the substance of the report and the information I provided in it, but did not propose any amendments. He simply called for the report to be referred back to the Committee for more detailed consideration.

I should like to answer him very briefly on this point. I was instructed by the General Affairs Committee to prepare a report on WEU's contribution to the development of European union. We convened several meetings of our General Affairs Committee and were given an opportunity in Bonn of considering in greater depth both the body of the report and the different paragraphs of the draft recommendation submitted to you today. I do not think — and it is a personal opinion — that I can, at any

Mr. Forni (continued)

rate now and on my own personal behalf, ask for reference to Committee. I have no remit to do so. My remit is to argue a report passed by a majority of the General Affairs Committee. And if I really wanted to please my friend, Mr. Cermolacce — no longer in the context of WEU policy but possibly that of French domestic politics — I could not go to such lengths in respect of a European institution's procedure.

For that reason, I am bound to point out that my remarks just now were made on behalf of the Committee and not on my own personal behalf.

With regard to the observation by Mr. Roper, who has also asked for reference back to the Committee — but not on the basis of any paragraphs that may to a greater or lesser extent have displeased him, but simply of the fact that I had asked for paragraph 7 of the recommendation, on revision of Article IX of the treaty, to be excluded from the Assembly's vote — I can tell him that, if I made that proposal, it was because there was nothing in the body of the report on which this paragraph of the recommendation could be based, and hence no justification for it in the report. And although we discussed this problem in the General Affairs Committee, that was on a proposal by Mr. de Koster, which, as I said just now, was rather cursorily considered. We decided to appoint a Rapporteur to examine it. I do not quite see how I could trespass on the territory of a Rapporteur appointed by the General Affairs Committee to examine any changes to Article IX of the treaty.

Those are the remarks that I wanted to make in answer to the requests by Mr. Cermolacce and Mr. Roper. Do you wish me to reply to the substantive comments made by various members, Mr. President, or shall we consider them later on?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I believe, although I have not my copy of the Rules of Procedure with me — I am afraid that I left it at my bedside — that they do, in fact, permit a Rapporteur to withdraw a report in the light of a debate. Since Mr. Forni has that power under the Rules of Procedure, and in view of what both Mr. Cermolacce and I have said, I ask him to consider very seriously this position. I am sure that neither Mr. Cermolacce nor I — not that I very often speak for him — would wish to vote against Mr. Forni's report, and it would make life very much easier for both of us and also, I believe, for the Assembly if he

would agree to the reference back of the report to his Committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Rapporteur, I have before me two requests along similar lines.

Mr. FORNI (*France*) (Translation). — Just now I used the phrase "the Europe of illusions". We are smack in the middle of it now. If our Assembly is to rest content with listening to the extremely eloquent speech of the Supreme Commander of NATO and a number of protagonists and supporters of the Atlantic Alliance, I wonder what I am doing in an Assembly that ought to be concerning itself with European defence problems.

For once in a way we are tackling concrete problems affecting the co-ordination of defence policies at European level, and it would be bad policy and bad tactics to refer this draft report back to the Committee. We know what reference back amounts to. In France, we call it a first-class burial, although I have to be convinced that some people here do want to give first-class treatment to this kind of reference to the General Affairs Committee.

Whatever my prerogatives as Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee may be, I hold by a number of moral rules whereby, a majority of the General Affairs Committee having accepted a lengthily-discussed report, I do not feel entitled to withdraw it off my own bat and on my own initiative before an assembly — not even a parliamentary assembly.

Lastly, whatever substantive problems may arise, I would address some remarks to Mr. Cermolacce about a comment that he made; and whatever divergences there may be and whatever shades of meaning may be attached to any particular interpretation of one paragraph or another in the report — although everyone has his own interpretation and his own way of reading between the lines — do try, Mr. Cermolacce, to stick to the text. I should like to make one single comment which seems to me important. If you imagine for a solitary moment that it may have been part of my intention, through the indirect agency of WEU and the wishes of this Assembly, to hand back Europe, as it were, to the custody of the United States of America, I believe, Mr. Cermolacce, if I may say so, that you have got my intentions entirely wrong.

I never said any such thing. If there was a single sentence in my report that might lead to confusion, if it was only a matter of a comma, a full-stop or an emphasis, kindly show me where it is, so that I can correct it and there is no further misinterpretation possible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the Committee.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — It is a pity that the debate has taken this turn, for in Committee there were, I think, only one or two people who did not agree with the report. Here in the Assembly only two speakers have taken part in the debate, both of whom have asked for the report to be referred back. Nobody else has taken the floor. I do not think this is a strong enough basis for immediate compliance with that request.

I would suggest that paragraph 7 of the recommendation might indeed be referred back to the Committee, but that the rest of the report should be adopted as it stands. Paragraph 7 could, if the Rules of Procedure so permit, be incorporated in the next report on this subject, which is, as we know, in preparation, or we could discuss it again in connection with that report. It seems to me that the report now before us deals with a whole series of important matters in such a way that reference back to Committee would detract somewhat from our credibility.

For example, it became clear from our discussion with the Council of Ministers in Bonn that in spite of its very amiable attitude towards us on that occasion, the Council is simply not coping with the task of taking a political decision on implementing, pursuing and further developing the modified Brussels Treaty. If the Council fails to carry out this political task we, as an Assembly, are left somewhat in the air. This is one of the things the report says, and I think it is a very serious demand which we have to raise and really cannot withdraw.

As the only European parliamentary institution that deals with defence matters, we must not fail to say clearly that we need the Council as partner in a dialogue if the whole Brussels Treaty is not to be an illusion.

There are a few other points on which I would like to speak, but I would rather, Mr. President, that we agreed now on how we are to proceed with the report. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The proposal which Mrs. von Bothmer has just made is to separate the recommendation, to refer paragraph 7 back to the Committee and to take a vote on the remainder of the report and recommendations as a whole.

Do you agree ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I want to be sure in my own mind that this possibility of a partial reference back to a Committee exists within our Rules of Procedure. I know that it is possible to refer an amendment back to a Com-

mittee, so I suppose that the thing to do would be for Mr. Forni to move an amendment to delete paragraph 7; and that amendment, I suppose, could then be referred back. But I am very anxious that what is put to the Committee is correct in terms of procedure.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Is it your proposal, Mr. Rapporteur, to refer paragraph 7 back to the Committee ?

Mr. FORNI (*France*) (Translation). — No, Mr. President, but in order to give Mr. Roper satisfaction, I shall ask for the reference back of paragraph 7 in a few moments' time, in the vote on the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 756, but first I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I have tabled Amendment No. 1 to Document 756. Its effect is that in the penultimate sentence of the preliminary paragraphs, which reads, "Deploring the fact that in practice the Council takes no account of these considerations", we should insert, "fails to take adequate account of these considerations".

As I made clear, there are a number of ways in which the report criticises perhaps even more than is justified. There is, I know, a great deal of parliamentary licence in these matters, but to say that the Council takes no account of these considerations is an absurd exaggeration, and my amendment makes a recommendation which I find slightly less unfortunate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does the Rapporteur accept what Mr. Roper's amendment seeks to do ?

Mr. FORNI (*France*) (Translation). — Yes, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put this amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The amendment is agreed to.

Mr. FORNI (*France*) (Translation). — I venture to remind you of the amendment I have tabled on paragraph 7. I propose that this paragraph be referred back to the General Affairs Committee for any changes to Article IX of the treaty to be considered.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does the Assembly agree to the Rapporteur's amendment ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Is it appropriate for a matter which deals with the revision of an article of the Brussels Treaty concerning the Assembly to be referred back to the General

Mr. Roper (continued)

Affairs Committee? Ought it not to be referred also to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and, possibly, to the Presidential Committee of the Assembly?

The PRESIDENT. — Rule 29(5) states :

“Reference back to Committee may always be requested and shall be obligatory if requested by the Chairman or Rapporteur of the Committee.”

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I understand that references to Committees and references back to Committees can be made by other members. I want to know whether it is possible, and I understand that it would have the support of the Rapporteur and of the Chairman of the Committee which studies the matter that it does not merely concern the General Affairs Committee but is central to the work of our Assembly. It should also go to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and to the Presidential Committee, and I so move.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I agree that the matter can be referred to those Committees for their opinion.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — As long as it is minuted correctly, I shall be happy.

Mr. FORNI (*France*) (Translation). — Yes.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put the Rapporteur's amendment to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The amendment is agreed to.

I call Mr. Cermolacce.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — We have to abide by the Assembly's Rules of Procedure. As I said before, I cannot vote in favour of this text. It is not a question, Mr. Rapporteur, of a full-stop or comma misplaced. If you deleted the sentence I criticised in paragraph 14, I could perhaps give you satisfaction on a number of points.

Mr. FORNI (*France*) (Translation). — If Mr. Cermolacce thinks that paragraph 14 of my report is capable of being interpreted in a misleading way, I am prepared simply to delete it altogether, for in my view, I repeat, the interpretation you placed on it just now was wrong.

I would prefer to delete it altogether rather than cause any ambiguities. May I request the President to take formal note that paragraph 14 of my report, which is a personal report, is deleted?

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — You have unquestionably given me satisfaction on this point. In my speech I made a number of more important remarks than those concerning paragraph 14. It was in reply to the Rapporteur, who asked me whether there was any misplaced full-stop or comma. I demonstrated the contrary. But this text calls for other objections. Therefore, I maintain my intention to abstain.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Périquier.

Mr. PERIDIER (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, if you are going to propose a vote, I say no more. What I wanted to say at the stage we have now reached with the amendments that have been moved is that the only thing left to do is take a vote, and that's that. Mr. Cermolacce can do as he pleases; if he wants to vote in favour, let him vote in favour; if he wants to vote against, let him vote against; and if he wants to abstain, let him abstain.

Therefore all we have to do is take the vote.

If you will allow me, I should like to remind you — since it has not been done from the chair — that in the Committee on Rules of Procedure, as any of its members will tell you, the question raised on the presentation of reports and their discussion was whether they should reflect the Committee's opinion or simply the Rapporteur's. Now, we keep on discussing the report itself, although, I repeat, it only reflects the Rapporteur's personal opinion. This was the view taken in the Committee on Rules of Procedure.

The only thing that counts is the resolution or recommendation which has to reflect the Committee's opinion.

Consequently, although of course we can criticise the Rapporteur, when it comes to adopting the final decision, we should only consider the recommendation, which truly represents the opinion of the whole Committee.

I believe this needed saying, because ever since the session started, we have heard criticism of the reports and never a word about the resolution or recommendation, which is the only matter to be considered when it comes to the vote.

Mr. President, I move we now put the matter to the vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. FORNI (*France*) (Translation). — Because of the procedural debate, I have been unable to give a substantive answer to the three speakers from the floor. May I do so briefly.

I would say to the first speaker that I am delighted that the debates of the WEU Assembly

Mr. Forni (continued)

should at last have been given some publicity. Our Assembly is not a Grand Lodge for Freemasons or a gathering of the Mafia, according to the way they generally hold their meetings. We want our debates to be given a maximum of publicity. I am as glad as you are that yesterday's *Le Matin* should have featured a number of points in our report, especially as we gave a press conference on the subject at Bonn, in the presence of the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee and the President of the WEU Assembly. Consequently, I do not see how we can expect journalists to hold over to tomorrow information we already gave them some weeks ago at Bonn.

Mr. Roper made three main points. I mentioned WEU's abandonment of its economic activities following the United Kingdom entry into the Communities simply because the Council altered its procedure after Britain's accession, notably by discontinuing the "economic days" that used to follow immediately upon its regular "political days". Consequently, WEU did in fact give up a number of its economic prerogatives. That, of course, was what I was referring to in my report.

Secondly, you alluded to the United Kingdom's obligation to maintain a certain level of forces on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. I did in fact argue that this was a good thing, as giving much greater credibility to solidarity among the WEU countries. I still believe this to be an excellent thing for Europe as a whole.

On the third point you raised about fears regarding the new procedures that might be adopted for nominating parliamentarians to be sent to WEU, I rejoice that all shades of opinion can find expression in this Assembly — and especially communist opinions — which, as you would agree, is not the case in the North Atlantic Assembly where only one section of public opinion is represented by parliamentarians. I do not believe this is the proper way to proceed nor that we as parliamentarians go along with it.

The third speaker from the floor was my friend, Mr. Cermolacce. First he handed out bouquets, so to speak, and welcomed the report's constructive aims; and then he also expressed gratification at what he considered my very proper feelings of concern in writing the report. Let us just say that he began to part company with me upon the way I set about it.

Perhaps this is the right point for me to affirm that we are as much in favour of pluralism as you are, so that it is not for France nor any other country to sway in any way whatsoever other States' domestic policies. Mr. Périquier and

Mr. Dejardin have voiced our protest against General Haig's remarks concerning the accession to power of governments or parties of the left in European countries. We do not have to follow his suit. Therefore we respect the freedom of choice of the peoples of Europe and consider that, in the light of such freedom and pluralism at the European level, we ought to try and strengthen WEU's rôle, for, as I have said, I do not think there can be any economic or social Europe, or any real construction of Europe, without the rudiments of a European defence policy.

Lastly, let nobody imagine — it would really be a complete distortion of my meaning — I could possibly have in mind the slightest wish to see Europe reintegrated into the Atlantic system. The whole of my report says the precise opposite. If you carefully re-read what is said in its paragraphs, you would see that it is all based on Europe's present form of allegiance to the Atlantic system.

Give me credit for there being on this point no better European than myself and some others inside the French Socialist Party, no better Europeans than those who proclaim that we must at all costs endeavour to cut the towline between ourselves and the ship of atlanticism.

Lastly, on nuclear policy, I think things are clear and our statements on the subject unequivocal. I said that there could be no deterrence without control of it in a national framework, and no control and credibility of the deterrent in present circumstances except within national frontiers, which is tantamount to saying that, so far as France and the United Kingdom are concerned, there can be no deterrent force if it is integrated into other than a national framework.

Consequently, it is really idle and utopian to imagine that tomorrow this report, if acted upon, would enable any military force whatsoever to seize control of our nuclear armament.

One last point: what is stated in this report concerning harmonisation gives no grounds for anyone to infer a desire on my part to see an armaments build-up, at any rate by way of harmonisation. The exact contrary is intended.

The very fact that we wish for harmonisation in armaments means, of course, that we also wish for control of them. And I do not just say that in my report, since I also emphasise the problem of controlling armaments sales, which is for me fundamental to any future European policy. Such are our intentions. I hope, at all events, they are those of the majority in the Assembly of Western European Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now proceed to vote by roll-call on the draft recommendation in Document 756, as amended.

The President (continued)

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Calamandrei.

The voting is open.

(*Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair*)

(*A vote by roll-call was then taken*)

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	45
Ayes	23
Noes	1
Abstentions	21

The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted².

6. European security and African problems

(*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 754 and Amendments*)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on European security and African problems and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 754 and Amendments.

I call Mr. Müller, the Rapporteur, to take the rostrum.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, for a long time — many hundreds of years — Africa was, for Europe, a dark continent. We did not concern ourselves with it, although Africa, or at least the Mediterranean coast of Africa, was of very particular significance in antiquity, and a large part of European history, including the history of European culture, was influenced by Mediterranean Africa.

It was not until the last century that Africa came back into the ken of European politics. It is astonishing how little time has elapsed between the discovery of large parts of Africa and their present political importance. It is difficult to imagine that only 120 years have gone by since two British explorers first discovered and described Lake Victoria. Today, on the banks of that very lake, the State of Uganda and its President

unquestionably play a rôle — whatever one may think of this rôle — on the international political stage.

The colonial era of the nineteenth century also left its mark on the twentieth century, although it would be wrong to take too partial a view of the rôle of colonialism, seeing, for example, the fight against the slave trade as a mainspring of European colonial policy or as an opportunity for transplanting European civilisation to Africa. When in Tanzania two years ago, I was much impressed during a visit to the National Museum in Dar-es-Salaam by a very fair-minded presentation of the last phase of the nineteenth century, in which a European country's contribution to the development of Tanzania was shown in an astonishingly objective light. I think Europeans could on occasion learn something from this — in reverse as it were — in regard to the presentation of their own history.

Nevertheless, colonialism also had its negative sides, and they are still causing us problems. I raise the point because the States we have to deal with today have retained the former colonial boundaries. This has given rise to a host of problems, for example the fact that members of one tribe live in different countries and the common or administrative language for the same tribe may be English in one case and French in the other. The frontiers imposed by the colonial empires were carried over, together with their problems, into the present. The African States and the Organisation of African Unity nevertheless today proceed on the principle that the colonial frontiers should be retained because anything else could only lead to fresh conflicts. Later on I shall be referring to one or two conflicts which are the result of this historical situation and have a very adverse impact today.

When we consider African politics and the relations between Europe and Africa today, this European colonial heritage is still apparent, but on an entirely different level. First of all, Europe has very close economic links with Africa. Africa is the closest continent to Europe, and the links between Europe and Africa in the economic field are of enormous importance for both sides. Africa supplies a large part of the raw materials that are particularly important for the industries of Western Europe, while Western Europe supplies a large part of the goods and machines which Africa needs for its development, especially its economic development.

Above all, Europe gives Africa development aid, and — much more important than money — it also provides advice and assistance. I might describe it as a case of two interlocking sets of interests. The debates on our policy on raw materials have shown us that, while the primary producing countries depend on their exports, the industrial nations depend on imports, and neither

1. See page 27.

2. See page 29.

Mr. Müller (continued)

side can do without the other. In the last report, each side depends on the other, and on occasion they must assume certain burdens jointly.

However, Europe is also looking at Africa in connection with its own security. By this I mean not only security for Europe's supplies of raw materials, which I have already mentioned, but also its military security. In the interests of our security in Western Europe the African continent must not be allowed to fall into the hands of a power hostile to Western Europe. We see today a whole series of conflicts in Africa that seem likely, because of foreign intervention, to have direct repercussions on European security. Let me list one or two of these conflicts, with no pretensions at completeness. There is the present situation in North-West Africa — the conflict between Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania over the former Spanish Sahara. There is the conflict between Libya and Chad over the Tibesti region. In the east there is the bitter conflict that has flared up currently between Ethiopia and Somalia, or the West Somalia Liberation Front. Here there is a danger of other States being drawn in, because the problem of certain tribal minorities affects not only relations between Ethiopia and Somalia but equally relations between Kenya and Somalia — to give but one more example. There was the great conflict in Nigeria, comparable with a civil war, and the conflict in the Congo over the Shaba Province, which has only recently been brought to an end. There are, above all, the sharp conflicts consequent upon decolonisation of the former Portuguese colonies, conflicts which have led to the most massive foreign intervention so far seen in Africa, namely in Angola where, although the civil war is officially over, there are still more than 20,000 foreign troops from another continent, in this case from the Americas — from Cuba to be precise. This is one of the largest concentrations of military forces anywhere on African soil. The latest information indicates that something similar is happening in the case of Ethiopia and Somalia, albeit so far on nothing like the same scale.

Another problem in Africa is that of the States at the southern extremity of the continent, a problem that affects us all in a multitude of ways. There is first of all the problem of Rhodesia, a former British colony that declared itself independent, and tried to become absolutely independent, and is now trying to put an end to this colonial status. I have explained my position on the Rhodesian problem in great detail but there is always some new development. As to the latest events, I would only express my conviction that, however clear we may be about the need for independence and a democratic government in Rhodesia, we should not attempt to rush things through overnight, because I am still

hopeful — and the recent past lends support to this view — that a rational solution can after all be reached and that the principle of one man one vote, whatever the colour of his skin, will be recognised. This could lead to a democratic solution. There have in the last few days been optimistic statements from leaders of the black majority in Rhodesia, like Mr. Sithole, Bishop Muzorewa and Chief Chirau, which have again given us some hope. There is the problem of the former German colony of South-West Africa, under the administration of the Union of South Africa since 1918, which we today call Namibia. We hope that it will be possible to settle the question of Namibian independence, too, in a peaceful and reasonable manner. Finally, there is the great problem of South Africa, which is causing us much concern because of the policy of apartheid.

Looking at Africa, in particular the problem of South Africa, from the point of view of human rights, we should not, however critical we may be, take too one-sided a view. Let me give you an example to show that there are still differences on the continent of Africa. We all know that a leader of the African majority in South Africa lost his life in prison in an extremely dramatic manner, which is still not entirely clear. But it is interesting to note the difference between South Africa and, say, Uganda. In South Africa such a case can be investigated, the matter can even be taken up in government circles, and there is an endeavour to ensure that such illegal acts cannot recur. I would be happy if what is happening in South Africa in this connection were possible in Uganda or many other African States.

I would like to add one remark on the conflict within South Africa about the problem of apartheid. A little while ago I heard some very harsh words about South Africa from a colleague who does not share my political views — a communist. He said it was a problem of capitalism, exploitation, etc. In my opinion, it is precisely the South African example that shows that one cannot approach these problems using the simplistic theory of the class struggle. The largest trust in South Africa, one of the biggest companies in the world, headed by Mr. Oppenheimer, is a leading opponent of apartheid. Oppenheimer's strongest opponent is the white miners' union, which attacks the capitalist Oppenheimer who is fighting apartheid. We see here that the problem cannot be approached with the standard set of concepts: it has to be seen from other angles — above all, in my opinion, from the point of view of general respect for human rights.

Let me very briefly summarise once again the most important points in my report and the explanatory memorandum. I would stress first

Mr. Müller (continued)

of all that Africa is of great importance for us in Europe. Its importance can have both positive and negative effects. Europe must interest itself in Africa's being able to develop in freedom and independence, without foreign intervention or domination. We in Western Europe, who founded the tradition of human rights, must also be concerned about and struggle to ensure respect for human rights everywhere — not, let me stress once again, only in this or that particular country, but in every country.

We in Europe, who took on a certain burden of guilt during the colonial period, must help the peoples of Africa to come to grips with their own problems and to find solutions to them. The north-south dialogue, whose rôle is so important today, should be developed, with special regard to European-African relations, for the benefit of Europeans and Africans alike. I have pointed out, too, that the Lomé Convention, for example, is a very promising starting-point for such a joint endeavour.

Furthermore, Europe must look to its own security and see that there is no intervention by other States in Africa which might build up a military potential that could be directed against Europe.

Let me at this point make one remark on the arms trade. I believe that it is one of the great sins of the developed countries of the world — a sin for which the less-developed countries must of course also share responsibility — that a large part of the national product of the less-developed countries is spent on armaments and is thus not available for those countries' economic development. I do not want to get into an argument: but here too, primitive ideas of red and black, black and white, right and left, must be avoided. However, if we look at the list of arms sales and see who is supplying weapons to Africa, we get very surprising results. First place goes to the Soviet Union, with the United States close behind and a few other countries following. I believe that we in Europe should use our influence to ensure that the arms trade with Africa is cut back rather than stepped up. Let me stress once again that this should apply to *all* African States, to avoid the possibility of a one-sided view developing in that field as well.

One further point in conclusion: independence, freedom of the African countries and respect for human rights must be our goal. It is in the best interests of Europe for African States to be able to solve their own problems freely and independently without outside intervention and, if I may put it in these terms, without being an instrument of world politics. We in Western Europe, who are also occasionally and in different connections drawn into the maelstrom of world politics, must

have a major interest in African problems being solved by free, independent States in Africa.

One last word of advice, Mr. President; it seems to me that in the past we, in Western European Union as elsewhere, have looked rather too little towards the south, towards the African continent. For Western European Union must look more attentively at Africa too, and above all must make sure that in their policy towards Africa the member countries of Western European Union achieve yet closer consultation, yet closer co-operation. Thank you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Müller.

There are thirteen names on the list of speakers. Some of them ask for ten minutes, some for eight minutes and some for five minutes. In view of the desire expressed by various members to be allowed to speak for five minutes, may we agree on this length of speaking time? I hope that we can keep to it.

The first speaker is Mr. Page.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). — I have had more than two days in preparing my speech, so that to reduce it now from one hour to five minutes is difficult, but I shall do my best.

We must all be grateful to our colleague Mr. Müller for his courageous speech and for his objective and informed report. I must say that I prefer the report to the recommendations, because I feel that in so many of the recommendations there appears to be the politicians' greatest vice of adopting double standards in making judgments.

I had the opportunity of visiting Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa in August, and perhaps I may refer to those countries. The wind of change in Africa has changed direction. It was blowing strongly from the East. I believe that there is now the beginning of a zephyr from the West. If we in the western countries can keep our nerve and remember the words and advice of General Haig this morning, I hope that in Namibia and Rhodesia in the next two years we may find black-controlled, pro-western responsible practical governments. There is hope of this in Rhodesia because at the election in August Mr. Smith was given a blank cheque by the vast majority of white Rhodesians and by a small group of black Rhodesians to negotiate a new constitution based on universal franchise. I refer to universal franchise because one man, one vote has often resulted in one man, one vote only once. I believe that the British-American initiative proved useful but impracticable.

I think that the internal solution being sought by Mr. Smith and his government should be encouraged by all of us. If an arrangement can be reached between Bishop Muzorewa, the Rev.

Mr. Page (continued)

Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief Chirau, they will carry with them at least 80 % of the black Rhodesians, and if a successful negotiation for a constitution is reached I hope that this will be accepted both by the western powers and by the United Nations, however loudly the so-called front-line presidents call "foul" and ask for a penalty.

In Namibia there are many similarities to Rhodesia, but I hope that during the coming year we shall see elections based on universal suffrage under United Nations supervision. Discussions on this were called by Judge Steyn, the Administrator-General, in September this year. There are likely to be two groupings between SWAPO on the one side and the Turnhalle Political Alliance on the other side. SWAPO members are likely to try to delay the elections because of the split in their external wing, where, sadly, a thousand liberators have been put in a prison camp in Zambia by the rest of the SWAPO chiefs and Andreas Shepanga and five others are in prison in Tanzania. Who will liberate the liberators?

There has been a great deal of liberalisation of policies over the last three years in South Africa which has received little recognition, but if we do not take care we shall drive the South Africans into a laager mentality.

I found on the dressing table of my hotel a policy for southern Africa — *Ne criez pas "Au feu" : gardez votre sang-froid*. If we do not panic, we shall perhaps save Africa.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Whitehead. He will be followed by Mr. Banks and Mr. Cer-molacce.

Mr. WHITEHEAD (*United Kingdom*). — I congratulate the Rapporteur, Mr. Müller, because he has produced a useful report based on much thought and first-hand experience. I particularly welcome what he said about his experiences in Tanzania, a country which is trying to take a peaceful road to development between the various ideologies of the world and which is often written off or categorised as being yet another place where democracy has been crushed underfoot, as has happened elsewhere in Africa.

I should like not to speak to the amendments in my name and the names of my colleagues, because I can say only a sentence or two in general about why we need them, but to mention one or two omissions from or errors in the report. They are not matters which lead me to quarrel with its totality; they relate only to points of detail.

It is perhaps a pity that there was not time to bring the report up to date on the question of Rhodesia and Zambia and, in particular, on some

of the historical errors which have cropped up — for example, the length of time during which the Patriotic Front of Zanu and Zapu have been fighting and where their headquarters are situated, which is not in Tanzania.

I should have liked to see mention of the latest initiatives and the way in which we should regard them, bearing in mind the tactics which Mr. Smith's régime appears to be following. This would be described in American terminology as the "Mutt and Jeff" technique whereby one alternately hits one's opponent over the head and offers him a cigarette. Hitting him over the head consists of raids into the territory of Mozambique which have been roundly condemned today by the British Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen. We are told that 1,200 people have been killed, many of them dependents of those in the guerrilla camps and possibly innocent civilians as well as fighters with Mr. Mugabe's guerrilla army.

The softening-up process is to offer one man, one vote to those leaders in the country. We should look somewhat sceptically at Mr. Smith's proposals in the light of his record over the past twelve years since his unilateral declaration of independence.

I should have liked to say more about the question of the supply of arms to Ethiopia and Somalia, and particularly the extent to which the Soviet Union and Cuba have become involved on the side of Ethiopia in the fighting going on around Harar and Diredawa.

There is no doubt that it is escalating into a conflict which may involve the whole of that corner of the African continent, where the Soviet Union is following the extremely foolish policy of supplying arms on an unlimited scale to the present unstable and unbalanced régime in Addis Ababa. We should say more about that matter, and this is why one of the draft recommendations suggested in the amendments of my colleagues and myself attempts to widen our condemnation of the extent of the arms traffic to all parts of Africa.

Paragraph 25 of the report, which refers to many of the atrocities, is probably mistakenly placed where it is because it comes as a preamble to a discussion of South Africa and provides an excuse for such people as Mr. John Page, who says, "Look at what is going on in Uganda and other countries. Surely that means that we must go easy on the South Africans." It means no such thing. The appalling régime in Uganda and in other countries today, such as the so-called Emperor Bokassa I and others who disfigure humanity with the cruelty of their various régimes, cannot be used as an excuse for condoning or going easy on the South African Government. My colleagues and myself would

Mr. Whitehead (continued)

prefer to say that we should strengthen the report in its call for tougher sanctions and tougher language towards South Africa but that simultaneously we should condemn the despotic régimes elsewhere in Africa — black African régimes — which have come into existence in the post-colonial period.

That is the purpose of the amendments that we shall be moving. I should like to say, because I have probably exhausted my five minutes already, that where, in one of the amendments standing in my name, we talk about the white majority régime in South Africa, we are really talking about the white minority régime. That was a typist's error and a slip which I regret. I hope that Representatives will know to whom we are referring when we speak of the "white majority régime" in South Africa.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Whitehead.

I call Mr. Banks.

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. Müller has tackled a subject that is both wide and complex. I congratulate him on the way he has set out such a wide approach in his report. Inevitably, a report dealing with the whole of the African continent in nine pages will omit some subjects and deal in only a limited way with some others. There is no mention of Uganda. Mr. Whitehead has already referred in positive terms to the situation in that country and I share his feelings about it.

Africa is a continent of hostilities. We see the problems of Ethiopia and Somalia. The report mentions the problems of Chad. Then there is the problem of Angola and the problem which arises between Angola and Zaire and also that of Mozambique and Rhodesia.

Above all, it stems from Russian influence and arms supplies, and it is a real threat to western trade and security. In all, democratic and economic progress is eclipsed by struggles for power or territory. Development of the various peoples in Africa since the change from the colonial system to independence has, by the speed of the transfer, taken people backwards. Poverty, fear and misery have not been eradicated. Economic progress has not advanced as it should have done, and hunger is still a huge problem.

Independence has not, I maintain, broadly speaking, enriched the peoples. Ethnic groups have lost in some cases their protection — as in the case of Angola, for instance. President Amin of Uganda rules that country as a merciless tyrant.

There is surely a lesson here. The question that we in the West must ask is: are we ignoring

that lesson? That lesson is that we must evolve civilisations and democracies and avoid rapid, ill-prepared change.

The recommendations deal with South Africa in a way which no other country is subjected to. There is no condemnation of Russia for her interference or of Uganda for the loss of human rights and independence there. These, surely, are double standards, and I want to see the record put into balance.

I hate apartheid as much as do any of my countrymen. I am appalled by the circumstances of Mr. Biko's death in detention. I believe that the Minister for Justice, Mr. Kruger, should have resigned before now. It is necessary that he be replaced so that conditions in the prisons are corrected and the situation which has come to light as a result of Biko's death is put right.

I share the feelings that people have towards South Africa and the abhorrence of apartheid, but I do not feel that sanctions and trade embargoes against the South African Government will achieve a set of new policies or benefit the black people for whom we must have the greatest regard. Our task must be to convince the government of the need to evolve a system of power-sharing.

I should like to put forward four points. First, I believe that the South African Government should erode and finally remove petty apartheid. I refer to the marriage laws, the segregation laws governing where black, coloured, white and Indian people go, and so on.

Secondly, there should be a step-by-step reduction in job reservations.

Thirdly, a separate black government should be included in the new constitutional proposals which give separate parliaments to the whites, the Indians and the coloureds. Such a black government could recognise the homeland governments in a federal-type system, but it should also recognise the urban blacks. That is the important point.

Fourthly, urban communities should have elected representatives. Above all, the blacks should have freedom of expression.

South Africa is a strong, well-equipped country. It has enormous potential if it will develop a new internal strategy. It has enormous potential for the black population, the coloured population and the Indian population.

It is South Africa's interest to stand against communism. It is Europe's vital interest to prevent the swing in favour of the forces of communism denying essential minerals to us and threatening the stability of the continent. European investment is essential to a stable African country. Aid and loans are not the long-term

Mr. Banks (continued)

answer. It is investment backed by the will and the military standing of Europe which will ensure peace and prosperity. One without the other is today unworkable in a continent that is restless and destructive.

Our security rests on preventing the spread of communism. Violence will propagate itself if ignored. We ignore events in Africa at our peril. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you Mr. Banks.

I call Mr. Cermolacce. He will be followed by Mr. Hardy and by Mr. Hawkins.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the liberation of the African continent has been going on for just over one decade.

Today it is, together with the Sahrawi people, mainly the peoples of Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa who are fighting to achieve independence and human dignity.

The report before us is significant of the way in which matters have evolved on the African continent. The central question that now arises is how to maintain the power and the interests of the big multinational companies in the new conditions of the world today. What is vital for the big capitalists is to continue in suitably-adapted forms their looting of the African continent.

It is significant that the report's proposals are essentially aimed at arranging things : apartheid; the racist domination of Ian Smith ; the part played by the big companies in the African economy and the looting of its resources. The other aim is to cover up the responsibility of the capitalist European powers for the political, military and economic support they give to the racist South African régime.

Africa is, in fact, that region of the world in which large-scale clashes are occurring between the peoples fighting for their freedom, dignity and national sovereignty on the one hand, and the imperialist systems of social and racial oppression on the other.

Succoured and encouraged, the racialists in Salisbury are plunging headlong into escalation of the war and multiplying their acts of aggression against Mozambique, Zambia and Namibia, which was used as a base for aggression against Angola, attempting to disrupt these countries' economies. The racist Rhodesian raid a few days ago into Mozambique, causing extremely heavy casualties and striking down women and children indiscriminately, is a heavy threat to a peace that is already precarious. We may search in vain throughout this report for any word of con-

demnation, other than a formal one, of such attacks on the peoples' right of self-determination.

The truth is that the savage obstinacy of the Smiths and the Vorsters is only made possible by the overt or covert complicity of the French, British, German and American Governments. The continued existence in Southern Africa of régimes practising racial and social oppression weighs heavily on the future of this region and of Africa as a whole.

It is, on the contrary, essential that we should vigorously condemn the fascist régimes of Pretoria and Salisbury, and implement the United Nations resolutions concerning them. It is essential that every State should desist from any nuclear and military co-operation with such régimes and from lending them any economic and financial support. It is also essential that we should support the legitimate claims of the peoples engaged in the struggle for these countries and their representative organisations.

Now, on the pretext of the strategic and economic value which Africa is alleged to have for Europe, a notion that perniciously echoes the concept of Eurafrika, the countries of Western Europe are called upon to increase their commitments in various forms on the African continent.

They are called upon to co-ordinate and concert such activities, including those in the military sphere. To act in this way is to turn our backs on realities, and on the African countries' will for peace and co-operation. They by no means allow their determination to achieve sovereignty to get in the way of further wide-scale co-operation on a basis of mutual aid. They are deeply engaged in the process of establishing fairer and more stable relations among nations, that is, a new international economic order.

That is the way to the future — relations founded on non-interference and democratically organised between one State and another, to the exclusion of any form of neo-colonialist pressure.

We are compelled to note that the report presented points in quite the opposite direction, calling for new forms of intervention in other peoples' affairs and a commitment to subdivision of the African continent. This is a danger to peace and to the future of mutually-beneficial co-operation.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — As Mr. Müller has shown us in his speech, Africa justifies our concern because it is our neighbour. I have visited several African countries this year. Mr. Page mentioned that the western zephyrs might be creating a change in the political climate in South Africa. If these fresh winds blow the injustices into the face of black Africa,

Mr. Hardy (continued)

it will cause us embarrassment, our fortunes will wane and our influence will diminish.

Mr. Cermolacce referred to the Rhodesian general elections. We ought to bear in mind that the total national electorate there may be smaller than in our individual constituencies in Britain, and few of us would see our constituents as providing a mandate for the sort of massive slaughter we have seen in Mozambique in the last few days.

The report is not entirely clear or accurate in regard to the Rhodesian position. United Kingdom policy has sought to ensure that legitimate independence achieved in 1978 is based on full adult suffrage. That has been made clear repeatedly in recent months and is in complete accord with the intention underlying the report, in pursuit of a sane Africa and a peaceful world.

Paragraph 27 says that the United Kingdom's proposals for Zimbabwe have not been published. Following the most vigorous initiatives this year, these proposals were published on 1st September. I suggest that enough time has been provided to allow for corrections to have been made.

That is not the only inaccuracy as far as Zimbabwe is concerned. The Patriotic Front is relatively new. The Rhodesian army cannot have been in conflict with that organisation for some years, as is said in paragraph 26. Nor is the headquarters of the Patriotic Front in Tanzania, as is suggested in paragraph 29. The section on Rhodesia provides inadequate emphasis of the general and helpful western support for the Anglo-United States initiatives to secure a democratic Rhodesia.

I hope that these comments are not seen as carping, but in a report as important as this accuracy is essential.

The report surely could have better emphasised that the United Kingdom and other members of the Security Council are much in favour of democratic change in Namibia and equally support the present endeavours to achieve change in accordance with Security Council Resolution 385.

As regards South Africa, perhaps we should comment that the huge and terrifying contempt for human rights which exists there is not simply a legacy of colonialism, as seems to be hinted in the report. Apartheid has severely compounded the inequitable inheritance of colonialism. It creates the complex tensions which are perhaps the gravest danger that the world faces today. It is the case that western countries subscribed to policies of economic links partly to promote changes towards decency in South Africa. However, attention has increasingly to be given to

the alternative approaches, as with the arms embargo, but as far as recommendations 3 and 4 are concerned, one should view these with hesitation since relevant studies are already taking place. Duplication is not always desirable except, perhaps, as a contribution to reducing unemployment.

There must be continuing anxiety about southern Africa in that there may be a danger that there will be consolidation of the fortresses of hate which can be constructed by the laager mentality. There is danger especially if there is a prospect of the laager being the source of holocaust. We should not accept racist blackmail even if expressed in nuclear terms, but we ought not to be blind to the risk. For that reason, our efforts and initiatives so far as South Africa is concerned need to be politically sensitive.

One aspect of the report which, I believe, deserves considerable applause is the implication that the OAU should be encouraged in its efforts to resolve difficulties in Africa, as with the Chad dispute. I believe that the rôle of the OAU must be sustained by Western Europe.

In conclusion, the principal weakness of the report is that it does not seem sufficiently to stress the fact that 1977 will be seen to be a very important year in the history of Afro-Western European relationships. If one looks at the various declarations — in Maputo and in Lagos, and the Belgian *démarche* in Pretoria — all these show that this year has been a significant year. I hope that 1978 will allow us to build upon it.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

I call Mr. Hawkins.

Mr. HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). — I am unfortunate in that, unlike my colleagues, I have not had the opportunity of touring Africa. I do not speak with any great certainty on these matters. In fact, I do not believe that a brief visit to any of those countries can endow one with great knowledge. However, I congratulate Mr. Müller on his comprehensive report. It is absolutely first class. We can all pick holes in one part or another of it, but the report does credit to Mr. Müller and to our organisation.

It is a great tragedy that world powers have decided to fight it out on African soil. It is a tragedy for people about whom we do not think enough — the African natives themselves, those who want to live in peace, those who want to fill their bellies before anything else. When people are down and out, this is always the first thing they think of, as I myself know perfectly well.

All European bodies ought to endeavour to prevent outside forces from stirring up one African country against another, such as the present tragedy in the Horn of Africa, where

Mr. Hawkins (continued)

Soviet forces on both sides have destroyed hundreds or thousands of people on each side. These forces can bring incalculable harm to Africa. This is a point to be borne in mind. We in the West — particularly the United States of America — were greatly at fault in not stopping the build-up by Cuba in Angola. The influence of those forces has now spread across to the Horn of Africa, where they will cause more trouble.

There is some hope in the fact that Africans are a race of great and courageous men. I would instance President Sadat of Egypt. His recent initiative as an African has filled us all with hope.

I shall now say something more controversial. I believe that Prime Minister Smith is most courageous and statesmanlike. He has, with great difficulty, fought out the situation in Rhodesia for twelve years as premier of that country. He has had every organisation of the civilised countries against him. I believe, however, that the average man in the street in Britain praises him for his forthrightness and courage in standing up for what he believes — namely, that the white and the black in Rhodesia should live side by side, because the black has a far better time there than in many of his neighbouring countries — and believes that Mr. Smith will gradually bring them to peace and prosperity, and that that country can contribute to the forces of good in Africa.

I am absolutely appalled at Mr. Boucheny's amendments. As for Mr. Cermolacce's speech, I can only say that I am sorry that he should see matters through coloured spectacles.

We must all do our best to try to allow Africa to settle her own problems, to keep out foreign forces from African soil and, as my colleague has just said, to let the OAU do far more in trying to settle the problems of Africa without all of us interfering. I believe that we must also give Mr. Smith a chance to try to settle his own affairs, if humanly possible. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Hawkins.

I call Mr. Minnocci. He will be followed by Mrs. Knight.

Mr. MINNOCCI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it has often, quite rightly, been said that ends are a mockery, unless adequate means of achieving them are indicated too. A carping critic might also apply the saying, not without reason in my opinion, to the draft recommendation and report on European security and African problems, now tabled before us, for which I think the Rap-

porteur, Mr. Müller, deserves a hearty vote of thanks and congratulation.

No doubt the objectives outlined in them are worthy of complete and unreserved support. But is it really feasible for Western Europe to aspire to such an overall and organic African policy as that recommended, without Community-wide integration of Europe undergoing a genuine qualitative mutation to full political union which, it is to be hoped, will effectively be set in motion by the coming elections to the European Parliament?

I think the answer to this question is bound to be: No.

It is an elementary fact of political science, one that springs immediately to the eye from a study of international relations, in the present as in the past, that only great powers of the dimensions of the United States or the Soviet Union have world-wide interests; medium-sized powers have what are called in English "regional" interests, i.e. limited to their own continent or geopolitical area in general, while smaller States have international interests strictly confined to immediately surrounding zones, and marginal elsewhere.

Our States which, notwithstanding the EEC and their sizable economic importance on world markets, do not as yet form a political unit, fall somewhat into the second and third of the categories listed; no wonder then that our report should say in its last chapter: "Western Europe's policy in Africa", that our States do not have a meaningful policy in the dark continent but only maintain specific relations with a specific African State or group of States without pursuing any organic and steadfastly sought-after grand design. This is a euphemism and needs to be clarified and spelt out to show not only the lack of any political planning and any idea of promoting and furthering the African peoples' economic and social progress, but also the support given to the most undefendable régimes; a cynical traffic in arms; economic exploitation of a neo-colonialist type, still much in evidence; lack of interest in, and indifference to intolerable situations, fraught with the menace of serious perils in a not too distant future, like the one in southern Africa.

All these can be symbolised by one glaring fact culled from the history of the last few years: if in the end Portuguese colonialism has been eliminated in Africa, the credit for this goes to the Portuguese themselves, who successfully threw off the dictatorship under which they had groaned for half a century, and reinstated a democratic régime. The same is true of the liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique, and certainly not of the Western European countries nor the Community institutions, which behind their lip-service always maintained the best of relations, economic and political, with

Mr. Minnoci (continued)

Salazar and his régime — as they did in the case of Franco and the Greek colonels.

Practically simultaneously with our own meeting, there is being held here in Paris the thirty-first round-table conference of the Association for the Study of European Problems, devoted to the theme of enlargement of the Community. Maurice Guernier presented to it a paper entitled "From the European Community to the Greater Euro-African Community", which could well be added to our reference documents.

The author of the paper refers to the Arab countries, but what he had to say applied to Africa as a whole. On the one hand, he says, Europe has raw material and energy requirements; on the other, the Africans need Europe's technology and capital — with the exception, for capital, of the oil-producing countries which will, incidentally, in a few decades exhaust their own reserves of that important source of wealth.

Guernier concludes that there is here a great opportunity, a great mission for Europe to carry out in Africa both in its own interests and in those of the African peoples. This could mark the advent of a European world leadership as a possible alternative to the American and Soviet monopoly: an influence, I would add, which tomorrow could extend to Latin America and Asia as well. It means working for the economic, political and democratic development of these countries and at the same time laying a firmer foundation for the security of our own supplies.

For such a leading rôle — it is a point Guernier possibly fails to see — the important and decisive factor is, much more even than economic and technological aid, the capital function of setting an example: a politically-unioned Europe in a new supranational entity will be a model and decisive stimulus for the emergence of, or rather a renewal of, vigour and strength for, in Africa and, as I was saying, in due course, in Latin America and Asia, the "emulative effect" of the European Common Market in its initial stage — lost later on through the gradual atrophy of its original impetus, or seeming impetus, towards more ambitious goals of political integration.

I mean that, in this way a fresh boost would be given to the trend towards the creation on the European model of large subcontinental unions — e.g. to stick to Guernier's proposal, the Arab community — constituting for such countries and their peoples, no less than for the Europeans, the only means of averting the two-fold threat of economic underdevelopment and political dependence inevitably linked to the current disunion that is often in Africa a hand-over from the colonial epoch, which has largely

handed on the frontiers drawn at that time in the most arbitrary manner and on the basis of the interests and power-relations of the occupying European powers, instead of on a pattern of distribution corresponding to indigenous requirements, be they geographical, economic, political or ethnic.

So now, a policy such as I have adumbrated or Guernier recommends, or what is suggested in the report we are considering, cannot get off the ground unless Europe becomes at least a regional power in the sense of the term I quoted earlier, unless, that is, it turns into a political community in which external relations, especially with black Africa, are in the limiting case the sole responsibility of the community authority in a plainly supranational context.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Minnoci.

I call Mrs. Knight. She will be followed by Mr. Bagier and Mr. Stoffelen.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). — Although I am not altogether happy about all the recommendations, I should like to congratulate Mr. Müller on a good and balanced report. Balance has been sadly lacking in debates on South Africa and Rhodesia. I hold no brief whatever for racism, but I hold a brief for fairness, balance and justice. I believe that it is the duty of this union, to which we all belong, to hold that same balance.

Mr. Müller was right to point to other parts of the African continent where less than justice obtains, but he did it rather sparingly. It was done so sparingly that I am not surprised that one of my colleagues had not noticed that reference was made to Uganda. The report speaks merely of despotism in Uganda. In my mild and temperate but, I hope, truthful way, I should say that there is a Hitlerite tyrant in charge there whose hands drip with the blood of thousands of people that he has murdered and whose gaols are full of thousands of others who are there without trial and with very little hope of release.

Is there one man, one vote in all other parts of the African continent? If not, why do we single out only two parts for our condemnation? Is it less injustice when it occurs between black and black than when it occurs between white and black or black and white? To me, and I think it should be to all of us, injustice is injustice wherever it may be found. We should fight it wherever it is.

I went to South Africa, at my own expense, to see for myself the circumstances of the black man there. I travelled round that country for three weeks. I found, to my amazement, that some of the black miners earned more money than British members of parliament. Whether

Mrs. Knight (continued)

that is a matter to be taken up with our Fees Office or with Western European Union, I do not know.

The point is that it is not necessarily true that the black South African has such a terribly bad deal. Indeed, if he has, it is astonishing to me — bearing in mind that he is encircled by other black African countries — that he does not simply walk over the border to find some other country where better conditions obtain. There is no wall around South Africa.

We ought to remind ourselves that there are great dangers inherent in some of the plans which we have for both Rhodesia and South Africa. I talked particularly to the Indian group in South Africa, and their leaders expressed the fear that world public opinion would force changes in South Africa which would mean the deaths of thousands of Indians living there who would immediately be attacked, as, of course, would be the Mashona by the Matabele in Rhodesia. Before we are so pious about one man, one vote, it ought to be said that we are here to defend not only the votes but also the lives of the black people for whom we dare to speak.

It is true to say that the situation in Rhodesia is better than that in South Africa. I have visited both countries. It certainly cannot be expected by any reasonable person that terrorist forces can be integrated into future Rhodesian forces any more than the IRA would be accepted into the British army as fellow soldiers.

In paragraph 39 of the report it is stated that there is little doubt that South Africa would use every means available to ensure its security. Need we attack it for that? Surely every country has a duty to guard its security.

I am very much against the amendments. I will not, however, discuss them, because others have referred to them. I plead for balance and fairness and for a wide view to be taken.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Bagier.

Mr. BAGIER (*United Kingdom*). — I, too, offer my congratulations to Mr. Müller on his report, if for no other reason than that it gives us an opportunity to discuss Africa. In five minutes, the only thing one can do is confine one's remarks to one particular part, and I shall confine mine to paragraphs 43 and 44 of the report where, quite rightly, Mr. Müller refers to a statement by Mr. Young in which he "did not hesitate to warn the African countries against a policy of over-radical sanctions against South Africa, which — he said — might kill rather than cure the patient". If there is one thing that will unite every delegate in this Assembly, it will

be the thought that we do not want to kill the patient. There is no doubt about that at all.

What worries us is contained in the next paragraph, which talks of our concern about, amongst other things, Namibia and Rhodesia and the transformation of "its internal régime by giving equal treatment to blacks and whites". That is basic and paramount to the main and specific difficulties which South Africa is experiencing.

Paragraph 37 of the report states that South Africa is pursuing an increasingly repressive policy which cannot but lead to increased tension. I do not think it is possible for the present régime's policy to lead in any other direction. Mr. Vorster has said without equivocation that no black, no Asian and no coloured will serve in his government. In a nation in which there are 4.3 million whites as opposed to 22 million blacks, this is a policy which is bound to be doomed to disaster.

In pursuing a policy of separatism, based as it is on the Bantustans and laying down as it does that everybody who is a Xhosa will live in the Transkei, that everyone who is a Zulu will live in Kwazululand and that this is the only way in which they can have their rights, South Africa is bound to fail because the one problem to which Mr. Vorster's government has found no answer is that of the urban black.

When I visited Johannesburg and saw the million and a half blacks in the township of Soweto who had no rights at all, not even to own land, not even to bring most of their families to live with them, I realised that this was a danger point on the outskirts of the city which was bound to explode, as, indeed, it has done. We all believe that this ought to be realised by the South African Government. Whatever pressures we can bring to bear ought to be brought to bear.

I am not sure that complete economic sanctions are the answer. I do not believe that that is a practical solution. The arms ban is one to which every member nation here subscribes, and rightly, but I believe that those who have business interests in South Africa could in combination utilise their influence on the government of the day to convince it that, even at this late stage, it should step back from a policy which lays down for all time that blacks, coloureds and Asians are a separate nation from the white people there.

Each of us has people there of our own colour. I think we can use our influence. It is very sad that it is not only the original white settlers who are pursuing this policy so vigorously but also the ordinary white railwaymen and miners who have gone out to that country and enjoyed the fruits of life there with their black servants and so on, and who underwrite the policy of apartheid.

Mr. Bagier (continued)

If nothing else, I hope that this debate will convince Mr. Vorster that the policy he is pursuing is wrong and that it is time he took steps to put it right. It is time he understood that the Asians, to whom Mrs. Knight so eloquently referred, are highly intelligent people with their own university and a great deal of culture but with no basic civil rights as far as the national government of the country is concerned. They resent this, as, indeed, do the coloureds in Cape Province who have the same sort of background and culture and who are a living example of the fact that apartheid does not work and that there can be, and is, a mixture of the two peoples.

I hope, therefore, that this debate will tell Mr. Vorster that there is a combination of nations here which believes that he is pursuing the wrong policy. We do not want to kill his country. We want to see a peaceful transition, to see a gradual changing of power, responsibility, votes and the like. We do not want to cause trouble, but we very much want him to change direction.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — First of all, Mr. President, I would like to compliment Mr. Müller on his report.

I feel that I must make one or two comments in this debate, especially about South Africa, because the Dutch have a special relationship with the people of South Africa. But also because the Republic of South Africa has pretensions to being a Christian bastion in Black Africa. South Africa is also regarded as a military bastion; but what is the true situation?

The black population of South Africa is enslaved, it is used — often abused — as a workforce that has to work for starvation wages. Its leaders are persecuted, proscribed and thrown into prison. The lucky ones survive. Nelson Mandela and Robert Sobukwe are on Seal Island. Winnie Mandela is under house arrest. Protesting schoolchildren are shot. The Christian Institute has had its work made impossible. Dr. Beyers Naudé, a man who has always been a champion of peace and justice, is in prison. The press is curbed and muzzled. All protest is smothered — sometimes literally. The tears are falling again in Johannesburg. Alan Paton could write another book about it.

Then there is the picture of the Republic of South Africa as a bastion of western civilisation, and a military bulwark. The truth is just the opposite. South Africa is a danger to peace, and a threat to the West as long as the policy and practice of apartheid continue there and the concepts of majority rule and fundamental rights

and liberties are not honoured and applied. The credibility of the West will be gauged by our attitude to apartheid and the situation in South Africa. There must be no hesitation, no half-heartedness in condemning apartheid nor in combating it and in applying military boycotts and economic sanctions.

Let there be no doubt that I am well aware that human rights are violated, and hideous terror reigns, in other African countries as well. We must, naturally, strongly condemn this too; but South Africa claims to be defending western civilisation, and yet the curtailing of human rights, and apartheid, are government policy in South Africa. This must be protested against forcefully, and without mincing words. This must be fought against, with the weapons embargo and economic sanctions.

This is why I hope that many if not all members will vote for the amendments proposed by Phillip Whitehead and others, if only to prove that Western European Union is not a machine built for war, but an instrument for peace.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. van Hulst, to be followed by Mr. Antoni and by Sir Frederic Bennett.

Mr. van HULST (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — It is a well known fact, Mr. President, that the Dutch language is scarcely spoken outside the Netherlands. Yet it would, I believe, be going too far to say that outside the Netherlands people do not understand one single word of Dutch. Because there is one Dutch word that is understood by certainly 100 million people. It is the Dutch word "apartheid".

You will appreciate that we in the Netherlands are not too happy about this. One more reason why I do with all my heart endorse the second paragraph of Mr. Müller's draft recommendation, where he says that everything possible will have to be done to combat apartheid and bring it to an end.

I join, too, in all the appreciative comments that have been made on this report by other honourable members. There is a large measure of agreement among the various political parties in my country on the subject of apartheid, though there are often differences as to the measures to be taken against South Africa.

I myself am in favour of keeping a dialogue going with South Africa. The need for a dialogue, for coming together with people there as a fundamental component of the human condition, is something I have learned from the teachings of the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber. He taught me that the *ich und du*, the "me and you", the relationship between people, must remain, that we must break it down. Similarly, the French writer Henri Bergson sees,

Mr. van Hulst (continued)

in the evolution of mankind, the fact that there are bound to be moments when one has to talk to the other. It must remain possible to talk to one another. And Henri Bergson would not have been a true Frenchman if he had not had this culminating in the *élan d'amour*.

This dialogue, Mr. President, must of course not be only between South Africa and the other countries; I believe that it must, in the first place, be between the various ethnic groups within South Africa itself. It is the job of the South African Government to get this dialogue going. Anyone who visits South Africa, and anyone who, like me, has worked there for quite a long time, hears continually that the South African government does a lot for its black population. This I will not deny, for it can be pointed out that 80 % of black children receive education, that there are five universities for non-whites, and that the township of Soweto has the biggest hospital in the southern hemisphere, with 3,000 beds.

What is lacking, however, is a beginning to political rights. When I was working in the five South African universities for Bantus, coloureds and Indians, I was invited by President Vorster to come and talk about South Africa's policies. I accepted this invitation, and he too again pointed out to me the vast amount the government was doing for the Bantus. This was something I was fully aware of. I told him plainly, in a long conversation, that he would have to make a start at last on giving the black population political rights. At the end of our talk, however, he said "What you are asking for is something I shall not see, nor will my children; possibly my grandchildren will see a start made on it". So South Africa is postponing the solution to the political problems for three generations.

Looking at Western Europe, we can see that over the last three centuries it has, in the main, known three kinds of government. The first was absolutism, *l'état, c'est moi*: the second was that of the enlightened despot, with everything for the people but nothing by the people; and the third is democracy. Looked at in its most favourable light, South Africa has something of the enlightened despot about it — certainly something for the black population, but nothing by them. They have no political rights.

I think it is our job to show the Republic of South Africa this, through dialogue, through contacts, through meeting the South Africans. South Africa needs Western Europe economically, but we need South Africa too. During the long period when the Suez Canal was closed, thousands of ships — freighters as well as oil tankers — used South Africa's ports as a staging

post, to refuel. South Africa has the only alternative ports in the whole continent, and we take account of this fact.

Unhappily, the continent of southern Africa has many obdurate dictatorships. As one African president puts it, "I govern extremely well, because in all my country there is no opposition". He was right: he had wiped out all his opponents. Let us all try together to achieve healthy democratic relationships in South Africa.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in view of the time allowed I will concentrate on one central theme. I also want to express beforehand my appreciation of the recommendation tabled and my congratulations to the Rapporteur, which speakers on several sides of the house have already conveyed. Nevertheless, we cannot go along with some of the things contained in the Müller report. Among others — and we are comforted here by a number of arguments we have heard in this evening's debate — we consider to be erroneous, as contrary to the facts and experience, the statement made in the fourth paragraph of the preamble, to the effect that economic and social development of the African countries should take precedence over questions of "sovereignty", which involves as a corollary the negative estimate of sovereignty of the African States remaining only one of the goals of any European policy.

Our rejection of any such postulate is motivated by the fact that respect of sovereignty and national independence is becoming to seem in recent years the essential prerequisite for such countries' effective economic and social development. Actually not only colonial domination but also, since its collapse, repeated attempts to splinter and put down liberation movements, and reiterated action unscrupulously taken by multinational companies to hold on to their own privileges intact, have underlined the decisive importance of national sovereignty.

Well now, experience over the years tends to show that development co-operation by the industrialised countries, their aid, transfers of technology to countries of Africa and the third world, do not generate new disequilibria, do not turn into fresh forms of subordination and despoliation, provided, having regard to economic structures, environmental conditions, social standards and local cultural conditions, they are directed towards full use of the countries' material and human resources. And this can only be ensured by respect of full sovereignty and national independence.

From this evaluation therefore stems the unacceptable and, if you like, dangerous nature, which has again been acknowledged this evening,

Mr. Antoni (continued)

of any statement of the problem which plays down the question of national sovereignty which, in my view — and, I feel, that of several proposers of amendments — is in fact implicit in the draft recommendation. Among other things, it might run ahead of its author's intentions and supply an alibi and justifications for foreign interventions.

On the other hand, I consider apt as well as important the guidelines and indications, which certainly also bear token of Mr. Minnocci's hopes for a change, aimed at a greater pledge by the European governments to co-operate in seeking means of achieving a control and "concerted limitation of the sale of arms" to African countries and in particular "enforcing the embargo on arms supplies to the South African Republic" and Rhodesia.

We take the view that those indications assume the greater importance and capability of fruitful development the more they are taken to be components and aspects of a commitment by governments, and a more general guideline, which we call for, not only to compel the South African Republic to end apartheid and Rhodesia to establish a democratic régime, but also to encourage negotiated solutions in conflicts of nationality and boundary disputes left unsettled by the former colonial powers and often aggravated by foreign intervention; to enable armaments expenditure to be slashed and resources to be fully devoted to development purposes; to promote the economic use of natural wealth and national productions through implementation and enlargement of the Lomé Convention; and lastly, to support the strengthening of unity among all the countries of Africa.

In such a guideline for development of the African continent, non-interference by foreigners in internal affairs, the economic take-off and social betterment of all African countries, Western Europe is undoubtedly interested for the sake of its own security and economic needs. It is therefore only fair that it should make its own full contribution thereto.

The draft recommendation ought, in our opinion, to bring all this out with greater cogency and clarity. Our appreciation is therefore mitigated: favourable on the whole, but with the qualifications and reservations stated to date.

Accordingly, our stance had better be one of abstention. Furthermore, we reserve our final attitude until certain amendments, such as those moved by Mr. Whitehead, Mr. Stoffelen and others, corresponding in their gist to what we have been saying, have been voted upon.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I gather, Mr. President, that at this late hour it is your wish that we should be even briefer than the time originally allocated to us. For that reason, I do not propose to spend any time at all, much as I feel inclined to do so, on complimenting the Rapporteur on the work he has put into producing the report. Indeed, had I not heard the concluding words of Mr. Antoni I might have been tempted to withdraw my name altogether, but Mr. Antoni uttered two sentences to which I feel I must make reference before I come to the two remarks that I wish to make.

Mr. Antoni talked, first, about forcing the South African Republic to adopt certain policies. I do not quite know what is meant by "forcing the South African Republic". All experience shows that, unless one is prepared to use superior military force, an attempt to exert external influence on the internal policies of another country is invariably counter-productive. Over the years we have seen this again and again and no one ever seems to learn this fundamental lesson.

Already it has been seen that as a result of the more loquacious efforts exerted towards what I suppose in some instances are creditable ends, although one sometimes doubts their authors, the result has been that probably Mr. Vorster will receive at the coming election the biggest majority he has ever enjoyed because of the natural feelings of any country whose government, rightly or wrongly, resent outside interference. There is not one person here, even in this depleted Assembly, who does not know or who should not know this one fundamental fact, that the exertion of pressure achieves a counter-productive effect.

Mr. Antoni's second remark to which I took exception was that establishing a democratic régime in Rhodesia — (*Interruption*) — I should be most grateful if Mr. Antoni would listen to me as patiently and as quietly as I listened to him. If it is desired to establish a democratic régime in Rhodesia, I suggest that what that means is that one should have a government there who accord with the wishes of the majority of the population. There is no doubt that a majority of the population at present does not wish to have a régime there inflicted by force of arms by one terrorist leader or another but wishes to have an internal solution which will result in majority rule at the majority wish of the majority of those inhabitants. If this opportunity is given to them, the result will not be in accord with the wishes of those who meddle in African affairs for the further exploitation of their own political ends.

I suggest that in both those instances we should look at the reality of the matter and try to work out solutions which in fact will be in accord with

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

the wishes of a clear majority of those who live in those areas, and not according to political doctrines instigated from far afield whose authors certainly do not have basic goodwill towards the establishment of genuinely democratic régimes. I have not yet heard any speaker in this debate tell me of one African country in which a liberal democracy survives today. Before people seek to bring pressures on other countries, I suggest they first look at what happens in the rest of Africa.

I conclude my remarks with these two thoughts. First, one does not obtain productive results by seeking to bring external pressures to bear which are regarded by the locals as undue interference in the way in which they are trying to work out their own salvation. Curiously enough, I have heard these remarks made equally forcefully in another context, in another debate, when I was told that undue interference in the internal affairs of eastern countries would be counter-productive.

Secondly, I hope we will now learn that the best way forward in Africa is to encourage the forces of moderation which do not use external aid for the purposes of arming themselves for further revolutionary struggles. It is nonsense to talk in terms that we give aid only on the basis that it is used for peaceful means, because in every instance it means that other domestic resources are diverted for the purpose of exploiting revolution and armed struggle.

Therefore, looked at on the whole and without prejudice — and I shall speak on various amendments if the need arises — I compliment the Rapporteur for trying to steer a sensible, moderate, balanced course. I wish him well in the progress of this report.

The PRESIDENT. — We have reached the end of the list of speakers. Does the Rapporteur wish to reply?

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Because of the lateness of the hour, I shall be very brief in what I have to say, Mr. President.

First, I should like to thank all those who have taken part in this debate. It is sound democratic practice to attach importance to different parts of a report according to one's political point of view. The task of the Rapporteur is — at least that is how I understand it — to draw up a balanced text enabling as many members of our Assembly as possible to vote for the recommendation.

I do not wish to discuss what each individual speaker has said, because otherwise, in view of the fact that twelve speakers took part in the discussion, it would be impossible to avoid

singling out some more than others. But there is one thing I must emphasise. I am personally on the side of those who spoke in favour of adopting, as far as possible, a well thought out and balanced approach to the problems in Africa and particularly in South Africa. One speaker said that if harsh measures are taken against a country, to the point where a dialogue is no longer possible, it will be very hard to influence such a country. I do want to influence South Africa.

Which brings me to what was said by my Dutch colleague, who actually has practical experience of South Africa. He emphasised that we, with our democratic beliefs and attitudes, should seek to influence the present government in South Africa and to show that it is moving along a wrong road and must get back on to the right one.

I am sure that what Sir Frederic has just said is also true: if you get a man up against the wall, his followers will rally round him. He is surely right, too, when he says that the Vorster government will probably get more votes in the next election than they did in the last. What I hope for is that this increased majority will not cause the Vorster government to say: we have behind us so-and-so many per cent of the population which is able to vote — and I say deliberately "able to vote" — and we can do exactly as we like. On the contrary, I hope and pray that this will be the beginning of a process by which people in Africa, despite the election results, will pay some attention to what is being said abroad and to the voices of those who, like ourselves in this Assembly, are ready and willing to help with sound advice.

On the question of measures against South Africa I think that we should take a firm stand on arms deliveries. Moreover, there is, I think, a very good reason for this.

In the case of the other sanctions, the economic ones, which we discussed, I am very sceptical, for I think that such measures are more likely to lead, in the country against which they are directed, to the development of that country's own production in an effort to become self-sufficient. As a result it is possible that the South African régime would indirectly be strengthened rather than weakened. We have, after all, the example of Rhodesia. For ten years the most stringent boycott has been imposed on Rhodesia. It is a much smaller country — 270,000 whites live there, while in South Africa there are 4.3 million. And yet in spite of these boycott measures, Rhodesia has not been brought to its knees. I would therefore warn against taking sides and placing hopes in measures which will probably not get us much further.

I have been criticised in various quarters because in the report I did not specifically mention other States, such as Uganda, the Central

Mr. Müller (continued)

African Republic, etc. Why did I not mention them, while I did do so at this rostrum in my introductory remarks? In the report I refrained from so doing because a list of such countries would be a very long one and yet be incomplete. In this connection, I made a general comment: I believe we ought to list any infringement of human rights wherever it has taken place, but without naming the particular African State where it took place. One could publish a whole White Paper on Uganda alone; but that would go far beyond our task in this Assembly.

Referring to what Mr. Hardy said, I quite agree that in paragraph 27 it is stated that this plan has not been published. In the meantime, it has been published. We shall include the British/American proposals in the text and of course make the necessary corrections. The original draft of the report was written before 1st September and this was then simply overlooked.

I do not want to say anything further as regards what Mr. Cermolacce said. In anticipation of what might happen — parliamentarians do occasionally have political premonitions — I referred to this in my remarks at the beginning of the debate, when I said that one must here get away from the concept of class war. I quoted the example of South Africa where the greatest capitalist is against apartheid whereas the representatives of the working classes, the white trade unions, support it. The old concepts of the last century — if I may so express myself — will be of no avail in these matters and it is no use Mr. Cermolacce for ever harping on the multinationals and so on which, unfortunately, he always trots out whatever the point at issue, whether it be Africa or any other problem: it is always the same old story and, quite frankly, it does not help us here one bit.

One final remark. In these discussions we should all be aware that our contributions will, I am sure, have drawn public attention to these African problems, and I for my part would hope that something of what has been said here today will have some impact on those in Africa who should be listening, and perhaps cause them to change their policies, and steer them in the right direction. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to speak?

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the Rapporteur completed his report at a time when in Africa much that we have learned of in the meantime had not yet taken place. These facts are not in the report and should now of course be taken into account.

On the other hand, it is quite clear that there are so many African problems that it is quite impossible for them to be presented satisfactorily in such a report. Indeed, that is the difficulty about a report like this from the outset. During the debate it became evident that different speakers wanted different points mentioned, dealt with in more detail or a particular angle emphasised. There are inevitably one or two matters on which I too do not see eye to eye with the Rapporteur.

Taking Africa as a whole, I would like to make only one or two points. The Rapporteur is quite right when he says that we in Europe must take a longer harder look at Africa if we really want to get to know its problems. We are very ready to believe that we know everything about them already and above all, we think that we are entitled to pass judgment and even to engineer changes. Several speakers, for instance, told us: "If we want to set up democracies there..." We cannot set up anything there, Mr. President, and we ought to realise clearly that doing so would constitute indefensible intervention in other peoples' affairs. Black people, too, have a right to settle their own affairs, and that is true even when, for example, in setting up their particular form of government they perhaps do so on a level beyond which we have already progressed. Even that does not give us the right to tell them what to do.

As for South Africa, there has unfortunately been no possibility of a dialogue with the Vorster government for many years. On this point I must disagree with the Rapporteur. Every attempt has shown itself to be in vain, and that is why we are now in the unfortunate position of having to bring pressure to bear. I know that pressure of course engenders counter-pressure. Yet, in such a situation there is really hardly any other way open to us if we want to stick out for the principle that in South Africa too human rights must be respected.

Although one speaker said that the law is the law no matter whether black or white, and that it applies the same to everyone, we must nevertheless make a distinction here in that we Europeans are involved in South Africa and what happens there affects us as Europeans. What I mean to say is that we are not entirely unaffected by problems in South Africa, and that is why we are more involved than others. That is also why we must be more anxious to see that a democratic State is created there, in other words, that all citizens there are accorded human and civil rights. People cannot, as was suggested here, simply go somewhere else. That I find ludicrous. For which one of us, if we were unhappy in our own country, would take kindly to being told "All right, so go somewhere else?" Such ideas cannot, in my opinion, be the basis of a political debate.

Mrs. von Bothmer (continued)

One thing we certainly must consider : that for the peoples in Africa who are struggling to free themselves from tyranny and are fighting for civil and human rights, the problem is not one of importing somebody else's ideology. They have their own particular reasons for taking up the fight, and we must accept this.

To my mind this report, limited as it needs must be because it just is not possible to cover all the problems, is by and large such that we can accept it. And even the draft recommendation, which we must however discuss further because a large number of amendments have been tabled, could well be accepted. Thank you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Madam Chairman.

We are at the end of the debate. We have now to vote nineteen times on the different paragraphs and a total of five amendments. I propose that we consider them in the order in which they relate to the text.

We begin with Amendment No. 2, part 1, by Mr. Whitehead and others, to leave out the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Do you wish to say anything, Mr. Whitehead ?

Mr. WHITEHEAD (*United Kingdom*). — Yes. In view of the shortage of time, I shall confine myself to one sentence on each of my amendments.

We wish to exclude the fourth paragraph of the preamble because we feel that it is not correct to take the view that one must always stress the priority of economic and social development over matters of sovereignty, for the very good reason that was given by a former conservative minister in the United Kingdom, namely, that good government is no substitute for self-government. We believe that it would be an impertinence for WEU to take the view that it could always assert that economic progress must come before self-government. We think that the paragraph should be excluded.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone else wish to speak ?...

We now come to vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 1 of Amendment No. 2 is agreed to.

I now call Amendment No. 2, part 2, also by Mr. Whitehead, in the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, to leave out "left by decolonisation" and insert "inherited from the colonial period".

Do you want to speak, Mr. Whitehead ?

Mr. WHITEHEAD (*United Kingdom*). — This is virtually a drafting amendment. We feel that it is less offensive to say "inherited from the colonial period", because the existing wording implies that this has been a deliberate colonial plot, as it were, to leave this political framework behind.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 2 of Amendment No. 2 is agreed to.

We come now to Amendment No. 2, part 3, also by Mr. Whitehead, in the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, to leave out "can" and insert "should" and to leave out all the words after "Africa".

Mr. Whitehead does not wish to speak.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 3 of Amendment No. 2 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment No. 2, part 4, by Mr. Whitehead, after the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, to insert the following new paragraph :

"Reaffirming our condemnation of the systematic violation of human rights in certain despotic post-colonial régimes in Africa ;"

Mr. WHITEHEAD (*United Kingdom*). — I hope that this amendment will be accepted unanimously, because it reinforces the point I made in the debate, namely, that we wish to have a specific reference to those other régimes in Africa which are dictatorships and which are behaving in an abominable way to the citizens of their countries.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 4 of Amendment No. 2 is agreed to.

I now turn to Amendment No. 5 by Mr. Page and others to leave out the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :

"Condemning the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the suppression of civil liberties by African governments;"

Who will speak in favour of the amendment ?...

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). — I feel that this new wording obviates us from any accusation of double standards.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

Mr. WHITEHEAD (*United Kingdom*). — We oppose the amendment because of what it leaves out as well as what it puts in. We have already put in a reference to the disgraceful behaviour of other régimes. It seems to us that to leave out reference to the South African régime is quite wrong. Therefore, we think that this amendment should be rejected.

The PRESIDENT. — You have heard both sides.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment No. 5 is negatived.

We come now to Amendment No. 2, part 5, by Mr. Whitehead, in the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, to leave out "practice" and insert "policy" and after "principles" insert "of democracy and human rights".

I think it is self-explanatory and that you need not speak.

Does anyone wish to speak against it ?...

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 5 of Amendment No. 2 is agreed to.

We come now to Amendment No. 2, part 6, by Mr. Whitehead, at the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, to insert the following new paragraph :

"Condemning the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the suppression of civil liberties by the white minority government of South Africa."

I think that this, too, is self-explanatory.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 6 of Amendment No. 2 is agreed to.

We come now to the amendments to the draft recommendation proper. The first is Amendment No. 2, part 7, by Mr. Whitehead : in paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "members" insert "to establish peace and security in southern Africa" ; leave out "improve the effectiveness of measures to" and leave out "régime" and insert "transition to majority rule".

I do not believe that this need be explained.

Does anyone wish to speak against ?...

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have no objection to the substance, but I do think we should not fall into the error of using a form of words which makes us promise something we just cannot carry out. When it says here in the latest version "co-ordinates the efforts of its members to establish..." such a form of words, widely interpreted, could mean : units of the member States of Western European Union must now be sent to South Africa in order finally to set up such a just régime. I think these words could lead to misunderstandings. I consider the original form of words better because, in my opinion, it corresponds more closely to the possibilities really open to us.

The PRESIDENT. — You have heard the Rapporteur. Is there any chance of finding some agreement ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. Müller is on to a good point in terms of drafting. I wonder whether we can find a compromise, something like "to assist in the establishment of", which would suggest that we would play a part but obviously we would not impose it ourselves. That might be a satisfactory compromise.

The PRESIDENT. — Can anyone tell me now what we shall be voting on ? There is a proposal and a counter-proposal and an effort to achieve a compromise. Mr. Whitehead ?

Mr. WHITEHEAD (*United Kingdom*). — I would accept the compromise, so that it would then read "to assist in establishing peace and security in southern Africa" and so on.

The PRESIDENT. — Has everyone understood that ? I hope so.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 7 of Amendment No. 2, as amended, is agreed to.

We come now to Amendment No. 4, part 1, by Mr. Banks : in paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "improve the effectiveness of measures to compel" and insert "convince" ; and after "Republic" insert "of the need".

Does he wish to speak to it ?

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). — I merely wanted to say that we believe that it is better to "convince" than to take measures to "compel".

The PRESIDENT. — It is an amendment to the same paragraph. Could you agree to that ?

Mr. WHITEHEAD (*United Kingdom*). — No, I prefer not to, because we feel that conviction is something which has not played much part in changes by the white minority régime either in Rhodesia or in South Africa. We prefer the word "compel".

The PRESIDENT. — You prefer “compel” to “convince”. The second part consists of “after ‘Republic’ insert ‘of the need’”. Is there any difficulty about this ?

I think we will vote on the whole amendment.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Part 1 of Amendment No. 4 is negatived.

We come now to Amendment No. 1 by Mr. Roper : in paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “measures” in line 1 insert “(i)”; after “apartheid” in line 2 insert “(ii) to”, and after “and” in line 3 insert “(iii) to”.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — With respect, Mr. President, in the light of Mr. Whitehead’s amendment I do not think that this amendment is now necessary.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Amendment No. 1 is withdrawn.

There is one more amendment to this paragraph 2, Amendment No. 3, part 1, by Mr. Boucheny : At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert, “ensuring the departure of Mr. Ian Smith’s illegal government ;”.

Is Mr. Boucheny present ? If he is not, he cannot speak for it.

Does anyone wish to speak against it ?...

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — In my speech I summed up the different points in Mr. Boucheny’s amendment. I propose that they should be put to the vote in order to save time.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. We will put it to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Part 1 of Amendment No. 3 is negatived.

We turn now to Amendment No. 2, part 8, by Mr. Whitehead, to leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

“Initiate steps to reduce the present deplorable level of arms sales from external countries to Africa ;”.

We need not discuss this ; it is, I think, clear-cut.

Does anyone wish to speak against it ?...

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Part 8 of Amendment No. 2 is agreed to.

We come to part 9 of Amendment No. 2 tabled by Mr. Whitehead : in paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “concerted” and insert “strict” and after “particular” insert “enforcing”.

Need we have any explanation of this ? I do not believe that anyone is against it.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Part 9 of Amendment No. 2 is agreed to.

I turn next to Amendment No. 4, part 2, tabled by Mr. Banks, in paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, to leave out all the words after “sales”.

That is a clear-cut position.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Part 2 of Amendment No. 4 is negatived.

I turn now to Amendment No. 3, part 2, tabled by Mr. Boucheny : after paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph :

“Reconsider policies of investment and technology transfer in South Africa and Rhodesia which might *inter alia* render ineffective the embargo on supplies of military equipment by strengthening the economies of these countries ;”.

Mr. Boucheny has already spoken to it.

No one seems to wish to speak against it.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Part 2 of Amendment No. 3 is agreed to.

I now call Amendment No. 3, part 3, tabled by Mr. Boucheny : at the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, insert : “so as to foster the economic progress of the African countries and not the interests of multinational firms attracted by low wages and the absence of social guarantees”.

The amendment has already been spoken to.

Does anyone wish to speak against it ?...

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Part 3 of Amendment No. 3 is negatived.

I turn now to Amendment No. 2, part 10, tabled by Mr. Whitehead, in paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, to leave out all the words after “rights”.

That is clear.

Does anyone wish to speak against it ?...

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would like to plead for retention of the original wording. I respect the deeply felt motives which make Mr. Whitehead and his friends put their weight behind the second paragraph, but I believe that progress towards democracy, as we see it in Africa today, should not necessarily lead us to apply criteria which we take for granted in Western Europe but which we cannot take for granted in a country where 90% to 95% of the population is illiterate. I ask, therefore, that we keep the original wording.

The PRESIDENT. — Is there any agreement?

Mr. WHITEHEAD (*United Kingdom*). — We wish to insist on this, though not because we misunderstand Mr. Müller's motives. We understand them, but this wording may be misunderstood elsewhere, particularly by those whose special pleading in the African situation would argue that various populations are not fit to exercise the franchise, and so on. We wish to keep our amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall therefore take a vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 10 of Amendment No. 2 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment No. 3, part 4, by Mr. Boucheny: after paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph 9:

"Afford its support to the liberation movements in Namibia, South Africa and Rhodesia which are recognised by the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, i.e. the ANC, the SWAPO and the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front;"

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of clarification, Mr. President. Would Mr. Boucheny insist on the examples he gives? At the end he says "i.e." and then he specifies certain organisations. It would be much easier if he did not refer to specific organisations, particularly in the situation in Rhodesia.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone take up this proposal?

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — Yes, this amendment might be altered to read: "Afford its support to the liberation movements in Namibia, South Africa and Rhodesia, which are recognised by the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity," the rest of the sentence being deleted.

The PRESIDENT. — It would then read as follows:

"Afford its support to the liberation movements in Namibia, South Africa and Rhodesia which are recognised by the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity,"

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 4 of Amendment No. 3, as amended, is agreed to.

I now take Amendment No. 3, part 5, by Mr. Boucheny, to insert the following new paragraph 10:

"Condemn the repeated attacks by the South African and Rhodesian régimes on neighbouring States and particularly the military operation against Mozambique on 27th November."

I do not think that that need be explained here.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). — I speak against this amendment because it is quite illogical. If the front-line Presidents state that they are at war with Rhodesia, they cannot complain if their military targets are attacked. I therefore do not think that the amendment should be adopted.

The PRESIDENT. — Then we must decide by voting.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 5 of Amendment No. 3 is agreed to.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 754, as amended.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. I am sorry at this late hour to ask for your advice. First of all, can you tell me the numbers needed in this Assembly tonight to pass the full report and recommendations? Secondly, you said before the debate began that it would be possible for this vote to be held tomorrow morning. Frankly, there are so many changes now that I feel that it would be fair to the rest of the members of the Assembly who are not here to be able to read the new draft recommendations as a whole. That is a rather strong view which I hold because it is difficult with the amendments, as they have been passed to get a view of the recommendations as a whole.

The PRESIDENT. — It is very reasonable to have the final vote tomorrow morning, and I would make that proposal. You asked how many members of the Assembly must be present. The answer is forty-five, but only if it were a roll-call. If it were not a roll-call, it would not be necessary. But I suggest that we print the whole

The President (continued)

thing anew. It will be distributed and we can take a final vote by roll-call, if it is wanted, tomorrow morning.

Mr. WHITEHEAD (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. Without wishing to challenge your ruling, if indeed it was a ruling, I submit that there is another sense of fairness — that is, that the vote should take place amongst those who have listened to the argument and to the debate. The votes so far happen to have gone in one particular way. The debate has gone in one particular way. Surely it is wrong now to deny a vote after a debate and ask representatives to come in tomorrow morning and vote on a matter the debate on which many of them will not have heard.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. If we are to have a vote now, there will have to be a roll-call on the whole recommendation, according to our rules, even if there is only one voice saying "No". Following what Mr. Page has said, I agree with him that the report has now been substantially altered. Therefore, if my colleague Mr. Whitehead wants a vote now, I am perfectly content that there should be one, but I register in advance the fact that I shall require, according to the rules of procedure, a roll-call vote, and in that event I have a suspicion that there will not be enough people to get a vote on this recommendation tonight. Therefore, for my part I do not mind one way or the other, but, if we are to vote now, in effect by saying "No" we are bound to have a roll-call vote in any event.

The PRESIDENT. — May I take up again what I have just proposed — that we go for the final vote tomorrow forenoon, and not at 9.30 a.m. or 9 a.m. when we meet. I propose that it should take place after the second Order of the Day. If we have a roll-call now, we shall not have a quorum and that will be the end of the matter. I therefore think that it is fair to do this tomorrow morning.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I should be very glad to fall in with your ruling, Mr. President, if I have correctly understood what was said by my colleague Sir Frederic Bennett. In arguing for a roll-call vote, was he indicating that he intended to vote against the recommendation as it now stood?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — Yes.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — In that case, there is clearly no point in trying to proceed with the vote tonight.

The PRESIDENT. — That is so.

7. Communications and crisis management in the Alliance

(Doc. 757)

The PRESIDENT. — I now wish to say a few words on one point on today's Orders of the Day. The draft recommendation in Document 757, as amended, was adopted this afternoon with abstentions recorded by Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Bernini, Mr. Antoni and Mr. Corallo. After the vote, Mr. Brugnon, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Forni and Mr. Rivière told me that they had intended to vote "No" and not to abstain. I am glad to be able to make this clear to the Assembly on their behalf.

8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sittings

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold two public Sittings tomorrow, Wednesday, 30th November, at 9 a.m. and 2.30 p.m., with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
2. Spread of nuclear energy and defence problems (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and the Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 760, Addendum and Amendment).
3. European security and African problems (Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Document 754).
4. Progress in aerospace (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 755).
5. Address by Mr. Deniau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.
6. Strategic mobility (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 758 and Amendments).
7. International terrorism (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft

The President (continued)

- Recommendation, Document 762 and Amendment).
8. Relations with Parliaments (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and Vote on the draft Order, Document 752).
 9. Procedure for electing the President of the Assembly when there is only one candidate (Presentation of and Debate on the Report

of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft text, Document 751).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sittings are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 7.25 p.m.)

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 30th November 1977

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
4. Spread of nuclear energy and defence problems (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and the Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 760, Addendum and Amendment*).
Speakers : The President, Mr. Jessel (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*), Mr. Roper (*Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. Cook, Mr. Bernini, Mr. Konings, Dr. Phipps, Mr. Cornelissen, Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Mr. Treu, Mr. Roper, Mr. Jessel (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Warren (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Roper (point of order).
5. Changes in the membership of Committees.
6. European security and African problems (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 754*).
Speakers (points of order) : Mr. Müller, Mr. Roper, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Roper, Mr. Müller, Mr. Mattiek, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Faulds, Mr. Enders.
7. Progress in aerospace (*Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 755*).
Speakers : The President, Mr. Valleix (*Rapporteur*).
8. Address by Mr. Deniau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.
Speakers : The President, Mr. Deniau (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*).
Replies by Mr. Deniau to questions put by : Mr. Reid, Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Radius, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper.
9. Progress in aerospace (*Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 755*).
Speakers : The President, Mr. Adriaensens, Mr. Bernini, Mr. Cornelissen, Mr. Treu, Mr. Valleix (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Warren (*Chairman of the Committee*).
10. Strategic mobility (*Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 758 and Amendments*).
Speakers : The President, Mr. Tanghe (*Rapporteur*).
11. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 9 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published

with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. — The Orders of the Day provide for the election of a Vice-President of the Assembly to fill the seat previously occupied by Mr. de Niet, a member of the Netherlands Delegation. I have received only one name, that of Mr. Stoffelen, a Representative of the Netherlands. This nomination has been presented in the manner prescribed in the Rules of Procedure. Therefore, I propose that the Assembly, elect Mr. Stoffelen by acclamation. (*Applause*)

That is unanimously agreed to.

I declare Mr. Stoffelen a Vice-President of the Assembly of Western European Union.

1. See page 32.

4. Spread of nuclear energy and defence problems

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and the Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 760, Addendum and Amendment)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the spread of nuclear energy and defence problems, together with the presentation of the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 760, Addendum and Amendment.

I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I have pleasure in placing before the Assembly the paper on the spread of nuclear energy and defence problems on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. Three weeks ago I was asked by that Committee to be Rapporteur, standing in for Mr. van Kleef in view of his sudden retirement from the Assembly.

The subject is a challenging one. In the world there are some thirty-five countries which have nuclear power plants in operation, under construction or on order. The problem is how to allow the growth of the peaceful use of nuclear energy whilst preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We must accept the assumption that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a threat to peace and to the survival of mankind. I believe it is true that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has provided a nuclear umbrella which, since 1945, has helped to prevent a third world war by, in effect, providing a stalemate between Russia and the West. Without that NATO nuclear umbrella, it is quite likely that there would have been a war between the East and the West in the 1950s or 1960s in which many members of this Assembly would have been killed.

But it is one thing for a handful of nations to have nuclear weapons and quite another thing for those nuclear weapons to be spread around the globe so that twenty, thirty, forty or eventually fifty countries possess them, including present or future international flashpoints in the Middle East, South and South-East Asia, Africa and South America, where wars between secondary powers might escalate into a nuclear holocaust.

In particular, I wish to draw the attention of the Assembly to the risk that nuclear weapons or other explosive nuclear material might fall

into the hands of terrorist organisations. To quote from my report :

“A highly-organised terrorist group might have the ability to fabricate a nuclear weapon from stolen plutonium or highly-enriched uranium. This threat will emerge if plutonium is reprocessed and recycled or if reactors requiring highly-enriched uranium are introduced.”

The past few years have seen a rise in the size, sophistication and capabilities of terrorist groups around the world. Their activities are strongly motivated, and modern communications allow terrorists to obtain a wide audience for their messages.

For some years now there has been the possibility that terrorists might attempt to steal nuclear weapons. The proliferation of civilian nuclear power and its sensitive technology provide additional opportunities for terrorists to employ nuclear energy as a weapon. The likelihood of nuclear terrorism is impossible to assess, but the possibility must be taken seriously. Security measures must be improved in both national and international frameworks where key nuclear facilities and transportation are concerned, with a view to forestalling terrorist activities.

For this reason I have recommended effective international standards and measures in nuclear security policies. Also for this reason I have made the third recommendation to be placed before the Assembly, which reads :

“To give impetus to the development and international application of procedures and stringent measures to protect nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, in storage or in transit, from terrorist seizure or diversion.”

This is not just a piece of science fiction, nor an adventure of James Bond. We must take the risk seriously and urge member governments to give high priority to conferring about what needs to be done about it. It would be wrong for us to attempt to discuss in detail the security measures required, because they should be kept secret, but a message can and should go out from this Assembly as to the frightful risks which might arise. We urge all member governments of Western European Union and governments all over the world to be alert to these dangers and to take action to minimise the risk, a risk which stems partly from the spread of nuclear energy.

I have said in the preamble that nuclear energy is a fact of international life which will provide a high percentage of world electricity by the end of the century. The object is to obtain a cheap and reliable source of electricity. The oil crisis which has afflicted the world over the

Mr. Jessel (continued)

last three years has added impetus to that movement. Stocks of oil and coal in the world as a whole will not run out for at least 100 years, but these commodities are not in the right places, nor are they available at the right prices. Around the turn from the twentieth century into the twenty-first century there will be a big energy gap so far as Europe is concerned, especially in electricity.

While this Assembly has looked carefully and critically at the new and renewable sources of energy such as energy from the sun, the wind, the tides and the waves, although these can make an improved contribution they are unlikely to meet the electricity gap and the energy gap of Europe as a whole. As nuclear energy is already with us, I regard its growth as inevitable. We can, therefore, come to the main question of how to allow that growth without the proliferation of weapons. There are some types of nuclear material which can be used for explosive purposes, but not all types can be so used.

Until 1976 the key to that control appeared to lie in the non-proliferation treaty, which is still important. I have referred to that in paragraph 14 of the report as follows :

“The treaty may be considered as an agreement between non-nuclear weapon States to forego nuclear weapons and accept the safeguards, but in turn they are promised full co-operation and assistance with nuclear power facilities.”

— that is to say, nuclear power facilities for peaceful purposes.

I refer the Assembly to the appendices at the back of the report, in particular Appendix II. There we have listed the powers which possess nuclear energy and those which have signed the non-proliferation treaty. The States which have signed the treaty are marked with two asterisks, those which have signed it but have not yet ratified it are marked with one asterisk, and those which have not yet signed the treaty are marked with a line.

The number of countries which have not yet signed the non-proliferation treaty is disturbing and should give rise to some anxiety. We need not worry too much, for example, about Liechtenstein and Monaco not having signed the treaty, because it is fairly unlikely that States as small as those would choose to become or would become involved in a nuclear war. But some important countries have not signed the non-proliferation treaty. They are Brazil, China, France, India, Israel, South Africa and Spain. That is, or should be, a source of anxiety to the Assembly.

The purposes of the non-proliferation treaty have now been strengthened by the London agreement which took place in the autumn of 1977 following a meeting which took place in May 1977. I refer to the London meeting in paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the report. As we are pressed for time, I shall not go into too much detail.

However, I regard it as a sanction which embraces the nuclear powers and the powers which produce nuclear reactors for sale to other countries, particularly the types of nuclear reactors which provide them with knowledge which could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. I regard the London agreement as a more effective sanction than the non-proliferation treaty.

The Defence Committee, in its recommendations, has not taken that matter into account. It appears to have gone only as far as Mr. Delorme's report of two years ago — a report which was commissioned by that Committee. However, I am prepared to accept, and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions at its meeting last night was prepared to accept and to welcome, the proposed additions to our recommendations from the Defence Committee, about which we shall hear more shortly from representatives of that Committee.

The purpose is to increase the safeguards against the dangers to which I have referred. These moves must have the support and encouragement of the Assembly of WEU, for what is at stake is nothing less than the peace of the world. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I call Mr. Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to begin by saying how much the Defence Committee welcomed the decision of the Presidential Committee to refer this report to it for an opinion. In the event, in view of the changes in Rapporteurs in the Defence Committee and the fact that the report was not finally agreed until a late stage, the Defence Committee was unable to give it as much attention as it would have liked. We had Mr. Jessel's report only in the last few days.

We were extremely concerned that, when we have a subject which covers the activity of more than one part of our Assembly, we should ensure that the other committees involved express an opinion. As has been pointed out by Mr. Jessel, we presented a report on 29th April 1975, and the Defence Committee has kept an active interest in the subject ever since.

Mr. Roper (continued)

We feel that, in the draft recommendation presented by Mr. Jessel and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, the paragraph dealing with the International Atomic Energy Authority's safeguards is not perhaps brought out as clearly as we would have thought desirable. Unlike the safeguards which Euratom possesses, which are applied automatically to the nuclear material of all the member States, the IAEA's safeguards are applicable only where a State concludes a specific agreement to accept those safeguards. Usually, those safeguards and such agreements cover only specified material or installations on the territory of that State. Under the non-proliferation treaty, however, nuclear weapon States are required to conclude agreements for the application of IAEA safeguards to all sources of fissionable material and for all peaceful nuclear activities in a State or in areas under its control. Thus, although the non-parties to the non-proliferation treaty are all members of the IAEA, the nuclear installations on their territories are not automatically covered by the safeguards except where they are covered in other agreements.

Therefore, we felt that our amendment — I was delighted to hear from Mr. Jessel that his Committee is prepared to accept it — covered the matter rather more satisfactorily than it had been covered previously. However, I agree with Mr. Jessel that, in a manner which is still not altogether clearly defined, the London agreement has in some ways ensured that the supplier States will impose rather more effective controls on their supplies in future. We felt that, in terms of the IAEA agreement, it was probably better to amend the second paragraph of the preamble in the way that we have proposed and to insert a new operative paragraph after operative paragraph 2 in the form set out in the amendment.

We in the Defence Committee have appreciated the opportunity of seeing this report, because there is obviously an overlap between the work of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and that of the Defence Committee in this matter. I hope that at the end of the day, by our joint efforts, we shall have a satisfactory report and recommendation for the Assembly. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

Does the Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions wish to reply?

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). — Not at present, thank you.

The PRESIDENT. — Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to reply?

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — At the end, please.

The PRESIDENT. — I open the debate. At present, I have six speakers on the list of those who wish to speak.

I call Mr. Cook.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to congratulate the Rapporteur on a very interesting and informative report, and particularly on the appendices to the report, which will prove useful to those of us who take part in the debate outside the Assembly.

Having said that, however, I have some grave reservations about the recommendations preceding the report. I understand that the Committee turned down the previous draft recommendations on the ground that they lacked realism about the energy needs in Europe. I am bound to ask whether the present recommendations are themselves sufficiently realistic in providing checks on proliferation among countries which at present do not possess nuclear weapons.

I was particularly distressed by paragraph 2 of the report, from which I infer that the Committee is prepared to consider the export of fast-breeder reactors and of reprocessing units, since that was one part of the recommendations earlier put before the Committee which it subsequently rejected. I must say that, if we are prepared to consider the export of fast-breeder reactors and reprocessing units, it is very unlikely that we shall succeed in halting nuclear weapon proliferation.

After all, over the past year there have been quite a number of studies which cast very serious doubts on the economics of fast-breeder and reprocessing cycles. We have seen in the last ten months the publication of the very authoritative Ford Foundation report, which makes the very elementary point that nuclear fuel costs are only one-tenth of the total costs of electricity derived from nuclear energy.

It points out that the fast-breeder reactor can save only a fraction of that one-tenth and that it can, therefore, offer us an advantage over other forms of reactor of only 1 or 2% of the cost of electricity as delivered to the consumer. Even then, it can do so only if the cost of constructing a fast-breeder reactor is no more than one-fifth higher than the cost of building other reactors. As everyone knows, the cost of the fast breeder looks like being two to three times the cost of present thermal reactors.

If we turn from the cost of fast breeders and examine that of the reprocessing units associated with them, we find that there is the same doubt,

Mr. Cook (continued)

especially in America, about the economics of the operation. There have been three attempts to develop commercial reprocessing units, and each attempt has been abandoned because it failed to prove economic. I shall give the figures for only one, the Morris plant. It was estimated that it would cost \$20 million to construct. In fact, the proprietors spent \$80 million before giving up, and it is now estimated that it will cost them a further \$120 million to put the plant into working condition. This represents a tenfold increase in the estimated cost of the plant which has produced a tenfold increase in the cost of reprocessing units of spent fuel.

As a result, for the developed world the economics of fast-breeder reactors and reprocessing are very doubtful indeed. We should have a much better return for our money if we concentrated on rescuing the 50% of energy which we currently send up the cooling stacks of power stations.

However doubtful are the economics for the developed world, they are very much more doubtful for the developing countries, where capital and skilled labour are much scarcer and where unskilled labour as a substitute for energy is much more plentiful. I should like to draw the attention of the Assembly to the practice of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which is concerned not with projects which lend status and prestige to a country but with those which will be of economic value to it. The International Bank has not supported one single nuclear development anywhere in the third world, because it has not been convinced by one single nuclear project that it would be of economic value to the country seeking to buy it. This is a sobering reflection. It is one which should colour our attitude to the export of facilities around the third world.

Our attitude should also be coloured by the fact that, whatever the doubts about the economic value of these facilities, there can be no doubt about the potential for nuclear weapon proliferation. The Rapporteur has made the point that there are other paths to obtaining nuclear weapons. He is perfectly right, but the significance of plutonium separation plants and the reprocessing cycle is that they make the time between the decision by a nation to obtain nuclear weapons and to construct them and the achievement of that aim much shorter.

This brings me to the question of safeguards. I am amused to see that both Rapporteurs have placed emphasis on safeguards in their recommendations, because these are significant only if they give sufficient warning to the rest of the world that a nation intends to construct nuclear weapons. If a fast-breeder reactor and a reproces-

sing unit have first been delivered to it, one will not have much warning. The time of warning that might otherwise be expected from the system of safeguards will have been shortened.

I remind the Assembly that it takes only three months for a party to leave the non-proliferation treaty. That is the only notice required. If such a country has a reprocessing unit, it may well be capable of constructing a nuclear weapon within that three-month period. It would be naive to imagine that some of the countries currently choosing to purchase nuclear facilities are not aware of this. Pakistan does not have a single reactor capable of burning plutonium. Is there a person here who believes that Pakistan, a country of considerable poverty and low capital, would be seeking to purchase a reprocessing unit if India had not exploded a nuclear device three years ago?

It is also naive to suppose that, if we give these countries the opportunity to purchase nuclear plant, there will not be people in their nuclear industry who will consider it a very good idea to go one step further and give their nation a prestigious military capability.

It may well turn out that nuclear energy is essential to Europe. I remain to be convinced of that. If it should ever prove to be the case, it will be because we have spent so much on it that we have neglected alternative energy options. However, we are being less than honest with ourselves if we pretend that by proliferating the reprocessing cycle we are not, in turn, proliferating the capacity to make nuclear weapons. If we do so, there is a much greater possibility that nuclear weapons will proliferate. That is a very great responsibility for us to take upon ourselves. We would be wise to pause for at least long enough to establish whether there may not be another energy option for the world. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Bernini.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Jessel's report, which has my esteem, and the draft recommendation derive, I think, much of their motivation from two growing risks that humanity nowadays has to run: first, proliferation of nuclear arms due to the spread of nuclear reactors, the multiplication of equipment and plant for the enrichment and recycling of nuclear fuels and especially the prospect of the production of fast-breeder reactors using plutonium.

If we reflect that already some thirty-five countries are supplied with nuclear reactors and that many of these are, without having signed the non-proliferation treaty, in possession of equipment covering the entire nuclear energy production cycle, while others still are preparing

Mr. Bernini (continued)

to follow suit, this gives some measure of how great the risk is — and it is becoming greater — and how well-founded and legitimate are the misgivings, also expressed by President Carter, concerning the possible spread of nuclear weaponry, and world security and peace.

The other risk, no less worrying in my opinion, has not I think been fully appreciated by Mr. Jessel. It is that of an energy shortage arising in the near future from a possible imbalance of production, oil costs and energy supplies. How dramatic this risk, that will have to be faced in the next few years, might also become is highlighted by the warning of the OECD Energy Agency, and the radical measures advocated last October for rapidly achieving a substantial reduction of oil consumption and imports and speedy development of fresh sources of energy at competitive prices, in order to spare the world economy dangerous new inflationary pressures and strains in energy supply and demand, with as a consequence incalculable adverse effects on employment, economic stability and therefore security too.

Truly, as Mr. Jessel also said, there are alternative energy sources, but equally truly, these are uncompetitive, and above all not immediately available.

The international debate of the last few months, the meeting on energy problems of the fifteen industrialised nations in London last November and the guidelines emanating from the EEC as well as the recent energy conference in Strasbourg under the auspices of the Council of Europe, have clearly shown, albeit with differences of appreciation, that these risks of an energy shortage cannot be averted, as Mr. Cook apparently argues, by freezing the spread of nuclear reactors, trying to prevent other countries from obtaining sensitive techniques essential to full use of energy resources, or postponing *sine die* research and development on new methods for the peaceful use of atomic energy such as fast-breeder reactors which, precisely because of the self-renewing facility they afford of producing plutonium in greater quantities than they need to consume, are able to help towards a real self-reliance in energy supplies at competitive costs, and therefore to be of great importance to Europe and poorer primary producers of the third world.

This option, if it is taken and, into the bargain, taken unilaterally, would end by replacing the existing dependence on oil by dependence on uranium and the supremacy of its biggest producer countries — the same being also the biggest producers and exporters of sensitive technologies and nuclear services — but since the non-proliferation treaty guaranteed access to the

peaceful uses of nuclear energy, such a development would end by constituting a breach of the treaty and an inducement for many countries to slip through every control, and at least lay their hands on every kind of equipment for the production of thermonuclear energy.

The stable door having been slammed, the risk of proliferation and threat to security and peace would come bursting through the window, in even more uncontrolled and exacerbated ways.

Hence, these risks and perils can under existing conditions only be effectively contained by a control which, without fear or favour, secured for everyone a genuine peaceful use of nuclear energy production structures. In sum, what is more necessary than ever is a policy of international agreements and co-operation designed to enforce countries' obligations under international treaties, including that of non-proliferation, renegotiated where appropriate and updated to suit new developments and ensure, aside from any possible unilateral embargo, uranium supplies at equal prices, at the same time strengthening — as called for by the recommendations of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the draft amendments too — the action and control structures of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, and lastly, preventing the multiplication of national nuclear fuel centres by setting up multinational regional centres under the Agency's control.

Western Europe is particularly interested in, and should give its whole-hearted backing to, such an international energy policy founded on negotiated agreements for encouraging valid checks and genuine security.

It is in this spirit that, during the recent debate on energy problems in our own country's parliament, we endorsed an active policy of European co-operation for energy, total support to the EEC programme, streamlining the function and structures of Euratom and co-ordination of the operations of Eurodif and Coredif, together with, in the same framework, promotion of research and development on fast-breeder reactors, subject of course to understandings and agreements on European and world-wide security and co-operation being observed. And in the same spirit we shall vote for the recommendations tabled in this Assembly. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Next on my list is Mr. Bagier. He does not appear to be present, so I call Mr. Konings.

Mr. KONINGS (*Netherlands*) (*Translation*). — I too would like to offer one or two comments on this report. In doing so, I must express my appreciation of the work done by Mr. Jessel, who has managed to have this report ready within three weeks. I shall try to put forward the viewpoint of myself and my political colleagues.

Mr. Konings (continued)

I start from the assumption that a great deal of caution is called for in spreading more power stations round the world at this stage. I say this because the discussions about security in the form they are taking at the moment, separate from the question of proliferation of nuclear weapons — to which I shall come back later — are really concerned only with technical matters. The fuel cycle as a whole can be broken down into three parts, the power stations, the enrichment facilities and the processing plants. I believe that the problems are perfectly solvable from the technical viewpoint. Whatever snags there may still be, the problems will be sorted out before long. There are, however, a number of other problems the solving of which is a good deal more difficult, and as I see it these are nowhere near being solved. I believe that further development will have to wait until these problems, too, have been overcome.

Mr. Jessel, in his introduction, also mentioned the danger of terrorism in this connection. If one follows this argument — which seen by itself is quite sound — you are calling for a management structure which incorporates extensive security measures. You then have to set up an organisation that will ensure the security of a great many installations all over the world. This means you need people who are trustworthy — a reasoning we always apply in this context. You then have to screen these people, examining among other things their political leanings. This is, naturally, an extremely dangerous state of affairs, because an organisation like this could end up acting as a State within a State, and this could offer a threat to our democracy. I see the call for security services of this kind as a dangerous development. We have not found the answer to this socio-psychological problem. Man cannot cope with keeping control over the technical potential that he does however already have to hand. What is perhaps also important is that the commercial concerns dealing with these installations generally pay scant heed to these aspects.

A second problem to which the answer has not yet been found is that of waste. The problem is at the present time being tackled on a national scale. Sweden is currently burying its waste in underground granite strata. In the Netherlands research is under way on doing the same thing in salt strata; this is already being done in Germany. All this means that the solutions are being looked for on a national basis. I think this too is the wrong approach; at all events there will have to be an international study to arrive at standards. I believe that an embargo will have to be placed on the selling of nuclear power stations to countries that have not solved this problem. It should be impossible for such sales to be made.

I will not say all that much about proliferation in general, for a great deal has already been said about it. I think this problem applies to the whole of the fuel cycle, and that there should not be any exports from those countries that operate, in particular, the enrichment and processing technology. They are not all that necessary, commercial arguments apart. It means that these plants ought to be taken out of the hands of the business world, and brought under national control. This ought to be a guarantee that the installations will not become stakes in a competitive battle, for this too could be a dangerous development. The security aspect, as it affects these plants, accounts for a not unimportant part of the costs. Competition for sales, essential if investment is to bring any sort of return — and this is, in general, what is wanted — could well be at the expense of security.

This brings me to my conclusion. I think that we shall in the first place have to sort out the problem of the management structure. I think, furthermore, that we shall have to solve the problem of waste storage before we join in a large-scale expansion of the nuclear technologies. It is as if a child were being given toys he is not old enough to cope with; this can seriously harm those around the child, as well as the child himself. And this is a course of development I think we should not help along. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Konings.

I call Dr. Phipps.

Dr. PHIPPS (*United Kingdom*). — I begin by congratulating Mr. Jessel on producing his report in a very short time after Senator van Kleeff had left. I had occasion at the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to say to Mr. Jessel that I felt that the draft recommendations were extremely anodyne but that that was hardly surprising given the political complexion of the Committee concerned. I think that they are anodyne, but I do not propose to criticise them in great detail because I think that Mr. Jessel has done us a service in giving us the opportunity through these recommendations to discuss the greater problem.

I am myself an energy scientist, a geologist by profession and training and a petroleum geologist by profession, and I have been aware for many years now, certainly for longer than fifteen years, that the impending oil shortage was upon us. People in the oil industry have been saying things like this ever since Dr. King Hubbard in the United States in the 1950s pointed out that the United States would by 1963 be using more oil each year than it was discovering each year. Similar studies done for the world pointed out that in the early 1990s the same would be true for the world as a whole. Purely

Dr. Phipps (continued)

as a scientist, knowing that this energy gap — as it has become called — was imminent, I was attracted to the thought of nuclear energy as being an obvious way of filling that gap.

However, as a politician, the more that I have looked at what filling that energy gap with the fast-breeder reactor actually means, the more convinced I have become that we must consider alternative forms of energy and not go down this particular path.

My colleague Mr. Robin Cook gave some very powerful economic arguments against the use and development of the fast-breeder reactor. Indeed, I think it is true to say that nuclear energy by and large has been very disappointing. I can remember that twenty years ago people were saying that it would answer our problems in twenty years' time. Clearly, that has not happened. We are now hearing exactly the same kind of thing said about the next twenty years.

However, irrespective of the economic merits or otherwise of fast-breeder reactors, I believe that there is a moral case which we as politicians must consider. At the energy colloquium which was held last week in Strasbourg under the auspices of the Science and Technology Committee of the Council of Europe and at which I was the Rapporteur, there was a very distinguished and rather heated debate for nuclear energy and its usage. One of the arguments that was advanced strongly by the proponents of the development of nuclear energy was that it was unlikely in one way or other — either through the disposal of waste or the escape of waste, or even by nuclear proliferation — to kill more people than are killed on the roads each day. This was advanced almost as if it were a genuine enough reason for going ahead with nuclear energy.

To me, the problem is not that that is a reason for going ahead with nuclear energy but how on earth we are to prevent so many deaths on the road. If I were able to put myself back fifty, sixty or seventy years in time as a politician and were even able to envisage in those days what might have been the effect of the proliferation of the private motor car, I wonder whether I and others of my colleagues would have had the courage to try at that very early stage to prevent its development and go for something which I think most of us would now agree is preferable — that is to say, some form of mass transport, which is not only preferable but is cheaper and better for the environment as a whole.

I have the feeling that I stand today in exactly the same position as I might have stood in 1907 in looking at the development of the motor car. Here we are facing something the effects of which are incalculable but in which we already

begin to see some of the terrible dangers which lie ahead. They may not be as great as we have heard people complaining both in this debate and last week in Strasbourg, but at least we know that they are going to be great. Mr. Jessel's report, if it does nothing else, spells out what those potential dangers are.

My own view is that we must look for alternative sources of energy. We cannot, anyway, rely upon nuclear energy to answer our problems, and we must be looking for the forms of renewable energy which are already concentrated. I shall not go into a long discussion on exactly what forms of energy are available to us, but by and large the forms of energy we have used — namely, the fossil fuels — are forms of energy which have been concentrated forms of primary energy — that is, of gravity and sunlight — over many millions of years. We are busily using them up in the matter of a few hundred years. Those forms of primary energy — namely, gravity and sunlight — are with us today. They suffer from being everywhere diffuse and very difficult to concentrate.

However, there are concentrated forms of these energies. The tides are a very fine example of a concentrated form of gravity, where the interaction between the moon and the sun holds vast quantities of water across, for example, the North Atlantic. I understand that more energy is dissipated throughout the Straits of Dover each day than is used in the entire world in about six months.

These are forms of energy which are available to us. They raise enormous international and environmental problems, but the international and environmental problems are no greater than those raised by the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the hands of a future General Amin or someone of that ilk. They are problems that as a world we shall eventually have to face. We are a world which managed to send a man to the moon in the 1960s by spending an enormous amount of technology, time, effort and money. It may require the same amount of time, effort and money to harness alternative forms of energy. That surely must be worth harnessing if we are to provide not only a safe future but an environmentally clean future.

I would briefly touch now on the problem of waste disposal. At Strasbourg last week, it was suggested that one could dig large holes in very stable geological formations such as the great granitic shields in places like Scandinavia and the Laurentian shield in Canada. It was suggested that in these holes we could bury the waste and it would be safe for all time. There is no such thing as geological safety. One does not know what will happen geologically; one can never be absolutely sure that any kind of burial in a geological formation is safe for all time. It may be safe for our time, but if we as parlia-

Dr. Phipps (continued)

mentarians of Western Europe were prepared to believe that it was satisfactory merely to make things safe for our time and to build up a time bomb for the future, not only would we be unworthy of our positions but we would be the murderers of the future. I hope that we will not become the murderers of the future.

There is no way of stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is no way of safeguarding their development in countries like Uganda unless we actually stop the availability of the material from which those weapons are made. This is a difficult decision for us to make, but we are still fortunate in that we have twenty or thirty years in which to make it. Future generations will thank us for deciding not to go ahead with fast-breeder reactors. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Cornelissen.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (*Translation*). — I want to compliment our colleague Mr. Jessel. He took over the preparing of this report at a very late stage in the proceedings from our ex-colleague Mr. van Kleef, who unfortunately is no longer a member of this Assembly. Let there be no misunderstanding — I am most impressed by how Mr. Jessel, in a very short time, has got a very sound grasp of what is by no means a simple subject, and the comments I am going to make must be seen against this background. I want, besides, to offer my apologies, especially to Mr. Jessel, for making these comments here and now, and not in the Committee meeting that dealt with this report. Because of the innumerable and interminable meetings that we have been devoting in my country over recent months to the possibilities and problems involved in arriving at a form for a new government, I was unhappily not able to attend that meeting of the Committee.

Now, Mr. President, I would like to make one or two comments on the content of the report. In paragraph 44, it talks about enrichment technology, and says that this is also available in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan. I would like to ask the Rapporteur why the Netherlands have been left out. I can assure you that there is a lot going on in the Netherlands on this subject, particularly in the political sphere.

After mention, in paragraph 49, of Almelo we then, in paragraph 50, find the following: "The French system has a great advantage in that it is already operational and using proven technology...". This tends to give the impression that the Dutch system is not operational. I am assured that it is; I am also assured that the Dutch system is far more economical. This is not denied here, but because the report says what it says this is, for me, a bit difficult to accept; hence

my asking the Rapporteur whether he would expand on this a little, bringing in a comparison with the situation in the Netherlands.

When I read through the report, I find myself wondering whether we as politicians are not in something of a cleft stick. I must honestly say that I just cannot offer a judgment on everything that is said about the technical difficulties and feasibilities. You need to be a real expert to give a balanced assessment of all the technical facts. I ask myself whether we as representatives of our voters, as politicians, are going about things the right way seeking even more information about things which I will honestly say I hear about without really knowing the rights of the matter where all these technical data are concerned. I think it might be a good thing for us to discuss this general problem in the appropriate forum, now we are getting reports which are presented by politicians but which I believe can only properly be assessed by experts. This is not to say that I do not have great admiration for those who can understand it all.

Now I come to the draft recommendation. In the preamble it says, "Considering that nuclear energy is a fact of international life which will provide a high percentage of the world's electricity by the end of the century". I am not so sure about that. I think there is every reason to be cautious in using nuclear power. My good friend Mr. Konings was pointing out a moment ago the security aspects that this involves. That struck a chord with me. Let there be no misunderstanding: in my country at least, this is not just the viewpoint of the political persuasion to which Mr. Konings belongs. To quote from the agreement which everything seems to indicate is going to form the basis for the new government in the Netherlands:

"In the realisation that the use of nuclear energy should, in our densely-populated country, be avoided as much as possible, decisions on implementing the decision of principle taken in 1974 to build three nuclear power stations will be taken only when an acceptable solution has been found to the problem of storing radioactive waste. A satisfactory solution will also have to be found to the problem of the safety of nuclear power stations and in particular of the risks of acts of terrorism and sabotage directed against nuclear power stations."

When you hear that, you wonder whether the Rapporteur, Mr. Jessel, has perhaps already read our new government agreement.

As representatives of our peoples — which is, after all, what we are — we have to realise that nuclear energy is still, for the people of our countries, a difficult question because among other things the scientists and technical experts are completely at odds on matters connected

Mr. Cornelissen (continued)

with the safety of nuclear energy. In more and more countries — the United States, Germany and Sweden, for instance — where there was at first a great faith in solving the energy problems by using nuclear power stations, the conviction seems to be gaining ground among large sectors of the population that programmes agreed to previously must be halted, or at least slowed down. I believe the confusion that surrounds nuclear power perhaps has to do with the fact that there has really been no policy on this subject in the European context.

I am distressed, therefore, that the EEC Council of Ministers has since 1956 been unable to shape the future of the Community in energy matters, or even to ward off the worst consequences of a serious energy crisis, something that I am afraid we can expect again, perhaps even in the very near future. Even before the 1974 oil crisis it was obvious — the crisis served only to emphasise the fact — that where energy supplies are concerned the Community is in an extremely vulnerable position. Some of our countries rely almost entirely on imported energy. It is most important, therefore, that we should press on with discussions about nuclear energy. It is a question of striking an optimum balance in the share allotted to the four main sources of energy, that is to say, coal, oil, natural gas and nuclear power. My assessment would be that the contribution made by nuclear energy will continue to be quite small, in quantitative terms, for many years yet.

The PRESIDENT. — Your ten minutes have already elapsed. Will you come to a conclusion?

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (*Translation*). — I am just rounding off what I have to say, Mr. President. I have some difficulty with the first sentence of the preamble, which really is emphatic in saying that nuclear energy will be providing a high percentage of power by the end of the century. I would not want to rule out that possibility, but it all depends on how far we manage to surmount the various serious problems over the next couple of decades. I want, therefore, to ask the Rapporteur quite explicitly whether he is willing to amend that part of the first paragraph, replacing the word "will" in the passage I have quoted with the word "may". (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Hawkins.

Mr. HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). — Like some of my colleagues here, Colin Phipps and others, I was fortunate to attend an energy conference only last week in Strasbourg. That conference was arranged by the Council of Europe. I believe that many of the contributions made

there should be studied with great care by the Defence Committee and by the Scientific Committee of Western European Union.

We were fortunate in having experts at that conference. I do not always believe in experts, but I believe that we got a picture of the world's supplies of oil and other forms of energy which made me, as someone who knows nothing about the subject, wonder where we or our children and grandchildren were going to be in about the year 2020. It seemed to me that nuclear power would be absolutely essential by that time and must therefore be further developed if we were not to be short of energy to run our factories and keep people employed.

The more I learn and the more I listen to my colleague Colin Phipps, for whom I have the greatest respect, the more I personally would endeavour not to permit a fast-breeder reactor to be built within my constituency. If we all feel like that, I suggest that we should adopt it as national policy, because what is fair for one's constituents and interests must surely be fair for one's neighbours.

With that qualification, being no expert but realising the difficulties, I believe that we must go ahead with ordinary nuclear development for the time being but hand in hand with massive research, as Colin Phipps said, into other forms of energy — wind, tidal and solar — and conservation. There is no doubt that conservation of much of our present energy resources could produce more energy in the difficult time between now and twenty years after the end of this century.

It is essential that great advances are made in the safeguards necessary against accidents, terrorists of course, about whom we have heard a great deal, and the disposal of waste. We were told that the hemicycle at Strasbourg would contain all the waste produced throughout the whole of Europe up to the year 2000. It would not be very comfortable to sit in that hemicycle with that waste. However, it gave us a picture of the scale of the operation. Nevertheless, I should feel most uncomfortable if I were to sit near the salt domes in Northern Germany or wherever it was decided that the waste should be put.

I believe, as I said at Strasbourg, that we must tell the people more about the facts of nuclear energy and our likely shortages of energy. We must get them to urge their governments to carry out further research into other forms of energy. We must tell the people about the dangers and the safeguards that have been taken.

The Defence Committee must look urgently into the question of protection and security of atomic weapons when manufactured. We had a most interesting contribution at Strasbourg by a gentleman who has worked inside atomic

Mr. Hawkins (continued)

stations. He said that it was easier to steal ready-made weapons — rifles from soldiers or even atomic weapons once manufactured — than to try to obtain the bits and pieces that go into making an atomic bomb or weapon of some kind or other. Therefore, the safeguards must be looked into urgently.

Many other matters were mentioned at the energy conference in Strasbourg. However, I do not want to detract from Mr. Jessel's excellent report. He had a difficult task, taking over at such short notice from our former Rapporteur, in putting together an extremely interesting paper which has enabled us to have these contributions today and has drawn attention to the problems facing the world should we become short of energy. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim. He will be followed by Mr. Treu.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I first of all congratulate Mr. Jessel most heartily on his report. Several people have pointed out that Mr. Jessel has drawn up the report in a short space of time. Here I seemed to detect, on the part of some speakers, a certain veiled criticism, surprise at the fact that in this report so important a matter had been dealt with at such length in so short a time. Perhaps too there was even a hint of reproach. I would like to say, as a member of the Committee, that Mr. Jessel took over this report just because he was already an outstanding expert in the field. It was easiest for him to take over from Mr. van Kleef as Rapporteur.

Today, it is just no longer possible to draw a line between rationally-motivated resistance and irrational fear in connection with the peaceful and military uses of nuclear power. Such a dividing line no longer exists; opponents of nuclear power have good reasons just like those who support it. Fear and rational argument merge, and this is shown, I believe, by our debate here today and the many debates on the subject already.

As already pointed out this morning, every step forward — from the steam engine to the motor vehicle — involves a risk. And indeed, those who decades ago predicted that the motor vehicle would bring great dangers for humanity were — as we see today — of course quite right. But in those days, it was not yet possible to spread such fears as widely as can be done today with the help of the media. It was not yet possible to have such widespread discussion nor, unlike today, was the average level of education

such that a very large section of the population could follow the discussion on these problems.

To fill out the report, I would like to go a little more deeply into one or two points which very often seem to be overlooked. First of all, we are now aware — and this needs to be specially emphasised — that the dividing line between peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy, which is still the assumption underlying the non-proliferation treaty, really no longer exists. It was — as we can see today — somewhat naive to assume a few years ago that a clear line could be drawn, as in the non-proliferation treaty, between the military use of nuclear energy on the one hand, and non-military, peaceful uses on the other. That is one difficulty.

The second difficulty that needs pointing out is this: because the situation is as it is — because, in other words, countries which have signed the non-proliferation treaty and countries which have not are both able to move from the peaceful side into the military sphere — it is of the greatest importance to tie down by means of special agreements just those countries which have not signed it. Let us take as an example Brazil, which, as we know, concluded a contract with the Federal Republic of Germany years ago, a contract which was looked at again at the request of President Carter. Brazil had not signed the non-proliferation treaty and only in connection with the German supply contract did it prove possible to bind Brazil as it would have been bound had it signed the non-proliferation treaty.

The third point I would like to go into is the matter of plutonium. Whenever there is any discussion of military dangers in connection with nuclear energy, the only subject dealt with is plutonium. I think this is a far too simple way of looking at things. We all know — and this is bad — that by 1985 the world will already have produced some 500 tonnes or more of plutonium — one can argue about the figures. I would refer you to the report — from light-water reactors alone, and that you need only five-and-a-half kilograms to make a nuclear bomb. Unhappily, it is not only with the help of a reprocessing plant that one can produce plutonium suitable for use in a bomb. We should remember that the bomb that fell on Nagasaki already contained plutonium components. It follows that any country wishing to manufacture a plutonium bomb for purely military reasons can do so with relatively limited financial means. Let us not, then, believe that plutonium bombs can be manufactured only at very considerable cost by countries with large reprocessing plants, like the one which is to be supplied to Brazil. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Today, any State with a certain degree of technical know-how can, unfortunately, do so with purely military ends in view.

Mr. Spies von Büllesheim (continued)

It should therefore also be pointed out that nuclear bombs can be based not only on plutonium but on uranium too, in which case all that is required is an enrichment plant. Experiments on the detonation of hydrogen bombs by means of laser beams are, alas, pretty far advanced. And finally, it should be said that radioactive material can be scattered by means of conventional explosives and so produce widespread contamination. There is thus a whole series of possibilities for people with technical know-how to use nuclear energy quite otherwise than for peaceful purposes, that is to say, for purely military ends, even with only a limited expenditure.

That is why it is so important and such a good thing that Mr. Jessel's report focuses attention on the dangers facing us from any misuse of nuclear energy by groups of terrorists. In view of the available supplies of plutonium — and of anything else for that matter, I would refer you to the report — that is where the real danger lies. There, in my opinion, lie far greater dangers than in the purely military field, precisely because these dangers cannot, by their very nature, be subject to supervision or guarded against by treaties.

Mr. President, these were the few remarks that I wanted to make to add to the report. It is always said and believed that, by entering the plutonium era, we shall be opening Pandora's box. I wanted to point out that unfortunately, at least as far as the military field is concerned, Pandora's box was, in view of widespread dissemination and the many technical possibilities that one cannot eternally refuse to see, opened long ago. Since much of the danger involved in the use of nuclear energy lies in the field of terrorism, we should follow the proposals and recommendations in Mr. Jessel's report and agree, because of the risks involved in nuclear energy as well as for other reasons, to fight terrorism in Europe. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Treu.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Dr. Phipps and another British colleague have reminded us that the debate last week in Strasbourg on the topic of energy and environment evoked the widest possible participation of engineers and politicians. I will not say very much about it, for fear of being accused of self-advertisement, the conference having been organised by the Committee I have the honour to preside over. When we turn our minds to the environment we obviously do not only think of flora and fauna but also of the safety of man as a primary vital element in the ecology.

Mr. Jessel's report affords considerable food for thought, but in these cases it would always be a good thing if two reports on parallel lines could be better correlated.

The future will certainly see a very widespread use of nuclear energy, whether or not this is wanted. Fast breeders, self-renewing and fuelled by a mixture of plutonium and uranium oxides will successfully produce, and therefore not destroy, their own raw material, and will inevitably become the most powerful means of producing energy and consequently causing danger. But we were also told at Strasbourg that there are means of reducing such danger. When Fermi pioneered fission of the uranium atom at Los Alamos, he performed a similar operation; control measures were largely perfected at that time and the pathway opened up towards peaceful use of the new forms of energy.

I turn now to plutonium. From the year 2010 onwards not only will the existing petroleum deposits be exhausted, but alternative sources such as solar energy, geothermal energy, oil-bearing schists and coal will do little to fill the gap, so that we shall certainly embark on fourth-generation nuclear reactors using plutonium fission. But this will be a matter of fission, and there is a world of difference between combustion and explosion. You do not have to be an engineer to know that combustion is a gradual process of chemical change of state, whereas a firing is an operation in which combustion takes place in a very short time.

If there is a political or technical control over any spread of the engineering facilities for producing terrorist weapons employing plutonium — paragraphs 81 and 82 of the Jessel report — it cannot be done by using a single appliance, or part thereof. The appliances will be used by States or international organisations building their own reactor, using the element plutonium, easily traceable on the market. It will not be Phoenix, nor the British reactor, but there will be many, many others capable of producing energy and from energy passing on to an explosion.

I do not claim to be another Einstein, but there are certainly technical and scientific means of putting a brake on explosions. The block of plutonium or oxide and other compounds may be stolen, or the whole plant, but if both scientist and engineer have kept the know-how strictly public — not private, not marketable, as certain States have unfortunately been doing, selling nuclear plants to developing countries, allegedly as a means of triggering economic growth; if the scientist and engineer, I say, identify a means of not priming the fuel for explosive purposes, the plutonium breeder reactor will also become unmarketable. What is needed is to keep it in public hands; my fear is that some big quasi-

Mr. Treu (continued)

public industrial corporation may grab a patent and put it up for sale. Our scientific and technical potential is enormous. There is no need for it to incur the fate of the sorcerer's apprentice; science, engineering and, above all, the public authority will have to be monitored. This is the best system, for the nuclear process of the future fast breeder to fulfil the function of a combustion engine and not a fire-arm, which would really mean the end of the world and not just of the State that brandished it. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. That completes the list of speakers, and I call on Mr. Roper to reply on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I wish to reply only very briefly to the point made by my colleague Mr. Hawkins about the problem of the movement of atomic weapons in Europe. He heard, as did others of my colleagues at Strasbourg, a distinguished French expert talk about the way in which barges carrying nuclear weapons were moving about in the North Sea in a very risky way and say that action should be taken. I was very interested and studied Protocols Nos. III and IV of the modified Brussels Treaty. We are well aware of the heavy responsibility that rests upon the Council and the Agency for the Control of Armaments. This matter having been brought to our attention, I am sure that we should pursue it with the appropriate authorities of Western European Union who, I am glad to see, are present here and have, no doubt, taken note of what has been said this morning.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. Does the Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions wish to speak?

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). — I am grateful for all the contributions that have been made to this debate from a large number of members, including such experts as Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Dr. Phipps and Mr. Cornelissen, who all provided specialist knowledge, as did others.

I wish to refer to three points in the debate. One concerns the new and renewable sources of energy such as the sun, the tides and the winds, which were referred to by Mr. Hawkins, Dr. Phipps and others. No member of the Assembly is more dedicated than I am to the use of these new sources of energy. I had the honour to produce a report on tidal and wave energy at our last part-session which followed an interesting report by Mr. Cornelissen on energy from the sun at the previous part-session.

We must go ahead with these new sources, but there are limitations. Energy from the sun can provide some of the hot water for people's homes, but it cannot produce it all, and certainly not in winter; nor can it provide enough energy to heat the houses. As for wave and wind energy, the United Kingdom, which is perhaps more favourably placed to use it than any other country, could derive only half of its electricity requirements in this way. Most other European countries could derive only a much smaller proportion. The other sources of energy are in finite supply.

Ultimately, it is inevitable that there will be an increased peaceful use of nuclear energy. Although Mr. Cornelissen and others have expressed reservations on that, we have to accept that as a fact of life. It has already advanced a long way. Thirty-five countries are already using nuclear energy to produce electricity for peaceful uses and some of them for defence purposes as well. But this is a movement that has come to stay. It is quite impossible to put the clock back with regard to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and I think it is inevitable that this energy in one form or another will be used increasingly to produce electricity.

Mr. Cook, in a very sincere and passionate speech, expressed great anxiety about the export of fast-breeder reactors and questioned the decision of the Committee in Bonn three weeks ago to change Senator van Kleeef's recommendation about that. But the Committee had to face the fact that West Germany, in the case of Brazil, and France, in the case of Pakistan, had already exported material that would come into this classification. We had to produce a report that was representative of the Committee as a whole. It did not split 50:50 or even 60:40, so we had to allow in the Committee for the interests of those two countries.

In that connection, the point I wish to stress is that the London agreement on these matters which took place in September was an agreement between the producer countries, including France, West Germany, America, Russia and the United Kingdom.

All the producers agreed that in future there would be a curtailment of such supplies, but of course this could not be retrospective as this would have made no sense.

Finally, I wish to stress a point about terrorism in relation to nuclear material on which I dwelt in my speech and to which Mr. Hawkins and others have referred. I believe that there is a risk at least as great from nuclear material falling into the hands of terrorists as from nuclear bombs in the hands of countries all over the world. There is a very grave risk that reprocessed material or other nuclear material in transit could fall into the hands of terrorists or

Mr. Jessel (continued)

that terrorists could steal the weapons, as another speaker mentioned. It is vital that governments get together to take all measures necessary to stop nuclear devices from falling into the hands of terrorist organisations which could place the world in deadly peril.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to reply?

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — Senator van Kleef laid the foundations for a good report. We regret his departure. Mr. Jessel reacted very fast three weeks ago and has brought before the Assembly a report which I think has been of tremendous interest to all of us.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. May I call your attention to Rule 15 of the Assembly, which states:

“No person shall enter the chamber for any reason except representatives and substitutes, Ministers who are members of the Council of Western European Union, other Ministers of member States and officials whose duties require their presence there.”

I assume that we have a large number of new officials this morning, but I hope that in any case the matter can be considered by the Presidential Committee.

The PRESIDENT. — I agree that the matter should be referred to the Presidential Committee, but I think you agree with me, Mr. Roper, that we should be glad to have television here to broadcast to the outside world the importance of our Assembly. Next time we will televise you, I think.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I have no desire to be seen on Southern Television. I should prefer to see you, Mr. President, while a debate is going on, but that is totally impossible with these lights shining in our faces.

The PRESIDENT. — The people concerned asked for only three minutes, but we will have the matter debated in the Presidential Committee at noon today.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — I admire Mr. Roper's dissipation of energy. Man's energy options are many, and Mr. Hawkins of the United Kingdom pointed out that not only are they many but the decisions are far too few. We have in our studies of nuclear energy here merely touched on one of the options. We have meteorological energy which is available, solar energy, energy from the sea and now the Joint European Torus. All of us welcome the agree-

ment between the United Kingdom and West Germany which made that possible through the EEC, but time is not on our side and the action on energy takes a decade to implement.

Mr. Cornelissen doubts whether nuclear energy is a fact of international life. He has only to look around him to see what happens when we lose any form of energy source. What happened in 1973 meant that there was a decimation of the standard of living across the whole world. Our defences were weakened in the West. Loss of energy is not just a cold day in Paris, Bonn or Washington: it means hungry children in many parts of the world. Poverty, which we had all hoped would be eradicated from those new territories in our own lifetime, has merely become a gain of monetary value for the Arab sheikhs.

In terms of terrorism, we have had a very valuable first look at this problem of nuclear energy and the new way of life which this has forced upon us. I do not think that any of us here in the Assembly would ever accept that the bullet would be any substitute for the ballot box. We know what the Baader-Meinhof gang has meant to your own country, Mr. President, and what the IRA has meant to mine.

The advent of nuclear energy has given new options to the terrorists, and Mr. Spies von Büllesheim drew our attention to the fact that it is not just the stealing of nuclear weapons or nuclear material but the ability to pollute which makes us realise that there is yet another danger arising from any abuse of this new style of energy which has come to us in the twentieth century.

We have tried here to make a first assessment of the risk of nuclear energy in our environment. I think that a good attempt has been made to analyse this, but it is clear from this debate that we are but at the beginning.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Warren.

The debate is closed.

An amendment has been tabled to the draft recommendation contained in Document 760.

I call Mr. Roper to move the amendment.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I move formally.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Roper does not wish to speak.

Does anybody wish to speak against the amendment?...

As no one wishes to speak, we can vote on Amendment No. 1 as a whole.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment No. 1 is agreed to.

The President (continued)

We come next to the vote on the draft recommendation in Document 760 as amended.

If there is no objection to it and there are no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a roll-call.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted unanimously*¹.

5. Changes in the membership of Committees

The PRESIDENT. — Before proceeding with the Orders of the Day, I must inform the Assembly that the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany has made the following nominations :

Mr. Mattick as alternate member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. He will fill a vacant seat.

Mr. Amrehn as an alternate member of the General Affairs Committee. He will fill a vacant seat.

Is there any opposition to these nominations ?...

As there is no opposition, they are agreed.

6. European security and African problems

(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 754)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is a vote by roll-call on the draft recommendation on European security and African problems in Document 754 which was amended by the Assembly yesterday afternoon. The amended text has been distributed. I draw the attention of the Assembly to an error in the French text only, as follows : At the beginning of the third paragraph of the preamble, instead of "*considérant*" it should read "*constatant*".

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, yesterday evening after the vote on the amendments I had no further opportunity to express my overall position. I would like to do so briefly now, if I may.

The PRESIDENT. — We finished before you made your final remarks. As Rapporteur, will you please take the floor.

1. See page 33.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. I draw your attention to the Official Report of yesterday's sitting where you, Sir, were on the point of putting this question to the vote. You said, and I quote :

"Ladies and gentlemen, we shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 754 as amended."

Mr. Page then rose on a point of order dealing with the voting procedure. Once you have started upon a vote, which is what I believe you did in yesterday's proceedings, surely it is out of order to allow further debate to take place on the substance of the matter. Therefore, Mr. President, I would like you to consider again the ruling you have just given.

The PRESIDENT. — I am sorry, Mr. Roper, you are right. I closed the debate. We went on to vote but postponed the voting until this morning for a number of reasons, one of which was fairness to those who had already left thinking that they would be voting this morning. I am sorry, but I cannot give Mr. Müller the chance to reply to the amendments. We must have a roll-call, starting with Mr. Treu.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. You will clearly recall that yesterday evening Mr. Page, who has already been referred to, requested information about the number of members required for a roll-call vote. In accordance with the general rules of the Assembly, you replied that forty-five was the requisite number. A few minutes ago, I checked the register for a quite different reason and found that there were only forty-nine members registered about half an hour ago. Now, several members have deliberately — I use the word advisedly — left the chamber. I ask you to rule, if the requisite forty-five are not present, whether or not the departure of those members should be taken into account in order to permit the vote to be taken.

The PRESIDENT. — I must inform you, Mr. Urwin, that voting here is not compulsory. The fact of ladies or gentlemen leaving the chamber does not constitute a problem for the President ; he does not have to call them in again. It is not compulsory. The necessary number is forty-five.

We shall therefore take a vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Treu.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

The President (continued)

The quorum has not been reached. Therefore, we shall have to vote again at the next sitting this afternoon. We go on now with the Orders of the Day.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. I should like clarification of the situation. Is it in accordance with the rules for members present to abstain otherwise than by saying "Abstention"? I notice that, for example, Mr. Page is present, and he did not vote "Yes", "No" or "Abstention". Is that in accordance with the rules? Will you clarify the situation?

The PRESIDENT. — It is in accordance with the rules of the Assembly. I cannot force anyone to take part in the voting.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — Further to that point of order and further to the point of order that I raised earlier, Mr. President. I ask you seriously to consider allowing an entry to be made in the record of these proceedings which would show quite clearly that, following the extensive debate yesterday and several votes on the amendments, some of which were adopted and others of which were rejected, the democratic processes of this Assembly were completely exhausted and we were deterred from taking a vote only because of people in the minority wishing to take advantage of the rule, as they are entitled to do.

We have come here this morning clearly with the requisite numerical quorum to conduct the vote, but, by deliberate physical abstention — in other words, by deliberate departure from the chamber — the democratic processes of this Assembly have been not only negated and nullified but held up to ridicule because of the action of those members, including the Rapporteur, who chose to ignore their responsibility on this vote.

I hope that, in the interests of democracy and of the Western European Union Assembly, we may put something on the record deploring the action that has been taken. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — No doubt, Mr. Urwin, your remarks will be taken into the minutes of this meeting. Perhaps we shall have a chance of discussing this problem in the Presidential Committee which has been summoned to meet during the luncheon interval.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Further to that point of order, Mr. President. This is in connection with Mr. Stoffelen's point of order. Rule 36 states:

"The Assembly shall not take any decision unless more than half the Representatives are present."

In addition to those who voted, I was able to see other members of the Assembly present in this chamber at the time. I refer in particular to Mr. Page, who was so insistent yesterday about the processes of democracy being followed and that as many members as possible should vote. Mr. Page was present. I am glad that he is now coming back into the hemicycle.

I should like to know how, under Rule 36 (1), you define those who are present and those who are absent. It is surely not the same as those who cast votes.

The PRESIDENT. — We found out at the beginning that forty-five members were present. I cannot force anyone to stay. I am sorry, but the President cannot force anyone to stay or to leave.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — The question that I am concerned about, Mr. President, is not perhaps the one that you have answered. As I understand it, you are able to add up those who voted "Aye", those who voted "No" and those who said, as one or two honourably did, "Abstention".

Rule 36 (1), which determines the quorum, to which you referred in giving the result of the vote, states:

"The Assembly shall not take any decision unless more than half the Representatives are present."

With respect, it does not say "take part in the vote". I should like to point out that, at the time you gave your ruling, there were other members of the Assembly present who, unfortunately, did not have the courage to open their mouths. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Roper, I must refer you to Rule 36 (3), which states:

"A vote by roll-call shall in no circumstances be valid, nor the result be made public" — I emphasise that — "if the vote shows that a majority of representatives was not present."

There were more than forty-five members present. If members decide to leave, I cannot make them stay. I think that we should reflect on the whole of Rule 36. It is at present valid and, as President, I must follow it.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I certainly do not wish to challenge your ruling, Mr. President, or the declaration that you have made. However, I wish to point out that there is an apparent conflict between paragraphs 1 and 3 of Rule 36. Perhaps you might like to give further consideration to this matter and refer it to the appropriate Committee of the Assembly for clarification. I suggest that we need clarification particularly on occasions when members do not physically withdraw from the hemicycle but are

Mr. Roper (continued)

present within this very room when the votes are taking place. On this occasion, in keeping with Rule 36 (3), you were right to rule as you did.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Müller, on a point of order.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would like to take a stage further what Mr. Roper said, since it seems to me he is basically right. It shows the whole dialectic method applied in these proceedings. When things get awkward, this clause is applied, and when they do not, the clause is not applied. Let me illustrate this with an example. If Mr. Roper is right in saying that the procedure for voting should not be begun when it can be seen that a quorum is not present, then voting should not have started yesterday evening, as there was certainly no quorum at the time. It is, then, absolutely wrong to refuse to allow me the final word. These methods are obviously designed to silence certain people, while on the other hand a recommendation is being amended in a dialectical way so that it no longer corresponds to what was originally being put forward. It would have been possible to do this in Committee. It was not done — there were no opposing votes and only four abstentions. This is the dialectics described by Friedrich Engels in his work on Eugen Dühring.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Müller, part of that was not a point of order.

Mr. MATTICK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, unless there has been a mistake in the interpreting, you have not yet announced the voting figures. I would ask you to do so, so that we at least know what minority is terrorising the majority.

The PRESIDENT. — According to Rule 36, I am not allowed to make it public. I am sorry. I think that the Presidential Committee will decide at lunch-time to have the whole problem referred to the Committee which is responsible for the Rules of Procedure.

We will go on.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. I want to pursue this question, at the risk of delaying the proceedings of the Assembly, to suggest to you that, now that the charade has been given further point by the return to the Assembly of the Rapporteur, Mr. Müller — I can see him leaving again now — who did not have the courage to face the roll-call vote earlier, and indeed the return of other members who could have participated in it, you ought to give serious consideration to conducting another vote.

Further, if I may bring the point to a conclusion, Mr. President, it is obviously within your knowledge that a large number of members will be leaving the Assembly to catch their flights home. When the vote is taken this afternoon, therefore, the situation will be even worse.

The PRESIDENT. — The rule states that I must take the roll-call again during the next sitting. We can repeat this vote at 2.30 p.m., but only then. The present sitting will finish at 1 o'clock.

May we now bring this matter to an end? We have debated it at great length.

Mr. FAULDS (*United Kingdom*). — This is a separate point of order, Mr. President. Since the parade of sulkiness which we have just witnessed nullifies the work of the Assembly, and the months of work and much debate on and consideration of the report by other members of the Assembly, is there some way in which the Assembly can this morning, immediately, pass a vote of censure on those members who made nonsense of our proceedings by their perverse withdrawal from the Assembly?

The PRESIDENT. — It has already been decided to discuss the whole matter in the Presidential Committee which has been summoned for the luncheon interval. I have already stated that there will be an opportunity to vote again on this subject in the next sitting, which starts at 2.30 p.m. I am sorry, but I cannot decide otherwise.

Mr. ENDERS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I must protest at Mr. Müller's discourtesy to this house, in saying that dialectic methods are being used. What has happened is an interpretation of the Rules of Procedure by the President, and a democratic debate by members of this house, and I would contest what Mr. Müller has said. This house is based firmly on democratic debate and will never depart from that basis. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — When Mr. Müller finished speaking, I commented that the second part of his contribution was not a point of order. I have already criticised it.

The debate on this point is now closed.

7. Progress in aerospace

(*Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 755*)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on progress in aerospace and vote on the draft recommendation in Document 755.

The President (continued)

I call Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we are dealing here with a report which, as you are aware, comes back like a periodical before our Assembly. In view of the progress being achieved in aeronautics, it constitutes one of our standing themes, and one which is related to the activities of our several countries, which have gained quite enviable reputations in this sector and whose industries are right in the forefront of technological progress.

As you know, the aircraft industry, which is a sector of advanced technology, being made up as it is of firms in the forefront of progress, is experiencing major financial and commercial difficulties. So we find a wide diversity of views on the activities of this sector, depending on the standpoint of the viewer. Anyone taking a technical approach will stress national successes in research and development, whereas those who take the economic approach will highlight the inadequacy of market forecasts.

Co-operation in the aeronautical field has experienced a number of setbacks bound up with the political nature of the decisions that are necessary. The present lack of decision regarding the construction programme for the new civil aircraft of the eighties and nineties clearly reveals this problem. Similarly, the repeated setbacks experienced in launching European satellites are symptomatic of the difficulty involved in establishing a European programme in conjunction with an American partner, whose technological and financial capacities are, like its economic and political aims, at times not readily compatible with the development of an independent European industry.

Several successes have, however, proved the ability of the Europeans to co-operate in the realms of research, development, production and marketing. The acquisition of advanced technology in the supersonic field, the current success of the Airbus and the joint production of military aircraft — Transall, Alpha-Jet — have shown that the various national aeronautical industries are capable of overcoming their differences. Yet the wide difference in the pictures presented by co-operation in the aeronautical field when we are criticising its shortcomings or are emphasising its successes, makes it essential to form a more accurate judgment, which would take into account co-operation in all its aspects and would show what obstacles must be overcome and what is at stake.

Several problems have to be examined. First, is there the requisite political will — which must be the driving force behind co-operation among

our States in this sphere? Is the international economic environment propitious or unfavourable to purely European co-operation? What links with the United States should the European countries envisage in order to ensure that aircraft production proves both technologically and financially successful?

Another question: are the aims of joint action defined clearly enough? Have past failures been sufficiently analysed? Should the bases for co-operation in the commercial, industrial and technological fields not be defined more precisely?

Despite these difficulties, European co-operation in aeronautics must continue and be given fresh momentum, a momentum which must also be political. The aims must be spelled out, so that we shall have solid foundations for effective and lasting co-operation.

The first point which I should like to analyse in this forum is the following: co-operation is difficult but it is necessary. It is difficult; and the difficulties of co-operation in the aeronautical field have been manifold. They have recently been revealed by the attitudes of several national airlines. As you are aware, Lufthansa for a long time raised objections to purchases based on a will to "buy national" or "buy European". In France, Air France is wondering about the renewal of its Caravelles, since at present there are no European types which meet its requirements. These attitudes reveal certain weaknesses in the aeronautical industries of several European countries, in particular France, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands.

For one thing the European market is still too narrow to satisfy the inexorable criterion of viability which must be met if an aircraft is to be sold on the American market and on the markets of third countries. Consequently, any form of protectionism becomes extremely dangerous because of the retaliatory action that customers outside Europe would inevitably take.

It is, in fact, characteristic of the aircraft industry that there are thresholds of profitability which must be crossed if the technical operation is also to be financially sound. It should therefore be remembered that runs of more than 300 units are necessary in the production of an aeroplane and of more than 2,500 units in the case of engines if the firm is to have a satisfactory financial return — especially as considerable economies of scale can be achieved once this level of production has been passed.

And another point: the co-ordination of decisions among the different States still leaves much to be desired despite the fact that the kind of decisions to be taken calls for resolute support in the financial sphere, the will to make a sustained effort and consistency of choice. These three qualities are very often lacking.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

Now the aeronautical sector is characterised by the many difficulties inherent in research, whether in the matter of costs or in the lead time required. The investment burden is particularly heavy and the time that elapses between construction of the prototype and the launching of the series amounts on average to five years in the case of an aircraft and to almost ten for a motor or vehicle, and this makes it all the more necessary that the public authorities should declare and maintain their support. These difficulties would be of little significance if they did not affect employment, the balance of trade and co-operation in the military sphere.

The aeronautical sector, however, employs 200,000 people in the United Kingdom — a point which must not be forgotten — more than 100,000 in France and 50,000 in the Federal Republic of Germany and elsewhere, some in Italy and some in Spain, the latter country not being a member of WEU. In practice, however, all these parts of Europe are concerned with activities in the field of aircraft construction. The technical skill of the personnel employed is high. The proportion of technicians, designers and supervisors is particularly high, and so any reduction in the work schedule has tragic repercussions in planning offices, which quickly become underemployed. We are in such a position, and the recent economic crisis has been reflected in reduced employment throughout the sector.

Export prospects are likewise very important in the sector, which is heavily dependent on foreign trade. Any fall in demand from abroad, therefore, automatically affects the overall balance of payments. Now the decline in European industry's share in all world markets has led, over the period 1968-73, to a deficit in this sector's trade balance of \$4,500 million.

In the best of cases, the industry in Europe will scarcely be able to balance its imports and exports of hardware in the next few years. Co-operation in the sphere of military aircraft suffered a galling setback when the "deal of the century" was concluded. The decision of Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands to buy the F-16 to equip their military air forces, specifically in preference to the Mirage F-1, was a serious blow to the prospects for the joint procurement of military aircraft. In the longer term, it is proving to be a source of difficulties in the employment field, especially in Belgium.

Military co-operation can, however, provide outlets for Community production. Military sales represent 72 % of the overall turnover of the aerospace industry in the countries of the European Community. This preponderant share is partially attributable to the particular difficulties of the market for civil transport aircraft.

The difficulties experienced by the European countries are, however, not all due to their lack of political will — witness the difficulties placed in the way of granting Concorde landing rights by various administrative authorities in the United States and Japan. It is a story to which I would rather not revert.

For all these reasons, co-operation is necessary. It is difficult, but necessary and indeed absolutely essential. It is all the more essential since fresh economic and political prospects are emerging.

The recovery of the western economies makes this a favourable moment to give fresh impetus to European co-operation. According to an OECD study, the European civil market will grow progressively in size between 1970 and the year 2000, with airline fleets increasing from 600 to more than 1,100 aircraft. The aeronautical industry should therefore envisage a marked increase in its capacity in order to meet the future demands of the airline companies. An increase of this order should, however, be provided for, planned and organised with due regard to market constraints and new restrictions connected with noise abatement and pollution control. Any other approach would be liable to bring in its train fresh setbacks and fresh disappointments.

Encouraging political signs, coming from several European countries, have recently appeared. The French Government has proposed to its partners that they should co-operate on a project for medium-haul aircraft, using the CFM-56 engine. The French proposals are currently under study by British Aerospace, MBB and VFW-Fokker.

Similarly, the Federal German Government has opted in favour of continuing with current aerospace projects in both the civil and the military spheres. And you are aware that studies are at present being carried out in the United Kingdom with representatives, experts, from various European countries to discuss specifications for the medium-haul carrier that might be adopted.

What is more, several American constructors — Boeing and McDonnell Douglas — have recently made clear their intention not to work out plans on their own for medium-haul aircraft of the nineteen-eighties, citing technical, economic and financial grounds. Boeing would, in fact, only be able to construct one single type of such aircraft, and does not wish to run into the same difficulties as in the sixties, when three programmes were launched simultaneously. Since the Anti-Trust Act makes it impossible for giant American firms to collaborate, the medium-haul aircraft of small, medium and large capacity — seating 120, 160 to 180 and 220 to 350 passengers respectively — will accordingly be the outcome

Mr. Valleix (continued)

of European-American co-operation or of close collaboration among European countries.

It is all the more important to give a fresh fillip to co-operation since the way in which market shares are developing is at present unfavourable to Europe: in the market for short-haul and medium-haul aircraft, the share of the United States is on the decline and Europe's share remains static, whereas that of the rest of the world is declining sharply. Although this trend could have proved favourable to the non-Americans, and hence to the Europeans, we find that the proportion of hardware produced in Europe went down between 1970 and 1975. It dropped from 33 % to 20.2 % of the European market, and from 9.5 % to nearly 6 % of the world market.

The combination of these two trends — relative stability of the European market against a background of growth, with decline in the share held by the European industry in all markets — was the cause of this sector's trade deficit in the period 1968-1973.

I should now like to deal rapidly with the aims and bases of European co-operation. It should not be forgotten that this co-operation must keep two main goals in view: the safeguarding of a vital economic sector, and avoidance of earlier mistakes.

The aircraft industry is, in fact, a vital economic sector, because of the quality of its personnel, the amount of value added which it creates and the spin-off from its technological research. The external effects of activity in this industry are many and varied, since the development of research contributes to the extension of scientific and technical knowledge in general, and so to economic progress.

Thus, the development of high temperature resistant alloys required for supersonic flight finds uses in various sectors of metallurgy. Similarly, the employment of computer-controlled machines, rendered essential by the Concorde programme, has spread to other branches of engineering. Electron beam welding has thus been used in engineering construction. In the same way, automated production management has benefited from the computerised processing of batched fabrication documents.

Co-operation in space, for its part, makes possible the acquisition of invaluable knowledge in the field of advanced technology, whose scientific, commercial and economic spin-off takes innumerable forms. European telecommunications satellites will serve to transmit telephone communications and television broadcasts between a number of countries. They will allow communica-

tions to be established easily with isolated places like oil rigs or Antarctic stations. They will also be able to meet the requirements of the third world, which attaches great importance to the development of satellites of this type, as it will enable them to avoid the costly process of building up ground telecommunications networks. They should, lastly, be of use in experiments with the transmission of digitalised television signals, which will open the way to their application in the fields of television, telephones and computers.

The second aim of European co-operation consists in avoiding the repetition of past mistakes and in knowing how to learn the right lessons.

The search for partners to help in building the new civil aircraft has given rise to too much tergiversation, which led only to disappointed hopes. France's various attempts to co-operate with an American partner — like that bringing Dassault, Douglas and SNIAS together — have, as you are aware, ended in failure. Accordingly, fresh lines of action must be worked out. Two plans are at present envisaged: one, centred on Airbus Industrie, would bring together British Aerospace, Aérospatiale, MBB and VFW-Fokker to produce an aircraft closely resembling project A-200; and the other, linking Boeing and British Aerospace, would be centred on a model derived from the 737, for which the British would design a supercritical wing.

The choice between these two forms of co-operation will therefore rest with Great Britain. It would be extremely dangerous if that country were to move towards exclusive co-operation with the United States, as this would deal a serious blow to European co-operation. Since the United Kingdom does not wish to exclude the United States from co-operation in the sphere of aviation, the solution will almost certainly be to establish co-operation among European countries, with which an American manufacturer will at some point be associated. The French Government, for its part, declares that it does not exclude co-operation with European firms, once the time is ripe and the main choices have been made. Indeed, the strengthening of European resources is a prerequisite for co-operation with American firms on an equitable basis.

In the realm of aerospace, the lesson provided by the failures of the Thor Delta rocket should at last be learnt. European space co-operation should take place in a more strictly defined framework, be carried through into national efforts and rest on the development of European launchers. Europe should no longer be dependent on American launchers in developing its space programme. The Ariane programme should be developed speedily and on a scale that would allow a cluster of scientific, meteorological and communications satellites to be put up by one European launcher.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

In order to achieve these goals we must — and this is my last point — spell out more clearly the bases for co-operation among the European countries.

In the commercial field, both the weight that the United States brings to bear on the world market and the weakness of the European market mean that ways of co-operation with transatlantic companies and manufacturers must be spelt out. Any denial of this would lead us into serious difficulties, particularly where engines are concerned. Co-operation of this kind must, however, be based on respect for equality among partners and must not rest, as has too often been the case, on a dominant position for American firms, reinforced by the divisions among European aerospace firms — especially as Europe, for its part, does not present a sufficiently united front. Only co-operation along these lines will make it possible to break into the United States market, which is something we shall simply have to do.

In the technological sphere, it is essential to envisage the development of far longer series. Let us not forget that failure to develop the Caravelles led to the early halting of their construction — that is a French example with which we are quite familiar, but which is unfortunately only too typical of what is happening in Europe. This situation caused the French industry to lose several markets.

It is then essential that Airbus should be developed, in order to ensure that it will be a still greater commercial success. Two new versions must be contemplated: one which would make it possible to increase the range of the aircraft, and one involving a smaller passenger capacity.

In the realm of industrial policy, we must in the last resort go beyond concentrations limited to the enterprises of one country. The formation of national groups will not of itself suffice to meet the civil and military needs of Western Europe and to allow meaningful competition — at any rate on equal terms — with the American aircraft industry. Arrangements for more lasting forms of co-operation, like those tried out in connection with Airbus Industrie, should be introduced.

My conclusion, Ladies and Gentlemen, is that European co-operation in the aircraft industry must be taken further and strengthened, whatever the difficulties involved; it must not be left to its own devices, or we shall fail to meet the demands of an advanced technology sector from which there is a considerable scientific, technical, military and commercial spin-off.

Both the current economic situation and the new attitude of the American manufacturers are

at present favourable to the pursuit of common aims in the preparation of specifications for the new civil aircraft and for the engine industry. Greater European cohesion seems, however, to be a *sine qua non* for co-operation with American industry. Long-term relations between the national airframe industries could, in particular, be fostered.

I will therefore conclude my remarks on a somewhat optimistic note, considering that at present the difficulties which burden our European aircraft industry often beset others as well. It is not that we rejoice at the misfortunes of others, but simply that this situation opens up a possibility for Europe to develop in this sphere.

Before saying my very last word, Mr. President, I should like to stress how difficult it sometimes is to conduct work in our Assembly and in our Committees, seeing that the latest replies to the text of the recommendation sent out by the Assembly several months ago reached us only just before this session. In saying this I wish to stress how slow the Council is in replying to the Assembly's decisions and, in addition, how difficult it is to take due account of these replies when they come through to us the day before a session begins. I trust therefore, Mr. President, that an effort may be made in this respect to ensure that co-operation between the Council of Ministers on the one hand and the Assembly on the other may be rendered more effective.

Ladies and Gentlemen, you will in fact have read the recommendation embodying the conclusions of the written report. I trust, in consequence, that the Assembly will take a clear stand on this text and that the Council of Ministers will do the same within a space of time which will, I hope, be shorter than has been the case in the past. In this way, we shall be able to contribute to developing such approaches as are currently possible and are opening up for European industry in the realms of aircraft and spacecraft. I hope, too, that in approving the five points of the recommendation our Assembly will take up a position that encourages our governments in the efforts they are making more or less directly to restructure national industries, often by means of incentives and sometimes more directly through the restructuring of major national aerospace firms. This should be done in such a way that the reorganisation undertaken in each of our countries may be imbued with a more markedly European will to achieve successes that should be not only European but also on a greater scale. Since such things are possible, I believe our Assembly owes it to itself to encourage the efforts already being made and to ensure that this possibility really leads to openings for Europe. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I interrupt this Order of the Day so that we may have the address by

The President (continued)

the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Mr. Jean-François Deniau, after which we will resume the debate on progress in aerospace.

8. Address by Mr. Deniau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I am glad to welcome amongst us Mr. Jean-François Deniau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who is going to give us the view of the French Government on certain questions that we are now discussing.

Mr. Jean-François Deniau, who for twenty years has been taking part in all the European negotiations, and who was a member of the Commission of the European Communities, is one of those who know most about Europe's difficulties in achieving unity. His book on *l'Europe interdite* shows that we have here one of the most passionate partisans of letting Europe come of age, of putting it in a position to take decisions and carry them out.

We await your remarks with the greatest interest. Would you please come to the rostrum.

Mr. DENIAU (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — First of all I should like to thank you, Mr. President, for your words of welcome.

In speaking before this Assembly, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is not merely going through a traditional ritual. He is here to demonstrate the importance which the French Government continues to attach to the modified Brussels Treaty and its organisation. Among the European organisations Western European Union is the one which has the longest history. It is therefore not surprising that there are those today who are wondering about its future. Western European Union is now more than twenty years old. It continues to exist, particularly on a parliamentary level. In that respect I would like to pay tribute to the quality of the work done by this Assembly and of the dialogue which it has established with the Council. Western European Union is still the only organisation concerned with western defence where the dialogue is conducted primarily and solely between Europeans.

Finally, Western European Union, in the form of its Standing Armaments Committee, has available a body whose mandate is even today specifically European. Here we have an organisation which one day could perhaps be endowed with fresh usefulness despite the uncertainties of the present and the burden of the past.

Our past has been marked by the cold war and the division of Europe into two blocs. That is why I think it is highly appropriate for this house to take a look at the present state of détente. Moreover, one of your reports deals with it.

By starting a dialogue with the East, rejecting the cold war and advocating détente, understanding and co-operation between the two parts of Europe, France was blazing a fresh trail. That policy is now beginning to bear fruit. This encourages us to stick to a rigorous concept of détente.

In the French view, the process of détente does not consist of an adjustment in the relations between blocs which would have been forced upon us by the peremptory needs of the nuclear age. That is why we do not think that it can depend on developments in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and cannot accept that we should find it undermined by the ups and downs in the relations between the superpowers.

Détente is inseparable from the security to which every State is entitled. There is no détente without defence. In this respect France will maintain its efforts. It is convinced that these efforts will make a significant contribution to the security of Western Europe as a whole. It will maintain the independence of the means at its disposal and will retain its freedom of decision. It will take the steps needed to ensure the credibility of its deterrent.

France will remain faithful to its alliances. For the endeavour to dissipate tension in Europe must not exclude the maintenance of alliances. The right of any State to be a member of a defensive alliance constitutes one of the inalienable elements of its sovereignty.

Détente must be on a world-wide scale and must not be limited to the European area where armaments are still being built up disproportionately. Détente must also extend to the other regions of the world. Africa, in particular, must not become a battlefield for the rivalries, confrontations or clashes between East and West. It is up to each State in Africa to arrange its own affairs without intervention or interference of any kind. Détente also involves mutual tolerance and therefore a reduction in the struggle between ideologies.

As the President of the Republic pointed out: "We stand by our ideology, our attachment to a political system and an economic system. We know that the socialist States do the same. We are not trying to make use of this occasion to substitute ours for theirs nor theirs for ours. In other words we are trying, in the world of today, to improve relations."

Mr. Deniau (continued)

Finally, détente concerns not only States but also peoples. As Mr. de Guiringaud reminded us at Warsaw last summer, "Détente cannot be built on the silence of men". On the basis of this yardstick we consider that respect for rights and for individual liberties plus freedom of movement for men and ideas are essential elements in détente. Our governments are deeply attached to them. Public opinion would not understand if it were otherwise.

It is in this spirit that France has always considered that only a frank and exhaustive discussion of the application of the final act, without omitting any of its parts, could pinpoint the problems being met on the path to détente and so allow of their solution.

At Belgrade we have been endeavouring to draw up, without fear or favour, a balance-sheet of the way in which the provisions of the final act have been put into practice. Obviously this examination could not leave out the failures to observe the seventh principle of Helsinki, which concerns human rights and the fundamental liberties. This was not an attempt to turn the Belgrade meeting into a tribunal, but it was up to all of us to state the simple truth on what was acceptable and what was not.

Today the Belgrade meeting has almost completed the task which was entrusted to it, which was to assess what has been done in implementation of the final act. I say advisedly "almost completed", for there is nothing to prevent any delegation from returning to a question if it thinks this is necessary. It is obvious that our delegations cannot remain indifferent to some new development constituting a flagrant breach of the obligations assumed at Helsinki. At this stage we can consider that the work done during the last two months in the Yugoslav capital may be considered positive.

On certain subjects it has been possible to start discussions which only a few years ago would have been inconceivable. Even if sometimes one regretted the absence of a dialogue in depth, an exchange of views has, up to now, always been possible. By taking part the signatory States have shown the importance they attach to the obligations entered into two years ago as well as the distance still to be covered.

Many proposals have been made at Belgrade to help further progress along this road. Our delegations are at this very moment examining them. But already we believe it necessary to point out that there is no question of doing Helsinki over again or of drafting another final act. That is why we hope there will be no recommendation which is not directly concerned

with the application of Helsinki or which would seek to change the provisions of the final act.

In particular, we do not think that the present conference at Belgrade is the best forum for a discussion on disarmament and military détente going beyond the provisions on confidence-building measures expressly included in the final document.

There are many areas in which the signatory States could define more clearly their obligations, whether they be economic or cultural exchanges, the working conditions of journalists, contacts between individuals and, more generally, the rôles they accord to their peoples, to groups and to individuals in the pursuit of the objectives they have set themselves. This is the line taken in the proposals put forward by France and by its partners in the European Community and other western countries.

It could be said that the final act was a long-term programme in which the peoples of Europe could co-operate and draw closer together. We find that there are some signs of progress. Nobody is in any doubt that this is only a beginning, for obviously much remains to be done, but that is the price of moving towards détente in Europe. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — On behalf of our members I thank you, Mr. Deniau, for your speech to which we have listened with great interest.

Would you be willing to answer any questions which members of the Assembly are, I am sure, waiting to put to you ?

Mr. DENIAU (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — Yes.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Reid.

Mr. REID (*United Kingdom*). — At the risk of its being presumptuous for a Scotsman to ask a question of a French Minister, may I say that I think he will be aware that in Chapter I (E) of the annual report for 1976 the WEU Council recommends members of the Assembly to put questions on matters that are of particular interest to WEU.

I understand from my French colleagues that for more than a year the French Government have refused to answer questions in the French parliament when such questions are connected with WEU Assembly recommendations. I ask this question as a matter of specific interest, because I have put five or six questions in the United Kingdom parliament and have received the same rather staid answer. How can these two positions be reconciled ? What in the French situation, which would help us in the British situation, can French parliamentarians do to meet the wishes of the WEU Council ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does the Minister prefer to answer questions one by one or hear them all and then make his reply in a single contribution ?

Mr. DENIAU (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — I think it would make for a better dialogue if I answered each question separately. I shall therefore first reply to Mr. Reid.

The French Government will of course continue, as in the past and in accordance with customary practice, to give the French Parliament substantial information on the international issues examined by the Council or Assembly of WEU. The problem that might arise is the following: it may happen that French parliamentarians put questions in our parliament that are identical with, or very similar to, questions put to the Council by the WEU Assembly. Members of the Assembly must understand that the French Government, like all WEU member governments must retain the right either to abide by the reply unanimously agreed by the Council, or to defer its own reply so as not to prejudice the Council's reply if it is still being deliberated. This is the procedure we ought to follow. However, subject to such necessary compliance with procedure, we of course intend to maintain the dialogue.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Cermolacce.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. Secretary of State, in his speech yesterday General Haig, described by WEU documents as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, conveyed his misgivings concerning the entry of communist ministers into Western European governments, and the possible military consequences.

This constitutes renewed interference in the internal affairs of those countries, particularly my own, and is both crude and out of place, for General Haig has no authority to give France any political or military directives whatsoever.

I should be obliged, Mr. Secretary of State, if you would inform me of what the French Government thinks of such intrusion into our affairs on our own national territory.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Deniau.

Mr. DENIAU (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — I am not sure that was exactly what General Haig said, at least not in that form. He only spoke of security problems that would arise, which is rather a different matter.

Having said that, and since we are in a democracy and treading on democratic soil, I cannot contest other people's opinions; but what

I can do is express my own. I consider, as indeed the French Government has repeatedly had occasion to recall, that we absolutely have to keep our independence, and that our internal affairs, and external ones too, depend primarily and solely on ourselves.

I think that is a perfectly clear reply, both to General Haig and to your own question.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Radius.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — I have two questions.

The first is as follows: does not the fact that Europe cannot defend itself without United States support, whereas United States commitment to the defence of Europe is not automatic, demand that Europeans consult among themselves on their defence policy? What does the Secretary of State think about it?

My second question relates to his recent book *L'Europe interdite*. On page 269 he says that "Europe's own efforts in defence matters should be directed towards developing institutional arrangements for the possible use of arms". What does he regard as the suitable institutional framework for discussions on this subject among Western European countries?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Deniau.

Mr. DENIAU (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — Let me first thank Mr. Radius — it is not so often that an author comes across one of his own readers. (*Laughter*) I very much appreciate his attention.

I think that there are actually two separate questions: within what framework can Europeans confer together in the armaments area, and does such co-operation presuppose concertation on the philosophy of their use?

I personally, like many people, have been struck by the need to improve or develop co-operation among Europeans. Such collaboration already exists. France does not belong to Eurogroup, which is a component part of the integrated organisation, but, as Mr. Radius said, it takes an active part in the work of the Rome group, of which it was a founder member, and is currently looking into the establishment of a joint programme and a kind of code of good conduct for participating countries. We think that the IEPG is doing useful work and therefore have no reason not to venture farther along this European path.

I can also tell you that the recent meeting of German, British and French Defence Ministers at Salon-de-Provence revealed a very

Mr. Deniau (continued)

large measure of agreement between the three countries on such an approach.

Can one go any further in this area in the absence of European collaboration properly so-called on the methods of using these armaments? I think that is Mr. Radius's basic question. I would reply that, on the security plane France feels complete solidarity with the nations with which it has embarked upon the construction of Europe. It is aware that it must take into account what happens beyond its own frontiers. Having recalled this position, I stress that there is no question of France's giving up its freedom of decision in advance by entering into automatic commitments, whether operational or political. On the other hand, and as I saw it, I think that there is a fairly large area in which contacts or conversations can be useful, even if at this stage they can only be contacts and conversations. There exist contacts between the general staffs; they are solely technical contacts for the purpose, say, of considering what would happen if the Alliance were put to the test, and indeed I do think that envisaging a number of hypotheses at this stage may have its usefulness. All this is simply a matter of commonsense.

Conversely, I think there should be no question — in the absence of a European policy as such — of undertaking in advance at the political level proper, since we have not yet reached that stage, to fill certain posts or react in specific ways in clearly-defined cases.

I would therefore say, in answer to Mr. Radius, that we are not, at this stage, concerned with a full definition going as far as specific commitments, and that such definition is doubtless neither possible nor desirable; but the fact of developing of a certain form of co-operation in armaments matters and conducting a certain number of conversations of the kind to which I have referred can, obviously, have their uses.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I should also like to take the opportunity, if you will allow me, to put two questions, although I am afraid I have not yet had the pleasure of reading Mr. Deniau's book.

My first question is as follows: Does the Secretary of State think that, after the European Parliament has been elected by universal suffrage, the WEU Assembly will be able to go on debating defence matters — as would appear absolutely essential? Does he think, therefore, that the Assembly's powers will remain unchanged?

My second question is of a very different kind: does he see any connection between the current discussions in Vienna on balanced force reductions and the talks in Belgrade?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Deniau.

Mr. DENIAU (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — Mr. President, as far as the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage is concerned, the French Government, in subscribing to this method of electing the European parliamentary assembly, made no bones about the fact that the new procedure for appointing members of that assembly could in no way alter the powers of this one, which would be neither diminished nor increased. The French Government confirmed its position during the debates on the approval of the Council's decision of 29th September 1976 in the National Assembly and the Senate. Article 2 of the act of approval stipulates that "any change in the powers of the assembly of the European Communities from the situation pertaining on the date of signature of the act for the election of representatives to the assembly by direct universal suffrage shall, unless it has been the subject of an authorisation of ratification or approval in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties of Paris and Rome and has, where applicable, given rise to a revision of the Constitution in accordance with the decision of the Constitutional Council of 30th December 1976, be null and void in regard to France."

I do not therefore think that the matter to which you refer gives any cause for concern, especially as in any case the European parliamentary assembly's powers relate only to matters covered by the treaties. It is therefore not entitled to deliberate on matters of defence.

It can therefore be said that your Assembly's powers will not be in any way changed and will remain intact as regards the essential object of its activities, that is, the defence issues whose importance has again been made clear to us today.

As to a connection between the Belgrade conference and the Vienna talks, we are, as you know, participating rather actively in the Belgrade conference, but we have always refused to take part in the Vienna operation for a number of substantive reasons.

We consider that while disarmament is a matter of extreme importance, it must be real disarmament, that is, it must apply to everybody and be genuine and controlled. It must not lead to a situation in which one type of weapon is restricted while another fairly considerable one remains free from control and restrictions. Partial limitation would increase the imbalance

Mr. Deniau (continued)

between countries according to which ones were involved. In simple terms, it would lead to a situation in which, aside from the superpowers, there would be a number of limitations on other countries. This would not be real disarmament; it would simply be a partial operation.

Therefore, the two conferences should not be linked together. Each has its own characteristics and difficulties. Their purpose, nature and participants are different. We should endeavour to apply the final act of Helsinki as fully as possible, as I said a short while ago, taking the section on respect for persons as an essential and fundamental ingredient of détente. I do not think we should mix up different kinds of conference and objectives.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I must apologise to the Secretary of State that I have not yet been able to read his book, although his publishers were wise enough to put an advertisement in last night's edition of *Le Monde*, so at least I knew that it was being published and that I can read it.

Will the Secretary of State accept that we were particularly interested in what he said: that, while the Belgrade conference was not a tribunal, it would have to take action if during the time the conference was meeting a flagrant violation of human rights occurred in Europe? Does he believe that in the agreement at the end of the Belgrade meeting there should be some sort of ongoing mechanism to monitor and consider the human rights aspect of the Helsinki final act?

The Secretary of State quite rightly said that it was not necessary at Belgrade to go into the details of disarmament. Can he indicate when we are likely to hear more of the French initiative in the field of disarmament, which was widely hinted at earlier in the year, particularly in the area of conventional arms transfers?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Deniau.

Mr. DENIAU (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — I said in my speech from this rostrum that we did not want to turn Belgrade into a tribunal, but that the truth must be spoken there, with all the appreciations that this entails of the manner in which the final act of Helsinki is or is not being applied.

On a precise point which I stressed a short while ago, I said that this operation was not finished, and by that I meant that, although the

stage of evaluation of the implementation of the act is in principle drawing to a close and we are entering upon a second stage in the Belgrade talks, we should at any time be able to revert to cases which we regard as breaches of the letter or spirit of the Helsinki act.

I must say I had in mind a quite specific instance. We ought not therefore to close the door in respect of it on a discussion and impugment by ourselves of the manner in which the Helsinki act is being applied.

As to the second question, concerning the French initiative on disarmament, you are aware that the French Government has appointed an eminent politician, who happens to be my distinguished predecessor, to follow these matters — which shows the importance the French Government attaches to it. But I am not yet able to give a precise date for the elaboration and public announcement by the French Government of its position on disarmament.

However, I can say that one of our aims is to be able at the special session of the United Nations Assembly in May on disarmament matters, to make the French contribution to which I referred. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Are there any more questions?...

Thank you, Mr. Deniau.

9. Progress in aerospace

(Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 755)

The PRESIDENT. — We now come to the debate on the report by Mr. Valleix.

I call Mr. Adriaensens to open the debate.

Mr. ADRIAENSENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). — This is not the first time we have a report from Mr. Valleix on the European aerospace industry. I have read the report with a great deal of interest, and I want to congratulate Mr. Valleix once again on the excellent work he has done. I agree with him that developments in the Common Market in this sector of industry have been very disappointing. A few years ago we hoped it would be possible to achieve genuine European co-operation in this field, but the influence of the national industries, and of the national government departments that deal with these industries, has prevented a European solution being found to the many problems that exist in this area.

In 1973, discussing another report from Mr. Valleix after the Paris colloquy and the dialogue between European industrialists, government representatives and parliamentarians, we had

Mr. Adriaensens (continued)

hopes that joint development might come about. Today, we have to admit that in each of the three major countries of Western European Union a concentration of national companies is under way, and there is by now hardly any question of a European approach. We did not want things to turn out the way they have today, and they do not bode well for the future development of Europe. We can only record that in this sphere the pre-eminence of national rules is overwhelming. The treaty of Rome has already foreseen this. The ministers responsible for aerospace matters, who could have given a quite different direction to Article 88 of the treaty, did not wish to do so. This means that the EEC in Brussels is now able to exert hardly any influence, and that if we want any changes to be made we shall have to bring them about by bringing our pressure to bear on our national governments.

I would point out to Mr. Valleix that the Airbus industry, and its organisation in Toulouse, is too French-oriented to be acceptable to the other big European countries. I do agree with him that if European industry has to build an aircraft series this will have to be based on the Airbus, and it will have to happen in collaboration with all the West European aircraft manufacturers and airlines.

If we are to achieve this, the Airbus sales organisation cannot however stay at Toulouse. I believe we would have to talk in terms of a European organisation centred, for example, in Paris, which could then be known as the European aircraft manufacturing centre. An organisation like Euromissile, which currently has production going on in various West European countries, could also be sited in this centre; it needs a sales organisation that is centrally placed and easily accessible to a lot of people.

As to production itself, it is unarguable that the three major countries — France, Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany — should have a part to play. Toulouse could then be the centre for the family of an Airbus aircraft derived directly from the A-300B. Airbuses with a capacity of 160-180 seats could be built in Britain, while Hamburg in West Germany could have the department dealing with repairs, replacement parts and the associated services for maintaining Airbuses already supplied to customers. This would let the airlines call on a European organisation for all the help needed for keeping their fleets in operation.

To ensure a fair sharing of the work, it would be well for the German, Dutch and Belgian industries to work together. It would provide a balance between the German-cum-Benelux industries and the British and French industries.

I would agree with Mr. Valleix that these European industries cannot remain in being if they are not set up so as to be able to offer real competition to those of the United States.

Where I cannot go along with Mr. Valleix is in the viewpoints put forward in the introduction to his explanatory memorandum, where he talks about production of F-16 engines. Although Belgium has no aircraft-manufacturing industry, it undeniably has had one for many years past for building aero-engines. The job of manufacturing F-16 engines is thus of enormous advantage to Belgium, enabling the country to keep an army of technically-skilled workers in jobs. And I am convinced that after 1985, precisely because there are these skilled workers with the experience they will have built up over the next few years, these leading Belgian companies will be assured of winning further orders.

I will end what I hope is constructive criticism by saying that I gladly endorse the draft recommendation, as adopted by the Committee on 3rd November 1977. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Adriaensens.

Before we proceed with the debate, I wish to inform representatives that after this debate and the vote, which will take only some twenty minutes, I shall call Mr. Tanghe to present the report on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

In this debate I now call Mr. Bernini. He will be followed by Mr. Cornelissen, who will be followed by Mr. Treu.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I too would like to convey my appreciation of Mr. Valleix's report and the draft recommendations tabled. In particular, I would like to underline certain aspects, for I do not feel that adequate guidelines and indications have been given for coping with the weaknesses and risks besetting Europe's military and civil aircraft industry — which you, Mr. Valleix, heavily emphasised — with the urgent need for consolidation, in Europe and world-wide, with the reproaches heaped on the European governments in the recommendations because of their vacillations and inability to reach agreement on a common aerospace policy and "promote a unified civil and military aircraft... market".

Firstly, I do not think we can achieve an effective common European policy, as rightly called for and reiterated by Mr. Adriaensens, by evading, as is clear in some parts of the report, the reality of the variety of conditions, and even less by perpetuating the existing inequalities of development among the different countries, by even initially associating some of them in aeronautical production and defining its orien-

Mr. Bernini (continued)

tation and then expecting the others to share the possible risks involved and market research in a given instance. This is where I think the development limitations and difficulties encountered by a European policy, throughout recent years, mainly lie.

Certainly, there is no getting away from existing differences in development. But if we want to construct an effective European aeronautical policy coherently pursued by all governments even with these initial handicaps, we have to seek at every phase, from the initial one on, a collaboration and partnership of all countries, according to their abilities, their aircraft industries and users, in order to lay down guidelines and define production capabilities and organise procurement and sales outlets, thus realising a joint economic and financial commitment of the various countries, and in the final analysis enabling a genuine common aeronautical policy to be prosecuted.

Well, this has not always been done in the past. Only now does there appear to be in some areas a wish to proceed in this direction on the part of the bigger countries' industries in the sector, whereas we think that this course ought to be followed more resolutely if we really want to give the European aircraft industry the joint boost asked for by Mr. Valleix.

Secondly, a common European aeronautical policy founded on intergovernmental co-operation and partnership between European producers and consumers cannot, I think, as suggested in some passages of the report, be thought of as setting up in opposition to American industry. I think it would be, among other things, foolish, given the standards achieved by the United States civil and military aircraft industry, but especially it would be contrary to the existing collaborative arrangements between European and American firms in the sector.

The search for a common and co-ordinated European approach to American aircraft producers, mentioned in the recommendations and several times referred to by Mr. Valleix, is surely both timely and important, and will go on; but in our opinion it should aim at making mutual interests even more profitable, equalising the existing relations of bilateral and multinational collaboration with American aircraft producers and consumers not only in certain areas and for certain types of aircraft as stated, but, where useful and necessary, in all areas, starting from scientific and technological research right up to production and marketing organisation, including the American market for the construction of long- and medium-range aircraft, planes and helicopters, with the object of increasing and speeding up every possibility

and capability of the European industry, its technology, production and market development, on the European and world markets, including the American.

This is why the recommendations are in my view unduly limited, are in certain aspects one-sided and liable to undermine that spirit of real European policy we would all like to see. Therefore, Mr. President, we Italian communists will be abstaining on the draft recommendation, without, however, dissociating ourselves, I would like to confirm, from a favourable overall appreciation and evaluation of both the recommendations and Mr. Valleix's report, for which we again express our gratitude. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Cornelissen.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I am glad to offer my congratulations to Mr. Valleix, Mr President, for he has given us a clear and well-documented report of the kind we are used to getting from him.

Like him, I deplore the fact that after years of intense effort it has still not been possible to arrive at a shared European policy on the subject of aircraft manufacture. It seems, even, as if we are further than ever from a really integrated form of co-operation. I am afraid that, just as has happened with steel production, national concentration of industry is going to stand in the way of European integration. Are not the governments — bearing in mind the worrying employment situation — going to be more or less forced to shore up their national concerns with sizable subsidies, thus running the risk of seriously distorting competition and even of keeping in being companies that are obsolete and out of date?

The difficult situation we have today cries out for a European approach, so that a strong, modern aircraft industry can be built up by pursuing a shared policy. A European approach like this would need to unite at least three major groups, the aircraft industries of France and Britain and the German and Dutch group. In spite of what would naturally be considerable problems, it must surely be possible for the leaders of these industries, and for the government ministers concerned in the various countries, to find a common basis for producing aircraft that measure up to the needs of the next ten years.

Can the Rapporteur tell us something more about the attitude of those concerned, and about any snags that these present? I have been told — though I am putting this to the Rapporteur as a question — that the British in particular would make any sound prospects for co-operation impossible by insisting on sticking, come what may, to the Lockheed TriStar, an aircraft the future for which is, according to expert opinion, extremely

Mr. Cornelissen (continued)

dim. And is it true that the German and French Governments are prepared to provide the necessary guarantees and finance only if the development of new aircraft types is based on the Airbus?

Looked at against this background, I am not all that happy with the wording of the first paragraph of the draft recommendation, which calls for families of aircraft based on the Airbus. Is not this rather too restrictive? Why are other types of aircraft not being considered? Surely different aircraft are needed for different distances and passenger capacities? I really do find the wording too limiting, and I would prefer to see future needs taken as the basis rather than to mention specific families of aircraft.

I would like to ask the Rapporteur what he thinks the consequences might be for the aircraft industry of recent developments within IATA. If I have heard it aright, the IATA tariffs are in a state of flux. What is this likely to mean for the smaller airlines especially?

Finally, I am glad that the report has less to say about Concorde than previous reports. I feel this has made it a more useful report, of a more forward-looking quality. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Treu.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I hope I can manage to be brief, for we have already on other occasions with Mr. Valleix cordially reviewed these problems concerning joint policy in aeronautics, civil as well as military.

A short while back Mr. Adriaensens reminded us that when speaking of a common policy we must not always stick our necks out, and say to the others: let us make a common policy. The cases of Airbus and Concorde are symptomatic in this respect.

Paragraph 57 of the report records the extremely disappointing fact about Ariane, which happens to be in a troublesome European phase and finds the Germans have embarked upon a parallel launcher development. As we see, there is not much for our comfort about the status of a common European policy.

I should also like to refer to the reply to one of our recommendations, number 300. The Council, after stating it shares the Assembly's view that Europe needs to develop and apply overall aeronautical, space and energy policies, says in paragraph 3:

"For example, in the case of both civil and military aircraft, a substantial degree of co-operation has been established between European manufacturers."

Very enthusiastic, I am sure, but I do not think it is possible to say so realistically. The Council shares the Assembly's wish for the development in the future of a European civil and military aircraft industry capable of co-operating, on an equal footing, with the United States. Are we really sure these declarations of good intentions have any possibility of being realised? Actually, if what is wanted is integrated co-operation with the United States, and not common-or-garden, not to say damaging, competition, these statements by the Council remain pious hopes. But, as I have said on other occasions about the annual report, the path to hell is paved with good intentions and if they only remain hopes, may our friend Mr. Valleix, who so skilfully marshalled this report, manage to give these good intentions too a push towards tangible achievement. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. The list of speakers is completed. Does the Rapporteur wish to reply? He has been asked several questions.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr President, without wishing to prolong the debate, I would like first of all to thank the four speakers for their useful contributions to our discussion.

I must say to Mr. Adriaensens that as regards national concentration, I believe we are going through a period when it is necessary to do this because in our industries, in each of the countries most concerned, including Italy, and not only in the three main industrial countries quoted, these concentrations are dictated by technical reasons and questions of capacity. Whereas England has taken the path of nationalisation, France, as you know, is thinking in terms of groups under a co-ordinating body, whilst in Germany the government has been urging the adoption of forms which look less like a public corporation but pursue the same aims. It is in no way proven that these cases of restructuring within one country have an adverse effect on the European dialogue. In any case it is a question I put to the various people with whom I have spoken — English as well as German and French — in the last few months while I was preparing the report, and I think I can reassure Mr. Adriaensens to some extent on this point. Restructuring on a national scale can make concerted action at European level almost easier.

As for the present Airbus organisation, I think we are still in a transitional period but I willingly take the speaker's point that we must concentrate on the lessons to be drawn

Mr. Valleix (continued)

from the current experiment, which is an experiment in development. Whether we are thinking of the headquarters in Toulouse or in Paris or elsewhere, or whether we are considering just how the Airbus industry is to be run, I feel we must look to a future which in these things too will be better structured. The Airbus set-up is of fundamental importance, firstly because it has at its disposal a well-developed planning office which it would be absurd to give up, but also because, what is to my mind even more important, the prospects of the Airbus — and tomorrow of the Airbus family — cannot be really credible in the world at large nor can they have any real chance of commercial success unless the Airbus industry meets this requirement of permanence, of flexibility in continuity which means that existing and potential customers can at all times be sure of finding a rapid and reliable maintenance service. I believe that, as our honourable friend has pointed out, this is a very important aspect of the problem, and I would certainly go along with him. I therefore agree with his remarks and hope that, as we have already indicated to those contacted, this line of thinking will result in some positive action.

I can assure Mr. Adriaensens that I will gladly take note of his remarks about the F-16 engine. Since this report is the personal responsibility of the Rapporteur, I can not only give him that assurance, but take the necessary steps.

To Mr. Bernini I would say that we are agreed on his main points but not necessarily on his conclusion: as for the possibilities of co-operation with America, we accept that it already exists in part at the level of individual European countries and their American partners.

Examples of European co-operation with the Americans are still few and far between. But I am convinced that the second form of co-operation, which would be European-American, must initially be based on co-operation between individual countries and America, by way of regrouping, of upgrading of these instances of co-operation, and not on suggestions that they should be reconsidered.

As for Italy, I quite appreciate that, in matters of European co-operation or in any project for future generations of the Airbus, it would certainly — alongside the three main manufacturing countries — be an excellent partner, as it has considerable potential for the production of airframes and of engines. I would therefore be very grateful if Mr. Bernini could give us his support in this matter and would hope that the recommendation can be approved in a form that will make it possible to inform our governments of the exact directives required.

Although Mr. Cornelissen had the impression that there was a moment when my attention had strayed, I have listened to him closely because the questions he put are very precise and important. I do not think that we are necessarily heading towards a reconsideration of European co-operation. As regards the point he was making, I would like, as I fully appreciate the importance of the Belgo-Dutch effort in European co-operation, to say to him that we have not as yet dealt with the general economic crisis and its impact on the aircraft industry.

It is obvious that this crisis has had considerable repercussions. It is also obvious that during this crisis Europe's aeronautical industry has not been the only one to suffer but then in certain directions Europe can find, in the present economic climate, opportunities which were not open to it three or four years ago. That is one of the reasons which cause me to qualify Mr. Cornelissen's judgment on paragraph 1 of the recommendation.

I note that you would object to my raising the case of the Airbus industry and possible future generations of the Airbus. I must draw your attention to the point I made in my report concerning the negotiations which at this moment are drawing to a close in Weybridge in Great Britain, negotiations in which those responsible, managements, senior technicians and experts from fifteen countries, are meeting in order to find the best definition of a medium-haul transport aircraft based on European initiative or European co-operation with American firms, if the latter so wish.

This being so, we shall continue to turn the matter over in our minds. I note with regret that the negotiations between Lockheed and the British firms have not come to a successful conclusion. Consequently, we are now left, as I speak to you, with nothing but the Airbus project.

Nevertheless, in view of Mr. Cornelissen's remarks and my own feeling that we must find a firmer basis for our discussions today without closing our eyes to the possibility of a different basis tomorrow, I would like to make the following comment. I think it is still right to talk of the Airbus, but I would like to suggest, to come back to your point, that in paragraph 1 of the recommendation the words "In order to promote families of aircraft based on the Airbus" should be replaced by "families of aircraft based, for example, on the Airbus" so that our statement is no longer exclusive, while hoping that whatever form this opening may take, it will be a European opening.

I would be grateful to Mr. Cornelissen if he were able to accept this proposal, so that the European project would not be quite anonymous,

Mr. Valleix (continued)

as it certainly would be if we were now not to mention the Airbus.

As for IATA, the problem of charters is quite troublesome. It is obvious that the facilities which are being made available at the moment to cross the Atlantic from London and from elsewhere may have repercussions on the production of new aircraft, as these new commercial undertakings are using charters quite systematically, that is to say they are often using second-hand machines, and this could have an adverse effect on orders for new aircraft. Consequently, this is a point of considerable importance which may be worth taking up in our Committee. Perhaps the Chairman of the Committee will want us to discuss it.

Finally, I would like to thank Mr. Treu for being in general agreement. I would like to say to him that co-operation with America is indeed difficult, but I would also like to emphasise — and I certainly cannot be accused of taking the matter lightly — that we are entering upon a period when the Americans themselves are beginning to have doubts, and this may provide an opportunity for Europe to open up and exploit new territory.

There are, then, two lines of approach that we can take. First, we must show greater determination — and greater speed in getting Europe to seize the opportunities available. Second, we must seek an opening for co-operation with the Americans, inasmuch as it is apparent that this is the only way to penetrate an indispensable market, the American market, and to obviate financial difficulties which, if they are felt even in America, are also with us in Europe.

Today these two lines of approach are more than ever complementary. We must exploit the situation — not dream about it — methodically, resolutely and cautiously, for there is obviously a possibility that we might soon find ourselves no longer using an opening, exploiting a favourable conjuncture, but landed in a situation where we were tagging along behind the Americans.

I believe therefore that our determination should be backed up by competence and lucidity; and, if it is not possible to come to an agreement without being dominated, we shall have to drop the idea. I am not at all sure that this would be to the benefit of the Americans, but I am also convinced that for Europe it would be an opportunity missed.

These, then, are the narrow limits within which we have to tread; but I believe that we have not the right to let such an opportunity go past. Although I have no illusions, I believe the Assembly would be well advised to urge our

governments to join their efforts and pull together in such a way that co-operation is accepted with open eyes and carried as far as is technically, financially and commercially possible, provided always that European industry shall benefit from it and does not accept the rôle of junior partner.

Those are the points I wished to make and I thank you, Mr. President, for allowing me to go on rather a long time. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to speak?

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to thank Mr. Valleix for the extensive work which he has carried out on behalf of the Assembly in presenting the report.

The only thing I did not hear mentioned was the industry and what it ought to be doing. It might not be unwise of us in this Assembly to ask the industry to stop believing that it can tell politicians how to get together, and perhaps some of us politicians ought to try to stop telling the industry how to organise itself. We all need to recognise that the aerospace industry in Western Europe is a tremendous national asset, one which must be regarded as such by the politicians of Western Europe. It is an asset which extends across national frontiers.

The industry itself must concentrate more on its customers, in terms of both defence and civil air transport, and spend less time in the chanceries of power. The customers are the people it needs to reach. Once it has found them, it must sell hard. We have experienced a bitter lesson in the last year when a large American order was sold into North-West Europe, an order which was found to exist only when it was too late to get a West European product into the market place.

This is a debate which has been going on for a long time and which, I fear, will continue, but I hope that the industry will start moving a little faster.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Warren.

The debate is closed.

No amendment has been tabled to the draft recommendation, but I have been informed — I think I am correct in saying this — that there is a trifling amendment to the recommendations to the Council in paragraph 1, which reads as follows:

“To establish a long-term relationship between their national airframe industries — alternating design leadership — in order to promote families of aircraft based...”

The President (continued)

The amendment would insert "for example", so that it reads

"...based, for example, on the Airbus and aircraft..."

Is that correct?... I understand that it is.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation as amended in the manner I have just described.

If there are no objections and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could do this without a roll-call.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

*The amended draft recommendation is therefore agreed to*¹, note being taken of the abstentions of Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Bernini, Mr. Antoni and Mr. Corallo.

10. Strategic mobility

(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 758 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on strategic mobility and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 758 and Amendments.

Perhaps we can hear the Rapporteur before we break for lunch.

I call Mr. Tanghe.

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me say before anything else that as the Rapporteur before you today I cannot take the credit for working out and writing the whole of the report on strategic mobility. The credit for this goes to my fellow-countryman Mr. Duvieusart, now no longer a member of this Assembly, who first prepared a provisional report and then wrote a first version which had already been discussed twice in Committee before I took over the job.

As Rapporteur I therefore have every reason to express my gratitude, and I hope that of you all, to Mr. Duvieusart for the work he has done, as well as to Mr. Whyte who gave both of us so much help as secretary to the Committee.

At the time I took over the report from my predecessor, a very large proportion of the work

had already been done. The point of departure for this report was the statement of fact that already in peacetime unhampered mobility for integrated forces in their many necessary movements is most important. However, it was first and foremost necessary to find out whether or not, in the NATO area or elsewhere where the Alliance's sea and air forces needed to move, there were any hindrances to normal mobility.

Well, it became clear at once to my predecessor that the information he needed was nowhere to hand, at least not in a collated form; so a questionnaire was, at the instigation of your Committee, drafted and sent to all the NATO and European Community member countries. The information gathered from the replies, filled out with facts obtained in interviews and conversations with the people involved, provided the initial basis for the report.

Besides, one cannot in a report like this ignore the content and scope of the various treaties and international conventions dealing with the Law of the Sea, nor the content of the agreements that are being drawn up in preparation for the third United Nations conference on this very same Law of the Sea.

Finally, in order to find out something about the strategic mobility enjoyed by the Soviet Union's forces, we look briefly, in Chapter VI of the report, at recent happenings in Angola.

This, then, tells you in a few words how this report came about.

The first version was however completely revised and rewritten as a result of discussions in Committee. Although basically it does not differ greatly from this first version — apart from the chapter on Iran, which was deleted practically *in toto* — the new text does take account of firstly the viewpoints put forward in Committee and secondly answers to the questionnaire and comments on the preliminary draft of the report that came in from certain governments.

The principal decisions taken by your Committee are more to be found in the preliminary draft of the recommendation, which was also revised. The preamble to the recommendation mentions what we found from studying events in Angola, i.e. a substantial increase in the strategic mobility of the armed forces of the Soviet Union.

Then it is noted that not all NATO countries offer to other forces of the Alliance on routine NATO missions sufficiently practical arrangements of the kind needed to ensure the desired freedom of movement. We go on to welcome the fact that President Carter has called for the Indian Ocean to be demilitarised, though the Committee stresses the need for the forces of the allied countries concerned to have ready access

1. See page 34.

Mr. Tanghe (continued)

to other parts of the world in which they have certain responsibilities. The final paragraph of the preamble underlines the special importance, for strategic mobility, of the decisions to be taken at the forthcoming Conference on the Law of the Sea.

In the operative part of the recommendation the Council of Ministers is asked to urge governments to call on all the NATO member countries to provide reciprocal overflying and landing rights to military transport and combat aircraft engaged on routine flights or NATO exercises, after simple prior notification via air traffic control or military channels.

The various arrangements covering these rights for the aircraft of NATO member countries in other NATO countries, which make up a real mosaic of rules, are the result of bilateral agreements, and this is what has led to the enormous discrepancies.

What this recommendation aims at is that the more flexible arrangements enjoyed by most of the countries involved in the central region should similarly, and for the same reasons, be applied by all the NATO countries in respect of the aircraft of all other NATO countries. This should be done within the framework of a general agreement which all member countries would gradually accede to. There is nothing revolutionary about this, since it relates solely to routine flights or NATO exercises. Certain of the defence ministers, by the way, have already let it be known that they wholeheartedly support this.

Paragraph 1 (b) of the recommendation deals with warships of the member States of the Alliance on normal NATO tasks, in respect of which it is suggested first that prior notice of routine visits to ports be limited to a maximum of two weeks, and secondly that port charges for these should either be waived, on a uniform, agreed basis, or else the feasibility of joint funding should be examined.

This proposal seems perfectly justifiable when we see just how large the differences are today between various member States where berthing and port dues and the cost of services are concerned. Here again at least one ministry of defence let it be known in its comments on the initial draft that it thought limiting prior notice to up to two weeks was an excellent idea.

Paragraphs 2 (a) and (b) again reflect the Committee's concern about the decisions to be taken at the Conference on the Law of the Sea and calls on governments, through their representatives at that conference, to press first for the maintenance of high-seas status for all

waters outside the territorial limits of a maximum width of twelve miles, where military ships and aircraft are concerned and second for permanent rights of transit passage through all straits linking two areas of the high seas, to permit unimpeded overflight of aircraft and passage of warships, including submarines even when passing through submerged in normal operational mode.

This recommendation seems wholly reasonable when one considers the repercussions that impending decisions at the Conference on the Law of the Sea could have on strategic mobility, the right of transit passage through straits for instance, if the twelve-mile territorial limit has to be generally recognised.

These brief comments will, I think, be enough as an introduction to your discussions.

We have found that still today in all the member States there is an enormous number of widely-divergent rules, also often complex and cumbersome, standing in the way of the essential strategic mobility of the Alliance's forces. Let us hope that our governments will, in response to the ministers, get down to tackling the problem; doing so would vastly benefit the mobility of the forces concerned, as well as co-operation between our countries.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur, for that report. We will proceed with the debate on this Order of the Day this afternoon.

11. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 2.30 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Strategic mobility (Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 758 and Amendments).
2. International terrorism (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 762 and Amendment).
3. European security and African problems (Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Document 754).
4. Relations with Parliaments (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and Vote on the draft Order, Document 752).

The President (continued)

5. Procedure for electing the President of the Assembly when there is only one candidate (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft text, Document 751).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 1 p.m.)

TWELFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 30th November 1977

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
Speakers: The President, Mrs. von Bothmer (*Chairman of the Committee*).
2. Attendance Register.
3. European security and African problems (*Postponement of the Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 754*).
Speaker: The President.
4. Strategic mobility (*Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 758 and Amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Corallo, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Tanghe (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roper (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper, Mr. Corallo, Mr. Roper.
5. International terrorism (*Reference of the Report to the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 762 and Amendment*).
6. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 752*).
Speakers (points of order): Mr. Reid, Mrs. Knight, Mr. Hardy.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Reid (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Whitehead, Mr. Mende.
7. Procedure for electing the President of the Assembly when there is only one candidate (*Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft text, Doc. 751*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Tréu.
8. Adoption of the Minutes.
9. Close of the Session.

The Sitting was opened at 2.30 p.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — The Minutes of Proceedings of the Eleventh Sitting will be distributed as soon as possible.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. European security and African problems (*Postponement of the Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 754*)

The PRESIDENT. — Before we resume the debate on the report by Mr. Tanghe, I must inform Representatives that the Presidential Committee has talked over the result of this morning's nominal vote. We shall have a vote again at the June 1978 session and not today.

1. See page 37.

4. Strategic mobility

(*Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 758 and Amendments*)

The PRESIDENT. — We proceed now with the debate on strategic mobility.

I call Mr. Corallo.

Mr. CORALLO (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the necessity of reaching a synthesis in present circumstances prompts me to illustrate briefly the essential elements of appreciation which I and others of my political allegiance apply to the draft recommendation and report we have before us.

We agree with the Rapporteur on the need to ensure a more satisfactory strategic mobility of the armed forces of the Atlantic Alliance, and we hold that the member governments should undertake a study of the problem and seek, by way of bilateral or multilateral negotiations and agreements, an improvement of the existing situation. We further acknowledge that the new Rapporteur has improved upon the previous text by leaving out the references to the Persian Gulf.

But the view we take is that the principle of member countries' independence cannot be

Mr. Corallo (continued)

gainsaid in respect of whatever does not concern application of the binding clauses of the pact and the guarantee of each country's surveillance over whatever happens in its own airspace, territorial waters and air and naval bases.

I am anxious to point out that certain guarantees, especially concerning control of vehicles transporting or equipped with nuclear warheads, or intended for operations external to the interests and purposes of the Alliance, cannot be dispensed with, since their abolition or non-application would profoundly upset the Alliance.

In this respect, for example, we do not approve of the reference in the report to the inability of the United States forces to use bases in the other NATO countries on the occasion of the Arab-Israeli hostilities in 1973, for we seem to detect here a hardly concealed complaint over what we consider the extremely proper attitude of Italy and other countries of the Alliance on such a dramatic occasion.

Likewise we find unacceptable the proposed recognition of the entitlement of nuclear or conventional submarines of any nationality to submerged passage through territorial waters, also because we would like to know how it could be ascertained that they were on routine operations, to use the term employed in the draft recommendation.

We also deem it obvious that there lurks behind the formal congratulations a telling criticism of President Carter's action for demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean, as being in sharp contrast to an alleged need for the armed forces of certain allied countries to have ready access to areas of the world where those countries exercise responsibilities. Such a notion above all inflates and denatures the tasks and objectives of the Alliance without any decision of the sort having ever been passed by the member States' parliaments.

These considerations, which are the principal ones exercising our minds, for this is no time and place to go into a more detailed examination of the report, lead us to regard the draft recommendation as unacceptable and propose that it be referred back to Committee for a redraft on the basis of a rethinking of the proposals to be advanced for upgrading strategic mobility, so that they do not call into question or overshadow principles and guarantees we hold to be indispensable, and not only for ourselves alone. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I entirely agree with the last speaker and I would add that, in my opinion,

the main purpose of this report is evidently to promote co-ordination of the rules and legislation of the member States of the Atlantic Alliance on overflight of their territory by military aircraft and on visits to their ports by warships of countries of the Alliance.

If any question falls specifically within the province of NATO and the North Atlantic Assembly, it is this. I do not think that WEU should substitute itself for that body, lest it appear somewhat over-zealous. The draft recommendation recognises this, since it is addressed, in paragraph 1, to the North Atlantic Council.

For those who want to read between the lines — but perhaps I am again going to be accused of seeing the cloven hoof everywhere — these recommendations may appear to be aimed not only at giving warships the same rights and facilities as those enjoyed by civilian vessels, but rather at granting them privileged treatment. This, however, raises a number of questions and evokes certain remarks.

As to the report itself — with due respect for my friend Mr. Péridier and the remark he made yesterday — the Rapporteur states in paragraph 17 that: "The facilities described above are usually available to aircraft on routine NATO missions including agreed NATO exercises".

Further down in the same text he also reminds us that "the United States, which has generally satisfactory arrangements for aircraft movements for NATO purposes in most NATO countries, was able to rely only on the Azores for staging military resupply flights to Israel during the 1973 hostilities".

What is the precise meaning of this reminder? In the report it might justify the fear I expressed in Committee that, contrary to what is said in paragraph 70, the recommendation may be suggesting between the lines that such an attitude on the part of the Europeans should not be allowed to arise in future. That is why I insist on my amendment, under which the word "exclusively" would be inserted in connection with routine missions and agreed NATO exercises. Its rejection at the Committee meeting in Bonn, despite the Rapporteur's support, tends to confirm my fears. If the paragraph really does mean "only routine exercises or those agreed by NATO", well then, let us write it into the recommendation!

I now turn to my second amendment. After reading paragraph 46, I would like to know how the bilateral commitments of member countries in zones other than that of NATO are any business of NATO and its member countries. Does this mean that NATO countries must associate themselves and show solidarity with certain post-colonial adventures of certain of their allies? That would, in my opinion, be a mani-

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

festation of a certain kind of imperialism that I cannot accept.

I would also like to ask my distinguished colleague, compatriot and friend, Mr. Tanghe, about a curious sentence that I, as a Belgian parliamentarian, fail to understand: "Belgium, within recent memory, has briefly deployed military forces in Africa". What does that mean? Either the Rapporteur has made a mistake or the government told the Belgian parliament something other than the truth when it was questioned on Belgian participation in the Shaba war. I would ask the Rapporteur, a fellow countryman of mine, to explain exactly what this sentence means.

I would like to say something about paragraph 50. We have repeated on several occasions that all external intervention in the third world must be avoided, and we have severely condemned Cuban and Russian intervention, particularly in Angola. Are we not acting rather like the man who sees the mote in his brother's eye but misses the beam in his own?

Paragraph 50 says: "Britain (and Iran) provided direct and indirect assistance to Oman during the Dhofar war; in February 1977 however the withdrawal of 3,000 Iranian troops was announced and there are now about 250 British servicemen on loan to Oman, together with other former British officers serving in Oman under contract."

Surely everyone knows the value put upon respect for human rights in the Sultanate of Oman and in the Iranian Empire?

For a democratic Western Europe there are obstacles which are sometimes rather awkward.

Paragraph 68 is concerned with the Indian Ocean. In point of fact, what it says has nothing to do with demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean; it speaks of stabilisation of the military forces present in the Indian Ocean and of talks on the reduction of those forces.

While I would be strongly in favour of joint demilitarisation and denuclearisation of the Indian Ocean, the wording of the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation makes it look as though nuclear warheads will continue to romp about over the Indian Ocean. I would point out that the third paragraph of the preamble, whose deletion I am proposing, contains a paradox. On the one hand it speaks of demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean and, on the other, of allowing the armed forces of certain allied countries to have ready access to other areas of the world. Now, the situation in the Indian Ocean is no concern of NATO. It may well concern other military blocs, but not

the one we belong to, and we feel very involved in what may happen there.

This would constitute an expansion of NATO's field of action, which is contrary to the objective I have set myself — to wit, the dismantling of military blocs, which, in our opinion, constitute one of the main obstacles to the achievement of peace in the world.

The fate of my amendment will depend on the answers given by the Rapporteur, whom I would congratulate on the difficult task he has performed.

The PRESIDENT. — The list of speakers is completed.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply?

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am glad that even if the stress of both contributions has been critical rather than on its positive aspects, my report has not gone unnoticed. As Rapporteur I can be glad, too, that both the first and second speakers admitted the need for the forces of the NATO member countries to remove as far as possible the obstacles that stand in the way of their mobility. It is, indeed, by co-ordinating existing arrangements that we hope to find the answer.

Now to deal with the criticisms made by the speakers. Mr. Corallo concedes that we shall have to improve mobility, but says that this must not mean removing, or diminishing, autonomy and the right of supervision over everything that goes on on or around a member country's own territory. He raised one delicate point, that of the case of military aircraft or warships carrying nuclear warheads. I think, though, that the very wording of the preamble and of the substantive recommendation itself makes quite clear that it relates solely to routine flights, routine visits to ports or missions carried out as part of agreed NATO manoeuvres or exercises. I think the fears expressed by Mr. Corallo are somewhat exaggerated.

Then there was comment especially on the part of our preamble where we express satisfaction at President Carter's call for greater demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean. It was, indeed, initially a matter of freezing the weapons and fleets there at their present levels. But if you read the whole of the relevant paragraph in the report you will find that a spokesman for the President explained that as a second stage there would be bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States about systematically reducing armaments in that part of the world.

Objections have been raised at the fact that in our preamble we have emphasised that some of the NATO member States which have taken on

Mr. Tanghe (continued)

or carried responsibilities unconnected with NATO commitments must still retain freedom of passage. This need not necessarily involve post-colonial missions; it could well include quite ordinarily justifiable responsibilities in certain parts of the world the carrying out of which makes free passage essential. So I cannot see there is any contradiction in the preamble and the associated comments about the rights of free passage for certain member States.

I think, therefore, that this is an important point. As Rapporteur I cannot accept the paragraph in Mr. Dejardin's amendment seeking to leave out part of the preamble.

I am more favourably-inclined towards my fellow-countryman and friend in respect of his amendment asking for the word "exclusively" to be inserted in paragraph 1 (a) after "combat aircraft on". To show clearly that in our text we are talking about only routine flights and missions and NATO exercises, I can happily accept the second part of this amendment. That second part of the amendment is in fact really redundant, because we have only two kinds of mission in mind.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to speak?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — We as a Committee are grateful to Mr. Tanghe for having presented this report and for the work he has done on this document. As he said, the report was begun by Mr. Duvieusart. We are glad that he did this work. This is an important document. It has not attracted a great deal of attention in the Assembly, but I am told by those outside that the collection of this material is relatively new and will have considerable value.

From discussing this matter with the authorities in the field, I understand that there is some indication that the fact that we have carried out this inquiry may have led to some rationalisation in procedures. I hope that when we get the Council's reply it will be shown that that has been carried further.

This is not a dramatic report which is likely to cause great political controversy here. Nonetheless, it is a very important, workmanlike document. On behalf of the Assembly, I thank Mr. Tanghe for all he has done to make this such an excellent report for us on this occasion.

I speak not as a British representative but as Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. Therefore, I do not want to get involved in a discussion with Mr. Dejardin about the use of forces in Oman. However, I

should point out that there are frequent debates in the House of Commons, not merely in the WEU Assembly, on that matter. Mr. Dejardin must realise that in the third paragraph of the preamble, to which the Rapporteur referred, the reference is not to any NATO obligation but to obligations which certain members of this organisation have outside NATO. It is possible for them to have responsibilities other than those which they have within the NATO Alliance. We are trying to ensure that, within the spirit of what President Carter put forward on the demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean, there will still be opportunities for them to carry out those responsibilities for as long as they prove necessary.

I did not hear the whole of Mr. Corallo's remarks — I apologise to him for that — because I was attending a meeting of the Presidential Committee. I understand that Mr. Corallo asked for the reference back of the report because he was concerned about certain aspects. In particular, like Mr. Dejardin, he was concerned about the additional access being given, possibly being used, by NATO members for activities outside the Alliance. I hope he will accept that the fact that Mr. Tanghe and the Committee have agreed to include the word "exclusively" in paragraph 1(a) will make it clear that we are talking only about routine NATO missions and that we are in no way giving authority to the United States or any other country to use staging permissions to carry out activities elsewhere.

In view of that assurance and the fact that we have accepted the amendment, I hope that Mr. Corallo will not press his motion to refer the report back to the Committee. I hope that, with acceptance of the amendment to which I referred and rejection of the other amendment, the Assembly will adopt the report. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — We have reached the end of the debate.

Two amendments have been tabled. The first, by Mr. Dejardin, has two paragraphs. The first paragraph proposes to leave out the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Does anyone wish to speak against this amendment?...

We come now to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 1 of Amendment No. 1 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment No. 2 by Mr. Valleix, because it must be inserted before...

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am sorry to say, Mr. President, that the Chairman and the Committee have not seen it yet.

The PRESIDENT. — I has been distributed. May I read it? Perhaps that will suffice.

Does Mr. Valleix wish to speak to it?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I am very sorry, Mr. President, if Amendment No. 2 has not been distributed, for it has been issued. It takes the same line as the previous amendment, but goes a little further. Mr. Tanghe's report to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments may cause some anxiety among those who favour rapprochement and a strengthening of Europe's own defence capability.

On the face of it, these are only technical recommendations: to offer overflight and staging rights for military transport and combat aircraft on routine NATO missions or agreed exercises, and provide improved facilities for naval exercises.

In fact, a vital issue is at stake: command by States over their own air and sea space. If as the Rapporteur proposes, we adopted an automatic and unrestricted procedure for the granting of overflight and staging rights to all the members of the Alliance, our States' freedom of choice and of political decision might be considerably diminished.

Through the mere fact of transferring operational equipment by airlift, using Europe as a staging point, our countries might find themselves involved in conflicts in which their interest would be to preserve their own neutrality. In this connection, we should remember the incidents created by the use of Hamburg installations for forwarding war material to Israel at the height of the Yom Kippur war.

Admittedly, the Rapporteur would limit the automatic granting of overflight and staging rights. But these remain somewhat vague. They amount to reserving the privilege of unrestricted passage to routine missions only. But who is to define the routine nature of a mission? In particular, does overflight of the territories of European States by aircraft equipped with atomic weapons constitute a routine mission? The question may arise. In order to dispel all the ambiguities that Mr. Tanghe's report appears to harbour, I propose that we should insert after the words "to call on all countries of the Atlantic Alliance", in paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, the following amendment: "with due respect for the different positions of the member States towards the integrated military organisation".

True, I speak as a Frenchman. Both the Rapporteur and the Chair are ready to accept that this is a special case. The rejection of an amendment along these lines would be to reject realistic co-operation among the countries of Europe — for France is a member of the Atlantic Alliance,

though with the reservations of which you are aware — having due regard to the political orientations they have freely taken. The Assembly would be adopting an unrealistic attitude if it were to reject this amendment and, through terms which might be deemed unfriendly, such an attitude might run counter to the political positions of certain partners. I would therefore fear that the recommendation, which is of undeniable interest, might be thought by one or other of the partners to be going too far on this point, and so of diminished effectiveness.

I should welcome such an attempt to conciliate opposing viewpoints, since I personally am very clear about this amendment, which I should like to see adopted.

The PRESIDENT. — Amendment No. 2 has meanwhile been distributed. It reads as follows:

In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after "Atlantic Alliance" insert, "with due respect for the different positions of the member States towards the integrated military organisation".

Is there any discussion about this?...

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — It is a little difficult as we have had a chance to consider this important amendment only in the last few minutes. In the Committee, Mr. Rivière, of course, put forward a similar point of view and it was defeated by the Committee. I think I should bring that to the attention of the Assembly first of all.

Secondly, Mr. Valleix asked where this question of routine was defined. He was not, I think, present when I made it clear that we have agreed to accept the wording "exclusively routine" which defines what sort of flights we are considering. If he looks at paragraphs 17 and 18, he will see that within NATO there have already been considerable efforts to define a formula which shows exactly what is meant by a routine flight and which would exclude, for example, flights involving nuclear weapons.

I believe, therefore, that the matter has already been adequately covered. In view of the decision of the Committee to reject an earlier amendment in similar terms from Mr. Rivière, I am afraid I have to recommend that the Assembly reject this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — You have heard that the Committee has dealt with the problem and that it has rejected this amendment. We come now to vote on Amendment No. 2 by Mr. Valleix.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment No. 2 is negatived.

The President (continued)

We turn now to the second part of Amendment No. 1 by Mr. Dejardin, which reads as follows :

In paragraph 1(a) of the draft recommendation proper, after "combat aircraft on" insert "exclusively".

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — We have accepted this.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall therefore take a vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 2 of Amendment No. 1 is agreed to.

If we now turn to the vote on the draft recommendation in Document 758, I am in a very difficult position. I can accept information about those members of the Assembly who abstain from voting. I cannot receive notification that they are against the recommendation. If they are against it, we must have a roll-call vote. If we have a roll-call vote, the whole question will fall, because I do not believe that we have forty-five members present. If members agree to abstain, I can note that they have abstained.

Mr. CORALLO (*Italy*) (Translation). — I am against the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. — This means that there must be a roll-call.

Mr. CORALLO (*Italy*) (Translation). — I should like to ask the Committee Chairman and the Rapporteur whether, in view of the situation, they would not be willing to re-examine our proposal, not for blocking the recommendation but for referring it back to the Committee and enabling everyone to vote upon it on some other occasion.

Moreover, if our request for reference back is not granted, we shall only be able to confirm our vote against the recommendation.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am not quite sure whether Mr. Corallo heard my reply to the debate. I said that I thought his concern was about the misuse of these overflight rights for functions which went outside those of NATO. That was why we agreed to include the second of Mr. Dejardin's amendments and insert "exclusively" before the phrase "routine or training measures". I thought that by accepting that amendment we had dealt with the substance of Mr. Corallo's concern about the report as it is at present drafted, and I am concerned about the further reasons why he feels it necessary to refer the report back to the Committee.

The PRESIDENT. — If it is agreed to say "Abstention" we can leave it at that, otherwise I must have a roll-call.

I see that there must be a vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Adriaensens.

The voting is open.

(*A vote by roll-call was then taken*)

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

There is no quorum. The business will stand over to the next session.

5. International terrorism

(*Reference of the Report to the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 762 and Amendment*)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on international terrorism and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 762 and Amendment.

I call Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — We have before us this draft recommendation on terrorism. I must admit that it was put together in haste. We cannot be completely satisfied with it. I would nonetheless like it to be tabled, as the Committee decided that it should be submitted. I see however that there are hardly enough members present to form the quorum needed for such an important matter.

The PRESIDENT. — The Chairman of the General Affairs Committee has asked whether we can decide this important matter. I have three names on the list of speakers, and there is one amendment which we are trying to get printed. The question is whether we should go on with this Order of the Day or refer it back to the Committee and have it tabled at the June meeting.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — In view of the small number of members still able to be present, I would suggest referring it back to the Committee, so as to go over it again more thoroughly and resubmit it to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — There is a proposal to refer this matter back to the Committee and to have it reconsidered in June. Is there agreement as to that ?...

That is agreed.

We therefore defer the matter until June.

6. Relations with Parliaments

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 752)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the information report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and vote on the draft order, Document 752.

I call Mr. Reid, the Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. REID (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President, I rise initially to inform you that I believe I am speaking illegally in this seat at this time because of events which happened earlier today. They are relevant to the United Kingdom Delegation, but they also raise the question of the rights of minority organisations within this Assembly.

As you, Mr. President, may know, Mr. Craig, of the United Ulster Unionists, has been officially listed with myself as a Scottish nationalist. We have had a strict agreement that when one of us is not here the seat falls to the other. Yet today — this is especially relevant to the vote on the South African question, when I made it clear that I would vote with the socialists — I find that the seat that I would normally occupy this afternoon has been occupied by the conservatives.

For guidance, I wish to ask two questions. Is it true that in this Assembly the substitution of a seat is totally within the gift of a representative? If so, why should we publish lists of specific substitutes side by side with representatives and why, in the case of my own country, should they be so published in the official report?

My last point in terms of the rights of minority parties is that, though my own party is second in Scotland and might become the government in Scotland very shortly, we have no way of making our views known in this Assembly if we are to be beggars at the gate and dependent entirely on the whim of other parties.

My vote in the Assembly in future will be entirely dependent on whether I agree in advance to say "Yes" to the Labour Party or "Yes" to the Conservative Party. What protection is there?

In terms of being here illegally, Mr. President, I occupy the seat of Mr. Tom Urwin. If it is true that seats are within the gift of individual representatives, I must state that Mr. Urwin has gone and I have simply been recommended to sit here by some of his colleagues, but he has certainly not instructed me to do so.

The PRESIDENT. — This is a difficult situation. The rules governing the rights of substitutes are set out in Rule 7 of the Rules of

Procedure. Perhaps Mr. Reid will first pursue this matter within his delegation in case there has been some misunderstanding. We can then see whether it will be necessary for this matter to be examined by the Assembly.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). — Further to that point of order, Mr. President. Because I am sitting here in Mr. Craig's seat, may I put on the record and make to you three short points? First, as I understood it when I came as an alternate, it was my responsibility to find my own proxy vote and I was permitted to vote when another member was not here, but it was to be arranged between me and the other member.

Secondly, the position with regard to Mr. Craig was checked officially at lunchtime and it was discovered through official channels that, indeed, Mr. Craig's vote was within his gift and that he gave it to the Conservative Party and to me as an alternate.

Thirdly, Mr. Craig would indeed strongly object to someone representing him and voting for him whose vote was to be cast in a way diametrically opposed to his own views.

As that is the case, Mr. President, I would suggest that there are plenty of labour representatives who are not here and that Mr. Reid is perfectly entitled to occupy the seat he now occupies.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — Further to that point of order, Mr. President. I am sorry to delay the Assembly, and I shall be very brief. The position *qua* the United Kingdom Delegation is that there are eight labour representatives, eight conservative representatives — the Conservative Party merely being the largest party in opposition — one liberal representative and one representative, namely, Mr. Craig, who represents the minority parties. As regards the alternates, there are eight labour members, eight conservatives, one liberal and one other representative of minority parties, namely, Mr. Reid.

This afternoon Mr. Reid is due to be the Rapporteur and his seat, we would have imagined, would have been that which would otherwise have been occupied by Mr. Craig. The Conservative Party's occupation of Mr. Craig's seat meant simply that if we had not suggested to Mr. Reid that he should occupy the seat of Mr. Urwin, who unavoidably has had to leave for London, Mr. Reid would not have been able to occupy a seat in this Assembly and the Assembly would have been frustrated in its consideration of the report for which Mr. Reid is responsible.

I do not suggest that we should encourage Mr. Reid in his advocacy of Scottish nationalism. That is a matter for the Westminster parliament, not for this Assembly. But, if the United Kingdom Parliament allocates a seat for minority

Mr. Hardy (continued)

parties, Mr. Reid is entitled to take that seat when Mr. Craig is unavoidably absent.

This is an important matter, and if it is not resolved there could be grave difficulty for the Chair. The British Delegation does not wish to cause such difficulty. The matter should be cleared up by the rules of the Assembly rather than left for possible arrangements and dealings between the leaders of the major parties in the United Kingdom.

The PRESIDENT. — I am sorry that we have to discuss the matter. There is no doubt that if a delegate is unable to attend he can nominate another delegate. It is not a question of the delegation as I see it. Who is now nominated — Mr. Craig or Mrs. Knight?

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). — I am.

The PRESIDENT. — By the delegation or by the member?

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). — By Mr. Craig.

Mr. REID (*United Kingdom*). — Further to my previous point of order, Mr. President, I have made my point and I would like to pursue it now purely within the United Kingdom parliament. I am prepared to present my report having made that point, if that would be helpful.

The PRESIDENT. — I suggest that we listen to the speech. Both members have the right to vote. Will you take the floor for the report, Mr. Reid?

Mr. REID (*United Kingdom*). — This is largely an information document, though inevitably it reflects some of the preconceptions and prejudices of the Scottish nationalists. That is proper, because today is my national day — St. Andrew's Day. In fact, this is three information documents in one. The first part deals with what the Committee has done and where it has been. The second part deals with direct elections in each WEU country, and the third part provides a personal look at broadcasting arrangements within our respective national legislatures.

There is only one significant point about the report. It was written very much against the clock. The only time available for research was the month of August and half of September. That is not the best time to obtain information or to gather written material. I was therefore dependent on press cuttings and the media to a large extent, and I hope members of the Assembly will understand that.

In terms of the first part of this document, I note only that the report of Mr. Péronnet — on regional assemblies — is now due for reconsider-

ation by the Committee, though the Committee has recently been to the Landtag in Hessen. I note that the importance of regionalisation is a continuing subject in the activities of the European Communities. That part of the report on direct elections is merely a shorthand account of what is going on in our respective countries. It reveals the state of electoral bills at the end of the last session, country by country. Much of the information is now outdated because parliaments in these countries have returned and begun on their European assembly bills. It delineates one or two key areas. The first is what I call the "disfranchised Europeans". In my reckoning, there are some 2.5 million Europeans — perhaps the figure is nearer 3 million — who are nationals of one EEC country but live in another. Quite clearly they are interested in direct elections to the European Parliament.

How is that to be achieved? There are two ways. The first is by extending the franchise to EEC nationals living in any EEC State, by giving them the vote in their own home country either by returning there to vote, by proxy or postal vote, or by voting in the nearest embassy or consulate. The second way is to allow such nationals voting rights in the host country. Obviously that is a matter for each national parliament, but there are three problems: first, to ensure that all citizens of the EEC, from the Shetland Isles to Sicily, have the vote; secondly, to avoid double voting; and, thirdly, to avoid different practices being established in different States. I make the simple suggestion that, if all member States enable their citizens resident abroad to vote at home by one means or another, adequate control of double voting can be exercised.

Turning to regionalism — and after our fracas earlier this afternoon I do not want to make too much of that — in all countries apart from France there has been debate about the regional approach to direct elections as against a Statist approach. Quite clearly, there are people within the European Communities who are prepared to say "I am a Fleming, and I am a European", or "I am a Scot, and I am a European", and who think increasingly in terms of leap-frogging their existing "national" legislature. As power grows in the centre of the European Communities, there should be a corresponding growth of power on the periphery.

The third important area is the dual mandate. We need not waste much time with that here. It seems to me that for practical reasons there will have to be a dual mandate in the first European elections, but for equally practical and physical reasons — the wear and tear on members of parliament in travel and double voting — they will have to decide one way or the other by the second election which mandate they choose.

Mr. Reid (continued)

There then follows a long list of electoral procedures with which I will not bore members of the Assembly. As bills are presented before parliaments, and as these bills go through, I shall need to update that section.

As time is short, I will deal only briefly with the third part of the report which covers broadcasting. In contrast with the section on direct elections, this section is a bit of froth, deliberately written from the viewpoint of a television producer, a "poacher turned gamekeeper", as someone who worked as a political broadcaster before becoming a politician. This is quite deliberate, because many reviews have been written on broadcasting from the point of view of the clerks of our respective legislatures, but far from the point of view of what appears on the screen and of how members of parliament are viewed there. My own national poet, Robert Burns, said :

"O wad some Pow'r the giftie gie us
To see oursels as others see us!"

That is one of the basic opportunities presented by broadcasting of parliaments.

Members will find my summary at the end of paragraph 103.

Briefly, I believe that radio and television can encourage intelligent communication between parliament and the electorate. It cannot guarantee it. It usually depends as much on cost, audience response, technical equipment, and so on, as on the parliamentary time-table. Until more channels become available, continuous broadcasting on television of parliament is impractical. I do not think it would be much use either on radio, although it is so used in New Zealand.

Then comes the most important point — the most advantageous use of the media — which, in my view, is in the form of edited reports rather than continuous live transmission. These reports should be linked together by skilled commentators. Radio is of more use than television in explaining parliament to the people. It is less expensive. It is easily edited and more flexible.

The potential conflict which many thought might exist between the broadcaster and the media man in terms of editorial freedom, of who goes where, or where one can take pictures, does not seem to have produced much strife. There have been grumbles, but at the end of the day objectivity has won through from both sides.

Lastly, I say this to fellow parliamentarians : a basic skill in the use of the media these days

is part of the trade of politicians. People should not grumble if they are in parliament and yet never appear on television. They must learn the skills themselves. Perhaps the broadcasting organisations could help them to learn these very skills.

The draft order asks permission from this Assembly to continue to update the report in the area both of direct elections — that is fairly obvious, because the bills are still going through our respective parliaments — and of broadcasting, where more information has yet to be received from the national broadcasting organisations and the WEU legislatures. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I now open the debate and call Mr. Whitehead.

Mr. WHITEHEAD (*United Kingdom*). — The Rapporteur, in his thoughtful address at this sparsely-attended Assembly, said, quoting his national poet, that he wished we had the gift to see ourselves as others see us.

If others were to see this Assembly today, what would they think of it? If others were able to see the procedures that we went through this afternoon, what would they think of them? If others were to see the procedure whereby Document 758 was allowed to fall because of the failure of a quorum, Document 754 was allowed to fall because of the failure of a quorum, and a report which was submitted for urgent consideration, Document 762, was not considered and debated because even the person who brought it forward and moved that it should have urgent consideration over other business did not bother to move it, what would they think? I do not wish to stray beyond the rules of order by going into the low opinion which others might have of an Assembly, already two-thirds empty, which is waiting for the clock and is not concerned with these great matters of State.

The first thing that the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and its Rapporteur, Mr. Reid, should do is not merely to look at the arcane statistics of electoral systems or of matters of self-publicity, but to decide how the business of parliament can be expedited, as all our member parliaments have managed to do, so that there will not be, as there frequently is here, the absurd time wasting that makes this such an otiose Assembly. If the interpreters have any difficulty with the word "otiose", I should point out that it means superfluous or useless. That is what this Assembly all too often is.

One of the ways in which we can publicise this Assembly is to link ourselves more closely with those emerging systems of broadcasting to which Mr. Reid referred in his report.

Mr. Whitehead (continued)

I, too, speak as a professional broadcaster. Like Mr. Reid, I earned my living in this profession for many years before being elected to parliament.

I was surprised that, when finally this week we had a television team from the United Kingdom here, its entry was brief, abrupt and somewhat divisive. It had brought inadequate television lights, which caused precisely that stir among some parliamentarians here that has prevented the introduction of television into the parliament of the United Kingdom.

We should see whether or not Western European Union, if it is to have any future at all, can link itself more directly with the television systems of the various member countries and develop the coverage of their parliaments.

I share Mr. Reid's view that not only in the United Kingdom but in most other countries, because of the constant tension between broadcasters and parliamentarians, some kind of broadcasting unit within the parliaments with seconded broadcasters is probably necessary to produce the right and effective balance for the proper treatment of our debates. Were we to have that in WEU or in our sister Assembly of the Council of Europe, again I think that it would be necessary to have broadcasters brought here on secondment.

Because the time available is very short and people want to go home, I do not wish to say too much about the rest of the report. Drawing evidence from a different quarter of Mr. Reid's survey of electoral systems, I would simply say that he should probably resign himself to the fact that, if the various member countries of the European Community which are now preparing themselves for direct elections wish to have those elections in the timescale laid down at the ministerial meeting on 20th September last year, it will probably be in a manner which allows for different electoral systems in the different countries. At least for the first time round, I prefer the first-past-the-post system, about which Mr. Reid is rather dismissive.

I accept that in subsequent elections all the member countries should probably evolve for themselves a common electoral system. I believe that there will be much to be said for the British and French systems if they are properly evaluated in such a discussion in future. But we cannot move, in the interests of this or that group in a particular country, to one system of proportional representation in time to keep the deadline of 1978.

I think that I have probably exceeded my time already. I hope that you, Mr. President, will forgive me for straying outside the rules of order

to say what a farce and a mockery much of today's proceedings have been.

The PRESIDENT. — You were just within your five minutes, Mr. Whitehead.

The list of speakers is concluded. Does anyone else wish to speak ?...

I call Mr. Mende and will then call the Rapporteur.

Mr. MENDE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I believe it must in all fairness be said that Mr. Whitehead's criticism, even though justified, is today not quite in order. Undoubtedly there are today specially mitigating circumstances as owing to the threatened strike in France tomorrow many Representatives have already left, who would otherwise surely be here today. I am afraid this poor attendance which we all regret is partly a question of *force majeure*. Unfortunately the whole meeting has suffered from the pressure and the threat caused by domestic political events in France, and especially in Paris.

The PRESIDENT. — Does the Rapporteur wish to reply ?

Mr. REID (*United Kingdom*). — No, thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. The debate is closed.

The Committee for Relations with Parliaments has submitted a draft order in Document 752.

I shall put this draft order to the vote.

Are there any objections to the draft order ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

*The draft order is therefore agreed to unanimously*¹.

7. Procedure for electing the President of the Assembly when there is only one candidate

(Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft text, Doc. 751)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on the procedure for electing the President of the Assembly when there is only one candidate — that is, Document 751.

I call Mr. Jessel, the Rapporteur of the Committee... I understand that he is not present.

Does anyone wish to speak in the debate ?...

¹ See page 38.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, as a member of the Committee that examined the case of the election of a President when there is only one official candidate, I am able to support Mr. Jessel's report as presented to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Treu.

Is the Assembly in agreement with the interpretation put forward?...

I see no objection to it.

The draft text is agreed to.

8. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — The Minutes of Proceedings of this morning's Sitting have now been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

9. Close of the Session

The PRESIDENT. — The Assembly has now come to the end of the business for the Second Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session.

I declare closed the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 3.50 p.m.)

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