

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-FIRST ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

May 1975


II

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

W E U

BONN



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II

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Official Report of Debates

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The Proceedings of the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume I : Assembly Documents.

Volume II : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.

The Proceedings of the special Sitting held on Monday, 26th May 1975, commemorating the Twentieth Anniversary of the Assembly are printed separately.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
DEQUAE André	Chr. Soc.
KEMPINAIRE André	PLP
LEYNEN Hubert	Chr. Soc.
SCHUGENS Willy	Socialist
de STEXHE Paul	Chr. Soc.
TANGHE Francis	Chr. Soc.

Substitutes

MM. BREYNE Gustave	Socialist
de BRUYNE Hektor	Volkunie
DUVIEUSART Etienne	FDF-RW
Mrs. GODINACHE-LAMBERT	
Marie-Thérèse	PLP
MM. HULPIAU Raphaël	Chr. Soc.
PLASMAN Marcel	Chr. Soc.
VAN HOEYLANDT D. Bernard	Socialist

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BOUCHENY Serge	Communist
BOULLOCHE André	Socialist
BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
CERNEAU Marcel	Centre Union
DELORME Claude	Socialist
GRANGIER Edouard	Dem. Left
KAUFFMANN Michel	UCDP
KRIEG Pierre-Charles	UDR
LEGARET Jean	Ind. Rep.
de MONTESQUIOU Pierre	Soc. Dem. Ref.
NESSLER Edmond	UDR
President of the Assembly	
PÉRIDIER Jean	Socialist
RADIUS René	UDR
RIVIÈRE Paul	UDR
ROGER Émile	Communist
SCHMITT Robert	UDR (App.)
VALLEIX Jean	UDR
VITTER Pierre	Ind. Rep.

Substitutes

MM. BEAUGUITTE André	Ind. Rep.
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BIZET Émile	UDR (App.)
BOURGEOIS Georges	UDR
CERMOLACCE Paul	Communist
DAILLET Jean-Marie	Soc. Dem. Ref.
DEPIETRI César	Communist
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	UDR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
LA COMBE René	UDR

MM. du LUART Ladislav	RIAS
MÉNARD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SOUSTELLE Jacques	Non-party
VADEPIED Raoul	UCDP
WEBER Pierre	Ind. Rep. (App.)

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ALBER Siegbert	CDU
AMREHN Franz	CDU
DREGGER Alfred	CDU
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
GESSNER Manfred	SPD
KEMPFLER Friedrich	CDU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU
MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
MATTICK Kurt	SPD
MENDE Erich	CDU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU
RICHTER Klaus	SPD
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
Mrs. SCHUCHARDT Helga	FDP
MM. SCHWENCKE Olaf	SPD
SIEGLERSCHMIDT Hellmut	SPD
Mrs. WOLF Erika	CDU

Substitutes

Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM. BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
CARSTENS Karl	CDU
GÖLTER Georg	CDU
HAASE Horst	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
KLEPSCH Egon	CDU
KLIESING Georg	CDU
LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU
LENZER Christian	CDU
PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
SCHAÜBLE Wolfgang	CDU
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
VOHRER Manfred	FDP
WALTHER Rudi	SPD
WENDE Manfred	SPD
WÖRNER Manfred	CDU
WURBS Richard	FDP

ITALY

Representatives

MM. AVERARDI Giuseppe	Socialist
BETTIOL Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
BOLOGNA Giacomo	Chr. Dem.
COPPOLA Mattia	Chr. Dem.
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
LAFORGIA Antonio	Chr. Dem.
LEGGIERI Vincenzo	Chr. Dem.
MAMMI Oscar	Republican
MINNOCCI Giacinto	Socialist
Mrs. MIOTTI CARLI Amalia	Chr. Dem.
MM. PECORARO Antonio	Chr. Dem.
PICA Domenico	Chr. Dem.
PRETI Luigi	Socialist
QUILLERI Fausto Samuele	Liberal
TALAMONA Augusto	Socialist
TREU Renato	Chr. Dem.
VEDOVATO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
ZAFFANELLA Renzo	Socialist

Substitutes

MM. ARFÈ Gaetano	Socialist
ARTALI Mario	Socialist
BONALDI Umberto	Liberal
CASTELLUCCI Albertino	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. CATTANEO-PETRINI Giannina	Chr. Dem.
MM. CAVEZZALI Paolo	Socialist
FARABEGOLI Furio	Chr. Dem.
LA ROSA Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
MAGLIANO Terenzio	Socialist
MANCINI Antonio	Chr. Dem.
MONETTI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
NEGRARI Andrea	Chr. Dem.
PACINI Arturo	Chr. Dem.
PREARO Roberto	Chr. Dem.
PUMILIA Calogero	Chr. Dem.
REALE Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
SANTALCO Carmelo	Chr. Dem.
SPORA Ettore	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. ABENS Victor	Soc. Workers
MARGUE Georges	Chr. Soc.
MART René	Dem.

Substitutes

MM. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
KONEN René	Dem.
SPAUTZ Jean	Chr. Soc.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. CORNELISSEN Pam	Pop. Cath.
DANKERT Pieter	Labour
LETSCHERT Hendrik	Pop. Cath.
de NIET Maarten	Labour
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	Antirevolution.
VOOGD Joop	Labour

Substitutes

MM. de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
van OOIJEN David	Labour
PEIJNENBURG Marinus	Pop. Cath.
PIKET Frederik	Chr. Hist.
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
WALTMANS Henk	Radical

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

MM. Ronald BROWN	Labour
Paul CHANNON	Conservative
Stanley COHEN	Labour
Julian CRITCHLEY	Conservative
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. Raymond FLETCHER	Labour
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
John HUNT	Conservative
Dr. J. Dickson MABON	Labour
MM. John MENDELSON	Labour
John PAGE	Conservative
Lord PEDDIE	Labour
MM. Tom PENDRY	Labour
John PRESCOTT	Labour
Sir John RODGERS	Conservative
MM. John ROPER	Labour
David STEEL	Liberal
Thomas URWIN	Labour

Substitutes

Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Raymond CARTER	Labour
John CORDLE	Conservative
Lord DARLING of HILLSBOROUGH	Labour
MM. John FARR	Labour
Andrew FAULDS	Conservative
Sir Harwood HARRISON	Labour
MM. Jim LESTER	Conservative
Arthur LEWIS	Labour
Hilary MILLER	Labour
Baroness PHILLIPS	Labour
Lord SELSDON	Conservative
MM. Peter SNAPE	Labour
Patrick WALL	Conservative
Lord WALSTON	Labour
MM. Kenneth WARREN	Conservative
Phillip WHITEHEAD	Labour

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 26th May 1975

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Opening of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Assembly.2. Welcoming address by Mrs. Renger, President of the Bundestag.3. Examination of Credentials. | <ol style="list-style-type: none">4. Election of the President of the Assembly.5. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session (Doc. 660).7. Nomination of members to Committees. |
|--|--|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10.30 a.m. with Mr. Grangier, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the Session

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2, 4, 5 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure, the Provisional President declared open the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Welcoming address by Mrs. Renger, President of the Bundestag

Mrs. Renger, President of the Bundestag, addressed the Assembly.

4. Address by the Provisional President

The Provisional President addressed the Assembly.

5. Examination of Credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, and subject to ratification by the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of Mr. Schäuble and

Mr. Wende as Substitutes of the Federal Republic of Germany in place of Mr. Barzel and Mr. Offergeld, who had resigned.

6. Election of the President of the Assembly

One candidate only was proposed for the post of President, namely Mr. Nessler.

Speaker : Mr. Leynen.

The Assembly decided unanimously to dispense with a secret ballot and elected Mr. Nessler President of the Assembly by acclamation.

On the invitation of the Provisional President, Mr. Nessler took the Chair.

7. Tributes

The President paid tribute to the memory of Mr. Joseph Bech, former Minister for Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, former Vice-President of the Assembly of WEU.

The President paid tribute to the memory of Mr. Noël Salter, former Clerk Assistant of the Assembly of WEU.

8. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The President informed the Assembly that six candidates were proposed for the six posts of

Vice-President, namely : MM. Amrehn, Bettiol, Mart, de Niet, Sir John Rodgers and Mr. Tanghe.

Speaker : Mr. Leynen.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation and that the Vice-Presidents should rank according to age, namely: Mr. de Niet, Sir John Rodgers, MM. Bettiol, Amrehn, Tanghe and Mart.

9. Observers

The President welcomed to the First Part of the Session, as observers, Mr. Honoré and Mr. Omann, members of the Danish Folketing, Mr. Fikioris and Mr. Tsatsos, members of the Greek Chamber of Deputies, Mr. Vattekar and Mr. Juvik, members of the Norwegian Storting, Mr.

Ünaldi, Vice-President of the Turkish Senate, and Mr. Karakas, President of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Committee, and Mr. Wolff, member of the United States House of Representatives.

10. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session

(Doc. 660)

The Assembly adopted the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session.

11. Nomination of members to Committees

In accordance with Rules 39 and 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the membership of the six Committees as follows :

1. COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS (27 seats)

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Kempinaire Schugens Tanghe	MM. Breyne Dequae Duvieusart
<i>France :</i>	MM. Beauguitte Bizet Boulloche Ménard Rivière	MM. Delorme La Combe Legaret de Montesquiou Schleiter
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Klepsch Lemmrich Pawelczyk Richter N...	MM. Wörner Schmidt Ahrens Büchner Mende
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Averardi Laforgia Pumilia Reale Vedovato	MM. Artali Bonaldi Spora Magliano La Rosa
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Konen	Mr. Spautz

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. Dankert de Koster N...	MM. de Niet Piket Cornelissen
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Critchley Pendry Prescott Roper Wall	MM. Miller Faulds Lord Peddie Dr. Mabon Sir Harwood Harrison

2. GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (27 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	Mrs. Godinache-Lambert MM. Leynen Van Hoeylandt	MM. de Bruyne de Stexhe Hulpiau
<i>France :</i>	MM. Brugnon Cermolacce Grangier Nessler Péridier	MM. Forni Grussenmeyer Krieg Soustelle Weber
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	Mr. Amrehn Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Mende Schmidt Siegler Schmidt	MM. Dregger Gessner Müller N... Schwencke
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Bettiol Fioret Minnocci Prete Quilleri	MM. Santalco Pecoraro Cavezzali Magliano Treu
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Abens	Mr. Hengel
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. de Niet Peijnenburg Porthoine	MM. Voogd Letschert de Koster
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Fletcher Sir John Rodgers MM. Steel Urwin	MM. Page Mendelson Channon Lord Beaumont of Whitley Mr. Lewis

3. COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS (21 seats)

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Adriaensens de Stexhe	MM. Plasman de Bruyne
<i>France :</i>	MM. Boucheny de Montesquiou Schmitt Valleix	MM. Bizet Cerneau La Combe Vitter
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Göltner Lenzer Richter Schwencke	MM. Lemmrich Klepsch Ahrens Walther
<i>Italy :</i>	Mr. Mammì Mrs. Miotti Carli MM. Pecoraro Treu	MM. Averardi Talamona Mancini Cattaneo-Petrini
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Mart	Mr. Hengel
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. Cornelissen van Ooijen	MM. Porthoine Waltmans
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Carter Fletcher Lewis Warren	MM. Miller Brown Whitehead Lester

4. COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION (21 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Dequae de Bruyne	MM. Kempinaire Adriaensens
<i>France :</i>	MM. Depietri Kauffmann Legaret Schleiter	MM. Bourgeois Belin Pignion Schmitt
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Ahrens Alber Mrs. Wolf Mr. Vohrer	MM. Gessner Kempfler Walther Wurbs

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Castellucci Moneti Prearo Talamona	Mr. Leggieri Mrs. Cattaneo-Petrini MM. Negrari Arfé
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Hengel	Mr. Margue
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. de Koster Waltmans	MM. Peijnenburg Voogd
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Lewis Page Lord Peddie Lord Selsdon	Baroness Phillips Mr. Grieve Lord Walston Sir John Rodgers

5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES (21 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Duvieusart Hulpiau	Mr. Breyne Mrs. Godinache-Lambert
<i>France :</i>	MM. Cerneau Krieg du Luart Pignion	MM. Nessler Péridier Roger Vadepied
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Alber Kempfer Marquardt Schulte	MM. Lenzer Gölter Büchner Pawelczyk
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Coppola Leggieri Pica Preti	MM. Bologna Reale Farabegoli Laforgia
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Konen	Mr. Abens
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. Voogd N...	MM. Piket Cornelissen
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	Lord Darling of Hillsborough MM. Grieve Hunt Snape	MM. Pendry Lester Cordle Cohen

6. COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS (14 seats)

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Schugens Tanghe	MM. Kempinaire Plasman
<i>France :</i>	MM. Delorme Jeambrun	MM. Radius Rivière
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Enders Müller	Mrs. von Bothmer Mr. Alber
<i>Italy :</i>	Mrs. Miotti Carli Mr. Zaffanella	MM. Pacini Bonaldi
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	MM. Hengel Spautz	MM. Mart Konen
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. Peijnenburg Stoffelen	MM. Schlingemann Voogd
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Cohen Farr	Baroness Phillips Mr. Mendelson

12. *Date and time of the next ordinary Sitting*

The next ordinary Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 11 a.m.

APPENDIX

The names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹ :

MM. Adriaensens	MM. Leynen	MM. Richter
Amrehn	<i>Piket</i> (Letschert)	Rivière
Bettiol	Dr. Mabon	Roper
<i>Forni</i> (Bouulloche)	MM. Margue	Schmidt
<i>Lewis</i> (Brown)	Marquardt	<i>Vadepied</i> (Schmitt)
Brugnon	Mart	<i>Waltmans</i> (Scholten)
Channon	Mattick	<i>Vohrer</i> (Mrs. Schuchardt)
Cohen	Mende	Schugens
Critchley	<i>Carter</i> (Mendelson)	Schwencke
Delorme	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Sieglerschmidt
Dequae	MM. Müller	Lord <i>Baumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
Lord Duncan-Sandys	de Niet	MM. de Stexhe
MM. Enders	Page	Treu
Grangier	<i>Moneti</i> (Pecoraro)	Urwin
Grieve	Pendry	Valleix
<i>Miller</i> (Hunt)	Péridier	<i>Bizet</i> (Vitter)
Kempfler	Portheine	Voogd
<i>Bourgeois</i> (Krieg)	Prescott	Mrs. Wolf
Lemmrich	Radius	Mr. Zaffanella

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

MM. Abens	MM. Dregger	Mr. de Montesquiou
Ahrens	Fioret	Lord Peddie
Alber	Fletcher	MM. Pica
Averardi	Gessner	Preti
Bologna	Kauffmann	Quilleri
Boucheny	Kempinaire	Sir John Rodgers
Cerneau	Laforgia	MM. Roger
Coppola	Legaret	Talamona
Cornelissen	Leggieri	Tanghe
Dankert	Mammi	Vedovato
	Minnocci	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

SECOND SITTING

Monday, 26th May 1975

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. The energy crisis and European security ; Conditions of service in the armed forces ; State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects (*Votes on the draft Recommendations postponed from the last Session, Docs. 656, 650 and 655*).
2. East-West relations (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 668 and Amendment*).
3. State of European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 671*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. The energy crisis and European security Conditions of service in the armed forces State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects

(Votes on the draft Recommendations postponed from the last Session, Docs. 656, 650 and 655)

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation contained in Document 656.

Speakers : Mr. Valleix (explanation of vote), the President.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 43 votes to 0 with 6 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 260) ¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation contained in Document 650.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 261) ¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation contained in Document 655, as amended.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 262) ².

4. East-West relations

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 668 and Amendment)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Müller, Amrehn, Lemmrich, Channon, Schwencke, Miller, Richter, Sir John Rodgers, MM. Mattick, Waltmans, Bettiol, Lord Duncan-Sandys.

Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation contained in Document 668.

1. See page 26.

1. See page 27.

2. See page 28.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Amrehn :

In paragraph 3 of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out the words "in a liberal manner" and insert the words "under present circumstances".

The Amendment was agreed to.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix

III) by 56 votes to 7 with 1 abstention¹. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 263)².

5. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 27th May, at 9.30 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 5.45 p.m.

1. Voting figures announced in the Chamber were : Ayes 56 ; Noes 6 ; Abstentions 0. After verification of the vote the result is : Ayes 56 ; Noes 7 ; Abstentions 1.

2. See page 29.

APPENDIX I

The names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

MM. Abens	MM. Kauffmann	MM. Porthoine
Adriaensens	Kempfler	Prescott
Ahrens	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	Radius
<i>Kliesing</i> (Alber)	(Kempinaire)	Richter
Amrehn	MM. <i>La Combe</i> (Krieg)	Sir John Rodgers
Bettiol	Legaret	MM. <i>Depietri</i> (Roger)
Boucheny	Lemmrich	Roper
<i>Forni</i> (Boulloche)	<i>Piket</i> (Letschert)	Schmidt
<i>Lewis</i> (Brown)	Leynen	<i>Vadepied</i> (Schmitt)
Brugnon	Margue	<i>Waltmans</i> (Scholten)
Cerneau	Marquardt	<i>Vohrer</i> (Mrs. Schuchardt)
Channon	Mart	Schugens
Cornelissen	Mattick	Schwencke
Cohen	Mende	Sieglerschmidt
Critchley	<i>Carter</i> (Mendelson)	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
Dankert	Mrs. Miotti Carli	MM. de Stexhe
Delorme	MM. de Montesquiou	Tanghe
Dequae	Müller	Treu
Lord Duncan-Sandys	<i>Grussenmeyer</i> (Nessler)	Urwin
Mr. Enders	de Niet	Valleix
Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Gessner)	<i>Miller</i> (Page)	Vitter
MM. <i>Jeambrun</i> (Grangier)	<i>Moneti</i> (Pecoraro)	Voogd
Grieve	Lord Peddie	Mrs. Wolf
<i>Lester</i> (Hunt)	MM. Pendry	Mr. <i>Mancini</i> (Zaffanella)
	Péridier	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

MM. Averardi	MM. Laforgia	MM. Pica
Bologna	Leggieri	Preti
Coppola	Dr. Mabon	Quilleri
Dregger	MM. Mammi	Rivière
Fioret	Minnocci	Talamona
Fletcher		Vedovato

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 1 by roll-call on the draft Recommendation on the energy crisis and European security (Doc. 656)¹:

Ayes	43
Noes	0
Abstentions	6

Ayes :

MM. Abens	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	MM. Porthoine
Adriaensens	(Kempinaire)	Prescott
Amrehn	MM. Lemmrich	Richter
Bettiol	Leynen	<i>Miller</i> (Sir John Rodgers)
<i>Lewis</i> (Brown)	Margue	Schmidt
Brugnon	Marquardt	<i>Vohrer</i> (Mrs. Schuchardt)
Channon	Mattick	Schugens
Cohen	Mende	Schwencke
Critchley	<i>Carter</i> (Mendelson)	Sieglerschmidt
Dequae	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
Lord Duncan-Sandys	MM. Müller	MM. de Stexhe
MM. Grieve	de Niet	Tanghe
<i>Lester</i> (Hunt)	Lord Peddie	Treu
Kauffmann	Mr. Pendry	Urwin
Kempfler		Voogd

Abstentions :

MM. Cerneau	MM. <i>Grussenmeyer</i> (Nessler)
Legaret	Valleix
de Montesquiou	<i>Bizet</i> (Vitter)

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX III

Vote No. 2 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on East-West relations¹:

Ayes	56
Noes	7
Abstentions	1

Ayes :

MM. Abens	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i> (Kempinaire)	MM. Radius
Adriaensens	MM. Legaret	Richter
Ahrens	Lemrich	Rivière
<i>Kliesing</i> (Alber)	<i>Piket</i> (Letschert)	Sir John Rodgers
Amrehn	Leynen	MM. Roper
<i>Lewis</i> (Brown)	Margue	Schmidt
Cerneau	Marquardt	<i>Vohrer</i> (Mrs. Schuchardt)
Channon	Mart	Schugens
Cohen	Mende	Schwencke
Cornelissen	<i>Carter</i> (Mendelson)	Sieglerschmidt
Critchley	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
Dankert	MM. de Montesquiou	MM. de Stexhe
<i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae)	Müller	Tanghe
Lord Duncan-Sandys	<i>Grussenmeyer</i> (Nessler)	Treu
MM. Enders	de Niet	Urwin
Grieve	<i>Miller</i> (Page)	Valleix
<i>Lester</i> (Hunt)	<i>Moneti</i> (Pecoraro)	<i>Bizet</i> (Vitter)
<i>Bourgeois</i> (Kauffmann)	Lord Peddie	Voogd
Kempfler		Mrs. Wolf

Noes :

MM. Boucheny	MM. <i>Depietri</i> (Roger)
<i>Forni</i> (Bouloche)	<i>Vadepied</i> (Schmitt)
<i>La Combe</i> (Krieg)	<i>Waltmans</i> (Scholten)
Mattick	

Abstention :

Mr. Bettiol

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

TEXTS ADOPTED AT THE SECOND SITTING



RECOMMENDATION 260
on the energy crisis and European security

The Assembly,

Recalling Recommendation 241 on oil and energy problems ;

Regretting that the Council did not find it necessary to give a satisfactory reply to that recommendation ;

Considering that supplies of energy for Europe at stable and reasonable prices are essential for its security ;

Noting with satisfaction that the Nine have affirmed their intention of working out a common European energy policy ;

Welcoming the initiative taken by the Group of Twelve to promote solidarity between the western countries and Japan in respect of oil supplies ;

Expressing the hope that as many countries as possible, including Norway, should co-operate with the International Energy Agency ;

Considering that close concerted action between the oil-producing and consumer countries is essential for the re-establishment of a balanced world energy market,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge the Nine to define their common energy policy without delay ;
2. Encourage the French Government to take part in the International Energy Agency ;
3. Invite the governments of the other member countries to seek to concert the action of producer and consumer countries with a view to organising the world oil market on a basis acceptable to all ;
4. Ensure that each member country constitutes or maintains strategic reserves of oil products at a level it shall define ;
5. Inform the Assembly of measures taken in the specialised international fora referred to in its reply to Recommendation 241.

RECOMMENDATION 261***on conditions of service in the armed forces***

The Assembly,

Reiterating its conviction that the existence of adequate defence forces clearly able to deter any likely act of aggression is essential to the maintenance of peace ;

Believing that even in a technological age the effectiveness of allied defence depends first and foremost on the men and women of the armed forces, and that their morale in peacetime depends in large part on conditions of service being in no way inferior to those offered by civilian employment ;

Believing that where defence policies require compulsory service, a period of at least fifteen months or a period considered adequate by the North Atlantic Council must be relied on to provide adequate numbers of service personnel ;

Aware that unilateral changes in fundamental aspects of service conditions, especially the period of compulsory service, can have adverse consequences in other allied countries ; and

Noting that the rôle of women in the armed forces varies widely from one allied country to another,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

1. That having regard to Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, it communicate to the Chairman of the North Atlantic Council and to the Chairman of the Military Committee the analysis of conditions of service in the armed forces at appendix to Document 650 with the request that the appropriate authorities study :

- (a) the considerable differences in the rates of pay in the armed forces of various allied countries, and the desirability of military personnel from different allied countries enjoying broadly comparable material conditions when serving in the same country ;
- (b) the experience of those countries that permit elected representatives of the armed forces to participate in negotiations with the authorities on conditions of service and rates of pay ;
- (c) the experience of countries which do not rely on compulsory military service ;
- (d) the possibility of nationals of one allied country serving in the armed forces of another allied country with the consent of the governments concerned ;
- (e) the desirability of making greater use of women in the armed forces ;

2. That it urge member countries to consult their allies in the North Atlantic Council before changing fundamental aspects of the conditions of service in their armed forces, especially the period of compulsory service ;

3. That, having regard to the fact that all countries of the European Community replied to the questionnaire circulated by the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, it communicate to the Council and the Commission of the European Community, with special reference to the conditions of employment offered by the armed forces of the countries of the Community, the analysis of conditions of service in the armed forces at appendix to Document 650.

RECOMMENDATION 262***on the state of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects***

The Assembly,

Conscious of the dangers involved in the large-scale establishment of nuclear energy installations throughout Europe and aware that the risks cut across national frontiers ;

Considering the need to protect the population of Europe against possible dangers inherent in the national programmes planned for execution up to 1985 ;

Noting the uneasiness among the public as expressed through information media and the press regarding the possible widespread use of nuclear energy and its consequences for the environment ;

Aware of the Paris, Brussels and Vienna conventions on nuclear liability,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the governments of member countries :

1. To organise a public European conference, within the framework of the OECD, to define the safety and security requirements of nuclear reactors, materials processing operations and the handling of nuclear waste based on international and world-wide experience and on the liability aspects of the use of nuclear energy ;
2. To promote the accession of all member countries to or the entry into force of the Paris, Brussels and Vienna conventions and, should they refuse, to communicate to the WEU Assembly the reasons for their refusal ;
3. To keep the public in all member countries regularly informed of all plans throughout Europe to establish nuclear power plants ;
4. To build nuclear power plants near a frontier only after agreement with the neighbouring country concerned.

RECOMMENDATION 263
on East-West relations

The Assembly,

Considering that détente should be accompanied by a balanced reduction in the level of forces and armaments in the countries of the Atlantic Alliance only in the framework of reciprocal agreements with the Warsaw Pact countries ;

Concerned that present economic difficulties in Western Europe may tempt the Soviet Union to take advantage of them with a view to extending its influence ;

Considering that the fight against inflation may incite the democratic countries to reduce their defence budgets to an extent which might endanger their security ;

Welcoming the development of bilateral relations between EEC and Warsaw Pact countries ;

Recalling nevertheless that those trends require close and continuing consultations between the western countries if their joint security is not to be jeopardised ;

Noting the Soviet Union's desire for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe to be concluded without delay ;

Considering that to achieve this end many divergencies still have to be overcome, particularly with regard to the movement of persons and ideas ;

Noting that the German Democratic Republic, followed to a great extent by the Soviet Union, still adheres to a most restrictive interpretation of the basic agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany and the quadripartite agreement on Berlin,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that the development of bilateral relations between individual members and members of the Warsaw Pact is not allowed to undermine the positions adopted jointly by the western countries towards the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, trade and the attendant financial arrangements ;
2. Ensure that the wish to bring the conference on security and co-operation in Europe to a speedy conclusion does not lead to the principal positions adopted jointly by the Nine at this conference being weakened or abandoned ;
3. Propose that the North Atlantic Council review under present circumstances the agreements concluded for limiting credits granted by its members to member countries of the Warsaw Pact in the framework of trade agreements ;
4. Ensure that in their relations with the German Democratic Republic its members take account of the special situation resulting from the existence of two States in Germany and the responsibility of the four powers towards Germany as a whole ;
5. Continue to consider the full application and strict maintenance of the quadripartite agreement on Berlin by the countries concerned as a condition for pursuing détente in Europe.

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 27th May 1975

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Mr. Geens, Secretary of State for Budget and Scientific Policy of Belgium.
2. Address by General Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
3. Address by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.
4. State of European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 671 and Amendment*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Address by Mr. Geens, Secretary of State for Budget and Scientific Policy of Belgium

Mr. Geens, Secretary of State for Budget and Scientific Policy of Belgium, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Geens replied to questions put by MM. de Montesquiou, Richter, Adriaensens, Treu, Schwencke.

4. Address by General Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe

General Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, addressed the Assembly.

General Haig replied to questions put by MM. Critchley, Sieglerschmidt, Valleix, La Combe,

Mattick, Lord Duncan-Sandys, MM. Wall, Fletcher, Waltmans.

5. Address by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic

Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Destremau replied to questions put by MM. Sieglerschmidt, Richter, Valleix.

6. Change in the Order of Business

On a proposal by the President, the Assembly agreed to add to the Order of Business for Thursday, 29th May, at 4 p.m. an address by Mr. Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

7. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 12.10 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

MM. Abens	MM. <i>La Combe</i> (Kauffmann)	Lord Peddie
Adriaensens	Kempfler	MM. Périquier
Ahrens	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	Portheine
<i>Kliesing</i> (Alber)	(Kempinaire)	Prescott
Amrehn	MM. <i>Bourgeois</i> (Krieg)	Radius
Bologna	<i>Mancini</i> (Laforgia)	Richter
<i>Depietri</i> (Boucheny)	Leggieri	Rivière
<i>Forni</i> (Boulloche)	Lemmrigh	Sir John Rodgers
<i>Lewis</i> (Brown)	<i>Peijnenburg</i> (Letschert)	MM. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
Brugnon	Leynen	Roper
Cerneau	Dr. Mabon	Schmidt
Channon	MM. Margue	<i>Waltmans</i> (Scholten)
<i>Farabegoli</i> (Coppola)	Marquardt	Schugens
Cornelissen	Mart	Schwencke
Critchley	Mattick	Sieglerschmidt
Dankert	Mende	Steel
<i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae)	<i>Carter</i> (Mendelson)	de Stexhe
Lord Duncan-Sandys	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Tanghe
MM. Enders	MM. de Montesquiou	Treu
Fioret	Müller	Urwin
Fletcher	<i>Grussenmeyer</i> (Nessler)	Valleix
Gessner	de Niet	<i>Bizet</i> (Vitter)
Grieve	Page	Voogd
<i>Wall</i> (Hunt)	<i>Moneti</i> (Pecoraro)	Zaffanella

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

MM. Averardi	MM. Legaret	MM. Quilleri
Bettioli	Mammi	Schmitt
Cohen	Minnocci	Mrs. Schuchardt
Delorme	Pendry	MM. Talamona
Dregger	Pica	Vedovato
Grangier	Preti	Mrs. Wolf

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

FOURTH SITTING

Tuesday, 27th May 1975

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>1. State of European security (<i>Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 671 and Amendments</i>).</p> | <p>2. Proliferation of nuclear weapons (<i>Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 672 and Amendment</i>).</p> |
|---|--|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. Change in the Orders of the Day

The President introduced a proposal to reverse the order of the two debates in the Orders of the Day.

Speakers : MM. Critchley, Delorme, Grieve.

The Assembly agreed to combine the presentation of and debate on the two Reports submitted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 671 and Amendments and 672 and Amendment.

4. State of European security

Proliferation of nuclear weapons

(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 671 and Amendments and 672 and Amendment)

The Introduction and Chapter II of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the state of European secu-

rity were presented by Mr. Critchley, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Chapter IV of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the state of European security was presented by Mr. Duvieusart, Rapporteur.

Mr. Bettiol, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler.

Chapter III of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the state of European security was presented by Mr. Dankert, Rapporteur.

Chapter V of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the state of European security was presented by Mr. Wall, Rapporteur.

Chapter VI of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the state of European security was presented by Mr. Lemmrich, Rapporteur.

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the proliferation of nuclear weapons was presented by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur.

On a proposal by Mr. Critchley, Chairman of the Committee, the Assembly agreed to take the debate on proliferation of nuclear weapons first.

The Debate was opened.

Speaker : Mr. de Stexhe.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. de Stexhe :

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft Recommendation add the following two paragraphs :

“Noting with keen satisfaction that, after the United Kingdom, five other member States of WEU have adhered to the treaty and deposited on the same day their instruments of ratification ;

Aware that the adoption of parallel if not identical attitudes on the part of the member States of WEU would be fruitful for Western Europe ;”

2. At the end of the draft Recommendation proper, add the following three paragraphs :

“To speak with one voice now in the Geneva conference responsible for considering the application of the treaty and subsequently adopt joint attitudes towards the depository countries of the treaty and of the IAEA ;

With this in view, to convey strongly to the USSR and the United States the urgency of meaningful progress towards vertical non-proliferation in accordance with the commitments entered into lest the treaty lose its credibility and become merely an instrument of discrimination ;

To increase IAEA guarantees and safeguards and in particular :

- (a) invite the nuclear States to follow the example of the United Kingdom and of the United States by making their civil installations subject to IAEA safeguards ;
- (b) extend IAEA safeguards to the physical protection of nuclear material throughout the whole nuclear fuel cycle. ”

Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur, replied to the speaker.

The Debate on the proliferation of nuclear weapons was closed.

Speaker : Mr. Radius.

The Amendment was agreed to.

The vote on the amended draft Recommendation as a whole was postponed until 5.30 p.m.

The Debate on the state of European security was opened.

Speakers : MM. Grieve, Tanghe, La Combe, Margue, Sir Harwood Harrison, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Karakas (Observer from Turkey).

The Debate was adjourned.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation on the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 46 votes to 4 with 10 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 264) ¹.

The Debate was resumed.

Speakers : Lord Peddie, MM. Faulds, Depietri.

The Debate was closed.

5. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 28th May, at 9.30 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 6 p.m.

1. See page 38.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹:

MM. Abens	MM. Enders	Mr. <i>Moneti</i> (Pecoraro)
Adriaensens	Fioret	Lord Peddie
Ahrens	Fletcher	MM. <i>Pignion</i> (Péridier)
Alber	Grieve	<i>Negrari</i> (Pica)
Amrehn	<i>Wall</i> (Hunt)	<i>Whitehead</i> (Prescott)
Bettiol	<i>La Combe</i> (Kauffmann)	Radius
Bologna	Kempfer	Richter
<i>Depietri</i> (Boucheny)	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	Sir John Rodgers
<i>Forni</i> (Boulloche)	(Kempinaire)	Mr. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
<i>Lewis</i> (Brown)	MM. Krieg	Lord <i>Walston</i> (Roper)
Brugnon	Leggieri	MM. Schmidt
Cerneau	Lemmrich	<i>Bourgeois</i> (Schmitt)
Channon	<i>Peijnenburg</i> (Letschert)	Scholten
Cohen	Leynen	Schugens
<i>Reale</i> (Coppola)	<i>Faulds</i> (Mabon)	Sieglerschmidt
Cornelissen	Margue	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
Critchley	Mart	MM. de Stexhe
Dankert	Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Mattick)	Tanghe
Delorme	MM. Mende	Treu
Dequae	<i>Carter</i> (Mendelson)	Urwin
<i>Kliesing</i> (Dregger)	Müller	Valleix
Sir <i>Harwood Harrison</i>	<i>Grussenmeyer</i> (Nessler)	Voogd
(Lord Duncan-Sandys)	Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i> (Page)	Mrs. Wolf

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

MM. Averardi	Mr. Minnoci	Mr. Rivière
Gessner	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Mrs. Schuchardt
Grangier	MM. de Montesquiou	MM. Schwencke
Laforgia	de Niet	Talamona
Legaret	Pendry	Vedovato
Mammi	Portheine	Vitter
Marquardt	Preti	Zaffanella
	Quilleri	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 3 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Doc. 672)¹ :

Ayes	46
Noes	4
Abstentions	10

Ayes :

MM. Abens	MM. Enders	Lord Peddie
Adriaensens	Fioret	MM. <i>Negrari</i> (Pica)
Ahrens	Fletcher	<i>Whitehead</i> (Prescott)
Bologna	Grieve	Richter
<i>Lewis</i> (Brown)	<i>Wall</i> (Hunt)	Sir John Rodgers
Brugnon	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	Lord <i>Walston</i> (Roper)
Channon	(<i>Kempinaire</i>)	MM. Scholten
Cohen	MM. Leggieri	Schugens
<i>Reale</i> (Coppola)	<i>Peijnenburg</i> (Letschert)	Sieglerschmidt
Cornelissen	Leynen	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
Critchley	<i>Faulds</i> (Mabon)	MM. de Stexhe
Dankert	Margue	Tanghe
Dequae	Mart	Treu
<i>Kliesing</i> (Dregger)	Mende	Urwin
Sir <i>Harwood Harrison</i>	<i>Carter</i> (Mendelson)	Voogd
(Lord Duncan-Sandys)	<i>Moneti</i> (Pecoraro)	Mrs. Wolf

Noes :

MM. <i>Depietri</i> (Boucheny)	MM. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
Radius	<i>Bourgeois</i> (Schmitt)

Abstentions :

MM. Amrehn	MM. Müller
<i>La Combe</i> (Kauffmann)	<i>Grussenmeyer</i> (Nessler)
Kempfler	Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i> (Page)
Krieg	MM. <i>Pignion</i> (Péridier)
Lemmrich	Valleix

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

TEXT ADOPTED AT THE FOURTH SITTING

RECOMMENDATION 264
on the proliferation of nuclear weapons

The Assembly,

Regretting that despite a certain progress in arms control negotiations, and the acceptance of "essential equivalence" in strategic armaments by the superpowers, the numbers of nuclear weapons have continued to grow ;

Considering that the nuclear explosion conducted by India threatens the stability of relations in the area, undermines the basis on which nuclear technology can be made available by one country to another, while doubtless adding nothing to the security or economic resources of India ;

Aware of the vital importance, in view of the energy crisis, of nuclear power being available to all countries for civil applications ;

Believing that the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons still offers the best basis on which the peaceful applications of nuclear energy can be made available in full to all countries, while avoiding total nuclear anarchy ;

Noting with keen satisfaction that, after the United Kingdom, five other member States of WEU have adhered to the treaty and deposited on the same day their instruments of ratification ;

Aware that the adoption of parallel if not identical attitudes on the part of the member States of WEU would be fruitful for Western Europe,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

That it urge member countries :

1. To adhere to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, where possible, to deposit their instruments of ratification before the end of the review conference ;
2. In all their foreign relations to encourage universal accession to that treaty ;
3. To accept the full application of controls provided for under that treaty, and to concert their policies with other supplying powers to make the supply of civil nuclear assistance of any sort to third countries dependent on their acceptance of full IAEA controls on all nuclear installations and material on their territory or under their control ;
4. Subject to the foregoing overriding consideration, to provide the maximum possible assistance to third countries in all civil applications of nuclear energy ;
5. To consult with their allies in the North Atlantic Council with a view to achieving, through the various arms control negotiations, a genuine reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons without diminishing the essential basis of their security ;
6. To speak with one voice now in the Geneva conference responsible for considering the application of the treaty and subsequently adopt joint attitudes towards the depository countries of the treaty and of the IAEA ;

7. With this in view, to convey strongly to the USSR and the United States the urgency of meaningful progress towards vertical non-proliferation in accordance with the commitments entered into lest the treaty lose its credibility and become merely an instrument of discrimination ;
8. To increase IAEA guarantees and safeguards and in particular :
 - (a) invite the nuclear States to follow the example of the United Kingdom and of the United States by making their civil installations subject to IAEA safeguards ;
 - (b) extend IAEA safeguards to the physical protection of nuclear material throughout the whole nuclear fuel cycle.

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 28th May 1975

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. State of European security (*Replies by the Chairman and Rapporteurs of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to the Debate on the Report, Doc. 671 and Amendments*).
2. Draft Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1975 (*Presentation of*
- and *Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 666*).
3. European union and WEU (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 662*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. State of European security

(Replies by the Chairman and Rapporteurs of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to the Debate on the Report, Doc. 671 and Amendments)

Mr. Critchley, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation contained in Document 671.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by MM. Radius, Valleix and La Combe :

1. In paragraph 6 of the draft Recommendation proper, in sub-paragraph (a), leave out the words "Eurogroup as the most appropriate organ at present in which", and insert the words "the mission of the Standing Armaments Committee which could usefully undertake, in co-operation with Eurogroup,"

2. In paragraph 6 of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (b) and insert :

"(b) that it examine with Mr. Tindemans the place which defence could take in a future European union."

Speakers : MM. Valleix, Richter, Siegler-schmidt.

The Amendment was negated.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Roper :

In paragraph 6(b) of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out the words "before the end of June 1975" and insert the words "as soon as possible and at the latest by September 1975".

Speaker : Mr. Critchley.

The Amendment was amended by the Committee to read as follows :

In paragraph 6(b) of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out the words "before the end of June 1975" and insert the words "in time for them to be incorporated in his report to the European Community".

Speaker : Mr. Radius.

The amended Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Tanghe :

At the end of the draft Recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

"7. That it follow up the proposals made by Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, in the Assembly in

December 1974 on a European armaments policy and in particular :

- (a) undertake a detailed study of the armaments sectors of industry in the economies of each member country ;
- (b) study the possibility of pooling research work and its financing ;
- (c) examine what is the best course to follow towards progressive integration."

The Amendment was agreed to.

The vote on the amended draft Recommendation as a whole was postponed until the Sitting on Wednesday afternoon at 5.30 p.m.

4. Draft Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1975

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 666)

The Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speaker : Mr. Treu.

Mr. Amrehn, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler.

Speakers : MM. Page, de Bruyne, Lord Peddie.

Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

An oral Amendment was tabled by Lord Peddie to delete paragraph 4 of the draft Recommendation proper.

Speakers : Mrs. Godinache-Lambert, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, Mr. Dequae, Lord Peddie.

The Amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft texts contained in Document 666.

The draft Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1975 was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 51 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions. (This Opinion will be published as No. 22) ¹.

The draft Recommendation on improving the status of WEU staff was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 265) ².

Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

5. European union and WEU

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 662 and Amendment)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Krieg, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Carstens, Steel, de Koster, Kliesing, Peijnenburg, Cermolacce, Waltmans, Dankert, Richter.

Mr. Krieg, Rapporteur, and Mr. Siegler Schmidt, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The votes on Amendment No. 1 by Mr. Richter and others and on the draft Recommendation were postponed until the Sitting on Wednesday afternoon at 5.30 p.m.

6. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 1 p.m.

1. See page 46.

2. See page 47.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

MM. Abens	MM. Hunt	Lord Peddie
Adriaensens	<i>La Combe</i> (Kauffmann)	MM. Périquier
Ahrens	Kempfer	<i>Negrari</i> (Pica)
Alber	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	<i>de Koster</i> (Portheine)
Amrehn	(Kempinaire)	<i>Whitehead</i> (Prescott)
Bettiol	MM. Krieg	Radius
Bologna	<i>Mancini</i> (Laforgia)	Richter
<i>Depietri</i> (Boucheny)	<i>Vadepied</i> (Legaret)	Rivière
<i>Forni</i> (Boulloche)	Leggieri	Sir John Rodgers
<i>Lewis</i> (Brown)	<i>Peijnenburg</i> (Letschert)	MM. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
Brugnon	Leynen	Schmidt
Channon	<i>Reale</i> (Mammi)	<i>Bourgeois</i> (Schmitt)
Cohen	Margue	<i>Walmans</i> (Scholten)
<i>Farabegoli</i> (Coppola)	Marquardt	Schugens
Cornelissen	<i>Konen</i> (Mart)	Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Schwencke)
Critchley	Mattick	MM. Sieglerschmidt
Dankert	Mende	Steel
<i>Pignion</i> (Delorme)	Lord <i>Seldon</i> (Mendelson)	<i>Breyne</i> (de Stexhe)
Dequae	Mr. Minnocci	Tanghe
<i>Lenzer</i> (Dregger)	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Treu
<i>Cordle</i> (Lord Duncan-Sandys)	MM. <i>Daillet</i> (de Montesquiou)	Urwin
Enders	<i>Carstens</i> (Müller)	Valleix
Fioret	<i>Grussenmeyer</i> (Nessler)	<i>Bizet</i> (Vitter)
Fletcher	de Niet	Voogd
<i>Wende</i> (Gessner)	Page	<i>Kliesing</i> (Mrs. Wolf)
Grievé	<i>Moneti</i> (Pecoraro)	Zaffanella

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

MM. Averardi	Dr. Mabon	Mr. Roper
Cerneau	MM. Pendry	Mrs. Schuchardt
Grangier	Preti	MM. Talamona
Lemmrich	Quilleri	Vedovato

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 4 by roll-call on the draft Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1975 (Doc. 666)¹:

Ayes	51
Noes	0
Abstentions	3

Ayes :

MM. Abens	Mr. <i>La Combe</i> (Kauffmann)	MM. RADIUS
Adriaensens	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	Richter
Ahrens	(Kempinaire)	Rivière
Alber	Krieg	Sir John Rodgers
Bettiol	MM. <i>Vadepied</i> (Legaret)	MM. <i>Bourgeois</i> (Schmitt)
<i>Lewis</i> (Brown)	<i>Peijnenburg</i> (Letschert)	<i>Waltmans</i> (Scholten)
Brugnon	Leynen	Schugens
Cohen	Margue	Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Schwencke)
Critchley	Marquardt	Mr. Sieglerschmidt
Dankert	<i>Konen</i> (Mart)	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
<i>Pignion</i> (Delorme)	Mattick	MM. <i>Breyne</i> (de Stexhe)
Dequae	<i>Daillet</i> (de Montesquiou)	Tanghe
<i>Cordle</i> (Lord Duncan-Sandys)	<i>Carstens</i> (Müller)	Urwin
Enders	<i>Grussenmeyer</i> (Nessler)	Valleix
Fioret	de Niet	<i>Bizet</i> (Vitter)
<i>Wende</i> (Gessner)	Page	Voogd
Hunt	Lord Peddie	<i>Kliesing</i> (Mrs. Wolf)
	Mr. <i>de Koster</i> (Porthoine)	

Abstentions :

MM. Bologna
<i>Reale</i> (Mammi)
Treu

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

TEXTS ADOPTED AT THE FIFTH SITTING

OPINION 22***on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU
for the financial year 1975***

The Assembly,

Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter ;

Having taken note of the contents,

Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated.

RECOMMENDATION 265
on improving the status of WEU staff

The Assembly,

Aware of the effort made by the Councils of the co-ordinated organisations to establish a pension scheme for the staff of these organisations ;

Deploring nevertheless the fact that the governments have not yet been able to set up a joint management body for all the organisations, a single appeals board or guarantee the payment of pensions should one of them withdraw or an organisation be wound up ;

Deeply regretting that the Co-ordinating Committee has been unable to agree to a reversionary pension being granted to widowers of female staff in the same way as to widows of male staff ;

Welcoming the action taken on Recommendation 200 and the definition of principles to be implemented with regard to the secondment of national officials to the co-ordinated organisations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

- I. In the framework of the co-ordinated organisations :
 1. Establish a joint management body for the pension scheme ;
 2. Set up a single appeals board ;
 3. Guarantee the full and uninterrupted payment of pensions even in the event of a government withdrawing or an organisation being wound up and to this end apply the provisions set out in Recommendation 250 of the Assembly ;
 4. Grant widowers of female staff a reversionary pension in the same conditions as for widows of male staff ;
 5. Afford officials who have obtained home loans from the provident fund a means of continuing those loans should they opt for the pension scheme ;
 6. Ensure that serving officials who do not opt for the pension scheme continue to benefit from the social advantages linked with the present provident fund system ;
 7. Grant officials of equal grade and length of service, regardless of the date of their retirement, a pension calculated on the basis of salaries payable to serving staff ;
 8. Take note of the problems arising from the introduction of the United Kingdom Social Security Act in April 1975 ;
 9. Establish a system for readjusting emoluments whereby the co-ordinated organisations may :
 - hold general reviews every four years or more frequently if circumstances warrant it ;
 - assess trends in the standard of living in the middle of the period between general reviews ;

- examine cost-of-living trends every six months ;
- take the necessary steps to adjust salaries in accordance with the trend of the cost of living as quickly as possible by abolishing the two-month observation period ;

II. Invite the Public Administration Committee to submit to it as soon as possible a first report on the way member States have implemented the principles defined by the special group of experts set up in October 1971 to study conditions for seconding national officials to international organisations, on the difficulties encountered in this respect and, as appropriate, ways of alleviating such difficulties.

SIXTH SITTING

Wednesday, 28th May 1975

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Twentieth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly (*Presentation by Mr. Van Elsandé, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 661 and 664*);

Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council; The European Space Agency — Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council (*Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and of the Com-*

mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 667 and Amendment, 673 and 670).

2. State of European security (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 671*).
3. European union and WEU (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 662 and Amendment*).
4. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 665*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. Changes in the membership of a Committee

In accordance with Rule 39(6) of the Rules of Procedure, on the proposal of the Italian Delegation, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions:

Mrs. Cattaneo-Petrini as a member in place of Mrs. Miotti Carli.

Mr. Leggieri as an alternate in place of Mrs. Cattaneo-Petrini.

4. Twentieth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly

(Presentation by Mr. Van Elsandé, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 661 and 664)

Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council
Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council
The European Space Agency — Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council

(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 667 and Amendment, 673 and 670)

The Report of the Council to the Assembly was presented by Mr. Van Elsandé, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur.

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. de Niet, Rapporteur.

Mr. Van Elsandé replied to questions put by MM. Radius and Waltmans.

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Richter, Rapporteur.

The Joint Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Fletcher, Treu, Brown.

Mr. Van Elslande replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation contained in Document 667.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. de Niet :

1. In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft Recommendation, after the word "Noting", insert the words "and regretting".

2. Leave out the second and third paragraphs of the preamble to the draft Recommendation.

3. In paragraph 5 of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out the words "with full powers".

Speakers : MM. de Niet, de Bruyne, Krieg, de Stexhe, Sieglerschmidt, Radius.

The Amendment was negatived.

An oral Amendment was tabled by Mr. de Stexhe to delete the words "by appointing a Secretary-General with full powers" at the end of paragraph 5 of the draft Recommendation proper.

The oral Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation contained in Document 667.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 266) ¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation contained in Document 673.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 267) ².

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation contained in Document 670.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 63 votes to 3 with 1 abstention. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 268) ³.

1. See page 58.

2. See page 59.

3. See page 60.

5. State of European security

(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 671)

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix III) by 51 votes to 11 with 3 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 269) ¹.

6. European union and WEU

(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 662 and Amendment)

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Richter :

1. In paragraph 6 of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out the words "regularly and".

2. Leave out paragraph 7 of the draft Recommendation proper and insert :

"7. Particularly in the examination it has been instructed to effect, to bear in mind the tasks of the Standing Armaments Committee in respect of the need to preserve and develop Europe's industrial potential with special reference to advanced technology."

Speakers : MM. Richter, Krieg.

Part 1 of the Amendment was amended to read :

1. In paragraph 6 of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out the words "regularly and" and insert "each time that this appears necessary".

Thus amended, the two parts of the Amendment were agreed to.

Speakers : MM. Peijnenburg, Krieg, Leynen.

A proposal by Mr. Peijnenburg to delete paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft Recommendation was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

1. See page 61.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix IV) by 52 votes to 7 with 7 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 270) ¹.

Speaker : Mr. Daillet (explanation of vote).

7. Relations with Parliaments

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 665)

The Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Radius in place of Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : Mr. Cordle, Mrs. Miotti Carli.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly took note of the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

8. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Thursday, 29th May, at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 6.20 p.m.

1. See page 63.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹ :

MM. Abens	MM. <i>La Combe</i> (Kauffmann)	MM. <i>Carter</i> (Pendry)
Adriaensens	Kempfer	Péridier
Ahrens	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	<i>de Koster</i> (Porthaine)
Alber	(Kempinaire)	<i>Whitehead</i> (Prescott)
Amrehn	MM. Krieg	Radius
Bettiol	<i>Mancini</i> (Laforgia)	Richter
Bologna	<i>Vadepied</i> (Legaret)	Rivière
Boucheny	Leggieri	Sir John Rodgers
<i>Forni</i> (Bouloche)	Lemmrich	MM. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
Brown	<i>Peijnenburg</i> (Letschert)	<i>Faulds</i> (Roper)
Brugnon	Leynen	Schmidt
<i>Warren</i> (Channon)	<i>Lester</i> (Mabon)	<i>Bourgeois</i> (Schmitt)
Cohen	Margue	<i>Walmans</i> (Scholten)
Cornelissen	Marquardt	<i>Vohrer</i> (Mrs. Schuchardt)
Critchley	Mart	<i>Breyne</i> (Schugens)
Dankert	Mattick	Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Schwencke)
<i>Pignion</i> (Delorme)	Mende	Mr. Sieglerschmidt
<i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae)	<i>Lewis</i> (Mendelson)	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
<i>Cordle</i> (Lord Duncan-Sandys)	<i>Reale</i> (Minnocci)	MM. <i>de Stexhe</i>
Enders	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Tanghe
Fioret	MM. <i>Daillet</i> (de Montesquiou)	Treu
Fletcher	<i>Grussenmeyer</i> (Nessler)	Urwin
Gessner	de Niet	Valleix
<i>Depietri</i> (Grangier)	Page	Voogd
Grieve	<i>Moneti</i> (Pecoraro)	<i>Kliesing</i> (Mrs. Wolf)
Hunt	Lord Peddie	Zaffanella

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

MM. Averardi	MM. Mammi	MM. Quilleri
Cerneau	Müller	Talamona
Coppola	Pica	Vedovato
Dregger	Preti	Vitter

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 5 by roll-call on the draft Recommendation on the European Space Agency (Doc. 670) ¹ :

Ayes	63
Noes	3
Abstentions	1

Ayes :

MM. Adriaensens	MM. <i>La Combe</i> (Kauffmann)	MM. Périquier
Ahrens	Kempfer	<i>de Koster</i> (Portheine)
Alber	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	Radius
Amrehn	(Kempinaire)	Richter
Bettiol	MM. Krieg	Rivière
Bologna	<i>Mancini</i> (Laforgia)	Sir John Rodgers
Brugnon	<i>Vadepied</i> (Legaret)	MM. <i>Faulds</i> (Roper)
<i>Warren</i> (Channon)	<i>Peijnenburg</i> (Letschert)	<i>Bourgeois</i> (Schmitt)
Cohen	Leynen	<i>Waltmans</i> (Scholten)
Cornelissen	<i>Lester</i> (Mabon)	<i>Vohrer</i> (Mrs. Schuchardt)
Critchley	Margue	<i>Breyne</i> (Schugens)
Dankert	Marquardt	Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Schwencke)
<i>Pignion</i> (Delorme)	Mart	MM. Sieglerschmidt
<i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae)	Mattick	de Stexhe
<i>Cordle</i> (Lord Duncan-Sandys)	<i>Reale</i> (Minnocci)	Tanghe
Enders	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Treu
Fioret	MM. <i>Daillet</i> (de Montesquiou)	Urwin
Fletcher	<i>Grussenmeyer</i> (Nessler)	Valleix
Gessner	de Niet	Voogd
Grieve	Page	<i>Kliesing</i> (Mrs. Wolf)
Hunt	<i>Moneti</i> (Pecoraro)	Zaffanella
	Lord Peddie	

Noes :

MM. Boucheny
<i>Depietri</i> (Grangier)
<i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)

Abstention :

Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX III

Vote No. 6 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on the state of European security (Doc. 671)¹:

Ayes	51
Noes	11
Abstentions	3

Ayes :

MM. Adriaensens	MM. Hunt	MM. <i>de Koster</i> (Portheine)
Ahrens	Kempfler	Richter
Alber	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	Sir John Rodgers
Amrehn	(Kempinaire)	MM. <i>Faulds</i> (Roper)
Bettiol	MM. <i>Mancini</i> (Laforgia)	Schmidt
Bologna	<i>Peijnenburg</i> (Letschert)	<i>Vohrer</i> (Mrs. Schuchardt)
<i>Warren</i> (Channon)	Leynen	<i>Breyne</i> (Schugens)
Cohen	<i>Lester</i> (Mabon)	Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Schwencke)
Cornelissen	Margue	Mr. Sieglerschmidt
Critchley	Marquardt	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
Dankert	Mart	MM. <i>de Stexhe</i>
<i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae)	Mattick	Tanghe
Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i>	<i>Reale</i> (Minnocci)	Treu
(Lord Duncan-Sandys)	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Urwin
MM. Enders	MM. <i>Daillet</i> (de Montesquiou)	Voogd
Fioret	de Niet	<i>Kliesing</i> (Mrs. Wolf)
Gessner	Page	Zaffanella
Grieve	<i>Moneti</i> (Pecoraro)	

Noes :

MM. Boucheny	MM. <i>Grussenmeyer</i> (Nessler)	MM. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
<i>Depietri</i> (Grangier)	Radius	<i>Bourgeois</i> (Schmitt)
<i>La Combe</i> (Kauffmann)	Rivière	<i>Walmans</i> (Scholten)
Krieg		Valleix

Abstentions :

MM. Brugnon
<i>Pignion</i> (Delorme)
Péridier

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX IV

Vote No. 7 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on European union and WEU (Doc. 662) ¹:

Ayes	52
Noes	7
Abstentions	7

Ayes :

MM. Abens	Mr. Kempfler	MM. <i>Moneti</i> (Pecoraro)
Adriaensens	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	Radius
Ahrens	(Kempinaire)	Richter
Alber	MM. Krieg	Rivière
Amrehn	<i>Mancini</i> (Laforgia)	Sir John Rodgers
Bettiol	<i>Vadepied</i> (Legaret)	MM. <i>Faulds</i> (Roper)
Bologna	Leggieri	Schmidt
<i>Warren</i> (Channon)	Leynen	<i>Bourgeois</i> (Schmitt)
Cohen	<i>Lester</i> (Mabon)	<i>Vohrer</i> (Mrs. Schuchardt)
Critchley	Margue	<i>Breyne</i> (Schugens)
<i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae)	Marquardt	Sieglerschmidt
Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i>	Mart	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
(Lord Duncan-Sandys)	Mattick	MM. de Stexhe
MM. Enders	<i>Reale</i> (Minnocci)	Tanghe
Fioret	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Treu
Gessner	MM. <i>Daillet</i> (de Montesquiou)	Valleix
Grieve	<i>Grussenmeyer</i> (Nessler)	<i>Kliesing</i> (Mrs. Wolf)
Hunt	de Niet	Zaffanella

Noes :

MM. Boucheny	MM. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
Dankert	<i>Waltmans</i> (Scholten)
<i>Depietri</i> (Grangier)	Voogd
<i>de Koster</i> (Portheine)	

Abstentions :

MM. Brugnon	Mr. Périquier
Cornelissen	Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Schwencke)
<i>Peijnenburg</i> (Letschert)	Mr. Urwin
Page	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

TEXTS ADOPTED AT THE SIXTH SITTING

RECOMMENDATION 266
on the political activities of the Council

The Assembly,

Noting that the Council is holding far fewer meetings at ministerial level ;

Considering that the Permanent Council has therefore become the only body of WEU working at that level ;

Regretting that the member countries have not taken account of this new situation to delegate to the Permanent Council more of the duties which the Council of Ministers is not in a position to carry out ;

Noting that despite repeated promises the Council fails to keep the Assembly well informed of matters affecting the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, in particular by refusing to hold a joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee and also by replying evasively to recommendations and written questions from the Assembly ;

Considering that in any event the Council is still responsible for supervising the application of the modified Brussels Treaty ;

Thanking the Council for having set out frankly in its twentieth annual report the reasons for its inactivity ;

Considering that the new situation gives added importance to the duties of the Secretary-General ;

Deploring, in these circumstances, that the governments have been unable to terminate the interim situation which has prevailed since September 1974,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Include regularly in its agenda consideration of the various problems raised by the application of the modified Brussels Treaty ;
2. In the light of its deliberations, remind governments whenever necessary of the implications of this treaty ;
3. Draw up a list of problems connected with the application of the treaty over which the governments of the seven member countries are divided so that they may be considered at ministerial level or that attention be drawn to them in the North Atlantic Council or in the European Council ;
4. Provide the Assembly with meaningful information on all matters affecting the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even if they are dealt with in the framework of other institutions ;
5. Appoint to the Secretariat-General a personality carrying sufficient authority with the governments of the seven member countries and terminate the present interim situation without delay.

RECOMMENDATION 267***on the application of the Brussels Treaty***

The Assembly,

Welcoming the prompt action by the Council which enabled the twentieth annual report to be communicated by 28th February and congratulating the Secretary-General on introducing the "appropriate administrative procedures to ensure that the preparation of its annual report is carried out on a current basis";

Stressing the close interest which the Council of WEU must necessarily take in the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, since all organs of WEU are required by the modified Brussels Treaty to work in close co-operation with it;

Aware that the modified Brussels Treaty is a supranational treaty in that Council — decisions concerning the force level and arms control provisions of Protocols Nos. II, III and IV are not subject to a unanimous vote, and that no usage or agreement has formally modified the majority voting procedures of those protocols;

Aware that the credibility of any future East-West agreements on arms control, especially in the framework of the conference on European security and co-operation, or mutual and balanced force reductions, may be undermined by the failure to apply the controls provided for by the modified Brussels Treaty;

Regretting that since 1966 annual reports have omitted the numbers of inspections, by category of establishment visited, that have been carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments;

Congratulating the Agency for the Control of Armaments on the way in which it has carried out in difficult circumstances the regrettably still too limited tasks assigned to it by the Council;

Recalling its recommendation that full use be made of the Standing Armaments Committee as a study and review body to eliminate duplication in other international bodies concerned with the standardisation and joint production of armaments, and endorsing the proposal of the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to entrust that Committee with a study of the armaments production capabilities existing in Europe,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Apply each year the new procedure for the prompt communication of the annual report;
2. Include in annual reports a statement of the numbers of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, both by category of installation and by country visited;
3. Include in the conclusions of the arms control chapter of the annual report a full and clear statement of all those aspects of the arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty which are not fully applied;
4. Continue to press for ratification by the remaining member of WEU of the Convention on the due process of law signed on 14th December 1957;
5. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to study and report on the arms production capabilities existing in the European NATO countries;
6. Advise the North Atlantic Council to revise the terms of appointment of its Chairman and Secretary-General, limiting it to four years in the first place.

RECOMMENDATION 268
on the European Space Agency

The Assembly,

Congratulating the governments of the member countries of the European Space Agency on the establishment of a new European space organisation ;

Aware of the need to give priority to the European space activities pursued within the Agency and noting governments' willingness to integrate their future national programmes in a joint European programme ;

Considering the agreed programme on scientific and application satellites and the Ariane launcher and the vast sums of money involved ;

Convinced of the need to devote the closest attention to the application of space research and development in preparation for subsequent commercial use ;

Considering that in the early 1980s space activities will leave the experimental phase and start a new era of operational utilisation ;

Considering especially Europe's present rôle in the new space transportation system : the American shuttle and the European development of Spacelab ;

Impressed by the importance of the American military space programme and its applications which will revolutionise existing strategic and tactical concepts,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments :

1. To define Europe's common space policy for the future in world-wide application satellite systems and the ways and means of collaborating with the United States in the use of Spacelab and its successors ;
2. To use the good offices of ESA for concerting, harmonising and co-ordinating the policies of the member States in all their space activities in the United Nations and other agencies, including in particular the United Nations Outer Space Committee ;
3. To complete the programmes already agreed to and undertake not to query their validity which would create uncertainty in industry ;
4. To formulate a policy with regard to the new era of easier and cheaper access to space through Spacelab ;
5. To formulate an industrial policy on application satellites with a view to exporting European satellite systems and other space hardware especially to the developing countries ;
6. To preserve Kourou not only as a launch base for the Ariane development phase but as a general launch facility for Europe in the future ;
7. To work out a European military space programme and provide the means for its implementation in parallel with the United States military space programme.

RECOMMENDATION 269
on the state of European security

The Assembly,

- (i) Having debated the state of European security in the light of the report of its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ;
- (ii) Believing that satisfactory détente through the various East-West negotiations can be achieved only if the real military capability of the Soviet Union is borne in mind, if the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance is assured, and if sufficient collective defences are maintained by the NATO powers through the allocation of adequate resources and their most rational joint use ;
- (iii) Calling for certain organisational and planning changes on the central front ;
- (iv) Stressing the importance of the northern and southern flanks to the security of Europe, and the need for political and military measures to prevent their isolation from the centre ;
- (v) Calling for practical measures to achieve much greater joint production of armaments, especially tactical missiles ;
- (vi) Calling for the collective defence commitment of the Brussels Treaty to be retained in any future European union, and stressing the importance of Eurogroup meanwhile, as the framework for practical expression of the European defence identity,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

1. That it bear in mind the need for greater cohesion in the Atlantic Alliance at a time when parity between the superpowers has made international relations as a whole more complex and less predictable ;
2. (a) That it welcome the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at summit level to prepare the conference on security and co-operation in Europe ;
(b) That all proposals advanced by NATO countries in the MBFR negotiations should be subject to prior agreement in NATO, and that any reductions agreed in the MBFR negotiations should (i) concern first the forces of the superpowers, and (ii) be asymmetric so as to reduce the present Warsaw Pact conventional superiority ; (iii) may include theatre nuclear weapons ;
3. That it request the North Atlantic Council to take note of the study by General de Maizière and :
(a) to consider the availability of new and reserve formations to make any improvements in the deployment pattern of forces on the central front ;
(b) to improve political decision-making procedures to make full use of available warning time in the event of threatened aggression ;
(c) to revise the dictum that logistics are a national responsibility ;
(d) to modify the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons ;
(e) to press for greater specialisation in defence tasks by country ;
4. That it ask member governments to urge :
(a) in the North Atlantic Council (i) that full support be given to all political and military measures necessary to prevent the isolation of the flanks, and to ensure the necessary conditions for

maintaining a regular supply of armaments to all allied countries ; (ii) that advantage be taken of the May summit meeting to facilitate a settlement of the differences between Greece and Turkey ;

- (b) in the International Civil Aviation Organisation, that Greece and Turkey be invited to withdraw their respective NOTAMs that prevent aircraft flying freely between the two countries ;

5. That it request the North Atlantic Council to ensure that all bodies concerned with arms production concentrate on the immediate need for the introduction of standardised tactical missile systems, and that it adopt the following procedures : (i) make the Military Committee responsible for determining the standard military characteristics to be applied in deciding on the development and the procurement of weapons systems, beginning with tactical missiles ; (ii) make initially 1 % of national research and development budgets available for NATO development projects to be decided by the Military Committee and Defence Support Division ;

6. (a) That it draw the attention of all members to the importance of Eurogroup as the most appropriate organ at present in which to arrange practical matters of European defence co-operation that are not effectively dealt with in NATO, on the understanding that problems of nuclear defence are the responsibility of the Alliance as a whole ;

- (b) That it instruct the Secretary-General to submit to Mr. Tindemans in time for them to be incorporated in his report to the European Community the views of the Council on the place of defence in a future European union, with the request that such union retain the mutual defence commitment of the Brussels Treaty ;

7. That it follow up the proposals made by Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, in the Assembly in December 1974 on a European armaments policy and in particular :

- (a) undertake a detailed study of the armaments sectors of industry in the economies of each member country ;
- (b) study the possibility of pooling research work and its financing ;
- (c) examine what is the best course to follow towards progressive integration.

RECOMMENDATION 270
on European union and WEU

The Assembly,

Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty is the basis of European political union in defence matters ;

Expressing the wish that the efforts of the Nine to achieve such a union will allow rapid progress to be made in this direction ;

Noting the decision of the Heads of State or of Government to examine, in 1975, a report on European union ;

Noting that the defence policies of member countries are insufficiently co-ordinated ;

Noting nevertheless that these policies pursue a common goal, that of ensuring Western European security in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance ;

Considering that there is broad agreement between the members of WEU to plan their defence policy in such a way as to make Europe a true partner of the United States in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance ;

Considering moreover that the most serious threats at present are to the northern and southern flanks of the western defence system ;

Recalling Recommendation 145 adopted by the Assembly on 15th December 1966,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Propose that a future meeting of the European Council study the requirements of a European defence policy in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty ;
2. With this conference in view, ask member governments to make the necessary preparatory studies now ;
3. Examine in particular the consequences for European security of the emergence of new nuclear powers and the agreements concluded or to be concluded between the nuclear powers ;
4. Ensure that WEU is maintained with its present responsibilities and that it takes effective action in all matters of concern to it ;
5. Remind the EEC countries which have not yet acceded to it, and all the European countries with a democratic régime which wish to be associated with a common defence policy, that they may accede to the Brussels Treaty ;
6. Consider each time that this appears necessary in the context of a European defence policy, foreign policy matters affecting the defence of Western Europe and the defence policies of the member States with a view to co-ordinating military efforts, developing industrial potential and limiting the cost of defence for these States ;
7. Particularly in the examination it has been instructed to effect, to bear in mind the tasks of the Standing Armaments Committee in respect of the need to preserve and develop Europe's industrial potential with special reference to advanced technology.

SEVENTH SITTING

Thursday, 29th May 1975

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Mr. Hattersley, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
2. Co-operation with the United States (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 669 and Amendments*).
3. Address by Mr. Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
4. The European aeronautical industry and civil aviation (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 674*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. Address by Mr. Hattersley, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom

In the absence of the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, the address by Mr. Hattersley was read by Mr. Fletcher, Chairman of the United Kingdom Delegation.

4. Address by Mr. Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

Mr. Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Amrehn, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler.

Mr. Moersch replied to questions put by MM. Sieglerschmidt, de Koster, Bettiol.

5. Co-operation with the United States

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 669 and Amendments)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. de Koster, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Bettiol, Piket, Reale, Sir Frederic Bennett.

Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers : MM. de Montesquiou (on a point of order), Radius.

The Debate was closed.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Piket :

In the draft Recommendation proper, delete paragraphs 1 (b) and (c) and replace them by the following :

“(b) promote the extension of OECD’s activities in the energy field ;”

Speaker : Mr. Sieglerschmidt.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Reale :

1. In the draft Recommendation proper, delete paragraph 1 (c).

2. Alternatively : in paragraph (c), leave out "played this rôle" and insert "play its rôle", and reverse the order of paragraphs (c) and (d).

The Amendment was negatived by the adoption of Amendment No. 1.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Bettiol :

Leave out paragraph B.2 of the draft Recommendation proper.

Speaker : Mr. Sieglerschmidt.

The Amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 45 votes to 8 with 2 abstentions. This Recommendation will be published as No. 271¹.

6. The European aeronautical industry and civil aviation

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 674)

Speaker : Mr. de Montesquiou (on a point of order).

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by MM. Valleix and Warren, Rapporteurs.

Speakers : MM. Cornelissen, Brown, Boucheny, Carter, van Ooijen, de Bruyne.

The Debate was closed.

On a proposal by Mr. de Montesquiou, Chairman of the Committee, the draft Recommendation contained in Document 674 was divided into two parts, to form two separate Recommendations.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendations.

The first draft Recommendation comprising the preamble and paragraphs 1 and 2 was adopted unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 272)¹.

The vote on the second draft Recommendation, comprising paragraphs 3 and 4, was deferred until the Second Part of the Session.

7. Adjournment of the Session

The President adjourned the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Assembly.

The Sitting was closed at 6.20 p.m.

¹. See page 70.

¹. See page 72.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹:

MM. Abens	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i> (Kempinaire)	MM. <i>Lewis</i> (Pendry)
Adriaensens		Péridier
<i>Wende</i> (Ahrens)	MM. Krieg	<i>Negrari</i> (Pica)
Alber	<i>Mancini</i> (Laforgia)	Portheine
Bettiol	<i>Vadepied</i> (Legaret)	Radius
Bologna	Leggieri	Richter
Boucheny	Lemmrich	Sir John Rodgers
Brown	<i>Piket</i> (Letschert)	Mr. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
Brugnon	Leynen	Lord <i>Walston</i> (Roper)
<i>Warren</i> (Channon)	<i>Faulds</i> (Mabon)	MM. Schmidt
Cohen	Margue	<i>Bourgeois</i> (Schmitt)
<i>Farabegoli</i> (Coppola)	Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Marquardt)	<i>Peijnenburg</i> (Scholten)
Cornelissen	MM. Mart	<i>Vohrer</i> (Mrs. Schuchardt)
<i>Stoffelen</i> (Dankert)	Mattick	Schugens
<i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae)	Mende	Schwencke
<i>Klepsch</i> (Dregger)	<i>Carter</i> (Mendelson)	Sieglerschmidt
<i>Cordle</i> (Lord Duncan-Sandys)	<i>Reale</i> (Minnocci)	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
Enders	Mrs. Miotti Carli	MM. <i>Breyne</i> (de Stexhe)
Fioret	MM. de Montesquiou	Tanghe
Fletcher	<i>Daillet</i> (Nessler)	Treu
<i>Depietri</i> (Grangier)	<i>van Ooijen</i> (de Niet)	Urwin
Grieve	Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i> (Page)	Valleix
Hunt	Mr. <i>Moneti</i> (Pecoraro)	Voogd
	Lord Peddie	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

MM. Amrehn	MM. Kauffmann	MM. Quilleri
Averardi	Kempfler	Rivière
Bouloche	Mammi	Talamona
Cerneau	Müller	Vedovato
Critchley	Prescott	Vitter
Delorme	Preti	Mrs. Wolf
Gessner		Mr. Zaffanella

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 8 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on co-operation with the United States (Doc. 669)¹:

Ayes	45
Noes	8
Abstentions	2

Ayes :

MM. Abens	Mr. Fletcher	Lord Peddie
Adriaensens	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	MM. <i>Lewis</i> (Pendry)
<i>Wende</i> (Ahrens)	(Kempinaire)	Péridier
Alber	MM. <i>Mancini</i> (Laforgia)	<i>Negrari</i> (Pica)
Amrehn	<i>Piket</i> (Letschert)	Porthaine
Bologna	Leynen	Richter
Brown	Margue	Sir John Rodgers
Brugnon	Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Marquardt)	MM. <i>Peijnenburg</i> (Scholten)
<i>Warren</i> (Channon)	MM. Mart	Schugens
Cohen	Mattick	Schwencke
<i>Stoffelen</i> (Dankert)	Mende	Sieglerschmidt
<i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae)	<i>Carter</i> (Mendelson)	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
<i>Klepsch</i> (Dregger)	<i>Reale</i> (Minnocci)	MM. <i>Breyne</i> (de Stexhe)
Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i>	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Tanghe
(Lord Duncan-Sandys)	Mr. <i>van Ooijen</i> (de Niet)	Treu
Mr. Enders		Urwin

Noes :

MM. Boucheny	MM. Radius
<i>Depietri</i> (Grangier)	<i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
Krieg	<i>Bourgeois</i> (Schmitt)
de Montesquiou	Valleix

Abstentions :

MM. Bettiol
Fioret

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

TEXTS ADOPTED AT THE SEVENTH SITTING

RECOMMENDATION 271
on co-operation with the United States

The Assembly,

A

Considering that the WEU member countries, like most other European countries and the United States, are threatened by continuous, dangerous and increasing inflation, encouraged by high energy prices (which in themselves have negative effects on the economy), resulting in unacceptable unemployment ;

Considering that continuous and, in many countries, accelerated inflation is a challenge to all democratic countries and may even endanger the survival of democracy ;

Considering that inflation is also threatening the budgetary position of western countries, thus having repercussions on the level of defence budgets ;

Noting that co-ordinated economic, social, financial and monetary policies are essential if imminent danger to our society's structure is to be tackled ;

Questioning the will of the democratic countries to co-ordinate policies sufficiently ;

Considering it essential for the western world to present a united front in the field of energy requirements ;

Taking into account the fact that the countries concerned are already co-operating in the framework of OECD ;

Considering that OECD does not have adequate machinery for parliamentary supervision ;

B

Considering that the security of Western Europe is ensured by the North Atlantic Treaty and the integration of European and American armed forces ;

Considering that the United States (approaching its bicentennial) and the Soviet Union (preparing for its Twenty-Fifth Party Congress) have achieved and will each try to maintain a military balance on a very high level ;

Considering that it must be regarded as a positive factor for détente that a number of major problems are being discussed regularly by the two superpowers in purely bilateral negotiations ;

Considering however that doubts must be expressed as to whether today's complex problems can still be handled by a small number of persons in the two countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

A

1. Urge member governments to :
 - (a) hold frequent exchanges of views leading to real co-ordination of long-term policy and research into the economic use of and substitutes for energy resources ;
 - (b) promote the extension of OECD's activities in the energy field ;

(c) strengthen the powers of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to supervise OECD ;

2. Consider that western co-operation would be better ensured if France joined the International Energy Agency ;

B

1. Ensure that frequent exchanges of views between member countries and the United States, particularly in the framework of NATO, lead to increased participation and influence of European States in respect of all major problems ;

2. Study the possibilities of truly European decision-making on all security matters, including the strategic arms limitation talks, the Middle East, Cyprus and the French nuclear deterrent.

RECOMMENDATION 272***on the European aeronautical industry and civil aviation***

The Assembly,

Aware that the recession in air transport and aircraft construction has compelled governments to consider the economic, social and financial problems facing the industries concerned ;

Also aware that, since they provide subsidies, governments now follow more closely the activities of airlines and aircraft industries in order to obtain better returns for their subsidies through more rational management of the firms concerned ;

Considering that the Council's reply to Recommendation 257 that all aspects of European aviation continue to receive its fullest attention evades the question and demonstrates its complete inability to take the necessary political action ;

Aware of the study undertaken within the Communities on civil aircraft production, to be ready by 1st October 1975 ;

Aware that the scope of Eurocontrol's activities is shrinking,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments :

1. To call upon European airlines to agree on the characteristics of their future equipment and European manufacturers to co-operate in the manufacture of such equipment ;
2. To ensure that the study undertaken by the Communities includes a detailed chapter on means of allowing effective decision-making machinery to be established in Europe, including a European aviation agency after the fashion of the European Space Agency.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 26th May 1975

SUMMARY

1. Opening of the Session.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Welcoming address by Mrs. Renger, President of the Bundestag.
4. Address by the Provisional President.
5. Examination of Credentials.
6. Election of the President of the Assembly.
7. Tributes.
8. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
Speakers : The President, Mr. Leynen, the President.
9. Observers.
10. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session (Doc. 660).
11. Nomination of members to Committees.
12. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next ordinary Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 10.30 a.m. with Mr. Grangier, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the Session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

In accordance with the provisions of Article III (a) of the Charter and with Rules 2, 5 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Welcoming address by Mrs. Renger, President of the Bundestag

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mrs. Renger, President of the Bundestag.

Mrs. Renger (*President of the Bundestag*) (Translation). — Mr. President, your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, on behalf of the Federal German Bundestag I should like to extend a very warm welcome to you all.

We are pleased and honoured to be hosts to the Assembly of Western European Union as it celebrates its twentieth anniversary. We are glad to have the opportunity of being hosts to the Assembly just as London, Rome and Brussels have been in the past. We are even more glad, here in Bonn and on the soil of our Federal Republic, of the opportunity to say a "Thank you" on the occasion of this anniversary, to thank our partners who, twenty years ago, took the decisive step of revising the Brussels Treaty of 1948. They cleared the air and dispelled reservations that still existed at that time. With the creation of this alliance of the Seven, the Federal Republic was accepted as an equal member of the European family, in the field of defence as elsewhere.

We know that this was no easy thing to do after the terrible events of the first half of the century, and that it meant above all the surmounting of psychological barriers. Coming only ten years after the end of the second world war, it was a proof of confidence in our young and liberal-democratic system which cannot be overrated even today.

Joining Western European Union was important for us mainly because it enabled us very shortly after the waves of enmity had risen higher and higher to take part in an attempt by the peoples of Europe to compose their interests in a way which must be unique in history. This effort has been continued until the present day in many areas and in a variety of institutions

1. See page 18.

Mrs. Renger (continued)

The fact that joint defence efforts were given priority from the outset in the endeavours to unify Europe led ineluctably to sharp confrontation between East and West. In the years that followed, the Assembly of Western European Union, as part of this alliance of the Seven, became an autonomous body for parliamentary consultation and control in matters of western defence. The effectiveness of the work of this Assembly, in which members from seven national parliaments regularly discuss major defence issues, has increased throughout those twenty years from session to session.

If I may strike a more personal note here, I was a member of the WEU Assembly for many years and consequently am well aware of the many and various ways in which it has sought to ensure peace amongst the nations; history teaches us that there can be no peace without a very concrete and comprehensive policy on security. It also shows the importance of a defence policy. I was at that time particularly concerned with civil defence matters — a pretty tough job!

Our joint defence efforts do not of course provide protection only for the abstract idea of the State in which we wish to live. They are concerned rather with protecting the population which puts its stamp on this State and confers reality on it through the political expressions of its will. For this reason I still consider that military and civil defence must be complementary. The armed forces are an integral part of our community. The concept of the "citizen in uniform" illustrates the permanent rôle which he plays in our society. However, just as a soldier is expected to live with the thought of conflict and to be prepared for it, so too must every other citizen be expected to play a part in the more limited field of civil defence.

The West's readiness to defend itself by means of alliances between nations finds expression not only in NATO but also in Western European Union. The obligation to afford mutual assistance, the determination of the member States for mutual defence, is one of its basic principles. However, the problem before us is not just one of defence in an enormous geo-political area known as Europe; it is also, indeed principally, one of promoting the unity of Europe, of providing a constant drive towards its progressive integration. A common policy on secu-

rity ensures that the partners in the alliance have the freedom to act which they need if they are to forge their common political future. What European could doubt the sense and the future of this institution?

The Atlantic Alliance guarantees the safety of Europe. However, this does not absolve Western Europe from its obligation to make its own contribution. Consequently, it is of the greatest importance to have the type of parliamentary forum which has, for the last twenty years, been provided by the Assembly of Western European Union. There is no better place from which to co-ordinate the specifically European concept of a security policy and to bring it effectively before the European public.

It is with this in mind that I wish you every success with your work and hope that your stay in our Federal capital of Bonn will be most enjoyable. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I thank the President of the Bundestag for her words of welcome.

I think that the President we are about to elect will be the person best able to say on our behalf how much we appreciate the welcome you have extended to us.

4. Address by the Provisional President

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Madam President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in view of the many speeches to be made today, I shall leave it to others more eminent than I to analyse the situation and express their wishes — and perhaps their fears — concerning the future of a certain concept of Europe which has been the *raison d'être* of the work done by this Assembly in the past twenty years.

As one to whom falls the formidable and distinctly doubtful honour of taking the Chair at the beginning of this commemorative sitting merely on account of his age, allow me to express the fervent hope that, at this twenty-first session, the proceedings of our Assembly will help to dispel the often pointless misunderstandings which still, in 1975, play too large a part in reducing the cohesion of this united Europe, which we and the world need more and more with every day that passes.

Long live Europe. (*Applause*)

5. Examination of Credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the examination of credentials.

The list of Representatives and Substitutes attending the twenty-first ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union has been published in Notice No. 1.

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, all credentials have been attested by the statement of ratification communicated by the President of the Assembly of the Council of Europe, with the exception of the credentials of two Substitutes from the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Schauble and Mr. Wende, who have been appointed since the adjournment of the session of that Assembly.

Our Assembly must now examine their credentials in accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure.

The credentials are certified by the State Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, and no objection has been raised to them.

If the Assembly is unanimous, it can ratify these credentials without prior reference to a Credentials Committee.

Are there any objections to such ratification ?...

There are no objections.

The credentials are ratified subject to their subsequent ratification by the Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Mr. Schauble and Mr. Wende are therefore entitled to attend the twenty-first session of the Assembly of Western European Union as Substitutes from the Federal Republic of Germany.

6. Election of the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the election of the President of the Assembly.

In accordance with the provisions of Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure, no Representative may stand as a candidate for the office of President unless his candidature has been sponsored by three or more Representatives. Representatives

who are members of a national government may not be members of the Bureau.

Furthermore, Rule 7 (2) stipulates that Substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

I have received only one nomination, that of Mr. Edmond Nessler, Representative of France, duly sponsored in the form prescribed by the Rules of Procedure.

I call Mr. Leynen.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I propose to the Assembly that Mr. Nessler be elected President by acclamation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Is there any objection to Mr. Nessler's candidature? (*Applause*)

I note that the Assembly is unanimous. I therefore declare Mr. Nessler President of the Assembly of Western European Union, and I invite him to take the Chair.

(*Mr. Nessler then took the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Before beginning our proceedings and opening the commemorative sitting, I would like to thank you warmly for placing your confidence in me once again and to say that, as President of Western European Union, I shall make every effort to show myself worthy of this office.

Madam President, I would like to say how much we appreciate the welcome extended by you and the Bundestag and how glad we are to meet for our twentieth anniversary in these fine and impressive surroundings.

We are convinced that, from this point of view, the twenty-first session of Western European Union will be a particularly brilliant one, thanks to you and to the Bundestag and its staff.

I thank you. (*Applause*)

7. Tributes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — A great European passed away on 10th March last (*The Representatives rose*): Joseph Bech, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs and the former Head of Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, who was also a former Vice-President of the WEU Assembly.

The President (continued)

In fifty years of parliamentary life, Joseph Bech had a long ministerial career which lasted for more than thirty years — from 1926 to 1958 — and included the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Thanks to his practical experience of international affairs, his European convictions and his personal gifts as a peace-maker, he played an important part in all the negotiations aiming at unity in Europe.

Thus on 23rd October 1954 he was one of those who signed the Protocol which set up Western European Union, modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty.

It was only natural that, when he ceased to be a minister, Joseph Bech should be one of the parliamentary Representatives of the Grand Duchy in the Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Assembly of Western European Union.

From 1959 until December 1964, when he did not seek further re-election, he was one of the Vice-Presidents of our Assembly; and he gave the Assembly and its Bureau a vast amount of invaluable help.

With the passing of Joseph Bech we have lost one of the foremost architects of European unity.

It falls to me to perform a sad duty on this twentieth anniversary, namely that of paying tribute to the memory of one of the first and most brilliant servants of our Assembly.

Noël Salter, who was the Clerk Assistant of the WEU Assembly from its establishment until 1963, died on 10th May last as the result of a painful illness at the age of 46.

After a brilliant career at Oxford, where he studied history, Noël Salter devoted his life to the cause of Europe.

Having served as an official in the Council of Europe, and then as Clerk Assistant of the WEU Assembly, he subsequently joined the British Council of Churches, and then took up the duties of Assistant to the Secretary-General at the Commonwealth Secretariat in London. While at the Commonwealth Secretariat, he specialised in the problems of development, and when the United Kingdom acceded to the European Communities, he was one of the first British officials to enter the service of the Euro-

pean Commission, which gave him special responsibility for relations with the developing countries.

On behalf of the Assembly, I would express to Mrs. Salter and her four children our heartfelt feelings of sympathy.

8. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. The number of candidatures submitted is the same as the number of vacancies.

I call Mr Leynen.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I propose that the Vice-Presidents be elected by acclamation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I would point out that, should the election be by acclamation, the order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents would be determined by their age.

Are there any objections to the candidatures submitted ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare elected as Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, in the following order of precedence: Mr. de Niet, Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Bettiol, Mr. Amrehn, Mr. Tanghe and Mr. Mart. (*Applause*)

9. Observers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Several parliamentarians are doing us the honour of coming to take part in our proceedings as observers: Mr. Honoré and Mr. Omann, members of the Danish Folketing; Mr. Fikioris and Mr. Tsatsos, members of the Greek Chamber of Deputies; Mr. Vattekar and Mr. Juvik, members of the Norwegian Storting; Mr. Ünaldi, Vice-President of the Turkish Senate, and Mr. Karakas, President of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Committee; Mr. Wolff, member of the United States House of Representatives.

I extend a warm welcome to them. We shall listen with the keenest interest to anything they may have to say concerning the items on our agenda.

10. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session

(Doc. 660)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Assembly.

This draft Order of Business is contained in Document 660 dated 21st May 1975.

Are there any objections to the draft Order of Business contained in Document 660 ?...

The Order of Business for the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session is adopted.

11. Nomination of members to Committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the nomination of members to Committees.

The candidatures for the six Committees of the Assembly have been published in an appendix to Notice No. 1 which has been distributed.

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) and Rule 42 bis (2) of the Rules of Procedure, these candidatures are submitted to the Assembly.

Are there any objections to the candidatures submitted ?...

There are no objections.

The candidatures for the Committees are ratified.

The Committees of the Assembly are thus appointed.

12. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next ordinary Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Before the sitting to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the Assembly begins, we must fix the Orders of the Day for this afternoon's sitting.

I propose that the Assembly hold its next ordinary Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. The energy crisis and European security ; Conditions of service in the armed forces ; State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects (Votes on the draft Recommendations postponed from the last Session, Documents 656, 650 and 655).
2. East-West relations (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 668 and Amendment).
3. State of European security (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 671).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 11 a.m.)

SECOND SITTING

Monday, 26th May 1975

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. The energy crisis and European security; Conditions of service in the armed forces; State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects (*Votes on the draft Recommendations postponed from the last Session, Docs. 656, 650 and 655*).
Speakers : The President, Mr. Valleix.
4. East-West relations (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 668 and Amendment*).
Speakers : The President, Mr. Sieglerschmidt (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Müller, Mr. Amrehn, Mr. Lemmrich, Mr. Channon, Mr. Schwencke, Mr. Miller, Mr. Richter, Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Mattick, Mr. Waltmans, Mr. Bettiol, Lord Duncan-Sandys, Mr. Sieglerschmidt (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
5. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. The energy crisis and European security Conditions of service in the armed forces State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects

(Votes on the draft Recommendations postponed from the last Session, Docs. 656, 650 and 655)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The first Order of the Day is to vote on the draft recom-

mendations on which the Assembly was unable to pronounce at its last session.

We begin with the vote on the draft recommendation on the energy crisis and European security, contained in Document 656, presented by Sir John Rodgers on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. The debate was concluded at the eleventh sitting of the previous session on Thursday afternoon, 5th December 1974.

In the absence of a quorum, the vote on the draft recommendation as a whole was deferred until the present session.

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Thank you for giving me the floor, Mr. President. I am going to abstain, so shall adopt a very moderate attitude. But developments since December, in my view, only lend further justification to the reservations that might be expressed.

I want to say to Sir John Rodgers that his report is an excellent one. It is, indeed, so excellent that it sometimes seems to me to leave itself open to the reservations which I voiced

1. See page 21.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

then and repeat today, especially where it recalls that the meeting instigated by the United States in May 1974 had raised doubts about the procedure followed and, finally, the aims pursued.

I would add — and it is the specific point which warrants my reservation — that paragraph 2 of the operative part of the recommendation says that the French Government should be encouraged to take part in the International Energy Agency.

Since December, a preparatory meeting for the trilateral conference has been held. This meeting, it must be said, was disappointing, since although some progress was made as regards potential participants, no conclusion was reached for drawing up the agenda, in particular the list of subjects to be dealt with, i.e. all raw materials or only some of them. The reservations then expressed are in my opinion even more justified today. Very briefly, here is the reason why.

First of all, the problem of prices threatens to crop up again, partly owing to the collapse of the dollar, a matter of regret to us all.

Secondly, Europe is in fact finding difficulty in speaking with a single voice. So much is this true that the Geneva conference, a year ago, somewhat disappointed the Europeans.

These are the reasons, Mr. President, which will lead me — and I am perhaps not the only one — to abstain from voting on this issue. I regret the fact, but it is the circumstances which are regrettable. And I should not wish to pronounce a harsher judgment on a report which is, in other respects, excellent.

Let me state my position again. I wish that, whatever the difficulties may be, the dialogue between the producer countries and the consumer countries shall never finally be conducted over the heads of the developing, and in consequence particularly disadvantaged consumer countries.

Thank you, Mr. President, for having allowed me these few minutes to explain my attitude.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In order to facilitate our discussions, since there are three draft recommendations left outstanding, pending a quorum and so as to avoid the difficulties which we experienced at the previous session, I

shall pass on to the following votes which we will, if need be, group together subsequently.

We will pass on to the vote on the draft recommendation on conditions of service in the armed forces, contained in Document 650, presented by Mr. Klepsch on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

At the end of the debate on Thursday afternoon, 5th December 1974, at the eleventh sitting of the previous session, the vote on the draft recommendation as a whole could not take place because there was no quorum.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation contained in Document 650 ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

*The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously*¹.

It remains for us to vote on the draft recommendation, as amended, on the state of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects, contained in Document 655, presented by Mr. Small on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

I would remind you that, at the tenth sitting of the previous session on Thursday, 5th December 1974, the debate was closed and the Assembly adopted an amendment to add at the end of the draft recommendation a new paragraph reading as follows :

“To build nuclear power plants near a frontier only after agreement with the neighbouring country concerned.”

The vote on the amended draft recommendation as a whole was included in the Orders of the Day for the sitting of Thursday afternoon, 5th December 1974, but in the absence of a quorum the vote on the whole text was deferred until the present session.

The vote would be by roll-call if the Assembly were not unanimous.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation in Document 655 as amended ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

1. See page 27.

The President (continued)

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted unanimously*¹.

We now come back to the vote on the draft recommendation on the energy crisis and European security, contained in Document 656, presented by Sir John Rodgers on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

In view of the fact that Mr. Valleix has expressed his intention of abstaining, we are obliged to take a vote by roll-call. I hope we shall have a quorum.

The voting will begin with Mr. Portheine.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows² :

Number of votes cast	49
Ayes	43
Noes	0
Abstentions	6

*The draft recommendation is therefore adopted*³.

I thank the Assembly for voting consistently.

4. East-West relations

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 668 and Amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on East-West relations and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 668 and Amendment.

I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman and Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President,

Ladies and Gentlemen, as the first German member whom you, Mr. President, have called to speak at this spring session, I should like to say how pleased I am to thus have the opportunity of welcoming you all to Germany. I am sure that in doing so I am speaking not just for myself, but echoing the sentiments of the whole German Delegation.

It was surely not mere chance that the General Affairs Committee, our political committee, decided to ask its Chairman to submit on its behalf a report on the state of East-West relations. The positive or negative development of East-West relations is of course very important for all our countries, but no member State is so sharply affected by any rise or fall in the political barometer as is the Federal Republic — because of its geographical position and its fateful situation in the magnetic field between East and West.

Twenty years ago it was the adverse state of East-West relations that led to the creation of Western European Union, with the Federal Republic as a member. The fact that we are meeting here today in Bonn is therefore closely connected with the subject of the report which I have to present. This report, to which I would like to add a few supplementary points and explanations, attempts to give a sober, balanced account of the situation. It will be for you to say, in the discussion which follows, whether or not it has succeeded in doing this.

During the lively discussions which we had about this report in the General Affairs Committee it was on the one hand claimed, as you will see in paragraph 84 of the report, that the Rapporteur was taking too pessimistic a view of the situation. He was, on the other hand, criticised for doing exactly the opposite. You will understand when I say that I take these diametrically opposed opinions to mean that the Rapporteur has had some success in avoiding overstatement of either case.

The course of the discussions in Committee was moreover typical of the way in which the prospects and dangers of East-West relations are assessed in our countries. In the discussions about political decisions in this field there is undoubtedly a small group of incorrigible optimists on one side and just as incorrigible pessimists on the other. The rest are sometimes hopeful and sometimes fearful, sometimes resigned and sometimes confident about our chances of consolidating the détente and so making peace

1. See page 28.
2. See page 22.
3. See page 26.

Mr. Sieglerschmidt (continued)

in Europe a bit more secure. We are encouraged to pursue our endeavours by recognition of a fact which was put into words by Peter Lorenz, the President of the Berlin Chamber of Deputies, when Mr. Kissinger visited this city: "We all know there is no alternative to the policy of détente." Recognition of this fact is neither erased nor reduced by his subsequent, and very true, statement that our readiness for détente is not matched by a similar readiness on the other side. It simply underlines the fact that a policy of détente can be successful only if it is pursued soberly and without illusions.

At this point I should like to make a few comments on the explanatory memorandum attached to the draft recommendation to the Council of Ministers.

You will find in the introduction, paragraph 22, a description of the situation in Portugal on the basis of the information available on 28th April. Since then we have heard of other events which fill us with grave misgivings. This is particularly true of the illegal closure of the socialist newspaper *República*. Freedom of the press is an essential element in human rights. The revolutionary movement that was determined to lead Portugal back into the family of democratic European countries must get back on the road to democracy if it is not to lose all credibility in Western Europe. Meanwhile, the European Community and its member States should do everything possible in the way of economic aid to give democracy in Portugal a chance. We should — and I say this without any hesitation — be prepared to take material risks now rather than having perhaps to reproach ourselves one day with failing to make the contribution which might have prevented events taking a bad turn. Our parliaments should also give some suitable demonstration of their solidarity with the forces of democracy in Portugal on the lines of the resolution adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 25th April.

There are no doubt many among you who are wondering what all this has to do with a report on East-West relations. They should not overlook the fact that, as things stand, developments in Portugal could disturb or even endanger the military and political balance in Europe. I do not believe that there is any real need to fear this at the moment, but it would be irresponsible

of the West not to take it into its political calculations. Anyone toying with the idea of using outside intervention to alter the existing balance of power should realise that this would indeed be playing with fire.

What I said at the beginning about the right way to pursue a policy of détente applies particularly to the conference on security and co-operation in Europe. The progress this conference has made to date in no way justifies the view that is sometimes heard, that it only furthers the Soviet aim of "Finlandisation" of Europe and must anyhow be suspect because it was initiated by the Soviet Union. Some years ago, Mr. President, I had occasion to submit a report to the Assembly on this matter. I can only repeat what I said then; what really counts is not the alleged or actual evil intentions of the negotiating partners, but what is finally achieved by tough negotiating. Seen from this angle, results have so far been not unfavourable apart from the still wide differences of opinion about the so-called third basket, in other words, about a freer exchange of people and ideas. An acceptable compromise can however be found even here, unless we are deliberately to let the whole thing fail because of this point. On the other hand, we must recognise the limits beyond which communist régimes cannot go in this matter without giving up their own nature.

As I am a deputy for Berlin, you will understand if I say a few words about my home town. In the speech which he made last Wednesday in Berlin, the American Foreign Affairs Secretary, Henry Kissinger, confirmed the main elements in the views expressed in our report when he said: "In the delicate balance of relations between East and West, Berlin's position is pivotal." Clearly alluding to the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, he went on to say that hopes for greater security and co-operation must be defended, first and foremost, in Berlin. He came to the following conclusion: "We consider the effectiveness, durability and scrupulous observance of the quadripartite agreement of September 1971 a crucial test of the process called détente", and in so doing lent his support to the maxim of western policy given in the fifth paragraph of the recommendation in the report.

It should also be pointed out how highly Kissinger rates the achievements of the quadripartite agreement on Berlin. His statements culminate in the following declaration:

Mr. Sieglerschmidt (continued)

"My visit does not come in the midst of crisis, rather it takes place at a moment when this city is enjoying greater security than at any time in the last thirty years."

Mr. President, as I have already said, quoting Kissinger, there is indeed no alternative to the policy of détente; we must pursue it soberly on the lines that I have tried to trace in the last paragraph of my conclusions, which is, with imagination and willingness to reach understanding, but also with courage and firmness. (Applause)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

To open the debate, I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MULLER (Federal Republic of Germany) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as Mr. Sieglerschmidt has already pointed out in his introductory address, this report was the subject of lively debate in Committee. I should like to say from the start that I was one of the members of the Committee who, at the meeting in March, said they felt that too optimistic a picture was being painted.

Allow me to say a few words on this point today. There are various statements in the explanatory memorandum and the draft recommendation which I do not believe can be maintained as they stand. For example, the report states at one point that when there were conflicts in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia the West silently accepted the expansion of Soviet power within the limits defined at Yalta. I consider this statement to be erroneous, as the limits defined at Yalta were different. I would remind you that at this international conference it was for Eastern Europe that spheres of influence were fixed, and the Soviet side has not adhered to the agreement. They began to extend their sphere of influence in this area immediately after the end of the war, and completed the process in 1948. The first country to be affected was Poland, which was followed by Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. It was not accident that the first step in establishing communist power in Poland was the ban on the Christian Democratic Party; the banning of the other parties followed. I mention this because I too want to say something about Portugal. As the members of the Committee will remember, I thought that nothing should be said about

Portugal in this report. I was convinced that in March it was not yet possible to foresee how events would develop; but I was afraid that they might take an even worse turn, and my fears have meanwhile been confirmed. I should like to read something from the *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, a paper closely connected with the Communist Party of the Federal Republic. This paper takes a look at Portuguese politics, and states — I quote from the paper:

"The Portuguese Communist Party was one of those which consistently pursued the aims of the Seventh Comintern Conference of 1935 with the Trojan horse strategy."

Here we have, I think, a very frank confession from a newspaper connected with the Communist Party. So I must tell Mr. Sieglerschmidt that it can no longer be said that the Communist Party in Portugal seems to be reaping great advantage from the situation. I am afraid that this is rather a matter of hard fact.

When he mentioned Portugal Mr. Sieglerschmidt quoted Ferdinand Lasalle, the founder of German social democracy, as saying — and I want to quote this correctly now — that constitutional questions are questions of relationships between forces. Here we are not discussing a balance of power, but might in all its harshness. With things as they are today in Portugal, we can no longer speak about a balance of power.

I should also like to say a few words about the conference on security and co-operation in Europe. Mr. Sieglerschmidt, in the explanatory memorandum to his report, argues that one of the conditions for calling the conference was — if I may put it this way — settlement of the *querelles allemandes*, the solution of the German problem. That is doubtless true. In one document, known as the Bahr paper, dealing with the negotiations between Bonn and Moscow, point 10 consisted of an undertaking given by both governments that they would support such a conference. It is my opinion — but here our opinions are sure to diverge — that this was an over-hasty decision. It would seem that a number of other statements concerning the German problem which are reproduced in this report were also over-hasty. According to these statements, the basic treaty, the treaties with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland and the quadripartite agreement have brought more security and more freedom of movement for the people.

Mr. MATTICK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — And Mr. Kissinger said that too.

Mr. MULLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I am quoting what Mr. Sieglerschmidt said. No doubt Mr. Kissinger has said exactly the same thing at some time or other. I was coming to Mr. Kissinger, particularly as he was mentioned by our Rapporteur. I do not agree with this viewpoint and so it is immaterial to me whether it comes from our Rapporteur or the United States Secretary of State. Anyone who looks at the situation in Berlin especially as it has been in the last few months must realise that peace there is no more secure than before.

In infringement of the treaty there have been restrictions on the transit routes, the lights have been red again. I would not like to bring up so emotional a subject as the incident with a Turkish child which occurred recently in Berlin.

Human contacts between the two Germanies have not become any easier. We know that GDR citizens working in factories have to sign an undertaking not to make contact with their relatives from the Federal Republic any more. The promises to let citizens of German origin leave Poland and the Soviet Union have not been kept. I should like to quote you something from a newspaper which may even interest Mr. Mattick, as well. A German newspaper writes that the obstacles to leaving these countries are many and varied. For example, citizens of German origin in Poland are reported to start queuing up at night in front of district headquarters to apply for exit visas. The militia then turns up during the night with a lorry, picks the people up and drives them to a point twenty kilometers outside the town, where they are made to get out and walk back, so that when they at last get back the office is of course closed. And that was not as Mr. Mattick might imagine in the *Bayernkurier* but in *Spiegel*, a news magazine of which no one would suggest that it is just a north German edition of that other weekly from Munich.

Mr. Sieglerschmidt quoted Mr. Kissinger as having said — and Mr. Mattick's interruption was on similar lines — that Berlin had never been safer. I would like to remind him that after the Paris agreement on Vietnam Mr. Kissinger, speaking of another problem, said something similar, and that it was not very long before his sentence was shown to be nothing but hot air.

How, then, anyone can talk about an improvement in the situation is beyond me.

(*Interjection from Mr. Sieglerschmidt*)

We saw that in the result of the elections, Mr. Sieglerschmidt. I had many conversations at that time, and we have seen what followed.

Allow me to make one more comment, on a passage dealing with easier terms of credit — paragraph 3 of the recommendation.

In Soviet publications I read again and again that the capitalist West is on the brink of disaster and that socialism is the better system. So I do not see why it is the crumbling capitalist system which has to give the superior socialist system credit on favourable terms so that the socialist system can cope with its own economic difficulties. Recently the Soviet Union's foreign trade situation has improved considerably, because not only are there sheiks who are believers in the Great Prophet but there are also atheist sheiks in the Soviet Union who have increased the price of oil and other raw materials just as much, with the result that there is now a comforting inflow of foreign currency to the Soviet Union. In my view the statement as formulated — that we are being particularly accommodating in this matter — and the corresponding proposal to the competent organs in NATO — do not fit the sober analysis which Mr. Sieglerschmidt has asked us to make.

After so much criticism, I should now like to say something positive; it concerns the remark in the introduction to your report that peaceful coexistence certainly does not mean ideological coexistence. I agree absolutely with the Rapporteur on this. I have taken the trouble to study the introductory course on the theory of communism provided for members of the Soviet Communist Party and would like on the basis of this study to make a few comments on the question of peaceful coexistence. The course, like the report, begins by stating that there can be no peaceful coexistence in the ideological sphere. It goes on to say that there are still imperialist strongholds which form the main barrier to the revolutionary process. Six countries are cited by name. Four of them are members of Western European Union: England, France, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany. The other two are the United States and Japan, likewise highly industrialised nations. On this point the course explains how the imperialist strongholds can gradually be conquered. It says: "It — i.e. the

Mr Müller (continued)

working class of the capitalist countries — by undermining the bases of capitalism from within — as it were, in its own house — paves the way for the final collapse of world capitalism and hastens its end.” But, it goes on to say, the socialist States must make their contribution, must “cut it off — the capitalist West — from its main sources of raw materials and labour, from its outlets and other spheres such as military deployment areas”.

If you read these frank statements, you will see that all the talk about peaceful coexistence is nothing more than one way of achieving a given aim by other methods. We know about the other methods. On page 420 of this introductory course it says: “The revolutionary working class and its party must always be ready for rapid changes in the form of the power struggle”.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is on this statement from the course on theoretical communism for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that I would like to close. When we are talking about the policy of détente or the question of East-West relations, a sober attitude is called for. Nobody wants a policy of confrontation. All of us without exception want a policy of détente. However, if we are to pursue this policy of détente, we should realise that we must keep our powder dry — if I may be allowed to use this picture — if we are not one day to have a very nasty surprise. We must keep our eyes wide open. In view of recent events in Berlin, Portugal and the Mediterranean, we should not become euphoric about détente but make sure that it is a two-sided affair and does not just depend on one party making all the concessions in advance. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Amrehn.

Mr. AMREHN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Sieglerschmidt’s report is remarkable in that its recommendation, which he urges us to accept, is in a way opposed to, in contradiction with the statements put forward to support it. It is possible to go along much of the way with the recommendation itself, as I have done, apart from one change which I shall propose at the end of my remarks.

If we have to discuss the report, it is because it reproduces a number of arguments which cannot simply be accepted as they stand and so will

have to be discussed here, as they were in the Committee. I would like to give one or two examples, which will not be exhaustive but are simply intended to bring out how far the explanatory memorandum and the recommendation itself are out of step.

For example, Mr. Sieglerschmidt says in the report: “As long as the Eastern European countries consider such opening (of frontiers) to be dangerous... the policy of détente will remain a rather empty formula, as it is today.” One can unhesitatingly subscribe to that. I would go so far as to say that Mr. Sieglerschmidt is depicting the situation as it really is. But in another section, although he has just stated that the policy of détente has become a rather empty formula, he says: “However, détente is... an undeniable fact”. To justify this he alleges that even the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 did not raise tension in Europe to the same degree as the Hungarian revolution in 1956.

At this point I will not take up the question whether tension in 1968 really was less than in November 1956, at the time of the Hungarian revolution. But even if Mr. Sieglerschmidt were correct in assuming that tension did not reach the same level, this really is not a positive finding, but just an expression of resignation, of impotence, in that we were unable to come to the help of these people, an impotence pervading the free world. I really cannot call this détente in the sense in which Mr. Sieglerschmidt himself understands the word.

At another point and on another subject, the report says that numerous bilateral economic agreements have improved co-operation in Europe. Is that a positive finding? Outwardly it would at first seem to be so; but looking closer we must realise that at a time when the EEC is trying to pursue a common commercial policy and none other, bilateral co-operation agreements are a means of undermining the commitments of the European Community and a way of enabling the Soviet Union to play off one EEC State against the other. We can only hope that in future co-operation agreements, too, are placed under the aegis of the European Community so that we will be able — at least among the Nine — to talk the same language on matters of trade.

There is a third statement to the effect that the rise in the prices of oil and raw materials has helped re-establish a balance of trade in Europe, including the East. That is no doubt

Mr. Amrehn (continued)

correct, but is nevertheless not a sign of détente and not a sign of progress. Mr. Sieglerschmidt adds that the way for further progress in this field is now open. Mr. President, this has not led to any increase in trade at all ; merely the prices paid for our goods have decreased considerably, without trade having expanded in any way. To suggest that the raising of prices for raw materials and oil as a way of achieving balance is an improvement must surely be sarcasm. It certainly cannot be looked on as a positive development.

Mr. Müller has already spoken about Portugal. When the report was drawn up we were perhaps all rather more hopeful than now about the way things would turn out. I can see, for example, Mr. Bettiol, who thought entirely differently six weeks ago. Perhaps we agreed with him then. But we were being more hopeful than we seem to have cause to be today.

Mr. Müller has already mentioned Berlin, as has Mr. Sieglerschmidt.

Here I should like to add a comment in rather more detail and say that we are not now concerned with the question of persons travelling or of improving and increasing trade, but with the way the Soviet Union is again using its heavy artillery — official statements, statements from the Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin, statements in *Pravda* and statements over the radio, and as we know these play a different note there than they do here — to intervene afresh in the dispute over Berlin by again declaring that from the outset the three western powers have had no right to be in Berlin. And all this is being done despite the fact that the quadripartite agreement on Berlin was to put an end once and for all to this discussion.

Umbrage was taken when Federal Minister Genscher was in Berlin three days ago ; yet we all know visits of this type are allowed by the quadripartite agreement. Under this agreement the Federal Republic is entitled to represent Berlin as well in the treaties to which Berlin wants to subscribe according to international law. But so far the Soviet Union has refused to sign the texts of treaties already submitted, because the Federal Republic wants Berlin to be included in them. It is because these treaties do not yet exist that it was possible for the accident with the child to occur recently in Berlin. The East German authorities prevented the rescue of the

child simply because the West Berlin authorities were not "competent" in this bit of Berlin. This is a glaring case of inhuman conduct which throws light not only on the particular case, but on the situation as a whole.

Allow me to finish by expressing another worry that is linked in my mind with these developments. It is more or less expected that the security conference will end this summer. We all know that the Soviet Union wants to link this with a big meeting of the Heads of State or Government. So far negotiations have not made it possible for an agreement to be signed, because in just those areas where the West has claims, the Soviet Union has not yet accepted them ; I refer to the better and broader exchange of information, opinions and people. The West can still make demands here.

And now here is the Soviet Union playing a new negotiating card by suddenly calling in question rules that have already been settled in the Berlin agreement. It may be prepared to concede something which under the quadripartite agreement is already part of the law. When it then once again concedes the point, the West suddenly has the feeling that it has brought the Soviet Union to give way and is consequently ready to sign, although the Soviet Union has really made none of the concessions which were expected from it at the security conference. It first makes counter-claims and then withdraws them, conceding only what has all along been part of the law. Meanwhile the West has been brought to the point where it will affix a signature it is not willing to give.

Today, Ladies and Gentlemen, the wording of paragraph 3 of the recommendation — and this brings me back to the text of the recommendation — is no longer appropriate, at any rate in the form that perhaps seemed appropriate to many amongst us a few weeks ago. It states that we should propose that the North Atlantic Council should operate the agreements on the delivery of restricted goods in a more liberal manner. At a time when the Soviet Union is again putting more pressure on the West, this recommendation is to say the least inopportune.

Consequently I would like to see the words "in a liberal manner" deleted from the English version and replaced by the words "under present circumstances". The rest of the text can remain as it is : it will have to be seen whether we wish to deliver more or less of the goods on the restricted list. I have submitted my amendment

Mr. Amrehn (continued)

in writing and it will be distributed later. I hope that the Rapporteur, in view of the overall argumentation in his report and of his basic attitude to the matter, will be able, at least in the situation as it is today, to agree that my proposal is right. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Lemmrich.

Mr. LEMMRICH (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am a little embarrassed at being the third representative of my country to comment on this report, and I hope that colleagues from other member States too will have something to say about it.

I should like to comment briefly on the question of reviewing trade agreements and limiting credits. Mr. Amrehn has already given his opinion on this matter. It really is a problem to know whether the western countries should in this connection undertake commitments which go beyond what they are already prepared to do. Having read a passage from Mr. Sieglerschmidt's report and visualised a little of the background, I think that paragraph 3 of the recommendation should be changed.

Right at the beginning of the draft recommendation it says: "Concerned that present economic difficulties in Western Europe may tempt the Soviet Union to take advantage of them with a view to extending its influence". Those of us who have been carefully following Soviet tactics over the years, as the Rapporteur could and did at very close quarters, will know what can lie behind the struggle, the dispute and the use of economic means of pressure as well.

When I recall that the Soviet Union spends 10 % of its gross national product on defence, the NATO countries on average 5.6 % but the European States in NATO not even that much, but a mere 4.4 %, I cannot but wonder whether the shortcomings in the communist bloc's normal economic output, caused by excessive spending on arms, should be made good by credits obtained so easily from the free world.

I agree completely with Mr. Amrehn when he says that we should reword this paragraph in such a way that while not ruling out such a review the current situation and all the relevant possibilities and intentions must be kept in mind.

It would be too bad if we gave anyone cause to think that there was truth in Lenin's familiar remark that the capitalists would seek to make a profit on the rope they are being hung with.

In view of this I think that we should go over it again. I think that this amendment would fit in better with the background to Mr. Sieglerschmidt's recommendation and would make it seem to hang together properly. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Channon.

Mr. CHANNON (*United Kingdom*). — It is the tradition, in the British House of Commons at least, that those who speak to an assembly for the first time do so shortly and not controversially. I hope that I shall be able to fulfil that rôle, at any rate at the beginning of my remarks, by saying, as, I think, the first non-German delegate to be speaking this afternoon, how grateful we are to those who have arranged the splendid hospitality provided and the excellent arrangements made for the conduct of our affairs.

Secondly, I want to say how much I have agreed with previous speakers in the debate, and with Mr. Amrehn in particular, in some of the criticisms that have been made of the report. I am, however, in very strong agreement with many of the recommendations in the report and with a great deal of what Mr. Sieglerschmidt said throughout his report. Personally, coming to this Assembly afresh I find this very full report an extremely instructive document, but I must confess to being, as those who have already spoken in the debate so far have confessed to being, one of the pessimists rather than one of the optimists to whom Mr. Sieglerschmidt refers at the end of his report.

When we look at the situation in the world and consider what has happened over the past few months, is it not right that in this Assembly at least we should take a most cautious look at the prospects for real and genuine détente at the moment? We have seen in the past few weeks the events in Vietnam, not referred to in the report.

We have seen great advances by the communists in different parts of the world. We also see the situation in Portugal evolving. There can be few people in the Assembly who would not have been delighted by the fact that the Portuguese people were to be given the chance

Mr. Channon (continued)

of once again having a democratic form of government. On the other hand, I suspect also that there can be few people here who are not extremely disturbed at the way in which events are shaping themselves in Portugal at present. The banning of political parties before the general election there and events after the general election lead one to have the very gravest doubts as to what will be the future in that country in the next few months and years.

All this leads me to the view, and I should have thought it ought to lead the Assembly to the view, that at a time when we are considering détente — and I agree that détente is the only road along which we can go — we should more than ever be careful of what is happening to us at present. There is the proportion of defence expenditure going on in the eastern bloc at present compared with the proportion of defence expenditure in the countries represented in the Assembly.

We ought all to take very much to heart Mr. Sieglerschmidt's preamble, in which he warns us that the fight against inflation may incite the democratic countries to reduce their defence budgets to an extent that might endanger their security. It is the duty of us all not to take that easy course when we are faced in all our countries by extreme pressures to cut expenditure in all fields but to realise that if we go far down the road to cutting defence expenditure we may well be endangering the very liberties and democracy for which we all stand. That is something that is controversial in my country and is controversial probably among the other countries represented here.

At a time when we know that events have not been moving in favour, as I believe, of the West, at a time when we are extremely worried about the reactions of the United States of America in future, all of us must at least have the question mark at the back of our minds of what would be the American posture if there were trouble in Europe in future; the question mark at least of what might be American policy in ten or twenty years' time. I take the view that the Americans will always stick to their guarantees in Berlin and Western Europe. But that question mark must be at the back of our minds at present.

I believe that now we as parliamentarians should in our own countries be sticking to the view that defence expenditure, far from being

cut, should be a high priority at the present; and, therefore, that this Assembly has a more important rôle to play now than perhaps at any time in its history. My criticism of the report — and here I support the three previous speakers — is that, although the recommendations themselves, with the possible exception of number 3, are sound in my opinion, nevertheless my view is that if we accept the report totally unamended we are in danger of taking far too optimistic a view rather than the realistic view that I believe the state of Europe and of the western world demands us to take if we are to make constructive suggestions on how détente can realistically be pursued. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Schwenecke.

Mr. SCHWENCKE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am glad that good sense — or just chance? — has seen to it that a guest from abroad, from the United Kingdom, has at last broken into the row of German speakers and taken the floor.

If we take a critical look at the report as a whole, I think there can be no denying that it is well balanced. I think that in its analysis and its recommendations it can be described as, if anything, moderately critical rather than belligerent and perhaps too optimistic. This can probably be attributed to the fact that our Rapporteur, a Berliner, has expressed his views and his political credo with the Berliner's sobriety.

I therefore fail to understand why Mr. Amrehn, Mr. Müller and Mr. Lemmrich have criticised just those points which I think — at least as a recommendation — represent the general opinion of this Assembly. It is perfectly natural that in this situation, and here in this parliamentary assembly the opposition should intervene with critical comments, and no one will deny their right to do so. But when I look at what they then had to say, I am left with the impression that there was more "unpolicy" than policy behind it. At any rate, I found nowhere any alternative put forward. The knife simply turned in a wound which we all recognise as a wound, but which cannot be healed with this sort of treatment.

A few days ago in Berlin the United States Secretary of State said — and this has already been quoted — that Berlin's position was better than it was thirty years ago, better than it ever

Mr. Schwencke (continued)

had been. However you look at it, Ladies and Gentlemen, this statement is a fact. Any of you who go to Berlin overland, and not by plane, will see the change which has come about. This is a result of the basic treaty which, with very few exceptions, the CDU/CSU opposed in this Chamber. And in connection with Berlin, too, the Rapporteur is not being over-optimistic — quite the opposite — but very careful, very restrained. He described as disgraceful what needs to be called disgraceful, namely that the lights were — figuratively speaking — again being switched to red.

Are the “alternatives” perhaps those we heard of at the party congress of the Berlin CDU, where a demand was made that the CSCE negotiations should be broken off? I do not know whether that can be called an alternative at all. Is it politically feasible? Can it be tabled by the opposition in this Chamber at a meeting of the Bundestag? Hardly! So far, the CSCE negotiations have not been fully tested even in respect of the third basket. Where have all the possibilities been exhausted? Where has the West gone so far that it evoked a final *Niet*? Not all the points which can be explored have as yet been explored. We must have an interest in the continuation of the negotiations.

I believe that the Soviet Union too has much to gain from bringing these negotiations to a positive conclusion. All we can do in conjunction with our governments is to keep the Soviet Union's interest alive by ensuring that the West keeps on trying to see what can be done by fresh offers and further negotiations. I think the chances of doing this are at any rate not so dim as many people, with the stereotyped views they are again expressing from morning till night and at every party congress, would have us believe.

Détente, the main theme of this report, has to a certain extent produced positive results in the economic field. Economic relations have become closer, not only bilaterally but multilaterally as well. Negotiations are still going on between the EEC and the CMEA, the former Comecon, and I think that both sides have an interest in stepping them up. That the Soviet Union, thanks to the energy crisis, that is, to the increase in the price of oil, is now in a better position politically to exert greater pressure in its own sphere of influence, is a point which must also be kept in mind in this connection.

Another point: the SALT negotiations have, it must be recognised, taken place against the background provided by this atmosphere of détente, and a great deal has been accomplished. This is also in our interests.

Mr. Müller has, as he always does, referred to Portugal. We had a similar discussion a few weeks ago in Strasbourg. I often have the impression that the situation in Portugal is seen not so much as an opportunity for the West to provide assistance but as a warning of what happens when a system is changed. I think that the satisfaction we felt at the election results was not shared by some opposition speakers, quite the reverse perhaps. At any rate, I have nowhere seen in black and white that they welcomed in democratic fashion the fact that the elections in Portugal have produced a result which has caught the attention of people in the West and which shows that what they were predicting in Strasbourg a few days before the election — and you, Mr. Müller, were among them — has not come about.

I also think that economic assistance from the EEC will probably not on its own be enough to change this country into a democracy after fifty years of dictatorship. What it needs much more is active moral support. That is what it needs, but not that every little step it takes, however decisive it may be in the longer run, should be accompanied by criticism. Discussing Portugal and the situation there in the way we have done here today is not very helpful.

In his report the Rapporteur gives only a shadowy outline of the longer term development of the policy of détente. We will have to wait and see. When however he refers in more detail to the CSCE negotiations, I think we get things right.

To sum up, Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe that this debate must give not only WEU but also the public an indication of what possible alternatives to the policy of détente might look like when put forward to an opposition which views entente in a different light. We know we are not living in days of boundless possibilities, but if we have no hope that further progress on the path of entente is possible and politically feasible, we will get nowhere. I thank you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). — Like my fellow countryman, Mr. Channon, I want to

Mr. Miller (continued)

assure our German friends that not only are we very conscious of their problems but we offer them our support.

This apart, I would like to take the opportunity of placing the concept of East-West relations in a wider perspective than have previous speakers. I apologise for stretching "East" a little further to include China and Japan. As the Rapporteur makes clear, détente is not a static concept but must be considered in dynamic terms; the centre of gravity in world affairs is moving steadily towards the Pacific, and this is something which we must bear in mind. It affects us here in that we have to consider very seriously the make-weight of China in our relations with the Soviet Union. It is very significant that the People's Republic of China has taken a great interest in the Common Market; I certainly recall conversations with its ambassador in London during which he was at great pains to point out his country's view that the next conflict or armed venture might well be in Europe. We need to consider our present position.

We have not very much time, but we have enough to make a diplomatic move towards strengthening our ties with China as well as maintaining the Atlantic Alliance. At the same time we have to make the effort of political will to get the best use out of our defence capabilities here in Europe, because the mere fact that the centre of gravity is beginning to change, as I ventured to suggest, means that we may no longer be a top priority in the considerations of our North American allies. It is true that they are far closer to the Soviet Union in the East than they are to us in the West.

The effort of will that we in Europe have to undertake on the defence side is to get better use of our forces and of our industrial capabilities. That means a very much greater degree of standardisation, and all the other issues which have been discussed in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments with which I do not wish to take up the time of the full Assembly. There is an effort of political will to be made here, and I hope that the United Kingdom will play its full part in this after the conclusions of our referendum.

While assuring our German friends of our commitment to the security of Western Europe, I ask them for understanding of our difficulties

in the United Kingdom, in particular the ancient subject of the support costs, which has to be looked at afresh if we are to be able to maintain that presence which we certainly hope to achieve. This is where I depart slightly from Mr. Channon. I find Mr. Sieglerschmidt's paper realistic. I do not find it complacent.

In my few remarks I have been trying to look at the matter in a slightly wider perspective because we have to remember that the centre of gravity is shifting. We also have to remember the age-old Soviet drive, which has always been down through India and into the Indian Ocean, where at the moment the Soviet Union is achieving a considerable position of strength. In Western Europe we have to consider not only our defence but the safeguarding of our sources of raw materials, which will become one of the main preoccupations of industrial countries in the future. I do not wish to prolong my remarks by getting drawn on to that question, which has a slightly wider scope than has our discussion this afternoon. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Richter.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I must confess that I was delighted when a few weeks ago I heard that Helmut Sieglerschmidt was the Rapporteur on this particular subject, because I know that he represents Berlin and that he is finely tuned in to everything to do with this problem. He hears not only the politicians here in Bonn, he also hears what the man in the street is saying in Berlin, he hears the taxi driver and he hears the woman behind the market stall. I was also pleased when I saw his report, for all the qualities we know him to possess are plain again in this report: we know him in this Assembly as a man of balanced judgment.

As I watch this discussion, it seems to me that on German questions it has been mainly German representatives who have spoken. This may be an indication of the degree of importance attaching to the problems we have been discussing. I do not wish to gloss over anything or to minimise anything; of course there are difficulties galore. Mr. Amrehn has listed a number of them. And this is my impression of the debate: once again we have just escaped giving the impression of pursuing our *querelles allemandes* in an international forum.

Mr. Richter (continued)

I might point out, Mr. President, that here, in this very hall and only a few days ago on 15th May, we held the 170th sitting of the Bundestag. We had a full debate on foreign policy and our alliances, and also turned our attention to an appreciation of what the alliance means to us. The result was — such was my impression — a considerable degree of consensus between both government and opposition. We recognised that we have to continue unswervingly to follow our policy of making peace more secure. This was formally decided by the Bundestag. It was — I repeat — not contested during the debate in any convincing manner.

Our policy of securing peace consists, in the opinion of the German Federal Government — our Foreign Minister, Mr. Genscher, dealt with this point during the debate — of four decisions of principle: first, the determination to work within the Atlantic Alliance; secondly, the constant endeavour to achieve the political union of Europe — I think that we are today contributing to this end, and that this Assembly has always contributed to it; thirdly, the day-to-day pursuit of further détente — this came out very clearly in the Bundestag; and fourthly, the will to work in partnership with all the countries of the third world.

We believe that the broad conditions for a policy of détente and adjustment have remained completely unaltered, and the same may surely be said — as I look at the international situation — of the other side. The Soviet Foreign Minister has only recently re-stated this attitude most firmly as that of his government. There is, in fact, no defensible alternative to the realistic policy of détente that we have worked out together in this Assembly. During the lunch break today I had a conversation with Sir John, and I took the opportunity to thank him, as a British Conservative, for his contribution to the development of détente in Europe.

We have before us an amendment tabled by Mr. Amrehn on the situation with respect to East bloc credits. I cannot, of course, anticipate on what the Rapporteur may say, but I would nevertheless urge him to consider very carefully how far we can accommodate Mr. Amrehn's wish to amend the formula. Looking at détente and feeling that it must be pursued in an intelligent way, I find it quite impossible to separate détente and economic co-operation.

Mr. Müller has spoken about keeping our powder dry and Mr. Lemmrich has talked about the rope we are paying for ourselves. These metaphors are simply out of place in our day and age. What we need is co-operation.

To Mr. Amrehn, I will say that the following point must be remembered: the West has agreed on uniform conditions of credit for the East European nations. This is an advance on the past. Why should this Assembly make a recommendation — which governments probably will interpret with much finesse — that we should renegue this formula? It is not, in my opinion, by refusing economic co-operation, as is being indirectly demanded in this proposed amendment, that we will be able to impose reasonable political behaviour.

It is even possible that the opposite could result. Only by continued pursuit of détente and serious co-operation — a process that is of course really only just beginning — can a situation be created in which even the Soviet Union will no longer be completely free to apply at this point or that the sort of pressure it used to exert whenever it found it useful to do so — often, especially, along the Berlin wall.

If Mr. Amrehn did not modify his draft amendment, I would, for the reasons I have stated, be inclined to vote against it. Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Sir John Rodgers.

Sir John RODGERS (*United Kingdom*). — I had no intention originally of participating in the debate. However, as it has developed, I wish to make a few observations.

I am very grateful to Mr. Richter for recalling to those members of WEU who are also members of the Council of Europe that when I was a Rapporteur in that organisation I introduced a series of papers in favour of *Ostpolitik*, and I did my best, sometimes against the opposition of the Chairman of the Committee at that time, to present what I believed was a right and proper judgment.

I still believe it is in the long-term interests of the world that we should pursue a policy of détente. I believe it is nothing but crazy if we do not bring about a better understanding between the East and the West. By East and West, unlike one or two speakers, I mean Rus-

Sir John Rodgers (continued)

sia, the satellites and the Western European world.

If only we can learn to live together in peace, tranquillity and friendship, the whole world will be greatly advantaged. Therefore, I am still fervently in favour of the pursuit of a policy of détente in Europe.

Having said that, however, I must now confess that I am beginning to have a few misgivings as to how far the policy of détente has advanced. Mr. Sieglerschmidt states in the report — and I am sure it is true — that the Soviet Union desires the conference on security and co-operation in Europe to be concluded without delay. I am sure it does. But is it right that we should hasten the conclusion of that treaty without looking at what we have conceded and what it has not conceded?

Month after month goes by and we see the disproportionate amount of money being spent by the Soviet Union on tanks, aeroplanes, submarines and the like. One has the right to ask against whom and why? Why is there this vast outpouring of money when the Russians already have two or three times the power that we have in the West? Why is there the build-up of armaments in Europe? For what purpose? I believe everybody, whatever line is taken in this matter, must always ask himself this question.

What is the objective of the Soviet Union in building up these vast armaments, not only men and the largest army in Europe, but also armaments, and not only conventional armaments but nuclear weapons and the like? I believe we must ask ourselves that question.

Up to date, the Soviet Union has exacted great concessions from the West. We have recognised the presence of East Germany as a sovereign State. We are now pressed to recognise the boundaries of the Eastern European countries *de jure* as well as *de facto* in Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union and its satellites have negotiated new sources for capital investment and greater and more liberal trade agreements, but what have we in the West received in exchange? We have received a few concessions about the treatment of journalists, a few acknowledgments about the ability to facilitate the reuniting of families, allowing mothers to join their children and husbands to join their wives. In reality we have received very little in return. Even on

the third basket, we have very few concessions about the real movement of people, the free movement of ideas or the acceptance of the rest of the world's newspapers into the Soviet Union.

I am now, therefore, worried. I do not wish to see the policy of détente put into reverse gear. I wish to see it advanced. However, in view of what has been said, I believe — and several speakers have referred to the position in Portugal as I intend to now — we have a right to ask what the intention of the Soviet Union is in Europe.

Is it not amazing that it has now been revealed that for many years — perhaps twenty years — the Soviet Union has been creating communist cells throughout the army and in other places in Portugal? Is it not amazing that today, without protest, we see the Soviet Union pouring in at least £4 million per month approximately into Portugal to support the communist case? Is it not astonishing that we do not raise our voice here in WEU against a situation where they pick the parties they think can stand for a free election and ban the possibility of the christian democrats even offering themselves to the Portuguese people to see if they are acceptable? Is it not astonishing that Mr. Soares of the Socialist Party has to sign a piece of paper before the election to say that he recognises the right of the Armed Forces Movement to govern the country and overrule anything which the so-called parliament may say for the next three to five years? Surely this situation cannot be tolerated in an institution which depends on parliamentary free democratic governments? I feel very sorry for Portugal.

Of course, Russia has now been accused of trying to get a pincer. It had Eastern Europe under its domain and would like to get the West and the rest of Europe in the pincers. Nothing can be worse than that.

I remain totally in favour of an attempt to reach a real rapprochement between Russia, the satellites and the Western European world. I believe we must proceed now very cautiously.

In my view, we have a right to demand to know from Russia exactly what its policy is. What is this policy of peaceful coexistence which means it can stir up trouble in my country or any other country in which it thinks it will to the disadvantage of that country? We have seen this in my own country. We see it in Portugal more dramatically now.

Sir John Rodgers (continued)

Peaceful coexistence was never meant to be what we are seeing, which is a policy of total and utterly unscrupulous destruction of a country and its democratic processes.

Therefore, while I am not opposed to the report of Mr. Sieglerschmidt — indeed, it is a remarkably good document — like my colleague, Mr. Channon, before we accept the document, I would like to see some amendments to it and some pointing out — which I think would be to the advantage of the West — that we are not fooled. We can see the difficulties that Russia is creating in the West, and we ask it to desist forthwith. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Mattick.

Mr. MATTICK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as I stand here today, this debate makes me feel that I am addressing the Bundestag and not Western European Union. We who have for years been fighting such battles in this Chamber would have heard absolutely nothing fresh if a British colleague had not occasionally taken the floor. It is, in fact, not only the same old subject, but we are hearing once more words that have so often been tossed to and fro.

I think Soviet policy is not so much inclined to buy rope from us to hang us with, but rather to stretch out in front of us pieces of rope over which we jump without knowing what lies beyond. We do not have — as one politician has put it — to jump over every piece of rope that is stretched out in front of us. I find that that is indeed true in the case we are discussing.

What is happening at present? I must tell you that the question whether a quadripartite administration still exists for the whole of Berlin is not mentioned at all in the Berlin agreement, because ever since 1948 there has been no meeting of minds on this point between the Soviet Union and the western powers. On 9th September 1948 the Soviet Union — still as an occupying power — organised in the Soviet zone an attack on the Berlin City Hall. In order to do this, communist workers were brought in from all over the Soviet zone. At that time we were having the last sitting of the House of Representatives in Berlin, which met in the eastern sector. We were chased out of the City Hall by the masses that had been brought in to

the spot. I still remember the fantastic scene: we had to fight our way through from the City Hall — which stands 2 km from the border of the western sector. I was involved, being at that time secretary to my party group in the Chamber. We had to battle through to the border of the western sector. We had no police protection — Berlin already had a communist in charge of the police — nor did the allies move a finger to get us out of the City Hall. They simply stood waiting nicely at the sector border at Lindenstrasse and received us with open arms — glad that we had managed to get through.

It was at that time that the western powers gave up the attempt to treat the quadripartite status of Berlin as a right to be asserted and a duty to be performed.

In 1953, when we wanted to help our people on the other side, they closed the border to the eastern sector and prevented us from going across, so that all dispute over the subject was avoided.

Perhaps all this was the right policy; it is at any rate a fact that from that day on this quadripartite city has had in the eyes of the Soviet Union and the GDR, no quadripartite status.

I will illustrate this by giving you an example which has by now become a bit comic. As you know, since the war, 1st May has in the eastern bloc countries, including the Soviet Union, been not a holiday in honour of labour, but a day for parades and marching to demonstrate the power of their military might. Gradually all the eastern bloc States have dispensed with these manifestations. Only the GDR continues, on every 1st May — including this year — to hold a big military parade in the eastern sector of Berlin, for they know — and this is where the rope is stretched in front of us — that the western powers would not be able to tolerate this if they had quadripartite control. Each year they accept the note of protest from the western allies — without giving an answer; there is no answer from the Soviet Union either. In the first year the Soviet Union answered once, to the effect that the western powers had no say there. But the western powers protest every year on 2nd May — and that is the end of the matter.

What is the point in my telling you this, Ladies and Gentlemen? The GDR is not impressed, and for the western powers the note of protest has long since become an annual farce.

Mr. Mattick (continued)

The western powers have rightly — as I say now — remained proud and cold. Had they got excited about the matter, had they let it lead to tension, they would have been doing what the GDR was trying to make them do.

What does it mean if Mr. Abrassimov is now back again and having to give his support to Mr. Honecker, because things are not going all that quietly in the GDR either? But these things are being kept fairly dark.

What does it matter if Mr. Abrassimov hands the western powers a protest, or a declaration, because the Foreign Minister has been in Berlin? This is to be accepted just as coldly as the GDR accepts the protest from the western allies after each 1st May. Anyone who does not learn this in the abrasive atmosphere of East-West politics will again and again be playing into the hands of the Russians and the GDR. That is how we see it, and I believe that is also how Mr. Kissinger sees it; after all, he did not say only the one sentence that has been quoted here, but went on to observe that anyone who believes that, after the way things have developed and after what we have achieved, our work can proceed without friction, is starting from completely false premises.

Of course none of us — and we have said this here often enough — imagines that all is now in order, that there will be no more friction, no more complications. What after all does it matter if Mr. Abrassimov makes this declaration or the GDR takes that step? The declaration, the step will be passed over and the negotiations go on. The western powers have taken not the slightest notice of the fact that May day exists in the GDR; they have handed in their note of protest and meanwhile made the quadripartite agreements in connection with which Mr. Kissinger rightly says that Berlin has never before been so free and secure as after these agreements. For if you look at the signatures under these agreements, you will see that the Soviet Union has for the first time deferred to the fact that the western powers have a right to a say in West Berlin and that they are not to be pushed out.

To me, that is politics. But what many members of our opposition here — forgive this remark — are trying to do, is to unleash a big debate over every word that is uttered on the other side of the border, and to demand such things as the breaking off of the CSCE nego-

tiations; in so doing we are in my opinion — jumping over each length of rope that the other side stretches in front of us in order to wear us down. For heaven's sake, do not jump over every piece of rope! I am very much against breaking off the CSCE negotiations. We shall have to decide about the results when all has been completed. At present we are in the phase of talks, of negotiating step by step, point by point, as East and West have been doing for the last thirty-five years. We should then have a look at the result. I have a feeling — and this is another point I want to make — that on the other side many people are also toying with the idea of doing certain things, in order that the Germans should do just this. Let me say that Fabian tactics will not work to our advantage. We should be wary of them. We should take care; we should be vigilant; but anyone who lets himself get worked up over things like the Abrassimov statement or GDR statements, will soon be a nervous wreck. We should be on our guard against that.

Let me add a remark about Portugal. Forty-nine years ago a terrible development started there, with catastrophic consequences for the people of Portugal, for its policy — including its colonial policy — and for Europe. If anyone thinks that such a change can be brought about without friction and danger, he has, in this case too, failed to think the matter through to its political finish. I am not at all happy about what is going on there at present, but I was glad that our Defence Minister was asked here on television yesterday what he had to say about developments in Portugal, whether Portugal would stay in NATO, and so on; to these questions he replied: "I think this is not the place to answer philosophical questions. It is our duty to help those who are struggling to attain democracy, and when the difficulties are as great as they are in Portugal, it is inadvisable to hint at over-hasty decisions which at the same time are threats, thereby giving those who oppose our interests in Portugal material with which to fight on the other side."

I thank you for your attention. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Waltmans.

Mr. WALTMANS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President. I would like to begin by saying to Mr. Mattick in German: If, here in the Chamber of the Bundestag, you have not, in year after year of debate, been able to

Mr. Waltmans (continued)

convince each other, how can I, with only five minutes to explain my conception of East-West relations, hope to be able to ?

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

Détente is irreversible and essential. There is no alternative to the present-day policy of détente, because the only alternative is collective suicide through the constant build-up of armaments, nuclear and conventional.

Mention has been made of Portugal, and on that topic what I long to ask is what the countries of Western Europe were doing when that country was fascist. Those who were silent then would, I feel, do better to keep silent now as well. What did they do, and what are we doing at the present time about giving financial aid to make it possible for Portugal, as it moves towards democracy, to achieve a renewal and forge a new policy ?

I have some criticism to make of the report and recommendation under discussion, where this involves the position of Western European Union, something which in my views is of much less importance for European political union, as the *Generalanzeiger* rightly said in an article this morning.

The expansion of WEU, which has been mentioned, or the expansion of NATO with Spain joining, for example, is not I believe any help towards détente ; this has, I am glad to say, been made clear by the Netherlands Government to the powers that, in NATO, would like nothing better than to see NATO expanded, irrespective of whether with fascist States or not — this is an aspect that does not interest them in the slightest.

I would like to offer one comment on the problem of Germany. Since 1960 I have been greatly concerned, in lecturing in political courses and during political discussions, with the question of the division of Germany. It is obvious that the western allies, including the Netherlands, wanted this division, and as a result we are still having to live with the consequences of it today. But it is also reasonable to assume that I can, if normal relations are achieved and the two German States are both to belong to the United Nations, justifiably claim that an end ought quickly to be put to the isolation of the GDR in, for instance, matters of inter-

nal German trade within the European Community. There are besides plenty of Europeans — not only in the Federal Republic, but elsewhere in Europe, East as well as West — who think this division is an anachronism, and should be done away with.

People have spoken of pessimism and optimism with regard to détente. Being a realist is, I believe, a matter of supporting rather than destroying the forces that promote peace. Being a realist means condemning propaganda for a European nuclear force as warmongering. Being a realist means appreciating the fact that a close meshing of East and West in the economic, technological, scientific and social spheres is a much better way of preventing wars than building up armaments in every country — not just in the Soviet Union, as we have had it stressed here so often today : it is going on there, but not only there.

The United States defence budget is proof enough of this : eighty thousand million dollars ! This increase in armaments only serves the ends of the hardliners on the right and on the left, in the East and in the West, and does nothing for the peoples of Europe or for peace in Europe.

Being a realist means, too, recognising the fact that the two military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, are phenomena that have been overtaken by historical events, and no longer serve the cause of peace. Being a realist is also recognising that the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, and the MBFR talks, must be made a success of, even though both sides — East and West, Warsaw Pact and NATO — have not been doing enough to make these conferences succeed.

And finally, being a realist means recognising that the differences there are between East and West are not the most important contrast there is in the world. The really important contrast is between North and South ; and this means realising that the development of the third world is essential for achieving world peace. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Bettiol.

Mr. BETTIOL (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to raise, amid the grand German chorus we have so far listened to here in Bonn, the provisional capital of Federal Germany, a voice from the distant South, from Italy. I have the utmost

Mr. Bettiol (continued)

respect for the personal qualities, moral as well as political, of the Rapporteur, Mr. Siegler-schmidt, but I cannot accept everything that he says in his nonetheless valuable report. There is some good to be found in it, but also assertions, and views and references, I absolutely reject. Indeed, as a party member of the Italian christian democrats, and as a European, I am unable to believe that Western Europe can fall for an idea couched in socialist terms concerning détente. Speaking as a democrat, I respect everybody's ideas but fight for my own, which is inspired by philosophical notions that differ from those underlying socialism. Moreover, this is a fact that democracies have to live with, and such a split is no matter for wonder. Only, we do not want any hegemonies, but we do want public opinion to be informed of what is in people's minds, what is being talked about in this exalted precinct.

Much has been said today, with great profundity and passion, especially by our German colleagues, about détente. Well, Gentlemen, for the past twenty years I have been modestly lifting up my voice in political argument whenever the subject of détente has cropped up, to assert that, as interpreted nowadays and upheld until now, détente is for the West a tragic mockery. East-West relations in 1975 have worsened compared with ten years ago or so, even though Soviet policy still talks about détente. Brezhnev's policy may differ from old Khrushchev's patter, but Soviet reality is still the same as ever. Khrushchev would slyly talk about détente, to sneak another step farther; Brezhnev says: "There will be no East-West confrontation". But for us, this does not spell détente.

The absence of a head-on collision, that is to say war, between West and East, is no détente. Brezhnev added one sentence that is frightening: "This will not preclude us communists from doing all we can to upset the countries of the capitalist system from within."

So we have subversive détente, what we are getting now in so many European countries, in my own for a start, in which the communists, abetted by the socialists, are moving heaven and earth to overturn the situation from the inside, by means of a policy of violence, aggression and force, that makes it impossible to develop the economy in the interests of the community at large.

The events of the past twenty years have unfortunately been overshadowed by a few stances we ought to remember. There was good old Kennedy, the famous Kennedy, who began by casting doubt upon the reliability of Europe's relations with America — we shall have a word to say on this — cutting the ground from underneath détente. And why should I not say it, as a Catholic: there was the good faith of Pope John XXIII, who believed in other people's good faith, and caused in the world of Catholicism, notwithstanding the Synod, a very serious split that weighs on whoever is attached to Catholic thinking. There has been — allow me to say so as a democrat and a free man — the so-called "opening to the left" in Italy, which has brought water to the Soviet mill. There has also been the German *Ostpolitik* which has done no less than the Italian equivalent to foster unrest and a state of terrible hardship.

We are, then, celebrating this twentieth anniversary not in a climate of true détente, nor in one of peace but in one of actual subversive war. Today that baneful drug, détente, calls itself subversion from within. International happenings like those in Portugal, which has turned the southern flank of the Atlantic Pact, also demonstrate what communists mean by détente and how they treat socialists wherever they manage to get into power. Events, these days, should open the eyes of many a socialist, especially in my own country.

Meanwhile, Moscow is stirring the cauldron in the Middle East, we have the assault on the Mediterranean, the Berlin question is coming up again, Russia wants to shut down the peace conference to establish the inviolability of frontiers, all the roses and other blooms are being thrown into the third basket, and into the first, the nettles and the flowers of evil, Baudelaire's *fleurs du mal*: these are to be welcomed, but not so the flowers of good.

While all this is going on, Europe disarms. We see, alas, European countries disarming, but Russia and its satellites do not follow suit. True, America has said it will not fail to send fresh forces to Europe, but, equally true, several European States are starting to cut back severely their armaments, and expenditure on armaments, thus gravely endangering security in general, and even what might be, and ought to be, American good will tomorrow.

This, Gentlemen, is why, faced by this report, however interesting and useful for the important

Mr. Bettiol (continued)

things we can learn from it, my mind remains perturbed, and I do not yet know what my decision will be in the end. Indeed, having spoken from this platform in this provisional German capital city or in other capitals, about détente for the last twenty years, I do not in the slightest intend to falter in my conviction, for the facts have unfortunately always proved me right. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Following the speech by Lord Duncan-Sandys, who is the last speaker on the list, I shall call the Rapporteur. After that, we shall discuss Mr. Amrehn's amendment and possibly proceed to the vote.

I call Lord Duncan-Sandys.

Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I had not intended to speak in this debate but, having listened to some of the speeches, I have been provoked into saying a few words. Of course we must assume détente. Nothing else makes any sense. Of course we must work for a situation in which we can all live in peace and confidence — I emphasise confidence — and stop wasting on armaments enormous resources which could be devoted to much more constructive and useful purposes.

I do not have the impression that we are making much progress towards real détente. I see no sign that the Soviet Union sincerely wants real détente in the sense that we on this side understand it.

Détente must be looked at against the background of growing Soviet military superiority. I hope that my German friends will not mind my alluding to this, but I cannot help thinking of the situation which existed when I was a member of parliament before the war in 1937-38 when we saw the growing strength of the Nazi military power. Everyone could see it, but we all closed our eyes to it. We preferred to think of other things, and to spend money on other things, and we allowed ourselves to be overtaken by events.

I feel exactly the same today. We can all see the growing strength of the Soviet Union. There is no doubt about it, and the figures are available for us to see. Yet we all like to think of détente and try not to face the real danger which confronts us. I am not suggesting that the Soviet Union is on the point of marching across into

Western Europe, but I do see a steadily deteriorating position in which the Soviet group will have not only growing military power but growing political strength and the ability to exercise political pressure.

I am sure that we must work for détente, but we shall get détente only from a position of mutual strength. That is an essential condition. We must show our determination by strengthening our defences. We must know the financial problems of strengthening our defences, but I believe that we have not sufficiently faced the problem of the absolute necessity for strengthening our defences and, at the same time, the absolute necessity for doing that with the least possible additional expenditure of money.

Every member of WEU knows that there are ways in which we can strengthen our defence without additional costs. The first and foremost is standardisation. All of us are wasting absurd amounts of money by producing a mass of different weapons to fight the same war in the same conditions. Obviously we must agree with one another. We must get together and compromise, and our staffs must agree. They will not necessarily get the exact weapon they want, but they will get something which will be perfectly effective, and a great deal of money will be saved.

We must also — and here I emphasise that the mutual strength about which we are talking is not only military but economic strength — pull ourselves together, and particularly my own country, to try to restore our economic strength. That is one of the matters at which Russia will be looking.

In many ways, economic weakness is as dangerous as military weakness in the balance between East and West. When the Soviet Union and her friends see that they cannot Finlandise Western Europe, I believe they will be prepared genuinely and sincerely to try to bring about real détente, because I am sure that they, as much as us, would like to stop wasting this vast amount of money on armaments.

A mass of things needs to be done in the Soviet Union which she wants to do but cannot do because so much effort is being spent on arms. At present, the Soviet Union thinks it is worthwhile, but if we show her it is not worthwhile, very quickly we shall be able to get round the table and talk seriously about détente.

Lord Duncan-Sandys (continued)

In short, we must recognise that effective détente is an essential precondition for détente. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to begin by thanking all my colleagues who have taken part in this discussion for an interesting and stimulating debate. I hope I may, without treading on the toes of German colleagues of all shades of opinion, say that I would like in particular to thank the representatives of other member States who, especially towards the end, helped to ensure that the debate did not, after all, become a purely German affair, which would of course not have been appropriate, as the subject of discussion was not exclusively or indeed primarily the German question and Berlin — though these certainly are important themes in East-West relations, as I know very well — but East-West relations as a whole. We should not lose sight of this distinction.

I would like to ask those who have reacted positively to my report for their comprehension if by and large I do not deal with their contributions, but concentrate on the critical speeches ; and even with these I will not be able to deal in detail, in order not to exceed by too much the time available.

Mr. Müller and Mr. Amrehn have criticised the passage in which I said that progress in détente was to be seen in the conduct of the West in connection with Czechoslovakia, but this criticism rests on a misunderstanding. In this context Mr. Amrehn has talked about resignation. But what does resignation mean ? What, in your opinion, Mr. Amrehn, should have happened ? Should NATO have intervened ? Perhaps you will say that we should have imposed some sort of sanctions, should have applied an economic embargo or something of that kind. But we know, after all, that if what your party colleague Lorenz has said is true — and nobody here has challenged his view that there is no alternative to the policy of détente — this must mean that if sanctions such as an embargo or the like are imposed, they will last for a year or two and after that will be dropped. They really are not serious measures. It would have been a

serious step only if we had risked the big fight — in this case with the Soviet Union. But I would like to see the person who would stand up in this Assembly and say : Yes, that is what one should have done in this case, it would have been right to do so.

As far as Portugal is concerned, I think I can quickly come to terms with those who have made critical comments. Although the report states : "The communists seem...", I am perfectly ready to replace the word "seem" by another, more precise word, that would better reflect the present situation ; that is not the point, and we do not need to talk about it.

On Berlin, some of the critics have objected that the statement made by Kissinger, which I have quoted, was wrong, that it was not true that everything was now more obscure, and so on and so forth. Here I can rely largely on what Mr. Mattick has already said. I would only like to add, Mr. Amrehn, that even though — in the light of what has already been said on the subject by Mr. Mattick — I do take very seriously indeed everything that goes on there in the form of diplomatic notes or otherwise, one cannot of course, simply dismiss everything else — such as transit routes and more humane treatment of the population — with a wave of the hand.

We have been reminded that at times the traffic lights on the transit routes stand at red. Here I must say — and I also say it to the Berliners, who naturally take what they have now achieved for granted and are upset about everything that is not yet working smoothly — that the difference between the former state of affairs and the present is this : there is today a two-column report in the newspapers when occasionally the traffic lights on the transit routes stay at red ; previously this would not even have been reported because the traffic lights were constantly at red and one always had to wait two or three hours or more. That is the most important change that we have been able to bring about.

Mr. Amrehn, you have pointed to supposed contradictions and said that at one point I expressed scepticism concerning the extent of the détente, while at another I expressed a more positive view. I can see no contradiction in this, but simply a reflection of the room for manoeuvre when we are dealing with the policy of détente. We have not only to see the limitations on what can be achieved today, but we

Mr. Sieglerschmidt (continued)

must also assess at its true value what has already been achieved, and not think that everything is hopeless.

As for the bilateral agreements, they do have a value of their own. They were of particular value before the Council for Mutual Economic Aid tried to establish contact with the EEC. There can be no doubt about it, the Soviet Union is now trying to adapt to realities. We all of us surely know just how strongly Soviet policy was opposed to the EEC. But now they want to negotiate with the European Community, because they have recognised the realities of the situation.

I should like to make one more comment on the contributions concerning the conference on security in Europe and to warn against establishing a link between the situation in Berlin — however we may assess it — and the end of the conference on security in Europe. I would assess the question when the conference on security in Europe can be terminated in the light of the result that it has been possible to put on the table. Whether the negotiations now taking place in Geneva will produce sufficient results, and not only in one but in all three baskets — that is the criterion by which this question ought to be assessed.

I would also like to comment shortly on Mr. Miller's contribution, who quite rightly pointed out that in certain circumstances we might have to reckon with the fact — and there are as we know already some signs of it happening — that the centre of gravity in world politics may shift to the Pacific. What does this signify for us, Ladies and Gentlemen? It means that we have even less time to press ahead with European integration, that — if Mr. Miller is right — we will have to put our shoulders to the wheel and our governments will have to recognise that there is not much time left to initiate the necessary steps. I can only repeat here once again what I believe I have already said in the Council of Europe: History has given us the terrible lesson of the French aristocracy and the Estates, which on the eve of the French revolution divested themselves of all their privileges — but it was then too late. I sometimes fear that in questions of European integration we may make the necessary decisions when here too it is too late.

And now a short comment on the question of credits, which is the subject of Mr. Amrehn's motion. I think that with this recommendation I have been completely misunderstood by all who have made critical comments on this point. What is the crux of the matter? The question is surely not one of making presents to the Soviet Union through liberalisation, but rather that some years ago NATO — in quite different circumstances — laid down conditions for the granting of credit to eastern bloc countries, and that today — as we know — these conditions are no longer observed by a number of member States. The terms applied by these countries are more liberal than the NATO conditions would allow. I really do not believe, Mr. Amrehn, that there is any chance of putting the clock back, of NATO, for instance, calling these countries to order and making them return to the old conditions. On the other hand I do not think it right — and that is why the suggestion from the Committee was made in the report — if some adhere to decisions once taken, and so of course run the risk of finding themselves economically at a disadvantage, while others do not keep to what has been laid down and thereby gain an unfair advantage. These in brief are the circumstances which today make a revision of the decisions necessary. Consequently, Mr. Richter, I am perfectly willing to agree with the proposed amendment. I can think of no NATO country that would dream of tightening up the conditions if they were revised; what would happen is what I have just said: the conditions would be adjusted on the lines of what is already being done in certain member States.

Before I end, a short comment on the observations made by Mr. Bettiol. Mr. Bettiol, you have compared the *apertura a sinistra*, the opening to the left, with the German *Ostpolitik*. I do not think they can be equated; if they could, you would bring Sir John Rodgers, who has expressed himself here as strongly in favour of détente, into the difficult position of being, simply because he supports the policy of détente, taken for a left-winger. I simply want to make the following point, Mr. Bettiol: these two things are on different levels. In German you say: this is a comparison between apples and pears; you cannot compare the two.

Let me now make a final observation on the assessment of the chances of détente. Some speakers — let me say this quite frankly — have been saying, "of course we are for the policy of détente, but...", and we have had the impression

Mr. Sieglerschmidt (continued)

that with some the "but" becomes so big that there is nothing left of the policy of détente.

On the other hand, I am perfectly ready to talk about "dry powder", Mr. Richter. After all, what does it mean when we talk of "dry powder"? It is the theme of a defence alliance such as the Western European Union. It is the theme of the Atlantic Alliance. This in no way conflicts with détente.

I would like to repeat here what I have already said elsewhere in this connection. There is an old English adage which I should like to change a little to fit this context. It runs: "Trust in God and keep your powder dry". I want to say: "Trust in détente and keep your powder dry", but nevertheless: "Trust in détente". (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The debate is closed.

The Assembly now has to vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 668.

I would remind you that Mr. Amrehn has tabled an amendment to this draft recommendation, which reads as follows:

In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out the words "in a liberal manner" and insert the words "under present circumstances".

The Rapporteur accepts this amendment.

I put the amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The amendment is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation as a whole.

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Is there any opposition to the recommendation contained in Document 668, as amended?...

There are objections.

We shall therefore proceed to vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Portheine.

The voting is open.

(*A vote by roll-call was then taken*)

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote, after rectification, is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	64
Ayes	56
Noes	7
Abstentions	1

The draft recommendation is therefore adopted².

5. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 27th May, at 9.30 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. Address by Mr. Geens, Secretary of State for Budget and Scientific Policy of Belgium.
2. Address by General Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
3. Address by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.
4. State of European security (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 671 and Amendment).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(*The Sitting was closed at 5.45 p.m.*)

1. See page 22.

2. See page 29.

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 27th May 1975

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Address by Mr. Geens, Secretary of State for Budget and Scientific Policy of Belgium.
Speakers : The President, Mr. Geens.
Replies by Mr. Geens to questions put by : Mr. de Montequiou, Mr. Richter, Mr. Adriaensens, Mr. Treu, Mr. Schwencke.
4. Address by General Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
Speakers : The President, General Haig.
5. Address by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.
Speakers : The President, Mr. Destremau.
Replies by Mr. Destremau to questions put by : Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. Richter, Mr. Valleix.
6. Change in the Order of Business.
7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments? ...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Address by Mr. Geens, Secretary of State for Budget and Scientific Policy of Belgium

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Geens, Secretary of State for Budget and Scientific Policy of Belgium.

Mr. GEENS (*Secretary of State for Budget and Scientific Policy of Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I much appreciate your invitation to present the results of the latest proceedings of the European Space Conference of which I am President.

As you know, the conference was set up in 1967 to enable the Ministers of the ELDO and ESRO member countries to meet whenever they felt the need and take the political options necessary for the advancement of European space research.

It was always this conference which took the major decisions, as when, at its last meeting on 15th April last, it approved the convention for the establishment of the European Space Agency.

Allow me to say that this meeting was a complete success, thanks to the spirit of co-operation among all my colleagues and their political determination to achieve results without further delay.

I shall say a few words about what has been achieved and the immediate prospects; I shall indicate the current status of our space potential, and deal at slightly greater length with the scope of the convention establishing the new agency and the means it affords us for pursuing henceforward a space policy worthy of Europe.

First, then, the progress achieved and immediate prospects.

1. See page 31.

Mr. Geens (continued)

The end of May 1975 will remain a milestone in European space activities, for it marks the end of a prolonged crisis which began in 1966 with the controversy among the ELDO member countries concerning the Europa I launcher project.

Already at that time it was clear that the chief launching requirements in future would be for application satellites placed in geostationary orbit, a mission beyond the capabilities of the Europa I launcher as initially designed.

Shortly afterwards the discussion spread to ESRO, where the necessity of extending that organisation's programme to the same area of applications was also raised.

In fact it was a matter of a profound change in the very conception of our space objectives. It was realised that space activities, originally considered as a means of scientific and technological research, would soon be entering the operational field; in other words they should be aimed at the production of space systems supplying concrete services to a whole range of users.

At the same time our countries were asking themselves whether Europe ought to build its own launcher to place these new satellites in orbit or whether it could, as it always had done for its scientific satellites, rely on using American launchers.

Lastly, the United States was drawing up its post-Apollo programme based on the principle of recoverable launchers, and our countries wondered whether Europe ought, as it had been invited to do, to participate in this programme, of considerable importance for the future of space activities.

It was felt in all responsible quarters that before setting off in this new direction, Europe would have to give itself the means of building up a coherent space policy, by putting an end to the undue dispersion of national efforts and establishing a single solidly-structured organisation, effective and fully responsible to the member countries.

However, there were great difficulties to be overcome and such ideas were slow in gaining ground.

It was during a ministerial meeting on 8th November 1972 that Mr. Heseltine, at that time

United Kingdom Minister for Aerospace, proposed the creation in Europe of a single space organisation out of ELDO and ESRO, into which the individual European countries' national commitments and programmes would be gradually incorporated.

One month later, on 7th December 1972, Mr. Heseltine argued the case for this proposal before your Assembly in Paris.

You will remember that the Belgian Minister Théo Lefèvre also attended that sitting. As President of the European Space Conference he had unceasingly called for a united effort. He exerted all his influence in favour of an evolution he considered essential.

The Conference of Space Ministers on 20th December 1972 adopted a resolution establishing the European Space Agency and proclaiming the principle of integrating European national space programmes "as far and as fast as reasonably possible". They gave their approval for the principle of jointly undertaking, pursuing and managing the post-Apollo Spacelab project and the project for a launcher to replace Europa III.

The various satellite programmes already decided upon in ESRO were confirmed.

These, let me remind you, were scientific satellites and three application satellites: the OTS telecommunications satellite, the Meteosat meteorological satellite and the Aerosat air navigation satellite. To these, on a proposal by the United Kingdom was added the Marots maritime navigation satellite.

At the ministerial meeting of the European Space Conference on 31st July 1973, agreement was reached on a scale of contributions to the financing of the Spacelab, Launcher and Marots programmes.

There remained to be finalised, on the basis of this agreement principle, the convention establishing the new agency. This was a long and difficult task, complicated by difficulties concerning the appointment of the agency's top management team and discussions regarding the financing of the Kourou base for the organisation's launch vehicle and the launching of future payloads.

Finally, on 15th April last the Conference at Ministers of Space level approved the work done by their Alternates. The Ministers themselves resolved the problem of financing the Kourou base. A conference of plenipotentiaries convened

Mr. Geens (continued)

for the 30th of this month in Paris is to sign the new convention and approve the resolution and final act accompanying it. This date will mark the *de facto* entry into force of the new agency.

Thus, four phases have been completed since 1970. The first was the decision taken by ESRO in 1970 to add an applications programme to the scientific programme. The second was that taken in 1972 to develop the Ariane heavy launcher and, by developing and supplying Spacelab, to associate Europe with the American programme of launchers and recoverable payloads.

The third decision, also taken in 1972, was to create a single European Space Agency.

The fourth, quite recent, phase allows the agency to be effectively established.

But life goes on and we must constantly think of the future. In this respect the excellent report submitted to you today by Mr. Klaus Richter defines very clearly the two essential tasks to which we must now address ourselves: first, defining the part to be played by Europe in the field of world application-satellite systems; second, achieving in co-operation with the United States the technological advance which is the objective of the post-Apollo programme, comprising recovery of vehicles and payloads, manned space flights and less subjection to the constraints of weight, volume and on-board power supply inherent in the use of current facilities and hardware.

In spite of the long drawn-out process which has finally given us an agency and a programme, Europe is now in good trim for attaining these objectives.

I would now like to turn to the current status of Europe's space potential.

The technologies of stabilisation, on-board power supply, heat control, tracking, guidance and telemetry which we have developed in building our scientific satellites constitute a considerable asset. They have been extrapolated and completed with a view to their operational use.

We also have adequate equipment for qualification of the components, sub-systems and complete spacecraft under construction.

Our ground station networks are functioning and are being added to according to require-

ments. We have appropriate computer facilities at our disposal. Lastly, now that we have a powerful launcher and a well situated and equipped launch base, we can launch with our own resources the special hardware we shall develop.

Advanced theoretical and experimental studies are now in hand to define the next technological steps in our work.

They will relate to the following areas: first, teledetection of earth resources. This expression covers geology, vegetation, oceanography, climatology, etc., in a word the many factors that govern our environment; second, telecommunications, particularly television broadcasting by satellite; third, equipment for Spacelab for making direct scientific observations in space environments and serving the most varied disciplines: life sciences, materials science, in-orbit qualification of components and systems for future projects.

I would, however, emphasise one point that I consider essential.

Thanks to the work done over the last ten years and more, our successes as well as failures, European industry has gradually acquired mastery of the space technology whether for the production and use of advanced hardware or for the management of major projects. Consortia and industrial alliances appropriate for this sort of venture have been formed.

This very day European space days are being opened at Noordwijk in the Netherlands; they will be attended by competent persons from all over the world, particularly the developing countries which may be interested in many of these technologies. The aim is to show that Europe is capable of developing, supplying and operating complete space systems.

I would now like to run through with you the chief provisions of the convention for the establishment of the European Space Agency, and the possibilities it affords.

The work put in hand would remain a very flimsy structure if it were not based on appropriate institutions. The convention establishing the new European Space Agency provides for the necessary reforms, beginning with the institutionalisation of deliberations at political level.

One of the most significant reforms is undoubtedly the possibility of holding Council sessions at ministerial level. The European space venture will indeed have specific repercussions on

Mr. Geens (continued)

national investment and technological promotion policies. It will demand substantial funding and involve long-term options.

As it involves the sectors of science, technology, industry and users, notably major public services, its action will at national level necessitate inter-departmental decision-making and co-operation that will in each case need to be discussed at government level.

There was yet another reason for the Council of the new agency to convene whenever necessary at ministerial level. Politics being what they are, the agency will only gradually be able to integrate the national programmes and pool facilities. For all programmes other than the scientific one it had to accept the *à la carte* system, implying free choice by individual countries and a sharing of the costs based, not on each one's ability to contribute but on the interest each project holds for it. What will be wanted to achieve the progressive constitution of a true European space community is therefore definitely a political stimulus.

Here the convention establishing the agency contains a number of particularly important provisions. Thus, each member country is placed under an obligation to notify its partners at a preliminary stage of its national projects and to submit to examination of them with a view to their possible Europeanisation.

In addition, the agency can, at the request of one or more member countries, take action in any space activity for peaceful purposes and place the organisation's equipment and staff at their disposal.

Lastly, the convention provides for concertation of the space policy objectives and resources of the agency and its member countries.

These are, it must be emphasised, only the first steps towards a real space policy. It is to be hoped that political concertation will enable rapid progress to be made in this direction.

The institutionalisation of agency missions in the applications field: another important feature of the convention is that relating to the agency's tasks. The agency's activities are to have both scientific aims, which remain extremely important, and practical aims. Quite clearly, the determination to tackle applications had already made itself manifest in the subjects chosen for the programmes.

A resolution by the plenipotentiaries is to state the member countries' determination that Europe shall play a full part in the market for space applications.

The agency's specific powers to this end are laid down in a series of texts:

The purpose of the agency shall be to provide for and to promote co-operation among European States with a view to the use of space applications, particularly operational applications systems.

The agency shall for its missions give priority to the use of its own launch facilities and space transport systems.

The agency shall from the project definition phase hold the necessary consultations with future users of the systems it develops. The object is to create the conditions for successfully pursuing a space applications policy while maintaining close contact with future users in order to take account of their requirements and facilitate the establishment, when the time comes, of the requisite bodies and arrangements for use of the systems.

The agency may, at the request of operating agencies and users, supply technical assistance and the use of facilities; it may even ensure on their behalf, the launching, placing in orbit and control of operational application satellites.

The agency shall elaborate an industrial policy appropriate to the various aspects of its mission. I shall return to this point in a moment.

Finally, the agency shall organise the concertation of its member States on the attitude to be adopted by both agency and the member States themselves, towards other national and international organisations. This is a highly important point which your Rapporteur quite rightly insisted upon.

To sum up, the agency, while for obvious reasons leaving the commercial exploitation of its products to other bodies will nevertheless ensure that its activities result in such exploitation. It can moreover provide at any stage whatever technical assistance may be requested.

I now come to the rationalisation of facilities.

In the preparations for setting up the new agency a great deal of attention was devoted to the facilities of the organisation and those of the member countries.

Mr. Geens (continued)

To be sure, the convention allows the co-existence of such facilities but makes a point of their rational use and the elimination of duplication. The agency gives priority to the use of its own facilities. If these do not fully meet its requirements, it then gives priority to the existing facilities of member countries. Only in cases where these too are unsuitable, i.e. in the last resort, will the agency consider any other appropriate solution.

It is to be hoped that, as a result of these arrangements, Europe will command all the facilities needed to develop activities and consolidate achievements in space without waste and without dispersal of resources. This is one of the political factors which will have to be constantly watched by the Council.

Continuity in action: your Rapporteur emphasised the necessity of henceforward carrying projects through to completion. The hesitations of the past will be repeated at our peril. This again is all a matter of political determination, but I should point out that today, when we are about to set up the agency, the political will exists for improving the continuity of European space policy.

In this connection, the convention contains a number of important provisions.

First, it introduces a five-year budget planning system to replace the three-year system previously in force. In addition, the plan for each five-year period is to be drawn up two years before the expiration of the previous one.

Second, whereas under the existing ESRO convention any member country, after the expiration of the initial six-year period, could withdraw at the end of a year, the new convention binds signatories for a further six-year period with no provision for withdrawal during such period.

Lastly, in the future, member countries withdrawing from the organisation or from one of the optional programmes on which they were engaged will continue to participate in the financing of the activities undertaken by common consent before their withdrawal.

As I said, I will now speak of industrial policy.

I shall conclude my comments by emphasising a fundamental issue which I have already mentioned in connection with the agency's activities in the applications area — industrial policy in space matters.

The convention makes the agency responsible for elaborating and applying an industrial policy in line with its programme, and recommending a coherent industrial policy to the member States.

It defines the chief aims of such a policy as follows: meeting the requirements of joint programmes and co-ordinated national programmes in a cost-effective manner; improving the competitiveness of European industry by maintaining and developing space technology and by encouraging the rationalisation and development of an industrial structure appropriate to market requirements; channelling development and work to the industries of member countries and ensuring that each country has an equitable share; continuing the system of free competitive bidding except where this would be incompatible with other defined objectives.

An annex to the convention deals with this problem in greater detail than I have time for now. The Council is to incorporate this industrial policy in subsequent regulations.

I shall therefore confine myself to adding that two crucial elements should be taken into account: the search for markets commensurate with the considerable financial effort demanded by the development and production of advanced technology components and the necessity for selecting with discernment the options implied by any specialisation and rationalisation so that the cohesion of the European space community shall be reinforced.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to sum up briefly.

The space effort we have begun and are to continue is for peaceful purposes. Its aim is a better knowledge and use of space for purposes of interest to the development of our countries and any other countries that want to co-operate with us.

The new agency starts with a programme resulting from negotiations which have lasted for eight years, and fortunately distinguished by satisfactory cohesion and internal balance. This programme gives due importance to scientific research, applications, space launching and transport vehicles.

We cannot, however, ignore the fact that this programme has been drawn up empirically on the basis of frequently diverging national conceptions and interests. Such a procedure in itself involves the dangers of disparity of effort,

Mr. Geens (continued)

lack of any dynamism inspired by a jointly deliberated policy, and the latent prevalence of national interests. We must, therefore, work steadily towards a programme in which common activities, jointly decided upon and undertaken by all member States, will have priority over optional activities.

The convention establishing the agency is sufficiently flexible for the organisation to be legally able to undertake missions in all fields of space activity.

The aims for such action have been correctly defined. The dialogue leading to the co-ordination, rationalisation and finally the integration of endeavours and policies is recognised as an organic necessity.

Provided it is continued, the political determination of the European countries to make a united effort towards the achievement of common objectives will find an adequate instrument in the new agency.

I think we can say that the balance is a favourable one.

It has taken a lot of faith and vigilance at all times to get Europe into space. The need is still as essential, but today can be accompanied by a reasonable assurance of success. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I am sure that I am voicing the unanimous wishes of the members of the Assembly when I thank Mr. Geens for his very substantial, very full and consequently very interesting statement.

The Minister has agreed to answer any questions which the members of the Assembly might care to ask him.

I call Mr. de Montesquiou, Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — It is pleasant and reassuring, Mr. Minister, that we have as President of the Ministerial Conference of the European Space Agency a Minister who is as young and dynamic as yourself. This renews our faith and hope in Europe's destiny in space.

Allow me to ask you three questions :

How many times a year is the Council at ministerial level going to be able to meet and what

are the rules governing the ministerial meetings provided for in the new treaty of the European Space Agency ?

My second question : what are the prospects for co-operation between the European Space Agency and NASA on the use of space after the stage of technological studies has been passed ?

My third question concerns the Kourou base. Would it not be less of a burden on European finances to maintain a certain level of activity at Kourou rather than wait until 1980, the launch date of Ariane, and to be able to offer the Americans the possibility of launching Telstar for European requirements — since the total shut-down of activity at Kourou will be a very costly matter for European finances ; it would be preferable to just maintenance and we know that a launch of Diamant costs as much as building a Mirage.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Minister, I believe you would prefer to give a comprehensive answer after all the questions have been asked.

I call Mr. Richter.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, I should like to thank you for the appreciation of the reply given by this Assembly. You have put it in a marvellous position. After years of prodding, the Ministers have come up with a solution which naturally delights the parliamentarians.

This Assembly has constantly been urging that a European space agency be set up. We are more than pleased that we now have a coherent European programme. We know that France has produced major innovations. Mention has been made of Ariane, which is progressing under French leadership. In the Federal Republic of Germany we are working on Spacelab in co-operation with America, France and other European partners. We know the efforts being made by the British in the field of maritime reconnaissance satellites. Here too we have an important European programme which is being maintained on an international basis, also in co-operation with the United States of America.

A regular dialogue has now been established between the Assembly and the Ministers. The creation of the space agency will raise the question of the form in which this Assembly and the agency will in future maintain contact. You made annual reports available to us, and we

Mr. Richter (continued)

replied. As Minister of Finance, you follow with particular care the financial aspects. As a parliamentarian, I am concerned with the question of parliamentary control. I would like to ask this question: how can we make quite sure that the European Space Agency is under satisfactory parliamentary control?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Adriaensens.

Mr. ADRIAENSENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). — There is no arguing the fact that Europe is lagging behind in space matters, and the Minister has given us several reasons why this is so. What interested me particularly in his speech is that we do seem, today, to be on the right path.

Space activities in themselves are important; but for me the technical know-how that results is just as important, especially as regards its application in industry. I would like to know what possibilities the Minister sees for converting knowledge gained in space research into industrial activities, so as to win a place on the world markets for European firms.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Treu.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, the adverb which we may apply to the start of our dialogue is "at last"! In two days' time the convention we have so often longed to see materialised will be signed in Paris: the one for the establishment of this single co-ordinated agency of the European countries. The question I should like to ask has already been partly raised by our colleague, Mr. Richter. It is this: how will the body we are referring to be able to keep a constant watch on the political direction of space activity, which is not merely that of building launch facilities or satellites but also, if times are propitious, of steering it towards other formulas and other kinds of hardware. I allude in particular to relations with the United States and with the third world. Europe is not alone in embarking upon this race, for substantial economic and political stakes, with the United States; there has also been a period of difficulties in reaching agreement on participation in the post-Apollo programmes, involving the rest of the world. The agency will, admittedly only in five years' time, have to envisage an orientation that will depend upon the shuttles that are to replace

the launchers, and more sophisticated satellites in geostationary orbit. My question therefore is this: what is the policy of the newborn agency to be in relation to the United States and to the problems of the third world?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I will request those asking questions to be as brief as possible, because we have other business to deal with. The procedure laid down for this sitting demands that we keep within the prescribed time-limits.

I call Mr. Schwencke.

Mr. SCHWENCKE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I have a brief question for the Minister. After his extensive survey, which is of interest to people beyond the narrow circle of people who as WEU parliamentarians are concerned with space matters, the range of our work will certainly be better understood by some of our colleagues here. I should like to ask the Minister whether he can say something about the present state of the military space programme. If he can, I would be grateful if he could take this opportunity of doing so.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I give you the floor, Mr. Minister, to answer the questions that have been put to you.

Mr. GEENS (*Secretary of State for Budget and Scientific Policy of Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am most grateful to the meeting for the interesting questions that have been put. I shall try to answer them within the time allotted, which is very short.

(The speaker continued in French)

With regard to the frequency of meetings of the Council at ministerial level, the convention provides that the Ministers shall meet whenever necessary. The procedures for its meetings have still to be finalised.

It had been hoped that some sort of timetable for ministerial meetings could be included in the convention, but in the end we confined ourselves to this vaguer formula of convening whenever necessary.

With regard to co-operation between ESA and NASA, besides the existing agreement on Space-lab, on which I have already enlarged at sufficient length, collaboration of this kind is either envisaged or already under way in other areas.

Mr. Geens (continued)

I refer in particular to co-operation between NASA, the United Kingdom and ESA in international space exploration.

Co-operation also exists in respect of the Aerosat satellites.

The launching of European satellites by NASA is envisaged. Indeed, it is already under way. Co-operation in this direction already exists for the time being. Of course, there are to be exchanges of information and documentation. In the longer term, so far as Spacelab is concerned, improvements are planned and also perhaps collaboration in future space stations.

I fully agree with the remark just made by Mr. de Montesquiou about the Kourou base. The arrangement finally arrived at for financing this base is provisional until 1980. After that date, we shall have to look afresh at the possibilities of finance by the different countries belonging to the agency.

As for parliamentary control over the agency, we all know that the idea would be for a body of this kind to be subject to international parliamentary control, but we are obviously compelled to admit that such control can at present only be exercised through the national parliaments. In fact, the budget of the agency, like that of other international organisations, is still dependent on the agreement of the various countries and, in consequence, on the parliamentary control of the different countries making up the organisation.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

Mr. Adriaensens asked about the industrial application of technical know-how. I dealt with this at some length in my speech. I might add to this, by way of explanation, that we make a distinction here between the internal and external aspects. By internal I mean application within the community itself, i.e. within the agency and the countries making up the agency. Here there are, beyond any doubt, a great many opportunities.

Industrial application might take place in three stages. In the first stage, contact can be made with industry to find out what its needs are and to see to what extent the agency can meet them: this involves, therefore, a dialogue about the industrial applications to be aimed at. The second stage could consist of testing the products the

agency is able to supply. Then the third stage would be actual industrial application.

Where the convention itself is concerned, the text provides ways and means of achieving closer collaboration with an eye to co-ordinating national industry at this level.

Externally, it is evident — and the talks starting today in Noordwijk are wholly devoted to this — that Europe wants to take its place in the space world, more particularly where applications are concerned. It is obvious that this calls for consultation with other organisations, but to judge from the information we have at the moment there is great interest in certain products in countries outside the agency. We have in fact already been successful in signing contracts in this sphere with India, and the Arab world is showing a lot of interest in these industrial initiatives.

(The speaker continued in French)

I have just alluded to co-operation with the third world. It is mainly in the countries of the third world that an interest is being taken in the activities of the European Space Agency. Obviously this does not prevent us from co-operating with the United States. Indeed, I have just referred to it.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

As to military orders and the possibility of military programmes, I think it must be emphasised that the European Space Agency works only towards peaceful ends, and can undertake only assignments outside the military sphere. This has been expressly agreed. We want to look on this as a firm rule for the conduct of the agency, and I would make it plain that people must not try to press us to do otherwise. I noticed that the draft recommendation refers to possible military contracts. If we want this undertaking to succeed, I believe we must stick to the original intention of applying space science solely for peaceful purposes, with the aim of using this new scientific technique to promote the progress and prosperity of our peoples. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you Mr. Geens.

4. Address by General Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We are now going to hear the statement by General Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

The President (continued)

As you are aware, General, this Assembly is specially concerned with defence problems — that is problems within your competence. We shall be listening to what you say with the greatest interest. You have the floor.

General HAIG (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). — It is a great privilege for me to meet the Assembly this morning. I am very conscious that history attests to the major contributions of the Western European Union and its predecessor, the Western Union, to the security, co-operation and progress of Europe and, indeed, the western world. In fact, it was WEU's predecessor, the Western Union, which was the forerunner to the great NATO Alliance, the command of which I have the privilege of holding today.

I am especially pleased to have an opportunity to meet you on what constitutes your twentieth anniversary. I do so with a keen awareness that I have been in my current position for just over some five months while many in this audience have been grappling with weighty security matters for years; indeed, even for decades. A wise old soldier would conclude that the best posture for me to occupy was one with my mouth closed and my eyes and ears open.

I am also quite aware of the fact that I have arrived here in Europe with some mixed reviews. Indeed, just a year ago some of my critics suggested that I was far too military to occupy the political chair that I did in Washington. Today the same critics suggest that I am far too political to hold the military responsibilities I now have.

This brings to mind the conviction with which one leaves Washington these days; that is, that an American bureaucrat suffering from acute paranoia can visit his psychiatrist on any given day and have his problem correctly diagnosed as excess complacency.

In many respects, I think our assessments of Europe suffer from that same proclivity. We tend to view everything, especially the NATO Alliance, as being in far worse shape than even our worst fears. Certainly today there are allegations that this great Alliance, which has provided over twenty years of security to the West, has lost its vitality or, worse, has lost its future potential in a changed strategic environment.

These are very serious and worrisome questions. Indeed, I am confident that few in this room

share those convictions. Nevertheless, they are of sufficient gravity for each and every one of us that they deserve and even demand a more careful introspection of their premises. In doing that, I hope we would avoid the current fetish for instant analysis, but rather step back on this twentieth anniversary of your Assembly and view the strategic environment in which we now find ourselves with greater historic perspective, greater balance and greater objectivity.

I will presume this morning to ask you to join me in such an overview. I am very conscious that time will force certain generalisations in my expression which may risk a distortion or two. Therefore, I understand time is allotted at the end of this presentation for your questions. I also urge on you that in my overview I will tend to deal in political-military matters and leave the more purely military for the question period.

As we step back and ask ourselves about these worrisome doubts that have raised themselves in recent months and years concerning NATO, I think it is important that we look at the strategic environment at the time this great Alliance was formed. That is not a difficult or time-consuming exercise.

First, the United States emerged from World War II totally victorious with an armed force second to none, with a nuclear monopoly and with an industrial base that had literally exploded during the mobilisation years of the forces.

Most importantly, we had in the United States the return of millions of young men who had for the first time been abroad. They returned with a conviction that it was the American intervention in that great complex that had been the decisive element. They were also imbued with a conviction that if somehow — and they soon participated in the government of the body politic — America could just translate her know-how, political, scientific, economic and military, to her friends and former enemies abroad, the world would never again be asked to share the burden and the sacrifices that World War II represented.

Here in Europe the picture was dramatically different because with respect to both former friends and former enemies these had been the territories on which the great battles had been fought and both friends and former enemies were depleted of resources economic, military and, indeed, to a degree spiritually and psychologically. They welcomed the hyperactive American

General Haig (continued)

style in leadership as they groped to rebuild from the ruins of World War II.

The third world, which liked to refer to itself as just having emerged from the yoke of imperialist domination, at that time included a number of young nascent States whose leaders were also groping for leadership from either side of the iron curtain, as it was then referred to. At first they welcomed hyperactivity on the part of the East or West in their society, especially if laced with resources.

What about the threat in those early days? Historians refer to it as monolithic and Kremlinologists as dominated by a system known as democratic centralism. This is Marxist jargon to describe a degree of discipline, emanating from Moscow and spread throughout the entire Marxist-socialist world, that was indeed something to behold.

This was the strategic environment in which this great Alliance was formed. It was propelled and led initially by a hyperactive, almost paternalistic, United States style welcomed by Europe that needed the resources and the leadership from across the Atlantic. Indeed, that style fostered the Marshall plan and the interlinked band of alliances developed by Foster Dulles in the 1950s, and it was a major contributor, along with some Soviet mis-steps, to the birth of the NATO Alliance itself.

Yet over the years, as we continued to view this strategic environment in the same stereotyped way, fundamental changes occurred in that strategic environment. The first concerned the third world during the decade of the sixties. We would all agree here today that it was the third world that dominated the strategic environment for a decade, because during that decade we almost believed that the problem of the developing States was essentially economic and amenable to economic solution.

We led ourselves to believe, for example, that the nascent leaders of those States were flirting with Marxism because it provided for equitable distribution of wealth throughout the societies for which they were responsible. I would suggest that during that period, as today, they flirted with Marxism not because it provided that equitable distribution of wealth, but because it provided a discipline-control mechanism for exercising political control: they would then take

care of the developmental dividend of that kind of control. Yet throughout the period of the sixties we tended to believe that if we could just provide for their economic well-being by an equitable distribution of wealth, those societies would opt for moderate political solutions.

What about the United States in the interim years between 1950 and certainly the mid-sixties and seventies? We saw a fundamental shift in the American dream. In the early days it had been hyperactive, paternalistic and it had developed a sense of responsibility in the American body politic for all that happened or did not happen throughout the globe. Certainly the experience of the sixties changed that American dream. Combined with the realisation of the fundamental change in the relative power of the United States, that contributed to a strange merger of traditional liberal and traditional conservative attitudes. After all, it had been the American liberal who had been the mainspring of America's international attitude and its involvement abroad. But suddenly, as the decade of the sixties began to conclude, as a result of frustration with third world experiments during that decade, the American liberal wanted to turn inward to solve the problems of the cities and the environment, a problem which for so long had been neglected during America's preoccupation with third world development. And that American liberal found a strange bedfellow: the traditional American conservative who had always been suspicious of foreign involvement and foreign entanglement. A whole new American international attitude developed, and it has been called neo-isolationist.

What about here in Europe? There, too, the strategic picture changed in fundamental ways. Europeans were no longer thirsting for American leadership; no longer thirsty for American largesse. They had come back economically, psychologically and politically, and by any demographic measurement they had turned off their hearing aid. They were no longer thirsting for American models on how to unify and how to provide for their defence. Partnership and co-operation, yes; American domination, no longer. That was a fundamental change from the strategic picture which we found in those early days.

What about the threat which I described as monolithic? At the conclusion of World War II, and certainly by the mid-sixties and undoubtedly by 1970, the perceptive observer could see three centres of Marxist power — Moscow, Peking and

General Haig (continued)

a third group of revolutionary developing States over whom the other two were fighting for influence and control. More significantly than that in many issues of fundamental importance to international stability, the animosity between Moscow and Peking was greater than that between either and the West. What a fundamental shift in the strategic environment! I would suggest that as we deal with our sombre assessments of the worth and viability of this Alliance today we should not lose sight of that reality.

As a military man I shall be asked about the military threat, because certainly in those early days Soviet style and capability were easily perceived, and it was easy to devise strategies to cope with them. In the early days they were simultaneously polemic, self-conscious and conservative.

That style has changed, and I like to regard the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 as the bench mark of those changes. We in the West were told that in 1962, by a few seconds, the world was relieved of the Armageddon of a nuclear exchange. In hindsight, indeed, if it were not evident at that time, I would maintain that no rational Soviet leader would ever have concluded that a nuclear exchange was conceivable in 1962 at a time when the Soviets were outnumbered in nuclear systems by 10:1, when all their systems were above ground, had liquid fuel, and took over ten hours to recycle.

What a great impact that trauma of 1962 had on western strategic thinking. In the belief that we had nearly brought a cataclysm upon the world, new theories were developed. Here I do not make value judgments of those theories. I merely state that from 1962 to 1970 the Soviets eliminated their 10:1 disadvantage in strategic systems. Much more importantly, they injected a momentum into their building programme that, had it gone unchecked by SALT or some other means of control, by 1976 would have found them in a dramatically superior position.

I say nothing about the sociological impact of that distorted trauma of 1962 and the effect it has had on our young and on the development and evolution of our societies. But in Moscow the lessons of that Cuba missile crisis were clearly perceived and accurately and positively analysed; not only in the subsequent decade did they eliminate that strategic disadvantage of 10:1 but they proceeded to implement a literal

explosion in their strategic conventional mobility because they realised that the Cuban crisis had been decided on the issue of their inability to project their conventional military power from their enclave far in the Western Atlantic. They have, therefore, set about remedying that with this explosion in naval, air and ground mobility, the consequences of which we see today and which represent a 3-5 % annual gross increase in real value in their expenditures for defence over the past decade.

Today we have problems on our southern flank which I regard as somewhat more tactical than strategic, although they could come into the latter category very easily if they are improperly managed by western leaders. There has been a revolution in Portugal, the consequences of which are at the moment transitional and evolutionary; we can only hope — and hope is all that it is — that the forces of moderation, which represent 80 to 90 % of the national will depending on one's bookkeeping, will insist on pluralistic and moderate solutions.

There has been a great deal of discussion recently about Spain and I think we all realise, regardless of our attitudes to this vexing question, that Spain is already in transition. That being so, whatever conclusions are reached through co-operation and consultation must be the product of up-dated and realistic assessments of the facts as they are today and not something outmoded, over-emotional or unjustified in character.

Much has been said about the agonising difficulties currently existing between Greece and Turkey, two trusted and essential allies. I would suggest that whether in Cyprus or in the Aegean the wisdom of the leadership of both countries must ultimately succumb to the pre-ordained, God-given reality of their geographical situation and their essential, continued relationship with Western Europe and the free world.

In this regard I must add that the American legislative ban on the supply of grant aid and military sales to Turkey is making it increasingly difficult for the leadership in Ankara to deal with this difficult problem with the necessary objectivity.

I have talked about some fundamental changes in the strategic environment and some more tactical difficulties which we are currently experiencing on the southern flank, and I would like to emphasise one more very fundamental change in this strategic environment of ours

General Haig (continued)

which in many respects is the most crucial of all. It has been referred to as the "socio-economic crisis". There are those who would tell us that these purely cyclical and fiscal economic peaks and valleys are characteristic of market economies from their very conception. I would suggest that the problem is far more fundamental, pervasive and broadly based than this. Indeed, even the fiscal aspects have unique characteristics which are not common to western market economies. Mr. Beetham of the Economist has described them as synchronised peaks and valleys where we are all concurrently experiencing the same "stagflation" phenomena ; but whereas in the past one power out of phase with the other in a cyclical difficulty could move to bale out a troubled ally, today we all find ourselves under pressure from the same phenomena.

There are other aspects of this socio-economic crisis of which we must not lose sight. There is the problem of rising expectations in our societies, the very product of the success of our systems, regardless of the politics involved. It has been called "egalitarian economics" and it poses a fundamental challenge to each national leadership. For the first time, there have been definite limitations on the raw materials that have spawned the progress of the western world since its earliest days, especially energy, and there has been a widespread and as yet unplumbed impact brought about by the explosion of communications, especially of television, and the effect that this has had on the mainstream of thought in each of our countries.

All of these things have converged to represent what I would refer to as the socio-economic crisis. I suggest that it is not purely cyclical, not something the consequences of which we can sit out in the hope that things will eventually improve, but rather something that is a challenge to the very structure of western industrialised society, regardless of the political systems involved.

On top of this is the dilemma of détente, which is also contributing to the confusion and lack of clarity of perception which has continually characterised our dealings with the threat. To some, détente represents a substitute for the years of burden of defence. As one who participated in the evolution of this phenomenon, I would suggest that it is emphatically the opposite. It cannot be, and never has been, a substitute for strength and unity, but rather the fruit of that endeavour ; to the degree that it loses that back-

drop of strength, it loses its utility for our purposes. Over the past five months I have had the opportunity of visiting each and every capital of this great Alliance, with the exception of those of Iceland and of Greece. I have talked to Heads of State, Heads of Government, Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Defence and military leaders, and my one overriding impression is that there is a growing realisation that the common nature of this socio-economic threat, which is the same in each capital, and differs only in degree, demands the collective pooling of our best energies and our best resources in the same co-operative way in which we have worked in the past to cope with more stereotyped, purely military threats.

As we step back from the strategic overview, I would suggest that, whereas this great Alliance was spawned with a single imperative to meet the perceivable and evident military threat, today there is a double imperative for this great Alliance and our collective efforts to meet these challenges ; first, because the traditional military threat has continued apace, but, secondly and most importantly, because as we attempt to concert and co-operate in solving the socio-economic problem, the energy, monetary and other problems, we cannot achieve success if we simultaneously undercut the bedrock or the rib cage of successful western collective action by undermining the mutual trust, the mutual comfort, that each of us and each of our peoples feels for our security.

There is no way in which a western leader can simultaneously be a proponent for collective co-operative effort in the socio-economic area while at the same time undercutting the underpinnings upon which any successful collective effort must be built. I suggest that that is the reality of the strategic overview that we have just concluded.

You can say to me with great justification : "Wait a minute, General, you are a soldier, and in a time of resource constraint your obligation is to provide for our taxpayer a dollar's, an IUA's or a franc's worth of defence for every unit spent." I accept that challenge, because it is indeed our obligation to do so. But I again suggest to you that as we proceed down this road, whether it be standardisation, flexibility or reassessment of our nuclear posture in Europe, we apply one fundamental criterion to each of these initiatives which we welcome and which must succeed. That is the impact that that initiative has on the solidarity and the mutual trust and confidence of the entire Alliance.

General Haig (continued)

There is a great tendency in time of resource constraint to focus on more fighting capabilities to the exclusion of that other fundamental mission which is deterrence. There is a great difference between war fighting and pure deterrence. The deterrence involves the enemy's perception of your will and your unity to use whatever machine you may have put together in a purely war fighting context. Never lose sight of that as you wrestle with these weighty initiatives which are so important to each of us. Never lose sight of the fact that when you focus exclusively on war fighting you tend to focus on the central front, which after the battle starts will, of course, be the crucial area, but is that the area where we are most likely to be confronted with dilemmas in the year ahead?

I suggest that we shall not have the luxury of a blatant crossborder operation in Central Europe initiated and planned by the Soviet Union. Is it not more likely that we shall continue to be plagued by these ambiguous, ambivalent moves, in which it is more difficult to assess our own vital interest, which have characterised the decade of the 1960s? Is it not, therefore, all the more essential that as we wrestle with the weighty problems that we are wrestling with during this session we should continue to think first and foremost of the unity and solidarity of the whole northern flank, the centre and the southern flank?

I have more than passed my time, and I welcome your questions. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Allow me to say, General, that for a military man you have just made a remarkable political speech. To a Frenchman, by the way, this is no surprise.

On behalf of the entire Assembly, I should like to congratulate you and to thank you most particularly.

General Haig has agreed to answer any questions that the members of the Assembly might care to put to him.

I call Mr. Critchley.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — General Haig has made an admirable speech in which he has demonstrated that he has more than his fair share of the arts of politics. May I ask him a question about the effect within the United States of the defeat in Vietnam and

whether he can reassure his European allies as to the efficacy of the American guarantee?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I think that you would like to give a comprehensive answer to all the questions asked, General.

I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I want to say how very impressed I was by General Haig's concise and compact remarks on his subject. I have questions on two points. The General went into considerable detail on the problems of the southern flank but mentioned the northern flank only briefly. I would like to know whether he regards the situation on the northern flank as less problematical and more satisfactory than that on the southern flank and, should that not be the case, what ideas he has about what should be done on the northern flank from a military, and perhaps also political angle — the angle of military policy — to improve the situation.

My second question is concerned with another of his remarks. He spoke of the "dilemma of détente" and said something about it. I would however like him to explain in rather more detail what he means by the "dilemma of détente".

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — This morning, General, you gave us a very interesting survey indeed of the political situation. I should like to ask one question which is prompted by a remark that you made yourself, namely that our western countries, at this present juncture of socio-economic crisis are looking for solutions by way of social and economic — and hence political — measures much rather than through investment on defence.

This is so much the fact that we see most of our western nations cutting back their defence budget expenditure rather than increasing it. Probably, though I will not labour the point, we should regard this as a weakening of the will to defend ourselves or consciousness of the need for defence to which you yourself alluded — as is frequently the case, but that is another story.

The question I am going to ask you is as follows: in your overall knowledge the expenditure which our western countries are willing to

Mr. Valleix (continued)

allocate for their own defence and particularly, of course, within the framework of NATO, have you the feeling that they ought to make an extra effort, or on the contrary, take the line of relaxing their endeavours to a disquieting extent?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. La Combe.

Mr. LA COMBE (*France*) (Translation). — We have followed with close attention the very excellent statement that you have just made, General. I have one question to ask you, and I would associate myself with what was said by one of my colleagues just now about the "dilemma of détente", to which you alluded.

Do you not think that, in the concert of nations, a new factor has emerged, with more particular reference to China about which you have not spoken. Do you not believe that, in the present world balance of power, the Chinese attitude towards the Russians is a very important factor, and perhaps also even for Europe, a factor making for equilibrium? I do not want to go into details here, but I should like to hear your opinion of the visit paid to France the other day by Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping. He made some extremely important remarks, which slightly corroborate what I said to you at the outset about a new and decisive factor in world equilibrium.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Mattick.

Mr. MATTICK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, everyone who has spoken before me has begun with a comment on the high quality of the General's address and I should like to add my own observation. I want to express my admiration for the fact that the General spoke before a parliament like a parliamentarian, not reading from a script, but expressing his thoughts. I found that particularly surprising.

I have three questions to put. Firstly, the General referred to the question of strength only in a subsidiary clause. A great deal was said yesterday in this Assembly about the enormous armaments of the Soviet Union, and the impression was given that these enormous Soviet armaments have become a threat to our policy. Can he confirm this on the basis of his factual knowledge?

The second question I would like to put as a supplementary to that put by Mr. Siegler-

schmidt, practically contains the answer. I took it that with the expression "dilemma of détente" General Haig meant that there was an impression that détente, before it happens, could lead to disarmament by one side. I think we all agree that this term, as he has used it, meaning that détente is possible only as part of the policy — I call it such — of the balance of strength, aptly describes the policy that is being generally pursued.

The last question I would like to put is this: a summit conference is to take place soon. In respect of Cyprus he has told us that he is relying on the wisdom of the leaders in Turkey and in Greece. Might the summit conference, prompted by him, not concern itself seriously with the question of how it could mediate between these two partners, who are confronting each other over the Cyprus question in a way that really should not occur between allies?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Lord Duncan-Sandys.

Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (*United Kingdom*). — First, I add my congratulations to the General. The General's address was one of the most remarkable ones to which I have listened for a very long time.

I wish to ask the General two questions. First, he mentioned standardisation of armaments. Does the General think that the United States would be prepared to join in an exercise to standardise weapons? My feeling is that they think that is something for other people to do and that there would be very great resistance in the United States — in the Pentagon — to any suggestion that they would have to accept a joint collective decision as to what arms they should have for the United States army.

Secondly, one matter to which the General did not refer was Berlin. Very recently, the United States Government have renewed their pledge to stand by West Berlin. We all know that West Berlin is military indefensible on the ground. What, therefore, is the answer? Does this seriously mean that a world nuclear war would be launched if there were trouble in West Berlin? If the General prefers not to answer that question, I would quite understand.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Wall.

Mr. WALL (*United Kingdom*). — The General has spoken about the military and economic

Mr. Wall (*continued*)

threat, and the danger of our willpower to resist. However, his command depends upon supplies of oil, minerals and, indeed, reinforcements from overseas.

Is the General satisfied about the degree of priority given to the protection of the sea lanes and his co-operation with SACLANT?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Fletcher.

Mr. FLETCHER (*United Kingdom*). — May I address my question to the side of our guest which is comprised of a competent political philosopher, although he wears a uniform? The fact that his ideas on certain political questions coincide with my own prompts that remark.

I wonder to what extent in NATO the high command is thinking the unthinkable, to use a politically fashionable expression. In other words, are we looking at all our weapons systems with a question-mark in our minds against some of them? I think, for instance, of the heavy battle tank. Has this exhausted its usefulness in the light of what we learned from the Yom Kippur war? Secondly, are all the types of strike aircraft now flying fully justified? Thirdly, in the search for strategic mobility, are we again thinking unthinkable thoughts?

Is it now time to think of putting almost all our naval strength under the water instead of its floating on top?

Here I am afraid I must stop, because the answers to all my other questions would inevitably be classified and of more interest to the KGB than to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Waltmans.

Mr. WALTMANS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I would like to begin by asking what he thinks of NATO's position today in relation to the MBFR talks in Vienna. My second question is: as Supreme Commander of NATO, what is the General's impression of the bearing, character, morale and strength of the Dutch army?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — You have the floor, General.

General HAIG (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). — We have a famous club in Washington which is referred to as the Foot-and-Mouth

Club. I think I have just had twelve invitations to join it.

I wish to move as rapidly as I can through a great variety of questions which are both political and military. I hope to concentrate in more depth on the military.

With respect to the credibility, vitality or viability of the United States guarantee, I can state only that I would not be where I am if I had any doubts about that. In many respects, probably for all the wrong reasons, recent events intensify awareness in my own country of the importance of these obligations and the mutual benefits derived by the United States as well as Europeans from our presence here.

With respect to the question on the northern flank, I apologise beforehand that I should be guilty of glib generalisations and a lack of precision. I certainly was about the northern flank.

No one who is viewing the strategic environment today who looks at what I called the literal explosion of Soviet naval mobility, a large portion of which emerges through the Behring exits, who is increasingly concerned about the range and durability of the latest Soviet submarine developments in the Delta class — which again puts the spotlight of strategic focus on the Behring and other northern exits from those waters — who considers the recent energy finds in that area and appreciates that today energy is a vital strategic weapon to a greater degree than ever — and it has always been that — could fail to be concerned about the likelihood of a growing problem in the northern reaches.

Am I comfortable about that? No, I am not comfortable, and now this is a military man talking. No commander is happy with the resources with which you politicians provide us. In this instance I can assure you that I am less than satisfied because, as you know, a recent review in Britain has reduced reaction forces in that area. That is a matter of concern. The main emphasis that we put on that region today is on the requirement to reinforce rapidly in time of crisis or conflict. That involves the great imperative of warning time, and the great question with which you are grappling here — the development of a political consensus to take steps before the conflict starts to reinforce and strengthen our posture.

In that regard we have in hand a number of studies in NATO command involving a United States and Canadian airlift and the resources of

General Haig (continued)

both the United States and Canada, which I hope will tend to relieve some of my concern about shortfall in that area.

There is the question of the détente dilemma. What I was trying to say in my overly-glib and generalised informal-formal comments was that détente as a phenomenon had caused great problems in the West, both real and psychological. Two questions about détente especially arise. The first is whether it is a one-way street. We have a number of American experts — and I suspect that this question will be politicalised in the days ahead — who wonder whether we are providing the East, in return for very little, with technological assets that it would take the East decades to get.

The second question concerns the psychological impact of détente and the feeling of nagging concern in many circles that it has put the West to sleep, that it is contradictory to the requirement for continued defence expenditure. That is a psychological question. I would suggest that détente is with us and that as we wrestle with this difficult question we must always be prepared to cope with the alternative — the obligations and burdens of a return to confrontation politics.

I suggest that it would be better for us to analyse with great care requirements such as standardisation, whether it is a two-way street, approaching questions with the most hard-bitten realism, but with the full realisation that communication with the East is preferable to isolation and polemics which eventually can only be sterile. Some of the rhetoric of the past promised more than perhaps détente could ever provide and it should be toned down to more realistic language.

What about the socio-economic crisis and the decrease of will? I must tell you that I see no fundamental erosion of will. There are many manifestations that are worrisome in that respect, but I see more confusion and dilemma about what the problem is rather than erosion of will *per se*. As one who has travelled to each of our capitals recently, I can say that I was left with the distinct impression that there was a deep well-spring of good common sense in each capital and no naivety about our problems.

There is the problem of coping with a new generation which has not experienced the dread-

ful consequences of conflict that so many of you remember so well. Our obligation, whether we be military men or statesmen, is to articulate for this new generation the fundamental rationale of what we are proposing in the way of security. These young people have crossed their Rubicon. They have settled down, but they want, and they will insist on getting, rational answers, to which they will give a rational weight of consideration. I do not think that our will has gone. I think we need to refocus on how to communicate among ourselves and to set our priorities.

Should we do more? Yes, I think that we should do more. The greatest danger is giving in to the temptation to cut defence at a time of socio-economic crisis in order to feed the monster that sits on the other side. That temptation must be combated not just for security reasons, but because if we erode this sense of self-confidence and security in our community, we shall never achieve co-operation in broader areas such as energy, monetary matters and trade.

It is true that I did not touch upon the subject of force balance. We look today at a Soviet strength on the central front in the neighbourhood of fifty-seven first-echelon divisions with another thirty immediately reinforceable, and at a western M-day posture substantially below that. So in purely quantitative terms our most severe shortfall is in conventional ground defence capability.

The strategic balance is essentially equivalent, to use an old term. The theatre nuclear balance is in our favour. But I would insist that those who are dealing with these questions within your group recognise that, although it is in favourable balance, it is dynamic and changing, that we tamper with our current capability only at the greatest risk not only in purely security measurements, but in terms of that very unity, self-confidence and solidarity about which I spoke in my formal remarks.

What is the product of the collective efforts of our nations concerned to design and modernise our capability, I welcome. We flirt with what represents a unilateral, or perhaps a bilateral or trilateral, effort dramatically to change our nuclear posture in Europe at the greatest risk not only to our capability but to that unity, self-confidence and solidarity. I do not think that I need go into the decouplement arguments in such a group as this.

General Haig (continued)

That takes me back to the first question I was asked. I have been asked what standardisation means and whether Washington means it. I have recently been discouraged by the degree to which some of our rhetoric on standardisation has become a club which those who are less interested in NATO viability and security are using to beat us to death every day by saying that we are squandering ten billion dollars a year. We have been doing this for twenty-six years. I do not welcome the squandering of that money and feel it is a tragedy. But I tell you to be careful with the rhetoric. What we need now is the kind of approach contained in this question; namely, what we are doing, what we can do and how receptive others are to suggestions made.

Recently Secretary Schlesinger sent a report to Congress on standardisation in which he said it was a two-way street. That is what it is. Anyone who thinks it is a vehicle for relegating the European defence industry to a subcontracting rôle has every reason in the world to protest that this is not the kind of standardisation he wants. It cannot be the kind that the United States envisages. I am very encouraged that the recent deliberations within the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and of the House recognise very clearly that standardisation is indeed a two-way street. We have had recent examples of such purchases, and I welcome them. The Eurogroup has just met, and communications between the Acting Chairman of the Eurogroup and the United States Secretary of Defence are under way which suggest — and indeed this has been confirmed at least as far as the latter is concerned — that it is indeed a two-way street. This is the kind of standardisation which I welcome and to which I look forward; it is one on which I feel we can make some real progress.

As far as the summit on Greece and Turkey is concerned, the worst thing I could do here today would be to try to be a preview spokesman for the meeting on Thursday. All I can say is that I welcome it. It involves some extra-curricular theory of a bilateral character which is associated with the summit itself. I think the time is right and that the need is there, and I am very optimistic that it will represent a major step forward at what is now a crucial time for the Western Alliance, a time when all the signals suggest to me that many of the longstanding obstacles to what you and I know must be done can be successfully overcome.

For the past twenty-six years I have heard people say that Berlin is indefensible. Of course we know it is not defensible, but it is there and it stands today as a bastion of the will and unity of the free world. It does not stand there because it is defensible but because it represents a tangible manifestation of our collective will to preserve and protect our rights. In this context, I welcome Dr. Kissinger's recent reassertion of the American guarantee on Berlin.

Concern was expressed about the North Atlantic sea lanes. We, too, are gravely concerned about them, because one of the most serious aspects of the explosion in Soviet mobility has been a concentration on their naval power. With respect to this — and this will touch on the question about weapons systems and tanks versus strike aircraft and undersea attack — let me just say that the most recent Soviet naval exercise suggests to me that they are indeed aiming at balanced naval operations; that is, an ability to interdict the surface lanes of the North Atlantic as well as to conduct the more sophisticated operations which subsurface launching platforms provide. In World War II over 93 % of our supplies came across those lanes; should there be a major conflict in Europe tomorrow I suspect that 90 % would still have to come over those lanes. My great concern is that if we permit our naval strength to deteriorate much beyond its current level — the margin of error is very slim — we are going to be faced with a situation in which those military forces will have to focus, first and foremost, on the elimination of the submarine threat. In World War II we were confronted with some fifty subsurface submarines; today the number is one hundred and they are far more sophisticated and far more capable. I assure you that we cannot permit our naval capabilities in the Atlantic to decline further.

There is a great debate going on in many capitals about the utility of the tank on the modern battlefield. We have just concluded a careful and detailed analysis of the Yom Kippur war, and this has confirmed for me that the majority of the tank kills in that conflict were the result of tank-inflicted wounds; indeed, 80 % of the tanks were knocked out by other tanks. The conclusion I draw from that study is that the tank is essential on the modern battlefield. It has not lost its utility.

This does not mean that I am an anti-missile man, because missiles did a very good job in the Yom Kippur war too. Our greatest danger

General Haig (continued)

as we tamper with the force structure is that we are motivated, if you get down to the hard core, by dollar expenditure, money, and in doing this we risk bringing about an imbalance in that force structure for which we will ever after have to pay the price. I can assure you that the tank is a very fundamental part of the conventional ground battle in Europe tomorrow as well as today.

We have looked at any number of combinations of strike aircraft. This is one of the greatest preoccupations of the military and of military industrialists. I do not see any fundamental changes there. I must point out, however, that the Soviet Union has in the last two years been moving progressively towards increasing the duration of flight, the load-carrying capability and the range of its tactical aircraft, which cannot but enhance its offensive capability. In the early days we were able to take some comfort from the fact that these aircraft were primarily designed for an air defence rôle. This has changed, and it gives cause for concern.

As far as undersea warfare is concerned, I would emphasise that the recent Soviet naval exercise suggests to me that they are not aiming at any tricky gimmick of shifting all of their assets to undersea ; precisely the opposite is the case. They are looking for a balanced naval force which can cope with American convoys and American undersea submarine-launched vehicles, which can undertake a submarine killer rôle and which can handle the great burdens and problems of the exits of the Baltic and the Behring and the area of the Mediterranean. I see no quick answer to the problem of the submarine launch.

If the question asked had something to do with the similar exercise in the mid-sixties when we looked at the possibility of a submarine nuclear force, I would reject that out of hand as gimmickry which would today cause the same problems as it caused then, not only with respect to their combat capability but also with respect to our mutual trust and confidence.

I propose to conclude with a piece of good news. I have visited most of our troops and I can tell you that whether they are American, West German, Dutch or Norwegian — whatever their nationality — I left with a great feeling of confidence in my head and in my heart. These young people are just fine. Whether or not they are conscripts or volunteers, I see in them a new

sense of purpose, a new sense of rationality. If our young soldiers demonstrate the general outlook of youth across the board, we have passed a tough time. That does not mean that we do not incur a fundamental obligation to explain to them what they are doing and what it is all about. If we fail to do that, they will not accept it. But, by golly, you will get a rational hearing from these young people today, and I am very proud of them. Thank you very much. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The number and quality of the questions which you have been asked, General, and the answers which you have given, all serve to highlight the exceptional importance of today's debate.

Once again, on behalf of all my colleagues, I should like to express my sincere thanks to you.

5. Address by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I shall now call Mr. Bernard Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.

Mr. Secretary of State, you have been a member of our Assembly. You are familiar with our problems. You are aware of the intense interest we bring to them. We shall undoubtedly listen to your words with special attention.

You have the floor.

Mr. DESTREMAU (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — I have, like some of yourselves, observed the virtuosity with which the distinguished speaker who preceded me expressed his views, without using notes or referring to documents, in the manner of a parliamentarian. I have to confess that you will be a little disappointed with me.

I myself stayed in the army for quite a long time. In those days, I did not have to use documents and I did not prepare my speeches. Since I became a parliamentarian, however, and especially since I became a member of a government, I have thought myself to some extent obliged to read part of what I am going to tell you. I would ask you to forgive me for this. But the precautions which I am taking in this respect will not stop me from speaking to you very frankly.

Mr. Destremau (continued)

The establishment of an international assembly of parliamentarians specialising in the study of defence problems would have been inconceivable in former times. Indeed, it seemed that few of the people's elected representatives were inclined to focus their attention on defence problems.

I must acknowledge that the quantity and quality of the reports emanating from your Assembly demonstrate today that it is possible to find, among the deputies and senators elected to the Assembly of WEU, genuine experts in patently complex matters.

To be sure, many of you complain, in your reports and comments, of the inadequacy of contacts between the Council and the Assembly. Now that I am a member of a government, I should not dream of arguing the contrary.

Although now on the other side of the fence, I shall not disown what I said in speeches taking the same line as yours during the period when I had the honour to serve as the Chairman of your Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

I still think and say that there should be closer relations between the Council and the Assembly, for various reasons, among which I shall single out two that are, in my view, more important than the others.

Although governments have access to a kind of information leading them to settle on a policy that is sometimes misunderstood, parliamentarians gather reactions from various quarters, which have to be adjusted to the technical elements of the problems before decisions are taken.

Another justification for the weight which should be attached to the views of people whose ears are open to public opinion : modern defence depends upon such varied factors that popular consent cannot be taken for granted, if only when it comes to calling upon every citizen to make material or financial sacrifices to avoid having to pay with his own blood.

No one is more convinced than we are of the need to conduct the security policy of the nations of Western Europe in agreement with those who are their elected representatives. The latter have sufficient political maturity and intelligence to realise that, in the realm of defence, certain secrets have to be kept, and that all cannot be told.

But, as far as is humanly possible, closer and more trusting relations should be established between the Council and the Assembly.

Without harking back to the time of the first debates in the Assembly of Western European Union, I will say that the premises on which joint defence is based have evolved to a significant degree over the past ten years. The increased power and accuracy of nuclear weapons entail a growing vulnerability of the two superpowers, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with, as a corollary, a tendency for each to consider the other's territory as inviolable. The SALT agreements confirm this trend.

It is natural that, in these circumstances, the Europeans should feel worried about a situation which concerns them directly : the strategic elements in the situation cannot be viewed from the same angle by the United States and by the so-called battlefield countries.

Do not allow this remark to lead you to believe that we entertain doubts about the spirit of solidarity of the United States or that we feel any apprehension of a withdrawal of their forces stationed in Europe. We want them to remain on our continent. The leaders in Washington are also aware that the United States presence in Europe is in the interests of their own great nation dedicated to the cause of world peace. That being the case, there seems no need to fear unduly that these forces will be shipped back home nor, prompted by such anxieties, to lose all objectivity and independence of judgement.

Undoubtedly, the situation can be looked at in a somewhat different light from the vantage-points of Washington or Europe. We may reflect on the fact that standpoints need not be identical. But to say that Europeans should give thought to this and draw the necessary conclusions does not mean that the time has come to set up, here and now, a European defence system. It stands to reason that a system of that kind could only be effective and efficient after the political unification of Europe.

What is more, European defence is a formula that calls for clarification. Do we mean the defence of a European territory ? If so, which one ? Do we mean a defence organisation among Europeans ? If so, which ones ?

Or again, do we mean the establishment of a European logistics system, involving the pre-

Mr. Destremau (continued)

dominant or exclusive use of European armaments? Whatever the case may be, any so-called European defence would today give rise to complex problems, especially by reason of the existence of nuclear weapons.

Let us note, moreover, that the formula of European defence in the framework of NATO appears to contain a contradiction in terms, for if its sponsors intend to put across a certain notion of independence, they at once come up against the idea central to integrated organisation — in a word, integration.

Today, to the extent that Atlantic defence comprises European elements, it can be described as partly European. So, for an organisation claiming to be specifically European to be differentiated from the existing system, it is a fundamental condition that it should have freedom of decision. We may wonder whether the apostles of integration and planning would recognise this cardinal departure from their doctrine. We may take leave to doubt it.

In reality, a defence system which set out to be completely European would in a way be contradictory to an Atlantic defence. That does not mean to say that it may not in fact, in certain circumstances, be complementary to Atlantic defence, or even be a substitute for it but it will only exist to the extent that it is not integrated. Let us suppose it escapes such integration. It will then have to obey an authority. There can only be one when in a community of European nations unity of views has been reached on the conduct of external policy. It would then be natural for nations so united to feel the need for a communal defence organisation to guard against any threat, from whatever quarter.

Then their governments, sharing the same fears and the same motivation, might take options and decisions in a European council, whose composition cannot be finally determined today, but which would meet, if need be, as a European security council.

What I have just said, to the effect that the time has not yet come for establishing a European defence system, does not mean giving up the idea altogether. It would be stupid to believe that all that is left to do is to lay aside our weapons and our ideas. While decisions — I repeat, decisions — demand certain preliminaries, we need not wait to give free rein to our thinking,

for political union will partly stem from shared conceptions of defence.

Let us note, moreover, that although political construction is being started among the Nine, it has to be admitted that some of them are reluctant to tackle questions of this sort.

Why not, therefore, use the framework of WEU, which might play a rôle in two ways: first, by giving greater depth to the thinking process in which the members of the Assembly engage at each session, by supplying concrete conclusions for it and persuading the governments to take them into consideration; secondly, by assigning specific tasks to the Standing Armaments Committee so as to improve European co-operation in armaments production. This suggestion ties in with one of the Belgian proposals presented to the WEU Council on Tuesday 20th May: WEU could usefully collect industrial and technical information on the European armaments industries as an essential preliminary to any attempt at restructuring them.

We should at the same time endeavour — and this is another aspect of Mr. Van Elslande's proposals — to find some means of applying a European armaments policy in conjunction with a common industrial policy.

Why, you may ask me, should we prefer the framework of the Standing Armaments Committee to that of Eurogroup? The joint manufacture of armaments is, to say the least, a difficult undertaking. Even where it is only a matter of inducing two countries to co-operate, it takes arduous preliminary studies and all sorts of precautions. In the case of a multilateral venture, the obstacles are multiplied. So, let us attempt to simplify matters.

Now Eurogroup counts among its members widely separated countries, at very different levels of industrial advancement — I mention at random Germany and Turkey. Where it is a question of manufacturing modern, sophisticated armaments, it is preferable to try and establish co-operation between countries which are neighbours and have arrived at a comparable stage of economic development. That appears to be only genuinely the case with the member countries of WEU.

And whenever we are told — and I heard this in London last Tuesday — that we must not carry out the same studies twice, I ask who is responsible for the duplication. Is it not Eurogroup, a relatively recent creation, which has

Mr. Destremau (continued)

duplicated the Standing Armaments Committee, established far earlier?

It is sometimes alleged that the Standing Armaments Committee has not achieved very much. But I wonder whether Eurogroup has, in the more than six years of its existence, really succeeded in having many European armaments adopted. To quote a very detailed report by two Representatives, one German, Mr. Damm, and the other British, Mr. Goodhart:

"Looking ahead, however, American support for the Eurogroup may wane if the efforts made by European countries to achieve co-operation in armaments production succeed to the point where United States equipment sales to Europe suffer."

I leave the controversy at that stage, and simply suggest that the national armaments directors convene under the auspices of the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU in order to consider whether such-and-such a problem could not be usefully dealt with, or indeed resolved, in the context of the Seven.

If no solution can be found in this way, it would ill become us to prevent other bodies from attempting to find the desired solution.

We have also been told that Eurogroup's superiority lay in working on NATO defence plans. I really do not see what advantage there is in squeezing the concepts of armaments production into the straitjacket of defence plans. After all, every military leader has experienced the disadvantages of excessive planning. In real warfare, nothing happens as it does in the *Kriegsspiel*.

We are therefore, I repeat, in favour of taking a quick look at the Belgian proposals in WEU.

I will add that in executing a European armaments policy we should keep a liberal touch, avoid constraints, and do nothing to prejudice the establishment of a European defence, nor rule it out as a possibility. On the other hand, no European defence would be possible if the technological potential of Western Europe were to disappear. Now, there is such a risk if Europe does not pull itself together. We must avert it by taking measures that are simply economically and socially urgent — I quote, as an example, employment — and by adopting arrangements

which would have the further advantage of safeguarding the future.

Defence is not an end in itself. It is, in fact, only one of the vehicles of security. Security can be assured in two ways: through armed forces at an appropriate level under an adequate employment strategy, and through a policy of peace implying in particular the avoidance of provocation.

There will not be any European defence until the advantages of its existence outweigh the disadvantages. There will not be any European defence unless the organisation established strengthens our protection without increasing the dangers of a breach of the peace, and over and beyond defence, the security of our peoples is better assured.

It is by no means unlikely that it will be in the framework of the treaty establishing Western European Union that these prospects will be opened up one day, which is not necessarily very far off. For that reason, it is essential that Western European Union and its Assembly revitalise their structures and develop their activities still further. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Secretary of State, for your statement, which incidentally brings fresh grist to our mill. Thank you too for your willingness to expose yourself to the crossfire of questions and answers.

I merely inform the Assembly that, owing to the exigencies of our time-table, I shall be obliged to close the sitting at 12.30 p.m., that is to say, in just under three-quarters of an hour. You will thus have time to put your questions to Mr. Destremau.

I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Mr. Destremau, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to thank our former colleague, Mr. Destremau, now Secretary of State for his interesting speech. It was all the more interesting because this morning we were given in this address a programme which, on at least one important point, had a different slant.

If I remember rightly, General Haig spoke very positively of his collaboration with Eurogroup. On the other hand, you, Mr. Destremau, spoke of it in somewhat disparaging terms and clearly gave preference to the Standing Arma-

Mr. Sieglerschmidt (continued)

ments Committee. Consequently I am a little diffident about putting my question to you. I suspect that you have *certaines préoccupations* on the point, but I am going to ask my question all the same. If you are in touch with reality — and the existence and work of Eurogroup are realities, as is the fact that the SAC is not being very active at the moment — do you not think it conceivable that the activities of WEU's Standing Armaments Committee and of Eurogroup might usefully be co-ordinated?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Richter.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. Destremau, I feel almost as if I were back again at the Palais d'Iéna in December 1973 when Mr. Jobert, then Foreign Minister, reviewed the possibilities of co-operation and the next day the German Minister of Defence, Georg Leber, put forward his ideas. You were Chairman of Committee at that time and spoke on more or less the same lines as you have done today.

I must say I was very grateful to France for two invitations which we, as members of parliament, could follow up. One was the visit to the French position on the Plateau d'Albion and the second was the visit to the atomic submarine Foudroyant. I was on each occasion very grateful that it was WEU which provided the opportunity for us to make this contact, which we considered important. I have certain expectations in connection with these fields, and that is why I am working so assiduously in WEU, for I know that the defence of Europe without France cannot be described as promising. That is one point.

The other is the French President's statement a few days ago about co-operation in Europe. This was hardly encouraging. His thesis was, if I may simplify a little, approximately this: closer integration in peacetime might annoy the Soviet Union and could lead to renewed tension in Europe. We must be understanding about this statement. But I think that Eurogroup came into being in a comparable situation. After France had pulled out of integration, we simply had to have a forum. It was possible to have meetings in this forum without France. I think that Eurogroup has in fact achieved some very remarkable results. Here I tend to agree with General Haig's assessment. Not the least of its

merits is to have set up an institution of whose effectiveness I am absolutely convinced: I refer to Euronad, the organisation of European armaments directors. This organisation works entirely outside WEU.

If we look at the effectiveness of armaments, we can say that although we do co-operate in many areas, there are broad areas in which we are moving further apart. We see armaments deals being made all over the world, sometimes in areas of tension. There is insufficient co-operation. I take very seriously the warning you have given us today. We members of parliament should do everything possible to draw together again. But the road suggested to us here in my view is not realistic or not yet realistic enough.

I should like to ask you what could be done at government level in France to bring about a fuller and genuine partnership. What steps do you have in mind?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I too was very interested in what Mr. Destremau had to say. I should like to underline what our colleague Mr. Richter has just said, without the reservations.

As I listened to the Secretary of State I was most interested by the way in which he stated the problem of European defence as Europe's right to have its own individuality and above all a strength of its own compared with an Atlantic defence in which, of course, it ought to remain, not as a competitor but as an essential complement. It is, therefore, a matter of co-ordination either going as far as integration — the present situation in all its complexity — or a matter of additive elements. This might imply accepting a greater degree of independence compared with the present situation of European defence. That being said, we may note that European defence can already rely on an effective European armaments capability. The proof is the success of all European hardware in the missiles area. This example is typical and quite clinching. I was going to say — and why not? — even in aeronautics, in so far as Europe is still in the running, even if this contract of the century as they call it should result in solutions which are not necessarily European.

That being so, we are entitled to pose the problem of European armaments. The difficulty lies

Mr. Valleix (continued)

with the structures, and that, if I may say so, is just where we are unarmed.

Here, like Mr. Richter, I think of the initiative taken by Mr. Destremau's predecessor in November 1973, based on the idea that the Standing Armaments Committee might play a more active part. I am one of those who are convinced of this. I am convinced that, through the Standing Armaments Committee, WEU ought to be a bonding element for any possible European defence.

Accordingly, might not the Standing Armaments Committee — here I come back to a political problem — be seen, not as a competitor of Eurogroup or an organisation ousted by it, but as resuming a more active service under some arrangement that would have to be arrived at — and I am delighted that the Secretary of State should have considered doing so — not as a neglected competitor of Eurogroup but as an institution capable of assisting the preparation of certain Eurogroup studies and decisions, and vice-versa.

Perhaps the Secretary of State's proposal will give WEU and the Standing Armaments Committee a new lease of life, which I regard as a necessity for European cohesion and fulfilment of the European and military mission of WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Destremau.

Mr. DESTREMAU (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — Mr. Sieglerschmidt asked why the Standing Armaments Committee had not been very active. The fault was not the Committee's. No tasks have been assigned to it. If it had been called upon, I am sure it would have been very glad to carry out studies from which useful conclusions could have been drawn.

It is a problem of co-ordination and, to reply to Mr. Richter's question, it should be possible in some way to establish co-ordination between the Standing Armaments Committee and, say, Euronad.

If my memory serves, the French Delegation has already proposed a sort of bridge between the Standing Armaments Committee and Euronad. The national armaments directors can always meet; they do not have to do so in any definite framework. They can convene in Euronad, or just as well in the Standing Armaments Committee.

During my address I gave you the reason why I felt our manufacture of modern industrial products ought not to be too widely dispersed. That is why the Standing Armaments Committee, as the emanation of highly-developed industrialised nations, may well be thought an appropriate forum. It would be very difficult, for example, to hold talks on sophisticated weaponry with the armament directors of some Eurogroup countries. But the last thing we want is to exacerbate this argument between the two groups. The parliamentarians of WEU should refer matters to the Standing Armaments Committee for study. And if in due course, as I said just now, the Committee were to declare itself unable to come up with the answer, it would obviously ill befit us to refuse referral to other bodies and communication to them, as appropriate, of information and studies originating with the Standing Armaments Committee.

Mr. Richter spoke of partnership and of what could be done to give a boost to the organisation of European defence.

The French Government is open to proposals. So far, none has been made, but there is nothing to stop their being submitted.

I now reply to Mr. Valleix's question on the necessity for liaison between the organs of WEU and technical agencies, particularly those specialising in armaments, i.e. those reached through Euronad.

What concerns me at present is not a political matter but the necessity for maintaining and developing a European armaments industry. We are all aware of this, for you have all seen in your constituencies the threat to employment, in France and elsewhere.

The priority of priorities is, therefore, to guarantee the future of employment in Europe. Co-ordination — and not rivalry — among armaments industries can help to avoid a serious worsening of the employment situation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Destremau, for the clarity of your answers.

The debate is now closed.

6. Change in the Order of Business

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Karl Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

The President (continued)

of the Federal Republic of Germany, will address the Assembly on Thursday afternoon, 29th May, at about 4 p.m.

No doubt the Assembly will be agreeable to this addition to the Order of Business adopted at the first sitting.

It is so decided.

7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. State of European security (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 671 and Amendments).
2. Proliferation of nuclear weapons (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 672 and Amendment).

Are there any objections ?...

I call Mr. Critchley.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — Could you let me have fifteen or twenty minutes, Mr. President, so that the debate on the state of European security could start now and be completed this afternoon ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We have to abide by the time laid down for closing the sitting at half-past twelve.

On the other hand, according to the custom that has grown up in other assemblies, in our parliaments and the Council of Europe in particular, I shall ask speakers to limit themselves strictly. I shall interrupt them if they run over the time-limit they themselves have fixed.

I therefore think the proper procedure will be to begin this afternoon's sitting promptly at 3 p.m., in the hope that all members will show a spirit of good discipline so that we can finish our business on time.

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are agreed to.

Does anyone else wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 12.10 p.m.)

FOURTH SITTING

Tuesday, 27th May 1975

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

2. Attendance Register.

3. Change in the Orders of the Day.

Speakers: The President, Mr. Critchley, Mr. Delorme, Mr. Grieve.

4. State of European security; Proliferation of nuclear weapons (*Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 671 and Amendments and 672 and Amendment*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Critchley (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Duvieusart (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Dankert (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Wall (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Lemmrich (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Delorme (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Critchley (*on a point of order*), Mr. de Stexhe, Mr. Delorme (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Radius, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Tanghe, Mr. La Combe, Mr. Margue, Sir Harwood Harrison, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Karakas (*Observer from Turkey*), Lord Peddie, Mr. Faulds, Mr. Depietri.

5. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Change in the Orders of the Day

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly should take the two subjects included in the Orders of the Day in reverse order and begin with Mr. Delorme's report on the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

I have the agreement of the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to this proposal.

I call Mr. Critchley.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — With respect, I think it would be better if I begin, my four colleagues next speak briefly, Mr. Delorme's report is debated and then finally we resume the debate on European security. I gather that all sorts of people want to leave at different times. We have come to an agreement over lunch that this might be the most efficient way of doing it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Delorme.

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, as Mr. Duvieusart has to leave earlier than I do, we shall, with the agreement of the Chairman of the Committee, hear the presentation of the two reports, Documents 671 and 672, and debate both reports together afterwards.

This is the change in procedure which the Committee proposes you adopt.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — Do I gather that our proceedings are once again changed ? If so, I wish to protest in the strongest possible language.

1. See page 34.

Mr. Grieve (continued)

I came here this afternoon understanding that the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of Mr. Critchley and those others who participated in it would now be heard by the Assembly, that it would be presented, and that those who wished to speak would then be called to speak. I came here under the impression that that was the order of the day. If that is to be changed, I protest formally and most strongly.

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — We agree.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Grieve, we have been in touch with the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, as the two Rapporteurs are obliged to leave very early — one of them for Moscow. As Mr. Delorme's report ought not, in principle, to give rise to a long debate, we together agreed on a way of expediting matters. If, however, there are objections, we can, by common accord and in order to avoid wasting further time, accept the compromise proposal by the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, which would give everybody a chance of speaking and of standing up to express their views.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — In that event, Mr. President, I bow to your wishes.

4. State of European security

Proliferation of nuclear weapons

(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 671 and Amendments and 672 and Amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of the general report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments for the twentieth anniversary of the Assembly on the state of European security, Document 671 and Amendments.

I call Mr. Critchley, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — One of the disadvantages of speaking so soon after

a magnificent lunch is that I have to fight against not only my own somnolence but yours as well. The fact that a number of members of the British Delegation have been in receipt of such lavish hospitality over the past day or two combined with the internal situation in the United Kingdom has persuaded a number of us to apply for political asylum.

There is no place for the rhetoric of defence following the superbly competent performance this morning of General Haig. This has concentrated my mind and the minds of my four fellow Rapporteurs who will speak very briefly and without frills to urge you to accept the recommendations of our report on the state of European security.

I apologise in advance that there will be five of us, followed by Mr. Delorme, one after the other. However, they have all given undertakings to speak briefly. That they would anyway have spoken in the debate at great length means that on balance the Assembly has won the advantage which flows from this arrangement.

I ask members to turn to the sixth page of the report, Document 671. There a list of recommendations is given. I wish briefly to highlight some of the recommendations we have made.

The second recommendation is that we should "welcome the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at summit level to prepare the conference on security and co-operation in Europe". The significance of that is not so much that we should welcome that summit conference, although that we do, but rather to remind the Assembly, as it has already been reminded in yesterday's debate, that we have yet to extract from the Soviet Union the sort of concessions on basket one and basket three in particular that would make it worth the while of the West to acquiesce in what has for long been a principle of Soviet policy; that is, a meeting at the summit which would set the seal of respectability upon the division of Europe and upon the existing *status quo*.

One of our many messages is, therefore, to beef up the attitude of our negotiators in Geneva. If the Soviets want a summit that badly, they will have to pay for it in concessions.

The report contains a chapter written by Mr. Dankert which is based in its turn upon a report, of which we all have copies, submitted by

Mr. Critchley (continued)

General de Maizière. That report, which I consider to be one of the most important documents ever presented to this Assembly, had its origins in November 1969, when the Assembly asked the Council for permission to spend 555,000 francs to produce five special studies. The Council, bearing in mind the interests of all those who paid taxes in our seven countries, reduced the subvention, but left enough money to enable us to purchase the report in front of the Assembly.

I submit that the report is a most valuable document. It rests at the moment in the Foreign and Defence Ministries of all the NATO countries. It either has been or will be circulated to all those institutes which devote themselves to academic studies of defence, and it will help to increase the reputation of the Committee and, more important, of the Assembly as a whole.

What I think we have to do in the Defence Committee is produce a blend of opinion, which is always easy, and factual reporting, which is more difficult, linked to the occasional contribution of the outside expert. If we can get right the balance between fact, opinion and outside expertise the sort of documents we shall produce will probably gain in reputation elsewhere.

Item 3 in the recommendation of our umbrella report relates directly to the de Maizière report, and you will see that each of the five subsections is of immense importance. We must do something in Europe to improve our reserves and to make more force available. We have to think hard about decision-making at a time of crisis. We have to do something about logistics and the present failure to operate in between one force and another. We have to think about the deployment of battlefield nuclear weapons, although we must go very slowly in proposing any radical changes in the number of American battlefield nuclear weapons. I am myself in favour of modernising the existing stocks even though that might mean that their number was reduced. But even were we to limit the exercise to modernisation it must take place only after consultations between America and Europe, because, as the General said this morning, to do anything at this stage of the game which would make relationships between America and Europe more difficult would be a very foolish move to make.

The fourth recommendation bears upon the southern flank in particular, and springs from

a visit the Committee made to Greece and Turkey in March of this year. I would only highlight one point there, and that is to express some disapproval of the United States embargo on arms to Turkey. This seems a very curious method of diplomacy, which has resulted only in making worse the situation in that part of the world, and is a curious example of letting members of parliament exercise their powers in diplomacy, something about which the executive and those who exercise their skills in diplomacy have always been very reluctant. I am all for the powers of members of parliament being increased, but I do not think that we can begin to rival the powers of Congress, and if the embargo is any example of the success of Congress in the rôle of foreign affairs we should be very reluctant to follow its example.

Item 6, which is the last of the recommendations, relates to the debate about structures within an emerging European unity and the age-old debate between Eurogroup and Western European Union, and you will see that it comes down in favour of Eurogroup if for no other reason than that the members of Eurogroup appear to be most reluctant to make concessions in the direction of any other forum which might perhaps in time come to rival it. But so robust an assertion in favour of the *status quo* still, I think, leaves some room for a rôle for the Standing Armaments Committee of Western European Union itself. I have been attracted to the proposals made in Paris last December by Mr. Van Elslande, which have since been circulated and presented to the Council of Europe.

The reason is that there is a rôle for the Standing Armaments Committee to search for the facts about the industrial armaments situation within the Seven in order to do a little research on this particular problem. The research in itself can do no harm and can do a lot of good, and our attitude to the debate between the Standing Armaments Committee in its function and Eurogroup in its function is surely that we should be prepared to explore the opportunities to improve the cohesion of European defence, but should not do so at the expense of one organisation or the other. There is no doubt that Eurogroup has played a valued rôle and could continue to do so, but I think also that there is a strong argument that the Standing Armaments Committee of this Council may also be more actively engaged on the process of harmonising European defence.

Mr. Critchley (continued)

The second part of the final recommendation is that we should instruct our Secretary-General to submit to Mr. Tindemans before the end of June 1975 the views of our Council on the place of defence in a future European union with a request that such a union retain the defence commitment of the Brussels Treaty. The Council of Western European Union should get into the act with respect to this report, and ought this summer to be able to present to the Belgian Prime Minister views on the way European defence might emerge.

In conclusion, while the referendum debate rages in the United Kingdom, which is the reason why some of us will be leaving before the end of this week, some of us here at least are helping to spearhead the movement towards united Europe. Western European Union is the sole parliamentary assembly with responsibility to specialise in matters of defence and security. The European Parliament in Strasbourg worries about the price of cheese ; we worry about the price of freedom. Western European Union is committed to the preservation of the European heritage and western democracy. Western Europe is all that is left of the greatest civilisation the world has known. Half Europe has already gone communist. The remainder is a small promontory at the end of Asia, each nation being vulnerable to subversion one by one.

I look forward to the creation of a genuine European foreign and defence policy which would enable us to retain our independence and avoid becoming the "dominoes" of Europe. Until Europe is ready to create a defence community of its own, we in Western European Union must exercise the function of watchdog on behalf of European security. Once the European Defence Community is set up, we shall happily pack our bags and go to Strasbourg, perhaps to a directly-elected European Parliament, which will then be in a position to debate the security of Europe. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Duvieusart, Rapporteur for Chapter IV of the general report, entitled "The flanks".

Mr. DUVIEUSART (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Chairman of our Committee has given us very precise instructions about the time allotted to us for speeches, and we shall abide by them.

It is my duty to present to you a review of the state of security on the flanks of the Alliance, and the report which I have the honour to submit to you is more especially concerned with the state of security on the southern flank.

In the case of the northern flank, which we shall mention briefly, a report was presented by our Committee in 1972. Since then, we have noted two changes in the state of security on this flank : on the one hand, the scaling down of the United Kingdom defence effort, which has resulted in the withdrawal of two airborne brigades, two battalions of parachutists and a battalion of Royal Marines ; and on the other, what your Committee has deemed to be a political weakening through Norway's decision not to accede to the European Economic Community, in the sense that the Committee considers that, the option having been considered, the refusal to give an affirmative answer constitutes a weakening from the political standpoint.

These are the two elements which have changed, so far as the northern flank is concerned, since the earlier report was compiled. And the direction of change has been, in our judgment, towards a weakening of that flank.

In the south, several elements should be noted. In the first place, let us mention the intensification of Russia's naval presence in the Mediterranean and the building of a large fleet and two aircraft carriers in the Black Sea.

Your Committee would remind you of its earlier recommendation concerning respect for the Montreux Convention, in order to ensure that the two aircraft carriers built in the Black Sea do not pass through the Dardanelles.

As regards the Alliance itself, your Assembly is aware that the aggravation of relations between Greece and Turkey constitutes in several aspects a profound weakening of the Alliance on the southern flank ; and it indisputably represents a weakening from the political standpoint in that two allied countries have been unable to find a peaceful solution to their dispute, and the Alliance unable to suggest an appropriate procedure to them within an acceptable time-limit. It also represents a weakening, because of the conditions in which our allied forces have to operate in this part of the world ; and the restrictions on flights over the Aegean Sea are a serious handicap for the Turkish air forces. The absence of any meaningful NATO exercise in this region of the Alliance likewise

Mr. Duvieusart (continued)

leads to a weakening in the military potential of our forces, which was remarked upon by the commanders we were able to meet.

Lastly — and I wish to emphasise this remark which has already been made by the Chairman of our Committee — the embargo which is currently placed on arms deliveries to Turkey, as a result of the decision by the American Congress, has seemed to us a particularly disquieting phenomenon.

Hence, the Committee in its recommendations and conclusions suggests that the technical, legal and political problems inherent in the arms embargo imposed by one of the powers in the Alliance on another be studied in depth.

Certainly the very idea of an embargo in the context of an alliance, is somewhat difficult to understand and is at variance with the very idea of an alliance.

We have, however, observed some elements which are more encouraging than those which I have just mentioned. In particular, the Committee is gratified at the improvement in the official links between NATO and CENTO, especially in radar.

I should like to end this rapid survey of the situation on the southern flank by stressing, just as your Committee did, Spain's indisputable place in concerted arrangements for the security of the Alliance's southern flank. We are familiar with the political problems involved in possible co-ordination, but your Committee could not pass over in silence the fact that it is inconceivable that any worthwhile concerted arrangements can be achieved in the Mediterranean, unless contacts are made with Spain. We merely emphasise this from the military standpoint, without raising any other problems which the subject may involve, but it is impossible to present a report on the state of security on the southern flank without touching upon this problem, on which everyone will have to take the responsibility for the views he advocates. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Dankert, the Rapporteur for Chapter III of the general report, entitled "The central front".

(Mr. Bettiol, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler)

Mr. DANKERT (*Netherlands*) (Translation).

— Mr. President, it was said a few years ago — I think it was in a SACEUR report — that NATO could provide a 30 to 50 % greater defence effort if it made more rational use of the resources available. There were of course people who concluded from that report that with rationalisation it would be possible to make a 30 to 50 % cut in expenditure.

I believe that both these lines of reasoning lose sight of the fact that maintaining the present level of personnel and of investment would seem to be impossible without increasing our budgets in real terms, and that the conclusions of that SACEUR report are that we should, by means of rationalisation, and in particular standardisation, keep our defence effort at its present level. Whether this will happen or not I cannot tell; I think there is reason to suppose that it is doubtful. I believe General de Maizière was quite right to conclude in his report that standardisation seems in the short term possible only by a policy of "little steps".

The de Maizière report deals with rationalising deployment on the central front, and thus has a considerably wider scope than that of standardisation alone. Its main conclusions have been adopted by the Defence Committee in paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation. These conclusions boil down to a recommendation that at no great extra cost we should increase the credibility of the conventional side of the West's deterrent. I believe that there is good reason to do so, in view of the might of the Warsaw Pact massed in Eastern Europe, and the nature of that might. It is not difficult to see that NATO defence in Central Europe does not have the standardisation, and hence the flexibility and interoperability, to cope rapidly with a conflict of any size.

Over recent years this kind of possibility of conflict management has become increasingly important. The reasons for this lie, I think, in the shifts in the strategic nuclear ratio between the United States and the Soviet Union, and as a consequence in the dwindling belief in the credibility of a deterrent that is based on a first and early use of tactical nuclear weapons. The remedies recommended for this can be found in sub-paragraphs (a) to (e) of paragraph 3, where it is urged that there should be more combat forces, more fighting units and less of a logistic tail. I believe there are a number of developments at the present moment, particu-

Mr. Dankert (continued)

larly on the American side, which justify the expectation that something is going to happen here ; the idea is, in particular, being considered of pulling two brigades out of the logistic tail, which will then be stationed in the Federal Republic, one of them hopefully outside the traditional area in which American forces are stationed, that is to say the NORTHAG area.

I think this is a good start on this line of policy. I also believe that another part of the same recommendation, on the development of more rapidly-available reserve units, is already under way, both in the Federal Republic and in the Netherlands with the modernisation of the five reserve divisions. It does however remain extremely important, certainly if one is to have reserve units of this kind, that the call-up procedures should be as simple and as flexible as possible. I think systems such as the Dutch RIM-system are ideal for this. We must not underestimate the importance of these procedures, which cost very little extra. In crisis situations they make an enormous contribution to the deterrent effect, which for me is the prime essential in Western Europe.

Then paragraph 3 calls for more logistic integration and more specialisation. These recommendations represent the nub of what General de Maizière himself recommended in his wide-ranging study, the importance of which I have just mentioned. I would offer General de Maizière very special thanks for the way he has worked on this study, and for the very clear manner in which he has put it together ; this has helped to make it a kind of handbook or work of reference on the situation in the Central European sector.

The study reflects, broadly, the views of the Committee, myself included, and for this reason I felt it to be superfluous to reiterate the findings of the study in the report that I have submitted. I would however like here to make a few, perhaps not unimportant, marginal comments.

Like any study, the one by General de Maizière is based on a number of assumptions, which I would describe as assumptions of a very definite *status quo* character. I myself am far from sure that all these assumptions will remain valid over the next two or three years. There were certain hints of this in the speech by General

Haig this morning, when he spoke about the possible effects of the socio-economic crisis. If this is so, then there would seem to be a need for a fundamental reappraisal.

On one point — the position of tactical nuclear weapons in the central sector — I am very definitely at odds with General de Maizière. Exaggerating slightly, I might say that de Maizière has taken the political-psychological approach, as seen from the viewpoint of the Federal Republic, while my approach would be more the military one. The history of the 5,000 or so tactical nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic shows that change is called for. These weapons were brought in at a time when the ruling strategy was one of massive retaliation, and at a time when they were regarded as direct operational weapons without ascribing any particular category to them. It is remarkable that nothing has yet been done about these 5,000 nuclear weapons despite changed strategic concepts and in spite of a very greatly changed balance in the strategic nuclear field. General Haig told us this morning that something needs to be done here, but what remains unclear is what precisely this ought to be.

A Brookings Institution study called for a reduction in the number of these weapons from 5,000 to 2,000, without giving any definite reasons for choosing this figure of 2,000. This was in an article by Lawrence Martin in "Survival", where he suggested that these weapons should be given a rôle fitting into the new strategic concepts.

I have no detailed final judgment to offer, though I do believe that there are clearly too many nuclear weapons in this central area. I believe that they are not rationally deployed, that they are not sufficiently safeguarded — there is in particular an increasing danger of a pre-emptive strike with conventional weapons, and here I am thinking in particular of precision ammunition — I believe that command and control (and this is plain from the 1975 budget of the American Minister of Defence, Mr. Schlesinger) is inadequate particularly as regards the quick reaction alert devices and artillery warheads. I also believe, and this is an additional factor, that tactical nuclear weapons tie up a sizeable number of troops who could be playing a more useful rôle in the conventional sphere. I am glad to see that in the United States there is a very thorough discussion going on about these weapons, even in the Pentagon itself.

Mr. Dankert (continued)

I think it would reveal an enormous lack of self-confidence in Western Europe if we saw the thinning-out of these weapons as a proof of American neo-isolationism. I would much prefer to see political use made of this nuclear surplus in the central area of Europe, by trading our surplus against a surplus on the Warsaw Pact side. This could be done within the context of the MBFR discussions. If however this should not prove possible, then I want there to be no misunderstanding that even then the surplus that exists in Western Europe will have to be got rid of, and that it must go in the same way that it came — as redundant matériel. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Wall, the Rapporteur for Chapter V of the general report, entitled "Production of missiles in Europe".

Mr. WALL (*United Kingdom*). — In studying Chapter V of the report we turn from strategy to hardware. As we all know, to some extent strategy depends on the hardware that is available. This Assembly has had many debates and discussions on the rationalisation and standardisation of weapons. We have produced many reports, but, I venture to suggest, with little result.

With this background, eighteen months ago it was decided to set up a study in depth of tactical nuclear weapons. That study appears on pages 27 to 37 of the report. You may ask: why tactical missiles? The answer is that missiles represent a fairly new technique in which there is not so much vested interest, either national or economic, as there is in the production of warships, aircraft or tanks.

Appendix II contains a list of all the missiles available in the world today, as far as we can find out, classified by countries and by classes, including those in the United States and the Soviet Union for purposes of providing a standard of comparison. I hope that this will prove to be the most up-to-date list of missiles available that is non-confidential, but we have already had to issue one corrigendum and I am afraid there are probably more to come. However, the list affords a good guide.

We set out on this task by examining each type of missile and ascertaining which were the most modern types in production in Europe today. We visited most of the major manu-

facturers in Europe, and the results are shown in the report. It is a technical problem, but I suggest to the Assembly that the importance is not in the technicalities but in the results, and the results are shown in a table on page 36. I shall not read that table but I shall remind the Assembly of three figures.

There are eighteen naval surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles produced in Europe alone. Duplication to that extent should be quite unacceptable. There are ten army surface-to-air missiles produced in Europe, and two are bought from the United States of America. There are sixteen anti-tank missiles produced in Europe, and at least one is bought from the United States. By adding up the total in eleven different classes of missiles one finds that eighty-four are produced in Europe and about fourteen are bought from the United States. I suggest that our task is to try to end this overlap which could almost be called waste.

How do we do it? I suggest that we consider — and we can only consider — the next generation of weapons, those that will become available in seven to ten years' time. We then standardise the types or categories required in ten years' time. We consider the missiles available today with the second or third generations which have lives of ten years or more. We then decide which categories would better be produced in Europe and which categories for a number of reasons would better be bought from the United States, bearing in mind that if we purchase American equipment we expect the Americans to purchase some form of equivalent equipment from Europe. When we have done that, I suggest that we are in a position to lay down future design requirements for European missiles.

I turn briefly to the problem of design and research and development. The big lesson I personally have learned in preparing this paper, having visited the various armament companies in Europe, is that they all said without exception that they were already co-operating with one another and were prepared to co-operate to an even greater degree. They also said that they would form international consortia to produce this or that weapon provided the military and the politicians could agree on design. That is the weakness we should face in the Assembly this afternoon, and I very much hope that we will do so.

Mr. Wall (continued)

I remind the Assembly that the Conference of National Armaments Directors is comprised of people who study this kind of problem. It has been in being for a long time and has had some success recently. The conference has decided, anyhow provisionally, that there will only be one European naval surface-to-surface missile in the next generation in ten years' time, and that there will be a family of three small anti-tank weapons built by the European countries in ten years' time. However, the criticism I have always heard of CNAD is that the members wear national hats and that, although this is a collection of nations, it is not an international organisation.

We propose, therefore, that the task — and I think it is the key task — of the design characteristics of the future generation of weapons should be given to the Military Committee and the NATO staff. I understand that they can carry out this task provided they are given the proper staff. Later we may be able either to bring in or to co-operate with the Standing Armaments Committee, as was suggested by Mr. Destremau this morning. Alternatively, indeed, we may later have a European armaments agency. However, I think it is a little too soon to decide on this.

What I and all the Rapporteurs are anxious to ask the Assembly to do this afternoon is to take some action now in order to design the characteristics and capabilities of the next generation of tactical missiles. In my view that is fundamental.

The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has already set up another study on such questions as an international armaments agency for our next conference, so that can be left open, but I think action now is essential.

Finally, on research and development, it has been suggested in various international documents that up to 50 % of research and development is wasted due to overlap and duplication. Not only do the European nations compete against each other but Europe competes against America. We suggest one way out of this, that the military staff of NATO should lay down design requirements; this ties in with the suggestion that each of the nations should allocate 1 % of its research and defence expenditure to NATO in exactly the same way as was done for

the NATO infrastructure programme which was so successful and had no costly national duplication. It parallels the existing action which is taken over anti-submarine warfare and the SHAPE Technical Centre.

The draft recommendation in which all these points have been covered is to be found in paragraph 5 on page 7. It is to the effect, first, that we should concentrate on standardised tactical missile systems for the next generation. Secondly, we should make the Military Committee responsible for deciding the characteristics to be applied to the development of future weapons. Thirdly, we should make 1 % of our national research and expenditure budget available to NATO to develop projects decided upon by the Military Committee.

I submit that in this way we can make a start on positive standardisation instead of merely talking about it.

I hope very much that the Assembly will decide to take this action and, equally important, to follow it up. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Lemmrich, Rapporteur for Chapter VI of the general report, entitled "Future organisation of European defence".

Mr. LEMMRICH (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, the future organisation of European defence is a subject in which we must build on hopes. Unfortunately we have to recognise that the hopes of rapid progress in European unity have not so far been fulfilled; on the contrary, we find ourselves worried by the possibility that part of what has been achieved may even be whittled away again.

There can in the final analysis be no lasting organisation of European defence, without political union in Europe. A separate Western European identity in defence matters would be the final element to be fitted into an all-embracing European Community. But neither political union nor an institutionalised European defence is at present within reach. A definite refusal in the sphere of defence was given again only a short while ago by the French President, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing.

All the same, this situation must not lead to a feeling of resignation. The efforts of Europeans to achieve co-operation in the defence sector must continue without interruption.

Mr. Lemmrich (continued)

Military co-operation cannot be postponed to the day when it will be possible to bring about political union in Europe.

The need for better co-operation in defence policies between Europeans is determined mainly by two factors: first, the threat from the potential opponent, evidenced by his constantly rising military efforts, and secondly, the financial limitations of the several European States. These in turn create pressures to rationalise defence expenditure, to standardise armaments, equipment and logistics, and to harmonise the concepts and theories of European defence — pressures which stem in particular from the fact that we Europeans, because of our geographical situation and also because of the threat, have particular problems in common.

If the political union of Europe is not yet possible, and the basis for a lasting defence organisation therefore not at present obtainable, we must at least try to do what is possible. Here, the problem is to find the right basis on which to proceed; of the various possibilities I shall mention only three. One is the European Community, which on one occasion already has dealt with questions of defence.

Mr. Critchley, the Chairman of our Committee, is certainly right when he says that the Community deals primarily with economic problems, such as, for instance, the price of cheese. But I can well imagine the importance which a nation as alert to economic problems as the British, attaches even to price negotiations such as these. The second possibility is Western European Union, and the third the Eurogroup of NATO.

The European Communities have no competence in defence matters; furthermore it should be remembered that they do not include our European partners on the flanks.

Western European Union officially handed over its military functions to NATO in 1956. The Standing Armaments Committee, which certainly could be a constructive organ, has so far shown no particularly impressive results.

Against this background, The Eurogroup of NATO has been gaining in importance as an instrument for co-ordinating the defence efforts of the various European States in NATO. It has, however, one handicap; a nation as important

and powerful as France is missing. In this matter of co-operation with France, WEU can fulfil a special task.

A European identity in defence matters is a goal well worth pursuing. It would extend and improve the significance of Europe's part in western defence — and given the terms of reference, the efforts to co-operate in the interests of greater security for the States of free Europe cannot be aimed against the United States.

The North Atlantic Alliance is and will continue to be the guarantor of our security. We shall have a long way to go before the European identity — which I am sure is widely desired among our peoples — is achieved even in defence matters. Existing organisations, such as the Eurogroup, should therefore be used as fully as possible to improve co-operation in defence — especially as the Europeans want to be allies of the United States. The worry that they could become mere dependents must remain an idle fear.

In defence matters as elsewhere, the forms of organisation are of great importance, but in the last resort the decisive factor for the freedom and security of Western Europe remains the morale of all its citizens, their will and their determination to stand their ground in a world beset by uncertainties. I thank you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Delorme to present, on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, his report on the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would first like to thank the Chair and Mr. Critchley for agreeing to add this report to the five others. Let me say straight away that the purpose of my report is to take stock of the situation. Two reports, those of Mr. Housiaux and Mr. Margue, have already been presented, and now, two years later, we come to review the implementation of the non-proliferation treaty.

While to some extent the preparation of this report has been facilitated by the quality of the preceding ones, I have some difficulty and a fairly delicate rôle as a member of the French Delegation in speaking to you about non-proliferation. However, I think it is, all the same, very interesting to accept the challenge and speak to you about this treaty which my country has neither signed nor ratified.

Mr. Delorme (continued)

After the introduction, the main body of the report is devoted to reviewing the extent of proliferation or non-proliferation, examining the results of the implementation of the treaty and concluding with a draft recommendation, to which will be added an amendment brought to my notice just now which also takes stock of the situation.

Going straight to the heart of the matter, I must say it is somewhat rare for resolutions by our Assembly to have so much effect as we now see. We have adopted resolutions calling upon all nations to sign and ratify this treaty. I am pleased to note that the recommendations adopted by the Assembly have been implemented by five European nations, and you can add to the table showing which nations have signed and ratified, an asterisk each for Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. This is most satisfactory, but I have other remarks to make which are less agreeable.

Where vertical proliferation is concerned, we are sorry to see that both the United States and the Soviet Union have only increased their armoury, and that the United Kingdom, France and China have continued their production or research, though of course to a lesser degree.

In the case of horizontal proliferation there has been, without any pun, a world-shaking event: on 18th May 1974, a nation which, under the non-proliferation treaty, should have abstained from nuclear tests, conducted an underground nuclear test; on 18th May 1974 India exploded its first atomic bomb.

Obviously, this shook Central Asia, and there were lively reactions in Pakistan as well as in other countries; you will find appreciations of the situation, particularly by the President of Pakistan since the explosion occurred within a few hundred miles of his frontier.

I must say that this fact is all the more serious because Canada, a country to which I pay tribute as having the wherewithal to make its own bomb and not having used it, supplied the fissile material under the treaty of 1st July 1958, which provided that such supplies should be for peaceful purposes and not for the manufacture of a bomb.

We have also heard what we consider to be dangerous statements like that of the Israeli

President who, on 1st December 1974, said: "My country is now capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons."

I find these developments in horizontal proliferation regrettable from every point of view.

But the years since the presentation of the last report have not been completely barren. On the positive side we should note the talks between Russia and the United States and the agreement the two major nuclear powers reached on a partial suspension of underground testing and on negotiating with a view to carrying out joint test explosions for peaceful purposes.

In addition a conference has been going on in Geneva since 5th May by virtue of the treaty of 1st July 1968; it is due to last for a number of weeks and will review the functioning of the treaty and of an organisation created concurrently — the Vienna Atomic Energy Agency.

In the light of the above review, I cannot make any predictions, for the prospects of this conference are uncertain and not very encouraging. In spite of the efforts made since the last war, it is obvious that we are faced on the one side with verbal professions of good will but on the other, alas, by extremely regrettable and unfortunate acts.

Since the publication of our last report, the two great powers have met in Vladivostok. This is an event. In my report you will find the results of the conversations and the agreements reached.

In paragraph 39 of Document 672, which has been distributed, you will see that the agreement reached is perhaps disappointing; indeed, it was thought that the Vladivostok talks would be aimed at limiting tests to a low ceiling. But we find that in fact the two powers have agreed on a high ceiling. According to the figures given in the report, each country undertakes not to exceed 2,500 vehicles — a figure which, it was considered, ought to be a ceiling. But if this trend is continued, a future conference will probably fix an even higher ceiling; I deplore this.

To some extent we can understand the nations which hesitated to accede to the treaty, since the latter includes certain paradoxes. I would remind you that only powers which had already carried out nuclear tests by 1967 were described as nuclear-weapon States in the treaty.

Mr. Delorme (continued)

Obviously, if India had exploded its bomb sooner, this rule would have enabled it to become the sixth nuclear-weapon power.

It is understandable that there should be a few difficulties in implementing a treaty concluded under such conditions.

Anyhow, I will conclude by quoting General Eisenhower who in 1953 gave an account of the history of what had been atomic warfare, and launched an appeal in favour of the "atom for peace" campaign.

Even his own people turned a deaf ear to his appeal. And we who are trying to establish a peaceful Europe under the auspices of this Assembly ought to try by all possible means to restore to the nations the elementary common sense of first of all avoiding proliferation which, even when carried out in the name of peaceful applications, gives rise to much concern and many problems for each and all of us. I am speaking now of the implementation of vast nuclear energy programmes which are the subject of discussion and conferences in our own countries.

Therefore, if, aside from such proliferation, that constitutes a definite danger for which special precautions must be taken, there is proliferation of nuclear weapons, too, the danger is even greater.

To conclude then, that is why in the draft recommendation we urged member countries "to adhere to the treaty on... non-proliferation" and, where possible, to deposit their instruments of ratification before the end of the review conference. The result has been that, even before you could discuss the recommendation, five nations have already taken heed of the Assembly and your Rapporteur's words: "in all their foreign relations to encourage universal accession to that treaty; to accept the full application of controls provided for under that treaty", and, subject to that consideration, "to provide the maximum possible assistance to third countries in all civil applications of nuclear energy"; and lastly "to consult with their allies in the North Atlantic Council with a view to achieving through the various arms control negotiations, a genuine reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons without diminishing the essential basis of their security".

Such are my conclusions, as your Rapporteur. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Critchley on a point of order.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. I wonder how many people have inscribed their names to speak on this report by Mr. Delorme. If there is only one, as I believe there is, it might well be that this debate could then be concluded with the Rapporteur winding up after the second speech.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Stexhe.

Mr. de STEXHE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I thank Mr. Delorme for his survey of the situation. He told us a moment ago that he had shown courage in so doing, since he comes from a country which has not acceded to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. On reading the recommendation that he is submitting to us, I noticed that this has, in fact — if I may say so — led him into one or two historical errors.

I read in the recommendation proper the words: "Recommends to the Council that it urge member countries" — in other words, the seven member States of WEU — "to adhere to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons...". Well, I observe that all of them except France have acceded to the treaty, and have deposited their instruments of ratification. I do not think therefore that we should vote on such a recommendation.

You said just now: "You see, we proposed, we pressed for adherence, and even before our debate could begin, we adhered in order to please you."

For heaven's sake! It was seven years ago that the five countries signed the treaty, and they have now deposited their instruments of ratification. They signed the convention in 1968, and have just made a concerted gesture as Europeans. We are bound to note with keen satisfaction — and that is the purpose of my amendment — that after the United Kingdom, which did so in 1968 — five European States have deposited on the same day their instruments of ratification, in order to demonstrate their European spirit.

In the second paragraph of the recommendation, you suggest that we should "encourage universal accession to that treaty". I see no objection to this.

Mr. de Steuxhe (continued)

In the third paragraph you propose that we should "accept the full application of controls provided for under that treaty".

I would remind those of you who are familiar with the application of the treaty that, for years, the United Kingdom, which was not obliged to do so under its treaty, submitted to controls in the same way as the United States.

Only the Soviet Union refused to accept controls, as did other States which had not signed the treaty. Yet the five member countries of WEU have for years accepted all these controls, up to the hilt.

In these circumstances, I do not think that a recommendation on these lines will increase the stature of WEU. When its terms become known tomorrow at the Geneva conference, which is now sitting, and when the conference sees what WEU is proposing, it will say to itself that we are not even aware of what is going on at the present time — that we are unaware of the controls which the five countries, plus the United Kingdom, have accepted for years.

I think, therefore, that we should keep up with current events, and not merely make history. Making history has its value, but the Geneva conference has been meeting since 5th May, not to talk about general disarmament but to see that the treaty is applied. The political rôle of WEU today is to direct its attention to what is going wrong in the application of the treaty and try to put it right. Now, on this point there is something radically wrong in my view, to which we should draw the conference's attention.

Mr. Delorme has said the same thing, he has stressed the point, and I am stressing it too.

You are aware that the treaty had a twofold aim: to avoid "horizontal" proliferation i.e. to reduce to a minimum the number of countries using nuclear energy for their armaments. All is not perfect. There are 130 countries represented at the United Nations, 90 have signed the treaty. Let us congratulate them; let us be sorry about the others.

We must, however, draw the conference's attention to the failure to carry out the second aim. In return for this restriction on their freedom, accepted by the non-nuclear weapon countries, the Soviet Union and the United States entered

into formal and precise commitments to reduce their nuclear arsenals.

In the document submitted to us, it suffices to re-read the preamble to the treaty to realise what we wanted to achieve in return for the relinquishment of our nuclear freedom:

"Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery..."

That was the aim.

Now, as you have just reminded us, all that was done at Vladivostok was to accept a ceiling even higher than what existed already. We are forced to note that, since signing the treaty and committing itself to reducing its nuclear arsenal, the Soviet Union has increased its armed nuclear force tenfold or a hundredfold.

So, at this Geneva conference, where the two superpowers find themselves face to face with the ninety other countries which have given up their freedom in the hope of seeing a general reduction in armaments, we must tell the representatives of the two superpowers: for pity's sake, abide by your commitments, for otherwise you run the risk that the signatories will view this treaty as a purely discriminatory one. Whereas the optimists accepted such discrimination in return for commitments, the latter have not been kept.

That must be clearly said at the Geneva conference, if we want to achieve any result. It is the purpose of one of the points in my amendment to the recommendation. We must also call upon those attending the conference, upon all Europeans, to speak with one voice. That is truly one of the aims that we must pursue.

Finally, if we want to go a little deeper into technical matters, and if we want to do better at this Geneva conference, we should demand that in the field of nuclear arms control in particular — and that begins with the exploitation of raw materials, their transport, their processing and their re-export — measures be taken to tighten up control — I am using a somewhat barbarous technical term — throughout the entire nuclear fuel cycle. Such control will have to avert happenings such as the supply of nuclear materials

Mr. de Stexhe (continued)

to India by Canada, as Mr. Delorme said. There are also thefts and misappropriations of nuclear materials for the benefit of groups whose possible identity we may readily imagine. In this respect, we could usefully ask for control to be tightened up.

Those are my reasons for tabling this amendment, which is perhaps rather a long one.

I believe that the proposed recommendation has to some extent been overtaken by events, since we are once again asked to "urge member countries of WEU"... Are you going to leave this as "member country", in the singular, in the text, since six of the seven member countries have ratified? Furthermore, you should not invite member countries to accept the tightening up of controls which they have already accepted up to the hilt, even beyond their strict legal commitment.

If WEU wishes to play an active part in trying to avert the outbreak of nuclear war and preparations for it, it is absolutely necessary for us to adopt a recommendation which is far closer to reality and more practical.

It is with this consideration in mind that I have ventured to table my amendment, which offers a few suggestions. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — What are the Committee's views on the amendment?

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — I am grateful to Mr. de Stexhe for having spoken in favour of tightening up what is, in my view, the very essence of the report which we were called upon to present. Whether or not an "s" is deleted from a word in my draft, I shall raise no objections. I would simply say that the proposed amendment does take account of ratification. What I am in fact proposing is that the countries which have not yet adhered to the treaty be asked to deposit their instruments of ratification.

In consequence, on this ground we were in full agreement. The issue was the instruments of ratification.

In the oral report I have just made, I expressed the satisfaction of the Rapporteur at what you had to say and the point you were making. I

therefore support the first paragraph in the preamble :

"Noting with keen satisfaction that, after the United Kingdom, five other member States of WEU have adhered to the treaty..."

Your Rapporteur also accepts that the recommendation proper should be supplemented by the paragraphs emphasising control.

On this point, I can speak personally. I absolutely agree that controls should be tightened up and, in particular, that those controls provided for by the treaty on non-proliferation should be made applicable and be applied to that one of the two superpowers which has rejected them. We must be objective and it has to be known. Here, too, the assistance of the Vienna Agency has been rejected.

It is just a matter of relating things as they are — a point to be considered, a mode of procedure — and in consequence I am not against it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now proceed to vote on the amendment.

Does anybody wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Radius.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — I am opposed to this amendment because of its penultimate sub-paragraph, in which in the first place I detect a drafting error, where it reads : "to increase IAEA guarantees... and in particular : (a) have the nuclear States follow the example..."

Something ought to be altered in this text. Furthermore, with apologies to Mr. de Stexhe, I am also opposed to the substance of this amendment, and you will of course understand that a member of the majority of my country cannot accept what is asked for in these terms.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does Mr. de Stexhe accept the wording proposed by Mr. Radius?

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I have not proposed an alternative text. I have said what I thought about the way it is drafted at present which I do not like anyway. I also said I was against the substance of the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put Mr. de Stexhe's amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amendment is agreed to.

The vote on the draft recommendation will be taken at 5.30 p.m.

We shall now take the debate on the state of European security.

I call Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — I wish to preface my few observations on the extremely important report to which we have been listening this afternoon by saying how honoured I feel to stand at this rostrum in the German Parliament and to take this opportunity of thanking our German friends for the hospitality, kindness and care with which they have received us in the capital of the Federal Republic.

We have, I think, been present today at one of the most interesting days of debate and speech in which I personally have ever participated during the six years in which I have been a delegate to Western European Union.

I congratulate the Rapporteurs — it would be invidious to single out any of them — on a report which, at a time when we are all so anxious to achieve détente and to arrive at some constructive and positive result in the negotiations — for instance, for mutual balanced force reductions — while aimed at achieving those significant ends, nevertheless underlines the dangers in which the western world still stands.

As Lord Duncan-Sandys said yesterday afternoon, it is important we should aim at détente, because at what else could the free world properly aim to achieve a reduction of the tensions of the world and of the confrontations between the countries of the Soviet bloc and the free western world? However, we must be realistic in doing that, and we must be on our guard.

I was particularly impressed in this regard by the passages in that part of the report which has been written by Mr. Critchley and in that part which has been written by Mr. Lemmrich, because they have emphasised the fact that the western world faces very great dangers and, the price of liberty being eternal vigilance, it behoves us as the Assembly of Western European Union to be vigilant.

In paragraph 2.13 we read :

"In Central Europe, in general terms, the Warsaw Pact has 20 % more soldiers than NATO ; 30 to 40 % more soldiers in fighting units ; two-and-a-half times the number of tanks, and twice as many guns. An overall ratio of two to one against NATO in combat aircraft hides more significant imbalances when specific aircraft rôles are taken into account, particularly those of air defence and ground attack."

It would be perfectly possible to negotiate mutual balanced force reductions to a degree and to a point where we had no forces left at all and where the countries of the Soviet bloc still had overwhelming armaments at their command. That, of course, is not the purpose of mutual balanced force reductions, but those figures indicate the degree to which in negotiation and in the effort to achieve détente we ought to be on our guard.

Surely this is the more so because, whilst willing to achieve some measure of agreement on the reduction of forces, the Soviet Union shows no inclination whatever to refrain from opposition to, and the undermining of, free western societies by the ways which we all know are taking place continually — in my own country, for instance, by the infiltration into positions of importance in the trade unions of persons dedicated to the Marxist line and to the establishment of a socialist society whilst the British people reject communism almost entirely and have not for many years elected a communist to parliament.

This, too, is underlined in paragraph 2.11 of Mr. Critchley's report, where he says :

"In any event, whatever Russian intentions may be, détente and peaceful coexistence will be the means it will adopt. To threaten Europe directly would be to strengthen NATO's resolve, an act that would be counter-productive. Dr. E.M. Chossudovsky, Representative in Europe of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, writing in a personal capacity in the London Times of 3rd July 1974, but no doubt reflecting a Soviet 'establishment' viewpoint, defined peaceful coexistence as follows : 'a form of historic conflict on a global scale between capitalism and socialism, linked with the revolutionary process and the concomitant class struggle, though it implies, at the same time, the possibility of mutually

Mr. Grieve (continued)

advantageous co-operative inter-systems' transactions in diverse fields'."

This clearly underlines why in my submission we should be perpetually on our guard in these matters and look with the very greatest possible care at any proposals for limitation of armaments which would alter the balance against us as against the Soviet bloc.

There is, of course, another reason why at the present juncture in the affairs of the free world we should exercise very great care. I was one of those who listened with admiration this morning to the speech of General Haig. The views he expressed came as no surprise. Twice in the last twenty-four months I have visited Washington in company with some of our Rapporteurs of our Defence Committee and our General Affairs Committee, and the views which General Haig expressed were the views which we heard then in the Pentagon and in the State Department, where the realisation that the defence of the free world is as much the defence of Europe as the defence of the American continent is clearly understood and appreciated.

But it would be wrong of us to overlook the fact that in the humiliation which the United States has suffered in South-East Asia many of the American people have sought refuge in a move towards isolationism, a move which has expressed itself in an opinion poll in the United States where over 60% of those consulted expressed the view that it would only be to the aid of Canada that the United States should go in an armed conflict.

This, too, is emphasised in paragraphs 6.1 and 6.6 of Mr. Lemmrich's part of the report where, in paragraph 6.1 he says :

"The long-term effects of the present tragedy in South-East Asia cannot now be foreseen."

Surely that is something we ought to bear in mind in assessing and approving, as I hope, this report where in paragraph 6.6 Mr. Lemmrich refers to the declaration on Atlantic relations :

"The allies share a common desire to reduce the burden of arms expenditure on their peoples. But States that wish to preserve peace have never achieved this aim by neglecting their own security."

We are all at the moment, in the economic situation in which the western world finds itself, under the very great temptation to reduce our security and armaments in order to try to maintain the standards of living of our people. In my country that has recently been done to a substantial degree. Speaking for myself, and without entering into British politics here, I deplore it. It is something against which we must all be on our guard.

My submission therefore is that for these two overriding reasons — because of the omnipresent danger from the Soviet Union and its satellites, and because of the trauma through which the United States is at present going and from which I hope it will emerge confidently with the policies which General Haig put this morning in the forefront of its national policies — we must be on our guard and exercise very great care.

One of the ways in which we could exercise care and help ourselves is this. For the six years I have been a member of the Assembly we have discussed over and over again the standardisation and rationalisation of our armaments. We all know why we have made so very little progress. It is because the national interests of all our States are concerned. But if tomorrow the western world were to be in real immediate danger we would not hesitate to sacrifice those national interests to the common good. But the danger, though not immediate and present tomorrow, is hovering in the background all the time, and I approve and applaud, and recommend to my colleagues, those passages in the report which strongly recommend that we should put the standardisation and rationalisation of our arms in the forefront of our politics. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Tanghe.

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the annals of the Assembly will show that there has been hardly a session, over these past twenty years, without a recommendation from one or other of our Committees — usually the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments — stressing the urgent need for standardisation of arms and equipment. And now, after these twenty years, we see the Chairman of the Defence Committee, Mr. Critchley, having to admit in his introduction, not without a certain sadness, that painfully little has been achieved in this respect.

Mr. Tanghe (continued)

Yet with every day that passes the need for standardisation and rationalisation of our weapons and equipment becomes more pressing. We can no longer have any doubt that the operational worth of our forces in Europe, and the effectiveness of our whole defence effort, really are being undermined by the existence of twenty-three or twenty-four different types of aircraft that have the job of defending the same airspace over Europe, by the existence of scores of different types of artillery and rocket, by the twenty or thirty different calibres of ammunition for use by the same troops. Long-term, the situation is quite mad. How can anyone take a shared operational approach when one has to work with so many different types of aircraft, weapons and so on?

And then there is a further argument: I ask myself whether ordinary people in all our various countries will continue to put up with the fact that — as the American Secretary of Defence said at the ministerial meeting in Brussels — the NATO countries taken together — and this includes the seven countries in WEU — are squandering millions of dollars every year for lack of standardisation and rationalisation. Will the countries of Europe be able to carry on affording the luxury of buying ever more costly armaments, each to its own taste and as it thinks best, when these high price levels are passing on the ever-rising cost of research? Can we go on affording this, especially when today in all the rich countries of Europe the standard of living — including that of military personnel — has become so high that in the Western European countries manning costs are now already swallowing up more than 50% of the defence budgets, with the result that there is regularly less money available to invest in modern hardware and still have the amount we need left over for running and training our armed forces?

In all our western countries we are well on the way to having to make do — if I may use the comparison — with expensively-paid weekend drivers driving second-hand cars. There has to be an end to it. I think our Foreign Minister, Mr. Van Elslande, was quite right to emphasise at our last meeting in Paris the need for the WEU countries — and preferably a number of other European countries as well — to give concrete expression to this desire for standardisation and rationalisation. Mr. Lemmrich, in his

report on the future organisation of European defence, has very rightly included a passage from this speech.

If what General Haig said this morning is true, that there is agreement on the other side of the Atlantic as well that standardisation should be a two-way street, then it is high time for us Europeans to see to it that two ways do not end up as eight or ten ways through the absence of any agreement between the European countries on the types of weapon they want to buy, and on the co-production of common arms and equipment. We should be in a very weak position if the Americans came into this common, NATO-countries market for armaments with their weapons, while the Europeans carried on making seven or nine or even more types.

The intention of my amendment, therefore, is to ask the Council of Ministers, as Mr. Van Elslande recommended, to give a fresh impetus, in a concrete and practical way, to the will of the European nations to achieve standardisation and rationalisation in our joint defence efforts. This could perhaps provide a starting point for a gradually increasing integration of our common defence effort in the NATO Alliance. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. La Combe.

Mr. LA COMBE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Madam, Gentlemen, the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and, more particularly, the statement by Mr. Critchley, reveal a very deep perplexity about the attitude, intentions and, in the final analysis, aim of the Soviet Union.

The report bristles with question-marks. On the one hand, we have reinforcement of the Warsaw Pact with its formidable weaponry and, above all, closeness to Europe; and, on the other, the Soviet-American agreement on armaments limitation, which leaves us somewhat sceptical, since there is no provision for controls by either party or, still less, by a third party — that is, possibly by a European country.

On the one hand, we see that the Russians are anxious to see the conference on security and co-operation brought to a successful conclusion; on the other, they show extreme reluctance to countenance any free movement of persons, ideas and information on their own territory and those of their satellite countries.

Mr. La Combe (continued)

This attitude is self-explanatory. The Russians carefully conceal whatever goes wrong in their country whereas we Europeans can fairly say that the game is not being played on equal terms, since we expose in broad daylight our difficulties, quarrels, inflation, financial straits, crises of confidence and employment and so forth.

Despite the handshakes, good intentions and fine words of the world's VIPs, they all remain on their guard and refuse to budge, so that general controlled disarmament is, I think, unfortunately not for tomorrow, to judge by the very brilliant but rather pessimistic statement by my colleague, Mr. Delorme.

But there is an important factor coming over the horizon of the world as at present constituted, which may help to hold the scales even between the nations of Europe and the eastern powers: I mean the attitude of China.

This morning, I had occasion to put the question to General Haig. He was unwilling to give an answer, and I can well understand this, because he did not wish to launch into questions of general policy. But the recent visit to France of Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping greatly impressed and revealed to me how divided the communist world is.

The fact is rather extraordinary when we reflect that after fifty years of communist régime in Russia and thirty years of communist régime in the satellite countries, we see that basically the world is divided not only in the West but also in the East. Such division may prove fortunate for Europe and ultimately for democracy. It may prove fortunate, above all, for peace in our part of the world in the years ahead.

We forget too easily that China is almost as densely populated as Russia, the United States and Europe put together. We do not realise enough that more than 800 million people are at the dawn of their existence, or at any rate progress. The Chinese presence, which will make itself increasingly felt in the world, induces the Russians to exercise caution in their desire for hegemony, and the Americans to refrain from shutting themselves up in an isolationism ill-considered both for us and perhaps for themselves.

The Warsaw Pact, which was directed against Europe, could reduce its potential strength and so contribute to genuine détente in the West. The Chinese factor might be one of those elements constituting a counterweight on the Siberian frontier. The Chinese threat in the East would demand a clarification of the attitude of the Russians, perpetually torn between the desire to spread their doctrine and the desire not to frighten the peoples of Western Europe.

In any case, dialogue is more than ever necessary between Europe, the Russians and the Americans, with an additional factor that must not be underestimated: I mean the formidable weight of Chinese power in human and material resources. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Margue.

Mr. MARGUE (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I asked to speak on the draft recommendation on the state of European security not because I want to add anything to what was said by the Rapporteurs about the hard facts of our state of security. I am not an expert and am always willing to be informed by those who know more than I do.

What prompted me to speak was the sub-title of the report: General report for the twentieth anniversary of the Assembly.

I should like to pass on to you a few thoughts about the twentieth anniversary not only of the Assembly but of Western European Union itself, which we celebrated yesterday in what strikes me as a slightly over-optimistic manner in view of the actual achievements of WEU.

What we really celebrated was the twentieth — or twenty-first, if you like — anniversary of the failure of the European Defence Community, which was camouflaged by transforming the Brussels Treaty Organisation into Western European Union.

Never has a European organisation had a more ambitious programme. No other treaty contains such a commitment to work for the political unification of Europe. And no other organisation has ever done less for such unification than Western European Union.

Yesterday, we listened to the Ministers. Some, like Mr. Vanden Boeynants, told us what they thought we ought to do to be prosperous and others were content with more or less soothing

Mr. Margue (continued)

words of praise. Mr. Krieps, the Minister from my own country, spoke of a dialogue between the Assembly and the Council. But this looks like an odd kind of dialogue; the parliamentarians do all the talking and the Council turns a deaf ear. What has ever come out of the pile of recommendations adopted over the past twenty years? We bandy words here, and express our shades of opinion by voting no or abstaining, which does not get us much forward; whether recommendations are adopted unanimously or by a majority vote or thrown out, they always suffer the same fate.

To be sure, the Assembly did good for a time. It could be considered as a link between the Six and Great Britain. What has been good about it, for those of us who are members of the Assembly of the Council of Europe and also delegates here, has been the opportunity, among the Seven, to discuss defence problems, exchange opinions, listen to Ministers and military leaders and hear speeches as outstanding as General Haig's this morning. All this is very useful for our personal edification and this is what the organisation has managed to achieve.

Some of our statesmen tell us — and nothing we learn here about the state of our security is very reassuring — that the defence community is still non-existent. On the one hand, they tell us that we have neither the necessary organisations nor the instruments for pursuing an integrated defence policy; on the other hand, they have been refusing to create them, for the past twenty years. Who will get us out of this vicious circle?

When I first attended this Assembly fifteen years ago, it was a commonplace to talk of the military superiority of the West; today it is a commonplace to speak of the military superiority of the East. That is one thing that has changed; another is that twenty years ago all WEU member countries were members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Since then one has left.

Let us go on talking, but let us recognise that there is less and less co-operation. If any argument were needed to show that the present state of affairs is unsatisfactory, I would remind you of what the previous speaker, Mr. Tanghe, said about the lack of standardisation of weapons of all sorts. When we are told that there can only be

joint European defence when the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, I wonder if such soothing terms are not out of place. I consider that very limited importance is being attributed to very serious facts: instead of advantages and disadvantages, we ought to be talking of necessities. True enough, as General Haig told us, there is no very great danger of an open confrontation between the armed forces of the two blocs. He is abundantly right, but the nature of the present situation is such that the danger can break out where we least expect it. Who would have thought, two years ago, that the threat of a communist takeover could arise in Western Europe?

In Strasbourg, during the latter part of the session of the Council of Europe, we bickered about how our appreciation of events in Portugal ought to be expressed; I think that, if we examine our consciences, we all cherish the same fears and the same hopes. None of us can say how things will turn out. Must we really wait till the Russians have occupied the Azores before we realise the necessity for a joint defence effort?

Twenty years of Western European Union do not appear to have convinced us, or at any rate made us unanimous, on this subject. I hope that the prospect I have hinted at will never be realised, but who of us can guarantee that we shall not have to undergo the bitter experience of the allies in 1940, when they were forced to admit that their attempts to rearm and co-operate had not sufficed to prevent collapse.

And they talk to us of détente! Détente? I search for it, like Diogenes with his lamp in full daylight, but have still not found it. To be sure, I have found it on our side, for we now sell to the Soviets the goods we refused to sell them a while back. We are reducing our armaments. Some of us, of course, think they can look after their own defence, but what about the others? The small countries particularly are so convinced of the uselessness of their efforts that they have little compunction in running them down from day to day. First of all, they cost a lot of money and, secondly, defence is no longer very popular with the electorate, especially the younger generation. Politicians give much more encouragement to so-called conscientious objectors than to zeal in doing one's duty of military service.

We are told that there is détente. Berlin is more easily and quickly reached by motorway

Mr. Margue (continued)

than a few years ago. That is very satisfactory, but in Berlin there is still a wall, and they still shoot those who try to climb over it. In the midst of the cold war there was no wall in Berlin ; now there is one, and we are enjoying détente !

The Soviet Union still continues its oppression of religious communities, going so far as total prohibition in the case of the Ukrainian Uniat church. There is no détente because to this day there is a ban on freedom of movement for individuals in the Soviet Union, which is maintaining its grip on the satellite countries and pursuing its Russianisation policy in the so-called Republics of the Union, not only in the poor little occupied countries that form the Baltic Republics but even in the great Ukraine, where periodically leaders who show themselves to be more Ukrainian than Russian are dismissed, however communist they are. If there is any détente, it is one I do not trust, and we ought to be doing more than we are now to secure our defence.

Those who drove the Americans out of their country express the hope and conviction that they will stay here in Europe, in somebody else's country. I hope they will.

The Americans have twice tried to defend a country against communist aggression with the help of anyone else they could find. Once they succeeded ; that was in Korea. Once they failed, and this was in Vietnam. Saigon has fallen, and the United States is no longer invincible.

American public opinion is probably convinced that the human and financial sacrifices made by the United States have been in vain, partly because the South Vietnamese were incapable of defending themselves with the aid they were given. I very much fear that they have similar thoughts in America about the Europeans.

Who can guarantee that, if a serious situation arose, American aid would still be able to plug the gaps in our defences ? Cannot those who once feared that a European Defence Community might be set up under American auspices now realise that it is quite possible for us to unite for our common defence without fear of American domination, for the Americans are very probably not so keen on it as they were in the past. But at least let us do it. Otherwise, I

am not sure that we shall celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Western European Union in the same spirit as that which presided over the twentieth. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Sir Harwood Harrison.

Sir Harwood HARRISON (*United Kingdom*). — I recommend the excellent and very important report submitted by my colleagues of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. Members have heard the very short speeches given this afternoon by the five Rap-porteurs.

I am a realistic politician. I know we do not read all that is put in front of us. A great deal reaches the wastepaper basket. I say to members here that if they cannot read the document because they have not the time, at least they might read the recommendations. I bring to members' special attention recommendation 2 which urges NATO member countries to bring their armed forces up to strength because in this way the chance of nuclear war is decreased, an objective very dear to the hearts of us all.

A great deal has also been said about genuine standardisation. I know that this has been mentioned time after time, but maybe we are at the present time getting nearer to it.

I do not wish to strike a pessimistic note, but many speeches here have expressed anxiety and concern at the continuation of Russian rearmament, particularly on the central front. I do not want to detract from any work that has been done on disarmament, détente or anything else. If it achieves the desired results it is excellent. However, at present there are no signs of this. Meanwhile, Russia continues concrete acts of increasing its armaments. Until we see that it is reducing them, we shall not feel confident.

Members heard General Haig in his excellent speech this morning say that he may be able to contain the situation at this moment, as might any other general of whatever nationality to whom one speaks, but what will the position be in two, three or four years' time if the Russians continue to pour more money into armaments whilst our peoples in the West have insufficient realisation nationally of the true position ? I do not see any of us through our governments devoting more money or more men over the next three or four years to defence. In fact, there is a danger, as has happened in my own country, of a slight cut.

Sir Harwood Harrison (continued)

I think our deterrent must be this. The Russians realise that if they attack us they will get a very bloody nose. Whilst they hold that view, peace is more likely to be maintained, but if they think we are weak and will give way, we are more likely to become engaged in war.

Standardisation of equipment is vital because all of us, as emphasised in other speeches, have no wish to give up some manufacturing on which we are keen. We think it is our right. However, we must be more realistic and we must say that A or B will manufacture such-and-such an armament and another country will not. As has been said a great deal over these two days, how much more effective, even without spending more money, we could be with standardisation.

I wish to draw the attention of members to one new weapon which is a joint effort by three countries — my own, Germany and Italy — the MRC aircraft. I have seen this aircraft flown in its trials, and I hope it will not be too long before it goes into service with our air force. I know that in my own country engineers and others design very good weapons but the scientists always want them to be perfect. The scientists, and perhaps the soldiers, may say, perhaps speaking of tanks: "We want you to do that much more." Is it always worth while spending that extra 10 % which is probably doubling your bill for that extra amount of perfection, or is it not better to say as Henry Ford said, that when he got a motor car that worked he would not change it for a long time? It is probably a better use of money to get that which works, although it may not have reached the absolute state of perfection we would like.

Earlier this afternoon a delegate asked what we could do about it. My answer is that we are all parliamentarians and it is up to us to get much more national awareness of what is happening in the world at the present time and its dangers. I know that we are all taken up with questions of housing, schools, the price of pigs, television, but all these go for nothing if we are not unitedly adequately defended. Even defence is not quite enough, when we get infiltration in Portugal and an elected Portuguese Government comes under the control of the communists. That is the message I appeal to you all to take home. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — Before I come to my own short theme I should like to express the hope that we do not now fall into the error of believing that standardisation is an aim in itself which will enable us still further to avoid the real obligations of maintaining an effective defence. I have an uneasy feeling that the more standardisation we achieve the more those in our midst who are always clamouring for less money to be spent on defending ourselves will use what has been achieved in that direction in order to try to justify still further cuts in the money to be spent.

Many just tributes were paid this morning to General Haig for his magnificent performance. He asked one question to which he sought to give his own answer. He said that he and all of us were facing what he called the dilemma of détente, and he gave one or two answers on various aspects of détente. I know that the sort of remarks that I make are often not popular because I have never believed that it is any good to think that just because something is desirable that necessarily makes it the father to the thought.

My dilemma on détente is that I do not know what détente is. I know what it was intended to be. It was intended to be efforts by both sides to relax tension and to that end to make gestures and acts of conciliation and of compromise. That is what it was meant to be when the word was first brought in, but the question I have asked in my own parliament in foreign affairs debates, to which I have yet to get an answer, is: "What has the Soviet Union stopped doing that it was doing before we took exception, and what gestures or acts of conciliation has it made to justify the idea of détente, which I am sure was in our minds when we first invented the word?" As détente has gradually turned out, it is simply another way of spelling "appeasement".

I have just come back from Berlin. No one who goes there can say that there has been a single gesture except a tightened harshness on the wall. It is uncomfortable for those who do not like to look facts in the face, but we have the events along the wall. We have the restrictions undertaken to prevent people escaping from the communist "paradise" to the capitalist "hell" and they are growing harsher with every day that passes. Just as many people, even kids, are

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

being shot now as were being shot before, but the world has got more used to these horrors. Indeed, it is now thought almost tactless and contrary to the spirit of détente to speak of what is going on at the Berlin wall.

The same applies throughout the whole area behind what is still the iron curtain. An earlier speaker this morning spoke of "what we used to call the iron curtain". I do not know why we do not now so call it, because the Russians still enforce that policy, and if there is a mutual spirit of détente why is it that, as we all know — the government of my country have printed a White Paper on it — the Russians grow stronger by deliberate effort every single month and year? Why are more men put into uniform and provided with more and more effective weapons? The balance has further and further shifted against us. Some people say that the purpose is to get into a better manoeuvring position when the next stage of détente is reached. Again, is the wish being father to the thought? Why are the Russians now spreading their influence so widely across the world, on the sea and in the air and trying to get new bases everywhere? Is that a new contribution towards détente while we maintain our responsibilities throughout the world?

It is not only in military terms that the Soviet Union is making no contribution to détente. There is not a single part of the world where it is possible to exploit trouble against a non-communist régime that such exploitation is not occurring. Having recently come from Pakistan and China, I can assure the Assembly that there are very few people in Rawalpindi or Peking who think that détente is other than a manoeuvre to lull the world further into a false sense of security while the communists continue to pursue their own aims.

We used to say that our aims were peace, security and freedom. Nowadays one sees the abandonment of those aims by those who plead that détente and more détente will now bring the right results. They now have only the one word "peace". Anybody can obtain peace. You can get the peace that surrender and subjection bring; you can get the peace that reigns over a concentration camp; and you can get peace in a graveyard. Security and freedom are much harder objectives to keep in view over the years. They have always been costly for those who

wished to preserve them, and, no matter what methods we use to standardise equipment or anything else, we will never alter the fact that the greater the danger which develops, the more expensive will be the cost of defending our security and freedom.

I do not believe that we politicians properly understand our public opinion. We ourselves do not make clear what is happening. I am absolutely sure that if the ordinary people — not just the vocal and articulate intellectuals — in our various countries understood what was happening in the world and saw which way the balance of power and aggression was being altered against their interests, we would have no complaints at all from taxpayers for preserving the most precious of all their assets, not only peace but security and freedom as well. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Karakas.

Mr. KARAKAS (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, on the occasion of the Assembly of Western European Union meeting in the Bundeshaus I am pleased and honoured to be able to address you in my capacity as an observer from the Turkish Parliament.

On behalf of the Turkish Parliament, allow me to start by thanking you, Mr. President, for the invitation to attend this Assembly.

Turkey is, of course, not a member of Western European Union, but it is an essential element in the European institutions which serve the European Alliance. With a deep sense of responsibility and a lively interest in all aspects of the problem we are making our contribution to the tasks involved in European security. We are trying to maintain the close contacts we have had with the countries of Europe, and not just on defence questions but also in economic, scientific and cultural matters. Our participation in NATO, the association with the Community and membership of the Council of Europe and OECD provide the surest proof that the fate of Turkey is closely bound up with the fate of Europe.

I think that all our friends in Europe who are really worried about the security of their continent know that the geographical and strategic position of Turkey is of the greatest importance for the security of Europe.

Mr. Karakas (continued)

I have noted with great satisfaction the reports and recommendations put forward by Mr. Critchley, Mr. Dankert, Mr. Duviolsart, Mr. Wall and Mr. Lemmrich on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. I would like to thank the Rapporteur for his excellent, realistically-formulated recommendations. We too believe that a policy of détente between East and West can be discussed only if the unity of the Atlantic Alliance is maintained. A security alliance is a whole and cannot be separated from the flanks. The security of Europe depends on the security of its flanks. For this reason I welcome the recommendations of the Rapporteur strongly urging the member governments of Western European Union to take all political and military measures within the North Atlantic Council to prevent the isolation of the flanks and to maintain a regular supply of arms to allied countries like Turkey.

At this point I should like to say a few words about the conflict between Turkey and Greece. It is our dearest wish that the problems between the two countries should be solved as quickly as possible by negotiation, so that Greece and Turkey can co-operate peacefully in solving their social and economic problems. This would at the same time eliminate the unnecessary damage done to the North Atlantic Alliance. Our point of view, that is to say the opinion of my party, the People's Republican Party, is that the Cyprus conflict should be separated from the other problems which the two nations have to solve — I mean the continental shelf in the Aegean and the air space above it.

I did not really want to speak about Cyprus, but should perhaps take this opportunity to say a few words which will contribute to the solution of this problem.

The maxim of the Turkish Republic, Ataturk's "peace at home, peace abroad", is the basis of our foreign policy. That is why the military action which Turkey was forced by events to take in Cyprus was called a "peace operation". Its aim was to bring peace, for which people had been yearning, to all the inhabitants of the island, both Turks and Greeks, after the many years of insecurity through which they had lived. The superficial solutions found previously have proved impossible to apply and have only been a source of bitter disappointments.

The Turkish peace operation on Cyprus was not directed against the Greeks. On the contrary: the democratisation carried out in Greece as a result of this operation was greeted with the greatest satisfaction in Turkey. From the outset Turkey wanted to avoid damage to the NATO Alliance and the policy of détente between East and West. To our regret we have found that Greece is not following the same line, as it first of all withdrew from the NATO military organisation and then accepted the Soviet proposal. Greece wants to make use of the Western Alliance to gain admission to the European Community, but is shirking its obligations to the Alliance.

We believe that Cyprus must become an independent, sovereign, neutral State on a geographical, federative basis.

First and foremost the Turks and Greeks are neighbours. No one should think that Turks and Greeks — like the Cypriot Turks and Greeks — will in future have to go on fighting and continue to be enemies. In this day and age no one with an ounce of humanity or reason could possibly want this to happen. This would not be in the true interests of either Turkey or Greece, nor would it accord with the idea of world peace.

I hope that the efforts of Western European Union will serve to preserve peace in the world. Thank you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now adjourn the debate on the state of European security, and pass on to Document 672 concerning the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the report on which was presented by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

We have already voted on an amendment, an hour and a half ago.

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Is there any opposition to the draft recommendation contained in Document 672 ?...

I note that there is an objection.

The President (continued)

As the Assembly is not unanimous, the vote will be by roll-call.

Let me remind you that we shall continue the debate after the vote has been taken. There are still three speakers on the list.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Dankert.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹ :

Number of votes cast	60
Ayes	46
Noes	4
Abstentions	10

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted*².

We shall now resume the debate on the draft recommendation relating to the state of European security.

There are still three speakers on the list.

I call Lord Peddie.

Lord PEDDIE (*United Kingdom*). — In view of the lateness of the hour I shall certainly be brief and curtail my remarks.

I congratulate Mr. Julian Critchley and his colleagues on the presentation of a most interesting report. In two areas, those dealing with research and with standardisation of armaments, I feel that the report lacks precision. There is a statement of the problem, but very little attention is given to the manner in which the problem can be dealt with.

In paragraph 5.20 of the report there is reference to the fact that the United States spends five billion dollars on armaments research. In the case of NATO, the expenditure is 2.6 billion dollars. The report goes on to state that this constitutes net waste and would be better employed on procurement.

1. See page 35.

2. See page 38.

The inference to be drawn is that we would have a complete centralisation of research. First, I am sure that would not be acceptable to member governments. Secondly, I doubt very much the wisdom of centralising research either in armaments or in any other sphere. Too much centralisation tends to stultify. In my view, it would have been far better if the report had dealt in greater detail with all the pros and cons of the problem.

I turn now to standardisation. On page 48 reference is made to the pooling of industrial and technical resources. I know there is every desire on the part of all of us to economise in this direction, but, as previous speakers have asked, how can we achieve this pooling along the lines hinted at in the report? I think there is a complete absence of any attention to the economic aspects of these problems. The problem is stated, but little attention is given to the conclusion.

That reminds me of a very humorous story that was told during the last great war regarding the problem my country experienced with submarines in the Atlantic. One demented scientist approached the naval authorities and suggested a way of dealing with the problem. He said: "If we drain the Atlantic, it will not be possible for the submarines to operate." The startled naval men said: "Good God! But how do you do that?" The demented scientist said "Well, I have indicated to you the possibilities. It is up to you to work out the details."

The two areas to which I have referred are vital not only to the subject we are now discussing but to the economies of the nations involved. I hope, even though I think the opportunity has been neglected on this occasion, that on any future occasion considerable attention will be devoted to the interrelationship between the economic aspects and problems and those very desirable objectives indicated in the report. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Faulds.

Mr. FAULDS (*United Kingdom*). — In commenting on what I think is a most important and detailed report, I wish to concentrate exclusively on Mr. Critchley's chapter on East-West negotiations. I leave aside the questions of military strength and intentions where others are better qualified than I am to judge and assess such matters.

Mr. Faulds (continued)

In passing, I would say that much of the analysis of the report seems to be based on the old ground of political cold war rather than on the new ground of at least limited détente.

I wish most to take issue with Mr. Critchley on his comments regarding the impact of the oil embargo on Europe and the whole question of the Middle East. In both of these matters, I believe his analysis displays what I can describe only as a lack of understanding of the issues involved.

In paragraph 2.7, for instance, he refers to the oil embargo against Europe and the rise in OPEC oil prices as "not an act of trade ... an act of force". It is a misuse of language so to describe actions employed by the oil producers in pursuit of their own legitimate political and economic interests. His underlying assumption is that the embargo and the oil price rises were actions of countries hostile to Europe.

Western Europe has depended on cheap oil from the Arabs and others for far too long. Now the producers, whatever their political attitude to Europe, have decided that their own economic requirement demands the charging of a proper price for their products. They have not been alone. Sugar producers, tin producers, bauxite producers and even banana producers have started in the last few years to extract fairer prices for their products. However, Mr. Critchley does not talk of a bauxite war or a banana war. He uses this sort of description only about oil.

As to the oil embargo — and let us not forget it was not universally applied — that was clearly a political step, but one that was taken, I think, with considerable reluctance. The Arab States would far rather that Western Europe had come of its own accord to recognise at least some of the justice of the Arab case against Israel. Mr. Critchley sees some sort of nefarious multi-faceted anti-western plot behind the oil embargo linked with other moves to undermine our security. A simplistic attitude of this kind does little to help Europe win friends on the other side of the Mediterranean.

Mr. Critchley's paragraph 2.10 is a clear example of the kind of — and forgive my so describing it — fuzzy thinking that we should try to avoid. He concedes that through conferences in Geneva, Vienna and Helsinki the

Soviet Union plays the rôle of an upholder of the existing European order. He then argues, however, that the Russians are acting as revolutionaries in the Middle East. Revolution in his eyes means supporting OPEC, which includes, if I may point it out, some conservative States like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran, none of which is noted for its hostility to Europe. Indeed, several Western European governments are profoundly grateful for their economic agreements with these States.

Mr. Critchley goes on to say that the Soviets are playing the revolutionary because they are, in his words, "partisans of the Palestinian" — he means, of course, Palestine, and I hope he will correct this wrong description — "Liberation Organisation whose inclusion in the discussion of the Arab-Israeli dispute can only make a settlement less likely". That is somewhat unrealistic.

If to support PLO — that is, the Palestine Liberation Organisation — involvement in any Middle East settlement is to be "revolutionary", most of the member States of the United Nations, including some Western European ones, have been revolutionaries since the passing of the resolutions concerning Palestine and Israel at last year's General Assembly.

The Arab-Israeli dispute is basically the dispute between the Palestinians and the Israelis. If it is to be solved, both those parties must be involved. Even some prominent Israelis at last — people such as the former Prime Minister, Abba Eban — have now come round to believing that the Palestinians are the crux of the matter, though Abba Eban does not support — and let me not pretend that he does — a direct PLO involvement in any negotiation. Since, however, virtually the whole world now accepts the PLO as the authentic voice of the Palestinians — even if it does not always like that voice — the PLO may well become involved in discussions regardless of Israeli wishes.

To argue for this is only to be realistic, accepting that the agreement of the Palestinians and the PLO is essential for any Middle East agreement to work effectively. To think otherwise is not only foolish but directly counter-productive from the point of view of European security.

The Arab world is well disposed towards us politically and economically, and only the declining but still extant presence of the views

Mr. Faulds (continued)

and voices of people such as Mr. Critchley prevents Western Europe and the Arab world developing still closer relations.

We cannot return to the days of cheap oil or the days when the Arab States were political eunuchs at our command, and to blame the change from those days on some kind of Soviet revolutionary strategy, as Mr. Critchley seems to suggest, is not only inaccurate in the extreme but directly offensive to the Arab world and to the oil-producing States. Bad relations with the Arab States do not further European interests. We should be working consistently for better Euro-Arab understanding. Such relations have a direct relevance to European security. Sadly, not enough European parliamentarians are yet aware of these facts of political life. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Depietri.

Mr. DEPIETRI (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this twentieth anniversary of Western European Union ought, in the first place, to give ground for satisfaction — that of seeing there has been no war in Europe for thirty years.

Our continent owes this to the nations' refusal to consider war as inevitable, and their determination to believe that all contentious matters can be settled by peaceful means, through peaceful coexistence.

Yet it is once again regrettable to note that, instead of gratification at an era of peace, not one session of WEU — and of WEU in particular — goes by without voices being raised to say that détente is dangerous, that Europe must arm itself to the teeth, and organise its defences, allegedly against a possible aggressor, the aggressor being the Soviet Union and the people's democracies.

All Heads of State of the capitalist countries who have been to the USSR or have received visits from the Soviet leaders have publicly recognised the Soviet Union's will to peace. They acknowledge that Russia genuinely needs peace in order to improve still further the living conditions of its population.

The draft recommendation on the state of European security therefore seems to me to run counter to the statements made by the Heads of State of the western countries.

The draft recommendation proposes military measures, including atomic measures, to strengthen the defences of the NATO countries ; but it also advocates in this context a strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance, of which everyone knows the Americans are the masters, and they realise that the balance of forces in the world has changed.

It is true that the balance of forces in the world has changed, that the retreat of imperialism is a matter of fact, and that the defeat of the United States in Vietnam and in Cambodia has further precipitated that retreat.

These events have also accentuated the confusion and distrust in the attitudes of its Western European partners towards the United States.

This change in the balance of forces in favour of the anti-imperialist systems has at the same time increased the antagonism between the socialist and the capitalist systems, which must inevitably end in the victory of one over the other, of socialism over capitalism.

Peaceful coexistence in no way puts an end to this antagonism. It is simply the background against which it evolves. Peaceful coexistence does not mean only competition ; it means confrontation, in which all the non-military means of opposition take on enhanced importance, and in which the economic and ideological struggle becomes more acute.

Can it be that you are afraid of this peaceful confrontation, whose sole aim would be to improve the living conditions of the working people in Europe ?

Do you prefer the armaments race, including nuclear armaments, with all the attendant dangers to world peace ?

Your draft recommendation proposes further increases in the already heavy financial burdens borne by the nations for military purposes, at the expense of the workers, who are at present bearing the brunt of the economic crisis afflicting Western Europe. How will you explain this to the four and a half million unemployed in Western Europe, to the millions of young people coming on to the labour market to swell the numbers of unemployed, to the workers' families who see the cost of living relentlessly and catastrophically soaring upwards, to the millions of children throughout the world who are dying of hunger — are you going to tell these people, these unemployed, those who are destitute, that

Mr. Depietri (continued)

they must make further sacrifices to increase our military potential? Then you should also tell them that it is to increase the profits of the Dassault group and the rest of the merchants of death.

Will you tell them too that the sacrifices are necessary because we are threatened by the Soviet Union — that country which knows no crisis, no unemployment and no inflation? Do you believe that they will follow your lead? Acceptance of the draft recommendation is a threat to peace and to make the prospects of peaceful coexistence recede is to increase the takeover of Europe by the Americans. What happened in Vietnam should give us food for thought. The solution lies in a successful and constructive outcome to the conference on security, co-operation in Europe, as advocated by the Soviet Union; it lies in the success of the Geneva disarmament conference; and it lies in being willing to accept without any mental reservations peaceful coexistence, and the peaceful struggle to improve the living conditions of Europe's working people. That is what we should be recommending to our governments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The debate is closed. I propose that we should break off our proceedings at this point. We shall continue the debate at 9.30 tomorrow morning. The votes on the draft recommendations and amendments will be taken at 5.30 p.m.

I call Mr. Lemmrich.

Mr. LEMMRICH (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, would it not be possible to close the debate today when the Rapporteurs have summed up, as we are already quite a long way behind with our agenda? Then we could proceed to the vote tomorrow. I realise that we do not have a quorum for a vote today, but we could at least close the debate today and then we would not be so pushed for time with the rest of the agenda.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We have heard all the speakers on the state of European security whose names were on the list, so the debate is now closed. As a precaution, we shall defer the vote until tomorrow.

No doubt you would like the Rapporteurs to be given the opportunity of replying this evening. That is not possible, so they will reply to the debate at 9.30 tomorrow morning.

5. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday 28th May 1975, at 9.30 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. State of European security (Replies by the Chairman and Rapporteurs of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to the Debate on the Report, Document 671 and Amendments).
2. Draft Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1975 (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Document 666).
3. European union and WEU (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 662).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 6 p.m.)

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 28th May 1975

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. State of European security (*Replies by the Chairman and Rapporteurs of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to the Debate on the Report, Doc. 671 and Amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Critchley (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Valleix, Mr. Richter, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Critchley, Mr. Radius.
4. Draft Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1975 (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 666*).
Speakers: The President, Lord Selsdon (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Treu, Mr. Page, Mr. de Bruyne, Lord Peddie, Lord Selsdon (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. Godinache-Lambert, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, Mr. Dequae, Lord Peddie.
5. European union and WEU (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 662 and Amendment*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Krieg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Carstens, Mr. Steel, Mr. de Koster, Mr. Kliesing, Mr. Peijnenburg, Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Waltmans, Mr. Dankert, Mr. Richter, Mr. Krieg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Sieglerschmidt (*Chairman of the Committee*).
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

1. See page 42.

3. State of European security

(Replies by the Chairman and Rapporteurs of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to the Debate on the Report, Doc. 671 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The first Order of the Day is the replies by the Chairman and Rapporteurs of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to the debate on the state of European security, Document 671 and Amendments.

I would remind you that we exhausted the list of speakers at the end of the last sitting.

I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — I see no reason why Mr. Mulley should have a monopoly of poetry, so I have four lines of verse which sum up the feelings of anyone obliged to make a speech at 9.30 in the morning to an empty assembly hall:

“The youth of the heart
And the dew of the morning
You wake and they’ve left you
Without any warning.”

Mr. Critchley (continued)

My other regret is that, having been put in the position of answering the objections of a number of my colleagues to the report, objections which were voiced in the debate last evening, and having spent last evening and this morning rehearsing my replies, I see that my colleagues are all still at breakfast. Nonetheless, I hope that they will read the report when it is finally printed.

Mr. Andrew Faulds complained that I had described the Arab oil embargo as an act of force. I stand by what I believe is an accurate description. The multiplying arbitrarily of the price of the West's most important raw material by four had a number of effects, all of them detrimental to the interests of Western Europe and to the West. The oil embargo and the price rise accelerated inflation amongst the developed nations and made international monetary and economic co-operation very much more difficult. The implication of the use of the oil weapon is clear: it is that the threat to Europe's financial stability is now to be considered more important even than the threat to her military security. I am in no way anti-Arab — indeed, neither is Europe — yet the thrust of the OPEC oil policy has been hostile to the interests of Europe.

Mr. Margue asked what the Western European Union Assembly had achieved after twenty years of debate, and this is a question we have all posed from time to time. I suggest that we have in part achieved the education of members of parliament in the complexities of defence and we have also succeeded, perhaps, in keeping defence fashionable despite the temptations of rival subjects.

Lord Peddie complained that the report was long on analysis and short on solutions. That is a very fair criticism. The solution, if there is one, to the problems of the allies lies in supranationality. How we achieve supranationality is, of course, the point. Now that Lord Peddie has joined the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments I look forward to receiving his advice on that point over the next six months.

Three amendments have been tabled. The amendment tabled by Mr. Roper seeks to extend the time limit of June in paragraph 6 (b). The Committee would be happy to accept that amendment.

The second amendment, tabled by Mr. Tanghe, is also acceptable to the Committee as it stands. But, having accepted Amendment No. 2, I suggest that it makes the first paragraph of the French amendment unnecessary. The result of its acceptance would, I suggest, be somewhat incestuous, because as the Chairman of the Western European Union Council is Mr. Van Elslande, the Belgian Foreign Minister himself, the effect of the French amendment would seem to be that he would have to report to his own Prime Minister. If the original amendment were to stand it would be the duty of the Secretary-General to make that simple recommendation.

In the fifties the objective of foreign policy was the maintenance of national security. In the sixties, that changed and the objective of national foreign policies became economic prosperity and the welfare of the people. In the seventies the radicalisation of politics has meant that defence has now to compete for attention with energy, inflation and unemployment.

The NATO Alliance is in bad shape. Along the southern flank we find instability and uncertainty; in the centre the military balance is shifting in favour of the Warsaw Pact; in the north we face a tremendous increase in Soviet power. The defeat in Vietnam may erode United States self-confidence and there are doubts in Europe about the United States commitment, although I do not share these doubts. Yet at a time when the international situation is perhaps more serious than it has been since 1949, Europe is far too weak to defend herself alone, far too divided to provide the political leadership which the Alliance now requires. What we must all acknowledge is that fewer resources will be devoted to defence in coming years; we must, therefore, now achieve the desired rationalisation, standardisation and specialisation of defence tasks, because if we do not make progress in that direction Western Europe will disarm itself through the process of inflation. If we wish to disarm unilaterally, it ought at least to be a conscious act of will. Unless we inject an element of supranationality into defence, just as similar elements have already been injected into the EEC, we may not survive. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I now have to call the Rapporteurs. There are several of them, and they do not all intend to avail themselves of this opportunity.

The President (continued)

Do any of the Rapporteurs intend to give additional explanations? If none of the Rapporteurs wishes to speak, we shall now pass on to consider the amendments and possibly proceed to the votes.

On Document 671, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is proposing a draft recommendation.

Mr. Radius and others have tabled Amendment No. 3 to the draft recommendation as follows :

1. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, in sub-paragraph (a), leave out the words "Eurogroup as the most appropriate organ at present in which", and insert the words "the mission of the Standing Armaments Committee which could usefully undertake, in co-operation with Eurogroup,"

2. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (b) and insert :

"(b) that it examine with Mr. Tindemans the place which defence could take in a future European union."

I call Mr. Valleix, to speak to the amendment.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I asked for the floor first in order to express my surprise : I had understood that the votes would be taken this evening.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The vote will be taken at 5.30 this evening, but we are opening the discussion on the amendments now, since certain additions have been accepted by the Committee, but others will give rise to controversy. We shall now take up the discussion of the amendments with the purpose of producing an orderly text, which we shall then be proposing and putting to the vote as a whole in its final form.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I should have preferred the explanations and the actual voting to be taken together so as to ensure that the Assembly could reach a decision in full knowledge of the facts, immediately after the explanations. I fear that if the discussion on the amendments opens now, the vote on the recommendation itself may not only be split up which is obvious but also somewhat liable to be misunderstood or marred, because of the procedure adopted.

I should therefore like the discussion as a whole to be deferred until this evening.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The fact of our discussing the amendments will in no way interfere with the final vote. There are only two possibilities : either the amendments will be adopted and incorporated in the text ; or else they will give rise to controversy, and there will be nothing to stop us holding them over and deferring a vote on them until the final vote is taken.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. President, I agree to the procedure that you propose: if there is no agreement on the amendment, the vote will be postponed until this evening. In these circumstances, I shall therefore speak to the amendment tabled by Mr. Radius, Mr. La Combe and myself.

This amendment takes account of two things, and one of them is, it seems to me, fundamental. As members of WEU, we felt that the organisation could underline the importance it attaches to a body like Eurogroup. That seems to me quite a matter of course. But what I find less so is that no mention should be made of a body of the same kind actually internal to WEU. This is why we have introduced this idea of the Standing Armaments Committee.

It seems to me that in this way we shall be improving the text presented by the Rapporteur, and we hope that he will look upon our amendment in that light. It is, of course, for that reason that the amendment retains its reference to Eurogroup.

I would nevertheless venture to point out that, as its sponsors conceive it, only a minimal amendment is involved, considering that we are not altering the remainder of the relevant paragraph. The Rapporteur will doubtless consider our text as representing an attempt to find a compromise formula.

With regard to sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 6, I was disappointed by the comment made by the Rapporteur. Indeed the reference in the recommendation which it is proposed that we should adopt, namely : "that it instruct the Secretary-General to submit..." etc. may cause some astonishment. We felt that, if the fact that we are addressing ourselves to the Council may possibly give rise to ambiguity, such ambiguity seems to me a venial sin in comparison with that

Mr. Valleix (continued)

of addressing ourselves to the Secretary-General — that is, to the most senior official of WEU.

It is for these reasons that our form of words on this second point too is, to my mind, without being perfect, preferable.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Richter.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to speak against this proposal. I should first of all like to say that I consider the original version, as put forward by Mr. Critchley, is best. Of the proposed additions, that put forward by Mr. Tanghe is well balanced. It replaces the proposals made by Mr. Radius and Mr. Valleix.

I would therefore be sorry if we agreed with this proposal, because I think it highlights the stresses which emerged yesterday from the discussion with Mr. Destremau. At the moment it appears to me that the possibility of changing something lies really with the governments concerned. I cannot imagine the Council of Ministers will be able to accept such an idea as we have here in this proposal. I feel that it also betrays a certain misunderstanding of the Standing Armaments Committee. It is not the sole job of this Committee to speak about armaments. Their job includes studies, operational tests and the like. I consider the proposal premature and would like the Rapporteur's wording to be retained.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should just like to comment briefly on what Mr. Richter has said. Everyone in the Assembly knows, particularly the members of the Political Committee — the General Affairs Committee — that I very much favour improved co-operation between Western European Union and Eurogroup. But I do not think that the amendment serves this purpose, because it shifts the emphasis so far that representatives from countries where the value of Eurogroup's work is known and appreciated will simply not be able to go along with it. Consequently I also think that it is better to adopt Mr. Tanghe's proposal.

I have really spoken only in order to make it clear that my adverse vote is not a vote against improved co-operation between WEU and Eurogroup.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Since this amendment does not appear to have the unanimous support of the Assembly, if I understand rightly, the vote on it will probably be taken this afternoon.

That being so, I feel I ought to repeat what I said just now — that this amendment is in my view and that of my co-signatories, especially Mr. Radius, a minimum requirement to enable us to vote for the recommendation with them. If the amendment were rejected therefore, we should of course be regretfully obliged to vote against the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anyone else wish to speak?

In that case I see no advantage in postponing the vote to the afternoon, whatever may be the final decision of the signatories to the amendment. The issue seems to me perfectly clear, either way. The Assembly has been fully informed about the advantages and consequences of the adoption or rejection of the amendment. I shall therefore put the amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The amendment is negatived.

We shall now discuss Amendment No. 1, accepted by the Committee and tabled by Mr. Roper.

I shall read it :

In paragraph 6(b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out the words : "before the end of June 1975" and insert the words : "as soon as possible and at the latest by September 1975".

I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — I understand that a revision of Mr. Roper's amendment has been deposited. The revision reads as follows :

Mr. Critchley (continued)

Leave out the words: "before the end of June 1975" and insert the words: "in time for them to be incorporated in his report to the European Community".

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I have not the text in front of me. What I read out was the one passed to me by Mr. Roper.

This is the one now proposed:

In paragraph 6(b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out the words: "before the end of June 1975" and insert the words: "in time for them to be incorporated in his report to the European Community".

I call Mr. Radius.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, this is no longer of any importance for us who voted just now for the amendment I tabled with some of my colleagues. We felt that the error contained in the recommendation was to ask us to "instruct the Secretary-General"; it is not for us to "instruct the Secretary-General". We normally address ourselves to the Council of Ministers. Whether it is at the end of June or at latest September is of no matter. We shall not vote for the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anybody else wish to speak?...

I put the amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The amendment is adopted.

A third amendment, No. 2, has been accepted by the Committee and tabled by Mr. Tanghe.

I shall read it:

At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

"7. That it follow up the proposals made by Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, in the Assembly in December 1974 on a European armaments policy and in particular:

(a) undertake a detailed study of the armaments sectors of industry in the economies of each member country;

(b) study the possibility of pooling research work and its financing;

(c) examine what is the best course to follow towards progressive integration."

Does anyone wish to speak?...

I put it to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The amendment is adopted.

The vote on the draft recommendation as a whole will be taken this afternoon at 5.30 p.m. as announced.

4. Draft Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1975

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 666)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1975, and votes on the draft opinion and draft recommendation, Document 666.

I call Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Lord SELSDON (*United Kingdom*). — This is the third report on this subject that I have presented. Today I should like to take a slightly broader view and look at the whole question of the European civil service.

The report deals with certain recommendations for the improvement of the working conditions of employees of WEU. We feel strongly that one cannot look at WEU in the sole, simple context of a small organisation within Western Europe. Instead, I ask you to consider the question of all the co-ordinated organisations within Western Europe at the present time. There is OECD with 1,542 employees, NATO with 2,910, ESRO with 1,507, SHAPE with 1,354, the Council of Europe with 709 and WEU with 150.

On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Assembly I am sure you will all support me in paying tribute to the staff of WEU who

Lord Selsdon (continued)

over twenty years have served the Assembly faithfully despite frictions at political level, despite doubts about the future of WEU and despite criticisms and questions about its achievements.

WEU is not a large organisation, as we know. It is not full of bureaucracy. There are only some 28 officials amongst the 150 employees, and this number has remained stationary since 1961. Therefore, WEU itself could not be accused of being over-bureaucratic. However, being a small organisation, it has suffered in that its voice may not be loud enough in the corridors of power to ensure that the 150 employees are adequately protected from the ravages of inflation and political decisions beyond their ken.

Originally this series of reports concentrated upon one thing, the need for a pension scheme for European civil servants and in particular for those employed by WEU. I remind the Assembly again that until recently WEU had no pension scheme at all. It had an early retirement fund to which individual employees made some contributions, and the organisation itself made some contributions, and, by some oversight, most of these contributions were held in dollars. We know what has happened to the dollar against most European currencies and in particular against the French franc. Therefore, we have seen employees of WEU steadily lose their savings through currency failures, and, furthermore, we have seen them lose even more because of the ravages of inflation.

A recommendation was made for a pension scheme. This recommendation was adopted by the Council of Ministers some time ago. It was agreed that this pension scheme would be back-dated to 1st July last year, but as yet there has been no final agreement upon when the scheme will be introduced and when it will take effect.

The report concerns itself basically with the effects and results of the pension scheme. We feel quite strongly that the pension scheme for WEU, with only 150 employees, must be looked at in the context of pension schemes for all co-ordinated organisations. We recommend that there should be a joint management body for the pension scheme within the framework of all the co-ordinated organisations.

Secondly, we recommend that there should be a single appeals board, because one of the

problems which occur with European civil servants of different nationalities who may have come from one country to another or who may retire to a third country is that they must have one central source of appeal. If we have no single appeals board, the complications are likely to be legion.

The third recommendation seems a very simple one. We are asking for a guarantee for the full and uninterrupted payment of pensions even in the event of a government withdrawing or an organisation being wound up, and to this end apply the provisions set out in Recommendation 250 of the Assembly. We are saying here that the WEU treaty has some time to run, but if by any chance there was a decision by one or other country to withdraw, this could have a very adverse effect on contributions to a pension scheme, which, of course, would be budgeted.

The fourth recommendation is made with a certain wry sense of humour in this year of women's liberation. We are suggesting that if European civil servants of both sexes are to be regarded as equal, they should be treated equally in pension schemes and their families should be treated equally. We are recommending the granting to widowers of female staff a reversionary pension in the same conditions as for widows of male staff. This means that if a woman employee in WEU dies, her pension rights and her pension should pass to her husband. There remains a certain unfairness in favour of women in this recommendation because women have a remarkable knack of living longer than men, between 7 and 8 % longer than men.

In recommendation 5, we are making another transitional proposal. At the moment, officials of WEU are allowed to borrow money from the provident fund to invest in property. Many of them have done this. I said before that those who were wise enough to borrow the money in these inflationary times to invest in their own homes have done well, whereas those who did not have not done so well. But there is a transitional period so that if someone has a home loan from the provident fund, this home loan cannot be cancelled overnight by the mere introduction of a pension scheme. The official would not necessarily have the capital to make the repayments. We are therefore proposing that some form of transitional scheme should be arranged for this.

Further, we are recommending that officials of equal grade and length of service, regardless

Lord Selsdon (continued)

of the date of their retirement, should be granted a pension calculated on the basis of salaries payable to serving staff. This is a much more far-reaching recommendation than it may appear.

In this inflationary period — and we have to live with inflation of some form or another for generations — one must take into account the need to ensure that people who are retired can maintain at least a modest standard of living and not have this completely eroded by inflation. Therefore, some linkage of pensions to the current salaries or remuneration of employees of a similar grade is being recommended.

One knows that this could create problems if there were changes of grade or changes within the organisation, but some form of linking to this, we believe, would be far more effective and better than a form of general indexation, bearing in mind particularly that European civil servants are of varying nationalities and that when they retire to a particular country the rate of inflation in that country may not be the same as the average throughout Western Europe.

One further domestic recommendation asks us to take note of the United Kingdom's Social Security Act introduced in April 1975.

Finally, we recommend that there should be general reviews every four years, an examination of cost-of-living trends every six months, and assessment of the trends in standards of living in the middle of the period between general reviews. Because of inflation, one must keep account of changes in the rates of inflation and improvement in salary conditions on an ongoing basis. We have suggested that, because of this, general reviews should go up to a period of four years.

All these recommendations, I feel, are relatively simple. They concern basically only 150 people, the employees of WEU, which, as you will see, is but one small part of all the co-ordinated organisations. However, we feel very strongly that everything relating to the co-ordinated organisations should to some extent be co-ordinated.

The words used at the beginning, that we deplore and regret, have come to be words that have been used in many reports which are put to WEU. There is a lack of action taken, often at a high political level.

One should pay tribute to all the staff of the co-ordinated organisations who, as we know, put in a large amount of effort, work long hours and try particularly hard to develop new projects and programmes within Europe. However, what they cannot do is be responsible for the lack of decision and initiative which may be taken at a political level.

In the time I have been with WEU I have often found that certain recommendations which make sense and would be relatively easy to implement are never implemented or are spun out perhaps because one feels that a minority organisation with only 150 employees does not deserve fair attention from the powers-that-be.

I end this brief intervention by asking that we once more urge the Council of Ministers to take fairly rapid action on the implementation of the recommendations, which I think have been fairly made. It is, I think, nice and pleasant that we should be making this presentation here today on the twentieth anniversary of WEU.

I wish also to repeat the thanks that have been offered before to Mrs. Renger, the President of the Bundestag, for having invited the Assembly to meet here in the Bundeshaus. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Before calling the speakers whose names are on the list, I wish to associate myself in my capacity as President with the well-deserved tribute paid to the staff, whose collaboration is particularly appreciated and who, in making the arrangements for the present session, have made absolutely prodigious efforts. I know very well that the organisation is small in numbers, but I trust that it will remain great by the goals we aim at and the action which we are going to take.

In the debate, I call Mr. Treu.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to make two comments on Lord Selsdon's report. The first is — how shall I say? — aesthetic and formal, the other a more substantive point on the technical and administrative aspects.

I notice, in the first place, that in the budget for 1975, the space devoted to finance and accounts constitutes roughly one-fifth of the whole, so that the latter looks to me more like a blueprint of staff regulations than an administrative report. This is not a criticism, Mr. Rap-

Mr. Treu (continued)

porteur, but I feel that greater prominence is given to the regulational and financial discipline of the staff than to budget matters proper. Prices are soaring and we all know that every organisation is being compelled, year by year, now more than ever, to report substantially increased management costs. This is less obvious in respect of the administrative part of the budget, and may be regarded as a favourable element that is also given warrant by the relief of numerous expenditures taken over by our colleagues in the Bundestag for this festive occasion.

The Rapporteur argued there were only one hundred and fifty officials. But I am not worried about how many there are. Even if they were many more, there is a certain correlation of staff rules between WEU, the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. What is done in a given sector of one of the European bodies will, quite naturally be inevitably reflected in parallel organisations. A concession to one individual or category of WEU staff will equally apply to those in the other organisations.

Certainly we do have to take account of the cost of living, and review salary scales in consequence, as soon as what we call, in Italy, the mobile scale begins to soar, and a common management body and appeals board are useful things to have, but I am still left with some misgivings about some of the other benefits it is intended to award to the staff.

There can be no question about the reversion of pension rights to the spouse: the two-way reversion is also an accomplished fact in our national statutes too. It is no longer like once upon a time when the widow was entitled to a reversionary pension, but not the widower. But the Rapporteur establishes notable facilities for reversion of pension and review of the provident fund which all leave me a bit perplexed. The same is true of the guarantee of housing loans. So many companies and organisations assist their employees in buying or building a home, but to guarantee that this will go on even when the employee leaves and is pensioned off seems to me to leave the door wide open for abuse.

Then there is the question of the 1973 British Social Security Act. The Committee and the Council initiated these studies in 1970. Probably the United Kingdom Act was still being drafted then. Now it is becoming law. But how is it

reflected in the individual national regulations? I am not acquainted with it: I have no doubt it is most admirable, but it is difficult to equalise at all levels in respect of a 1973 Act that has yet to be fully applied.

Above all I am worried by the problems of staff mobility, dealt with in Chapter VI, which also quotes a report by the Council. For detached, or rather seconded, civil servants in international institutions and bodies, certain benefits are provided, including renewal of the detachment for three to five years. I really do not see the need for this concession. An official detached to an international organisation accepts what we call a duty mission order. At any rate in my country, there is no clause allowing a detachment of more than six months; for longer periods the individual is appointed to a post in the organisation to which he is seconded. What are called mission allowances may not in fact last too long. This seems to me a delicate point. I have no intention of moving an amendment, but I do venture to suggest we leave it to every State to govern the legal status of seconded civil servants in international organisations.

These are my modest comments on the most estimable report, of which I do not know whether it purports to regulate the life of WEU for the next twenty, thirty or forty years but it does give the impression somehow of wanting to safeguard staff on leaving, as if we were on the eve of closing down our offices. In reading the conclusions I got the impression it was trying to say: "As we are about to close down, we ought to safeguard staff by the social security scheme, because the ship has reached port and the sailors are about to be sent ashore."

Therefore, while expressing a favourable view of the report, I am bound to be somewhat dubious about the effects it might have in the individual States for officials of parallel rank were certain provisions to be applied.

Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Treu.

I call Mr. Page.

(*Mr. Amrehn, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler*)

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). — It is a matter of some amazement to me that I should find myself speaking in the Bundestag on something

Mr. Page (continued)

to do with the budget, but I suppose that if one goes on living amazing things can happen.

I should like on behalf of my colleagues to thank Lord Selsdon for a report presented so interestingly and clearly. He has for the last three years been taking a close interest as Rapporteur of the Budget Committee, and he has taken a great deal of trouble and has studied the problems in connection with the civil services of the member countries of Western European Union. It is also a tribute to the Chairman of our Committee, Mr. Dequae, and the other members for the amount of time and trouble they take in preparing reports such as this.

This is the twentieth anniversary of Western European Union, and it is particularly appropriate that on this occasion we should consider very carefully the interests of the staff of our organisation, some of whom have served it for twenty years, and all of whom render it a loyal service. It is important that we consider both their present terms of service and their pension positions after they have retired.

Lord Selsdon mentioned the other members of what are called the co-ordinated organisations. I do not really agree with my colleague, Mr. Treu, who said that it is wrong that so much effort should be made to co-ordinate pensions, salaries and terms of service within these organisations. We have to compete for the best staff we can recruit, and we must see to it that those who remain members of our staff are properly treated, otherwise, compared particularly with the staff of the EEC, those in the co-ordinated organisations could become almost second-class citizens. I do not think this is either right or fair.

I would just, therefore, underline what Lord Selsdon said about the first three recommendations, the third of which is particularly important. We must lose no time in making sure that the pension arrangements for the staff are guaranteed against the possibility of any member country leaving WEU and against the possible demise of the organisation itself. We must give our staff a cast-iron undertaking that their pensions are assured and will be paid whatever happens in the future.

A single appeals board for the co-ordinated organisations would be extremely helpful.

These are the parts of the recommendations with which I particularly agree. I would just like to query two others. The first is recommendation 4, where the widowers of female staff would receive a reversionary pension in the same way as widows of male staff. When my wife discussed this with me this morning, she said that this was yet another reason why men should send their wives out to work, so as to make sure that if the husband should live longer than the wife he would be able to obtain some payment in respect of her, even after her death. However, that is a rather depressing thought. The question I particularly want to ask — and I hope that, when he replies, Lord Selsdon will be able to tell us — is what would be the cost of providing such a reversionary pension. Secondly, if the contributions were not greatly increased, would the widows' pension go down very much? We should first of all ensure that the widows of male employees are properly looked after before putting too much emphasis on benefits for the widowers of female employees.

In connection with recommendation 7, which would have the effect of inflation-proofing pensions, I wonder if Lord Selsdon could tell us in how many of our member countries the pensions of the national civil servants are treated in this way. I do not believe they are in the United Kingdom, though I must take advice on this. It is something we should like to see and something towards which we should work. I just wonder how real it is. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Page.

The next speaker is Mr. de Bruyne.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, over the years quite a few efforts have been made to bring uniformity on matters of pensions and other social benefits between a number of European organisations, known as the co-ordinated organisations. They have not had the hoped-for result. The draft recommendation very rightly deplores this, and proposals are made in the recommendation — which, incidentally, has my full support — that would nonetheless bring about a further improvement in the position of the European civil servant.

Given the circumstances in which we have made these proposals, and in particular the lack of a common social fund for all the European organisations in question, we must allow for the possibility of a continuing discrepancy between

Mr. de Bruyne (continued)

the position of officials of WEU and that in other European organisations, and even more so that of national civil servants. This is especially true of the widows' and orphans' pensions referred to in paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation. This may well lead to tensions.

I will take this opportunity to offer a word of praise to the officials of WEU — who are short on numbers but long on quality. They invariably do their job with great competence and skill, and a proper place must be set aside for them in the WEU budget. This is, indeed, the tenor of the report by Lord Selsdon, whom I congratulate on producing an outstanding document.

I will not, Mr. President, repeat here what was said in Committee about a certain limitation of the budget. I do however want to say again that the cutback in the funds for WEU publications must not be allowed to result in members of this Assembly finding that the excellent documentation published by WEU is less readily available than it has been in the past. I am surely not the only member of this Assembly who has regularly been able to make a wide and profitable use of it, in the work of my national parliament and elsewhere.

The Chairman of our Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration holds the purse-strings tight in the tradition of the sound Minister of Finance he has once been. I hope, nonetheless, that he will be able to make allowance for the continued wide availability of WEU documentation I have been pleading for. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The last speaker whose name is down to speak in the debate on this report is Lord Peddie.

I call Lord Peddie.

Lord PEDDIE (*United Kingdom*). — I support the general principle that lies behind these recommendations, which is that one has to maintain the highest standard of remuneration and conditions for one's staff. That I accept. I am, however, at a loss to understand recommendation 4 to grant widowers of female staff a reversionary pension in the same conditions as for widows of male staff. There is no justification for that, apart from its being a demonstration of Women's Lib.

I can see the possibility of an increasing number of young men aged 21 or 22 marrying eligible lady officials of 50 plus. If such a lady should unfortunately die, does it mean that the youngster of 21 or 22 be able to live comfortably on the pension awarded to her? To my mind the whole thing is utterly ridiculous and should be withdrawn.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Lord Peddie.

(Translation). — Does anybody else wish to speak?...

The debate is closed.

I call Lord Selsdon, the Rapporteur.

Lord SELSDON (*United Kingdom*). — I had not planned to say any more, but I will try to reply to some of the comments which have been made.

Mr. Treu thought that perhaps a greater part of the report should have been devoted to money. I hold the view that the people who work in the co-ordinated organisations are more important than money. As the powers-that-be have entirely failed to give the people who work in the co-ordinated organisations what they need and what we have fairly recommended that they should have, it is important that we should emphasise yet again the terms and conditions of the people rather than the expenditure.

Mr. Page and I have previously discussed several questions relating to the report. He asked a question about the controversial recommendation 4, which I said that we put forward with a certain wry sense of humour. I will at the same time answer Lord Peddie's criticism. Perhaps men are not so interested in their liberties as are women. It may be that that is historically justified. Men perhaps do not realise that if the current trend continues and women live longer and longer and men die younger and younger, men may be further outweighed and placed at considerable disadvantage.

The co-ordinated organisations employ a growing number of women. Women are often better than men at repetitive tasks and at preparing reports. Within WEU there are fifty women. There is a relatively low turnover, and a fair number of women are not married. From an actuarial point of view it is difficult to say what would happen, but in general women tend to marry men slightly older than themselves and women tend to outlive men. The number of men

Lord Selsdon (continued)

who would qualify for this reversionary pension scheme is likely to be small. To hazard a guess, it could be a very small percentage and certainly less than one-tenth of the number of women who qualify for pensions on their husband's salaries.

Lord Peddie is right in saying that a bright young man might well set his sights on a senior A grade civil servant of 60 with the idea in his mind that, although she may live to be 74, he is now only 20. He could work out the benefits to him of receiving a reversionary pension. I am happy to withdraw the recommendation if there is sufficient pressure to do so, but it is a point worth making because we are entering a stage where women earn substantial amounts of money and for the first time a growing number of women earn more than do their husbands.

Mr. Page's second question concerned the number of countries within Europe which have indexed pensions. It is regrettable that the country in which Mr. Page and I live should have the highest rate of inflation in Western Europe and should have done nothing about the indexation of pensions, whereas Belgium, with a relatively low rate of inflation, has had indexation for some time. I understand that four countries within the co-ordinated organisations currently have indexation for pension schemes.

I second the tribute paid by Mr. Page to the WEU staff. We know that the co-ordinated organisations in Europe cannot work without competent, skilled, high-class, effective civil servants. He spoke of not cutting down on reports or publications. They are obviously some of the most valuable products of WEU. The only rider I add to that is that the consumption of paper in WEU is substantial and we might learn a lesson from the United Kingdom where year after year we have managed to use less paper than almost any other country in Western Europe in the administration of our affairs. I support wholeheartedly the need not to reduce reports and publications but nevertheless urge the reduction of unnecessary paper work and wasted paper. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Lord Peddie has submitted an oral amendment to the effect that recommendation 4 should be withdrawn.

Does anyone wish to speak on that amendment ?...

I call Mrs. Godinache-Lambert.

Mrs. GODINACHE-LAMBERT (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, as a woman I do not, of course, want this provision to be withdrawn. If it were to be, I should regard it as an injustice towards women. Let me take an example: in the Belgian Parliament, the salaries of female senators are subject to exactly the same deductions as those of male senators. When there was only one woman in the Senate, it was agreed that an exception should be made, and the exception confirmed the rule. We have, however, become "extremely" numerous—"extremely" in inverted commas — and we are now thirteen women senators. It is inconceivable that these thirteen women should be liable to exactly the same deductions as their male colleagues if their husbands, should they become widowers, did not draw the same pension, and the other way round. If it is not accepted that women should draw the same pension, it would be necessary, in all logic, for them not to pay the same deductions. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Lord Beaumont.

Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY (*United Kingdom*). — I very strongly oppose the amendment. I am very proud of the fact that Western European Union should be setting the pace in this kind of way and treating women on a basis of equality with men. I cannot see that there is any objection to this except, frankly, that based on the old-fashioned prejudice of the man being the sole breadwinner. This is no longer happening, and it will happen less and less in the future. We have been given the totally ridiculous example of the young man marrying an elderly woman civil servant in order to get the reversionary pension rights. I say "ridiculous" because it is exactly the same at the moment but the other way round: a young woman could marry an older male civil servant. That is an argument against any reversionary rights, and it may be a good or a bad argument, but there is no argument in favour of the discrimination which exists so often now and which this report seeks to remove. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Dequae.

Mr. DEQUAE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, through the voices of its Rapporteur and its Chairman, the Committee asks for this amendment to be rejected, because we must at all costs put an end to discrimination, which is, I believe, unacceptable.

The PRESIDENT. — If Lord Peddie found himself able to withdraw his amendment it would make things easier for the Assembly.

Lord PEDDIE (*United Kingdom*). — I see no reason for withdrawing it. I recognise that this is an opportunity for people to demonstrate their point of view. This is no question of loss of women's rights, but it is an attempt to avoid a Romeo's charter.

The PRESIDENT. — We must vote on the amendment.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amendment is negatived.

The next Order of the Day is the vote on the draft opinion and draft recommendation.

We shall first vote on the draft opinion.

Is anyone against the draft opinion ?...

Mr. Treu is against it.

We must therefore have a vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with Mr. Kliesing in place of Mrs. Wolf, who is not present.

(The President continued in French)

(Translation). — We have deferred the other votes until 5.30 this afternoon, but I believe that there are enough of us present at the moment and that if we take this vote now we shall facilitate the voting this afternoon.

Are you in agreement that we should vote now ?... (*Murmurs of assent*)

The roll-call will begin with Mr. Kliesing, who is the substitute for Mrs. Wolf.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows ¹ :

Number of votes cast	54
Ayes	51
Noes	0
Abstentions	3

1. See page 43.

The draft opinion is therefore adopted ¹.

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation on improving the status of WEU staff.

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

The draft recommendation is therefore adopted unanimously ².

(Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

5. European union and WEU

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 662 and Amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on European union and WEU and the vote on the draft recommendation, Document 662 and Amendment.

I call Mr. Krieg, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, if I began this oral statement by telling you that the report I have to present corresponds very precisely to what I hoped for, I suppose some of you would not believe me. Admittedly, I am bound to say at the outset that the report which was implicitly rejected last December was certainly much closer to my real way of thinking than the one we shall be debating shortly.

1. See page 46.

2. See page 47.

Mr. Krieg (continued)

Obviously, too, in some respects it might have been logical if, at some time during that debate or those which followed in the General Affairs Committee, I had stepped down as Rapporteur in favour of one of those who opposed my report, particularly at the time of the debate in Paris in December 1974.

I therefore think I should tell you why, after all, I now have the pleasure of being here to defend this report.

I must admit that the first reason was the inconsistencies I personally noticed among the objections raised to the text proposed at the end of last year. I tried to find out what there was in common between, to take only two examples, the thoughts expressed by Mr. Dankert and Mr. Cermolacce. I think that if either had been called upon to succeed me, he might have presented a report with as little chance of being unanimously adopted as mine. Secondly, I found it possible, in the end, in spite of the large number of changes I had to make in my written report, to retain what still appeared to be the essential — that the countries of Western Europe, being unable to ensure their security unaided, cannot, either, abandon their collective security to the good will of an extra-European power.

I had a third reason for retaining the same report.

Since the speeches of some of my co-members more frequently deal with the form than the substance, their votes in plenary session have sometimes differed from their votes in Committee; from this I gleaned the impression that a number of important ideas which used to be greeted with unanimity in our Assembly are now only paid lip service and are treated, if I may say so, with a certain mental reservation.

That is why, having looked up several references in the report presented in 1966 by Mr. Peter Kirk, which, I would like to remind you, was then unanimously adopted by the Assembly, I thought it essential that the Assembly should on the occasion of this twentieth anniversary declare its opinion again. It must state very plainly whether or not it considers Europeans ought to deal with the defence of Europe among themselves. It should give a definite answer now to the appeal launched here yesterday by the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I am personally quite prepared to believe that, in a number of cases, our governments have good and perhaps even excellent reasons for dodging this basic issue, but there is no reason for us parliamentarians, who do not have to observe the same diplomatic niceties, to imitate our governments.

Who in the future, or even right now, would still take us seriously if we claimed to be striving to build Europe and failed to say quite clearly what Europe we were talking about?

At present, our governments seem to be generally agreed in reducing WEU activities to a minimum; and I must say in this connection that the very recent meeting of a number of us in London with members of the Council of Ministers only served to confirm this impression, for me at any rate — I do not want to put the words into anyone else's mouth — if only because of the lack of thoroughgoing and properly considered replies to the questions raised by the various parliamentarians present at that meeting.

Mr. de Bruyne, incidentally, makes an extremely judicious analysis of this situation in his report. I would like personally to compliment him on this report, for I believe it corresponds very precisely to what nearly all, if not all, members of the Assembly think, no matter how divided they may be on other matters.

And I must say that the absence from our commemorative session of Heads of State and Government and of most of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers goes to bear me out on this point.

I would add further that the vigour of our Assembly, the only truly live element of WEU, stands in stark contrast on all sides to what you must allow me to call the Council's apathy.

I personally am convinced that it is because the Assembly has never shirked real issues that it has retained the ear of public opinion which, you may be sure, it would immediately lose if it confined itself to the tameness of some of the declarations inspired by national governments or intergovernmental organisations.

But many of the reports which have been presented during this session make me fear that some people today are prepared to surrender this freedom of parliamentary debate which is the major, and perhaps the only, strength of our institution.

Mr. Krieg (continued)

Let me add that events which have occurred since the present report was adopted by the General Affairs Committee in my view go a long way towards confirming our misgivings, as expressed in the report.

Firstly, we should remember the fate which has overtaken Cambodia and Vietnam in the last few weeks. Their unhappy lot, at which we can only look on as impotent bystanders, confirms, if any confirmation were needed, that governments which rely too exclusively for the defence of their country on the assistance of foreign powers are in the end fatally and inexorably doomed by history.

It is not for us to sit in judgment on the policy of any western power in this matter ; but I do think it is for us to learn from a situation which we have no right to ignore.

Another new factor which has intervened since the debate on the report in the General Affairs Committee has been the twofold indication given by the highest French authority, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, President of the Republic, regarding the orientations he intended to impart to France's defence policy and European policy. Since these do not figure in the printed report, for obvious reasons, allow me to quote two statements by Mr. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

In his television talk on 25th March, he stated :

"I have come to the conclusion, as did General de Gaulle, that France ought to have its own independent means of defence. France belongs to an alliance, but should independently look to its own defence..."

And again, in an interview granted on 7th April to a reporter from the French weekly *Paris-Match*, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing said :

"The equilibrium of the world would be better served by an independent Europe which, while retaining its own structures and types of society, would at the same time be capable of injecting in difficult circumstances an independent factor of conciliation and balance in such regions of the world as South-East Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

The chief obstacle to the political union of Europe has been the deliberate or unconscious

attitude whereby a number of European States, and the United States itself, reject the idea that political decisions should be taken within Europe without consultation with — or let us say, the approval of — the United States. In the grand reappraisal, the problem arises whether this was the right policy. It has not created reliable, stalwart partners. When all is said and done, the part played by such a Europe in periods of major difficulty has scarcely been substantial. I think the time will come for an independent Europe. The initiatives we took last year were intended to prepare for that day."

In my opinion these two statements are complementary and give an overall picture of French foreign policy which is very close to the one I have given in my written report. I would add that they have the great merit of removing, if need be — but I think that in such matters it is always a good thing to speak out plainly — any doubts that might have been entertained among some of France's partners regarding the determination of its present leaders to pursue the direction indicated first by General de Gaulle and then by Georges Pompidou.

There is now no longer any excuse for speculating whether France is about to rejoin the NATO command, or even to join Eurogroup. This may be a matter for regret in some quarters, but there is no longer and, which is possibly even more important, there should no longer be any grounds for behaving as if the French Government had left the slightest doubt on the subject.

You may be sure that before very long the talks to which President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has invited the European governments will inevitably have to be held. Certainly, the present WEU session has the great merit of enabling us to anticipate such talks in a parliamentary assembly, albeit one destined to enlighten its respective governments on public opinion rather than to take decisions.

Having reminded you of that, I would like, without repeating and enlarging upon everything I have already said in my written report — which you have certainly read — to clear up a number of points with which I could not deal at sufficient length in a text submitted for the approval of a Committee. I think — and I hope that I shall not be too sharply criticised for it — that it is the right and duty of a Rapporteur to expatiate in his speech upon the ideas which,

Mr. Krieg (continued)

for a number of reasons, could not be clearly enough expressed in the written report.

The first point on which I would like to dwell for a moment is related to the statements by Mr. van der Stoel quoted in paragraph 7 of my report. It should be noted that these statements, which, it must be admitted constitute a homage to WEU, include no reference to the modified Brussels Treaty, although, as we are all convinced, this remains the cornerstone of the institution to which we belong. Now certain opinions expressed during the recent congress of the Dutch Socialist Party, of which Mr. van der Stoel is an eminent member, including the final motion on NATO — at least as reported in the newspapers I read — make me wonder how the Dutch Socialist Party members interpret the commitments entered into by the WEU member countries under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. Do they consider that, whereas the United States' partners are obliged — I quote — "to afford [the party so attacked] all the military and other aid and assistance in their power", nuclear weapons can possibly be excluded from any defence of Europe?

Obviously, the Brussels Treaty enables all its countries, including the Netherlands, to arm themselves as they see fit. But I do not think that it entitles them to take exception to the weapons with which their partners are equipped. In fact, you may be sure that the question whether, when the time comes, the defence of Europe will be nuclear or not, does not arise.

The defence of Europe is already nuclear. It has been so ever since one of the signatories to the treaty first acquired the atomic weapon. And, unless I am mistaken, it was on 3rd October 1952 — two years before the signature of the Paris Agreements modifying the Brussels Treaty — that the first British atomic bomb was exploded. The Dutch signatories to the Paris Agreements must have been aware of this and, if my memory serves, the Netherlands Government was then headed by a member of the Socialist Party.

What should we conclude from this? That the nuclear weapon is acceptable to Dutch socialists providing it is American or British, but not if it belongs to another country of continental Europe?

As far as I am concerned, this is certainly not the conclusion I have arrived at, but I am obliged to put the question.

In any case, we all know perfectly well that the deterrent on which the maintenance of peace in Europe is based consists of nuclear weapons, and above all those of the United States.

I simply cannot grasp the ethical reasons which would enable Europe to accept the American nuclear umbrella but to reject European nuclear defence.

On the other hand, I understand perfectly well the political reasons for such a choice. But in that case let us not claim to be building any sort of Europe. If it is argued that French and British nuclear weapons as they exist at present are not adequate for such defence, it is an opinion I readily share, but let nobody refuse Europe, *a priori*, the right to its own nuclear defence.

It is also obvious that if the Nine are determined to achieve, over the next few years and perhaps earlier than we think, a European union extending, as is proper, to all foreign policy problems, they cannot avoid a joint approach to problems connected with Europe's defence.

At this point I would like to quote one of our former members, for whom I think we all have a great deal of liking and respect, Lord Gladwyn, who, when he was one of us, pointed out to the Assembly as far back as 1971 that he considered it unacceptable — that was the word he used and the same term figures in the French translation — for any State to join the EEC without agreeing that at some point the European Community would extend its activities to cover defence. And I would remind you that this Assembly had not the slightest difficulty in accepting Lord Gladwyn's views.

Some members took the view that it was unrealistic of me to mention in my report the possibility of Ireland and Denmark acceding to the modified Brussels Treaty and thus to WEU. I would add that a reply given in London by Mr. Callaghan on this same matter appeared to coincide exactly with their view. True enough, but the point had to be mentioned if only to recall that the modified Brussels Treaty is still open-ended and the possibility could be envisaged of certain powers acceding to it without necessarily accepting all the protocols annexed to it. The main thing obviously is that all members of a European union accept the undertakings con-

Mr. Krieg (continued)

tained in Article V, which constitutes the essential basis of any European defence organisation. Anyhow, what would become of a community — even an exclusively economic one as it still is — whose members considered that they did not have to support one another in face of aggression?

Another objection to the organisation of defence on the basis of the modified Brussels Treaty was put forward during the last session in December 1974. As you will certainly remember, it related to the discriminatory nature of the Brussels Treaty, particularly in respect of the Federal Republic.

In this connection three things should be borne in mind. First of all, the Brussels Treaty is not actually as discriminatory as it appears at first sight. True enough, it lays down different obligations for the various signatories, but, inasmuch as Germany's partners have agreed, either under the Brussels Treaty or subsequent agreements, to maintain forces on German territory, we may take it that there is a certain balance between the disadvantages incurred as a result of the treaty by one party or another.

Moreover, the text of the treaty, which is more than twenty-five years old, and more explicitly the protocols to it, reflects a situation which is undeniably no longer the same in 1975. But the limitations placed by some of the protocols on the rights of the Federal Republic of Germany to have conventional weapons have already been reviewed several times, as indeed provided for in the protocols, and there is nothing to prevent a further updating if necessary.

Lastly, I want to state that the addition of the word "officially" in paragraph 23 of the report is not our doing. In fact I personally have no knowledge of any moves official or unofficial, by the Federal Republic of Germany to escape from the only important limitation concerning it in an essential field, that of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, I think the entire policy of détente and co-operation of the Federal Republic with its eastern neighbours confirms my impression — and I do not think I am mistaken — that a nuclear weapons policy is no part of the intentions of the Federal Republic of Germany. However, there is no doubt that that country has some misgivings about its neighbours' nuclear weapons. I say that this is a perfectly legitimate and normal reaction, and the chief country con-

cerned is France. Such concern is understandable, and is mainly related to two points, according to a particularly interesting statement made by a member of the Assembly, Mr. Alfred Dregger, only two or three weeks ago to the French weekly *Valeurs actuelles*.

From this statement it would appear not only that the Federal Republic would like to have a say in the use of the French nuclear force, but also that it would like to avoid any deployment of French tactical weapons facing its frontiers; they should take up positions further east.

In order to achieve this, Mr. Dregger suggested a number of methods with which I might agree were it not that in one respect they refer to a European defence community — whose somewhat remote spectre it would perhaps be better not to conjure up today — a European community which bears no relation to the sort of defence links which Mr. Dregger would like to see established between France and the German Federal Republic.

It is as well to avoid the ambiguities inherent in certain terms, and I gladly recognise that I myself have been guilty of this sort of misuse of language in mentioning in paragraph 28 of my report the military integration of the forces stationed in Europe. We must recognise that the term integration is very unsuitable for defining the status of NATO forces. NATO commands may be integrated, but its forces are not. Our British friends have far more experience of this problem than we do, whenever they withdraw troops from the army of the Rhine and send them to Ireland.

To the extent that we accept today and for the future that the defence of Europe is a matter of common concern for Europeans, that it can be assumed neither by any European State in isolation nor exclusively by an extra-European power even if the participation of all the countries of Western Europe appears necessary and a close understanding with the United States essential, we must jointly consider by what means and under what auspices such defence can be guaranteed. Whether we like it or not, whether it embarrasses some of us and whether we intended it or not, our seven countries are bound by their signature of the modified Brussels Treaty and the automatic assistance clause in Article V. It is open to them to envisage other forums than WEU for implementing a common defence policy, but, whichever it is, even if it is not WEU, the

Mr. Krieg (continued)

Brussels Treaty will go on being, for nearly thirty years to come, the basis of such policy and, inasmuch as our American allies are not bound by it, the defence of Europe and the West will under the terms of the Atlantic Alliance remain two separate things.

To be sure, it is understandable that most of our countries rely on NATO for the strategic aspects of a defence policy which is almost no longer conceivable except in the combined framework of the United States and Europe. It might, however, be desirable if such considerations did not lead Europeans to abandon the principle of joint examination of the challenges they may have to face some day. What Mr. Dregger suggests concerning France and Germany would no doubt be possible and even desirable for all WEU member countries, at least in matters of nuclear defence.

The other field which appears to be more important than ever is that of armaments production. The exceedingly tiresome business nicknamed "the deal of the century" has certainly had the adverse effect of giving the impression that there was a conflict of national interests and that a difficult choice had to be made between those in favour of the French aircraft and those in favour of the American one. However, this choice had many other aspects if we consider among other things the nature of the manufacturers' offers to their customers. For France it was a matter of deciding whether the customers would be satisfied with industrial set-offs for their purchase, or whether they would launch into the joint manufacture of aeronautical equipment, which implied acceptance of the French proposals.

However, I would like to conclude my oral report which, I hope has not been too long-winded, by reverting to the proposals made before the Assembly during the December 1974 session by Mr. Van Elsslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, to which Mr. Destremau referred here yesterday. I cannot do better than read you the essential passage of his speech, essential from the point of view of our organisation. Here it is :

"The industrial problem, and that of exports which is closely bound up with it, are by far the most vast and most delicate. I believe that WEU could devote itself to the study of these

questions, to which insufficient attention has hitherto been paid. WEU includes the chief European producers. The first step must be a thorough study of the structures of the military sectors in the economy of each country. We must also ascertain what is their relative importance, what forms of specialisation are possible and what can be done about the pooling and financing of research activities. Finally, we must determine the best ways towards progressive integration, taking account of existing financial structures and of alliances which may constitute an advantage or a disadvantage, depending on circumstances."

So here we have a member of the Council of Ministers of WEU, who is today its Chairman-in-Office, and who, scarcely six months ago, made precise proposals in the Assembly for giving WEU a programme of work and launching Europe on the road to a joint armaments policy.

In saying this he was replying to an initial appeal made in the same context exactly one year earlier by Mr. Jobert, the then French Foreign Minister, with which there is reason to think the Italian Government associated itself.

However, to my knowledge — and I think to that of all those present — nothing whatsoever has since been done along the lines suggested by these Ministers.

It is our business to ask why. To speak of a lack of political will is no answer, for we would have to ask ourselves what is the substance of such political will, who lacks it and why.

I would ask you to believe that all possible steps were taken to avoid advancing any national point of view in the report of the General Affairs Committee which the Assembly will now debate. The aim was to express a European point of view, and this did not emerge without a great deal of discussion, compromise and, inevitably, a number of ambiguities. However, it is still founded on the basic idea that Europe must, happen what may, remain master of its own destiny and side by side with the United States constitute one of the pillars of the Atlantic Alliance.

If you do not share this concept, Ladies and Gentlemen, you must say so very plainly and throw out the report, but I think that public opinion and our governments would look askance if once again the debate on this question, of prime importance for the Assembly, as to whether

Mr. Krieg (continued)

Europe can and should assume responsibility for its own defence within the Atlantic Alliance, were evaded by means of a reference back or a procedural device, and we were finally prevented by a subterfuge from discovering whether and how we want to exist.

This is the essential question to which you will have to reply when the voting takes place this evening, at the end of what will probably be a lengthy and certainly highly-interesting debate. You may be sure that, by replying to it, you will at the same time be responding to the appeals launched eighteen months ago by Mr. Jobert, six months ago by Mr. Van Elslande and yesterday by Mr. Destremau. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur. We are, in fact, now going to open the debate. I already have a large number of speakers on the list. Consequently, contrary to our usual practice, I shall have to be rather strict about the time-limits on speeches.

I call Mr. Carstens, to speak for fifteen minutes.

Mr. CARSTENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have listened with great interest to the report of Mr. Krieg. I would like to congratulate him on his report, and in the course of what I have to say I shall refer to some of the points he has raised.

But first of all I wish to convey to the Assembly of WEU greetings from the CDU/CSU group in the Bundestag. We are very happy that the Assembly of WEU is meeting — for the first time — in the German Federal Republic, in Bonn. We see in this an encouraging sign for German co-operation in WEU, and we believe that this session of the Assembly of Western European Union in Bonn will have repercussions on public opinion in Germany, that it will evoke an echo and that the two central themes which the Assembly will be discussing at this session, European union and the military security of Western Europe, will find an attentive audience in the German population — for it is the conviction of many people — and certainly the opinion of the CDU/CSU for whom I speak — that today no foreign policy themes are more important than these.

Ladies and Gentlemen, twenty years ago the Federal Republic of Germany became a member

of WEU ; this made it a partner of its European neighbours, and was a milestone not only in the history of our own country, but in the history of Europe as a whole. On that occasion the German Federal Republic confirmed its renunciation of the use of force in its international relations and declared that it was renouncing the right to manufacture atomic, biological and chemical weapons. I can underline what Mr. Krieg has just said : that no German Government has questioned this obligation, to which the Federal German Republic subscribed in the WEU treaty of 1954-55.

I should like on this occasion to acknowledge with gratitude that Western European Union, and in particular this Assembly, has often expressed its views on the problem of the partition of Germany, and that the goal of German policy, namely to work towards a state of peace in Europe in which the German people can regain its unity through a free act of self-determination, has repeatedly found emphatic support. For this, too, I feel it is proper that we should thank the Assembly.

The Assembly has also dealt often and in depth with the problems of Berlin. This, too, should be gratefully acknowledged. All of us have had to recognise that, despite the hopes which many people placed in the quadripartite agreement of 1971, the difficulties have not disappeared ; on the contrary, there has very recently been another series of Soviet political moves intended to weaken the existing ties between Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. I am thinking particularly of the Soviet objection to the presence of the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany when the American Secretary of State visited Berlin.

Here as elsewhere it is evident that on the meaning of détente those who have accepted this policy in East and West are not entirely of one mind. While the western partners are applying the policy of détente in order to make peace more secure and so to achieve a settlement which should in the course of time lead to reconciliation, we find that with the same policy the eastern side is pursuing — at least in some respects — quite different aims, namely the continuation of what it calls the ideological battle, and furthermore — I think this must be added — the expansion of their sphere of influence, wherever and whenever an opportunity arises.

Mr. Carstens (continued)

It has been pointed out in these debates at the Assembly of Western European Union that the members of the Warsaw Pact are intensifying their armaments drive. It has been said — and I would like to stress this — that the States of Europe must make their own contribution towards their security. Quite a few concrete proposals already exist in this context: better co-operation between Western European members of the Atlantic Alliance inside WEU; better co-ordination of planning; better co-ordinated production of armaments and a higher degree of standardisation in both equipment and training. All these are important aims, which the Western European members of the Atlantic Alliance should pursue.

Mr. Krieg has also mentioned the possibility of strengthening co-operation in the nuclear sector. He has referred to the statements made by Mr. Dregger, of my political group. I think we should explore and make the fullest use of all the possibilities that may occur in this field. Nevertheless, I think that whatever we in Western Europe do to strengthen our security should be done within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. I consider that in the present situation and for the foreseeable future the Atlantic Alliance, that is, the alliance between Western Europe and North America, is a *sine qua non* for the security of the free part of our continent. But I am also for Europe attaining — and I think we should all consider this together — a greater political weight within the Alliance by speaking more than hitherto with one voice when it comes to important political questions and moreover not only on questions relating to the Alliance, but on all international questions whatever they may be.

This leads me to the second important theme, one of the themes of this session of the Assembly of Western European Union in Bonn, namely the unification of Europe.

The idea of European unity has just celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary. We have been remembering the day when Mr. Schuman — at that time the French Foreign Minister — presented the plan that formed the basis for the Coal and Steel Community and led later to the European Economic Community which we now call the European Community.

I believe that the reasons given in 1950 for the creation of a united Europe, which Mr.

Schuman expounded and formulated, still hold good today. Indeed, it can be said that today this cogency is even greater; it seems to me that the unification of Europe has never been so necessary in post-war history as it is today.

Unification of Europe means — I think there is agreement on this — economic and monetary union and political union, that would make it possible for Europe to speak with one voice on international affairs. In the sphere of economic and monetary union we have experienced setbacks and disappointments. We have had to recognise that the deadlines we had set ourselves could not be kept. This was partly due to causes that were nobody's fault and for which nobody can be held responsible. But there is not much that can be changed in the basic conception. The economic integration of Europe can be successful in the long run only if it leads to full economic and monetary union. Anything less than this, anything that falls short of this goal, will become untenable. I could give you many examples to illustrate this.

An economic and monetary union cannot of course exist without a political union — that is, unity in respect of the most important problems of foreign policy. Economic and foreign policies are so closely interwoven that they cannot be conducted separately and without mutual consideration.

It is in this context that we must consider the project of direct elections to the European Parliament — a project which the two parties of my political group, the CDU and the CSU, strongly support. We should work towards early realisation of this project.

Like you, I know the argument: is there any sense in electing a European parliament directly, if that parliament has as little authority as the present one? Is it not necessary, if we wish to elect a parliament directly, to give it in advance, or at least when it is elected, greater authority?

That is an argument which in principle may have much to commend it, but it is — I would like to say — a completely unrealistic argument; because, if you go about it that way, you will in my opinion ensure that there are no direct elections to a European parliament, and that it will be given no wider and greater authority. As in all such matters, one must be prepared to take a first step, and the first step that can reasonably be taken and therefore should be taken is the move to direct elections. I am convinced that

Mr. Carstens (continued)

once a directly elected parliament has been constituted it will, in the course of time, be given greater authority than the present one has.

From the point of view of my political group, and of my position in that group, I would like to add another argument for direct elections. I consider that to be at one and the same time a member of both one's national parliament — I refer here to the Bundestag — and the European Parliament places such a heavy burden on members that it is hardly possible for them to do full justice to both functions.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Western European Union has been a driving force for the unification of Europe ever since it came into being twenty years ago, and it has remained faithful to its motto, as expressed in the preamble to the Brussels Treaty :

“Resolved :

.....

To afford assistance to each other... in maintaining international peace and security... ;

To promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe ;...”

This was the *leitmotiv*, the aim of Western European Union. The Assembly has — and I feel one can already state this with confidence — served that aim with all its strength and energy. I am therefore of the opinion that, until the political union of Europe has been achieved, Western European Union, and the Assembly of Western European Union in particular, should be maintained as an institution which will, I hope, be a strong driving force carrying us forward towards the goal of European unification. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Steel to speak for ten minutes.

Mr. STEEL (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to deal with one particular question which I think is insufficiently stressed in Mr. Krieg's report — and here I follow the theme of the previous speaker — the question of the future rôle of the European Community itself.

The report much too much assumes that the question of a defence rôle for the European

Community is so far removed into the future that we can put it out of our minds, and the rest of the report flows from that. I would much prefer us, as an Assembly, to take a more radical and forward-thinking approach to this whole area of discussion so that we commit ourselves at least to the possibility in the not-too-distant future of the Community moving towards a closer political union and, in a sense, of the work of Western European Union becoming redundant. We should not be afraid to work ourselves out of our own jobs.

Of course, we shall not know until the end of this year what the Prime Minister of Belgium is going to recommend in his report on political union ; we do not even know whether it will include any reference to a defence element. However, I believe that attitudes are changing on this question, and even in the white paper which the British Government drew up after the renegotiations and in which it commended the new situation to our people, the government says : “If our membership of the Community is confirmed, the government will be ready to play a full part in developing a new and wider Europe.” That is something beyond the existing, static Community structure.

It is interesting to note that our former Prime Minister, Mr. Heath, in a remarkable speech here in Bonn in March of this year took a much more positive stance on this question than he did as either Prime Minister or Leader of the Opposition, and argued about the development of a Community foreign policy.

In his report, Mr. Krieg has quoted Mr. Van Elslande in saying that a common foreign policy necessarily implies a common defence policy and that the fact that we are all members of the Atlantic Alliance cannot be used as an alibi to justify the lack of a European defence policy.

You yourself, Mr. President, in your postscript to the booklet on the work of WEU have said, in a rather confident sentence, that the United Kingdom is “moored to Europe”. It is true that there are some people at present campaigning to wield an axe over the mooring rope, but if we assume that in another fortnight that statement is correct and without qualification, I will still believe that it must be part of our rôle within the Community to look beyond the present structure.

If I may quote another sentence from your excellent postscript, you say : “We must not fall

Mr. Steel (continued)

under the spell of institutions." This is perhaps the one danger which besets us in WEU. It is easier to create European institutions than it is to bring them to an end when their particular purpose has been fulfilled and when there are other institutions more capable of carrying forward the process of political integration.

In his speech to us this morning, Mr. Krieg referred to my distinguished predecessor, Lord Gladwyn, and his 1971 report, in which he argued that there was a strong case for taking over the whole of the WEU machine as it is and, to a certain extent, merging it with the existing EEC apparatus. In 1971 that was a very forward-looking view, but we have not ourselves, as a group, as a Western European Union, advanced very far along that way.

We should, as an Assembly, be looking much further ahead. We ought to be pressing our governments and the Council of Ministers to bring forward into their consideration the point at which the Community itself might become the European pillar of the western defence system. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Koster.

Mr. de KOSTER (*Netherlands*). — I have some admiration for a politician who continues to pursue his aims against considerable opposition. Mr. Krieg has recycled his report, rather as dollars that are used to buy oil are recycled, but they still come back as dollars. That is shown in his introduction. Some of his conclusions could be acceptable to me if they had not been based on the report. I wish to make some short remarks on the report.

The integration of forces in NATO does not imply that Europe depends on others for shaping its defence policy, as the Rapporteur states in paragraph 45. A German general — General Ferber — is in full command, just as are a British admiral and many other non-American commanders.

NATO cannot be considered as uneven. Although there are some forceful and powerful interests in the United States, decision-making is not uneven. For six years I have participated in NATO Council meetings, and I assure you that unanimity is always the principle on which all decisions are made in the NATO Council, as within the DPC.

If NATO's task is confined to concertation — whatever that may mean — instead of integration, as is suggested, the ineffectiveness will become a thousand times greater. Mr. Krieg is afraid of ineffectiveness and is right in assuming that harmonisation is essential.

We have to maintain a system of integrated forces for another very important reason — the guarantees given by the individual NATO members not to decrease the forces offered to NATO. If Mr. Krieg is afraid that European forces cannot be compared in quantity and quality with those of the Warsaw Pact countries, I share his anxiety, but the worst solution for this problem of inequality is the proposal made by him. It is not realistic to expect a fruitful solution on the basis of his philosophy. Contrary to what he hopes for, which is a strengthening of the forces, I am convinced that his ideas will lead to a disastrous weakening of NATO which may end in a "Finlandisation" of Western Europe and the end of freedom and democracy. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Kliesing.

Mr. KLIESING (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, when we are discussing the question of relations between Western European Union and a political union, in particular a European defence union, we should never forget that the Brussels Treaty was modified and Western European Union then set up in its present form as a direct result of the failure of the plan for a European defence community. This question has haunted our Assembly ever since. The history of Western European Union is largely identical with this problem.

In this connection we must first of all recognise, as Professor Carstens did yesterday, that for a very long time to come the Atlantic Alliance, which is based essentially on a close relationship with the United States, is likely to be a prerequisite for our safety and freedom. It is also important for our economic, social and intellectual life. Priority for the Atlantic Alliance is a *sine qua non* of our survival.

Linked with this is the question of the greatest possible effectiveness of our defence efforts, particularly where standardisation and a uniform logistics system are concerned; this question came up in our discussions the day before yesterday. I have here the communiqué from Eurogroup's ministerial meeting on 7th May in

Mr. Kliesing (continued)

London, and would like to quote a passage from it :

“Ministers... welcomed in particular the agreement on operational requirements... which will ensure interoperability between future tactical communications systems of the land forces of the Eurogroup nations ; and the progress made... in developing agreed tactical concepts as a basis for drawing up the operational requirements of future weapons systems.”

I could continue with this quotation and talk about problems of logistics.

Allow me to say that for seven years I had the privilege of observing at close quarters the work of the Standing Armaments Committee of Western European Union. I came to have great doubts as to whether this institution of Western European Union was in a position to take over the work of Eurogroup in this field. We cannot remove all these questions of logistics, standardisation, etc., from the Atlantic Alliance and arrange for them to be dealt with on an autonomous basis. This certainly does not mean that European interests should be subordinated to those of the United States. I think that the best solution would be to organise them within the Alliance by loyally co-operating on an equal footing with the United States.

If WEU were to adopt an independent position in this field, it would complicate the issue. For one thing, there are various countries in the Atlantic Alliance which just do not belong to WEU. And here I am not thinking just of the two member States of the European Community mentioned by Mr. Krieg, but of the Scandinavians and of the Mediterranean countries like Greece and Turkey. What is to become of them ? I think the idea that they would all meet in Western European Union to forge a political union with us is a mere delusion. Either we would be pushing these countries towards total dependence on the United States or towards a very, very expensive national autonomy. There is, as our Turkish friend Mr. Karakas will certainly confirm, a strong movement in this direction in Turkey.

We must therefore take care that nothing is done which will be a burden on the harmony of the Atlantic Alliance and that energy is not squandered to no purpose. Besides, to be quite frank, I have an uneasy feeling that WEU could

be used to stabilise national economic interests in the armaments industry, and this would not promote integration, but rather hinder it.

There are a lot of other questions which I have no time to deal with here, such as the question of relations between nuclear and non-nuclear members of WEU, which would then become very relevant, or the important question of target planning for French atomic weapons. I read with interest the statement made by Mr. Chirac last week in the French National Assembly, to which Mr. Krieg has referred. When all is said and done, this stressing of France's total national independence in the defence sector does not strike me as very encouraging if we should think of turning WEU into a European defence community.

The most important thing, Mr. President — if I may add this — is perhaps that in today's world defence policy is very largely a function of foreign policy. Had it not been for the international situation, we Germans would probably never have dreamt of getting militarily involved again after the war, and but for the acute difficulties of foreign policy and of the world situation, the other countries in the Alliance would probably not devote such great efforts to defence.

If a common will in foreign affairs is a prerequisite for a defence union we must, I feel, draw the conclusion that we will have to pursue a common and largely integrated foreign policy before we can even begin to think of a defence union. In paragraph 62(b) Mr. Krieg has, it is true, said that the Brussels Treaty is the only treaty which commits the Western European countries to close collaboration in foreign policy questions ; but all of us who have been in WEU for the past few years know that it is just in foreign policy questions that there has been no concertation. We must look the facts in the face and not rely on a declaration which unfortunately has remained largely a theory.

Turning to the questions of the armaments industry, we might add that the prerequisites are not merely a unified foreign policy, but that there must also be an economic community which has advanced far beyond the stage that has been reached today.

Of course we all support the idea of a European defence community as part of the Western Alliance. But I do not think we should start at the wrong end. We should demand that our governments bring about a political union and

Mr. Kliesing (continued)

a European economic community, and should support their efforts to do so. Then, I believe, we will have a solid foundation for building a European defence policy. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Peijnenburg.

Mr. PEIJNENBURG (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I have read the report, and listened to the speech, of Mr. Krieg with great interest. A viewpoint long held by successive French Governments is that the other countries of WEU or of the EEC are not capable of setting out clearly the political objectives of Western Europe, nor in a mind to decide among themselves just what sort of Europe — dependent on, or independent of, the United States — Europe is supposed to be.

It is said, too, that the other member States are unwilling to set up a European defence system that is wholly European, and hence independent of the United States.

Mr. Krieg has said in his speech that opposition to his views is variegated, with no common denominator. I cannot agree with him on this, because it has been quite plain, from consultations between the Western European countries, inside and outside the NATO context, that they consider a purely European defence to be too weak in the face of the threat from the Soviet Union. I think we differ quite considerably from Mr. Krieg and his political friends on this point.

Conquest by Germany in 1940 taught the Netherlands and many other small countries that an independent policy on defence is out of the question in an era of modern weaponry. We are still convinced that in presentday circumstances a single State such as France or the United Kingdom is not to be compared militarily, politically or in other ways to a continent-sized world power like the Soviet Union. To be able sufficiently to deter a continent-sized world power, the countries of the West must band together — with each other, naturally, but also with another continent-sized world power like the United States. Europe, meaning free Europe, is quite simply not a continent-sized power, either geographically, politically or in any other way. The French may well feel safe, shielded behind West Germany; but this shield would be a poor one if the American divisions were not stationed in Germany. So it is obvious that, power rela-

tionships being what they are today, European political decisions cannot be taken without the "approval", as Mr. Krieg puts it, of the United States.

Turning to a number of specific points mentioned by Mr. Krieg in his report, I would like to say that I do agree with him that — as he says in paragraph 20 — it is impossible at the present juncture to set up an entity covering all fields that is limited to the Nine. European space policy is subscribed to by thirteen European countries. Financial decisions are taken among the Ten; short-term economic policy is a matter for OECD, which has twenty-three member countries; energy policy is being worked out by the OECD's International Energy Agency, in which there are eighteen countries.

In view of all this I cannot understand why Mr. Krieg has such an aversion to seeing defence policy and military problems dealt with within the NATO set-up. In paragraph 26 Mr. Krieg says he is afraid that unless these matters are speedily dealt with in a purely European framework, each country will provide for its own security in its own way. For me, it is quite out of the question, because as I have said there is no European country capable of coping with this.

One of the victors in the last war was, beyond argument, the United Kingdom. Fortified by this in their illusions of still being a great power, successive British Governments have subscribed to the "three-circles" theory, which held that Britain, as the centre of the Commonwealth, as a nation closely related to the United States and as a European country, was so involved in world events that it was bound to have an important seat at the conference table, wherever in the world. It was aware that for this it needed to have a significant civil and military nuclear programme. What has this policy led to, twenty years later? It has led quite simply to Britain falling between three stools. In practical terms the links with the Commonwealth are of limited political value; the special relationship with America is more cultural than anything else; and finally Britain has come to understand that — if it wants to play any part — it will have to join Western Europe, not as a leader or centre of power, but as an equal among other European countries. It is to the credit of the governments of the French Fourth Republic that they realised this early on.

Mr. Peijnenburg (continued)

Now, coming to paragraph 27 of Mr. Krieg's report, I would remind the Assembly that a resolution was adopted in the United Nations on 14th December 1974 which defined the word aggression. This same word aggression also appears in the NATO treaty and the WEU treaty. In both instances reference is made to the United Nations. To my total amazement, Article 2 of this definition of the word aggression provides the possibility for a great power, a member of the Security Council, to decide that what looks like aggression is not invariably aggression, or need not be seen as such. This is highly dangerous, and gives the Soviet Union a kind of *droit de regard* — a right to intervene — which it has in fact always demanded where the Federal Republic of Germany is concerned. This is all the more dangerous now that leading statesmen in Europe are openly saying that nuclear defence of Europe cannot be considered, because the Soviet Union would not like it. It is one thing deciding on our own how we shall defend ourselves: whether we have first to ask the Russians for permission is another. More generally, I believe that rethinking is called for, bearing in mind that this term aggression appears in both the NATO treaty and the WEU treaty.

In the annexes to the Brussels Treaty the member countries placed the burden of defending Western Europe on NATO. So it is up to the Council of Ministers of that organisation to decide on the strategy to be adopted. Paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation in Mr. Krieg's report would not, therefore, seem to me to have a great deal of point. Nor do I believe that the European Council of Heads of Government would be all that keen to grasp this nettle of a problem at the present time. I move, therefore, that the first two paragraphs of the draft recommendation be deleted. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Cermolacce.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, all the reports which have been presented, and all the discussions which have taken place in this forum, have one thing in common: what is wrongly described as defence against an explicitly named enemy, the Soviet Union and the socialist countries.

We have, indeed, heard it said — and the comment is, to say the very least, unwarranted —

that the forces of the Atlantic Pact should be ready to fight "the monster at the other end".

Within only a few days of the thirtieth anniversary of the victory won at such heavy cost, after a war into which sixty-one countries had been dragged, and which witnessed the deaths of fifty-five million human beings, both troops and civilians, the destruction of entire cities and the economic ruin of a whole series of countries, here we are again, just as we were in the heyday of the cold war.

This is an indefensible position, which we mean to denounce with vehemence to European public opinion. You are going against the trend of history, which testifies that a turning-point has just been reached in the international situation on the road to peaceful coexistence and the security of our peoples.

To confine ourselves only to new developments, this is illustrated by the following events among others: the conclusion of an agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Czechoslovakia; the admission of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations; the work of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe; the opening of negotiations at Vienna on the reduction of armed forces in Europe; the American-Soviet agreements on the prevention of nuclear war and on the limitation of strategic weapons; and, incidentally, the development of economic and technological co-operation between the capitalist and socialist countries.

In order to remain faithful to the spirit of our times, our Assembly would have been happily inspired if a motion had been proposed for saluting the thirtieth anniversary of liberation and committing WEU to continued efforts towards establishing better East-West relations and promoting measures for arms limitation and disarmament.

Now, what we have been discussing up to the present is exactly the reverse. A new EDC is being spoken about in scarcely veiled terms. Thus we may read in the report — and I quote:

"Without sharing General von Kielmansegg's regrets about the EDC, of which the least can be said is that it was premature, your Rapporteur willingly concedes that some elements of the draft treaty to establish the EDC might now be suitable for a European defence organisation. Above all, he does not think it neces-

Mr. Cermolacce (continued)

sary to seek new institutions to carry out what can be done in existing institutions..."

This goes to justify certain statements and actions when it is said, for instance, that France intends to play a rôle commensurate with its capabilities and that, in order to do so, it must look beyond its own frontiers.

Is not this a sign that certain deals have been reached between France and the Federal Republic of Germany? Was not Mr. Walter Scheel able to assign himself, here on French soil and without being contradicted, a leading rôle in a supranational Europe closely linked with the United States and having a nuclear force at its disposal? Was it not in order to facilitate the birth of a Europe of that kind that President Giscard d'Estaing decided that 8th May should no longer be celebrated, doubtless in order to make people forget that it marked a victory won over Nazism and that this victory, in freeing Europe, also gave Germany back its freedom?

A new EDC would constitute a mortal blow to détente and a real provocation to the socialist camp and the Soviet Union.

It is incontrovertible that, by joining a new EDC armed with nuclear weapons, with partners who are all subject to what de Gaulle described as the "American protectorate", France and Europe would no longer be their own masters in decision-making. And it is on WEU that this rôle has devolved.

In France, proof of this is provided by the highly official *Revue de la Défense nationale*. In December 1974, it described in detail the means for creating a Franco-German nuclear force and getting France back into NATO, while at the same time keeping up appearances.

Recognising that any scheme which, in its initial stages, involved a French return to NATO, would have scant chance of success, the author of this study, who is a general, added:

"Fortunately, an institutional basis is already to hand in the shape of WEU. It would be essential to set up the equivalent of the NATO nuclear group within its framework. The permanent members of the group would be France and the United Kingdom, as nuclear powers, and the Federal Republic of Germany as the State whose territory is directly involved. This

group would work in close liaison with the United States, through concerted arrangements rather than through integration..." — and please listen closely to this, Gentlemen! — "in order to spare French susceptibilities."

These words speak volumes. They confirm what has been said in this Assembly. You who are present in this forum are pursuing an outdated policy, a policy from the past, a cold war policy. This is no longer 1948; it is 1975.

The political map of our planet has undergone profound changes. The sphere of imperialist domination has shrunk significantly. The recent victories of the peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia give powerful encouragement to all those who are still struggling in various ways to put an end to imperialism, especially American imperialism. Nor is the balance of economic strength any longer in imperialism's favour.

It is of all this that we should take cognisance, to be able to act accordingly. It is in the interests of our peoples, today even more than yesterday, to live in a world at peace, to be assured of security through the consolidation of friendly and understanding relations with one another, through the introduction of a system of collective security, and through the guarantee of frontiers that some people in this very place still nostalgically dream of challenging afresh. The interests of our peoples lie in international co-operation on the broadest scale, with no discrimination and no political reservations, solely based on mutual advantage; and their interests also demand, above all, the assurance of full and entire independence and of a sovereignty that is completely inalienable. That is our conception; and it is the reverse of the recommendation which you propose we should approve. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Waltmans.

Mr. WALTMANS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I feel I must congratulate Mr. Krieg on having succeeded in getting a serious political discussion under way. It is well that there should be a discussion on the place Western European Union occupies in the European union.

I think it is a good thing Mr. Krieg should have set out so clearly his view of things; we do then at least know what we are talking about. We know, if we are not in agreement, exactly

Mr. Waltmans (continued)

what it is that we do not agree about. I congratulate Mr. Krieg on having contributed to clarity. One might hope that all Rapporteurs chose as clearcut a position, and that there was indeed a position to choose.

There are one or two further comments I would like to make. We cannot look for much more from WEU than from NATO. I see WEU as being even more dangerous, because it provides a very suitable organisational framework for a Western European nuclear force. To digress for a moment I might comment that General Haig yesterday left something out when, talking about Spain, he did not mention the word democratic. This suggests to me that leading personalities do not always keep this concept, on which our alliances are founded, clearly enough in mind. How does WEU look as an alternative to NATO, seen in the light of armaments policy, or perhaps putting it better, in the light of peace policy and disarmament policy? To my mind it looks scarcely better, and probably even worse. WEU can remain the insignificant organisation that it is at the present moment in the eyes of the Dutch Government; or it can become a Western European defence organisation with what we see as a sound policy — that of a weapons structure, military structure and strategy aimed towards détente and peace. I might sum up that policy with the phrase "Western Europe, an open city". But then there could also be a move towards a Western European defence organisation with what we regard as a bad policy, that of a European nuclear force, with an enmeshing of the military-industrial complex. There has been a potential forerunner of this in the NATO Eurogroup. I will admit that, with different governments and other coalitions in Western Europe, Eurogroup might also be a forerunner of a sound Western European defence organisation.

When it is suggested that WEU could work out a better policy than NATO, I take leave to doubt this, because the only difference there might then be is that in NATO the United States stands in the way of a sound policy. This is however not invariably the case: is it not the Federal Republic that has objected to the thinning-out of tactical nuclear weapons the United States wanted to make in Western Europe? Was it not the Federal Republic which, at the last meeting of the NATO Council, wanted to bring South Africa into NATO? In other words, if

WEU can achieve a better policy, why does not NATO do the same? Incidentally, I might comment that I do attach a great deal of importance to WEU as a parliamentary forum, provided this forum is used for discussing coherent new policies, directed towards security and détente. I see too little of this happening. I do however have very serious objections to WEU as an organisation where, through a policy of the *fait accompli*, all kinds of preconditions are little by little being created for a Western European security organisation, without there being any coherent view of things. Europe does not need a Western European NATO.

But this does not bring an end to the discussion. The problem of Western European defence — and here Mr. Krieg is perfectly right — will remain with us so long as we try to produce a European political community. My co-operation, and that of my political friends, in a Western European defence community depends however on the strict condition of a complete freezing, and dismantling, of the British and French nuclear forces. This means that I also make further co-operation by my political group in the Netherlands, which as you all know is a coalition partner of the Dutch Government, dependent upon the answer I get to the question of whether the European Community and the European union are prepared to get rid of nuclear weapons. We shall never feel able to give our assistance to a nuclear Western European community.

There are one or two words I would like to say about the Soviet Union. After the second world war we built up European integration against the Soviet Union. This is not something I alone am saying, it has been said by the Flemish Professor Vandermersch in his book on European integration. It is time to build European integration not against but for world peace and world unity, not against other countries but in collaboration with all countries in the world, that is to say within the framework of a European and a world-wide security system. For these reasons I totally reject Mr. Krieg's report and the draft recommendation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Dankert.

Mr. DANKERT (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Mr. Krieg has brought a whole battalion of Dutch speakers to their feet,

Mr. Dankert (continued)

but I believe that the problem by itself justifies such a level of intervention in the debate.

In his introduction just now Mr. Krieg has made it plain in a very unequivocal manner, and I admire him for it, that he is a protagonist of — I shall try to choose my words very carefully — a European defence, both conventional and nuclear, which is as a matter of principle independent of the United States. Independence is, if you read very carefully, to be found in the draft recommendation, which does not talk about European defence in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation but only about defence in the framework of the treaty, which is something rather different.

After the skirmishing that went on at the last meeting of this Assembly, and after the speech by Mr. Krieg a moment ago, you will understand that I once again feel a great need to dot the "i's" here and there; I am surely in some ways even challenged to do so.

To take it point by point then: how do we, or how do I, see Dutch obligations with regard to the WEU treaty? There is no need for me to cast any doubt on Dutch loyalty to what are in fact quite stringent obligations to lend assistance, as these are laid down in the WEU treaty. But, Mr. President, I have no reason at the present time to lay too much stress on these obligations, so long as the Netherlands is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty and — what is more important — a member of the integrated defence organisation based on that treaty.

As has been so admirably set out in the de Mai-zière report, the integrated character of this organisation rests in the fact that an attack against one country in the Central European area is an attack on all, in a manner of speaking from the moment that the first shot has been fired. You could put it another way by saying that the obligation to lend assistance which is mentioned in the WEU treaty finds its best expression in Dutch membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Only if that membership should come to an end, for any reason whatsoever, would the question of the content given to the WEU obligation to lend assistance need to be looked at again.

There are a couple of comments I would like to make about the Labour Party and nuclear

weapons. I think it is nonsense to say American nuclear weapons are ethically acceptable to my party and European ones are not. Personally, I think I have just as little or just as much ethical objection to European weapons as I have to American ones. The problem of European nuclear weapons is quite plainly a political problem.

I have already said, and not everybody in my party agrees with this, that I am in favour of maintaining Dutch membership of NATO, because this offers the possibility of protection for Europe — albeit a limited one — through a credible nuclear force.

Although I do have objections to British nuclear weapons as well, the objections are particularly towards French weapons, because they are not integrated within the Atlantic framework and their effect could thus be to produce an imbalance in the East-West relationship.

A European nuclear force is not on the agenda at the present time, and my feeling is it will not be put on the agenda so long as there are Western European governments that reject a nuclear force of this kind. I do indeed feel that the Netherlands ought to take this attitude, and would myself even suggest that Dutch membership of a European union should be made dependent on the matter of nuclear force or no nuclear force, so long as the existing American guarantee remains.

Now we do of course have a problem — that of the two nuclear forces that exist in Europe. Well, Mr. President, I cannot make decisions about these two nuclear forces; if I could I would get rid of them, or at least integrate them with the American nuclear force. At this very time these nuclear forces, particularly the French one, are creating serious problems in European relationships. The fact that France is not integrated in NATO, for example, means that Pluton is at the present time apparently a weapon directed more against the Germans than against any other enemy of France.

The fact that the French nuclear force is not integrated also means that France is on its own in a position, whether France's allies like it or not, to loose a nuclear holocaust over Europe.

And finally nuclear efforts, which are superfluous from the viewpoint of an Atlantic deterrent, occupy resources that could be better used on conventional defence.

Mr. Dankert (continued)

I cannot predict whether NATO will remain in being or not, but I can foresee that the American guarantee to Europe which, I say again, is an important one for European security will be jeopardised by the development of a European nuclear force. It does not seem to me that a development of this kind will bring us any closer to our aim of further détente and co-operation in East-West relations.

All of this does not set me against European union. I believe that limited defence tasks could have a place in such a union, limited so long as France is not a member of NATO or for so long as NATO continues in being. I can well imagine that, particularly in the field of the standardisation of armaments, there is a job for such a union, although I must immediately add to this that I do not believe that such a union is necessary for defence reasons. The small countries in Europe have long been aware of this; and awareness is beginning to dawn in the larger countries — and now I am not talking about France — that national sovereignty in the field of defence, and not only in nuclear developments, is a thing of the past, if we want to spend government funds on more than just defence alone. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — (Translation). — I call Mr. Richter, the last speaker.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I thank you that I am to be the last person to speak; it means that we can end the debate on time.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I would first of all like to say how glad I am that Professor Carstens has taken part in the proceedings today and addressed us. He conveyed the greetings of one party, which I believe is something without precedent. I have been a member of this Assembly for ten years, and once prepared a computer report. I am in a position to store up a great deal of information, but I would obviously not be sure of remembering correctly everything which happened during those ten years. As far as I can remember I have not witnessed anything like this before. But I will readily admit that I was pleased about the CDU/CSU welcome to the Assembly. The other delegations are assuredly not unaware that a good atmosphere prevails in our German Delegation. However, the event to which I have just referred forces me to add at

this point something for the record: I must convey to you the greetings of the government coalition of the SPD and the FDP. But this is not really very necessary, because the Federal Government was glad to have the anniversary meeting in the Bundeshaus, and so in Bonn — and from that you can judge the extent to which the activities of the Assembly are appreciated by our parties.

I should now like to turn to Mr. Krieg's report. I am glad that in paragraph 5 of your report, Mr. Krieg, you explain that the text you are submitting does not necessarily represent the unanimous opinion of your Committee or of the Assembly. That was a very good limitation to make.

I was particularly pleased with the section of your report in which you drew attention to the increasing amount of work being done by the Assembly. I must say that over the past few years I have found the meetings of the Assembly have become much livelier.

I do not want to forestall Mr. de Bruyne — of course he too criticises the answers of the Council of Ministers a little — but I think that in the last few years the Assembly has greatly benefited from the discussion with the Council and also from the presence of Ministers who have put forward their governments' views here. Personally, Mr. Krieg, I am prepared to follow your conclusions to a large extent. For me, they are a very good result.

In paragraph 62 you make some comments on the short-term future. I am ready to follow you in almost all the conclusions which you draw. Like you, I believe that the modified Brussels Treaty guarantees military assistance in the event of an attack against one of the signatory States. It is important that in it the British and French atomic arm is placed at the service of Europe. That is the great advantage of the Brussels Treaty, especially from the Federal Republic's point of view, and it must be rated very highly.

I also agree with what you say in (b). You say that it is the only treaty which commits the Western European countries to close concertation in foreign policy questions. This is the view I take as well.

In (c) you say the treaty associates France with the NATO defence system. This is also to be welcomed.

Mr. Richter (continued)

In (e) you go on to say it associates parliamentarians from all the member countries with continuing examination of defence matters. This is a very important point.

There should have been a further sub-paragraph (f). Obviously you cannot add it, but as a German parliamentarian I would like to do so. As I said to Mr. Destremau yesterday, this is the place where I have the opportunity of bringing up and discussing important problems of European defence policy with French colleagues. Like you, I set great store by this. I said yesterday that this is the reason why I throw myself into the work of this Assembly. I believe — and I would like to repeat this — that a defence in Europe without France will lack credibility.

Perhaps a longer-term concept could be added to your short-term ones. We will start with the modified Brussels Treaty. Like me, Mr. Krieg, you will have read the minutes and reports of the North Atlantic Assembly. I think that Mr. Destremau and possibly your President may share the following view: it is nowhere laid down that the modified Brussels Treaty might not be changed again and so become the basis for a union to which further tasks would be allotted. We would have to check whether and how far there is any justification for the point raised by the North Atlantic Alliance that there might still be some areas in which there was discrimination against the Federal Republic. But I cannot conceive that this could lead to any dispute.

I have sent you an amendment to the recommendation. You have probably already seen it. It concerns item (d), which I have so far left out. I do not want a repeat of this morning's debate about the amendment put forward by Mr. Radius and Mr. Valleix. My proposal is a compromise formula, and I think you might agree to it. If you as Rapporteur could accept it you would, I am convinced, find in the German Delegation the support needed to ensure acceptance of your report.

Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Krieg, the Rapporteur.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am going to make a confession to you: I still feel quite hungry for more. I was expecting infinitely more

searching and more severe criticisms of my report and of the remarks which I made just now. I am bound to say I was a little bit disappointed in this respect; perhaps it is because as the months have gone by there is less enthusiasm now for certain ideas.

I will say, however — to repeat to some extent what I said just now in my introductory statement — that I still find just as many disparities in Mr. Cermolacce's criticisms as in Mr. Dankert's, which leads me to believe that unanimity on the problems which we are considering remains and will always remain completely unattainable.

My reply to the various speakers will be brief. I want, first of all, to thank them for what they have said, since all their comments, including those disapproving of what I said orally or in writing, contained a tremendous number of constructive elements. In particular, I am grateful to Mr. Carstens for having kindly confirmed the point which I had raised and which had led to discussions in the General Affairs Committee, namely, the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany had renounced nuclear weapons. It was fitting that a solemn assurance to that effect should be given today in this forum, which is the most appropriate place for it.

With your permission, I will try to give a fairly comprehensive answer to what was said just now. I think that we are still not straying beyond the limits of the same debate — a debate in which we certainly cannot be expected to hold the same views.

Indeed, the problem which still arises and will continue to arise for a long time to come, and which, incidentally, is that of the integration of the French forces into NATO, about which I think I have explained my position pretty clearly and the French authorities have explained theirs even more clearly, concerns, in the final analysis, the existence of European nuclear forces and the existence of the United States nuclear force.

The whole essence of the problem — and I believe that Mr. Dankert put it admirably into words and that he carried his argument to its logical conclusion — remains this: is it conceivable and natural that the European States should possess a nuclear capability? And is it natural that some of them, having such a nuclear capability, should refuse to destroy its potential effectiveness by making it subject in the last resort, to decisions which, we have to admit, are

Mr. Krieg (continued)

primarily taken by the principal nuclear power in NATO, namely, the United States?

On this point, we could revert to the discussions which we had in the General Affairs Committee here, at the meeting a little while ago, and we could go on endlessly arguing the pros and cons of it.

I am bound to say that, when it comes to the crunch, if somebody sets out to argue a different case from the one I myself propounded at this rostrum and in my report, it is natural enough for them to take it to its logical conclusion and to do as Mr. Dankert, and another of my colleagues, I believe, did, just now, and say that they are completely and radically opposed to any European nuclear force. That is one point of view. But in that case please let me remind you of what I said an hour and a half ago, in my introductory statement, namely, that in respect of the defence of Europe and the defence of the countries of Western Europe, we find ourselves totally, entirely and solely in the hands of a country which is not a Western European country. Let me remind you too that we might run the risk of seeing, one of these days, for nobody knows what the future holds in store for Western Europe, the same things happening in Europe that occurred in other countries of the world. In fact, we must recognise clearly that all the various theories of nuclear retaliation are all so designed as to make it certain that the first and principal victim would be, say and think what you like about it, Western Europe itself.

It is for this reason that some of us deem it essential that this Western Europe of ours should retain, with modest nuclear forces, nuclear forces whose importance must not, of course, be exaggerated, but which have the immense advantage of actually existing, a minimum degree of independence in this area, and the ability to ensure, if need be, that its standpoint and interests prevail — I am weighing my words carefully — that they prevail. Believe me, Ladies and Gentlemen, specifically, the British integrated nuclear force and the French one which is not, may well prove, if ever by misfortune the occasion arose, vital for Europe's survival, by reason of their inherent value as a deterrent. I am sure, Ladies and Gentlemen, that on the whole, despite the divergences which may have become apparent between the different speakers and between the speakers and

myself, we have sufficient common ground and sufficient common interests to enable us now, on the basis of the report which I have presented and perhaps of the amendments we shall be discussing today, to seize the opportunity of demonstrating our Assembly's will both to exist and to fulfil its rôle, in its totality, that is, especially in the realm of defence.

I should like to tell the last speaker, Mr. Richter, who has tabled an amendment, that in a few moments I shall be obliged to say that I am, in fact, not wholly in agreement with him. My quarrel is not with the actual terms of his amendment, which on the face of it might perhaps be considered perfectly acceptable; but I fear that, if the Assembly were to adopt it, the report which I have presented would be watered down. I am also afraid that, in accepting this amendment, we should be getting our fingers caught in a diabolic machine which might from one moment to the next void our work of all its interest and, as a direct consequence, possibly cause the institution to which we belong to wither away altogether.

The point has, moreover, already been made, if I am not mistaken, by Mr. Steel, whose remarks were inclined to make one think that, at a given moment, the Assembly in which we sit might cease to have any real value, by the mere fact that the EEC member countries would have taken over its functions and *raison d'être*. It is obviously possible that this may happen one day, but it is equally possible that the economic difficulties peculiar to the EEC, combined with the political difficulties with which it is having to contend, may postpone any such decision until the Greek Calends, or some date of which we can at present form no accurate idea.

I believe that we should not envisage this eventuality, for even if it cannot be excluded, we do not know when it may occur. It would in advance cause a number of States and our countries' parliaments to withdraw their support from us, and diminish any value that might be attached to our work.

We have the utmost interest in regarding ourselves as an assembly whose rôle is to deal with defence problems — problems of defence policy and not of tactics, I want to make that point clear. We have to retain all our fields of competence, and make use of them for the good of the countries of Europe, including those who are not members of our organisation.

Mr. Krieg (continued)

For that reason, I am asking you to adopt a report which, so far as possible, has not been watered down or mutilated by the omission of a number of points which, I would like to tell you, are to me its strong points. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall try to sum up the result of our discussion — as I see it — in five comments.

To start with, I would like to thank the Rapporteur for his really fair attempt to portray in his explanatory memorandum the divergent opinions proffered — as far as this is possible for a person who has his own clear opinion on a subject, no matter what others may think of this opinion. It can have been no easy task.

Next, I attach importance to a question which is touched on in the report in the form of a comment I once made in the General Affairs Committee. The Rapporteur quotes me as saying that one of the decisive points in the discussion was when the European Community could hold a discussion about defence, if it was agreed that the Community had a political purpose. I found today's discussion on this point very interesting. Mr. Kliesing said — if I have understood him rightly — first a common foreign policy, then we can talk about defence. Well, there used to be a point of view, according to which one could proceed only in three separate steps: first integration of economic policies, then a common foreign policy, and as a third step a common European defence policy. But right from the start it became apparent that things could not be done this way, because interdependence between the three spheres is such that it is impossible to lay down an inflexible sequence like this. We do not have economic integration yet, but we are already starting European political co-operation in the European union. I think the same holds good — without giving priority to defence — for the relationship between foreign policy and defence policy. One cannot plan a common foreign policy for the Nine without also thinking of defence policy. I would like to remind you, Mr. Kliesing, of something Mr. Carstens said in another context. He rightly warned — and I am of the same opinion — against saying: first extension

of authority, then direct elections. In this case, too, I hope we will not lay down such inflexible priorities, but rather do the right thing at the right time.

My third comment relates to the question of nuclear military forces in Europe. I do not wish at this point to go into the details of this difficult subject, but one thing does seem to be clear: as long as we cannot wish away the nuclear arms of Great Britain and France or make them disappear by magic, we shall have to come to terms with the idea that a European defence concept must at some time or other include a common nuclear defence concept. In view of the inner logic of this argument, it simply cannot be brushed aside as something obscene or just put off and off. One day thought will have to be given to this question — no matter how it may be solved in the end. May I say clearly here and now that I am in no way in favour of a European nuclear force or anything of that sort. But we must consider the subject together just as long as — and this is of course the premise from which we have to start — Great Britain and France dispose of nuclear forces.

I now come to my fourth comment with a question about the result of today's discussion. What is the importance, the value of Western European Union when compared with all the other institutions that are now coming to the fore — be it the EEC on the one hand or NATO on the other? There is firstly — and this has been stated here repeatedly — the automatic clause in this alliance, which does not exist in NATO. The second point — and this concerns what I have said regarding the political purpose and therefore also the defence purpose of the Community — is that Western European Union is the proper place to make preparatory studies for such a defence concept. The third is that Western European Union and the Brussels Treaty are the basis for the presence of British troops on the mainland. I wish to stress that point very firmly. The fourth has already been mentioned by my friend Klaus Richter: it is important that we have here a forum which allows us to co-operate in defence matters with a France which — I say it frankly and with regret — no longer takes part in the military integration in NATO. I have some hopes, Mr. President, that one day the same thing will happen as with Great Britain's accession to the European Community. It was in WEU that this development was promoted. Perhaps Western European Union could, one day, be the place

Mr. Sieglerschmidt (continued)

where France will draw closer to military integration in the NATO Alliance. Anyone defending the French Government's policy would certainly reject this idea firmly. But it is equally certain that in politics one should never say "never".

I have arrived at my fifth and last comment. If, in view of what I have just said, I vote for the report and the recommendation — and I must at the same time stress that I think the proposed amendments are reasonable, because they make the recommendation sound more realistic — it is because I am convinced that the essential points have been covered in the report. But I must also say frankly that my approval does not extend to certain of the views that come through in the explanatory memorandum. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, the time has come, I think, to adjourn this debate. We are, in fact, to be the guests of the German Delegation. When the sitting is resumed at 3 p.m., we shall hear Mr. Van Elslande, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium. After that, we shall come back to the amendment and to the vote on Mr. Krieg's report.

I call Mr. Krieg.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, do you not think that the vote on the amendment and the vote on the report should be taken together at the end of the sitting at 5.30 p.m. as planned?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — That is just what I mean. Mr. Van Elslande will answer three questions which are being put to him by Mr. de Bruyne. He himself has to leave for Brussels. We shall then resume the discussion of your report, and the vote should be taken at about 5.30 p.m.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — Agreed.

6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. Twentieth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly (Presentation by Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Documents 661 and 664);

Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council; The European Space Agency — Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council (Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Documents 667 and Amendment, 673 and 670).

2. State of European security (Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Document 671).
3. European union and WEU (Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 662 and Amendment).
4. Relations with Parliaments (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 665).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 1 p.m.)

SIXTH SITTING

Wednesday, 28th May 1975

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

2. Attendance Register.

3. Changes in the membership of a Committee.

4. Twentieth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly (*Presentation by Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 661 and 664*). Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council; The European Space Agency — Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council (*Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 667 and Amendment, 673 and 670*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Van Elslande (*Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*), Mr. de Bruyne (*Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. de Niet (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*).

Reply by Mr. Van Elslande to questions put by: Mr. Radius and Mr. Waltmans.

Speakers: Mr. Richter (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*), Mr. Fletcher, Mr. Treu, Mr. Brown, Mr. Van Elslande, Mr. de Niet, Mr. de Bruyne, Mr. Krieg, Mr. de Stexhe, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. Radius, Mr. Cermolacce.

5. State of European security (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 671*).

6. European union and WEU (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 662 and Amendment*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Richter, Mr. Krieg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Richter, Mr. Krieg, Mr. Peijnenburg, Mr. Krieg, Mr. Leynen, Mr. Daillet.

7. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 665*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Radius (*in place of Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur*), Mr. Cordle, Mrs. Miotti Carli.

8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ? ...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will

be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Changes in the membership of a Committee

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Italian Delegation proposes the candidature of Mrs. Cattaneo-Petrini as a member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in place of Mrs. Miotti Carli, and the candidature of Mr. Leggieri as an alternate in place of Mrs. Cattaneo-Petrini.

Are there any objections ? ...

The candidatures are ratified.

1. See page 52.

4. Twentieth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly

(Presentation by Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 661 and 664)

Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council

Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council

The European Space Agency — Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council

(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 667 and Amendment, 673 and 670)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of the twentieth annual report of the Council by Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Documents 661 and 664.

After the presentation of this report and the replies of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to the oral questions put by the members of the Assembly, we shall hear the Rapporteurs of three Assembly Committees: Mr. de Bruyne will present the report of the General Affairs Committee on the political activities of the Council, Document 667; Mr. de Niet will present the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the application of the Brussels Treaty, Document 673; Mr. Richter will present the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the European Space Agency, Document 670.

Mr. Van Elslande, in welcoming you to this rostrum, I should like to stress that of all the statesmen with whom we maintain close and continuous relations, you are one of the most faithful participants in the work of our assemblies and committees. After all, your words have been extensively quoted in the speeches made during the past two days.

Many speakers have referred to your previous address at our December session. I am there-

fore, Mr. Minister, doubly glad to welcome you here.

I give you the floor.

Mr. VAN ELSLANDE (*Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — Allow me, first of all, Mr. President, to thank you most warmly for your kind words and to tell you that I shall possibly report them to the Belgian Parliament whenever I am told that I do not pay sufficient attention to meetings like those of your Assembly.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is the privilege of the Chairman-in-Office — a function which I have just assumed following the last ministerial meeting of WEU in London — to present to you the annual report of the Council on its activities during 1974.

First of all, I want to tell you how sorry I was to be unable to attend personally the ceremony on 26th May to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of your Assembly, upon which the gracious hospitality of the German Federal Government conferred all the brilliance the occasion called for and deserved.

On that occasion, the Belgian Minister of National Defence expressed, as I should have done had I not been detained in Dublin, the significance which Belgium attached to this solemn commemoration.

The report of the Council, which I have the honour to present to you, is a document which describes without embellishment the activities of the Council and of the other organs contributing to the implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty. Consequently, your General Affairs Committee had no hesitation in acknowledging its merits of frankness and precision, which it qualified as unwonted, about the motivations of the Council.

I personally think this to be the right climate for the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, at the stage we have now reached in our already long-established co-operation.

Latterly, both ministers and parliamentarians have had occasion to dwell at length on this question of relations between the Council and the Assembly. These will constitute the first point in my statement.

The Assembly has often expressed astonishment at the time taken by the Council to react

Mr. Van Elslande (continued)

to its recommendations. The Council has endeavoured to meet these complaints, and acknowledged the need to shorten time-limits as far as humanly possible. The commitments entered into in response to Recommendation 249 on the relations of the Assembly with the Council have been kept. The concerted efforts of the national administrations, the working groups and the Council itself have, in several instances, borne fruit. Precious time has been saved in meeting the Assembly's requirements. The same applies to transmission of the twentieth annual report, which was this time communicated to the Assembly by 1st March 1975. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has been good enough to express its appreciation.

I can tell you that the Council is perfectly aware of the need to use the utmost despatch in replying to the Assembly's recommendations and written questions. I believe, however, that it would not necessarily serve the interests of the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly to adopt for the future, as has been suggested, hard and fast deadlines for drafting replies to be conveyed to the Assembly.

The substance of the Council's replies is another subject of criticism by members of the Assembly. They are generally alleged to be inadequate. The problem had already risen in the past, and we have to be resigned to the fact that no absolutely satisfactory solution can doubtless be found. I emphasise the word absolutely, for there have been cases where members of the Assembly have thought it their duty to draw attention to replies somewhat lacking in substance. There have been other cases where the Assembly has expressed its satisfaction that the Council should make a point of giving it all the desired explanations and even of noting common positions, as generally understood by the Assembly.

This proves clearly that the satisfactory or unsatisfactory character of replies by the Council depends mainly on the nature and complexity of the subject-matter on which the Assembly bases its speeches and questions. We must not blink the fact that some areas which have justifiably engaged the attention of the Assembly, and on which it calls for a particular stance to be taken in the cause of European co-operation, are also sensitive areas in which the governments are, for the time being, or at any rate I

hope it is only for the time being, unable to take options and reach identical views, as a necessary prerequisite for taking joint action.

This is where there have been undoubted weaknesses in the action taken by the Council of WEU. These are inevitable, in that we have to observe the rule of unanimity in drafting our texts.

It would not be right to speak of offhandedness on the part of the Council in responding to recommendations and replies of the Assembly, if by any chance their replies do not go all the way towards meeting the wishes of the Assembly, which is certainly right in aiming high and prodding the Council into keeping its sights on target.

The Council has assured you, Ladies and Gentlemen, of the pains it takes to make its replies as substantial as possible, although this is unlikely to be able to prevent the real action in the service of Europe from taking place by an evolutionary process you all know about, in another framework, that of the nine countries of the European Communities which have taken over the major part of the political activities initially carried on in WEU.

I believe, Ladies and Gentlemen, that this is a development that answers your desires. In the report presented by Mr. de Niet on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, I read the following words :

"The Committee welcomes the fact that the growing cohesion of Europe has enabled matters which might at one time have been discussed within the framework of WEU, to be transferred to other fora such as the North Atlantic Council, Eurogroup, the European Community, and the political consultation machinery of the nine members of the European Community, where they can be more effectively dealt with than in the restricted framework of WEU."

These words set the seal of approval on a situation that stems logically from a policy we have all wanted and done our best to promote.

These facts, which in any realistic view of things have to be accepted, in no way detract from what is still the intrinsic value of the Brussels Treaty. Solemn declarations have not been lacking, either at the meeting of the Council on 23rd October 1974, the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the treaty, or more recently

Mr. Van Elstlande (continued)

on 26th May ; and they bear witness to the will of the member States to go on upholding and defending the principles enshrined in the basic provisions of the treaty. WEU remains a focus of European co-operation in its continuing concern to cover subjects and fields as varied as East-West relations, the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, relations between the United States and Europe, and scientific, technological and aerospace questions.

The annual report broadly reflects the positions on these subjects that the Council has taken in response to the recommendations submitted to it.

I hope I may be allowed to emphasise, in passing, the high quality of the analyses by the Assembly Committees of the subjects I have just enumerated. In the Council's view, defence questions remain a matter of paramount concern.

Need I remind you that the Brussels Treaty, with its formal commitments of mutual assistance in the event of aggression against one of its members, remains one of the keystones in the security of its signatory States ? For the Council, this alliance is just as valuable now as it was when the treaty was signed, and you know what conditions prevailed at the birth of this alliance. The Council is ever heedful of the observance of the protocols concerning the levels of member States' forces and armaments. In 1974, as in previous years, the commitments to which they subscribed have been honoured.

The activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, which assists the Council in its task, have been described in as great detail as possible in the annual report. In the sectors that are open to its control, the alliance has been able to fulfil its mission properly and effectively.

As regards the Standing Armaments Committee, the Council has continued to consider the possibilities of reactivating it, without however reaching any definite conclusions in 1974.

Then, in December 1974, I had the honour of addressing the Assembly and putting forward certain views on armaments.

The central idea was that a European armaments policy was one means of making progress in defence matters or towards a European defence system.

The meeting of the WEU Council in London on 20th May was for me an opportunity of reverting to the important problem of standardisation of European armaments, in respect of which WEU and the Standing Armaments Committee may well be assigned their due share of studies and research.

I am running a little ahead of activities for 1975. But without wishing to go any further at this stage, I think that this much can be said in the context of the chapter devoted to the Standing Armaments Committee in the annual report.

With these remarks, I conclude my presentation of the twentieth annual report, and I propose now, with your permission, Mr. President, to give you some views, in my capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, on a subject of current political concern.

I should now like to broach the matter of East-West relations, and more specifically that of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe. We have just had a meeting on political co-operation in Dublin, largely devoted to this theme. You have certainly had a chance to read the press release. Moreover, the CSCE will again be on the agenda of tomorrow's NATO ministerial session. The Heads of State and of Government attending the meeting in Brussels will be able to exchange views on the subject. So I think it may be useful for me to say a few words about it too.

I shall begin by placing the CSCE in the general context of East-West relations and of détente.

While the notion of peaceful coexistence is unacceptable because it really masks a particular form of confrontation, the concept of détente is ambiguous. Indeed, the situation in Europe is still one of division between different systems, and rivalries between great powers. Admittedly, we are experiencing a stability at which we can only rejoice, but divergent interests constantly threaten to shake the edifice. Détente should therefore be regarded as existing *de facto*.

This *de facto* state is primarily based on the perception of a certain balance of forces, and therefore on the conviction, shared by both sides, that it is necessary to steer clear of adventures. A certain *modus vivendi* has been established between East and West. The foundations were laid by a series of bilateral or multilateral agreements — I am thinking, in particular, of the

Mr. Van Elsandé (continued)

German question and that of Berlin — observance of these agreements being one of the basic factors of European stability.

There also exists a growing network of agreements for economic and cultural co-operation between East and West.

But is détente an irreversible reality? Is it an inevitable basic trend, or is it instead merely a transient cyclical phenomenon? Only the establishment of a structure for broadbased and open-ended co-operation gradually taking in all areas of international life, can transform a precarious *de facto* state into a durable and irreversible situation.

It is not a question of eliminating basic philosophical divergences — to hope to do so would be unrealistic — but of laying the foundations for fruitful and mutually advantageous long-term co-operation.

Now, we are up against a number of fundamental difficulties.

The first issue of concern to us is the increase in nuclear but also conventional armaments in the Warsaw Pact countries. Certainly, we have great expectations from the SALT negotiations between the two major nuclear powers. But we have to note, with some regret, that the agreements taking shape seem to be levelling upwards instead of ensuring any genuine cutback, as provided for in the treaty on non-proliferation.

Furthermore, the Vienna negotiations have not yet held out any prospect of a rapprochement, even though they have clarified the views of both sides, which so far remain very far apart.

Next, détente should go beyond the stage of declarations of principle. Co-operation presupposes improved and intensified contacts, as well as freer movement of ideas and information. Without yielding to discouragement, let us nonetheless note that the CSCE is there to show how slow progress is in this field, and always liable to falter. In the final analysis, everything will depend on the goodwill shown by States in applying and implementing the results of the conference.

Lastly, we find it difficult to understand how people can pay lip service to a policy of détente and at the same time proclaim the need to intensify the ideological struggle. Genuine co-operation

should take divergences into account and practise mutual respect by all concerned, without direct or indirect interference in the affairs of other States, irrespective of their political, economic and social systems. Hence we do not think that the ideological hostility apparent in the statements of prominent politicians, in newspaper articles and at international gatherings constitutes a favourable element calculated to ensure true and sincere détente.

It is against this background of East-West relations that the final phase of the CSCE is being prepared. Our negotiators have got through a great deal of work. It would be unfair to claim that substantial progress has not been made, especially in areas particularly dear to our hearts, such as improved human contacts. Yet we should, I am convinced, be over-optimistic if we were to subscribe to the thesis we sometimes hear advanced, that the main points under negotiation have now been satisfactorily decided, and that the others still outstanding are too delicate to be resolved at this juncture and therefore have to be postponed for a later round of negotiations. That argument is unacceptable.

I am convinced that it is in the interests of all of us to see the conference concluded as speedily as possible. Before it ends, however, the last of the matters in abeyance must be settled. Now some of them are fundamental and simply must be solved. The solutions can only depend upon goodwill and a spirit of conciliation on the part of all those concerned. In other words, our European countries can subscribe to the idea of a third phase ensuing as soon as possible, but those who are pressing us to conclude should give evidence of sufficient willingness to make concessions and of a genuine will to conclude.

What are now the main points still outstanding?

CBMs — military confidence-building measures — have from the start of the conference been one of the thorniest questions. We rejoice at the more constructive attitude that the eastern bloc countries have recently adopted. It presages that progress can at last be made where there was total stagnation before. The formula towards which we are moving is a political commitment, with each State acting on a voluntary, which does not mean an optional or selective, basis. It simply implies a political commitment in contradistinction to a legal one. In consequence, it is all the more essential that the content of notifications of military manoeuvres should be suffi-

Mr. Van Elsslande (continued)

ciently tangible to demonstrate governments' genuine will to commit themselves to practical and meaningful measures. The parameters for notifications will accordingly have to be sufficiently explicit.

In the sphere of external economic relations, the delicate question is that of reciprocity. It is vital to ensure that any concessions made would effectively take the form of balanced reciprocal advantages.

It is naturally in respect of free movement of persons, ideas and information that the negotiations have proved stickiest. We have always considered that progress in these areas remained essential, as really constituting one of the bases without which détente will never be durable. The Geneva negotiations already have produced texts dealing with meetings and family reunions, marriages and spoken and written information. It must be confessed that these texts are neither very precise nor very binding. Only the future can tell to what extent they will bring about perceptible changes in the prevailing situation.

However, some vital issues are still pending. I refer to travel facilities, better working conditions for journalists, liberalisation of the movement of cultural assets, and direct contacts between persons in the cultural field.

The problem of follow-up action on the conference is essentially political in character. This is one of the most awkward questions the conference still has to resolve, and one on which the positions are still very far apart. More than any item on the agenda, follow-up action represents an irreversible future commitment. Accordingly, we wish to proceed with caution and only act in full knowledge of the facts, i.e. in the light of future developments. A distinction must be drawn, in considering follow-up action, between implementation of conference decisions, the question of continuing the dialogue on a multilateral basis after the conference ends, and finally the establishment of a permanent body having general political competence.

The logical follow-up to the conference is obviously the implementation of its decisions. Moreover, it is by its practical results that we shall be able to judge what the conference's effective contribution to détente has been. Generally speaking, the implementation of decisions will be a matter for each individual government,

and it is not necessary at this stage to envisage setting up an *ad hoc* body responsible for monitoring implementation. So far as continuing the multilateral dialogue is concerned, we are of course not averse to it, but believe it would be difficult to lay down ways and means and procedures here and now. It will first of all be necessary to verify that the conference's decisions are translated into practical action, and to assess their influence on the state of East-West relations. In this perspective, we still support the proposal put forward by Denmark for a meeting of senior officials which would be convened during 1977 and would be responsible for determining by what methods the dialogue could be continued. It is, therefore, not a question of breaking off the multilateral dialogue, since a future rendezvous has already been arranged. Lastly, a permanent body having general political competence would not be justified in the present state of affairs. The conference revealed what a gap still remained between the opposing positions. Such a body, which certain countries would like to make the nucleus of a new pan-European security system, would be a constant battleground rather than an effective contribution to European security. The truth is that we cannot accept to endanger our alliances and the work of building Europe in the name of a new European order and a pan-European structure, which it would be unrealistic to believe could exist in the foreseeable future.

This then, in brief, is the current status of this important question. The next few weeks will probably be crucial, especially if both sides come to a firm decision that it is time to wind up the conference. Since the inception of the CSCE, Europe has succeeded in speaking with a single voice. Our countries have maintained a remarkable degree of cohesion. Obviously, this cohesion must be carried over into the final stage, for it alone will enable us to find satisfactory solutions to the priority matters that still remain undecided. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Minister. I would particularly like to say how full of substance your speech was, as usual, and how valuable the information you have given us will be for our continuing debate and the edification of the Assembly.

We now have to deal with two related reports and then, if you agree, I will call the members who are down to speak on the questions which have been or will be raised.

The President (continued)

I call Mr. de Bruyne to present his report on the political activities of the Council — reply to the twentieth annual report, Document 667.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it might perhaps not be out of place, in introducing this report — Document 667 — to set it, and the debate we shall be having on it, against the background of the various organs of WEU and the way this body works.

The starting-point here is the twentieth annual report from the Council, submitted by the Ministers to this Assembly in accordance with Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty. I might point out that the reports to be presented by our colleagues Mr. de Niet and Mr. Richter are based on this same twentieth annual report of the Council, as is the report I have the honour to put before you on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Our introduction to the debate need not be a long one, and can be limited to a brief gloss on the recommendations to the Council and the preamble to them. The recommendation has five parts.

The first three paragraphs relate to the working of the Council of Ministers, something that we feel is, in itself, unsatisfactory.

The fourth paragraph asks that there should be more fruitful relations between the Council of Ministers and our Assembly.

In the fifth, we call on the Council of Ministers speedily to fill the vacancy created by the departure of the Secretary-General, Mr. Heisbourg, by appointing a successor with full powers.

That forms the essence of our recommendations, Ladies and Gentlemen. I have reason to believe that they represent accurately your views on the matter, and I hope you will feel able to adopt them even if, in the explanatory memorandum the accents are placed slightly differently from what some members of this Assembly might choose.

Like the five paragraphs of the recommendation, the preamble relates first to the working of the Council of Ministers, secondly to relations between the Assembly and the Council in connection with the twentieth annual report, and

thirdly to the appointment of a new Secretary-General. If any of the paragraphs of the preamble are likely to give rise to argument — and we shall see this in a moment — it will probably be those that seek to give the Permanent Council a wider scope and greater weight, particularly as regards the work of this Assembly.

I want to stress, Mr. President, that with these proposals on the Permanent Council there is no departure whatever from the legal structure set out under Article IV of Protocol No. I to the modified Brussels Treaty. According to this article the Permanent Council is, quite simply, an offshoot of the Council of Western European Union. The Permanent Council has no separate legal existence, no existence of its own distinct from the Council of Ministers. There can therefore be no objection to what we are, on practical grounds, proposing — that the activities of the Permanent Council be extended, in relations with the Assembly as well. By having recourse to the Permanent Council we are detracting neither from our Assembly nor from the Council of Ministers — of which the Permanent Council is an extension, and with which it forms a single entity within the meaning of the WEU constitution.

What matters, Mr. President, is the overall import of the recommendation. All we are trying to do is to maintain or to revive the vitality of WEU. To this end, the highest body in WEU, its Council of Ministers, of which the Permanent Council is an extension, must be given a proper measure of activity. And to this end also this Assembly must press on energetically with its work, without any feelings of inferiority, both in its relations with the Council and Secretariat-General and in its own sphere as a consultative parliamentary body.

In this report we voice our dissatisfaction at the dialogue between ourselves and the top body of WEU, and more particularly at the absence of any adequate reaction from the Council of Ministers to our activities as a democratic parliamentary body. At the same time — though this is not the main thrust of the report — we are putting forward in the explanatory memorandum a number of concrete proposals that are open to amendment and additions.

Your Committee voted for the draft recommendation with fourteen in favour and four abstentions. I believe, Ladies and Gentlemen, that in the interests of the authority and influence of the Assembly it is desirable that you support

Mr. de Bruyne (continued)

your Committee's view. The main thing is for this Assembly to retain confidence in itself. Only this week we have had a number of Ministers, Secretaries of State and a top-ranking officer coming here to offer suggestions and propose tasks to us, evidence that for them, too, this cannot be a redundant or moribund organisation.

The survey which you, Mr. Minister, have given here today can only lend weight to this part of my remarks. In this respect I will only say that once again you have made a valuable contribution to the work of our Assembly. And not for the first time; I would go so far as to say that the contribution you made during the last session, when you spoke for the Council of Ministers, was in some ways even more important, and had an even wider practical scope. This has most certainly been noticeable in the activities of this assembly. Reference has been made in various documents and various speeches to the important and extremely practical task you set us when you were last here. Again, I think I can deduce from this that you, too, do not look upon our organisation as condemned quietly to die away. With this in mind, Mr. Minister, I would like to thank you for what you had to say.

(The speaker continued in French)

I conclude along the lines of the speech you made, Mr. President, at Monday's commemorative sitting. Your words were inspired by the same preoccupations and hopes as those which animated the proceedings of the General Affairs Committee whose Rapporteur I am.

I quote your very words, Mr. President.

"The Assembly must continue its dialogue with the WEU Council, however paralysed the latter may be by the inability of Europeans to take a common view of the facts of defence policy. Conscious of the task before it, the Assembly will pursue its work. Its recommendations, written questions and requests for joint meetings will be no less numerous than in the past, quite the contrary. The Council will not be able to ignore them even if for some of us European defence matters are dealt with in other places." *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Niet, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, to present his report on the application of the Brussels Treaty, Document 673.

Mr. de NIET (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, my introduction follows on what is termed the more political part of the reactions of this Assembly to the annual report for 1974 from the Council of Ministers, and the commentary on the report given by Mr. de Bruyne. The latter gives an excellent analysis of what this Assembly has found lacking in the annual report, and would like to see improved. I will say immediately here — though probably this is not the right moment to do so — that I have felt it necessary to put forward an amendment to the recommendation that accompanies this report.

The report from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is a very simple one, and as in fact so often is the case in our work, boils down to a reiteration of recommendations and wishes that have already been expressed in the past.

It was nice that this time we could begin by noting that the Council of Ministers has this year reacted very promptly to the request for speedier publication and distribution of the annual report. The Minister has quite correctly pointed out that this has been achieved, and we hope very sincerely that the same may be true in the years to come.

We all know, and the Minister has made allusion to the fact, that the absolute commitment to mutual assistance in the case of attack forms the body of and the justification for the Brussels Treaty. But another important facet of this organisation has been that originally it was the only European meeting place for the Common Market Six and Britain. For this reason I think we would be wise so far as possible to defer a discussion of whether or not we should reduce the activities of the organisation and this Assembly until a later session, when we know how things stand with the United Kingdom's membership of the Common Market.

If — as I hope with all my heart — Britain does finally remain with the Common Market and is to form a significant member of it, then it will be for both the Council of Ministers and this Assembly to discuss together how far the activities of both the Council of Ministers and this Assembly ought perhaps to be reduced in the scope of what they seek to do.

The most important aspect of this report, I think, relates to WEU's control on armaments, and here there has still been no change at all. A very important protocol, which would make

Mr. de Niet (continued)

this control a practical possibility, has still been ratified by only six of the seven countries. Even where protocols have been ratified by everyone, all is very often still not 100 % in order where nominations and practical measures of implementation are concerned. There is very plain evidence of this in Document 673. I would point here to the conclusions set out in paragraph 28 of the report, i.e. that the credibility of our countries in relation to questions of armament and disarmament is lessened enormously by the fact that this control, which is specifically set as a task under the Brussels Treaty, is not effective. The task is not something that can be done, but one that is specifically laid down. Hence the provision in the treaty that provides for the setting-up without delay of a body to control armaments production. This body has been set up. Gradually it has come of age, but it is still very restricted in its ability to do its job as, there is no doubt, the treaty intended this job to be done. And this is why — once again — we call in the recommendation for ratification of the implementing protocol, which is necessary if control is to be able to be applied fully in wider scope.

We know that our recommendations are often no more than a voice crying in the wilderness. One cannot do the impossible — a feeling one gets when looking at all kinds of points that arise in my report and that of Mr. de Bruyne. When there is no unanimity, and it is our policy and tradition to call a decision a real decision only if there is unanimity — even if the supra-national aspects which are, after all, enshrined in the treaty do not in fact strictly require it — then I feel it is not wholly beyond comprehension that when everyone is not unanimous there should be a good deal of hesitation about taking a decision. This is all the more important when in a great many cases which, from the strictly legalistic viewpoint, can lend themselves to it the voting pattern is almost always exactly the same. This makes things even more difficult.

Our credibility is not only at issue internally, in the eyes of our own populations, but externally as well. We are losing our credibility when, for instance, as members of the United Nations Assembly — where, against the diversity of the world as a whole, our seven countries look at first sight to be all alike — we are shown to be not even capable of really implementing a twenty-year old treaty and of achieving, as fully as possible, any genuine control over armaments and so

on. And then we all stand up, brave and true and virtuous, pleading the cause in international negotiations between East and West. I can list them — the SALT talks, MBFR and the CSCE. At these talks we urge — and quite rightly so — that there should be control. But we, the seven of us, do not exercise it at all — or perhaps only a little bit. In some cases, as we have read, there has to be six weeks' prior notice. To make inspection possible without harming certain financial and technical patent interests, there are the protocols. These have been adopted, but they have not been ratified by all seven countries.

This sad state of affairs still remains. As has already been said a great many times, it is the duty of this Assembly to keep hammering away at this point.

For the rest, there is nothing really new in the report. The precision one finds in it is, thanks to the very large measure of collaboration from the staff, to be praised. I have in mind here the recommendation that there should be a return to a system of fuller availability of data on inspections carried out, as used to be the case a few years ago. I think that the Council of Ministers would be prepared to meet our demands on this.

The report also contains a question to the Ministers, that of how the Council has been able to say in its annual report that the Atlantic Council and WEU have been keeping a finger on the pulse of the Cyprus situation, which has still not found any solution, while we in fact know from an article in the *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant* written by Mr. Stikker, who has been with us here, that in 1964, at the time of the previous major crisis between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, the President of the NATO Council did offer his good offices to the countries concerned. Such action was possible then, but on this occasion we as parliamentarians have not seen, either in publications or in communications, any expression of satisfaction by the Council of Ministers of this organisation with regard to what happened in the WEU or NATO context during the most recent crisis; at least not up to the moment the Council's report was drafted. We have heard rather more since then, but that was already very late on.

I would like to say something as an individual member of this Assembly — and not as the Rapporteur — about the recommendation in Mr. de Bruyne's report, when this comes to be discussed. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Six members have asked to speak, and from the time they have asked for I see that some of them want to put questions to the Chairman of the Council, while others, who have asked for more time, intend to express their opinion on the reports which have been presented.

I will begin by calling members who have questions to put. Perhaps the Chairman of the Council of Ministers will reply where appropriate.

At all events, we shall begin the debate, and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers will intervene if he thinks fit. It will simply be an ordinary debate.

I call Mr. Radius.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — The report submitted by Mr. de Bruyne on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, and the many speeches made over the past forty-eight hours, reflect a certain uneasiness which has for some time been characteristic of relations between the Council and the Assembly and reveal the concern of all those who hope for real understanding between these two organs of WEU to be restored.

I would like to ask the Chairman of the Council if he does not think that relations with the Assembly would be rendered more effective by less infrequent Council meetings at ministerial level.

These meetings, which were first held quarterly and then twice a year, are now held only once a year. The spacing out may be explained by the fact that Ministers are increasingly obliged to deal with problems originating from WEU in other assemblies.

The fact remains, however, that the Council still has general competence, since it covers all questions related to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, Article VIII of which provides that the Council shall be so organised as to be able to exercise its functions continuously.

Without, therefore, wishing to lay down hard and fast intervals for these meetings, which in any case would contravene the provisions of the treaty, I would ask Mr. Van Elslande if he does not think that the Council, which has a free hand in the matter, should not meet at ministerial level more frequently.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Would you like to reply now, Mr. Chairman, or deal with all the questions together?

Mr. VAN ELSLANDE (*Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — As you wish.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I therefore call Mr. Waltmans.

Mr. WALTMANS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would like to ask whether the Minister looks upon a successful conclusion to the European security conference as a precondition for smooth progress in the MBFR talks?

And how does the Minister see the matter of replacement of the Starfighter in relation to the MBFR discussions?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. VAN ELSLANDE (*Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — The reply to the first question by Mr. Radius concerning the uneasy relations between the Assembly and the Council is obviously affirmative. Clearly, there would be less of this uneasiness, which undoubtedly exists, if the Council of Ministers met more frequently.

The only problem is whether it is a physical possibility for them to convene very often.

I remember that two years ago, at a meeting in Luxembourg, it was proposed that the Council should meet once a year. We succeeded in changing this to at least once a year. This implies that, theoretically, it is always possible to convene the Council as the occasion arises. But I am somewhat sceptical about the willingness and the physical possibility of increasing the frequency of these meetings, as suggested.

He also drew attention to the purport of Article VIII. This does not of course mean that the Council as such or at ministerial level should meet continuously. I think that, as in any multi-lateral organisation, cases may arise where urgent problems can be solved either in writing or through the permanent representatives. This obviously applies in WEU.

(*The speaker continued in Dutch*)

The two questions from Mr. Waltmans leave me in some perplexity. In answer to his first

Mr. Van Elslande (continued)

question I would say that probably not only I, but all my colleagues over the last two years, have all asked themselves the same question about the internal relationship that exists between the two conferences mentioned by Mr. Waltmans ; that is to say whether results in one could have a favourable influence on discussions in the other. It seems obvious to me that if in Geneva we can come to serious conclusions on the point of confidence-building measures, in the third phase, sanctioned in Helsinki, this will have some significance in connection with the problem of disarmament in general. This would be the case not only because it would be plain from such a conclusion that countries of Eastern Europe are indeed moved by positive goodwill on the problems of security, but also because the very announcement of troop movements in a radius of action of, for instance, 200 or 300 km can quite obviously have a definite and positive effect on the security situation in the various countries.

Answering the second question, I must say that it brings to mind a professor in an examination trying to "stump" a student. In more general terms I would reply that in my view unilateral disarmament is not the most suitable way of arriving at shared disarmament. In this context everyone will make up his own mind whether he feels that replacement of the Starfighter comes into the matter or not.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Richter.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I have the honour to present on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions the Assembly's reply to the twentieth annual report of the Council. This task is both easy and pleasant. First of all, the period on which I have to report is certainly the most important in the history of European space activities. Secondly, as Mr. Gaston Geens, Secretary of State for Budget and Scientific Policy of Belgium, indicated yesterday, a certain measure of agreement has in the past few months been achieved between the Council and the Assembly.

In previous years, Mr. Minister, a lot of criticism was heard from this House. In the draft recommendation we now congratulate the governments on having established the European Space Agency. The Committee has been calling for this

ESA for years. Numerous experts from ESA's top management have acknowledged at our committee meetings that it is largely due to the work of this specialist committee that our great aim has finally been achieved.

On Friday ESA's official document will be ceremoniously signed in the international conference centre, Avenue Kléber. Mr. de Bruyne will be there to represent the Parliamentary Assembly.

On 15th April the ESA Council complied with another of our wishes and named its Director-General. In the present organisation and the terms of reference given to it, we should now have a guarantee that it will be possible to overcome the shortcomings that had become apparent in ELDO and ESRO in the past. I am also convinced that ESA will be off to a good start because its budget has been approved for the next four years, a change which will make long-term planning possible. This too was one of the wishes put forward by the Assembly.

The main development in the field of applied programmes is the start being made on three new programmes: Spacelab, Ariane and Marots. The technologically ambitious Spacelab programme means there will be close co-operation between Europe and the United States, as the space laboratory is an integral part of the American space shuttle programme. The European contribution is in large measure German ; the Federal Republic is paying 52.5 % of the costs of this programme.

Ariane is to take over European launcher technology, and by 1980 Europe should have its own launcher capacity. The three-stage launcher is partly based on developments which were begun for ELDO's Europa III programme. We had, if I may use such a phrase, put our hearts into the Ariane project. We were constantly urging our French friends to press stubbornly on with it. Obviously the lead in this programme will lie with France, which is footing 62.5 % of the bill.

I should like to put one point to you before you leave us, Mr. Minister. Every one of us concerned with scientific questions is interested in the Kourou base ; that has already been made clear on a number of occasions this week. Mr. de Montesquiou went into the point fully at the outset. Perhaps I should add that on a trip to the United States the Committee found a changed American attitude to Ariane. Although the

Mr. Richter (continued)

Americans adopted a rather negative approach, for the first time they showed understanding of the European attitude.

Finally, I should mention that the British are taking the lead in a very ambitious programme for maritime satellites. With this satellite system we hope one day to be able to supervise world shipping routes in conjunction with the corresponding American Marisat programme. Great Britain is paying 55.8 % of the costs.

For reasons of time, Mr. Minister — you have very little time — I will not go into the scientific programme. A lot has already been said about the results of Heos 1 and Heos 2.

The Committee still has several requests which you will find in the recommendation. We hope that governments will harmonise European space policy on a long-term basis among themselves and with the United States. We think that the member governments should use ESA as basis for the discussions which will have to be held at the United Nations about the peaceful use of space. This agency is an excellent starting point for the material preparation of these discussions.

Finally, we set great store by the completion of the space programmes which I have already touched on. From the point of view of industry, it is also important that later programmes, started after Spacelab, Ariane and Marots, should be discussed in good time.

One last remark: we should like to point out that we also need a European space programme which would pay due attention to the military aspects of the question. Very little thought has been given to this matter so far, but the Assembly which has always been very open to suggestions concerning defence, believes that there are many possibilities here. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Fletcher.

Mr. FLETCHER (*United Kingdom*). — As you know, Britain has been under certain criticism in some European countries because we have a lack of enthusiasm for certain projects. That is the vague sort of statement which would be expected from a British Minister rather than from a British back-bencher, but to go into greater detail would lead me into conflict with Mr. Richter, whose report I intend to support.

However, as is known, we have reservations about Ariane. We have these reservations not because we query the capability of the countries involved nor even the necessity for such a programme, but we happen to have more confidence in the willingness of the United States of America in future to provide launcher facilities than is the case with some other countries. The impression I gained during our recent visit to the United States of America confirmed that generally-held impression in my own country.

There are other points of detail where I could pick my arguments with the report. I feel, for instance, that the calculations on savings to be made or anticipated by the use of the space shuttle need to be looked at very carefully. Articles in the British technical press have cast certain doubts about this. I know that the voice of the British technical press is not the voice of God. Nevertheless, we should not be overhasty in our assumption that gigantic savings will be made possible by the use of a space shuttle. This in no way invalidates the programme, and it may underline the importance of the European contribution to the whole of the post-Apollo programme. In other words, Spacelab may be more significant than seemed to be the case when it was first conceived.

One could go on about the implications of paragraph 7 in the recommendation about the working out of a European military space programme. Here again I am quite sure it is not meant, and I would not want it to be meant — and there are very few people in the United Kingdom, whether in or out of government, who would want it to be meant — that we should engage in expensive duplication of most American military space activities.

The one predominant impression I received from General Haig's address earlier this week was that we can have confidence in SACEUR and the government which supports him. That may be a triumph of hope over experience. If it is, I stand at this rostrum condemned. It is only a feeling for which I can provide no concrete evidence whatever.

Nevertheless, generally speaking, I do not feel that the United States of America will rat on Europe in any aspect of military activity, including that part which must take place in outer space.

Having said that, I think we have to look at the whole space programme in its historic con-

Mr. Fletcher (continued)

text. Roughly fourteen years after the Wright brothers first flew an aircraft, men were still flying in strange constructions. The machine that Mr. Blériot used to fly over the Channel and the Albatross that Mr. Immelman gave to the first world war aces were strange contraptions tied together with piano wire and chewing gum and hardly to be foreseen as the progenitors of the jumbo jets or the Concorde of today. Twenty years after 1914, aircraft were still in a fairly primitive state. As far as the space age is concerned we are roughly at the Blériot stage.

I listened last night on the radio to a fascinating talk by a Professor O'Neill who, having attended a congress in the United States of America, was talking very seriously of putting an industrial manufacturing complex up in space between the earth and the moon.

This made sense because, as we learned in the United States of America — and what is theorised about over here in Europe is accepted over there — there are many industrial processes that can be carried out at zero gravity which are totally impossible on this earth and which can bring innumerable benefits to people of this planet and certainly people of this continent.

For instance, it is a fact that in one second the sun generates more energy than mankind has used throughout the whole of the history of civilisation. Our German colleagues have ideas about tapping that source of energy. The problem is to beam it down to earth. Does one use the laser — which presents enormous difficulty — microwaves, and so on ?

I wish to emphasise that we are in the infancy and not in the maturity of the space age. We are talking in pretty much the same terms as those fliers who flew in the first London to Paris air race many years ago. That was sponsored by a British newspaper. The joke is that it still takes as long to cross the Channel, only one spends forty-five minutes in the aircraft and twenty-four hours at the two different airports.

Nevertheless, we are still at the Blériot stage of development. It is because we are at that stage that I welcome the creation of this new agency. I welcome the fact that in the United States of America the contribution that that country can make is fully recognised.

It is in that spirit, without engaging in tiny arguments of detail, that not only do I accept

and support the report, but I accept it with a high degree of enthusiasm. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Treu.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Minister, I should like briefly to take up the points made by Mr. Richter in the matter of space policy. Last Monday the Belgian Secretary of State said that progress in this area could be summed up under four heads: first, the setting up of a single agency for the co-ordination and development of European space policy; second, the transition from the phase of technical and scientific research, as in ESRO, to that of applications of more direct concern to our territory, Europe and the world; third, the programmes adopted — Marots, Ariane, Kourou; fourth, subsequent developments.

Roughly two years after the Brussels space conference presided over by Minister Lefèvre, the European Space Agency has at last been born. It has been two years in gestation, not to mention the years that went before. We can say that the length of gestation holds out the hope that the infant will be sturdy, and keep on growing.

But if I may say so, the problem is not resolved, even if this phase can be regarded as satisfactory. My friend and colleague, Mr. Richter, who in a way is leading the way for me as a Rapporteur in WEU — for I am his opposite-number in the Council of Europe for the same subjects that will be examined in Strasbourg in October — has reminded us of the questions still outstanding. They are as follows: once we have agreed with the United States on taking a share of the post-Apollo projects, i.e. in respect of construction of the Spacelab, this still leaves unsolved what are for me the two biggest doubts. How is the subsequent use of these highly important instruments for placing objects in outer space to be managed? And secondly, what conditions will the United States place on the eventual supply of launchers? You will remember that three years ago the post-Apollo programme was much broader but subject, if you will forgive the expression, to a kind of blackmail: either Europe participated in the whole post-Apollo programme — and at that time they were thinking of Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Pluto and Uranus, as well as the Moon — or there would be no collaboration for launchers. In present circumstances, I trust there has been a little evolution in this respect.

Mr. Treu (continued)

Granted, in short, European participation in the construction of spacelabs, the Space Agency's authority must also be exerted to determine the conditions on which the United States will be willing to supply launch facilities. True, the conventional launcher, the long-range missile, to speak plainly, will be replaced by the shuttle, but it will take another eight years at least to arrive at a space shuttle and during the intervening period up to 1983 the launches of the Marots navigation satellites, Aerosat and the communications satellites I have mentioned will still require the use of conventional launchers fuelled by liquid air, liquid oxygen or whatever.

It is at this point that we come to the passages concerning Kourou and Ariane. The Kourou base has to be kept in being not only for European launches but for whatever type of satellite needs to be launched from a favourable geographical situation provided it is a French base, managed by CNES, at Kourou.

For this reason I venture to say that the prospect of a wide horizon of collaboration with the United States in the matter of launchers and subsequent participation has still to be realised. We shall go on discussing aerospace, nuclear and military policy. I regret that in the last clause of the draft recommendation the hypothesis of forging a European space policy is left rather remote, with the mere statement that the member governments are invited to "work out a European military space programme and provide the means for its implementation". If there is anything which differentiates our reports from the parallel ones in the Council of Europe, it is that we here can also mention military applications. In the Council of Europe they would be out of context. But if missiles and launchers, supersonic aircraft, artificial satellites, the farthest space base 30-40,000 km out, are scientific instruments, they are also and especially, let us not forget, instruments of military strategy.

I venture to say therefore that this loosely-worded mention in the draft recommendation leaves me unconvinced of our Assembly's sense of purpose. It is still a fact that the projects of co-operation with the Americans are not only commercial but also, and above all, political. When, two years ago, the United States talked about terms for participation in Intelsat, a kind of deadlock was reached: either any satellites

launched by the Europeans would be co-ordinated with, and practically authorised by, Intelsat, or nothing would be done at all. We cannot have among genuine partners exclusions, limitations even on the use of our own hardware. The developing countries, the African and Latin American countries may have their own communications and information systems, whether from the United States or from Europe. The United States cannot claim any right of preclusion, nor any reduction in Europe's future capability. In a space policy, these are the watchwords of our civilisation and potentialities, even in such difficult and costly sectors of technology. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). — I wish to intervene only briefly to support our colleague, Mr. Richter, in what I believe to be an excellent report. Mr. Richter has attempted to analyse the state of the art of space technology in Europe, and our Committee greatly appreciates the enormous amount of work he has undertaken in producing a report of this standing.

Our main problem is that we have always been unable to persuade the Council of Ministers to understand the importance and relevance of science, technology and space. This has been a fundamental problem for a very long time, fundamentally because we cannot convince our own individual countries that it is important to put money into this type of technology. The failure of ELDO and the demise of ESRO can all be placed at the door of our own countries in their failure to give adequate support to our efforts.

The idea of setting up the space agency is a very useful step forward, but it is a step forward that will be viable only provided the member countries believe in it and have every intention of making it work. I tend, it seems, in my later life to become a bit of a cynic. I am not so sure that the member countries, having agreed the setting up of this space agency, will fund it in the way that it should be funded; that we shall have this continual analysis, re-examination and revaluation, wondering whether it is the right thing to have or whether we can get it cheaper somewhere else, and so on, so that in about three years from now, when talking of what the progress of the European Space Agency may cost, we will be able to say that we have not been able to do very much because a lot of problems have

Mr. Brown (continued)

had to be got over. That has been the tragic story of Europe for the last twenty years ; we have always found a reason for its not being possible to do something.

Some ten years ago I presented a report to this Assembly which contained substantially all the recommendations in the report from Mr. Richter which we are discussing today. I certainly argued for the definition of a common space policy, and I called then for the political will of the countries in Europe to produce one. Recommendation 1 wants a common space policy for the future in world-wide application satellite systems. I remember discussing in great detail ten years ago the value of communications satellites ; I went through their various uses and described their great value to us in Europe as well as to those in the rest of the world.

I look at recommendation 3 and it seems extraordinary to me that we have to have a recommendation which actually tries to persuade Europe at least to complete something. This is what the recommendation is actually calling for, that we finally get down to completing one of the jobs which we have started. I am sure we can all find reasonable support for that.

On the subject of recommendation 5, it seems elementary that we should formulate an industrial policy on application satellites which will allow us not only to use them for Europe but also to be able to export them to other parts of the world. The need for educational satellites in the developing countries speaks for itself, and has done so for a very long time. We could be responsible for an enormous amount of educational work and encouragement if we were to use the application satellites for this purpose. We could do so much more. It seems extraordinary to me that in 1975 we actually have to have a recommendation to the Council of Ministers asking them to accept this basic proposition.

Turning to recommendation 6, I suppose there is no law in this Assembly which prevents one of the members of the British Delegation from falling out with the leader of that delegation ; I am sure Mr. Fletcher will forgive me if I confess that he was expressing a view which I find some difficulty in accepting. I still take the view which I took in this Assembly ten years ago, that it is important for Europe to have a launcher capability, for I believe that in the year

2000 the launching of a satellite will be an everyday occurrence. I cannot believe that this great continent of Europe should decide that it does not want to have this technology, because this is what it means. If you accept that you are going to rely on the Americans — whatever their good will may be — and if you accept their understanding that they will provide us with launchers, it means that the young men studying high technology in Europe will never understand launcher technology at all ; they will have to go to the McGraw-Hill books or on funded scholarships to America to learn that technique. I want that for Europe. We ought to be in a position to have our own launcher. I was not in favour of Kourou, and it is common knowledge that I objected to its setting up, but, since we have got it, I believe Europe ought to make a launcher facility available for all the nations in Europe.

I do not believe that we should rely on the Americans, whatever their good will — and I have a lot of friendship for them. People have heard me say this many times before : we should stand on our own feet and be able to produce our own technology.

I am pleased to support the report ; I think it is an excellent analysis, and I hope that the Assembly will accept it with acclaim. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I will now ask the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers if he has any comments to make.

Mr. VAN ELSLANDE (*Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I really have no comments to make because you are discussing texts which will in due course be submitted to the Council of Ministers so that the latter can make use of them as you wish.

We have already had occasion to notice this afternoon that this is not always the case. I listened most attentively to the three Rapporteurs and the speakers in the debate. I am certain that, if all my fellow members of the Council could find the time to attend meetings of the Assembly regularly, your proceedings would have a greater impact than they do at present.

(*The speaker continued in Dutch*)

And finally, I will make you a confession. When I first had the opportunity — I think it was back in 1967 — of attending this Assem-

Mr. Van Elslande (continued)

bly's discussions on behalf of my government, it changed my view of the work you do. Up to then I had assumed that this was a kind of liturgical ceremony that took place at regular intervals in the Assembly of WEU. So I did not have the feeling, at that time, that the recommendations that came from these meetings were of any real significance. Today, looking back over the past ten years, the value of your debates has become much clearer to me. Today I have had to tell you, speaking for the Council of Ministers, that it is often quite hard to arrive at certain decisions since — as Mr. de Niet has already emphasised — we try each time to be unanimous. So it is difficult to answer in a way that will give satisfaction when dealing with recommendations that have been adopted by this Assembly. I have talked this over in the past with quite a few of my colleagues, and I can tell you that the influence of what you do here, and the true significance of the recommendations you adopt here, are greater than might appear from the official reaction you get from the Council of Ministers. I can say quite frankly that, though I do not as a rule have a great deal of time, I always read your recommendations attentively. Even though they may not always lead to a positive result in the Council, they never fail to have an effect there. I have no doubt at all that they have an influence on the thinking of the Ministers as individuals, and of the Council in general.

(The speaker continued in French)

I wanted to tell the Assembly this to show that, in spite of what you understandably consider to be the sometimes disappointing results of proceedings of the Council of Ministers, the impact is, I believe, really much greater than you think.

I wanted to tell you this and thank the Assembly for its unwearying efforts to build Europe. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Van Elslande.

We shall now continue the debate on the reports.

I call Mr. de Niet to speak to his amendment.

Mr. de NIET (*Netherlands*). — I should like to make a few comments in justification of the amendments. Sir Frederic Bennett and I drafted

the amendments at coffee time this morning. His name is not attached because he could not be here this afternoon as a fully-fledged member with voting and speaking rights, but he entirely agrees with the text of the amendments.

I said an hour ago that the analysis contained in Mr. de Bruyne's report of the Assembly's discontent with its dialogue with the Council of Ministers is very valuable and good, but one of the remedies which he proposes is totally wrong in principle. The draft recommendation reads as follows :

“Considering that the Permanent Council has therefore become the only body of WEU working at that level ;”

Which level I do not know, because the only level that has been mentioned is the ministerial level, and it is not that level. The recommendation continues :

“Regretting that the member countries have not taken account of this new situation to delegate to the Permanent Council more of the duties which the Council of Ministers is not in a position to carry out ;”

If one considers that in the context of the full report, everyone knows that the suggestion is that the Council of Ministers does not do that and does not accept the Assembly as an opposite number for dialogue about the wishes of the Assembly. We have to accept that, apparently, that is the philosophy, so we ask the Council of Ministers to delegate more to the Permanent Council of Ambassadors under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General. But about what ?

The report makes clear that the Council of Ministers either does not answer questions relevantly or does not answer at all. As Minister Van Elslande made clear, that is because it gives a relevant answer only when there is unanimity on the Council of Ministers. That can never be a reason for addressing ourselves in future to the Council of Ambassadors. If there is no unanimity in the Council of Ministers, how can there be unanimity in the Council of Ambassadors ?

We know from the yearly report of the Ministers that they are trying to reconstruct the procedure for answering questions and to accelerate it. As Minister Van Elslande stressed, a dialogue between a parliamentary assembly, even a consultative parliamentary assembly, and Ministers can never be replaced by a dialogue with

Mr. de Niet (continued)

the Council of Ambassadors. That is not fair to the ambassadors and civil servants. It is totally impossible for the Council of Ministers to abdicate, even if this Assembly were prepared to abdicate, because it no longer required a dialogue with the Council of Ministers on the points that we feel are important by answering questions either in writing or orally and, instead, having that dialogue with the Permanent Council of Ambassadors. That would be a complete abdication by a parliamentary assembly, and I am sure also that the Council of Ministers will not be prepared to abdicate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, all of us know Mr. de Niet as one of the most devoted and most talented members of this Assembly. I want, therefore, to voice my appreciation of the amendment he has put forward ; it must be seen as an expression of the interest he brings to the problems we are discussing today.

On the content of Mr. de Niet's amendment, I would like to say this. Paragraph 1 only makes sense if paragraphs 2 and 3 are discarded. There is reason and justification in Mr. de Niet's addition of "and regretting" only if one proceeds from the assumption that the next two paragraphs are to be deleted. What we are mainly concerned with, therefore, is paragraphs 2 and 3.

I have already done my level best, in Committee, to persuade Mr. de Niet that we are quite certainly being faithful interpreters of what has been said repeatedly in the Committee and before that in the Assembly, about the lack of contact between the Assembly and its Committees on the one hand and the highest body in this organisation on the other. I am far from believing that in my choice of words I tended towards the slightest radicalism : indeed I think I kept a little below the level of criticism that one has heard many times over the years, in the Assembly and its Committees, on this issue.

Furthermore I tried, when introducing my report, to bring legal arguments to bear to persuade Mr. de Niet to withdraw his amendment. These legal arguments he did not refute. What is involved is a matter of legal identity. Constitutionally, there is no such thing as a separate Permanent Council. According to the texts, the

Permanent Council is an extension of the Council of Ministers. It has no separate existence, has no responsibilities of its own, and undertakes no activities on its own. There is simply an offshoot of the Council of Ministers which meets fortnightly, and you will all know that over the past two years the Council of Ministers has met only once a year. You will also know — from what Mr. Van Elslande had to say, among other things — that one cannot expect that in the months to come the Council of Ministers is going to meet any more frequently.

This is why I ask you, Ladies and Gentlemen, not to let Mr. de Niet's amendment dissuade you from voting for the text as put forward by the Committee. In a way, Mr. de Niet is asking for more than is feasible under present circumstances. He is wanting, in fact, to make approaches to a Council of Ministers which he himself knows is not going to meet in the foreseeable future any more often than it has done over the past two years. Against this, I am suggesting — for practical reasons — contacts with the permanent representatives ; but not in the way that Mr. de Niet seems to see as the only possibility, that of going to them with problems which, so to speak, can be met only with acceptance or rejection. This is not what we have in mind at all. We are very well aware that when there is no unanimity — and in many instances there is no unanimity — it is impossible for the permanent representatives to give a final answer. In many cases we are not asking for a final answer, only for the opportunity of making contact, and exchanging views, so that we are not going with our wishes and our recommendations and our proposals to a body from whom we never get an answer. We can well imagine that in the permanent representatives we shall find a partner we can talk to, and thus a dialogue that will so to speak nourish our activities.

So I do urge you to look once again at the question of the second and third paragraphs of the preamble, in the way I have just explained. And I urge you very strongly to keep the Committee's text. Unanimity on this point cannot but help to enhance our authority and influence at the top level of this organisation.

I have a further comment on the third part of Mr. de Niet's amendment, where quite obviously an error in translation is involved. I think the original French text leaves no room for misunderstanding. I will read this text again :

"... et de mettre fin sans délai... par la nomination d'un Secrétaire général de plein droit."

Mr. de Bruyne (continued)

It is not, therefore, a matter of giving "full powers" to the Secretary-General. We are simply asking that the Secretary-General shall exercise his powers fully, in the sense of the treaty rules, nothing more, nothing less.

I am badly placed to judge the English translation, but the phrase "full powers" does not carry the meaning that was in the mind of the Rapporteur, nor that in the mind of the Committee Chairman, whom I have consulted specially on this point. It is not a matter of giving the Secretary-General full powers. We do not seek to give him any powers above those he has under the treaty rules. Having made this clear, I think I can prevail upon Mr. de Niet not to press the third paragraph at least of his amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Krieg.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would like to say a few words about paragraph 3 of the amendment. I hope that Mr. de Bruyne will not mind if I do not quite agree with him.

Actually retaining the original wording of the French text does not mean very much. I do not know what a *Secrétaire général de plein droit* is. I would point out that if we said *de plein exercice* that would have a genuine meaning.

The real problem is to have a Secretary-General who fulfils all the functions of his office.

We therefore ought to delete the phrase "with full powers", which does not mean anything, and substitute "exercising full powers" which does have a meaning. We could all agree on this point.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I see that the debate is becoming more general.

I call Mr. de Stexhe.

Mr. de STEXHE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I understand Mr. de Niet's comment that the phrase "a Secretary-General with full powers" does not have much meaning. I wonder whether it would not be simpler to fall in with Mr. de Bruyne's idea by merely saying "... terminate the present interim situation without delay". I think that would meet the objections which have been raised.

I would like to answer on the two other points of Mr. de Niet's amendment. I would remind the Assembly that this question was discussed at length at the last meeting of the General Affairs Committee. The original text was more blunt, and the present one, which was adopted by 14 votes with 4 abstentions, was arrived at by a sort of compromise.

Mr. de Bruyne rightly points out that the Council of Ministers meets only once a year; it is a fact. In the meantime questions are asked. To those in respect of which there is unanimity replies can be given, to others not; but there could be a dialogue. If it is not through the Council of Ministers, which is a pity, other methods must be found, at any rate for the time being.

In the third paragraph of the recommendation it is regretted that "member countries have not taken account of this new situation to delegate to the Permanent Council more of the duties...". I would have preferred the words "to delegate more duties, notably to the Permanent Council...". We cannot be left in a vacuum for a year. An interim formula must be found. Such delegation detracts nothing from the Council of Ministers; all the powers lie with the Ministers, but appropriate practical means must be found. Mr. de Bruyne has suggested them. If the Ministers wish to suggest another formula, we shall be agreeable, but there must not be a vacuum for a whole year.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Assembly needs a partner if there is to be a dialogue, and this it really does not have at the moment, or at best in a very homeopathic manner, if I may express myself diplomatically.

I have much understanding for Mr. de Niet's view when he says that the Ministers, or at any rate the Secretaries of State, are the right partners for parliamentarians. Those of us who believe that we must stick to this level will vote for Mr. de Niet's proposal. However, those of us who believe — and I cannot but say that I and the great majority of the members of the General Affairs Committee are of this opinion — that half a loaf is better than no bread — and this is not meant to be a dig at the Ambassadors — reject this proposal.

Mr. Sieglerschmidt (continued)

Mr. de Niet is also right if we base our views on the old forms of co-operation between the Council and the Assembly. It is time, however, that we try to develop new forms of co-operation between the Council and the Assembly, particularly in the present situation, where we all have the impression that our relations with the Council have reached a dead end. The Council of Permanent Representatives could play an important rôle here.

As far as paragraph 3, is concerned, I agree with Mr. de Stexhe's proposal.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. de Niet, do you wish to add anything ?

Mr. de NIET (*Belgium*) (Translation). — No, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall vote on Mr. de Niet's amendment in two parts.

I put the first part of the amendment, consisting of paragraphs 1 and 2, to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The first part of the amendment is negatived.

We now come to paragraph 3 of Mr. de Niet's amendment proposing that the words "with full powers" be deleted at the end of paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Radius.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. de Stexhe did not table a written text. That is of little consequence. But his proposal is farther away from the text of the recommendation than Mr. de Niet's amendment. It would therefore be logical to take the vote on it first.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you for your suggestion, Mr. Radius.

I therefore put to the vote the simplified draft proposed for paragraph 5, which runs as follows :

"Appoint to the Secretariat-General a personality carrying sufficient authority with the governments of the seven member countries and terminate the present interim situation without delay."

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amendment is adopted.

We shall now vote on the amended draft recommendation in Document 667.

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted¹.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation on the application of the Brussels Treaty in Document 673.

The vote on the draft recommendation as a whole will be by roll-call if the Assembly is not unanimous.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

The draft recommendation is therefore adopted².

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation on the European Space Agency in Document 670.

The vote on the draft recommendation as a whole will be by roll-call if the Assembly is not unanimous.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — We object to this text.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall therefore vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mrs. Wolf.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

1. See page 58.

2. See page 59.

The President (continued)

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	67
Ayes	63
Noes	3
Abstentions	1

*The draft recommendation is therefore adopted*².

5. State of European security

(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 671)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now take votes postponed from previous debates. We shall begin with the vote on the draft recommendation on the state of European security in Document 671 presented on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by MM. Critchley, Dankert, Duvieusart, Wall and Lemmrich.

The debate was concluded during yesterday afternoon's sitting and this morning the Assembly heard the reply by the Chairman of the Committee and adopted two amendments to the draft recommendation.

The vote on the draft recommendation as a whole will be taken by roll-call if the Assembly is not unanimous.

As the Assembly is not unanimous, we shall proceed to vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Kliesing.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote? ...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows³:

Number of votes cast	65
Ayes	51
Noes	11
Abstentions	3

1. See page 53.

2. See page 60.

3. See page 54.

*The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted*¹.

6. European union and WEU

(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 662 and Amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Before voting on the draft recommendation on European union and WEU in Document 662 presented on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Mr. Krieg, the Assembly has to consider Amendment No. 1 tabled by Mr. Richter and others.

I call Mr. Richter to speak to his amendment.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we have a somewhat difficult situation here at the moment. We were having a very peaceful and balanced discussion, as our Rapporteur, Mr. Krieg, has acknowledged. At the end of the discussion the Chairman of the Committee made it known that he considered the amendments sent in by myself and some of my colleagues to be well balanced. If you look at the signatories you will see that we have tried to include members representing all shades of political opinion on this matter. I feel, too, that a lot of my fellow members are ready to follow me.

In my final assessment of Mr. Krieg's address I went part of the way to meet him on all points. When I think back to the discussion in Paris, that is a lot more than was expected at that time. I feel that if the amendment were accepted it would prevent a recurrence of the type of situation which we have already had once this morning, for the content of the proposal put forward by Mr. Radius and Mr. Valleix is practically the same. The result of the vote on this proposal was after all quite clear.

I was anxious — and the Assembly should recognise this — that my amendment should serve as a bridge, should go as it were half way to meeting Mr. Krieg. That is the purpose of my proposal. I hope it receive support. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

1. See page 61.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, it shall not be said at the end of this debate that I was less conciliatory than Mr. Richter. I will do what I can to enable the Assembly to agree on an amendment.

With your permission, I shall divide my explanation into two, by dealing with each paragraph separately.

I admit that the present text of paragraph 6 of the recommendation — “Consider regularly and in the context of a European defence policy...” — may be considered somewhat restrictive. It implies that the Council would have to be seized of problems at regular intervals of two or three months. The text contains an ambiguity which should be eliminated. At first sight, therefore, I would not be opposed to deletion of the word “regularly”. But I would point out that, if we say nothing at all in this respect, we go to the other extreme: “Consider in the context of a European defence policy foreign policy matters affecting the defence of Western Europe...”.

Once they have been “considered”, what then?

Perhaps it might not be necessary ever to return to these problems; on the other hand, it might. And if they have been considered once, will the draft recommendation have been complied with?

I would like to propose to Mr. Richter and the others who signed his amendment a compromise solution. The text might read as follows: “Consider, *each time that this appears necessary* and in the context of a European defence policy...”.

This lays down absolutely nothing by way of fixed intervals but does enable problems to be taken up again as the occasion arises.

If Mr. Richter could agree, I would readily fall in with such an amendment of paragraph 6.

The problem related to paragraph 7 is somewhat different, but we should be able to reach an understanding on this too. Mr. Richter and others suggest replacing paragraph 7 by a draft which, at first sight, is almost identical, except that the order of words has been changed. However, if we look closely at the two texts, we see that in the amendment the word reactivation has been left out; I do not want to make a fuss about the omission but I just point out that, if

we vote for this amendment, we run the risk of being discourteous to Mr. Van Elslande who referred just now, from this rostrum, to the reactivation of the Standing Armaments Committee.

It is a subject we have discussed fifty times, and is still topical, that Mr. Van Elslande has just brought up again, after having done so in December 1974.

I repeat, I shall make no fuss if this deletion takes place, but I still think that if we throw away the idea of reactivation and adopt the amendment of Mr. Richter and others as it stands, we shall look as if we are disowning what Mr. Van Elslande said just now. I consider we should have no reason for doing so.

Having made this point, so far as I am concerned I shall, in the time-honoured phrase, rely upon the wisdom of the Assembly, to do as it thinks fit with the amendment by Mr. Richter and others.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Richter.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am prepared to accept paragraph 6, the compromise wording, put forward by the Rapporteur. I find it balanced. It is acceptable like that.

In paragraph 7 I have not omitted the word “reactivate”, but expanded it. I have found another way of expressing it. I speak of the tasks of the Standing Armaments Committee which must always be borne in mind. I think that that is a very precise statement and would like the vote to be on the text as I have formulated it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Since the Rapporteur has no objection to the first part of the amendment, there is no need to hold a separate vote on it.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — With my text, Mr. President?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Yes, I think it is less heavy and more accurate.

If there are no objections we shall not vote on the second part by sitting and standing.

Are there any objections? ...

There are. We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

The President (continued)

I remind you that the text proposed is, for paragraph 1, the draft proposed in extremis by Mr. Krieg and, for paragraph 2, the draft submitted by Mr. Richter and others.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The amendment is adopted.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation as a whole.

I call Mr. Peijnenburg.

Mr. PEIJNENBURG (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I would like a word on the order of voting, Mr. President. This morning, I moved that the first two paragraphs of the draft recommendation be deleted. Now I would like to ask you to put the first two paragraphs to the vote first, and then the remainder of the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Krieg.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — If I understand correctly this is an oral amendment proposing that the first two paragraphs be deleted.

I insist personally that they be adopted. The General Affairs Committee discussed them at considerable length and, at the cost of a great many compromises, finally agreed this text as one which was fairly, if not fully, satisfactory.

If these two paragraphs were deleted, it would alter the nature of the recommendation considerably and divert it from its purpose. I therefore ask the Assembly to retain paragraphs 1 and 2 of the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Leynen.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I support the Rapporteur.

During the discussion in Committee, I acted as spokesman for him when he was absent, and the Committee reached an honourable compromise, placing particular emphasis on the necessity for concerted action to be taken in NATO. That is why I do not support Mr. Peijnenburg's proposals but those of the Rapporteur.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Nevertheless, we shall vote since that is the rule.

I put the oral amendment, proposing deletion of paragraphs 1 and 2, to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The amendment is negatived.

I call Mr. Daillet.

Mr. DAILLET (*France*) (Translation). — I wish to explain my vote, Mr. President.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — I wish to speak on a point of order.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — On explanation of vote, a member cannot speak after a vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Daillet, Mr. Grieve has pointed out that in this House explanations of vote should be given after the vote. The procedure is not the same as in the French National Assembly where explanations have to be given before the vote. As you are a newcomer here, you are probably still unaware of some of our customs. You may speak, therefore, immediately after the vote. We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation as a whole. If there are any objections, we shall again vote by roll-call.

There are objections.

I therefore put the draft recommendation to the vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mrs. Wolf.

The voting is open.

(*A vote by roll-call was then taken*)

Does any other Representative wish to vote ? ...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows ¹ :

Number of votes cast	66
Ayes	52
Noes	7
Abstentions	7

The draft recommendation is therefore adopted ².

1. See page 55.

2. See page 63.

The President (continued)

Mr. Daillet, I have learnt that what I told you about procedure needs to be slightly corrected. Our procedure is not the same as the Council of Europe's; explanations of vote may be given either before or after the vote. So the next time we shall not go into these procedural details and you may speak before the vote if you wish.

You have the floor, Mr. Daillet.

Mr. DAILLET (*France*) (Translation). — I would like to say briefly how well I understood Mr. Krieg's disappointment this morning at the meagre debate on his report, whereas it deserved a far more detailed discussion.

A number of speeches, including that of the Rapporteur, brought out an important fact: the change of outlook on European defence problems, particularly in France and Federal Germany.

However, some other speeches showed that certain sectors of opinion in other countries had regrettably — and, I hope, temporarily — failed to notice this trend and indulged in some rather out-of-date questioning of motives.

To sum up, I would like to impress upon our colleagues from certain countries that they are well behind the times. It is clear to me that for some time now the French Government's will to achieve European union has been above suspicion.

7. Relations with Parliaments

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 665)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the twelfth half-yearly report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 665.

I call Mr. Radius to submit the Committee's report in place of Mr. Delorme, who is unable to be present.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, since Mr. Delorme is unable to attend, I have been asked to present in his place the information report he has prepared on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

As usual, the report is in two parts, the first reviewing reports on the activities of Western European Union submitted to the parliaments of member countries by their respective governments and reports on the activities of the Assembly submitted by delegations to their own parliaments, and the second analysing parliamentary action on Assembly recommendations.

It is unnecessary to emphasise the importance of both in bringing our institution and the problems with which it deals to the notice of a public not always very well informed regarding the activities of international parliamentary assemblies.

You will remember that at the December 1974 session the Assembly adopted Recommendation 258 urging governments to report, during debates on foreign policy by their parliaments, on their position on matters considered by the Council or Assembly of WEU and the action they intend to take on Assembly recommendations.

On the basis of this recommendation, Mr. Delorme wrote to the seven Chairmen of delegations asking what action the governments were taking upon it.

I am bound to point out that only two delegations have replied to Mr. Delorme's request. However, two other countries have also issued a report on WEU activities. In addition, the parliamentary delegations of both countries have reported on the activities of the Assembly.

I do not need to remind you of the importance which the Committee for Relations with Parliaments attaches to the implementation of Recommendation 258, nor to impress upon heads of national delegations and their fellow members that they should urge their respective governments to proceed with its implementation as rapidly as possible.

A table appended to this report, indicating the action taken by governments on recommendations adopted by the Assembly, shows that, whereas the number of interventions reached a very acceptable level in 1968, figures since seem to have fallen off. It will be seen that, in 1968, 126 questions were put to governments but that by 1972 the number had fallen to 10. Since then, there seems to have been a slight increase with 13 questions being put in 1973 and 16 in 1974. Ten questions have already been put during the first months of 1975.

Mr. Radius (continued)

The Committee therefore requests all members of the Assembly to prepare and make interventions, particularly in the form of written questions, on matters dealt with during our session. It is prepared to supply any technical support they may require for the purpose.

I think that these few remarks are a faithful summary of Mr. Delorme's report.

During a period in which the WEU Council's activities have dwindled, it is essential, if we wish our institution to survive, that the Assembly should take over this task and constantly appeal to governments to review all the problems raised by the implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly by inviting them to state their views on recommendations adopted by the Assembly.

There can be no question of any duplication between questions put to a national government in a national parliament to ascertain the particular country's situation, and written questions put to the Council in order to elicit, as in the case of replies to recommendations, the extent to which unanimity has been achieved among the seven.

I think therefore that I can conclude my presentation of Mr. Delorme's report by asking you to increase the number of such questions. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Cordle.

Mr. CORDLE (*United Kingdom*). — I feel very honoured in being called to speak now, and I am very grateful for the opportunity of following Mr. Radius.

In this twenty-first ordinary session of WEU we have had hammered home afresh the vital need of maintaining absolute cohesion in our special rôle of defence. Our treaty of 1954, with its serious obligations, is more than ever a matter of concern to millions of people in these days when communism is on the increase, and when through economic pressures defence budgets are being reduced rather than increased on the entirely false premise that détente can be the better served by this regrettable action — which is rubbish, of course.

Mr. Delorme's report makes a noble attempt to provide a stronger structure for WEU relations with national member parliaments, and I

was sorry that the United Kingdom made no text contribution relating to action taken in national parliaments in implementation of recommendations adopted by the Assembly, and on my return to the United Kingdom I propose asking why such an omission occurred.

After all, our work here is of great interest and concern to many, and the taxpayer has a right to know what his money is being spent on and how the elected representatives are carrying out the important rôle of the treaty in the field of defence, science and technology. One thing certain is that if we look to our national press we will look in vain for the publicity we deserve. I very much doubt if the great and remarkable speech delivered here by General Haig on Tuesday will be given more than a few lines or a modest article, if that, in our national press.

We must, therefore, pose ourselves the question: what can we really do to make known all our recommendations to the people, but in particular to the national parliaments? Paragraph 3 uses the words "urged the governments of member countries" to present a report during debates on foreign policy, etc. But to "urge" is obviously not enough, and a stronger structure should be found if the work of WEU is to be known. Dare I say that public relations in the United Kingdom vis-à-vis WEU are abysmally low and must be corrected?

I was delighted to see in the Order Paper of our House of Commons on 21st May a motion in the names of Mr. Raymond Fletcher and Sir John Rodgers in the following terms: "That this House, which has since July 1955 been represented by a delegation of United Kingdom members in the Assembly of Western European Union, congratulates the Assembly on its twentieth anniversary which it will celebrate in Bonn on 26th May and reaffirms its own commitment to the Brussels Treaty as a safeguard of the defence of Western Europe."

I suggest that a direct approach be made to member parliaments to agree to a formula which can at least provide national parliaments with constant and continuing information. Perhaps a special committee could be set up in the national parliaments which would receive a report from each delegate and, in its turn, report to the national parliament as soon as convenient following the WEU session. This would have two effects: the proceedings would be printed in the official record, and the press and public

Mr. Cordle (continued)

would be able to view and study the work in detail. Each parliament could then follow this by setting aside a full day for a WEU debate, and in this way both members and electorate would be better informed.

If such a procedure had been in force when our government recently decided to cut back on its defence budget, I doubt whether it could have done so, as members and the electorate would have been fully aware of the present dangers facing the western world. Had they heard General Haig's firm words and clear exposition, such a reduction in man- and weapon-power could not have been contemplated, let alone put into effect. I hope, therefore, that a procedure can be devised which will be acceptable to all members of parliament and which can provide a forum for the publicity which WEU requires if it is to do its work properly.

Also relative to Mr. Delorme's excellent report is the need for the better use of Chairmen of Committees, perhaps not Chairmen of all Committees but those who, with their specialised knowledge, could address national parliamentary committees and undertake the new rôle of regular visits to each country to explain and advise on WEU and its recommendations.

Perhaps the time has arrived for an all-party defence committee in the United Kingdom Parliament, superseding the present arrangements for defence to be discussed only through the Estimates Committee.

Following the referendum battle, which ends on 5th June, and which I firmly believe will be in favour of the United Kingdom remaining in the EEC, much can be done in correcting the balance in the party representatives, thereby giving a much greater stimulus to better relations between all European organisations. Relations with parliaments outside Europe should also be a matter for further discussion, since the Assembly will remember that Mr. Ford, the President of the United States, said recently that his country was going to maintain its leadership on a world-wide basis, that it wanted its friends to know that it would stand by them, and that it wanted any adversaries to know that it would stand up to them. This infers a closer relationship than exists at the present time. Nothing but good would come if our ranks were swelled by selected Congressmen who would be not only observers but advisers too.

We are well aware who are our economic masters today. Through their oil resources, they continue to influence all our lives. Ought we not to make sure that they are fully aware of the rôle we play and its influence on their own position in the event of crisis and combat? Where our confidence lies, there we should seek a closer relationship. Surely our confidence must be, and indeed is, with our friends in the Middle East and America. Greater security is to be found in an outward-looking WEU, not in one which is concerned only with its own areas. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the Committee, Mrs. Miotti Carli.

Mrs. MIOTTI CARLI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like first of all to thank Mr. Delorme, our Committee's Rapporteur, for the estimable work accomplished and contributed by him towards making the proceedings of the WEU Assembly known in the parliaments of the member countries. I also thank Mr. Radius, deputy Chairman of the Committee I have the honour to preside over, for having so splendidly presented our colleague's report.

May I also thank most warmly Mr. Borcier for his study entitled "The Assembly of Western European Union" which set out to illustrate the part played by this body in the defence and construction of Europe during these two decades 1955-75, which we are gathered together to celebrate today, here in Bonn, in the warm and hospitable framework of the Bundeshaus, as guests of the Federal German Republic, which has treated us with such exquisite courtesy and kindness.

Nor can I overlook, Mr. President, the valuable contribution you yourself have made during your year of office, and are ready to go on making, towards the attainment of the aims of our Assembly, both in your daily tasks and in the stimulating criticisms you have made of Mr. Borcier's book, with your sensitive and realistic comments bringing out our positive achievements and indicating, fearlessly and with wise perspicacity, the objective limitations encountered by the Assembly.

I think that only a few remarks will serve to characterise the tasks assigned to our Committee, and the activities by it for carrying them out as efficiently as possible.

Mrs. Miotti Carli (continued)

In the climate of uncertainty besetting WEU as an institution — which we ignore at our own peril — I believe it essential to emphasise the urgent need to regain a margin of credibility and efficacy by disseminating the results of our activities through appropriate contacts with the parliamentary institutions of the seven member countries and using the mass media to publicise the short- and long-term goals which WEU has set itself; the difficulties which the economic downturn has created for the West in Europe and overseas, afford an opportunity for WEU to reactivate the plan for cohesion and unity in order to ensure, thanks to the political stability of the industrialised West, the preconditions for triggering balanced economic growth as an indispensable prerequisite for a peaceful and secure future.

This very demand for security, which we wish to attain for the member countries but is obviously an option that is not available on a planetary scale, may at this precise difficult juncture, almost paradoxically as I may say, set in train an activity that will confer upon WEU new vitality and a new purpose which, twenty years on, now appear to be confined to the narrow limits of routine contacts which do not detract from, but add nothing to, the degree of integration secured in the western world by the laws of a market economy and the social and political habits of the free world.

I attach particular importance to stressing that the future of our house is, in the last resort, in the hands of our peoples, the industrious citizens, more and more keenly aware that the prosperity and security of their own livelihoods are only safeguarded by the general political commitment to ensure the stability of our institutions and efficiency of their defence, both against internal threats that are serious and disquieting, and any external ones that, God forbid, are about to loom over us.

The Committee for Relations with Parliaments feels strongly impelled to convey to democratic public opinion in our countries the ideals and intentions WEU is capable of setting down on paper by what has proved at times an invaluable work of synthesis. The tangible success of its endeavour, which I can with a good conscience corroborate to you, lies in the hands of us all, and I am sure we shall not wish to let slip any oppor-

tunity of making ourselves known and attracting ever-growing public interest. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — There are no more speakers, and the Chairman has summed up.

The Assembly takes note of the Committee's report, presented by Mr. Radius in place of Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee.

8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow afternoon, Thursday 29th May, at 3 p.m. I would remind you that tomorrow is a public holiday in the Federal Republic, but that our colleagues of the German Delegation and the Bundestag are making an exception so as to enable us to meet. We thank them once again for doing so, for it would have interrupted our proceedings for too long.

The orders of the Day are as follows :

1. Address by Mr. Hattersley, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
2. Co-operation with the United States (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 669 and Amendments).
3. Address by Mr. Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
4. The European aeronautical industry and civil aviation (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 674).

Are there any objections ? ...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ? ...

The Sitting is closed.

(*The Sitting was closed at 6.20 p.m.*)

SEVENTH SITTING

Thursday, 29th May 1975

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Address by Mr. Hattersley, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Fletcher (for Mr. Hattersley, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom).
4. Address by Mr. Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Moersch (Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany).
Replies by Mr. Moersch to questions put by: Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. de Koster, Mr. Bettiol.
5. Co-operation with the United States (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 669 and Amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. de Koster (Rapporteur), Mr. Bettiol, Mr. Piket, Mr. Reale, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. de Montesquiou (on a point of order), Mr. Radius, Mr. Sieglerschmidt.
6. The European aeronautical industry and civil aviation (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 674*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. de Montesquiou (Chairman of the Committee, on a point of order), Mr. Valleix (Rapporteur), Mr. Warren (Rapporteur), Mr. Cornelissen, Mr. Brown, Mr. Boucheny, Mr. Carter, Mr. van Ooijen, Mr. de Bruyne.
7. Adjournment of the Session.

The Sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Address by Mr. Hattersley, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I regret to inform the Assembly that Mr. Roy Hattersley,

Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, is unable to be present because of ill-health.

On behalf of the Assembly, I convey our deepest sympathy to Mr. Hattersley and will send him our best wishes for a speedy recovery.

Fortunately we have received a copy of the speech which Mr. Hattersley was to deliver, and I have asked the Chairman of the United Kingdom Delegation, Mr. Fletcher, to read it to us.

I call Mr. Fletcher.

Mr. FLETCHER (*United Kingdom*). — Before I begin my acting performance as a Minister of the British Government, may I state on my own behalf that we of the United Kingdom Delegation are very grateful to you, Mr. President, for allowing this speech to be read into the record. It was not at our request that this was done. This gesture of friendship will not go unnoticed in London. We of the British Delegation will see to that.

Quite obviously, not being a member of the British Government, and sometimes not even a supporter of the British Government — although I belong to the government party — I cannot answer questions. Therefore, those who know my

1. See page 66.

Mr. Fletcher (continued)

good friend, Mr. Hattersley, will now have to make the visual assumption that I am speaking not only for him but as him.

"Mr. President, I am most grateful to you for this opportunity to speak to the Assembly during its historic session here in Bonn. I am very conscious of the valuable contribution which the Assembly makes to the improvement of understanding among Western European countries, and to the formation of informed public opinion on external political and defence matters. I have no doubt that the debate on European security which took place two days ago continued that process and I very much regret that I was not able to be here to take part in it. But I make no apologies for returning to the subject today, for its importance cannot be overstressed.

It is increasingly believed that the cold war is largely a thing of the past. In one sense it is. We have gone thirty years now without a major war in Europe, and so have proved we can live peacefully among ourselves. All men and women of good will should rejoice in that. But it is important to keep even good news in perspective.

Of course, the prospects for lasting peace are on the whole much better than they were thirty years ago. But the very progress we have made brings its own risks. *Détente* has become a fashionable concept, and we talk easily nowadays about living in an age of *détente* without perhaps always being clear what we mean. It is worth remembering that when General de Gaulle coined the phrase *détente, entente et coopération* he envisaged *détente* as only the first stage in a process. We regard the word as embracing such concepts as the relaxing of tension and the cultivation of better relationships. But tension can always grow again: and the warmest friendships can cool.

Fortunately there remains, among member governments of the Atlantic Alliance, a full awareness of the threat which still faces us and a strong determination to maintain a defence effort capable of meeting it. I am sure that the Heads of Government of NATO member countries, who are assembling in Brussels today, will make this clear at their meeting. I attach particular importance to the fact that President Ford has come to Europe to attend the meeting. We have all heard it argued in recent weeks that the setbacks suffered by the Americans in Indo-China will have lessened their readiness to

come to the assistance of their European allies. I do not believe it. The American commitment to the defence of Europe remains as strong as it was when Western European Union came into being. In his message to the member countries of the WEU on 10th March 1955, President Eisenhower reaffirmed in the clearest terms his country's willingness to participate in NATO affairs, to continue to station forces in Europe and "to regard any action from whatever quarter which threatens the integrity or unity of the Western European Union as a threat to the security of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty calling for consultation in accordance with Article 4 of that treaty". I have no doubt that President Ford will speak in the same sense today — and he will do so with the support of Congress which only last week voted by 311 to 95 against a proposal to reduce American troop strength overseas over the next fifteen months.

Political will and determination are the rock on which our defence policy must be built. But they are only the foundation. From will and determination real results must grow. The threat itself is real enough. Whatever the Soviet Union says about its pursuit of *détente* — and I make no attempt here to interpret its intentions — the fact is that over the past five years it has improved and increased the capability of its conventional forces to a much greater extent than in any previous five-year period in peacetime. The Warsaw Pact now faces the Alliance with a marked superiority in manpower and conventional weapons. In Central Europe, for example, it has a 30 to 40 % superiority in fighting units, and an advantage of over two-and-a-quarter to one in tanks. The Soviet Union has emerged as a maritime superpower with a large, modern, well-equipped fleet, which has expanded out of all proportion to Soviet seaborne trade. Warsaw Pact air force and missile systems have also been improved, particularly through the introduction of technologically advanced multi-rôle aircraft. And meanwhile, the Soviet Union has achieved rough strategic nuclear parity with the United States and continues to develop its strategic armoury.

The West's ultimate deterrent against strategic nuclear attack is its strategic nuclear forces. But in a period of strategic parity, strategic nuclear forces are not necessarily a credible deterrent against lower levels of aggression. So we have to make available, and to deploy, credible numbers of conventional and tactical nuclear weapons, as well as the forces to make use of

Mr. Fletcher (continued)

them. For democratic governments in a period of world inflation this is not an easy task. The costs of developing, producing, maintaining and operating armaments and equipment are rising constantly. At the same time, our national economies are coming under strain, and we are under greater pressure than for many years to reduce our defence budgets. The British Government is suffering as severely as any from these pressures and has, as you know, decided that it must reduce its defence spending for the next few years below the levels originally planned, and must keep that spending to an essential minimum. But even at its reduced levels, our defence expenditure will still represent a higher percentage of GNP than that presently spent by any of the countries represented here today. Moreover, we have kept in mind, in reviewing our defence programme, the essential rôle of NATO in our own security. We have made most of our savings outside the NATO area and have concentrated our national defence effort to a greater extent than ever before on our contribution to the Alliance.

We must nevertheless face the fact that for all of us money will continue to be short. Our duty is to make our limited defence budgets go further. Compared with the Warsaw Pact, NATO has a poor record in defence cost-efficiency, and there is no doubt that we can do better than we have done in making use of our resources.

NATO is already studying ways of rationalising defence tasks, of promoting greater flexibility in the use of forces, and — perhaps the most important field for improvement — of standardising defence equipment. At present, there is a good deal of duplication in research and development, as well as in production. This is a difficult problem, since defence industries play a crucial rôle in many countries' economies, and buying foreign equipment can aggravate already considerable balance-of-payments difficulties. I am glad to say that Britain has taken a substantial initiative in this field. At the Eurogroup ministerial meeting on 6th May in London, the British Defence Secretary, Roy Mason, obtained the agreement of his colleagues to the idea of a "two-way street" in defence equipment procurement with the United States whereby the Americans and the Europeans would each agree on a target figure for reciprocal procurement on defence equipment over a certain period of time.

This idea has been subsequently welcomed by Dr. Schlesinger in the course of a very valuable discussion which took place in last week's meeting of the Defence Planning Committee in Brussels. We believe that, if it is successfully followed up, it will be an important step in making the best use of NATO's resources.

On the whole, therefore, I am optimistic about the prospects of our being able to continue to provide a credible defence and deterrent against threats to Western Europe. But the task will be considerably eased if we can develop the process of thawing out the cold war and bring it to a point where we really can afford to spend less on our own defence.

The ice has, of course, been melting now for some years. I suppose that the process began after the Cuba missile crisis in 1962, though it was not until the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1971 that the Russians formally committed themselves to a policy of relaxing tension and of expanding relations in the West. Politically, the United States and the Soviet Union have developed a super-power relationship to which both clearly attach importance, and which provides the essential starting point for détente in other fields. The *Ostpolitik* of Chancellor Brandt has led to a successful restoration of relations between the two parts of Germany and has helped greatly to reduce tension in the heart of Europe. And in the military sphere, the two superpowers have begun the long, slow process of limiting strategic nuclear weapons.

We in Western Europe are currently engaged in two sets of negotiations which are part of this process. One is the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, the working stage of which has been in progress for nearly three years in Geneva, and which is essentially about political, rather than military security.

The main aim of this conference is to increase mutual confidence throughout the continent. Western participants have been concerned that it should not merely endorse the *status quo* in Europe, with its remaining tensions and imperfections, but should establish a framework in which further barriers can be dismantled and greater understanding promoted. We want, for example, less secrecy about each other's military manoeuvres in peacetime, fewer obstacles to contacts between individuals between East and West, and freer flow of information about each other's countries and way of life. There is still some way

Mr. Fletcher (continued)

to go before we achieve these objectives. But the conference has made some real progress, and I hope we can produce results which will justify holding the final stage of the conference at summit level very soon.

In advancing the process of détente beyond this point we must have two main objectives. One is to ensure that the decisions agreed upon in the CSCE are effectively implemented in and by all participating countries. Unless this happens, the political climate in Europe is unlikely to improve.

The other is to make progress in military détente by achieving some reduction in forces in Central Europe through the MBFR negotiations in Vienna. We have always believed that if there is to be any lasting improvement in the political relationship between East and West in Europe we must reduce the level of military confrontation between the two sides, though without diminishing the security of any of the countries concerned. In our view, it is the Warsaw Pact's superiority in ground force manpower which most threatens the stability of Europe. This is why we on the western side have proposed that the talks should result in the establishment of a common ceiling on the total number of ground forces on both sides. The Warsaw Pact, by contrast, has proposed reductions in all the forces of all the direct participants in the talks by equal numbers or equal percentages. This is a proposal which we can hardly accept as satisfactory, since it would perpetuate the present imbalance in ground forces and would weaken security in Central Europe rather than strengthen it.

This fundamental difference in the present positions of East and West is the reason why the MBFR talks, though they started soon after the beginning of the CSCE, have not made anything like the same degree of progress as that conference. It would perhaps have been surprising if, after so many years of mutual suspicion, it had been possible to reconcile the approaches of the two sides without long and difficult negotiations. Nevertheless, we believe that on both sides there is a will to succeed and a determination to build a safer Europe, and we hope that, once we no longer have to concentrate our minds to the same extent on the CSCE, we shall be able to start making progress in Vienna. In this way, we hope to be able to achieve the reductions in our forces which we cannot afford to make unilaterally.

I began this speech by disagreeing with those who say that the threat to our security scarcely exists any longer. The threat does indeed exist, in the growing military might of our eastern neighbours, whatever peaceful intentions they profess, and we shall do well to trust in ourselves, not in Providence or in other people, to defend us against it. But equally, I think it is possible to be too pessimistic about our prospects of containing it. If we can maintain the present level of our defence effort and develop the political cohesion to which we are now accustomed among the members both of the European Community and of the Atlantic Alliance, we shall remain strong enough to deter any likely attacker. And we can, and must, use that strength to negotiate for the climate of greater confidence and security in Europe to which the Russians and their allies, too, are committed."

In my own person, Mr. President, I thank you once again for permitting the British Delegation, through me, to read that speech into the record. I deeply regret that I cannot both answer questions and ask one or two myself. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Fletcher, for reading Mr. Hattersley's speech.

Obviously, as he concluded by telling you, he is not qualified to reply to any questions which might have been put to the Minister had the latter been present.

We all renew our best wishes to Mr. Hattersley and hope to see him fit again at our next session. I would particularly ask Mr. Fletcher to convey this message on behalf of all of us.

4. Address by Mr. Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I am glad to see that Mr. Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, is present.

We all know Mr. Moersch, and he knows WEU well, for having already taken part in our proceedings and having received us on a number of different occasions.

We shall listen to him most attentively. He has already said he is prepared to reply to any questions which may be put.

The President (continued)

I invite Mr. Moersch to come to the rostrum.

Mr. MOERSCH (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I feel myself greatly honoured at being able, on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, to offer a brief comment on the report made by Mr. de Koster in Document 669. I may say that on major points the Federal Government's view is totally in accord with that of the Rapporteur. We are grateful for this down-to-earth assessment of present and future relations between the United States and Europe, and for the reference to the knowledge needed of the background and the experience that has shaped present-day American public opinion — a public opinion that is very powerful, a force to be reckoned with, one that has its influence on the decisions of the American Administration.

We are therefore especially glad to see this review by Mr. de Koster, which besides providing a thorough historical analysis also offers the great merit of spelling out the current situation ; spelling out both the political military situation and the situation in the economic sphere, which was of course in a way — and it might be well to recall the fact — the starting-point for American thinking on Europe after the second world war. The political and military situation was the consequence, rather than the beginning ; the United States economic thinking — the Administration was under President Truman, with Foreign Secretary Marshall — formed the starting-point. At that time, it was quite correctly felt in the United States — as Mr. de Koster has told us — that this Europe of ours needed help if it was to help itself. And help was given generously ; we Europeans have reason to be grateful for it.

I find no difficulty at all in endorsing the conclusions of Mr. de Koster's report, though perhaps with one small limitation — my faith in the opportunities for tangible progress in European unification within a not too distant future is perhaps rather more marked than his. There are only one or two points on which I want to lay stress in speaking to you, the specially important thing for me being a realistic assessment of the situation in which Europe and the United States are placed today, one that will serve as a base for making our political decisions in the future.

I believe that any survey of European-American relations must proceed from the fact that the United States has remained, even over the last few years, and will remain, the undisputed leading western power. The United States has kept, in the Atlantic Community, the preponderance it has enjoyed since the end of the war. NATO is, under the American nuclear shield, the basis of our shared military security — that is to say, the military security of the West as a whole.

In saying this we must keep in mind that the United States has over the past three years been going through, and is still going through, times of great upheaval. Though in the 1950s and through into the 1960s American domestic and foreign policies bore the stamp of what we here in Europe called the "missionary" phase, of world-wide commitment, a world-wide providing of political, military and economic assistance wherever it seemed to be needed, now after the heavy burden of Vietnam there has for some time past — and more keenly today — been growing awareness in the United States of having over-committed itself ; and a feeling that this over-commitment must be whittled down.

Briefly, the process I have just outlined is one that has very substantial economic, social and internal political consequences in the United States which can also be felt particularly in Europe. The effects on public opinion in the United States have been especially lasting. This is being reflected in Congress, and in a deep discussion about the capacity of democracy and its institutions to function effectively. To judge by recent observations in the United States I might even go a step further, and say that I believe the Americans are beginning to wonder whether their constitution — which came into being in America when there was no wide-ranging policy of any kind towards the world outside — is, with its provisions for checks and balances, really up to coping with a rôle in world politics ; whether it ought not to be, as it were, adapted to meet the United States' new responsibilities.

At the present stage the results of this discussion going on within America are not clear ; the radical changes, in particular, have not yet been decided. The outcome could be a plunge into crisis, or emergence healed from the experience. One thing, however, is quite certain : there is no doubt whatsoever, either at home or abroad, about the impressive regenerative powers of the United States, its capacity to regenerate from its

Mr. Moersch (continued)

own, internal strength. We have often, in the past, had cause to admire this capacity of the United States to discuss its own problems keenly and then draw the consequences necessary for improvement.

Yet all these shifts in home and foreign policy in the United States position have, indisputably, left one major aspect totally unaltered — the American ties with Western Europe. In none of the discussions in the United States has any headway been made with the idea of turning away from Europe or from NATO. The American commitment to Europe has been fully maintained, and has kept its priority. Any comparisons made between events in South-East Asia and the American-European relationship are false, and cannot lead to sensible conclusions.

At the same time, the concentration of major American effort and attention in areas outside Europe has led to America paying, for a time, somewhat less heed to European developments than used to be the case in the 1950s and early 1960s; and this during a period that was especially important and urgent in the process of uniting Europe, more important than it had ever been since the fifties — the years of incipient political co-operation. There were, for example, the European conferences in The Hague, Paris and Copenhagen. At the same time these were the years of the expansion of the European Community through the accession of Britain, Ireland and Denmark on 1st January 1973. This situation in the United States, and the simultaneous developments in Europe, have now given rise to a mass of problems stemming from too little mutual willingness to understand the difficulties being faced in this or that sector of the Atlantic Alliance.

There is a further factor that has undoubtedly exacerbated the difficulties, one that Mr. de Koster has mentioned — the growing economic power of the European Community, and the deteriorating economic position of the United States. There has on the one hand been on the American side — and this cannot be disputed — a lack of confidence in the goodwill of the Europeans; while on the other the Europeans have mistrusted American willingness to consult and come to agreement on political issues affecting both sides. Finally, there has been the Middle East war of October 1973, sparking off the energy crisis among the industrial nations of the West. This conflict was, in turn, followed by

the equally serious problem of supplies of raw materials in general — involving both shortages and rising prices — with all the consequences this brings for industrial countries that rely heavily on raw material imports.

The results of this we know. There has, fortunately, been a growing realisation of European-American interdependence, but at the same time a clear realisation that this is going to pose long-term problems that will take a great deal of solving. It has become clear, too, that though a move has been made along the road towards Western Europe being able to play a part in the political counsels of the world, there is still a long and difficult way to go before this goal is reached.

I would like, therefore, to say a few words about where the process of European unification stands today. Undoubtedly things over the past few years have not gone according to the original plan. A milestone was the achieving of a common market, as the term was intended in the Treaty of Rome, in 1970 after the summit conference at The Hague. The main project then mapped out for achievement during the 1970s was economic and monetary union. This was meant to bring, by the end of the seventies, significant transfers of sovereignty to the organs of the Community; the simultaneous setting-up of a political union, with wide areas of responsibility for the central power — a kind of, if you like, European Government — would be an urgent necessity if only as a consequence of the economic co-operation and the co-ordination of monetary and economic decision-making. Alongside this, the expansion of the Community from six to, initially, ten members presented a task that does not alter the nature of the process of unification, but should widen and at the same time strengthen its base.

The first summit conference of what was then ten member countries, in October 1972, set out the ambitious programme we know today, one matching the new dimensions of the expanded Community. The central political outcome of this Paris conference was the decision to set up a European union “before the end of the present decade”. An undisturbed carrying-through of these plans for what was termed at the time the second stage in the process of unification would have reached the goals that, in a policy towards Europe, have been a target for all governments in the Federal Republic — bringing the strengths of the old continent together in a shared economic and political structure in order to ensure

Mr. Moersch (continued)

peace and liberty, prosperity and independence for Europe, in close partnership with the United States, within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, and with the possibility of providing effective friendship and assistance to the countries of the third world. That, I say again, was what we had in mind, and that is our concept today.

Despite the changed circumstances that have since come about, these basic options from the early 1970s — economic and monetary union and European political union — are still the major goals for the Federal Republic of Germany.

There are many reasons why these objectives have not so far been achieved, and Mr. de Koster has listed the most important of them. I would like to comment further on some of them. These causes have been, and are, beyond the influence of the Community, and its member States, alone ; this is especially true of the world-wide changes in the economic and monetary scene, where we can find the right answers only together with, co-ordinated with or at least in company with, others. As you will know we are trying to find these answers in OECD and the International Energy Agency. Very recently, these attempts have crystallised and have, as I hope and believe, brought us all a step forward.

Other burdens facing the Community we shall have to cope with on our own, such as the question of British membership. Here the Community has, in a very difficult phase in the negotiations, given proof of a degree of flexibility that will, I believe, be crucial in keeping it together in the future. The British referendum is only just over a week ahead, and we hope the outcome will be positive. When this is over the question of the cohesion of the enlarged Community should, however, be seen as settled once and for all : we need to enter a phase of active consolidation and continued development. We see the announcement that France is to return to the currency snake as an encouraging sign. One of the most important steps that must be taken is to give the Europe of the Nine the democratic basis it is still lacking and to which all the member countries individually are committed. Even if they were not, they would be bound by reason of their own histories of democracy to insist on there being this democratic foundation.

When we look at the overall political situation as it is today, one can have no doubt at all that progress towards European unification is urgently needed. A politically united Europe will be a politically and economically stronger Europe, and by the same token a Europe able to operate its defence policy more effectively. The speech by our British colleague Mr. Hattersley, read out a moment ago, very rightly made this point. Greater effectiveness on the part of Europe would inevitably strengthen the Alliance as a whole. Welding together the strength of Europe would also bring about a better balance in the interplay of political forces in the world. A Europe moving towards unity will be better placed to negotiate, more independent and more self-possessed. With this will grow the ability to shoulder the responsibility that many people in the world look to us Europeans to carry. In this way, especially, Europe could become a far more effective and worthwhile partner for the United States than it has been hitherto.

For the rest — and this can be said as we make a realistic assessment of the years that have passed — we should not underestimate the growing number of items standing to our credit in the European balance-sheet. At the present time the foundations for a common foreign policy are being laid in the activities of the European Community and in European political co-operation : little by little these foundations are developing. Here, the decision at the Paris summit conference in December 1974 that in future the Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers would meet at least three times a year offers a good chance of arriving at a single political will and making concrete progress in the process of unification.

Quite aside from the concrete decisions that are reached at meetings such as these, we should not underestimate the importance of the fact that the political figures who carry responsibility in the nine member States are bound, when they meet, to exchange their individual views on the situation ; each comes to understand better how the others think, and in their negotiations on current problems they as it were almost imperceptibly harmonise their approaches.

What will matter in the future is for the European countries to succeed in making clear, by their actions, how firmly their growing unity is a basic factor in world politics. This will not mean aiming to produce a self-contained entity, nor to form a bloc — rather a grouping together

Mr. Moersch (continued)

of forces, which will be in the interests of the United States as well. This grouping will help to bring stability, equilibrium and, with it, peace and an opportunity for greater freedom in this world of ours.

The Ottawa declaration underlined the importance of European unification for the Atlantic Alliance. There is no doubt whatsoever in the mind of the Federal Government that the policy of détente being pursued by East and West can come to fruition only on the two preconditions of an effective alliance and continuing European unification. We are happy to see that for the American Administration the close of the era of Vietnam is, first and foremost, providing the stimulus for the West to concentrate on the tasks that face it in the future. The meeting in Brussels has been superb proof of this, and Mr. Hattersley's speech already made reference to it. The Atlantic link is today increasingly the strongest and surest external obligation the United States has. Not least among the reasons for this is the fact that American national interests demand a close politico-military and economic exchange, and close politico-military and economic co-operation, with Western Europe. There are many people in America who are aware of this mutual dependence.

The Americans have talked about the lesson of Vietnam. This means, as we understand it, first of all the strengthening and widening of the West's military alliance — which is exactly what the NATO summit meeting in Brussels today and tomorrow is all about; and secondly it means examining the possibilities for a more intensive political dialogue on all major issues, together with joint preparations of the positions to be taken up during the coming world-wide talks on the problems of energy and raw materials in general. This is the purpose of co-operation, in creating a new economic system for the world. Not a totally different system, but one built on the same principles that in the past have, I believe, made real social and economic progress possible; a system, in fact, in which both the industrial nations and the countries that supply the raw materials will enjoy their fair share; a system, in short, based not on confrontation but on co-operation to the benefit of all.

We can see, furthermore, that as the United States shows greater selectiveness in its external relations the priority given to the Atlantic ties

is not being disputed. It is the special duty of those who carry political responsibility — of parliamentarians — to make a realistic assessment of the balance of world forces, and to do what is necessary to see that we do not become the plaything of these forces: to see that we can have our say in shaping events in the way we want. The efforts being made by the nine States of Europe to achieve unity and co-operation serve the aim of building a firm base for action, one that will give the peoples of Western Europe — not just the members of the European Community — a chance in the future of playing an active part in the political decisions that will determine their fate.

Fitting the policy of European unification into an existing alliance in which the United States plays a special rôle requires very careful steering. The way we develop, and what our future is to be, will depend very largely on how skilfully this is done. I am glad indeed to see that the debates of the Assembly bear out this general consensus. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Moersch has agreed to answer questions. I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, I have listened with interest to your observations and have nothing to add, because by and large I am in agreement with you — and that will not surprise you. But I noted that in what you had to say, after all concerned had already said so much about Western European Union at the beginning of our session, you had — if I did not miss anything — mentioned Western European Union only briefly as you finished. I would be glad to know from you what rôle you allot to Western European Union and its Assembly in the concepts you have just developed.

(*Mr. Amrehn, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Moersch.

Mr. MOERSCH (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. Sieglerschmidt, you have rightly noticed that I have described what we might call the overall situation; I did so because I wished to avoid repetition after we had only last week in London explained our position on these matters at length. I can assure you that

Mr. Moersch (continued)

it is the Federal Government's view that the Assembly of Western European Union is a necessary and important forum in which to discuss questions of security policy in Western Europe, for there is no other parliamentary body which is in a position to discuss them. I can also tell you that it is the Federal Government's view that Western European Union should not only maintain in full the undertakings laid down in the treaty, but that these undertakings must continue in force without restriction. However — and this is no secret ; at any rate we have never hidden the fact — it is our view that active military co-operation is a matter for the Alliance, which was created for this purpose by all the members, I mean the Atlantic Alliance ; it is also our view that within the Atlantic Alliance Eurogroup has a special function in the co-operation of the European side, while the political cohesion of the Alliance involves Western European Union to the full even if we have endeavoured, in order to avoid duplication of effort after the introduction of European political co-operation — where the same partners are involved — to concentrate these European political groupings. That does not however mean that we would want to give up something which was established for the good of all.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Moersch.

I call Mr. de Koster.

Mr. de KOSTER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, I should like as a start to say how grateful I am to you for your interesting and positive comments on my report. I could not have put what you have said better myself.

I think you are perfectly right when you say that from time to time I am a little optimistic. But is it not right that parliamentarians should join together in an effort to constitute a driving force for governments? If we do not at some point do our best to ensure that things move forward somewhat faster, I do not of course believe that they have after all so much else to cope with than just those things about which we are enthusiastic. In connection with the possibilities of building Europe it is therefore up to us to seize the initiative whenever this is necessary.

Mr. President, I hope that we shall be given the Minister's speech in full. And it might be

better if my report were attached to this speech as an annex.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Minister's address will of course be published in full.

I call Mr. Moersch.

Mr. MOERSCH (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Perhaps, Mr. de Koster, it would be appropriate if at this point I were to say a further word on the rôle of parliamentarians as a driving force for governments, which is something you mentioned just now. I would in fact like to go a step further. After what has recently been happening in the United States, I am convinced that it is just not possible for governments to do their job soundly, that is, to have a successful foreign policy and security policy, unless the political acts and necessary decisions which they take are fully backed up by representatives with due and proper powers, in other words, by the elected parliaments ; I am also convinced that the conflicting interests of States can best be pinpointed and confronted in parliamentary discussion — better anyhow than in inevitably non-public talks and negotiations between governments. We need the dynamism of an active parliament to play its part in forming the awareness of common interests and common tasks. We can of course sense how necessary it is in, for instance, the European Community to strengthen the parliamentary element in order to set in motion the long-term processes of awareness which bring out the joint responsibility that exists in such a group of States and so contributes to continuity, despite changes of governments or other changes in individual States. Unless there are strong parliamentary links and a lively parliamentary pressure, we shall always be exposed to the risk that there could be abrupt changes of government in the States. If political decisions are firmly anchored in the parliamentary, and so directly democratic, sphere we shall have a much greater measure of continuity. And let me say, since you and I have been speaking of the particular changes that have taken place in America : I believe that in the long run it will indeed become more complicated to shape policy in America with greater attention to the foreign policy of Congress, but in the long run an element of security and continuity will also creep into this policy if there is a closer connection with bodies elected in parliamentary fashion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Bettiol.

Mr. BETTIOL (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would like to put to the Minister a question in connection with what is known as *Ostpolitik*. What today are the relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and red China? We have heard and read about one famous visit. Was this an official or a private visit? What, too, are the relations with white China? We know of course that economic relations between Formosa and Germany are very strong.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Moersch.

Mr. MOERSCH (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I should like as a start to say to Mr. Bettiol that in our terminology *Ostpolitik* covers the States of the Warsaw Pact. When we speak of China, we ought to use our accepted geographical definition and say "Far Eastern policy". We have established relations with this State. These relations are on the whole developing quite positively. Recently, too, there have been increased exchanges in the economic field and a growth in mutual interests.

I can comment on visits to Peking only if the visits are made by members of the government; other visits are, so to speak, beyond the ken of the Federal Government; the Federal Government cannot and should not make assessments of their value. As a parliamentarian you will understand that. That many Germans have been visiting China is evidence of a certain need to fill the gaps in information on this most populous State in the world which, we all know, had as it were cut itself off for many years from communication with the outside world. There is therefore nothing unusual about these visits; it seems to me, on the contrary, that they can in part be accounted for by the natural curiosity which every politician should feel. That is something, of course, which they share with journalists.

On the question of relations with Formosa I can say that the Federal Republic of Germany has never had relations with Formosa, and so has never recognised Formosa as a State; it has consequently been spared many difficult problems which other States have had to face in the last thirty years. The Federal Government can therefore give no answer to this

question, as it has no official relations with the State concerned.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anybody else wish to speak?...

The debate is closed.

(*The President continued in German*)

Mr. Minister, President Nessler has already thanked you warmly for addressing this Assembly today. I should like to repeat his thanks and to express particular appreciation for your readiness to answer questions and so, at the end of this sitting, to enrich the session we have held in Bonn. I thank you. (*Applause*)

5. Co-operation with the United States

(*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 669 and Amendments*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on co-operation with the United States and the vote on the draft recommendation, Document 669, to which there are so far two amendments.

I call Mr. de Koster, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. de KOSTER (*Netherlands*). — International policy is what the French call *une mer à boire*, "a sea to drink". When speaking about foreign policy, one feels like a mosquito in a nudist camp: one does not know where to start. Nowadays a speaker has at least to toss a scenario or two at his audience; indeed, he is expected to do so. The more sophisticated listener wants to be entertained in the year 2000-plus range, others will be impressed by 1990; nothing this side of 1980 will live up to expectations.

The scenario has to be carefully flavoured to the taste of the audience. Extremes should be avoided at all costs. A bright outlook will be rejected as totally unrealistic; a thoroughly gloomy scenario, even if it seems more realistic, could well lead to imprisonment — in non-member countries, of course. Ten years ago, most speeches had to refer to the Almighty; the letters of John have now been replaced by the report of the Club of Rome on the future dangers for our environment. In the United States, a recent Gallup poll indicated that the recycling

Mr. de Koster (continued)

of refuse now has a higher priority in thinking than has foreign relations. Public opinion shows a tendency to go to extremes, encouraged by the mass media. One day the war in Biafra is the subject of much political emotion ; soon after, it is difficult to find somebody who remembers where Biafra is.

You have found my scenario in the report, and I will now limit myself to a few comments. We are facing a process of rebalancing Atlantic co-operation. How much faith do we have in the promises and obligations which the United States had made and accepted? Has the security of Europe been vitally affected by the events in Vietnam? Is this a hypothetical question? If there is a change in the philosophy of the administration in Washington, will the President get continued authority from Congress? Does the United States continue to participate in an active way in world affairs or will it fall back into one of the periods of isolationism described in the report? The 56,000 dead and the countless wounded in the Vietnam war created understandable agonies. They were fighting against communism, communism armed mainly by the Soviet Union. I am happy that President Ford, arriving in Brussels yesterday, has reaffirmed the United States commitment to NATO, which, as he said, "is so vital to American well-being and security". The President stated that the Alliance remains the cornerstone of United States foreign policy and that reduction of tension with Eastern Europe can go forward only on the basis of a strong and secure Alliance.

We can be very happy with this statement. It takes away some of our hesitation. The United States will be doomed, whether it likes it or not, to play an active rôle in world politics in the coming decade. This will be in quite new circumstances, since it will no longer be the undisputed leader of the world, no longer unchallenged. There is a new military balance and changing economic conditions ; there is a changing national situation in the United States itself. But the world leader is able, a little hesitant still, to speak with one voice again. Europe could have become "a" world leader — although not "the" world leader — if we had also been able to speak with one voice on the Middle East, on Cyprus, on the energy crisis and on many other important items of foreign policy. We seem to be faced in Europe with an abundance of politicians, all struggling to win the next election,

because of very small majorities in parliaments. These politicians have to fight for the very last vote, and they have difficulty in becoming the statesmen who were so numerous in the postwar years.

The weakness of an increasing number of governments is that they have to try to take decisions which are based on a minority. On the other hand, I am convinced that this world has become too complicated to be governed by Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kissinger alone. Europe has to play its part.

In today's scenario it is essential to have a global view, with very strong lines of communication running between the countries of Western Europe and their allies, between Western Europe and Eastern Europe, and also from the United States to the Soviet Union as well as to Peking. Power, whether we like it or not, is still the dominant factor in world politics, economic power — the possession of scarce raw materials essential for the welfare State for both industrial societies and the third and fourth worlds — and military power. It seems that the possession of the nuclear deterrent is still a condition for acceptance as a permanent member of the Security Council.

Why, I ask myself, are we still spending billions of dollars on armaments? It is the lack of confidence and the lack of trust in each other's aims. There is no certainty in the minds of the Chinese that the Russians will not attack them. Peking hopes that NATO will be strong enough to withstand an attack by the Soviet Union not because it loves NATO but, if war were to break out, its hope is that there would be a very long struggle — something like a Greek drama.

China has a multitude of ideological problems. Public opinion had to accept that the aggressive feelings against the United States and Chiang Kai-shek nurtured during many years had been replaced by aggressive feelings against the Soviet Union without diluting the ideological purity. The first Charlemagne prize for the statesman who more than any other promoted European union should have been given to Stalin. Today Mao Tse-tung would be a very good candidate.

The Soviet Union is facing a period which in democratic countries would be called an election. It is common habit in Moscow to appoint a leader whose number one priority is *détente*. The best we can hope for is a successor with a very strong grip on his competitors, someone

Mr. de Koster (continued)

who is in a position to continue the negotiations with the West because his own position is sufficiently strong in his own country. The Soviet Union will not start an all-out war but it takes advantage of every weakness of our democratic system, which for all of us is still the very best system — although some may say it is the least worst system.

The real test of what will happen in Europe is the eventual success of the MBFR discussions. For me personally the most important moment of détente will be if the Soviet Union is willing to decrease its arms and troops in Central Europe to such an extent that it can still defend itself — and very well do so — but also give the same security to us so that the equilibrium is re-established.

Another danger in the Western European Union member States lies in inflation. So far countries that have had a rate of inflation of more than 20 % have in the long run become dictatorships. We have to learn to share our deficits with each other, after having shared in each other's growth during many decades.

The United States has been complaining about the Common Market's trade policies. I want to point out that United States trade with the Common Market has increased more than has its trade with the rest of the world. We hope that the people of Great Britain will give a clear opinion on Europe. It is my personal hope that, in order to avoid a humiliating spectacle of disarray, Europe will be united so that we may prepare for 1980 the contours of a federation, or a model built up by a piecemeal approach which some may call a confederation.

In neither scenario does the landscape end at Western European frontiers or on the Atlantic coast. In the Year of Europe the Davignons of our member countries co-operated in drafting a memorandum on Europe: "The Identity of Europe". It made me think of a very old recipe for making a Welsh rarebit. It started "First get hold of a rabbit". The strength of Europe lies in its multiplicity. Europe is the cradle of major political systems. Europe should again demonstrate its creative abilities and develop a framework for preserving peace and improving co-operation with second, third and fourth world countries.

I shall never forget a declaration I heard when I arrived in Washington at the end of 1945. It read :

"After this war there will be some help from the United States to the devastated countries of Europe. After the next war there will be relief from nowhere."

Let us, together with the other democratic nations, keep our defences both militarily and ideologically intact. It still is the only way to preserve peace. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur, for the report you have tabled and for the additional explanations which you have given us.

The first speaker in the debate is Mr. Bettiol.

Mr. BETTIOL (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I greatly admired Mr. de Koster's address just now on co-operation between Europe and the United States, but if I may objectively state my view on the draft recommendation I hold a different opinion. The draft speaks about everything: inflation, unemployment, the budgetary situation of the western countries, energy policy, military equilibrium between East and West, possible, even bilateral, negotiations; it demands co-operation with OECD, but in case the latter is unable to fulfil its task, the creation of another *ad hoc* organisation; then it discusses the possibility of establishing European decision-making machinery for all security matters, more especially the strategic arms limitation talks, the Middle East, Cyprus and the French nuclear deterrent. To my mind this is all too much, or, as the proverb says, having too many irons in the fire, and we cannot give a clear-cut and precise answer except on some of the specific problems raised in this draft recommendation.

First of all, I should like to say, as far as America is concerned, that the United States is certainly coming out of the Vietnam emergency crestfallen, but all the same it did not lose the war, it was not beaten, there is no military discomfiture. It did not want to win the war in Vietnam because what it did want was a political decision to that particular conflict. Therefore we cannot agree that it emerges from it militarily diminished and with its credibility shaken, the fact being that America has in recent days confirmed — as our Rapporteur has also stated — its precise determination to maintain its leadership of NATO in order to give us a sense of security and stability.

Mr. Bettiol (continued)

Clearly, however, we have relied too heavily on America, in that it has to be able to maintain its presence all over the globe, upholding alone, without the fifth columns on which the Soviet Union can count, the banner of world freedom and democracy. Undeniably Russia has stolen a march on America in this physical confrontation.

The Rapporteur says that Russia will not go to war. I too believe it will not make a frontal attack, but I think that it will continue the work of revolutionary subversion in every country, so that we are absolutely unable to speak of détente when we are no longer secure in our daily lives, there is no more social tranquillity and systematic strikes are ruining our daily lives.

Can we speak of détente, tranquillity, order? I think not. This is one of the reasons why we should be extremely cautious, always on our guard, and absolutely the stronger, willing also to make economic and financial sacrifices to be able to do our duty at America's side; because I do not believe any truly European decision-making machinery can be established, because I believe Europe cannot be a third force. In preceding years we have spoken at great length of a European third force. I definitely do not believe in stating the matter in these terms: Europe must march with the United States and there must be between them total understanding and trust if we truly do not wish our continent to be more enfeebled and disunited than it is now.

We now see every European State going, or preparing to go, its own way: Germany with its *Ostpolitik*, Italy with its own *Ostpolitik*, France with its national independence in security matters, and we do not yet know whether Britain will remain in Europe or not. We still form a patchwork with no clear overall vision and no definite political line, in spite of twenty-five years of European policy. To be sure, these twenty-five years have borne fruit, but the last five of them have shown that Soviet strength is steadily growing and becoming more dangerous. We have to exert ourselves to co-ordinate our policies. No need for any new decision-making machinery, or for any particular *ad hoc* organisation, for as the Latin tag says *Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate*, bodies should not be unnecessarily multiplied. We have these joint organisations, we need to be able to pursue a joint policy and thereby strengthen also our economic, financial and military strength so as to form, together with America, the force guar-

anteeing, under democracy, continuity of orderly living and freedom; for this is the fundamental purpose of our organisations and policy, during these twenty years in WEU, this institution which, despite criticisms of ineffectiveness, has also co-operated in making an effort to demonstrate that the goodwill for achieving these ends exists. Let us increase this effort, in this particular situation fraught with unknown quantities and dangers.

But, as at this time Europe stands alone against the American isolationism that some allege to see looming ahead — which I myself do not particularly believe to be the case — and against aggressive solutions in the form of the subversive warfare that still goes on in so many European and non-European countries, we should also seek to look beyond America to see what we can do to help keep Western Europe safe and sound.

I have just put a question to the German Minister of State about relations between Germany and Mao's China: well, having had a little to do, for twenty years, with Chiang Kai-shek and Formosa, I believe the fact that there is a China is extremely useful to us Europeans at this time. I do not say it can be our sheet-anchor, but certainly a united Europe linked to a militarily strong China can bring about fresh alignments, big with consequences I would call beneficial for the preservation of peace in our continent and in Asia. We ought not to disparage China, because the government of Chou En-lai maintains that Russia will attack Europe first and then China, because the road to Peking goes via Paris. Let us Europeans pay good heed to what Chinese wisdom has to tell us and let us not forget that their civilisation is four millennia older than ours and has built up over many centuries a store of very rich experience. We must look to mainland China, as politicians and not as having any liking for their system, but knowing that an agreement between a united Europe and China, anti-Soviet in its purpose but operating in Europe's favour — as the statements by Chinese leaders prove — may create an extremely positive situation for our future.

As for the draft recommendation as tabled, I beg to move an amendment for the deletion of paragraph B.2. In my view it militates against close collaboration between Europe and the United States, and envisages a European third force — I would call it a third weakness — that might really compromise world security. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Are you moving the deletion of paragraph 2 of section B of the draft recommendation ?

Mr. BETTIOL (*Italy*) (Translation). — Yes, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Piket.

I presume that you will take this opportunity to move your amendment ?

Mr. PIKET (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, my good friend Mr. de Koster has put an extremely interesting report before this Assembly. It is interesting not only because of its content, where, having first reviewed the historical background to the relationship with the United States, the author outlines the situation as it exists today and finally looks at the consequences of the energy crisis on European-American relations. It is also extremely interesting because of the subject itself. It is, indeed, a very pertinent thought to see a good relationship between America and Europe as the essential basis for securing our democratic freedoms.

On the extreme left — and by this I do not mean those who call themselves communists, because for years they have been doing so openly and through other channels — it is fashionable nowadays to spurn and denigrate and criticise anything that comes from America. This is why it is well to make it plain, once again, that Europe needs America, and vice versa.

Without the Alliance and without close collaboration with the United States, Europe will be unable to withstand the ever-growing pressure of the forces of communism. One has only to look at a map of the world and a map of Europe to see what proportion of it — large, far too large a part, alas — is already red. It pleases the communists enormously — and heaven knows how much trouble they go to promote this — to see the relationship between Europe and America undermined. They must not be given the chance, Ladies and Gentlemen. Nor must we forget, in all this, that European liberty would have been all over and done with thirty years ago if we had not had the indispensable help of the Americans during the years from 1940 to 1945.

The speech by my fellow countryman and friend Mr. Waltmans on Monday shows what is I think an overdone faith in the peaceful intentions of the eastern bloc countries. In the com-

munist ideology such peaceful coexistence has one aim and one aim only — the usurping of power ; and maintaining the *status quo* between the powers does not fit in with their image of living in peace. The latest, clear, textbook example of this is Vietnam. This is why I was glad to hear the encouraging remarks the NATO Supreme Commander, General Haig, made here yesterday. Europe and America must avoid a slanging match. And from this viewpoint I deplore the comments made by Mr. Kissinger that Europe has only regional, not world interests. But here there may well be call for a certain amount of self-criticism : could it be that we, by the way we act, have put these thoughts in Mr. Kissinger's mind ? I am merely asking, that is all.

All of us must work together towards greater co-ordination between America and Europe. America needs this co-ordination just as much as Europe does, at least if it wants to keep the Atlantic Alliance in being. America needs Europe's help in respect of Portugal, and the government that is hosting us here today is already making great efforts in this regard. The German Government, with a strong economy to lend it financial and economic support, has already provided large sums of money to help the Portuguese economy. This government sees very clearly the threat of Russian communism, and is therefore keen that a situation does not arise in Portugal like that in the early sixties, when Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba.

At the other end of the Mediterranean the German Government is helping the Turkish army to get the spare parts it is lacking through the introduction of an American embargo on arms exports to Turkey. At the same time it is helping the new Greek Government to avoid the danger of war in Cyprus. In all these areas Europe must give clear support to the United States, so as to defend and hold firm the southern flank.

It is obvious that Europe, for its part, can also make certain calls on America for support, and this not only on the military side. This brings me to the content of the report, and in particular to paragraph 119 and those that follow, where the Rapporteur says nothing about it being essential for Europe that America should support the dollar. Yet it is plain that when the currency of a particular country is a reserve currency for world trade, it cannot go on and on dropping in value. The American Treasury must intervene. If the present trend continues it will do enormous damage to world trade, and will

Mr. Piket (continued)

sap the western economy and western civilisation.

Where the draft recommendation is concerned I feel that the Rapporteur is giving rather a lot of heed to OECD. This is an organisation that can provide a stimulus, but is not equipped to play an active part in the international economy.

As to the International Energy Agency, it is still by no means clear whether people are happy enough with it for it to be continued in its present form and linked to OECD. There are signs, from the American side, that the United States Government may be looking at the oil supplies issue rather more as one part — large or small — of the international supply of raw materials in general. At the end of the day Europe itself — and Europe of the Nine in particular — will have to work out an energy policy of its own, if it wants the objectives of the Treaty of Rome to be achieved. The Americans, for their part, should give more support to the European Economic Community. The Rapporteur has made no mention of these points; yet these few marginal comments of mine really are marginal compared to the great value I attach to Mr. de Koster's outstanding report.

You have asked us, Mr. President, to discuss the draft recommendation, and I want to look at paragraphs 1(a), (b), (c) and (d). I feel that paragraphs (b) and (c) are asking too much. We already have the OECD Committee on Energy Policy and the International Energy Agency. Must we add a third to these? I think it would be too much of a good thing. We must avoid proliferating the bodies discussing energy problems, because this is not a practical way of going about things.

This is why I am moving the following amendment, set out in Document 669, Amendment No. 1, which seeks to replace paragraphs 1(b) and 1(c) with a new paragraph reading: "promote the extension of OECD's activities in the energy field".

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank you for your attention. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The draft amendment has now been distributed.

I call Mr. Reale.

Mr. REALE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as the Rap-

porteur said in his well-informed and valuable report, paragraph 67, all the efforts exerted to achieve détente and collaboration between East and West in Europe are hampered by radically-opposite political and economic systems. There is hardly any need to add that the economic and political opposition is the offspring of the ideological opposition. The West is our frontier. It is our duty to defend it. The United States forms part of it, and events of the last thirty years have demonstrated the necessary rôle it still has to play, at any rate in the short term.

First of all, security. NATO looks after the security of the West. It is chiefly founded on the United States nuclear deterrent, which should be looked at with the greater attention because, in this forum too, its reduction, even removal, is being more and more insistently called for.

The "noes" in yesterday's voting were so motivated. We are not warmongers, I do not think anyone is, but a state of weakness, as the fable of the wolf and the lamb tells us, always excites a temptation to act. And it is not we who are the wolf.

This need for nuclear reinforcement may not be to everyone's liking, but in present circumstances the nuclear strike force is still the only genuine European deterrent. Hence the United Kingdom's nuclear forces should be increasingly brought into NATO, and France's independent deterrent should be integrated too. What considerations could be so decisive as to dissuade us from seeking the means of achieving this? We are all too prone to object to the attitude of the United States. Public opinion may be roused against so-called American imperialism, but governments bear the responsibility not only for the economic well-being of their own nations but also for the conservation of the national heritage, the values embodied in their history, and it is their duty to be prepared for problems as they occur, worldwide.

Yesterday a communist colleague defended the inviolability of frontiers, and obviously meant those secured during the war by the power nearest to his heart. We who have renounced frontiers as being against nature and anti-historical, if the Christianity on which western civilisation is founded constantly aspires to form one big family, should firmly demand the abolition of frontiers insofar as, in the West, they indicate differences and opposition.

Among the Seven of WEU, the Nine of the EEC, the Eighteen of the Council of Europe, our

Mr. Reale (continued)

duty lies here. The United States has called for the political unification of European States. But Russia has never wanted this ; on the contrary it labours, according to some, even by using détente as a pretext, to break up the possibilities of any union. When European nations and governments reserve their position or harbour doubts about the conduct of the United States, we should also think of what that country has done in the cause of the unity in which its strength resides in the defence area. I look forward with mixed feelings of anxiety and hope to the outcome of the British referendum on 5th June. Our wish to see the "ayes" have it for joining the Common Market is so urgent and so keen because of the necessity of an active share being taken by the British nation and government in solving the problems which beset us and are, at bottom, the same.

Italy, these days, is going through particularly strenuous difficulties in respect of its very internal political equilibrium. I have been asked by a Danish colleague whether the Italian communists have in the West chosen to tread the path of democracy as we see it. I answered that historical compromise is a tactical weapon for coming into power, or a share of power, from within the system, but that Italian communism always in one way or another takes its orders from Moscow. The elections may unfortunately in the fairly near future reserve for my country the bitter pill of a Marxist triumph, but even in that case, if western union is a tangible, decisive, deterrent reality and Italy is part of it, I have no fear or misgivings. Europe in its defensive structure will defend my country even if, as a result of the stands taken by Greece and Turkey, we now find ourselves in a very awkward position on the southern flank of our security system.

Certainly, the Mediterranean claims to be European, and all the events around its shores in recent times go to prove, for anyone who may have forgotten it, the primordial importance of this sea to Europe. Moreover, in the context of unified convergence, the elections by universal suffrage to the European Parliament scheduled for 1978 represent a big stride forward. Along the road to unity co-operation with the United States demands, for its full efficacy, prior co-operation among the Europeans. This point should constantly be borne in mind, and I should have preferred a more explicit reference to it in the draft recommendation.

The second point is the economy. Economic problems are not to be divorced from security, even if they can be viewed separately ; the energy crisis and redistribution of world resources stir up problems demanding to be dealt with in a perspective of ever-closer collaboration between Europe and the United States. Maybe the United States will, after the events in South-East Asia, be less conscious of its own world-wide primacy of democratic values, but it has certainly not bowed before the onslaught of the energy and monetary crises.

The report deals with these points trenchantly : the United States retains the will to honour its commitments to Europe as well, because of the growing conviction that the world is too small and that the defence and preservation of its own assets and economic potential are particularly bound up with effective co-ordination with its European partners.

On the energy plane, the instruments are to hand : the OECD can and must be the permanent forum for any substantive discussion of the subject ; in the economic and monetary areas there are the IMF and IBRD. Agreement and co-ordination call for concrete solutions and not oratorical jousts and wearisome disquisitions. They and we should all be convinced that no one will be safe on his own, no one will win by shutting himself up in isolation in what happens to himself in particular. Greatness is either a joint undertaking, or a useless relic of the past. We ought to co-operate ; we are all also members of the Council of Europe.

The draft recommendation, in section A subparagraph (c), seeks to strengthen the power of the Parliamentary Assembly to supervise the activities of OECD. The Rapporteur touched briefly on the point, which is an important one. Our debate in Strasbourg on the activities of OECD is rather hasty and disappointing : committees occasionally appear unimportant because of the minor character of the matters discussed. Perhaps many could find enough material in it for a debate, and appropriate comments, when they examined that body's relevant documents.

The question is mooted of adjusting the Council's activities more closely to the realities of European life. Such a task, involving increased supervisory powers over OECD, would enhance its prestige and inspire respect for it. We should set ourselves the ambition of making our function more concrete in accordance with the economic and democratic interests of our

Mr. Reale (continued)

ancient and ever-rejuvenated continent. That such a request should come from the Assembly of WEU is also a token of the vitality of our body which, in respect of European co-operation with the United States, just now when the American President is visiting Europe, is exactly right for the spirit of our times.

The most interesting point of the report for me is the last one which, referring to the political systems based on Christianity, liberalism and Marxism, says that the genius of Europe should develop a framework for preserving peace, and for internationalism furthering the spirit of co-operation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — As a member of the Committee that produced the report under the guidance of our Rapporteur, of all those which I have studied since I was a member of the Assembly I have found less to argue with in this report than in others I can recall.

I wish merely to draw attention to one sentence in paragraph 132 of the conclusions and make one very minor correction regarding my own point of view, although it is perhaps rather a serious one. In this paragraph, it is stated :

“A cursory analysis of the international situation in the political, defence, economic and financial fields leads to the conclusion that the West is now facing dangers more serious for its survival than any since 1955.”

Were I back in the Committee, I would have said that possibly we should have written 1939 instead of 1955, since for a variety of reasons, some of which I spoke about yesterday, I think we are now in a period of particularly intense difficulty and danger for our country.

The main reason why I endorse the report enthusiastically is that it spells out something I think we sometimes forget or to which we do not pay enough attention in the Assembly. It is the utter nonsense of believing that as things stand today we can defend ourselves without the active co-operation and support at every level of the United States of America.

Nothing would make me prouder, as a European, than if we were one day in a position where we were able to look after ourselves

without having to depend on one of the super-powers. But, whatever may be the situation in the future, that is not so today. Some members carry no conviction at all when they suggest that at this stage we can in any way afford to do without the active support of the United States.

I find it particularly difficult to understand this when all our countries are concentrating not on increasing their armaments so that they could stand alone but on decreasing them. It is at that time that some people seem to think we can do without the United States rather than in some ways needing its co-operation and support more than ever before.

At this stage I wish to refer to the speech read on behalf of Mr. Hattersley in the same context as the report. Had my ministerial colleague in London been present, I would have asked him one or two questions. I wish to say, as I would have said to him, that I approve very much of the start of what he said and also of the end of it, but I have one rather important criticism regarding the centre of his remarks.

The beginning of his speech contained a sentence which, with respect, could have been taken out of what I said a couple of days ago, which is now recorded :

“Détente has become a fashionable concept, and we talk easily nowadays about living in an age of détente without perhaps always being clear what we mean.”

Some may remember that that was the exact question to which I directed myself only a couple of days ago.

If we move to the end of the speech, Mr. Hattersley said :

“I began this speech by disagreeing with those who say that the threat to our security scarcely exists any longer. The threat does indeed exist, in the growing military might of our eastern neighbours whatever peaceful intentions they profess, and we shall do well to trust in ourselves, not in Providence or in other people, to defend us against it.”

Both of those remarks I would have thought were abundantly realistic.

However, in the middle of his speech, discussing the political situation, he said in regard to détente, of which he wondered whether we all knew the meaning, “The ice has, of course, been melting now for some years.” I do not believe,

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

as I said before, that that is other than the wish being father to the thought. I do not think that those living in Prague today would think that "the ice has, of course, been melting now for some years". I am very doubtful if those living in Yugoslavia are quite so sure either that "the ice has, of course, been melting for some years". I would prefer to say that we like to believe that the ice has been melting, but we are still waiting for some positive evidence from the other side that they will contribute other than words to this aim.

A little earlier my ministerial colleague expressed a sense of, shall we say, limited satisfaction that, although we admitted we had cut our own British defence, our defence expenditure will still represent a higher percentage of GNP than presently spent by any of the countries represented here today.

I am glad for the opportunity to put on record that I believe this juggling with figures — and I say this against what my countryman has said — is totally unrealistic. We must get out of the habit, by measuring our respective contributions to our common defence, of mucking around with figures. My view — and if I were a Defence Minister I would say this — is that before one starts mucking around with figures as to whether one could afford one more school or one new road, one should first decide what is needed for the defence of one's country, and play around with the GNP statistics, if one wants to, only after that.

I assure members, who probably do not need assurance, that that is not the way that countries which feel themselves in great danger work it out. They do not say: "We must have so much of our GNP for something or other." Israel does not do that at the present time, nor does Pakistan, nor do others. They say: "How much do we need to spend to safeguard our own safety, our own security and our own freedom?" They then move on from there to the other demands.

I believe this is a matter that we in this Assembly should push in the future. When it comes to our essential defences, let us get rid of statistics, let us be advised and let us work together for what we need and not try to compete with one another as to whether somebody spends another 0.1 or another 0.01, which in my view is totally unrealistic.

Having said that, I wish to end on a more cheerful note — more cheerful than I felt even a few weeks ago. Like many others, I think, I was worried, and expressed these fears at the Council of Europe, that the American débacle in Vietnam not only might be a domino theory in South-East Asia but might lead to an increasing decline in American interest elsewhere in the world in regard to its alliances. Luckily, it would seem that in fact the opposite has proved to be the case and that the lesson of the Vietnam débacle has taught the Americans not that they should retreat further but that they must now reassert their strength and their will in the areas where they believe their interests are vitally concerned. There is obviously a determination now not to yield further but to reassert a positive world rôle. I believe this applies particularly to Europe.

Two sentences are contained in paragraph 134 in the conclusions which I particularly commend:

"Your Rapporteur believes that Americans will first look after their own interests."

If one reads that sentence alone, it is perhaps not so satisfactory. However, the next sentence reads:

"A threat to Europe is also a threat to the United States."

For that reason I believe one good thing will come out of what happened in South-East Asia; namely, a renewed determination by Europe and the United States of America to work together for the common defence of all of us. (*Applause*)

(*Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Montesquiou.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am sorry, but I must say that the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions is always victimised. Although it is getting late, we are absolutely determined to have the two reports submitted by this Committee dealt with this evening.

I would therefore ask you to stop this debate which has been much too long-winded. I repeat, why should our Committee always be the one to suffer?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I agree with you, Mr. de Montesquiou. I was going to say something to that effect before you spoke.

The President (continued)

The present debate has been allowed to go on too long. Although we are expected by the President of the Federal Republic, we shall try to take both reports of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

I call Mr. Radius, with a friendly request that, in view of the circumstances, he keep to his allotted time of five minutes.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — I shall not start off like Sir Frederic Bennett, since I have to announce that my friends and I will not vote for the recommendation. We regret this, because Mr. de Koster's report is, in our view, in many ways satisfactory and well-balanced. But we do not find in the draft recommendation the spirit which seems to have animated the author of the report. It fails to mention a number of problems, although these are dealt with in a precise and well-documented manner in the report itself. The problem of concerting the attitudes of oil-producing countries and consumer countries was not tackled. There was only talk of confrontation.

In the recommendation we read that it is essential for the western world to present a united front in the field of energy requirements. But paragraph 101 of the report says that producer and consumer countries seem to have a common interest in reaching agreement on stabilising demand and prices for oil.

Why, then, should it be considered that priority ought to be given to the formation of a bloc of industrialised consumers to the exclusion, for the moment, of any attempt to revive the world conference on energy?

Is not the reason for the failure of the preparatory meeting for this conference in April 1975 to be found in a certain intransigence which the recommendation before us seems to encourage, particularly in demanding a strengthening of the International Energy Agency?

France does not want to join, not because it is opposed to international co-operation, but, on the contrary, to enable such co-operation to develop and bear fruit.

What France, in fact, blames the agency for doing is that it hardens the positions of the industrialised consumer countries and so prevents any negotiations on a basis of equality with countries of the third world.

Moreover, the recommendation lays the chief responsibility for our current financial and economic difficulties on the increase in energy prices. Why not say something about the persistent deficit in the United States balance of payments and the laxity with which the dollar has been managed, although it is a *de facto* world currency.

Mr. de Koster quite rightly pointed to the enormous deficit of the budget for 1976 which has just been adopted by the American Congress. The draft recommendation appears to me to be not only inadequate but somewhat one-sided, and its political aspiration runs counter to the recommendation contained in the Krieg report which was adopted yesterday.

The idea that Europe should not depend on external powers to decide its essential problems seems to be totally foreign to the author of the recommendation. In the eleventh paragraph of the preamble he appears to rejoice in the absence of Europe from the international stage. He puts forward as a positive factor for détente the fact that a number of major problems are regularly discussed by the United States and the USSR in purely bilateral negotiations. This is an immoderate point of view which, to my mind, does not represent the feelings of the Assembly.

The same point of view recurs when the draft recommendation asserts that the security of Europe is ensured by the integration of American and European armed forces, without breathing a word about non-integrated forces. Are these utterly negligible and powerless? May they not also play their part in the defence of Europe within the Atlantic Alliance, as Mr. Richter so aptly reminded us yesterday?

The draft recommendation appears to contradict itself when it demands truly European decision-making concerning the French nuclear deterrent. Does this not imply that the latter is a reality which must be fully taken into account in defining a defence policy for Europe?

To sum up, I maintain that the Assembly would be eating its own words by adopting such a recommendation after having, with yesterday's votes, proclaimed a truly European political determination, particularly borne out in statements by our Belgian, German and many other fellow members. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — On the draft recommendation on co-operation with the United States contained in Document 669 I have been informed of three amendments.

The President (continued)

Amendment No. 1, tabled by Mr. Piket, reads as follows :

In the draft recommendation proper, delete paragraphs 1(b) and (c) and replace them by the following :

“(b) promote the extension of OECD’s activities in the energy field ;”

What is the view of the Committee ?

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — It is my view that the proposal put forward by Mr. Piket can be accepted. It sums up and simplifies in a way which I think will make it easier for many of us to vote for the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put to the vote by sitting and standing, Amendment No. 1 tabled by Mr. Piket, which has been accepted by the Committee.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The amendment is adopted.

I have received Amendment No. 2 tabled by Mr. Reale, in the following terms :

1. In the draft recommendation proper, delete paragraph 1(c).
2. Alternatively : in paragraph (c), leave out “played this rôle” and insert “play its rôle”, and reverse the order of paragraphs (c) and (d).”

As a result of the adoption of the previous amendment, this amendment falls.

It does, however, contain in its second paragraph a correction of form which can be accepted, because it is obvious.

I have received Amendment No. 3 tabled by Mr. Bettiol, proposing that paragraph B.2 of the recommendation proper be left out.

What is the opinion of the Committee ?

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I suggest that we do not accept the amendment proposed by Mr. Bettiol. The part affected by the amendment is an essential part of the recommendation. Consequently this part should not be deleted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put to the vote by sitting and standing the amendment

tabled by Mr. Bettiol, which the Committee has not accepted.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The amendment is negatived.

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation ?...

There is an objection.

Then we shall have a roll-call vote.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Scholten.

The voting is open.

(*A vote by roll-call was then taken*)

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹ :

Number of votes cast	55
Ayes	45
Noes	8
Abstentions	2

The draft recommendation is therefore adopted².

6. The European aeronautical industry and civil aviation

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 674)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

1. See page 67.

2. See page 70.

The President (continued)

tions, prepared by MM. Warren and Valleix, on the European aeronautical industry and civil aviation, and the vote on the draft recommendation, Document 674.

I call Mr. de Montesquiou, Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I will be as brief as possible. I want first of all to renew my protests. Our Committee is always sacrificed. It has been sacrificed once again, and we do not know how, in the time we are allowed, you will be able to put to the vote two reports of great importance on the European aeronautical industry.

I would like on behalf of the Committee to ask that, with the Assembly's agreement, the draft recommendation be taken in two parts. The two preambles being identical, we would begin with the report by Mr. Valleix, which concerns paragraphs 1 and 2 of the recommendation, and would then move on to hear what Mr. Warren has to say on paragraphs 3 and 4.

These two parts are complementary, and not in opposition to each other. I think that for better understanding of the aeronautical situation in Europe it is essential to divide them, so that we can stress Europe's will to independence in the aeronautical industry and not once again give our European aviation the impression that it is America which calls the tune.

I wanted to make these comments and ask you to be good enough to agree and also ask the Assembly to let us split up the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I would like first of all to reassure the Chairman of the Committee as regards the future. I have tried to arrange things in such a way that we can complete as many questions as possible. It is true that your Committee at one or two previous sessions has not been particularly lucky. But here and now I will give you my word that I will suggest to the Presidential Committee that at the next session you will be given time in the Orders of the Day which should ensure that the very important problems we have to cover are indeed not neglected.

I call Mr. Valleix, the Committee's Rapporteur.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I will try to

limit my time to the strict minimum in view, as they say, of the circumstances. To start with I should like to thank the Chairman of the Committee, the President of the Assembly, and the Assembly itself for accepting this procedure, and in doing so, I must not forget my colleague, Mr. Warren, who as the result has himself accepted that we take this debate in two parts.

For we really must not leave the aeronautical industry in its present situation without WEU, which has already shown a remarkable sense of responsibility in the way it has interested itself in these matters, being able at the present juncture to make its voice heard once more.

The unfortunate individual speaking to you this afternoon might have been tempted to drop the task that had been entrusted to him. Having to prepare a balance sheet for civil aviation in Europe and to attempt to show where it is going might seem a hopeless task and quite illusory. Hopeless, because time is not working for the European aeronautical industry — and this is not solely due to there being an energy crisis. Illusory, because the energy crisis and its repercussions are only worsening a situation that is already unfavourable.

I have however accepted to make this report for three main reasons.

The first stems from economic and social considerations. The industrial capacity of European aviation exists, will continue to exist, and may spring surprises; even difficult programmes may take an unexpected turn. Mercury for instance might turn up in a new version and the F-28 might continue its career. Since yesterday Concorde has, as you know, been making its endurance flights, and this means that there may be developments once it is put into commercial service at the beginning of 1976.

There are also social arguments for taking an interest in this problem. We cannot forget the 400,000 employees — engineers, supervisory staff, skilled and semi-skilled workers — who contribute to the repute and the success of the creation of the European aeronautical industry. It is a resource which can be measured in terms not only of the pay offered, the services supplied by our specialists, the most qualified in the European economy, but also by the volume of subcontracting, by the forms of advanced technology involved, and by the laboratory work required.

The second reason which intrigues me in this report is political in character. Any further

Mr. Valleix (continued)

recession in our aeronautical activity could be the end of this activity, we are, as they say, on the edge of the knife.

Table II in Appendix II shows that in 1973 three European-built planes were bought by the European air lines. Worse still, in 1974 the figures went down to two planes. How can our enterprises keep going and for what purpose? In this period where employment is for all of us who have public responsibilities, a source of distress and very definitely a responsibility, how can we fail to ponder this matter at length?

Our airlines themselves — this is another political aspect — are facing heavier and heavier deficits, our States naturally find that they must come to the aid of these lines with larger and larger subsidies, and our taxpayers as a result are called upon to share the burden of ensuring the survival of our aeronautical industry and of the manufacturers of aircraft in Europe. For all these reasons we cannot let our governments go on dealing with the problem in — I nearly said — in disorder, when the problem is really both national, for each of us, and also European.

The third reason which convinced me of the importance of the part we have to play in this connection is that the Assembly of WEU did not let a year go by before tackling the problem. In this connection I would refer you to Recommendation 244 that you yourselves voted in November 1973, after a colloquy arranged on your suggestion and so organised by WEU in Paris; this European colloquy was held in the Senate in September 1973. The recommendation you adopted at that time is in no way out of date. What has unfortunately changed is the problems, which of course have only grown more serious.

For all these reasons, I shall say firmly to you that we must realise that WEU, which took the lead in defining the lines of a coherent European policy for the aeronautical industry and the manufacture of aircraft, today has the right to say its say and consequently to confirm the recommendations it has made and to bring them up to date.

WEU must make its voice heard if it is to contribute to the salvation of the aeronautical industry in Europe. If circumstances allow, this is the moment. Of course in health matters, as

in any others, the worse things are going the more chance there is to get far-ranging analyses, penetrating summaries of the situation, and a serious diagnosis. Sometimes it is the best moment to start shock treatment, which frequently proves beneficial.

The health of the aeronautical industry warrants such shock treatment. I note that only yesterday we were voting a text on the European Space Agency, submitted by Mr. Richter. If I speak of this, it is not to recall a debate that was wound up yesterday, but to recall that the example which Europe can put forward in space matters should inspire us in the aeronautical field. That is why paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation that we are submitting to you picks up the proposal for a European aviation agency, so that there should be an authority capable of decisions which could take shape little by little, allowing Europe to provide itself with a decision-making body that is lacking today, without the aeronautical industry having to wait for a political union which, as you know, is creeping forward too timidly.

These then are the reasons why we and our Committee are grateful that you have accepted this debate, even if we divide it in the recommendation. For it is important that we should be able to close with a concrete proposal. A European aviation agency could take this form, drawing once more on the aerospace precedent to which we have so largely contributed; this it should do in such a way as to improve the chances of salvation for the European aeronautical industry — not against or in competition with the American industry, but because the graphs you will find in the appendices to this report show that, with American production covering the whole of the European market, there must be something misfiring in the European economy.

It is not insulting anyone, and still less destroying a friendship and an economic balance which are natural between the western powers, if we claim for Europe a fair share in the world aeronautical market as a whole. We must not forget that European carriers constitute 28 % of the world total, but European production is only 2.8 %.

I will close, Ladies and Gentlemen, because we are very pressed for time. These are the reasons — which I give objectively and without dramatising, for it is the situation which is dramatic — which lead me to urge that you

Mr. Valleix (continued)

accept paragraphs 1 and 2 of this recommendation as suggested by Mr. de Montesquiou, but to do this in such a way that a decision on the matter is not held over until the December session, particularly as this Assembly has already decided to organise a new colloquy in February 1976.

WEU's action programme seems to me to be built on firm ground. I have reminded you of the two main reasons for adopting the recommendations. May I thank you in advance. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Do you wish other speakers to be heard? Because of the reception given by the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, I will have to close the sitting at 6.15 p.m.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. Warren will have to speak as Rapporteur; he will be very brief so that other speakers can have the floor for a time, though this will inevitably be short. Whatever happens we must see this important debate through to the finish.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I hope that all speakers will be laconic.

I call Mr. Warren.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — It is difficult to be brief when one has spent a long time preparing a speech and finds that time has run out. Perhaps what the Herald Tribune said about my part of the report of 21st May in Paris might be true of the way I feel at the moment. Mr. Sulzberger said in his observations on the report: "There is an air of bitterness." He went on to say: "The answer is obvious. Europe will have to unite more effectively." At that point possibly I can step down from the rostrum, but I do not wish to be accused of being bitter by the Herald Tribune and I ask it to substitute the view that I am amazed.

I ask: "Why do we do what we do to ourselves in Europe?" If we look at Recommendation 257 which we put to the Council of Ministers and at the Council's reply we find that after all the years in which reports have been prepared all it can offer us in return is the statement that it will continue to study the question.

I do not think that the European governments, which are the largest customers of the aircraft

industry, have accepted their responsibility to that industry. I was cheered to hear what Mr. Hattersley said today, but why is it that Europe's governments as the major customers of the industry cannot get themselves organised and have remained in continuous disarray for decades?

In considering standardisation, which has been debated here, we find numerous differences between that which is required in Europe and that which is achieved. The Warsaw Pact countries have no problem of standardisation. In my view they outnumber us not just by two to one, but by four to one because of the multiplicity of weapons systems and military equipments which we insist on having. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the aircraft industry. In one recent NATO exercise the home fleets of NATO managed to shoot down, luckily only theoretically, one half of our own force because it was impossible for the aircraft to communicate with each other as they had different radios. Indeed, in the 2nd Tactical Air Force there are at this moment four different types of bombs, five different types of gun ammunitions, six different napalm containers and sixteen different types of drop tanks for fuel.

Looking at the civil sector of aviation in Europe, one finds it costs two to four times as much to travel by air in Europe as one would be charged in the United States of America in the same aircraft flying the same distances. In fact, we have the extraordinary situation where trade is being restrained by governments allowing high prices to be charged for tickets.

It is no wonder that many of my colleagues in the United Kingdom are concerned about whether Britain should remain in Europe when it costs us 12.5 pence per mile to fly to the continent. Governments have still managed to separate nation from nation by passports and the increasing price of getting from one nation to another.

In conclusion, I believe the question could fairly be thrown at me: "Well, are there any solutions?" There are several solutions. I apologise for leading the Assembly possibly to believe that the divergence of opinion recorded in my report is not as strong as it is. Indeed, I had believed there would be an appendix expressing the views of Mr. Brown and some of his socialist colleagues which are different from that which I have expressed in the report about the British industry.

Mr. Warren (continued)

It was impressive to see Mr. Spinelli, the EEC Commissioner for industrial affairs, in Paris this week following the WEU lead. It is nice to see Western European Union leading the European Commission. In fact, he called for exactly that which we put down in our Recommendation 257 which the Council of Ministers felt it could only "continue to study". I wish all success to Mr. Spinelli and hope that he will have a greater impression on his Council of Ministers.

Western Europe has a formidable industrial power base in aviation as a lead technology. Western European workers are quite as good as American workers at innovation, but they need the opportunity of a united home market across Europe. I believe it is much more important to employ the aircraft workers of the factories of Bremen, Bristol, Derby, Munich, Turin, Toulouse and Weybridge than it is to employ with European money the American workers of Seattle, St. Louis or Los Angeles.

The European aerospace industry helped to create European collaboration. Four hundred separate industrial agreements now exist in Europe between one factory and another. I believe that European members of parliament must learn to use this power base to strengthen European policies within the total Western Alliance. Surely if we wish to talk about unification, here is an industry which would welcome our practising it. We must get things moving.

I commend to members paragraph 16 of the report, in which I have said :

"European engineers have proved that they can meet the most stringent tasks set for them. As politicians we still have to match their determination and their vision." (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Six speakers are on the list. I will ask them to be very brief, and will interrupt them at the end of five minutes, with apologies in advance for doing this. It is not that I wish to be discourteous, but I am obliged to do it.

I call Mr. Cornelissen.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — In view of the savage curtailing of speaking time, Mr. President, I shall limit myself to criticism of the report, though this does not mean I do not greatly value it.

First, a general comment. My criticism must be looked at against the background of concern and impatience at what is, in my view, totally inadequate progress towards integration in Western Europe in general, and towards co-operation between the various countries in civil aviation and the aircraft industry in particular.

Both of the Rapporteurs are working rather firmly from a situation as it exists in the countries where they are members of parliament. Thus, Mr. Warren explains a number of internal British political aspects. He tells us, for example, that Britain has always made a sizeable contribution to the defence of Western Europe, but he does not tell us that the British aircraft industry has never made an aircraft that, besides having British characteristics, also met European specifications.

Another aspect Mr. Warren covers is the plan for nationalisation of the British aircraft industry. I will not go into this in any depth, although I will say that in general nationalising industries has brought with it the practical impossibility of getting rid of staff. But surely one of the biggest problems of the British aircraft industry is precisely that of overmanning? Is it true, for example, that the French aircraft industry manages to get the same production using half the manpower? What is Mr. Warren's answer to this critical problem? I wholly agree with him that there must continue to be a European aircraft industry, but it has to be on a sound economic basis, and there must not be constant calls on the taxpayer to shield this industry from bankruptcy.

Then I come to Mr. Valleix. He, I think, takes a number of French dogmas as Gospel truth, and on the basis of this builds up what is otherwise a sound and lucid argument. One of these dogmas is that Concorde is a good and desirable transport vehicle. I have already protested a number of times in this Assembly that I cannot accept this French dogma; on another occasion, when we have rather more time, I shall be glad to cross swords again on this topic.

A second French dogma is that the French aircraft industry represents a major European interest. Here, again, I would comment that the French plane manufacturers have never up to now asked the non-French airlines in Europe what aircraft they would like. I would like to see representatives of these two leading WEU countries beating their breasts and standing up in their respective parliaments to plead forcefully

Mr. Cornelissen (continued)

for a greater degree of co-operation in working out the specifications for the aircraft of the future.

Finally, a brief word about Eurocontrol. It is not true that the Netherlands wants to take control of Dutch airspace away from Eurocontrol and deal with this itself, as the report alleges in paragraph 37. When the alarming reports about Eurocontrol became known I took the initiative for an emergency discussion between my parliament's transport committee and the Minister concerned. In this discussion, two days before the important meeting in Brussels on 15th May, the Dutch Minister for Transport and Waterways declared that during these discussions the Netherlands would be pressing for a closer study of the opportunities for achieving the greatest possible measure of European integration.

May I ask Mr. Warren and Mr. Valleix what standpoint their own Ministers took in these talks, and what they did to influence their own Minister's standpoint? Is it not surely essential that, to back up our activities in Western European Union, we should all call the responsible Ministers to account each in our own parliaments? I think this is urgently called for, not only for the sake of the European co-operation we are trying to achieve, but also for that of the credibility of our organisation, and even of ourselves as parliamentary representatives of our peoples. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). — I intervene in the debate primarily to draw attention to certain matters in the report on which there was some contention in the Committee. The Valleix report I am in substantial agreement with and will, therefore, not seek to criticise it, but there are certain parts of the Warren part of the report to which I wish to speak.

In the middle of paragraph 2 of that part of the report we read :

"Without doubt the General Dynamics F-16 aircraft is an extremely fine aircraft..."

That is all very well, but I believe that the Americans already have enough publicists, and those publicists are paid. The F-16 aircraft is still a prototype and has not yet been validated.

We understand that the American navy still is not satisfied that it is a good aircraft. It is a prototype. That we should stand at a European rostrum praising an American aircraft is exactly what is wrong with Europe. I therefore beg my colleagues not to be unpaid publicists in this way of an aircraft still to be proven.

In paragraph 4 we read :

"This capability has stemmed from the fact that the nation" — that is, the United Kingdom — "was able to afford to bear more than its fair burden of defence costs."

That statement is not in accordance with the facts. The fact is that the nation was called upon to bear more than it could afford and not that it was able to bear that burden. To say otherwise is very much to stretch the truth. It is true that we paid the price, and it is true that the United Kingdom Government has chosen to cut expenditure, but my colleague could have been more helpful. There could have been inserted in the report a reference to the fact that the United Kingdom was forced to bear the burden. For example, the equipment budget is still planned to rise from about £1,300 million in 1974-75 to about £1,500 million in 1974-75 terms in the early eighties.

In paragraph 5 the Rapporteur issues a warning, and here again he could have given a great deal of help in terms of public ownership. He raises issues here which are purely party politics. This I do not resent, nor do I blame him for doing so, but I suggest that this forum is not quite the place for it. He could have quoted from our own government's document :

"Full public ownership of the main part of the aircraft industry is now urgently needed for the following reasons : to bring greater public accountability to an industry which depends to an unusually large extent on government purchasing and on government financial support of various kinds. Since 1966, government support to the airframe sector for civil projects alone has amounted to £300 million. In the same period, another £350 million has been spent in the sector on military research and development contracts and over £800 million on purchases of military aircraft and guided weapons."

To have inserted those words would have given an indication of why public funds are being laid out in this way and what the government are doing to bring the industry into public ownership and so be more accountable to the people...

The PRESIDENT. — I remind Mr. Brown of the need to be brief.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). — Yes, Mr. President, but I join the Chairman of the Committee in protesting at the way in which the Committee is treated.

Paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 are so pedestrian that it is very difficult to comment on them. I had thought of describing them by using an American euphemism but this I shall not do as it might give the translators some difficulty. I ask my colleague to find some means of revising his review. I suggest that certain objections made in the Committee, with which I agreed, be added as an appendix to the report. If he agreed to some such a course I would not press the matter to a vote tonight. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Boucheny.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I associate myself with the protests made by the Chairman and consider that a debate which is of concern to hundreds of thousands of workers deserved to be given more time. But, like the other speakers, I will endeavour to be brief.

This crisis in the aeronautical industry, of which too little has been heard, stems from the entirely military slant given to this industry. Not to recognise this fact means depriving ourselves of the means which our Rapporteur claimed were necessary if we were to be in a position to arrive at a sound assessment of this serious crisis.

Although in the past — the recent past — one or other of the States in Europe, the cradle of the industry, could hope to play a part, this is no longer true today. The very existence of civil aviation is now in peril because of the stranglehold exerted by the Americans. This is all the more serious in that it is a technologically advanced industry.

It should be noted that if concerns like Boeing, Douglas, General Electric and others have been able to make enormous profits at the expense of the workers and the technicians in our countries by gaining a quasi-monopoly of the delivery of aircraft to the air lines, the reason is that anti-sovietism and profits impose priority on the manufacture of military hardware.

This supposed defence policy serves, from this point of view, to highlight most effectively the political blindness — not to say hate — that

prevails with regard to the socialist countries, and which has in the end deprived our countries of a technical and scientific potential which is indispensable for the living conditions of the people.

Are the remedies put forward still valid? Will they make it possible to save what can still be saved?

We do not think so. The trade union organisations, both in France and in England, have shown that only the construction of civil aircraft and the generalisation of civil air transport would make possible a broad expansion of the industry in our countries.

In the proposals that have been put before us for concentrating capacities in this part of Europe, the aim is to establish a military aerospace industry which, we might note in passing, will not be independent, but will be complementary to American industry. It is therefore not a remedy, but a way of making the crisis more serious still.

As a corollary of this would-be standardisation of armaments, it is the American industry which would gain a complete monopoly. The way the Starfighter is being replaced is sufficiently eloquent; it is very revealing.

Our Assembly would be much better advised to take measures for the development of our air transport and for its democratisation, for very few Frenchmen or Europeans travel by plane. Civil aviation cannot therefore serve as a support for the systems of offensive armaments which by definition constitute the major part of all aircraft and missiles.

The general interests of each of our countries are therefore closely bound up with the advanced industries.

A second important remark: Mr. Warren's report criticises the nationalisation of certain British undertakings in the United Kingdom. This, too, is very revealing.

We firmly object to certain foreign persons being able to intervene when the workers have decided to use for the good of the nation a resource which belongs to the people.

In France, for instance, the major part of the aerospace industry is nationalised. The workers and the trade unions have struggled to ensure that this national resource shall not be grabbed by individuals whose feeling for the national

Mr. Boucheny (continued)

interest comes a poor second to the harvesting of dividends.

It must be noticed that where France is concerned, it is thanks to the nationalisation of enterprises that aircraft like the Concorde, the Caravelle and many others have been built.

We on our side advocate a large measure of co-operation with countries even beyond the frontiers of little Europe.

The aerospace industry is only in its infancy. Its future lies not in the manufacture of instruments of death, but in the contribution it can make to the steady advance of the standard of living.

The development of the aerospace industry despite the stranglehold of the big American companies will be on the lines of a truly national industry oriented towards peace and broad co-operation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER (*United Kingdom*). — Like my colleague, Mr. Brown, I want to draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that Mr. Warren in his report has criticised the British Government on two grounds: first, that it is reducing defence expenditure below a level consistent with maintaining a satisfactory western defence system, and, secondly, that it is to take aircraft production into public ownership.

On the issue of defence, I would remind both him and this Assembly that Britain has been paying more than its fair share towards western defence ever since the second world war. All the present Labour Government intends to do is to reduce that expenditure to the same average level as is found in other member countries.

This point must be made because some members of the Assembly, on the basis of what Mr. Warren has said, may have gained the impression that there is an attempt by the British to reduce their commitment to the western defence system. That is far from the truth. The present Labour Government is as intent on maintaining its fair share of the country's commitment towards the western defence system as any past or future government.

On public ownership, Mr. Warren says in paragraph 6 of his explanatory memorandum:

"Your Rapporteur would be failing in his duty if he did not issue a warning that the consequences could be dangerous and that he believes Western Europe must make such arrangements as it feels necessary to ensure that there is a sufficient design and manufacturing capability for military aircraft on the mainland of Europe."

This is a fatuous remark. The object of public ownership in Britain, contrary to what a French speaker said, is to improve our capability rather than diminish it. It is extraordinary for a Rapporteur to argue that Western Europe should unite in its efforts in this sphere and yet complain when the British Government does precisely that on a national basis.

However, I will abandon this negative approach to the document and say that I welcome, as do the British Government and, I think, the vast bulk of the Labour Party, most of what is said in the report. I sincerely hope that there are rapid moves towards a more united European approach to aviation. Every day that Europe remains divided finds the United States increasing its penetration of European markets and the Soviet Union catching up in some areas and overtaking us in others.

As someone who formerly worked in the aerospace industry, I feel it imperative for Europe to "get its finger out", and move quickly towards some kind of unity. It is an indictment of Europe as a whole that we have spent a decade or more arguing about the standardisation of the sausage or the minimum size at which celery may be sold and yet have totally neglected the basic foundation of our economy, which is a strong industry, a strong scientific effort and strong technology. At the top of that list comes aerospace.

We must ensure that, in the not too distant future, the European effort quickly matches or at least counterbalances the efforts of both the United States and the USSR. Without a strong science-based industry, Europe has no future at all. It is one thing to market food; it is another to exist as an independent continent. We need an industry which is soundly based in science and technology, and aerospace is very much at the top of that queue.

I hope that what is said in this report will compel not just members of parliament here but listening governments to take action soon, because we have not very much time left. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. van Ooijen.

Mr. van OOIJEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I read the report and recommendation from Mr. Warren and Mr. Valleix with a great deal of interest, not least because both these Rapporteurs were extremely critical of the WEU governments for being unable or unwilling to implement earlier recommendations from this Assembly.

So it is not at all clear to me why a further recommendation is being made, one which adds nothing new and may be doomed to remain unimplemented just as previous recommendations have been. It occurs to me that it would have made more sense to have set up an investigation into the causes of this political incapacity to arrive at the desired solutions. The EEC, rather than WEU, would seem to me to be the proper place for this.

The report by Mr. Valleix mentioned, in paragraph 33, a NASA study about a new civil airliner with a seating capacity of between 30 and 120 passengers. Such a project could, the Rapporteur says, be a strong competitor to a number of European aircraft designs. I wonder why he has not mentioned the F-28, a great many of which have already been sold. The Rapporteur does not tell us that the F-28 is being challenged by the Hawker Siddeley 146, which he does include in his little list. It is not only the United States that is providing competition for European aircraft companies — these companies are competing between themselves. I think that this fact is, where a number of countries are concerned, insufficiently brought out in the report.

The report by Mr. Warren and Mr. Valleix, like earlier reports, makes the point very strongly that European aircraft manufacturers need to work together, so as to make common front as a strong competitor with the United States. I do not believe all that much in going about things this way; I think that in the world market for aircraft there is no longer enough room for Europe and the United States to compete with each other. I believe that, in building aircraft and running airlines, the two continents must co-operate.

Political preferences, or political antipathies, cannot decide matters here. The European aircraft industry will have to win a world-wide market particularly in areas where this is not yet wholly in American hands. The Americans, for

their part — and this will need negotiating — will have to hold back from developing projects that clash with European initiatives. Negotiations could, for example, result in the United States giving up the development of a rival to the Dassault Falcon, the F-28 and the VFW-Fokker 614.

We know the disease the European aircraft industry is suffering from, and we know what the remedy is. The puzzle that remains is why the patient will not take the medicine. Why will the patient not come out of his isolation and into the world, out among other people, and do something about limiting his girth a bit? I feel that the Rapporteurs have still not given us the right answer to this question.

From what I have been saying it will be obvious that I am not all that keen on the recommendation put forward by the Rapporteurs. It says nothing that has not already been said. In the Netherlands we have a stock expression to mean that someone should not make the same mistake again; it runs: "An ass does not usually trip over the same stone twice."

Although an earlier recommendation has had no effect at all — and the Rapporteurs themselves recognise the fact — the recommendation is being repeated in a different wording. Obviously the Rapporteurs have not learned to do as the proverbial ass.

Although I admit I cannot really see what there is to be gained from setting up a European aviation agency, there is nothing else in the recommendation to which I take serious objection, and I shall not, therefore, be opposing it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Bruyne, the last speaker.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I protest.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. de Bruyne, it is not our fault if the President of the Federal Republic of Germany has timed the reception for 7 p.m. It is not of our doing.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — It is not the first time our Committee has been so badly treated.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Bruyne.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is of course impossible in the circumstances to say

Mr. de Bruyne (continued)

what I would have liked to say. I would have liked merely to say something about how Sabena, KLM and Luxair co-operate. The first stage of the negotiations went well, and I had intended to highlight a few aspects of this collaboration between these three small airlines.

I have come to this rostrum more than anything as a matter of principle, and almost as a symbolic gesture, because I hope that the situation that has now arisen will not be repeated in the future. We are seeing for the second time how the activities of this Committee are not given proper recognition by the Bureau of this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. de Bruyne, I think your observation is fully justified, but this is an event beyond our control. We are the guests of the Federal Republic and there are things we have to take into account. But I promise you, and the Chairman of the Committee and the Rapporteurs, that we shall, in view of the interest of the debate and the problems for which your Committee is competent, take all the necessary steps to ensure that these problems have a good place in the order of business of the next session.

Do the Rapporteurs wish to speak ?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — It is impossible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Warren.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — I would love to take the floor, but nobody would welcome that and I feel that I should not do so.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — No amendment has been tabled. I shall therefore, as has already been agreed, put the text to the vote in two parts.

Are there any objections to the first two paragraphs of the recommendation which concern Mr. Valleix's report ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

The Assembly is unanimous.

The first two paragraphs of the recommendation in Document 674 are therefore adopted and thus constitute a first recommendation¹.

1. See page 72.

Are there any objections to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the recommendation which concern Mr. Warren's report ?...

There is an objection. We must therefore take a vote by roll-call.

Unfortunately I note that there is not a quorum and the vote will therefore have to be taken at the next session.

7. Adjournment of the Session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, before closing the sitting and adjourning the session I would point out that owing to the last-minute bustle caused by a change of programme, we have been unable to impart the necessary importance and brilliance to this closing ceremony.

However, before leaving Bonn, I am very glad to note that, of all the sessions of the Assembly which I have attended in the course of many years, that now coming to a close is one of the most interesting and full of substance, not only on account of the interesting speeches made but also for the consistently high level of debates, the excellent quality of the speeches and the courtesy with which arguments were exchanged.

I would also like to repeat once again our thanks to the administration of the Bundestag and of course to its President and her immediate associates. In addition, we would like to express our gratitude to the City of Bonn for the way it has welcomed us.

I have already conveyed our thanks to the Mayor of the City and to the President of the Bundestag ; I express them once again for all the staff who have worked with me during these four days.

I hope that at some time in the future, if circumstances allow, we shall once again hold a session in this very hospitable city. (*Applause*)

Does anyone else wish to speak ?...

I declare the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union adjourned.

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 6.20 p.m.)

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