

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

# PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1976


II

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

W E U

PARIS



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The Proceedings of the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume I : Assembly Documents.

Volume II : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.



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## LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

### BELGIUM

#### Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
DEQUAE André	Chr. Soc.
KEMPINAIRE André	PLP
LEYNEN Hubert	Chr. Soc.
SCHUGENS Willy	Socialist
de STEXHE Paul	Chr. Soc.
TANGHE Francis	Chr. Soc.

#### Substitutes

MM. BREYNE Gustave de BRUYNE Hektor DUVIEUSART Etienne	Socialist Volkunie FDF-RW
Mrs. GODINACHE-LAMBERT Marie-Thérèse	PLP
MM. HULPIAU Raphaël PLASMAN Marcel VAN HOEYLANDT D. Bernard	Chr. Soc. Chr. Soc. Socialist

### FRANCE

#### Representatives

MM. BOUCHENY Serge	Communist
BOULLOCHE André	Socialist
BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
BURCKEL Jean-Claude	UDR
CERNEAU Marcel	Centre Union
DELORME Claude	Socialist
GRANGIER Edouard	Dem. Left
KAUFFMANN Michel	UCDP
de MONTESQUIOU Pierre	Soc. Dem. Ref.
NESSLER Edmond President of the Assembly	UDR
PÉRIDIER Jean	Socialist
RADIUS René	UDR
RIVIÈRE Paul	UDR
ROGER Émile	Communist
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SCHMITT Robert	UDR (App.)
VALLEIX Jean	UDR
VITTEZ Pierre	Ind. Rep.

#### Substitutes

MM. BEAUGUITTE André	Ind. Rep.
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BIZET Émile	UDR (App.)
BOURGEOIS Georges	UDR
CERMOLACCE Paul	Communist
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DAILLET Jean-Marie	Soc. Dem. Ref.
DEPIETRI César	Communist
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	UDR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left

MM. LA COMBE René du LUART Ladislas MÉNARD Jacques PIGNION Lucien SOUSTELLE Jacques VADEPIED Raoul WEBER Pierre	UDR RIAS Ind. Rep. Socialist Non-party UCDP Ind. Rep. (App.)
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### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

#### Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ALBER Siegbert	CDU/CSU
AMREHN Franz	CDU/CSU
DREGGER Alfred	CDU/CSU
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
GESSNER Manfred	SPD
KEMPFLER Friedrich	CDU/CSU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
MATTICK Kurt	SPD
MENDE Erich	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
RICHTER Klaus	SPD
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
SCHWENCKE Olaf	SPD
SIEGLERSCHMIDT Hellmut	SPD
VOHRER Manfred	FDP
Mrs. WOLF Erika	CDU/CSU

#### Substitutes

Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM. BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
CARSTENS Karl	CDU/CSU
GÖLTER Georg	CDU/CSU
HAASE Horst	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
KLEPSCH Egon	CDU/CSU
KLIESING Georg	CDU/CSU
LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
OPITZ Rudolf	FDP
PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
WALTHER Rudi	SPD
WENDE Manfred	SPD
WÖRNER Manfred	CDU/CSU
WURBS Richard	FDP

ITALY

Representatives

MM. AVERARDI Giuseppe	Socialist
BETTIOL Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
BOLOGNA Giacomo	Chr. Dem.
COPPOLA Mattia	Chr. Dem.
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
LAFORGIA Antonio	Chr. Dem.
LEGGIERI Vincenzo	Chr. Dem.
MAMMI Oscar	Republican
MINNOCCI Giacinto	Socialist
Mrs. MIOTTI CARLI Amalia	Chr. Dem.
MM. PECORARO Antonio	Chr. Dem.
PICA Domenico	Chr. Dem.
PRETI Luigi	Socialist
QUILLERI Fausto Samuele	Liberal
TALAMONA Augusto	Socialist
TREU Renato	Chr. Dem.
VEDOVATO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
ZAFFANELLA Renzo	Socialist

Substitutes

MM. ARFÉ Gaetano	Socialist
ARTALI Mario	Socialist
BONALDI Umberto	Liberal
CASTELLUCCI Albertino	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. CATTANEO-PETRINI Giannina	Chr. Dem.
MM. CAVEZZALI Paolo	Socialist
FARABEGOLI Furio	Chr. Dem.
LA ROSA Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
MAGLIANO Terenzio	Socialist
MANCINI Antonio	Chr. Dem.
MONETTI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
NEGRARI Andrea	Chr. Dem.
PACINI Arturo	Chr. Dem.
PREARO Roberto	Chr. Dem.
PUMILIA Calogero	Chr. Dem.
REALE Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
SANTALCO Carmelo	Chr. Dem.
SPOA Ettore	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. ABENS Victor	Soc. Workers
MARGUE Georges	Chr. Soc.
MART René	Dem.

Substitutes

MM. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
KONEN René	Dem.
SPAUTZ Jean	Chr. Soc.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. CORNELISSEN Pam	Pop. Cath.
DANKERT Pieter	Labour
de NIET Maarten	Labour
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
REIJNEN Johannes	Pop. Cath.
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	Antirevolution.
VOOGD Joop	Labour

Substitutes

MM. de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
van OOIJEN David	Labour
PEIJNENBURG Marinus	Pop. Cath.
PIKET Frederik	Chr. Hist.
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
WALTMANS Henk	Radical

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

MM. Ronald BROWN	Labour
Paul CHANNON	Conservative
Julian CRITCHLEY	Conservative
Lord DARLING of HILLSBOROUGH	Labour
MM. John FARR	Conservative
Andrew FAULDS	Labour
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
John HUNT	Conservative
Arthur LEWIS	Labour
John MENDELSON	Labour
John PAGE	Conservative
Lord PEDDIE	Labour
Sir John RODGERS	Conservative
MM. John ROPER	Labour
David STEEL	Liberal
Thomas URWIN	Labour
Phillip WHITEHEAD	Labour

Substitutes

Mr. Gordon BAGIER	Labour
Lord BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Antony BUCK	Conservative
John CORDLE	Conservative
Jim CRAIGEN	Labour
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
Sir Harwood HARRISON	Conservative
Mr. Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
MM. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Kevin McNAMARA	Labour
Dr. Colin PHIPPS	Labour
Lord SELSDON	Conservative
Mrs. Ann TAYLOR	Labour
Lord WALLACE of COSLANY	Labour
MM. Kenneth WARREN	Conservative
John WATKINSON	Labour



**I**

**MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS**

# FIRST SITTING

Monday, 14th June 1976

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly.
2. Examination of Credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
5. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session (Doc. 695).
6. Ratification of action by the Presidential Committee (Docs. 696, 698 and 699).
7. Détente and security in Europe (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 703).
8. Nomination of members to Committees.

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Grangier, Provisional President, in the Chair.*

### 1. Opening of the Session

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2, 4, 5 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure, the Provisional President declared open the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

### 2. Tributes

The Provisional President paid tribute to the memory of Mr. Beyen, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, and to Mr. Piccioni and Mr. Legaret, former members of the Assembly of WEU.

### 3. Address by the Provisional President

The Provisional President addressed the Assembly.

### 4. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

The Provisional President informed the Assembly that the Labour members of the United Kingdom Delegation who were members of the House of Commons were unable to participate in the First Part of the Session.

### 5. Examination of Credentials

In accordance with Rule 6(2) of the Rules of Procedure, and subject to ratification by the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of Lord Hughes as a Substitute for the United Kingdom in place of Baroness Phillips, who had resigned.

### 6. Election of the President of the Assembly

One candidate only was proposed for the post of President, namely Mr. Nessler.

*Speaker* : Mr. Leynen.

The Assembly decided unanimously to dispense with a secret ballot and elected Mr. Nessler President of the Assembly by acclamation.

On the invitation of the Provisional President, Mr. Nessler took the Chair.

### 7. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

### 8. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The President informed the Assembly that five candidates were proposed for the six posts of Vice-President, namely : MM. Amrehn, Mart, de Niet, Sir John Rodgers and Mr. Tanghe.



*Speaker* : Mr. Leynen.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation and that the Vice-Presidents should rank according to age, namely: Mr. de Niet, Sir John Rodgers, MM. Amrehn, Tanghe and Mart.

The vice-presidency reserved for Italy remained vacant.

### 9. Observers

The President welcomed Mr. Belisle, member of the Canadian Senate, Mr. Roberts, member of the Canadian House of Commons, Mr. Guldberg and Mr Budtz, members of the Danish Folketing, Mr. Papapolitis and Mr. Tavlarios, members of the Greek Chamber of Deputies, Mr. Eidem, Mr. Aarvik and Mr. Thyness, members of the Norwegian Storting, Mr. Vasco da Gama Fernandes, President of the Portuguese Assembly, and Mr. Roseta, member of the Portuguese Assembly.

### 10. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session

(Doc. 695)

The Assembly adopted the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session.

### 11. Ratification of action by the Presidential Committee

(Docs. 696, 698 and 699)

In accordance with Rule 14(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified unanimously the adoption by the Presidential Committee on 12th January 1976 of the order on the organisation of a symposium on a European armaments

policy, Document 696. (This Order will be published as No. 45) <sup>1</sup>.

The Assembly ratified by sitting and standing the adoption by the Presidential Committee on 1st March 1976 of the resolution on European union and WEU, Documents 698 and 699. (This Resolution will be published as No. 59) <sup>2</sup>.

### 12. Détente and security in Europe

(Presentation of the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 703)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur.

### 13. Address by Mr. Roberts, Observer from Canada

Mr. Roberts, Observer from Canada, addressed the Assembly.

### 14. Détente and security in Europe

(Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 703)

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Kliesing, Critchley, Müller, Scholten, Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Cermolacce, Guldberg (Observer from Denmark), Dankert.

The Debate was adjourned.

### 15. Nomination of members to Committees

In accordance with Rules 39 and 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the membership of the six Committees as follows :

#### 1. COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS (27 seats)

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium</i> :	MM. Kempinaire Schugens Tanghe	MM. Breyne Dequae Duvieusart

1. See page 19.

2. See page 20.

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>France :</i>	MM. Beauguitte Bizet Bouloche Ménard Rivière	MM. Delorme La Combe Vadepied de Montesquiou Schleiter
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Haase Klepsch Lemmrich Pawelczyk Richter	MM. Mende Wörner Schmidt Ahrens Büchner
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Averardi Laforgia Pumilia Reale Vedovato	MM. Artali Bonaldi Spora Magliano La Rosa
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Konen	Mr. Spautz
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. Dankert de Koster Scholten	MM. de Niet Piket Cornelissen
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Buck Critchley Hardy Roper Urwin	Sir Harwood Harrison Lord Duncan-Sandys Lord Peddie MM. Watkinson Whitehead

## 2. GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (27 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	Mrs. Godinache-Lambert MM. Leynen Van Hoeylandt	MM. de Bruyne de Stexhe Hulpiau
<i>France :</i>	MM. Brugnon Cermolacce Grangier Nessler Péridier	MM. Forni Grussenmeyer Burckel Soustelle Weber
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	Mr. Amrehn Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Mende Schmidt Siegler Schmidt	MM. Dregger Gessner Müller Schäuble Schwencke

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Bettiol Fioret Minnocci Preti Quilleri	MM. Santalco Pecoraro Cavezzali Magliano Treu
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Abens	Mr. Hengel
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. de Niet Peijnenburg Portheine	MM. Voogd Reijnen de Koster
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Mendelson Sir John Rodgers MM. Steel Urwin	MM. Page Faulds Channon McNamara Lewis

### 3. COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS (21 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Adriaensens de Stexhe	MM. Plasman de Bruyne
<i>France :</i>	MM. Boucheny de Montesquiou Schmitt Valleix	MM. Bizet Cerneau La Combe Vitter
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Gölter Lenzer Richter Schwencke	MM. Lemmrich Klepsch Ahrens Walther
<i>Italy :</i>	Mr. Mammi Mrs. Cattaneo-Petrini MM. Pecoraro Treu	MM. Averardi Talamona Mancini Leggieri
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Mart	Mr. Hengel
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. Cornelissen van Ooijen	MM. Portheine Waltmans
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Craigen Lewis Dr. Phipps Mr. Warren	MM. Hawkins Bagier Brown Jessel

## 4. COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION (21 seats)

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Dequae de Bruyne	MM. Kempinaire Adriaensens
<i>France :</i>	MM. Depietri Kauffmann Croze Schleiter	MM. Bourgeois Belin Pignion Schmitt
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Ahrens Alber Mrs. Wolf Mr. Vohrer	MM. Gessner Kempfler Walther Wurbs
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Castellucci Moneti Prearo Talamona	Mr. Leggieri Mrs. Cattaneo-Petrini MM. Negrari Arfé
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Hengel	Mr. Margue
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. de Koster Waltmans	MM. Peijnenburg Voogd
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Lewis Page Lord Peddie Lord Selsdon	Lord Beaumont of Whitley Mr. Grieve Lord Wallace of Coslany Sir John Rodgers

## 5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES (21 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Duvieusart Hulpiau	Mr. Breyne Mrs. Godinache-Lambert
<i>France :</i>	MM. Cerneau Burekel du Luart Pignion	MM. Nessler Péridier Roger Croze
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Alber Kempfler Marquardt Schulte	MM. Lenzer Gölter Büchner Paweleyk

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Coppola Leggieri Pica Preti	MM. Bologna Reale Farabegoli Laforgia
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Konen	Mr. Abens
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. Voogd Scholten	MM. Piket Cornelissen
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Craigen Grieve Dr. Phipps Mrs. Taylor	Lord Hughes MM. Jessel Watkinson Cordle

#### 6. COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS (14 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Schugens Tanghe	MM. Kempinaire Plasman
<i>France :</i>	MM. Delorme Jeambrun	MM. Radius Rivière
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Enders Müller	Mrs. von Bothmer Mr. Alber
<i>Italy :</i>	Mrs. Miotti Carli Mr. Zaffanella	MM. Pacini Bonaldi
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	MM. Hengel Spautz	MM. Mart Konen
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. Peijnenburg Stoffelen	MM. Schlingemann Voogd
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Farr Mendelson	MM. Hunt Roper

#### 16. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 15th June, at 10 a.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance<sup>1</sup> :

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. <i>Hulpiau</i> (Adriaensens)	Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Ahrens)	MM. <i>Piket</i> (Cornelissen)
Dequae	MM. Alber	Dankert
Kempinaire	<i>Kliesing</i> (Amrehn)	de Niet
Leynen	Enders	Portheine
Schugens	Kempfler	Scholten
de Stexhe	<i>Schäuble</i> (Lemmrigh)	<i>Stoffelen</i> (Voogd)
<i>de Bruyne</i> (Tanghe)	Marquardt	
	Mattick	<b>United Kingdom</b>
	Mende	MM. Critchley
<b>France</b>	Müller	<i>Hawkins</i> (Farr)
MM. Burokel	Richter	Grieve
Delorme	Schwencke	<i>Warren</i> (Hunt)
Grangier	Sieglerschmidt	Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i> (Page)
Kauffmann		Lord Peddie
de Montesquiou	<b>Italy</b>	Sir John Rodgers
Péridier	MM. Bologna	Lord <i>Hughes</i> (Roper)
Radius	Vedovato	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
<i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)	<b>Luxembourg</b>	Lord <i>Wallace of Coslany</i> (Urwin)
Schmitt	Mr. Abens	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

<b>France</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>
MM. Boucheny	MM. Averardi	MM. Margue
Bouloche	Bettiol	Mart
Brugnon	Coppola	
Cerneau	Fioret	<b>Netherlands</b>
Rivière	<i>Laforgia</i>	Mr. Reijnen
Schleiter	Leggieri	
Valleix	Mammi	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Vitter	Minnocci	MM. Brown
	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Channon
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	MM. Pecoraro	Lord Darling of Hillsborough
MM. Dregger	Pica	MM. Faulds
Gessner	Preti	Hardy
Schmidt	Quilleri	Lewis
Vohrer	Talamona	Mendelson
Mrs. Wolf	Treu	Whitehead
	Zaffanella	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**ORDER 45*****on a symposium on a European armaments policy***

---

The Presidential Committee,

Anxious to secure widespread recognition of the need for a European policy on the production and procurement of armaments ;

Aware of the interest of such a symposium attended by members of parliament and experts ;

Noting the success of the colloquy on a civil and military aeronautical policy for Europe organised by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions,

**INSTRUCTS**

The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to organise a symposium on a European armaments policy as set out in the explanatory memorandum of this order and to submit proposals to the Presidential Committee for approval, including the expenditure to be authorised and the list of persons to be invited.

**RESOLUTION 59**  
**on European union and WEU**

---

The Assembly,

Noting the decision by the nine member countries of the EEC to set up a European union by 1980 and to elect the European Parliament by universal suffrage as from 1978 ;

Noting the report submitted by Mr. Léo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the members of the European Council in January 1976 ;

Noting further that the modified Brussels Treaty is at present the only juridical basis for a European defence policy ;

Considering that the development of the European union must not be an occasion for weakening the mutual commitments of the signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty ;

Believing that continuing consultations between European countries on defence policy must be based on recognition of existing reciprocal obligations ;

Recalling that the WEU Assembly, established under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, is responsible for supervising the application of that treaty ;

Considering that this Assembly cannot therefore entertain the transfer of its activities to another parliamentary assembly unless the latter has the right and obligation to supervise the application of the modified Brussels Treaty,

**INVITES THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL**

1. To make certain that all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are respected in establishing the European union ;
2. Not to infringe the rights of any WEU body unless its full responsibilities have been transferred by treaty to a body of the union ;
3. To examine how to integrate WEU in the union rather than develop new institutions in fields in which WEU has legally-instituted responsibilities ;
4. To maintain at all events a parliamentary assembly with statutory competence for all aspects of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty.



## SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 15th June 1976

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. *Détente and security in Europe (Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 703 and Amendments).*
2. *Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly (Presentation by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 697 and 710);*  
*Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council; Political*

activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council; Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council (*Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 700 and Amendments, 702 and 705).*

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

#### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

#### 3. *Détente and security in Europe*

*(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 703 and Amendments)*

The Debate was resumed.

*Speakers* : Mr. Mattick, Lord Peddie, Sir John Rodgers, MM. de Niet, Portheine.

The Debate was adjourned.

#### 4. *Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly*

*(Presentation by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs 697 and 710)*

*Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council*

#### *Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council*

#### *Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council*

*(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 700 and Amendments, 702 and 705)*

The Report of the Council to the Assembly was presented by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. Destremau replied to questions put by MM. de Bruyne, Sieglerschmidt, Warren, Klie-sing, Leynen, Mattick, Valleix, Cermolacce, Tanghe.

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Haase, Rapporteur.

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Périquier, Rapporteur.

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Richter, Rapporteur.

The Joint Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. de Montesquiou, de Bruyne.

*Mr. de Niet, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler.*

*Speaker* : Mr. Rivière.

Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, replied to the speakers.

*Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.*

The Joint Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation in Document 700.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Haase :

At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :

“Welcoming the Council’s replies to Recommendation 281 and to Written Question 167, and the assignment to the Standing Armaments Committee of a study of the situation of the armaments industry in the member countries,”.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Haase :

In paragraph 2 of the operative text of the draft recommendation, before sub-paragraph (i) insert a sub-paragraph as follows :

“(i) Include in annual reports, in addition to the present statement of the total level of British forces on the continent at 31st

December, a statement of the level of British forces on the mainland on that date, established in accordance with the Council’s definition of the approved level ;”.

Sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) become sub-paragraphs (ii), (iii) and (iv).

*Speakers* : MM. de Bruyne, Richter, Critchley.

The Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 700, as amended.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 285) <sup>2</sup>.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 702.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 285) <sup>2</sup>.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 705.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 286) <sup>3</sup>.

### **5. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 12.50 p.m.*

1. See page 24.

2. See page 25.

3. See page 26.

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance <sup>1</sup> :

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>
MM. <i>de Bruyne</i> (Adriaensens)	MM. Ahrens	MM. <i>Hengel</i> (Abens)
Dequae	Alber	<i>Spautz</i> (Margue)
Leynen	<i>Kliesing</i> (Amrehn)	Mart
Schugens	Enders	<b>Netherlands</b>
de Stexhe	Gessner	MM. Dankert
Tanghe	Kempfer	de Niet
	Marquardt	Porthoine
	Mattick	<i>Schlingemann</i> (Reijnen)
<b>France</b>	Mende	Stoffelen
MM. <i>La Combe</i> (Burekel)	Müller	
<i>Pignon</i> (Delorme)	Richter	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Kauffmann	<i>Haase</i> (Schmidt)	MM. Critchley
de Montesquiou	Schwencke	Grieve
Péridier	Sieglerschmidt	<i>Warren</i> (Hunt)
Radius	Vohrer	Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i> (Page)
Rivière		Lord Peddie
<i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)	<b>Italy</b>	Sir John Rodgers
<i>Croze</i> (Schleiter)	MM. Bologna	Lord <i>Hughes</i> (Roper)
Schmitt	Vedovato	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
Valleix		Lord <i>Wallace of Coslany</i> (Urwin)

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
Mr. Kempinaire	MM. Averardi	MM. Cornelissen
	Bettiol	Scholten
<b>France</b>	Coppola	
MM. Boucheny	Fioret	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Boulloche	Laforgia	MM. Brown
Brugnon	Leggieri	Channon
Cerneau	Mammi	Lord Darling of Hillsborough
Grangier	Minnocci	MM. Farr
Vitter	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Faulds
	MM. Pecoraro	Hardy
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	Pica	Lewis
MM. Dregger	Preti	Mendelson
Lemrich	Quilleri	Whitehead
Mrs. Wolf	Talamona	
	Treu	
	Zaffanella	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 284*****on the application of the Brussels Treaty —  
reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Welcoming the continued prompt action by the Council which enabled the twenty-first annual report to be communicated by 4th March ;

Believing that when the mutual defence obligations of the modified Brussels Treaty are effectively incorporated in a treaty on a European union controlling all its external defence and foreign policy, only then will the time have come to abrogate the arms control provisions of the treaty ;

Again congratulating the Agency for the Control of Armaments on the way in which it has carried out in difficult circumstances the regrettably still too-limited tasks assigned to it by the Council ;

Welcoming the Council's replies to Recommendation 281 and to Written Question 167, and the assignment to the Standing Armaments Committee of a study of the situation of the armaments industry in the member countries,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Apply each year the Secretary-General's new procedure for the prompt communication of the annual report ;
2. Ensure the application of the modified Brussels Treaty until such time as the mutual defence undertakings are effectively incorporated in a treaty of European union, and meanwhile that it :
  - (i) Include in annual reports, in addition to the present statement of the total level of British forces on the continent at 31st December, a statement of the level of British forces on the mainland on that date, established in accordance with the Council's definition of the approved level ;
  - (ii) Include in annual reports a statement of the numbers of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, both by category of installation and by country visited ;
  - (iii) Include in the conclusion of the arms control chapter of the annual report a full and clear statement of all those aspects of the arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty which are not fully applied as it did in earlier years ;
  - (iv) Continue to press for the entry into force of the convention for the due process of law signed on 14th December 1957 ;
3. Report to the Assembly on the rôle it envisages for the independent programme group.

**RECOMMENDATION 285*****on the political activities of the Council —  
reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Noting the twenty-first annual report of the Council ;

Recalling Resolutions 55 and 59 ;

Noting with satisfaction that the Council “ makes no distinction between the Council of Western European Union meeting at ministerial level and the same Council meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives” ;

Recalling that the Council “ is fully empowered to exercise the rights and duties ascribed to it in the treaty” as long as these rights and duties have not been transferred by treaty to another institution ;

Deploring that the Council meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives makes only exceptional use of its prerogatives ;

Noting however that circumstances continue to make it essential to maintain procedure for consultation between the Western European countries on matters affecting their security ;

Noting that the Council's refusal to reply to Written Questions 158, 159 and 160 and to hold a joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee in 1975 shows that the Council is shirking its responsibilities in respect of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty ;

Recalling that the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty commits its signatories to “ preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage” ;

Recalling finally Recommendation 266 to which the Council gave only a very incomplete reply,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Ensure the application of the modified Brussels Treaty by ;
  - (a) examining in which framework each question concerning European security should be discussed by the Seven ;
  - (b) dealing effectively with the various problems raised by the application of the modified Brussels Treaty even when it meets at the level of Permanent Representatives ;
  - (c) examining attentively the means whereby it may complement possible action by the Nine in defence matters, particularly in emergencies ;
  - (d) illustrating how the Council's activities reflect the constantly-repeated statement by the Council and by the member countries that they attach the greatest importance to the full application of the modified Brussels Treaty ;
2. Give the Assembly a precise reply to paragraph 3 of Recommendation 266 ;
3. Report without hesitation in its communications to the Assembly on any differences between the positions adopted by its members, as it did in its reply to Recommendation 283 ;
4. Consider, together with the other powers concerned, how it might follow the political consultations between the nine member countries of the EEC on the one hand and on the other, in view of the study it is undertaking on “ the possibility that WEU might undertake additional work connected with the standardisation of armaments in Europe”, the activities of the European programme group ;
5. Should not invoke the possibility of members using national procedure in order to avoid replying to recommendations and written questions.

**RECOMMENDATION 286**

***on scientific, technological and aerospace questions —  
reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council***

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The Assembly,

Appreciating the Council's interest in promoting technological collaboration in a European framework ;

Regretting the absence of a medium- and long-term policy to encourage advanced technology programmes, although such a policy is necessary if Western European industry is to maintain a valid civil and military capability,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

Include in its twenty-second annual report on its activities guidelines for a long-term European policy in sectors of advanced technology such as space, aeronautics, aviation, nuclear reactors, computers and electronics, taking both civil and military aspects into consideration and indicating how effective decision-making machinery could be set up in Western Europe.

# THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 15th June 1976

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. European aeronautical policy — Guidelines emerging from the Colloquy on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 (*Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions; Address by Mr. Chabert, Minister of Communications of Belgium; Debate and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 704*).
2. Détente and security in Europe (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 703 and Amendments*).
3. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 706*).

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

### 3. European aeronautical policy — Guidelines emerging from the Colloquy on 2nd and 3rd February 1976

*(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions; Address by Mr. Chabert, Minister of Communications of Belgium; Debate and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 704)*

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by MM. Richter, Valleix and Warren, Rapporteurs.

*Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly.*

The Debate was opened.

Mr. Chabert, Minister of Communications of Belgium, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Chabert replied to questions put by MM. Valleix, de Bruyne.

*Speakers* : MM. de Montesquiou, Portheine, de Bruyne, Schlingemann.

MM. Valleix and Warren, Rapporteurs, and Mr. de Montesquiou, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The vote on the draft Recommendation was postponed until the morning Sitting on Thursday, 17th June, at 11.30 a.m.

### 4. Détente and security in Europe

*(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 703 and Amendments)*

The Debate was resumed.

Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur, and Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation in Document 703.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett :

Leave out the draft recommendation in Document 703 and insert a revised draft recommendation as follows :

“The Assembly,

Affirming that true East-West détente can be achieved only through substantial mutual,

balanced and controlled reductions in armaments by both blocs ;

Considering the growing preponderance of troops and weapons on the side of the Soviet Union and its allies in Central and Northern Europe ;

Noting that the Soviet Union has up to now interpreted the commitments entered into in the final act of the CSCE in a restrictive manner ;

Regretting that no recent progress has been made in the SALT and MBFR negotiations ;

Condemning the Soviet Union's policy to take advantage of crises outside Europe to strengthen its political position by direct or indirect military means ;

Concerned that in face of increasingly powerful Warsaw Pact forces the members of the Atlantic Alliance will no longer deploy sufficient strength to guarantee their continuing collective security ;

Noting that while the Soviet Union and its allies fail to accept the main implications of détente, as this concept is interpreted in the West, a relative reduction of military strength in Western Europe has occurred vis-à-vis the Soviet military threat ;

Satisfied that matters emerging from the CSCE have played a large part in the Council's discussions in 1975 ;

Considering that the application of the provisions of the final act of the CSCE on the movement of persons is one of the vital elements by which one can judge the Soviet Union's desire for détente ;

Considering that there is still some uncertainty about the operation of NATO in the event of some members of the Atlantic Alliance falling prey to subversion directly or indirectly sustained by external military intervention ;

Regretting that South Africa's widely condemned racial policies and intervention provided a pretext, although unjustified, for massive Soviet and Cuban military intervention in Angola,

#### RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine regularly the consequences of the CSCE ;

2. Inform the Assembly of any reported infringements of the provisions of the final act of the CSCE ;

3. Examine how great an effort each member country has to make to maintain a continuing adequate balance to ensure peace with security ;

4. Ensure that its members concert their views in the appropriate framework on any crisis arising outside Europe in order :

(a) to avoid hasty action which might serve as a pretext for interference by the Soviet Union or its allies ;

(b) to deter any further Soviet interference ;

5. Report to the Assembly on any implications for Western Europe of developments in the political, economic and military balance in Europe and the world ;

6. Give timely consideration to the conditions in which the modified Brussels Treaty could be applied should one of the member countries fall prey to direct or indirect military intervention from outside."

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Dankert, Mr. Richter and Lord Peddie :

1. In paragraph 4 of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "little or no" and insert "little or insufficient".

2. Leave out paragraph 5 of the preamble and insert :

"Condemning the Soviet Union's policy to take advantage of crises outside Europe to strengthen its political position by military means ;"

3. In paragraph 6 of the preamble, leave out "no longer" and insert "should".

4. Leave out paragraph 7 of the preamble.

5. Leave out paragraph 11 of the preamble and insert :

"Regretting that South Africa's widely-condemned racial policies and later intervention provided a pretext, although unjustified, for massive Soviet and Cuban military intervention in Angola, "

6. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "re-establish and".

The substance of Parts 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 having been included in the new text submitted by the Rapporteur, Mr. Dankert moved Part 4 of Amendment No. 1.

*Speakers* : Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Dankert, Sir Frederic Bennett.



Part 4 of Amendment No. 1 was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Radius :

In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper :

- (a) leave out "re-establish and" ;
- (b) leave out "a secure balance between the forces of the two alliances in Central and Northern Europe" and insert "a sufficient balance in order to ensure peace".

The substance of Amendment No. 2 having been met, in part, by the new text submitted by the Rapporteur, Amendment No. 2 was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Radius :

At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "direct or indirect".

*Speakers* : Mr. Radius, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Radius.

Amendment No. 3 was withdrawn.

The vote on the revised draft Recommendation was postponed until the morning Sitting on Thursday, 17th June, at 11.30 a.m.

### **5. Relations with Parliaments**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 706)*

The Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speaker* : Mr. Radius.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly took note of the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

### **6. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 16th June, at 10 a.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 6.10 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance <sup>1</sup> :

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. <i>Kliesing</i> (Amrehn)	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. <i>de Bruyne</i> (Adriaensens)	Gessner	MM. Dankert
Leynen	Kempfler	de Niet
Schugens	<i>Schäuble</i> (Lemmerich)	Portheine
de Stexhe	<i>Pawelczyk</i> (Marquardt)	<i>Schlingemann</i> (Reijnen)
Tanghe	Mende	Scholten
<b>France</b>	Richter	
MM. Brugnon	Sieglerschmidt	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Delorme	Vohrer	MM. <i>Buck</i> (Channon)
de Montesquiou		Critchley
Radius	<b>Italy</b>	Grieve
<i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)	Mr. Bologna	<i>Warren</i> (Hunt)
Valleix		Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i> (Page)
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	Lord Peddie
MM. Ahrens	MM. Margue	Lord <i>Hughes</i> (Roper)
Alber	Mart	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Schmidt	<b>Luxembourg</b>
MM. Dequae	Schwencke	Mr. Abens
Kempinaire	Mrs. Wolf	
<b>France</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Boucheny	MM. Averardi	MM. Cornelissen
Bouloche	Bettiol	Voogd
Burckel	Coppola	
Cerneau	Fioret	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Grangier	Laforgia	Mr. Brown
Kauffmann	Leggieri	Lord Darling of Hillsborough
Péridier	Mammi	MM. Farr
Rivière	Minnocci	Faulds
Schleiter	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Hardy
Schmitt	MM. Pecoraro	Lewis
Vitter	Pica	Mendelson
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	Preti	Sir John Rodgers
MM. Dregger	Quilleri	MM. Urwin
Enders	Talamona	Whitehead
Mattick	Treu	
Müller	Vedovato	
	Zaffanella	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 16th June 1976

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1976 (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 701*).
2. Address by Mr. Schmidt, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany.
3. Security in the Mediterranean (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Docs. 708 and Amendments and 712*).
4. Reserve forces (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 707*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Mart, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

#### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

#### 3. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1976

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 701)*

The Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. de Bruyne, Page.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft texts in Document 701.

The draft Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1976 was agreed to unanimously. (This Opinion will be published as No. 23) <sup>1</sup>.

1. See page 34.

The draft Recommendation on improving the status of WEU staff was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 287) <sup>1</sup>.

#### 4. Security in the Mediterranean

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 708 and Amendments and 712)*

The Report and supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments were presented by Mr. Buck, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speaker* : Mr. Bologna.

*Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Mart, Vice-President of the Assembly.*

The Debate was adjourned.

#### 5. Address by Mr. Schmidt, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany

Mr. Schmidt, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, addressed the Assembly.

1. See page 35.

Mr. Schmidt replied to questions put by MM. Critchley, Rivière, Richter, Mattick, Schwencke, Enders.

### **6. Security in the Mediterranean**

**(Resumed Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 708 and Amendments and 712)**

The Debate was resumed.

*Speakers* : MM. Rivière, Vasco da Gama Fernandes (Observer from Portugal), Lord Peddie, MM. Radius, Vedovato.

The Debate was adjourned.

### **7. Change in the Order of Business**

The President proposed that the votes postponed until Thursday, 17th June, at 11.30 a.m., should be brought forward to this afternoon following the conclusion of the debate on security in the Mediterranean.

*Speaker* : Mr. Piket.

The proposal was agreed to.

### **8. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance <sup>1</sup> :

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. <i>de Bruyne</i> (Adriaensens)	MM. Ahrens	MM. <i>Piket</i> (Cornelissen)
Dequae	Alber	de Niet
Leynen	<i>Kliesing</i> (Amrehn)	<i>Schlingemann</i> (Reijnen)
Schugens	Enders	Scholten
<i>Plasman</i> (de Stexhe)	Kempfler	
Tanghe	<i>Schäuble</i> (Lemmerich)	
	Marquardt	
	Mattick	
	Richter	<b>United Kingdom</b>
<b>France</b>	Schwencke	MM. <i>Buck</i> (Channon)
MM. Burckel	Sieglerschmidt	Critchley
Kauffmann	Vohrer	Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i> (Farr)
de Montesquiou		Mr. Grieve
Péridier	<b>Italy</b>	Lord <i>Selsdon</i> (Hardy)
Radius	MM. Bologna	MM. <i>Warren</i> (Hunt)
Rivière	Vedovato	Page
<i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)	<b>Luxembourg</b>	Lord Peddie
Schleiter	MM. Abens	Sir John Rodgers
Schmitt	Margue	Lord <i>Hughes</i> (Roper)
Valleix	Mart	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
		Lord <i>Wallace of Coslany</i> (Urwin)

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Müller	MM. Quilleri
Mr. Kempinaire	Schmidt	Talamona
	Mrs. Wolf	Treu
		Zaffanella
<b>France</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Boucheny	MM. Averardi	MM. Dankert
Bouloche	Bettiol	Portheine
Brugnon	Coppola	Voogd
Cerneau	Fioret	
Delorme	Laforgia	
Grangier	Leggieri	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Vitter	Mammi	Mr. Brown
	Minnocci	Lord Darling of Hillsborough
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	Mrs. Miotti Carli	MM. Faulds
MM. Dregger	MM. Pecoraro	Lewis
Gessner	Pica	Mendelson
Mende	Prete	Whitehead

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**OPINION 23*****on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU  
for the financial year 1976***

---

The Assembly,

Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter ;

Having taken note of the contents,

Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated.

**RECOMMENDATION 287**  
***on improving the status of WEU staff***

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The Assembly,

Recalling Recommendations 250 and 265 ;

Deploring the slow progress of work in the Co-ordinating Committee ;

Regretting that the governments have still not introduced a pension scheme for all the co-ordinated organisations ;

Regretting the governments' decision to abandon present procedure for adjusting salaries before introducing new procedure ;

Noting the ensuing unrest among staff members of the co-ordinated organisations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. In the framework of the co-ordinated organisations :

1. Endeavour to have the pension scheme brought into effect before the end of 1976, its provisions being applied as from the date of adoption of the regulations governing its application, but payment of pensions for retired officials still being made as from 1st January 1973 ;

2. Ensure that the scheme includes all necessary guarantees, based *inter alia* on joint management for all the co-ordinated organisations in accordance with the principles set out in Recommendations 250 and 265 ;

3. Amend the Staff Rules to avoid the widow or orphans of an official suffering hardship through a break in income during the period preceding payment of the first arrears of the pension ;

4. Introduce procedure for salary reviews similar to practice in the European Communities ;

5. Improve the speed and efficiency of co-ordination by tightening up procedure ;

6. Change the system of indemnities for loss of job on the lines of regulations in the European Communities and in the meantime improve the pension rights of officials who have become redundant by adding to their entitlement the period for which an indemnity for loss of job is granted ;

7. Make provision for a reinstatement allowance for officials terminating their service and who were granted an installation allowance at the time of recruitment, as is the case in the European Communities ;

II. Ask the Public Administration Committee to transmit to the Assembly as soon as available its study on conditions for seconding national officials.

## FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 16th June 1976

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Security in the Mediterranean (*Resumed Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Docs. 708 and Amendments and 712*).
2. European aeronautical policy — Guidelines emerging from the Colloquy on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 704*).
3. Détente and security in Europe (*Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doc. 703*).
4. Reserve forces (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 707*).
5. Strategic mobility (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 709*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

#### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

#### 3. Security in the Mediterranean

*(Resumed Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Docs. 708 and Amendments and 712)*

The Debate was resumed.

*Speakers:* MM. de Montesquiou, Thyness (Observer from Norway), Cermolacce, Papapolitis (Observer from Greece), Kliesing, Budtz (Observer from Denmark), Piket, Valleix (on a point of order), Buck.

The Assembly agreed that the words "Recommends that the Council and member Governments" be replaced by the words "Recommends that the Council and requests that the member Governments".

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation in Documents 708 and 712.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Dankert, Mr. Sieglerschmidt and Lord Peddie:

1. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "if the Atlantic Alliance weakened in its determination to defend its freedom".

2. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "freely-elected parliamentary democracies and the preparation of NATO contingency plans designed to meet any crisis" and insert "parliamentary democracy and human rights and the preparation of NATO contingency plans designed to meet any crisis in the treaty area".

3. Leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

4. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "announcement of free elections in Spain" and insert "signs of democratic developments in Spain".

5. Leave out paragraph 1(a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert "by negotiating in due time with a democratic Spain the accession of that country to the North Atlantic Treaty".

6. Leave out paragraph 1(d) of the draft recommendation proper.

7. Leave out paragraph 2(a) of the draft recommendation proper.



8. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by MM. Radius, de Montesquiou, Burekel and Valleix.

1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out all the words after "Alliance".

2. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "appropriate" and replace "Iran associated with Alliance defence planning" with "Iran associated with the Alliance".

3. Leave out paragraph 1(c) of the draft recommendation proper and insert "by recognising the value of NATO military facilities located in several countries of the Mediterranean area".

4. In paragraph 2(b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after "détente" and insert "of any installation of new Soviet bases or similar facilities in the Mediterranean area".

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Valleix and Mr. de Bruyne.

In the draft recommendation, before the words "RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS", insert the following :

"RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

(a) Examine regularly all questions relating to the security of Europe in the Mediterranean and thus foster a rapprochement of political and strategic concepts underlying the defence of the different member countries of Western European Union in the Mediterranean basin ;

(b) Follow the evolution of the situation in Spain and examine the conditions and possibilities for that country joining Western European Union when its internal régime conforms with the principles on which the modified Brussels Treaty is based ;"

The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 1 of Amendment No. 1.

*Speakers* : MM. Sieglerschmidt, Buck.

Part 1 of Amendment No. 1 was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 2 of Amendment No. 1 and Part 1 of Amendment No. 2.

*Speakers* : MM. Sieglerschmidt, Buck, Valleix, Piket, Buck, Kliesing, Sieglerschmidt, Lord Peddie, Mr. Buck.

Part 1 of Amendment No. 2 was negatived.

Part 2 of Amendment No. 1 was amended by leaving out the words "in the treaty area" and, as amended, was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 3 of Amendment No. 1.

*Speakers* : MM. Buck, Sieglerschmidt, Lord Peddie, MM. Buck, Piket.

Part 3 of Amendment No. 1 was agreed to.

In consequence, Part 2 of Amendment No. 2 fell.

The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 4 of Amendment No. 1.

*Speaker* : Mr. Buck.

Part 4 of Amendment No. 1 was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to consider Amendment No. 3.

*Speakers* : MM. Valleix, Sieglerschmidt, Valleix, Buck, Valleix (on a point of order).

The Amendment was amended by leaving out paragraph (b) and, as amended, was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 5 of Amendment No. 1.

*Speakers* : MM. Sieglerschmidt, Buck.

The Amendment was amended to read : "by negotiating with the Government of Spain that emerges from free elections the accession of that country to the North Atlantic Treaty, and an appropriate rôle for the Spanish armed forces ;" and, as amended, was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 3 of Amendment No. 2.

*Speaker* : Mr. Buck.

Part 3 of Amendment No. 2 was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 6 of Amendment No. 1.

*Speakers* : Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Lord Peddie, Mr. Buck.

Part 6 of Amendment No. 1 was withdrawn.

The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 7 of Amendment No. 1.

*Speakers* : MM. Sieglerschmidt, Buck.

Part 7 of Amendment No. 1 was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 4 of Amendment No. 2.

*Speaker* : Mr. Valleix.

Part 4 of Amendment No. 2 was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to consider Part 8 of Amendment No. 1.

*Speakers* : MM. Sieglerschmidt, Buck.

Part 8 of Amendment No. 1 was negatived.

Mr. Buck proposed an oral amendment, in paragraph 3 of the operative text of the draft Recommendation to leave out "the European programme group" and to insert "NATO".

The oral Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Documents 708 and 712, as amended.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to, note having been taken of the objection of Mr. Cermolacce. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 288) <sup>1</sup>.

#### **4. European aeronautical policy — Guidelines emerging from the Colloquy on 2nd and 3rd February 1976**

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 704)*

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 704.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to, note having been taken of the objection of Mr. Cermolacce. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 289) <sup>2</sup>.

#### **5. Détente and security in Europe**

*(Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doc. 703)*

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 703, as revised.

*Speakers* : MM. Cermolacce, Delorme, Richter, Sir Frederic Bennett.

The vote on the revised draft Recommendation was postponed until the morning Sitting on Thursday, 17th June, at about 11.30 a.m.

#### **6. Strategic mobility**

*(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 709)*

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Duvieusart, Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Order in Document 709.

The draft Order was agreed to. (This Order will be published as No. 46) <sup>1</sup>.

#### **7. Reserve forces**

*(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 707)*

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 707.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 290) <sup>2</sup>.

#### **8. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for Thursday, 17th June, at 10 a.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 5.55 p.m.*

1. See page 40.

2. See page 42.

1. See page 44.

2. See page 45.

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance <sup>1</sup> :

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. <i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae) Leynen <i>Plasman</i> (de Stexhe) <i>Duviensart</i> (Tanghe)	MM. <i>Kliesing</i> (Amrehn) Enders Kempfler <i>Schäuble</i> (Lemmrich) <i>Pawelczyk</i> (Marquardt) Richter Sieglerschmidt	MM. <i>Piket</i> (Cornelissen) <i>Schlingemann</i> (Portheine)
<b>France</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Burckel Delorme de Montesquiou <i>Vadepied</i> (Radius) <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger) <i>Grussenmeyer</i> (Schmitt) Valleix	Mr. Bologna	MM. <i>Buck</i> (Channon) Critchley <i>Hawkins</i> (Farr) Grieve <i>Warren</i> (Hunt) Lord <i>Selsdon</i> (Lewis) Sir Frederic Bennett Lord Peddie Sir John Rodgers Lord <i>Hughes</i> (Roper) Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel) Lord <i>Wallace of Costlany</i> (Urwin)
	<b>Luxembourg</b>	
	MM. Abens Margue Mart	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Gessner Mattick Mende Müller Schmidt Schwencke Vohrer	MM. Preti Quilleri Talamona Treu Vedovato Zaffanella
MM. Adriaensens Kempinaire Schugens	Mrs. Wolf	<b>Netherlands</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>Italy</b>	MM. Dankert de Niet Reijnen Scholten Voogd
MM. Boucheny Bouloche Brugnon Cerneau Grangier Kauffmann Péridier Rivière Schleiter Valleix	MM. Averardi Bettiol Coppola Fioret Laforgia Leggieri Mammi Minnocci Mrs. Miotti Carli	<b>United Kingdom</b>
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	MM. Pecoraro Pica	Mr. Brown Lord Darling of Hillsborough MM. Faulds Hardy Mendelson Whitehead
MM. Ahrens Alber Dregger		

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 288**  
***on security in the Mediterranean***

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The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the emergence of the Soviet Union as a world naval power presents the Soviet Government with new options for extending its influence ;
- (ii) Aware that the many political uncertainties and local disputes and conflicts that afflict both allied and non-aligned countries of the Mediterranean area present an ever-present danger of major conflict arising through miscalculation or escalation ;
- (iii) Calling for the broadening and strengthening of the Alliance based on parliamentary democracy and human rights and the preparation of NATO contingency plans designed to meet any crisis ;
- (iv) Welcoming the advent of a freely-elected parliament in Portugal and the signs of democratic developments in Spain ;
- (v) Recalling and reaffirming its earlier recommendations for the correct application of the Montreux Convention to prohibit the passage of aircraft carriers through the Turkish Straits ; for the provision of diplomatic advice from the NATO international staff for NATO commanders ; and for the NATO Gibraltar command to be transferred to the IBERLANT command,

I. RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Examine regularly all questions relating to the security of Europe in the Mediterranean and thus foster a rapprochement of political and strategic concepts underlying the defence of the different member countries of Western European Union in the Mediterranean basin,

II. RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND REQUESTS THAT THE MEMBER GOVERNMENTS

1. Call on the North Atlantic Council to broaden and strengthen the basis of the Alliance :
  - (a) by negotiating with the Government of Spain that emerges from free elections the accession of that country to the North Atlantic Treaty, and an appropriate rôle for the Spanish armed forces ;
  - (b) by fostering the accession of Malta to the North Atlantic Treaty, should a Maltese Government so request, or the conclusion of bilateral defence arrangements between Malta and Italy ;
  - (c) by recognising the value of NATO military facilities located in several countries of the Mediterranean area ;
  - (d) by more publicly identifying all the member countries and the Alliance as a whole with NATO defence arrangements in the Mediterranean area ;
  - (e) by providing military assistance to modernise the armed forces of Portugal to enable them to play a new and more vital rôle in allied defence plans ;
  - (f) by advising the Secretary-General to assign political advisers from his Political Affairs Division to all significant NATO military headquarters ;
  - (g) by transferring the Gibraltar Mediterranean Command from the Command of Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe to that of the Iberian Atlantic area ;

2. (a) Join with the other governments of the Alliance in making clear to the Soviet Union and to the country concerned the serious disadvantages for normal relations and détente of any installation of new Soviet bases or similar facilities in the Mediterranean area ;

(b) Call on the North Atlantic Council to have full political and military contingency plans prepared to meet any of the foregoing eventualities, with no more secrecy than that required for their success ;

3. Propose that NATO issue an annual defence white paper incorporating a joint assessment of the threat and statement of allied strategy, combined with separate chapters on national defence programmes.

**RECOMMENDATION 289*****on European aeronautical policy —  
guidelines emerging from the colloquy  
on 2nd and 3rd February 1976***

The Assembly,

Acknowledging the conclusions of the colloquy on a European aeronautical policy held in Toulouse on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 under the aegis of its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ;

Aware of the difficulties in the aeronautical industry, which employs 400,000 persons, and the airlines, and the threats to the very existence of these sectors which may have serious consequences for Europe's security and well-being ;

Convinced that without an affirmation of political determination the governments concerned will be unable to take joint action to safeguard this industry ;

Regretting that governments have not yet adopted a position on the action programme for the European aeronautical sector proposed by the Commission of the European Communities on 1st October 1975 ;

Reiterating its regret that there is a risk of Eurocontrol being dismantled ;

Aware that the problems cannot be solved through protectionism and the creation of a closed European market ;

Advocating on the contrary an investigation of world markets and of possibilities of co-operation with the United States on a basis of equality and reciprocity and not as subcontractors,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Promote the creation in each member country concerned of a national aeronautical council associating, for instance, representatives of parliaments, ministries, manufacturers, airlines and trades unions under the chairmanship of the appropriate government representative ;
2. Invite the national aeronautical councils to form a European aeronautical council to ;
  - (a) develop together with the Commission of the European Communities a European aeronautical manufacturing programme with a view to developing, producing and marketing large civil aircraft ;
  - (b) arrange for joint financing for marketing these aircraft and study the possibilities of a European Import-Export Bank ;
  - (c) ensure that Concorde remains in production and that Europe is able to benefit from the technical lead thus acquired ;
  - (d) establish a civil aviation agency for Western Europe responsible for European airworthiness certification ;
  - (e) develop in concert with the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) a joint policy for air transport and examine the possibilities of adopting a joint European position in negotiations between Western Europe and the rest of the world on problems such as landing rights and recognition of European airspace ;
3. Create a study group to determine the military aircraft requirements of member countries in liaison with the Standing Armaments Committee ;

**FURTHER RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

Urge the member States of Eurocontrol :

4. To set themselves as a long-term aim in the future Eurocontrol convention, which will be applied as from 1983, the establishment of a joint agency for the control of air traffic networks, including major terminal areas ;
5. To standardise equipment and systems to the maximum for the sake of efficiency and economy and in particular make a joint study in the Eurocontrol agency of new systems to be brought into service as from 1985 ;
6. To draw up a common industrial policy for applied electronics in these fields, giving priority, when calling for tenders, to industries in the member States of the Eurocontrol community, and maintain a joint investment budget in the future agency with a view to procuring the said equipment through the agency ;
7. To make the maximum use of the Eurocontrol agency in the field of research and development and draw up a joint research and development programme to avoid duplication wherever possible.

**ORDER 46**  
***on strategic mobility***

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The Assembly,

Noting that the armed forces of the Soviet Union enjoy worldwide strategic mobility based on a modern navy and a large air transport fleet, complete with bases and facilities acquired through political penetration of key countries in all the oceans of the world ;

Aware that it is of vital importance to the security of Europe that the armed forces of all countries of the Atlantic Alliance should have strategic mobility throughout the area of the Atlantic Alliance and to other areas where they exercise responsibilities,

REQUESTS THE COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS

To continue its study of the problems of strategic mobility and report at an early date.



**RECOMMENDATION 290*****on reserve forces***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that improved organisation, recruitment and training of reserve forces would allow :
  - (a) a considerable strengthening of the deterrent potential of the field forces of the European armies ;
  - (b) European defence to be based to a substantial extent on recourse to the widest possible mobilisation of the people's energies in the event of attack ;
- (ii) Considering that the defence of Europe must not be based solely on nuclear deterrence and a modern and effective field force but must also be ensured by a people's deterrent, expressing the will of the peoples of Europe to remain responsible for their own destinies ;
- (iii) Aware of the importance of the rôle which reserves can play in strengthening the links between the European peoples and their armies, particularly in keeping public opinion better informed about the importance of defence problems ;
- (iv) Underlining the financial advantages of forming large-scale reserves, as opposed to an equivalent active force, when the proportion of national budgets devoted to defence tends to remain constant or even diminish and when personnel costs linked with the maintenance of active forces are continuously increasing to the point of sometimes jeopardising the implementation of certain equipment programmes ;
- (v) Considering it necessary to harmonise the concepts which govern the organisation of reserves in Europe, in the framework of a common strategy for all the Western European States,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. (a) Together with the member States of the Atlantic Alliance which are not members of WEU, specify the type of tasks entrusted to the various components of the European defence system : nuclear forces, combat forces, internal defence forces ;  
  
(b) Consequently define requirements in respect of internal defence forces and combat forces with a view to harmonising the concepts of European States in this field ;
2. To this end, set up a group of experts consisting of senior defence officials to study measures likely to develop the contribution by reserves to the internal defence of European territory and *inter alia* consider the possibility of :
  - (a) increasing the number of reservists who could be called up for internal defence, particularly where there is no system of conscription ;
  - (b) producing special equipment for reserves for internal defence forces, combining power, simplicity and robustness, and ensuring that it is made available immediately in the event of mobilisation ;
  - (c) improving training of reserve officers responsible for commanding the units forming internal defence forces, such training to include on the one hand periods of training in active units and on the other hand periods of training together with reservists in the ranks ;
  - (d) adapting compulsory military service, where this exists, to the requirements of internal defence and consequently provide for a short but intensive period of active service followed by a number of training periods at regular intervals ;

- 
- (e) organising internal defence forces on a territorial basis by assigning the necessary number of national servicemen and the essential reservists, according to their place of residence ;
  - (f) paying reservists undergoing periods of training at an appropriate rate ;
3. (a) Study measures likely to increase the availability and effectiveness of reserves for combat forces and *inter alia* seek means of improving the training of such reserves and the speed and efficiency of their mobilisation ;
- (b) Pay particular attention to the question of the time required for the mobilisation and immediate use of reserve units in the field forces ;
4. Consider setting up a European defence college where those responsible for Europe's defence and reserve officers would discuss their experiences and endeavour to define joint principles which might govern the use of reserves in Europe.

# SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 17th June 1976

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <p>1. Address by Mr. van der Stoel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.</p> <p>2. Rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today (<i>Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General</i></p> | <p><i>Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 711).</i></p> <p>3. Détente and security in Europe (<i>Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doc. 703).</i></p> |
|---|--|

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

### 3. Address by Mr. van der Stoel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands

Mr. van der Stoel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. van der Stoel replied to questions put by MM. Leynen, de Montesquiou, Radius, de Bruyne, Sieglerschmidt, Mattick, Richter.

### 4. Rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 711)*

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. de Niet, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Critchley.

Mr. de Niet, Rapporteur, and Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation in Document 711.

*Speakers* : Mr. Richter, Lord Peddie, MM. Leynen, Radius, Grieve, Richter, Sieglerschmidt, Sir Frederic Bennett.

In the absence of a quorum, the vote was postponed until the next Sitting.

### 5. Détente and security in Europe

*(Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doc. 703)*

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 703, as revised.

In the absence of a quorum, the vote was postponed until the next Sitting.

### 6. Address by Mr. Roseta, Observer from Portugal

Mr. Roseta, Observer from Portugal, addressed the Assembly.

### 7. Adjournment of the Session

The President adjourned the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly.

*The Sitting was closed at 12.15 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance <sup>1</sup> :

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Gessner	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. <i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae)	<i>Pawelczyk</i> (Marquardt)	MM. <i>Piket</i> (Cornelissen)
Leynen	Mattick	de Niet
<b>France</b>	Richter	
MM. Brugnon	Sieglerschmidt	
Delorme		
Kauffmann	<b>Italy</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
de Montesquiou	Mr. Bologna	MM. Critchley
Péridier		<i>Hawkins</i> (Farr)
Radius		Grieve
<i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)	<b>Luxembourg</b>	Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i> (Page)
<i>Soustelle</i> (Vitter)	MM. Abens	Lord Peddie
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	Margue	Lord <i>Hughes</i> (Roper)
MM. Alber	Mart	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
Enders		Lord <i>Wallace of Coslany</i> (Urwin)

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Kempfler	MM. Talamona
MM. Adriaensens	Lemmrich	Treu
Kempinaire	Mende	Vedovato
Schugens	Müller	Zaffanella
de Stexhe	Schmidt	
Tanghe	Schwencke	<b>Netherlands</b>
	Vohrer	MM. Dankert
<b>France</b>	Mrs. Wolf	Portheine
MM. Boucheny		Reijnen
Bouloche	<b>Italy</b>	Scholten
Burckel	MM. Averardi	Voogd
Cerneau	Bettiol	
Grangier	Coppola	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Rivière	Fioret	MM. Brown
Schleiter	Laforgia	Channon
Schmitt	Leggieri	Lord Darling of Hillsborough
Valleix	Mammi	MM. Faulds
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	Minnocci	Hardy
MM. Ahrens	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Hunt
Amrehn	MM. Pecoraro	Lewis
Dregger	Pica	Mendelson
	Preti	Sir John Rodgers
	Quillieri	Mr. Whitehead

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**II**

**OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES**

# FIRST SITTING

Monday, 14th June 1976

## SUMMARY

1. Opening of the Session.
2. Tributes.
3. Address by the Provisional President.
4. Attendance Register.
5. Examination of Credentials.
6. Election of the President of the Assembly.
7. Address by the President of the Assembly.
8. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.  
*Speakers* : The President, Mr. Leynen, the President.
9. Observers.
10. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session (Doc. 695).
11. Ratification of action by the Presidential Committee (Docs. 696, 698 and 699).
12. Détente and security in Europe (*Presentation of the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 703*).  
*Speakers* : The President, Sir Frederic Bennett (*Rapporteur*).
13. Address by Mr. Roberts, Observer from Canada.  
*Speakers* : The President, Mr. Roberts.
14. Détente and security in Europe (*Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 703*).  
*Speakers* : The President, Mr. Kliesing, Mr. Critchley, Mr. Müller, Mr. Scholten, Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. Cernolacce, Mr. Guldberg (*Observer from Denmark*), Mr. Dankert.
15. Nomination of members to Committees.
16. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Grangier, Provisional President, in the Chair.*

### 1. Opening of the Session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2, 4, 5 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

### 2. Tributes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, before following our tradition that the oldest member of this Assembly makes a speech at the beginning of each new session, it is my sorrowful duty to announce to you the recent deaths of three of our members who, each in his own way, played a prominent part in the work of this Assembly. (*The Representatives rose*)

J. W. Beyen died at the beginning of May. With him we lost a great European, comrade-in-arms of de Gasperi, Spaak, Schuman and Adenauer. It was he who signed the modified Brussels Treaty on behalf of the Netherlands.

Attilio Piccioni passed away at the end of March. An eminent Italian parliamentarian and a convinced European, Attilio Piccioni was a member of the European Parliament as well as of this Assembly, in which he took an active part in the General Affairs Committee from 1959 to 1962.

Jean Legaret died, whilst still a comparatively young man, during the winter. A brilliant senior civil servant and influential parliamentarian, he played an important rôle, as Chairman of the Budget Committee from 1959 to 1962, in superintending the material arrangements for housing our Assembly in the Palais d'Iéna. He will long be remembered by those who knew him, for his intelligence, his courtesy and his sense of humour.

### 3. Address by the Provisional President

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — It is only because of my age that I find myself, albeit for a few brief moments in the Chair. I shall therefore refrain from taking unfair advantage of the honour which my years have bestowed on me.

*The President (continued)*

The period covered by the last session of our Assembly had much to offer in the way of lessons to be drawn from matters concerning the defence of Europe. No one concerned for European security could fail to be struck by a number of world events which I think particularly significant.

The building-up of the Soviet navy and the high level of equipment recently achieved by the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries would seem to be new factors liable to upset the balance of forces, upon which, hitherto, diplomatic relations between East and West, have depended.

During the same period, the setting up of régimes based on Marxist ideology in South Vietnam and in Angola, and the progress made by these same political forces in numerous States throughout the world, in particular in Africa and in Southern Europe, have, in some people's eyes, weakened the credibility of American protection just at a time when the executive power was — and still is — going through a period of profound crisis in the country which is the surest, indeed the only, guarantee of western defence. And there is no sign that this crisis is simply a passing phase.

The conclusion, with effects admittedly more apparent in theory than in practice, of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe and, at the same time, the somewhat laboured progress of the SALT and MBFR negotiations on the reduction of forces, have served to bring home to a good many people Europe's actual and potential military weakness compared with the sizable forces lined up along its eastern marches.

It is in this, to say the least, disturbing general context that Europe itself has recently had to deal with a number of specific questions of strategy: the commissioning by French army ground forces of the first Pluton tactical nuclear missiles has usefully underlined the size and complexity of the problems involved outside a European and Atlantic alliance in the siting and possible use of the various elements of the French nuclear deterrent.

As for the political scene, the debate on European unity which preceded and followed publication of the Tindemans report has made people appreciate the stark problem of choosing the most suitable institutional framework for pro-

moting a more specifically European defence effort.

As for armaments, the manifold vicissitudes of the so-called "deal of the century" have clearly shown up Europe's failure to achieve joint production for its own requirements. Once again the low level of standardisation, or even of interoperability in the European partners' military equipment has been made manifest.

Psychologically, the low morale of the armed forces of some of our countries basically indicates, over and above certain material as well as democratic claims, a fundamental questioning of the utility and efficiency of defence as presently conceived by most of our States.

By their very diversity, the various European and world phenomena brought to our notice over the past year tend, whether we like it or not — and a great many people, for many different reasons, do not — to put the question of Europe's defence back on the agenda. It is, indeed, becoming more and more apparent that, in the last analysis, the driving force for the construction of Europe, and Europe's very existence, will depend on the answer to this question.

The pace of Europe's construction will depend on the solution given to the problem of its defence. The obstructions encountered in areas essential for Europe's future, such as energy and the monetary system, by attempts to make headway towards European construction, are mostly occasioned by differences between France and its partners in their assessment of European and American interests. These differences of appraisal are fundamentally based on the real or fancied independence or dependence of each of the European States in respect of American protection.

Europe's very existence could depend on the solution arrived at concerning this question of its defence. It cannot be repeated too often. Indeed, the American nuclear shield, which has until now enabled the gaps in the defence system of Western Europe to be filled, has, while remaining the basic element of deterrence in Europe, become more aleatory. Besides the weakening of the United States executive and the reinforcement of isolationist tendencies, which are, whether recognised or not, a recurrent phenomenon in American politics, we are forced to admit that the increased range of the nuclear vehicles of the two superpowers makes their national territories more directly vulnerable to the blows of any potential adversary.

*The President (continued)*

At the same time it significantly reduces the usefulness for their own defence of foreign bases, especially air bases. On the other hand, the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons in the armies of the two superpowers enables the latter to be more flexible in wielding deterrence. The flexible response concept, moreover, disquietingly reflects this trend. And Europe as an indispensable outpost for the security of the United States may be liable to become, in the event of a major and direct clash of interests between the two superpowers, a testing ground for possible intentions and the degree of determination of each.

However, the question of Europe's defence, which is vital for its future, raises two major problems.

The first is a consequence of the imperatives of maintaining and developing the improvement in relations between Western and Eastern Europe. The normalisation and improvement of relations with Eastern Europe seem to have become — and nobody is going to complain about that — over and beyond the fluctuations of internal policy in each of our States, one of the most abiding and preponderant features of the foreign policy of most Western European countries. Now, any sabre-rattling reinforcement of European defence would run the risk of endangering the détente between East and West achieved so painfully, and even more painfully consolidated in Europe in recent years.

The second major obstacle to reactivation of the idea of European defence stems from the French position which remains a special one within the Atlantic Alliance. France's defence is organised around a nuclear deterrent force, which would seem to imply a doctrine of its use and, consequently, a system of defence mainly organised on a national basis. For France's partners, the chief concern is to confirm the United States commitment towards Europe within the framework affording, in their view, the best guarantee, namely, the North Atlantic Treaty and its supporting organisation.

The necessity of promoting a more broadly shared and effective defence would now seem to be just as imperative as the obstacles in the way appear to be insurmountable. This year, although a dark one for Europe, has nevertheless seen progress in some directions.

Aside from the institutional problem of the future of WEU, the considerations on defence in the Tindemans report go beyond conventional *a priori* thinking in the matter, and evince a pragmatism and realism that might gradually open up new paths.

In the same spirit and as a part of the work of our Assembly, documents such as the Krieg report or the Leynen report seem to open the way to fresh thinking on the necessary complementarity that potentially exists between the European Communities and WEU, and between the Atlantic Alliance and WEU.

In practical terms, the establishment of such a flexible institution as the independent European armaments group in Rome would seem to be might, if the experiment were persevered in and extended, enable decisive steps forward both in the standardisation of armaments and in balanced production of weaponry on both sides of the Atlantic.

In practical terms, too, very recent developments in French military doctrine place new emphasis on the French Government's willingness to reconcile its commitments under France's continued adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty with the special requirements arising from possession of an independent nuclear deterrent.

These are only straws in the wind. But we may hope that they will serve as a starting point for fresh thinking on the facts of European defence. May our debates, which have largely contributed to the adumbration of such a process, enable it to be given further sustenance and amplification. May they help to dissuade our governments from clinging to the sterile *a priori* concepts which have so far paralysed any serious thinking about Europe's defence, and enable them to realise the importance of such thinking at a time when there are only very few ways open to us in our attempts to get Europe out of the deep rut into which it has fallen. That is the reasonably optimistic hope your Provisional President would like to express at the outset of the twenty-second ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU. (*Applause*)

#### 4. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will



*The President (continued)*

be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

I have received a letter from Mr. Urwin, head of the United Kingdom Delegation, informing me that the Labour members of the delegation are, with the exception of three members of the House of Lords, unable to attend our session because of the present parliamentary situation at Westminster, and asking me to convey their apologies to the Assembly and the Committees of which they are members.

**5. Examination of Credentials**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the examination of credentials.

The list of Representatives and Substitutes attending the twenty-second ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union has been published in Notice No. 1.

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, all credentials have been attested by the statement of ratification communicated by the President of the Assembly of the Council of Europe, with the exception of the credentials of one Substitute from the United Kingdom, Lord Hughes, who has been appointed since the adjournment of the session of that Assembly.

Our Assembly must now examine his credentials in accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure.

The credentials of Lord Hughes are certified by the United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and no objection has been raised to them.

If the Assembly is unanimous, it can ratify these credentials without prior reference to a Credentials Committee.

Are there any objections to such ratification ?...

There are no objections.

The credentials are ratified, subject to their subsequent ratification by the Assembly of the Council of Europe.

1. See page 18.

Lord Hughes is therefore entitled to attend the twenty-second session of the Assembly of Western European Union as a Substitute from the United Kingdom.

I bid him heartily welcome. (*Applause*)

**6. Election of the President of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the election of the President of the Assembly.

In accordance with the provisions of Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure, no Representative may stand as a candidate for the office of President unless his candidature has been sponsored by three or more Representatives. Representatives who are members of a national government may not be members of the Bureau.

Furthermore, Rule 7 (2) stipulates that Substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

I have received only one nomination, that of Mr. Edmond Nessler, Representative of France, duly sponsored in the form prescribed by the Rules of Procedure.

I call Mr. Leynen.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I am quite sure that the Assembly will be unanimous in re-electing by acclamation our distinguished outgoing President, Mr. Nessler. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Leynen proposes that the Assembly should elect Mr. Nessler President by acclamation.

Is there any objection to Mr. Nessler's candidature ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous. I therefore declare Mr. Nessler President of the Assembly of Western European Union, and I invite him to take the Chair. (*Applause*)

(*Mr. Nessler then took the Chair*)

**7. Address by the President of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Before addressing you in my turn, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I express my gratitude for this third renewal of the confidence you have placed in me.

*The President (continued)*

Representatives of the Ministers, Ladies and Gentlemen, on this opening of our twenty-second session, there is little gratification to be derived from progress in the building of Europe. The political, economic and monetary union has been put off to the Greek Kalends. Although not entirely fruitless, consultations at the highest level have not produced a joint foreign policy. The highly successful Toulouse colloquy forced us to recognise continuing stubborn resistance to the establishment of a European aeronautical policy. There seems to be no grand design to incite governments to overcome their differences. So Europe is not being made. Perhaps it is even falling apart. Have we no choice but to paraphrase Bossuet: "Europe is dying, Europe is dead"?

We may no doubt be able to find some excuses for not facing the facts. One is the election by direct universal suffrage of a European parliamentary assembly of undefined responsibilities and resources, and liable to be greeted with indifference by the public and to transfer domestic political differences to the European level. Another excuse is the gradual effacement of Europe before a will expressed overseas and itself uncertain and currently subject to severe electoral constraints.

We have, however, tried to break the deadlock. In Rome, at the beginning of the year, the European members of the Atlantic Alliance met in order to set up a European programme group which, it is rumoured, would lay the foundations for European co-operation in the production and standardisation of certain military equipment.

But this is only a temporary expedient. So long as the WEU Standing Armaments Committee is limited in its activities, there will be grounds for wondering about the reluctance and real motives of the partners in the Brussels Treaty, whose validity is nevertheless undisputed.

We are in fact still deeply divided over the aims of the Europe we intend to build. Some see it only as a fairly flexible association for defending trade interests: others as a union to be steadily strengthened until it becomes a federation with responsibilities in the monetary, diplomatic and military fields. Moreover, many of our countries, being unduly absorbed by domestic political problems and economic dif-

ficulties, postpone major policy decisions and adopt a purely pragmatic approach.

As time goes by, the significance of the Rome and Brussels agreements is becoming blurred. Are they just window-dressing, or do they represent a sincere agreement to safeguard the European heritage and, in particular, the existence of an industry in full expansion despite recent setbacks?

The Standing Armaments Committee, in reviewing the possibilities and resources of the European armaments industry, can, through its studies, help to lay the foundations for a realistic approach to the uncommonly difficult problem posed by the definition of a European policy for co-operation in that field. At its very recent ministerial meeting in Brussels, the WEU Council decided to entrust it with this new task.

The Assembly, for its part, attaches the greatest importance to solving this problem and the Presidential Committee has therefore instructed the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to arrange a symposium on the subject at the beginning of next year, which would be attended by representatives of the ministers concerned and the armaments industries.

We trust that the Council, on its side, will be moved by a firm intention to achieve tangible results. It is time that it gave not only authorisation to act but the necessary impetus.

Let us not be told that the governments are taking the action necessary for the defence of Europe elsewhere. We have not yet been able to discern any effective European defence consultations in any framework whatever. What matters is not to show a preference for one institution or another, but to take action.

Many theories have been put forward about the tasks which might be assigned to WEU, the European Community or Eurogroup. We are obliged to note that so far no concrete result has been recorded and that, juridically, there is only one framework: Western European Union, always prepared to carry out the tasks assigned to it by the treaties.

But, the most urgent action needed today is to save our armaments industries' capability. To attain this goal, there is no need for in-depth agreement on the final aims of European co-operation. More modest agreements may allow the essential measures to be taken. First, we must

*The President (continued)*

save the European aeronautical industry, which has been severely affected by the crisis. Among the studies which might be entrusted to the Standing Armaments Committee, should not top priority be given to reviewing our countries' capabilities in the military aircraft area? Last year, four European countries chose an American aircraft in preference to a European aircraft of comparable price and quality. Another such decision would spell the end of Europe's ability to produce military aircraft.

Tomorrow, the same problem will arise for the procurement of combat tanks. I do not think that this is a means of strengthening the Alliance's security. The work of the Standing Armaments Committee might help to avoid such mistakes by making governments pay greater attention to safeguarding an incomparable industrial potential and to the need to employ it to the full. It would thus provide a foundation for joint action based on industrial realities and the political hopes of Europe.

Those who drew up the treaties instituting the Council of Europe, WEU and the Common Market must be congratulated for having had the wisdom to link the governmental bodies to parliamentary assemblies. When governments drag their feet, parliamentarians become the watchdogs of the treaties. It is for them in their discussions to pinpoint the obstacles resulting from divided opinions and to give the governments political impetus by revealing through their work of conciliation and synthesis the broad lines of action which would allow partial results to be achieved, having due regard to differences over ends and means.

In general, the European parliamentary assemblies are very critical about the present government inertia. To develop into a European union, the Common Market would need a common plan, which is now non-existent.

The WEU Assembly believes that the circumstances call for concerted action by the European governments in defence matters. It will carry out the task assigned to it by the treaties, even if the governments fail to carry out theirs.

We repeat this all the more emphatically since the desire for security is one of our common concerns. If there is a field in which it is possible to be genuinely European-minded, this

is surely it. This would help to shape an identity which is still too frequently called in question.

I therefore urge the Assembly to pursue its work and action unswervingly, convinced as I am that it is, on its own level, helping to bring the peoples of our ancient continent closer together and strengthen world peace in a spirit of broad understanding. (*Applause*)

### **8. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. Five candidatures have been presented in the prescribed form. In alphabetical order, the candidates are: Mr. Amrehn (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Mart (Luxembourg), Mr. de Niet (Netherlands), Sir John Rodgers (United Kingdom) and Mr. Tanghe (Belgium).

Because of the forthcoming elections, the seat reserved for Italy will be filled at a later date.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly should also re-elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I would point out that should the election be by acclamation, the order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents would be determined by their age.

I invite the Assembly to re-elect the five Vice-Presidents by acclamation, keeping open the seat reserved for Italy.

Are there any objections to the candidatures submitted ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare elected as Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, in the following order of precedence: Mr. de Niet, Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Amrehn, Mr. Tanghe and Mr. Mart.

### **9. Observers**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Several parliamentarians are doing us the honour of coming to take part in our proceedings as observers: Mr. Belisle, member of the Canadian Senate, and Mr. Roberts, member of the Canadian House of Commons; Mr. Guldberg, former

*The President (continued)*

Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark and Mr. Budtz, both of them members of the Danish Folketing; Mr. Papapolitis and Mr. Tavlarios, members of the Greek Chamber of Deputies; Mr. Eidem, Mr. Aavik and Mr. Thyness, members of the Norwegian Storting; Mr. Vasco da Gama Fernandes, President of the Assembly of the Portuguese Republic, and Mr. Roseta, a member of that Assembly. (*Applause*)

To the applause with which you greeted our observers allow me, as President, to add my own feelings of friendliness and welcome.

On behalf of the Assembly, I thank them for their kind acceptance of our invitation. We shall listen to them with the greatest interest, should they wish to speak on any of the subjects on the agenda.

#### **10. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session**

(*Doc. 695*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the adoption of the draft Order of Business for the first part of the twenty-second ordinary session of the Assembly.

This draft Order of Business is given in Document 695 dated 12th June 1976.

Before asking the Assembly to adopt the draft Order of Business, I call your attention to the Orders of the Day for the morning sitting on Thursday, 17th June, providing that a vote should be taken at 11.30 a.m. on the draft recommendations not yet voted upon by the Assembly.

The Presidential Committee felt that, by fixing beforehand a time for taking these votes, the greatest possible number of members of the Assembly should be able to be present.

I would therefore urge the heads of delegation and chairmen of the political groups to do their best to ensure maximum participation by the members of their delegations and groups in the voting at 11.30 a.m. on Thursday.

Are there any objections to the draft Order of Business given in Document 695 ?...

The Order of Business for the first part of the twenty-second ordinary session is adopted.

#### **11. Ratification of action by the Presidential Committee**

(*Docs. 696, 698 and 699*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the ratification of action by the Presidential Committee.

Under Rule 14(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Committee is empowered, in between sessions or part-sessions and subject to subsequent ratification by the Assembly, to take all such measures as it considers necessary for the activities of the Assembly to be properly carried on.

The first text to be ratified is Order 45 of 12th January 1976, by which the Presidential Committee instructed the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to organise a symposium on a European armaments policy.

Document 696, which gives the text of the order, contains an explanatory memorandum. As the symposium is to be held in late 1976, the intervention of the Presidential Committee was necessary in order to allow the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to make the necessary preparations.

I invite the Assembly to ratify the order in Document 696.

Is there any objection ?...

Order 45 on a symposium on a European armaments policy is accordingly ratified <sup>1</sup>.

The second text submitted for ratification by the Assembly is Resolution 59 on European union and WEU adopted by the Presidential Committee on 1st March 1976 on a report by the General Affairs Committee, Document 698. Resolution 59 is given in Document 699.

The Presidential Committee considered that the Assembly should not wait until the opening of the present session to make known to the European Assembly its attitude towards the proposals of the Tindemans report concerning European union and defence questions and, in particular, their implications for the statutory powers of the Assembly of WEU pursuant to Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty.

Resolution 59 on European union and WEU was therefore adopted on 1st March and sent

<sup>1</sup>. See page 19.

*The President (continued)*

by me to the members of the European Council. It is now submitted to the Assembly for ratification.

I ask the Assembly to ratify this resolution by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Resolution 59 on European union and WEU is ratified<sup>1</sup>.

## 12. *Détente and security in Europe*

(Presentation of the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 703)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on détente and security in Europe and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 703.

Before calling the Rapporteur, I would ask members who wish to take part in the debate to add their names to the list of speakers, stating for how long they intend to speak.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, distinguished colleagues and delegates, as the first speaker from the hall, I should like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your fully justified re-election, and I am honoured to be the first person to have the opportunity to give you a cordial welcome.

When I was invited to be the Rapporteur for this subject, I was under no illusion about the difficulties. Not only is this a controversial political subject, but, as the title détente and security in Europe suggests, it is a subject which changes, if not from hour to hour, certainly from week to week and even more certainly from month to month.

Because of changing developments, I decided, with the help of the secretariat and advice from my Chairman, to alter the report eight to ten times — irrespective of the political difficulties.

1. See page 20.

Let me give three examples. When I was invited to be a Rapporteur on this subject, the future of Portugal — to whose observers I offer a cordial welcome — looked dark indeed. Since then an election has taken place and a further election, to be followed by the formation of a government, presumably by the majority party with or without coalition forces from other parties, will shortly be held.

What I originally intended to report on Portugal has, happily, been outdated by events. Now that Portugal has established the desire to work out its own destiny along genuine pluralistic and democratic lines, I hope that the forces which have suffered a reverse will accept the clearly-expressed verdict of the people of that country.

When I was first invited to undertake this task, the future of Angola seemed uncertain, and even today we still cannot be sure what will be the outcome of the recent struggle in Angola, which clearly has a bearing on security in Europe. We all deplore the continuing presence of foreign forces in that country, which should be left to work out its own destiny as other genuinely free countries.

Speaking as a British member of parliament as well as your Rapporteur, I must say that I am delighted that the fruitless argument with Iceland, which had bedevilled much wider questions than fishing for many months, has now been resolved. I have expressed fears in the report. It was not able to be reprinted again. The agreement reached a few days ago makes the situation look a great deal brighter than when I made the report.

These were among my difficulties in trying to present a report on a constantly-changing pattern of events. I hope that all members of the Assembly will accept that no one could have tried harder than I to keep the report up-to-date.

There was another difficulty which I realised when I undertook this task. It was the impossibility of one Rapporteur with an individual frame of mind producing in a report — as opposed to the recommendations — a foundation of thinking which was likely to receive unanimous support. There will always be those who believe that the Soviet menace is greater than some others believe. There are those who believe that, although there is a military threat, we should look more closely at other methods of defending ourselves. For instance, they suggest that social welfare and social advance should

*Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)*

be the predominant opposition vis-à-vis other methods of resistance against attack and subversion from abroad.

I had to decide to which school of thought I belonged. I say without apology or hesitation that, although I am not the oldest member of the Assembly, I can recall the late 1930s and how the same arguments were being used about the degree, extent and scope of the military strength of another imperialist power. This was the subject of endless discussion, debate and argument in our own parliament. I did my modest bit during the war and I recall hearing precisely the same arguments when my father was in the House of Commons that I have heard during the Committee stages of this report.

Some say that there is no parallel with the 1930s. Others believe that the build-up of the largest military forces the world has ever seen at the disposal of one great power does not presage an attack on the western world or an attempt to dominate Western Europe in the same way that we suffered to our cost at the end of the 1930s. I make no apology for the fact that I have been unable to compromise with my belief, as opposed to the recommendations, expressed in my report — that we face a potential threat at least as great if not greater than we faced in the late 1930s. I should not have been able to present this report if I did not think that. If I am proved wrong by history, no one will be more delighted than I.

However, in talking to an Assembly which is primarily concerned with defence, I have to accept the realities of the situation.

I have had to accept the unanimous advice of our own chiefs-of-staff and defence ministers that, to obtain a reasonable defence posture which makes it unlikely that any aggressor will be able to launch an altogether successful conventional attack, one needs an approximate ratio of only 1:3. This is the present NATO standard.

Why, then, should another group of powers, which preaches that its interest lies only in defence, insist on trying to retain a ratio of 3:1? What must I conclude when I read that the Warsaw Pact countries are coming dangerously close to this ratio whilst continuing to proclaim a defence credibility?

There are those who point out that the Soviet Union must take into account Chinese aggres-

sion. I am no expert in Sino-Russian problems, but I recently had the privilege of visiting and travelling widely in China and I know which way the Chinese would vote if they were represented in this Assembly. However, the figures I have given in this report, on the balance of naval, military and air forces, exclude completely the other Soviet forces ranged against China in the East. They comprise only those forces facing westwards. Were we ever to reach a situation of real rapprochement between Peking and Moscow, we should be in even greater danger than now.

I gave an undertaking in the Committee that endorsed this report and recommendations which I repeat to-day — that the foundations of my thinking and my conclusions are mine and mine alone as Rapporteur. I feel I am entitled to assert this. None of my findings has emerged merely from my own individual thinking. They have come from consultations with authoritative sources in WEU countries, across the Atlantic and even further afield. I recently made a brief tour of Africa and I have already referred to my visit to China. Nor have these findings been lightly reached. They are the result of months of painstaking consultation.

Although I have said that the report is mine and mine alone, I do not assume that I received anything like unanimous support for my findings within the Committee. Its members would agree that, apart from altering my thinking, I have altered a number of findings for which I was originally responsible because of what I considered very reasonable representations by senior members of that Committee, who perfectly properly admitted that the report was mine but felt that I had unduly emphasised or wrongly perceived this or that point. I do not think that I once disregarded a request to reconsider the matter made by a member of the Committee; there are fifteen such sections and I accepted all the recommendations thereon which arose in the Committee.

The report itself is therefore mine. The recommendations which follow were accepted by a majority vote. I can recall only one occasion when I voted against. However, members of the Assembly may not necessarily accept the premise of the recommendations — that at present we are not in a position militarily to guarantee our own security. Although I believe it to be the case and the evidence submitted to me suggests it, in the same spirit of compromise that I showed throughout the Committee discussions I will have

*Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)*

another look at this to see whether we cannot obtain an even wider measure of agreement than was shown in the Committee when these decisions were made.

I can state that, whether or not we are in a position to guarantee our own security today, the rate of development of the Warsaw Pact forces and of the Soviet Union in particular means that, unless we reconsider our defences next year and the year after, no Rapporteur will be able to stand here and say that we are in a position to defend ourselves with a complete guarantee of security. Although there may be arguments today, therefore, unless we act differently in the future and give defence matters a greater degree of attention, including standardisation and so on, we shall increasingly fall behind.

All our governments accept this. Indeed the German Federal Government is itself taking steps to stabilise its own defence. The French, to their credit, have announced a very considerable increase in the effort they are devoting to their conventional forces, and the United States is doing likewise.

I have not come here to play what I would call the "card game" of arguing which country does the most. There are so many different packs of cards one can use, whether one talks in terms of GNP, or per capita, or any other criterion. It has not been my task in a report entitled "Détente and security in Europe" to pick and choose between individual countries and to blame one or praise another.

What I have done to the best of my ability is to depict the present situation, not altogether dark, as my final paragraphs show, as I truthfully see it, without garnishing, without political overtones, without prejudice. I look forward to hearing the comments on what I have found to be an exacting but very instructive task.

I hope that it will not be too long before this Assembly, which is devoted to the defence of Europe, rather than spending time on the detailed substance of the report comes to appreciate that at this moment we are entering a very dangerous era for western security and that it behoves all of us to ensure that we do not once again go through the endless tragedies which led to the conflagration of 1939. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I thank the Rapporteur.

### **13. Address by Mr. Roberts, Observer from Canada**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Before calling the speakers who have put down their names for this debate, I venture to invite Mr. Roberts, a member of the Canadian Parliament, to deliver the address which he has prepared. As he has come from so far, I think we can extend him this courtesy and give him the privilege of a hearing before we proceed with this debate.

Mr. Roberts, I invite you to come to the rostrum. (*Applause*)

Mr. ROBERTS (*Observer from Canada*). — If a mere observer may be permitted such a liberty, Mr. President, I should like at the outset to congratulate you, as the previous speaker has, on your election to the Chair of this Assembly.

Canadian parliamentarians attended the annual session of Western European Union for the first time in 1974 and they found this direct and personal exposure to European thinking a most valuable and stimulating experience. This year we have come again to listen, but also, at your kind invitation, to speak on Canada's foreign policy. The Secretary of State for External Affairs in Canada, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, asked me to convey to you his regret that he was not able to come to Europe himself to deliver the statement. I must say that while it was of course regrettable, it at least affords me the pleasure of being able to come in his place and to speak on his behalf — a privilege and an honour.

In formulating foreign policy, while assisted no doubt by experience, one inevitably tries to make a judgment of what lies ahead, and in mid-1976 it is not an easy task. The world is entering the last quarter of the twentieth century having existed through severe recessions, which have tested our economic and political institutions both at the national and international level. This economic crisis has given us a sharp reminder that the industrialised technological societies are still vulnerable to the ebb and flow of the international economy, and at the same time the situation has been more severe for the developing countries, most of which have been faced with a catastrophic increase in the

*Mr. Roberts (continued)*

cost of their imports while suffering a sharp decline in their export earnings.

Our experience recently has been painful but, if we learn from it, not without value. The weaknesses within the international financial and monetary machinery have been exposed, and we are now having to make changes in the institutional arrangements which may have served us well in the past but which are now dated. We have seen, perhaps inevitably, the re-emergence of tendencies towards isolationism and protectionism. However at this point governments have been reasonably successful in preventing those forces gaining the upper hand.

*(The speaker continued in French)*

(Translation). — Moreover, this crisis has clearly shown us that there can be no purely national solution to problems whose magnitude and impact are international. Inflation and large-scale unemployment have not yet been defeated, though there are some signs of abatement. Other pointers tell us a recovery is on the way in other sectors, but there will have to be concerted action to strengthen and consolidate it.

The problems are complex and highly technical. It is not always easy to relate the recondite remarks of the economists to the everyday problems we have to face as parliamentarians. What is more, decision-making will increasingly have to take account of not only national but also international considerations. The European Community and its members have a rôle of paramount importance to play in this respect. We Canadians are aware of the difficulties you have to face in harmonising your economic policies, and of the obstacles which you have to overcome to achieve greater unity.

We have also been struck by the determination which you have shown over the years and which has led you not to give up any of the ground already gained and to persevere in your efforts to reach your objectives. We wish you success in this venture, and we feel confident that the Europeans will demonstrate their ability to advance together for the common good, without turning their backs on the outside world.

But we want to do more than simply wish you success. Indeed, I have already pointed out the importance of concerted action to maintain the momentum of economic recovery. The

economic summit meeting of the Heads of State and Government at Rambouillet established an important link in that respect. Canada therefore readily accepted the invitation of the President of the United States to take part in the further meeting to be held at Puerto Rico on 27th and 28th June of the seven major industrialised countries — Canada being one of them — to continue the process started at Rambouillet.

Canada believes firmly that co-operation and close and continuous consultations among the main industrial nations, including ourselves, will be highly conducive to progress in a number of fields of common interest; and we hope we may be able to play a part in that connection.

Obviously, the medium chosen for framing and applying foreign policy varies from one country to another. Canada is a North American country, and our relations with the United States naturally assume special importance. While Canadian and United States interests sometimes diverge, we have nevertheless managed to establish excellent relations with one another based on mutual trust and a common determination. Although, geographically speaking, we are North Americans, we are nonetheless aware of the need to forge solid links with Europe. As our membership of NATO bears witness, we are also very much alive to the interdependence of security and prosperity in North America and in Europe, and to the need for establishing transatlantic links, in relation to the rôle that Canada has to play in the world. Moreover, Canada's economic relations with the Nine enable it to be less dependent upon the United States market.

*(The speaker continued in English)*

On the economic side, the European Economic Community is today the world's largest import market, accounting as it does for some 40 % of international trade. Canada, too, is an important world trading partner with almost one-fifth of our national product deriving from exports. Hence our economic links with the Nine are of great importance to us.

It was those fundamental reasons, as well as a desire to reduce our vulnerability to the economic forces which could pull us too deeply and too completely into an integration with only the North American market, that led us to attempt to reach a balance in our external economic relations. For those reasons the Canadian Government has for some time been pur-



*Mr. Roberts (continued)*

suings a policy of reasserting and expanding our relations with the European Community and its member States. Because there is a great deal of complementarity between the economies of Canada and those of the Western European countries, we believe that such development will be in our mutual interest.

In pressing forward to give substance to this concept, Canada proposed to the European Economic Community the conclusion of a framework agreement for commercial and economic co-operation. In making this proposal we based ourselves on certain considerations. The first is that Canada's economic links with Europe have not developed to the extent that would be justified by Europe's continuing, indeed, increasing importance in the world, whether measured against its actual economic growth or in terms of its potential, or measured against its expanding share of world trade.

The second is that trade today is only one element in a complex network of economic interaction that embraces investment, technology, licensing, joint ventures and co-operation in third world markets. It was clear to us, therefore, that conscious action was required to create a basis for close, coherent and continuing industrial co-operation with Europe if we were to expand and reach the full potential of Canada's own economic situation.

As I am sure you know, negotiations on the framework agreement with the European Community concluded two weeks ago and the agreed text is now being submitted to respective governments for consideration and approval. We hope very strongly that the signature of this agreement will take place soon. It is an event which will mark an important milestone in the relations between Canada and the Community. The agreement will be successful only if it provides an impetus towards closer co-operation and if it is followed up not simply by governments but in the private sector, so that we shall be able to create and exploit development that will increase the level of economic exchanges between Canada and its European partners.

Important as we expect this framework agreement to be, we do not see our future relations with Europe exclusively in terms of the Community-Canada link. We intend to continue to develop our bilateral relations with European

countries, both inside and outside the Community.

Another aspect of Canada's close involvement with Europe is our active participation in the East-West dialogue where, together with our allies, we are trying to draw the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe into a more civilised, open and constructive relationship with the West. It is perhaps at this point that my remarks join the report presented by Sir Frederic Bennett.

An important development in this dialogue between East and West was the signing of the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe. The Canadian Government is committed fully to implement the provisions of this document. While we recognise the importance of all sections of the final act, the part that reflects Canada's concerns most clearly is Basket III, in which State-to-State relations are in a sense secondary to the emphasis placed on person-to-person relations. This area includes such matters as the freer movement of people and ideas and particularly the reunification of families, a subject of direct concern to the many Canadians who have relatives in the Eastern European countries.

Implementation of the Basket III texts will be for Canada one of the main indicators of the progress of détente and as a matter of policy we are concerned that the Soviet Union and the other East European countries shall live up to them. For us the Helsinki agreement is not simply a ratification of the past: it is a living commitment of obligations that we expect to see accepted and fulfilled. We will be following up next year at Belgrade the assessment of the progress made by all the participating States in implementing the agreement and looking for new ways to further the mutual understanding necessary for security and co-operation in Europe.

At the same time, Canada shares the view of its European allies that in the face of increasing Warsaw Pact military strength a satisfactory dialogue with the East can be conducted only from a basis of western solidarity and the maintenance of adequate collective security arrangements. In this connection the Canadian Government announced last November a series of decisions which, among other things, provides for a substantial increase in capital expenditure for defence that will permit an extensive re-equipment programme for the Canadian armed forces.

*Mr. Roberts (continued)*

As a part of this programme, as you know, the Canadian Government has recently decided to enter into negotiations for the purchase of 128 German Leopard tanks.

*(The speaker continued in French)*

(Translation). — However, Canada's interests are not limited to those conferred upon it by geographical proximity or historical and cultural links. Indeed, our foreign relations have a worldwide character, and we engage in all kinds of activities in the four corners of the globe.

Thus, in the Middle East and Cyprus, we are contributing to the peace-keeping operations conducted by the United Nations. In conformity with the rôle that has thus been entrusted to us in the Middle East, and with our policy, which recognises Israel's right to continued existence and the Palestinians' equally fundamental right to take part in discussions and negotiations affecting their future, we have adopted an objective attitude towards the conflict between Israel and the Arab States. If, as we believe will happen, Canada is given a two-year mandate to serve on the Security Council as from 1st January 1977, it will more than ever unite its efforts with those of the international community towards a settlement in the Middle East.

We are also concerned with keeping the peace and other activities in Asia and the Pacific. We are actively engaged in this region with a view to extending our bilateral economic relations, especially with Japan. We have privileged relations and consultations with the Japanese Government on a whole range of questions of foreign policy.

Because of its geographical position and its strong economic influence, Japan is ideally placed to help in the economic development of Asia and the Pacific region, and supply a driving force for political stability.

We have taken practical steps, including an offer of development aid, to maintain and support action by the Association of South-East Asian Nations, which we consider capable of encouraging stability in this rapidly-developing region of the world.

*(The speaker continued in English)*

I should now like to turn to UNCTAD IV, which was recently concluded in Nairobi. Canada

came to that conference determined to play a positive rôle in order to help bring about a constructive change in the international economic system, and thereby to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor nations. Together with delegations from the developed and the developing countries, the Canadian representative worked hard to find and enlarge the areas of common ground that could form the basis of resolutions. As you know, the deliberations were difficult and it is a considerable accomplishment that the process of accommodation was made to work, and that the necessary compromises were made that led to the adoption of a number of significant resolutions.

The adoption by consensus of an integrated programme on commodities marks an important step forward and, in the Canadian view, constitutes the major achievement of the conference. Other resolutions on the debt problems of developing countries and on trade liberalisation are also significant accomplishments.

Thus, in the Canadian view, the results of UNCTAD IV are substantial and the conference as a whole marks an important stage in our efforts to reduce disparities between developed and developing countries.

The outcome of UNCTAD IV should also have a beneficial effect on the ongoing discussions in Paris in the CIEC. The positive programme adopted in Nairobi, particularly in the field of commodities, should enable us in the CIEC to focus more closely on specific proposals for action. As co-Chairman of the CIEC, Canada has a particular interest in the success of this unique venture which, in the second half of 1976, will be the main focus of the North-South dialogue.

Before concluding, I should like to touch on one more subject of particular importance to Canada. The third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, which has just concluded its fourth session in New York, made a good deal of progress in most areas of its mandate, but, as you know, no final agreement was reached. The New York negotiating text, however, reflects the great distances already travelled in the development of revolutionary new concepts in international law. Some basic concepts that have endured for centuries are being changed radically because of a general conviction, which Canada shares, that they no longer reflect the needs of our times. The economic zone concept, which vests in the coastal State sovereign rights out to 200 miles over fisheries and mineral

*Mr. Roberts (continued)*

resources, as well as jurisdiction for the preservation of the marine environment, is one such idea whose time has come and which is now firmly entrenched in the revised single negotiating text.

The revised text also reaffirms the coastal State's sovereign rights over the resources of its continental shelf. Furthermore, it enshrines the innovative principle of the "common heritage of mankind", which will apply to the international seabed area beyond national jurisdiction. Canada has sought a provision to give the coastal State the right to apply particularly stringent measures to protect its marine environment from pollution in ice-covered areas of its economic zone, such as in Canada's arctic waters. At the next session of the Law of the Sea Conference, which will convene again in New York from 2nd August to 17th September, Canada will be working actively to ensure that this session makes decisive progress on these issues, which remain unsolved.

I have touched briefly on some aspects of Canada's external relations and I have tried to give some indication of the direction in which we are moving. But, as we all know, no foreign policy is wholly subject to the logic of design. Events create their own logic and their own inheritance which cannot be ignored. Thus, foreign policy must remain sufficiently flexible to take account of changing circumstances, but while flexibility is necessary, it does not relieve us of the obligation to establish our objectives and reach them in a reasonable way.

It is for that reason that in this brief *tour d'horizon* I have touched on the main elements of Canada's foreign policy: our friendship with the United States; the importance that we attach to maintaining and strengthening our relations with Europe; the importance of peace-keeping in the context of the United Nations; the importance that we place on the Helsinki agreement; the commitments into which countries have entered; and the importance that we attach to the Law of the Sea Conference and the deliberations of UNCTAD IV. These, whatever the immediate changing circumstances, will remain the basic concern of Europe. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Roberts. In listening to our Canadian guests, who are so close to us in spirit, it feels as if the Atlantic Ocean is but a narrow sea. Thank you once again for your brilliant speech.

#### 14. *Détente and security in Europe*

(*Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 703*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now take the debate on détente and security in Europe.

I would mention that ten speakers have put their names down which shows the importance attached to Sir Frederic Bennett's report.

In accordance with the prescribed procedure, I declare the list of speakers in the debate closed.

I call Mr. Kliesing.

Mr. KLIESING (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like to open this Assembly's debate on détente and security in Europe by thanking Sir Frederic for his report and for the great deal of trouble he has taken over it. He, himself, referred a moment ago to the difficulties that he encountered, and we are all the more indebted to him for his efforts to cope with them.

The main aim of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe was to improve security through measures to promote détente. The conclusion reached in the draft recommendation that we are considering today, however, is that the Soviet Union's interpretation of what it has signed in the final act of the conference has so far been highly restrictive and that it is refusing to follow up the concept of détente, as we in the West understand it, with practical measures.

The report and the draft recommendation do, in my opinion, constitute a realistic assessment of the effects of the Helsinki decisions so far. WEU is therefore associating itself with a view already expressed in such bodies as the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly and the North Atlantic Assembly, but is not giving a final verdict.

Why the effects of Helsinki have so far produced little substantial progress towards détente may best be answered objectively by pointing to the total contradiction between what the West and what the Soviet Union understand by détente. In his report Sir Frederic has, fortunately, given us a clear picture of this difference. I do not wish to repeat what he has said, but only to complement it with a few remarks on one political event that had not yet

*Mr. Kliesing (continued)*

occurred when Sir Frederic submitted his written report.

On 22nd May, the Soviet Government issued a statement which caused some excitement over the unusual way in which it was published. This was the twelve-point note — and we may certainly call it a note — which instead of being handed by one government to another was published by Tass for general information. It is clear from comments made since by the Soviet Government that the reason why this method of communication was adopted was that the note was in no way intended for the Government of the Federal Republic only but was considered to be addressed to the public in the whole of Germany and in the rest of Europe; so it may be recommended to everyone for careful reading.

The note expresses the expectations of the Soviet policy on Europe in the coming years, and at the same time sounds a warning lest these expectations should not be fulfilled. In the note the Soviet Government includes a reference, in its own familiar manner, to the problem of détente. Because of the exceptional importance attaching to this publication by Tass, I should like, Mr. President, to draw the Assembly's attention to those parts of the text that concern the Soviet concept of détente. Let me quote from the note:

"The relaxation of tension does not and cannot mean a freezing of the objective processes of historical development. It is not a green light for corrupt régimes. It gives no freedom or right to suppress the just struggle of the peoples for their national liberation. It does not remove the need for social transformations."

This, therefore, shows what, in the Soviet view, détente is not. A few lines later, the note then tells us what, in the Soviet opinion, détente does mean. To quote verbatim:

"The point of relaxation of tension is, first of all, to exclude the use of force or the threat of force in disputes and conflicts between States."

This interpretation of the term détente is therefore a highly restrictive one, according to which the Soviet side sees détente merely as a renunciation of military conflict, with the Soviet Union continuing fully to claim the right to

undermine and destroy the internal structures of such States as are not minded to adapt to the communist system. This is readily apparent from a sentence in the Soviet note which is prefixed to the Soviet definition of détente referred to above as a kind of thesis. This runs as follows, and I quote:

"All this experience demonstrates that it is the policy of peaceful coexistence that, as V.I. Lenin noted, is 'the only correct way out' [I repeat, the only correct way out,] of the difficulties, chaos and danger of war."

In other words, anyone who does not accept the doctrine of peaceful coexistence in the Leninist meaning of the phrase is an enemy of détente and of peace. So as to bring home to the people of Europe the seriousness of this warning, the last sentence of the note states — I quote once again:

"Today, just as in the past, facing the people of the Federal Republic of Germany, just as any other European nation, is the cardinal question of where it is going to direct its energy, on what side of the scales it will put its weight — that of peace or that of war."

After what I have just said about the claim that Lenin's doctrine alone is the right one, this sentence, following the demands outlined in the note, raises it in my opinion to the level of an ultimatum, since it is no less than a scarcely veiled threat.

If we compare this with earlier Soviet policy, we come to the following conclusion — nothing in the objectives of Soviet policy has altered, nor can any kind of change be expected. The policy of peaceful coexistence is no more than an attempt to achieve the aim of communist domination in Europe, if possible without resort to military means. In other words, the policy of peaceful coexistence is only a continuation of the cold war by different means.

These means include, in particular, the encouragement of anti-democratic communist forces in free democracies and attempts to discredit those democratic forces that repel attack by the enemies of democracy. Mr. President, I have good reasons for saying this, belonging as I do to the generation which, as young democrats, tried actively in the years between 1930 and 1933 to defend and save the democratic ideals of the Weimar Republic. At that time I, as a young politician, saw how the enemies of democracy attempted — successfully — to undermine and

*Mr. Kliesing (continued)*

destroy our democratic, established State by working more and more enemies of democracy into the administration. Today we are faced with a similar attempt — once again the enemies of democracy, this time the communists, are making an attempt to invade the ranks of our institutions and so gain influence over the machinery of the State. Our people and the people of Europe have had to pay so dearly for the fall of the first democracy in Germany that we do not want our second democracy to suffer the same fate. We are defending our free, democratic State.

We are therefore all the more inclined to take amiss any attempts at international level to hamper us, by false recriminations and insinuations, in our defence of democracy. I would ask all those who sympathise with ploys of this kind to stop for a moment and think whom they are really helping. It can hardly serve the interests of democratic politicians to decry German democrats when they defend freedom and democracy; it should rather be the unanimous wish of all democrats in Europe to form a common front against those who are once again trying to destroy our democratic institutions.

Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Critchley.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — I begin by congratulating you, Mr. President, on your re-election, and I congratulate Sir Frederic on a characteristically robust and well-thought-out report.

There are three roads which might conceivably lead towards the unity of Europe. The first is unity through conquest, which has been tried comparatively recently and which, fortunately, failed. Secondly, there may be unity through economics which is, at present, the whole thrust of the Common Market experiment and idea. Thirdly, there is the possibility of unity through the threat of a common enemy.

The enemy exists; the enemy is Russia. Yet the alliance with America and our protection by America have succeeded in reducing our perception of the threat in Europe. Europe has preferred its security to its independence because, for the past quarter of a century, Europe has been an American military protectorate.

European defence has been the gift of the United States, just as Europe's prosperity has come to depend upon free access to raw materials — a system long sustained by United States power.

For a long time Europe has enjoyed a comfortable dependence upon the United States. The theme of my short speech is that this dependence will become increasingly uncomfortable.

Three new features have contributed to European unease. First the United States has moved towards an understanding with the USSR and a mutual acceptance of the *status quo* established in Europe — the division of Europe itself. Secondly, there is the slow collapse of the western monetary system. In response Europe has tried to build a European monetary union which would reflect the commercial flavour and strength of Europe. Thirdly, the United States' Middle East policies resulted in the oil embargo, which seriously threatened both Europe's prosperity and its politics.

We are experiencing the end of the post-war system. As the United States' military strength and power and its failing commitment are seen to weaken, Europe must, sooner or later, be faced with alternatives.

The first is that Europe will decline into a less comfortable dependence on or subordination to one side or other of the superpowers. It could become Finlandised as a Soviet dependency or become another Canada or Mexico. The second is that Europe, its vital interests no longer the exclusive concern of the United States, may begin to rebuild and strengthen its unity and independence. So robust a reaction would be rational and logical for a European bloc and would be the natural response of middle-ranking European States faced with a fragmenting world order.

Which of these courses appears more likely? There is evidence in favour of both. First, if we are gloomy about the prospects for Europe, there is little leadership in the West and virtually none in Europe. There is a comfortable reliance in Europe upon the theory of convergence. The only trouble is that we are converging more rapidly than they are.

There are also in Europe itself the consequences of the social revolution which has taken place since the end of the war. The old élites have largely vanished; the newly rich have become Americanised Europeans but with none

*Mr. Critchley (continued)*

of that wish for involvement in politics which is so characteristic of the Americans themselves. In short, the two world wars and the events following on them have sapped the political will of Europe.

If, however, one wishes to be optimistic, there is evidence to support this view too. The Germans are to increase their armed forces; the Federal Republic enjoys considerable prosperity and a marvellous stability. As significant and perhaps even more interesting are the changes announced in French defence policy, by which France is to increase its defence spending and to adopt the Alliance strategy of a flexible response. Yet even this optimistic picture of France and Germany being prepared to do more is spoilt by the example of my own country where the Labour Government will allot to defence only the priority permitted by a large and vociferous neutralist left wing.

The lesson of all this is surely that if Europe wishes to become independent, it must dispose of a sufficiency of armed forces. Only in this way shall we encourage the United States to remain committed to our common defence. A weak Europe will inevitably lead to an American withdrawal, a nightmare prospect which we in Europe wish to avoid. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to begin by thanking Sir Frederic Bennett most heartily for his report and I would like, too, to add to my thanks something which is not usually included in the thanks given to a Rapporteur, but which personally at least I would like to say very definitely about this report. It is not always that one can agree 100 % with a report. Sometimes the percentage of agreement with a report falls well short of this. But in the case of Sir Frederic's report, I can say that what he has said is 100 % the expression of my own views.

Karl Marx says somewhere in "The civil war in France" that certain events in history occur twice over. I think we are today seeing developments which show only too well that this is not entirely wrong. When we look back — and the Rapporteur expressly refers to this in his report — to the days before the second world war, we

realise that it was a similar political situation which led directly to that war. History has shown us that Hitler's policy from 1933 on was constant moves to test, stage by stage, the readiness of the democratic States to defend themselves: the occupation of the Rhineland, the Saar problem, the problem of the Sudetenland and finally the Munich agreement. It was exactly this policy which later on, when the war was over, was described by the leader of the Hungarian communist party, Rakosi, in a lecture he gave to the party academy in Budapest, as "salami tactics".

We remember how the Munich agreement was lauded as something that would give Europe "peace in our time". I cannot shake off the suspicion that similar eulogies spoken last year, following the conclusion of the CSCE conference in Helsinki, may well go down in history as rapidly as the words uttered in 1938.

If we draw further parallels between now and the period before 1939, we find that then, too, there had been very clear statements of what the aggressive policy of national socialism meant. Even before the national socialists seized power in Germany, one had only to read what Adolf Hitler had written in "Mein Kampf". I believe we can also re-read today what the long-term policy of world communism is, despite peaceful coexistence.

If we look at the manual of scientific communism, the official textbook of the communist party of the Soviet Union, published by a group of authors under Professor Afanasyev, who at the last congress of the communist party of the Soviet Union was elected to the Central Committee in recognition of his services, we will find that the policy of peaceful coexistence means "conquering the citadels of imperialism from within". Three WEU countries are included amongst the "citadels of imperialism"; five countries are listed in all — Japan and the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.

In this manual of scientific communism, we are also told that the aim is, in this period of a policy of peaceful coexistence, to cut off the imperialists — meaning the non-communist camp — from access to the sources of raw materials. Bearing in mind the constant disturbances in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere, that is a point which should not be overlooked.

We have had the example of Portugal, in connection with which a communist paper in the

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

Federal Republic wrote that since 1935, since the Seventh Comintern Congress, the Portuguese communist party had systematically been pursuing a Trojan horse policy.

Today that is also true for the policy that we are seeing everywhere in Europe. I am quite simply very sceptical of the independence which the communist parties of Italy and France enjoy vis-à-vis Moscow, however loudly they may keep on proclaiming it. How, for instance, could the Soviet Union allow funds to flow to Italy, and increase the subsidies for the communist party organ in Italy, *Unità*, fourfold in two years, if there were major differences of opinion?

One point in this connection, while we are talking of money, was referred to by the Rapporteur and is very obvious: we in the West are using the money which is earned here in the West, which is created by our industry and flows through our treasuries, to help strengthen the other side in its weaknesses. I am not referring solely to the fact that in East-West trade the Soviet Union has today a debit balance of 80,000 million French francs, I am not referring simply to the existence of the trade agreements involved, I am also thinking, for instance, of the subsidised foodstuffs that the European Economic Community is supplying to the eastern bloc on particularly favourable terms. I am glad to see that the report and the draft recommendation urge that we should put an end to this policy of financing the opponent, for our opponent could of course expand his armaments a little less, and build more tractors instead of more tanks, so as to overcome his agricultural problems.

I also attach importance to the statement that the question of morale is affecting us in the West too. In other words, peace and a policy of détente have also become a question of morale. We no longer have the morale that is needed for us to resist what is threatening us. We think too much in terms of our standard of living, we are too busy chasing the standard of living and are no longer able to see what is needed if we are to defend our freedom in the long term.

The Rapporteur has very rightly pointed out that the mass media and what is called "public opinion" play a quite decisive rôle. Again and again we find ourselves exposed to campaigns of dis-information started by the KGB. It is both the weakness and the strength of our system, the strength of our liberal social structure but its

weakness too, that the mass media can often be misused to serve the other side and to help to aggravate the divisions between the countries of the West.

Mr. Kliesing has drawn attention to the particular situation in such matters as the so-called exclusion from certain occupations or the defence of democracy. Other examples could be given, it could be pointed out that, as has recently been proved, there was some twenty years ago a campaign in the Federal Republic to desecrate Jewish cemeteries and deface them with Nazi slogans. It turned out that here too the KGB had had a finger in the pie. The KGB knew that such behaviour would inevitably evoke reaction on the part of the other countries in the West.

Again and again, too, we find that there are complaints in the West about violations of human rights, violations which undoubtedly occur even in non-communist countries, but certainly not on the same scale as in the communist countries. Where, in these days of détente, are the complaints, the constant and cogent complaints against such things as the automatic killers installed along the frontier between the GDR and the Federal Republic?

Our Rapporteur has stressed another point which I too would like to mention, and to which I want to give my express support. He has pointed out that one sure reason why the conclusions of the Helsinki conference have turned out as they have is that they were the result of rapid, overhasty negotiations. It is not merely in the CSCE that we have had this sort of experience, it has been the same with many attempts to apply the policy of détente at national level. It has been seen that the East can always count on the West giving way if the negotiations last for more than a certain time and if the pressure of the mass media for some measure of détente on certain issues leads the West to sign too soon instead of perhaps keeping the negotiations going longer and using tougher methods.

Today we see the situation in a different light, though in fact the situation remains unchanged. Mr. Kliesing has rightly made this point — the situation today is just the same as it was after 1945.

Let us not forget that the institution in which we are meeting today is itself a reaction to what happened in the States of the eastern bloc in 1945, just as the setting up of NATO in 1949 was a result of a trend apparent since 1945 in

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

Poland, in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary and in other countries of the eastern bloc. In those days people talked about the cold war. The time of the cold war is, thank goodness, past — so they say. The way we see the situation has changed, Ladies and Gentlemen, but the facts of the situation are just as they were before. The cold war had an ugly face; peaceful coexistence is a smiling mask. But behind this mask lurks the end of our freedom unless we look at the facts in the same down-to-earth way as our Rapporteur. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Scholten.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — First of all, Mr. President, I would like to offer my congratulations on your re-election to the presidency.

I have read Sir Frederic Bennett's report with a great deal of interest. The picture he gives of the present state of international consultation on security matters leaves little scope for optimism. I share his view that present developments leave a lot to be desired, and give us cause for concern. This does not mean, however, that I can agree with everything the report says.

We must in particular be careful not to paint the situation in unnecessarily sombre tones. This could bring the population of Western Europe to despondency and defeatism, with all the consequences that would involve.

It is now almost a year since the thirty-five European leaders set their signatures in Helsinki to the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

In that final act it was agreed that the extent to which it had been complied with would be examined during an evaluation conference to be held in 1977 in Belgrade. I believe that we must be very careful indeed in making an interim assessment of the policy of détente, certainly if we seek to link direct consequences with this policy. There is every sign that the West's expectations about a follow-up to the European security conference were pitched too high. There have, however, been one or two results, even if they do not go all that far. The text of the final act has been published in all the countries of Eastern Europe. More flexibility has been apparent in the treatment of foreign journalists, although a more liberal policy is much to be

desired. As part of the confidence-building measures, Soviet military manoeuvres have been announced in advance, and NATO observers have been admitted to watch them.

There are two main problems I would like briefly to discuss in connection with détente as it stands today.

First of all there is the growth in the armaments industry in the Soviet Union, accompanied by stagnation in international negotiations in the MBFR and SALT talks, stemming basically from mutual suspicion. This situation demands all the more urgently that the western allies should hold firm to the agreements they have made with each other. We need to keep a close and critical watch on the expansion of the Warsaw Pact forces; but I do wonder, for a variety of reasons, whether this vigilance must automatically mean an increase in NATO armaments.

I believe that Sir Frederic Bennett's report is too emphatic on this point, and I shall return to this in a moment.

There is a second point to which I would like to call the Assembly's attention. The Russian dissident Mr. Amalrik has said that the danger of war can be avoided only by changing the Soviet system from a closed to an open system. Until that has happened, the West will always — even with a mutual reduction in the growth of armaments — run the risk of sudden attack.

This seems to me a perfectly sound statement, Mr. President. We can perhaps start from the assumption that the eastern bloc is quite able to start a war, but for various reasons does not have the political will to do so. But in a system where power is in the hands of a few men, this can change very rapidly. This calls for vigilance, but it also calls for an all-out effort to influence the system itself from without. For doing this the agreements arrived at in the security conference's third basket have their importance. I have already mentioned that in this respect there have been a number of positive results, though of course I freely admit, too, that there is still a great deal of serious discrimination in the Soviet Union, and that the Soviet Union remains dangerous. Infringement of fundamental human rights is a commonplace there, and the treatment of the members of Amnesty International and the Jewish minority are two clear examples of this.

Yet despite this we cannot reject détente. The abandoning of any attempt at détente, as some



*Mr. Scholten (continued)*

people suggest, does, I am quite convinced, involve enormous risks. The Soviet Union will realise that it will have to do more about the third basket, and that the West will be taking the third basket as an acid test for further détente. It would perhaps be well in this Assembly to make it plain that we shall hold the eastern bloc to the contents of the whole of the final act.

It would not be sensible, however, to make further statements now, particularly about sanctions if the Helsinki undertakings are not honoured, or not honoured enough. Let us not make difficulties for Belgrade in advance.

To sum up this point, I would say that we must be vigilant but also very prudent in keeping an eye on the developments that bring about a disturbance in the balance of forces. I would say, too, that we must be careful about commenting scathingly on the handful of measures that have been taken in the eastern bloc countries.

I call on Sir Frederic to amend his recommendation; the sixth and seventh paragraphs of the preamble, in particular, seem to me to be too outspoken. I do not share the view that the members of the Atlantic Alliance have not enough strength to guarantee collective security, while I think it is unreasonable to talk about reducing military forces in Western Europe. In this connection I have very real objections to the third paragraph of the recommendation, especially against the word "re-established", and I hope Sir Frederic will give thought to changing his recommendation. Our policy should be directed towards maintaining our armaments at an adequate level, at the same time striving for détente in the spirit of Helsinki.

There is another thing that is no less important and which up to now I have not heard mentioned in the debate. In our internal policies we should combat the causes of the growing sympathy there is in Western Europe for marxism and communism. This is clearest in Italy, but the same thing is also going on in other countries. We can only combat communism in Western Europe if we achieve a more just society. Anyone who thinks that he can ensure freedom by putting an excessive stress on weaponry will find that his freedom is being lost. The chances of success lie, I am certain, only in a proper balance. Building good homes that everyone can afford to

buy is for everyone in Western Europe just as important as building warships and tanks. By adopting such a policy we can combat communism from within, at the same time trying to keep our defence within certain limits.

This applies particularly to our attitude towards Africa. Why is it that a number of earlier colonial territories in Africa turn so often towards Moscow or Peking? One reason is that these people have very often had no support at all from the West in their struggle for freedom and independence.

The same sort of thing now threatens in the Republic of South Africa. Very rightly Sir Frederic Bennett, in his draft recommendation, mentions the general condemnation of South Africa's racial policies. In South Africa fundamental human rights are systematically violated, while that country refuses to sign the non-proliferation treaty. In these circumstances, we in the West must not strengthen the authorities in Pretoria by supplying them with nuclear equipment that would lower the military nuclear threshold in South Africa and reinforce South Africa's position of power over the rest of Africa and the black majority in its own population.

The Dutch Parliament has, by a majority vote, rejected any responsibility on the part of the Dutch Government for supplying nuclear reactors for building nuclear power stations in South Africa. In the United States, too, there is growing opposition to deliveries of such equipment.

Now there is a danger that a French company, with the support of the French Government, is going to build these nuclear power stations. I think this is a very sad business, which is going to strengthen many Africans in their view that no justice can be expected from Western Europe in overcoming the inhumane policy of apartheid.

I urge my French colleagues to oppose this, not only because by following a policy of this kind we shall be indirectly helping the communist cause, but most of all because the oppressed black majority in South Africa has a right to freedom and human dignity and thus a right to our sympathy and support.

If anyone wants to be really credible in calling for adequate military strength for the West, he will have at the same time to work just as strenuously for freedom and social justice in Europe and elsewhere. Only ideals and moral

*Mr. Scholten (continued)*

values, only strength and authority supported by the basis of national and international society have, I believe, any prospect for the future. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mrs. von Bothmer.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Gentlemen. I wish to make only a few brief comments on Sir Frederic's report. If I were to say everything that I feel could be said on this matter it would hold up the debate for too long. And anyhow, we have had a number of reactions already.

I find the report quite one-sided and negative. It reaches unplumbed depths of helplessness and is mesmerised by communism. I am convinced that we are failing in our difficult task of doing something more than merely talking about détente and security in Europe if, delving back into the past without making allowances for differences of emphasis, we do not recognise the fact that treaties have been made and are having consequences.

The reduction in Europe's national defence budgets is not simply the result of an economic crisis. Even before the crisis there was some weariness about maintaining defence budgets at a certain level. Yet people are, on the one hand, mesmerised by the rise in the armed strength of the USSR and, on the other, ready to chide or praise the United States — depending on their attitudes. This is an illogical attitude for which we all share the blame, or in which we take a part, since military co-operation in Europe has remained a patchwork, and it need not have been so. The recent economic crisis is not the only reason.

Here, I should like to mention briefly what the Federal German Minister of Defence, Mr. Leber, said at the NATO conference. Taking issue with the others present, he said that it was not enough always to talk of the threat presented by communism, but that people must be made to see that this threat cannot be met with like means. The tanks massed on the eastern side should be countered not with a similar array of tanks, but with modern defensive weaponry, thus showing clearly that NATO is a defensive alliance, with defence as its object. I believe that this is right, it is also well worth noting, for the

point is gradually being forgotten in the escalation of armaments.

The USSR, for example, is not the only power to intervene in the Middle East. The United States has done likewise. Whether one holds this against both of them as a mistake or whether one says they helped and that was a good thing, depends on where one happens to stand politically. In our country we view with scepticism all these cases of intervention with arms supplies. That is our political view of the matter. To be fair, we must also mention that substantial quantities of weapons have also been sent to the Middle East by a third party.

In this case, therefore, as in many others, it cannot be said that the Russians are complete masters of the situation. I find that it is an all too simplistic view of the world to present public enemy No. 1 as the ubiquitous and the only agitator and to act as if there were no treaties at all with the USSR and as if the USSR for its part were not also subject to certain constraints, imposed on it by the law of action.

Soviet intervention in Angola is not what we understand by détente. It has already been said in this Assembly by various speakers — and I agree with them — that détente evidently means something rather different to the USSR than it does to us. However, some of the blame for the Soviet intervention in Angola rests with us, with NATO. During all the years that Portugal was waging a cruel and merciless war in its African colonies, NATO stood by and watched. Indeed, nearly all the NATO countries even supplied arms for this, each in accordance with its treaties with Portugal. Germany stopped sending arms as soon as it realised that Portugal was not abiding by agreements on where the arms would be used. Be that as it may, none of the member countries made any serious attempt to stop Portugal in this disastrous war. And now, of course, it is we who are in part responsible for the fact that eventually others intervened in this desperate war of liberation, when it was already well advanced.

It is my opinion that the CSCE was concluded neither hastily nor without due consideration. This Sir Frederic knows, as I had already expressed this view when I introduced my report last year, and he contested it. All right, that is his opinion. But I can only repeat what I said then in my report. In the long run, there is no alternative to coexistence — for either side. Alone and left to itself the USSR and its agita-

*Mrs. von Bothmer (continued)*

tion throughout the world cannot survive without the West. It is in my opinion here that we must seek to carry through our political task, and not in some cold war game. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Cermolacce.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — Sir Frederic Bennett's report has the great merit of not disguising its author's aims. The theme of the "Soviet threat" runs through it like a connecting thread. The reasons he gives are the growing militarisation of the USSR, the preponderance in men and arms of the Warsaw Pact and the pursuit of an expansionist imperialistic policy by the Soviet Union.

According to this argument, the Rapporteur warns the western countries against what he calls the "illusions" of détente.

How does Sir Frederic Bennett prove that these "expansionist aims" of the USSR exist? Quite simply by affirming that the Soviet Union is responsible for the political, social and economic crisis currently affecting the capitalist world, and that all the popular movements of protest and struggle against this crisis are to be laid at its door.

In Sir Frederic Bennett's view, if the Italian and French voters bring communists into the government, if the people of Britain call for a cutback in military expenditure, if the government of Juan Carlos wavers in Spain, it is all because of the Soviet Union. Why does he paint such a picture of a Soviet threat if not to exhort the western countries to increase their military expenditure?

One of the reasons for proceeding in this manner is given in the NATO Review of October 1975:

"There is a tendency in all democratic societies to make the enemy look 10 feet tall in order to get next year's budget approved."

However, what is at stake, goes beyond any mere increase in military credits.

The "Soviet threat" bogey enables the preparations for setting up a European defence to be justified and covered up — which is the real *raison d'être* of WEU. It is the military variant of anti-sovietism, and its continued use serves to

remind us that anti-sovietism is truly the main-spring of the Atlantic pact.

For the French Government, the Soviet threat serves to justify the policy of rejoining NATO and giving up national independence and makes its armaments policy more palatable: it explains the repeated refusals by that country to participate in conferences or to sign treaties on disarmament.

Besides, the absolute superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries is a myth. Of course, the military forces under their command have to meet new demands. But whereas the report takes into account the development of Soviet military forces, it maintains a discreet silence on parallel improvements in NATO.

Let us take a few examples. While the report emphasises Sir Peter Hill-Norton's speech to the Atlantic Pact Ministers of Defence in December 1975 pointing to a marked increase in the logistics of the Warsaw Pact forces, it said nothing about the increased western potential.

The Eurogroup communiqué of 10th December 1975 tells us a little more: a new sub-group, Eurostructure, was set up in 1974. This has "helped to produce more responsive command and control arrangements for ground forces to enable transfer to NATO control in an emergency to take place earlier and more simply".

Similarly, at an interview on current affairs, the Minister of Defence of Western Germany, speaking of the strengthening of the Warsaw Pact countries, said:

"But the West, for its part, has not been marking time. Our armies have been modernised and adapted to the changes which have taken place. I think the West can stay as tranquil as it was a few years ago."

These are, as you see, arguments which are, to say the least, specious.

The report is equally silent about the increased military expenditures of the countries of the Atlantic Pact. For 1976, the United States military budget is \$101,000 million, or 29% of the Federal budget. The increase over the preceding year is around 8%. As for the Eurogroup countries, their military expenditures rose by \$5,500 million in 1975, which, according to the Eurogroup communiqué of 10th December 1975, more than offset inflation.

*Mr. Cermolacce (continued)*

The communiqué adds that further defence budget increases by member States are foreseen for 1976. Similarly, the disproportion often alleged to exist between the forces at the disposal of the two alliances is sheer imagination. The global figures given by the Institute for Strategic Studies in London afford ample proof of this.

Even more eloquently than the figures for the various military budgets, recent events in the international arena show where the threat really comes from: imperialist intervention in Vietnam, support of Pinochet's fascist régime, the temptation of Mr. Giscard's government to station Pluton nuclear-headed tactical missiles on the territory of the German Federal Republic against the socialist countries, the United States marine manoeuvres in Provence as a rehearsal to a possible military intervention in the Middle East.

Add to that corruption: the bribes paid by Lockheed and other armaments manufacturers are but a few examples: and then there are the scandals which have splashed the reputations of certain European political parties and bear the mark of the virulent anti-communism which animates imperialism.

Actually, the myth of the Soviet threat to the West serves to cover up the narrowly selfish interests of insignificant groups in the capitalist countries, groups which dream of torpedoing international détente, bringing the world back to the cold war period and giving fresh impetus to the arms race, thus filling the coffers of the multinational companies and other arms manufacturers at the expense of the social budgets which have already been trimmed so severely.

Behind the myth of a Soviet threat lurk the opponents of mutually-advantageous co-operation between States with different social systems which are afraid of peaceful confrontation.

In these circumstances we shall not approve the recommendation tabled.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Guldberg, observer from Denmark, member of the Folketing.

Mr. GULDBERG (*Observer from Denmark*) (Translation). — I should first like to thank you for giving me an opportunity, although I am only here as an observer, of making a few

remarks which are, I believe, pertinent to the subject under discussion.

I listened with great interest to the speech of our Canadian friend and with no less interest to the last speaker.

When, as a Dane, I heard what the Canadian representative told us, I said to myself: "Lucky people!" Canada covers about one-third of the arctic territories, my own country represents the second third and there is no need to say who accounts for the other third.

I represent a small Nordic nation of five million scattered inhabitants having to contend with nearly all the economic problems known in the world. So I find it very hard to accept that the country I represent should be regarded as negligible.

Availing myself of the opportunity given me to take the floor here, I venture to say that for the time being we are living through a period in which basic changes are occurring in the organisations that deal with co-operation in the economic field and that of security policy. It is perhaps premature to enter into detailed arguments about whether such union will be achieved in the framework of one or other of the existing organisations or institutions.

There are sound political reasons for these changes not to be translated immediately into practical policies by the governments of the various countries.

It is obvious that this period of change has both negative and positive aspects in relation to the common task of ensuring the security and defence of Western Europe.

Allow me to pass on to you briefly some of our current anxieties.

The Helsinki conference has failed to relax the military and psychological pressure on Western Europe. In several countries including my own, people have realised that worldwide propaganda campaigns alter the balance of power more decisively than more powerful local operations. We have observed this in some countries of Western Europe, but also in Asia and Africa.

It also has to be admitted that Europe's ability to take decisions is sagging under the repercussions of the oil crisis and the monetary situation.

Once again, Mr. President, it is not difficult to explain why: national governments, particu-

*Mr. Guldberg (continued)*

larly in election periods, are more concerned with their domestic policy than with the delicate decision-making in foreign policy.

The negative aspects I have mentioned should not make us lose sight of the positive aspects, which we should endeavour to put to good use.

I am one of those people who consider that political and economic co-operation can only develop where there is a closer alignment of the security policies of the countries concerned. This also implies a clarification of Western Europe's relations with the United States.

Everywhere we come up against the same problem, whether in resolving Western Europe's common monetary difficulties, which means in practice creating a monetary unit in a world system of floating currencies, or in resolving our social and employment problems without doing so at the expense of the developing countries. The agenda of this meeting provides some glaring instances in the industrialisation field. Western Europe's attitude towards defence and security has wavered between dislike of American domination and fear of having to make shift for ourselves unaided.

The dualism mentioned in this connection is really no longer in any way justified. It will take some time for the governments of the various countries to draw the necessary consequences, for of course they cannot alter their policies from one day to the next in such important areas. Still, it would be preferable if they were able to recognise that fresh attitudes may also be the logical consequences of previous positions.

Nevertheless I believe that conditions elsewhere have removed some of the main grounds for differences of opinion in Western Europe on this score, and that we are approximating to a mean proportional — in other words, a balance between particular European co-operation in the spheres of economic, monetary and security policy areas, which is one of the essential prerequisites, and maintaining the special relationship with the United States, based on a shared conception of political and personal freedom and a common idea of what is to be defended.

Certainly, these problems form the subject of discussion in a great many international organisations and institutions. I am thinking of European union and Western European Union, the

North Atlantic Treaty and special military co-operation under it, and special co-operation in Eurogroup. It does not seem very practical, may prompt a desire to rationalise, and may even create competition among these organisations which are all really working towards the same ends.

I believe, however, that we shall best serve the common cause by leaving each country's political development to draw the consequences of changes applied at the base ; and I am convinced that the problem of how to organise co-operation in the field of security policy will not be difficult to resolve, if the proper foundations are laid in the different countries.

In conclusion, I should like to stress that these views, which I am grateful to you for allowing me to express, do not reflect a passive attitude or the idea that there is plenty of time to spare. I personally believe that the most urgent matter is for the nine countries of the European Community to strengthen and consolidate their existing co-operation through the development of industrial co-operation, including the military sector, and co-operation in short-term economic policy, so as to enable the member countries to freeze their floating exchange rates to form a firm basis for their economic and security policy.

As an observer, Mr. President, I cannot speak to the subject under discussion, nor am I entitled to vote, but I trust I have been able to put across to you the point of view of the world I belong to. The general philosophy of the report you are discussing very closely corresponds to the fears which we feel in our country, due to a sort of inverted aggressiveness. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with the prescribed procedure, I shall call Mr. Dankert. It will then be 6 p.m., and we shall have to suspend this debate and resume it tomorrow morning. In fact, there are still three speakers on the list : Mr. Mattick, Lord Peddie and Sir John Rodgers ; and before the address to be given by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Destremau, tomorrow morning, we shall have to take the amendments. So our debate will have been very wide-ranging and complete. But, I repeat, I think it advisable to adjourn this debate until tomorrow morning, so as to allow participants to speak for as long as they like — despite the fact that, when they tell me how long they want, they always overrun their time.

I call Mr. Dankert.

Mr. DANKERT (*Netherlands*). — My first impulse on reading Sir Frederic Bennett's very depressing report was to join the Dutch communist party and await the arrival of the communist liberators but, to my great regret, the Dutch communists and the communist liberators seem not to be on good terms. I decided, therefore, to take a closer look at the report.

I have never seen so much mention of the cold war in so few pages. I am also astonished that the General Affairs Committee has presented a report which touches on so much of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments' sphere. I shall not talk about the explanatory memorandum and I shall refer to it only insofar as it is relevant to the draft recommendation, on which I should like to say a few words and to which I have proposed a few amendments.

The draft recommendation asks the Assembly to note "that the Soviet Union has up to now interpreted the commitments entered into in the final act of the CSCE in a restricted manner...". I shall not dispute the accuracy of that statement, yet I cannot help recalling that this Assembly is composed of the same members as those who represent our seven countries in the Council of Europe. In that Assembly a few weeks ago exactly the same members as represent their countries here said that it was too early to judge, that we should await the outcome of the Belgrade conference and, without making any pronouncement, carefully note what is happening in the implementation of the CSCE — as our Ministers do — so that in a few months' time it will be possible to formulate a more definite attitude towards it. Yet here we are saying that the Soviet Union is acting in a restrictive manner. This may be so, but it is too early to tell.

The draft recommendation also says that the Assembly regrets "that in three years little or no progress has been made in the SALT and MBFR negotiations...".

I would say and the Americans say that the main problem in the SALT talks is the Cruise missile, and the Cruise missile is not a Russian but an American invention. It is an important missile for the possible solutions to European tactical problems. Solutions on the use of Cruise missiles should be found, and it seems that in the air force rôle these solutions are under way. However, judging from the draft recommendation and Sir Frederic's report, one would think that those damn devil Russians had invented something to blow up the SALT nego-

tiations. That is not exactly the case. The same story could be told about MBFR.

I dispute many of the figures in Sir Frederic's explanatory memorandum. They were disputed not only by the Military Balance — or the strategic survey — but by his own Minister of Defence at Oslo and by Mr. Schlesinger while he was the United States Secretary of Defence as well. From year to year he included in his reports to Congress for the fiscal year — I do not know how many times — the view that there was a reasonable balance in Europe, that there was no great discrepancy between East and West, that even if in one area the Soviet Union had a big lead, in another the western countries had the edge.

If one is asked why no progress has been made with our MBFR negotiations, one must ask whose responsibility it is. I cannot dispute that there is a basic difference of principle in the MBFR negotiations. The West declares it unacceptable that the Soviet Union tries to impose national ceilings. I think it is unacceptable — and in this Western European Union Assembly it should be said very loudly that it is unacceptable — that Western Germany is discriminated against vis-à-vis other major European countries. The Soviet Union's basic position on MBFR is basically unacceptable. But one has to ask whether the positions of both parties are acceptable. One has to see whether we in the West should ask for a common ceiling.

I doubt whether it is realistic and reasonable to ask for common ceilings in the MBFR discussions for the couple of countries concerned. It is unrealistic because we maintain — and Sir Frederic is among the foremost exponents of this view — that the Soviet Union still has a kind of Eastern European empire in which it uses occupation forces, and it is difficult to equate those occupation forces with the forces we need for the defence of the West.

It is said that we are anxious because the Soviets and their allies are still taking advantage of the crisis outside Europe to strengthen their political, economic and military position in the world. I thought it was a normal power game between two big powers that they tried to strengthen their political and economic positions. When I was, as a member of the NATO subcommittee on détente, in the United States with some of the members here today we were told that the United States accepted that the Soviet Union was trying to achieve a superpower status

*Mr. Dankert (continued)*

comparable with the superpower status of the United States.

From that flow certain consequences. We should accept and try to guide the efforts of the Soviet Union to achieve political and economic parity in the world. The only thing we should not accept is that it may do it by military means. We can condemn military intervention in Angola, but it is too far-reaching to condemn also the Soviet Union's efforts to strengthen its influence by political and economic means.

When one considers United States activities in the Mediterranean in the last few months or years and the decreasing influence of the Soviet Union on Egypt and, in the last few months, the changing position of Syria, only a few weeks ago a big pawn of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, but now in a very difficult position in its relations with the Soviet Union, one cannot maintain that only the Soviet Union is a winner. The United States too, wins. The world position is less dramatic than Sir Frederic suggests.

But that is not the worst of it. In the next paragraph of the draft recommendation Sir Frederic goes further still. He says that, in view of the size of the Warsaw Pact forces, the members of the Atlantic Alliance no longer deploy sufficient strength to guarantee their collective security. He goes on to note that while the Soviet Union and its allies have failed to accept the main implications of détente as it is conceived and interpreted in the West, a reduction of military strength has occurred in Western Europe without a lessening of the Soviet military threat. The figures of which Sir Frederic tries to convince us are absolutely false.

They are absolutely false in the sense that in the MBFR talks governments are not negotiating on the basis of Central Europe strengths of 895,000 Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops as against 575,000 NATO troops. That excludes at least two French divisions in Germany. I will not go into the very interesting new development in French strategy for perhaps in a year's time we shall know a little more about what is behind it. Those elements have to be taken into account. If we look into the figures we come to very different conclusions from the 3:1 figures that Sir Frederic is trying to make us believe. Defensively — that is the only stance we should consider, for we are not intending to conquer the

Soviet Union — the present ratio of forces is acceptable. Mr. Schlesinger has said so, contrary to what is cited in Sir Frederic's report. Our NATO ministers have said so. The only qualification is that by reductions we should not diminish our security. There should not be one-sided reductions.

I would conclude, if I were an American looking into the considerations of the recommendation, that it would be very wise to withdraw from Western Europe so as not to be drawn into the disasters when the Russians are coming.

Sir Frederic's approach is demoralising public opinion without facts being available to support such an attitude. It is stupid for Western European Union to see it in such strong terms and to accept recommendations of this kind.

The preamble to the final part of the draft recommendation regrets that South Africa's widely condemned racial policies provided a pretext to justify Soviet and Cuban intervention. I condemn the intervention of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Angola, but to formulate such condemnation in the way in which it has been formulated in this draft recommendation is slightly hypocritical, because there has been South African involvement in Angola — and very heavy involvement. The Cubans have acted as military advisers to the liberation movement — MPLA — for many years. They have done so as part of a fight against the colonial Portuguese régime, a régime supported by most of the western countries.

Even if there have been some humanitarian noises from the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries, we have never made any real effort to support the liberation movements. The Cubans were there, and they did. They have always been there in hundreds, but they came in thousands only when there was a South African armoured column marching up in November 1975 to the Benguela railway, and higher up in order to cut off Luanda. I will not justify Russian or Cuban intervention but one has to see the consequential effects of other actions.

The only action that Western Europeans should take about the régime in Angola is to try to correct our errors of the past and to establish ties in such a way that there is no Russian predominance there. If I were an Angolan and a member of the Angolan anti-colonial movement, I think that I should have good reasons to support Soviet influence in Angola. It is a pity that

*Mr. Dankert (continued)*

it has gone that way, but that is not the fault of the Angolans. It is not, in the first place, the fault of the Soviet Union. It is basically our own fault.

Paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation says that we have to re-establish a secure balance. That means that Sir Frederic and his General Affairs Committee admit that there is not a balance at the moment and that we are inviting the Soviet Union to come in simply because of that. Our ministers proclaim all the time that we should maintain a balance. That is a sensible policy, because, apart from military possibilities, politically it is wise to maintain a secure balance, but as long as Sir Frederic does not prove by facts, and he has not done so, that there is a disrupted balance which we have to re-establish, we should not say in the resolutions of our Assembly that such a balance does not exist.

It would be good for this Assembly to come back to reality and not to be unduly pessimistic. We should draft our recommendation with the sense of reality that our governments have displayed so far and that I would hope this Assembly can display. That is why the amendments have been put forward. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Some amendments have been tabled.

As I said, I am adjourning the debate on Sir Frederic Bennett's report. This is of such interest, if only by being so controversial, that there are still five speakers on the list, not counting those who may put their names down later on to support or oppose the amendments. We shall therefore resume this debate tomorrow morning.

### **15. Nomination of members to Committees**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the nomination of members to Committees.

The candidatures for the six Committees of the Assembly have been published in an appendix to Notice No. 1 which has been distributed.

In accordance with the provisions of Rule 39 (6) and Rule 42 *bis* (2) of the Rules of Procedure, these candidatures are submitted to the Assembly.

Are there any objections to the candidatures submitted ?...

There are no objections

The candidatures for Committees are ratified.

The Committees of the Assembly are thus constituted.

### **16. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday 15th June, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Détente and security in Europe (Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 703 and Amendments).
2. Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly (Presentation by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Documents 697 and 710) ;

Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council ; Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council ; Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council (Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Documents 700 and Amendments, 702 and 705).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.)*



## SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 15th June 1976

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

2. Attendance Register.

3. Détente and security in Europe (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 703 and Amendments*).

*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Mattick, Lord Peddie, Sir John Rodgers, Mr. de Niet, Mr. Porthoine.

4. Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly (*Presentation by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 697 and 710*).

Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council; Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council; Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council (*Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, of the General Affairs Com-*

*mittee and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 700 and Amendments, 702 and 705*).

*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Destremau (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*).

*Reply by Mr. Destremau to questions put by*: Mr. de Bruyne, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. Warren, Mr. Kliesing, Mr. Leynen, Mr. Mattick, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Tanghe.

*Speakers*: Mr. Haase (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. Péridier (*Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. Richter (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*), Mr. de Montesquiou, (*Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*), Mr. de Bruyne, Mr. Rivière, Mr. Sieglerschmidt (*Chairman of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. de Bruyne, Mr. Richter, Mr. Critchley.

5. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

1. See page 23.

### 3. Détente and security in Europe

*(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 703 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The first Order of the Day is the resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on détente and security in Europe and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 703 and Amendments.

In view of the fact that at 10.30 we shall be receiving the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of WEU, I must ask speakers not to over-run their time, so that we may get through the list of speakers and go on to the debate on the amendments following Mr. Destremau's presentation and the traditional questions he will be asked.

I call Mr. Mattick.

Mr. MATTICK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the presentation of the report now being debated and the debate yesterday in this Assembly were characterised by a largely

*Mr. Mattick (continued)*

defensive attitude which is to be found in the report and was in addition supported by many of those who took part in the debate. The aims of Soviet communism were gone into one by one and there was talk of demobilisation in Europe.

What I have been wondering all along is whether the Soviet Union is the only side with an offensive strategy? Does the Rapporteur consider that the West has no offensive policy at all? Does our fight for democracy, quality of life and security not amount to an offensive position which in this context counters the Soviet position? Was support for the democrats in Portugal not an offensive policy by the West that was crowned with success? I get the impression that some of the bourgeois elements in this Europe of ours no longer know where they stand and are ready to capitulate.

In this Assembly the CSCE has been compared with Munich in 1938. A fellow member of the same age as myself made this comparison. May I just remind you that Munich in 1938 bore the stamp of failure, failure by Europe and its friends to act against Nazi fascism between 1933 and 1938. Hitler tore up the Versailles Treaty; the western powers made no move. Hitler marched into the Rhineland; his opponents made no move. Hitler organised rearmament on an unbelievably gigantic scale, while the British Labour Party were all the time fighting for disarmament and claiming that they really should not have to listen to any nonsense about Hitler.

The result of this good opinion — or rather, wrong opinion of Hitler, was that the western allies, the former guarantors of the Versailles Treaty, had to look on helplessly when Hitler marched into Austria in 1938. The United States stood aloof. Munich was a capitulation of weakness, since the powers who subsequently had to band together against Hitler were in no way equipped to come through the struggle or even to use against Hitler the same kind of blackmail that he was using against them.

How, if we think politically and if we have learned anything from history — as we after all believe we have done — how, I ask, can we compare the CSCE with Munich without looking irresponsible, without being seen to mislead public opinion? We should at least ourselves believe what we say.

How do things now differ from 1938? There is NATO, which aims at being in military terms

sufficiently on a par with the enemy, in this case the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc, and consequently at offering such a measure of security that no unilateral blackmail is possible. We are concerned with the balance of forces and all genuine statements on the true position and quality of armaments and military strength, all true figures from our governments clearly indicate that the bleats about the dangerous superiority of the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc are wrong. NATO as a whole is working well. We know that the Americans have budgeted more for security this year than last, and Germany itself, too, has fulfilled all its obligations. America and Europe have jointly, in NATO, founded their policies on military security.

Then, in 1967, we took on a further task in the Harmel report. After outlining the situation, the report says:

“Under these conditions, the allies will maintain as necessary a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence.

In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved. Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary. Collective defence is a stabilising factor in world politics.”

Has all this slipped our memory? Or why do Sir Frederic and some of my other friends in the House want to put us psychologically on the defensive, a position which is not justified by the facts and which we have no reason to adopt?

The President has referred to the briefness of the time at our disposal; I, too, will therefore keep my comments brief on this question. I shall not give you figures, but I feel I should set out these facts to counter the things that were said at certain points in the discussion yesterday. I would caution against regarding this defensive position as a factor that will contribute to recovery, or as likely to produce a shake-up. Why, then? Has the CSCE not, after all, been an offensive position for the West, and is it not still so today?

Sir Frederic has mentioned Berlin and has informed us that, before writing the report, he travelled widely. Did Sir Frederic include both

*Mr. Mattick (continued)*

East and West Berlin in his visits, did he speak to the people there, and did he notice the difference between then and now — before and after the CSCE, before and after the four-power agreement? Does he not know that the way people in Berlin think today, the way they live today is entirely changed? Did he not notice that in East Germany — not just in East Berlin — the millions of encounters with people from the other part of Germany are producing the first signs that people are discussing the question of what Germany looks like, and what is to become of this Germany. If he has done all that, he cannot say that the position of West Berlin and relations between the two parts of Germany have worsened. He would inevitably have sensed that the leadership in the DDR and its socialist unity party have been running into great difficulties because of the four-power agreement and the Helsinki agreement, and that over there they still have to surmount these great difficulties.

If we look at what the CSCE has achieved now, at the end of ten months — the report is, of course, already two months old — and if we try and determine what has and what has not been happening in that period, we really cannot deny that certain things are moving, not as much as some might perhaps have hoped, not as much as many had suggested with perhaps deliberate intent to mislead so that they could later prove that nothing is as we fooled ourselves into believing it to be. But those who approached the proceedings with realistic and logical assumptions knew that particularly in fulfilling the commitments of the third basket, the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc may from time to time be not only showing unwillingness but also facing very many difficulties.

I would warn people against promoting these defensive attitudes in the hopes of shaking up a few people, of rousing a few Dutchmen, to take a more active part in defence than they do now. Surely it would today be far more sensible to tell people the facts, to tell them that on the whole all is well with defence, that there is a balance, and that we cannot be blackmailed if we do not weaken politically, than to present them what was said here yesterday about Helsinki and the four-power agreement and the position of NATO in this world-wide struggle, with a swan-song of the West.

These being my views, I cannot give this report my approval. To tinker around with it would

seem rather pointless, since it is fundamentally defensive and it contains no basis at all for an offensive attitude. Thank you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Lord Peddie.

Lord PEDDIE (*United Kingdom*). — We can congratulate Sir Frederic Bennett at least on delivering his message loudly and clearly. In unmistakable terms he has demonstrated his personal violent opposition if not to communism, at least to the Soviet system. We may deplore what many would regard as his abrasive language, but I accept the basic sentiments behind his comments — that preparedness is a basic element in western security.

We must recognise the limited but important aims of détente — the commitment to free the world from war and encourage good relations over a wide area of social, cultural and economic interests. It is quite likely that, with a widening of the contacts in those areas, we may be making a substantial contribution towards lessening tension among powers.

At the same time, we must not allow ourselves to be deluded into the belief that the acceptance of détente eliminates the fundamental differences between the objectives of the Soviet system and those of the West; it merely obscures them. There is no doubt, in spite of the nice, kind comments from certain members of this Assembly, that the Soviet Union has substantially increased its arms expenditure. Paragraph 11 of this report states that Soviet expenditure on defence constitutes 10.6% of its gross national product, and it goes on to confirm a statement made only a few days ago by the British defence minister which indicated that the overall expenditure of the Soviet Union was substantially in excess of the figure originally quoted in the report. This excessive expenditure may prove to be the West's secret weapon, because there is no doubt that the strain on the Soviet economy is beginning to show.

My colleagues and I are not happy with all aspects of this report and we have tabled a number of amendments which we feel will strengthen the recommendations and eliminate some inaccuracies and misplaced emphasis. There are two serious inaccuracies: paragraph four of the preamble says that little or no progress has been made in the strategic arms limitation talks and paragraph six says that we no longer deploy sufficient strength. These statements cannot be substantiated.

*Lord Peddie (continued)*

I do not intend to argue in support of the amendments since Mr. Dankert has already done so very effectively. I am pleased, however, to learn that Sir Frederic Bennett and his colleagues have considered our amendments and feel sympathy with our proposals in general.

I accept the basic message of this report, that there is no room for complacency about western defence. William Shakespeare has a message for both Sir Frederic and this Assembly: "Beware of entrance to a quarrel; but, being in, bear't that th'opposed may beware of thee."

Sir Frederic has sounded a warning, perhaps in too strident a tone, that could, unfortunately, be mistaken for panic. The Assembly will recognise, I am sure, that rational, confident and sophisticated preparedness is more likely to win respect and ensure security and peace for the West. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Sir John Rodgers.

Sir John RODGERS (*United Kingdom*). — I should first like to congratulate the Assembly on your re-election, Mr. President, and to congratulate you personally.

As Vice-Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, I should like to congratulate Sir Frederic Bennett on this eminently careful report and on the immense amount of travel and work that he has put into it. We all realise that it will not gain the support of every member, that there are passages that are abrasive and that could be toned down. Nevertheless, we should thank him for its thought-provoking character.

Developments in defence are occurring with such rapidity that it is not possible for statistics to carry any lasting significance, but the figures on the balance of military forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries show a disturbing trend. Undoubtedly these armaments are the product of policies made ten or even twenty years ago and we cannot therefore expect immediate or dramatic changes in Soviet policy, although I agree with Lord Peddie that the amount of money the Soviet Union is spending on its defence is causing stresses and strains that are not perhaps immediately obvious to us.

Nevertheless, superiority of roughly 3:1 in all arms — be they soldiers, tanks, guns, aircraft, ships or submarines — should give us food for

thought. Why should Russia pursue a policy designed to achieve strategic weapon superiority and develop diverse offensive capability and increase these in such numbers that it is possible for Russia to support political objectives in distant areas like Angola and the Middle East, to say nothing of the Cape route or the Indian Ocean? Soviet military strength is being progressively transformed into an ever more capable, ever more flexible and ever more responsive means of supporting globally expanding Soviet political objectives.

Missile-carrying submarines are being launched at a rate of two every month. A new type, with more than 16 missiles with multiple warheads, is expected to appear. The Soviet submarine fleet is the largest in the world, with over 300 vessels. Whatever the advantages accruing from our presence at the CSCE talks, it is undoubtedly true that these have not in any way led to a slackening in Russia's military build-up.

We must not exaggerate Russian strength but we should be complete idiots to underestimate it. Nations fear not so much that Russia is likely to embark on a belligerent course in Europe but that countries such as Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece, Turkey and others may be subjected to pressures from Russia, backed by military superiority, to bring about communist States in Europe, perhaps initially through the device of the popular front, with the communists hiding behind the respectability of the socialists.

Everyone desires peaceful coexistence. No one seeks confrontation. Everyone wishes to see a lowering of the tension which now, unfortunately, exists between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Everyone wishes to build a safer and more secure world, free from the threat of war, and to encourage and facilitate more productive relations between governments and people.

That is why the West entered into the CSCE talks. That is why I believe that we should explore every avenue to increase contacts between the eastern and western countries in Europe by trade, cultural and environmental co-operation, travel and tourism, and exchange of information. But we should look long and coolly at suggestions that we should support calls from the USSR for European talks on such subjects as energy and pollution of the environment. Certainly talks on these subjects should be held, but we should be careful not to support demands that might undermine the already existing European organisations, such as the Council of Europe

*Sir John Rodgers (continued)*

and the EEC Parliament, that have laboured already in these fields.

Of course we must monitor and examine regularly the consequences of CSCE and report back at intervals. Of course we must examine how great an effort each country is making to maintain the balance of forces between East and West.

We should be acutely aware, however, that this so-called détente will not resolve the ideological and political differences between communist and non-communist countries. We must be careful in our use of this word "détente". It is a French word that I understand to mean "the lowering of tension" — it is neither more nor less. I do not see why we should use this word in English. Détente is not in itself a policy. It merely means pursuing policies that should help us to create an international climate for better understanding between the two blocs and lead us to improved communications and co-operation.

I had considerable sympathy and support for President Ford when he said that he did not wish to see the continued use of this word "détente", which the Soviet Union continues to use as if it were a definable policy. The capacity of the West to indulge in self-deception is pretty obvious, but we must have no illusions as to what the Soviet means by that word. The recent speech by Mr. Brezhnev to the recent Soviet party conference is brutally frank. To the Soviet détente means continuation of their suzerainty over the satellite countries of Eastern Europe plus a right to try to overturn the governmental systems of the countries of the West by subversion and financial assistance. Mr. Brezhnev has made it crystal clear that he believes détente is indivisible and does not stop at Europe. Indeed, as we have seen, it allows the Soviet to build up its bases in places such as Angola.

The wave of spy arrests in the last few weeks in West Germany should remind us that, despite détente, communist countries, especially East Germany, are still intent on undermining the West's democratic system. Some people have estimated that there are more than 10,000 spies indulging in political and industrial espionage in West Germany. Subversion is a major weapon of the communist world.

The consensus is that the Soviet Union has doubled its defence expenditure from between 6 % and 8 % of its gross national product to

between 15 % and 20 %. Our Rapporteur has used the figure of 10.6 %, but the figures which I have managed to obtain put it at far higher than that. The United States devotes around 6 % to its defence budget, which, of course, is high, and is now increasing this figure. We have heard good news from France — that it is to spend 20 % of its budget on defence, mainly on conventional forces, and West Germany has increased its expenditure.

But we must not take for granted that the world is safe for democracy. We must be perpetually on our guard. That is why I hope that the majority of members of this Assembly will vote in support of the report and its recommendations, subject to the amendments already tabled. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Niet.

Mr. de NIET (*Netherlands*). — I feel that I owe it to Sir Frederic Bennett to say a few words about his report and his draft recommendations, because, although in Committee I did not object to the draft report, I reserved my vote for the plenary session, because in Committee there were many oral changes. But I am always in favour of having controversial reports and recommendations go to the plenary session. However, I believe that the success of a report and draft recommendation depends on whether it is adopted unanimously. If it is, it is often, especially on strictly political subjects, because different things are read into it by different people, and that does not help political clarity.

I have been shocked by Sir Frederic's comments on this report. He has said that many of his statements are based on authoritative sources. I do not know what those sources are, except that they are chiefs-of-staff. I remember a BBC production about Cuban missiles. If the chiefs-of-staff had had their way, Armageddon would already be here.

I believe also that his comparison with 1939 is disastrous for his whole philosophy. If what he says is true, the millions and millions spent on NATO have been wasted. Chiefs-of-staff always have the only answer, as in Vietnam. The only cure for them is more money, weapons and armaments. I think, therefore, that his sources are rather one-sided. The threat of Nazi Germany was much greater and more disastrous than any threat we have now, because the Warsaw Pact is not just one monolithic block.

*Mr. de Niet (continued)*

I see this report as part of the philosophy that totalitarianism from the right is always preferable to totalitarianism from the left. For me they are the same. I do not like either and I have no illusions about either. I am terrified when I see who is against this whole philosophy and who is in favour, because I note that Sir Frederic Bennett is even glad of the way he was supported by Mr. Müller. That is quite enough for me. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Portheine.

Mr. PORTHEINE (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I am nonetheless glad that you have given me the floor, Mr. President, so that I can voice my reactions to a number of comments that have been made, some by my fellow-countrymen.

First of all there is Mr. Scholten, who has told us once again that it is important to continue to believe in and give meaning to the spirit of Helsinki, though even he admits that the results from Helsinki are nothing to write home about. He has told us that we must do away with the causes that bring about imbalances.

It is not quite clear how he sees that being done. It may be that he is thinking of a remodelling of our society in the socio-economic sphere, touching on fundamental points in our market economy system and on freedom of production by undertakings.

If this were so, I would argue that I still see the carrying through of the communist system — particularly in the socio-economic and financial spheres — as a grave threat to our western democracy. Even if we can — and want to — keep our defence effort at a reasonable level, this is not I think the only thing that matters. Just as important, and inextricably bound up with this, is the defence of our socio-economic and financial system. This was the standpoint I put to the authorities in America, and I am glad that our liberal friend and guest, the Danish ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Guldberg, said exactly the same thing here yesterday.

It is not a question here of allowing the old liberal *laissez-faire* to continue — even the liberals have totally abandoned this. There has, of course, been a balanced evolution in that system, which I have already supported else-

where. There are various examples that can be given, more particularly in the area of industrial democracy, but at heart the system remains unchanged and sets us apart from dogmatic socialist and communist attitudes. The nub of it is whether the State is to be all-powerful or whether the accent is still to be on the individual, with his potential and his imperfections. My very real fear is that with governments in which communists have a share the tendency will — though little is clear about this, and it is something that is not often emphasised — be towards the former.

In other words, if the Italian communists say they want to stay in NATO some people may be happy with this; I am certainly not, because I do not know what is to happen in the other area. Is the ordinary person going to retain his opportunities for using his initiative, as he has in the economy we have known up to now, one we need to defend?

Mr. Scholten also spoke about the deal with South Africa for nuclear equipment, and said that a majority of the Dutch Parliament had voted against this. This is not entirely accurate. A motion — the Ter Beek motion — was passed in the Second Chamber of the States-General by a majority of one, and set certain conditions on deliveries and called for diplomatic talks. These have in fact since taken place. I believe that they not only brought good results in the foreign policy field, but also led to the inclusion in the draft contract of provisions satisfying the conditions set.

There have been many others in the Netherlands who have been annoyed with our government for having hesitated — solely on matters of credit guarantees, and nothing to do with export licences — ignoring the hopes that had been raised and losing an order that could have been of major importance for us from the viewpoint of jobs and of technology. Because we understand what international co-operation is about, we do not blame France for having seized the opportunity.

For the rest, I will end by saying that I am broadly in agreement with Sir Frederic Bennett's report, and offer him my congratulations.

#### **4. Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly**

*(Presentation by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 697 and 710)*

***Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council***

***Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council***

***Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council***

***(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 700 and Amendments, 702 and 705)***

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of the twenty-first annual report of the Council of WEU by Mr. Bernard Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic and Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, Documents 697 and 710.

After the presentation of this report and the Chairman of the Council's replies to the oral questions put by members of the Assembly, we shall hear the three Rapporteurs of the Committees of the Assembly who have prepared the replies to the annual report of the Council: Mr. Haase will present the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the application of the Brussels Treaty, Document 700; Mr. Périquier will present the report of the General Affairs Committee on the political activities of the Council, Document 702; Mr. Richter will present the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 705.

Mr. Minister, you are no stranger to this rostrum; you have been a member of our Assembly, you have chaired one of its most important Committees; and thereafter you have acted as spokesman for the French Government, following the many important ministerial duties assigned to you.

Today, in your capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Council of WEU, you will be speaking of the activities of the Council.

You are aware of the great importance which the Assembly attaches to dialogue with the Council on the occasion of the presentation of its annual report. We are therefore looking forward with very great interest to your report.

I would add, as I already mentioned in the speech I made here yesterday, that the Assembly

intends, because of present circumstances, internationally and especially in Europe, which I would not exactly describe as disturbing but rather confused, to be particularly demanding. It looks forward to hearing your comments, which I am sure will be very well worth hearing, and I rather think our colleagues are going to give you a good grilling during question-time. I anticipate from this open debate some highly practical results.

Mr. Minister, you have the floor.

Mr. DESTREMAU (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — Mr. President, first of all I would like to thank you for your kind remarks. Coming as they do from a member of the Assembly who, before being called to higher office, was one of its most lively members, I appreciate them very greatly. Thank you.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I did indeed, for several years, take part in the work of your Assembly, and I am pleased for more reasons than one to appear before you once more as a member of the French Government and Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

By virtue of the latter office, to which I have just been appointed following the latest ministerial meeting of WEU in Brussels, I am privileged to come here this morning to present the annual report of the Council on its activities during 1975.

You have read this report; it has been, I am glad to say, submitted to you in plenty of time this year as the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the General Affairs Committee appreciate. It is a paper familiar to you both in form and content. It describes the activities of the Council and of the other organs responsible for implementing the modified Brussels Treaty.

Presenting it to you gives me the opportunity of reminding you, first of all, of the importance which the Council attaches to maintaining good relations with the Assembly. I notice in this respect that, with only a few reservations, your Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has expressed its full satisfaction.

The Council has indeed endeavoured over the past year to keep the promises it has made to you and to reply as quickly as possible to the recommendations adopted by your Assembly,

*Mr. Destremau (continued)*

bearing in mind, in particular, the commitments entered into following Recommendation 249. Of course it may have happened that some replies are held up, but in their case the reason has been that they involved recommendations dealing with problems which were still evolving, and the Council was concerned to inform the Assembly of the latest developments. The Council is, at all events, particularly aware of the need to speed up as much as possible the replies to the recommendations and to the written questions of the Assembly. I think it would in any case be difficult, even illusory, to set time limits for such replies and I can assure you that the authorities, working parties and the Council have always endeavoured to answer your questions as quickly as possible.

As for the content of these replies, which has been criticised by the Assembly, this is not a new problem and you appreciate how difficult it is sometimes to finalise a reply to certain recommendations or questions in view of the nature and complexity of the matters concerned. Especially as you know the Council is bound to observe the rule of unanimity in drafting its replies.

At all events, the Council takes a keen interest in the useful contribution made by the Assembly in examining certain questions. This has been particularly the case for the issues of European security and integration raised in its Recommendation 266.

Your Assembly has repeatedly requested that it should be better informed of the positions of the various member governments. Accordingly, this year too several ministers have attended the sessions of the Assembly, to spell out the views of their governments. In addition, the informal meetings with the Presidential Committee and the General Affairs Committee in May 1975, and in May of this year with the Presidential Committee and with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, have enabled a freer exchange of views than would have been possible in formal meetings.

Examination of political questions does of course continue to be one of the Council's principal activities. However, as recommended by the treaty, we have to avoid duplication. But a number of questions of interest to WEU are dealt with in other international bodies, e.g. the European Communities, the Atlantic Alliance,

OECD. In particular there is growing political co-operation among the Nine — and the Council knows that the Assembly is as pleased as itself at the prospects of the European union we all long to see. It has therefore not been thought appropriate to hold consultations in WEU on matters which member governments are examining quite satisfactorily elsewhere.

However, the Council's competence in matters of foreign policy has never been challenged. Witness the fact that an exchange of views on East-West relations took place on the occasion of the ministerial meetings in London in 1975 and in Brussels in May of this year, and that the Council has carefully examined the recommendations of the Assembly on other important aspects of international relations such as relations between Europe and the United States, the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, questions of energy or scientific, technological and aerospace questions.

In these circumstances, it is not right to describe the way in which the Council has carried out its responsibilities in respect of foreign affairs as "shirking its duties".

As for defence matters, they are, as you know, one of the Council's major preoccupations.

Let me remind you that on various occasions in 1975, notably the presentation of the twentieth annual report to the Council by Mr. Van Elsslande and the commemorative session of the Assembly in May, the Council emphasised that defence problems were one of its main concerns and that the modified Brussels Treaty was in its view "one of the keystones in the security of the signatory States".

I think it not inappropriate at this time to affirm that the Council attaches the same importance as heretofore to the application of the provisions of the treaty and its protocol on the level of forces and armaments of the member States.

Hence it has continued to keep a close watch on their application. The Council, with the help of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, continued in 1975 to carry out its responsibilities under the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols. The activities of the Agency, which assists the Council in its task, have been set out in the fullest possible manner in the annual report. This shows that in the sectors open to its inspection, the Agency has satisfactorily and efficiently fulfilled its task.



*Mr. Destremau (continued)*

Finally, member governments have taken note of the resolutions adopted by the Presidential Committee of the Assembly on 11th September 1976 and 1st March 1976 in respect of the Tindemans report on European union.

The validity of the Brussels Treaty and its protocols and the responsibilities of the Council for their application, were reaffirmed in the reply given in April 1976 to Recommendation 273 adopted in the context of that report.

Regarding the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee of this organ of WEU, the Council of Ministers debated the matter at length at its meeting in London on 20th May 1975 and the permanent representatives have subsequently exchanged views on the subject on numerous occasions. Lastly, the recent meeting of the Council of Ministers in Brussels on 31st May produced a new remit for the Standing Armaments Committee about which I would like to say a few words.

As I mentioned a few moments ago, and bearing in mind the need to avoid any danger of duplication of effort or any interference with the work now being done in other organisations, the Council instructed the Standing Armaments Committee, as an immediate task, to submit a detailed plan for a study which, in the form of a descriptive analysis of the situation of the armaments industries in the member countries, would contribute to a better knowledge of the industrial and economic implications of the standardisation of armaments.

The Council will monitor the progress of work and instruct the Standing Armaments Committee, as may be appropriate.

Finally, the representatives of the member countries have closely followed developments in other organisations in European co-operation and the standardisation of armaments. The creation of the European programme group in Rome on 2nd February 1976 is thus an appreciable step forward and we have every reason to be glad that its activities have made an auspicious beginning. I also mention the setting up of a working group which has been given the task of studying, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, questions of the interoperability of materials and equipment.

That brings me to the end of the presentation of the twenty-first annual report of the Council

to the Assembly and now, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I propose to say a few words on current topics in my capacity as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Government.

Since the last session France has, of course, taken part in the meeting of the Atlantic Council in Oslo. In addition, some further particulars on the French Government's ideas and policy concerning defence have been given at the highest level.

At Oslo, the French Delegation was gratified to note that its partners continued to accept the grounds for a policy based on the two-fold concept of defence and détente. There is no anti-thesis between the two, but a relation of complementarity. It was recognised that while the defence effort should be maintained or even increased, that was no reason for neglecting efforts towards détente, since only a combination of the two could bring about security and peace.

We have also pointed out that, in the event of a displacement of political and military instability from north to south, specific attempts must be made to mitigate the effect and avoid transposing outside Europe our continent's confrontations of eastern and western blocs. Noting globalising tendencies need not be any reason for globalising our response.

Recent statements on military policy by the President of the French Republic and by the Chief-of-Staff of the armed forces prove once again, if it were needed, that France remains faithful to its alliances. These are set out more particularly in two treaties: that of the North Atlantic and that of Western European Union.

If we examine the literal wording, we see that the WEU treaty is, in its main article, much more binding than the North Atlantic Treaty. For, in Article 5 of the latter a clause was inserted, apparently at the request of the American Government, which is seldom singled out for mention. With reference to measures for mutual assistance between the allies it is stipulated that these should be taken "individually and in concert with the other parties". This phrase clearly means that there must be prior consultation. It constitutes a kind of escape clause nowhere to be found in the WEU treaty, which provides for an automatic obligation to assist. If France, as has sometimes been somewhat maliciously insinuated, had wished to go it alone, it would have had to denounce the WEU treaty as well as the North Atlantic Treaty. It

*Mr. Destremau (continued)*

has not done so, and has of course no intention of doing so.

But, much more than the literal text of the treaties, what counts is the spirit in which it is intended to apply them. There too, motives have been ascribed because France withdrew from the integrated organisation created subsequently to the treaty.

It is true that France will not let itself be bound *de facto* by certain mechanisms. It wishes to retain its freedom of decision in the event of a conflict breaking out through bungling or as a result of provocation or for the sake of interests alien to Europe's own.

But caution does not mean detachment, and the best proof of our spirit of solidarity is given once again in recent statements by the President of the Republic. Mr. Giscard d'Estaing has just said that in the hypothesis of a conflict and because of the speed of transport and communications media, especially by air, there was liable to be only one air space, and France's air space would from the outset be brought into the battle, which would be general.

While there is still no question of our undertaking to man a sector under plans which, as is well-known, are often set at naught by events, we do not rule out participation with all our tactical arms in the front line of battle, once we have freely taken our own decision.

This does not signify at all that we attach less importance to the rôle and the effectiveness of our strategic nuclear forces. Recently we brought into service the first thermonuclear missile on our submarines and our development priorities are now concentrated on multiple warheads. France's nuclear deterrent, whose mere existence gives the adversary an extra problem for his strategic thinking, remains the undivided pillar of our defence. But we consider that the credibility of massive retaliation will be strengthened by the variety of the available strike capabilities. Instead of all or nothing, which simplifies things for the aggressor as well as the defender, we shall confront him with a greater number of uncertainties.

Gentlemen, I am sure it has not escaped your notice that the French plans are directed towards the establishment of a defence system of which the Europeans would gradually take over control.

Although, in sound logic, there cannot be a unified European operational defence without there being a European unified political power, there is no reason why, to save time, we should not conceptualise here and now the conditions for establishing such a defence. In this area and until such time as the strategic concept takes shape, the setting up of a programme group for the standardisation of armaments designed and manufactured by Europeans might prove the desired trigger for developing a European armaments industry. In the same prospect may be viewed the Council of Ministers' remit to the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU to conduct an in-depth survey of our countries' armament industries. This is being done at Belgium's instigation, firmly backed by ourselves. Moreover it was your Assembly which, on a report I had the honour to submit to it on 8th November 1972, advocated reactivating the Standing Armaments Committee.

As regards European defence, the existence of conventional French forces comparable to those of the Germans will introduce a new factor making for equilibrium that will facilitate negotiations by shifting the debate away from the formula of French nuclear forces and German conventional ones.

I should add that, as far as I am concerned, it seems to me unrealistic to blueprint a European defence system in a spirit of cussedness or sniping at our American allies. Besides, it would be contrary to the Alliance.

National defence, European defence, Atlantic defence — these ought to be the different components we need to have at our disposal to meet any given situation.

Agreeing to indulge in the intellectual satisfaction of drawing up plans has never been any proof of a will to defend oneself. But, just as solidarity does not signify submission, refusal to commit oneself does not mean an intention to stand aloof and independence of decision-making does not mean neutrality. Being neutral, withdrawing one's stake at other people's expense, in other words being downright selfish, has never been a tradition of the French nation.

The will to defend oneself is in times of peace mainly demonstrated by the financial sacrifices a nation is prepared to make. In this connection, I have to inform the Assembly that the French Government has a planning programme which, in a few years' time, will involve devoting 20 % of its budget to defence.

Mr. Destremau (*continued*)

The will to defend oneself is also in the case of France demonstrated by retaining conscription, so much do we consider security demands a commitment of the whole nation.

Faithful to our alliances, but determined to adapt our means of action to the political and military circumstances of today, we would remind our allies that, although France has not always accepted *a priori* their ideas in the organisation of defence, it has always been at their side at the dangerous moments of history. If the need should arise tomorrow, we shall be there again. Our solidarity will not be found wanting. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The applause you have just been given tells you how interested the Assembly has been in what you have had to say, especially as you have made a number of points that richly deserved your very valuable comments.

Please accept our unanimous thanks, Mr. Minister, and I will now ask you kindly to submit to the crossfire of questions and answers.

I call Mr. de Bruyne.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I should first like to say how pleased we are to see Mr. Destremau has not disowned his origins, and that he still holds our Assembly in high esteem, thus setting an example for all those whose benevolence towards our Assembly is sometimes less apparent.

Here are my three questions: First, is the Standing Armaments Committee's remit of which you have just spoken one of information only? Second, does it solely cover the economic aspects of armaments production, or certain military aspects too? Third, what is the relationship between the tasks of the Rome group and that of the Standing Armaments Committee?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Do you wish, Mr. Minister, to answer the questions one at a time or all together?

Mr. DESTREMAU (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — I might perhaps answer the first three, and deal later with any others that might be asked.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — You have spoken,

Mr. Minister, of the possibilities for improved co-operation between France and its allies and the authorities of the Alliance.

On the other hand, you have stated once again that France's decision not to join the military organs of NATO remains unchanged.

I wonder whether, while France's co-operation with the allies and the authorities of the Alliance is in practice being extended, France's decision not to participate in the military organs is to be regarded irreversible?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Warren.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to ask the French Foreign Minister whether, in the light of the speech which President Giscard d'Estaing made at Verdun on Sunday, we are entering a difficult phase of relationships between France and Western European Union. This morning the French Foreign Minister said that France remains faithful to its alliances and, later on, that independent decisions do not mean neutrality.

Will France come to the aid of each and all of its allies of Western European Union if they are attacked? Does France expect each and all of its allies of Western European Union to come to its aid if it is attacked?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Kliesing.

Mr. KLIESING (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — When the Minister was dealing with the question of a common European armaments policy he made a reference to the Tindemans report. Now that report makes a second point in connection with defence policy, in the form of a proposal that there should in future be regular meetings of the nine Ministers of Defence. I would like to know whether the French Government consider that this would help to strengthen a uniform European defence policy?

Mr. DESTREMAU (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like first of all to answer Mr. de Bruyne and to tell him that the remit of the Standing Armaments Committee is not solely one of information, but also includes analyses of the armaments industries, and not only in each individual country, for the Standing Armaments Committee ought also to make a kind of in-depth survey

*Mr. Destremau (continued)*

of whatever links there may be between the different European armaments industries. There is no such thing as total independence in this area, and we are all perfectly aware that the development of a given industry sometimes depends on industrial development in a neighbouring country.

The difference between the Committee and the Rome group is very clear-cut: the latter is responsible for programming and is an *ad hoc* group, whereas the Standing Armaments Committee is, as I said just now, charged with analyses of the armaments industries.

Mr. Sieglerschmidt asked me a question about my country's frame of mind. I must say I think this Assembly has come to understand that everything does not depend on integrated organisation, which was established after the treaty precisely to correct what was unclear in Article 5. This clause on prior consultation had to be inserted to pass the United States Congress.

However, let me tell you, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, that all this depends on the state of mind and, as you are well aware, the strength of alliances does not lie so much in texts or forms of words. I seem to recall that we have, since France left the integrated organisation, forged a number of links that meet our partners' entire satisfaction.

Mr. Warren asked me a question about the French Government's intentions regarding assistance to its partners. I believe we take the WEU treaty in the same attitude as the United Kingdom. If I remember rightly, the United Kingdom Government of the day played a preponderant part in the conclusion of this treaty, since it was the first time it ever committed itself to maintaining troops on the continent.

I am bound to say that the French Government, as I remarked at the rostrum, is wholly loyal to its alliances; and I see nothing in what President Giscard d'Estaing said at Verdun that can contradict that decision.

In answer to Mr. Kliesing, I would say that contacts between the Ministers of Defence can only facilitate the setting up, that will be long and difficult, of a European defence organisation.

I think we should not split too many hairs in this matter; we must not necessarily give one operation priority over another; every study, every piece of thinking on the subject can help to advance a solution of this difficult problem. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you for your forthright answer, Mr. Minister.

Mr. Leynen wishes to ask a question.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — In the second part of Mr. Destremau's speech, in which he was speaking in the name of France, I was struck by two sentences, and I am going to ask whether I understood them correctly. The first was the one in which he spoke of the establishment of a defence system of which the Europeans would gradually take over control: does that mean that, as France sees it, as soon as the European union is made responsible for defence matters, France's nuclear strike force as well as the United Kingdom's will pass under European authority?

The second sentence, a little further on, ran as follows: "... conceptualise here and now the conditions for establishing such a defence [policy]." Have I understood correctly? Does this mean that France is immediately ready to enter into talks, to arrive at a European defence policy?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Mattick.

Mr. MATTICK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — The Minister made three points in connection with the decision on what France would do in case of a conflict. One point was that there might be escalation outside Europe, in which case France maintains a right of decision. The second point was that there might be escalation due to negligence — I think I understood him correctly. Who would decide what constituted negligence if there were to be a conflict involving one or more members of NATO? Is the decision on this question entirely a matter for the French Government, or does the Alliance have a say?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — We have all, I think, been interested by the Minister's communication, and I personally would like to thank him very cordially for his words.

I should like to revert to the two questions which have just been raised, with specific reference to the rôle of France, in order to try and widen the scope of our debate by putting to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council the following question: as he has affirmed that defence questions are a vital concern of the

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

Council — which is true — where can we find some definition of defence policy? Could you, Mr. Minister, clarify it somewhat? You have given us a very broad outline of it; would you give us some further details? I think it will be the right moment, too, to clarify France's rôle and that of an overall policy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Cermolacce.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, you have been good enough to state some views on French foreign policy in the defence field, and thus confirmed that after the statements made by the President of the Republic, Mr. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and by General Méry, Chief of the General Staff, the French Army was being invited to discard the concept of France as a national sanctuary to be defended against all comers, and take up station with the outposts of the *Bundeswehr* on the Federal Republic's eastern frontier with the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

Ten years after General de Gaulle pulled the French forces out of NATO, can you dispute the fact that this new defence concept amounts to a *de facto* reintegration of the French forces into the NATO system?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Tanghe.

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, you have spoken to us of the impressive effort France is making to increase its own defence potential and at the same time, as we all trust, the defence potential of Europe as a whole.

Could you tell us in somewhat more detail how this effort is broken down between the nuclear strike force and conventional forces?

As we all know, we are for the time being fairly strong in terms of strike capability but weaker in terms of conventional forces.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Destremau.

Mr. DESTREMAU (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — May I congratulate Senator Leynen on being able to see far ahead? Actually, it is too soon to enquire what an intra-European defence organisation could do with nuclear weaponry. But it is quite

obvious that in the nature of things the nuclear arm must remain essentially national, so long as that is where the onus of decision lies. If I spoke of European defence, it is because the fact that we cannot make it operational before a European authority comes into being does not prevent us from giving thought to the organisation of such a defence capability.

Moreover, it is also possible to argue the case that political union can be partly fashioned out of similar defence concepts. It is a subject to which we must give immediate thought and I trust you will make your able contribution to the task.

Mr. Mattick talked of escalation and the reasons that had induced France to have reservations on its commitments at one time or another. The fact was, it feared that some ill-advised move in extra-European theatres of operation, far away, might drag us all into an armed conflict.

I would say to Mr. Valleix that in fact a very full description of French defence policy is given in the planning documentation just tabled in parliament — the National Assembly and Senate — and it indicates, as he is aware, an additional effort in conventional arms which in no way detracts from our nuclear effort.

My reply to Mr. Cermolacce is that he must not let his imagination run riot, and that what I have said today in no way signifies that France intends to rejoin the integrated organisation of the Atlantic Alliance.

Let me say to Mr. Tanghe that he has raised a topical problem. It is perfectly true that, in the nuclear area — perhaps just as much in the United States as in France — the level reached is practically adequate to ensure the required degree of protection, but it is in fact in conventional armaments that a special effort needs to be made; such an effort had been envisaged in France for some time past, but we shall be including it in our planning figures and budget as of now.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Minister. I think that the questions have been sufficiently varied for the answers to cover the whole field. As you know this Assembly so well, you have given it all the details it could desire. On behalf of every one of us here, let me give you my very warm and sincere thanks. (*Applause*)

*The President (continued)*

I call Mr. Haase, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, to present the report on the application of the Brussels Treaty, Document 700.

Mr. HAASE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the twenty-first annual report of the Council, covering the year 1975, follows the familiar pattern. As the activities of WEU have changed but little for a number of years, there is no need for the Rapporteur to go into each item contained in the report. I would however like to thank the Secretariat-General for the speed with which it produced the report.

There are in fact only a few points on which we need dwell. First, the seven member States of WEU have not always reached a uniform position. It seems, however, that they are now making greater efforts to find a joint stance, and this change was to be seen in what Mr. Destremau has just been telling the Assembly. It is undoubtedly a political matter, which is also brought out in the report submitted to the Assembly. In particular it seems to be becoming clear that for political reasons greater stress is to be laid on WEU.

There are signs of this when we compare the tasks given to the Rome group and the mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee. In the light of what Mr. Destremau said just now, the Rome group is considered in France — and we shall need to put questions on this matter — to be an *ad hoc* group. It is a point which has so far not been made in the report. We shall need to know just what the tasks of the Rome group are.

The Standing Armaments Committee has, in addition to its operational research mandate and apart from the sub-group on uniform evaluation of military equipment, no other functions. In this connection, however, it is interesting to note the French moves of 29th/30th January to put fresh life into the Standing Armaments Committee, and the steps taken by the Belgians in May 1975.

It remains to be seen — and this is a matter with which the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments will have specially to concern itself — what details still have to be cleared up and just how the work will be defined. One question here is assessment of armaments fund-

ing, another is the question of compensation in respect of armaments and armaments production, and yet another the problem of reciprocal arrangements for the use of patents; but there will, too, undoubtedly have to be an examination of present forms of co-operation, in order to find out how much co-operation there actually is and what recommendations should be made. These tasks will have to be taken on either by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee or by the Rome group — and which is to do it is a point that needs to be cleared up.

The Defence Committee has therefore offered the Assembly in paragraph 41 a formula on the Rome group in which the establishment of the independent programme group is welcomed but which says that the Assembly now hopes for early progress in this field and requests the Council — and this is important — to state its views on the division of work between the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU and the independent programme group, the Rome group.

A second point to be touched on here is the problem of maintaining British troops on the continent. The report before us shows that we could not help noting that the reported strength of 60,066 men — a figure based on the information reported to the Committee on 30th November 1975 — did not tally with the figures given in the United Kingdom's white papers. Although the discrepancies are only minor, it was necessary to make a further check. An answer to Question 170, given by the Council, does not fully clear up the situation, which is why this additional point has been made in the report.

Having made the foregoing observations, your Rapporteur need only add that the Defence Committee is unanimous in recommending that the report be adopted. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Périquier, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, to present the report on the political activities of the Council, Document 702.

Mr. PERIDIÉRIE (*France*) (Translation). — The report which I have the honour to present to you on behalf of the General Affairs Committee was adopted unanimously by that Committee. In other words, at least in its essentials, it reflects the lines along which the Committee was thinking.

In fact, if we turn again to the report presented on behalf of this same Committee by Mr. de

*Mr. Périquier (continued)*

Bruyne at the session in June 1975, and to that presented by the same Rapporteur to the Presidential Committee in February 1976, we observe that this text, which was adopted by the General Affairs Committee, follows a line of thought which has remained consistent, even if the circumstances have markedly changed since June 1975.

Indeed, confining ourselves to the broad outlines of political development over the past few months, clearly account must be taken of the status of deliberations among the Nine on European union, notably in respect of defence.

We are aware that both the report presented by the Commission of the European Communities in July 1975 and that presented by Mr. Tindemans in January 1976 take the view that defence forms part of the "potential competence" of the European union. But each points out that it can hardly be envisaged as becoming immediately part of its actual competence.

Our Assembly has, for its part, always asserted the need to avoid duplication of effort among the European institutions so long as WEU's present powers have not been transferred to the European union by a proper legal instrument. WEU must retain all its powers, even if some have to be exercised in another framework.

Our Assembly has also always stressed that the institution of WEU, under the modified Brussels Treaty, could not be transformed without a revision of the treaty. Thus the prospect of a European union clearly makes it essential for permanent contacts to be established between WEU and the Nine, and we can only regret that the twenty-first annual report of the Council makes no mention of the matter.

Secondly, uncertainties still subsist, not perhaps about the future of the Atlantic Alliance, but about the part which the organisation that emerged from it will be able to play in the coming years. These uncertainties can mainly be ascribed to the evolution of American public opinion over the past few years, particularly during the present election campaign.

On the one hand, there has been since the end of the war in Vietnam, a revival of certain isolationist tendencies. On the other, the parliamentarians — of whom I was one — who visited the United States last April, were able to note that the prospect of government coalitions includ-

ing communist parties in some Western European countries was rousing considerable anxiety, and that the successive threats by General Haig, Mr. Kissinger and President Ford of a review of American policy in the Atlantic Alliance were being taken quite seriously both by the administration and by many United States parliamentarians.

It is therefore expedient to consider carefully what place Western Europe might hold in the Atlantic Alliance in the event of any changes in the forms of United States participation in joint defence.

Two new events have occurred since the General Affairs Committee adopted this report.

The first is that the Council has, after an interval of twelve weeks, at last replied to the written question put by Mr. Radius on 8th March last. I would remind you that this written question raised a problem which, on the eve of the Italian elections next week, is clearly absolutely vital. The question sought to elicit whether "the application of the modified Brussels Treaty would also be jeopardised if communist party members were to join the government of a WEU member country".

Now while the Council's reply follows the lead of common sense and legality, it is far from being as clearcut as might have been expected. Indeed, after two and a half months of what we may hope was profound consideration, the Council came up with nothing better than :

"The modified Brussels Treaty is based on principles and is directed to purposes set forth by the signatory parties in the preamble to the treaty.

It is the duty of the Council to consider matters concerning the execution of the treaty and its protocols and to ensure that they are implemented in such manner that the sovereignty and independence of each of the member States is respected."

This reply in itself prompts no particular comments and is entirely in conformity with the treaty. Yet the Council does not state clearly, as we expected it to do, that insofar as signatory countries respect the principles and aims set forth in the preamble to the treaty, the application of the treaty in no way depends on the composition of governments in the member States. In short, there is every indication that the Council was unwilling to give a forthright

*Mr. Périquier (continued)*

reply to a question so vital for the future, not only of WEU but also of the functioning of democracy in Western Europe.

The second question which could not be tackled in this report concerns the decision by the Council of WEU of 31st May 1976 to reactivate the Standing Armaments Committee. Admittedly, this issue is one more pertinent to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and one on which the information coming my way so far is too vague and incomplete to enable me really to deal with it. I should merely like to stress that it seems to me absolutely wrong that a matter of this importance should be settled in such an almost underhand manner. Did the Council issue a press release? I did not see any mention of it. The information I have got reached me more or less by word of mouth, with all the margins for error and tendentious interpretations that this implies.

In setting up a WEU parliamentary assembly, the signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty wished to found Western Europe's defence on a genuinely popular consensus reflected in real parliamentary control. But nowadays you would think the Council were seeking to dissemble its proceedings which obviously leaves room for every supposition as to the real intentions of this or that group.

It is not enough for a Minister or a Secretary of State to come here and hand out information and soothing phrases. Even a luncheon with the Presidential Committee, a talk between the Chairman-in-Office and the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, or indeed a private meeting with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, do not suit our requirements. They are measures of appeasement and not normal actions by a governmental organ towards a responsible assembly.

In the case of the Council's activities we could pronounce a very swift judgment. It met only once at ministerial level during 1975 and, even then, the meeting was particularly short. The Council has, however, met frequently at the level of the permanent representatives. But all goes to show that at these meetings it did not take up any political question on its own initiative, and dealt only with the replies it was going to give to recommendations or written questions by the Assembly.

In his reply to the twentieth annual report of the Council, Mr. de Bruyne called upon the Council to take the initiative of deciding which political questions concerned it, and the Council recalled, in its reply to the recommendation adopted by the Assembly, that the Brussels Treaty made no distinction between the Council of WEU meeting at ministerial level and meeting at permanent representative level, the latter being fully empowered to exercise the rights and duties ascribed to it under the treaty.

This reply, therefore, fully vindicates the position of the General Affairs Committee, so it has been seen fit to remind the Council that it should give a precise reply to paragraph 3 of Recommendation 266.

Here I should like to stress the importance of this question. Indeed, although it now appears to be accepted that the Council should not meet more than once a year at ministerial level — and we have seen, once again, from its meeting of 31st May that such meetings are still very short — it is essential for the Permanent Council to carry out at least part of the duties hitherto performed by the Council of Ministers.

In its reply to the Assembly's recommendation, the Council confirms that it is empowered to do so. That is excellent news. But it must also do so in fact, for otherwise the WEU Council's only function would be to answer parliamentarians' questions. And even so it would perform that function very badly, as is already very often the case, for unless it took up on its own initiative questions concerning the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, the sole concern of the officials composing the Council would remain the drafting of texts to be as vague and cryptic as possible.

That brings us to the chapter on relations between the Council and the Assembly.

In this respect, it is pointed out that in 1975 the Council was unwilling to hold the joint meeting requested by the General Affairs Committee. On that occasion, it proposed instead that the members of that Committee should attend a luncheon to which the Council had invited the Presidential Committee. I believe I am right in saying that in 1976 it replied in a similar way to a request addressed to it by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. Obviously, a luncheon at which the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and possibly one or two of his colleagues, answer questions not submitted to



*Mr. Périquier (continued)*

them in advance and not having been discussed in the Council, is no substitute for a joint meeting.

Indeed, it should be remembered that at joint meetings questions which have been communicated several weeks beforehand by the Committee concerned receive a reply from the Chairman-in-Office of the Council which has been agreed by all member countries. In that case a genuinely official position of WEU is conveyed to the parliamentarians, whereas, however useful informal meetings can sometimes be, they do not enable any such positions to be defined. Everything goes to show that, on the contrary, they allow the Council to shirk its responsibilities, and we may wonder to what extent that is not the real motive for rejecting the Assembly's later requests for joint meetings. It demonstrates the value the General Affairs Committee would attach to being able to hold a joint meeting with the Council in the reasonably near future.

Although we suspect a downright shirking of responsibilities in this affair, we find another case in a passage in the twenty-first annual report, in which the Council invokes the right to decline to reply to whatever question may be asked by the parliamentarians. According to the report :

"...members of the Assembly are at liberty to question their governments whenever they want a more detailed consideration of various policy matters of particular concern to WEU..."

Now, it has been noticeable on at least two occasions, that the national governments have sheltered behind the fact that the questions had been put to the WEU Council, in order not to answer questions addressed to themselves. Any one member government of WEU can hardly answer questions addressed to the organisation as a whole.

Secondly, the Council has declined to answer a number of written questions, notwithstanding the fact that they had a quite obvious bearing on problems coming within WEU's competence.

Lastly, there is a question raised in Mr. de Bruyne's report last year and not taken up again in the present report : that of the organisation's Secretary-General. As we know, for the past two years, no one has been appointed to succeed Ambassador Heisbourg, who relinquished his appointment in September 1974. Since then,

the duties have been fulfilled by the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. von Plehwe, in a manner affording, I may say, full satisfaction to the Assembly.

The General Affairs Committee decided not to raise the problem of the Secretary-General in the present report just because of Mr. von Plehwe's outstanding qualities so that it was unanimously decided not to introduce any comment that might have been construed as a reflection on the acting Secretary-General. Indeed, the General Affairs Committee is in no way concerned with personalities, nor is there any conflict between it and the acting Secretary-General.

In 1975, the Assembly had asked the governments to put an end to these provisional arrangements, whose obvious effect was to weaken the authority of the Secretariat-General vis-à-vis the members of the Permanent Council of which, it should be remembered, the Secretary-General is Chairman.

Several of our colleagues have asked their governments in their respective parliaments whether they intended to put an end to this situation soon, and all the governments have replied that such was indeed their intention. So far, however, nothing has been done, and although the report adopted by the General Affairs Committee does not refer to the matter, this in no way infers abandonment of the position it took up last year.

This consideration, when added to the others, justifies describing the attitude of the Council, i.e. the governments of our seven countries, both towards the modified Brussels Treaty and towards the Assembly, as "shirking" duties. We may well wonder whether, behind this shirking, we should not, despite all the pious declarations made by the seven governments in praise of European union, discern a deeper will to void the future union of all substance, at any rate in the political and defence areas. Hence, we should emphatically record that the Council's failure to fulfil the rôle assigned to it by the Brussels Treaty, far from strengthening the future European union, serves, on the contrary, to weaken it, if not endanger it still more seriously. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Périquier.

I call Mr. Richter, Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions has for years been trying to intensify European collaboration in many fields of advanced technology. I can only say in response to Mr. Destremau that we are glad to know of the Council's interest in our work. The Committee, like the Council, is convinced that the concept of security is wider than that of defence. The capacity of Europe's industries must, however, be maintained as a basis for our defence effort. If Europe does not ensure the continuance of those areas of prime importance where inventions and new ideas originate, e.g. in space research or nuclear power, the civil and military potential of our industries will wither away.

On behalf of the Committee, I must again point out that it is a matter of continued regret that the countries of Western Europe are needing so much time to find a common stance in the chief fields of advanced technology. In report after report the Assembly's Committee covering this field has drawn attention to the fact that the absence of any suitable decision-taking machinery presents a major problem. Because of this, the Committee has frequently referred to the need for a systematic, multilateral and, in the final analysis, integrated European approach to these problems. Advances in European co-operation in research and technology can be achieved only by means of a more rational policy.

As Rapporteur to the Assembly, my view is that the activities of the Council should include the formulation of a medium-term and long-term policy for the most varied fields of science and technology. In doing this, the Council has the advantage of being able to rely on the experience and knowledge of the ministries of member States. Europe continues to depend far more heavily on the export of its technologies than, for instance, the United States and Canada, who have abundant and comparatively well-balanced sources of raw materials at their disposal. Nor will Europe be in a position in the future to acquire a high degree of independence in respect of its sources of energy and minerals. We must therefore be able to compensate this dependence by offering the products of advanced technologies. Only in this way can we, acting purposefully together, maintain our place in world trade and co-operation.

In its report, the Council dwells particularly on the aviation and space industries. The Chair-

man of our Committee, Mr. Pierre de Montesquiou, referred at the start of the Toulouse colloquy on the position of these European industries to the fact that it was the Committee's aim to improve their position through increased co-operation between WEU member States. In this connection, members of the Committee would welcome more active measures by the Council to encourage consultation and co-operation of this kind. The Committee accordingly recommends that in its twenty-second annual report, i.e. next year, the Council lay down guidelines for a long-term European policy covering the various advanced technologies, particularly space aeronautics, aviation, nuclear power, computers and electronics taking both the civil and military aspects into consideration, and indicating what form an effective West European decision-making machinery might take.

We parliamentarians find that at present there are too many open questions. We know all about our industries' productive capacity. But where is discussion taking place about our technological future? Who is discussing the successor to Concorde, or the successor to the Airbus? Who is today giving sufficient attention to studying and defining future generations of aircraft in the military sector? What is to come after Jaguar, MRCA and the Alpha-Jet? Who is seriously investigating the question, for example, of quality in military transport? The existing systems, for instance those of the Americans, such as the Galaxy 5A, are quite inadequate and are being prematurely run down.

Here the joint efforts being made today at government level — that is how I see it, Mr. Destremau — look as though they are paralysed. We parliamentarians would like to take it that on this point, too, we shall next year have guidelines from the Council. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The joint debate is open.

I call Mr. de Montesquiou, Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, whenever we have before us a report by Mr. Richter, we feel highly gratified. I agree with Mr. Richter when he deplores the absence of a medium- and long-term policy for European advanced technology programmes. The Committee has often expressed a wish for the Council to

*Mr. de Montesquiou (continued)*

take an initiative in this area that might be of use to high technology industries in Western Europe and European security. Obviously, Europe should preserve a genuine civil and military production capability in leading technologies such as metallurgy, computers, space and aeronautics.

In its twenty-first annual report, the Council specifically mentions aeronautics and space. We shall be talking about aeronautics one of these days. Today I want to speak mainly about the European Space Agency, which has suddenly entered a critical phase. In paragraph 10 of his report, Mr. Richter points out that the European Space Agency has made a successful start and that, at least here, Europe had provided itself with an instrument capable of gaining its rightful place in this sector. Since then, the European Space Agency has run into difficulties. When it was set up, it seemed to be agreed that, in order to gain time and avoid waste, existing national facilities would be co-ordinated and used in the European framework. Thanks to an additional French contribution this condition has now been fulfilled for the Kourou centre. But the activities of the Toulouse centre are not guaranteed beyond the end of this year by any long-term planning arrangements making use of the abilities of its teams.

Another conflict is brewing about the failure to use the existing operational capabilities in Germany and France for the placing in position of geostationary satellites like GEOS, METEOSAT, OTS and MAROTS. The other countries belonging to the agency are disinclined to carry out such work, for lack of money and because they prefer to use the same type of satellite that is launched and operated by the United States. It is essential that this sort of behaviour should be analysed at the highest level, that of the ministers responsible for space research in the member States of the agency.

To avoid the difficulties I have just mentioned, I believe it to be absolutely necessary, as is stated in the draft recommendation, for the Council to include in the twenty-second annual report on its activities guidelines for a long-term European policy in sectors of advanced technology, taking both civil and military aspects into consideration and indicating how effective decision-making machinery could be set up in Western Europe. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Bruyne.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as every year, we have a clear picture, when we look carefully at the annual report from the Council of Ministers and the reply made to it by the Assembly, of the situation Western European Union finds itself in and — more particularly — of the difficulties it is facing. All this culminates in a number of recommendations which, as in previous years, are being submitted by the General Affairs Committee and which need to be seen against the recommendations from earlier years. Taken together, they form a fairly logical whole; and in all their vague benevolence there is even a measure of “European” wisdom. In this respect, the report from Mr. Périquier, and the verbal introduction of it we have just heard, provide us with an excellent document on which I would like to offer him my congratulations.

This year, again, the Assembly is trying to drag the Council out of the state of torpor it has been sunk in for some years past. I would recommend the newer members of this Assembly to read Paul Borcier’s booklet “The Assembly of Western European Union”. Page 18 gives a clear picture of the loss of substance that WEU has suffered. To quote from the text:

“The regularity of ministerial meetings has varied according to the tasks allotted to WEU by the member governments. The Council first met every three months and then less frequently, but resumed quarterly meetings after a decision reached in July 1963 after difficulties in intra-European relations. Again, since the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community the Council has been meeting less often. For instance, in 1973 and 1974 it met only once.”

I have no illusions about what is achievable, Mr. President, but as a matter of principle Mr. Périquier deserves the Assembly’s full support when he urges that in the years to come the Council of Ministers should show more than a token activity.

It might well be, Mr. President, that the situation of a number of European and Atlantic institutions will before long develop in such a way that the existence of Western European Union will be seen more clearly than it is today to offer an advantage for tackling effectively a whole range of shared defence problems.

*Mr. de Bruyne (continued)*

The fourth paragraph of the recommendation sets out a task for the Council of Ministers, saying :

"Consider, together with the other powers concerned, how it might follow the political consultations between the nine member countries of the EEC on the one hand and on the other, in view of the study it is undertaking on 'the possibility that WEU might undertake additional work connected with the standardisation of armaments in Europe', the activities of the European programme group ;"

These cannot surely be just empty words, Mr. President ; this morning the Secretary of State, Mr. Destremau, put all the authority of his office into supporting this idea, at least in principle.

It is gratifying to see that Mr. Périquier's report and the recommendation resulting from it leave no doubt about the powers legally vested in the permanent representatives. The wording used here is important, more especially because it comes from the Council of Ministers itself. To quote :

"Noting with satisfaction that the Council 'makes no distinction between the Council of Western European Union meeting at ministerial level and the same Council meeting at the level of permanent representatives' ;"

This is undeniably interesting, and we shall have need to refer to it on occasion.

To breathe more life into WEU, the Council of Ministers ought to undertake a constant and more intense activity through the permanent representatives.

To end, I would comment that Mr. Périquier's report and the accompanying recommendation deserve our support. To anyone who can understand, they show all the concern there is among those who hope that Western European Union will manage to avoid getting sclerosis of all its joints. We can see what advantages there are to be had from full activity by WEU in general and this Assembly in particular, so long as it cannot hand over its responsibilities to one or other of the European bodies, something that is described in the report as being in the future and uncertain. Let us not get rid of organisations that exist and that work, *de jure*, and *de facto*, while there is still no certainty that we shall hand on our powers to some other, at present non-existent, European institution.

We are bound by the revised Brussels Treaty, Ladies and Gentlemen — and *pacta sunt servanda*. (*Applause*)

(*Mr. de Niet, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Rivière.

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, as the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee quite rightly remarked, it is impossible to judge the annual report of the Council without taking account of events in the first months of 1976.

Although the report deals with a year during which nothing much may be said to have happened at WEU, what we have heard about the meeting of the Council of WEU at Brussels on 31st May last would suggest that, through its Standing Armaments Committee, the rôle of WEU in the defence of the West and in the future European union has become clearer in recent weeks.

I must point out the extent to which the semi-secrecy which has so far enshrouded the decisions taken on 31st May has prevented members of the Assembly from fulfilling their duty as parliamentarians, which is to assess the policy pursued by governments in the Council of WEU. We cannot in such a sensitive area speak off the cuff on the sole basis of the indications given in the course of the debate, without having been able to have prior knowledge of the decisions taken by the Council.

However, it seems to me essential to raise here certain questions I consider necessary albeit in the absence of sufficient background information, with no pretention at solving them. Thus, our Assembly still does not know what the terms of reference given to the Standing Armaments Committee were. You will recall that reactivation of the Standing Armaments Committee was the subject of several proposals. The first ones, at least chronologically, were those of the French Government and were presented by Michel Debré, then French Minister of National Defence, and later by Michel Jobert, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs. They date from December 1972 in the case of Mr. Debré and, in the case of Michel Jobert, from a speech to this Assembly in November 1973.

It was clearly, as far as the French Government was concerned, not merely a tactical move against the Eurogroup of NATO as too often

*Mr. Rivière (continued)*

claimed in those circles which systematically condemn every French initiative. The *Europa Archiv* in its issue of 25th May provides further evidence of this. While the French Government has never considered joining the club, it has never undertaken anything directed against Eurogroup any more than against NATO itself.

Moreover, Mr. Debré's and Mr. Jobert's proposals were aimed at something which had nothing whatever to do with the activities of NATO's Eurogroup. Mr. Jobert, may I remind you, requested before this Assembly that WEU should be the framework in which a dialogue should be attempted and thought given to the problems affecting European defence. In a book which he published very recently entitled *L'autre regard*, Mr. Jobert devoted a dozen pages to the initiative which he had taken at WEU and re-emphasised its importance in his view. He writes :

"I am glad to have had the time during my brief stay at the Quai d'Orsay to make this statement. The analysis which it makes and the guidelines traced seem to me as sound today as they were yesterday, and nobody yet has ventured to utter these self-evident truths and the need for a common resolve by the Europeans to defend themselves."

It seems therefore quite clear that the French proposals aimed at making WEU the nucleus of a policy of European defence by Europeans, and the joint manufacture of armaments in such a prospect constituted only one element of a more ambitious policy. The object was not to weaken NATO in any way or to attach armed forces to an organisation like WEU, but to induce the countries of Western Europe to apply the modified Brussels Treaty by examining together the requirements of European defence.

The decision which the Council of WEU has just taken originated directly in Mr. Van Elslande's proposals. We know about them because the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs was good enough to come and expound them to our Assembly in December 1974. At the time he proposed an organisation of the European armaments industries within the framework of the future European union, the Standing Armaments Committee being charged with a preliminary survey, covering not at all defence questions but only industrial problems.

If we examine Mr. Van Elslande's proposals in the light of the report presented in January 1976 by Mr. Tindemans to his partners in the Nine, we may infer that the Belgian Government's proposals were primarily aimed at making WEU act for a transitional period as the organising body for the armaments industry and the arms trade with a view to the future union. Neither the Tindemans project nor Van Elslande's proposals to our knowledge consider which defence policy European union or WEU will have to implement. Everything seems to indicate that in their view it is a question of the policy applied by NATO, and we all know who frames that.

It was common knowledge that some member countries of WEU were originally opposed to both Mr. Jobert's and Mr. Van Elslande's proposals and we may wonder what their reasons were for accepting the latter, and to what extent the fact of having subscribed to them implies that, somehow or other, these countries were agreeable to the Europeans discussing the European defence policy amongst themselves, in the framework of WEU. That is the first question I think this sudden decision to resuscitate the Standing Armaments Committee seems to raise.

But if we examine this decision in the light of what has happened in other organisations, notably the setting up of the European programme group in Rome at the beginning of 1976 and the NATO working party on the interoperability of armaments we may wonder to what extent this purported reactivation of the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU does not in fact constitute a further advance along the path which seems to have been consistently followed by France's partners in WEU and which would induce it by means of new institutions, to return to integration in NATO, which General de Gaulle decided to leave once and for all in 1966.

You must see that, in such case, it would not be a question of France alone but that such a decision would aim at steering the future of the European union-to-be. The report submitted by the Brussels Commission last August referred to defence as a potential competence of the union. The Tindemans report was less clear on the point, whereas the advances which NATO seems to want to make in the field of armaments seem to proceed in a fairly obvious direction.

In the end the sole object, the sole possibility and the sole function of European union would

*Mr. Rivière (continued)*

be to induce the Europeans, by means of integration, to unite their forces in support of a policy they would have no means of determining since they have at their disposal no instrument for decision-making ; we would be up against all the defects which caused the French Parliament in the old days to reject the European Defence Community project.

Nor is it any use telling us that it is a question of avoiding situations such as that created by the famous deal of the century when a number of European countries preferred to buy an American plane rather than a European one. Indeed, what guarantee should we have that the same thing will not happen again the next time ? Especially as the efforts in NATO to promote trade between both sides of the Atlantic have in recent months been given a tremendous boost : the organisation in present circumstances of some form of European armaments market would probably not make the NATO countries buy more European equipment but might enable them to prevent one or other of their members — and here again France seems to be the one they have in mind — from selling armaments to non-member countries of NATO.

We may well wonder therefore whether reactivation of the Standing Armaments Committee, as now proposed, runs counter to the objectives apparently assigned to it and will not, unless it is matched by a definition of European defence policy, end by ruining the existing armaments industries in some of our countries.

Let us note in passing that the modified Brussels Treaty plainly subordinates economic co-operation, which it advocates, to the defence functions of WEU, whereas all the indications that we have on the decisions taken by the Council would seem to suggest that it has been the other way round. The motivations of our seven countries are unlikely to have been the same in this matter. But in that case we should want to know who are entertaining dangerous illusions as to the benefits they might derive from organising European production and trade in armaments. The divergence between the views of France and those of its partners is such as to make it difficult to believe that behind a decision of this type there is any real consensus on the objectives of the Standing Armaments Committee.

If this were not so, if there had been any effective concordance of underlying motives, then let us know on what basis this has been achieved.

I should not be the only one to find it intolerable that WEU should once again be the tool of a policy which France has rejected over and over again.

Such are the main questions which occur to me on hearing of the initiative of the WEU Council on 31st May last. If it were a real reactivation of WEU, with the Standing Armaments Committee considered as only one constituent part of it, I would regard this as wholly advantageous in that I should see in it the attainment of what has consistently been France's aim ever since 1958, Europe taking charge of its own defence. But should such reactivation only form part of an attempt to reintegrate France into NATO, the effect would be to tie the future European union, even before it was properly started, to the defence policy defined by the United States and applied by NATO, and before very long condemn it to the fate which befell the European Defence Community.

The Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee mentions the problem which any future participation of the communist party in the government of member countries of WEU would raise for the organisation. The American authorities have let it be known fairly clearly, as was confirmed to the General Affairs Committee when it met in the United States last April, that in that event American participation in the Atlantic Alliance would be jeopardised.

I regret that the Council of WEU was not able to give a clearer reply to the question put by Mr. Radius on the repercussions of such participation on the working of WEU. I am not certain, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, whether the optimistic interpretation which Mr. Périquier gave us was the right one, but I would like to ask him if he thinks that a reactivation of the Standing Armaments Committee in favour of a defence policy controlled by NATO and effectively resulting in France being fully integrated in that organisation, would be acceptable to his party and his allies. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Rivière.

Do any of the Rapporteurs or Chairmen of Committees wish to reply to the speakers ?...

I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Périquier, is not present, and as the discussion has turned largely on matters affecting this Committee, I feel it would be right to make a few brief observations in conclusion ; in doing this I can of course only try to present the views of the Committee. However, I hope that I shall be on the right wavelength.

When we consider the twenty years of marriage between Western Europe and WEU, the position is similar to that where after twenty years of matrimony one sometimes says that one's wife, one's marriage partner, is reliable and to be trusted. This at any rate is how it should be after twenty years of marriage. But it is also frequently said that one's wife is no longer quite as attractive as she was at the start of the marriage. And this is what is happening with the good old WEU as well. In my view we should not at each session moan and complain that this is so. I do not mean to say that anyone here has actually been doing so. We should, instead, be glad and happy that it is such a faithful marriage partner for Europe in all its important functions — with regard to the obligations of members as allies, for example, to the presence of the British Army of the Rhine on the mainland of Europe and to other points that have been mentioned here.

The defence of Europe, which we talk about as a special task within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, cannot be limited to WEU alone. It simply must be recognised that those members of NATO in Europe who do not belong to WEU have a part to play. And this is where we encounter the problems that Mr. Rivière referred to at the end of his speech. I am very pleased at what the Secretary of State Mr. Destremau had to say today in his remarks and especially in what he has said in his replies to questions. These showed a keen feeling for clarity, but showed too that with him clarity did not mean orthodoxy. We all of us have, of course, to accept France's desire to mark out its special position within the Atlantic Alliance. Our French friends and the French Government naturally expect us not to be dogmatic about this, not to keep on saying "Now you really must get back into the integrated organisation of NATO as soon as possible". But I would in turn urge my French friends and Mr. Rivière

for their part not to be dogmatic if the present French Government takes certain steps for practical collaboration within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. If it does, this should not be condemned as heresy against some holy dogma. I am speaking frankly because we are in a parliamentary assembly and I am speaking here as a parliamentarian and need not observe a diplomatic discretion.

Another important group of problems already mentioned in our debate in which this Assembly has, in my opinion, special tasks to carry out, is that of the relations between the European Community, with its own functions, and Western European Union. These we are only just beginning to tackle, and the rather sweeping cryptic remark made by Mr. Tindemans as a footnote to his report certainly shows that much thought still has to be given to how these two institutions can complement each other in the circumstances of today and not only when we have already reached the ideal stage of European union, as well as to how in our work we can — if I may put it this way — move towards the European Community in the field of defence. Here the Assembly has the important job of developing initiatives and producing ideas. For there can be no doubt about it — if the European Community is to develop into a European union, it will have more and more to bring defence policy matters into its thinking.

Which brings me back to where I started. When discussing the Council's report, all the speakers have, quite logically, brought up the matter of relations between the Council and the Assembly, and between the Council and the individual Committees of the Assembly. I should most certainly support those speakers who in their contributions have called upon the Council to show flexibility in this connection as well. It does not matter what hat one happens to be wearing or what label one happens to be carrying when discussions are held between Council and Assembly, what does matter is that the discussions should be effective and that information should be exchanged. This seems to me to be the decisive factor, and is what we look to the Council for in the year ahead. (*Applause*)

(*Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The joint debate is closed.

*The President (continued)*

We shall now proceed to consider the draft recommendation on the application of the Brussels Treaty, Document 700.

Mr. Haase has tabled Amendment No. 1 to add a new paragraph at the end of the preamble as follows :

“Welcoming the Council’s replies to Recommendation 281 and to Written Question 167, and the assignment to the Standing Armaments Committee of a study of the situation of the armaments industry in the member countries ;”.

I put this amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The amendment is agreed to.*

Mr. Haase has tabled Amendment No. 2 to insert in paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, before sub-paragraph (i), a new sub-paragraph as follows :

“(i) Include in annual reports, in addition to the present statement of the total level of British forces on the continent at 31st December, a statement of the level of British forces on the mainland on that date, established in accordance with the Council’s definition of the approved level ;”.

Sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) become sub-paragraphs (ii), (iii) and (iv).

I shall put this amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

I call Mr. de Bruyne.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — This amendment is so precise, on a more than technical subject, that I have no idea of which way I am going to vote. Could Mr. Haase give us some details about the meaning and scope of this amendment? Otherwise, I shall be forced to abstain.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — As a matter of fact, I share your uncertainties, and I will ask the sponsor of the amendment to give us some clarification about its wording.

I call Mr. Richter.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would have thought that this amendment had been dealt with in Mr. Haase’s speech, and that Mr. Haase has fully substantiated it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Critchley.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — I think I can give an explanation of this amendment. In the past, the British Government has been obliged to station 55,000 troops in Germany or, more correctly, to assign them to SACEUR. Whenever the question of numbers has been raised in the House of Commons and elsewhere, Ministers have replied that we have about 60,000 soldiers stationed in Germany.

We wish to point out that the number is 54,700 and that the difference between that and the figure given by Mr. Mason is accounted for by the Berlin brigade, which does not come under the conditions of the Brussels Treaty, and our garrison in Gibraltar.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — It would, in fact, be useful to clarify matters for the Assembly by inserting this additional piece of information. I believe that this should satisfy Mr. de Bruyne : in the light of the explanations provided, the amendment becomes reasonably clear.

I put Amendment No. 2 to the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment No. 2 is agreed to.*

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation in Document 700, as amended ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

*The amended draft recommendation is agreed to unanimously*<sup>1</sup>.

1. See page 24.



*The President (continued)*

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation on the political activities of the Council, Document 702.

The vote on the draft recommendation as a whole will be by roll-call if the Assembly is not unanimous.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation in Document 702 ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

*The draft recommendation is agreed to unanimously*<sup>1</sup>.

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation on scientific, technological and aerospace questions, Document 705.

The vote on the draft recommendation as a whole will be by roll-call if the Assembly is not unanimous.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation in Document 705 ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

*The draft recommendation is agreed to unanimously*<sup>2</sup>.

### **5. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. European aeronautical policy — Guidelines emerging from the Colloquy on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 (Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ; Address by Mr. Chabert, Minister of Communications of Belgium ; Debate and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 704).
2. Détente and security in Europe (Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 703 and Amendments).
3. Relations with Parliaments (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 706).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 12.50 p.m.)*

1. See page 25.

2. See page 26.

# THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 15th June 1976

## SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. European aeronautical policy — Guidelines emerging from the Colloquy on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 (*Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions; Address by Mr. Chabert, Minister of Communications of Belgium; Debate and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 704*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Richter, Mr. Valleix and Mr. Warren (*Rapporteurs*), the President, Mr. Chabert (*Minister of Communications of Belgium*).  
*Reply by Mr. Chabert to questions put by*: Mr. Valleix, Mr. de Bruyne.  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. de Montesquiou (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Porthoine, Mr. de Bruyne, Mr. Schlingemann, Mr. Valleix and Mr. Warren (*Rapporteurs*), Mr. de Montesquiou (*Chairman of the Committee*).
4. Détente and security in Europe (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 703 and Amendments*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Sir Frederic Bennett (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Sieglerschmidt (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Dankert, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Radius, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Radius.
5. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 706*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Delorme (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Radius (*Chairman of the Committee*).
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### 3. European aeronautical policy — Guidelines emerging from the Colloquy on 2nd and 3rd February 1976

*(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions; Address by Mr. Chabert, Minister of Communications of Belgium; Debate and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 704)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and

debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on a European aeronautical policy — guidelines emerging from the colloquy on 2nd and 3rd February 1976, and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 704.

I shall give the floor, one after the other, to the three Rapporteurs of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

I call Mr. Richter.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to start by referring to a very topical matter; since the attendance in this House is not yet all that large, I may perhaps mention something I recently heard in the German Parliament on a point of topical interest. On 26th April, members of the German Parliament's Defence Committee were told that the partners producing the MRCA weapons system, or Tornado as it has recently come to be called, intend to begin series production of the system from 1st July 1976. Under a three-nation agreement between governments, the partners have undertaken to carry the whole programme through. Britain will build 385 aircraft, West Germany 322 and Italy 100. Up to the present, overall spending by the three partner

1. See page 30.

*Mr. Richter (continued)*

countries on the joint development stage has been in the order of DM 8,000 million. During this stage, the partners succeeded in surmounting difficulties of the most varied kind. The highly-advanced engineering design of this aircraft has been proved sound.

May I take this opportunity of saying how proud we are that it has now been shown that Europe has been able to produce a modern weapons system, if not the most modern of all. The continuing threat from the Warsaw Pact has been mentioned several times in the Assembly. The latest information available suggests that the MRCA is making a decisive contribution towards improving the Alliance's defence strength.

I would remind you that at our previous session we dealt, amongst other things, with the importance of the Franco-German joint Alpha-Jet programme.

While explaining to you just what equipping the air forces of Europe as a whole with these two systems means for Europe's defence strength, it is a particular pleasure to me to welcome to this Assembly one of the manufacturers who accepted the heavy risks involved, namely Mr. Dornier. I believe the reason he is here is that he has recognised how much the Assembly is doing to co-ordinate what Europe is doing in the air force sector, in armaments for our air forces. I hope we shall succeed in broadening the existing programmes. Bearing in mind the general position of the Alliance, I should like to express the hope that our NATO partner Turkey, for example, can also be included in these efforts, which have already proved successful in the Franco-German sphere with Alpha-Jet.

The Assembly has also welcomed the decision of several European countries which have opted for an American programme as a successor to the F-104. I am glad that we can confirm this in the presence of a Belgian Minister. I believe that Belgium, together with other countries of Europe, has made an important contribution to the equipment of our air forces and thereby to the security of the Alliance.

Our WEU colloquy at Toulouse has again confirmed that it is still in the aircraft and space industries that we will find innovation in very many of the technologies of tomorrow. These

industries constitute a technological sector which has called for — and will still call for — an extraordinarily high level of effort if it is to do what is expected of it. This means that in the future, too, it will provide considerable impetus to technical progress.

I must further point out that at our colloquy we came to recognise that despite the energy crisis and a world-wide recession, the airline companies and manufacturers are basing their forecasts on the average annual growth rate of air traffic remaining at 6 % to 8 %. As far as our industries are concerned, this would mean in the short term that the European aviation industry will have to make special efforts to overcome the present world-wide economic depression. We must also realise that the aviation industry in Europe belongs to those sectors of the economy where — and on this we are all agreed — independent effort on a national basis is no longer a viable solution.

I should like to say here, echoing the conclusions reached at the Toulouse colloquy, that the European aviation programme is technically and financially realisable only if it is backed up by a range of measures on both sides, that is, by the governments and by the companies. We parliamentarians therefore proposed at Toulouse in consultation with the industrial representatives that the national bodies for aviation and space research that are to be found in one form or another in practically every country should be invited to set up a European council for aviation and space research. We can legitimately point to the success enjoyed by ESA in Europe in the space field. I think no one will dispute that it was in fact this Assembly which time and again came forward with fresh ideas in order to get ESA off the ground. Mr. Gibson attended meetings of our Committee on several occasions, and has confirmed that it is thanks to the Committee that we were able to arrive at a co-ordinated programme in the space research field.

Military and civil requirements must be co-ordinated at European level and in future, to the extent that this is worth while, at Atlantic level too, by extending co-operation on armaments with a view to making the most of the security and economic advantages of weapons standardisation through arrangements with the United States on opening up the two-way street that will be necessary. We have objected time and again that, in the past, this has been very much a one-sided affair. Above all else, a two-

*Mr. Richter (continued)*

way street must be opened up in connection with co-operation on armaments, through increased collaboration between the European airline companies and European manufacturers when new civil projects are to be implemented.

I feel I must tell you what I felt as I flew to Paris on the way to this meeting. It was the first time I had the opportunity of flying from Frankfurt to Paris on an Airbus, and I am, myself, now convinced that this is certainly the most modern and the best aircraft of all the jumbo family, and proof of what we in Europe are capable of producing. With Alpha-Jet, MRCA, Jaguar and other Mirage systems in mind, I must say that we can produce the goods, and WEU must do all it can to ensure, through the proposals it made in Toulouse, that co-ordination will be possible. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, for the second time in three years, your Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, in accordance with an order of our Assembly, convened a colloquy on a European aeronautical policy — at Toulouse on 2nd and 3rd February last.

It was an entirely new idea the first time in 1973, and had lost nothing of its originality in 1976, because in the meantime oil prices had completely upset the initial premises.

The task of WEU is a military and defence one. Hence, its mission in the scientific and technological fields has gone from strength to strength. Aeronautics is both a civil and a military sector. Modern aeronautics presupposes a high technological content and a powerful industry. Both for civil and military purposes it is essential for the defence of our western countries. The fact was established in 1973, and remains just as true today. It was confirmed at Toulouse. But in 1973 the whole outlook for aeronautics and every forecast were based on an annual growth rate of air transport of 15 % to 18 %. Today, the figure has fallen to between 3 % and 4 %.

Suffering as it was from a latent crisis of over-equipment, which could already be discerned in 1973, the aeronautical industry was, by its very nature, completely vulnerable to the direct effects of the oil crisis. For example, the airport

of Roissy-Charles de Gaulle opened at the very height of the crisis and Concorde made its appearance upon the market in a climate rendered all the more difficult by the fact that even the Boeing 747s represented a heavy burden on the capital costs of all the major world airline companies.

In the current economic situation, the renewal of aircraft fleets will often have to wait until the 1980s and, by the same token, technological improvements are marking time.

It was in this sort of atmosphere that the partners in the Toulouse colloquy assembled in response to the initiative of your Committee and the Assembly. The heavy task of acting as General Rapporteur of this colloquy fell to Mr. Vergnaud, and it was he who, in a particularly remarkable summing up, reviewed the main findings of the two days' proceedings.

These were :

First : there is no future for the individual national aviation industries of each of our countries, nor will there be any future for the European aeronautical and air transport industries without a genuine European political purpose.

Second : the civil and military aviation industries are closely linked. Mr. Richter reminded us just now that military orders often account for between 60 % and 70 % of total output — hence, of course, the size of military budgets.

Third : in the present economic situation, State aid for the aircraft industry and for the airlines is tending to increase. This should induce our governments to look for increased co-operation in order to ensure that public funds are put to the most profitable use.

These three comments, as you will observe, all converge on the need for increased political awareness.

Fourth : aeronautical Europe should increasingly rely on quality and not succumb to the temptation of tariff protection for its markets. Not wanting to be a "closed" market, its products should impose themselves by their technology, industrial efficiency and the quality of after-sales services.

But — and this is a fifth conclusion — we must also have stronger and more coherent structures. Stronger structures : I will take the example of Airbus, a thoroughly sound venture,

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

which has proved its lasting worth. By ensuring its own continuity, Airbus should also be able to ensure continuity in the service and maintenance of this European family of aircraft. But we must also, above all, have coherent structures. Just as at Bonn, a year ago, you were good enough to support your Rapporteur's advocacy of an advance in European civil aviation, at Toulouse the idea was canvassed of a European aeronautical council, backed up by national aeronautical councils that should facilitate its advent.

Lastly, the sixth conclusion: Mr. Vergnaud was able to note a fresh approach at Toulouse, as compared with 1973: the idea of co-operation with the United States emerged as a possibility to be explored, in that it would be based on equality and reciprocity, not tagging along as subcontractors.

I should like to dwell, in a few brief words, on these two last points.

The idea of a national aeronautical council in each country: there exist in fact, in each of our countries, structures for monitoring, promoting and safeguarding civil or military aeronautics. Often, there are two separate governmental structures involved. These already constitute an element of dispersion, not necessarily of interests, but sometimes of guidelines. Moreover, the responsible body may sometimes be a departmental structure in one country and a secretariat-general in others. Let us not forget either that there are private structures too. In short, our countries' aeronautics, whether it be aircraft manufacture, air transport or all the ancillary activities, often depends on various structures. What is important therefore is not so much the term "national aeronautical council" as the fact that these structures, would, within each of our governments, be more coherent and better consolidated, so that there would genuinely be a governmental organisation or authority able to deal with the whole range of aeronautics in each country.

As for the European aeronautical council, which harks back to the idea of European advancement developed a year ago at Bonn, it is defined in the recommendation which we propose you should adopt, and would be designed to cope with the following problems: consultations with the European Communities, which, as you know, are concerned with this issue, although the

governments have not followed up the proposals of the Brussels Commission: consultations with a view to improved production, more competitive prices and marketing arrangements for large civil aircraft. Another aim of the European aeronautical council would be to arrange finance for marketing European aircraft through, say, a kind of European export-import bank.

The third aim is to keep Concorde in production so that Europe retains its technological lead.

The fourth concern is the establishment of a civil aviation agency for Western Europe. This concerns the everlasting problem of European airworthiness certificates. As you know, a plane can fly in France, but not necessarily in the United Kingdom — and, why not, vice-versa, although I do not know of such a case.

Fifth, the aim is finally to develop, with the European Civil Aviation Conference, a joint policy for air transport. This would cover landing rights and recognition of European airspace.

Another remark concerns co-operation with the United States. As envisaged at Toulouse, this represents a new collective attitude whereas so far there have only been moves by individual countries, or private industrial sectors. Such co-operation must, however, be subject to strict conditions and requirements of equality and reciprocity, such as rejection of subcontracting by European firms.

On this subject, I have two comments: the need to keep up high scientific and technological standards in Europe. This is no time, just when we are becoming reconciled to the idea of a dialogue with our big American partner, to let ourselves be disqualified in this respect, for I believe the facts speak for themselves. The dialogue would become one in which Europe would play second fiddle to the United States if American technology ruled the roost.

I think, too, another obligation arises: taking into account the vital share of military aeronautics in this context, it is imperative — I was going to say, a prerequisite — that there should be increased consultation in defining military requirements. For that reason, we are proposing a study group — the third point in the recommendation — for determining member countries' military aircraft requirements in liaison with the Standing Armaments Committee.

This is a particularly difficult debate. I believe, however, that our proceedings this

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

morning, following the statement by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, lend even greater justification, if that were needed, to this proposal.

The establishment of the European programme group last February and the rôle devolving upon the Standing Armaments Committee of carrying out an industrial analysis in our countries are all approaches compatible with this point in the proposed recommendation.

I listened carefully this morning to the remarks of Mr. Rivière. Of course, like him, I should hope and trust "reactivation" of the Standing Armaments Committee may proceed along European lines and not under the aegis of another, even of a great ally. That is indeed what our proposal has in mind.

Let me say again, however, that while co-operation with our great United States partners may be contemplated, we should not sacrifice the high technological standards achieved by Europe. That is indeed the first prerequisite.

The second — equally, or doubtless even more important — is that we must be able to express our views with one voice and not confusedly, which would justify setting up these high-level national aeronautical councils or a European aeronautical council whose duty it would also be to perfect our cohesion in the military sphere, industrially so important but politically so difficult. In this respect WEU is, in my view, assuming a very special responsibility, which enhances anew, for any who still doubt it, the unique value of its mission.

I shall conclude, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, by simply stressing how pretentious and overweening some aspects of this recommendation may appear, bearing in mind the action taken by the Council of Ministers following the Assembly's recommendations. That is why, in the case of a subject fully in keeping with WEU's traditions, these aeronautical problems bearing on Europe's defence, independence, technology and, let us never forget, the employment prospects for 400,000 European workers, wage-earners, supervisors and engineers, we are so very anxious that a recommendation like the one we are putting before you, in the hopes that you will agree to adopt it, may be given a speedy and, I hope, as constructive as possible response. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Warren.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — I am the third Rapporteur and perhaps after two polite gentlemen it might be valuable to insert a note of contention which could be taken up in discussion, and to pose some questions that are not yet answered in terms of European aerospace.

I listened very carefully this morning to Mr. Destremau and I came to the conclusion that for him Europe was still a dream; there was no Europe of the kind that we in Western European Union, the seven nations, have cherished; there was not the Europe of the nine of the European Community and there was not the Europe of the eighteen nations of the Council of Europe. He told us that France remained faithful to its alliances. I, as the third Rapporteur, might be allowed to question this.

But first perhaps I could state the facts as I see them arising out of these very valuable colloquies that we have had and the great collaboration and help that we have received from the European aircraft industry and from the aircraft industry of the United States of America. Political initiatives create projects. A political initiative created Concorde. It created the multi-rôle combat aircraft. It created the Airbus. Political initiatives have not yet been used effectively to create the markets for the European industry. The political initiatives that are needed can be created only by members of Western European Union.

It is true that in 1975 politicians in Western Europe created a magnificent market. It was the market of Norway, Denmark, Holland and Belgium for the F-16. We created that market. We did it carefully and with calculation. In 1976 we are creating another market for the Boeing E-3 A airborne warning and command system. The F-16 was but of small value for the Americans compared with that which we are now undertaking by our own direct action. The Americans are looking forward to receiving from all of us here 4,000 million dollars of our taxpayers' money in order to buy an aeroplane.

I must ask you, gentlemen — I hope you will allow me to pose this question, Mr. President, to my fellow parliamentarians — have we not learned from last year? Are we to go forward this year and next year building markets for the Americans? They have fine aircraft, but our problem is that we have the political capability

*Mr. Warren (continued)*

to create the markets in which our own industry will also participate. There is no equality of participation. There was none last year.

The French aircraft, the F-1 E, was used as what the Americans would call "the fall guy" so that the F-16 could succeed. This year there is no "fall guy". NATO has studied only the Boeing E-3 A, but nobody has got to the point — and this is the question today — of how much money we need to pay for this aeroplane. They are talking about how much we should pay. I would question the philosophy of whether we need it at all.

These are the prime questions that we as politicians should be asking in allowing ourselves to subcontract to the military the question of which aircraft they should fly. They should put to us recommendations. We do not have to accept those recommendations. In Western European Union we are interested in defence, and I give this as one instance where there is no means of questioning that which the military propose. My fear is that we shall get to a point where we shall be talking so fast that we cannot even hear what is being said.

The next point I would make about markets is that political initiatives have not been used to create a unified air transport market in Western Europe. I am told by civil servants in the United Kingdom that I do not need to worry about this, but we must worry about it. We are the only nation group in the world that is burdened with the antiquated 1946 Bermuda agreements, which mean that all air transport between separate European countries is regulated. We are a market as big as the United States. We may be fifteen or twenty years behind the United States in terms of passenger demand for air transport, but we are as big and we need the same kind of development.

It is time we looked to the reasons why that development is not taking place. It now costs me more than £60 to fly from London to Paris and back. To fly the same distance in the United States costs me only a quarter of that sum. There must be something wrong, and the responsibility lies with the politicians rather than the airlines. We as politicians must ask ourselves why this is happening to us.

I move now to an area of probably greater contention. Mr. Destremau left me with the same

fear as I have after hearing Mr. Valleix speaking about France. France has gone to the United States. In all my time at Western European Union I have been told that I must collaborate with France, that I must work with France, that I must support Concorde. But when the moment comes when there is something else which should be done, France goes to America. Why is this? France must answer this question.

I can only pose these questions. I have asked so many questions that I now know the real questions to ask. Why has France gone to the United States of America after so many forms of co-operation with the United Kingdom and with Western Germany? Does the Alpha-Jet with Western Germany mean nothing, or the Airbus with Western Germany, or the Jaguar? Does the Concorde mean nothing? Out of all that has gone on since 1962 with the signing of the Concorde agreement, I would hope that France would ally itself in this way, but it seems that my own statement is true and that Europe is still a dream.

I am worried about this. Like most British politicians, I have many problems, such as the problem of nationalisation to which I shall turn in a moment or two. I have problems about what is to happen to France if it allows itself to be swallowed by the "Jaws" of the United States. There is this serious danger that the French air industry will go to the United States thinking that the Americans are talking politics. The Americans are not talking politics: they are talking business.

The people at Boeing, at McDonnell Douglas and at Lockheed with whom I have been talking during the last four weeks have told me that they regard France as only a contractor. There is no indication coming out of France either with the 7-N7, the Dassault 600 or the 7 × 7 that there have been any opportunities of design leadership for France. The Americans still hold this to their hearts.

We must not believe that there is some rapport which can be taken at political level with America. It is not looked at in that form by the United States purely as a commercial arrangement. It is a mistake on the part of France to think that there is some political relationship in terms of the "Spirit of 1776".

What is this co-operation in Europe? We have nearly failed over the years and we should now try to realise it. We have tried to work together.

*Mr. Warren (continued)*

It has been hard to work together, we have different languages, but we have worked together, and we should try to maintain the solidarity that has been created.

I said in Toulouse that we must not "invent the wheel". In this commercial world of civil aviation the Americans have already made the rules. We cannot change those rules and I hope that we are not led astray as Western European Union politicians. We may want to change them and, with success, we probably can change them in five or ten years' time but at the moment the market which is Europe is being used not by the Europeans but by the Americans. We must once more restate the premises on which aircraft can be sold when they are built.

Let us take the civil aircraft situation, which is of such interest to Marcel Dassault and General Mitterrand. There is only one way to go to the next generation of jet transports in Europe. All we have to do is find two airlines that will buy a minimum of fifty aeroplanes. These are not my rules but the American rules, and we must learn that lesson. We may not like those rules, but if we do not accept them we lose as we have lost in the past. We must look for two airlines that will buy a minimum of fifty civil aircraft.

Where are they to be found? They are here in Europe. There are Lufthansa, Air France, British Airways, the KSSU group. They are here, and if members do not believe that this is the way to do it, I must say that from Boeing comes the one message "That is what Boeing is going to do". It is going to take Lufthansa or Air France or KSSU or British Airways. I have great admiration for Boeing. That is what it intends to do.

The fact is that with all our power in Europe we cannot protect our aircraft manufacturers from the import of American airliners, but if I tried to sell European aircraft in the United States, I should meet a tariff barrier. We put no tariff barrier against the Americans. One must keep on telling the same story that I now seek to tell. There is no other story. That is what it is all about. It is not a small story. It is worth billions and billions and billions of dollars, of pounds, of Deutschmarks, of francs, of Dutch guilders.

The last thing to which I must refer is the nationalisation situation in the United Kingdom.

I am a dedicated conservative who does not believe in nationalisation. I am more than sorry that my socialist comrades are not here to share in our deliberations, but that is their decision. But one must be aware that whether or not nationalisation takes place in the United Kingdom, there is 50 % of Europe's aerospace industry power and we must not by nationalisation undo our capability but recognise where it is.

As a last word I pose one more question. When will Europe act? When will Europe learn to use to its advantage, its market, its capability, its financial resources? When will it show the will? It is a question not just of talking as Europeans but of acting as Europeans and being one people together. (*Applause*)

*(Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The debate is open.

We are particularly happy, Mr. Minister, to welcome you in this Assembly which has its origins in the Brussels Treaty and was set up as a result of Belgian initiative. I realise how much we are indebted to you for having found the time, in spite of your many commitments, to come and address the Assembly.

Mr. Chabert, you are the Belgian Minister of Communications. Allow me to add that you are the white hope of Belgian politics and that, as we are so very security-minded, communications and logistics are to our way of thinking as decisive and as important as armaments themselves. So we have both personal and technical reasons for attaching the greatest importance to what you have to say. We shall therefore be hanging on your lips. As is customary, you will be subjected to the cut and thrust of questions and replies.

Without wishing to anticipate too much, I am quite sure that the debate which will now take place will be of the highest interest.

Mr. Minister, would you please come to the speaker's rostrum and give your address?

Mr. CHABERT (*Minister of Communications of Belgium*) (Translation). — I look on it as a privilege, Mr. President, to be able to address this distinguished assembly on the twofold policy matter of the expediency of, and the prospects for, European co-operation in the aircraft industry and civil aviation. For some long time



*Mr. Chabert (continued)*

past the future of the European aircraft industry and European air transport have been a subject of concern to both industry and government circles in various countries and in the European Community. Some very remarkable papers were presented at the colloquy on this topic at Toulouse on 2nd and 3rd February this year, all of which helped to throw light on the many and complex aspects of the problems arising in this subject area. My brief contribution here will therefore also help towards sketching the broad outlines of what a common policy might be in the European context.

Although the futures of aircraft building in Europe and air transport in Europe are undoubtedly connected, we cannot get away from the fact that both the historical background to the development of these two sectors of aviation, and the motivation underlying this development, have been totally different. Wishing to be objective, I shall therefore deal separately with the problems affecting each sector so as to try to see what influence developments in each sector can have upon the other.

In the postwar years the building of civil transport aircraft developed mainly in the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France. It was a development marked, among other things, by a *de facto* dividing-up of the markets. It should be noted that France and Britain never managed a real breakthrough with their civil aircraft, and were unable to dominate even their own domestic markets; that the Soviet Union has managed to supply its aircraft only on its own home market — albeit a very large one — and to the closely-associated countries of the eastern bloc; and that the United States, on the other hand, of course found a wide outlet for sales in America but also sold its aircraft in most other countries apart from the eastern bloc, and thus dominates the majority of the world market. The important thing is that this state of affairs, once it came about, has continued over successive periods during which most airlines were rebuilding — and later modernising — their fleets.

*(The speaker continued in French)*

In the building of civil air fleets we have therefore seen a marked preference for American products, a situation which has not altered much, if at all. American manufacturers start from a

position of strength backed up by the decisive magnitude of domestic market requirements in respect of air transport and by a sales philosophy which has always been based on intensive marketing research among the airlines of the whole world.

Being able to rely on a large home market, allied with a marketing system which adapted as much as possible the product offered to what the airlines demanded, has given American manufacturers a firm and enviable market.

This market position has been bolstered up by the Export-Import Bank finance facilities thanks to which the high selling prices of ever more advanced aircraft with ever larger capacities have remained acceptable to foreign buyers thanks to ingenious back-stop clauses in the supply contracts. Another trump card that must not be overlooked is a reliable supply of spare parts and accessories, together with trade-in guarantees.

What is rather remarkable is that some manufacturers have in such circumstances managed to make their production programmes pay off by capturing the American market, as in the case of the Vickers Viscount, the Sud-Aviation's Caravelle and the Fokker F-27.

It is noteworthy that this was achieved in the case of the Viscount and the Caravelle mainly by development of an advanced technology which answered commercial requirements more rapidly than the technology the American manufacturers were able to offer. This breakthrough could not be enlarged because of the rapid powers of adaptation of the American competitors who very soon put some highly competitive products on the market which they had already captured.

At the moment aircraft production has developed to such an extent that the break-even point at which amortisation of research and development costs is assured is about 400 units, whereas as models become larger the difficulties of reaching this threshold increase correspondingly.

This seems likely to have been the immediate cause of a definite move towards co-operation among manufacturers. The British and the French were the first to resort to co-operation as well as going on collaborating with other European manufacturers. And, one can say, with some measure of success.

The question is whether such limited collaboration offers any real possibility of a favourable

*Mr. Chabert (continued)*

change in the European manufacturers' relative share of the market.

Apart from the countries of the eastern bloc, the ratio at the moment is nine to one. Everybody seems convinced that the European aircraft industry is not lacking in know-how : quite the contrary.

Moreover, Europe's total production capacity is comparable to that of America. Yet it does not show the same results and remains mostly unused because the finished product finds it difficult to penetrate the market. There is therefore a complete disproportion between sales and costs of existing capacity.

In this connection I refer to the excellent report by Mr. Richter, Mr. Valleix and Mr. Warren, in particular the following passage :

"So far Europe has had the necessary technological expertise. Its capacity for imagination, high standard of engineering, its production potential and its highly skilled 400,000-strong work force have not yet however achieved the same credibility as American manufacturers have in the world and especially the United States market. More effort must therefore be concentrated on the standards of after-sales support. This, too, presupposes that Europe's industry must not disperse its financial and technical resources but must concentrate its efforts on judiciously-selected programmes involving whole families of aircraft."

In present circumstances therefore we must turn towards other formulae which may in the medium term make existing production capacity profitable by adapting to the needs of the market and by rationalisation and lowering costs by means of financial aid to support sales, and by creating competitive conditions for the supply and trade-in of accessories and spares.

Adaptation of products to market requirements calls for proper marketing techniques involving a radical break with the existing link-up in certain countries between aircraft manufacturers and the national airlines.

The question also arises as to whether the European industry would not be better advised to envisage a certain amount of collaboration with American industry in order to encourage opportunities for a rapid improvement in its share of the market, at least in future expansion.

The present system of offset production, usually negotiated by the European governments on the occasion of large orders in favour of the American aeronautical industry and economy, should in any case be reviewed and more firmly based on true reciprocity. Such reciprocity can and should be found in closer co-operation between comparable American and European aeronautical industries in balanced partnership.

The future development of European air transport and the associated potential growth of the European fleet may play a big rôle in this, on the understanding that the airlines are offered types of planes which meet their needs on competitive terms and which do not present insurmountable obstacles to a coherent build-up of existing fleets.

May I now quote Mr. Claudius Dornier Jr. in his speech at the Toulouse colloquy last February :

"I believe that the success enjoyed by the Airbus and other well-known European aircraft — and, let us hope, by Concorde too — will enable our European aircraft industry to gain more and more ground over the United States so as to establish the conditions that are indispensable if we want the United States to consider co-operation on an equal basis with Europe in the aviation field to be worthwhile.

However, the interest aroused in the United States by these successes should in no case deceive us. We shall achieve collaboration on a basis of true equality with this great partner only after we have succeeded in getting Europe to hold indivisible views on a 'European' solution for our aircraft industry.

Unless we get our house in order without delay, I do not believe the United States will recognise us as true partners.

It is the immense importance of this process of European integration in relation to the United States, and the opportunities which the necessarily synchronised political interests of the 'free world' would provide and which we should be wasting if we hesitated any longer, that calls for a reappraisal of our common attitude in the military and economic spheres.

In reality the point has already been reached when it is no longer possible to divide the world of aviation into an American aircraft industry and a European aircraft industry ;

*Mr. Chabert (continued)*

indeed this fact should be central to all future planning: western aviation versus eastern aviation."

This brings me to the second part of my speech: the advisability and the chances of closer collaboration between the European airlines.

Like most air transport companies, they are confronted most of the time with a situation of over-capacity which is a direct result of clinging to over-narrow nationalist ideas in a pre-eminently international market whose expansion has in recent years been too slow to keep pace with steeply climbing production costs.

Both on a world scale and in Europe, this situation has led to ruinous competitive relations likely to undermine any sound commercial operation.

In many cases the situation has been aggravated by overt or covert government intervention, whereby competitive conditions are falsified even more.

In recent years, the trend has quickened and become even more acute because of the international energy crisis, widespread inflation and economic recession.

Certain changes in operating conditions, in particular steep price increases in energy products, very high investment costs of hardware coupled with very high finance costs and steadily rising labour costs, all constitute additional and continuing elements of distortion in a market which is too limited and fractionated to allow of profitable operating.

The inevitable result is that the disproportion between revenue and expenditure has become more and more acute. To cope with this the European companies have collaborated technically by setting up consortia such as the KSSU and ATLAS which have undeniably produced savings in operating expenditures of the airline fleets but which are not by a long way sufficient in themselves to restore the situation.

Efforts to achieve collaboration in operating airlines have not so far succeeded, because the political will has been lacking. The only exception is the SAS consortium which has resulted in a better economic sharing among airlines, a stronger international position, and better use of equipment, with considerable cost economies.

Many experts would support me in my contention that this system could be a possible answer to the problems facing civil aviation in Europe.

Moreover, the situation is such that around 62 % of the activities of all the European airlines is concentrated on intercontinental flights. This has the effect of producing cut-throat competition in a fraction of the market where the European companies not only face one another but also non-European companies in the framework of an exceedingly costly sales organisation and a policy of prestige covering practically all the major cities of the world.

In the present state of affairs, it is essential to cut out irrational mutual competition, make drastic reductions in expenditure and consolidate market positions.

Clearly this can only be done by means of very close collaboration sensibly carried out between companies which are to a degree complementary and by avoiding concentrations leading to hypertrophy which is often an obstacle to efficient management.

What European civil aviation needs is in my opinion not another mammoth organisation, but to be split up into operating units small enough to be more profitable, and offer reasonable conditions for striking a new and better balance for sharing the market. This could well strengthen their position vis-à-vis the aircraft industry and give them a better starting position to cope with the enormous financial problems inherent in modern air transport.

I have already drawn your attention to the fact that the European airlines are, and will remain for some time to come, big customers of American industry and the American economy in general.

Between 1966 and 1970 the European companies' total expenditure rose by 250 % for operating costs in respect of activities and interest repayments in America, whilst capital expenditure on aircraft and equipment rose by 514 % in the same period.

There is no doubt that the smaller European companies have every interest in achieving, by means of adequate concentration, better negotiating positions as regards steadily rising investment costs whose repercussion on fares will raise almost insurmountable problems.

*Mr. Chabert (continued)*

The present situation, as I have tried to show, can hardly be called favourable. Whereas the number of passengers carried has risen by more than half since the second world war, the profitability of the airlines has fallen by about 50 %. One of the major causes is certainly, I repeat, the irrational competition between the aircraft industries in Europe. The price paid for this by the taxpayer in certain countries is very high, and the question is whether those who are the real losers will not condemn this state of affairs, possibly through their representatives in the European Parliament elected by universal suffrage.

It is my opinion that the time is approaching when we ought to put a stop to investments which, while serving national prestige, are in socio-economic terms unproductive.

If we wish to improve the situation we must finish with attempts to outbid each other by the various national States and, taking a European view, urgently seek new forms of collaboration. This should be located in the field of aircraft manufacture and the operation of the airlines, and based on an in-depth study of medium- and long-term needs, control of capacity and a rational organisation of the market keeping competition within reasonable bounds. In Europe, aeronautical policy is not European enough and the result is a fragmentation of opportunities and a waste of financial means.

Rationalisation by collaboration instead of battling against the stream appears the only formula that can bring salvation. The example of SAS should be an example for us to reflect upon and act upon.

On those privileged occasions when we take a piercing look at Europe's aeronautical problems, as we did at Toulouse, and as we are doing again in this Assembly, nobody can seriously doubt the potential possibilities of European aeronautics. We are unanimous in our belief in these.

In the last resort, however, the political will is lacking for setting in motion the machinery of collaboration. But such a political will is indispensable since we shall have to give up a part of our national sovereignty.

In looking to the future I am not entirely pessimistic. Interest in the problems which we

have been discussing here today is growing. It is not only in political circles that people are working on new forms of collaboration. The airlines are also carefully reconnoitring the terrain, as seen from the ongoing informal contacts with the European authorities. That is an encouraging development. I am therefore convinced that the airlines in Europe will be given a fresh opportunity if they can agree on less costly new forms of collaboration through adequate concentration. In the longer prospect, such a development will open the way to joint refurbishing of aeronautical construction and policy in Europe. This is an essential *sine qua non* for a dialogue with the United States of America and the other continents, not only for aircraft construction but also for improved organisation and sharing of intercontinental air traffic.

Thank you for your attention. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Minister. Before calling members of the Assembly who wish to put questions, I should like to welcome the presence in the public gallery of a certain number of prominent participants at the Toulouse colloquy organised by WEU, and particularly by the Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, our friend Mr. Pierre de Montequiou. They are — forgive me if I miss anybody out — Mr. Dornier, Mr. Iserland, Sir Richard Smeeton, Mr. Sisson, Mr. Scherer and Mr. Jourdet.

Their presence here underlines the great interest they took in the colloquy, and the healthy collaboration which will, I trust, grow up between politicians and top industrialists. Thank you, Gentlemen, for coming here. (*Applause*)

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — It is for us both a pleasure and an honour to meet again those who gave us so much enlightenment at Toulouse three months ago. I would like, too, to welcome Mr. Lucien who is also with us today.

Mr. President, I should like to confirm what you have already said, and say how greatly we appreciated the address by the Belgian Minister of Communications, and what a pleasure it is to find that he shares our opinions.

I should now like to refer to the *sine qua non* he mentioned at the end of his remarks, to the effect that if we turn towards not research but

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

an open dialogue with our American partners, we must do so with a minimum of discipline among ourselves: otherwise there would be no point in laying down any conditions at all and this debate would be scuppered from the start.

You pointed out the difficulties of the European airlines in meeting twofold competition, worldwide and overseas, among themselves and with the big American companies. It is on this last point that I should like to ask you a few questions.

The American companies have in their time engaged in cut-throat competition. I have been led to believe that the monopoly act is only valid within the United States, and that the major American airlines, Pan Am and TWA in particular, now have zoning arrangements and have put an end to such competition. But, totting up the draw-backs, they pushed competition to such lengths as operating at a loss, so we should be very badly placed for trying to undercut them. In any case they have now given up such competition and so frozen the situation in comparatively monopolistic positions worldwide.

My first question is: how can we start a European dialogue when faced by such strong American competitors seeing that they are protected by agreements between themselves which place us at a double disadvantage?

My second question concerns the proposed agreement between KLM, Sabena and Luxair. You, Mr. Minister, are something of a prophet, or at least an expert in the matter. You have, very rightly, proclaimed the merits of the proposed regrouping of SAS. Can you tell us how the plan to merge the three companies I mentioned is getting along?

A third question: since you are here, I would kick myself if I missed the opportunity: the European Communities have made proposals in aeronautical matters and we are waiting for the reply of the Council of Ministers in Brussels. I do not wish to involve you personally, Mr. Minister, but I think that, if only because you come from the same place and share the same interests, you may have a few reliable items of information to give us.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Chabert.

Mr. CHABERT (*Minister of Communications of Belgium*) (Translation). — Thank you, Sir, for your remarks.

As for your first question, clearly if there is ever a dialogue with the United States on some regulating of capacity on, say, the North Atlantic route, it will have to be done on an absolutely equal footing between the two partners. It is not a question of monopolistic policy in the United States, which would be at the expense of our policy here at home in Europe. I believe that it ought to be possible, in the near future, to talk over with the Americans this problem of regulating capacity, for both continents have every interest in doing so.

I personally am convinced that, when the whole world is poverty-stricken and surrounded by difficult problems, the time has come to try and find solutions. One of the reasons, if I have been well informed, of the failures of the meetings at the time was precisely that when they were due to be held, things were picking up, and some people considered there was no more need for getting together and coming to an understanding.

Things are not going well in civil aviation, as you know, and that is the reason why, if we do succeed in coming to an agreement in Europe, there must be some means of starting this global dialogue with the United States under normal conditions. That answers your first question.

The second question is rather a tricky one. It concerns the collaboration we advocated in my country with two small neighbouring countries. You know that a study has been carried out on this matter by a firm of American consultants, MacKinsey, whose conclusions we are currently examining in all three countries.

I am not making a value judgment about these conclusions; you know one of them is that if we effect a certain rationalisation, if we create a consortium of the SAS type with the three airlines, it should be possible, according to this study, to achieve by 1980 a significantly higher profitability than today.

But I think it is too early to express an opinion on the political results and the decisions that will result from this study. The three governments and the three companies are currently studying the report, and we shall see towards the end of the year what will be done about it.

Finally, you have suggested, quite rightly I think, some form of European initiative possibly by a Council of Ministers. I think we must be

*Mr. Chabert (continued)*

realists: we can only progress where there are the means of doing so. For years nothing moved except the collaboration at technical level to which I referred a little while ago. I understand things are now beginning to move a little and that, for example, the Vice-President of the European Commission, Mr. Scarascia Mugnozza, has already initiated moves to explore the possibilities of collaboration between the various European companies.

In view of the framework within which we are working, it is not necessary to tell you that we must begin with the Nine. I understand that informal contacts are being made in this matter and that all the companies are being somewhat guarded in their attitude: that is normal. There are still the governments that have to be convinced that such collaboration will not be at the expense of the national flag: you know how sensitive these things are, for many politicians say things but when it comes to putting them into practice begin to hesitate. I think that is the way things are in reality and we have to admit it. But I do not despair of seeing these strange get-togethers resulting in something more solid: we hope so, like yourselves, and I thank you for the questions you have put to me.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Bruyne.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — During the Toulouse colloquy there was, according to the report by Mr. Richter, Mr. Valleix and Mr. Warren whose recommendation we are now debating, a call to set up one or more specialised European institutions in the field of civil aviation and aircraft construction, including a European aeronautics council and subsequently a West European civil aviation agency, which would grant European airworthiness certificates.

I would like to know from the Minister whether he foresees the possibility, at institutional level, of one or more such initiatives being taken or promoted in the short term?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Chabert.

Mr. CHABERT (*Minister of Communications of Belgium*) (Translation). — I am grateful to Mr. de Bruyne for asking this question. He will always find me on his side when it is a matter of taking effective initiatives towards

co-operation. I know that various recommendations have been made, but before giving a firm opinion on these, I would like to get a better idea of the way the new proposals and structures are to work.

I am a little hesitant, because I wonder whether it is really necessary — with all the European institutions we have already — to set up new, specific machinery just to deal with aviation. We have at the present time in the European Commission a Commissioner who is Vice-President and who is specially concerned with transport and the integration of transport policy. Before I offer an opinion on what has been suggested here it seems to me best to see first of all what official EEC circles think about this.

I repeat, that if anyone can give me proof that this would bring about a smoother co-operation than we have today, I shall not hesitate for one moment to give it my support. While waiting for that, I would like to delay answering.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anyone else wish to speak?...

I would thank you once again on behalf of the whole Assembly, Mr Minister, for your substantial speech from the rostrum, and also for your very constructive answers; subject to the full limits of what any of us can do in the current status of the complexity of our problems, your presence here once again adds consistence to the Assembly and enhances its influence and prestige. (*Applause*)

We will resume the debate on European aeronautical policy. I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — I apologise for taking the place of a great liberal, Mr. Portheine; you can see the liberalism that unites us. Since the Minister is still among us, I am glad to emulate yourself, Mr. President, and in my capacity of Chairman of the Committee, tell him how pleased we were to hear him review a situation of concern to us all, and in particular the members of this Committee, following the colloquy held at Toulouse. The words spoken by Mr. Chabert were, I think, first of all very objective and realistic, and at the same time, without showing any great optimism, they give us grounds for hope.

As Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, I would say that it is very seldom you get three Rap-

*Mr. de Montesquiou (continued)*

porteurs of different nationalities agreeing on a conclusion which, despite some variants introduced by Mr. Warren, as is only proper for an Englishman, is, in sum, the same, which is rather comforting.

True, in Mr. Vergnaud we had a man with a talent for synthesising, who managed to synthesise the three reports ; and I think he strongly influenced Mr. Richter, Mr. Valleix and, whatever he may say, even Mr. Warren. You are a European, Mr. Warren.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — You are a European, too.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — All right then, I believe Mr. Vergnaud had a great deal to do with it, and I pay tribute to him for it — he is sitting in the gallery with the gentlemen mentioned just now by Mr. Nessler. It is my pleasant duty to tell him how much we owe to him for the success of a colloquy, which was no small undertaking and which, following on the Paris colloquy, had a very great influence on this question of coherency in European aviation, precisely because the manufacturers came too as well as the promoters and everybody who has used and is using aircraft produced by the European aviation industries. I believe the colloquy was a great success, and should like to draw one or two conclusions in the light of what I heard just now from the three Rapporteurs.

The most important question about the aeronautical industry is that of employment.

We wonder what will be the future of those who work for it. Can the necessary decisions be taken to ensure the employment of the workers in this industry? Adding up the numbers of persons employed — be they manual workers, technicians or engineers — we arrive at the impressive total of over 400,000 workers in the aviation industries of the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany.

In France, a restricted ministerial council on aeronautics is to be held in the next few weeks, and we await its decision, which is bound to be important, since a choice is shortly to be made that will determine French or European policy in this field for the next fifteen years or so.

We may regret this mutation in the mind of a man who held great responsibilities in the EEC,

Mr. Spinelli, who will now certainly prod the European aeronautical industry towards that of the Soviet Union, since he has become one of the leaders of the communist party in Italy.

In the draft recommendation, we expressed regret that the EEC member governments should not yet have adopted a position on the action programme for the European aeronautical sector proposed by the Commission of the European Communities on 3rd October 1975.

The best solution for Europe will be to draw up a common strategy of co-operation and together confront the problem of co-operating with the Americans. But if the Community, as such, cannot act in this way, what else can be done other than to arrange bilateral conversations on the joint implementation of a new civil programme?

Certainly, the European countries cannot individually speak to the Americans on an equal footing. But the overriding need is to assure the future security of the people working for the aeronautical industry. That is both a humane and a moral duty. We get the impression that there are countries which do not want to commit themselves and which are now, for domestic political reasons, engaged on delaying tactics.

What we may regret today is the lack of faith, and I think that the draft recommendation, in the form in which it was adopted by our Committee, gives all the member countries concerned a last chance of initiating a European aeronautical policy. I do not think a European failure can be contemplated in this area.

I hope that the Council will seriously examine the proposals, which are not only those of our Committee, but which also take into account the main guidelines emerging from the colloquy of 2nd and 3rd February 1976, and the opinions of the representatives of national airlines and the aeronautical trade unions, all of whom are given their due place. They are at one in defending the European aeronautical industry and its users, in order to ensure the survival of the clerical grades and technicians who are the salt of European technology. I believe that if they all have faith, as they should, we can still save European aeronautics, all its labour force and all who gain their livelihood from it, to the great honour of European technology. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I call Mr. Portheine.

Mr. PORTHEINE (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, one needs a certain amount of courage to follow the excellent speeches by the Belgian Minister of Communications, the Chairman of the Committee and the three Rapporteurs in speaking on aviation policy. I shall, however, gladly do so, and I shall try to go rather more into the details of the problem we are discussing.

I have followed the work of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions with the greatest interest. After a first colloquy in 1973, we now have the results from the second, held in 1976, and besides this an account of the Committee's other activities such as a recent visit to the Dornier factory in southern Germany, near Lake Constance. These works are still run by the owner and managing director of that name, and I am pleased to see that Mr. Dornier is present here. I would thank him for the hospitality shown to the Committee and myself. During the visit I became aware yet again of the many and varied activities of an aircraft company which draws on all aspects of up-to-date technology. This made it clear that, as Mr. Dornier explained, no single European country — not even the Federal Republic — is able on its own to undertake the necessary research and development work. Mr. Dornier believed that because of this there must be an agency set up in Europe to arrive at a joint research and development programme.

I agree with the Committee's Rapporteurs that before such a programme is set up there needs to be national consultation on aviation matters. There need to be special committees for this. I think, however, that the idea ought to be pursued first at national level, and a policy subsequently mapped out at international level. This has already been referred to a number of times. It seems to be an extremely difficult process, despite the fact that — as the colloquy showed — everyone is convinced that it must come. We heard this from representatives of the airlines, of the aircraft industry and of the governments, as well as from independent experts.

There have, indeed, always been problems in the aircraft industry, but these have now been exacerbated by the economic crisis and by the very substantial rises in the cost of aviation fuel.

The airline companies, most of whom published in the spring their results for the last financial year, are in dire financial straits, and are therefore far from inclined to enter into aircraft

purchasing programmes. They do not want to commit themselves to a long-term programme, nor do they want to define their future aircraft requirements very closely, since they have no clear picture of the future pattern of air transport in the shorter or the longer term.

The aircraft manufacturers have fully appreciated this fact, and as a result are — both in Europe and in the United States — directing their design studies towards the further development of existing aircraft types rather than the designing of new types. The intention is to produce improved versions of existing types, with special emphasis on fuel consumption, maintenance costs and environmental protection — and the latter is, of course, a very topical issue. They have postponed design and development work on new aircraft to a later date, when a new generation of aircraft will make its appearance. This halt on further design work has naturally had a major effect on job prospects for designers, draughtsmen and the like, who consequently have little or no new work to do. And on top of this there is, as with all areas of new technology, the fact that research and development costs have risen so sharply that a cutback was necessary.

These problems are arising on both sides of the Atlantic, though not in the same way. The American industry intends very firmly to stay number one in the world, though inclined to co-operate with European countries and by doing so to win part of the European market even though this is dominated by national government policies. On the other hand, the industry in Europe is suffering from excess production capacity and has insufficient orders to keep its available work force busy, though giving these workers the sack is difficult in Europe at the present time. At the same time the European industry is afraid of becoming subordinate to American firms, which seek only to use it as subcontractors.

Unfortunately the various countries take differing attitudes to these problems. Britain is now regretting having opted out of the Airbus project and would gladly get back in on it, without however being willing to shoulder part of the original research and development costs. As Sir Kenneth Keith, the chairman of Rolls-Royce, said at the colloquy, "the Airbus development to a 200-seat aircraft, with the RB-211 engine, could take a considerable share of a very lucrative market...". Britain is, furthermore, still involved in a debate on nationalisation — which



*Mr. Porthéine (continued)*

Mr. Warren has mentioned — which seems for the moment to have been postponed once again ; at all events, no final stage has been reached, and so uncertainty continues in the industry.

Aeritalia — helped with money from the Italian Government — is joining with Boeing in a study of the 7 × 7 programme, a direct competitor for the Airbus as it was described by Sir Kenneth Keith. Bearing in mind the size and importance of the two firms, it is clear that this is a case of subordination far more than collaboration.

The German Government is supporting the Airbus programme, but it is obvious from the report prepared by Mr. Grüner, the Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and co-ordinator for the German aircraft and space industry, that no thought need be given to any expansion of these aviation activities. The current programmes do, it is true, cost a great deal of money, but the disadvantages that go with calling a halt are so major that they cannot be offset by the financial advantages they bring.

The Dutch and Belgian Governments favour discussions on future aircraft-building programmes within the EEC, but are not prepared to invest a lot of taxpayers' money in these. Where the Netherlands is concerned, the German/Dutch firm Fokker-VFW is going to design a new aircraft leading on from the Fokker F-27 and F-28 series (a short-haul 100-seater aircraft) and 27 million guilders have been earmarked for launching the project.

The French Secretary of State for Transport, Mr. Cavaillé, has already said, during the colloquy, that France is seeking co-operation with America. It is no secret that among the French especially there is great disappointment that the products of European co-operation are bought only in small numbers by European governments where military aircraft are concerned and by the airlines in the case of civil aircraft. There has been a deal of hard feeling on a number of occasions, but I must say that France — even though it may be quite justified — tends very readily to stick a European label on something that is wholly or very largely a French product. Dassault and Aérospatiale, with the backing of the French Government, are currently negotiating with Boeing and McDonnell Douglas about a variety of aircraft types. These talks with Boeing and McDonnell Douglas are well

advanced, and could culminate in a passenger aircraft programme for the 1980s and beyond. In the coming months the French Government will have to decide which of the two programmes it wants to give development finance to.

Dassault is negotiating with McDonnell Douglas on a new version of the Mercure, the Mercure 200, to which Douglas is to contribute some of its most up-to-date engineering. The plane would be built in France and Douglas would handle marketing worldwide.

Aérospatiale is discussing two projects with Boeing, the first a short- and medium-haul aircraft derived from the existing Boeing 737, equipped with new engines and a new wing structure and typenamed the 7-N7. The Americans would take on the leadership of this project. In the second Aérospatiale project, for an aircraft in the Airbus family, the French would act as project-leader while Boeing would deal with the sales organisation. It is known as the B-10, and involves a medium-haul aircraft providing 210 seats.

It is fairly obvious that solutions are being sought in a variety of directions, but that it is possible for the preferred solution to be a European one. It will be possible, too, after so many years of research and development work, to reap the benefits and at the same time find an answer to the problems of employment and the difficulties of finding a market. Other people, however, believe that co-operation with the Americans provides the only answer to the problems of European aviation. The European Commission in Brussels feels that these two viewpoints need not be mutually exclusive, and has therefore suggested that the European governments should draw up a medium- and long-term plan and approach together the Americans to seek fruitful negotiations. It was plain from the colloquy in Toulouse that it is impossible to put a large civil aircraft on the market if potential sales are not created in the United States which, when it comes down to it, represents and dominates half the world market. It must however be remembered here that in contacts between European firms and one or more American firms, the latter are so much bigger than the former that even without it being intentional the European firm will end up as a subcontractor to the American company.

I believe, Mr. President, that the solution put forward by the European Commission is the

*Mr. Porthéine (continued)*

most logical and the most promising, though I do realise what difficulties it entails. In the large countries especially it will be hard to get the departments concerned to give up some of their powers of decision to Brussels.

Looking at the broader aspect of technology, too, one can but come to the conclusion that if Europe cannot or will not work together in the areas of telecommunications, nuclear energy, computers and metallurgy, then American industrial supremacy will be unshakably established in the world. That in itself would not worry me; but this Assembly, which strives for European co-operation, should surely explore all the opportunities there are for European co-operation in this field.

So I agree with the Rapporteurs' recommendations that, working from national bases, there should be a European aeronautical council. The Minister has just told us that he was certainly not yet convinced to this extent. I do appeal to him, and other members of governments, since in my opinion there is, alongside all the other bodies, a need for a separate organ that can have an overview of this sector.

We all know that national authorities and powers in this sphere are so substantial that they cannot be ignored, and I am glad that this occupies an important place in the recommendation.

Finally, Mr. President, I do not share Mr. Warren's view that making this council answerable to this Assembly could have a great influence. We have known too many disappointments, not only in technology but also in the defence and political contexts.

Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Bruyne.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the report and the draft recommendation that accompanies it have a very wide scope. I support them entirely, and I hope that they will have the Assembly's unqualified approval. We must not, however, blind ourselves to certain aspects of the report and recommendation that could lead to our trying to set up too many European institutions in areas where other institutions — like the ECAC, for instance — already exist. It was this concern that led me to put a question to Mr. Chabert, and I rather

believe that the answer he gave strengthens my feelings.

The large number of suggestions put forward in the report and recommendation come, in fact, from the wealth and width of subject matter at the Toulouse colloquy. One must hope that Toulouse will not all be wasted effort, and that concrete follow-up will be given to the desires expressed and resolutions formulated. This cannot of course happen simultaneously and at all the various levels. It is difficult to tell in what sequence that might happen. It strikes me as not entirely out of the question that the new mandate given to the Standing Armaments Committee, on which Mr. Destremau spoke so positively this morning, should be able to contribute towards rapid implementation of some of the initiatives mentioned in our recommendations. The job the SAC has been given to do covers, it is true, more than the building of European military aircraft, but one can expect military aircraft to form a central feature of that Committee's work.

Special importance must attach to that passage of the recommendation that expresses a desire for a European financial institution along the lines of the American Export-Import Bank. This is a bold suggestion, but one that cannot be dismissed. It is, however, one of the points in our recommendation whose practical value will depend on the way Western European Union manages to achieve collaboration with other important European bodies in this field. This is why it is so crucial that the EEC Commission should tackle the task it set itself in an official document dated 9th October 1975. It is a great pity that there seems so far to have been a standstill in doing anything about this initiative at EEC Commission level. That explains the cautious hopes expressed by Mr. Chabert. I expect that the WEU Assembly and its Committees will be keeping a close watch, and in the meantime I think the paragraphs of the preamble and recommendation that have a bearing on this are wholly justified.

Equally important is sub-paragraph (e) of the second paragraph of the recommendation, which emphasises the desirability of working with the ECAC towards a European policy on landing rights and the recognition of European airspace.

Monday of next week will see the start of the three-yearly meeting of ECAC in Strasbourg, and this would seem to me to provide an excellent opportunity to make a start on giving

*Mr. de Bruyne (continued)*

concrete form to the wishes expressed in paragraph 2 (e) of the draft recommendation. Some of the members of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions will be at the Strasbourg meeting. It would be well for our Committee in future to deal with this question on the basis of decisions reached in Strasbourg.

*(The speaker continued in French)*

I hope, Mr. President, that this subject will be considered in depth by our Committee in the very near future, which, under your renewed presidency, is accustomed to make a particularly favourable contribution to the proceedings of our Assembly, for which I congratulate you once more.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Schlingemann.

Mr. SCHLINGEMANN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I was very pleased to see the reply from the Council of Ministers to Recommendation 274 which accompanied Mr. Warren's report adopted by this Assembly on 4th December 1975. In its reply, the Council says it "would welcome any efforts designed to create in Europe a single military market which would benefit manufacturers and users equally". It goes on to say that "such a development would improve the prospects of the European aeronautical industry". A study must of course be made of whether setting up new agencies will necessitate alterations in the tasks of existing agencies. Moreover, a European programme group was set up on 2nd February 1976 in Rome, with the job of dealing with co-operation in the armaments sector in general. At its meeting in May of this year the Council of Ministers decided that WEU's Standing Armaments Committee should deal rather more particularly with a study of the armaments industries in the WEU countries, and should try to bring about the necessary contacts between them.

I am pleased to see that the Council of Ministers has now given a number of directives on military aircraft production, and is beginning to define the various tasks of existing organisations. I hope that the European programme group will in the end lead to a separate agency for the procurement of military aircraft. These small forward steps the Council of Ministers has now taken must not make us lose

sight of our final goal, for we all know that one swallow does not make a summer.

So much for the military aspects, Mr. President. Turning now to the civil aspects of a European policy for the aviation and space industry, I must, alas, use a different imagery. Despite the work done by our Committee and by many other bodies inside and outside the Community, what we have here is a pair of partridges that have just had a charge of shot fired at them; each flies off in a different direction. Each of these European partridges is trying to cross the Atlantic ocean under its own power to form a new brace with an American bird. One may wonder what the future holds for the space and aviation industry in Europe. Which way ought it to go? The European Commissioner whose responsibility this is, Mr. Spinnelli — who is, in any case, tending for the moment to look towards Moscow rather than towards Washington — said not long ago that he was in despair and wondered whether a European space and aviation industry would ever come about. It had been found plainly impossible within the Nine to set up even an informal European programme. The industry in Britain does not know how and, in particular, when it is to be nationalised, nor who will be affected by this measure. French firms are at present taking up contacts with American companies without paying a great deal of attention to their partners' wishes, in particular those of the British. From the French point of view, the industry in Britain is, because of its surplus manpower and out-of-date equipment, even looked on as a hindrance to negotiations with the Americans. Moreover it is felt that far too cumbersome a procedure is involved in undertaking co-operation with more than two countries and two firms. Rolls-Royce, in particular, will have nothing to do with this attitude because it would be very glad to see its engines fitted to the new Airbus family of aircraft. The French are however using this matter of engines as a bait for co-operation with the Americans. And, besides, everyone is now well aware that — cost what it may — sales opportunities will have to be created in America if the Airbus family of aircraft is to be sold in large enough numbers to allow a reasonable level of production and financial return.

In Germany, where the aviation and space industry is a good deal smaller than in the other two countries, there are hopes that the Airbus will sell. At the same time, people are trying to

*Mr. Schlingemann (continued)*

get the Americans to agree to a bilateral flow of trade in armaments, thinking particularly of sales of the Leopard tank to the American forces. Bearing in mind all the interests of the various European countries and the reluctance there is to subordinate national interests it will be extremely difficult to arrive at any common and overall solution. I believe therefore that the idea put forward in the draft recommendation, that of giving national aeronautical councils an important job of work to do, is a very sound one. I believe too that these national councils could together form a European aeronautical council.

Since the ministries involved in this council would exert great influence, an attempt could be made to map out together certain limited European objectives. Efforts towards finding a certain degree of unity should be concentrated initially on two fundamental points. First of all there would have to be, as the recommendation suggests, a European agency for issuing airworthiness certificates, and secondly there would have to be an organisation for selling European-built aircraft on the world market. This point, too, has been brought out in the recommendation. I am, incidentally, well aware that it will probably not be possible to give one single organisation the job of selling civil and military aircraft. The national councils and the European aeronautical council will, I believe, be up to the task of finding a solution to this problem.

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to sound a warning against setting up too close a business relationship with American firms. We must not forget that although the American industry is in a considerably better position than it was some time ago, the overall economy of the United States is still rather fragile. For the moment, the prices of European aircraft and equipment are higher than American prices, which are showing a measure of stability. One can only conclude that this could change very quickly. Let us not forget that the Americans still have a very substantial budget deficit, which even for the United States of America amounts to a quite inconceivable amount of money. What surety do we have when making the costly investment of tax-payers' money essential for new civil aircraft? Ought we not to fear that — as has happened in the past — the Americans would choose first to scrap projects of a bilateral or a multilateral nature, which are much less signi-

ficant for the American employment market or American trade than purely national projects? It is because of this that I hope that Europe can manage to find acceptable alternative solutions. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — I understand that Mr. Valleix has agreed with Mr. Warren and Mr. Richter that he will reply to the different speakers and I should like him to speak first. I shall say a few words at the end.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — In reply to Mr. Schlingemann I will say that, taking his speech as a whole, I did not find anything with which I disagreed, and I thank him for what he said and the support I feel he gives to the draft recommendation.

I will also say to Mr. de Bruyne that I agree with him about the somewhat awe-inspiring number of proposed new organisations and that we must avoid this danger, which we have, I believe, minimised. The national councils of aeronautics we were talking about this morning with Mr. Warren are intended to secure a greater coherence within our respective countries. But we have no patented rights in the name. Anything that helps towards greater coherence must facilitate the advent of that European council which is our final aim, a European council or agency, the aim being to work effectively in concert.

I would also like to say to Mr. de Bruyne that as far as the EEC is concerned we do refer to it, for we have no intention of ignoring, much less opposing, the work of the European Economic Community in this area, and look to our fellow member when he takes his seat in the near future in the ECAC to help us to ensure that the need to concert the efforts of WEU and ECAC is always properly understood. Not only do we not misunderstand the rôle of ECAC but we refer to it so as to make it quite clear that the reference to the organisation was intended more to emphasise its rôle than to encroach on it.

In reply to Mr. Portheine, I should like to say how much we appreciated his very detailed speech. In my capacity of French Rapporteur

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

I listened with great interest to the projects attributed to France in aeronautical matters. But I should like to make a general point. If all these projects of equal-sided representation — i.e. for my country's sake provided they are actually projects of equal-sided representation — i.e. handled on the basis of equal negotiating rights such as we want in Europe. I should also like all currently bilateral negotiations, which ought to be pursued, I repeat, with a European objective in view, to be carried out as in the case of SNECMA and General Electric, that is, with SNECMA exercising European leadership. What is necessary in such matters is that the search for contacts should yield possibilities of European co-operation. All of which shows us how careful we must be in our search for bilateral contacts. I would go further: in order that these contacts give tangible results along the lines that we have marked out today, full use should be made of all the possibilities for operating on a European scale, and I entirely agree with the position taken by Mr. Chabert a few moments ago.

As for the Airbus, I will not go into details of the information supplied by Mr. Portheine. If our English friends should take a larger share in the Airbus, we regretted TriStar too much not to be delighted at increased British participation in Airbus. And so we should like to hope that all that — and I call my English friends to witness — is only a pledge of a wider European co-operation.

Finally, Mr. Portheine spoke of the importance he attaches, if I understood him rightly, to aeronautical research. Personally, though I think I can speak on behalf of my Rapporteur colleagues, we have ourselves been alive to this aspect of the matter. The current relative stagnation of technological advance which is both related to and a demonstration of the crisis or a slowing-down in purchases of aircraft, should not completely obstruct and sterilise the programme of our planning offices. It is a serious and costly problem. Mr. Portheine rightly reminded us of it. Insofar as we voluntarily support these research units, and that means the will of our governments to pursue research, without any guarantee that we shall tomorrow be able to reap the fruits of it, such aid by corresponding industrial developments may be very costly. But I am one of those who think — I think we can all agree on the point — that it

is a matter of budget priority that has to be given, since otherwise any acceptance of co-operation with our American partners would *ipso facto* result in co-operation by way of subcontracting.

If we are to hope for equality and reciprocity, it will be by a will towards co-operation and political understanding, by demonstrating our technological capability. That is why I thank you for having raised this point. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Warren.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — I merely wish to thank everybody who has taken part in the debate and apologise if I introduced a note of contention, but I think Pierre de Montesquiou, in his wisdom, has been able to look after three Rapporteurs in a way which should commend itself to the whole of the Assembly. If we did not all arrive with exactly the same story, that is perhaps a matter of inability to rehearse the situation, but perhaps one or two of us had our own individual points of view which we could not allow to be dimmed by debate. I would hope that by putting forward different ideas and the idea of contention itself we have lent quality to the debate.

Our Dutch colleague talked of the antiquated British industry, which I shall be delighted to show him at any time, and also the exports we have been able to achieve in competition with American manufacturers in their own nation with engines, aircraft and equipment.

To my dear colleague Jean Valleix and his Airbus, which I am sure British Airways would love to buy but of which it cannot afford the American engines, I would say that we look forward to the time when General Mitterrand has the opportunity to sell the aircraft to United States airlines.

Let us look forward together to the ability to recognise that, with 400,000 people at a spearhead of technology in Europe, it is right and proper that we should be debating their affairs, employment and future, because it is our future. If we are not able to master technology to achieve all we have talked about, the future of Europe will not be theirs to enjoy. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Montesquiou, Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — In my capacity as Chairman of the Committee I should like to say how glad we are today, at the close of this debate, to come together with those who took the first steps, at Toulouse, towards achieving a favourable conclusion as regards European aviation. I, too, would like to thank them, and the three Rapporteurs who, as Mr. Warren said with his typical English humour, consider that any shades of difference between us only serve to reinforce the cohesion and solidarity of European aviation.

I should also like to thank Mr. Vergnaud and all those who helped us to make such a success of the second colloquy at Toulouse and so helped to give added vigour to WEU as an institution.

Mr. Warren has invited us to Farnborough at the beginning of September. I think we shall there see everything that we have wanted to do on behalf of European aviation. He will be our guide that day, one who is more European than English.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The debate is closed.

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — I call for a vote by roll-call.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The regulations which are very strict on this point insist on a vote by roll-call if there is not unanimity. But in view of the fact that there is not a quorum, I propose to the Assembly that the vote be adjourned to the Thursday sitting, along with the votes on the other draft recommendations not previously adopted.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — Thank you.

#### **4. *Détente and security in Europe***

*(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 703 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall resume the debate, which was adjourned this morning, on détente and security in Europe, Document 703 and Amendments.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I assume from your last remarks, Mr. President, in connection with another series of reports that this evening I shall reply to the debate as Rapporteur and then the Chairman of my Committee will speak, but that detailed consideration and votes will take place on another day. On that assumption, I shall content myself with quite a brief response.

I do not think that I need feel surprised that the wording of my memorandum has not met with unanimous consent, as I made it quite clear in my opening that it was no part of the job of a Rapporteur to seek a consensus in regard to what must essentially be his own responsibility. I have made no pretence, nor do I make any pretence now that I expected, that what I put forward as my own appreciation would receive universal consent, although I have been gratified by some of the tributes that have been paid.

I should like to deal with one or two remarks that have been made by those taking an approach rather different from my own towards our problems. Some of those have said that I have laid an undue emphasis on defence, but I must remind the Assembly that this is an Assembly created for the very purpose of defence. It is the parliamentary defence body of Western European Union and it would indeed be strange if such a body, established and maintained as a parliamentary body concerned with the defence of the West, did not concentrate its reports on that very basis of its being.

I was delighted when Lord Peddie pointed to something I had tried to put forward earlier and which I now wish to amplify in regard to the present threat to the western world. Needless to add, we, like most members here, are politically opposed to communism and at successive elections we all, including socialist members, stand against communism, but the threat that I have mentioned and that we are considering is not a reaction of those who are not communists against those who are but a reaction against an imperialist threat by another power which would still be the same whatever party might be established there at any given time.

That I am setting the record straight here, as I believe, is shown only too clearly when one refers again to the attitude adopted to this very problem by, for example, the Chinese at the

*Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)*

present time. No one can suggest that China is a capitalist power but, as I said somewhat flip-pantly in opening, there is not the slightest doubt that if Mao Tse-tung and his cohorts were here and we were talking in terms of the threat of Soviet aggression, I should be able to gain some more votes on my side. Yet no one can suggest that China is other than a communist power.

We must therefore free ourselves of accusations of party ideological thinking, which has certainly not guided my report. On the contrary, in every paragraph I have made it clear that it is the Soviet interpretation of communism which worries us and not the communist ideology which will be fought on such different battle-grounds as the social and economic, and all the factors that decide current elections throughout the western world.

I do not accept that the basis of our fears has anything to do with communism as a political ideology. It has more to do with a power among whose weapons is the use of an ideology in the same way, but much less efficiently, as Hitler used to try to get a fifth column of sympathisers in other countries. The communist authorities in the Kremlin as opposed to those in China or Yugoslavia have developed this method considerably, as I have understood from at least one speech to this Assembly.

I also share Mr. Niet's view of totalitarianism, whether of the right or of the left. At times it seems that we have either a totalitarian State, where freedom is denied, or not. The colour of one's shirt or the flag one waves has always seemed quite irrelevant to me.

I was asked, perhaps a little aggressively — or abrasively, which is the phrase used about my own remarks — about what I had seen in Berlin. It is true that I went to West Berlin and to East Berlin. I consulted the Berlin authorities, and the paragraphs in my memorandum with regard to what is going on in Berlin, I can say without betraying confidences, do not differ from the views of the present Federal Government.

These are not my own personal inventions. Where tensions have eased in Berlin, I have referred to them, and where they have worsened, I have mentioned them, but these views have not just been gathered by myself and are not only the result of visits but are the result of con-

sulting those who are in a position to know because they live there and know what they are talking about.

The only other direct suggestion I cannot accept is that the figures I have given are either false or irresponsible. By a curious coincidence I have been able to rely on only two sets of figures given in my report, one set being that of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which others have mentioned — the latest set being dated 1975-76 — and the other is drawn, word for word, letter for letter, figure by figure, from the defence white paper published by the present Socialist Government in Great Britain and accepted as being accurate by all the NATO powers.

There is one other figure I have given which I have had to put in as a note. This figure is given by a Socialist Defence Minister in Great Britain who has said that my figure of 10.6 % was too optimistic and that in fact the Russians have been spending between 11 and 12 %. It is a British Defence Minister, not Sir Frederic Bennett, who has produced this additional example of how the Soviet Union is spending increased sums.

However the debate goes on, please do not let us hear any more about the figures being a reactionary's nightmare. They are taken from the most official sources, including the British Government — with whom I do not normally agree.

When I spoke at the start of this debate, I expressed the hope that someone would be able to tell me why, if the Soviet military build-up was only defensive, the Russians were approaching a 3:1 ratio against us in Central Europe. We admit that our whole NATO strategy is based on the fact that, providing we can keep a ratio of 1:3, our defence capability is reasonably preserved.

No speaker has yet informed me why it is that, when we are content with a 1:3 ratio for our defence, the Soviet Union insists on a 3:1 ratio in its favour. I have taken careful notes and read the official reports of the debate and I have not yet been told what is the purpose of a build-up which not only exceeds parity, but approaches 3:1.

Throughout the Committee stage of this paper I agreed to the insertion of a whole range of amendments and alterations to fit in more closely with the views of my Committee colleagues —

*Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)*

even though I did not necessarily agree with them. I did so because I feel passionately that in a report like this it would be tragic if, when considering the defence of countries with democratic governments of every hue, we started to divide on traditional left and right lines. The question of defence is surely one on which we should be able to base a reasonable foundation for consensus.

I believe that we no longer deploy sufficient defences to guarantee our security. It is our obligation to re-establish a balance that will do that, but I appreciate that in this Assembly, as in the Committee, some do not share my view. That is why I have tabled, on my own responsibility as a Rapporteur, a new paper of recommendations and conclusions that precisely embody the amendments tabled separately by other distinguished delegates, although I could not agree to the total omission of paragraph 7.

In every other respect, having consulted everybody I could, I think we have reached a consensus. It means that I am agreeing to something which I do not really feel is correct according to my calculations. However, I have to accept that, while the paper and the memorandum are mine, the conclusions are for all of you.

For that reason alone, I am prepared to accept almost the letter of the amendments. I am ready to come to a compromise on the recommendations because I feel that there should go forth from the Assembly, if not a unanimous opinion, at least a clear majority view on what Lord Peddie called the warning that all may not be well. We must maintain our guard.

If I have contributed to that, I shall feel that the sacrifices I have made by giving way against my better judgment have been justified and that I have fulfilled and performed my task as Rapporteur. I hope to earn the confidence of the Assembly if there should be a vote on these matters. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, before turning to discussion of the actual report, I should like to offer a brief word of thanks to the two observers, our

Canadian and Danish colleagues, who spoke during the debate. The fact that they have been here, and what they had to say, have, I believe, been a source of great satisfaction to us. I am all the more pleased to say so, Mr. President, since I see in it a continuation of the dialogue carried on by the General Affairs Committee when it visited Scandinavia in autumn last year and Canada and the United States in April this year. I hope this dialogue will continue and will be intensified, for it is important for WEU's position in the Atlantic Alliance.

Discussion on Sir Frederic Bennett's report has confirmed what was already said in the debate. With his report, Sir Frederic has managed to unleash a discussion of a vigour not often seen in this chamber in recent times. This, I think is a first point in its favour; for what have we to gain, Mr. President, from reports that are so well tuned and so well balanced that no one really feels any particular urge to say anything about them here? I feel that on this score our thanks are due to the Rapporteur.

Secondly, I should like to thank him for the way in which he co-operated with the Committee and with its Chairman. I can say quite frankly that it is a little difficult when the Chairman and the Rapporteur hold differing views on certain fundamental aspects. But this problem was overcome — I hope by myself, but certainly, I would stress, by Sir Frederic — with great fairness. I would like expressly to confirm that Sir Frederic did make additions to the explanatory memorandum on a number of points.

This in no way alters the fact that there are certain points where we are concerned not with facts but with judgments based on these facts and where, as the Rapporteur himself has just said, fundamental differences of opinion still exist.

I will illustrate this with an example in a field where I feel myself to be particularly well informed, namely, Berlin. The Rapporteur has added to his explanatory memorandum on this point after something I had said. Yet we still differ in our assessments both of the importance of the advantages accruing to Berlin from *Ostpolitik*, and of the difficulties involved. From my very intimate knowledge of the situation I see the advantages in a far more positive light, while he is more impressed with the difficulties and the dangers and has stressed them more than I would do.

By and large, this is the one point left outstanding after Sir Frederic's redraft of his



*Mr. Sieglerschmidt (continued)*

recommendation. I have the impression that we can now look forward to general agreement on the draft recommendation, perhaps with the very minor exception that Sir Frederic has mentioned.

May I add a few further comments on the debate? In the debate, a comparison was once again drawn between the situation in Europe in 1938-39 and that existing today. I want to take this comparison to show where the assessments we make here differ fundamentally. Some of my friends — and I share their opinion — feel that such a comparison is simply unacceptable. Others — and not just the Rapporteur — feel that such a comparison can be made.

Mr. Kliesing has quoted the Tass statement and the definition of the policy of détente contained in it. I must say to Mr. Kliesing I did not find these statements in the least sensational, since anyone familiar with the fundamental views of the Soviet leadership on this point knows that these are the basic principles they have always defended. The only question that must of course be asked is how far these principles coincide with the policies adopted in practice.

Let me give you an example to illustrate what I mean. It is surely a basic tenet of everyone in this chamber — or, to be a little less sweeping, of nearly everyone — that we should very much like to see democratic parliamentary governments in other European States, in Eastern and in Central Europe. But no one could seriously take this to mean that we would use every means, including force if necessary, to impose this view on these other countries. I hope that I have made clear what I consider to be the difference between fundamental attitudes and practical politics in this connection.

Now, a word on the comments by Mr. Müller on the subject of the European security conference. When he agreed with the Rapporteur and said that in his opinion action here had been too rapid and over-hasty, we must realise that he was levelling this reproach at twenty-two of the signatory States — leaving out Spain and certain others and counting only the democracies on the western side at Helsinki. Everyone can draw his own conclusions on how matters should be judged in the light of this fact.

Then a comment on the statement by Mr. Dankert who feels that the General Affairs

Committee has, in a way, been grazing in foreign pastures, that is, has been concerning itself too much with defence policy. I would reply to Mr. Dankert that this point has been raised time and again in the Presidential Committee for years, and I think we would all agree that no clear-cut division is possible. Anyone concerned with defence matters from the military aspects will always have to trespass on the political aspects, and anyone who has to deal with the political aspects in this House will be unable to leave the military factors out of account.

I agree however that we should not abandon our attempts to draw what could be a clearer dividing line in this matter. By way of example, I should like to show you how this looks from the viewpoint of the Defence Committee. Discussion on Portugal and Spain was certainly not confined to technical and military matters but also had a thoroughly political content. Mr. President, perhaps we should all in future see to it, on the Presidential Committee, that these two Committees complement each other in dealing with the matters before them and do not overlap too much.

May I end, in view of the coming vote, with a comment on the relationship between a recommendation and an explanatory memorandum. It is true, as Sir Frederic has said, that the draft recommendation of course takes absolute precedence. But if I recall our rules of procedure correctly, the ultimate position on this much debated question is that in cases like this not just the recommendation and that alone forms the basis for assessment, but that it must be permissible, is perfectly proper and is held by many to be desirable, for account to be taken of the explanatory memorandum also, when members decide on which way to vote — particularly if there are very provocative statements in it.

All in all, however, Mr. President, I should like to express my satisfaction on the fact that we have found it possible to achieve such far-reaching agreement on the recommendation which, as I have already said, takes absolute precedence. I think that this agreement can perhaps hardly be better summarised in the present instance than in the recognition by all of us that the SHAPE motto is right — Vigilance is the price of liberty. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Rapporteur has tabled a revised recommendation — Amendment No. 4 — as follows :

*The President (continued)*

"The Assembly,

Affirming that true East-West détente can be achieved only through substantial mutual, balanced and controlled reductions in armaments by both blocs ;

Considering the growing preponderance of troops and weapons on the side of the Soviet Union and its allies in Central and Northern Europe ;

Noting that the Soviet Union has up to now interpreted the commitments entered into in the final act of the CSCE in a restrictive manner ;

Regretting that no recent progress has been made in the SALT and MBFR negotiations ;

Condemning the Soviet Union's policy to take advantage of crises outside Europe to strengthen its political position by direct or indirect military means ;

Concerned that in face of increasingly powerful Warsaw Pact forces the members of the Atlantic Alliance will no longer deploy sufficient strength to guarantee their continuing collective security ;

Noting that while the Soviet Union and its allies fail to accept the main implications of détente, as this concept is interpreted in the West, a relative reduction of military strength in Western Europe has occurred vis-à-vis the Soviet military threat ;

Satisfied that matters emerging from the CSCE have played a large part in the Council's discussions in 1975 ;

Considering that the application of the provisions of the final act of the CSCE on the movement of persons is one of the vital elements by which one can judge the Soviet Union's desire for détente ;

Considering that there is still some uncertainty about the operation of NATO in the event of some members of the Atlantic Alliance falling prey to subversion directly or indirectly sustained by external military intervention ;

Regretting that South Africa's widely condemned racial policies and intervention provided a pretext, although unjustified, for massive Soviet and Cuban military intervention in Angola,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine regularly the consequences of the CSCE ;
2. Inform the Assembly of any reported infringements of the provisions of the final act of the CSCE ;
3. Examine how great an effort each member country has to make to maintain a continuing adequate balance to ensure peace with security ;
4. Ensure that its members concert their views in the appropriate framework on any crisis arising outside Europe in order :
  - (a) to avoid hasty action which might serve as a pretext for interference by the Soviet Union or its allies ;
  - (b) to deter any further Soviet interference ;
5. Report to the Assembly on any implications for Western Europe of developments in the political, economic and military balance in Europe and the world ;
6. Give timely consideration to the conditions in which the modified Brussels Treaty could be applied should one of the member countries fall prey to direct or indirect military intervention from outside."

The new text proposed by the Rapporteur seems to cover the points raised by all the amendments tabled except paragraph 4 of Amendment No. 1 by Mr. Dankert, Mr. Richter and Lord Peddie, and Amendment No. 3 by Mr. Radius.

Mr. Dankert proposes that the seventh paragraph of the preamble be left out.

I call Mr. Dankert.

Mr. DANKERT (*Netherlands*). — The modified recommendation meets, in either spirit or exact wording, nearly all of the objections I had in mind in proposing the amendment. There remains one element, that covered by the paragraph in the preamble which says :

"Noting that while the Soviet Union and its allies fail to accept the main implications of détente, as this concept is interpreted in the West, a reduction of military strength in Western Europe has occurred without a lessening in the Soviet military threat ;"

The substance of this paragraph, that the Soviet Union enjoys a relative superiority, is contained in two earlier ones. We are committing ourselves

*Mr. Dankert (continued)*

to one paragraph and I have accepted the second; to say the same thing three times seems too much.

There is another problem in this same paragraph in the words :

“Noting that while the Soviet Union and its allies fail to accept the main implications of détente, as this concept is interpreted in the West...”

Why should the Soviet Union have a concept of détente as it is interpreted in the West? We should know what the Soviet Union is doing, and it should know what we are doing, and we should come to concrete results together. By the deletion of this paragraph this resolution will become clear and acceptable even if there still remains the problem of the explanatory memorandum, which the Chairman pointed out.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur of the Committee.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I must say in response to the last suggestion that I do not think that the two preceding paragraphs convey what I and my fellow members of the Committee were trying to assert. I have not suggested that the Soviet Union should accept the implications of détente as we do. I have simply implied that I do not — and I know of no responsible person who does — believe that it accepts détente in the same way as we do. This is not a criticism — it is noting a fact which I think important. I have agreed with all the other suggestions put forward — including the loss of some of my most cherished points — but this is one point which my colleagues and I feel is an important matter of principle which should be included.

I would hope that Mr. Dankert remembers that I have dropped my two main points about re-establishing. He denies the need for this, and I have dropped the phrase we “no longer deploy”, saying we “will no longer deploy” if the present build-up accrues on one side and not the other. I am making no criticisms, but simply noting that the Soviet Union and its allies do not accept the main implications of détente. That is a fact which perhaps few people realise. It is the main theme of the explanatory memorandum. It is a fact of life that the Soviet Union does not accept the implications of détente. Because of

this I hope that Mr. Dankert will not press this point.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Dankert.

Mr. DANKERT (*Netherlands*). — I now understand what Sir Frederic meant. He wants to note in this paragraph that the Soviet Union and its allies failed to accept the main implications of détente as this concept is interpreted in the West. I think that statement is correct, and I am quite ready to accept it. My problem is that he ties it up with the relative reduction of military strength, which is mentioned twice in earlier paragraphs. If that last reference were deleted, I should find the resolution more acceptable. It is a minor point, because I think that the sense of the resolution is already changed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — If I could be told where else we have said that a relative reduction of military strength has occurred, I might be more willing to respond. But now that we have deleted the first three lines of that paragraph, I am not myself aware of a reference in the other paragraphs since I changed them to meet Mr. Dankert's views. There were references to the fact that we no longer possessed the same relative strength as before, but I have removed those references to please Mr. Dankert and his friends and now say that we no longer seek to re-establish it. I agree that this was referred to two or three times, but these references have been deleted at Mr. Dankert's request, and I would ask him at this late hour not to press the matter.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Dankert.

Mr. DANKERT (*Netherlands*). — I still cannot see the difference between a relative reduction of military strength in Western Europe and a growing preponderance of troops and weapons on the part of the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe. However, if it is really important, I shall be ready to withdraw my objection.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I am grateful.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We have reached common ground. I feel duly gratified

*The President (continued)*

and would congratulate both the Rapporteur and Mr. Dankert.

Mr. Radius has tabled an amendment to delete the words "direct or indirect" at the end of paragraph 6 of the operative text of the draft recommendation.

I call Mr. Radius.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — Allow me to thank the Rapporteur for having accepted both parts, albeit, in the case of the second, in another form.

I avail myself of the opportunity to call attention to what he said. This is not only a question of form, but also of a substantive shade of meaning, and I am doubly grateful to him for kindly recognising this. But I shall press for the acceptance of my Amendment No. 3 to leave out the words "direct or indirect" at the end of paragraph 6. If you do not accept it, I shall not be very upset.

Nevertheless, it seems to me that the words: "military intervention from outside" are enough. Indeed, we must not always insist so much on all the problems; I am afraid that if we use the phrase "direct or indirect", some people may think we mean to allude to the possibility of the left coming to power in Italy. If this were followed by the Assembly, such an idea might justify an accusation of serious interference in Italy's internal affairs. However, if we are able to remain true to the principle of respect for the independence of the European nations, the Assembly should in my view as far as possible avoid any illusion to a change, whether imaginary or hypothetical, in the internal policy of one of the WEU member States. Stated more simply, I fear that if we labour the point unduly, we shall only be killing our friends with good intentions — I mean, those who, in the boot of Italy, are trying to defend genuine democracy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — As Mr. Radius has been good enough to mention, where there is a question of substance I have met both his other points. In this instance, I must recall — as the minutes of the Committee show — that this question was raised, and, as I am sure the Chairman will confirm in a moment — I have already altered my views regarding

any kind of intervention on those lines — the reference is now to intervention "from outside". We were unanimous in Committee that it was inappropriate to neglect the instances that have taken place in the case of Angola of a great power using other forces from outside. It was for that reason we altered the text to meet the point — and I am sure that the Chairman will back me up, because it was his point that we took. In fact, I think we wanted here to cover the instance of a power using military intervention indirectly because by so doing it might avoid responsibility of doing so directly. There was general agreement about this and I do not think that I can now go back, even if I wished to do so, and reverse a unanimous decision of the Committee. I hope that Mr. Radius will not press this point when all other members of the Committee have acceded to what we had in mind.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — I might say that the explanation given by Sir Frederic Bennett confirms what I said: I think the words: "military intervention from outside" would suffice, and that the words "direct or indirect" could be left out. But I do not want to be a bad loser, and I withdraw my amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Amendment No. 3 by Mr. Radius is withdrawn.

I thank the movers of the amendments, as well as the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the Committee, who have all made a very big effort to reconcile their views.

The vote on the revised draft recommendation as a whole is deferred to a later date.

## 5. Relations with Parliaments

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 706)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the fourteenth half-yearly report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 706.

I call Mr. Delorme, the Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like first of all to say that our lady Chairman,

*Mr. Delorme (continued)*

Mrs. Miotti Carli, has asked to be excused: she has not been able to come because of electoral duties. I should like to welcome our new Chairman since this morning, Mr. Radius: may I remind you that this report covers the period from November 1975 to April 1976.

The texts of the interventions made in the various parliaments of member countries are given in Collected Texts 23, insofar as they have reached the secretariat of the Committee, and I have to inform you that the Committee, meeting in Paris for the purpose of selecting, in accordance with the provisions of Article 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure of your Assembly, from the texts adopted by the Assembly those which in its opinion should be debated in the parliaments, selected Recommendation 273 on Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance, Recommendation 274 on the European aeronautical industry and Recommendation 276 on the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

The texts of these three recommendations have been officially sent to the Presidents of the various Houses of Parliament of the member countries, and our Committee always endeavours to draw the attention of the seven parliaments to the texts which it thinks likely to arouse their interest and stimulate debate.

At this point in my introductory remarks, I should like to appeal once again to my colleagues, and with all due respect to the Presidents of our respective parliaments, regarding the importance of giving the widest distribution to the recommendations adopted and to the work of our Assembly.

We recently noted once more that, at the level of a conference of our Ministers of Defence, it might have been thought there was an Assembly — this one — created especially to study and resolve, as far as possible, certain problems dealing notably with their armaments and their unification.

This is the reason why we insist, and we note, over and over again, that the texts we have chosen for transmission to the parliaments do not always get the attention they deserve. Indeed you will see from the table which is given at Appendix II to my report that the texts selected in November 1973 elicited only four questions and replies; the two texts selected in June 1974

produced only four questions and the single text chosen in December 1974 resulted in only one intervention. Such were the results which we noted in the case of certain interventions.

I note that the WEU Assembly's last session in December roused an echo — I am very pleased to say — in both chambers of the French Parliament. Our report was mentioned in the French Senate at its sitting of 6th December 1975 and in the National Assembly in the official report of 9th December. It should be noted that both official reports were distributed to all members of parliament and anybody else who asked for them.

We noted also that on 23rd October 1975, in a statement on his country's foreign affairs, Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, reviewed the activities of this Assembly.

Finally, in the Federal Republic of Germany, the government continued to submit its half-yearly reports to parliament on the activities of WEU, and Bundestag document 7/4355 mentioned our activities from 1st April to 30th September 1975. The delegation tabled its report on the session and we were able to note, as in a previous report, that the response to the texts adopted by the Assembly was, reassuringly, fifty-six parliamentary interventions during the current half-year, which represents a very marked increase in the interest which members of parliament take in the texts we have adopted. So much for the interest which has been shown in our respective parliaments in the work of WEU.

In this connection our Press Counsellor is to be congratulated on keeping specialist journalists informed of questions and replies likely to interest the mass media.

We have observed during the last few months that people have been talking about WEU, discussing it and referring to some of the reports and, as I saw again in the German press this morning, a reference was made to the work of our current session and the interest being taken in the work of our Assembly.

I believe it was worth while mentioning this, and we ought to encourage our Press Counsellor to continue his, so to say, precision work in publicising the work of our Assembly.

I should mention that Resolution 55 has been the subject of questions in Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Italy. The Belgian reply said

*Mr. Delorme (continued)*

the modified Brussels Treaty was important because it provides for automatic assistance in the event of armed attack. The Italian Government considered that our Assembly has and will have an essential rôle to play because it offers instruments of co-operation which meet the needs of defence. That is what I was pointing out a moment ago. People in high places do not always know what our Assembly has to offer and we can only deplore the fact that there is no call for its services and co-operation, nor of course, Ladies and Gentlemen, your own.

Finally, the Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated that the existing structures of our Assembly might play an important rôle in pooling our ideas about European defence. He welcomed the fact that the Assembly had raised these problems and tabled proposals through our President, Mr. Nessler, to Mr. Tindemans.

As for Recommendation 262, our Netherlands colleagues have again been questioning their Minister about ratifying the conventions on third-party liability in the field of nuclear energy. The reply was even vaguer than the one given in the past.

The Italian Government in reply to a question by Senator Bonaldi, one of our most eminent and faithful fellow members, said that the 1960 and 1963 conventions on third-party liability in the field of nuclear energy had been ratified and would shortly be implemented.

I will not dwell on all the recommendations proposed by your Committee, including Recommendation 263 and Recommendation 266. I should mention that Senator Grangier and our late lamented Mr. Legaret had also put down questions on the continuing failure to appoint a permanent Secretary-General of WEU. The Minister for Foreign Affairs wishes steps to be taken to put an end to this situation, and is doing what he can in this direction.

Questions were put concerning all the other recommendations, which brings me at once to the particularly important one about interventions apart from questions concerning resolutions. It is this type of intervention we ought to be making and I appeal to members to do so whenever the occasion arises. I insist on this point because it is very important. We did it in the case of Mr. Nessler and Mr. Rivière,

when they seized the opportunity of the recent debate on the military programmes act tabled in the French Parliament three weeks ago. We expressed surprise that our own government did not take more account of the work of WEU and all that could be done through this instrument. While it is the Assembly's rôle under normal working conditions to discuss from time to time, pleasantly, and in a well-bred manner, amid a soothing murmur of voices in an air-conditioned hall, it has also a higher and more direct mission. It should be allowed to achieve what those who created it intended it for. That is why we intervened to point out that solutions could be found for a number of problems by making use of what already existed. As a humble lawyer, I notice that very often people hunt through the statute books for texts which already exist and only need to be modernised, or, to use a horrid word, revitalised. The treaty establishing this Assembly and assigning precise aims for it is all too often forgotten. It is wrong not to take a look at texts which would precisely allow the Seven represented here to propose, in a democratic fashion, solutions that have already been studied. At all events this is the pious hope of your Rapporteur.

I mentioned in my report that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs answered a question put by Mr. Radius on NATO's Eurogroup and the proposal to create a European secretariat, even though the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU already exists. The Minister replied that there was no question of France participating in the work of Eurogroup and that misgivings about the creation of an Atlantic organisation were unfounded. Senator Ménard had put a question to the Minister of Defence on armaments procurement, WEU and Eurogroup. So far there has been no reply.

One way or another, every time you speak about WEU in your parliaments you will have contributed to revitalising it and demonstrating its usefulness. That is why we are pleased to note that Mr. Tanghe had put a question to his Defence Minister on the bodies of which Belgium was a member and had concerned himself with the quest for joint production of armaments and equipment. He said that while the WEU Assembly was not the body for this, and although the name of the organisation carried some weight, in practice nationalism would always be a big obstacle. I was delighted with this reply, especially knowing how harm has been done by nationalism in certain respects, especially for

*Mr. Delorme (continued)*

implementation of the treaties as we would like to see it. But since we have a treaty we must make use of it. The rôle of your Rapporteur and of the Committee is, in fact, to urge upon you, whenever you mention the Assembly, to demonstrate its full usefulness.

On 11th and 12th May last, as guests of the government of Luxembourg, in the course of a very pleasant visit, we were given a very interesting commentary on parliamentary life by Mr. Wagener, Secretary-General of the Chamber of Deputies of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. It was brought home to us that we really were in a profoundly democratic and liberal country.

Our Committee is desirous of continuing its visits to the parliaments represented here, to prove that, in our organisation, democracy is sovereign and not an empty word.

In conclusion, besides our proceedings in Committee and in public sittings, another important job is making known what the Assembly has already accomplished. Relations with parliaments are, so to say, specially designed to promote publicity, public relations and propaganda in favour of the aims of WEU. We ought, whenever we can, to tell our fellow members in our own national assemblies what WEU stands for, explain to them what these initials mean, how it was born and in what ways it can be of service. It would be an excellent lesson in civics, and would enhance the reputation of our Assembly if everybody knew the exact terms of the treaty which established it.

While this Committee is not called upon to study questions of grand strategy, armaments or groups of armaments, it does all the same have the mission of making known that, for its defence, Europe has at its disposal an instrument that simply demands to be fully wielded, deployed and used as a framework, and there is no need to look for it any further.

When solutions are sought at international conferences, they could perhaps be found in this Assembly of seven nations. That is why the Committee decided at its last meeting in May 1976 to take concerted and concentrated action to publicise Resolution 59 on European union and WEU without waiting for it to be ratified by the Assembly and form the subject of questions in parliaments. For the French Delegation

we did it in the case of Document 701 on a matter concerning the staff regulations and the pension scheme for our international civil servants.

Such are the conclusions of my report.

With a barometer in one hand, and a thermometer in the other, we of WEU must continue the effort to make known in all organs or committees what contribution it can bring and what an invaluable instrument our Assembly is. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — No other speaker has put down his name for this debate.

I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — This information report presented by Mr. Delorme does not contain any recommendation or resolution. He has presented it with burning eloquence. He is no humble lawyer as he claims to be, but a great jurist — and a man of conviction. I would ask those members still present and all the others, to follow the recommendations which he has made. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Assembly takes note of the fourteenth half-yearly report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

#### **6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 16th June, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1976 (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Document 701).
2. Address by Mr. Schmidt, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany.
3. Security in the Mediterranean (Presentation of and Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and

*The President (continued)*

Vote on the draft Recommendation, Documents 708 and Amendments and 712).

4. Reserve forces (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 707).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 6.10 p.m.)*



## FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 16th June 1976

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1976 (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 701*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Lord Selsdon (*Rapporteur*), Mr. de Bruyne, Mr. Page.
4. Security in the Mediterranean (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 708 and Amendments and 712*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Buck (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Bologna.
5. Address by Mr. Schmidt, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany.  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Schmidt.  
*Replies by Mr. Schmidt to questions put by*: Mr. Critchley, Mr. Rivière, Mr. Richter, Mr. Mattick, Mr. Schwencke, Mr. Enders.
6. Security in the Mediterranean (*Resumed Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 708 and Amendments and 712*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Rivière, Mr. Vasco da Gama Fernandes (*Observer from Portugal*), Lord Peddie, Mr. Radius, Mr. Vedovato.
7. Change in the Order of Business.  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Picket.
8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Mart, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> See page 33.

### 3. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1976

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 701)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1976 and votes on the draft opinion and draft recommendation, Document 701.

I call the Rapporteur, Lord Selsdon.

Lord SELSDON (*United Kingdom*). — I find myself today in danger of being as repetitive as it is possible to be in that the contents of the report I have prepared are repetitions of previous reports, with one or two minor amendments. I shall once again review the situation. The report deals essentially with the terms and conditions of employment of members of WEU but it also looks at the overall problems of conditions of employment of the other co-ordinated organisations.

*Lord Selsdon (continued)*

I should like to call your attention to Appendices VIII and IX. We often forget that when we speak of the co-ordinated organisations we are speaking of some 12,724 civil servants to whom will be added shortly another 100 or so from the long- or medium-range weather forecasting unit and some 2,000 in connection with the patents office to be established in Brussels. Although they all work for separate organisations, they have one thing in common: they belong to the co-ordinated organisations and do not come under the administration of any single government or of the Commission.

The problem lies in the fact that each organisation reports to a considerable number of governments, WEU being composed of only seven member countries whereas OECD is composed of about 24. WEU is the smallest organisation and perhaps the one whose staff are most inclined to wonder whether its long-term future is viable or how long it will continue after the treaty expires. All this creates some insecurity for its employees. Their number is small, only 105, and it has not been increased, so there can be no accusation that it is over-staffed. Nor has the overall budget itself been increased very much.

Perhaps the most important element of this and previous reports is the question of a pension scheme. Whilst it was the declared intention in 1974 to introduce a pension scheme for WEU and the co-ordinated organisations, nothing has happened so far. The various governments appointed a committee of fully qualified experts, which was faced with the task of putting forward and obtaining agreement on final proposals for such a scheme. Whilst there has been much discussion and, I would suggest, considerable expense, nothing constructive has happened to date. I do not mean that the proposals themselves are not constructive but that there has been no action on them. It is important to remember that a subject such as pensions involves human feelings. Although people believe in their hearts that a pension scheme will come, there is nevertheless an element of uncertainty which causes them considerable discomfort and nervousness and which may lead in certain cases to a lack of devotion to duty.

There are two basic problems in the introduction and co-ordination of the scheme in both this and the other organisations. The different organisations themselves were not sure whether

they actually wanted a common scheme. This may have been due to internal politics, jealousies, or concerns of one sort, or wars between one organisation and another. They have now agreed that a common scheme under common management would be not only economic and justified, but almost a necessity if one is to develop any common organisation for European civil servants outside the Commission.

Most of the recommendations we have made represent attempts to draw procedures into line with those in the Community in order to avoid creating a different type of civil servant so that someone who works in the Community is no better or worse off than someone who works outside it. Since the member States of WEU are members of the Community, it seems logical that everything should fall into line with Community proposals.

These deliberations about pensions have caused some suffering to those who have retired during the past two years because of this uncertainty. Then, not perhaps a blow, but something rather stupid happened — the system for reviewing salaries was suddenly dropped and nothing was put in its place. This added to the uncertainty about pensions and caused some unrest — not within WEU, but, as delegates will be aware, in other organisations such as NATO and the Council of Europe — and anxiety that there would be what might be called industrial disputes.

This may seem odd to many of us, because we are aware that most European civil servants have quite good remuneration and a reasonable standard of living. But they have no permanent home and are to some extent international wanderers not tied to any one country. They need security and that security must come from regular reviews of salaries to keep them in line with inflation, and also the security of a pension. We understand that since this decision to suspend or drop the system of review, one or two things have happened. Within WEU, I understand, the lower grades have received a 5% increase and the higher grades about 4% or less — which is reasonably modest in these inflationary times, but I think that it is acceptable to them, provided the system of review is re-established.

I ask colleagues today to do anything in their power to urge the appropriate governments or authorities to pursue and conclude the introduction of a pension scheme during this year.

*Lord Selsdon (continued)*

If it is introduced by the end of this year, it will have to be back-dated for about two and a half years.

It may often not be realised that, although there have been no pension schemes within WEU, there are various provident funds to which people contribute, and the pension scheme itself is scheduled to be a budgeted pension scheme. Therefore, past contributions and everything connected with provident funds will actually be paid back to governments when the schemes have been agreed. Naturally, this would start at a later date, but there is no immediate extra financial burden on governments in introducing these pension schemes at present.

So I would ask our colleagues today to do everything possible to draw attention to this, remembering that if things are allowed to fester, they can cause very serious disruption within the European civil service and this can do the cause of Europe nothing but harm. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In the debate, I call Mr. de Bruyne.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we are lucky in having as Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration an experienced politician and financial expert like Mr. Dequae. He helps to strengthen the authority of our Committee, an authority that indeed needs strengthening because, among other things, of the great personal and social responsibilities the Committee carries. I congratulate Mr. Dequae on his recent election to the chairmanship, and hope that this decision will be crowned with success. You will know what I mean, Mr. President, and what personal, social and human aspects are involved.

This brings me to the recommendation and to Lord Selsdon's report. Lord Selsdon is an experienced Rapporteur, with a specially sound knowledge of the financial and administrative background to the WEU staff regulations. I hope that we shall long benefit from his skilled collaboration as Rapporteur.

In conclusion, I would draw your attention to one aspect of the report that may have escaped you. The report looks highly technical where it deals with financial matters, and it may well be that it is understandable in all its

sections only to the initiated. I want to emphasise that it is the interests of the members of the staff of WEU, and their families, that are at stake here. These interests are no longer fully protected by the present staff regulations and pension arrangements. I would call attention, too, to the fact that WEU, as an employer, is running the risk of being put in a situation where it would, for want of a sufficiently strong financial basis, no longer be able to fulfil its most elementary human and social obligations.

We must avoid WEU ever being blamed for shortcomings in the social and human sphere. I hope, therefore, that Mr. Dequae will indeed have the real success he is seeking in the discussions he is now having and which he will probably be pursuing to the very highest, ministerial summit level, in the days and weeks to come.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Page.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to follow Mr. de Bruyne in congratulating Mr. Dequae on once again becoming Chairman of the Budget Committee. He has great experience. In nearly every speech I seem to make in any international organisation I have to start by congratulating Mr. Dequae. It gives one great comfort to have such a firm foundation for these bodies. I should also like to congratulate Lord Selsdon on his election as Vice-Chairman, and Mr. Robert Schmitt, and wish them good luck in the coming year — particularly Lord Selsdon in his efforts to achieve final results in connection with some of the staff matters.

I should like to underline two of the observations that Lord Selsdon has made in his speech and in his report. We must see that the staffs of Western European Union and other co-ordinated organisations do not feel that they are second-class citizens compared with those employed by the EEC. An organisation such as WEU depends very much on the efficiency, loyalty and quality of its staff, and it is essential that it continues to attract the highest calibre of employee. If such people feel that they are at too much of a disadvantage compared with the EEC, it would be an extremely damaging situation for WEU itself.

Lord Selsdon was quite right to say that the international civil service has not the same home base as civil servants working for the civil service in their own member countries. They have their staff associations, their own civil service, their own national parliaments. The civil

*Mr. Page (continued)*

servants who work in WEU and the Council of Europe and other of the co-ordinated organisations have only the assistance of those workers who can act *in loco parentis*.

Therefore, it is important that we in this Assembly should accept the responsibility of being the only judges of the quality of emoluments and terms of service of those who work for us.

It is difficult for all national governments to find finance at this time for international organisations and it must be a great temptation in the cabinets of our different countries to think: "If we make an economy in the Council of Europe or WEU or NATO, or somewhere else like that, it will not show so much as making an economy in a home spending department." Therefore, I think Lord Selsdon is right to point out that to get a decent and efficient pension scheme need not and should not be a burden on tax-payers and exchequers. The time has come for a step forward in the subject of pensions in the co-ordinated organisations. I hope that members of the Assembly will give Mr. Dequae and Lord Selsdon their full backing in negotiations with the Council of Ministers on this important subject. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — There are no more speakers on the list.

The debate is closed.

In Document 701, the Committee presents a draft opinion and a draft recommendation.

No amendment has been tabled to the draft opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1976.

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation or draft opinion taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation or draft opinion and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections to the draft opinion ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

*The draft opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1976 is adopted unanimously*<sup>1</sup>.

No amendment has been tabled to the draft recommendation on improving the status of WEU staff.

The vote on the draft recommendation as a whole will be by roll-call if the Assembly is not unanimous.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

*The draft recommendation is therefore adopted unanimously*<sup>2</sup>.

#### **4. Security in the Mediterranean**

**(Presentation of and Debate on the Report and Supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 708 and Amendments and 712)**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report and supplementary report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on security in the Mediterranean and vote on the draft recommendation, Documents 708 and Amendments and 712.

I call Mr. Buck, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*). — First, I should like to say what an honour it is to present a report to the Assembly of Western European Union. This is the first time I have had this honour and I trust that the Assembly will forgive any inadequacies which there may be in my presentation and will attribute such inadequacies to my inexperience in operating in this distinguished international forum.

I should like to thank the secretariat, which has been such an enormous help to me in the preparation of this report. In particular, I should like to thank Stuart Whyte and his hard-working secretary for all their help in the compilation of this work. In the relatively few months during which I have had the privilege

1. See page 34.

2. See page 35.

*Mr. Buck (continued)*

of serving as a member of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU, I have learnt that we have indeed a very small secretariat, but my experience over these months leads me to the firm conclusion that what our secretariat may lack in numbers it makes up for fully in quality. I think we are sometimes, if I may respectfully say so, slightly inclined to take for granted all the enormous amount of hard work which our small secretariat does. I cannot speak highly enough of the help that I have had from Mr. Whyte and his secretary in the compilation of this report.

Next I should like to thank the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. This report, as set out in paragraph 152, was adopted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by 11 votes to 2. I hope that I am not out of order if I point out to the Assembly that before that vote was taken I was glad to accept various amendments put forward by colleagues more experienced in the operation of this distinguished international forum than I and that I now recognise that I was wholly right to accept those amendments. I should like to express my gratitude to them for taking the trouble to put forward those amendments. Their inclusion in the draft report has made it a better report. I am grateful to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments which was kind enough to adopt the report after I had been glad to meet some of the comments made in Committee.

I should like to make one other remark before returning to the recommendations that I have the honour of putting before the Assembly. Whatever colleagues may think of the recommendations, I hope that they will find the document as a whole a useful working document. If my colleagues have been kind enough to look at the document, they will have noticed that it contains a great deal of information that I hope will be useful to our colleagues who have made a particular study of armament matters. There is a great deal of information and I hope that the material both within the body of the report and in the appendices will prove useful to my colleagues. Here again I reiterate the gratitude that I feel for the secretariat, which has enabled me to compile the information contained in the appendices, which, if nothing else, make it what might be described as a useful working document.

In an introductory note, there is set out a fairly large number of people who have been consulted and who have given me the benefit of their great wisdom before I compiled the draft recommendations. There is set out all those by whom I have had the benefit of being briefed.

Then we come to the draft recommendations. First, there is what I suppose must be regarded as the preamble.

Paragraph (i) sets out that which we all know only too well — it draws attention again to the emergence of the Soviet Union as a world naval power.

We are all familiar with this phenomenon. As a former Minister for the Royal Navy, I certainly am as familiar with it as anyone else here. What has happened since Cuba has been a massive build-up of the Russian naval forces. The great Admiral Gorshkov had his task of persuading the Politburo to go ahead with massive naval expansion made easy by what happened in Cuba when the Russians had to turn back their ships. They now have a blue water fleet capable of deployment anywhere in the world. That former humiliation could not again be inflicted on Russia. The Russians now have a vast ocean-going fleet and the accumulation of their forces is well known to us all.

We know that a new Russian nuclear submarine is being built every month. We know about the aircraft carrier Kiev, which is built and to which I shall refer later, and we also know about the other aircraft carrier which is being built. This development has been stressed in other working documents of Western European Union, but I trust that the Assembly will agree that it is right to mention it again.

There is a passing reference to the political uncertainties and disputes in the Mediterranean area. It is not appropriate in this paper, however, to go into that in detail. We are all familiar with the tremendous uncertainties, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Paragraph (iii) calls for "the broadening and strengthening of the Alliance, based on freely-elected parliamentary democracies and the preparation of NATO contingency plans designed to meet any crisis". In paragraph (iv) I make the suggestion that we should be "willing to see other appropriate countries such as Australia, New Zealand and, to the extent that it progresses to democracy, Iran associated with Alliance defence planning".

*Mr. Buck (continued)*

I call particular attention to this part of the preamble. This matter is dealt with further in paragraph 146 where it is pointed out that Australia and New Zealand have in recent times taken a closer interest in mutual defence plans. Australia has made available to the United Kingdom and United States warships the enlarged Cockburn Sands naval base and there has been a continuation of the ANZUS defence pact and a greater degree of exercises between the Australian and New Zealand fleets and the fleets of the rest of the western world. I hope that the Assembly thinks it appropriate that passing reference should be made to closer association with Australia and New Zealand. It is not unduly influenced by the fact that I have an Australian wife, but perhaps that has had something to do with the recommendation. I know from having met the present commanders-in-chief of the Australian fleet and of the New Zealand fleet in an earlier rôle that they are keen, and we should be keen, on closer liaison with those countries.

Iran is also mentioned as an emerging power and I believe it appropriate that we should have closer association with it. That is all that is called for, but it will be noted that I have been careful to refer to the extent that progress to democracy takes place in Iran when closer integration may be possible in the short term and defence planning at every level might be thought wholly appropriate.

Paragraph (v) welcomes "the advent of a freely-elected Parliament in Portugal and the announcement of free elections in Spain". This is a subject to which I propose to return when I get away from the preamble to the body of the recommendations.

Paragraph (vi) refers to matters already considered by the Assembly. There is the Montreux Convention by which, in all fairness, I must say the USSR has, as far as I am aware, meticulously abided. It will be interesting to observe what happens when the Russians wish the Kiev to emerge from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean and how they deal with that, because, as we all know, there is a prohibition on the movement of aircraft carriers through the Turkish Straits. We may suddenly find that this aircraft carrier becomes an anti-submarine vessel. We must watch that situation and do everything possible to maintain the Montreux Convention.

There is also a recommendation that the NATO Gibraltar command be transferred to the IBERLANT command. There is now a first-class communications link between Gibraltar and the IBERLANT headquarters, not yet entirely completed. I do not think that I am in contravention of the Official Secrets Act if I say that this substantial improvement in communications between Gibraltar and the IBERLANT command makes it appropriate that there should be this transfer. Whilst not quoting any military leaders, I can indicate that there is a very substantial body of opinion that the transfer should be made. If any of my distinguished colleagues wish to study this aspect further, they can refer to Appendix I.

I turn now to recommendation 1(a), which relates to a matter on which I have already touched. I hope that colleagues will note the careful way in which, assisted by the secretariat, I have worded this paragraph. It calls for the North Atlantic Council to negotiate with the Government of Spain "that emerges from free elections the accession of that country to the North Atlantic Treaty, and an appropriate rôle for the Spanish armed forces in the integrated military structure". That is made contingent on there emerging a democratic government freely elected: I emphasise that.

I hope that this attempt to hold out the hand of friendship will be seen as encouraging those in the Iberian peninsula who are striving so hard, as I have seen from visiting Madrid, to bring about a democratic society. I hope that those who are striving so hard with such difficulties facing them, after forty years or more of a totalitarian régime, will feel that it gives them some small help. If so, we shall have done something very worth while. But, as I say, this paragraph is carefully worded and made wholly dependent on there being free elections in that country, elections that are seen to be free.

The value of a Spanish integration into our command structure in the Mediterranean is obvious, but let us for a moment put it into balance. It is clear that because of the difficulties in the Eastern Mediterranean resulting from the tragic dispute between Turkey and Greece, the free world's position there is weaker and less satisfactory than it has been. If we can offer this as a *quid pro quo*, as it were, the strengthening of the Alliance at the other end of the Mediterranean will have been achieved.

Recommendation 1 (b) reads: "by fostering the accession of Malta to the North Atlantic

*Mr. Buck (continued)*

Treaty, should a Maltese Government so request, or the conclusion of bilateral defence arrangements between Malta and Italy." I have visited Malta. We all know the importance of its strategic position although, to be frank, it is not so great as in the past. It would be disastrous for the Alliance, however, if there were to be an occupation by any unfriendly power. This modest recommendation makes such proposed accession contingent and dependent on the desires of a Maltese Government. It would be inappropriate not to indicate that if a Maltese Government wants it, we should be glad to welcome Malta within the body of the Alliance.

I then suggest that we should recommend the value of military facilities being located on a basis of territorial diversity in the Mediterranean area. This speaks for itself. It is an example of the old adage of not putting all one's eggs in one basket. This recommendation has been made before. There is a heartening diversity and number of bases. It is a matter which has been referred to in earlier reports, and it is appropriate that it should be stressed here.

Recommendation 1 (d) calls for increased public identification by all the member countries and the Alliance as a whole with NATO defence arrangements in the Mediterranean area. This takes up a recommendation made in an earlier report by Mr. Critchley, the present Chairman of our Defence Committee. We have reiterated that sensible recommendation.

Recommendation 1 (e) is similarly self-explanatory. Help should obviously be given to the Portuguese forces to become more effective in any NATO rôle. I know from my visits to Lisbon that the Portuguese are establishing true democracy there. They should play a more adequate and appropriate rôle within NATO as they emerge to proper democracy. We should give them every help and assistance, and it may be helpful for us to express that aim in the report.

Recommendation 2 (a) calls on the North Atlantic Council to declare that the Alliance will take appropriate measures to resist any external political or military pressure designed to change the government or policy of Yugoslavia.

No doubt we have all given considerable thought and attention to this matter. What is

needed is a strong affirmation by the western world that when Marshal Tito dies, the Western Alliance will not tolerate outside intervention. The mere expression of that will may be sufficient to prevent such intervention.

There follows an exhortation in recommendation 2 (b) that we should make clear to the Soviet Union that changes in the *status quo* in the Mediterranean area by the taking up of new bases there by the USSR could be a dangerous course to pursue and will be met in a robust manner by the Alliance.

Recommendation 2 (c) includes an exhortation that there should be contingency plans to deal with any of the eventualities to which I have referred, or any other matters. There is also a plea for no more secrecy than is required for the success of the plans. I am a great believer in open government and — although I may have been guilty when I was a Minister — I wonder whether governments do not often keep things under wraps far more than is necessary. We should do all we can to get governments to be more outward-looking and approachable, to give more information and to have the minimum of secrecy about defence matters. An exhortation of that character seems appropriate.

There is now a European programme group and it would be a good idea for it to produce an annual defence white paper — as we have in Great Britain and many other countries — setting out its progress in the previous year.

I apologise for having taken so much time. I hope that the Assembly will find this a useful work and will look favourably on it. It contains in a compact and easily digestible form a great deal of information about the situation in the Mediterranean and should be regarded as a working document. I hope that it will be thought that the recommendations make practical suggestions about the efficient working of the defence structure in the Mediterranean and that it will give some encouragement to those striving to restore democracy to the troubled Iberian peninsula. I hope that we shall give them a welcome when their efforts are crowned with success.

I thank the Assembly for its patience in listening to what I have said and hope that members will be kind enough to adopt the report that I have presented. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

The first speaker on the list is Mr. Bologna.

Mr. BOLOGNA (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen. I have seen fit to address you on a more specific topic, so as not to find myself, as sometimes may occur, discussing in general, unduly philosophical terms.

All I can say is that, as polling day draws 21st June, for we should not in that case be here, making predictions and attempting forecasts. We should know what we are so anxious to learn — the way the Italian elections have gone, and whether or not the communists will be entering the government. But this is still one big question-mark, and there is no easy way of finding an answer.

All I can say is that, as polling day draws nearer, the Italian electorate is more preoccupied with misgivings, or, if you like, fear of the unknown aspects of a political turning point — communists in the cabinet — than with the desire and will for change at all costs.

However, it has unfortunately to be said too, quite outspokenly, that if the communist party, together with the socialists and other left-wing minority groups, fails to achieve a majority, we shall not see the end of political instability in Italy. This stems from the crisis among the christian democrats, and the uncertainties and vacillations of the socialist party.

But I believe I can, no less outspokenly, assert that the case of Italy, which rightly preoccupies our NATO friends and allies and the governments of the seven WEU member countries by reason of its adverse repercussions on the political situation and on Western Europe's defensive alignments, especially in the Mediterranean sector, is only one of a set of other possible cases. I mean that — unfortunately, to my mind — communism is, or might be, about to gain a foothold in the governments of other West European countries.

The precarious balance in the Mediterranean, which has become topical again with the reopening of the Suez Canal — I am summarising what was written in the latest Strategic Survey — might be struck a shrewd blow by a communist presence in the government majorities of countries like Italy, France and Spain.

Is there any justification for the concern expressed on all sides at the progress of the Italian communists towards government, or is it exaggerated, or may it even betray undemo-

cratic sentiments? I disregard the latter accusation, which is unfounded.

The concern is well-justified, for the following reasons:

First, "Italy is", as we read in the report tabled by Mr. Buck, Document 708, "the most important single country to the Alliance on its southern flank". It has an effective navy of three cruisers, eight destroyers, ten frigates, seven corvettes and ten submarines, and has a fleet modernisation programme in hand. Apart from the submarines, Italy's surface fleet alone is, according to our Rapporteur Mr. Buck, more powerful than the mean size of the Soviet squadron in the Mediterranean.

Still quoting Mr. Buck, "The vital and loyal contribution of Italy to the mutual defence arrangements of the North Atlantic Treaty makes it natural that the political uncertainties of that country should be of concern to other members of the Alliance".

Obviously the question whether Italy remains in or withdraws from NATO, or is left to wither on the stem, cannot be a matter of indifference to us.

Second, once in the Italian Government, the communists could not — despite their constant repetitions, these days, that they will not seek Italy's withdrawal from the Atlantic Pact and its military organisation, NATO — objectively be expected to leave things as they are. There is no knowing whether they are sincere in what they are saying now or merely being opportunists.

The incompatibility for the communists between membership of an alliance created and kept alive as the answer to a hypothetical threat of Soviet aggression — and as a counterweight to Soviet military strength — and the continuing links to a party, the communist party of the Soviet Union, still referred to as fraternal, is glaringly obvious, and, as I said just now, an objective fact. Fair words and good intentions would cut no ice, even if true. And another objective fact would be the shift in the political balance between East and West.

Let us not forget either yet another possibility, far from remote or fanciful, of Yugoslavia, after Tito's death, being once more wholly swallowed up, in one way or another — of its own choice, or through Soviet pressure — by the USSR.



*Mr. Bologna (continued)*

So, when Berlinguer tells *Time* magazine that what happened to Dubcek in 1968 could not happen to him, because, as he says, "Who could prevent us in Italy from following our own Italian way? The national frontiers are the ones we have now", well, this disregards the possibility I have just mentioned. The latter would effectively give Italy a common frontier with the USSR and the Soviet Union immediate control of the eastern shores of the Adriatic: a convenient position, as you see, for dominion over the whole Mediterranean.

Summing up, I can even believe the Italian communists would, if they entered the government, honour the pacts, for a number of reasons. Meanwhile it would suit their book to await the ripening in France and Spain of favourable situations under the benefit of "Latin socialism", which is currently proclaimed to favour a re-hash of the popular fronts or left-wing alliances, and accepts without suspicion, indeed favourably, what is being called "Eurocommunism". Secondly, the honouring of alliances would be facilitated by the foreseeable substantially unchanged relations between the United States and the USSR, so that Italian communists would not be immediately compelled to choose between these two.

I think that on the strength of such a stance there will still be talk of authentic and essential diversity between "Eurocommunism" and Soviet communism. But nobody can prove this any more than, in the absence of decisive proof, it can be denied, but those who have denied so far the possibility of diversity can at least appeal to past history to support their argument.

Why drag in all this, on the subject of security in the Mediterranean? Because, of course, to me security in the Mediterranean is only accessorially a military problem and even this, it will be realised, as I am well aware, is attributable to my having been for the past eighteen consecutive years a member of the Defence Committee of the Chamber of Deputies: primarily it is a political one.

I understand then, the worries about the Italian elections on 20th June entertained by those among you who have tactfully alluded to them. I am, as I have told you, worried too, both as an Italian and as a Triestino, about what may happen in Yugoslavia when Tito dies, with possible effects on Italy and more generally on

the balance of defensive forces in the Mediterranean.

Let us not say anything else. I know full well that communism is spreading for objective reasons, and cannot be conquered by words alone but by exorcism, but I also know there is so much lip-service, especially among intellectuals, towards marxism; that "Latin socialism" will in the event of communism coming to power in certain West European countries, be a useful, necessary or even determining factor: it would only take a little rethinking on these kinds of socialism to avert the eventuality I have evoked but I know equally well that communism has "helped itself", overtly or covertly, by force in achieving or remaining in power — look at Eastern Europe. So let us endeavour to remain vigilant and not let our guard slip, or ourselves be taken in; above all, I will never tire of saying this, let us build a political united Europe.

This may be the last time I address this Assembly. I shall be sorry to leave it, for I love Europe and want to see it united as a single country transcending the individual States. That is why I wanted to be so outspoken today. *(Applause)*

*(Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Mart, Vice-President of the Assembly)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now interrupt the debate in order to hear the address by Mr. Hermann Schmidt, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany.

**5. Address by Mr. Schmidt, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We have the pleasure of welcoming Mr. Hermann Schmidt, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. Schmidt is a former member of the Assembly of whom we have warm memories.

You have kindly agreed, Mr. Secretary of State, to come and address us on the Government of the Federal Republic's views on defence.

I can assure you that your contribution to our discussions will be followed with the utmost attention and the keenest interest.

Will you please come to the rostrum?

Mr. SCHMIDT (*Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is for me both a signal honour and a pleasure to speak to you, as a representative of the Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, about my country's policy on security and defence. As you have already said, Mr. President, I was a member of this Assembly myself for seven years, and for ten also a member of the North Atlantic Assembly. That period still has very pleasant memories for me. Unfortunately, I then had to return to politics at national level, as I became chairman of our national defence committee and then Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence, in which capacity I represent the Minister.

If you ask me about the aims of the Federal Republic's policy on security — for this is both the problem we are discussing and the subject of my address — the answer can be short and simple: security for my, for our country. Since, however, security must be seen as the product of political, economic, social and also military factors, we cannot be satisfied with such an oversimplified answer. Further, it would hold good for any State, irrespective of its political and social structure.

The supreme aim of security policy in the Federal Republic of Germany is to safeguard the freedom and independence of our country against military threat and political pressure, and to ensure peace. The maintenance of external security is a major condition of our citizens being able to live in freedom and justice under our social laws. Life described in these words constitutes what, as defined by our highest court, the Federal Constitutional Court, is meant in our constitution by "human dignity".

If for no other reason, the Federal Republic of Germany has a vital interest in the maintenance of peace both in Europe and in other parts of the world. Maintenance of peace means in this case preventing both the threat and the use of force in international relations and eliminating any tension that might lead to military conflict. Security for our country is not possible without a credible deterrent against threats from any quarter. However, the Federal Republic is, for many reasons, not in a position to defend itself unaided.

I need mention only our geo-strategic position in immediate proximity to the eastern bloc, with which we have our longest land frontier; our lack of geographical depth; and the high density

of the country's industries and population. It is, moreover, a significant fact that more than 30 % of the West German population lives within a 100-kilometre-wide strip along the border with Warsaw Pact countries and that a quarter of all our industry is in the same area.

I think that this clearly demonstrates the high risk to which our country is exposed. Even quite small losses of territory would be a dangerous blow to the fabric of our country. This, too, is why, surely, we see potential dangers more clearly than some of our friends to the west of us do, and are bound to do.

This lays on us a special obligation to deal with conflict situations before they develop. We cannot hope, in the event of an attack, to have our country liberated only after it has been occupied. The defence of the Federal Republic must be a forward one, that is, right up at Germany's internal border and at the Czechoslovak frontier.

For this reason, the Federal Republic must cling to the principle of forward defence as a component of the Alliance's common strategy; this will also be serving the interests of our West European partners in the Alliance, since we all suffer both from the strategically unfavourable position around the edges of the Eurasian land mass and from a lack of geographical depth.

Left to itself, our nation could not organise its defence. It is not just the military potential which is lacking. In the negotiations for a European Defence Community, and later when we came into WEU and through WEU into NATO as well, we accepted certain upper limits to our armed forces. At the same time, we undertook not to manufacture or own any atomic, chemical or biological weapons, and we have signed and ratified the non-proliferation treaty.

All this, coupled with our vital economic interests throughout the world, requires us to seek protection and security in an alliance. That is why we belong to WEU and to the North Atlantic Alliance. And that is why we make our contribution towards this Alliance. Without support from its allies, the Federal Republic could not maintain its territorial integrity — and this includes the freedom of West Berlin.

Only by joining the Alliance has the Federal Republic been able to cope with its own security problems. Only through the Alliance, which by virtue of its own constitution and the United Nations Charter is a purely defensive body, can

*Mr. Schmidt (continued)*

our country acquire a defence organisation able to deal with any threat from the East and to guarantee a credible deterrent against any aggressor.

Finally, it is only thanks to the certainty that we have the Alliance behind us, and jointly with our partners in this Alliance, that we can pursue a policy of détente intended to prevent military conflict and reduce tension.

For this reason the Federal Republic's policy on security and defence is first and foremost a policy of alliance. With regard to this cornerstone of our policy we have never left the government, parliament or the public in any doubt. We do not, however, limit ourselves to giving the Alliance only what it requires. As a powerful partner we also make our influence felt within the Alliance, so that in the daily round of detailed work we help to keep operational what must remain operational.

Elections are to be held this autumn in the United States and in my own country. It is understandable that in America, as with us in the Federal Republic, the election campaign will lead to many questions being asked concerning the operational efficiency of NATO. As part of the campaign, doubts are inevitably being expressed, even publicly, as to the reliability of the Alliance — sometimes by people who really ought to know better. The doubts expressed about the defensive capacity of the Alliance and the events in Angola were the subject of a large-scale publicity campaign which aroused fears that the West was in the last resort too weak to defend its freedom.

A superficial glance at the ratio of forces in Central Europe would appear to confirm the views of the critics. Within this area, which is important to the security of my country, NATO maintains 27 divisions at combat strength. On the Warsaw Pact side, there are 58 divisions, amongst which the Soviet forces divisions have been strengthened so that now, in contrast to previous years, they have much the same combat strength as western divisions. On the other hand, the strength of the other Warsaw Pact divisions is substantially lower than that of the NATO divisions. Within the area, the Warsaw Pact has appreciably more armour than the Alliance. The number of operational aircraft, too, is greater on the eastern side than on the NATO side, although certain differences in the quality of equipment

and pilot training do something to offset the Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority.

If we include in our calculations the principles of Soviet military strategy, which clearly favour the offensive, we obtain a fairly clear picture of the threat we are facing.

The effect of the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional forces is further enhanced by the naval threat, by which I mean the Soviet navy's capacity to cause serious disruption to our vital sea links in the event of conflict. It may therefore justifiably be asked whether we are still strong enough to ensure our security both now and in the future. I would answer this with a clear "yes". There is no reason to play down the military strength of NATO, nor should we place any faith in those people who would have us believe that every Russian is a superman, a giant.

Anyone who keeps on pointing to the disparities in the distribution of conventional forces should also say that the Atlantic Pact strategy takes these facts into account, that it is designed to take account of the forces on the eastern side. And to this I would add that during the many years in which the East has been growing, the West has not been getting weaker, but has been growing as well. I stress this point with complete conviction as far as Central Europe — the part of NATO which is particularly important to us — is concerned. Deterrence is working. The balance has been maintained.

What we now have is enough to prevent war. We have a broad spectrum of modern defensive weaponry at our disposal. The Alliance possesses this defence spectrum as a triad of strategic nuclear, tactical nuclear and conventional weapons which, if we have to defend ourselves, will be applied in accordance with the agreed strategy of flexible response.

As realists, we naturally appreciate the offensive military strength of the Warsaw Pact. In our opinion, it exceeds defence requirements, which are legitimate even there. It is not, therefore, so much the question "how" the Soviet side is arming that gives cause for concern, but the question "why". We have doubts as to whether the strength, the arms and the organisation of the Warsaw Pact armies serve exclusively defensive aims.

We must, however, be careful not to overestimate the military strength of the East and to play down the strength of NATO. In a speech

*Mr. Schmidt (continued)*

at Boston in March 1976, Dr. Kissinger pointed out that the Soviet system, too, had its obvious weaknesses. It is therefore factually wrong to picture the East as disciplined, productive and strong, while the West is decadent and in a state of disintegration.

Anyone who continually draws an exaggerated picture of Soviet strength and NATO weakness does the Alliance no service. By doing so he makes expenditure on defence seem pointless in the eyes of the public and undermines their will to defend themselves. He wrongly encourages a feeling of inferiority and so unintentionally does the enemy's work for them. The difficulties the Soviet Union is having over the supply of cereals and meat, for example — the Soviet Government has just ordered one fast-day each week — show that for all their spectacular successes in space, in everyday matters they still have to come down to earth. My two sons, who have served in my country's armed forces, and the hundreds and hundreds of thousands of young men in the Federal Republic do not feel that they are inferior to the enemy in the East.

Another thing we in the West must continue to ensure is that we keep pace with what we recognise to be the threat. We have what is needed to secure and protect ourselves adequately against threats of any kind. What is decisive is the will to do what is required for the protection of our freedom. It must continue to be seen without possibility of doubt that the deterrent is not a mere facade or simply a minor hurdle to be taken in one's stride. Anyone attacking us must know that he must count with the West using all the weapons at its disposal. This is a principle of our defence accepted by the whole of the Alliance, and it constitutes the backbone of our deterrent.

In connection with our defensive capability, I referred to the triad and the strategy of flexible response. Of outstanding importance in this context is the presence in Europe of the United States forces. Only the stationing of American troops in Europe makes joint action by the Alliance politically credible. Militarily, it is the necessary complement to the conventional fighting strength of America's Western European partners in the Alliance. Without the presence of North American conventional forces, deterrence and the — for us — vital principle of forward defence would be jeopardised, despite

the considerably higher spending on conventional defence by the West Europeans.

As the leading power in the West, with the largest nuclear deterrent potential at its disposal, the United States has a decisive function in Europe. Its armed forces epitomise a determination and capacity for nuclear defence of the Alliance as well. They are the connecting link to the nuclear strategic weapons in the United States and on the oceans, the most powerful element in deterrence to avoid war.

In view of the geo-strategic and military circumstances of Europe, this escalation link from deterrence to defence is indispensable. It is in line with the particular security interests not only of our continent but with those of the United States as well. We Europeans cannot expect the United States to accept an unreasonable nuclear risk simply because the Europeans are neglecting their conventional armaments.

That my country takes the situation seriously is proved by the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany raises the highest *per capita* amount of all the European allies for defence. We must all, however, make sure that the accepted strategy of flexible response is not changed into one of flexible responsibility.

If, however, attention to our conventional strength is necessary in order to keep the nuclear component of deterrence credible and to present the nuclear risk to the United States in such a way that it remains bearable and defensible for the Americans, it is not only for the Europeans but as much for the Americans too to gauge the conventional balance correctly. We gratefully note signs that the United States Congress is prepared — and may I say quite openly, more ready than it has ever been before — to give high priority to the security tasks to be accomplished in Europe. I am convinced that responsible politicians in North America are aware that freedom will either be safeguarded for all of us or be lost for all of us. The events of the past few years have brought home to us drastically, and tragically, the dangers we are facing. There is no easy way of guaranteeing our freedom, either for us or for America. In July 1975 President Ford, by signing at Helsinki, once again affirmed the responsibility of the United States for peace and security in Europe. For this we are grateful to him. However, we also know that our community of interests requires each of us to do his duty, and none of us must expect others to bear excessive

*Mr. Schmidt (continued)*

burdens and risks. These are the most important of the conditions which must be fulfilled if free nations are to be able to rely on one another.

The United States has built its units in Europe up to full strength. They are on the spot and, as I have found time and again when visiting them, in first-class condition. The stationing of two further operational brigades in Western Germany will strengthen NATO's conventional strike power in this decisive area. The United States remains the cornerstone of the Atlantic Alliance. The dual function of providing a full counterweight to the Soviet Union in the sphere of nuclear strategy and of being the main conventional power can be taken over by no other member of the Alliance, nor even by the Europeans jointly.

We have not got a choice between a European defence and the defence of Europe. In my view, the thesis put forward by the Frenchman, Alfred Grosser, has to be accepted. He said that either our system of defence is secure, in which case it cannot be purely European, or it is purely European, in which case it cannot be secure.

One important addition should, however, be made to Grosser's thesis. The absence of a European defence structure or a European defence organisation cannot be equated with a lack of a European will to defend itself. On the contrary. That was made clear by the comments of the French President, whom I greatly respect, in November 1975. According to what he said, the French President regards any attack or pressure on the Federal Republic as an attack or pressure on France. We in Germany are grateful to him for this clear statement.

I feel that we should stop doubting, because of France's special position in the Alliance, the declared French willingness to defend Europe. The announcement by the French Government that it will be strengthening its conventional forces points in this direction.

We are in the process of fully exploiting the possibilities of co-operation with France on defence matters, and in future too we shall endeavour to shape our relations with our French neighbours on as close a basis as possible in this field which is so important to all the countries of Western Europe. We shall also support practical steps along the road to the unification of Europe, through an intensification of work

on defence matters. Such co-operation can hardly, however, serve as pacemaker for the process of unification. It can only accompany such a process.

Both now and in the future, our main task will be to ensure that in Central Europe the Alliance continues to be capable of warding off any attack. It must be so strong in that region that no one need yield to a military threat on the flanks either. The credible determination of NATO members to make an appropriate military response to attack in any form is demonstrated by the stationing of armed forces from six Alliance countries on the soil of the Federal Republic. This clear determination must not be undermined by relaxation of the defence effort for economic reasons. The level of the defence effort must not depend on the ups and downs of the economic situation; the yardstick for a responsible defence policy must be the scale of the known threat.

The speed of the armaments race between East and West continues to be set by the Soviet Union and its allies. And the Warsaw Pact powers obtain, quite apart from the concentration of economic resources on armaments, more strike power than the West for much the same expenditure. This is made easier for them by, amongst other things, lower manpower costs and virtually complete standardisation. Expenditure on armaments has absolute priority over all other State expenditure. This way of doing things is possible only in countries under an authoritarian government.

In democratically constituted societies, a defence policy that becomes too great a burden on the economy would lead to social stresses and political instability at home. It would be failing in its task and jeopardising what it sought to protect. Similarly wide of the mark, however, is a defence policy that does not relate defence expenditures to the military threat.

The search for a middle road which on the one hand corresponds with the economic capacity of each of the countries concerned and, on the other, enables the armed forces to contribute to a credible deterrent is a continuing and important task in a defence community of democratic States. The fulfilment of this task will be successful in the long run only if we manage to use the defence appropriations more rationally, in other words to co-operate more closely on armaments.

The first step on the right road was the initiative by the Eurogroup Ministers in

*Mr. Schmidt (continued)*

November 1975. They set up the European programme group, which met for the first time at Secretary of State level in Rome in February 1976. The programme group is of particular importance because of France's membership. If co-operation on armaments can be promoted in this way in the Alliance, it may be that military and industrial integration will have moved one step forward in Europe. The members of the European programme group are also quite aware, however, that the difficulties of the matter are such that it is of course not possible to expect rapid results. The success or failure of co-operation will depend largely on whether the declared political will of Alliance members to co-operate on armaments will ultimately be followed through with political determination.

In this matter, the Alliance is by no means only just starting. There is hardly an important weapons system that has not already become a two- or three-country joint project. Examples include Milan, Hot, Roland and the FH-70 field howitzer, the MRCA — known in Germany as the "Tornado" — the Alpha-Jet and the 148 fast motor launch.

Rational utilisation of resources, however, requires that co-operation should be wider than the bi- or tri-national work undertaken so far. In this connection, three essential points must be observed. First, co-operation must increase the defence effectiveness of the Alliance without over-burdening the western national economies. Secondly, it must prevent Europe from dropping behind technologically; by combining the hitherto divergent national efforts on armaments it must raise Europe to the level of a partner who will be taken seriously by the United States. Thirdly, it must ensure that co-operation in Europe does not impede but rather encourages an American presence in Europe. In this way, it must contribute to the strengthening of our Alliance. And when we talk of Europe in this context, it is quite clear that it can only be a Europe which includes France.

The people of the States within the North Atlantic Alliance have a right to insist that the funds raised for defence are applied as cost-effectively as possible. This places an obligation on the governments of the member States. It is up to them to prove that even an Alliance of sovereign States has the strength to overcome national self-interest when the common interest of all is concerned.

As regards the many problems with which the Alliance is faced — and here of course I include the situation on the flanks of the Alliance — we must not forget that this is nothing unusual in an Alliance consisting of free, sovereign States. For members of the Alliance their sovereign freedom of decision is a cherished heritage to be defended by NATO but it is also, of course, a source of weakness with which the Alliance has time and again to cope.

We should not therefore assess the value of the Alliance simply on the picture it presents at one given moment. Reliable constants exist, of greater weight than the problems I have enumerated. The Alliance represents two-thirds of all the world's democratic States. It is, Ladies and Gentlemen, the largest reservoir of economic, military and also moral strength. We in the West must become more conscious than we have been in the past of our own moral and human values, of our economic and also our military resources, which taken together make up our strength. We must draw on these sources so as to safeguard our liberty and solve the problems that beset us.

This also means leaving the people of our countries in no doubt as to the sacrifices that will have to be made in order to secure peace for all. In the Federal Republic, the need for armed forces to maintain our external security is acknowledged by the great majority of our citizens. In pursuing its policy on security, the Federal Government can therefore rely entirely on popular support in Western Germany. This consent by the people is based on the universal desire for security; but it is also encouraged by the openness with which information can be obtained on everything to do with security and defence policy.

First and foremost we explain to the public the defensive principles on which our armed forces have been built up. We have followed to the letter — that is, with the utmost seriousness — the constitutional duty laid upon us by our basic law, which expressly provides that armed forces shall be for defence only. This is clear to all who have eyes and want to see, because of the way the Federal army is composed, equipped and armed. Hardly any other State has so clearly and exclusively geared its armed forces to the sole duty of self-defence. It would do a great deal for world peace if other nations, too, were to accept similar legal commitments. The same holds true for the self-imposed limitations, already referred to, which we undertook to

*Mr. Schmidt (continued)*

observe when we signed the WEU treaty. There is hardly any State in East or West that has accepted such advance commitments.

No one in Europe need feel threatened by us. By renouncing an offensive capability, we are showing that we are prepared to follow a policy of conciliation. We also make it clear, however, that our love of peace is not based on fear, something which can only end in endangering peace. I would add — and this ties up closely with what I have just been saying — that we renounce the fostering of hate in any form. We want to educate and motivate our soldiers for peace and the defence of peace, and not against anything.

This also includes explaining to the public in our country the connection between external security and the social content and free way of life of our country. The citizen must know what he stands to lose. He must also know that this country is worth all of us fighting for. We take very seriously in both our internal and our external dealings, the principle of an "armed democracy" called for by the Federal Constitutional Court.

An important element in our defence policy is the Atlantic Alliance. We do everything we can to strengthen cohesion and collaboration within the Alliance. We pay particular attention to relations with our most important partner in the Alliance, the United States.

In the armed forces, we have especially championed the cause of those doing their service in the Federal Republic. By reforming our educational and training methods, we have made our officers and NCOs better equipped to carry out their task of leading men. By openness in matters affecting careers, we have also given soldiers unparalleled opportunities for promotion. By giving the lower ranks new opportunities of having their say, we have shown that we pay serious heed to what comes, as it were, from below. None of this is allowed to weaken the principle of obedience to orders; but we are certain that a soldier whose human dignity is respected will be a better soldier than one who is not allowed to think for himself. What we want is co-operation between superior and subordinate, and not a rigidly hierarchical system.

We do not regard the Bundeswehr soldier as "material" for the forces. Men and materials are

two fundamentally different things. The human being must always come first. And it is in this spirit that we have decisively improved the social status of our soldiers.

We have done a great deal for the maintenance of our external security. This may often not be entirely evident, even in our own country, for we are now living through the longest period in this century during which there has been no war in Europe. It is however all too frequently forgotten, Ladies and Gentlemen, that this situation does not come about by dreaming of it or looking for it, but by continually watching over and fighting for it anew each day. I am reminded here of the words of the German philosopher, Kant; he pointed out that peace was not a natural state, but must be continually recreated.

Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Secretary of State, for your very full and very interesting statement. You have kindly agreed to answer any questions which the members of this Assembly might wish to ask you.

I call Mr. Critchley, Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — Would the Minister describe the new emphasis which France has placed on its defence policies as the adoption of a forward strategy or the adoption of a strategy of flexible response? How does he distinguish between the two?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHMIDT (*Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — It is quite obvious that in the past views have differed very widely as to the use of French troops in the event of tension or an incipient war. From what has been said by the French President and other responsible persons such as the Minister of Defence and the Chief-of-Staff of the French forces, it is now clearly established that attacks on the Alliance are also attacks on France and that any such attack would immediately evoke defensive action, in other words it is now absolutely certain that French troops too will undertake forward defence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Rivière.

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, yesterday Mr. Destremau talked to us about the reactivation of the Standing Armaments Committee. Now I observe that today you have not said a word about it. Was it simply an oversight on your part, or do you attach no importance to reactivation ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHMIDT (*Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I have made only brief comments on this committee. I have said that it was formed on the initiative of the Ministers in the Eurogroup, and consists of the Secretaries of State who held their first meeting in Rome. We want particularly to put it on record how pleased we are that France is present. We hope for great things from this committee in the future. But it is, of course, a committee for the future ; it is not so far possible to say anything about its effectiveness.

I have just been told that what was meant was WEU's Standing Armaments Committee. I had assumed, on the basis of my address, that it was the committee of Secretaries of State. I did not mention the other committee since in my address I was dealing primarily with the political matters that affect us in the Federal Republic in relation to the Alliance as a whole.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Richter.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — May I ask Mr. Schmidt, following up his last answer, how he sees the future of this ad hoc committee ? Would he say this ad hoc group set up in Rome was in a position to secure co-operation on armaments between the Eurogroup and the French Republic in the longer term ?

I should like to add a second question. I got the impression that when dealing in the last few days with our defence efforts, the Assembly has taken rather a defensive stance. He has described the situation of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany. Is the Minister in a position to add a few comments about the areas in which he has been able to make improvements in the armed forces ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHMIDT (*Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I shall be very pleased to do so, Mr. Richter. First of all, on the aims and efforts of this committee which has had its first meeting in Rome. We set great store by this committee. I feel that the dearer weapons systems become as generation follows generation, the more shall we all be forced to co-operate, to work closely together. The subject is a very difficult one, since it will not be possible without further ado to convince countries that have their own armaments capabilities to let these capabilities fade out. They will not in fact have to do so ; it will be possible to arrive at a division of labour, through grants of licences and through co-operation, as we have done with Great Britain and Italy in the case of Tornado in a way that takes much better care of national economic interests than seemed previously to be the case.

I therefore feel that this committee of Secretaries of State will run into a large number of constraints. The subject is difficult, but we are simply being pushed by events towards complete co-operation.

I do not regard the situation — and I say this most unequivocally — in the central sector, which I touched on at some length this morning, as negative. In that sector, we have done everything to improve our defensive strength. Let me only remind you, *en passant*, that my own country's armed forces at the end of the sixties mustered less than 450,000 men. Today, we have a standing army of 495,000 highly trained troops. Of our own accord, we have continually been renewing and improving our weapons systems. I would mention only one figure, which I will not break down : since 1972, the German Parliament has unanimously voted more than DM 50,000 million to the Bundeswehr in the form of contracts for weapons systems and clearances for production runs, as is now the case with Tornado. We have introduced the availability reserve, which means that for one year after their release young men must remain available for military service. We note that the Canadians are bringing their brigade up to full strength, equipping it with very modern weapons and consequently increasing strike power in the central sector. I am wholly optimistic : we are ready and we are able to undertake forward defence in the central sector.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Mattick.



Mr. MATTICK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like to ask the Minister one or two questions in connection with the debate that we have had in this House. In view of the comments he has made to us, would he share the fear that was expressed in one resolution, that when compared with the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact the military striking power of the Atlantic Alliance no longer suffices to guarantee the individual and joint security of the Alliance?

Secondly, we have compared defence spending in the West in the Soviet bloc in relation to their respective gross national products. Could the Minister say whether we in the West are really doing all that much less?

Thirdly, would he support the view put forward, in connection with the Helsinki final act and the policy of détente, that détente as now practised in the West has much in common with the policy of appeasement at the time of the Munich agreement? Could he tell us what the main differences are between Munich in 1938 and our situation today? I am afraid that if this comes to be discussed outside, we may find ourselves in an uncomfortable position.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHMIDT (*Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I will deal first with Mr. Mattick's question about the fear that the other side's striking power is such that the Warsaw Pact States would be able, as it were, to drive right through the NATO forces. This fear has recently been mentioned in books and comment columns, and the Federal Minister of Defence, Mr. Leber, made the following comment: "... only if parts of NATO, perhaps including the West German army, were to take over traffic control duties for the Warsaw Pact States." That is treating it as something of a joke, but, really, who can suggest such a thing? It must be realised that we have left entirely out of account in this assessment a whole range of factors that affect the other side. No one would dispute the fact that on the other side there is something in the nature of an occupation régime, whether in Czechoslovakia, in Poland or in Eastern Germany — and this is something we no longer have in NATO, where we enjoy the relationship of friendly agreement. This means that the security even of the USSR's troops is seen rather differently there than that

of American troops in the Federal Republic or in other West European countries. I just do not accept that anyone could think that the striking power of the Warsaw Pact countries could be so high, and that we had not enough to pit against them.

I would suggest that you read an article by a very well-known journalist which appeared yesterday in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. The article is about Soviet thinking about their own armour in the light of the continually increasing defensive strength of NATO. He says that we cannot for instance merely compare the 19,000 tanks on one side and the 6,500 on the other. The way we fill the gap is with a large complement of anti-tank weapons which, firstly, are much cheaper than tanks; which secondly make it plain for all the world to see that our forces are prepared for defence and not for attack, and which thirdly are so effective that the tank has hardly any chance once it comes up against them and against other weapons which are still being developed but are virtually ready in the Federal Republic, in particular the saturation effect rocket launcher.

To compare percentages of gross national products is always a very facile trick. If a country has a low GNP and low defence expenditure, the latter will nonetheless very quickly amount to 10% or 20%. If a country like America or the Federal Republic, which are among the richest countries has as is natural a low percentage, we must be quite clear — and this is why I mentioned it in my speech — that what really matters here is the *per capita* figure. That, I think, is the essential thing.

The comparison with Munich I think is most unfortunate, because in the Alliance as a whole we take as a principle that maximum preparedness will also mean détente; one does not negotiate with weaklings, one dictates one's wishes to them. That is why we need maximum preparedness and the largest possible forces armed with the most modern weapons. Only from such a position of strength can there be negotiations on détente. Only that can bring success. Between this and Munich there can be no comparison, and I think it is very bad that such an idea should have found expression at all.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Schwencke.

Mr. SCHWENCKE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am almost afraid that you and the Assembly will

*Mr. Schwencke (continued)*

take it amiss that for the third time a question is being asked by a German social democrat. I would, however, like to put two short questions to Mr. Schmidt, since I take it that the replies will be of great interest to the other members of the House as well.

The Secretary of State clearly referred to the disparities in the armaments of East and West: he has spoken about the continuing offensive strategy of the Soviet Union in particular and stressed that the West and especially the Federal Republic of Germany have decided to pursue a defensive strategy. He explained — very convincingly, I feel — that the moral strength of the West, with its parliamentary democracies, is also a cornerstone of our defence. I would now ask whether you feel that our moral position might be weakened by the West debating whether, for example, a non-democratically governed country could be brought into the Alliance.

And now my second question. Mr. Schmidt referred to our flanks and hinted at the possibility that they might not be in as good heart as they ought to be. If I may put it more precisely, does the Minister see any danger in the possibility that Italy or Spain, for example, may within the foreseeable future have communists in their governments?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHMIDT (*Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, if I were to answer this we would be going beyond the world of grand policy and starting to gaze into a crystal ball. I would have to be a soothsayer, since Italy, which has just been referred to, has not yet had its elections.

I will, however, say something on the first point. There can be no doubt that the production of weapons in Eastern Europe is higher than ours. We have however already said elsewhere that if the West were to concentrate its united economic strength on arms production, the output would of course exceed what the East is able to produce. They do it by imposing considerable restrictions on their citizens. I do not feel that discussing whether a non-democratic or a democratic country should in the future be a member of NATO is to the point at this time.

Why discuss the matter? Surely the answer can only be that it is not possible — Portugal was a member of NATO for a long time as a non-democratic country and caused us within NATO a great deal of difficulty — to bring other countries — and here the reference was apparently to Spain — into the Alliance if they do not meet the criteria that are now quite clear within NATO. So I do not see this as a matter for discussion. We can only say that it just does not arise now that we have finished with the very difficult problem of Portugal thanks to the way it has turned to democracy.

As regards the security of our flanks. A great deal could be said on the subject. I have always been an optimist. In the past few years we have seen how the Portuguese, of whom it seemed possible to prophesy that they would become communist, have quite decisively found the right line, the way to democracy. We have had the difficulties with Greece and Turkey. Now Italy is faced with the decisive question as to what form the future government there will take. I am not a prophet and shall not say anything now about what might happen if... Let us first wait for the results of next Sunday's elections. I am still betting on the national pride of our Italian friends and on Italian awareness of what this election means for them. So let us wait and see.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Enders.

Mr. ENDERS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, in the final act of the CSCE at Helsinki, reference was made to the fact that each side would inform the other of large-scale manoeuvres. Has Mr. Schmidt yet had any experience of this and has he been able to draw any conclusions on the results that have so far come to light?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHMIDT (*Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Yes, we have of course already some experience in this connection. I personally have had the feeling, Ladies and Gentlemen, that after the West had reacted immediately after the signing of the final act and had notified its manoeuvres and issued invitations to attend them, the East, and the USSR in particular, was somewhat taken aback by the speed with which we managed to put this into effect. For democrats this was a matter

*Mr. Schmidt (continued)*

of course. We then awaited developments. It has been established that manoeuvres on the other side have for the most part remained under the limit of 25,000. Two sets of manoeuvres have exceeded this. The evidence collected by technical means has confirmed that there were manoeuvres on the Turkish border, to which the Turks and the Greeks were invited. Manoeuvres are now being held in the north, to which Norway, Sweden and Finland have been invited. There is therefore a timorous move towards the system which for NATO has for quite some time past been a matter of course.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anyone else wish to ask any questions?...

Mr. Secretary of State, it only remains for me to thank you; and I am convinced that all the members of this Assembly have in the highest degree appreciated the explanations that you have given, even though some of them may have had a few reservations or different interpretation. In any case, your appearance at this rostrum will be recorded with gratitude by an Assembly whose vitality is no longer in question. (*Applause*)

## 6. Security in the Mediterranean

*(Resumed Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 708 and Amendments and 712)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now resume the debate on security in the Mediterranean. Since Mr. Paul Rivière has imperative reasons for absencing himself this afternoon, we have agreed to give him the floor as the first speaker, although he was not first on the list.

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, at the meetings of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of our Assembly, which were devoted to the report on security in the Mediterranean, I had occasion to make a number of comments and to express certain reservations.

The latter do not detract from the remarkable quality of the documentation submitted to you by our Rapporteur, nor to his precise and lucid analysis of the situation in the Mediterranean. I entirely share his view of the disquieting character of increased Soviet strength in this

sector, and the Russians' diplomatic and military aggressiveness in this sector. Like him, too, I do not fail to recognise the positive aspect of the political situation in Spain and Portugal.

Nevertheless, I cannot agree with certain lines of thought in the recommendation tabled which actually express the conclusions reached by the Committee.

I do not believe that our policy for security in the Mediterranean can be whittled down to a strengthening of the integrated elements in NATO.

The challenge with which the eastern bloc confronts us is not primarily a military challenge. It is first of all a political challenge, which demands a joint political response. What is the use of integration of the means of defence if they serve unco-ordinated, not to say conflicting, foreign policies, and, in fact, only suit the game, to say the least, ill-defined and obscure, of one single power, the United States.

Our Assembly should be the privileged forum in which the fundamentals of a European policy for striking a balance in the Mediterranean can be set forth, compared and harmonised. Before calling Australia and New Zealand in aid, let us have a look at what we can do for ourselves. In this respect, the balance sheet for the past year is, to say the least, partly disappointing.

Consciously or unconsciously, Europe has allowed the political situation to deteriorate to the advantage of the Soviet Union alone. Three facts illustrate this state of affairs.

The first is that relations between Greece and Turkey have become bogged down in a situation of permanent conflict. For the past three years, Europe has been impotent to find a solution to this conflict. That is particularly serious, for it means that one of the Western Mediterranean's two safety-links no longer exists except on paper. What is more, this conflict renders ineffectual all efforts to organise Mediterranean defence inside NATO. In the event of a crisis, what attitude will Greece or Turkey take towards the Alliance? They are liable to make up their minds not according to the solidarity with the West professed by them, but according to their strictly national interests.

Greece has already left the organisation, and it is impossible to believe that its close bilateral ties with the United States can take the place of a co-ordinated organisation. If it thinks that such

*Mr. Rivière (continued)*

bilateral ties can disguise stress, Europe is playing a dangerous game for its own safety. It is abandoning the traditional rôle of a factor making for balance and union.

Second, the same applies to the Middle East and, in particular, to the Lebanon crisis. How can we accept that a country with which Western Europe has always had privileged links should fall victim to an internecine war — ostensibly a civil war, but one in which the individual strategies of the USSR and the United States are being furthered. Can we go on allowing the Lebanese people to be sacrificed to consolidation of the patient and rewarding expansion of the USSR or to indirect protection of the *status quo* for Israel? In the very short term, the solution arrived at will be anything but beneficial to Europe. I can only regret that all France's attempts at objective mediation, by countries having no direct interest in the conflict, should have met with downright scepticism in most of its European partners.

Here again, the reversal of a threatening situation could only result from joint action, by, in the first instance, all the States of Western Europe. In the absence of a common European policy, there could not be any security worthy of the name.

Third, the political situation on the southern flank. The domestic situation in Italy, as in Spain, continues to cause concern. It is easy to demonstrate that it affects the efficiency of European defence in the Mediterranean although it has far wider repercussions.

Admittedly, we may congratulate ourselves on the way matters are evolving in Portugal and are taking shape in Spain. We may hope to see the emergence of genuine democracies, without any revolutionary clashes.

By contrast, the situation in Italy is, to say the least, disquieting. Whatever the outcome of the elections, disorder will persist for some time in a country severely affected by the economic crisis. Here again, action by Europe as such has been too little and too late to avert paralysis of one of the chief powers guardians of our security.

It is of course as well to stress the Soviet effort and its potential dangers. But these would not exist if Europe were to master its internal

problems and appear more united and more determined in its political action.

Hence the primary factor in Mediterranean defence is not of a military but of a political order. Without it, the stockpiling of weapons and development of sophisticated strategies and tactics will only prove a snare and a delusion.

A co-ordinated European policy in the Mediterranean should first settle the structural problems, second, establish the elements of a genuinely European defence thus enabling action to be taken at the international level, and third, polarise in this way the Mediterranean component of the Atlantic Alliance.

I maintain that it is in the first instance for the countries of Europe acting in unison — whether it be in the EEC, the Council of Europe or WEU — to settle structural problems.

We must induce Greece and Turkey to settle their disputes on a lasting basis. By offering them a chance to do this in a European context, we enable them to escape from the selfish ascendancy of the two superpowers. We have the means to do this indirectly through their economic association and their membership of the Council of Europe. The existence of the EEC is today recognised by our adversaries, and its arbitration could be decisive. On the other hand, any intervention by NATO will provoke the eastern countries to try and outbid us.

The Council of Europe played an important part in re-establishing democracy in Greece. With the support of our organisation and the European Community, it could restore a lasting peace between its two Mediterranean partners.

The same goes for Spain, Portugal and, to some extent, Italy. If the European nations show solidarity with them at all political, economic and social levels, democracy can be installed or saved in these countries, and a dangerous adventure for Europe averted. Here, too, I believe that direct intervention by the United States could only provoke a violent reaction by our opponents.

The second element in the awakening political awareness of Europe must be that of a defence which is primarily promoted and assured by the Europeans.

Far be it from me to underestimate the importance of the United States presence in this respect. I believe, however, I have pointed out the political weakness of this aspect. American

*Mr. Rivière (continued)*

strength cannot at the same time counterbalance Soviet strength, palliate the deficiencies of Turkey and Greece and make good the inadequacies resulting from the domestic situation in Spain and Italy. It is for all the countries of Europe, particularly those who are members of our union, to establish the elements of a military defence system in the Mediterranean. That calls for some heart-searching by certain countries. The Soviet threat squarely across the frontiers is not the only one. Do not let us forget that Lenin always advocated outflanking Europe from the south. It must accordingly be the first concern of Europeans, even of those who have no direct links with the region, to protect this southern flank.

The sector-by-sector organisation of NATO is liable to be reflected in a lack of interest in Northern Europe regarding the military situation in Southern Europe. Working out a European defence policy would enable this situation to be avoided.

A third factor is that on the basis of this common defence policy, Europe should regain the political rôle in the Mediterranean which it has lost since 1956, when, at the time of Suez, the Russians and Americans ousted France and the United Kingdom. But it is just such an imaginative European policy, by putting forward realistic solutions to current conflicts, which might have a chance of success since it would not be tainted with neo-imperialism. A chance of success, because it would offer the countries confronting each other the opportunity of taking a middle course, for which they are desperately seeking to escape from the daily more onerous tutelage of the two superpowers.

If these conditions were fulfilled, the organisation of the Atlantic Alliance might be refurbished along the lines of greater justification and enhanced efficiency.

Its justification, since it would legitimise the United States' complementary contribution to Europe's will for security and peace, and not, in default of a shared determination, purport to fill a political and military vacuum. Its efficiency, since, in the present state of affairs, intervention by NATO would be everywhere interpreted simply as direct intervention by the United States. Now, the latter is not ready, believe you me, to repeat the experience it underwent in South-East Asia. In the final

analysis, the Mediterranean would therefore be at the mercy of Russian expansion.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the majority of us have lived through two world wars: we were born before the first and we contributed copiously in our flesh and blood to the second. I should not like to see our children and grandchildren compelled by our mistakes and failures to put up with a third one.

Well, everything leads us to believe that, if we do not take care, we Western Europeans are going to find ourselves in the middle of the battlefield as a result of our allegiance to the United States, whereas we could, if we wanted, hold our destiny in our own hands, of course, with the help of the United States, but not under its tutelage. That is why I am voicing here my great anxiety at the turn which events are taking.

Such are the thoughts provoked in my mind by the excellent report of our colleague, Mr. Buck. If I have sometimes appeared critical, it is because I have always been convinced that our Assembly should supply the driving force for establishing a European defence characterised by self-reliance, determination and efficiency.

Our freedoms are at stake; yet their defence cannot be entrusted to a third party, however powerful and however friendly it may be. Our liberties are the very lifeblood of our nations, and their fate lies in our hands. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Portuguese observer, Mr. Vasco da Gama Fernandes, President of the Portuguese National Assembly, who wishes to make a short address.

Mr. VASCO DA GAMA FERNANDES (*Observer from Portugal*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, two years ago I attended a sitting of the Assembly for the first time, just when the great events in Portugal were starting. Portugal has emerged from forty-eight years of fascism and is about to begin the harsh and difficult life of a democracy. Two years have already gone by! My friends, today I feel it my duty to say a few brief words about the situation in my country.

We have passed through a period of grave political crisis, with great ideological confusion and serious and bewildering economic and social problems. We have lived through eighteen terrible months, but the armed forces have re-

*Mr. Vasco da Gama Fernandes (continued)*

established order and social equilibrium, and it has proved possible to hold elections for a constituent assembly, followed by parliamentary elections. On the 27th of this month, the election for the President of the Republic will take place. Developments in Portugal have been full of interest but life has been very difficult. We have suffered under a terrible dictatorship which destroyed the country's economy and dislocated Portuguese social life, with an unjust war in Africa that robbed us of the flower of our youth. Our country is very impoverished.

We have to contend with the very grave problem of nearly a million refugees from Angola. There is also the problem of 160,000 unemployed, and that of emigrant workers in France and Germany, numbering nearly two million, out of a population of ten million. Yes, my friends, I can assure you that our life is very harsh and very difficult.

Portugal is a European country that has natural historical links with the countries of Africa and those of the Portuguese-speaking third world with whom we have a common culture and historical spiritual links. But, we are Europeans, with an Atlantic vocation. And we are resolved to work with you and all those who "think European" towards the re-establishment of world peace, right sentiments and specific solutions to specific and important problems.

In the name of little Portugal, I give you greetings and thanks. I do so with some emotion, as is natural since we are setting out on a new and inspiring way of living, with the restoration of public freedoms, thanks to the institution of political, economic and cultural democracy through the due process of parliamentary elections.

I believe that once the President of the Republic has been elected, my country will have gained sufficient equilibrium and will thus be able to be a good fellow-traveller to each of your countries, whom I salute with great emotion and great joy. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. President.

I am sure that the Assembly shares the emotions that I myself felt when I heard the stirring words you spoke to us. We have long been hoping that Portugal would rediscover its proud past, under a régime of liberty and justice, that

is, democracy. Some of us had been anxious; I personally am somewhat of an optimist by nature and I was convinced that sooner or later you would come back to the fold of the democratic nations which are the nucleus of our Western European Union.

I call Lord Peddie.

Lord PEDDIE (*United Kingdom*). — Before I begin my comments on Mr. Buck's paper, Mr. President, I want to join you in expressing appreciation of what we have just heard from our Portuguese friend. I make that reference because it indicates that politics and emotions are not far apart; and what he has said has some bearing on Mr. Buck's paper and on my own comments.

Mr. Buck has presented a most useful document. It is useful in two areas. First, it focuses attention upon the serious and considerable growth of the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean and it has highlighted the quite justifiable concern that this has evoked among our allies. Secondly, there is an emphasis in his paper, probably not as great as I should have liked to see, on the aspects of a problem that is more political than anything else. I recognise the seriousness of the situation, and I am also appreciative of the fact that my country's decision to withdraw its own forces from Malta by April 1979 was an unavoidable decision, but one which will focus in the minds of our allies their greater collective responsibility.

I have said that the situation in the Mediterranean presents more problems, particularly of a political character, than the report itself identifies. At present the Spanish Government is not seeking full membership of NATO. I recognise that a number of governments, including the Government of the United Kingdom, would welcome the presence of a free and democratic Spain in Western European defence. When that will be and how it will be achieved we cannot at present tell. Malta has not expressed any interest in association with NATO.

We therefore have a combination of political factors which add to the difficulties of NATO in dealing with this important question. I agree with a previous speaker that it is imperative that NATO itself should be able to deal with this question of the increased maritime threat of the Soviet, particularly to the Mediterranean, which is an area where we should be able to solve these European political problems which tend to

*Lord Peddie (continued)*

impede, or restrict, or restrain our adequate defence there.

My colleagues, Mr. Dankert, Mr. Siegler-schmidt and I have put down a number of amendments. I take this opportunity of assuring Mr. Buck that the amendments are not put down in a sense of expressing any violent opposition to the basic sentiments referred to in his report. We believe that we have sharpened the recommendations and I hope that he and his colleagues will give serious consideration to our amendments and be able to accept them.

I shall refer to two amendments. The first deletes recommendation 2 (a), because it would be quite wrong for the North Atlantic Council to make such a declaration. The reason is clear. NATO is a defensive organisation and its only commitments under the articles of the treaty would preclude the activity requested in the recommendation.

The second amendment deletes recommendation 3. We believe that acceptance of the recommendation would substantially decrease the responsibility of NATO while extending the responsibility of the European programme group. This is not a good idea and we consider that the deletion of these recommendations would strengthen the overall report.

I am pleased to have had the opportunity to explain the purpose of the amendments. I wanted to emphasise that we support the contentions in the report and are glad that it highlights the important problems that NATO nations must seek to solve. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Radius.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report submitted by Mr. Buck seems to me to raise a whole range of problems. Before tackling these, however, I must heartily congratulate him on the very remarkable documentation he has assembled.

Much of what he says in his paper is based on information that is new and, as far as I know, unpublished, which gives his report a quite special value. I shall not therefore pick up any particular point he makes, but rather the general philosophy that can be read between the lines. Yet, in his second paragraph, Mr. Buck

sums up the general situation in the Mediterranean area in what I consider admirable terms :

“... Today, in many countries of the Mediterranean littoral, significant political changes, or the imminence of political changes, have introduced many factors of uncertainty typical of the multipolar world. The uncertainties apply both to NATO countries and to non-aligned countries ; to European countries as well as to those on the African shore. The uncertainties are a cause of anxiety as they appear to many to threaten changes of alignment.”

This appears to me to put its finger on the essential situation in the Mediterranean.

Where I begin to disagree with the Rapporteur is when he considers these uncertainties as fatal or dangerous factors. The multifariousness of the world of today seems to me, on the contrary, to be an essential factor in freedom for the nations, and, finally, peace, for only in this way can the nations elude the hegemony of the two world superpowers : lasting peace can only be built on nations' freedom to determine their own destiny and not on permanent confrontation between two military blocs.

Quite possibly those elements of uncertainty that the report condemns may herald changes in alignment. But it all depends on what he means by “changes of alignment”. If he means by this that a large part of the Mediterranean world is likely to escape the two-bloc system, he must excuse me if I do not join him in regretting the fact.

As to the uncertainty about the fate of one or other of them, it is, the way I see it, far less dangerous than to live with a number of certainties that may prove fallacious.

As far as I can remember, what the Assembly has always condemned in the Brezhnev doctrine has been its basic search for an insurance against changes of alignment. Yet, Mr. Buck seems to me to be preaching some kind of western Brezhnev doctrine. Above all, as General Beaufre has so often emphasised in the past, a defensive strategy based essentially on nuclear deterrence would appear to carry with it a considerable amount of uncertainties about the attitudes that may be adopted by one country or another in the event of conflict. Certainties are what the aggressor requires, and uncertainties operate in favour of the one whose strategy is defensive. In effect, uncertainty

*Mr. RADIUS (continued)*

means a very strong probability that those who are unsure will, when the time comes, take sides against the aggressor, who cannot ignore this fact.

If all that was concerned was doctrinal disputation between the partisans of such and such a strategy, the matter would not be so serious. But it becomes serious as soon as Mr. Buck considers how to guard against those uncertainties and replace them with certainties. The whole of his report clearly says so. In his eyes, membership of and control by NATO are the only true certainty by which the western world can stand when it comes to the Mediterranean and the countries around its shores.

What, then, does NATO mean to him?

He states his position quite clearly in paragraph 31 on the subject of the Italian communist party, which he accuses of drawing a spurious and dangerous distinction between NATO bases and American bases in Italy. There could be no clearer way of saying that, as Mr. Buck sees it, NATO and the United States are one and the same. This shows what the remainder of the paragraph means where he writes that the Committee calls for all member countries and the Alliance as a whole to be more publicly identified with NATO defence arrangements in the Mediterranean area.

The thought behind a sentence at first sight very clear, seems equally clear to me. All members of the Alliance ought to identify themselves with the Mediterranean policy of the United States. Farther on in the report, we find more applications of this doctrine of identifying the Alliance with its member countries, for example in paragraph 48, concerning Cyprus. Mr. Buck says that although Cyprus has long been a base for potential British intervention in the Near and Middle East, the island is today more important for the defence of NATO interests, i.e. that NATO, and we have seen what NATO means to Mr. Buck, should now take over the defence of interests that hitherto were solely Britain's.

In paragraph 56, Mr. Buck regrets that the military facilities in Malta are not on the sovereign territory of a NATO country and do not provide the territorial diversity that the Committee sees as an advantage in the case of Cyprus, unless of course Malta were to join

NATO or conclude a bilateral defence arrangement with Italy.

I wonder, first of all, what this "territorial diversity" may be, which would appear if Malta were to belong to NATO but in the contrary case would not exist. What I see in this above all is that Mr. Buck finds it intolerable that Malta should retain an independent policy.

The same reasoning crops up in paragraph 63, with reference to Gibraltar. In it, Mr. Buck mentions the possibility of Spain joining the Atlantic Alliance. In such an event, however, if we are to believe Mr. Buck the British forces and the NATO headquarters would have to remain in Gibraltar since "if Spanish bases should cease to be available to United States aircraft for any reason in the future, Gibraltar can provide facilities for maritime patrol aircraft at a strategic point for surveillance of both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean". In other words, even if Spain were to become a member of NATO, it would not carry the same weight as the United Kingdom, since only the British presence can ensure the support facilities that NATO needs, while the handing back to Spain of this British colony would not provide equivalent guarantees, even if Spain were to join the Atlantic Alliance.

More examples may be found in the same vein. What is sought is a strengthening of American hegemony in the Mediterranean and finally placing NATO at the service of British colonial policy of a quite traditional kind.

This is how Mr. Buck seems to see this identification of NATO and its member States, which he has made one of the recurrent themes of both his explanatory memorandum and his recommendation.

In paragraph 133, Mr. Buck refers to a proposal already made by the Assembly, despite opposition from certain quarters, to send NATO political advisers to the various commands in the Mediterranean area. This would of course strengthen NATO's political influence so as to turn it into an instrument of a policy probably concocted between Great Britain and the United States.

One might have thought that the problems at present confronting the United Kingdom would have induced our British friends to revise a little more thoroughly the concepts they have inherited from the nineteenth century and are trying to cling to in the teeth of all the realities



*Mr. Radius (continued)*

of our time. One may well wonder how far they will have to go before admitting what to me seems to be the fundamental reality of the present-day world. I do not believe that anything of lasting value can be built up, particularly in the Mediterranean area, without the independence and recognition of the full sovereignty of all national States. To import into this area a Manichaean doctrine that everything which is not part of NATO or of the Warsaw Pact is a source of mischief, disorder or instability, and must be brought back to bipolar orthodoxy as soon as possible, is to pursue a policy that, one would like to have hoped, had been superseded long ago.

The Atlantic Alliance as such perfectly defines what an alliance of independent sovereign States can be. They are committed to joint defence if one of them is the object of aggression, but they retain a wide measure of freedom in their foreign policy and defence policy.

As we see it, the way to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance, which I want just as much as Mr. Buck does, is to recognise such freedom for everyone. It is not a matter of wondering all the time how far Soviet influence or NATO influence extends in the Middle East or in the eastern Mediterranean, but of leaving the countries of those regions to work out their own national destiny. Only to the extent that the Atlantic Alliance allows them this right can it count on them to face up to Soviet imperialism, about which neither France nor any of the Near or Middle East countries has the slightest illusions.

If we turn now to the draft recommendation submitted by Mr. Buck, I find myself obliged to ask for quite a few amendments before I can vote for it. These amendments are required, first of all, because of the rather unusual and obscure wording of several paragraphs, as a result of which no one knows exactly what they mean.

It is therefore for purely editorial reasons that I ask to delete the words "based on freely-elected parliamentary democracies" in paragraph (iii) of the preamble, and I should be happy to support any suitable form of words expressing the idea that members of the Atlantic Alliance should have a democratic system of government.

Similarly, in paragraph (iv) of the preamble, I wonder what is meant by the phrase "other appropriate countries"? Appropriate for what? Because of what? I do not know.

On the other hand, for political reasons I ask for the deletion in the same paragraph of the words "associated with Alliance defence planning". I would be quite prepared to vote for a sub-paragraph seeking the association of Australia, New Zealand or Iran with the Atlantic Alliance, but how can they be asked to associate themselves with Alliance defence planning if they are not yet members of the Alliance?

If, now, we consider the recommendation proper, I must say that the form of words used in paragraph (c), where reference is made to "military facilities being located on a basis of territorial diversity in the Mediterranean area", seems to me to be utterly incomprehensible. On purely linguistic grounds alone, I would therefore suggest writing "located in different countries in the Mediterranean", if that corresponds to what the writer intends; if it does not, he ought to explain to us what he meant.

On the other hand, in paragraph 1(d), difficulties in comprehension combine with political difficulties to render it, to my mind, unacceptable. What is meant by "identifying all the member countries and the Alliance as a whole" with the arrangements in each of the member countries irrespective of the kind of conflict in which they are involved? What, then, does this mean in the case of the recent conflict between Greece and Turkey? The wording seems unacceptable to me, but I fear that what I find really unacceptable is the actual thought that the recommendation wishes to express.

In paragraph 2(b), the change I propose seems logical to me in that the warnings the Assembly proposes to give the Soviet Union could be aimed at no country other than the USSR itself. What interests us is not, therefore, the granting of new bases to the Soviet forces but the location of new bases, whatever the means used by the Soviet Union to move into them. The reason why I am asking you to change the wording in this way is therefore purely a question of logic.

Paragraph 3 is totally unacceptable to me for two reasons: first, it has nothing to do with the subject matter of the report, which is security in the Mediterranean, but only with the European programme group, which has no particular

*Mr. Radius (continued)*

territorial competence and consequently in no way covers the Mediterranean area.

Secondly, I cannot accept that an institution intended to promote European co-operation on armaments should, from the start, be diverted from the task that the governments have wished to assign to it. In fact, asking it to make an assessment of the threat and a joint statement of allied strategy is to require it to play a rôle for which it is in no way fitted and, therefore, to take the place of the NATO Council, or the WEU Council, or consultations between the Nine, whereas nothing qualifies it to undertake such a task. The institutions of Europe and the West are sufficient in number and their powers already sufficiently overlap without it being further suggested, without rhyme or reason, that each of them should enter on fields falling within the purview of several organisations, but certainly not their own.

How I shall vote on the draft recommendation will depend on whether these amendments are accepted, but I must stress that if in the end I find this recommendation acceptable, the fact that I vote for it will in no way mean that I am of the same mind as the Rapporteur, and he must excuse me for this. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Vedovato.

Mr. VEDOVATO (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to begin by expressing my warm congratulations to the President upon his re-election, and begging him to excuse the many gaps, for reasons you will appreciate, in the ranks of the Italian Delegation. I also thank the President for allowing me to speak this morning on this report, which I regard as, in a way, a supplement to and up-dating of the one I had the honour to submit, precisely devoted to the defence of our northern and southern flanks, in April 1972.

When I had the honour, a fortnight ago, of addressing the United States Congress at a working meeting with the Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Congress itself and authoritative members of the House of Representatives, I made a statement I would like to read to you now :

“Western Europe, lopped of its eastern territories now under Soviet domination, has ever since 1945 been in a state of siege. Today,

thirty years on, solidarity with the United States is as indispensable as ever. But this fact is also an essential safeguard for the security of the American nation. The United States and its liberties are the ultimate and real objective of Soviet expansion, and this objective Moscow means to achieve in Europe, along its frontiers from the Arctic to the Mediterranean, a focal point of worldwide and internal strategy for every nation that has to contend with Marxist subversion.”

A lot has been said here yesterday and today about Italy. I know that you are afraid for Italy, and that, through it, perils loom ahead for Europe and the whole western world. It would be a mistake to assign to the Italians alone the entire responsibility for the events leading up to this crisis, or even the decisions which, according to the pessimists I have met as well as listened to in this Assembly, the Italian electorate is preparing to take on 20th and 21st June. Having sat in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate for twenty-five years, I believe I know the Italian people well enough to say that it is fundamentally sound and devoted to freedom. It will probably not recognise the communist's right to govern in Rome. But the reason why the communist option is liable to become reality is the postwar legacy that still burdens Italy. At the end of the war the victorious powers, for the sake of a compromise with Moscow, conceded that the left should be monopolised by an undemocratic party controlled by Russia. The christian democrats had to face a thankless task, rendered unnatural by the lack of a democratic alternative and consequently exposed to the dangers inherent in the wear and tear of office. The crux of the problem let me say, Ladies and Gentlemen, lies today in the mere fact that the Italian electorate is placed between the anvil of an often effete ruling class, and the hammer of a prospective abolition of every liberty.

The Italian phenomenon reflects in particular ways a crisis besetting practically the whole western world, which has failed to carry freedom over into the age of technology. It is essentially a joint problem, one to be jointly tackled, courageously and with resolution.

This brings us to the Mediterranean. Historically, the Mediterranean has always been recognised by the European States, as well as the United States Government and Congress, as a zone of special interest. It is so today more than ever in political and economic, even more than in military, terms. More than other parts of the

*Mr. Vedovato (continued)*

world, the Mediterranean is the subject of a coherent Russian policy and strategy. The eastern Mediterranean is still one of the main objectives that are a determining factor for further expansion by the Soviet Union, westwards with respect to peninsular Europe, and eastwards with respect to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. Both objectives have, by the way, always been closely interwoven in the causes and effects of political and historical strategy and development. In the 19th century, and at any rate up to the outbreak of the first world war, the "eastern question" formed one of the perennial aims of strategy and diplomacy in Europe. The persistence of the Ottoman Empire on the one hand, and the equilibrium of the Balkans on the other, constituted suitable instruments for averting the supremacy, though not the legitimate presence, of Russian power in the eastern Mediterranean. Events arising from the precarity of the *status quo* in the Middle East following the second world war enabled Russia to set up a state of permanent tension and impose its own direct presence, through its navy and air force, together with the establishment in certain Arab States of powerful land forces, armed and instructed, and where possible controlled, by itself.

The latter element would have obviated, at least initially, direct intervention by the Russian armed forces, still compelled in the context of confrontation between East and West to stand firm on the Danube or north of the Straits. The fruits of tension might, by definitely consolidating Russian supremacy in the Middle East, have altered the strategic situation to such an extent as to give Russia, without any risk to itself, a corresponding modification of the political *status quo*, both on the Danube and in the Straits. But Kissinger's peace efforts, supported by some of the major protagonists in the Middle East, might be thwarted in the event of flare-ups at certain critical points — mentioned by the way in our debate, such as Cyprus and Lebanon — or should Europe, with all due respect to Mr. Rivière, fail to abandon once and for all any aspirations towards illusory positions separate from the Americans', and, in the last resort, play into the hands of Soviet diplomacy.

There exists today a common interest in keeping the peace, both for Arabs and Israelis, Turks and Greeks, Europe even more than America.

It is however threatened in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean. What is more, if Europe fails to restore full solidarity of western strategy and policy in the Mediterranean, the Kremlin might be tempted to add to its numerous naval and air forces scattered throughout the eastern Mediterranean the decisive advantages that can only be conferred by territorial continuity, that is, freedom of movement for the Soviet ground forces. These are, let us not forget, regardless of their scope for manoeuvring, concentrated along the Danube. Let us not forget that in 1878 the Czar sent his armies as far as the gates of Constantinople to force the Straits for Russia's might. But what counts today in this geographical area is not so much the strict deployment of forces as an intelligent and flexible doctrine of European policy for the western Mediterranean associating all countries along its littoral in unity of interests, independence and progress. From such a doctrine would ensue security for all concerned and for the West. Let us be clear about it: there is no question of shutting Russia out, but of seeing its influence kept within bounds inside a vast framework ensuring guaranteed freedom and stability for one and all. Let our Western European Union, Mr. President, establish such a doctrine, in the service of a united Europe, the Atlantic idea and the peaceful progress of the Mediterranean peoples.

These are my reasons for taking a favourable view of the draft recommendation by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, subject to a few amendments I also consider to be called for. For these reasons too, I welcome Mr. Buck's report adumbrating useful points for the political doctrine I postulate, for the independence, progress and security of the Mediterranean area.

Lastly, for these same reasons, I have requested the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, for whose support in the matter I am grateful, to keep the topic of security in the Mediterranean permanently on its agenda.

Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Vedovato, for your very full statement. I hope that we shall have an opportunity in rather different circumstances to work together both on the independence of Europe and on peace in the world.

### 7. Change in the Order of Business

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Order of Business adopted by the Assembly provided that items outstanding today would be voted on at 11.30 a.m. tomorrow, Thursday. However, because of the absence of many members of the Assembly recalled tomorrow to their respective parliaments, I suggest that the Assembly take these votes at this afternoon's Sitting, after the present debate.

Are there any objections ?...

*It is so decided.*

Mr. PIKET (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — One small point, will there be no voting at all tomorrow morning ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Yes, there will. To give you the full story, since these are texts that are open to disagreement, we are obliged by an extremely strict, not to say in my honest opinion, an absurd procedure, to have a quorum in order to be able to vote. As it happens, we shall not have a quorum tomorrow because the German Delegation cannot be present. With the agreement of those opposing the motion, it has been arranged that a series of votes on the contested recommendations will be brought forward to this afternoon, so that we have a quorum. However, there will be more voting tomorrow morning on recommendations not subject to adverse votes or abstentions.

Mr. PIKET (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Thank you.

### 8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Security in the Mediterranean (Resumed Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Documents 708 and Amendments and 712).
2. European aeronautical policy — Guidelines emerging from the Colloquy on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 (Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 704).
3. Détente and security in Europe (Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Document 703).
4. Reserve forces (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 707).
5. Strategic mobility (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Order, Document 709).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.)*

## FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 16th June 1976

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Security in the Mediterranean (*Resumed Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Docs. 708 and Amendments and 712*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. de Montesquiou, Mr. Thyness (*Observer from Norway*), Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Papapolitis (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Kliesing, Mr. Budtz (*Observer from Denmark*), Mr. Piket, Mr. Valleix (on a point of order), Mr. Buck (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Piket, Mr. Buck, Mr. Kliesing, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Lord Peddie, Mr. Buck, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Lord Peddie, Mr. Buck, Mr. Piket, Mr. Buck, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Buck, Mr. Valleix (on a point of order), Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. Buck, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Lord Peddie, Mr. Buck, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. Buck, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. Buck.
4. European aeronautical policy — Guidelines emerging from the Colloquy on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 704*).
5. Détente and security in Europe (*Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doc. 703*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Delorme, Mr. Richter, Sir Frederic Bennett (*Rapporteur*).
6. Strategic mobility (*Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 709*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Duviousart (*Rapporteur*).
7. Reserve forces (*Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 707*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Delorme (*Rapporteur*).
8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### 3. Security in the Mediterranean

*(Resumed Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Docs. 708 and Amendments and 712)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The first Order of the Day is the resumed debate on the

report and supplementary report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on security in the Mediterranean and vote on the draft recommendation, Documents 708 and Amendments and 712.

I call Mr. de Montesquiou.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — The report presented by Mr. Buck contains a great deal of detailed and valuable information on the balance of forces in the Mediterranean. He urges us to be fully mindful of the growing threat which the significant increase in Soviet naval power in the area represents to Europe's security. During the Middle East crises in 1956 and 1958 the Soviet Union had no military means of influencing the course of events. Today it has at its disposal the base of Latakia in Syria. The Algerian naval installations are open to it and, above all, its Mediterranean squadron comprises, as Mr. Buck states with precision, a total of 40 to 60 vessels.

There is therefore a real threat. However, it should not, militarily speaking, be exaggerated. Mr. Buck told us that in the Mediterranean the Soviet fleet is very inferior both quantitatively and qualitatively to that of the countries of the Atlantic Alliance.

1. See page 39.

*Mr. de Montesquiou (continued)*

But misgivings at the Soviet military presence become more acute if we consider the political instability of the Mediterranean region. That is where the real danger lies and Mr. Buck was quite right to emphasise it.

This instability is due in the first place to a number of internal crises all taking place at the same time in nations whose unbalanced economic and social structures were ill adapted to the new development conditions. Spain, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia and other countries experienced, in different ways, profound difficulties affecting their will to resist armed aggression. The instability of international relations in the Mediterranean basin is also due to the continuing bitter conflicts in the eastern part of the region. In Cyprus and in the Middle East there are bloody confrontations at regular intervals which have an unsettling effect on the whole Mediterranean region. The situation is all the more serious in that it encourages the great powers to intervene constantly in order to support one or the other of the contending parties, all of which constitutes a permanent threat of generalised conflict. Thus, in Libya we see a Syrian intervention which, by giving the Soviet Union the means of strengthening its influence in part of the Middle East, will eventually not fail to alarm Israel and cause the United States to throw in all its weight in order to re-establish the balance of forces in the region.

How can Europe, faced by such an unstable situation, guarantee its security, protect its vital lines of communications, and intervene actively to promote a policy answering its special needs, particularly in trade and energy?

Mr. Buck replies to this question by proposing the integration of all the allied countries, including France and Greece, in NATO's military set-up, and asking for it to be expanded to include a number of other countries such as Malta and Spain.

This is, in my opinion, a solution inadequate to meet the problems raised by current developments in the Mediterranean. True, the strengthening of Atlantic solidarity is indispensable in order to deter the Soviet Union from employing in the Mediterranean the considerable military forces which it has today at its disposal. But Atlantic solidarity should, in my opinion, primarily assume a political form. It does not necessarily imply, at any rate for France, integration in a joint military alignment of forces. Such

integration would force my country to give up its freedom of decision in matters of defence. It would moreover not make sense unless it were necessary today to prepare, with maximum efficiency, for conventional warfare. But we know that the nuclear deterrent which is the kingpin of France's defence in fact rules out the hypothesis of a conventional war. The nuclear deterrent, by holding over the head of any aggressor the threat of massive reprisals, makes it useless to set up an order of battle comparable in every respect with that of the adversary.

The integration of France in NATO, contrary to what the Rapporteur claims, is not the real answer to the new challenge of Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean.

Nor is an enlargement of the integrated military force to include other countries desirable. Such a proposal would result in the setting-up of a western military bloc, necessarily under American hegemony, which would endeavour to act as a counterweight to the Soviet bloc. In such a situation Europe's freedom of action would be considerably restricted. Moreover, the risk of escalation of conventional outbreaks, which would be limited but violent and frequent, would significantly increase. American, British and French nuclear deterrence, which today forms the essential element of Europe's security, would not, in a scenario of limited confrontation, be able to come into play, and Europe would have to envisage the very real possibility of trials of strength liable to spell ruin and devastation for it.

The strengthening and enlargement of the integrated military structure of NATO does not therefore represent the best means at Europe's disposal for guaranteeing its security in the Mediterranean.

A strategy less oriented towards confrontation and based primarily on the nuclear deterrent would, in my opinion, be best suited to Europe's specific interests.

Any trial of strength in the Mediterranean would be disastrous for our continent and we must therefore gather together all the means — mainly nuclear — of avoiding war, instead of piling up the means of waging it.

In parallel with such a strategy adapted to the interests of Europe it would be necessary to work out a joint foreign policy aimed at promoting an active and independent European presence in the Mediterranean. In that way

*Mr. de Montesquiou (continued)*

Europe could, by its own intervention, contribute to the stabilisation of the situation in the Mediterranean basin by helping to strengthen internally the countries of the region and finally settle the conflicts which steep its history in bloodshed. A Mediterranean policy on trade has already been worked out by the European Communities. An extension of this policy to financial, social and cultural affairs should enable us to strengthen the bonds which unite Europe to all the countries around the Mediterranean basin and restore to our continent a political influence which it has lost in this region since the end of the colonial era.

The example of Vietnam shows us that no nation, or group of nations, can leave it to foreign powers to ensure their security. Let us not therefore rely for our defence solely on our alliance with the United States and on a strengthening of NATO, but let us together work out the strategic principles and political guidelines most likely to safeguard our interests in the Mediterranean basin and in other areas of the world. Only if all the countries of the Mediterranean littoral place their faith in us shall we be able to stand up to the dangers which threaten us. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Thyness, member of the Norwegian Storting.

Mr. THYNESS (*Observer from Norway*). — Although I am always very proud to represent Norway and its parliament, I am here in my capacity as Chairman of the North Atlantic Assembly's Military Committee, which in the past few years has enjoyed a very relaxed and profitable co-operation with your Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. I am grateful for the invitation to attend this sitting of the parent body of NATO and the North Atlantic Assembly.

I find the excellent report on security in the Mediterranean very interesting in view of the fact that the North Atlantic Assembly's Military Committee considered a similar report only last month. The conclusions of the two reports are rather similar, but in some respects I detect a subtle difference in emphasis. A case in point is the possible communist participation in government in Italy. We all recognise that if this happens, we shall be confronted with some very awkward problems, and perhaps more than that. Nevertheless the perception of communism in

Europe differs from that in the United States, as clearly demonstrated in the North Atlantic Assembly by the interventions in the debate of our United States colleagues, one of whom stated quite bluntly that it would be hard to explain to American voters the possible participation of communists in the Italian Government and to counteract the impression created thereby that NATO was becoming increasingly irrelevant.

To the European mind, this is over-reacting. We tend to regard Secretary Kissinger's warning as counter-productive, perhaps in Italy and most certainly in the United States itself, where that kind of statement increases anxiety and doubt about developments in Europe over which the Americans basically have no control and with which the Americans will have to live if they eventually occur. The Italian electorate must decide who is to govern Italy. It is in no doubt about the risks inherent in electing communists. However, in Europe, unlike the United States, communist parties have been a political fact of life for a very long time — the European assessment of the risk has more nuances and is perhaps a little more realistic.

I believe that communism is changing slowly and that communist allegiance to the Soviet Union is gradually being eroded. This does not make communism any more palatable to me, but it suggests that it may be slowly declining as an external — and I stress external — security risk. What we have to contend with now is Kremlin imperialism, and indigenous communist parties may be less willing to serve as its instrument in future. Very few people nowadays believe that workers are closer to paradise in the East than in the West. Communism in the West today is more likely to be a belief in certain principles, which are nowhere more grossly distorted and perverted than in the USSR.

Whatever happens in Italy, the Italians are our brothers. We want to work with them, to safeguard with them their national sovereignty as far as they will allow us to do so. We should guard against any deed or utterance that will make that co-operation unnecessarily difficult. Democracy is very fragile and the road to it is both long and tortuous. Not more than 20 out of the nearly 150 sovereign nations of the world qualify for the label.

The developments in Portugal are very little short of miraculous. Up to now both the electorate and the politicians have acted as though fifty years of dictatorship was but a very short inter-

*Mr. Thyness (continued)*

lude in a long and gradual political and economic development. I find myself at a loss to explain where the Portuguese have found this political maturity which is denied to so many other, more highly-developed countries. I can only rejoice in its obvious existence.

We should, however, not ask too much of a miracle. Democracy in Portugal will probably be in danger if the country does not experience a rapid economic development as well. I should therefore like to stress the economic support of Portugal called for by the report. I should have liked to see it incorporated into the draft recommendation. Portugal is important to the defence of Europe not primarily because of the military force it contributes, but because of its geographical position and because of the lessons the Portuguese can teach us on internal security by national action and allied interaction.

Economic development must now be of first priority and I hope most sincerely that no ally will object to Portugal's scaling down its military forces to a new level. As the Portuguese representative has emphasised here, there must be a reorientation of Portugal's national interests and this must be reflected in the armed forces of Portugal, which must be trained and supplied for a new and meaningful rôle in the defence of the West.

But we, as Portugal's allies, must not allow that reorientation to become an economic burden on the fledgling democracy in that country. So I would also hope that Portugal's allies will join in giving massive economic aid to Portugal in the same spirit in which we ourselves received Marshall aid when our situation was not too dissimilar from the one in which Portugal finds itself today. That much, I think, we owe to a close friend and a loyal ally — and also to our own ideal, which Portugal is now realising in a very impressive way.

The security of the Mediterranean is not a military problem. The Russian fleet must be seen mainly as a political weapon very effective in peacetime — devastatingly effective in peacetime, sometimes — but in war not too important, and it is less important if the situation should be a warlike one and the Arab nations should suddenly see the risks inherent in playing the East against the West, and the use of facilities in other countries as a sort of bargain chip. Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy, Spain, Portu-

gal, Malta, Cyprus — it is all a political problem. If NATO is ever challenged militarily in that area, I feel confident that our adversaries are going to have some very bloody noses to show for their efforts — provided the cohesion of the Alliance and the political stability of the allies are maintained.

Perhaps this is a signal of a more profound change taking place gradually in our whole security situation, a new kind of threat development demanding a new kind of answer, a new set of opportunities and a new set of risks. I do not know — but I do think that we ought to be on our toes lest we let ourselves drift into a policy which is increasingly irrelevant. We will always need arms, we will always need a military defence for our sovereignty. But possibly the first order of the day in the years to come will be honest responsible government and political cohesion, internally in the different countries, and within the Alliance. I think we may be in a situation when the relationships between the military and the political means that one is pursued and the other not neglected. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Cermolacce.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the debate on the report on European security in the Mediterranean coincides with the end of the Italian election campaign. It might therefore have been hoped that Mr. Buck, who claims he sets great store by the rules of parliamentary democracy, would abstain, in the text of his report to the Assembly, from any unwarrantable interference in the Italian political debate. It is up to the Italian electorate to decide what course their country will take, and the Assembly of Western European Union has no right to try and influence their choice.

Unfortunately, Mr. Buck has not seen fit to adopt an attitude which fully respects the freedom of choice of the Italian people. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation, the North Atlantic Council is called on to have "full political and military contingency plans" prepared.

Is not this with the intention of bringing pressure to bear on Italy should it decide to elect a government representing the vast majority of its population ?

Mr. Buck does not go into too much detail about these contingency plans. Would it be an economic boycott, diplomatic interference or a



*Mr. Cermolacce (continued)*

show of force? None of these hypotheses is ruled out by the Rapporteur, who goes to the length of proposing in paragraph 31 of the explanatory memorandum that naval and air contingents from countries in Northern Europe should participate in exercises off the Italian coast, of course, after communists had entered the Italian Government.

If the Assembly were to endorse proposals of that kind, it would be showing a distrust for universal suffrage and a contempt for the independence of States that would be bound to bring it into disrepute.

Such an attitude towards a possible democratic change in Italy is but the consequence of a more general political orientation, leading to advocacy of a strengthening and a considerable extension of NATO powers in Europe, under the aegis of the United States. For the Rapporteur there is no distinction to be drawn — he says so clearly in paragraph 31 of the explanatory memorandum — between the United States and NATO. When he calls somewhat cryptically for “member countries... to be more publicly identified with NATO defence arrangements in the Mediterranean area”, what he is asking for is for Europe to align itself unconditionally on United States policy in the Mediterranean. In effect, this amounts to demanding an indirect strengthening of American hegemony in this region through strengthening NATO.

Still according to the Rapporteur, this strengthening should be at one and the same time political, military and territorial.

In the political sphere, the dispatch of NATO diplomatic advisers to the organisation's regional commands — in other words, to Greece, Italy and Portugal — is advocated. How can we fail to see in this proposal an attempt to encroach upon the independence of countries deemed “unreliable” by the United States? Nowadays we know all about the involvement of American diplomats and the CIA in the Greek *coup d'état* of 1967 and in the Chilean *putsch* of 1973. Do we want to see these tragic events repeated in other circumstances?

On the military plane, a strengthening of the NATO presence throughout the Mediterranean is called for. There is also a demand for the *de facto* integration of the Portuguese army in the Atlantic organisation's military set-up. The hope

is to see a reinforcement of the division into eastern and western blocs, and an aggravation of tensions on our continent, whereas there has been a swing of public opinion against this policy of confrontation, and the success of the Helsinki conference and the numerous treaties recently concluded between the socialist and capitalist countries hold out a hope that the process of détente may spread to the military sphere.

Territorially, the Rapporteur calls, with, to be sure, certain qualifications, for the integrated military organisation of the North Atlantic Treaty to swallow up at the earliest opportunity Malta, Spain and even Iran. He also hopes to see France publicly and finally return to the ranks of NATO, thus renouncing the gestures of independence of which it has sometimes shown itself capable in the past.

In the Middle East, although the situation in this Mediterranean sector is serious and disquieting, and demands speedy progress towards a fair and lasting settlement of the conflict, this is not the path on which the European Parliament, which I take as an example, has just embarked.

Indeed, on the pretext of taking up a humanitarian position, the latter only last Tuesday condoned the Syrian military intervention in Lebanon, by refusing to condemn the foreign aggression and recognise the Lebanese people's right to affirm its own destiny in complete independence, and urged the EEC member States “to co-ordinate their positions and their actions... so as to put into immediate effect any measure which might prevent the conflict spreading”. Such was the resolution passed by the European Parliament. It could, in our view, be used to cover a possible military operation: interference that would incur the general hostility of the Arab peoples and could only make it more difficult to find a peaceful solution and establish a just and lasting peace in this part of the world.

We find this same bias in the report we are discussing. It does not speak of leaving the peoples of the Mediterranean basin free to live out their national destinies as they see fit. On the contrary, according to the Rapporteur, they must be voluntarily or forcibly integrated into the NATO military bloc and subjected to American hegemony.

If the Assembly were to vote in favour of this text, it would be proclaiming openly that, in its eyes the independence of the European peoples and respect for the courses which they have

*Mr. Cermolacce (continued)*

freely chosen for themselves, carry little weight when the maintenance and strengthening of the Atlantic military bloc is at stake, biased towards the preservation of every possible means of a capitalist system of society which, in Europe today, is in the throes of one of the gravest crises of its history.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Papapolitis, a member of the Greek Chamber of Deputies.

Mr. PAPANOLITIS (*Observer from Greece*). — Allow me, Mr. President, in the name of my colleague, Mr. Tavlaris, and myself to express to you our warm congratulations on your reelection to the presidency of this Assembly. It confirms the high esteem in which the members of the Assembly of Western European Union hold you.

On behalf of the Greek Delegation, I should like to convey to you, Mr. President, as well as to the distinguished members of this Assembly, the warmest thanks of the President of the Greek Parliament for the invitation you have so cordially once more extended to members of the Greek Parliament to follow as observers the work of your Assembly. Contact with your members and study of the reports submitted to this Assembly are very instructive to us.

You are already aware of the fundamental view of almost all members of the Greek Parliament in favour of European union. I want to reiterate our belief that further economic, political and social progress of the European peoples can be achieved only through political union of the European countries. Hence the application of Greece to become a full member of the European Community. The realisation of the ideal of European union is of extreme importance. It is an historical necessity. We should not hesitate to accept the necessary sacrifices.

Greece, both now under its present status and as a full member of the European Community, will do its utmost towards that goal. Greece is a peace-loving country. The Greek people want to live in peace and security with their neighbours. The Greek Government has often proved its desire for peace and co-operation. Let me mention only the initiative taken by Prime Minister Caramanlis to convene an intra-Balkan conference with a view to promot-

ing the solution of some practical and technical aspects of the collaboration among Balkan States.

It is important to say that the Greek Government is convinced that the existing questions between Turkey and Greece could be solved peacefully. For the delimitation of the continental shelf, the Greek Government has proposed the submission of the matter to the International Court of The Hague. As far as the problem, raised by Turkey, of control of the air space above the Aegean Sea is concerned, representatives of the two governments have initiated discussions, which are still continuing.

Also, the Greek Prime Minister quite recently proposed to Turkey the conclusion of a treaty of non-recourse to violence and an agreement limiting the arms race. The first of these proposals is mentioned in the report on security in the Mediterranean.

However, I should like to point out that this report includes certain information which does not represent official positions and does not emanate from any official Greek source. I refer to the negotiations between NATO and Greece, as well as between the United States and Greece. On these important subjects discussions are being held at present. It is therefore inappropriate and premature for me to extend my remarks on these confidential negotiations.

I shall refer to the statement by Prime Minister Caramanlis on 16th October 1975 in the Greek Parliament concerning the position of Greece with regard to NATO. According to this statement, our relations will be guided by three principles. The first is that in time of peace the armed forces of Greece will be under national command. Secondly, in periods of war there will be full co-operation with the Alliance in matters of defence. Thirdly, methods rendering possible and effective co-operation in time of war will be devised beforehand. Finally, we are confident that the distinguished members of this Assembly will not fail to contribute towards a solution of the Cyprus problem in conformity with the United Nations Charter. Such a solution would constitute a fundamental element for peace and security for the whole European continent and the Eastern Mediterranean.

I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity you have given the Greek Delegation to explain briefly some of the positions of Greece on important matters, and I thank the members of this Assembly for the attention given to my remarks. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Kliesing.

Mr. KLIESING (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should first like to congratulate the Rapporteur on his success in presenting in such detail and so objectively the problems that the Atlantic Alliance faces in the Mediterranean area. It is in the nature of things that, as Rapporteur for the Committee on Defence Questions, he should have paid particular attention to the military aspects. Both the report and the present debate show however that, in this matter, the political cannot be separated from the military, but that the two are closely linked.

Of course, on this or that point of detail, our views may differ from those of the Rapporteur. I might mention, for example, that I cannot share his optimism about what is happening with Malta. I am convinced that the political friends we have in the Arab world will be far more worried than we are as to the political road that Malta, with its great strategic importance, will follow. It may perhaps be for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to which, after all, we all belong, to consider this question.

I do not want to minimise any of the problems that Mr. Buck has raised with regard to the area between the Bosphorus and Gibraltar. They are all very important and very difficult, and may one day be dangerous. I would however like to add just this. When we talk about the Mediterranean area in connection with the problem of European security, then we must look on this area as a single whole. With all due respect and much as I agree with the report and the draft recommendation, I would none the less have liked to see greater prominence given in the draft recommendation to the questions dealt with in Chapter IV of the report under the title "Other countries". For without wishing to belittle the importance of any of the problems touched upon here, I consider that the greatest threat to European security in the Mediterranean area is still that of the Middle East, of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In view of the civil war and of the hostilities not only in the Lebanon but also in the Maghreb countries, this may at the present time seem rather surprising. I feel, however, that these hostilities are evidence of nothing more than a far-reaching political instability which is in no way irreversible, and that they are not at any rate evidence of any absolute instability. It is

quite possible that when the present disputes are over a situation may arise in which the essential feature will be that a steel band will seem to be drawn round Israel from Beirut through Amman to Akaba, and perhaps from there on to Gaza, and then the situation will be more dangerous than it ever was before. I say that this is not a total contradiction; for even in the present situation you will, from Beirut to Nouakchott, get from all the Arab parties who are fighting amongst themselves only one reply to the question of what constitutes the central problem behind the dispute. This answer is: "The Palestinian question." On that, everyone is agreed. But that is not a matter I wish to discuss today.

I would, however, draw attention to one point. Two months ago, a well-known Arab statesman from an oil State in the Persian Gulf, a man whose European sympathies are well known, told us clearly and unambiguously that in any future war with Israel, the oil weapon would be far more rigorously and decisively used than in the Yom Kippur war. This would place us Europeans in a dilemma. In such a dispute, if we were to agree to Arab demands, it would, in view of the rôle played by the United States, rob the Alliance of its decisive base or at least decisively weaken the Alliance. If, on the other hand, we were to oppose Arab demands in the event of war, this would lead to an oil boycott which would within a few months cause a crisis of crucial proportions not only in our economic system but in our social system as well.

For us Europeans this means that we must concentrate a maximum of political energy towards helping to ensure that no military catastrophe occurs in the Middle East of a kind that would spell disaster, not only for the nations concerned but for Europe as well. The area about which I have spoken is for Europe flash-point number one of the present situation. It has played a decisive rôle in our history for thousands of years, but only rarely has the position of Europe on such matters been as weak as today.

When the Mediterranean area is being looked at in connection with European security, I should therefore be glad if the problems I have just discussed were also given priority treatment. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Budtz, member of the Danish Folketing.

Mr. BUDTZ (*Observer from Denmark*). — Allow me, first, Mr. President, to thank you and

*Mr. Budtz (continued)*

this distinguished Assembly for the kind invitation to observers from countries which are not members of this distinguished body. This is my second visit, and I find it very useful and helpful to listen to the debates. We learn quite a lot as observers and we are grateful to be allowed to make a few remarks.

This is in many ways an interesting experience because I find myself sitting next to my old friend and colleague, Mr. Thyness, who, if I may say so, made a very good speech. I found myself sharing his views, which is interesting because he is a conservative and I am a socialist. I believe this to be quite a good sign of the atmosphere of this organisation.

I find this an excellent report and I congratulate Mr. Buck on his work. If I may say so, it is a much more balanced view than that which we had the other day from Sir Frederic Bennett. It is very important that we should try to balance our views on foreign affairs. The situation is grave, but if we do not try to balance our views, we might find ourselves in difficulties that we do not want.

It is necessary for me to say that it is not the policy of the Danish Government, the Danish social democratic party, which I am honoured to represent here, and the majority of the Danish Parliament and people to participate in any kind of a rekindling of the cold war atmosphere. I think that Sir Frederic Bennett's report did in some ways reopen that period of tension. It is not a good idea. It does not get us anywhere.

Having complimented Mr. Buck, I now have to admit that if I had the honour to be able to vote here, I should not be able to vote for the recommendation, because I have to look at it from the Danish, or shall I say the Scandinavian point of view. The recommendation talks about co-operation with Australia and New Zealand, and even Iran. I should like to ask the Rapporteur whether this is done with the idea of opening new areas of responsibility for the NATO countries. If so, a country like Denmark — and, I am sure, Norway — would not be able to follow that path a single step.

It is only honest that I should say that. We are all aware that in Denmark there is a vast majority in the parliament and amongst the people in favour of Danish membership of NATO, and we do not want this to be changed.

If one wants to lose the backing for Denmark's membership of NATO, one should suggest a wider area of responsibility or the election of Spain to NATO. I know that that is not done in the report, which is why I back it. If we get too close to the idea of Spain's becoming a member of NATO, the backing of the Danish people will disappear. We are not interested in that. We should probably not be able to keep Denmark in NATO if other members tried to force us to support the idea of Spain as a full member. It is impossible at this time, and I shall explain why.

I am fully aware of declarations by the Spanish Government about movements towards democracy, but the average Dane regards democracy as indivisible. Either you have democracy, or you do not, and at the moment Spain does not have democracy. According to declarations from the Spanish Government, they are not going to allow communists to participate in the elections. My party, the Danish Government and the Danish people want to fight communism wherever it exists, whether in Denmark or in Spain. However, it is not democratic to say that communists will not be allowed to take part in the elections. In a democratic society they should be allowed to participate, and we believe that it would only increase their support if they were prevented from taking part.

Comments have been made about the policy of Portugal and the United States towards Angola. My colleague from the German social democrat party, Mrs. von Bothmer, referred to NATO's policy towards Angola and said that nobody had done anything at the appropriate time. Denmark is only a very small country, but we protested against the Portuguese colonial war at a very early stage and offered help to all three resistance movements. The MPLA was able to pick up this help most effectively. It is my honest belief that if western democracies had helped the resistance movements in the right way during the fascist régime of Portugal, though not with weapons, which is against Danish law anyway, we should not have pushed Angola into the arms of the Soviet Union. History should have reminded us of what happened in Egypt and Cuba, but we did not learn its lessons.

We have been discussing today and on many other occasions here and in the North Atlantic Assembly the situation on NATO's southern flank. The northern flank also makes an interesting study and I had the honour in the Mili-

*Mr. Budtz (continued)*

tary Committee of the Assembly, of which Mr. Thyness is the head, to suggest a study of the situation on the northern flank. May I suggest that Western European Union could do the same thing? (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Piket.

Mr. PIKET (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, first I should like to say how glad I am to see you in the chair again.

*(The speaker continued in English)*

I am pleased to be able to congratulate Mr. Buck on an excellent report which has been discussed in other places in Europe.

*(The speaker continued in French)*

(Translation). — I am going to speak to you in my own language since I have the possibility of doing so here.

*(The speaker continued in Dutch)*

I believe it is extremely valuable, Mr. President for us to be able to look at how the NATO command structure is made up and how the financial efforts of the various member countries of NATO relate to each other. All these facts hold, I believe, a special interest, and are to be found in Mr. Buck's report.

What Mr. Buck has to say about the Soviet navy is also extremely interesting. His wide knowledge of the subject is not surprising, in view of the fact that he spent some time as Under-Secretary of State for the Navy in the British Ministry of Defence. I do not dare, therefore, cross swords with my friend Mr. Buck on technical and military facts or to question him on this subject, though I do feel obliged to make one or two comments on his political views as they appear from the report. These I am unable to subscribe to as they stand.

I am sure Mr. Buck will not take it amiss if I say that I feel his report concentrates too much on United Kingdom interests, and those of yesterday's Commonwealth, and not enough on the Europe of today and tomorrow.

When he says, in paragraph 2, that not all changes in the Mediterranean have operated to the disadvantage of the western alliance, he is not saying something that is incorrect but he is, in my opinion, saying something that is not

entirely true either. The changes that have taken place recently came about without Europe having played a rôle or having any rôle still to play. It is as if Europe did not exist. Even the United States has played only a very minor rôle. I for my part would have preferred changes in the Mediterranean to have been such that the United States would have been forced to take an active part.

I believe that the operations that the United States carried out in Lebanon in 1958 did that country a deal of good, while today we see Lebanon suffering, because of the Syrian intervention, 500 deaths a day on average instead of the previous 100 a day: in 1958 the Americans' intervention caused no deaths at all.

Europe could have played a part in these events if it had been organised politically so as to be able to form a political will and undertake political action. But Europe is, alas too divided for this to be possible.

This division can be seen, too, in the part played by the British Government in the Cyprus conflict. In my humble opinion, the Commons select committee was right to criticise the policy followed by the British Government. What is the point of offering guarantees and having military bases on Cyprus if they do nothing to keep the peace? If these bases had been European rather than solely British, the Greeks and Turks might have thought twice before starting military operations and before violating the independence of Cyprus.

The paragraphs on Gibraltar, too, do not give enough attention to the Europe of tomorrow. Yet it is perfectly understandable that Spain — which one hopes will in the future become a member of NATO and the EEC — should find it hard to accept that a part of its territory, even as small a part as Gibraltar, has been and continues to be occupied by another country, even in the event of it joining the European and Atlantic organisations to which we all belong.

What is more, the Treaty of Utrecht — which is in the middle of the Kingdom of the Netherlands — of 1713 stipulates that the territory of Gibraltar is to be returned to Spain when it no longer needs to be occupied for defence purposes. A logical conclusion would have been for Mr. Buck to say in his report that Spain, once it has joined NATO and the EEC, would regain its sovereignty over Gibraltar. It is besides extremely doubtful whether, as Mr. Buck states in paragraph 63 of his report, Gibraltar would

*Mr. Piket (continued)*

be of any use to the United States if Spanish bases were to be no longer available. How could Gibraltar then provide a support point for military action in the Mediterranean? I do not believe this is all that realistic, Mr. President.

Where the southern Mediterranean is concerned, relations there are still dominated by the tensions between Israel and the Arab countries. So long as Israel is not recognised by the Arab States, the state of war in this area will persist and American influence will remain predominant.

I am in agreement with the draft recommendation itself, though I am sorry that here again too little emphasis is given to the European point of view.

I believe that the European Community will have to work out a policy for this area, one that gives expression to the great interest the Western European countries need to have in this region.

If, as one hopes, Greece at one end of the Mediterranean and Spain and Portugal at the other join the European Communities, there will have to be a common European standpoint on security. If this does not come about, then the European Communities will, politically speaking, simply fall apart. I should have liked to find this notion echoed somewhere in the recommendation. Naturally, the NATO side of things is very important; more important for the future, however, is the working-out of a European policy for the Mediterranean. Because it is precisely now, Mr. President, and in Southern Europe, that we need to keep a watch on what Soviet policy is up to. Communism will — if you will forgive me the figure of speech — always try to gain a foothold on our continent from the waters of the Mediterranean. We must, therefore, be and remain aware of this. And this is why we need to have European unanimity in defending this region. And there I will close this brief contribution to the debate.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix on a point of order.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I merely wanted to remind you of the following: the paper presented by Mr. Buck does not quite seem to conform to the Rules of Procedure. It

is a case of a recommendation which, under Rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure, can only be addressed to the Council of Ministers. However, the text, as drafted by Mr. Buck, is addressed to the Council and member governments.

I suggest that, in order to bring the draft recommendation in line with the provisions of the Rules of Procedure and of the Charter, that the words "and member governments" be deleted from the text submitted to the Assembly.

This minor change will not only enable us to conform to our Rules of Procedure but will also make it quite clear that our recommendations are not addressed to any individual States but to a collective body, the Council of Ministers, which, for my part, I would like to see more active in seeking a European policy of security independent of any external allegiance.

Consequently, I think that, in this particular case, my view on the substance chimes with my view on the form, to which we should pay heed, both for the present text and because of the precedent we would be establishing.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*). — May I first thank Mr. Valleix for his contribution. In dealing with the various points which have been raised during the course of the debate — which I should now like to do — I intend to begin by dealing with this one because I have been informed that it is entirely valid. I therefore seek your leave, Mr. President, and that of the Assembly to include where it says: "recommends that the Council and member governments..." the words: "recommends that the Council and requests that the member governments".

As far as I understand it, this meets the point of order which has just been raised. I am sorry that this technical point should have arisen but, thanks to Mr. Valleix and the advice I have received today, I hope that in this way we can set it right.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Rapporteur, my understanding is that you fall in with Mr. Valleix's suggestion. Choice of procedure is a matter for the Committee. If, for the sake of convenience, you agree that we now take the amendments, I see no objection. We shall therefore begin the debate on the amend-

*The President (continued)*

ments, in the course of which you will be able to express your approval, reservations or even opposition.

I have received several amendments to the draft recommendation.

Mr. Rapporteur, do you wish to speak now ?...

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*). — I seek your advice, Mr. President. If you think it would be more convenient for me to reply after the amendments have been moved, I can do so. If not, I can deal briefly now with the substance of the debate, leaving some of the matters to be dealt with when I come to the amendments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I think we can take the amendments now.

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*). — I shall reply then.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Amendment No. 1 tabled by MM. Dankert, Sieglerschmidt and Lord Peddie proposes that in paragraph (i) of the preamble, the words "if the Atlantic Alliance weakened in its determination to defend its freedom" be deleted.

The Rapporteur has the floor on the first part of this amendment.

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*). — I support this amendment entirely.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Rapporteur accepts the first part of your amendment, Mr. Sieglerschmidt. I take it that meets your point.

There is no amendment to the second paragraph of the preamble.

I put the two first paragraphs of the preamble to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*These two paragraphs of the preamble are adopted.*

In paragraph (iii) of the preamble, Amendment No. 1 seeks to delete the words "freely elected parliamentary democracies and the preparation of NATO contingency plans designed to meet any crisis" and insert "parliamentary democracy and human rights and the preparation of NATO

contingency plans designed to meet any crisis in the treaty area".

I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt to defend the amendment.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen. The amendment has two aims, and these can be dealt with very briefly. First, we wish to make it clear that a freely elected parliament is not the only important criterion in this connection, but that there are also other essential democratic principles, one of them for example being respect for human rights. It is perfectly conceivable that a country may have a freely elected parliament and that human rights are nevertheless not respected ; it is something which, unfortunately, does happen. So much for the first amendment.

Secondly, we want to prevent any misunderstanding that the plans referred to in this paragraph of the preamble could include not only plans relating exclusively to the NATO treaty territory, but also others of wider extent. This is the point of the amendment, and I believe that this is sensible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*). — I am very grateful for this further amendment. If my friend Mr. Sieglerschmidt were prepared to accept a small amendment to his amendment, I personally would advise the Assembly to accept his amendment. I am with him as to the first part of what he said. It seems to me appropriate that there should be a mention here not only of parliamentary democracy — which I was careful to put in the report — but of human rights. I would have no quarrel with that, and I would respectfully advise that that part of the amendment be accepted.

I would, however, ask that Mr. Sieglerschmidt should not press those last few words of his amendment, "in the treaty area", because it seems to me — and here we may have a divergence of opinion which may need to be tested — important that the Alliance should adopt a firm attitude in the Mediterranean.

Technically, it would not be possible for there to be contingency plans for eventualities in Yugoslavia, because, having looked at the rather difficult question of the treaty area, Yugoslavia would be excluded. It seems appropriate that

*Mr. Buck (continued)*

planning staffs should think of what should, or may, happen after Marshal Tito's death, and I would suggest that it would not be appropriate for us to preclude plans to widen the margins of democracy if requested by a new Yugoslav Government.

I hope I am acting in a spirit of reasonableness if I recommend to the Assembly that the first part of this amendment should be adopted, and I hope that Mr. Sieglerschmidt will meet me and delete from his amendment the last few words, "in the treaty area", because of the Yugoslav situation. I can assure the Assembly that there is no nefarious purpose in putting this recommendation, but in a spirit of compromise I hope that he will accept that amendment.

I see that in the fashion of our House of Commons there is a possibility of agreement from other supporters of the amendment, and indeed I see that my colleague, friend and political opponent, Lord Peddie, who is one of the signatories of this amendment, is among them.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, to be fair, I should say that the movers of the amendment are not united. My friend Lord Peddie is prepared to accept this, but I must say to Mr. Buck that despite my wish to accommodate him, I am still very hesitant about accepting. My hesitations have to some extent actually been strengthened by what he has just said. With his sub-amendment we are of course back again on the subject of Yugoslavia. To the extent that the security of the Alliance in the Adriatic area might be threatened by events in Yugoslavia, I feel that there really can be no question about whether the Atlantic Alliance can plan for this. What the movers of the amendment wanted was, in fact, to exclude the possibility of corresponding plans being prepared in an area extending far beyond this. I am quite ready to meet Mr. Buck on another point and to withdraw part of the amendment, but on this question I stand by my proposal, and perhaps, Mr. President, it would not be such a bad thing if for once we were to vote on an amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Although it is not for the President to give his opinion

on this matter, this seems to be, so to speak, a matter of semantics. A contingency plan, Mr. Rapporteur, is only of use if it is kept secret. If we reveal it by making a recommendation either to the Council or to the various governments, we merely succeed in expressing a pious hope, and will not know at all whether the plan has been implemented or not since its value, forgive me for repeating this, depends on it being kept secret.

We shall try to avoid a vote in the Assembly on a point which raises, all the same, a matter of principle on which, as far as I am concerned, I do not wish the Assembly to take a vote which is not unanimous.

Mr. Rapporteur, I apologise for intruding in the debate but I do not wish to go along with Mr. Sieglerschmidt's proposal to take a vote.

Do you maintain your text?

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*). — I have already indicated that I am wholly prepared to adopt a totally reasonable attitude. I accept the first paragraph *in toto*. I accept three-quarters of the second amendment. It has been clear that the other signatory to this amendment agrees to the compromise I suggest. I trust that Mr. Sieglerschmidt will adopt the same spirit of compromise that Lord Peddie has adopted and that I am adopting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does Mr. Valleix wish to speak?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Yes. I would not like to complicate the task of the Rapporteur nor to encroach on what members have said who have put forward amendments. Nor do I wish to make matters more difficult for the President, but I would like to draw his and your attention to Amendment No. 2, tabled by Mr. Radius and several of his colleagues who, on the point at issue, quite simply want to delete the words "based on freely-elected parliamentary democracies and the preparation of NATO contingency plans designed to meet any crisis".

Consequently, the present motion to delete should be discussed first.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, I must first put to the vote the amendment which differs most from the original text. This is Amendment No. 2 tabled by Mr. Radius and presented by Mr. Valleix: I am therefore going to put to



*The President (continued)*

the vote the deletion *in toto* of this part of the preamble.

You have something to add, Mr. Valleix ?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — A word about the amendment in question. Without wishing to repeat this morning's debate, since Mr. Radius has already explained matters clearly and at length to the Assembly, I would like to go back to the metaphor he himself used in his speech, that perhaps we should guard against finishing up with a kind of inverted western Brezhnev doctrine. That is more or less what the President was saying a moment ago : there is an element of incompatibility in presenting contingency plans or in asking for their discussion whereas, I repeat, their urgency does not always allow of preparation a long time in advance and in some cases even less, if I may say so, of publicity.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put to the vote part 1 of the amendment tabled by Mr. Radius, it being the one which differs most from the text of the Committee. If it is not adopted, I shall put Mr. Sieglerschmidt's amendment to the vote.

I put it to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Part 1 of the amendment is negatived.*

I put to the vote the amendment tabled by Mr. Sieglerschmidt which proposes that only a part of the phrase referred to by Mr. Radius, namely that which concerns the contingency plan, be deleted. This amendment is endorsed by Mr. Tanghe and Lord Peddie.

I put it to the vote by sitting and standing.

Mr. PIKET (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Is Mr. Sieglerschmidt's amendment a sub-amendment ? Which amendment are we voting on now ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — On Mr. Sieglerschmidt's amendment which now differs most from the text.

Mr. PIKET (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Has it not been amended by Mr. Buck ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — No, it has not.

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*). — I am advised — perhaps this may not be right, because one is acting off the cuff, as it were — that my suggestion that Mr. Dankert's, Mr. Sieglerschmidt's and Lord Peddie's amendment be carried with the deletion of the last four words, should be put first because if those last four words are deleted, in the spirit of compromise and good will which so often prevails here, I should be prepared to recommend that the Assembly accept the amendment. I am advised that the appropriate course would be that my sub-amendment, which I understand has the support of one of the sponsors of the main amendment, should be put first. I would seek your guidance as to that, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Kliesing.

Mr. KLIESING (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I believe it is politically irrelevant whether the words "in the treaty area" appear in the text or not, since we are all bound by the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty. May I suggest that we re-word the treaty on this point ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Sieglerschmidt, do you accept the proposal to delete the last four words in the preamble ?

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — No, I cannot agree to that because of the treaty.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Lord Peddie.

Lord PEDDIE (*United Kingdom*). — There seems to be some confusion. I should like some guidance as to whether, Mr. President, you are taking Mr. Buck's part acceptance first. If you are not, those who hold my point of view are in considerable difficulty. Further, I should be interested to know at this point, as we are dealing with it on these lines, Mr. Buck's reaction to our further amendment on paragraph 2, that is, on the subject of Yugoslavia, because that will have a bearing upon our attitude.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The sub-amendment proposes deleting the words "in the treaty area".

I put the sub-amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*The President (continued)*

*The sub-amendment is agreed to.*

I put to the vote, by sitting and standing, the amendment tabled by Mr. Dankert, Mr. Sieglerschmidt and Lord Peddie, as amended.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The amendment, as amended, is agreed to.*

Consequently, in this paragraph of the preamble, only the first part up to the words "based on parliamentary democracy and human rights" remains.

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — This text stands.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — That goes without saying.

We shall now turn to the fourth paragraph of the preamble.

The amendment tabled by Mr. Dankert, Mr. Sieglerschmidt and Lord Peddie proposes that paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation should be deleted. This reads as follows: "Willing to see other appropriate countries such as Australia, New Zealand and, to the extent that it progresses to democracy, Iran associated with Alliance defence planning".

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*). — I cannot ask my colleagues to accept part 3 of Amendment No. 1. I have long been aware that NATO must strengthen its position relative to other countries that are friendly with it. In paragraph 146, I set out my reasons for making this recommendation. In that paragraph it will be seen that Australia and New Zealand have taken a closer interest in mutual defence plans. There is also a reference to a twelve-day naval exercise, Valiant Heritage, which has taken place.

I know that the military staffs in NATO and, I suspect, in the majority of the countries here mentioned, are keen to have this closer association, and I hope that the Assembly will give further impetus to that feeling. It seems to me to be a marginally restrictive attitude to the Alliance that a question should be raised relative to this part of the recommendation, and I very much hope my colleagues will cause this part to remain in its carefully drafted form.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Rapporteur, allow me to point out that here we are not attending the Assembly of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, but the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union, and that, bearing this in mind, we can in fact trespass very far beyond the field on which we are called upon to pronounce and about which, it may be remembered, we are often very intransigent in insisting that it be respected. It is, however, certain that, if we constantly wander beyond the scope of the problems that concern us, we shall get in a tangle. I understand that some of our colleagues are objecting to this text, at all events, this paragraph of the preamble, which is going very far; and that is why some of our European colleagues, like Mr. Sieglerschmidt and his friends, are asking us to get back to more humdrum realities.

I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, if we were to accept this amendment I would propose moving forthwith a proposal that the name of the North Atlantic Treaty be changed to the "World Treaty". That would be right on the mark.

On a more serious note, Mr. President, collaboration of this kind really cannot be just a one-way street. Logically, there really must be give and take. The consequence, that the North Atlantic Alliance is involved in problems between New Zealand, Japan, Australia and so on and so forth, is unacceptable, despite all the good intentions that may lie behind it.

I would therefore ask that the deletion be adopted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Lord Peddie.

Lord PEDDIE (*United Kingdom*). — I hope that the Assembly will support the amendment and reject the point of view expressed by Mr. Buck. We have been exceedingly accommodating. Members will recollect that the tone of the majority of speeches we have heard on this subject have emphasised the political problems in the Mediterranean area. To bring in outside elements would do nothing to ease or settle those problems, but rather the reverse. Let us set about dealing with these problems as political problems on the spot before calling in elements from the furthestmost parts of the globe which can

*Lord Peddie (continued)*

have no other effect than to exacerbate feelings and make the whole situation worse.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*). — I am always very influenced by what my colleagues in this chamber say, and I want to keep up the spirit of compromise that has been shown. If one were to recommend acceptance of the amendment, perhaps compromise would come my way when we reached the amendment about Yugoslavia.

If I may say so, Mr. President, I am aware that we are not in the NATO Assembly but in the Assembly of Western European Union. I am a new boy and bow to your great wisdom and great experience, but Article IV of our confirming statutes says that we should work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Looking through, as I have in my compilation of this report, many previous reports presented by Rapporteurs so much more distinguished than I, I find that they have just this character that I have put before the Assembly.

In view of what Lord Peddie has said and in order to try to maintain harmony and in the hope that a future compromise will go my way, I recommend that the amendment be accepted, as it seems to have such considerable backing.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur. I think it would serve no useful purpose to put this amendment to the vote, since the Rapporteur accepts it and the movers of the amendment have obtained satisfaction. After all, that in no way detracts from the general intention of the recommendation, but it restricts its scope whilst at the same time strengthening it.

Mr. PIKET (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I would request a vote on the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — It was my idea to spare you additional gymnastics, but since you request it, I put part 3 of Amendment No. 1 to the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The amendment is agreed to.*

We apply the Rules of Procedure extremely strictly, but since there was general consent, I

wanted to set the official seal on this show of unanimity and on the good will of the Rapporteur, who is here making a concession which deserves to be recorded.

We shall turn to part 4 of Amendment No. 1. This proposes that in paragraph (v) of the preamble the words "announcement of free elections in Spain" be deleted, and the words "signs of democratic developments in Spain" be inserted.

It is chiefly a matter of drafting.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*). — This is a matter of drafting and I recommend the Assembly to accept the amendment. The wording of the amendment is marginally preferable and I am grateful to the gentlemen who proposed it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Piket, you are not pressing for a vote? The Rapporteur accepts the new wording, and it is only a question of form.

*The amendment is agreed to.*

In Amendment No. 3, before the words "Recommends that the Council and member governments", Mr. Valleix and Mr. de Bruyne propose to insert the following:

"RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

(a) Examine regularly all questions relating to the security of Europe in the Mediterranean and thus foster a rapprochement of political and strategic concepts underlying the defence of the different member countries of Western European Union in the Mediterranean basin;

(b) Follow the evolution of the situation in Spain and examine the conditions and possibilities for that country joining Western European Union when its internal régime conforms with the principles on which the modified Brussels Treaty is based ;"

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — We have therefore accepted the form of words to be used in presenting this recommendation to the Council and I am duly thankful to the Rapporteur; and the two sub-paragraphs that I shall introduce with my colleague, Mr. de Bruyne, are based on the following observations:

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

As at present drafted, Mr. Buck's draft recommendation is addressed to the Atlantic Council, and in this regard I share the anxieties of Mr. Sieglerschmidt. The main object of this draft recommendation is the strengthening and extension of the Alliance in the Mediterranean area, both through increased co-operation with States like Spain and Malta, and through consultations among allies. Mindful as I am of Atlantic solidarity, I have no objections on principle to this part of Mr. Buck's report.

It does seem to me, however, that although the Atlantic dimension of European security in the Mediterranean is given due weight, the report underestimates the contribution that a Europe more united and more conscious of its destiny could make to international stability in this region. Europe has an autonomous and independent part to play in assuring its security in the Mediterranean basin and in helping to unravel certain crises and solve certain conflicts, which are aggravated by rivalry between the superpowers.

It seems desirable that the recommendation proposed by Mr. Buck should include an additional paragraph, addressed solely to the WEU Council and inviting the governments of the European States to concert their action in the Mediterranean basin in order to ensure improved defence of our continent's specific interests.

The second part of the amendment concerns Spain. We are watching developments in that country with interest. And that is exactly the form of words used in the recommendation itself and in the paragraphs of the preamble. At the present moment, legislation establishing a number of fundamental freedoms is in process of adoption in Spain, and it is our fervent hope that adoption of this text may be followed by practical measures of enforcement. It is our duty to encourage these efforts towards democratisation. We must remind Spain that, on the day when it fully adheres to democratic principles, it will be able to play its part, in WEU and perhaps also in the future European union, but I deliberately say expressly in WEU, in our endeavours for the security of our continent.

In this matter, I should like it to be clearly understood that it has been our foremost concern not to let the very close attention with which we are all following this discussion concerning the Atlantic Alliance slacken. There can be no

question, as you have clearly understood, of reopening in the proposal which we have put forward the issue regarding other points, and especially the developments included in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of the recommendation proper. In other words, we are not going back on the proposals, particularly those designed to strengthen the basis of the Alliance.

We have, however, also been concerned to address ourselves first and foremost to the WEU Council of Ministers, before calling on the Atlantic Council, since we must never forget that we are primarily and specifically, when all is said and done, the Assembly of WEU. I believe that in this way our Assembly would only be affirming its personality, which is essential.

Moreover, I have been led to believe by the discussions of this afternoon and this morning, and by the thoughts voiced during the discussions on amendments, that our text goes some way to meet the anxieties expressed by several of our colleagues. I accordingly think, and would say once again, that it in no way detracts from the recommendation as a whole, but that on the contrary it adds something of advantage to WEU and hence to Europe. This can only serve to strengthen us in our relations and our co-operation with the Atlantic Alliance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I have nothing against the first part of Mr. Valleix's amendment. I must say that I do not know whether there are any differences of opinion on this policy between WEU member States concerned. Essentially these could of course only be France and Italy. If that is the case, they must naturally see to settling such differences within the WEU framework. In principle, I have nothing against that.

I do, however, have my doubts concerning the second part of Mr. Valleix's amendment, for the following reasons. In the Assembly, we have on a number of occasions considered the accession of other countries — including mainly NATO States — primarily, of course, with an eye to Denmark and Ireland, as members of the European Community who are not in WEU. Recently, we have been very reticent on that score, since we know that this just does not match up with reality. At any rate, neither of these countries is

*Mr. Sieglerschmidt (continued)*

interested in joining within the foreseeable future.

When I recall that there is still another NATO country that might perhaps be considered in the foreseeable future, namely Portugal, I must say that Spain is more or less right at the bottom of my list for possible membership of WEU, and since this is, in my opinion, so far removed from the realm of reality, I am unable to offer my support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — On a simple point of order. I would be the first to ask, subject to Mr. de Bruyne's consent, that the two paragraphs of the amendment should be taken separately or, at all events put to a separate vote. We might quite well hold different attitudes towards the two parts of the amendment and so come to different conclusions about them.

Just one comment directed to Mr. Sieglerschmidt: this amendment does not go so far as the form of words we have just voted on for the preamble, that is, development along democratic lines, provided we refer to the WEU Charter. Consequently, if Spain were accepted into WEU, we should be respecting the terms of the Charter. Finally, the amendment is more specific in that it concerns Spain in relation to WEU.

For all these reasons, and since there is nevertheless a difference in thinking and motivation between paragraphs (a) and (b), I should like the Assembly to decide on them separately.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Separation is in order, if it is requested.

I call Mr. Buck.

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*). — I regret that the considerable spirit of compromise which has existed up to now has broken down on this matter. The first part of the amendment would be inappropriate because it duplicates work done by NATO. I see Mr. Sieglerschmidt seems to agree with me.

I am sorry that there should be such a fundamental objection to the first part of the amendment, but perhaps I am expressing the feelings of a number of members.

I hope that the Assembly will not accept amendment 3 (b). I have gone to some trouble to try to make clear the position in Spain so that encouragement can be given to those valiant people who are striving to create democracy where it has not existed for so long. To hedge it round in this way and to make this a condition of its becoming a member of WEU is unrealistic.

Because of provisions about German rearmament and for other historical reasons, our Scandinavian friends have not been prepared to become members of WEU, although we have been delighted to have them as guests and to listen to their valuable contributions to our debates. This attitude, though it makes me sad, is understandable. For us to suggest that before Spain comes forward into democratic society it should be made to do something which several of our other friends have not been prepared to do would blur the message that I should like to go out, loud and clear, from this Assembly — that if there is a steady progress towards parliamentary democracy and the enjoyment by the Spanish people of human rights, they will be accepted. If this amendment were to be accepted, it would blur that issue.

I ask my colleagues not to accept these two amendments for those reasons.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I should like to draw your attention to the rules. I thought I heard Mr. Buck himself, just now, defining the rôle of WEU in relation to that of NATO and, under the provisions of the Charter, the relationship between that organisation and WEU. That being so, let me say just this. Mr. Buck mentioned a short while ago that everything had been said in the recommendation and that it was the Assembly's continuing concern to devote itself to what is set out in the first paragraph: "to examine regularly all questions relating"... etc.

Mr. Buck, I believe these are our continuing preoccupations with regard to NATO. But once again, I should like to say that we are in WEU now — I said so in Bonn a year ago, without any notice being taken. It must be that the time is not right — and that we must first tackle the existing matters among ourselves. Otherwise, Mr. Buck, I would go so far as to say that we must alter the definition of the report we are discussing. We would then no longer be concerned with a "recommendation on security in

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

the Mediterranean" but with a "recommendation on security in the Mediterranean as ensured by NATO". I should like to enquire whether WEU is an organisation affiliated to NATO or if, when it meets, as we do today, it sits in judgment on NATO's actions and preferred organisational modes, but also takes the liberty of recalling — this seems to me to be its prime right — its obligations towards members of the Council of Ministers and the seven governments associated with it.

I do not believe that there should be any difficulty in that respect, Mr. Buck. If we can agree that our report should not ultimately degenerate into a kind of missive to NATO pure and simple, but should also state WEU's will to assert its own personality, I think we shall find ourselves travelling in the same direction. But we would not be doing so if the position were otherwise, since, if WEU's need to assert itself is not properly stated, it will then merely tag along behind NATO and, I fear, prove but a poor sort of partner for it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Buck.

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*). — I have nothing further to say.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put part (a) of Amendment No. 3 by Mr. Valleix and Mr. de Bruyne to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Part (a) of Amendment No. 3 is agreed to.*

We shall now vote on part (b) of Amendment No. 3 by Mr. Valleix and Mr. de Bruyne.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Part (b) of Amendment No. 3 is negatived.*

In the recommendation proper, Mr. Siegler-schmidt's Amendment No. 1 proposes to replace paragraph 1 (a) with the following wording: "by negotiating in due time with a democratic Spain the accession of that country to the North Atlantic Treaty".

I call Mr. Siegler-schmidt.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the point here is essentially the same as that behind the previous draft amendment. Since we

accepted the earlier amendment, we should also logically accept this one.

The stress on a "government... that emerges from free elections" is now somewhat modified in the direction we have already decided on. At the same time it has been made a little clearer that such negotiations will probably not take place today or even tomorrow, but at the earliest the day after.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Buck.

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*). — It is a good thing on a hot afternoon to continue in the spirit of co-operation that we have so far enjoyed. I would recommend that this amendment be accepted. I wonder whether I can persuade Mr. Siegler-schmidt to retain one further part of my draft — the reference in it to the place in the military structure. In this way he will be happy that I have accepted the first part of his proposal and I should have thought that the reference to "an appropriate rôle for the Spanish armed forces in the integrated military structure" could be retained.

It seems that we have a happy accord. Perhaps we had better have confirmation of that.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Buck, of course there are a great many amendments to your text, which complicates the task of the President but underlines the interest that the Assembly has shown in your report and recommendation. It means that both have been followed with much attention and even analysed in rather a finicky spirit.

However, we have now come to the point where discussion is no longer on principles but on a drafting aspect. And this comes from a direction you did not expect. The reference to integrated structures already places one of the seven WEU member States in a rather awkward posture since it does not belong to the integrated structure. I believe that to insist would belie your intentions, because you thereby demonstrate that there is a fault in your system, and you emphasise its presence without taking precautions. I think deletion of the phrase would be a good compromise.

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*). — I apologise for the words "integrated structure". The phrase should be "appropriate rôle in the structure". This I think avoids the difficulty. They are the original words in the text. As I understand it,

*Mr. Buck (continued)*

that is agreeable to the supporters of the amendment. I apologise for having used provocative words. I had no intention of doing so.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Sieglerschmidt, what about you who proposed the amendment?

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — In a spirit of compromise, Mr. President, let me say that I agree to Mr. Buck's proposals.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The text stops at "for the Spanish armed forces"; the last phrase is deleted. Are there any objections to paragraph 1 (a) in this form?

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Paragraph 1 (a) is agreed to.*

No amendment has been put forward to paragraph 1 (b).

I put it to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Paragraph 1 (b) is agreed to.*

Part 3 of Amendment No. 2 proposes to replace the words in paragraph 1 (c) "located on a basis of territorial diversity" by the words "located in several countries of".

I think, Mr. Buck, that this is a question of form. Indeed, to simplify a sentence is always better than to complicate it.

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*). — I think that is so, but I am wondering whether there is any particular significance in the word "countries", in the phrase "located in several countries". I do not know whether this may refer to Cyprus or Gibraltar, for instance. If it does not, I should be happy to recommend that the amendment be accepted. As you so wisely said, Mr. President, it is largely a matter of form.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Buck shows a fine spirit of conciliation and I should like to thank him.

The text of the amendment therefore replaces the original text.

We now have an amendment by Mr. Sieglerschmidt and others to delete paragraph 1 (d) in its present form: "by more publicly identifying

all the member countries and the Alliance as a whole with NATO defence arrangements in the Mediterranean area".

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — It is an adage of German jurists that "a look at the Act simplifies the finding". When we put forward this amendment we were not quite sure what the Rapporteur meant by this passage.

We have in the meantime found the relevant passage in his report and now we know what was in his mind. I do not, however, want to discuss this at length in public. In the circumstances we shall not press the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Lord Peddie.

Lord PEDDIE (*United Kingdom*). — I share my colleague's view, but I should be grateful if Mr. Buck would indicate why.

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*). — This matter has been resolved by referring Mr. Sieglerschmidt to paragraph 31 of the explanatory memorandum where I have set out my reasons for having made those recommendations and, at the request of my friend Lord Peddie, I should be very glad to read this out. This is the reason for this recommendation:

"Far more serious is the attempt on the part of the Italian communist party to make a spurious and dangerous distinction between NATO bases and United States bases in Italy — which are present under NATO agreements and are an essential part of Alliance defence planning — and to call for the dismantlement of the latter. In the draft recommendation, the Committee calls for all member countries and the Alliance as a whole to be more publicly identified with NATO defence arrangements in the Mediterranean area. Ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council could be held more frequently in Italy, Greece and Turkey; at permanent level, the ambassadors of all the NATO countries should publicly visit the headquarters and defence installations in Italy; naval and air contingents from northern countries should participate in exercises in the Mediterranean area as much as possible."

That is what it is based on, and I am most grateful to the movers of the amendment for withdrawing it now that that matter has been drawn to their attention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The amendment is withdrawn.

We now come to part 7 of Amendment No. 1.

I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am sorry to say that I must now completely abandon the spirit of compromise that we have so often invoked and most urgently ask the Assembly to adopt the proposal. It goes without saying that neither WEU, to which I would now refer expressly, nor the Atlantic Alliance can fail to be affected if a crisis were to arise in Yugoslavia. But to define this crisis as it were here and now, in black and white, to announce everything that will then be done — so that other people are encouraged to embark on similar escalating considerations and make similar announcements — is to my mind not only wrong but downright dangerous.

I therefore ask you most pressingly to adopt the amendment. There is in this case no room — I should like to say this right away to Mr. Buck — for any change within this sentence. This sentence, this whole matter, must be entirely removed from the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — As the Rapporteur does not accept this part of the amendment which deletes all reference to a possible crisis in Yugoslavia while Marshal Tito is still alive, I put the amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*This part of the amendment is agreed to.*

Paragraph 2 (a) of the recommendation is accordingly deleted.

Mr. Radius and others have proposed an amendment to paragraph 2 (b) of the recommendation proper to leave out all the words after "détente" and insert "of any installation of new Soviet bases or similar facilities in the Mediterranean area".

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — This amendment should not cause any substantive differences of opinion. In fact, warnings by the Assembly regarding the granting of new bases could not be aimed at any country other than the Soviet Union. The wording of the amendment is explicit. That being so, it is not

the granting of new bases that we are concerned about but the installation of new ones, whatever means the USSR may use to establish them.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — This change of form seems to have been accepted by Mr. Buck. I shall put it to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Part 4 of Amendment No. 2 is agreed to.*

The amendment by Mr. Dankert, Mr. Sieglerschmidt and Lord Peddie is to delete paragraph 3 of the recommendation proper, which reads: "Propose that the European programme group issue an annual defence white paper incorporating a joint assessment of the threat and statement of allied strategy, combined with separate chapters on national defence programmes."

I call Mr Sieglerschmidt.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, now that our amendment on Yugoslavia has been accepted, I have put my kid gloves on again. The proposers' principal concern is that they consider the European programme group to be the wrong body for such a task. Having heard — a little bird whispered it in my ear — that the Rapporteur might be prepared to replace the words "European programme group" with the word "NATO", I can say that the proposers could agree to this version.

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*). — I have never heard my friend Lord Peddie called a little bird before, but it is certainly the case that as a result of consultations with Lord Peddie, if the Assembly were prepared to delete the words "European programme group" and insert instead "NATO", I should be content and I understand that the proposers of the amendment would be content. Whether everybody else would be, I do not know.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — With this change I accept, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Nothing is deleted, then, but "European programme group" is replaced by "NATO". I think that is wise, particularly as the European programme group may no longer exist by next year, in view of its provisional character. It may possibly last for several years, but once having completed its job, will be *ipso facto* dissolved, as it is not based



*The President (continued)*

on any treaty. Mr. Buck's comment is therefore justified.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation as altered by the amendments that have been accepted.

Is the Assembly unanimous ?...

Mr. Cermolacce states that he is voting against the draft and asks that this be noted in the minutes ; in that case, he will not ask for a roll-call vote. This is a concession on his part and I suggest that out of courtesy you note his dissent to the draft recommendation.

Are there any objections to this manner of proceeding ?...

Mr. Cermolacce, I thank you on behalf of us all. (*Applause*)

*The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted*<sup>1</sup>.

**4. European aeronautical policy —  
Guidelines emerging from the Colloquy on  
2nd and 3rd February 1976**

(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 704)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is to vote on the draft texts not already voted upon by the Assembly.

I shall now put to the vote these draft recommendations in the same way as before so that we can arrive at favourable conclusions on the work of a session which has been at a very high level and conducted with exceptional patience and perseverance.

I put to the vote the draft recommendation on a European aeronautical policy, presented by Mr. Richter, Mr. Valleix and Mr. Warren, Document 704.

Are there any objections ?...

Note is taken of Mr. Cermolacce's objection.

Are there any abstentions ?...

*The draft recommendation is adopted*<sup>2</sup>.

1. See page 40.

2. See page 42.

**5. Détente and security in Europe**

(Vote on the revised draft Recommendation,  
Doc. 703)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — As regards the draft recommendation on détente and security in Europe, besides Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Mattiek and Mr. Richter are also opposed to the draft.

Do they wish to follow Mr. Cermolacce's good example ?...

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — It is not a good example : I simply wanted to expedite proceedings because I was the only one against. But if I am no longer alone, I ask for a roll-call vote.

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — This morning I was absent because I had to attend a Committee meeting at the Senate. It was formally agreed that voting would take place on Thursday at 11.30 a.m. We had made arrangements to attend the sitting. I protest against this manner of proceeding.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Quite, but the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, since it must leave the Assembly, will not be here tomorrow morning ; consequently, it was no longer possible to count on having a quorum.

If you were at the Senate this morning, that was your good right, but it is equally your duty to be here or to make arrangements to be represented.

I call Mr. Richter.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like to inform you that certain members of the German Delegation will definitely be present tomorrow. We would not want this report to fail for lack of a quorum. We are against the substance of the report, since we believe that it conflicts so sharply with other reports adopted by this Assembly that it is not credible. We would therefore vote with the "Noes", but perhaps the vote can be postponed until tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — If members think that we should take the risk of presenting this text tomorrow... I am there to see good order maintained and endeavour, following our work and discussions, to assemble some material for our future debates, thus demonstrating the genuine parliamentary function served by WEU.

*The President (continued)*

I call Sir Frederic Bennett who is, so to speak, the father of one of these reports.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — As I have given way on my report, even more than did my predecessor on his, I had hoped, Mr. President, that your proposal that objections might be recorded would be accepted. If a roll-call vote is insisted upon our proceedings will be stultified, because from inquiries I have made I am sure that there will be even fewer members present tomorrow morning than there are if a vote is taken today.

Though, naturally, I shall stay over, there is no more chance of getting the full quorum of forty-five tomorrow than there is today. There is no suggestion of our adopting the wording or sentiments expressed in the report, but only the clauses that we accepted one by one without a single division. In those circumstances, I urge acceptance of your appeal that those who want to make strong objections should do so but that the procedure should go forward.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Since it is not possible to use the entirely exceptional procedure which we adopted in the case of another report, and some members having asked for a vote by roll-call, which they are entitled to do under the rules of our Assembly, I am obliged to bow to their wishes and, since we have no quorum this evening, and we may have one tomorrow morning — for we are going to round up a number of members of the Assembly for the purpose — I think it only right and proper to postpone the vote till tomorrow in the case of your report. In spite of the fact that you have made some concessions, I acknowledge that, as a matter of principle, some members have not been able to fall in with you.

I think in the case of our French colleagues there may have been a misunderstanding and they will be able to be present tomorrow morning, failing which we shall not have a quorum and your report will not be adopted.

### **6. Strategic mobility**

*(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 709)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and

debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on strategic mobility and vote on the draft order, Document 709.

I call Mr. Duvieusart, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. DUVIEUSART (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report which I have the honour to present will only take up a few moments of the Assembly's time and will not require the heated discussions engendered by the previous report.

This is a preliminary report, since by assigning to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments the report on strategic mobility, your Assembly set it a task whose magnitude increased as work proceeded.

Preliminary studies called for a questionnaire which is still being drafted and could be sent to the various governments in order to find out exactly what the current situation is, of which there does not seem to have been any systematic study made as yet.

The object of the report will be to cover numerous questions which have been debated at the conference on the law of the sea and on the occasion of changes in the rights which national States have accorded each other in this matter.

The questionnaire will also deal with the problem of relations inside and outside NATO in respect of the rights of aircraft and ships to take on supplies in each State. It seems desirable that, as a result of such a study, the guidelines may be laid down inside NATO for a standard agreement on problems concerning the stationing and stop-over of ships and aircraft in NATO countries.

This first step will also perhaps enable a standard form of negotiation between these countries and non-NATO countries to obtain the same facilities. The report will also have to examine, apart from material aspects, the question of securing freedom of movement in areas where the WEU countries might have to take action. We are thinking particularly of the Near and Middle East, the Indian ocean and continental Africa, in which interests may have to be defended.

Lastly, the report will examine what mobility the armies of NATO will have to contend with in the case of the armies of the Soviet bloc. This will be the last part of the report.

*Mr. Duviolsart (continued)*

In conclusion, the Committee and your Rapporteur propose that they be given an order to pursue this study which, as I said at the beginning, consists in drawing up a questionnaire, a statistical survey and, lastly, the drafting of a fuller order.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

Nobody else is down to speak.

In Document 709, the Committee proposes a draft order which I put to the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The draft order is adopted*<sup>1</sup>.

### **7. Reserve forces**

***(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 707)***

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on reserve forces and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 707.

I call Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, you all have in your possession the report and the draft recommendation which I have prepared on behalf of our Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments concerning reserve forces.

I shall therefore confine myself to recalling the broad lines of our thinking on which, to my great gratification, there has been total consensus and a unanimous vote.

In fact, we asked ourselves three questions: — Is it necessary for our Assembly to concern itself with the problem of reserves? — If so, why? In the circumstances, what elements of a European policy on reserves could be put forward for the attention of our governments?

Why is a report on reserve forces necessary?

The two world conflicts through which our generation has lived have left their imprint on our ideas and policies concerning defence.

First, they were conflicts in which the reserves played an important part and, humanly speaking, bore the brunt of the fighting.

Second, the emergence of new weapons, and the feeling that our peoples could not bear another holocaust, led to the idea that nuclear deterrence could take the place of the formation of "big armies".

Although in the majority of WEU countries conscription is still the basis on which the conventional armed forces of the regular services are constituted, the whole of their organisation presupposes a short engagement, a simple means of avoiding the immediate massive use of nuclear weapons.

As the years go by, this widespread attitude, among those responsible for our military policies, has for a variety of reasons become increasingly unrealistic. Despite nuclear weapons, conventional warfare has not disappeared. It can be prolonged. It assumes very varied forms: guerrilla warfare, raids and revolutionary wars.

Moreover, atomic weapons are vulnerable. Their infrastructure can easily be damaged by conventional military action, and their protection demands large numbers of trained personnel.

Opposite Western Europe, the Warsaw Pact keeps under arms very big conventional forces, constantly growing in numbers and serving for long periods. In our democracies, however, for psychological and economic reasons, the trend is to shorten the length of national service for our citizens. The gap between the military strength of the eastern countries and our own is tending to grow wider both for armaments and conventional forces.

There is therefore a danger that Europe's field force might be whittled away very quickly in the event of conflict, and would have to be renewed if deterrence did not work. These are the circumstances in which we have come to believe that the reserve forces might play a novel and important rôle in the defence of Europe. It is accordingly for us to consider the rationale and operating modes of the rôle envisaged for them.

Even more than the technical reasons, political and psychological reasons are, in our view, determinant. Psychologically, ever since 1945 and apart from a few colonial-type conflicts, the

<sup>1</sup>. See page 44.

*Mr. Delorme (continued)*

nations of Western Europe have been living at peace, as we thankfully appreciate. Of course, nobody would dream of complaining about that. Nevertheless, this situation affects our young people in ways we must take into account.

Although peace is subject to the permanent threat of atomic war, it has become a basic factor in the psychology of the younger generations. The dangers, although real enough, grow dim. In a civilisation where social and cultural progress has become the driving force, the idea of external danger tends to seem somewhat unreal. Hence, in our countries, conscription, military organisation relying on good citizenship, is increasingly grudgingly accepted.

Furthermore, expenditure on conventional armed forces is contested, and the young conscript gains the impression, all too often justified, that he is completely useless and is wasting his time. It is therefore necessary to give him back the civic sense of defence, appropriate to our civilisation.

The constitution of reserve forces, essentially formed of citizens, is likely to stimulate mindfulness of the vital will to defence as a means of safeguarding peace and progress in each of our States. Service in the reserves keeps permanently alive what we can only describe as patriotism, which can moreover be a European patriotism.

From the political standpoint, the sophistication of nuclear armaments and certain highly elaborate conventional weaponry requires, under sound management, that they be in charge of regular soldiers. There is therefore a tendency for the permanent professional armed forces to increase. In these, the conscript often feels he is merely expendable, with a consequent sense of frustration among the population at large.

What is more, the professional army, like any other technical body, tends to stand apart from the bulk of the nation it serves. A gulf then tends to grow between the nation and its army, with the former distrustful of the latter but at the same time relying blindly upon it for its defence.

Now it is proved — and examples of this are given in my report — that no defence is possible, even on the basis of nuclear deterrence, without a will to resist among the entire nation.

Nuclear deterrence cannot replace popular deterrence. On the contrary, it can only operate provided the latter already exists.

Hence the constitution of reserve forces as a link between the nation and the professional army, integrating the regular soldier in the population as a whole, is a basic factor in any defence policy. The examples I mention in my report, of Israel, Sweden, Switzerland, Vietnam and especially Yugoslavia, to my way of thinking speak volumes. And why should we not also mention the popular uprisings of the resistance movements on the home front during the war of 1939-1945 — in Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, and lastly, our own French forces of the interior, who gave such effective support to the allied liberation armies.

There are also military reasons.

A policy in respect of the reserve forces is also militarily essential. Faced with a sudden aggression by conventional forces, which will always outnumber those that Europe can field, our continent should use its full human potential. In particular a ground defence combining direct action with guerrilla action may be a means of stopping an enemy break-through.

A defence of this kind can only be put up by men determined to protect their homes, their home regions and towns, and militarily fit from their peacetime training.

The formation and training of such forces would restore a meaning and efficiency to military service and conscription. We must not close our eyes to the fact that they might increase the obligations imposed on citizens. The purpose of throwing in the reserves is, however, not to lighten military obligations, but rather to render them militarily more efficient in the context of our societies.

Lastly, it would be wrong to believe that, although reserve forces are not the major concern of our governments, they are being completely neglected. You will find in my report the main basic facts about the existence and use of reserve forces in the WEU countries.

On the basis of these examples, the recommendation which our Committee proposes you should adopt is designed both to improve the system in each individual country and also to promote a reserve forces policy at European level.

*Mr. Delorme (continued)*

We consider that improvement of the existing arrangements in each of our nations might be based on: establishment of a specific form of military service for the reserve forces — this could comprise a relatively short period of active service, but a fairly prolonged period of service in the reserves interspersed with training periods; organising reserve forces on a territorial basis to further the ground defence of the territory; reservist status, which would, in particular, guarantee appropriate rates of pay during these periods of service.

True, the problem of reserves seen in these terms is obviously a national one. We believe, however, that it can and should also be dealt with at the European level.

As a first step, we consider the European countries should compare notes and jointly study certain problems of the use of such forces in association with regular officers and reserve officers.

For that reason, we propose the setting up of a European defence college in which a doctrine for the use of reserve forces would be worked out.

In conclusion, by taking up the problem of the reserves, your Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments may have had the impression of moving back in time. But I believe that, as its work proceeded, it came to feel, on the contrary, that it was rediscovering the underlying reasons for the existence of our Western European Union: the will to freedom, the need for self-respect and a refusal to accept any form of slavery, whatever its nature and origin might be.

Such are the findings which I have the honour to submit to your Assembly, requesting you to adopt the draft recommendation and the conclusions resulting from my endeavours. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

There are no more speakers on the list.

In Document 707, the Committee proposes a draft recommendation which I now put to the vote.

Are there any objections? ...

Are there any abstentions? ...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

*The draft recommendation is therefore adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

### **8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 17th June, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. Address by Mr. van der Stoep, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
2. Rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 711).
3. Détente and security in Europe (Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Document 703).

Are there any objections? ...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak? ...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 5.55 p.m.)*

1. See page 45.

# SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 17th June 1976

## SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Address by Mr. van der Stoel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. van der Stoel.  
*Replies by Mr. van der Stoel to questions put by*: Mr. Leynen, Mr. de Montesquiou, Mr. Radius, Mr. de Bruyne, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. Mattick, Mr. Richter.
4. Rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 711*).

*Speakers*: The President, Mr. de Niet (*Rapporteur*), Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Critchley, Mr. de Niet (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Sieglerschmidt (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Richter, Lord Peddie, Mr. Leynen, Mr. Radius, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Richter, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Sir Frederic Bennett.

5. Détente and security in Europe (*Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doc. 703*).
6. Address by Mr. Roseta, Observer from Portugal.  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Roseta.
7. Adjournment of the Session.

*The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### 3. Address by Mr. van der Stoel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The first Order of the Day is the address by Mr. van der Stoel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

Mr. van der Stoel, we know what your commitments are, and appreciate it all the more that you have found time to come and address the Assembly, of which you were until recently a distinguished Rapporteur.

You came back to it in June 1973 as President of the Council of WEU. Your presence today marks the interest that you continue to show in the Assembly, and we are grateful to you for it.

I call the Minister.

Mr. van der STOEL (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I must first of all thank you for the kind words you have addressed to me.

*(The speaker continued in Dutch)*

It is a privilege and a pleasure for me to be allowed back among you again today after an absence of some years. The Assembly of WEU is a unique parliamentary forum at European level in which political and military questions are regularly discussed, and close contact between the Assembly and the Council has a stimulating effect in both directions. It is in this light that I view my presence among you this morning.

I should like to explain this morning the security policy of the Netherlands in the light of the limits and possibilities of détente.

1. See page 48.

*Mr. van der Stoep (continued)*

Let me begin with NATO.

In view of the nature of East-West relations and their development during the past few decades, it is the view of the Netherlands Government that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is necessary as a counterbalance to the potential of the Soviet Union.

I shall return to East-West relations later.

As far as NATO is concerned I want to restate here that the strength of the Alliance is based not only on its military resources, however important these are for the balance of power. This strength is based just as much on the measure of credibility attaching to the Alliance as an organisation for the safeguarding of democracy, of respect for the rights of the individual, of justice and of social progress. We can rejoice in the fact that today all members of NATO profess democratic principles. It is enormously important that this should remain so.

It is occasionally said that under present-day circumstances military blocs and alliances are obstacles to establishing even closer relations between the peoples of Europe, and that consequently alternative arrangements should be sought. The idea of a European security system is often presented in this connection. Nowhere, however, has a convincing outline of such a system ever been put forward. Who, for example, would be responsible for guaranteeing the security of Europe under such a system? How would the disputes that arise be resolved? What restrictions would the countries in Europe have to observe in regard to each other? In short, the suggestion raises many questions to which no quick satisfactory answers can be given.

It is also occasionally asserted that Europe can no longer count on the American security guarantee, because of the risks that could arise for the United States if it were called upon to honour this guarantee. According to this view of the situation, Western Europe would have to learn to stand entirely on its own two feet and even be prepared to build up its own nuclear deterrent force.

The Netherlands Government rejects this reasoning too, for it does have faith in the solidarity of the United States with the fate of Western Europe and because it also believes that the United States itself has an interest in the security of our part of the world.

Furthermore it believes that an independent Western European nuclear force would have a destabilising effect on both intra-European and extra-European relations.

Nor is the Netherlands Government an advocate of armed neutrality such as we see in Switzerland or Sweden. A neutrality of this kind would place the Netherlands in a position of isolation, and would deprive us of the opportunity of working towards better and more stable relations in the world from the position of the common strength of the Alliance.

The Netherlands is, and will therefore remain, a positive and loyal ally. At the same time it wishes to promote an active peace policy through the medium of a powerful alliance. In our view an unlimited arms race must be condemned, and every means must be employed to find a way of restricting and curbing such a race. This is why the Netherlands has for very many years been an advocate of concrete measures in the field of arms control and disarmament.

A matter of the greatest concern to my government is the nuclear danger. I am thinking of both the vertical and the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, and of the enormous risks which are associated with the establishment of enrichment and reprocessing plant without the protection of really sound guarantees. To control and lessen this danger it is essential to frame international rules for all the areas referred to.

The Netherlands is therefore a convinced member of the Disarmament Committee in Geneva. Although results often fall short of expectations, it must be said that there have also been some very positive results from this consultation. I am thinking here in particular of the non-proliferation treaty. This treaty is now more timely than ever, and it pleases me that its effectiveness was recently strengthened by the accession of Japan.

I also welcome the fact that a number of supplier countries have made more precise arrangements with regard to the export of nuclear materials, though these are only a first step and will have to be tightened up so that the existing guarantees are improved and refined.

It is from the same viewpoint that the Netherlands sees the efforts of the two superpowers to reach binding agreements on the nature and size of their respective nuclear forces.

*Mr. van der Stoep (continued)*

The conclusion of agreements about underground nuclear tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is in itself encouraging, although I will not conceal the fact that the Netherlands Government is concerned about where the threshold for underground nuclear tests is set. I wonder in this regard whether a significant contribution really is being made to curbing the nature of the weapons involved in the arms race.

On the other hand, with regard to the carrying out of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes — the economic value of which the Netherlands Government incidentally continues to doubt — the fact that at least reciprocal inspection is permitted, should be fully appreciated.

The negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and related measures in Central Europe now also contain an important nuclear element which was introduced in December last year by the western participants.

I think that, certainly after this last adaptation of our negotiating proposals, the position of the West is entirely reasonable. It is not only based on an exchange of concessions of equal value, but is aimed at establishing a situation of parity, which will benefit the security of both parties.

The most recent developments at Vienna, modest as they are at the moment, give me the hope that our eastern negotiating partners are also perhaps gradually becoming convinced of the merits of the western offer.

Both in the past and beyond the borders of our continent, Mr. President, thought has been given to the problems of vigilance and security. Before the beginning of our era, for example, Confucius said that :

“Danger arises when a man feels secure in his position. Destruction threatens when a man seeks to preserve his worldly estate. Confusion develops when a man has put everything in order. Therefore the superior man does not forget danger in his security, nor ruin when he is well established, nor confusion when his affairs are in order. In this way he gains personal safety and is able to protect the empire.”

However, it is not primarily the study of the words of Confucius that accounts for the marked

trend which has recently arisen throughout the western press to pay attention not so much to the opportunities and promises of détente between East and West as to the limits that have been set to improving East-West relations. In various national parliaments, too, noises are being heard which bear witness more to a certain scepticism, and also perhaps to a certain disappointment regarding détente.

One possible reason for this new current may lie in the fact that an election campaign is at present being waged in the United States, during which East-West policy, as conducted to date by the present government, is coming under attack from the President's opponents. It is unavoidable that emphasis is being placed on the negative sides of the policy of détente with the Soviet Union.

I do not believe, however, that we in Europe are at present simply witnessing a new fashion which has blown over from the United States.

After the expectations raised by the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, I believe that there was also good reason for Europeans themselves to take a sober look at what had actually been improved, and if this was disappointing, to consider the reasons why.

Have developments lagged behind legitimate expectations? Or were those expectations perhaps set too high?

Secretary of State Kissinger once described détente as a continuous process in which the West, having regard to existing realities, is seeking a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. By settling or limiting the disputes between them, the parties could ultimately progress from a competitive relationship to one of co-operation.

The European countries particularly within the framework of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, have placed quite some emphasis on improving the quality and duration of the relationship to be built up with the USSR, by cultivating greater openness on both sides and also by removing the artificial barriers standing in the way of a freer interchange of people, ideas and information.

All western countries have always agreed that détente is not a state but a gradually developing process whose tempo was dependent upon the degree of involvement of all the parties concerned.



*Mr. van der Stoep (continued)*

Now, in itself, it is not surprising that there are limits to this process of détente. If they did not exist, we would eventually reach a stage of such extensive co-operation that East and West would blend into one large, world-wide State framework; a vision which does not appear likely to be realised very rapidly. The question is, therefore, not whether there are limits to détente, but rather where they are.

I should like to indicate some of these limits in my statement, together with an outline of the possibilities that, in my view, really do exist within détente.

To start with, I believe it is important not to lose sight of the fact that we are talking about an interdependent whole.

This means that progress in one sub-area can bring a positive influence to bear on the relaxation of tension as a whole. It also means that lack of progress in one given field can be injurious to other components of the process of détente.

Then there is the fact that, in my view, détente touches upon every aspect of the relationship between East and West. I do not believe that a distinction can be made between areas that are relevant to détente and those that are not.

Let me give you a few examples. The conference on security and co-operation in Europe played a part in giving a concrete shape to the process of détente, both by formulating a number of principles and by agreeing upon a number of measures. It must be said in passing, of course, that implementing the final act is of much greater importance than the mere signing of it.

It must be said, however, that in the area of tangible measures for military security next to no progress has been made; not only in SALT, the negotiations between the two superpowers which we cannot know about in full detail, but also in the MBFR negotiations, which have been at almost a total standstill for some time past.

There has been scarcely any reaction to the new proposals advanced by the West in Vienna in December, unless we wish to describe as a reaction the Warsaw Pact proposal of February which again boils down to establishing by treaty

the imbalance of military forces in Central Europe in their present proportions. Let us hope it will be possible to note some progress.

I feel that if this situation continues for too long it can only have a harmful effect on détente.

A further possible stumbling-block to the relaxation of tension in Europe is the fact that détente cannot be viewed in isolation from events elsewhere in the world.

If attempts are made to extend the sphere of influence of the Warsaw Pact in Africa under the slogan of "proletarian internationalism", it is inevitable that this will have repercussions on East-West relations in Europe.

I must however mention in passing that, in my view, western policy in current or potential crisis areas outside Europe cannot be based on joining with those forces which indeed feel threatened by, among others, the USSR but which in fact have themselves been the cause of the local tension.

We shall have to gear our policy not so much to the symptoms as to the instigators of tension if we wish to prevent interference by the USSR in other parts of the world. Here, too, prevention is better than cure.

For Southern Africa this means a resolute and co-ordinated western policy with regard to Rhodesia and Namibia, and with regard to the apartheid problem in the Republic of South Africa.

"Proletarian internationalism", put into practice in Africa, brings me to another factor which may have an adverse effect on détente.

Particularly since Helsinki we have been confronted with remarks from one side on what is termed there the "ideological battle"; a battle — and this is added in so many words — which must be continued with unabated intensity alongside the policy of détente.

I find this rather a paradox. How is it possible at one and the same time to advocate détente and to pursue a violent ideological confrontation?

Naturally, there will be rivalry between the various ideas prevailing in the East and the West concerning the best ways of organising society and government. By no means do I wish to avoid rivalry of this nature. I believe that we have good reasons for preferring a pluralistic

*Mr. van der Stoep (continued)*

democracy, and that we can face a battle in the ideological field with a healthy ration of self-confidence. On the other side of the coin, I do not begrudge those of a different persuasion their convictions. Each nation must be able to decide in freedom on its own system, a right that was reconfirmed recently in the final act of Helsinki.

I do believe, however, that this rivalry must be subject to moderation if we really do wish to see an improvement in relations between States. Rivalry must not degenerate into a struggle in which, short of war, anything goes.

If one of two parties still insists on taking up arms, that is where I believe a clear limit to détente exists; and certainly if the battle is in fact nothing more than a cloak to disguise a country's efforts at extending its power.

These are just a few examples of areas where I see difficulties in the way of the further progress of détente. I believe that these difficulties can also serve as an illustration of the interest that the West could have in developing its own philosophy of détente in joint consultation. The West could then advance this philosophy to counter the unattractive Soviet vision of an incomplete détente, incomplete since it will operate only in certain areas of intergovernmental exchanges; a détente which, moreover, proves to be fragmented, divided into political, military and economic compartments, proof of the latter being the USSR proposals for separate, pan-European conferences on economic topics and on the environment.

In general the western attitude is more pragmatic than doctrinaire, but I would like to suggest to you that in this field we should for once risk an exchange of ideas about a sort of pragmatic doctrine which would provide a summary of our position with regard to détente.

I would not have raised this idea of an exchange of views on détente by the West if I did not see, in addition to the limits of the process of relaxation in tension, real possibilities for its continuation.

This is not just because in the present general situation with the build-up of armaments proceeding in parity there is no real alternative in the search for a peaceful stable relationship between East and West. The alternative, a sharp political confrontation, is not only unattractive,

but is also more difficult to control and therefore potentially extremely dangerous.

Leaving aside the lack of a sensible alternative, I see various areas in which further progress might be made, although it would not always be easy and it would not always be speedily achieved.

First and foremost, I still do not wish to exclude in any way the possibility of reaching agreement with the eastern participants in the MBFR negotiations on reductions of forces in Central Europe, which would mean a real strengthening of security for both East and West. The position of the West in the negotiations is now both reasonable and credible.

It is not impossible that it will be mainly a question of time before the eastern participants formulate a constructive reply. Perhaps results will first have to be achieved in SALT. If that is the case, we can certainly exercise patience for some time yet.

In addition, I believe that scope still exists for continuing the dialogue with the Eastern European States, in a multilateral context, too, concerning a strengthening of relations and a gradual increase in the rôle of the individual in East-West exchanges.

The Helsinki final act provides good starting-points for this: both the principles for relations between the States in general and more particularly the aims of their co-operation in the economic and humanitarian fields are formulated in this document in a suitable manner, which leaves open the possibility of a positive development.

I believe that the sensible application of the final act, which contains an important passage on respect for the rights of the individual, may at the same time help to bring about greater justice and equity even in those States which are not members of our organisation. This is something that my government regards as the basis for genuinely stable relations within each individual country and between East and West.

You might suspect me of euphoria if I did not stress at this point that further progress in the relaxation of tension, as I have just outlined, will only be possible if certain conditions are satisfied.

First of all, there must be present on the part of the Soviet Union too, the will to extend détente, and a willingness to make the necessary

*Mr. van der Stoel (continued)*

sacrifices. This willingness can be measured, for example, by the extent to which also those parts of the final act that resulted from the initiative of other countries are really put into practice by the Soviet Union. It will be revealed too by the degree of moderation exercised in both offensive armaments and ideological rivalry.

But the success of détente will not depend just on the attitude of the Soviet Union. A staunch western solidarity expressed in a joint policy and based on sound self-confidence is just as important for the continuation of this process.

The self-confidence of the West must be rooted in a belief in the value of a pluralistic, democratic social order which gives the individual the opportunity of self-development in the manner that he himself chooses.

The self-confidence will also have to spring from the knowledge that the West is safe against political pressure and military aggression. An adequate, integrated western defence system remains vitally important, in particular for détente.

The Netherlands is firmly resolved to contribute everything in its power to this defence and to the continuation of the process of détente. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. van der Stoel, for this valuable contribution to our work. You have been a member of the Assembly and are quite familiar with our traditional procedure. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Assembly who have indicated their desire to ask questions, to which you may wish to reply.

I call Mr. Leynen.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I am not surprised to learn that the Minister from the Netherlands is against what he calls a European nuclear force, but I would like to have a straightforward answer to a straightforward question. Does he — assuming that a European union fully competent on matters of defence comes into being — feel it is acceptable that two countries in this union — that is to say, the United Kingdom and France — should retain autonomous control over a nuclear capability?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. van der STOEL (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, reference has very rightly been made by Mr. Leynen — whose views on this point I am well aware of — to the discussion that is going on about European union. Indeed we must, when we give thought to a further development of the process of European integration, also think about the likelihood of this covering the area of common defence policy. I will however at once comment that in my opinion it is impossible to arrive at a common defence policy unless firm foundations have first been laid for a common foreign policy. As Mr. Leynen knows, a great deal of effort is still going to be needed before we achieve a common foreign policy, despite the many moves made within the Nine to harmonise foreign policies and despite the gratifying increase we are seeing in the number of instances where the countries of the Community do adopt the same standpoint.

All this is not to say that I would seek to place a taboo, until such time as there is a common foreign policy, on all matters connected with defence within the framework of European co-operation. There are, for instance, the possibilities of co-operation in the area of defence production. But I do think that a full and complete common defence policy will have to wait quite some while yet, until common foreign policy is an established fact. No one knows what East-West relations would be like in these circumstances. A prime consideration will have to be that a developing European union with a common defence policy would have to avoid anything that could jeopardise East-West relations in any way. My view remains that in the situation we have today — and no one can look into the future, no one can say with certainty what relations are going to be like ten to twenty years from now — setting up a European nuclear force would mean a serious blow to the possibilities of détente.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Montesquiou.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — As Mr. Nessler has said, we are very happy and very proud to see you responsible for the foreign policy of one of the States that plays an important rôle in Western Europe. Allow me to ask you two questions.

The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, of which I have the honour to be Chairman, deals as you can well

*Mr. de Montesquiou (continued)*

imagine with aviation matters and we greatly regretted the final decisions on the famous "deal of the century", though I have no wish to dwell on the past.

During the latter part of 1976 you will be President of the Council of Ministers of the Common Market. Since you are more European than many other Ministers, could you not do something to improve the lot of the European aircraft industry whose civil and military production schedules are, as you know, very run down and liable to jeopardise the future welfare of more than four hundred thousand European workers?

The second question is the one which you answered just now, though neither I nor some other of my colleagues quite understood your reply. Why do you say that the effect of an independent European nuclear force would be to cause imbalance within Europe, when the two existing nuclear forces, the British and the French, have already been recognised at Ottawa as an important asset to the Atlantic forces?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. van der STOEL (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, first of all I would assure Mr. de Montesquiou that I have every sympathy for the problems facing the aircraft industry in Europe. I am convinced, therefore, that there is every reason — and the European Commission too has been bending its mind to this — for greater and closer co-operation in this sphere. I hope that the vain attempts of the past will be replaced by more successful efforts.

As to the Ottawa declaration, it will perhaps not have escaped Mr. de Montesquiou's notice that the Netherlands has slightly different ideas from other countries in the Alliance on the matter of the plurality of nuclear forces within the Alliance. The Netherlands showed this by recording its reservations at Ottawa.

For the rest, I would repeat what I said a moment ago when answering Mr. Leynen, that is to say that a European nuclear force, alongside the American one, could in my opinion give rise to serious tensions in relations between East and West. Let me, to avoid any misunderstanding, make it plain that I am in no way trying to say that the Alliance can do without a nuclear

deterrent in today's circumstances. What I think I can say, however, is that the nuclear deterrent already exists, and that there is good reason for asking ourselves whether the problems that are facing us in the field of joint defence are not in the conventional sphere rather than a matter of increasing further our nuclear defence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Radius.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — I should like to ask the Minister whether he does not think that the European programme group set up in Rome at the beginning of this year should prevent a recurrence of the kind of situation which led to four European countries purchasing YF-16 aircraft when European aircraft were available.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. van der STOEL (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — In answering Mr. Radius, Mr. President, I want first of all to emphasise how glad I am that this European group has been set up. We know that his country made a particular contribution towards creating this group. I hope that consultation which goes on in it will be able to help towards developing much closer collaboration, in the defence production field, between the European countries.

Mr. Radius reminded us of the choice, made some time ago by a number of countries in the Alliance, of a non-European aircraft. For the four countries concerned it was a matter of choosing between aircraft all of which had their points. After a very searching expert assessment, which led to a consensus between the four member countries in question, the final decision in this case was along the lines Mr. Radius will know. This in no way means that the Netherlands, the next time a choice of aircraft has to be made, would be against buying one made in Europe. I think it would be useful to start studying the various possibilities already. It will be evident that a choice like this depends on a great many factors, with price, quality and compensation facilities as major considerations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Bruyne.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — There are two questions I would like to ask the Minister, Mr. President.

*Mr. de Bruyne (continued)*

The first is about the future European union and its competence to deal with matters of defence. From his answer to Mr. Leynen, I gathered that Mr. van der Stoel does indeed consider that the future European union could look on questions of defence as being part of its remit.

The second question is whether the Minister thinks that reactivation of the Standing Armaments Committee — I do not mean the Rome group, which Mr. Radius has just spoken about — can help on the one hand to strengthen WEU and on the other can provide an indication of the task that a future European union might eventually undertake?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. van der STOEL (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — Where European union is concerned, I would first of all make it clear that this union is not a firm concept, but rather an idea that is being developed. I can very well imagine that at a certain point in time the whole complex of existing relations between the member countries of the Community will be translated into what will then be called a union, but that then at a later stage this union will be given powers that it did not possess at the time it came into being.

It does, indeed, seem to me to be a logical sequel to a constantly advancing process of European integration that ultimately defence, too, should be a matter for the union. I have come across a number of comments on this in the report by the Belgian Prime Minister, Mr. Tindemans. In answering Mr. Leynen my view was, indeed, that I could not imagine how the European Communities could succeed, inside the union, in reaching a common defence policy so long as there was no common foreign policy. The common defence policy must, in the end, be based on a common foreign policy.

I have just indicated what importance I attach to European groups for co-operation, and the questioner has just asked about the Standing Armaments Committee. You will undoubtedly remember the answer given on this point by the WEU Council of Ministers. I think it would be interesting if we could, at the end of the year, and in the light of the progress made in the European programme group, show it to have given particularly valuable services, while the

Standing Armaments Committee in the WEU sphere made an inventory of industries dealing with armaments. I believe that these analyses and studies might contribute usefully to the continuing discussion on the building of European union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, you have referred to the need for a steadfast and co-ordinated western policy on apartheid in the republics of southern Africa. In what fields do you consider the WEU countries can act with this object in view? In particular, do you think that all co-operation in the production of nuclear power should be stopped?

You also spoke of a necessary improvement of controls in this sector, particularly when nuclear reactors are bought and sold. Are the steps taken by the IAEA in Vienna adequate in this respect, or what possibilities are there for improvement? Will the Netherlands Government in due course take action along these lines?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. van der STOEL (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am very glad that Mr. Sieglerschmidt has brought up the question of southern Africa, because I feel sure that this is one of the main focuses of tension in the world. I saw from the press again this morning that tension there is constantly rising, and developments are threatening to take an ever more dramatic turn, all because in one leading State in southern Africa the equality of the various races is not recognised.

I think it is most important that within the European Community, and among the WEU member countries, there should be the greatest possible consultation on a common policy towards southern Africa.

I am glad to be able to say that substantial progress has been made on this during recent months. There was, for example, a decision by the European Council in early April to apply the strongest possible sanctions against the illegal Smith régime in Rhodesia. There was also the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the European Communities in February, in which

*Mr. van der Stoel (continued)*

they issued a statement on the policy of apartheid, on the illegal Smith régime in Rhodesia and commented on the unacceptability of the people of Namibia not being allowed the free right to self-determination. I hope that we shall go further in building on these foundations.

Mr. Sieglerschmidt has now brought up a specific aspect of the problem, i.e. what is to be done about supplying nuclear equipment. I know that there has been a great deal of general consultation between the countries exporting nuclear technology about the line to be taken — this has led to what is known as the London Club. These have arrived at agreements under which standard conditions are being applied to the risks — which I referred to in my speech — of handling and processing nuclear materials that might be used for building up military capabilities. Where the nuclear power stations are concerned, there will be a strict observance of the guarantees provided by the system of the Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Mattick.

Mr. MATTICK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, may I put a delicate question? Since the conclusion of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe certain circles, finding that the agreements in the third basket are not yet being implemented, have had the impression — which I do not share — that the West is being led up the garden path, showing a trust that is totally unjustified. It is frequently said in this connection that there has been a corresponding slackening in defence preparedness, and at that point the first country to be mentioned — forgive me for being so blunt — is always the Netherlands. People are worried that the Community's readiness to defend itself is no longer what it was.

If he is in a position to do so, may I ask the Minister to dispel these worries?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. van der STOEL (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. Mattick has raised the matter of developments in East-West relations. As he will have heard, I said when speaking about the final act of the Helsinki conference that application of

the Helsinki agreements was a great deal more important than the signing of the document. Practice matters more than theory. The theory of Helsinki is sound, but now it has also to be put into practice. I will make no bones about the fact that where the application of the Helsinki decisions is concerned — thinking particularly of the third basket — I am up to now not all that satisfied and optimistic.

I am especially sad that a number of humanitarian problems that still exist between the countries of the East and West have not yet been settled in the letter and spirit of Helsinki. I hope that the months ahead will see a few concrete examples of the principles that were subscribed to by all the countries being implemented.

Now, the question of Dutch defence efforts. I can give Mr. Mattick an assurance that the Netherlands is and remains wholly prepared to contribute its share to our shared defence. As I said in my speech, the Netherlands looks on the maintaining of a collective defence as an essential condition for a continuing policy of détente.

Dutch defence policy has more than once given rise to comments, some of them from other WEU countries. Let me say that Dutch defence was undergoing a process of rationalisation, and that this has been completed during the past few years. As a result, the effectiveness of the Dutch contribution to the joint defence effort has certainly not decreased. I think I can say, too, that the Dutch defence effort will stand comparison with that of other member countries of Western European Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Richter.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — In his address the Minister devotes a welcome amount of space to détente. His evaluation of the progress to date in the MBFR talks in Vienna was very cautious. He dealt in some detail with the situation in the nuclear sector, and bearing this situation and the MBFR negotiations in Vienna in mind, I should be interested to have his forecast on this field.

If I remember correctly, an offer was made by the Americans to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe. The Soviet Union did not agree to this American proposal. On the other hand, the Soviet Union made offers which in turn were in substance an attempt to persuade

*Mr. Richter (continued)*

NATO — or the Americans — to undertake certain reductions with regard to Nike and Pershing guided missiles. The situation seems to have reached stalemate. Is the Minister able to foreshadow any lines of progress for the coming months?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. van der STOEL (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — Perhaps, Mr. President, I can start with Mr. Richter's last comment. He voiced the fear that the negotiations in Vienna were running into the sand. I would not myself be so pessimistic. I will not hide the fact that there are obvious difficulties, and that there is a sizable discrepancy between the negotiating positions of the eastern and western countries taking part. I do not however rule out the possibility of, for example, the conclusion of the SALT II agreement — and here again I am not giving up hope — having a positive effect.

Nor do I rule out the possibility of the eastern bloc, after a closer analysis of the new proposals from the West as put forward last December, coming to the conclusion that — talking in terms of readiness to make mutual reductions even though these may be made up of different things — they represent a reasonable offer.

What I obviously regard as essential is that the eastern bloc should understand that the countries of the West could in no circumstances agree to a form of wording that would, as it were, mean setting a treaty-like seal on the unequal balance of numbers between eastern and western troops in the areas of Central Europe where the reductions are to be made. Similarly the West cannot accept any national ceilings on force levels. On the other hand, I think it would be perfectly reasonable for the western negotiators to say that there should be an overall parity of forces in the reduction areas, so that there would be a kind of common ceiling. This could help substantially to stabilise relations in Europe.

Since on the western side, there is now readiness to combine this with a cutback in the number of nuclear weapons, it seems to be quite reasonable that the West's offer will meet with a positive response from the eastern bloc. I do know, of course, that nuclear problems do not come into these talks.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anyone else wish to speak?...

Mr. Minister, it only remains for me to thank you for having enriched the intellectual feast you have given us with an abundance of informatory comment in response to members' questions. I feel that all you have said has been very instructive and we again unanimously express our thanks. (*Applause*)

#### **4. Rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 711)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 711.

I call Mr. de Niet.

Mr. de NIET (*Netherlands*). — The title of the report does not exactly cover the contents. I think perhaps it should be: "The impact of economic and political events and trends in the world on the Atlantic Alliance with special reference to the relationship of the United States and Western European members of NATO." It is impossible, in view of the small amount of time which is left to us in this meeting, for me to give an adequate survey of the contents of the report. However, I am strengthened by what I heard yesterday from the West German Under-Secretary and from what I heard today from the Netherlands Minister in my belief that the contents of this report are not as revolutionary as some people had thought, although I have heard in the corridors that it is far from orthodox; I hope that this is so.

As I said on Tuesday, the amazing feature of an assembly such as this is that the fact that there are entirely different philosophies behind, for instance, Sir Frederic Bennett's report and mine does not mean a totally divided vote on the recommendations. This Assembly is and should remain a political assembly. Its members should respect each other's convictions and differences of opinion should never be hidden.

The Minister today and the Under-Secretary yesterday made it absolutely clear that a military alliance based on the defence of democratic

*Mr. de Niet (continued)*

values had to show that it had those democratic values to defend, socially and politically. Therefore it is always a balance to decide what part of the budgets have to be spent on military defence and what part on the social and economic progress of the electorate. Both of them said that. One of the main points of my paper is that military defence is only one of the legs of a real and comprehensive policy.

A military defence based on Western Europe together with NATO is absolutely necessary. I have never doubted the fundamental need for such an alliance. At the same time, I am more and more convinced that we should not seek to get others, and the younger generation especially, to accept that alliance only on military argument, only on the basis of what are described as threats. We should base it on facts and on the recognition that in this world there can never be security or peace as long as, for instance, the relationship between poor and rich countries is not basically changed in such a way that there is at least a future prospect for all to have a fair share of what this earth offers us in standards of living and other essentials for a full life. As we all know, that is not yet the case.

There is a third factor and that is the need to extinguish all discrimination on the basis of colour, creed or what-have-you. It is not so many years since we had the Atlantic Charter and all the amazing initiatives of the United States of America. It is only a few years since that terrible war that demanded so many sacrifices and that was won only by the sacrifices of the allied powers with the aid of the USSR. The USSR lost twenty million people, compared with which the losses of all the other Western European countries were small. Much the same was true of Poland. What we must not forget is that three-quarters of all Jews living in our territories were killed merely because they were Jews. We still have not made up for that, or the basic attitudes underlying it.

Then came victory. What has been the attitude of victors in the past? We had the Treaty of Versailles, which proved to be one of the seeds of the war that followed. Then, on American initiative, we had the ideal of the United Nations. The ideal of the Marshall plan, now OECD, was open for East and West, communist and non-communist, but it was rejected by the

USSR, which coerced its satellites into rejecting it, too, even though they had all originally accepted the idea.

In July 1946 there came the independence of the Philippines and a strict policy on the part of the United States of decolonisation everywhere. In 1947 we had the Truman doctrine, which has outlived its value but was necessary at the time because it said to the USSR after Czechoslovakia and other events "You will never again cross the border in our direction". That has never happened in our part of the world.

Then, as I have said, we had the Marshall plan with, at almost the same time, the integration of Western Germany. It would have been the integration of Germany, but Eastern Germany had to say "No", because it could not say anything else. I am convinced that never before has such a thing happened. The Russians have helped us to accept that position by coming nearer and nearer, but let us never forget that 100 or more kilometres lie between the eastern and the western blocs. The Under-Secretary said yesterday that things looked the same from the other side and even our former Minister Luns when he visited the USSR for the first time was impressed by how alive the fear of being overrun still remained. We know that it is not justified, but it is a fact of life — and understandably so after twenty million people dead.

After the Marshall plan we had Truman's point four in January 1949 — an essential doctrine about solidarity. I do not say that it has been practised, but it was there. It was something unique, something never put forward before, certainly not by such a powerful nation. NATO is the logical consequence of the Truman doctrine.

My paper tries to indicate what has been done with these initiatives and what has made it difficult, especially for our younger generation, to accept the vital need for something like NATO. For instance, we have seen apartheid, the events in Vietnam and Spain, the fact that there have been non-democratic members of NATO — Greece and Portugal — and so on. This is a subjective list, but it is not complete. It would be easy to treble it.

Many of us are agreed on the basic factors necessary for a comprehensive security policy. We need military, economic and social solidarity. We must fight and join with others who fight against discrimination. These factors are only



*Mr. de Niet (continued)*

rarely present. The gap between rich and poor is increasing. At last we are seeing that apartheid does not have a long future whatever we do. Now we are bold enough to make clear that we are against it.

We are also against the new economic order. Dr. Kissinger has said that it is not needed and that the old order has served us well. Basically, he is right and it may be seen to have served us well. It has been the basis of the exploitation of raw materials and what the earth holds. It has been the stimulus for capital investment to exploit everything the world has to give. It has served us well up to now.

We have to ask how we are to become people of solidarity, sharing everything possible in this world with everybody else. It will not be possible in one decade, but we should at least open the prospect. When shall we who have the know-how and riches take the sort of initiatives that President Truman took in those few postwar years? All the components of a genuine security policy were present in his policies. He was said to be a wash-out, but, fortunately, he was re-elected.

The relationship of the United States with many countries has been shadowed by Vietnam and the poisoning effects of McCarthyism. The civil servants in the United States have been so conservative that even progressive men such as President Kennedy found it impossible to switch to an anti-Vietnam war policy and carry it through. For many years the United States attempted to ignore the existence of the Republic of China. Action on such matters has often proved possible only under governments whose leaders are renowned for their pure conservatism. They will not be called communists or men of the left.

Willy Brandt is the only exception. Only Eisenhower could finish Korea and only Nixon could start the rapprochement between the United States and China and finish the Vietnam war. The fact that these actions are possible only under conservative leaders is one of the tragedies of our politics in the West.

I have tried to make clear the philosophy behind this paper. I hope that the report will be accepted, but if there is a schism between those who are in favour and those who are not, we should have a vote. We should not attempt to manoeuvre a unanimous decision. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you for your report, Mr. de Niet.

In the debate, I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — At both the beginning and the end of his remarks, Mr. de Niet referred to the differences between the underlying philosophies of his report and my own. Our attitudes towards one another's reports are curiously similar. He and others went along with the conclusions and recommendations of my report, with amendments on which I was prepared to yield, and it was generally agreed that there was no dispute on the conclusions and recommendations because I had given way to all the amendments put forward, some of which, I agree, improved the text. However, when Mr. de Niet spoke a couple of days ago he made it clear that he was bearing in mind what I said in my introductory speech and the contents and purport of my explanatory memorandum.

I take precisely that attitude today. I have no particular objections to the conclusions and recommendations of Mr. de Niet's report. If I had, I should have put down amendments so that we could have voted on them. However, I do disapprove of many of the matters underlying his own explanatory memorandum. I shall not, at this late stage, elaborate on them, since it is not difficult for anyone to work out where the differences between our respective philosophies lie, but I mention only two examples.

The explanatory memorandum contains a degree of anti-American political bias of a kind that is unacceptable to me. It is also critical of the continued possession of national nuclear forces by France and Great Britain. I do not share Mr. de Niet's disapproval. The United Kingdom Government's official policy, with the complete support of the opposition, is to favour for an indefinite period the maintenance of our own nuclear deterrent in order that we need not wholly rely on a foreign power, however benevolent. The same attitude was expounded very clearly to us by the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

That brings me to the difficulty in which I find myself. I am a fair-minded person. I do not engage in manoeuvres. However, the Political Committee has produced two reports, and there are those who object to the themes underlying each of the explanatory memoranda. In each case, as far as I know, there will be no

*Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)*

objection to either the conclusions or the recommendations. In the case of my own report, this has already been shown to be so. I do not expect there to be any objection to Mr. de Niet's report. Since the recommendations and conclusions of both reports have already been approved, as in the case of mine, or are about to be approved, as in the case of Mr. de Niet's, the only reason for not letting both reports go ahead would be that one or more members took so much exception to the explanatory memoranda that a quorum would be called for, thus ensuring that the papers were deferred.

As I understand the convention here, related to me by a number of senior people, when the Assembly approves or disapproves of a report, what it is judging is the resolutions and recommendations, whilst the theme of the report must be that of the Rapporteur himself. To use an English proverb, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. As votes are shortly to be taken, I seek your help, Mr. President, in ensuring that fair play is observed and that the same treatment is applied to both reports. If this is to happen, I shall be only too happy to send Mr. de Niet's report forward with a good wind. If, on the other hand, it is made clear that only one report is to be the subject of discrimination because the theme of its memorandum is unacceptable, I in my turn will find the other equally unacceptable and will do my best to ensure that both reports, in that unhappy event, are deferred. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Critchley.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — If the Times is to be believed, Mr. Callaghan has taken umbrage with President Giscard d'Estaing because the latter has asserted that the world's third nuclear power is France and next week when President Giscard d'Estaing visits London Mr. Callaghan intends to point out that Great Britain is the world's third nuclear power. That seems to me an extraordinary competition in virility as to whose missile is the bigger. I should have thought it wiser, even more fruitful, were President Giscard d'Estaing and Mr. Callaghan to discuss co-operation between France and Britain with a view to trying to solve the problem of what sort of weapons system ought to replace the British Polaris or the French nuclear deterrent.

Whilst there can be no European nuclear force until there is a European union, this does not mean that we should not think about the place that European nuclear weapons should occupy within the Alliance. We in Europe worry about the bomb, but prefer to let the Americans discuss it. We do so because we wish to mask the inconsistencies underlying our policies within Europe. On the one hand, we rely upon the uncertainty of a United States response; on the other, we are very careful to take out a nuclear insurance of our own in the form of four English Polaris submarines and five French nuclear ones.

Through the adoption of the Schlesinger doctrine, the Americans emphasise the rational use of nuclear weapons against a conventional attack in Europe. On the other hand, the British and French emphasise the uncertainty that must always exist in the mind of the enemy. Britain — and I suppose this argument would apply to the French — has always justified the possession of an independent nuclear deterrent, in two ways. First, we would assert that the possession of a nuclear force must prevent the first use of Soviet nuclear weapons against us, secondly, that the "uncertainty" argument would apply were the Russians to attack Europe or Great Britain and we then had the threat of using our nuclear weapons first. Of these two arguments, the first is clearly stronger.

However, the question that we in Britain should be asking ourselves is what, if anything, should replace the four Polaris submarines in the 1990s, because the hull life of the first vessel will be over at the end of the 1980s. The decision whether to replace should be high on the agenda of the British cabinet and of the Conservative shadow cabinet.

The United Kingdom and French deterrents are minimal. That is why the British have decided not to match United States improvements to their submarine-launched ballistic missile system. We are not to buy Poseidon, even though it will mean that we shall be unable to fit our Polaris warheads with MIRVs, because our warheads are too small. Instead, we have gone in for a modest warhead improvement programme, operation Antelope. Were we to conclude that it is essential for Britain to stay nuclear — and I suspect that a Conservative administration would reach that decision — it seems that it would be economically and technologically impossible unless we were prepared to do so on a co-operative basis.

*Mr. Critchley (continued)*

Therefore, the question is : with whom should a future British Government be prepared to co-operate ? Secondly, are we to look again to the United States ? The question that we must ask ourselves now is whether the United States would be prepared to make available the Trident system under the same convenient terms as they did Polaris, fifteen years ago. Washington might well be prepared to take the view that more than one nuclear decision-centre enhances deterrence, which is Dr. Kissinger's view at the moment. On the other hand, Washington might refuse to make the Trident available because the Americans believe that to do so would be to threaten and undermine United States/Soviet relations — and clearly we have no idea over the next five years how much more difficult Congress might become in the United States.

If, therefore, there is a big question mark over Anglo-American co-operation for the successor system to Polaris, why not look more seriously to the possibility of Anglo/French military co-operation, at least in the construction of the missile, warhead and delivery system, which could, in theory at least, be a combination of our warhead technology and the ability of the French to produce the missile, such as the M-4 ?

Also in the air is the question and nature of Anglo/French co-operation once the two forces become operational — satellite surveillance, how many bodies should be on patrol, joint targeting, and so on. At present the United Kingdom has four Polaris submarines, and I believe that the French are to reduce their number from six to five. Would nine submarines make a credible force for Europe ? At the moment, the national nuclear forces are minimal deterrents ; that is, they have the capacity to destroy a few key cities, with little or no counterforce capacity to attack Soviet military forces. In essence, they rely upon the threat alone to deter.

A European force would need to be somewhat more than minimal. It would have to be large enough to ensure assured destruction, that is, a force designed to destroy many cities, millions of people and much industrial capacity. Thus, for the United Kingdom, if we are still thinking of what should succeed the Polaris system, we shall have to increase our four ships to nine, and the French will have to increase their five perhaps to eleven. The question one then asks

oneself is : would our German allies be prepared to pay part of the bill ?

A Europe which remains allied to the United States in the years until the end of the century would not need to construct a force capable of making a realistic threat to the major elements of Soviet nuclear forces — such as the United States, of course, is capable of doing today. A relatively modest European nuclear deterrent could provide insurance against a Soviet first strike, and might conceivably deter a Soviet conventional attack. But a Europe no longer allied to the United States would, if it wished to preserve its independence, be obliged to construct the full range of deterrents — that is, a nuclear war-winning capability.

I wish the European-American alliance to endure. I believe that a united Europe should be an end in itself, just as the unification of Italy was an end in itself, and indeed of the United States of America and Germany. But I do not believe that this means that a united Europe must be formed in opposition to the United States. We in Western Europe should never be prepared to take the initiative in renouncing the United States alliance. Western Europe needs allies. We are obliged to share our continent with a superpower, the Soviet Union, and thus the alliance between Europe and the United States is the basis of the balance of power.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. de NIET (*Netherlands*). — I have heard what Sir Frederic Bennett said, and what Mr. Critchley said — and, as we know, Mr. Critchley is the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. He questioned the German Under-Secretary yesterday in five or six words, and he has made a speech today lasting twenty minutes.

This is amazing, because he has subjected me to this long interrogation about matters which are no concern of my Committee. To be subjected to such continuous criticism is a threat to our safety, because he has said that we have enough to prevent a war. That is wrong, and it is bad propaganda, to overestimate the Warsaw Pact forces and underestimate NATO. That is what he said, and it will be found on the record. Now he says that I am "touched", even though he was not present.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — A point of order.

Mr. de NIET (*Netherlands*). — But Mr. Critchley was not present yesterday for the debate when Sir Frederic Bennett classified me as “an anti-American biased man”. As Mr. Portheine said yesterday, it is not a question of fair-minded co-operation between Western Europe and the United States. It might be said that we should co-operate not only militarily, but to defend our freedom in economic affairs, but it is wrong to attempt definitions in black and white and to classify us as having an anti-American political bias.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you for your clarifications.

I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I make four brief points? First of all, I feel we must be grateful to the Rapporteur, whatever one may think of his explanatory memorandum, for having given us a lesson concerning an observation by a German philosopher which I value greatly. This observation runs: “He who does not want to have a past can have no future”. The Rapporteur has in fact made the interesting attempt to use events of the past, of history, in order to determine the needs of the present and those of the future.

Secondly, I should like to refer to Sir Frederic Bennett's contribution. I shall do my best to speak with the objectivity demanded of the Chairman of the Committee. I, too, have been unable to discover any anti-American feeling in Mr. de Niet's explanatory memorandum. He pronounced certain judgments on American political events that one may certainly regard in one light or another, that one may or may not criticise. But various passages, and the report as a whole, seem to me imbued with a profound respect for the great American people, which I share.

Thirdly, for reasons of solidarity amongst Committee Chairmen, I have sympathy for Mr. Critchley's contribution. He is, of course, in a difficult situation when he wants to talk about technical aspects of military affairs. When they come up, he is a Committee Chairman. He has now seized on the opportunity to speak for once about technical military matters close to his heart as a “freelance”, if I may put it that way. This is how I interpreted his contribution.

A final observation in connection with what Sir Frederic had to say on the impending vote. Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would simply like to remind you of our Rules of Procedure, where Rule 42(3) says: “Only the substantive text is voted on by the Assembly.”

Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Sieglerschmidt.

I call Mr. Richter, whom I would ask to be brief, since we are to hear Mr. Roseta, the Observer from Portugal, who is to make a statement before the close of our debates.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should just like to say one or two more words that may perhaps facilitate voting. You will recall the situation yesterday evening. For my part and on behalf of many of my social democrat friends, I must say that we are very grateful to Sir Frederic for accepting all the proposed amendments put forward in the Assembly yesterday.

I must, however, quite clearly dissociate myself — again, speaking for many social democrats — from his explanatory memorandum. We consider that this gives a picture that conflicts with other reports adopted by the Assembly, with what Mr. Hermann Schmidt had to say here yesterday, with official NATO views on the situation and, I am sure, also with his own government's official assessment of the position in Europe.

When, however, we base ourselves on what was expressly confirmed here once again yesterday by the Chairman of the Committee, namely, that the explanatory memorandum constitutes the subjective views of the Rapporteur, I am in a position to say that we shall reconsider our voting intentions as they were taking shape yesterday. We shall, then, vote for Sir Frederic's recommendation, and this may perhaps make things easier.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Lord Peddie.

Lord PEDDIE (*United Kingdom*). — I will not keep you for very long. I take this opportunity to support Mr. Richter's comments. As one of the signatories to the amendments to Sir Frederic Bennett's paper, I was conscious that there was severe criticism, which I shared, of the explanatory memorandum. Therefore, as it is now suggested that Sir Frederic Bennett be

*Lord Peddie (continued)*

personally responsible for his explanatory memorandum and that we are concerned solely with the recommendations, I give complete support to Mr. Richter's attitude in this matter.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, you have introduced into our customary procedure an innovation which is difficult to accept. The Assembly only takes cognisance of the recommendation and the report belongs to the Committee — in other words, even if the Rapporteur were to stand down, the Committee would keep control of the text.

Since unanimity has not been achieved — and I see signs of dissent in various quarters — the procedure calls for a roll-call vote. But since this morning we have counted and re-counted the number of those present, and there is no quorum, I am therefore forced, in this particular case, to defer the vote on Sir Frederic Bennett's proposal until a future sitting.

I call Mr. Leynen.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly should treat both reports by the General Affairs Committee in the same way.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Leynen, you would only have to speak your mind if your position on Mr. de Niet's report is the same as that of Mr. Richter, Mr. Cermolacce and Lord Peddie. Your proposal therefore only goes to confirm what is going to happen. I am going to put Mr. de Niet's report to the vote in the same way as that of Sir Frederic Bennett. If there are no objections, the report will be adopted unanimously. If there is a single objection — for that is the rule under our procedure — I shall be obliged to take a roll-call vote and at the same time declare there is no quorum.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — My proposal is slightly different...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I know, but it is irrelevant.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I move that Rule 34(3) of the Rules of Procedure be applied. I agree with Mr. de Niet's report, for which I voted in Committee and for which I am prepared to vote here. But if there is agreement on Sir Frederic Bennett's proposal, I request that Mr. de Niet's proposal be treated in the same way under Rule 34(3) of the Rules of Procedure.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. RADIUS.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — In the light of what was said just now, we are considering the actual operative part, and perhaps we should make some qualification. But no provision is made for such qualification in the Rules of Procedure. I could vote for the recommendation proper, but I do not agree with the paragraphs of the preamble. In other words, I am obliged to abstain from voting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. GRIEVE.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — I am in no way opposed to the recommendations in the report of Mr. de Niet. Indeed, I would support them. However, I cannot go along with all of the matters contained in the report. I would go along with the recommendations but I entirely support Sir Frederic Bennett in saying that if there is no opposition at all to the report, the right course for the Assembly is that both reports should suffer the same fate and both be dealt with by roll-call.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Grieve, that is what I have just said and we are bound — as far as I am concerned, I have said so many times outside this chamber and in Committee — by an exceptionally rigorous procedure. It is the historical result of the conditions under which the Assembly was set up twenty-two years ago.

Having said that, I have put Sir Frederic Bennett's report to the vote. There has been some opposition. In the absence of a quorum, we have to defer the vote to a future sitting. In the same way, we put Mr. de Niet's report to the vote. There has been some opposition again, and we are obliged to apply the same procedure.

To avoid this double setback there would have to have been a general consensus between the various groups outside the chamber. There is no sign of this and I am therefore bound by the rules. I therefore find that the two reports must be deferred to the next session.

I call Mr. Richter.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, my understanding of the position we are in is unclear on one point. As far as I can see, no objection has been raised so far. We can vote, since no roll-call vote has been asked for.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — There has been one. There was Mr. Leynen's.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the procedural position as I see it is that we must first find out whether a roll-call vote is being asked for. If a roll-call vote is being demanded on the one report, it will probably be demanded on the other as well. We shall then have to accept the outcome of the roll-call vote in each case.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Gentlemen, let us not lose sight of the true issue of this discussion. In actual fact, the two reports have of course a different political slant. As soon as you fail to reach agreement someone or other on either side is certain to ask for a roll-call vote, for all it takes is one single objection or one single abstention for it to be compulsory. Unfortunately, despite our efforts and even though we postponed yesterday's voting until today, there is no quorum and I am obliged to apply the procedure that applies in this case.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — As far as I know, Mr. President, no one called for a roll-call vote on my report. If I am wrong, I apologise, but I saw no indication of a wish for a roll-call vote. If it was called for, of course you are right, Mr. President, in assuming that I would immediately call for a roll-call vote on Mr. de Niet's report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — That is the way the rules of the Assembly of Western European Union have been drafted: if there are no objections and no abstentions, i.e. if everyone is unanimous, the motion is carried. If there is but one objection or one abstention, a roll-call vote must be held and a quorum is required. I find that there have been one or more objections to both reports. Consequently, in both cases, I am bound to take a roll-call vote and, as there is no quorum, to postpone the votes to the next session. Those are the rules. I repeat, I am one of those who consider this over-strict. We tried to have it changed in the Committee on Rules of Procedure, but objections were raised and we went back to first principles.

##### 5. *Détente and security in Europe*

(*Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doc. 703*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — There not being a quorum, the vote on the revised draft

recommendation on détente and security in Europe, Document 703, is postponed until the next sitting.

##### 6. *Address by Mr. Roseta, Observer from Portugal*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — This matter now being regrettably closed, I call Mr. Roseta, member of the parliamentary Assembly of Portugal, who will tell us about the state of the Portuguese economy following on the ups and downs and the crisis that this friendly country has experienced, and I am sure that the Assembly will be interested to hear the first-hand information that he is bringing us. (*Applause*)

Mr. ROSETA (*Observer from Portugal*) (Translation). — Mr. President, friends, thank you for your applause. Yesterday, you had a brief address by the President of the National Assembly of the Portuguese Republic, for many years a great fighter against dictatorship, who reviewed developments in the Portuguese political situation since the revolution.

It is now my turn, with many thanks for your invitation, which has enabled me to follow the work of the Assembly of WEU as an observer, to have the honour of addressing you, at the risk of taking up a little of your time, on two fundamental matters.

First of all, I would thank you for the attention that you have paid to my country in recent years and throughout the session now drawing to a close, and salute you as parliamentarians fighting for national freedom. I add my personal agreement on the remarks made about Portugal in the report on security in the Mediterranean, the supplementary report and the text of the recommendation.

What I also wish to do is to point out that what you have so rightly recorded here, the birth and consolidation of democracy in Portugal, is no reason for paying less attention to my country from now on. On the contrary, even more attention is required.

You might say to me: We are far less worried about your country, and we have other irons in the fire. But is it not a fact that the political situation in Portugal will henceforward be stable, despite the possibility of a minority government being formed, that democratic political institutions are beginning to operate after free elections, and that human rights have been enshrined in

*Mr. Roseta (continued)*

the constitution, and ultimately respected throughout the country?

Yes, our democratic constitution, drafted by a constituent assembly which bore the brunt of the battle against totalitarian escalation, is now really beginning to be applied.

Yes, elections for the Assembly of the Republic have produced a landslide majority for the three major democratic parties.

Yes, the candidate of these parties, General Antonio Eanes, a man profoundly attached to the defence of democracy, will certainly be elected President of the Republic.

Yes, the Portuguese people are deserving of your trust. A feat rare or even unique in history, they have, without the intervention of outside armies, overthrown two totalitarian régimes in two consecutive years. With the democratic sections of its armed forces, it overturned in 1974 an old but inveterate dictatorship, and in 1975, last summer, a government totally controlled by the communist party, which had also taken a stranglehold on all the media, the trade unions, the machinery of state, local government, the banks and nationalised industry, structures which it had in many cases taken over by force.

Your colleague, the Norwegian member of parliament, Mr. Thyness, quite rightly referred yesterday to the unprecedented nature of the achievement of the people to whom I have the honour to belong, an achievement that affords proof of their deep attachment to freedom and democracy.

In spite of all this, Portugal demands and deserves your attention more than ever. I hope you will always be mindful of its admission to full membership of the European organisations from which it is still excluded, after, to be sure, suitable periods of adjustment whenever this may be rendered necessary for economic reasons.

The very grave economic situation which Mr. Buck has not overlooked in his report in fact demands your immediate action, for the situation is such that it may endanger democracy itself.

I can quickly sketch in a picture of what our new democratic institutions have inherited: over a million unemployed, nearly a million refugees from Angola and Mozambique, a drop in GNP in 1975 of 3% according to the most optimistic

estimate and 10% according to the most pessimistic, given the increase in population during that same year; a figure of 4.5% gives a drop in *per capita* product of from 7.5% to 14.5%; inflation is running at over 20%; the deficit in the balance of payments is worsening, and the gold and currency reserves are dwindling day by day.

The public enterprises and most private firms see their deficits increasing, there is practically no new investment. Of course, consumption of certain products will have to be reduced. In my view, however, the only solution will be massive investment allowing either an increase in output or a reduction of unemployment by creating thousands of new jobs.

Mr. Sa' Carneiro, Secretary-General of the popular democratic party, of which I am a member, suggested a few weeks ago the launching of a mini-Marshall plan with the support of the developed countries of the West. I was pleased to hear the same idea ventilated here. Without a massive and co-ordinated investment programme in Portugal, there will be no economic recovery.

The great internal changes in our economy, and external aid, must be swiftly pressed into service of development, for the country cannot go on being "assisted" in respect of its consumption. Given the European vocation of our country, notwithstanding what may be said by some "third world" partisans, who have no following among us, it is absolutely necessary for our economic and social development that the free trade agreement between Portugal and the EEC should be renegotiated to allow us access to Community schemes of aid for the development of trade, as in other sectors of regional policy, and the like.

We must therefore also have recourse to the services of experts from the multilateral and European economic organisations, such as EEC, to renovate our commercial structure.

Those are a few of the chief aspects that are vital to any solution of our economic crisis. We must speedily turn back to economic and social stability, create new jobs and reactivate the economy, for you are well aware that security in this part of Europe does not merely depend on political and military factors, but also on economic development, social justice and cultural advance.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in concluding this brief outline, I look forward to

*Mr. Roseta (continued)*

your collaboration, both here and in your parliaments, for massive aid to Portugal, which is vital for the safeguard of democracy, which is your concern as much as ours, which is your democracy. Consequently, Portugal liberated from years of dictatorship and a long colonial war, intends to contribute, and will certainly contribute, towards strengthening European and Atlantic defence. It will play a far more important part in the Atlantic Alliance, now that it has thrown off all its burdens and will have its own place in a future European union. With your lasting support, of which I am certain, its people will never again lose their freedom, believe me, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, because I have faith in democracy. (*Loud applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Roseta. You have heard say, or seen for yourself, that this Assembly has never faltered in its solicitude for the Portuguese people, especially now they have set an example of democratic will by ridding themselves of a harsh dictatorship that had set it apart from the European international institutions. In all our dealings and in all dealings of WEU, we shall continue to maintain a relationship of trust and friendship with you, and what is more, the mere fact that you are here proves that we have not forgotten you.

**7. Adjournment of the Session**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We have come to the end of our labours. We have lengthily

discussed, made speeches and analysed texts, we have opened our hearts and girded our loins, our debates have at times become impassioned, which is additional proof — if any were needed — of the vitality of WEU.

Ministers of the various member States parties to the treaty have spoken from this rostrum.

I note that, despite the slowness of governmental decision-making, this is the first occasion for some time on which some progress has been made in implementation of the Brussels Treaty, notably as regards the remit given to the Standing Armaments Committee. Accordingly, our sitting closes, if not on an optimistic note, at least on a less pessimistic one than usual.

Anyhow, let me thank you all for having taken part in these proceedings, very enthusiastically at times, very earnestly at others, and I look forward to seeing you at the next session, not to mention, of course, that some of us will be seeing one another for our work in Committee, which is always of a methodical, well-documented kind and, thank heavens, we also have the extremely efficient co-operation of the staff of the Office of the Clerk and the Committee secretariats, to whom I offer publicly our tribute of thanks.

I declare the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union adjourned.

The Sitting is closed.

(*The Sitting was closed at 12.15 p.m.*)



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