

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

November 1976

IV

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

W E U

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
43, avenue du President Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tel. 723.54.32

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The Proceedings of the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume III : Assembly Documents.

Volume IV : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.



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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
BONNEL Raoul	PLP
DEQUAE André	Chr. Soc.
LEYNEN Hubert	Chr. Soc.
SCHUGENS Willy	Socialist
de STEKHE Paul	Chr. Soc.
TANGHE Francis	Chr. Soc.

Substitutes

MM. BREYNE Gustave	Socialist
de BRUYNE Hektor	Volkswijde
DUVIEUSART Etienne	FDF-RW
Mrs. GODINACHE-LAMBERT	
Marie-Thérèse	PLP
MM. HULPIAU Raphaël	Chr. Soc.
PLASMAN Marcel	Chr. Soc.
VAN HOEYLANDT D. Bernard	Socialist

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BOUCHENY Serge	Communist
BOULLOCHE André	Socialist
BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
BURCKEL Jean-Claude	UDR
CERMOLACCE Paul	Communist
CERNEAU Marcel	Centre Union
DELORME Claude	Socialist
GRANGIER Edouard	Dem. Left
KAUFFMANN Michel	UCDP
NESSLER Edmond	UDR
President of the Assembly	
PÉRIDIER Jean	Socialist
PÉRONNET Gabriel	Soc. Dem. Ref.
RADIUS René	UDR
RIVIÈRE Paul	UDR
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SCHMITT Robert	UDR (App.)
VALLEIX Jean	UDR
VITTER Pierre	Ind. Rep.

Substitutes

MM. BEAUGUITTE André	Ind. Rep.
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BIZET Émile	UDR (App.)
BOURGEOIS Georges	UDR
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DAILLET Jean-Marie	Soc. Dem. Ref.
DEPIETRI César	Communist
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	UDR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
LA COMBE René	UDR

MM. du LUART Ladislas
MÉNARD Jacques
PIGNION Lucien
ROGER Émile
SOUSTELLE Jacques
VADEPIED Raoul
WEBER Pierre

RIAS
Ind. Rep.
Socialist
Communist
Non-party
UCDP
Ind. Rep. (App.)

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ALBER Siegbert	CDU/CSU
AMREHN Franz	CDU/CSU
DREGGER Alfred	CDU/CSU
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
GESSNER Manfred	SPD
KEMPFER Friedrich	CDU/CSU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
MATTICK Kurt	SPD
MENDE Erich	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
RICHTER Klaus	SPD
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
SCHWENCKE Olaf	SPD
SIEGLERSCHMIDT Hellmut	SPD
VOHRER Manfred	FDP
Mrs. WOLF Erika	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM. BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
CARSTENS Karl	CDU/CSU
GÖLTER Georg	CDU/CSU
HAASE Horst	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
KLEPSCH Egon	CDU/CSU
KLIESING Georg	CDU/CSU
LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
OPITZ Rudolf	FDP
PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
WALTHER Rudi	SPD
WENDE Manfred	SPD
WÖRNER Manfred	CDU/CSU
WURBS Richard	FDP

ITALY

Representatives

MM. ARFÉ Gaetano	Socialist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BOLDRINI Arrigo	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CALAMANDREI Franco	Communist
CORALLO Salvatore	Communist
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
GONELLA Guido	Chr. Dem.
MAGGIONI Desiderio	Chr. Dem.
MINNOCCI Giacinto	Socialist
ORSINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOI Ugo	Communist
PECORARO Antonio	Chr. Dem.
ROBERTI Giovanni	MSI-DN
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SEGRE Sergio	Communist
TREU Renato	Chr. Dem.

Substitutes

Mrs. AGNELLI Susanna	Republican
MM. ANTONI Varese	Communist
ARIOSTO Egidio	PSDI
AVELLONE Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
BORGHI Luigi	Chr. Dem.
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DEL DUCA Antonio	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FACCIO Adele	Radical
MM. GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MARAVALLE Fabio	Socialist
Mrs. PAPA DE SANTIS Cristina	Communist
MM. PINTO Biagio	Republican
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
ROSSI Raffaele	Communist
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SGHERRI Evaristo	Communist
TREMAGLIA Pierantonio Mirko	MSI-DN
URSO Salvatore	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. ABENS Victor	Soc. Workers
MARGUE Georges	Chr. Soc.
MART René	Dem.

Substitutes

MM. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
KONEN René	Dem.
SPAUTZ Jean	Chr. Soc.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. CORNELISSEN Pam	Pop. Cath.
DANKERT Pieter	Labour
de NIET Maarten	Labour
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
REIJNEN Johannes	Pop. Cath.
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	Anti-Revolut.
VOOGD Joop	Labour

Substitutes

MM. van KLEEF Dik	Radical
de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
van OOIJEN David	Labour
PEIJNENBURG Marinus	Pop. Cath.
PIKET Frederik	Chr. Hist.
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

MM. Alan BEITH	Liberal
Ronald BROWN	Labour
Paul CHANNON	Conservative
Julian CRITCHLEY	Conservative
Lord DARLING of HILLSBOROUGH	Labour
MM. John FARR	Conservative
Andrew FAULDS	Labour
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
John HUNT	Conservative
Arthur LEWIS	Labour
John MENDELSON	Labour
John PAGE	Conservative
Lord PEDDIE	Labour
Sir John RODGERS	Conservative
MM. John ROPER	Labour
Thomas URWIN	Labour
Phillip WHITEHEAD	Labour

Substitutes

Mr. Gordon BAGIER	Labour
Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Antony BUCK	Conservative
John CORDLE	Conservative
Jim CRAIGEN	Labour
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
Sir Harwood HARRISON	Conservative
Mr. Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
MM. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Kevin McNAMARA	Labour
Dr. Colin PHIPPS	Labour
Lord SELSDON	Conservative
Mrs. Ann TAYLOR	Labour
Lord WALLACE of COSLAN	Labour
MM. Kenneth WARREN	Conservative
John WATKINSON	Labour



I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 29th November 1976

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly.
2. Examination of Credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session (Doc. 714).
5. Détente and security in Europe ; Rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today (*Votes on the draft Recommendations postponed from the First Part of the Session, Docs. 703 and 711*).
6. European union and WEU (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 720*).
7. Changes in the membership of Committees.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes

The President announced the resumption of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly.

The Minutes of Proceedings of the Sixth Sitting on Thursday, 17th June 1976, were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. Examination of Credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stating that the Assembly had ratified the credentials of Mr. Beith as a Representative of the United Kingdom in place of Mr. Steel.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, and subject to ratification by the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of the Italian Delegation and of :

- Mr. Bonnel as a Representative of Belgium in place of Mr. Kempinaire ;
- Mr. Cermolacce as a Representative of France in place of Mr. Roger ;
- Mr. Péronnet as a Representative of France to the vacant seat caused by the death of Mr. de Montesquiou ;
- Mr. Roger as a Substitute of France in place of Mr. Cermolacce ;
- Mr. van Kleef as a Substitute of the Netherlands in place of Mr. Waltmans.

4. Observers

The President welcomed to the Second Part of the Session as parliamentary observers :

- Mr. Austin, Mr. Haidasz and Mr. Oberlé from Canada ;
- Mr. Stephanopoulos and Mr. Manavis from Greece ;
- Mr. de Oliveira Baptista and Mr. Pedro from Portugal ;
- Mr. Inan and Mr. Ugur from Turkey.

The President also welcomed Mr. Messia, Representative of the Government of Spain.

5. Tribute

The President paid tribute to the memory of Mr. de Montesquiou, Duke of Fezensac, Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

Speakers : MM. Pecchioli, Leynen (point of order).

7. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session

(Doc. 714)

The Assembly adopted the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session.

8. Détente and security in Europe

Rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today

(Votes on the draft Recommendations postponed from the First Part of the Session, Docs. 703 and 711)

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 703, as revised.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 31 votes to 16 with 15 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 291) ¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 711.

Speakers : MM. Amrehn (explanation of vote); Dankert, Dequae (points of order).

The draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix III) by 33 votes to 10 with 18 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 292) ¹.

9. European union and WEU

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 720)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Critchley, Müller, Lord Duncan-Sandys, MM. Amrehn, Grieve, Valleix, Cermolacce, Mende.

Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur, and Sir John Rodgers, Vice-Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 720.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix IV) by 46 votes to 2 with 7 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 293) ².

Speaker : Mr. Rivière (explanation of vote).

10. Changes in the membership of Committees

In accordance with Rules 39 and 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the following changes in the membership of Committees :

1. COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium</i> :	Mr. Bonnel (in place of Mr. Kempinaire)	
<i>Italy</i> :	MM. Boldrini Fosson Maggioni Pecchioli Roberti	MM. Corallo Maravalle Avellone Calamandrei Urso

1. See page 19.

1. See page 20.

2. See page 21.

2. GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Ariosto Gonella Minnocci Sarti Segre	Mrs. Agnelli MM. Pecoraro Calamandrei Treu Rubbi
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	Mr. Beith (in place of Mr. Steel)	

3. COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS

<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Bernini Cavaliere Pinto Treu	MM. Boldrini Urso Minnocci Pecoraro
<i>Netherlands :</i>		Mr. van Kleef (in place of Mr. Waltmans)
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	Mr. Hawkins (in place of Mr. Craigen)	Mr. Craigen (in place of Mr. Hawkins)

4. COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION

<i>Belgium :</i>		Mr. Bonnel (in place of Mr. Kempinaire)
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Antoni Bonalumi Del Duca Orsini	Mr. Rossi Mrs. Faccio MM. Tremaglia Giust
<i>Netherlands :</i>	Mr. van Kleef (in place of Mr. Waltmans)	

5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES

<i>Italy :</i>	Mr. Borghi Mrs. Faccio MM. Giust Sgherri	MM. Cavaliere Maravalle Del Duca Romano
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	Mr. Jessel (in place of Mrs. Taylor)	Mrs. Taylor (in place of Mr. Jessel)

6. COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS

<i>Belgium :</i>		Mr. Bonnel (in place of Mr. Kempinaire)
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Arfé De Poi	Mr. Borghi Mrs. Papa De Santis

11. *Date and time of the next Sitting*

The next Sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 30th November, at 10 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 5.45 p.m.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹ :

Belgium	MM. Lemmrich	MM. Margue
MM. Adriaensens	Marquardt	Mart
Bonnel	<i>Wende (Mattick)</i>	
Dequae	Mende	Netherlands
Leynen	Müller	MM. Dankert
Schugens	Richter	de Niet
<i>de Bruyne (de Stexhe)</i>	Schmidt	<i>van Kleef (Reijnen)</i>
Tanghe	Schwencke	<i>van Ooijen (Scholten)</i>
	Sieglerschmidt	<i>Stoffelen (Voogd)</i>
France	Italy	
MM. <i>Depietri (Boucheny)</i>	MM. Bernini	United Kingdom
Bouloche	Boldrini	MM. Beith
Burekel	<i>Cavalere (Bonalumi)</i>	Brown
Cermolacce	Calamandrei	Channon
Delorme	Corallo	Critchley
Péridier	De Poi	Lord <i>Duncan-Sandys (Farr)</i>
Rivière	Fosson	MM. Faulds
Schleiter	Gonella	Grieve
Schmitt	Maggioni	Hardy
Valleix	Pecchioli	Hunt
Federal Republic of Germany	Pecoraro	Lewis
MM. Ahrens	Roberti	Mendelson
Alber	Sarti	Page
Amrehn	Segre	<i>McNamara (Lord Peddie)</i>
<i>Lenzer (Dregger)</i>	Treu	Sir John Rodgers
Enders	Luxembourg	MM. Roper
<i>Büchner (Gessner)</i>	Mr. Abens	Urwin
Kempfler		Mrs. <i>Taylor (Whitehead)</i>

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

France	Federal Republic of Germany	Mr. Orsini
MM. Brugnon	Mr. Vohrer	Netherlands
Cerneau	Mrs. Wolf	MM. Cornelissen
Grangier		Porthoine
Kauffman	Italy	United Kingdom
Péronnet	MM. Arfé	Lord Darling of Hillsborough
Radius	Minnocci	
Vitter		

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 1 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on détente and security in Europe (Doc. 703)¹:

Ayes	31
Noes	16
Abstentions	15

Ayes :

MM. Alber	MM. Fosson	MM. Page
Amrehn	<i>Büchner</i> (Gessner)	Pecoraro
Beith	Grieve	Roberti
<i>Cavaliere</i> (Bonalumi)	Hunt	Sir John Rodgers
Channon	Lemmerich	MM. Sarti
Critchley	Leynen	Schmidt
De Poi	Maggioni	Schmitt
Dequae	Margue	<i>de Bruyne</i> (de Stexhe)
<i>Lenzer</i> (Dregger)	<i>Wende</i> (Mattick)	Tanghe
Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i> (Farr)	Mende	Treu
	Müller	

Noes :

MM. Abens	MM. Cermolacce	MM. <i>van Kleef</i> (Reijnen)
Adriaensens	Dankert	Richter
Ahrens	Enders	Schugens
<i>Depietri</i> (Boucheny)	Marquardt	<i>Pawelczyk</i> (Siegler Schmidt)
Bouloche	de Niet	<i>Stoffelen</i> (Voogd)
	Péridier	

Abstentions :

MM. Bernini	MM. Corallo	MM. <i>McNamara</i> (Lord Peddie)
Boldrini	Delorme	Roper
Bonnel	Hardy	Segre
Brown	Lewis	Urwin
Calamandrei	Pecchioli	Mrs. <i>Taylor</i> (Whitehead)

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX III

Vote No. 2 by roll-call on the draft Recommendation on the rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today (Doc. 711)¹:

Ayes	33
Noes	10
Abstentions	18

Ayes :

MM. Abens	MM. Enders	MM. <i>van Kleef</i> (Reijnen)
Adriaensens	Fosson	Richter
Ahrens	<i>Büchner</i> (Gessner)	Roberti
Beith	Gonella	Roper
<i>Cavaliere</i> (Bonalumi)	Maggioni	Sarti
Boulloche	Marquardt	Schugens
Brown	<i>Wende</i> (Mattick)	<i>Pawelczyk</i> (Sieglerschmidt)
Critchley	de Niet	<i>de Bruyne</i> (de Stexhe)
Dankert	Pecoraro	Urwin
Delorme	<i>McNamara</i> (Lord Peddie)	<i>Stoffelen</i> (Voogd)
De Poi	Péridier	Mrs. <i>Taylor</i> (Whitehead)

Noes :

MM. Alber	MM. Burckel	MM. Mende
Amrehn	Cermolacce	Müller
<i>Depietri</i> (Boucheny)	Lemmrich	Tanghe
	Leynen	

Abstentions :

MM. Bernini	MM. Dequae	MM. Margue
Boldrini	<i>Lenzer</i> (Dregger)	Page
Bonnell	Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i> (Farr)	Pecchioli
Channon	MM. Faulds	Sir John Rodgers
Corallo	Grieve	MM. Schmitt
Lord Darling of Hillsborough	Hunt	Segre

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX IV

Vote No. 3 by roll-call on the draft Recommendation on European union and WEU (Doc. 720)¹:

Ayes	46
Noes	2
Abstentions	7

Ayes :

MM. Abens	Lord <i>Duncan-Sandys</i> (Farr)	MM. Page
Adriaensens	MM. <i>Büchner</i> (Gessner)	<i>van Kleef</i> (Reijnen)
Ahrens	Grieve	Richter
Alber	Hardy	Sir John Rodgers
Amrehn	Hunt	MM. Sarti
Beith	Kempfer	Schleiter
<i>Cavaliere</i> (Bonalumi)	Lemrich	<i>van Ooijen</i> (Scholten)
Bonnel	Leynen	Schugens
Brown	Maggioni	Schwencke
Channon	Margue	<i>de Bruyne</i> (de Stexhe)
Critchley	Marquardt	Tanghe
Dankert	Mart	Treu
De Poi	<i>Wende</i> (Mattick)	Urwin
Dequae	Mende	Valleix
Enders	Minnocci	<i>Stoffelen</i> (Voogd)
	Müller	

Noes :

MM. *Depietri* (Boucheny)
Cermolacce

Abstentions :

MM. Bernini	MM. Calamandrei	MM. Rivière
Boldrini	Corallo	Segre
	Pecchioli	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 291
on détente and security in Europe

The Assembly,

Affirming that true East-West détente can be achieved only through substantial mutual, balanced and controlled reductions in armaments by both blocs ;

Considering the growing preponderance of troops and weapons on the side of the Soviet Union and its allies in Central and Northern Europe ;

Noting that the Soviet Union has up to now interpreted the commitments entered into in the final act of the CSCE in a restrictive manner ;

Regretting that no recent progress has been made in the SALT and MBFR negotiations ;

Condemning the Soviet Union's policy to take advantage of crises outside Europe to strengthen its political position by direct or indirect military means ;

Concerned that in face of increasingly powerful Warsaw Pact forces the members of the Atlantic Alliance will no longer deploy sufficient strength to guarantee their continuing collective security ;

Noting that while the Soviet Union and its allies fail to accept the main implications of détente, as this concept is interpreted in the West, a relative reduction of military strength in Western Europe has occurred vis-à-vis the Soviet military threat ;

Satisfied that matters emerging from the CSCE have played a large part in the Council's discussions in 1975 ;

Considering that the application of the provisions of the final act of the CSCE on the movement of persons is one of the vital elements by which one can judge the Soviet Union's desire for détente ;

Considering that there is still some uncertainty about the operation of NATO in the event of some members of the Atlantic Alliance falling prey to subversion directly or indirectly sustained by external military intervention ;

Regretting that South Africa's widely-condemned racial policies and intervention provided a pretext, although unjustified, for massive Soviet and Cuban military intervention in Angola,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine regularly the consequences of the CSCE ;
2. Inform the Assembly of any reported infringements of the provisions of the final act of the CSCE ;
3. Examine how great an effort each member country has to make to maintain a continuing adequate balance to ensure peace with security ;
4. Ensure that its members concert their views in the appropriate framework on any crisis arising outside Europe in order :
 - (a) to avoid hasty action which might serve as a pretext for interference by the Soviet Union or its allies ;
 - (b) to deter any further Soviet interference ;
5. Report to the Assembly on any implications for Western Europe of developments in the political, economic and military balance in Europe and the world ;
6. Give due consideration to the conditions in which the modified Brussels Treaty could be applied should one or more member countries fall prey to direct or indirect military intervention from outside.

RECOMMENDATION 292***on the rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today***

The Assembly,

Recalling the decisive rôle constantly played by the United States (and Canada) in ensuring security and peace in Western Europe ;

Considering the maintenance and cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance to be the only military guarantee of lasting peace in Europe ;

Considering that its maintenance and cohesion require continuous and frank consultations in many fields between the European and American members of the Alliance ;

Considering that it is the duty of the European and American members to help each other effectively avoiding any policy or undertaking contrary to the principles of democracy ;

Considering that since the second world war member States of the Atlantic Alliance have not always managed to fulfil the obligations to adhere to such principles ;

Recalling, finally, that next to the alliance for the necessary military defence a genuinely comprehensive policy for security and peace should consist of relevant and fully adequate components in the field of social-economic solidarity between the rich and the poor parts of the world population, as well as in the field of elimination of all discrimination on grounds of race, colour or creed,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Encourage its members to initiate or consistently afford their support in the appropriate frameworks to the following policies which are essential components of a comprehensive security policy :
 - necessary military defence and mutual, balanced and controlled disarmament ;
 - defence and the promotion of parliamentary democracy ;
 - respect for the equivalence of men and peoples ;
 - recognition of the fact that all men are entitled to a fair share of this earth's wealth and its possibilities of well-being ;
2. Constantly remind its partners in the Atlantic Alliance and elsewhere (notably in the OECD) of these guidelines ;
3. Ensure that NATO, like the Council of Europe, WEU and the European Communities, groups only countries with democratic régimes ;
4. Give the Assembly a fair assessment of relevant difficulties and dangers facing the Atlantic Alliance as such or individual member countries and, if possible, the means for meeting them.

RECOMMENDATION 293
on European union and WEU

The Assembly,

Welcoming the decision taken by the European Council to elect the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage as from 1978 ;

Regretting the European Council's slowness in considering and implementing the Tindemans report ;

Recalling its Resolution 59 ;

Considering that the decision taken by the WEU Council on 31st May 1976 can help to develop the activities of the future European union in the field of armaments industries ;

Noting that this undertaking requires close co-operation between WEU and the European programme group ;

Considering that the co-ordination of European armaments industries can produce satisfactory results for the European economy and for the common defence in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance only if started without delay,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Study at an early date the outline programme which is to be submitted to it by the Standing Armaments Committee in order to be able to determine that body's new tasks as soon as possible and at the latest at its ministerial meeting in 1977 ;
2. Pay close attention to co-ordinating this undertaking with the work of the European programme group and have the latter's decisions communicated to it or be kept informed, through the international secretariat of the SAC, of the activities of that body in matters affecting the mandate of the SAC ;
3. Report to the Assembly in the appropriate manner on the results of the studies conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee and the decisions it takes in pursuit thereof ;
4. Invite the signatory countries of the North Atlantic Treaty who are members of the EEC or associated with it under Article 238 of the Rome Treaty to take part in the study to be undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee.

EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 30th November 1976

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1977 (Doc. 717); Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1975 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Doc. 715 and Addendum); Amendment of Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly (Doc. 716) (*Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 717, 715 and Addendum and 716*).
2. Address by Mr. Taittinger, Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.
3. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 719; Address by Mr. Stavropoulos, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

Speaker : Mr. Pecoraro.

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1977

(Doc. 717)

Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1975 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts

(Doc. 715 and Addendum)

Amendment of Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly

(Doc. 716)

(*Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 717, 715 and Addendum and 716*)

The Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration were presented by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Page, Hawkins.

Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1977 in Document 717 was agreed to unanimously.

The Motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1975 in the Addendum to Document 715 was agreed to unanimously.

The draft Resolution to amend Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly in Document 716 was agreed to unanimously. (This Resolution will be published as No. 60) ¹.

4. Address by Mr. Taittinger, Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic

Mr. Taittinger, Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Taittinger replied to questions put by MM. de Bruyne, Radius, Valleix, Burekel, Jessel, Cermolacce, de Bruyne, Kliesing, Lewis.

¹. See page 25.

5. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the
General Affairs Committee, Doc. 719; Address by
Mr. Stavropoulos, Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs of Greece)*

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Burekel, Rapporteur.

Mr. Stavropoulos, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Stavropoulos replied to questions put by MM. Schweneke, Urwin, Burekel, Channon.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Roberti, Dankert.

The Debate was adjourned.

6. Designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly

*(Motion for a Resolution with a request for urgent
procedure, Doc. 727)*

The President announced that a Motion for a Resolution on the designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly had been tabled by Mr. Burekel and others with a request for urgent procedure in accordance with Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure.

The request for urgent procedure had been posted up and the text of the Motion circulated as Document 727.

The Assembly would decide on the request for urgent procedure at its next Sitting.

7. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 12.30 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. Müller Schwencke Vohrer <i>Kliesing</i> (Mrs. Wolf)	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bonnell Dequae Leynen Schugens <i>de Bruyne</i> (de Stexhe) Tanghe	Italy	MM. Cornelissen Dankert de Niet <i>de Koster</i> (Portheine) <i>van Kleef</i> (Reijnen) <i>van Ooijen</i> (Voogd)
France	MM. Bernini Boldrini Calamandrei <i>Cavaliere</i> (Bonalumi) De Poi Fosson Gonella Maggioni Minnocci Pecchioli Pecoraro Roberti Sarti Treu	United Kingdom
MM. <i>Depietri</i> (Boucheny) Burckel Cermolacce Delorme Péridier Radium Rivière Valleix	Luxembourg	MM. Beith Brown Channon Critchley <i>Craigie</i> (Lord Darling of Hillsborough) Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i> (Farr) MM. Grieve Hardy <i>Jessel</i> (Hunt) Lewis Mendelson Page <i>McNamara</i> (Lord Peddie) <i>Hawkins</i> (Sir John Rodgers) Roper Urwin Whitehead
Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Abens Margue Mart	
MM. Alber Amrehn Enders Kempfler Mende		

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy
MM. Boulloche Brugnon Cerneau Grangier Kauffmann Péronnet Schleiter Schmitt Vitter	MM. Ahrens Dregger Gessner Lemmrigh Marquardt Mattick Richter Schmidt Siegler Schmidt	MM. Arfé Corallo Orsini Segre
		Netherlands
		Mr. Scholten
		United Kingdom
		Mr. Faulds

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RESOLUTION 60***to amend Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly***

The Assembly,

DECIDES to amend paragraph 3 of Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly to read as follows :

“If payment of a commitment for the previous year has not been made before 1st April, the credits concerned shall be cancelled automatically and corresponding credits will be taken up in the budget of the current financial year.

Such action shall be submitted to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration for approval and then brought to the attention of the Council.”

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 30th November 1976

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 719*).
2. Designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly (*Motion for a Resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 727*).
3. European oceanographic activities (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 722*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 719)

The Debate was resumed.

Speakers : MM. Cordle, Inan (Observer from Turkey), Cavaliere.

Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler.

Speakers : Mr. Schwencke, Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Debate was adjourned.

4. Designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly

(Motion for a Resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 727)

Speaker : Mr. Urwin (point of order).

In accordance with Rule 43 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider

the request for urgent procedure on the Motion for a Resolution tabled by Mr. Burekel and others.

Speakers : MM. Burekel, Channon, Grieve ; Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Radius (points of order).

Urgent procedure was not adopted.

The Motion for a Resolution was referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Speaker : Mr. Valleix (explanation of vote).

5. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 719)

Speakers : MM. Radius, Urwin, Amrehn.

Mr. de Niet, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Tanghe.

Speakers : MM. Calamandrei, Stephanopoulos (Observer from Greece).

The Debate was adjourned.

6. European oceanographic activities

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 722)

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Craigen, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. van Kleef, Lewis.

Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers : MM. Hawkins, Hardy, McNamara.

Mr. Craigen, Rapporteur, and Mr. Warren, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 722.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 294) ¹.

7. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 1st December, at 10 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.

1. See page 29.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹ :

Belgium	MM. Schwencke Vohrer <i>Kliesing</i> (Mrs. Wolf)	MM. <i>van Kleef</i> (Reijnen) <i>van Ooijen</i> (Voogd) Cornelissen
MM. Adriaensens Bonnell Dequae Leynen Schugens <i>Plasman</i> (de Stexhe) Tanghe	Italy	United Kingdom
	MM. Bernini Boldrini <i>Cavaliere</i> (Bonalumi) Corallo Fosson Minnocci Pecoraro Treu	MM. Beith Brown Channon Critchley <i>Craigen</i> (Lord Darling of Hillsborough) Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i> (Farr)
France		MM. Faulds Grieve Hardy <i>Cordle</i> (Hunt) Lewis Mendelson Page <i>McNamara</i> (Lord Peddie)
MM. Brugnon Burckel Péridier Radius Valleix	Luxembourg	Sir John Rodgers
	MM. Abens Margue Mart	MM. Roper Urwin Whitehead
Federal Republic of Germany		
MM. Amrehn Enders <i>Haase</i> (Gessner) Kempfler Mende	Netherlands	
	MM. Dankert de Niet	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy
MM. Boucheny Bouloche Cermolacce Cerneau Delorme Grangier Kauffmann Péronnet Rivière Schleiter Schmitt Vitter	MM. Ahrens Alber Dregger Lemmrigh Marquardt Mattick Müller Richter Schmidt Siegler Schmidt	MM. Arfé De Poi Gonella Maggioni Orsini Pecchioli Roberti Sarti Segre
		Netherlands
		MM. Porthoine Scholten

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 294***on European oceanographic activities***

The Assembly,

Noting the Council's reply to Recommendation 275 that no European oceanographic authority should be set up, even in the framework of an existing European organisation ;

Noting also the total absence of a common overall European policy with respect to mining seabed minerals, prospecting for and exploitation of other marine resources, marine pollution and scientific oceanographic research ;

Expressing satisfaction however with European co-operation during the negotiations of the Law of the Sea Conference in New York ;

Aware of the existence of numerous oceanographic organisations and *ad hoc* bodies in worldwide, Atlantic, Western European and smaller regional frameworks ;

Aware of the defence aspects of many oceanographic activities,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments :

1. To define their own national maritime policies ;
2. To try to work out a general European strategy while at the same time proceeding with co-operation in practical and specific oceanographic subjects and to consider setting up a standing steering committee of national authorities for this purpose ;
3. To study possible means of co-operation in a regional framework, such as the North Sea area, between all countries interested in :
 - (a) the defence by national coastguard forces or navies of oil rigs and other installations which come within that area but which are outside territorial waters ;
 - (b) the establishment of a common programme and strategy for policing the 200-mile economic zone ;
 - (c) reaching agreement on the joint implementation of all conventions on pollution ;
 - (d) collaboration on basic maritime research and development.

TENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 1st December 1976

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 721 and Amendments*).
2. Address by Mr. Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg.
3. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 724*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 721 and Amendments)

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Cornelissen, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Stoffelen, Hardy, Valleix, Treu, Bagier, Bernini.

The Debate was adjourned.

4. Address by Mr. Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg

Mr. Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Thorn replied to questions put by MM. Leynen, Radius, de Bruyne, Valleix, Cornelissen, Segre, Roper, Sir John Rodgers.

5. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 721 and Amendments)

The Debate was resumed.

Speaker : Mr. Brown.

The Debate was adjourned.

6. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹ :

Belgium	MM. <i>Büchner</i> (Siegler Schmidt)	MM. Dankert
MM. Adriaensens	Vohrer	<i>van Kleef</i> (de Niet)
<i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae)	<i>Kliesing</i> (Mrs. Wolf)	<i>de Koster</i> (Portheine)
Leynen		Scholten
Schugens	Italy	<i>Stoffelen</i> (Voogd)
<i>Plasman</i> (de Stexhe)	MM. Bernini	United Kingdom
<i>Hulpiau</i> (Tanghe)	Boldrini	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Beith)
France	MM. Bernini	MM. Brown
MM. Cermolacce	Boldrini	Channon
Delorme	<i>Cavaliere</i> (Bonalumi)	Critchley
<i>La Combe</i> (Kauffmann)	Calamandrei	<i>Craigie</i> (Lord Darling of Hillsborough)
Radius	Corallo	Farr
Rivière	Fosson	Faulds
Valleix	Maggioni	Grieve
	Pecchioli	Hardy
	Pecoraro	Hunt
	Segre	Lewis
	Treu	<i>Watkinson</i> (Mendelson)
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i> (Page)
MM. Amrehn	MM. Abens	Mr. <i>Bagier</i> (Lord Peddie)
Enders	Margue	Sir John Rodgers
<i>Haase</i> (Gessner)	Mart	MM. Roper
Kempfler	Netherlands	Urwin
Marquardt	Mr. Cornelissen	Whitehead
Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Mattick)		

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

Belgium	MM. Schmitt	Italy
Mr. Bonnel	Vitter	MM. Arfé
France	Federal Republic of Germany	De Poi
MM. Boucheny	MM. Ahrens	Gonella
Boulloche	Alber	Minnocci
Brugnon	Dregger	Orsini
Burckel	Lemmrich	Roberti
Cerneau	Mende	Sarti
Grangier	Müller	Netherlands
Péridier	Richter	Mr. Reijnen
Péronnet	Schmidt	
Schleiter	Schwencke	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 1st December 1976

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Doc. 721 and Amendments).
2. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments*, Doc. 724).
3. European security and East-West relations (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 726 and Amendments); Mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee — Motion for an Order tabled by Mr. Delorme and others (Doc. 728).
4. Address by Mr. Duffy, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom.
5. Address by Mr. Feyzioglu, Minister of State, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey.
6. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 719 and Amendment).
7. European security and East-West relations (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and on the Motion for an Order and Votes on the draft Recommendation and Motion for an Order*, Docs. 726 and Amendments and 728).
8. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy (*Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 721 and Amendments).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. Change in the Orders of the Day

Speaker : Mr. Warren.

The presentation of and debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 724, were postponed until the morning Sitting on Thursday, 2nd December.

4. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 721 and Amendments)

The Debate was resumed.

Speaker : Mr. van Kleef.

Mr. Cornelissen, Rapporteur, and Mr. Warren, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation in Document 721.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Cornelissen, Rapporteur :

In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "during which equal consideration should be" and insert "equal consideration being".

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Valleix :

In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "in the framework of the OECD" and insert "with the concurrence of the OECD and in the framework of the EEC".

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Vohrer :

After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph :

"To draft further safety regulations for nuclear energy production, harmonised at Western European level, which should allow any population concerned, especially in frontier regions, to be involved in a democratic decision on the siting of nuclear plants ;"

The three Amendments were agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

Speakers : MM. Cornelissen, Treu, Cermolacce.

Note was taken of the withdrawal of abstentions to avoid recourse to a vote by roll-call.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 295) ¹.

5. Address by Mr. Duffy, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom

Mr. Duffy, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Duffy replied to questions put by MM. Roper, Farr, McNamara, Watkinson, Treu.

6. Address by Mr. Feyzioglu, Minister of State, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey

Mr. Feyzioglu, Minister of State, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Feyzioglu replied to questions put by MM. Urwin, Cordle, Hunt.

7. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 719 and Amendment)

The Debate was resumed.

Mr. Burckel, Rapporteur, and Sir John Rodgers, Vice-Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

Speakers : MM. Stavropoulos (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece), Inan (Observer from Turkey). •

The Debate was closed.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Urwin :

1. See page 36.

Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.

The Amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 719.

Sir John Rodgers, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 25 votes to 1 with 27 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 296) ¹.

Speakers : MM. Lewis, Roper, Urwin (points of order).

8. European security and East-West relations

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 726 and Amendments)

Mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee — Motion for an Order tabled by Mr. Delorme and others

(Doc. 728)

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. de Koster, Rapporteur.

A Motion for an Order inviting the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to follow attentively the implementation of the mandate given to the Standing Armaments Committee was tabled by Mr. Delorme and others, Document 728.

Speakers : MM. Roper, de Bruyne, Radius.

The Assembly decided by sitting and standing not to link the debate on the Motion for an Order with the debate on the Report.

The Debate on the Report was opened.

Speakers : MM. Rivière, Watkinson ; Roper, de Niet (points of order).

The Debate was adjourned.

9. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Thursday, 2nd December, at 10 a.m.

Speaker : Mr. Roper.

The Sitting was closed at 6.20 p.m.

1. See page 37.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹ :

Belgium

MM. *Adriaensens*
Van Hoeylandt (Bonnell)
de Bruyne (Dequae)
Leynen
Schugens
Plasman (de Stexhe)
Breyne (Tanghe)

France

MM. *Pignon* (Boulloche)
Brugnon
Burckel
Cermolacce
La Combe (Cerneau)
Péridier
Radius
Rivière
Schmitt

Federal Republic of Germany

MM. Ahrens
Amrehn
Enders

MM. *Haase* (Gessner)

Kempfler
Marquardt
Mrs. *von Bothmer* (Mattick)
MM. Richter
Büchner (Schwencke)
Pawelczyk (Sieglerschmidt)
Vohrer
Kliesing (Mrs. Wolf)

Italy

MM. Bernini
Boldrini
Cavaliere (Bonalumi)
Calamandrei
Corallo
Fosson
Maggioni
Pecchioli
Pecoraro
Segre
Treu

Luxembourg

Mr. Margue

Netherlands

MM. Cornelissen
Dankert
de Niet
de Koster (Portheine)
Scholten
Stoffelen (Voogd)

United Kingdom

Lord *Beaumont of Whitley* (Beith)
MM. Brown
Channon
Critchley
McNamara (Lord Darling of Hillsborough)
Farr
Faulds
Grieve
Hunt
Lewis
Mendelson
Hawkins (Page)
Watkinson (Lord Peddie)
Sir John Rodgers
MM. Roper
Urwin
Whitehead

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

France

MM. Boucheny
Delorme
Grangier
Kauffmann
Péronnet
Schleiter
Valleix
Vitter

Federal Republic of Germany

MM. Alber
Dregger

MM. Lemmrich

Mende
Müller
Schmidt

Italy

MM. Arfé
De Poi
Gonella
Minnocci
Orsini
Roberti
Sarti

Luxembourg

MM. Abens
Mart

Netherlands

Mr. Reijnen

United Kingdom

• Mr. Hardy

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 4 by roll-call on the draft Recommendation on Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems (Doc. 719)¹:

Ayes	25
Noes	1
Abstentions	27

Ayes :

Mr. Amrehn	MM. De Poi	MM. <i>Hawkins</i> (Page)
Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Beith)	<i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae)	<i>de Koster</i> (Portheine)
MM. <i>Cavaliere</i> (Bonalumi)	Farr	Radius
<i>Van Hoeylandt</i> (Bonnell)	Fosson	Rivière
Burckel	Grieve	Sir John Rodgers
<i>La Combe</i> (Cerneau)	Hunt	MM. <i>Breyne</i> (Tanghe)
Channon	Kempfler	Treu
Critchley	Maggioni	<i>Kliesing</i> (Mrs. Wolf)
	Margue	

Noes :

Mr. Cermolacce

Abstentions :

MM. Adriaensens	MM. <i>Haase</i> (Gessner)	MM. Scholten
Ahrens	Lewis	Schugens
Bernini	Marquardt	<i>Büchner</i> (Schwencke)
Calamandrei	Mrs. von Bothmer	Segre
Corallo	MM. Mendelson	<i>Pawelczyk</i> (Siegler Schmidt)
Cornelissen	Pecchioli	Urwin
Dankert	<i>Watkinson</i> (Lord Peddie)	Vohrer
Enders	Richter	<i>Stoffelen</i> (Voogd)
Faulds	Roper	Whitehead

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 295
on safeguarding Europe's energy supplies
— new sources of energy

The Assembly,

Considering that there is a close link between Europe's security and safeguarding its energy supplies ;

Aware that even so the Western European governments are unwilling to establish a common energy supply policy within a European framework ;

Considering that no nuclear programme on a large scale is acceptable without a solution being found for the hazards posed by nuclear power, stringent safety measures being established to eliminate these hazards and special attention being paid to the problems of the disposal of radioactive waste ;

Acknowledging the need to reduce consumption of all forms of energy by using them more efficiently and thereby lessening the need to resort to nuclear power ;

Convinced that alternative sources of energy, especially solar energy, could be used more widely instead of nuclear means,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments :

1. To promote a worldwide convention on both primary and energy resources, equal consideration being given to the interests of the developing and developed countries ;
2. To establish a common strategy here and now since oil prices will increase by 10 or 15 % by the end of this year ;
3. To accept joint planning for the improved use of energy resources, increase investments, particularly in coal production including the gasification process, and promote action by industry by guaranteeing long-term security for the development of coal power ;
4. To accord greater attention and financial means to research and development of alternative sources of energy in general, and to solar energy in particular, at both national and European Community levels ;
5. To draft further safety regulations for nuclear energy production, harmonised at Western European level, which should allow any population concerned, especially in frontier regions, to be involved in a democratic decision on the siting of nuclear plants ;
6. To hold a wide-ranging conference with the concurrence of the OECD and in the framework of the EEC covering all aspects of energy-saving through oil conservation programmes, invitations also being extended to parliamentarians and representatives of employers' and employees' organisations and other civic groups such as consumers' and women's organisations in order to elaborate a common energy-saving strategy.

RECOMMENDATION 296***on Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems***

The Assembly,

Considering the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean to be an essential part of European security ;

Recalling that WEU is the only European organisation with responsibilities in defence matters ;

Welcoming the opening of negotiations for the early accession of Greece to the EEC ;

Recalling that the agreement of association between Turkey and the EEC provides for the accession of Turkey after a period of adaptation ;

Considering it essential to associate Greece and Turkey here and now with examination of matters affecting the security and the building of Europe ;

Recalling that paragraph 10 of the decision of the WEU Council of 7th May 1955 setting up a Standing Armaments Committee provided that the undertakings of that Committee "would remain open to participation by other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation" ;

Gratified that the three member countries represented in the Security Council have acted jointly to encourage Greece and Turkey to seek together a solution to the points at issue between them ;

Deploring the wait-and-see policy pursued by the United Nations towards the Lebanese tragedy and the increasingly systematic deviation of worldwide organisations from their original tasks,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Draw up a programme forthwith to strengthen Europe's share in the joint defence of the Eastern Mediterranean ;
2. Invite the Greek and Turkish Governments to be associated with the work of the Standing Armaments Committee, including the study on European armaments industries ;
3. Make every effort for Greece and Turkey to be associated ever more closely with the building of Europe ;
4. Continue its work towards settling issues between Greece and Turkey ;
5. Co-ordinate the efforts of member countries with a view to finding a fair solution to the Lebanese conflict ;
6. Invite member States in the United Nations and other worldwide organisations to adhere firmly to the commitments they entered into on joining, particularly as regards the Middle East conflict and the situation in the Mediterranean.

TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 2nd December 1976

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 724*).
2. European security and East-West relations (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 726 and Amendments*).
3. Mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee — Motion for an Order tabled by Mr. Delorme and others (Doc. 728 and Amendment).
4. Anti-submarine warfare (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 725*).
5. Address by Mr. Wischniewski, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
6. Anti-submarine warfare (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 725*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

Speaker : Mr. Roper (points of order).

Note was taken of Mr. Roper's comments.

The amended Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Relations with Parliaments

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 724)

The Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speaker : Mr. Radius.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly took note of the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

4. European security and East-West relations

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 726 and Amendments)

The Debate was resumed.

Speakers : MM. Dankert, La Combe, Roper.

The Debate was adjourned.

5. Address by Mr. Wischniewski, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

Mr. Wischniewski, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Wischniewski replied to questions put by MM. Péridier, Hulpiau, Roper, Faulds, Jessel, Mendelson, Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. de Niet.

Sir John Rodgers, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler.

6. European security and East-West relations

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 726 and Amendments)

The Debate was resumed.

Speakers : MM. Cermolacce, Scholten, Mendelson, Cavaliere.

The Debate was closed.

Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

7. European security and East-West relations

Anti-submarine warfare

Mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee — Motion for an Order tabled by Mr. Delorme and others

(Reference back to Committee of the Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and withdrawal of the Motion for an Order, Docs. 726 and Amendments, 725 and 728 and Amendment)

Mr. Critchley, Chairman of the Committee, proposed that the Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Documents 726 and Amendments and 725, and the Motion for an Order tabled by Mr. Delorme, Document 728 and Amendment, be referred back to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Speaker : Mr. Delorme.

An Amendment (No. 1) to the Motion for an Order was tabled by Mr. Delorme :

After the words "INVITES THE COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS" insert "AND THE GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, each within its own sphere of responsibilities".

The Amendment was negatived.

Mr. Delorme withdrew his Motion for an Order.

The Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Documents 726 and Amendments and 725, were referred back to the Committee.

8. Close of the Session

The President declared the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly closed.

The Sitting was closed at 12.50 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹:

Belgium	Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Mattick)	MM. <i>Piket</i> (Reijnen)
MM. <i>Adriaensens</i>	MM. <i>Richter</i>	<i>Scholten</i>
<i>Schugens</i>	<i>Vohrer</i>	<i>Stoffelen</i> (Voogd)
<i>Breyne</i> (de Stexhe)		
<i>Hulpiau</i> (Tanghe)		
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. <i>Pignion</i> (Bouloche)	MM. <i>Bernini</i>	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Beith)
<i>Cermolacce</i>	<i>Cavaliere</i> (Bonalumi)	MM. <i>Jessel</i> (Channon)
<i>Cerneau</i>	<i>Calamandrei</i>	<i>Critchley</i>
<i>Delorme</i>	<i>Fosson</i>	Lord <i>Wallace of Coslany</i> (Lord
<i>La Combe</i> (Kauffmann)	<i>Maggioni</i>	<i>Darling of Hillsborough</i>)
<i>Péridier</i>	<i>Pecoraro</i>	Sir <i>Harwood Harrison</i> (Farr)
<i>Radius</i>	<i>Treu</i>	MM. <i>Faulds</i>
<i>Rivière</i>		<i>Grieve</i>
<i>du Luart</i> (Schleiter)		<i>Hardy</i>
<i>Schmitt</i>	Luxembourg	<i>Hunt</i>
	MM. <i>Abens</i>	<i>Lewis</i>
	<i>Margue</i>	<i>Mendelson</i>
Federal Republic of Germany		<i>Hawkins</i> (Page)
MM. <i>Ahrens</i>	Netherlands	<i>McNamara</i> (Lord Peddie)
<i>Alber</i>	MM. <i>van Kleef</i> (Cornelissen)	Sir <i>John Rodgers</i>
<i>Enders</i>	<i>Dankert</i>	MM. <i>Roper</i>
<i>Kempfler</i>	<i>de Niet</i>	<i>Urwin</i>
		<i>Whitehead</i>

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

Belgium	MM. <i>Dregger</i>	MM. <i>Minnocci</i>
MM. <i>Bonnel</i>	<i>Gessner</i>	<i>Orsini</i>
<i>Dequae</i>	<i>Lemmrigh</i>	<i>Pecchioli</i>
<i>Leynen</i>	<i>Marquardt</i>	<i>Roberti</i>
France	<i>Mende</i>	<i>Sarti</i>
MM. <i>Boucheny</i>	<i>Müller</i>	<i>Segre</i>
<i>Brugnon</i>	<i>Schmidt</i>	
<i>Burckel</i>	<i>Schwencke</i>	Luxembourg
<i>Grangier</i>	<i>Sieglerschmidt</i>	Mr. <i>Mart</i>
<i>Péronnet</i>	Mrs. <i>Wolf</i>	
<i>Valleix</i>		Netherlands
<i>Vitter</i>	Italy	Mr. <i>Portheine</i>
Federal Republic of Germany	MM. <i>Arfé</i>	
Mr. <i>Amrehn</i>	<i>Boldrini</i>	United Kingdom
	<i>Corallo</i>	Mr. <i>Brown</i>
	<i>De Poi</i>	
	<i>Gonella</i>	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 29th November 1976

SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Examination of Credentials.
4. Observers.
5. Tribute.
6. Address by the President of the Assembly.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Pecchioli, Mr. Leynen (point of order).
7. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session (Doc. 714).
8. Détente and security in Europe; Rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today (*Votes on the draft Recommendations postponed from the First Part of the Session, Docs. 703 and 711*).
9. European union and WEU (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation (Doc. 720)*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. de Bruyne (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Critchley, Mr. Müller, Lord Duncan-Sandys, Mr. Amrehn, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Mende, Mr. de Bruyne (*Rapporteur*), Sir John Rodgers (*Vice-Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Rivière (explanation of vote).
10. Changes in the membership of Committees.
11. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

I declare resumed the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union, which was adjourned on Thursday, 17th June 1976, at the conclusion of the Sixth Sitting.

In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the Sixth Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

1. See page 15.

3. Examination of Credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the examination of credentials of new Representatives and Substitutes.

The list of new Representatives and Substitutes appointed since the first part of the session has been published in Notice No. 7.

Only the credentials of Mr. Beith, nominated by the United Kingdom in place of Mr. Steel, have been ratified by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, on 15th September last.

That Assembly has not yet considered the credentials of Mr. Bonnel, recently nominated as a Representative of Belgium in place of Mr. Kempinaire, who has resigned; the credentials of Mr. Cermolacce, a Substitute from France, who has been nominated as a Representative in place of Mr. Roger; those of Mr. Roger, nominated as a Substitute in place of Mr. Cermolacce; and those of Mr. Péronnet, nominated as a Representative to the seat that was vacant owing to the death of Mr. de Montesquiou; the credentials of the Italian Delegation, which has been entirely reconstituted following the Italian general election, and those of Mr. van Kleef, nominated as a Substitute from the

The President (continued)

Netherlands in place of Mr. Waltmans, who has resigned.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, it falls to our Assembly to examine their credentials.

It appears from the credentials received that the nominations have been made in the proper manner by the national parliaments and that none has been contested.

If the Assembly is unanimous, it may ratify these credentials without prior reference to a Credentials Committee.

Are there any objections to ratification of the credentials of Mr. Bonnel, Representative of Belgium; Mr. Cermolacce and Mr. Péronnet, Representatives of France, and Mr. Roger, Substitute from France; the 18 Representatives and 18 Substitutes from Italy; and Mr. van Kleef, Substitute from the Netherlands?...

There are no objections.

The credentials of our new colleagues are ratified, subject to their subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

I extend a hearty welcome to them all.

4. Observers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I would similarly extend a hearty welcome to the parliamentarians who are honouring us by participating in our proceedings as observers: Mr. Austin, a Senator, and Mr. Haidasz and Mr. Oberlé, members of parliament from Canada; Mr. Stephanopoulos and Mr. Manavis, members of the Greek Parliament; Mr. de Oliveira Baptista and Mr. Pedro, members of the Portuguese Parliament; Mr. Inan, a senator, and Mr. Ugur, member of parliament from Turkey.

If they wish to speak on any of the problems included in our Orders of the Day, we shall listen to them with the greatest interest.

I further welcome His Excellency, Ambassador Don José Luis Messia, representing the Spanish Government.

5. Tribute

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — A little more than a month ago, Pierre de Montesquiou, Duke of Fezensac, Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, was struck down by illness and died on 15th October at the age of 67. (*The Representatives rose*)

From a line of ancestors whose names are part of French history and literature he inherited an illustrious name. Amongst his ancestors we might note another Pierre de Montesquiou, Count of Artagnan, Maréchal de France, to whom our former colleague devoted a work entitled *Le vrai d'Artagnan*.

But for Pierre de Montesquiou, a noble lineage was not enough. After a period of serious studies, he applied himself to improving the situation of his native Armagnac, in the Gascon *département* of Gers, where he soon acquired an interest in politics as well. In 1936, at the age of 27, he stood for parliament as an independent radical, but without success. On the outbreak of war, he served as an officer and then joined the resistance, but only after the liberation did he fully enter public life, as mayor of Marsan, then as a general councillor in the *département* of Gers, and, finally, in 1958, as a member of the National Assembly.

His political horizons were, however, not limited to his own country. In 1963, he was appointed to our Assembly, and in 1965 he became Secretary-General to the French Delegation.

A member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions since its creation in 1966, he produced outstanding reports on such matters as the state of European space activities, on European co-operation in aeronautics and on the Airbus, and quite recently, on 2nd December last year, on United States-European co-operation in advanced technology.

After his election as Chairman of the Committee in 1971, he continued to direct its work with benevolent authority right up to his death. He had also been Chairman of the Liberal Group of the Assembly since 1974.

Pierre de Montesquiou's contributions from the rostrum were frequent. He approached the most technical of topics with ardour, and when dealing with burning political issues he could

The President (continued)

temper the depth of his feeling with scholarly wisdom and the tolerant attitude of a man of the world who, having travelled widely, knows from experience that human nature is "supple and many-sided".

Under his chairmanship, the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions successfully ran two colloquies, the one in Paris in September 1973, the other in Toulouse, in February 1976, for parliamentarians, aircraft constructors, and airline operators, to lay down, in concert with the appropriate members of the national governments, guidelines for a civil and military aviation policy in Europe.

The important offices that Pierre de Montequiou has occupied in the Assembly attest both to his attachment to the European cause and to the enduring confidence placed by his colleagues in this well-balanced, kindly and ever-courteous man.

We mourn the loss of a very dear friend. On behalf of the Assembly, I convey our sincere condolences and deep sympathy to his family.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — As I open this session of the only European assembly with responsibilities in defence matters, would it be presumptuous of me to affirm, despite frequent denials, that a European approach to security problems is a decisive factor of détente and hence of peace?

Faced with the massive increase in the price of oil, the monetary storm and the armaments race, Europe is in danger of becoming bogged down in insuperable difficulties.

Yet is not Europe more necessary than ever? Can we seek our salvation in measures that are ill-assorted and sometimes inconsistent, or are conceived and implemented according to the interests of the United States, which is certainly our ally but follows a course which daily diverges further from that of the old continent?

Doubtless, Europe does not yet have the institutions which would allow it to pursue a common policy in every field. I consider this objection to be nugatory. Looking to a reform of the institutions for a solution to specific problems

is an alibi for inertia — in other words, bowing before those who have a policy and pursue it vigorously, whether the United States or the members of OPEC. But Europe already has the institutional means of establishing a policy of its own. All that is lacking is the will. Will the European Council, which is meeting this very day in The Hague, be able to take the decisions which are essential if we are to defend our hard-pressed interests? Unfortunately, experience inclines us to scepticism.

The European Parliamentary Assembly is already in a position to exercise the twofold function of criticism and driving force. Its task is facilitated at present in that, as an emanation of the national parliaments, its members can make direct approaches to their respective governments. It would be more difficult or even impossible if, elected by direct universal suffrage, the parliament had its links with our institutions severed.

If, therefore, the aim in building Europe is to strengthen our hand, we must prove this immediately by resolute action; but to claim that nothing can be done as long as the States composing Europe have not relinquished some degree of sovereignty throws doubt on the reasons for their doing so, feeds the suspicion that a certain conception of Europe is only being used to deprive it of vigour and personality.

This suspicion is confirmed when it comes to defence matters, for here too institutions exist. As you are well aware, I am referring to the modified Brussels Treaty. Only the will to follow it through is lacking. But the impossibility of working out an economic or monetary policy in a European framework without due consideration of the conditions for European security has never been so clearly apparent. To refuse Europe any right of concertation in security matters is to deny it the possibility of asserting its own identity and thus having any prospect of a future.

Willingness to use WEU should therefore be considered as the touchstone of all our governments' will to achieve Europe.

At a time when Europe ought to maintain and strengthen its defence capability, give itself the means of keeping up with the leading runners in the race for technological progress and safeguard the industrial basis of its security, it would be absurd to refuse the Standing Armaments Committee the right both to carry out its mission and the means of doing so.

The President (continued)

In the interests of all the partners, the best balance must be ensured in the Atlantic Alliance through an increase in European strength. In the strategic field, we can hardly form an exact idea of what the views of the next United States administration will be. But Europe cannot accept that its destiny should for ever depend on the United States' conceptions of its own security.

Europe of the Seven has a population of 250 million. Its gross annual product is higher than that of the Soviet Union. Its military potential is considerable. Its apparent weakness only stems from dispersion of its efforts due to the lack of a concerted approach to security matters.

Are we to remain inactive until such time as our foreign and defence policy concepts have been unified? The WEU member countries can reach an understanding here and now to create the industrial conditions for their joint strength. Even a limited will to agree would enable this.

On the initiative of our Assembly, two colloquies on the future of the European aeronautical industry, held in Paris and Toulouse, have already brought together ministers, experts, heads of firms and representatives of airlines, with the appropriate specialist committee of WEU. Their conclusions have been given a good airing in public opinion.

Next March, a symposium, having comparable aims, is to be held on armaments and will show that safeguarding European industry is an essential element for Europe's existence as a political entity. I cannot believe that the Western European countries, whose particularly rich history has been marked by the progressive affirmation of national personality and will, are prepared to entrust their destiny to others on the grounds that they are no longer able to fulfil the tasks that await them.

That is why to prevent the forging of a European will would be to invite countries unwilling to give up sovereignty to resume their entire freedom and look, for salvation in a troubled world, to the speedy decision-taking and energetic action of purely national bodies. For Europe should be a means of strengthening our potential, and not a source of weakness or an excuse for moral abdication.

It is for our Assembly to remind the governments, which are daily distracted by new prob-

lems, that it is not possible to triumph over the difficulties assailing them without a political vision of the community we must build and defend together. On this depends not only the security of Europe but also its very survival. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Pecchioli, one of the Italian Representatives, has asked for the floor.

I call Mr. Pecchioli.

Mr. PECCHIOLI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, in rising to announce to the Assembly the attitude which the communist representatives of the Italian Delegation intend to adopt, my first wish is to express to you my thanks for the courteous welcome you have extended to the new members of this Assembly. We should like to reciprocate by offering a cordial greeting to yourself, Mr. President, and to the honourable members of all the countries represented in the Assembly of WEU, to whose precincts we are happy to be admitted at long last.

Allow me to point out that the presence here of a parliamentary representation of the Italian Communist Party, that carries the suffrages of over twelve million of its own countrymen thanks to the policy it has consistently followed of peace, development of pluralistic democracy, social progress and national unity, in itself speaks volumes for the new processes stirring in the European political field. Notwithstanding the opposition and grave difficulties still impeding the construction of a united and democratic Europe truly capable of assuming an essential rôle in the development of détente and co-operation, both in our own continent and worldwide, and, in full respect of existing international alliances, gradually and steadily getting away from opposing military blocs — notwithstanding all this, I say, and in spite of the serious obstacles created by the economic crisis in whose throes the West is gripped, there is in this sector of the globe a drive towards European collaboration, towards the search for solutions to the problems outstanding between East and West, and towards the construction of a Western Europe founded on those values which our peoples have wrestled to secure throughout these postwar years.

Many of the old contentions and discriminations dating from the cold war period have gone, or are going, by the board, but the path towards unity and democratic growth of Western Europe

Mr. Pecchioli (continued)

is still a long and arduous one. To follow it, we need the participation of all the healthy and progressive social forces in our countries, for otherwise European unity will remain a Utopia or, worse still, a smoke screen concealing a policy hostile to détente and designed to encourage interference in, and iniquities against, the individual countries and the working classes in each.

It is our firm conviction that the flag of European unity may not, and shall not, be the banner of any latter-day crusade. Our presence here, now that we have overcome the obstacles that stood in our way, is a token of our will to foster our mutual acquaintance, a constructive confrontation, and possibly collaboration with other countries' democratic forces in all international gatherings, as a contribution to security and co-operation between States and their peoples. And as we are firm believers in the construction of a Western Europe united to serve the supreme purposes of peace and democracy, we shall diligently labour, in the framework of the alliances, communities, treaties pertaining to Western Europe, to ensure that such institutions fulfil a function consistent with them.

We should not be here, did we not look forward with interest and hope to such a possibility for the Assembly of WEU too, and were we not animated by the purpose of playing an active part in the labours, the debates and proceedings of this Assembly, with the frankness, critical spirit and constructive determination which we bring to it.

I crave your indulgence and that of the Assembly if what I am saying is not strictly relevant to the Orders of the Day. I have availed myself of this opportunity to convey to the Assembly itself, in the name of the communist representatives on the Italian Delegation, the guidelines and commitments of our participation.

As regards the Order of Business for this second part of the twenty-second ordinary session, I should, however, say that we have tabled before us reports, documents and projects in the preparation of which, through no choice of our own, we have had no part. Therefore, at this session, which we are attending for the first time ever, we shall abstain on every document put to the vote. We are taking this stand, which we trust will be appreciated as a mark of respect for the preparatory work contributed by others,

even if certain papers might already on a first reading attract our disagreement or approval. In the future work of committees and the plenary sessions, we shall be willing to intervene more directly about each problem.

Thank you again, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen. We shall, I repeat, abstain from every vote that is taken on the Order of Business for this session. (*Scattered applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Pecchioli, for your reply to my speech ; but I have to point out that in this House we follow a fairly strict, if not absolutely rigid, rule of procedure, and although we agreed — and I myself gave the lead — to hear your introductory statement on behalf of the Italian Delegation, which we have listened to with interest and sympathy, kindly in future put your name down to speak on the items of the Orders of the Day. You will then take your turn to speak under the normal rules for the work and conduct of this Assembly.

I call Mr. Leynen on a point of order.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the Assembly of Western European Union is a democratic assembly. That means we give a respectful hearing to every opinion that may be expressed. But it does not mean that any one of its members can take the floor at any time. I appreciate that one of our colleagues may not be conversant with the customs and rules of our Assembly, but please see that it shall not happen again.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Leynen, I said I was making an exception to demonstrate the interest we take in, and the warm feelings we entertain for, the Italian Delegation. But it is, of course, an incident that will not create a precedent, and I accept your point of order.

7. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session

(Doc. 714)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the adoption of the draft Order of Business for this part of the session.

This draft Order of Business is given in Document 714 dated 25th November 1976.

The President (continued)

Before putting the whole draft Order of Business to the vote, I would draw your attention to the grouped votes referred to in item 4 of the draft Order of Business for the sitting of Wednesday afternoon, 1st December.

I make an urgent appeal to all delegations to ensure that the maximum number of members of the Assembly are in attendance when these votes are taken.

Are there any objections to the draft Order of Business in Document 714 ?...

The draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session is agreed to.

8. Détente and security in Europe**Rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today**

(Votes on the draft Recommendations postponed from the First Part of the Session, Docs. 703 and 711)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the vote on the draft recommendation on détente and security in Europe, the new text proposed by the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, Sir Frederic Bennett, Document 703.

May I remind you that the debate on the report was held during the first part-session on Monday 14th and Tuesday 15th June 1976, and that the debate was declared closed.

It became apparent at the sitting of Wednesday afternoon, 16th June, and also at the last sitting on Thursday, 17th June, that there was no quorum and that the vote on the draft recommendation would have to be postponed until the present sitting, under Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure.

Since objections were raised in the earlier part of the session, we shall proceed to a vote by roll-call on the draft recommendation as a whole.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Cermolacce.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹ :

Number of votes cast	62
Ayes	31
Noes	16
Abstentions	15

The draft recommendation is adopted².

The next Order of the Day is the vote on the draft recommendation on the rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today in the report presented by Mr. de Niet on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, Document 711.

The debate on the report was held at the last sitting of the first part-session on Thursday morning, 17th June, but in the absence of a quorum the vote on the draft recommendation was postponed until today's sitting.

We shall proceed to a vote by roll-call on the draft recommendation as a whole.

Mr. AMREHN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, before voting I wish to make an explanation of vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Afterwards.

Mr. AMREHN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Before.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — No.

Mr. AMREHN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I should like to make a statement before the vote to explain the attitude of the German Christian Democrats and the British Conservatives.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Very quickly, then.

Mr. AMREHN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I shall be very brief, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — It is a little irregular, but I think that, as an exceptional case, we can let you explain your vote at this point.

Mr. AMREHN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — The Federated Christian Democrat Group and British Conservatives have made a particularly careful study of this report,

1. See page 16.

2. See page 19.

Mr. Amrehn (continued)

and we have come to the conclusion that from our viewpoint there is no reason to object to the recommendation in its present form. Our Rules of Procedure lay down, however, that approval of the recommendation constitutes approval of the report accompanying it as well, and this means that our group, because of its objections to the report itself, is unable to give its approval. We shall consequently reject the draft recommendation as a whole.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Dankert on a point of order.

Mr. DANKERT (*Netherlands*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. Before voting, I would like to have your opinion on the judgment of Mr. Amrehn that a report is approved when the recommendation is accepted. If that is the case, in my view it will become extremely difficult for Rapporteurs to write reports.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Agreed, Mr. Dankert, we have this afternoon allowed a certain number of exceptions to our procedure, which is a strict one. It is a fact that Mr. Amrehn sought permission to explain the rather unexpected attitude of the German Christian Democrats. This I gave him and he made a statement, very briefly. He made it a point not of substance but of form. He put his views as you have put yours and I consider the matter closed.

Mr. DEQUAE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — That was not the point. It was whether by voting yes to recommendations we are at the same time adopting the whole report.

I had always believed that that was not so, but Mr. Amrehn says that it is. I should like to be clear on this matter.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Dequae, you are right, and I shall make the point for the new members of the Assembly: what is voted on is the recommendation or the resolution. Mr. Amrehn felt bound to explain the attitude — a somewhat odd one, if he will allow me to say so — of the Christian Democrat Group from the Federal Republic, and to say that the German Christian Democrat Group were abstaining because they felt that the draft recommendation did not reflect all the facts included in the body of the actual report.

The matter is closed.

I put the draft recommendation in Document 711 to the vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Cermolacce.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	61
Ayes	33
Noes	10
Abstentions	18

The draft recommendation is adopted².

9. European union and WEU

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 720)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on European union and WEU and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 720. The mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee, to which reference is made in the report, has been published in Document 718.

I call Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report that it is my honour to put before you matches the previous report very closely in its subject matter. Nothing has happened over the past six months that would lead us to ask this Assembly to make any fundamental change in the standpoint it took last June, a standpoint expressed in the recommendation adopted on that occasion. Quite the opposite, in fact. As the report before you makes clear, discussion of the Tindemans report has made only slow headway. The prospects outlined by Mr. Tindemans, which could have led to thoughts of the powers of the

1. See page 17.

2. See page 20.

Mr. de Bruyne (continued)

WEU Assembly being passed over to the European Parliament in certain circumstances, lie in a far-off and uncertain future. Even if there prove to be no serious obstacles to the holding of direct European elections — and this is by no means certain at the present time — the parliament thus elected will have no competence to deal with matters of foreign policy and defence. It has become obvious that a number of governments are linking their agreement to have European elections very closely to the viewpoint that the new parliament will not be given powers other than those set out in the Treaty of Rome. Our conclusion is, therefore, that the WEU Assembly will continue for an indefinite period to be the only possible body to shoulder the responsibilities that stem from the treaty — with its organic addenda — on which WEU is based. Our work must continue along the lines set out in the modified Brussels Treaty.

What I have just been saying covers the general background and main features of the report, up to and including paragraph 22. The second part of the report is devoted to the new and important task given to WEU, more particularly to the Standing Armaments Committee. The report, in paragraphs 23 to 46, examines the work that the WEU Council of Ministers has entrusted to the SAC. It refers both to the limits set, and to the tie-up with the work of the European programme group. Without wishing to exaggerate the importance of the study the Standing Armaments Committee has been asked to carry out, we feel sure that it is important enough for this Assembly to lend its full authority in support.

Since critical comments on the text are made in the report, in the light of statements made by Mr. Destremau, Mr. van der Stoep and Mr. Schmidt, I think I can say there is good reason for wording the draft recommendation in the way it has been worded. The four paragraphs of the draft recommendation to the Council of Ministers deal with this very important topic. I hope that the Assembly will, in a moment, feel able to give its unconditional approval to this draft, with the certainty of making in this way a major contribution towards putting fresh life into WEU and its various organs in the specific area in which it has responsibilities under the modified Brussels Treaty. It can sometimes seem difficult to pinpoint practical possibilities for giving WEU a larger measure

of activity; but there is such a possibility embodied in the draft recommendation we are now discussing. The Council of Ministers has played its part in this, and it is gratifying to have to say so; this judgment is in no way negated by paragraph 47 of the report which, brief though it is, is not without importance. It reads: "Finally, it is to be hoped that the Council will be more diligent in informing the Assembly of its decisions than it was in informing it of the May 1976 mandate." In paragraphs 23 and 24 of the report you will find the same slight note of disenchantment indicating that the dialogue between Council of Ministers and Assembly is not, in the Committee's view, carried on as the parliamentarians' side would like. The draft recommendation, however, contains no obvious echo of this note of criticism, though this does not mean to say that the Assembly will not be disappointed with the Council of Ministers if it takes no notice of the recommendation and gives it no consideration.

I do not think I would be doing my job of Rapporteur properly if I omitted to report that your General Affairs Committee, on 8th November, discussed briefly the exchange of correspondence between the acting Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. von Plehwe, and the President of the Assembly, Mr. Nessler. At the request of Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Nessler had asked the Council of Ministers for a joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee. This is something that has been possible since 1970, but it has never happened despite repeated requests from the Committee. This time, again, the reply from the acting Secretary-General offers the prospect of an informal meeting — in the spring of next year in Paris — but not a joint meeting of the kind the General Affairs Committee has been asking for since 1970.

Since then we have received a letter from the acting Secretary-General in which he reiterates this viewpoint and indicates that in his opinion such formal meetings are not always the best way of achieving the co-operation I am talking about. I am not making these comments in order to deflect the debate away from its proper subject matter, that of the draft recommendation and its accompanying explanatory memorandum. It might however be a good thing to invite the Assembly, one of these days soon, when it has been able to do the necessary preparatory work, to look at the real significance and worth of the procedure for a joint meeting in which the

Mr. de Bruyne (continued)

Council of Ministers and the General Affairs Committee — through its Chairman, for example — take part. The difference between formal and informal meetings needs to be very carefully underlined. This applies especially to the unanimity the Council of Ministers can, or cannot, find in their answers to the General Affairs Committee. I shall not go into this any further now, because this important procedural matter can perhaps be put on the agenda with more useful results after it has been prepared more thoroughly.

This completes my task as Rapporteur, and I would express the hope that the Assembly will feel able to support its Committee, which was unanimous in approving the document now before you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Critchley to speak in the debate.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — I must be the first to congratulate the Rapporteur on the quality of his report. It is a report on the future of Western European Union and it is, therefore, hardly surprising if it makes us out to be rather more important than we are. Whereas I should not like to describe the Council of Europe or the European Assembly as the two ugly sisters, there is no doubt that WEU is the Cinderella of the parliamentary assemblies of Europe. How close it is to midnight is perhaps one of the more important aspects that the report has tried to deal with.

Clearly, the only foreseeable and reasonable end to WEU and its Assembly is for the Common Market eventually to assume responsibilities in defence and foreign policy, for the Treaty of Rome to be restructured and changed, and for people such as ourselves to be absorbed into the European Parliament, wherever that body might have decided its headquarters shall be, which I assume in the long term will be Brussels. Clearly, the decision of the European Council that the countries of the Nine should have elections for the European Parliament is a giant step forward in the slow progress towards the unity of Europe. It is clear also that, once the parliament is elected, questions will arise of how strong it should be, what its powers will be and how swiftly those powers can be extended. If that is the case, those issues will be an all too fruitful source of friction between the new European Parliament and the nine national

parliaments, all of which will be most reluctant to concede any sovereignty to the newly-elected body.

Let me deal briefly with the problem in the United Kingdom concerning direct elections. Each country has its problems. Perhaps ours are not as acute as those of France, but they are difficult none the less. We expect that within weeks the government will introduce into the House of Commons a bill for direct elections. That legislation will be opposed by the extremes of the left and the right of British politics, and the bill will make only slow progress towards the statute book. We in Britain have the problem of deciding on the constituency boundaries and, more particularly, the problem of what sort of electoral system should be adopted for the first of what I hope to be many elections to a European Parliament.

The two great parties in Great Britain, the Conservative and the Labour Parties, are in the main, although not exclusively, hostile to the concept of electoral reform and proportional representation. I do not share the hostility felt by the great majority of my colleagues towards electoral reform, certainly not in the context of Great Britain or of elections to a European parliamentary assembly. Were we to adopt in 1978 the existing and British system of "first past the post", we should very likely exclude from Brussels every Liberal who might stand and, what would be worse in my view, ensure that every Scottish seat would be represented by a failed schoolmaster representing and carrying the standard of Scottish nationalism.

Clearly, therefore, fairness, reason and logic — three factors which have nothing to do with politics — will claim that electoral reform of sorts is desirable for the first round of our election. In Great Britain we must admit, whatever we might think about the Scottish, Welsh and Irish Assemblies, that each of them is likely to be elected under proportional representation. In addition, the second round of elections to the European Parliament must be on a system agreed on behalf of that parliamentary assembly, and not by Great Britain. Therefore, the long-term trend is in favour of some form of electoral reform in Great Britain, and, sooner or later, even the British for their elections will be pledged to follow suit. I believe that the sooner the better.

I welcome the very modest proposal of the Rapporteur that the Standing Armaments Com-

Mr. Critchley (continued)

mittee of WEU should be allowed by its masters to proceed beyond the study of an armaments plan and to set up and work out the armaments idea itself. We should be able to extend it just a little bit more. The unity of Europe, if it comes about, is most likely to occur through the slow process of the reinforcement of existing institutions within the Community, with the powers of those institutions being slowly added to.

I look forward to the absorption of the WEU Assembly into the elected European assembly, but only when the Treaty of Rome is amended so that the Common Market might adopt defence and foreign affairs responsibilities. As long as Europe prefers its security, which is the gift of the United States, to its independence, any progress towards a united Europe must by its very reason be slow and laborious. But were we in Europe to place defence at the forefront of our priorities the whole march towards what I believe is the goal of most of us here — a United States of Europe — would be that much swifter, and we would achieve our objective that much more quickly. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to pick up what the last speaker, Mr. Critchley, was saying. I think we are broadly agreed that this is the right road for a united Europe. But for my part I am rather hopeful that we will be able to amend the Treaty of Rome once direct elections give us a European Parliament which is in far greater measure directly answerable to the electorate and will therefore have a remit which gives much greater weight to the wishes of the peoples.

Of course we shall run into a number of difficulties as we move along the road to these European direct elections. Discussion of the problem is not confined to the United Kingdom. Among the nine member States there are other countries in which the debate on the procedure and on the detailed arrangements for these direct elections is not yet closed. But I hope that in 1978 we shall have direct elections.

I hope, too, that the European Parliament which emerges from direct elections will have a momentum of its own and will be able to prod governments to action.

And I hope that it will then be possible to amend the Treaty of Rome, for a common European policy which is concerned only with regulations in the sphere of agriculture and fisheries surely cannot be the sole aim of the deliberations of a European Parliament. One day there will also have to be a common foreign and defence policy.

The explanatory memorandum to the report says that though progress has been limited, this cannot be attributed solely to ill will. I would put it rather differently. It is a question of will, of course, and governments will have to show more good will, more determination, if the problems are to be tackled effectively.

Turning to our Assembly, to Western European Union, I agree with those who consider that it is within the terms of reference of the SAC to do something about this matter. The problems have not grown less difficult. If, beyond the boundaries of the member States of WEU, we look at Europe as a whole, we find among the Warsaw Pact States an increase in their armed strength together with a standardisation of armaments. These are problems with which we shall one day have to grapple.

With your permission I will make a comment on paragraph 48, in the conclusions, where it is stated that the economic recession in the western world since 1973 has raised difficulties and obstacles. I should like to criticise the fact that here the report refers only to the western world, while in reality, of course, what we are dealing with is not a recession in the western world alone, but worldwide recession, worldwide economic problems. And here I also disagree with the view put forward by our Italian colleague who today made his "entrance" with a speech in which he too referred to the crisis of the western world. In my opinion, the crisis is worldwide. It is not only in the West that there are difficulties; they have them in the East too, and in countries which are not tied either to the West or to the East. Plans in the eastern countries have been revised, and the workers of Radom were not a clique of intellectuals lucubrating on the subject of freedom, but workers from the Ursus tractor works marching down the street because of economic difficulties in Poland. So we are facing a worldwide problem, one which is affecting Western Europe and the Nine along with the rest.

The raising of petroleum prices by OPEC, with which the States of the eastern bloc of

Mr. Müller (continued)

course went along, and the worldwide recession in East and West might after all provide a decisive opportunity for the nine countries in Europe to take joint steps, joint action, since in my opinion worldwide problems cannot be solved locally. It must be clear to anyone that the aids which the countries of the West have given to the Soviet Union and other States of Eastern Europe by means of credits have helped to mitigate the impact which world recession has been having on the eastern bloc of States.

I repeat, the recession is an opportunity for the countries of Europe to take joint action. It would be wrong if we were at this point to swing back in the direction of national sovereignty — a tendency which can be sensed in the report. True, I agree with the Federal German Chancellor, Mr. Schmidt, who told the gathering of the Socialist International that every country must first deal with its own problems, and that a country cannot consume what has not yet been produced ; but I consider that this is not enough, that the world's problems cannot be solved otherwise than at world level and by certain regions — in our case Europe — working together. Here the Community of Nine faces a great task.

I fear it will be a long trek from our economic policy to a common foreign and defence policy. Until the day when our Assembly is merged into a European parliament which will then have a responsibility in the field of foreign and defence policy, it will therefore still be necessary for this Assembly and the governments which have come together in the Brussels Treaty to pursue their tasks. For a common European foreign and defence policy, even if undertaken only in the framework of the European Community, must inherit at least something — however modest — brought into being by the Brussels Treaty and Western European Union.

It is with these points in mind that I welcome the report and look upon it as a step in the right direction. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Lord Duncan-Sandys.

Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (*United Kingdom*). — Before I deal with the main recommendations submitted to us, I should like to make a brief reference to the subject of terrorism which is raised in paragraph 19 of the report. This says

that the nine governments of the Community have decided to take the initiative in combating the evil practice of taking hostages by securing international agreement for the extradition of the offenders. In actual fact, the Nine, in a resolution adopted last July, agreed to press for the extradition or the prosecution of those who take hostages. In my opinion, the addition of the alternative destroys the entire effect of any such action. A hijacked aircraft invariably lands in a country which is favourable to the political objectives of the hijackers, who, if prosecuted, would be given purely nominal sentences which would be no deterrent at all.

The report rightly emphasises the continuing importance of the Western European Union Assembly in defence. As long as the European Community does not assume responsibility for defence, our Assembly here must maintain its vigilance and keep up its pressure upon governments to discharge their basic duty of security for their peoples.

Above all, we must insist, as the report emphasises, on progress in the standardisation of armaments. The lamentable lack of progress in the co-ordination of our arms production is, I submit to this Assembly, a crying scandal. We have been paying lip service to this principle for more than twenty years but very little of practical value has been achieved. A few weeks ago, with other members of the Defence Committee of Western European Union, I made a tour of army and air force headquarters of NATO in West Germany. Wherever we went, concern was expressed to us about the grave consequences of the failure to standardise the armaments of the NATO allies or, at least, to make them interoperable. Whilst standardisation is essential, it will, of course, take time to achieve. In the meantime, interoperability is an immediate and absolute necessity. Modern warfare is essentially mobile. The armed forces of the different allied nations cannot be kept in separate, watertight compartments. They must be able to move freely over the battle area. That means that they must be able to draw upon each other's ammunition supplies ; but that is impossible if their ammunition is not interchangeable.

Perhaps most important of all, their communications systems must be compatible with one another, so that units of one nationality can make quick and efficient contact with units of other nationalities. Unfortunately, that is not the present position. The inevitable result is delay and risk of dangerous confusion. It seems

Lord Duncan-Sandys (continued)

to me that it is largely a question of priorities. Are we prepared to allow domestic economic considerations and commercial rivalry to take precedence over the needs of security? How much importance do we attach to survival as free peoples? Even if the issue is judged from a purely economic standpoint, we are being very short-sighted, because standardisation offers us by far the cheapest means of strengthening our defences.

This brings us back to the main purpose of the recommendation before us, which is to ensure that the Western European Union Assembly is kept fully informed of what governments are planning to do and are actually doing to develop co-operation in the field of armaments. It has often been said that we cannot have a common defence policy until we have a common foreign policy. In view of the NATO Alliance that is not entirely true, but at any rate one thing is quite certain: the absence of a common foreign policy does not prevent us from equipping our forces with common weapons, or, at least, weapons which are interoperable.

In view of the growing danger of further delay, it is high time for this Assembly to play a more active part, but before it can do so it must be given much fuller information. That is the very modest request made by the recommendation which I wholly support. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Amrehn.

Mr. AMREHN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the Rapporteur is to be congratulated on the report which he has given us today and on the recommendation which he is asking us to adopt. I am sure there is nobody who has any objection to this recommendation.

We are particularly grateful however to the Rapporteur for having described in this report the situation as it is, for not having shied away from telling the truth. I would like to emphasise this because the disappointment we all feel at the lack of action by the European Council has not so far been made sufficiently clear in the discussions.

The Rapporteur complains of this lack of action. He complains of the fact that neither the European Council — nor, indeed, the Council of our Western European Union — is keen to keep

us better informed. He complains that both the Council of WEU and the European Council are too ineffective, and rightly points out that the Belgian premier, Mr. Tindemans, is publicly complaining that his colleagues are not ready to join him in implementing the Tindemans plan gradually but visibly.

Today the European Council is meeting again in The Hague — and it will also be meeting tomorrow — seven years after the decision by President Pompidou and Federal Chancellor Brandt, also taken at The Hague, finally to bring about European union. When we look back over these seven years we have, sadly, to admit that there has been very little progress, if not indeed that we have slipped back during this period.

The result with which we are faced today — and this comes out clearly again in Mr. de Bruyne's report — appears to be that we are seeking to excuse or justify our failure to make any progress. People tell us, for instance — as my colleague Mr. Müller has already pointed out — that the economic recession has made better progress impossible. As far as I know, the European Council will not be dealing today with the problems of the Tindemans report, nor with the question of how we can strengthen Europe. All we can today get from a report like this is the statement that the inaction or ineffectiveness of the European Council can be excused or justified. The main reason advanced for this is that the economic recession has thrown us so far back. I entirely agree with Mr. Müller when he says that, precisely because the economic recession has placed us in this difficult position, it is all the more necessary to undertake joint action in the economic field, joint action in the currency field and in the field of general policy; because, once we have established greater unity in Europe, we have at least some hope of taking together a European step forward in the joint struggle to overcome the recession in Europe.

Unfortunately the European Council will today be dealing less with the question of European union than with the problem of what we can do to counter the rise in oil prices. It will be dealing more with the question of unemployment and the practical problems this raises than with the steps forward which must be taken if the economic policies of the various European States are to be co-ordinated. Unfortunately, there are a large number of proposals — including pressure on the Federal Republic of Germany — to create more inflation in order to

Mr. Amrehn (continued)

create more jobs, despite the fact that we have learned that more inflation will always lead to more unemployment. This is unfortunately not a proposal for strengthening Europe, but a proposal for making it even weaker.

Lord Duncan-Sandys has pointed out — and so does Mr. de Bruyne's report — that a common defence policy presupposes a common foreign policy. The principle is undoubtedly correct. But at the present point in the debate it is quite out of place, almost as out of place as the title of the report, which reads European union and WEU. We are meant to look at Western European Union in relation to European union, to discuss this and draw conclusions. But there is no European union. We are only imagining that there is, as if it were going to be set up next year. We must begin by taking far more modest steps. However, in my opinion, it is in this respect that the body of the report — not the resolution or recommendation — goes wrong. Standardisation of weapons still falls far short of a joint defence policy. Standardisation for reasons of logic and economy is always necessary and possible, even amongst widely differing allies with widely different political aims. I therefore think that standardisation of weapons amongst the allies should in no circumstances be allowed to go by the board, even if there is no question of, and unfortunately no feasibility of, making political progress. Perhaps we shall, as a result of the European elections, manage in the not too distant future to achieve a greater degree of political progress.

I am convinced that elections among the Nine in Europe must and can be held. But I am equally convinced that the powers of the future European parliament must for the present remain strictly within the limits of the Rome Treaties. However much I agree with the statement that a political union means much more, I remain convinced that the small step forward represented by elections to a European parliament, endowed with the powers laid down in the European treaties, must not be prevented by our already demanding much greater powers. And it is very important that France and Great Britain shall be able to implement in their own countries the agreement which has just been reached. I should therefore like to warn against pitching our expectations too high in the immediate future; it is much a matter of doing what can be done.

To that extent we do not, in my opinion, need to occupy ourselves today with whether the Assembly of Western European Union should one day be merged with another European parliament, as Mr. Tindemans has proposed. That is not a point for discussion at the present time, because it is not to be expected that in the foreseeable future a European parliament could take over the powers of this Assembly. If we were to discuss this today — perhaps it will be a full decade before the question is ripe for decision — we would be wasting our energies, we would be printing paper to no purpose and holding superfluous conferences. This is a problem which we ought to discuss a great deal more in our national parliaments, because it is there that we must press the executive, our governments, to at least honour the commitments they have undertaken. These include the Treaties of Rome and, more recently, the agreement to hold European elections as laid down in the Treaties of Rome. If we complain that our governments and the European Council have reached no decision, there is no point in moaning unless at the same time we urge our governments, through our national parliaments, to do what they have undertaken to do.

What I ask of you today is that you do not merely raise this complaint — which I too am making — here in this chamber, but play your part in ensuring that our national parliaments force the governments to do what Europe needs. Only then shall we be able to speak of extending powers, of European union, of taking further joint action. That is what we need to do today, and not to make grandiose plans for the future which, as we know, cannot yet be realised. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — It is not always in this Assembly, or indeed in any other of the international assemblies in which I have played a part, that we are able to congratulate a Rapporteur upon and agree with his report, recommendations and explanatory memorandum. That, however, is my position this afternoon. Mr. de Bruyne is to be congratulated upon a cogent, well-argued and pertinent report. I should like to offer him my personal congratulations.

In the first place I wish to turn, as my colleague Mr. Critchley turned, to the observations which are made in the explanatory memorandum

Mr. Grieve (continued)

on the question of direct elections to the parliament of the European Community. I share the pleasure and the approbation of the Rapporteur and of Mr. Critchley that we are approaching direct elections. I believe that this is an absolutely vital and important step forward in the reinforcing of Western European unity and the power, status and prestige of the Community.

It is essential if Europe is to progress that we should hold such democratic elections. The attitude of the mother States, if I may so call them, to the problem of devolving sovereignty to the Community has hitherto not been unlike that of trustees of a great estate which is shortly to come into the hands of a young man. They know that for the future it is essential that they should hand over their powers and the *gérance* of the fortune to the young man. They know that in the end it is inevitable that they should do so. They know that there is no future for them or the young man if they do not hand over that power. But they hesitate to do so. They ask "Will he not leave his mother without means? Will he not hand over the family heirlooms to the first pretty girl he meets?"

Those are in some ways — I hope that I am not pushing my analogy too far — the reactions of the sovereign States which make up the Community, and they have hitherto been the reactions of those sovereign States to the necessary handing over of sovereignty, or a measure of sovereignty, and a share in the sovereignty to the organisations of the European Community. For the future of us all and of Western Europe, it is vital that they should be handed over. It is not until we have democratic elections that the parliament of the Community will be in a position to exercise real influence over the activities and workings of the Community.

I believe that all the talk we have had about the difficulties of formulating constituency boundaries and about whether we should have proportional representation of "first past the post" elections has represented the hesitations which people cling to when they hesitate to hand over what they know perfectly well must be handed over for the good of the whole Community. I am especially pleased that Mr. de Bruyne should have pointed out that such hesitations are of little importance, as is implicit in paragraph 11 of the explanatory memorandum, which says that once the European Parliament

is directly elected it will be able to determine the procedure governing its renewal.

Therefore, it is of little importance *ab initio* whether we should proceed by proportional representation or by the British system of "first past the post". I dare say it is essential that we should proceed by the form of election that is most natural to the country holding the elections and easiest to put into operation in the short space of time that will lapse between now and 1978 when the direct elections take place. I therefore welcome that part of Mr. de Bruyne's report.

I turn to something that my colleague Lord Duncan-Sandys said this afternoon. There is no other assembly to discuss the defence of Europe, the European countries and our mutual obligations to come to one another's aid, than this Assembly, under the modified Brussels Treaty. For the foreseeable future we cannot envisage other arrangements. Therefore, Western European Union's contribution to the defence of Europe for the future is vital and indispensable.

I share Lord Duncan-Sandys' reactions to what we have been able to achieve in the years of our existence. It is shameful that we should not have arrived at a greater measure of standardisation of our national armaments. When we consider the problems that we face in the world today, and the knife edge that we are riding in the defence of Europe and the problems that we face in that defence, it is crazy that we have not achieved more in this area. Here again, I fear that we are up against that hesitation in our own sovereign States which causes us to draw back from what we should do and to draw back in short-sighted national interest from conceding a little for the good of the whole. If our nation States were prepared to concede a little more for the good of the whole, we should long ago have arrived at a far greater measure of standardisation than that which we have now as we meet this afternoon in this Assembly.

I stand here as a committed European believing that we must pool a large measure of our national sovereignty in all areas for the good of the whole. Here is one area in which we in this Assembly may contribute — the standardisation of our armaments. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Following the example of our other colleagues,

Mr. Valleix (continued)

I should first like to express my congratulations to Mr. de Bruyne on the excellent report which he has just presented to the Assembly.

Although, on the whole, the report in its general lines and the attached recommendation seem to me entirely satisfactory, there is one point on which I should like to dwell in particular, namely the task of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee, following the Council's decision of 31st May.

The thoughts I should like to pursue are prompted by a number of criticisms which have been taken up by both the American and the European press as regards the functioning of armaments standardisation or joint production in the framework of NATO.

One initial remark is that, at any rate from the American viewpoint, armaments standardisation in the Atlantic Alliance has made no headway over the past ten years. A very interesting study published in the *Economist* of 6th November stated that, whereas the famous F-104 Starfighter had been used to equip the air forces of ten out of thirteen NATO countries, the aircraft designed to replace it, the F-16, would only be purchased by five of them, including neither France nor Germany nor the United Kingdom nor Italy — in other words, not one of the four biggest potential customers of the American aircraft industry.

We know that three of these countries have in fact already undertaken joint construction of the MRCA Tornado. France, which builds its own warplanes, has started development of a new aircraft, the ACF, and we still await the outcome of talks with a view to unification of these two European ventures in military aircraft construction.

At all events, the same article in the *Economist* alleges that the MRCA could well cost 25 % more than if it was being manufactured by one single country, because of the vast administrative machinery accompanying any attempt at joint manufacture, and of the constant to- and fro-ing involved. This is a constant feature of any kind of industrial co-operation.

Similarly, the attempt by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany to reach agreement on the manufacture of a single tank designed to equip both the European and American members of NATO ended in failure

because, from the very outset, it was clear that the two sides were not evenly matched and that the United States was in no circumstances prepared either to purchase or even to manufacture on its own territory a tank that was not American. The upshot was that, although the theoretical superiority of the German Leopard tank had been accepted by the United States military authorities, another tank is to be constructed by American industry, and the number of major components common to the German Leopard and the American tank will be extremely few. Thus, far from lowering production costs as had been supposed and hoped, joint manufacture, as conceived in the NATO framework, apparently means higher costs without even the technical benefits to be expected from standardisation.

Similarly, in January 1975 the Americans decided to equip their land forces with a new ground-to-air missile jointly manufactured by France and Germany, the Roland. But, instead of buying it from its producers the Americans redesigned the system in such a way that the American missile could no longer be launched by a European vehicle. So a launcher had to be specifically designed and built for the American version of the Roland. This would have been far more expensive than if the Americans had themselves designed a missile and suitable launch vehicle without calling on European production capacity.

Still according to the *Economist*, all these difficulties, to which must be added the adoption by the Europeans of metrication, along with another system of measurement being used by the Americans, have meant that, whereas the original missile was to have cost \$130 million, the American missile is now estimated at about \$260 million, or twice as much, which does not rule out further unpleasant surprises.

Thus, everything goes to show that the reproduction or modified reproduction of European weaponry systems in the United States is an economic disaster for the Americans. It is to be presumed that they will not persist for long with this kind of venture.

If I have dwelt at some length on the problems involved in the standardisation of armaments within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, it is because I think there are three lessons to be drawn.

The first is probably that European and American armaments are not designed for precisely the same purposes.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

The American army is deployed over far-flung areas of the world and has to be prepared to fight on any of the five continents. Its armaments have to be exceedingly versatile. The same is no longer true of European armies, essentially confined to the European theatre. The climatic, geographical and military conditions governing the use of their weapons are accordingly far more limited. It therefore seems logical that the requirements imposed on armaments manufacturers by the European and American general staffs are not the same. This difference should enable the Europeans to produce lower cost armaments that are, however, not always potentially salable to the United States.

Is it any use manufacturing armaments that are also up to the American general staff requirements? In view of the experiences already mentioned, we may doubt it, and wonder whether, in any event, the protectionism consistently practised by the American administration does not foredoom any such attempt to failure.

The fact remains that the joint manufacture of armaments in Europe also has to contend with considerable obstacles like those pointed out by the Economist with regard to the MRCA. Of course, the European countries as well have a tendency to protect their domestic industries by reserving State orders for them. But joint production also comes up against further difficulties: the armaments industries, generally strictly State-controlled, operate on the basis of standards laid down and orders placed by their national general staffs. There is no European authority capable of defining standards applicable to all the armies, although it is perfectly clear that, in the event of conflict, these will have to be deployed on the same battlefield.

So long as each general staff retains free will in defining its needs, we can scarcely hope for a common definition enabling true joint production. An initial effort would have to be made at general staff level prior to any standardisation.

But — and this is the third lesson — because of the very structure of the armaments firms and their legal status for operating and marketing their production, another prerequisite for joint manufacture is the establishment of close inter-firm co-operation, which in itself demands that the State keep a firm hand on the reins,

and that the possibilities for co-operation be thoroughly researched.

So long as our countries continue to keep a jealous eye on maintaining a perfectly balanced spread of costs among the various national industries for every single project, we shall not be able to escape from such wastefulness, whose net effect is that jointly-produced equipment proves far more expensive — much too expensive — than that produced by a national industry.

I now come to my final reflections. These considerations lead me to believe that the task assigned to the WEU Standing Armaments Committee, which Mr. de Bruyne sums up perfectly in his recommendation, is of far greater importance than might appear at first sight. Although the Standing Armaments Committee is not in present circumstances in a position to define joint requirements for the European armed forces, the outline programme which it is to prepare, prior to being charged with its implementation, on the armaments industry and production conditions in the different member countries, should be of considerable help in finding solutions to the problems of industrial co-ordination in Europe. How will it do this? Conscientiously, I am sure; with determination, I hope. For I think it will have to arm itself with determination, so to say, if it is going to have the ear of our governments.

For these reasons, I am glad to see that Mr. de Bruyne's report stresses the need for a speedy decision by the Council on the implementation of the tasks assigned to the Standing Armaments Committee.

I cannot do other than share his opinion, too, on the urgent need to co-ordinate the work undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee with that of the European programme group, the Rome group.

To sum up, I stress this aspect of urgency, and would remind you, not out of demagogy but because there is to my mind an obvious connection, that at a time when our industries — I was going to say our iron and steel industries — are often wondering about their programmes and production schedules, and when all our European countries have to contend with employment problems, there is also a human aspect. So that the problem with which WEU is concerning itself may ultimately find expression in both industrial and social terms; and, as a consequence, these kinds of urgency should add to the fundamental urgency of the military problem.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

In conclusion, I support this report, Mr. de Bruyne, and shall vote in favour of your recommendation. I shall do so with all the more enthusiasm in that it seems to me that — I will not say for once, but at any rate this time — our Assembly is right on course for WEU's proper tasks. For that reason I trust that this intra-European debate may, without cutting us off from our great American friends, lead to the development and advancement, among Europeans, of European projects. The time will then have come to seek a closer contact with our Atlantic partners; but what I wanted was to stress the importance and the timeliness of this European step. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Cermolacce.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the report presented by Mr. de Bruyne has two aims, the one as negative as the other: first, to support those who are seeking to impose supranationality on the people of Europe, and secondly, to assist in the development, intensification and rationalisation of armaments production in Europe.

The two aims are correlated since, as soon as we call for supranationality, we cannot but opt in favour of forming a European bloc closely tied to American interests and hostile to all genuine détente and co-operation with the socialist countries. People then call, as does Mr. de Bruyne, for a strengthening of the armaments industries and the expansion of military budgets in Europe.

Such a step is out of line with the interests of the people of Europe. It is dictated purely by the financial and economic lobbies of little Europe which are attempting not only to overcome the peoples' will to achieve independence and social progress by developing supranational institutions, but also to hold up the process of détente by preparing for a policy of confrontation and opposition to both the socialist countries and the third world.

The decision to hold direct elections to the European Parliament, which Mr. de Bruyne welcomes, is a serious development and a danger to the people of Europe. Even when elected, a European parliament would never be more than a pseudo-democratic screen intended, within the EEC, to conceal the intensification of authori-

tarianism and the growing centralisation of power in the European councils. Furthermore, it would serve as a cover and a pretext for any enterprise hostile to peace, to the independence of nations and to the advance of democracy in Europe. Already many governments of little Europe, led by the Federal Republic of Germany, are not afraid to say that they would oppose the participation of communists in their government. How much more room for manoeuvre these governments would have if they could be sure that there would be an automatic majority in the European Parliament at their beck and call! In the circumstances, what is at stake is the liberty, no less, of the peoples of Europe, what is threatened is their right to a fully independent choice of their economic, political, social and military systems.

These military objectives are clearly apparent in the text on which our Assembly is to vote. It is concerned with developing the rôle of WEU's Standing Armaments Committee, and co-ordinating its actions with those of the European programme group, in other words, developing and intensifying the production of armaments in Europe.

For some years now, NATO has been searching for ways of obtaining a considerable increase in its military potential. That is the context into which the proposed recommendation fits. With the consent and participation of France, moreover, NATO has recently set up a committee on the interoperability of equipment and a European programme group on the co-ordination of armaments, theoretically independent of the United States but in fact closely linked to Eurogroup, a European branch of the Atlantic military alliance. To these various organisations, Mr. de Bruyne wishes to add the WEU Standing Armaments Committee so as to give the European arms industries the appearance of being independent of NATO. But how could a Europe founded on supranationality and on a refusal to co-operate with the socialist countries shake off its dependence on NATO? How could an institution such as the Standing Armaments Committee be anything else than an instrument of cold war under the strict control of the supranational establishment of little Europe, that is, in the final analysis, of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States?

Mr. de Bruyne carefully avoids answering these questions. He simply asserts, in paragraph 42, that little Europe needs to raise its armaments to the highest possible level and must

Mr. Cermolacce (continued)

boost its exports of military equipment to the utmost.

By doing so, he falls in completely with the United States' way of thinking: was it not General Haig who, on 25th February, said in Brussels that the United States could no longer be expected to intervene the world over as used to be the case and that efforts to build a united Europe were therefore of the utmost importance for our collective security?

A little Europe, over-armed and unified behind West German leadership, that is what the American top brass wants, so that wherever a too greatly discredited United States can no longer act, Western Europe can take up the reins and try to preserve a *status quo* that is favourable to imperialism.

Those are the aims really served by Mr. de Bruyne's proposals for setting up a European armaments agency and for working out a defence policy on an EEC scale.

That is not the policy we propose to the peoples of Europe. The countries of Europe must not allow themselves to be dragged into the arms race. They can and must make an exemplary move towards détente, collective security and disarmament. Instead of justifying a senseless armaments drive on the grounds of an alleged threat from the East and relying on an outdated anti-communist sentiment, the European States must suggest to the Soviet Union the conclusion of a treaty of non-aggression and friendship and be mindful of the recommendations of the Helsinki conference.

Those amongst them who hold nuclear weapons should subscribe to the treaty already signed by the Soviet Union and the United States on the prevention of nuclear war. A move in this direction could be made right now. It is the only way we can safeguard the independence and security of Europe, the only way we can prepare the ground for superseding and dismantling the blocs, and so satisfy the peoples of our continent in their desire for independence and peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Mende.

Mr. MENDE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I consider it my duty to defend our Belgian colleague, the Rapporteur Mr. de Bruyne, against the

indefensible attacks just made by the representative of the French Communist Party, Mr. Cermolacce. To listen to Mr. Cermolacce, one would imagine that there is no such thing as the Warsaw Pact, and no Council for Economic Co-operation of the eastern communist States — COMECON. They are allowed to co-ordinate. The Soviet Union is allowed to dominate the Warsaw Pact. But when the Europeans for their part also co-ordinate, standardise and achieve greater effectiveness of their common defence efforts, that, in Mr. Cermolacce's book, is a threat to peace and means that NATO is dominated by the Americans, egged on by the Germans, as he has just said.

Nobody judging the matter objectively can deny that it is the military preponderance in Europe of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact States that compels WEU and NATO to seek to achieve not a military balance, it is true, but at least a potential deterrent in the face of the imperialist ambitions and militarist thinking of the Soviet Union.

I therefore agree with the report of Mr. de Bruyne, a colleague of his Prime Minister, Mr. Tindemans, who in turn represents today a driving force in Europe.

Mr. President, may I be allowed a few further remarks following the very lengthy introductory speech which the representative of the Italian Communist Party was allowed to make. In view of the fact that eleven representatives of the Italian Communist Party are now present, may I remind one of them, namely the representative of the communist party who addressed us, of Benito Corghi, his communist fellow-countryman who was shot on the internal German border a few weeks ago. If, as their spokesman said, the Italian communists are really interested in progress and European co-operation, then let them see to it that there is no more shooting along the frontiers of Europe — including those inside Germany. Then, at least, the Italian communist Benito Corghi will not have died in vain. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — It is quite an easy matter for a Rapporteur to review the speeches made, Mr. President, though I will make an exception here for the remarks made by Mr. Cermolacce. The remaining statements have been wholly in line with the draft recommendation.

Mr. de Bruyne (continued)

I will follow the sequence of the speakers in replying to them. Mr. Critchley supported fully the views underlying the report and draft recommendation, and mentioned the difficulties that are being encountered in the United Kingdom in preparing for European elections. In this, of course, I am entirely on his side. I was glad to see that the conclusions he drew from these difficulties do not lessen the faith he has in the future rôle to be given to a directly-elected European parliament. Finally, he gave his support to the major part of the draft recommendation on the study to be entrusted to the Standing Armaments Committee. Mr. Müller, too, supported the views put forward in the report, where the recommendation was concerned, but had one or two slightly divergent comments to offer when discussing the economic difficulties. Mr. Amrehn also spoke about these. The viewpoint of Mr. Müller and Mr. Amrehn comes down to this: that it is wrong to look on the present economic recession as a pretext or a reason for putting a brake on European integration — the opposite should rather be the case. Instead of taking the excuse to slow down European integration, the European integration policy should, in fact, be pressed more vigorously precisely in this economic sphere. Looked at in the light of what is ideal, I think this attitude is right; but in reality we have seen that economic difficulties have indeed put a brake on the bringing about of economic integration. Here I mean most of all the difficulties there have been in monetary policy, and I can point to the problems that have been encountered in developing the European snake in the direction for which it was in fact intended.

Lord Duncan-Sandys, of course, gave substantial support to the ideas set out in the report. He spoke about the incredible delays in bringing about an integration of armaments and a standardisation of certain weapons components. He spoke of the slowness with which standardisation is progressing, if indeed one can talk about progress at all.

It is extremely worrying and discouraging to have to realise that after so many years of political co-operation on matters of defence we have in many instances not reached the stage of making co-ordination of our air power possible. We find that because we have not managed to achieve enough uniformity in our communications systems, normal collaboration in this area is not a practicality.

When we look at the negative results from so much effort we can only conclude from this that we cannot let this drop — that we must strive with renewed energy to attain that minimum of standardisation in armaments without which European co-operation in military matters will cease to make any sense at all.

I am very glad that the section of the report and of the recommendation relating to the study mission to be given to the Standing Armaments Committee will be seen against the background sketched out by Lord Duncan-Sandys. This is a background that goes further than involving just some kind of study scheme. What is involved is one of the most urgent needs that has to be met if, in our various countries, we want to make sense, and a minimum of effective use, of our defence budgets.

I have already answered some of Mr. Amrehn's comments. One of these I listened to with some pleasure, when he spoke of the need to pass over the powers of this Assembly to a directly-elected European parliament. Mr. Amrehn told us not to waste too much breath, in the present circumstances, on a transfer of powers. As things stand today, these powers cannot be transferred. This makes it logical that within this Assembly we should continue to exercise the powers conferred on us by the modified Brussels Treaty.

Mr. Grieve, too, went along with me to a very large extent. He had some very friendly things to say, and I am grateful to him. He endorsed what Lord Duncan-Sandys had to say about one crucial issue, that of the continued absence of the minimum degree of standardisation and technical co-operation needed to make the most basic operations by our armies possible. I can only thank Mr. Grieve for the forcefulness with which he spoke on these various points.

(The speaker continued in French)

Mr. Valleix, I was expecting yours to be a positive contribution, but it has been even more favourable than I had hoped. You have first of all laid your finger on the many difficulties that technological collaboration between the United States and Europe has to encounter. You have quoted examples to illustrate the many snags we encountered when we tried, for instance, to carry through certain technical projects in the military area. You even gave an explanation for our lack of success and said, perhaps rightly, that there are too many differences of scale between the authorities responsible for United States military policy and the area within which military policy

Mr. de Bruyne (continued)

at European level has to be circumscribed. If I understood you correctly, what you meant was that these differences in scale account for the difficulties, but these are precisely non-existent if we limit ourselves to the European arena.

Arguing from this strict premise, you then expressed the wish that such collaboration should be achieved, for example, by the study group whose creation you welcomed and from which you expect a great deal. Mr. Valleix, on this point I agree, and am grateful to you for making it.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

Then I must point out that part of the answer I wanted to give to Mr. Cermolacce has already been supplied by Mr. Mende, to whom I am grateful for this. He said, with a good deal of emphasis, a number of things that needed saying in this connection.

Now to the answer I myself wanted to make to Mr. Cermolacce.

(The speaker continued in French)

There is no way in which I can offer you a recommendation to any other effect without finding ourselves in breach of the treaty on which this Assembly is founded. That is my first comment.

As for the link between this Assembly's policy aims and those of the European union and NATO, on this matter, too, Mr. Cermolacce, I cannot but repeat that has been said time and time again in this House. Whenever these principles have been debated and papers submitted, the reports and draft recommendations have been passed by a large majority.

If you want to make any changes in this respect, the right time for doing so is not when discussing a report such as mine and a draft recommendation of the kind now tabled before us. To attempt to achieve your programme, you must go to the very roots of European policy in general. You will have to find some other occasion to argue your case. What you seem to expect with regard to the true aims of European policy cannot, I think, be achieved in this debate and in this Assembly.

It is not possible for me to give you any other kind of answer, and I am sure that Mr. Cermolacce and his political friends will appreciate that it would be illogical to place before you

any other draft recommendation than the one I have the honour to submit. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Sir John Rodgers, Vice-Chairman of the Committee.

Sir John RODGERS (*United Kingdom*). — In the absence of the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, it falls to me as Vice-Chairman to take his place and to express the thanks of the Committee and, I am sure, of this whole Assembly in the hemicycle for the excellent report — whether all members agreed with it or not — that Mr. de Bruyne has presented to us today.

The subject that we have been discussing — European union and the future of WEU — is obviously one which commends itself to everybody in the hemicycle, because it is our future that we are discussing as well as the future of Europe. I am sure most of us in this hemicycle believe that it is very important that we should have a democratic forum for the discussion of the defence system of the West under the modified Brussels Treaty; and, until something replaces that, obviously WEU has a future, particularly its parliamentary Assembly.

I do not wish to go into all the points that have been raised during the debate because Mr. de Bruyne has very adequately covered most of them. However, I wish to comment on two points. The first is that raised by Lord Duncan-Sandys concerning the lack of standardisation of armaments, rationalisation of production and interoperability. This is something on which we have failed all along the line since we started the defence against the Soviet threats.

I should like to say to Mr. Cermolacce that, if one can stand truth on its head, he did it beautifully. I should hate to see the West have the same powers of individual freedom and ability to express themselves freely as the Russians have under their system of communism.

My second and final point concerns the direct elections to the European Parliament. We are all hoping to see by 1978 an elected European Parliament based on universal suffrage, but I hope that my friend Mr. Critchley will not at present press for a specific form of election. We in Great Britain have enormous problems before us. For instance, the boundaries have not yet been fixed, we have yet to discuss the selection of candidates and we have yet to settle the method of financing candidates. It will take time to solve all these problems, and time is running out as it

Sir John Rodgers (continued)

is already nearly 1977. Therefore, I should like to leave the form of election open. I am neither for nor against proportional representation, but I am against trying to push it through at this time. As my friend Mr. Percy Grieve pointed out, it does not matter as long as we have elections based on universal suffrage in all the member States. The onus will then be on the European Parliament which will be elected in 1978 to determine procedure governing its renewal. It is at that time that the debate should take place on whether or not there should be proportional representation.

I thank Mr. de Bruyne very much for a clear, concise, beautifully-expressed and short report on a most important subject. I commend the report to members of the Assembly and hope that they will give it their full support. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I now propose to put the draft recommendation in Document 720 to the vote.

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation ?...

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — I object to it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I note that the Assembly is not unanimous.

The vote must therefore be taken by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Cermolacce.

The voting is open.

(*A vote by roll-call was then taken*)

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹ :

Number of votes cast	55
Ayes	46
Noes	2
Abstentions	7

*The draft recommendation is adopted*¹.

Mr. Rivière asked me to call him in the debate, but when I called him he was not there. If he can keep his contribution very brief, I am willing to depart from procedure and give him the floor to explain his vote.

I call Mr. Rivière.

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — First of all, I wish to apologise for my absence this afternoon. I was detained in my constituency and have just this minute got back.

I wish to explain my abstention in the vote. I must first of all heartily congratulate the Rapporteur and the General Affairs Committee for the explanatory memorandum and recommendation that they have submitted to us today.

This document seems to me to have the very great merit of being based not on lofty speculation but on the realities of today. It conveys — and this is another of its merits — a particularly important and encouraging appreciation of the rôle that could, and should, be played by WEU, and it addresses itself to the Council to ask for a number of things that should be feasible straight away.

In this respect it differs from certain other reports which, instead of being addressed to the Council of WEU, attempt through it to get at other institutions, of which one wonders to what extent they are properly interlocutors of this Assembly. I refer more especially to Recommendation 288 and the Council's reply to it. Actually, that recommendation was aimed, over the heads of the WEU Council, at the North Atlantic Council, and it was quite in order for our Council not to reply to it save by informing the Assembly that it had passed on to the North Atlantic Council that part of the recommendation that concerned the latter.

It remains to be seen whether it did so by a date enabling the North Atlantic Council to give a valid reply and, if so, why none was received in time. Finally, if the reply could only arrive after the Council had replied to our Assembly,

1. See page 18.

1. See page 21.

Mr. Rivière (continued)

the Council would have to be asked how it will let us know what the NATO Council had to say on the matter.

But my remark would apply to a great many other papers emanating from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. I, for my part, am determined from now on to abstain from voting on recommendations not addressed to the Council of WEU, and I believe that a number of my friends intend to do likewise.

It is no use asking the WEU Council to apply the modified Brussels Treaty if the recommendations that we make to it are in actual fact intended for other institutions. And I welcome the fact that Mr. de Bruyne's report reacts positively against the propensity, all too frequently shown by this Assembly, towards not taking account of treaties, and in particular the modified Brussels Treaty, or of the very general character of the powers it confers on the WEU Council as well as on our Assembly.

I would add that Mr. de Bruyne's report seems to me to take a line very close to that defined by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. de Guiringaud, in the reply that he gave on 10th November 1976 to a written question by Mr. Radius on the application of Recommendation 285, adopted by this Assembly on 15th June last. In fact, the French Government reaffirmed "the prerogatives of the Council and its resolve to fulfil the obligations imposed on it by the WEU Treaty".

Further on, the reply stated that the question of a European defence policy could not be realistically tackled as long as no substantial progress had been made towards political union. It would therefore be premature to examine what possibilities there might be for the Council to complement the action of the Nine on political co-operation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Rivière, you have overrun your five minutes.

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — Please let me finish, Mr. President. It is, I think, very nearly the thought expounded here by Mr. de Bruyne in asking the WEU Council to continue the task entrusted to it under the modified Brussels Treaty as long as insufficient progress has been made along the road to political union in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We have understood perfectly.

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — I am coming to an end. As regards the direct elections to the European Parliament, which Mr. de Bruyne welcomes, I would be far less hesitant in approving them if I felt that there was in Europe a true political will, especially a will for independence from the United States. In our area of concern, defence, such a will could be only expressed by saying "no" from time to time and, for a start, to the strategy imposed on NATO by the United States in the name of the "Schlesinger doctrine", whose inescapable result is to weaken the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons and to make warfare, whether conventional or nuclear, in the European theatre, less improbable.

Let no one tell us that a European Parliament will give spontaneous birth to a political will from the day on which it is elected by direct suffrage. There is nothing to prove this or indicate it, quite the reverse. France's allies in the Atlantic Alliance make little secret of the fact that it still is their purpose to bring it round to the orthodoxy of integrating its arms, strategy and defence policy in that of NATO. If France left NATO, it was not in order to revert to a situation in which it would, directly or indirectly, find itself reduced, by European institutions or by Atlantic institutions, to the status that it has rejected.

Therefore, granted that a parliamentary assembly, whose attributes and powers were very strictly limited to the application of the Treaties of Rome and of the ECSC might be elected by direct suffrage, it is only possible if the areas of competence essential to the sovereignty of States, notably foreign affairs and defence, remain excluded from the deliberations of such an assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — This is a speech you are making ; you are not explaining your vote any more.

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — It is, in fact, the fear of seeing Europe defined in areas over which the treaties have implied no abandonment by member States of their sovereignty that led me to abstain.

In the areas not covered by the treaties, I hold it to be essential that the political will which the European States may evince when their vital interests are at stake should not be limited or

Mr. Rivière (continued)

diminished. Now, the European Parliament might, once it was elected by direct suffrage, represent a European public opinion which has so far never been clearly demonstrated to exist.

These are the reasons that made me abstain in this vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Rivière, for not abusing my forbearance and that of our colleagues.

10. Changes in the membership of Committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is to appoint members of Committees in line with new delegations. Candidatures for membership of Committees were published as an appendix to Notice No. 7. The proposals are submitted to the Assembly in accordance with Rules 39(6) and 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure.

Are there any objections to the proposals?...

They are agreed to.

11. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting

tomorrow morning, Tuesday 30th November, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1977 (Document 717) ; Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1975 — the Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Document 715 and Addendum) ; Amendment of Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly (Document 716) (Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Documents 717, 715 and Addendum and 716).
2. Address by Mr. Taittinger, Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.
3. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 719 ; Address by Mr. Stavropoulos, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 5.45 p.m.)

EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 30th November 1976

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

Speakers: The President, Mr. Pecoraro.

2. Attendance Register.

3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1977 (Doc. 717); Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1975 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Doc. 715 and Addendum); Amendment of Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly (Doc. 716) (Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 717, 715 and Addendum and 716).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Dequae (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Page, Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Dequae.

4. Address by Mr. Taittinger, Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.

Speakers: The President, Mr. Taittinger (*Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*).

Replies by Mr. Taittinger to questions put by: Mr. de Bruyne, Mr. Radius, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Burckel, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. de Bruyne, Mr. Kliesing, Mr. Lewis.

5. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 719; Address by Mr. Stavropoulos, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Burckel (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stavropoulos (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece*).

Replies by Mr. Stavropoulos to questions put by: Mr. Schwencke, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Burckel, Mr. Channon.

Speakers: Mr. Roberti, Mr. Dankert.

6. Designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly (Motion for a Resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 727).

7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

I call Mr. Pecoraro.

Mr. PECORARO (*Italy*) (Translation). — I notice that in the Minutes of yesterday's sitting it is stated that Mr. Pecchioli's speech was made in the name of the Italian Delegation. I should like to qualify that statement. Mr. Pecchioli was, on the contrary, speaking only in the name of his own political group.

I should like this to be made plain to every member of the Assembly and the Chair.

Excuse me, it was my duty to make this clear.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — It was unnecessary to dot the "i"s and cross the "t"s, because everybody understood this. Mr. Pecoraro alone had some feelings about this misunderstanding, which I regret. A correction will be made to the Minutes.

Are there any other comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings ¹.

¹. See page 24.

3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1977

(Doc. 717)

Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1975 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts

(Doc. 715 and Addendum)

Amendment of Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly

(Doc. 716)

(Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 717, 715 and Addendum and 716)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and votes on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1977, Document 717, the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1975 — the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts, Document 715 and Addendum, and the amendment of Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly, Document 716.

I call Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. DEQUAE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — First of all, Mr President, I would like to say one or two words about the budget for next year. As we know, the total amount has risen from 6,559,000 French francs to 7,256,000, an increase of 10.63 %. Bearing in mind price rises and the inflation we are seeing everywhere, this is a very modest increase. It does, in fact, come about from this factor alone, for there is no wholly new expenditure, at least not such that the budget as a whole or past facilities for work would be affected. It is interesting to note that 60 % of the overall expenditure goes on staffing costs, while 20 % is spent on premises, equipment and the general overheads of normal activities ; 15 % goes on our Assembly, and the remaining 5 % is earmarked for sundry expenses. As you can see, it is impossible to reduce the budget further. Every effort has been made to keep outgoings as low as possible.

Secondly, there are the accounts, in which the seriousness with which the budget committee tackles its work is even more apparent. The financial year 1975 closed with a surplus of 556,000 francs, 54,000 of which resulted from increased revenue. I think, therefore, that our organisation must be one of the few that is not having to ask for supplementary funds, and in which instead there is a certain amount to be returned to the countries that have contributed.

Then, thirdly, there is the matter of altering the budgeting procedure, though this will not mean any basic changes. In the past it has been possible even after 31st March, after the end of the budget year, for there to be outgoings relating to that year. This was found inconvenient from the budgetary viewpoint, in that it made it difficult to close the books. It is now being proposed that 31st March be taken as the cut-off point for all expenditure, including that relating to the budget year, while equivalent amounts will be taken up in the new budget so that payments can be made. In fact, therefore, nothing will be changed apart from the internal budgeting method. The Committee has consequently adopted this proposal.

(The speaker continued in French)

Having dealt with the budgetary situation, my work should be over, but since Lord Selsdon, the Rapporteur for administrative matters, is away, I have to put to you a problem concerning the Assembly staff.

As you know, the Assembly has repeatedly during the last few years expressed concern at the dilatoriness with which the pensions scheme was being put into effect in the co-ordinated organisations.

I am pleased to say that the reservations made by a few governments have been lifted, and that the scheme can be put into effect in the very near future. The Council of Western European Union adopted the rules for the pension scheme at its meeting of 23rd November 1976. What still remains is for central management of the scheme in the five organisations concerned, which your Assembly has advocated on several occasions, to be put in hand without delay, since it is vital that the complex machinery that this will involve be planned and set up for the purpose.

It would be equally desirable for reversionary pensions to the widows of deceased staff to be extended as soon as possible to widowers whose wives have acquired pension rights. Such a step,

Mr. Dequae (continued)

which has been discussed by an Assembly Committee, would enable a large number of female staff to join the scheme without their membership creating for them a quandary that might dissuade them from joining.

As regards salaries, I am sorry to say that the review procedure that has applied for fifteen years should have been terminated without any new rules having been adopted. The Co-ordinating Committee is continuing to discuss the matter. Pending their findings, the cost of living, which has gone on rising steeply in most of the countries where staff are employed, renders it necessary for *ad hoc* measures to be adopted, without delay and without any qualifying condition, to adjust staff salaries, which are still based on the position as at 1st January 1976.

It would indeed be most unfair to make the staff of the co-ordinated organisations bear the consequences of a deficiency of regulations for which they are in no way responsible. A proposal had been made, pending the final rules, to grant them an advance, and I consider we should at least allow an advance against a final scheme to be set up by the end of the year.

It is unthinkable that staff should be left in insecurity, with their salaries frozen. Incidentally, I should inform the Assembly that the staff association is meeting on Friday, 3rd December, to consider the situation and the measures to be taken. Accordingly, I make bold to insist all the more that a decision be taken quickly, even if it is only a provisional one, to clear the situation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In the joint debate on the Committee's reports, I call Mr. Page.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). — It gives me very great pleasure to support the report of Mr. Dequae and also the financial resolution which he is putting forward. At this time of financial difficulty for all our countries, it is very important that our constituents and our governments should be certain that the money that comes to WEU is being well spent. The presence of Mr. Dequae, a man of great distinction in both the parliamentary world and the financial one, acts as a kind of guarantee to our countries that the money is being properly spent. We must all be grateful to him for the time which he devotes to the Assembly's budget.

Before turning in detail to the accounts I have to make a confession, one so shocking and so disgraceful that I hardly like to mention it in an Assembly such as this. I have to admit that I do not read every word of the documents, reports, summaries and other papers which are sent to me. This leads me to Head IV, Sub-Head 8, which shows that we spend Frs. 680,000 on the printing and publishing of Assembly documents, and to Sub-Head 17 of Head V, expenditure on information, Frs. 33,000. We spend more than twenty times as much on printing and publishing documents as we do on information. I wonder whether it would be right for the Presidential Committee to check that all documents sent to members are absolutely necessary. We might make a saving if it could be shown that economies were possible. If such a saving could be made, it might be worth while to spend some of it on information to the outside world on the activities of WEU. The efforts made by the secretariat for publicity purposes are creditable. Nevertheless, some of the money spent on the papers that find their way into our files and bookshelves might be better used to trumpet our activities abroad.

Mr. Dequae mentioned the decision taken only ten days ago on a pension scheme for our staff. This has been a long road for Mr. Dequae. He kindly mentioned our colleague, Lord Selsdon, who for many years has devoted his efforts to attempts to improve the pension arrangements which were, I think we have to say, quite inadequate for an organisation such as this. I am very glad that at last the co-ordinated organisations have decided to put forward a proper pension scheme. However, I should also like to underline what Mr. Dequae said. Of course, new procedures for salary reviews are being worked out, but an international organisation such as this is only as strong as its secretariat; this one has no home civil service base on which to rely for support. It is important that the words of Mr. Dequae be noted and that some kind of advance — which we all know is coming — should be made to our staff very soon. It would be a mistake if the Council were to hold back on this unnecessarily in the certain knowledge that an advance is to be made.

It gives me great pleasure to support Mr. Dequae in the draft budget presented to us this morning. (*Applause*)

Mr. HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to be allowed to speak, Mr President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Hawkins.

Mr. HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). — I shall try to be brief. I wish to raise two matters which concern merely the administrative side of these conferences. I have attended only two, but I find it very strange to have television cameramen wandering round the benches and among the members at the beginning of the session. I wonder whether that is a good thing. We are here to represent our voters and our countries and to get over the business of the Assembly as quickly as possible. I do not think it is conducive to business to have television cameras moving up and down our benches during sittings. That view may seem strange to some people who seem to have television cameras even at funerals and weddings these days, but I wish to mention it.

A second matter is that I should like some help for the secretary when votes are being counted. We may have more votes to count in the future, and yesterday things appeared to be a little chaotic. The secretary did not seem to have any help in identifying members and substitutes sitting in their various seats.

On expenditure, of course I support the report and I am very glad to hear of the long-awaited pension scheme for the staff. When we become more prosperous, I should like to see an allocation of expenditure to make it possible to join together the hemicycle and our rooms upstairs, so that we do not have to come down and then go up again. That seems to me a waste of time. I should like to support my friend Mr. Page in his view that the documents that are sent out seem to be far too numerous. I certainly do not read them all, and I am not ashamed to say so. I cannot do so because I have to read many documents of my own parliament, as have other members. We have far too many documents.

I believe that WEU is to be congratulated on usually getting its minutes out to members before the next meeting takes place. That is quite unlike the Council of Europe, which often sends us such documents a fortnight after meetings have taken place. This is the first time I have spoken in the hemicycle. I am sorry that I did not put my name down to speak, as I should have done. In making these disjointed remarks I should like to congratulate the Rapporteur and I support the report. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. DEQUAE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I should first like to reply to Mr. Page that the printing costs of assemblies are what might be termed the nightmare of their budgets. I would recall that, in my own country, we have broken the barrier of 100 million for printing costs. What is still more serious is the fact that, as you say — and you are one of the best members of this Assembly — a large proportion of these publications is never read and ends up in the wastepaper basket.

That is why we have for the past two years endeavoured not only to reduce costs by producing documents in one language only, but also to reduce the number of publications and even to eliminate some of them. This has evoked a number of remarks and caused some difficulties, but we have gone ahead.

I personally should be glad if these efforts could lead to releasing larger sums for information purposes. In any case, it was essential to have this squeeze on expenditure in order to keep the budget within the appropriations which the ministers of members countries are prepared to earmark for our Assembly. Perhaps this can be managed in the future. At all events I hope so.

Turning to Mr. Hawkins's remark, it rather surprises me. If, indeed, there is one type of information which "gets over" and which still has an impact today, it is certainly television. I am aware that one country is still allergic to the introduction of television in its parliamentary proceedings, but there are others where television is already accepted in practice, if not continually at least fairly regularly. It will be possible for this to be the subject of discussions which we must certainly hold one day in Committee in order to find out whether the Assembly of Western European Union really wants television's contribution to informing opinion or whether perhaps a majority does not accept it. The same remarks apply, moreover, to some practical questions which we shall consider and which we may possibly refer to the Committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anyone else wish to speak ?...

The debate is closed.

The Assembly will now vote first on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1977, Document 717, then on the motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1975 in the addendum to Document 715, and

The President (continued)

finally on the draft resolution to amend Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly, Document 716.

No amendment has been tabled to the draft budget of the Assembly for 1977.

If the Assembly is not unanimous, the vote on the draft budget as a whole will be taken by roll-call.

Are there any objections to the draft budget?...

Are there any abstentions?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for 1977 is adopted unanimously.

No amendment has been tabled to the motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for 1975 in the addendum to Document 715.

Are there any objections to this motion?...

Are there any abstentions?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

The motion is adopted unanimously.

No amendment has been tabled to the draft resolution to amend Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly, Document 716.

I put the draft resolution to the vote.

*The draft resolution is adopted unanimously*¹.

4. Address by Mr. Taittinger, Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now have the pleasure and the honour of hearing an address to be given from this rostrum by Mr. Pierre-Christian Taittinger, who represents in this House both the President of the Council of Ministers and France.

We shall be particularly interested in what he has to say, first, Mr. Minister, because our country's position here is often original and some clarification is needed both for our fellow countrymen and for all our partners in Western European Union.

In addition, we know that you have had a brilliant parliamentary career before attaining government office; this career means that you are in many ways one of us. I have much personal pleasure and the very great honour of calling you to address us.

Mr. TAITTINGER (*Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I first say how much I appreciate the words of welcome your President has just addressed to me. I see them as both a token of friendship and as a sign of your indulgence. I am appreciative of both.

I have not had the honour of taking part in your work in the past, but I have always followed its progress with very great interest, as I realised its quality and have very frequently had occasion to value the soundness and pertinence of your thinking both in the field of defence and in that of security. Consequently, I do not, now that I am among you, find myself on unfamiliar ground. I would add that my years of parliamentary life have made me share your anxiety to see better contacts established between the Assembly and the Council, for while it is for the latter to assume its obligations under the treaty, its decisions must be taken with the benefit of your judgment and your knowledge of the facts.

In this connection, joint meetings between the Council and your Committees are one way of establishing a confident collaboration between you and us. As the Council has informed you, I shall also have the pleasure on 26th April next of discussing matters with your General Affairs Committee and of replying to all the questions that its members may wish to put to the Council. In accordance with your wishes, this meeting will be held on a completely informal basis so as to make a fruitful exchange of ideas possible.

Need I repeat in this House that France attaches great importance both to the spirit and to the letter of the modified Brussels Treaty? Anxious that the treaty should not sink into obsolescence, France wishes to reaffirm strongly before you its permanence, its fundamental character.

It is in this spirit that we have, for instance, actively supported the proposal to reactivate the Standing Armaments Committee and, in doing so, have encouraged European co-operation on armaments. As you know, the Council of Min-

1. See page 25.

Mr. Taittinger (continued)

isters of Western European Union last month called on WEU's Standing Armaments Committee to prepare a detailed outline programme for a study on the situation of the armaments industries in member countries. The fact that the independent European programme group set up at the beginning of the year includes all the signatories of the WEU Treaty in its membership and has embarked on a programme of which certain aspects are analogous to the tasks entrusted to the Standing Armaments Committee in no way reduces the usefulness of the latter. What is essential, if duplication is to be avoided, is that the responsibilities of each should be defined.

So it is now up to the Standing Armaments Committee to give the Council of WEU the benefit of its preliminary thinking and to say just what it proposes to do on the basis of the mandate adopted last May by the Ministers.

We are awaiting the SAC's proposals with all the more interest since our governments must have at their disposal the fullest possible information before deciding on a real policy of co-operation. Such co-operation, as your Assembly knows, means something quite precise to the French Government: its purpose is that the States of Europe should jointly produce equipment that will meet their common needs; and it must evoke a real will to act as Europeans in a field where each of us has a major interest in safeguarding his own technological and industrial capacity.

It is in our view by endeavouring to comply with these desiderata that the colloquy on a European armaments policy which your Assembly is organising in Paris next March could make a useful contribution to the success of our efforts.

The mission entrusted to Western European Union is to consider the problems of security on our continent. France's position in this field is well known. Our Minister for Foreign Affairs has just restated them, on 9th November 1976, before our National Assembly and reaffirmed that "our defence effort is inseparable from our policy on détente, since they are the two elements that underpin our determination to remain independent". Mr. de Guiringaud also recalled that our defence policy is still based on the inalienable independence of our nuclear weapons, on the maintenance of our freedom of decision

with regard to the possible engagement of our forces, and on loyalty to our alliances.

You are aware of the efforts made by the French Government, despite the present economic difficulties, to maintain our defence budget at the requisite level, to ensure that we have our own deterrent capability, and so to contribute to the security of Europe. Such efforts must be continued, and will be continued, without giving way to certain pessimistic predictions, which we do not share, as to the extent and duration of American commitments on our continent. We must continually bear in mind, too, that the increased power and precision of nuclear weapons are leading to a growing vulnerability of the two superpowers and, as a corollary, a tendency on the part of each of them to keep its own territory from becoming a battlefield.

Our policy on détente goes hand in hand with our defence policy. Its purpose is to reduce progressively the risk of confrontation between blocs by encouraging contacts and exchanges between each of the States of our continent. We think of it as a continuous process allowing us to "overcome distrust and increase confidence", to substitute toleration for confrontation. We categorically reject any idea of blocs or spheres of influence, and any concept of a dominating power. We encourage dialogue between States, to be conducted with a strict respect for the sovereignty of each.

That is the spirit in which we took part in the conference on security and co-operation in Europe and signed the final act at Helsinki. Its provisions, as we see it, form a balanced whole; none of them, we feel, should be given preference or neglected. The act must be applied in its entirety and we shall have an opportunity of checking the record of its implementation at the coming meeting in Belgrade. We shall approach this meeting with no polemical motives in the back of our minds, but simply with a desire to encourage the implementation of all the provisions subscribed to by the thirty-five States which signed the act.

At the same time, we shall pursue our efforts to promote co-operation between each of the States on our continent. On this point you know the value that the French Government attaches to maintaining its bilateral relations with the countries of Eastern Europe.

We must also support the cause of disarmament, which at present is marking time discon-

Mr. Taittinger (continued)

certingly. Without underestimating the importance of the provisions concerning strategic arms control adopted by the two major superpowers, we cannot but recognise that we have made practically no progress towards a reduction in existing armaments either, or in the main stockpiles.

I would now turn to the unification of Europe, to which you have quite rightly given some consideration, and in particular to the question of European defence, to which you have devoted a good deal of useful and profitable thought. The practical implementation of this idea at the present stage of European development is, as you know, hardly to be contemplated. Besides, the formula is still rather ambiguous. It throws up complex problems with regard to the nuclear situation, the undertakings entered into within the framework of the Alliance, and the differing ways in which we interpret the implications of these undertakings. However, we would not exclude this as a future aim, and that is one of the reasons why we uphold the permanence of the WEU institutions and support the continuation of its work, which thus makes an essential contribution towards thinking on the unification of Europe.

Our approach to European union must, in fact, be methodical. The Community, to which all our States belong, must first devote itself to maintaining and developing what has been achieved by the Community. Nothing would in fact be served by stepping up the number of joint declarations in this or that field or by stating that we intend to speak with one voice as often as possible, if we then allow the joint policies embarked upon since 1960 to stagnate and fall apart. We must at the same time widen the scope of the treaties, particularly in the field of economic and monetary union; we must encourage a greater dovetailing of the policies pursued by member States and have more concerted action in the field of intergovernmental co-operation. I would remind you that at this very moment the President of the Republic and the Minister for Foreign Affairs are emphasising and reaffirming in the European Council at The Hague the abiding importance that we attach to a progressive and orderly approach to European union.

Your Assembly is all the more able to understand our preoccupations since it has shown its concern, in your reports, at the slow progress

being made in the effective introduction of common European policies. However, your responsibilities — whether they be national or European — make you particularly mindful of existing disparities, the difficulties of joint action and the need to proceed by stages in a pragmatic manner, without seeking to take on too much.

This must make abundantly clear the importance we attach to the particular framework provided by WEU, which constitutes a perfect forum for raising questions on security and defence in Europe and which must ensure application of the revised Brussels Treaty and pursue, in its own particular field, the important task of concerting our efforts, reflecting on our problems and formulating proposals. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Minister, for your particularly constructive contribution to our proceedings. You have agreed to answer any questions that may be asked by the members of the Assembly.

I call Mr. de Bruyne of the Volksunie, Belgium.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, I should first like to ask you a question which follows on logically from the draft recommendation which the Assembly adopted yesterday at its afternoon sitting. It seems, Mr. Minister, that it was decided at the last meeting of the Rome group — in other words, the European programme group — a week ago, to co-ordinate the activities of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee and those of the Rome group. Could you give us any detailed information on this subject?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Minister, do you wish to answer question by question, or would you prefer to reply to the questions put to you all together?

Mr. TAITTINGER (*Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — I am at the Assembly's disposal.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We are at yours. But if you are willing to answer now, we can take the questions one by one.

Mr. TAITTINGER (*Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — I thank Mr. de Bruyne for his question and in reply tell him that the independent European programme group which was set up a year ago and combines

Mr. Taittinger (continued)

all the European members of the Atlantic Alliance has embarked upon a programme certain aspects of which present analogies with the task devolving upon the SAC. Faced with this situation, it is accordingly natural that we should specify the responsibilities of each in order to avoid a multiplication of bodies leading to duplication.

The basic aim of the independent European programme group is to study specific co-operation programmes. It was with this in mind that the independent European programme group set out to collect and analyse information relating to national armaments plans, which has enabled a number of areas for technological co-operation to be identified. In each of the fields deemed to be promising a group of experts has been set up to determine the real chances of working out joint projects involving several partners. And I must tell Mr. de Bruyne that several groups of the kind have already been constituted.

The possible implementation of joint programmes may involve a number of related problems bearing on the economies of the armaments industries. The group has turned its attention to the matter and instructed a number of sub-groups to deal with it. Even if the fields to be explored in the framework of the independent European programme group present some analogies with those which the SAC will be called upon to study, duplication will be avoided by co-ordinating the work.

It has been agreed that the group would, in its own studies, take into account those being carried out by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee. As a matter of fact, I believe it may be affirmed that overlapping should be all the easier to avoid because, as you noted in your report on European union and WEU, the work of these two bodies is not conducted on the same plane. The study which the SAC has been asked to carry out is more of an economic and legal nature than a military one, and differs from that of the European programme group, which is directed towards the implementation of concrete projects for equipping the armed forces.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Radius, UDR, France.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, the French Government has several

times had occasion to define a Mediterranean policy to the effect that the region's problems should in the first instance be settled by the countries bordering on the Mediterranean, without any outside interference.

To what extent can such a policy, whose aim it is virtually to turn the Mediterranean into a lake of peace, be integrated into a common approach by the countries of Western Europe?

Does the Minister consider that the Mediterranean policy upon which the European Economic Community has embarked takes due account of French preoccupations?

Lastly, does he deem it possible to extend the Community's Mediterranean policy which seems to have been guided hitherto only by purely economic and commercial considerations, to cover co-operation in the political sphere and perhaps also in that of security?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Secretary of State.

Mr. TAITTINGER (*Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like to reply to Mr. Radius, who has raised a very important point whose significance will not have escaped any of my WEU audience.

I would like to say that this Mediterranean policy should be considered from two standpoints: defence and détente. France is very attentive to anything that might weaken defence arrangements in the Mediterranean area, and I would remind Mr. Radius that the French Government has demonstrated this by bringing our Atlantic fleet into the Mediterranean.

We also believe that problems of détente affect the Mediterranean; in other words, we hope that the process of improving relations between East and West which has, as we must be glad to recognise, created an atmosphere of reduced tension in Europe, may have comparable results in the Mediterranean. In this area, however, it has to be admitted that the absence of any settlement in the Middle East, the rivalries between the two biggest powers and their intensive political and military activities, have kept tension at a high level. It is the French Government's hope that this situation will gradually simmer down and, in particular, that the Mediterranean littoral States may be enabled to decide their own fate and political allegiance in full freedom, and without waiting upon the decisions of the super-powers.

Mr. Taittinger (continued)

We, for our part, hope to maintain friendly relations with all the Mediterranean States, whatever their domestic arrangements or foreign policies may be. We also favour, and on this point I am entirely with you, the development of relations between all these countries, and the European Economic Community — this will be my answer to your question — in the context of a comprehensive approach which was originally, let me remind you, a French proposal.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I have no bright afterthoughts to offer; I found your reply to Mr. Radius extremely interesting, and perhaps you will allow me to explain our preoccupations in this Mediterranean area.

Could you give us some reasons for this recent movement of French warships, with a considerable combined fire-power, from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean area? Can this decision be explained by the need to improve the defence system of Europe as such in the Mediterranean at a time when the NATO structures seem to be losing some of their effectiveness, either because of the attitudes and difficulties of the Greek and Turkish Governments, or possibly also because of the United States power vacuum before President Carter takes over the reins of government, just when the growing Soviet threat in the Mediterranean is being confirmed?

So now a supplementary question. Do you, Mr. Minister, as a representative of the French Government, which was a signatory to the 1936 Montreux Convention, consider that the recent passage of Soviet aircraft-carriers through the Dardanelles Straits constitutes a violation of the convention? And would you perhaps think it necessary for the European signatories of the Montreux Convention to hold consultations with a view to ensuring its effective application?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Secretary of State.

Mr. TAITTINGER (*Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — I should like to answer both the questions asked by Mr. Valleix. With regard to France's position and the reason for the presence of the French fleet in the Mediterranean, the reason is that we considered that there was a problem of international tension

there, and that it was not right to see the two superpowers making a major demonstration of naval strength whereas they were not directly concerned in the region. It was entirely proper for France, with its responsibilities in the Mediterranean, to assert its military, and especially naval, presence in the threatened sector.

Moreover, the interpretation of the treaty referred to does leave room for argument, and observations were addressed at the appropriate time to some of the countries concerned. In this respect, I share your expressions of concern, for such action did not conform with the spirit of the treaty signed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Burckel, UDR, France.

Mr. BURCKEL (*France*) (Translation). — It emerged in the General Affairs Committee that the economic and trading advantages conferred by the European Economic Community on a number of Mediterranean countries were greater than those accorded to Turkey, and this has helped to produce a deficit in Turkey's trade with the EEC to an extent which we consider exaggerated, thus impeding the functioning of Turkey's association with the European Economic Community.

Does the Minister deem it desirable that the Community should give priority to a policy of association with a country which intends to accede to it at a later date, or does he think it desirable to give priority to the requirements of an overall Mediterranean policy?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Secretary of State.

Mr. TAITTINGER (*Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — I think that this question would be more appropriately addressed to the European Economic Community than to WEU. My answer to Mr. Burckel is this: I believe that it would not be the right approach to try and draw invidious comparisons between one country and another, or give credence to the belief that one party was more favoured than the other. I believe that the Community's policy should be viewed realistically and as a whole and encouraged to strike a proper balance among all the powers and all the countries concerned in these agreements.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Jessel, Conservative, United Kingdom.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). — From the translation, I understood the Secretary of State to say that a united European defence policy was hardly possible. Is that what he meant? Is he willing to enlarge upon that?

Mr. TAITTINGER (*Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — Not the slightest doubt or the least ambiguity should be allowed to exist on this point. The problem is not one of being impossible. The question is not an immediate issue, for the reasons which Mr. Jessel recognises and which have been brought up on various occasions. I would refer Mr. Jessel to the statement made on this very point a short while ago by the President of the French Republic, who put the problem in its true perspective.

The problem is not, I repeat, one of impossibility, but a problem of circumstances, linked with a certain number of difficulties or obstacles to be overcome, which are well known.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Cermolacce.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — The member States of the Warsaw Pact met recently in Bucharest, and some proposals have been published.

I should like to ask the Secretary of State for his opinion on certain of these proposals, particularly on the need for the thirty-five States signatories to the final act at Helsinki to undertake that they will not be the first to use the nuclear weapon, and secondly, on the desirability that the two major alliances which at present divide up Europe should abstain from any increase in the number of their members. Do they not intend to work towards the simultaneous dissolution of the Atlantic Pact and the Warsaw Pact, as has been proposed?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Secretary of State.

Mr. TAITTINGER (*Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — On the first point, my reply to Mr. Cermolacce is that we have not yet studied the resolutions that were signed at Bucharest. The matter needs thinking over, and we shall make our position known when we have seen what these proposals are.

On the second point, it is really quite astonishing that the various security systems should be called in question, and that there should be a

proposal for the dissolution of all military blocs and equipment. This goes far beyond what was accepted at Helsinki by the thirty-five powers which took part in the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

With regard to the Warsaw Pact and security matters, I would remind you of the French position on MBFR. Although we did not take part in these negotiations, our reason for not doing so was a very simple one which links up with the concern that you have expressed. Far from correcting the imbalance between forces in Europe, these negotiations might perpetuate or, worse still, aggravate it. If anyone doubts this, he need only look at a map.

Besides, negotiations of this sort could lead to a special-status zone being created in the centre of Europe, which might compromise even further the balance of forces and affect the process of détente, inasmuch as this balance is a *sine qua non* of détente. That is just a matter of common sense. Before telling you what we think of the Bucharest declarations, I wanted to remind you of this position, which reflects our convictions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Bruyne.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — The WEU Council has on several occasions refused to hold a joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee in accordance with the procedure proposed by the Council itself and accepted by the Assembly. Instead, it has suggested an informal meeting over a lunch.

Can you, as Chairman-in-Office of the Council, tell me whether it is because of the procedure governing joint meetings or whether it is the questions put by the General Affairs Committee that have led the Council to refuse the requests repeatedly made to it?

Then can you, as a French Minister, tell me what questions France, for its part, would be prepared to tackle at a joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. TAITTINGER (*Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — I would say to Mr. de Bruyne that we like the idea of joint meetings on an informal basis and our experience with them has demonstrated the advantages of this approach. That is why the Council, far from

Mr. Taittinger (continued)

rejecting the idea of a joint meeting with your General Affairs Committee, approved it in principle and suggested that it should take the form of a working lunch at which replies could be given far more freely to any questions that your Committee might want to put and at which a fruitful dialogue could be conducted. That shows that we agree to the meeting. We suggested this procedure only because we find it more informal, more relaxed, and feel that it allows of the most effective discussion.

In choosing the 26th April, a date coinciding with a meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers, the Council wished to show how great was the importance it attached to the meeting with your Committee. In his letter of 23rd November, the acting Secretary-General of WEU confirmed the Council's plan to hold this meeting on 26th April next.

The procedure is, in my opinion, a simple one which can be both effective and realistic and which, should it produce results of the kind we can really hope for, would be worth developing. In any event, it complies with your wishes.

Informal meetings allow all topics to be tackled quite frankly without any need for drawing up a precise agenda and make it possible to comment on various matters in a relaxed fashion. This discussion round the table should meet both your needs and those of the Council.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Kliesing.

Mr. KLIESING (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — The Minister has said that governments were reflecting on the recent offer by the Warsaw Pact. My question is as follows: would such reflection not have a better chance of leading to a positive result if the Warsaw Pact had not only renounced a first strike with nuclear weapons but had agreed not to strike first with conventional weapons? On the basis of the present proposals of the Warsaw Pact one cannot but gain the impression that the Soviet Union, relying on its superior conventional weapons, is reserving the right to strike first with these conventional weapons.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. TAITTINGER (*Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French*

Republic) (Translation). — Mr. Kliesing is quite right. He has very neatly both put the question and answered it.

The time is not yet ripe for us to go into these proposals. The ideal, of course, would be to renounce the use not only of nuclear weapons but also of conventional weapons. The desire for peace cannot be translated into reality by selecting this or that type of weapon, but only by a determination to achieve peace. I believe that the détente which would spring from a genuine disarmament would be far more useful to the cause of peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Lewis.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — I intervene because of the Minister's last reply. Is it not the case that in every country in the world, both East and West, the industry which is the best organised and most profitable is that of armaments? Would not the Minister agree that these industrialists and military people in general have a vested interest in keeping militarism going?

Professor Parkinson formulated a law describing how bureaucracy builds up and keeps its jobs going. Is it not the case that, once we try to reduce armaments, these people will not wish to see their well-paid jobs come to an end, in either East or West? Once we can break down the bureaucracy of the military machine, we might see a reduction in armaments and defence spending. But, believe me, both East and West have a vested interest in keeping this most profitable and worldwide industry going, because it is good for business. Does the Minister agree?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. TAITTINGER (*Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — My honourable friend is of course entitled to his own opinions on the general attitude of those who have responsibilities in the field of armaments policy. What we must all try for is a policy of complete and total disarmament, and till we have this we must not be satisfied with deceptive appearances.

A policy of total disarmament extending to both nuclear and conventional arms must be the ambition not only of an Assembly such as yours but of our countries and our generation.

Mr. Taittinger (continued)

Here too, however, there are problems that go beyond the interests of those who, in the East and in the West, produce armaments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Minister, I believe I speak for the whole of this Assembly in repeating our thanks. Your participation in our work both through your address and in your replies, which were particularly to the point and at times very clever, has made a great contribution to this session. We shall remember it. Once again, Mr. Minister, my congratulations and thank you. (*Applause*)

5. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 719; Address by Mr. Stavropoulos, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems, Document 719.

I call Mr. Burckel, the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. BURCKEL (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the General Affairs Committee decided to undertake a wide-ranging study on the policy of Western European Union towards Mediterranean problems, but I personally was only instructed to deal with problems of the Eastern Mediterranean, a report on problems affecting the Western Mediterranean being assigned to another Rapporteur, Mr. Mendelson. However, the latter was, for reasons quite beyond his control, unable to present his report during the present session, but it will remain on the Assembly's register for the 1977 session. For this reason I shall today be presenting to you only what was to have been the first part of the General Affairs Committee's report, that dealing with the Eastern Mediterranean. We should no doubt be glad of this, inasmuch as recent events in Spain should enable the next Rapporteur to present a particularly interesting document.

If now we turn our eyes towards the Mediterranean, we have to admit that, although the distances which separate it from the countries

of Western European Union are relatively great, it still plays a rôle essential to their interests: for one thing, because it is strategically the key to the defence of Europe's southern flank and, for another, because a large proportion of Europe's oil supplies come from its shores. The recent reopening of the Suez Canal and the project for deepening the channel should enhance its importance during years to come. Now, the Eastern Mediterranean represents a weak link in the western defence system. Indeed — and we were reminded of this a few moments ago — a Soviet squadron whose size has been considerably augmented during the past few years, will now be sailing in Mediterranean waters. For a few months in 1976, it was reinforced by a Soviet aircraft-carrier, and the information in our possession on naval construction in the USSR leads us to believe that in the next few years several more will be added, to lend it even more powerful air support.

No doubt, it is not so much a direct attack by the Soviet Union on one or other of the countries bordering on the Mediterranean which is to be feared, as the possibility it now has of exploiting all the elements of political instability that arise in the Mediterranean coastal States, and thus of provoking a political and military escalation whose full extent nobody can foresee.

Obviously such instability primarily concerns the region occupied by Israel and its neighbouring countries. During the current year, Lebanon has been the focus of our misgivings for international peace. But so long as peace has not been restored between Israel and the Arab countries, there will be a standing menace, and unrelieved tensions to tempt the great powers to intervene, possibly with the most praiseworthy and peaceful intentions, but with unpredictable effects.

Before turning to the next point in my report, with reference more specifically to relations between Greece and Turkey, I should like here to spare a pious thought for the victims of the latest earthquake in Turkey and to express my very deep sympathy to the Turkish Government, compelled once again to face up to a catastrophe we could all afford to have done without. May I also be allowed to place on record the humanitarian gesture made by Greece in springing spontaneously to the aid of the survivors of the disaster; such a gesture, natural in other circumstances, deserves special mention in the present state of Greco-Turkish relations; certainly, in my eyes, it was in keeping with

Mr. Burckel (continued)

the concern to find a solution to the problems confronting the two countries and for me is a symbol of hope; I personally look to the future with confidence.

If I have devoted a lot of space to Greco-Turkish relations, it is partly because the General Affairs Committee has had the opportunity of travelling to Greece and Turkey and been able to bring back particularly important and interesting information in this context, and partly because Greece is in process of acceding to the European Community, while Turkey, which is an associated member, likewise intends to seek full membership. Consequently, relations between Greece and Turkey are one of the problems that vitally concern Western Europe.

In this connection, I should like to express my warmest thanks to the Greek and Turkish authorities for their exceeding kindness in providing your Rapporteur with assistance that proved quite invaluable. Indeed, both countries received the Committee in October and in the course of its visit supplied it with a great deal of varied and specific information on the way in which they view the problem of their mutual relations and each one's relations with Western Europe on the one hand and with the Atlantic Alliance on the other.

I might add that the meetings which the WEU parliamentarians were able to hold with their Greek and Turkish colleagues on this occasion were extremely valuable, because they gave us a clear picture of the way in which public opinion in the two countries was reacting to the questions dealt with in this report.

Needless to say, the working paper which formed the basis of the Committee's enquiries in Greece and Turkey had to be fundamentally recast as a result of the visit. It was also amended as a result of the help given by the Greek and Turkish Governments to the Rapporteur in sending him extremely precise memoranda containing comments on his working paper.

I have paid the greatest possible heed to the remarks conveyed to me by the Greek authorities.

So far as the memorandum transmitted to me by the Turkish Government is concerned, it unfortunately arrived after your General Affairs Committee had adopted this report. As a result, I was unable to write it into the record, but

a number of the comments which it contained were already familiar to me and, as regards the remainder, I reserve the right to convey to you in this introductory statement those I have considered most relevant to our purpose.

I have endeavoured to be as objective as possible about the conflict between Greece and Turkey.

I know that it is impossible in such an intricate matter to achieve perfect and total objectivity. I have accordingly striven, wherever controversial questions were at issue, to present side by side the views I had listened to in Athens and in Ankara, as I understand them.

I did not do this solely out of concern to remain neutral. I did it, above all, because it seemed to me equally useful to both parties and especially in cooling down emotions, that the views and fears of both should be clearly set forth. It seemed to me, in fact, that they were less divergent and above all less incompatible than might have appeared to someone who had not had the advantage of taking part in the long talks we were able to hold with both our Greek and our Turkish partners. I trust that this method of approach will have paid dividends.

I have, moreover, endeavoured to leave out of this report any recriminations about the past, because probably no compromise is possible in interpreting it, and also because it is an area in which there is no use in being in the right. I have, though, attempted to describe the two main elements in the dispute between Greece and Turkey: the conflict in Cyprus and its flare-ups since summer 1974, and the disagreements about the Aegean.

Those who have read the report — and I think there are enough who have — will see that, so far as Cyprus is concerned, no basic divergences exist between the Greek and Turkish standpoints. Greece has given up the idea of Enosis, and Turkey does not envisage annexing the part of the island at present occupied by its forces. The memorandum addressed to me by the Turkish Government states that "it does not favour partition... the Turkish position to promote a federation of the two regions has been consistently maintained and remains unshaken." In February 1975, the Turkish Cypriots proclaimed a "federated State". It was, however, stipulated that this was without prejudice to the ultimate political solution: the Turkish Federal State in Cyprus would constitute the Turkish Cypriot

Mr. Burckel (continued)

wing of the future Republic of Cyprus. Thus the two countries agree in considering that Cyprus should constitute an independent State, which should be given a constitution that would guarantee a sufficiently large degree of autonomy for each of the two ethnic groups. The main points at issue are the demarcation line, the island's constitutional status and allowing refugees to return to their former homes. These are of importance, but do not affect the basic principles which all the quarrel is about; and there are every grounds for hoping that negotiations between the two communities will succeed in resolving them.

With regard to the Aegean we shall leave aside the question of militarisation of the islands or the stationing of a Turkish army on the coast of Anatolia, for it seems to me that these are a consequence and not a cause of the crisis. Similarly, the question of a possible extension of Greek territorial waters around the islands has not been raised by the Greek Government and, although the Turkish Government has let it be known that it would find this unacceptable there is no need to waste more words on what is not a live issue.

The two points at issue are the apportionment of the continental shelf between Greece and Turkey and, correlatively, the resumption of overflights in the Aegean air-space. Since the report was drafted, extremely encouraging news has reached us on the progress of negotiations between Greece and Turkey on both points.

Negotiations about the air routes are proceeding in Paris. For the continental shelf, the negotiations being conducted in Brussels have already yielded measurable results, a committee having been set up to consider the principles on which a division can be made, and the two countries having mutually undertaken to take no steps that might prejudice the results of the negotiations as a whole.

I should like to stress that these results exactly correspond to the direction in which the General Affairs Committee wished relations between Greece and Turkey to move, taking the view that the main need was for the two countries to reach agreement without the intervention of third powers on the problems on which they are at odds. We may already say that such an agreement seems to be on the way.

With regard to the applications of Greece and Turkey for accession to the European Community the position appears to be satisfactory, in the case of Greece, in that active negotiations have begun thanks, it needs to be said, to the determination of the nine governments of the member countries which have, with the agreement of the Greek Government, decided to speed up the accession procedure.

In the case of Turkey, the position is far less satisfactory. Indeed, its association agreement with the EEC is having to contend with a number of difficulties which have caused the Turkish Government to wonder, not without some justification, whether the Nine were doing all they could to overcome them.

Among these, let me mention three vital matters: firstly, the inadequacy of investments by EEC countries in Turkey. In this connection, the Turkish authorities have informed me that, in their view, the 50 % share of investments in their country attributed to the EEC in paragraph 74 of the report was greatly exaggerated. I take due note of the criticism.

Secondly, the economic recession in Western Europe during the past few years has led our countries to restrict the numbers of Turkish immigrant workers their industry was prepared to accept, which has meant for Turkey a considerable loss of potential earnings of foreign exchange. The fact remains, too, that the conditions for the reception of these workers in the European countries are not always of a standard which Turkey would be entitled to look for. On this point, it seems to me that the Nine should take specific steps.

Lastly, the multiplication of agreements between the EEC and other Mediterranean countries, which are Turkey's competitors in markets for agricultural produce, has injured Turkey's exports to Europe and is helping to produce an unduly heavy deficit on the Turkish balance of payments.

It is no use holding out a prospect of future accession to the European Communities for Turkey, albeit our countries are committed to doing so, unless they are first determined to surmount the difficulties besetting Turkey's association.

If we now enquire into the consequences on WEU policy of tension between Greece and Turkey and of both countries' relations with the European Community, we must first hope for a full and speedy reconciliation between the

Mr. Burckel (continued)

two. This is essential to the development of normal relations between the EEC member States and the associated countries, and to European security.

Secondly, we have to admit that the wish expressed by the Turkish Government to enjoy equal treatment to that accorded the Greek Government in its relations with the European Community in the political and military spheres is broadly justified. Turkish determination to participate fully in the activities of the western world has been consistently upheld ever since Ataturk's revolution and it would be contrary to Western Europe's vaunted ethical standards and to our countries' economic, political and military interests to discourage a resolve which has been so unswervingly demonstrated.

So far as WEU is more specifically concerned, the overtures to Greece and Turkey may assume extremely varied forms. Just as the WEU Council served for a number of years as a link between the United Kingdom and Europe of the Six, it could, if necessary, play a similar rôle in relations between Greece, Turkey and their partners, should both countries evince the desire that it do so.

What is more, inasmuch as Greece and Turkey are likely in the near future to be integrated in the European Economic Community, it would be incomprehensible for their defence not to be integrated with that of their partners. Western European Union is the natural military extension of institutional Europe. Some will object that, so long as tension between Greece and Turkey subsists, the addition of one or other to the Brussels Treaty would be difficult in the light of Article V of the treaty, which provides for reciprocal aid in the event of attack.

This leads me to repeat on the subject of defence what I said about the economy. The dispute between Greece and Turkey, genuine though it is, should be viewed in its proper proportion, compared with the future awaiting them upon integration in Europe. Everything militates in favour of the voice of reason making itself heard and of conciliation finally triumphing. That should be the wish of all Europeans.

In the immediate prospect, and without their accession to the modified Brussels Treaty being necessary, two steps would be possible: one would be to invite Greece and Turkey to parti-

cipate in the work of the Standing Armaments Committee, in particular in the study which it has been instructed to carry out of the European armaments industries. That might constitute the first stage in co-operation between Greece, Turkey and Western Europe in the defence field, and would present no legal difficulty, since Greece and Turkey alike are members of the Atlantic Alliance and the remit of the Standing Armaments Committee is not restricted to signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty.

Another possibility would be having a standing arrangement for Greek and Turkish parliamentarians to attend the proceedings of our Assembly. Observers from Greece and Turkey have on several occasions been invited to take part in our sessions. We have with us today two Greek and two Turkish Representatives, and we have all greatly appreciated their contribution to our proceedings at the last few sessions.

The General Affairs Committee has discussed the matter and has decided to leave it to the initiative of its members to present a draft resolution for giving a permanent status to the Greek and Turkish observers. Accordingly, I and a number of my colleagues have tabled the motion for a resolution to be distributed in a few moments. The question is whether the internal problems of our organisation and the technical difficulties which may be entailed in establishing a standing group of observers should outweigh the political will, which, I am convinced, most of us share, to associate Greece and Turkey as closely as possible with our activities.

Such is the problem which constitutes the main gist of the report. The other questions affecting the Eastern Mediterranean are only more briefly touched on here, because there is a broad consensus among the seven member countries of WEU for the restoration of peace between Israel and its neighbours and towards the Lebanon problem.

Although the unanimous will of the member countries of WEU to re-establish peace in the Eastern Mediterranean and, through the medium of the European Economic Community, to help in its regional development has been a definite success in the economic sphere, it has perhaps been too much inclined towards non-involvement in the political sphere.

Admittedly, in the case of Lebanon, non-involvement has enabled the contending parties finally to arrive at an outline solution under the auspices of the Arab League.

Mr. Burckel (continued)

What has proved possible in the instance I have just mentioned should also be possible elsewhere, with the European countries helping to put an end to the other existing conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean.

So, it is principally, in my view, upon the question of our relations with Greece and Turkey that the WEU parliamentarians are now invited to take a stand. The formulations proposed in the report which I have the honour to present today on behalf of the General Affairs Committee are, I think, both balanced and reasonable, and at the same time calculated to advance the cause of Europe in the field for which we are responsible. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We are now to hear an address by Mr. Constantine Stavropoulos, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece.

Mr. Secretary of State, we know you well, since you are a colleague of ours at the Council of Europe. We have already had occasion to discuss a number of your country's special problems with you. We are aware of the interest with which you follow our work and we welcome your presence amongst us. Your contribution will be most useful in our subsequent debates.

I would ask you, Mr. Stavropoulos, kindly to come to the rostrum.

You have told us that, like Mr. Taittinger, you are willing to answer questions put to you by members of the Assembly.

Mr. STAVROPOULOS (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece*). — I thank you for your kind words, Mr. President. I must say that this is not exactly like Strasbourg. I like the atmosphere very much.

I should like to thank Mr. Burckel, for three reasons: first, for his kind words about our reaction to the Turkish catastrophe. We have been friendly with the Turks. We can be friendly with the Turks, if the spirit of Kemal prevails, as we hope that it will one day. We are very glad that Mr. Burckel made his remarks.

I also thank Mr. Burckel for his excellent effort in his report. We may not agree on every single word, but on the whole it is a magnificent effort and I congratulate him on it. He seems to see everything clearly and in a practical manner. The same applies to his pertinent re-

marks today. Indeed, it was a pleasure to hear him.

I am grateful to you, Mr. President, for the opportunity you have offered me to address such a distinguished audience. In my country, Western European Union is considered a major factor in the process of creating a united Europe, with which we have the ambition to be incorporated in the not very distant future, as you are certainly aware.

I am glad to see among the items to be discussed at the present session of your organisation the subject of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. You no doubt realise our particular interest in any development in this part of the world, which is precisely the area to which my country belongs.

I do not intend to proceed to a detailed exposé of the situation in that area. Especially after the recent developments in Lebanon, the situation appears so entangled that one could hardly risk any realistic appraisals, let alone any forecasts for the future. Let us simply hope.

I should like to tell you that, in my opinion, the Mediterranean and the countries adjacent to its southern and eastern shores could not possibly be considered as alien to the fortunes of Europe. A crisis in the Mediterranean, and especially in its eastern basin, would inevitably influence the situation of our continent. A conflagration in this area could jump to the European mainland, the more so in view of the actual massive presence of the superpowers in that area. Détente should by now be considered as indivisible in both those major areas of the eastern hemisphere.

In view of such assessments you have, I believe, a very good reason not only to follow closely developments in the Eastern Mediterranean but to use your friendly influence and contribute as best you can to a settlement of disputes and a lessening of the tensions which poison the atmosphere in that area. I do not disregard the decisive rôle of the superpowers in this connection but I believe that Europe also possesses now both the authority and the possibility to contribute to a considerable degree in the task of creating a situation of peace and security which it has every interest to bring about. To my mind, the best means to attain this goal is to establish between those countries and Europe the closest possible contacts in all fields and all aspects of activity. They should be made to feel that Europe is close to them and that if they do not constitute an integral part of

Mr. Stavropoulos (continued)

Europe they are at least its closest neighbours. Such a feeling will help them to expand their horizons and overcome the complex differences that divide them today.

I am glad of the opportunity to comment briefly on certain points in Mr. Burckel's report on the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Secondly, let me commend the Rapporteur and all the members of the General Affairs Committee on their active interest in the problems besetting our region. It is a region which I dare say is of vital importance not only to Western European Union as such but to all the countries interested in the maintenance of peace and security. We were very happy to receive those countries in Athens last fall, and we tried to the best of our ability to answer the pointed and searching questions which they asked of the Greek Government and of the elected representatives of the Greek people.

Let me state that no country is more interested than Greece in the restoration of stable conditions in the Eastern Mediterranean. No country is more dedicated than my own to the ideals of European co-operation in peace and honour, as witness our active participation in the conference on European security and co-operation and our application for full membership of the European Communities. However, believing in peace means believing in its indivisibility. Believing in détente and in the principles to which all of us subscribed in the final act of Helsinki also means rejecting their selective implementation.

Of these beliefs Greece has given tangible proof in the last two years since democracy was at long last restored to its birthplace after seven years of unlamented totalitarian rule. Thus, not later than last summer, Greece showed commendable restraint in the face of extreme provocation, while only two years ago, mainly through the statesmanship and moderation of Prime Minister Karamanlis, a major and possibly disastrous confrontation was avoided over Cyprus.

In his report, Mr. Burckel mentions the Cyprus crisis of 1974 as one of three main contributory factors in the present instability in the Eastern Mediterranean, the other two being the dispute over the Aegean continental shelf and the recent and tragic events in Lebanon.

We are deeply concerned over the situation in Cyprus, a situation which is the result of the Turkish invasion in 1974. As Mr. Burckel rightly points out, almost 40 % of the territory of the republic is occupied by Turkish forces, while 70 % of the economic resources are at the disposal of the 18 % Turkish-Cypriot community. To that we must add that one-third of the island's population is reduced to the status of refugees in their own country.

However, in spite of the obligation undertaken under the agreements reached at the third round of the intercommunal talks in Vienna in August 1975, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership continues, through various means, every day to press Greek-Cypriots who are enclaved in the occupied areas into leaving their homes and taking refuge in the south. This is, of course, an intolerable situation for the Cypriot Government. In his report of 30th October 1976, the Secretary-General of the United Nations underlines that the conditions of the Greek Cypriots in the north continue to be a cause for serious concern. He also mentions that, of a Greek-Cypriot population of about 9,000 at the time of that agreement, 4,817 remained in the occupied north as of mid-October 1976. Today the number is fewer than that. If the virtual expulsion of enclaved Greek-Cypriots from the occupied areas continues at the present rate of thirty per day, no Greek-Cypriot will be left in that area by May 1977.

As for the colonisation of the occupied areas by mainland Turks, it may be of interest to mention that the relevant information published in *Le Monde* on 3rd and 4th September 1976 is confirmed by several other reliable sources. Among these, the Turkish ones are of particular importance. Thus, in the weekly Turkish magazine *Yanki* of 27th September to 3rd October 1976, it is said that "the answer of Ankara to accusations concerning efforts aimed at changing the demographic structure on the island is that the Turkish-Cypriot areas need workers. This need can be satisfied either on a seasonal basis or in the long run. It is not certain that people going from Turkey to Cyprus will remain permanently in the island. But this can also happen".

The Turkish invasion of Cyprus was carried out under the sign of the Turkish minority on the island. But surely the situation that I have just outlined, a situation brought about by force of arms, is neither necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of the Turkish-Cypriot population nor conducive to a lasting settlement,

Mr. Stavropoulos (continued)

since it is based on violence and inequity. Neither can it be justified under the terms of the 1960 treaty of guarantee, which aimed at the preservation of the basic features of the 1960 constitution, every provision of which was violated by the Turkish intervention. The Turkish argument is that the invasion has created a new situation, but, even so, a permanent settlement can still be found only through negotiations and can be based only on the free will of the two communities living in Cyprus. This has not been the case to date.

Mr. President, no progress has been made towards achieving a peaceful, just and viable solution of the Cyprus question. The Turkish side has completely disregarded all relevant resolutions of both the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations. For our part, we support intercommunal talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations as a means of reaching a solution.

Up to now the Turkish side has persistently refused to submit concrete proposals on the territorial aspect, which in our view constitutes the key to the problem, for it is difficult to see how 80 % of the population can be confined to 60 % of the territory and to 30 % of the resources of the island and still manage to survive. In fact, the Greek-Cypriots, complying with the obligations undertaken at Vienna last February, have submitted clear and comprehensive proposals covering both the territorial and the constitutional aspects of the issue. On the other hand, the Turkish-Cypriot side has limited itself only to certain doubtful criteria, aimed at demonstrating that what has been seized by force of arms fits the needs of the 18 % Turkish-Cypriot community. Therefore, I believe you will agree that what is happening in Cyprus contravenes all principles and rules of international behaviour.

On 12th November 1976, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a new resolution which can really constitute the basis of a just solution to the Cyprus problem. It calls for the implementation of the previous resolutions. Indeed, what is needed is the full implementation of the recommendations of the world community. Turkey, which cast the only negative vote, as in the previous year, should realise that the only way to solve this grave problem in the area is to give up her intransigent and unacceptable position and come forward in a spirit of

co-operation and good faith. Such a spirit is also needed in order to solve the problems that Turkey raises over the Aegean, which for the last few years have been poisoning Greek-Turkish relations and endangering peace in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Rapporteur deals at length with the question of the continental shelf. His report unavoidably leads to certain over-simplifications, since it is impossible to deal accurately with such very complex matters in the space of a report which must be relatively brief. On these I shall not dwell. I would rather deal with the positive aspects of the report in order to stress that the Rapporteur is right in saying that suspicion and lack of trust have done much to aggravate differences and to exacerbate public feeling on both sides of the Aegean.

Complex though they may be, these issues are certainly not incapable of solution if approached in good faith and with a clear understanding of the legitimate interests of the parties involved.

In Bern a few days ago, a procedural agreement was reached providing the framework for the discussions in depth of the continental shelf question, both sides fully reserving their legal positions. I do not expect the talks that will follow to be either easy or short. But a start, however modest, has been made and the outcome of the negotiations will ultimately depend on the good faith and the understanding displayed by both sides. At this point, it would not be wise to say more other than to assure you that my country is genuinely desirous of making a positive contribution to the solution of this problem.

On the question of air space, three weeks of talks in Paris failed to produce a settlement. This is rather disappointing as the views of the two countries, which had been aired at several previous meetings, were thought to be close enough for an agreement to emerge. However, the matter will be discussed again with, we hope, better results.

Other points of difference between Greece and Turkey are mentioned in the report, but I do not want to abuse your patience by elaborating on each and every one of them. Besides, the report covers them more or less satisfactorily in the sense that the Greek point of view is adequately reflected in it.

There is one point, however, on which it seems appropriate to say a few words. The Rapporteur

Mr. Stavropoulos (continued)

seems to believe that one of the factors which prompted Greece to seek full membership of the European Communities was her disappointment at the attitude of NATO over the 1974 Cyprus crisis and her need to obtain a guarantee of her security against Turkish military might. This is simply not so, for the reasons succinctly but eloquently explained in paragraph 61 (2) of the report. Moreover, Greece does not consider the EEC as a substitute for other defence arrangements or for reliance on her own determination to defend her vital interests to the limits of her capabilities, should the need ever arise. Her application for full membership of the EEC is due to her European vocation and to her profound conviction that, geographically, politically and culturally, she belongs to the community of western democratic nations. Having contributed substantially over the past millennia to the common cultural heritage of the western world, she feels that she has both the will and the potential to make further constructive contributions to the building of a united Europe.

Her application for membership is aimed against no one and could be profitable to all. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to reiterate to this Assembly the statement often made by Prime Minister Karamanlis that Greece does not oppose the EEC membership of any other country, including Turkey, if and when objective conditions make this membership desirable to the interested country and acceptable to the other members of the Community. Not being herself a member of the EEC, she obviously cannot exert any influence on this matter in either sense for the time being. Conversely, she does not believe and cannot accept that her own application should be predicated on conditions other than her willingness and her ability to assume the rights and obligations of full membership.

That having been said, Greece remains deeply interested in matters of European defence and joint armaments production. She certainly welcomes the suggestion made in the report that she be associated to the fullest extent possible with the work of the Standing Armaments Committee. Should this suggestion be accepted by the Assembly and the Council of Western European Union, she would be prepared to respond favourably in such forms and at such times as may be appropriate.

Since we are dealing with defence matters, it may not be out of place for me to say a few words on Greek-NATO relations, the more so as the matter is discussed at some length in the report. Little need be added to what you already know. Our withdrawal from the integrated NATO defence organisation was dictated neither by a spirit of vindictiveness nor by frustration but by the stark realisation forced upon us by the 1974 Cyprus crisis that Greece could rely only on her own forces for defence against armed attack directed at her from within the Alliance. The report accurately states that in July and again in August 1974 Greek forces stationed in Cyprus under treaty commitments were attacked by Turkish forces. The situation remained tense and verging on war throughout that fateful summer and autumn and required drastic measures on our side, among which full national control of the armed forces was considered vital.

Following the withdrawal of her forces from NATO on 14th August 1974, and in view of her statement that she did not dissociate herself from the North Atlantic Alliance, it became apparent that certain adjustments were necessary to bring the relationship of Greece with the Alliance in line with the new realities.

What we are now seeking is a formula which, without disregarding Greece's present defence imperatives, would not prove prejudicial to the defence of the West and would, at the same time, meet the objectives and requirements of both sides. In peacetime, the Greek armed forces will be under national command. However, the co-operation and planning that will enable the allied and Greek forces to cope jointly with a state of general emergency will continue. If our allies respond — as we hope they will — to the willingness of the Greek side to elaborate a mutually acceptable formula and establish fruitful co-operation, we do not doubt that there will be no difficulty in arriving at the best possible solution, to the satisfaction of both parties.

Coming now to the negotiations proper, approximately one year ago Greece submitted to the Alliance the general guidelines that would constitute the framework of her future co-operation with it. Our statement was commented upon by the Alliance in a memorandum mainly dealing with the significance attributed by the allies to the points in question. This memorandum, which was received in Athens last March, has been considered carefully and we hope to be able to communicate our views very shortly to the Alliance so that negotiations might soon

Mr. Stavropoulos (continued)

be initiated on a technical level, touching upon specific questions which must be settled in order to establish our future co-operation on a sound basis.

In short, the negotiation is proceeding with deliberate haste, as dictated by the complexity of the issues involved. We hope, however, that prudence and perseverance will ultimately be rewarded by a practical agreement which takes into account the interests of all concerned. It is on this hopeful note that I should like to conclude my remarks. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation): — Thank you, Mr. Minister, for such a full, I might almost say exhaustive, survey, for you have touched on all the problems that beset your country, your neighbours and also your Atlantic and European friends.

May I ask you now to answer any questions that members of this Assembly may care to put to you: as you know, that is the custom here, as at the Council of Europe.

I call Mr. Schwencke.

Mr. SCHWENCKE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would like to ask the Minister a question, and to lead up to it with a few preliminary remarks. I really wanted to make these remarks in my prepared speech, but perhaps I can have my point cleared up more precisely by putting it in the form of a question.

I am in agreement with most of what the Minister said. We already know one another from our discussions in Greece and Strasbourg. I hope that we both accept that what we are saying and contributing to the debate is meant seriously and serves the cause of peace, in particular in connection with the situation in Cyprus. Consequently, as regards everything he had to say, I do not question the seriousness of the efforts for peace which his government is making. However, he put things in a way which I believe is wrong.

He said that the trouble in Cyprus all began with the Turkish invasion in 1974. That is, historically speaking, incorrect. The pre-history of the matter surely began when the Greek colonels gave a man named Nicos Sampson the task of carrying out Enosis in Cyprus. This Enosis was then fortunately thwarted, in part by

the Greek Cypriots themselves; but it triggered off the invasion. In this House we wanted, because of the fairness of our debates and the readiness with which we must be prepared to help each other, to get these developments in the right perspective. The fact that not one of us — and I am convinced this is so — feels that the 1974 invasion was a right and appropriate reaction is quite another matter.

May I put to the Minister the specific question whether in his opinion the antecedents of the Turkish invasion are to be found not only in Sampson but also in the long years of repression of the Turkish Cypriots as, indeed, is well documented by the United Nations. Must we not see these related matters as a whole in order to understand the real situation? (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Would you like to answer that question, Mr. Minister?

Mr. STAVROPOULOS (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece*). — I am rather surprised that it should be said that I have made a false statement. The history of Cyprus started 4,000 years before Christ and is full of peculiarities. I was not going to deal in my report with the history of Cyprus, which some members will know. I am speaking only of the present moment and of what is happening now. It is rather interesting, therefore, to hear it said that there has been a false statement.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Urwin of the United Kingdom Labour Party.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — In view of the Minister's warm welcome and affirmation of support for NATO, albeit on a somewhat qualified basis, having regard to the strategic importance of the south-eastern flank of NATO may I ask him under what circumstances, and when, Greece will resume full participation in the NATO military command structure?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Stavropoulos.

Mr. STAVROPOULOS (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece*). — I thought I made clear in my speech that we are at present negotiating. We hope that we shall shortly adjust our relations with NATO, in view of the present realities.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Burekel.

Mr. BURCKEL (*France*) (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Minister, for the information that you have given us in the course of your address. My question concerns the United States embargo on armaments supplies to Turkey. Can the enforcement of this embargo contribute anything towards maintaining joint security in the Eastern Mediterranean ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Stavropoulos.

Mr. STAVROPOULOS (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece*). — This is not a question for me. It belongs to the Americans. The Americans did not impose the embargo to favour Greece. I believe they were upset because Turkey had invaded Cyprus using armaments which Turkey has received for NATO purposes. That was not a NATO purpose. Then there was the entanglement which is still in the air. It is not for me to say what American policy should be.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Channon.

Mr. CHANNON (*United Kingdom*). — Can the Minister confirm one thing which I believe I heard him say in his speech, that were Greece to accede to the European Economic Community there would then be no question of her taking steps to block subsequent accession by Turkey to the EEC, should the remaining members of the Community wish Turkey to become a member ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Stavropoulos.

Mr. STAVROPOULOS (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece*). — That is perfectly right. It would not occur to us that we could do such a thing as block Turkey's accession.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Minister.

Are there any more questions ?...

Mr. STAVROPOULOS (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece*). — May I make an additional remark, Mr. President? My false statement was due to the fact that the same false statement occurs in the report of the Rapporteur. He speaks to us only about today, not about the past.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Minister, you have answered all the questions that

have been put to you. I thank you on behalf of our Assembly. We shall have many further opportunities of working together in the other assembly which is a sister to this one.

We shall resume our debate on Mr. Burckel's report.

I call Mr. Roberti of the Italian MSI.

Mr. ROBERTI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, on rising to make my maiden speech in this august gathering, let me begin by expressing to you, Sir, and all our other colleagues, my gratitude for the cordial welcome I have been given.

I am fully mindful of the importance and exalted status of this international assembly. I put my name down to speak on Mr. Burckel's report because in my view it deserves my own and the Assembly's favourable appreciation for its accurate analysis of the problems at issue and of the synthetic solutions propounded in the recommendations. In the latter I welcome a sense of realism, in that they are precisely adjusted to the Assembly's powers and have no pretension of transgressing them, any more than those of the other interested parties. It is, I find, appropriate that this political debate on western defence should in fact begin its proceedings by examining the problem of the Mediterranean. Indeed, as has been repeatedly said, the Mediterranean constitutes one of the basic problems for the defence of the West. The eastern basin of the Mediterranean is the most sensitive spot in the entire defence of the western world. History teaches us, moreover, that the Mediterranean has always determined the fate of Europe, and that the one who held dominion over the Mediterranean has in the end been the master of Europe too. Hence all the nations of Europe, especially Western Europe, are directly involved in western defence and in that of the Mediterranean. As the Rapporteur says, the Eastern Mediterranean presents three critical points: the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Lebanese affair and Greco-Turkish relations.

Now the situation in the Mediterranean has been greatly aggravated by the fact that some of the powers abutting on it are seen today to be in a particularly critical political and economic state owing to the considerable influence exerted on one or two of them, and on Italy first and foremost, by particular political forces apparently tightly linked — ideologically and in some respects also politically and even organisationally, if, as they do, they attend international

Mr. Roberti (continued)

conferences of the communist parties and the eastern bloc countries — to the States and therefore in a way also to the policy and the political and ideological ends of the Warsaw Pact alliance. This adds to the difficulties created by the crises in the Eastern Mediterranean.

To be sure, we have had the pleasure of listening in this Assembly to the statements made by representatives of some of these parties and we would like to hope that their intentions match the facts. But politics does not go by intentions. I am not arguing about anybody's intentions, but politics goes by results, and we must wait and see what these are, because, I think, *détente* is an aspiration common to all mankind and to every nation. But for there to be *détente*, it must be a two-way process, and we are pleased to see in our Assembly representatives of those same ideological and political forces, though I do not think that the favour is reciprocated to any of the western powers in the deliberations of the Warsaw Pact countries.

This said, and addressing myself now more particularly to briefly drawing your attention to the points shrewdly raised by our Rapporteur, let me offer a few remarks, mainly confined to relations between Greece and Turkey, *inter alia* because, as the Rapporteur has said, as regards the conflicts for which the Arab States are more directly answerable, any undue interference by European powers might awaken charges of neo-colonialism, and worsen rather than improve the situation.

As for the current crisis situation between Greece and Turkey, it need, I think, occasion no wonder. Basically, there are, between the two, geographical, geopolitical and historical reasons for jealousy and rivalry dating back thousands of years: without going back to the Trojan or even the Persian wars, certainly what happened in the immediate postwar years goes to prove that this is an area in which, for the sake of Aegean and economic hegemony, there have often been causes of friction between the two powers, inherent in their geographical and historical circumstances. But the way to eliminate such friction has been sagaciously indicated by our Rapporteur. It lies in the urgent need for joint defence, the promptings of necessity and the complementarity of defence requirements. Let us not forget that, quite apart from the general needs of the West, Greece and Turkey

have the greatest length of land frontiers with the countries of the Warsaw Pact: hence their essential complementarity of defence requirements.

Our Rapporteur has dealt with this in paragraph 61. I am glad that the Greek Minister in his statement underlined the point. The Rapporteur observes that Turkish territory is an essential part of the western defence system, in which Turkey plays an important rôle. Greece's security is very largely ensured by Turkey's participation in the system. Conversely, for its own security Turkey also needs Greece to take part in the western defence system.

I am glad to emphasise that the Greek Minister in his speech — which in some respects we did not find altogether promising for an amicable solution to be found to this dispute — quoted specifically paragraph 21. I think that it is precisely proper, within the purview of this Assembly, to note that, if we raise our eyes beyond the strict confines of our own country to the broader horizons of groups of countries, groups of powers, not to say, indeed, the entire continent, it will be easier to settle individual disputes. In this connection — and I conclude, Mr. President, by thanking you for the opportunity of speaking from the floor at the start of this debate — I affirm that the proposals in the Rapporteur's draft recommendation constitute, in my view, the most appropriate means of seeking to make a contribution — the contribution this Assembly is able to make — towards solving this serious problem: seeking, that is, to draw both countries ever closer towards an awareness of the problems involved in matters of western defence in general, by facilitating their admission to the EEC — on this, too, I am glad to have heard reassurances from the Greek Minister — and, through the proposals, jointly involving, by a form of participation consistent with the treaty and our regulations, the representatives of both Greece and Turkey in the studies and contributions which this Assembly is, with so much zeal and scruple, bringing to western defence, and so, as a fact, in our opinion, to *détente* and world peace.

Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Dankert.

Mr. DANKERT (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Like the Rapporteur, Mr. President, I want to begin by expressing my sympathy for those in eastern Turkey so sorely afflicted by earthquake

Mr. Dankert (continued)

and snowstorms, and I think that Senator Inan, who himself comes from that area, is very much the right person to receive this message of sympathy.

One cannot escape the fact that the eastern end of the Mediterranean is an area where there are serious political problems, and from this viewpoint the report we are discussing has been written at the right time.

But the report culminates in a recommendation to the WEU Council of Ministers that it should, as the WEU Council of Ministers, concern itself with these problems. I have doubts about the wisdom of this. WEU is, itself, already a problem area. The Council of Ministers has, in practical terms, ceased to operate politically. It seems to me there is a total absence of the political will to get operating again. The Standing Armaments Committee, which is also mentioned in the recommendation, may well be a permanent body, but this club of gradually aging gentlemen now has very little to do with armaments. The best that is to be hoped for is that the governments will try to build up this Committee into a sort of advisory body able to undertake useful studies of the problems affecting the defence of Western Europe.

We are left with an assembly and a treaty — both of them were perhaps useful, but they are not in my opinion in a position to solve the problems set out in Mr. Burekel's report. I am assuming, therefore, that the discussion today will not bind us in any way, and that the real deliberations over problems in the Eastern Mediterranean will have to go on in NATO and in the Political Committee of the EEC Foreign Ministers. Nonetheless, the Burekel report is here before us, and there are still one or two comments I would like to make on it.

I think it is nonsense to presume, as the recommendation does, that Greece and Turkey can be helped by WEU taking a hand; there is proof enough in the fact that WEU has absolutely no part in what the recommendation so resplendently calls the building of Europe. WEU is at a standstill, and there is no building going on.

It might be to the point if, in this Assembly, we were to look at what sensible rôle there still is for the Assembly and the Council of Ministers in the present circumstances. This would at least

make more sense than pushing WEU deeper into the morass by the present attempts to burden it with tasks it is not up to coping with. This might perhaps even help the Greeks and Turks.

Yesterday we adopted the recommendation in the de Bruyne report on relations between WEU and European union. This contained a plea for implementation of the Tindemans report. I have my doubts about the means Mr. Tindemans wants to employ to get European union off the ground. Luckily I get the impression — the European Council has not said any more about this yet — that these doubts of mine are shared by the European Council, and that there will be no outcome in The Hague today either.

On one thing — and this is I think of interest where Greece and Turkey are concerned — Mr. Tindemans is certainly not wrong: he was right in pointing out that it is impossible to take countries like Greece and Turkey into the EEC without profoundly unsettling those countries. That was why he came up with the idea of a Europe proceeding at two different speeds — dividing Europe into first- and second-class members. I believe this is an extremely dangerous idea, certainly so in view of the EEC's capacity for consecrating the temporary as the eternal. This is why I think the negotiations with Greece have been begun too soon. Too soon for Greece — though that is the Greeks' responsibility — and too soon for the EEC. The EEC is running the risk, in rushing towards a widening of the Community, of losing out on deepening it. When the Six were expanded to become the Nine, some excuse could still be found for the deepening process grinding to a halt. But after the experience we have had with the Nine, I do not feel there are any excuses left. One has only, in the present economic state of affairs, to look at the monetary uncertainty there is in the Community. For me, there is no hurry about Greek accession; rather the opposite, in fact. Nor, therefore, am I worried about speeding up Turkish, Portuguese and possibly Spanish membership of the EEC. I think the Community will have to find other arrangements acceptable to these Mediterranean countries.

You will have gathered, Mr. President, that I am not in favour of this recommendation. Quite simply, I feel we would be awakening expectations we could not fulfil. I find difficulty with the recommendation, too, over what it has to say about the Lebanese problem; I get the feeling that it is taking a side-swipe at the United

Mr. Dankert (continued)

Nations, one that is not merited. I would like to know what the Foreign Ministers of the WEU countries have done to settle the crisis in the Lebanon? How have they been any more effective, or could they have been any more effective, in dealing with this problem?

I would recall here the experience there was with a French initiative; that too came to nothing.

There is no more horrible war than a civil war. We know that. Mediation and conflict management is well-nigh impossible in that kind of war. I would not ask the United Nations to do the impossible. I think it is regrettable that the Rapporteur has, as it were, taken advantage of the situation to show an organisation — which I do not indeed always find appealing — in an unfavourable light.

We need the United Nations: sometimes despite the United Nations. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The debate is adjourned.

6. Designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly

(Motion for a Resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 727)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I have received from Mr. Burekel and others a motion for a resolution on the designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly with a request for urgent procedure.

The request for urgent procedure will be posted up and the text distributed as Document 727. The Assembly will be asked to decide on the request for urgent procedure this afternoon at 4 p.m.

7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems (Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 719).
2. Designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly (Motion for a Resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Document 727).
3. European oceanographic activities (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 722).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 12.30 p.m.)

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 30th November 1976

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 719*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Cordle, Mr. Inan (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Schwencke, Sir Frederic Bennett.
4. Designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly (*Motion for a Resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 727*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Urwin (*point of order*), Mr. Burckel, Mr. Channon, Mr. Grieve; Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Radius (*points of order*), Mr. Valleix (*explanation of vote*).
5. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 719*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Radius, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Amrehn, Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Stephanopoulos (*Observer from Greece*).
6. European oceanographic activities (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 722*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Craigen (*Rapporteur*), Mr. van Kleef, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Hardy, Mr. McNamara, Mr. Craigen (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Warren (*Chairman of the Committee*).
7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 719)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The first Order of the Day is the resumed debate on the

report of the General Affairs Committee on Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems, Document 719.

In the resumed debate, I call Mr. Cordle.

Mr. CORDLE (*United Kingdom*). — The two previous speakers in the discussion before the luncheon adjournment expressed their sympathy with the people of Turkey at the calamity that has recently befallen them. I should like to associate myself with those sentiments and to assure the people of Turkey that they are much in our minds at this time of suffering and sorrow.

In Mr. Burckel's wide and highly informative explanatory memorandum we see a large degree of diplomacy and sound common sense, but it also reveals the urgency for the action which has to be taken seriously if the problems in the Mediterranean are to be faced up to and resolved. This brilliant report has fairly laid all the facts before us without crashing head-on into any of the many and varied rocks that are both dangerous and frustrating.

The main problem concerns the importance of both a strong defence programme for our Turkish and Greek friends, a programme which is autonomous in theory but united in practice, and one that will provide sound Eastern Mediter-

1. See page 28.

Mr. Cordle (continued)

anean security for Western Europe. But I must ask how the United Kingdom squares up to its share in this. The answer is that it does so very badly. It seems more than ever clear now that the conditions demanded by the International Monetary Fund for bailing Britain out of its current dangerous financial situation would include cuts in public spending.

The left-wing extremists will no doubt call for further defence cuts in whatever package is put together, but cuts in defence expenditure additional to the massive £8,000 million already axed would be catastrophic. When he was Defence Secretary, Mr. Roy Mason, who was a responsible member of the Cabinet, warned us of the serious and dangerous situation confronting us if we reduced our defence any further. Last Wednesday, when Her Majesty the Queen opened parliament, her speech contained the commitment that the government would continue their support of the Atlantic Alliance. But there may well be danger signals in that our own Prime Minister, in an attempt to influence our allies to bail us out of our financial problems on his terms, threatened to consider withdrawing British troops from Germany. That is an odd and inept piece of diplomacy which was not only unlikely to impress anyone but was likely to damage us more than anything else.

It is also clear that the Americans are extremely apprehensive about possible cuts in Britain's Rhine Army. They are also deeply worried about the future of the British sovereign base on Cyprus. They are openly saying that the United Kingdom is pulling out of the Mediterranean. They view that with increasing alarm in view of the delicate situation there.

If Turkey and Greece can accept the obvious solution of a fair partition of Cyprus and a federal government loosely shared between them, this vital strategic area could be sustained by a strong defence programme as heretofore. But I believe that a greater and stronger bond can be provided by the EEC eventually inviting both Greece and Turkey into full membership.

In paragraph 7 of the report, the Rapporteur sets out very clearly the present state of affairs. He says that "Greece is on the way towards integration, but the association agreement with Turkey no longer corresponds to reality today and a reappraisal is urgent. Only ambitious concrete proposals can re-establish a balance between

the two States and avoid Turkey drifting away from Europe and the West. In general, Community action is over-cautious, due perhaps to the lack of a common approach towards foreign policy in the Mediterranean area." If we believe that, we here in WEU should do everything in our power to see that the long-drawn-out matters of conflict and strife which have bedevilled these two great countries are set aside by an invitation to full membership of the EEC, at a time when Turkey and Greece are so ready, which would not only divert attention from their interrelated problems but give them a greater say at the conference tables of Europe on trade matters and, more important to us all, in matters of security.

To maintain the presence of the free world in the Eastern Mediterranean is of paramount importance, for great is the activity of Russian forces in the area and this could have devastating effects on our friends in the event of a conflict. Our only help, if our endeavours with Greece and Turkey fail, must surely rest with our allies, the Americans. I hope that they will not hesitate to maintain the sovereign base of Cyprus rather than allow it to fall into the hands of Mr. Makarios, who has already admitted that he has turned to the Russians for help. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Inan, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). — I thank you, Mr. President, and the Assembly for having invited us to this sitting and for thus giving us a chance to speak to you here after our ally and neighbour, Greece, and to put before you the situation that at present prevails in the two countries.

I also thank the Rapporteur, Mr. Burckel, and Mr. Dankert and Mr. Cordle who have expressed their sympathy with us in the disaster that has hit Turkey; we greatly appreciate this token of sympathy.

I further thank Mr. Burckel, the Rapporteur, for having mentioned, as I intended to do myself, the very humanitarian gesture by the Greek Government in coming to the aid of Turkey. We have seen a Greek military aircraft flying across Turkish territory to come to the aid of the Turkish people. This is a gesture by which we were much touched and which we greatly appreciate.

However, after that gesture, it was disheartening to hear Mr. Stavropoulos putting Turkey, as

Mr. Inan (continued)

it were, in the dock, just after the agreement reached in Bern and the progress made in Paris. I do not think that that will contribute towards building up the good atmosphere that we are trying to create between the two countries.

In fact, after the Bern negotiations on an interim agreement between the two countries, which ended with what is called an agreement of good neighbourliness, to apply for two years, the two countries were to stop throwing accusations at each other and to cease mutual recrimination.

Yet today, 30th November, I find that a section of this agreement has been abandoned and that Turkey has once again been, as it were, put in the dock here, as in other international bodies, and this does not make things easier. I was pained to hear Mr. Stavropoulos refer to the "coup" by Mr. Sampson, supported by the colonels in Athens. In his very evasive reply to Mr. Schwencke he showed no sign whatever of accepting the responsibility of the colonels and of Mr. Sampson for what happened or what is now happening in Cyprus. I think that does democracy no credit. Mr. Stavropoulos said "We should be friendly with the Turks". I had expected more than that.

For more than nine centuries our two nations have formed a kind of outpost of western civilisation and of western democratic systems in this part of the world. Mr. Stavropoulos also mentioned the restoration of democracy in Athens, and we are very pleased about it, although he made no reference to the folly of the colonels, together with Mr. Sampson's "coup", a crazy move which Turkey was forced to thwart — with the result that my country can pride itself on having made some contribution towards the return of democracy in Greece, about which we are very glad, even if this democracy gives Greek parliamentarians and members of the Greek Government a chance to try and indict us before this international forum.

Mr. Stavropoulos also said that one third of the present population of Cyprus consisted of refugees. That is a far cry from the true facts. According to United Nations statistics, they number only 24,000; if we go by the figures we have at present, there are no more than 17,000 refugees in the southern sector. We must bear in mind that those who have been described as refugees in the southern sector today occupy the

houses and land of some 70,000 Turks who have left the area.

Mr. Stavropoulos similarly mentioned colonisation of Cyprus by Turkey.

We should not forget that, at the present time, there are nearly 100,000 Cypriots in Turkey and 50,000 in England, as our British colleagues well know. If these people now decide to return to their property, I do not think it can be held against them. To say that the 1960 agreement was violated by the Turkish invasion is to close one's eyes to what has happened over a period of twelve years, from 23rd December 1963 when Archbishop Makarios unilaterally breached the treaty then in force, to the events of 15th July 1974, events that were not of Turkey's making.

I now come to the report itself, and I congratulate the Rapporteur. His was not an easy task, since a balance had to be found that could satisfy everybody.

Both sides tend at times to react with feeling and emotion rather than *sang-froid*, which does not ease the task of the Rapporteur, who has carried it through with fairness and objectivity. I should like to thank him for it and to congratulate him and the members of the General Affairs Committee who have visited both Turkey and Greece to see for themselves how things are.

Coming back to the document itself, I shall start with the title, "Western Europe's policy". In fact, there is at present no Western European policy on the Mediterranean, and I doubt whether there will be one tomorrow. The Mediterranean policy of the western countries is based on the political and economic interests of each government, interests which are not always convergent; at times they even conflict with each other, and with the interests of the West or of other allied countries.

We should like such a policy to emerge one day, but, alas, Europe, whether as an enlarged community or otherwise, is nearly always a giant in economic terms, while in the political sphere, I am sorry to say, it has as yet not faced up to its responsibilities. Consequently, to talk of Western Europe's policy is to talk of an ideal, a pious hope to which I willingly subscribe, but I would also like to face facts.

This morning, to a question put to the Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic on the way that Turkey and the other Mediterranean countries have been

Mr. Inan (continued)

treated, the reply was that there was no western policy, and his reply was evasive.

There are at the present time four Community policies on the Mediterranean, each quite different from the others. In each member country of the Community the government uses the Community as an instrument of its own foreign policy. Certain member States have interests in the Maghreb in North Africa and so we have the Community oriented in that direction.

When they had to deal with Greece and Turkey, who are associated with the Community not only as a preliminary to membership but also as members of the Atlantic Alliance, and who are accorded less favourable treatment than the other countries — in their case, we hear, there is a Mediterranean policy and Turkey is thrown in with all the rest. This is something which, alas, has confirmed my doubts.

In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation, the Assembly recommends that the Council "continue its work". Well, so far there has been no work, but perhaps there will be from then on.

Paragraph 7 of the explanatory memorandum states that "Community action is over-cautious, due perhaps to the lack of a common approach towards foreign policy in the Mediterranean area". Here, again, it is more than over-cautious.

In paragraph 8, France's withdrawal is compared with that of Greece. In France's case this was deliberate policy. In Greece's case, an emotional reaction. The analogy is not therefore all that plain.

Towards the end of this paragraph, the United States embargo is referred to. On this point, too, I found Mr. Stavropoulos' reply astonishing. He did not say that he did not approve of the American embargo, whereas we could have expected him to say that the embargo affected the whole defence system.

I have visited the United States four times. I saw what went on in the Capitol in connection with the American embargo. There are three million Greek Americans, who are controlled by the Greek Cypriot community in Athens, which is carrying on an anti-Turkish campaign in the United States. It was following this campaign that the American Congress imposed its embargo.

Paragraph 10 refers to a 35,000-ton ship, the Kiev. As it happens, there is some disagreement on the tonnage of this vessel. In the NATO document, reference is made to a ship of 45,000 tons, while the report mentions a 35,000-ton ship. The difference is vast and allows a number of interpretations.

As regards the permission granted by Turkey for the Kiev's passage, Turkey, in accordance with the Montreux Convention, informed the contracting parties that this permission had been granted. The notification produced no reaction.

We must not forget that the treaty is forty years old and that it must be interpreted in a way that fits in with the facts of economic development. The Montreux Convention makes no mention of missiles. Today, tramps carry rockets and certain ships of allied countries passing through the Bosphorus carry missiles.

At the end of paragraph 11, we read that Turkey "could perhaps do so if the solution of its problems with Greece allowed its allies to give it the guarantees which it requires".

I believe that the Rapporteur will agree with me, since Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty gives Turkey every guarantee. This is a kind of denial of the North Atlantic Treaty and of Article 5. It is not, therefore, desirable for this Assembly, which is concerned with defence...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I have to inform you that you have exceeded the time allowed you. I must ask you to finish off quickly.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). — The final report must be in line with the facts.

Paragraph 20 refers to the Greek Cypriot Government. Up to 1963, 30 % of this government consisted of Turks, the rest were Greeks. After the events of 1963, when there was no government in Greece, the administration was Greek.

In paragraph 21, Turkey's intervention is explained as having been undertaken in order to protect the Turkish minority. First of all, I would mention that there is no minority, even the United Nations has adopted the word "community". There are two communities — the Turkish community and the Greek community. Subsequently, there was the intervention undertaken on the basis of the 1960 treaty of guarantee, under which Turkey was under an obligation to intervene in situations such as that

Mr. Inan (continued)

brought about by Sampson, in order to maintain the independence of Cyprus ; it was not just to defend the Turkish community.

In paragraph 28(2) and the footnote, where there is reference to the Lausanne Treaty and the Paris Treaty, the report, following the statement put out in Athens, says that Turkey did not sign the Paris Treaty and that what was being done was not therefore a threat to Turkey. Turkey's security is not affected, and if there is to be no demilitarisation of the Dodecanese, what power could be concerned ? The islands are one mile, two miles, three or four miles from the Turkish coast. It is just with this situation that the Lausanne and Paris Treaties had to deal. The British Government of the time suggested, in order to satisfy the Turks and offer the necessary security, and also to maintain the balance of the Lausanne Treaty, that an article should be added providing for the demilitarisation of these islands. The British Government had also warned the Turks. As history has shown, the Germans before leaving the islands proposed to the Turkish Government, which did not accept, that the Turks should move in when they left. The suggestion was made in order to safeguard Turkey's security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall not finish tonight if you go on. I cannot let you speak any longer, you have already taken up twice the time accorded you, which was ten minutes. I am sorry that the procedure I have to apply is so harsh, but the Orders of the Day are very strict ; you are here as an observer, you can make a certain number of observations, but if you are going to review the whole of the Burckel report we shall not have finished this evening.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). — I am not doing so solely for Mr. Burckel and I have not come from Ankara just for the report. I leave the last word to you, but there are facts that I want to underline. In paragraph 28(7) reference is made to four powers on the Security Council. I am sorry to say that in the United Nations Assembly one of the powers represented in this room voted against Turkey.

A general comment on relations between the two countries and the European Economic Community : Greece's application for membership on 12th June 1975 was purely and simply a matter

of policy. The Athens Government said as much and all the world knows it.

Policy directed against whom and to achieve what, when the question was one of a difference between two associates ? Moreover, the treatment meted out to Turkey is far from being in line with the 1963 Ankara Treaty and the additional protocol signed between Turkey and the Community. At a time when Turkey is experiencing difficulties with its ally the United States because of the embargo, we expect a good deal more understanding from the Community. What we get is almost indifference ; we are even meeting with extreme difficulties on the part of certain member countries, which I regret.

I shall gladly answer any request for further explanation, but reserve my right to reply, and I apologise for having overstepped the time allowed me. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Your contribution was very interesting but we are pressed for time. I have let you speak for a far longer time than that allowed to our colleagues and even to Ministers.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, may I on behalf of the Christian Democrat Group of the Italian Delegation offer you our sincerest and warmest thanks for the generous and cordial greetings you extended to us at the start of yesterday's sitting.

About the matter on the Orders of the Day, I agree with the speaker who said that there is at the moment no Western European policy for the Mediterranean and all the important and weighty problems involved. However, I think the issue is one of promoting a WEU policy in the Mediterranean area. If this be not the case, I fail to see what purpose our Assembly serves. We have no decision-making powers, but we do have the ability and duty of urging the member countries and therefore the organisation to frame a policy of their own to abolish the situations which have been decried and in respect of which, whereas Western Europe is greatly concerned with defence problems, and these are inseparable from the situation of the Mediterranean countries, we nowadays see, on the contrary, the presence of armed forces of countries not directly concerned with Mediterranean problems. I allude to the presence of the United States and Russian navies, which this morning served as a pretext for the French Foreign Minister to

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

justify dispatching a French fleet because of the perils that loom in this area.

I observe that the greater the tension between the countries whose policy we are discussing from the standpoint of European defence, the steadier and more wholehearted should be our endeavour to eliminate the causes of friction, dissension or even conflict, and to create a new situation in the Mediterranean — I mean, the whole of it, and not merely the eastern basin. For this reason I feel I must reject the down-right statement by the second of this morning's speakers, Mr. Dankert, to the effect that we as the Assembly of WEU would be liable to make ourselves ridiculous by passing a resolution like the one which terminates Mr. Burekel's excellent report. I think we really lose all touch with reality by indulging in such remarks which are after all disparaging to our Assembly, and allow me to say that it is really a serious matter that such a disparaging remark should have been made by a person of authority in the Assembly itself.

I have neither the authority, nor above all the time, to argue the point in specific terms, but I would like to point out that it says on the third page of the admirable report that the Common Market countries decided in 1972 to implement an overall Mediterranean policy, which means they have an interest, they have a stake in the area. Even if the results have not been satisfactory so far — or rather, I would say, because of this — we should try and exert the greatest effort to eradicate the negative factors that militated against the framing of an overall Mediterranean policy.

I think the Rapporteur's conclusions represent a first serious effort towards ensuring that our Assembly may bring a valid contribution to overcoming the obstacles that have so far stood in the way of a European presence in the Mediterranean and making some progress in problems of Mediterranean defence.

Our task should be even greater, in the light of what speakers have said: the Greek Foreign Minister this morning and now the Turkish observer. There are, to say the least, reasons for friction. There are reasons for very serious controversy, reasons for strife. Our duty is not to disarm before these reasons for strife, nor to cry halt at the sight of these obstacles, but rather to point out the best ways of overcoming them,

inasmuch as — as the Rapporteur rightly acknowledges — it really is a pipe-dream to think of achieving a European defence, a Western European presence in the Mediterranean if only one of the two contending parties, Greece and Turkey, were to be left out.

I take the view that, beyond the facts, the will to do this exists; the Greek Foreign Minister said as much this morning, and the Turkish representative this afternoon, albeit after some lively polemics. We should avail ourselves of the positive aspect of all this and, to any who have the power to frame policy and take decisions, indicate where an equitable solution will be found to lie. It seems to me that to accept, or rather implement the accession and admittance to the Common Market of Greece and Turkey can, and will, be a decisive step towards settling our differences and achieving our design — not our dream, for in politics there can be no such thing: we are not pursuing dreams but concrete designs — of securing European defence in the Mediterranean.

In conclusion, mark well the extreme importance of this, for the fact that there should exist today, at various points in the East, hotbeds of unrest and war is not the only reason for our concern, but there is also that of what tomorrow may bring, to exercise our minds. I am speaking especially as an Italian — for the Assembly should realise Italy's particular position makes it perhaps more concerned than any other country in achieving a defence system. In short, we wonder what may happen tomorrow in Albania or Yugoslavia. From this question mark we receive admonitions that we should press resolutely on with our intent to reach the goal of a true European unity with all the countries whose presence is essential to our defence system. (*Applause*)

(*Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Schwencke.

Mr. SCHWENCKE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen. The Burekel report has made it abundantly clear to me once more how limited, indeed lacking, are the powers of WEU and, in particular, of this Assembly, and at the same time how impossible it is at present to relinquish the rôle that is ours. We can work out recommendations, adopt the recommendations proposed — and I shall vote for the present one — and yet all the time we must know that,

Mr. Schwencke (continued)

first, we are not more but rather less in a position to contribute towards solving the Turkish-Greek problems than in the United Nations or the Council of Europe, both organisations having of course better possibilities; secondly, the pressure which would have to be exerted on both sides by the United States and by the nine Community countries — by the United States in particular on Greece and by the Nine on both Turkey and Greece — in order to force them into bilateral negotiations on the substance of their problems, can scarcely be exerted through WEU; and, thirdly, that we, in this Assembly, cannot bring the two Presidents Demirel and Karamanlis to the negotiating table again with a view, for instance, to getting them to adopt the measures announced in their letters. I do not think we can expect this in the foreseeable future, particularly in view of the fact that the election campaign has begun in Turkey and will not be finished until October next year. And, in my opinion, not only the Turkish President in office but his rival, Mr. Ecevit, too, will have a good deal to say in the solution of these problems.

In spite of all this, the report is useful in that it forces us to take up a position, to draw the attention of the public to this European storm centre, to provide public opinion with more balanced and, I believe, fuller information than has usually been available, because of the greater facilities open to Greece — not only, of course, through the United States but also through France. And let me add something which also helps the Greek part of Cyprus: at the conference of the third world countries in Colombo, at UNESCO, now meeting in Nairobi, and at the United Nations in New York, only this side is able to reach the world with its international appeals. That is why I believe it will be helpful — even though it may not help much in the short term — to adopt the motion for a resolution from Mr. Burckel, for giving both the Turks and the Greeks observer status here.

Turkey — and it is important I think, for us all that the point be made — is a European State, it wishes to participate politically in Europe's problems and it must be given the means to do so. May I, therefore — perhaps more bluntly than I ought — return to the problems involved from the Turkish point of view, in particular that of the Turkish Cypriots.

Of course we have here, as can be seen from the report, a whole range of problems: the Aegean, the continental shelf, the refusal of the Turkish side to consider the Aegean as a Greek inland sea; the question of air safety, which is of much more importance than many of us assume, and finally Greece's application to accede to the EEC and the closer association with the Community wanted by the Turks.

Allow me to pick out one problem which is in some ways typical: the problem of Cyprus. I believe that we members of the Committee, when we were in Athens and Ankara, felt two things: first that for the Greeks the solution of the Cyprus problem has priority, for its influence on public opinion among other reasons; secondly — and this is what we were told in Ankara by the acting Foreign Minister and, if I rightly remember, by the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who is here with us — that for Turkey the Cyprus problem has its importance but that other problems have political priority. I am picking out the Cyprus problem because I pride myself that I may know a little more about this country than some of my colleagues. The visit to Cyprus by WEU's General Affairs Committee was not my first visit to the country. I have known it for many years and think highly of it and its people, both Turkish and Greek. I hope you will believe me when I say that my love of Cyprus and my political interest in it embrace the country as a whole.

What does the situation in Cyprus really look like? When I was there six weeks ago I observed the following. First, both sides have troops armed to the teeth; it is true that the green line of the United Nations separates them, but I think the chances of the United Nations intervening effectively in a crisis are slender. Secondly, there are refugees and refugee camps on both sides, which I have either seen myself or on which I have had reports.

Thirdly, I do not see any hope of the representatives of these two ethnic groups or — and I gladly adopt this phraseology — these two communities, on the one hand Archbishop Makarios and on the other Mr. Denktash, being in a position to solve the outstanding problems on an intercommunity basis. Quite the contrary: the situation is such that there is in practice no longer any bond holding the two together; the bond has been shattered, and it is a vain endeavour to say which side did most to destroy it.

Mr. Schwencke (continued)

Fourthly, the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot part of the population from international developments and international relations is so strict that it has led to distressing economic, political and human consequences. The economic consequences have gone so far that the supplies of power and water for the northern part of the island have been cut off, and the Turkish side has had to consider whether water supplies will have to be brought from the Turkish mainland. This and many other things constitute a harsh and unwarranted treatment of the Turkish inhabitants of the island for which the Greek side, under Makarios, must bear the sole responsibility. I believe we must see these matters clearly if we are to discuss things together frankly and openly in this Assembly; United Nations documents on the subject are available.

I am not trying — and I made this clear earlier on — to justify the 1974 invasion in any way. It must however be seen in relation to the broader political continuum which cannot be shrugged off with a reference to Cyprus's millennial history — and about that history, too, there are one or two things I could tell you. There was a certain current in Cypriot affairs which began positively in 1957 with President Makarios and Vice-President Denktash, but in 1963 — and there were many reasons for this as far as the Turks were concerned — it had to be abandoned. This left a situation in which Cyprus has been represented in international relations solely by the Greek side, and the Turkish side has not even been consulted. That links up with many other factors that work against the Turkish Cypriots. I would only like to point out, as one example, that even today Turkish-Cypriot diplomats have to travel with Turkish passports because they cannot get their own from the Cypriot capital of Nicosia.

This is, I think, indicative of a situation which I consider to be dangerous for Europeans as a whole. I am not here — even though my remarks are perhaps a little blunt — to say who is right or who is wrong. And we are not here in a body charged with divining the truth. What I would say is that this Assembly, in accordance with the ancient Greek saying *ho logos pethai* (the word convinces), must also listen to the words of those who speak for the Turkish community which has long been neglected by the Greek Cypriots, and which is now asking to be heard.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have no magic formula for solving these problems, but I think it might be useful if I were to close with four observations.

First, on my estimate of both sides, there is no chance of reaching a quick solution internally in Cyprus. The diametrically opposed forces at work since 1963, and even more since 1974, have moved so far apart that the bond of unity no longer exists.

Secondly, I see no hope that any progress will be made in these intercommunity problems even by bringing in the United Nations Secretary-General Mr. Waldheim, as both sides — Turkish and Greek — send their negotiators to the negotiations without any real powers.

Thirdly, I hope we are agreed that we must do all in our power to preserve the sovereign State of Cyprus. This sovereign State, which is earnestly desired by the citizens on both sides, will be a State with two communities — one of which must not be systematically disqualified as a minority, but must share in foreign and State affairs — under one stormproof roof.

Fourthly, we must try to make sure that this State with its sovereignty fits itself into the western world in such a way that it is assured of the security which is its due.

The problems of military policy raised by the situation in Cyprus affect our security too. They must be brought nearer to a solution. The debate in this House must once again make it clear that it is incumbent on us to prevent an escalation which could come about and which I for one certainly do not consider to be out of the question for the foreseeable future. We must compel the two powers most directly concerned, Turkey and Greece, to enter into meaningful negotiations so that in future all Cypriots can shape their fate in sovereign manner. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I was fortunate enough to be one of those who went on the visit to Greece and Turkey. I should like to pay a tribute to the Rapporteur, a tribute I have paid to him on previous occasions, for having performed the most difficult task of all — that is, to try to pursue a line between the differing points of view of two countries in a dispute which hinges not only on interpretation but on contested facts. There have been times

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

when I have wondered whether it was wise for this distinguished group to look into this matter. Sometimes it is better to allow two bodies or nations in conflict to work things out for themselves, free from outside intervention. I am still not sure whether we adopted the wise course.

There is in Britain, however, the saying that the only way to prevent two members of a family from continuing to quarrel is for an outsider to intervene when they both come together. I hope that that does not sound unduly optimistic, since in all my time in assemblies such as this I have never known a more difficult task than that which the Rapporteur has been asked to perform. I do not agree with all his conclusions, but it is a brave man who would claim that he could do better than the Rapporteur did in trying to pick a path between so many conflicting points of view.

I have said in public, as opposed to saying it in diplomatic circles, that I have doubts about the wisdom of outside intervention by those not immediately concerned with the argument. Since I hold that view, I would be less than fair if I were now to try to reconstruct all the events which have led to this unhappy situation. I propose to content myself merely with talking about the Cyprus situation, because there seem to be fair prospects of the Aegean dispute being settled by resolution and good sense. The best we can do today is to wish continuing success to those talks.

Let me say one thing which I hope will not be regarded as controversial. When there is an argument between two countries or two individuals, it is difficult to determine the precise point at which it is fair to say that the argument began. I am afraid that in the matter of Cyprus one cannot simply pick the moment at which the Turkish forces landed in Cyprus. As a British member of parliament, I must go back to what took place after the Zurich agreements and during the period before the Turks invaded. In what I am about to say, I mean no offence to my Greek friends who have no responsibility for what happened there. However, we all know in our hearts and minds that during that intervening period the proposal in the Zurich agreements for Turkish participation in the government of the island was never implemented.

Therefore, if we are to try to reach an impartial and objective view of what took place,

and if we have any hope of securing the understanding of the Turkish community in Cyprus and of Turkey itself, we cannot choose for the beginning of the dispute the arbitrary moment at which the Turkish invasion took place. We have to look further back than that, and further back than the colonels. We have to look back to the time when President Makarios did not interpret the Zurich agreements in the same way as did the various powers concerned which solemnly adhered to those agreements.

This is not to excuse any unlawful acts which followed. However, one cannot make a balanced judgment unless one examines the circumstances leading up to a situation rather than looking merely at the situation itself. One of the greatest difficulties in the way of resolving the current problem is that unfortunately, because of those events and because of what took place after the conclusion of the Zurich agreement and up to the moment when the invasion by the Turks took place, the Turks on both the island and the mainland no longer had any confidence in President Makarios' ability to restore unity of any sort, federal or otherwise, to the island.

It is no good saying that President Makarios has learned his lesson and that he will be a different man from now on. If one goes to Cyprus, Greece or Turkey, as I and many others have done, one discovers a fundamental distrust of President Makarios on the part of the Turkish community. In these circumstances, it is to be regretted that Mr. Clerides no longer plays a leading rôle on the island, because there were moments when one hoped that a new start might be made in reaching some agreement.

What is to be done today? I believe that the only hope is for a very loose federal solution. I stress the words "very loose". It may become a more effective and unified federation in the future, but there are too many wounds for this to happen all at once. All that we can hope, if we are not to have a permanently divided island or any other of the less happy consequences, is that the two communities will learn to live together again within a federation and somehow regain the trust in one another which they currently lack.

We should therefore try to produce a federal system, which at the beginning would have to be very loose indeed but which, as the two communities grew together and recovered their mutual trust, could develop into a more effective system.

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

The difficulty is a familiar one to politicians : which comes first, the chicken or the egg ? The Turks say that they want a loose federation ; the Greeks say that before they can take part in any discussion about federation there must be a redistribution of the territory of Cyprus which is more equitable to their population percentages than the present situation. There are very real difficulties here. We heard the Greek Foreign Minister use percentage figures, but we must remember that prior to the Turkish invasion the Turkish community always had a much more substantial proportion of the territorial area of Cyprus — according, at least, to official British figures — than 18 %. The explanation of this lies largely in the fact that the Turks were the rural community. I agree, however, with the Minister when it comes to the division of the economic resources of the island, and I suggest that that is a better argument on which to base a more equitable division of the land than mere mention of acreages, which is perhaps not a very wise tactic to pursue.

Who will give way first ? Do the Turks agree to give up some of the land which they now occupy in order to persuade the Greeks to talk about a federal system ? Or do the Greeks undertake to rely on the federal system and hope that, later, those concerned in the north will give up some of the land ?

In the face of such an intractable situation, all that one can do is to warn both sides that the longer a solution is delayed, the more difficult it will be to achieve one. If people live in an area for three or four growing seasons and harvests, it becomes incredibly difficult, in both human and political terms, to persuade those who have occupied that land to move all over again.

I ask our friends on both sides, friends whom we value highly in this Assembly, in Britain and in NATO, to start now, whichever one is to give way first, to try to achieve some sort of resolution of this problem. Within months from now it will become more intractable. Within years it will become totally impossible to resolve, other than on the basis of a permanently partitioned island. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Sir Frederic.

4. Designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly

(Motion for a Resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 727)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We are now going to adjourn the debate for a few minutes in order to decide about the request for a debate under the urgent procedure on a motion for a resolution on the designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly, Document 727.

I call Mr. Urwin on a point of order.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President, are you now proposing to close the preceding debate in order to go on to this other question, or will the debate be resumed afterwards ?

The PRESIDENT. — I am proposing not to close the debate but merely to interrupt it for a few minutes.

(The President continued in French)

(Translation). — I would remind you that the next Order of the Day is the decision on the request for urgent procedure on a motion for a resolution on the designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly, Document 727.

The debate on a request for urgent procedure shall not enter into the substance of the question.

According to the Rules of Procedure, in connection with a request for urgent procedure, the following only shall be heard : one speaker for the request, one speaker against, the Chairman of the Committee concerned and a representative of the Bureau of the Assembly speaking in its name.

I call Mr. Burckel to move the urgent procedure.

Mr. BURCKEL (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in my report this morning I intimated what our courses of action in this matter might possibly be. I said that the Assembly would perhaps be well-advised to invite the representatives of Greece and Turkey to attend our discussions as permanent observers.

This motion for a resolution was presented in Committee, but it became very quickly apparent that, for procedural and constitutional reasons, it

Mr. Burckel (continued)

was perhaps premature to discuss it in the General Affairs Committee, especially as this motion for a resolution would have to be considered by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

It was finally agreed in Committee that the motion for a resolution would be tabled at a public sitting of the Assembly by ten of its members, and that the urgent procedure would be requested.

There were discussions on this, but no definite stand was taken. I do not intend to enlarge upon the arguments which might militate in favour of considering the substantive motion, since that is not the purpose of my speech, but I merely want to say that we think it would be helpful if the matter could be thoroughly examined by the competent Committee and that, so far as the urgent procedure proper is concerned, we shall leave it to the wisdom of the Assembly, without undue insistence.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Channon, you may take the floor.

Mr. CHANNON (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to oppose the motion that we should adopt the urgent procedure in this case. I do so not because I believe it is necessarily wrong that we should have permanent Greek and Turkish observers but because I believe that this is a matter which ought to be decided by the appropriate Committees, and that it is for the Assembly to take a decision at leisure and not in a rush. After all, there are a number of very important considerations. If we are to have permanent Greek and Turkish observers, why should we not have permanent Portuguese, Spanish, American, Canadian, Danish or Norwegian observers? All these countries have problems that are extremely relevant to the problems of WEU. All these matters ought to be considered by the appropriate Committees.

If the resolution is carried tomorrow and we have a debate under the urgent procedure, we shall, in effect, be deciding permanently that there shall be ten permanent Greek observers and twenty permanent Turkish observers. We shall have taken no decision about observers from other countries with other equally important and interesting claims to be present here. I ask the Assembly to vote against the urgent procedure and to ask for this matter to be referred to

the appropriate Committees for a report on the whole question of observers, both in this and in other cases, so that the Assembly may decide at leisure the appropriate forum for observers, what their numbers should be and who should be represented.

I believe that it would be quite unfair for us in isolation to decide that, alone among all other countries interested in our problems, we should permanently admit the Greeks and the Turks without any discussion and with only a few hours' consideration. Therefore, I urge my colleagues in the Assembly to vote against the urgent procedure, to refer this matter to the appropriate Committees and in due course to have a report from those Committees; and then for the Assembly to make a decision at the appropriate time when all of us have given this matter the mature consideration that it deserves. Surely there can be no urgency. It is an important matter that deserves mature consideration, not a rushed decision today or tomorrow. Therefore, I ask the Assembly to vote against Mr. Burckel's motion and to ask the appropriate Committees to consider this matter and to refer back to us.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Channon.

(The President continued in French)

(Translation). — In the absence of the Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, I invite one of its members to give his opinion on applying the urgent procedure.

I call Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — As Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, I should like to support what Mr. Channon has just said. It seems to me that if we were to adopt this resolution this afternoon we should be rushing a very important fence. The points made by Mr. Channon are cogent and to the point. We all desire that Greece and Turkey should fulfil their respective full parts in the community of nations in Europe in every way, in every degree and to the full. But it seems to me that if we were to pass the resolution this afternoon as a matter of urgent procedure we should be rushing a question of great gravity which requires most careful consideration by this Assembly. I do not wish to press the matter further. It is one of gravity and of weight. It deserves our serious consideration, the kind of consideration which we shall have given after

Mr. Grieve (continued)

mature thought and deliberation. For these reasons, I support Mr. Channon and oppose the resolution.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

(The President continued in French)

(Translation). — In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, I shall take a vote on the request for a debate under urgent procedure by sitting and standing.

Sir John RODGERS (*United Kingdom*). — With due respect, Mr. President, according to the Rules of Procedure the Chairman of the appropriate Committee should be allowed to speak on a request for the urgent procedure but should not enter into the substance of it other than to justify the request or seek rejection of the urgent procedure, and in respect of a request for urgent procedure only the following shall be heard: one speaker for the request, one speaker against, the Chairman of the Committee concerned and a representative of the Bureau. I suggest that, as acting Chairman of the Committee, I have a right to speak before a vote is taken.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — I request the floor on a point of order.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Radius on a point of order.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — I am astonished that anyone should be allowed to speak, in contravention of the Rules of Procedure, once voting has started — regardless of the opinion expressed.

Mr. BURCKEL (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. Radius is right.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The voting will continue.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

(The request for urgent procedure was negatived)

The request is accordingly referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Sir John RODGERS (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. This is very important. The Chairman of the appropriate

Committee should be allowed to speak and to speak for the Committee, because this subject came up on 8th November. The British members were not present. No decision was taken at that meeting in favour or against, but Mr. Burckel was allowed to put forward a motion signed by ten members of the Committee. Actually, it is signed by ten members of the Assembly, not all of them members of the Committee. Therefore, it is very important that the General Affairs Committee should have expressed a view, Mr. President, before you called a vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I must tell the speaker that the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges is the competent body for considering the request for urgent procedure and the substance of the motion, and not any other Committee.

I call Mr. Radius.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — If you will allow me, I should like to say that at no time did I wish to cut Sir John short. I agree that he has a perfect right to speak, provided that he comes forward at the right time. My objection was that he, or anybody else, should take the floor while voting is in progress. That is all.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — In explanation of my vote — and I think I can also speak for all our co-signatories — I believe we are heading towards a virtually unanimous interpretation of the Assembly's will in the matter, including the originators of the motion.

Now that our Chairman, Mr. Radius, has clarified the procedure to be followed, I would say — and it is my own view, which I think is shared by others — that the vote just taken is no criticism of the underlying aim of the motion, on the contrary, and that if the motion for urgent procedure has at least allowed the Assembly to demonstrate its interest, we are all quite happy about it.

My co-signatories and I gladly fall in with the solution adopted: it is an entirely proper matter to be referred to this Committee, which should consider it and report back at the next session. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — That discussion is now closed and the vote has been taken.

5. *Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems*

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 719)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall resume the debate on Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems.

In the debate, I call Mr. Radius.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I really am very sorry that this debate should be limited to the problems of the Eastern Mediterranean, the General Affairs Committee having only been able to do the preparatory work for a report on the Western Mediterranean; Mr. Burckel's excellent report is therefore the only paper tabled concerning Mediterranean problems.

It appears to me that Mr. Burckel's thoughts could have gained in topicality and interest had they been accompanied by some illuminating comments on Spain, in particular.

Honour where honour is due. Mr. Burckel does raise the point in paragraph 3 of his report. He says the progressive re-establishment of democracy in Spain affords a major opportunity for strengthening and asserting a European presence in the Mediterranean. This emphasises that the forging of further links between Europe and Spain constitutes an essential aspect of the Mediterranean policy now taking shape on a European scale not only in the economic and commercial spheres but also in that of political co-operation.

Mr. Burckel's proposals, to which I fully subscribe, tend to encourage more active intervention by Europe in the Mediterranean to counter the uncertainty that hangs over the future of NATO and the growth of the Soviet threat.

This general orientation, which I hope will commend itself to this Assembly, should induce Europe to turn towards Spain with the proposal that it should participate in its unification and in determining its future guidelines. Spain is steadily drawing closer to our own political and social pattern. In recent months, progress towards democracy has been speeded up. In a few week's time, the Spanish people will pronounce by referendum on a radical constitutional reform. They will decide whether Spain shall be given a parliament comprising two chambers, the Congress of Deputies, and the Senate, elected by

direct universal suffrage, apart from a handful of senators who will be appointed by the Crown. This parliament will be invested with the fullest legislative power, and will share constitutional powers with the government.

This decisive democratisation of Spain's political institutions marks the completion of a peaceful and orderly process, in which all the basic liberties have been gradually recognised and confirmed. Trade union freedom, in practice authorised within the limits imposed by the requirements of public order, is on the point of being legally recognised. Freedom of the press is already established, at any rate for all objective and impartial observers who have had occasion to visit Spain.

These are events of capital importance that cannot be ignored by this Assembly and will in the near future have extremely beneficial consequences on Europe's security. The Spain of today, which is fully eligible to participate in the construction of Europe, is in fact capable of considerably strengthening the unity of Western Europe and adding to the weight it carries in the world.

Thanks to its traditional relations with certain African countries, especially Morocco, Spain will enhance Europe's capability for dialogue and co-operation with the less industrialised Mediterranean countries. In its foreign policy options, marked by a concern for independence, it will encourage Europe to assert its own personality in respect of outside influences. By favouring exchanges of all kinds between Europe and the countries bordering on the Mediterranean, Spain will compel us not to limit ourselves to the economic integration of the countries of Northern Europe in the framework of a vast Atlantic free-trade area. It will also spur us on to seek means for associating Southern Europe more closely in a process of European unification, which has been for too long dominated by the more powerful regions in the northern sector of our continent.

True, difficulties will continue to exist, especially in economics. As in the case of Greece and Turkey, Spain's accession to the European Community presupposes mutual concessions on both sides. States applying for accession will in fact have to take account of what has been achieved by the common agricultural policy, while member States will have to make a special effort to facilitate a more balanced economic and industrial development of the future enlarged Community.

Mr. Radius (continued)

However, there is one decisive political argument that should persuade us to opt for Spain's admission to the European organisations, whether the European Community, WEU and, consequently, the Council of Europe.

No time must be lost in encouraging and consolidating Spain's advance towards democracy. Let us not forget that the economic outlook in Spain at the present time is hardly rosy, despite the recent adoption of a courageous and forthright plan of stabilisation. In fact, added to the difficulties encountered by all countries obliged to import their raw materials are, in the case of Spain, the specific difficulties of an economy in transition from economic take-off to rapid industrialisation. The rate of inflation is likely to reach 25 % this year. Some 850,000 persons are out of work. These problems are liable to jeopardise the process of democratisation on which the Spanish Government has embarked.

Spain must therefore be able to rely on Europe for assistance. It is, in particular, the duty of WEU to help it to overcome its difficulties, without counting the cost of support but placing implicit reliance on the will for reform of the government of Mr. Suarez and King Juan Carlos.

Why should the Ministers of WEU not make a start now on exploring the possibilities for the future accession of Spain to the modified Brussels Treaty?

My sole purpose in what I have been saying has been to bring to this debate some complementary information on the situation in Spain which is, as I see it, at this particular time crucial to the future of Europe. It was just not possible to talk about Mediterranean problems without taking this aspect into account.

When I began my contribution, which has been over-long, I deplored the fact that not enough attention was paid to the problems of the Western Mediterranean. I shall therefore end, if you will allow me, by reminding you, at the risk of stating the obvious, that the Mediterranean runs from east to west, from Suez to Gibraltar. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Urwin.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — First, I wish to correct a misapprehension that obviously existed in the mind of Mr. Cavaliere, who quoted a statement that he said was made by Lord

Darling, who is not attending the Assembly this week. Mr. Cavaliere's reference could only have been to the speech of Mr. Dankert of the Netherlands, who spoke in Flemish. Even my redoubtable friend Lord Darling does not include a command of the Flemish language among his achievements.

I wish to address myself to the speech made this afternoon by my British parliamentary colleague, Mr. Cordle. I regret that he is not now in his place. It was my firm conclusion that the first part of his speech would have been better delivered in a defence debate in the House of Commons at Westminster than in this important Assembly. I refer to the part of his speech which was devoted to a severe critique of the defence policy of the British Government.

I thank the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece for what he said this morning, and especially for his assurance, which he repeated later during answers to questions, of the support of the Greek Government for NATO, and for the relief of doubt in some of our minds as to what the future might hold for the defence of the strategic element of the south-east flank of NATO.

In today's debate we heard controversial statements by delegates. I was pleased to hear the Greek Minister say in his statement that he was not dwelling on the past but was speaking of the present. In his presentation of the report today, the Rapporteur directed our attention to the present situation.

The two major concerns for WEU must essentially be to build on the strength of friendship that already exists between Western Europe and the Turkish and Greek nations and to consolidate those existing links, and to encourage both parties to ensure that there is a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus and Aegean problems. However, in his report, draft recommendations and draft resolution the Rapporteur says that the WEU Assembly and the member nations of WEU should be more actively involved in trying to achieve that solution. I find that premise difficult to accept. Indeed, I think that the final resolution of these difficult but not intransigent problems should remain firmly the responsibility of the two countries concerned.

Here I turn to the draft recommendations and more especially to the draft resolution. The second item of the draft recommendation states: "Invite the Greek and Turkish Governments to be associated with the work of the Standing Arma-

Mr. Urwin (continued)

ments Committee, including the study on European armaments industries." I assume that that statement may be regarded only as a palliative to Greece and Turkey.

The first question that I must ask is what use or purpose would be served by embarking on such an exercise? Participation by Turkey and Greece in the work of the Standing Armaments Committee would not facilitate the work of the Committee, nor would it have any real impact on Turkish-Greek relations, especially as the SAC has only been asked to draft and outline a work programme. It is not involved in any study of the armaments industries. It is difficult to judge to what extent other countries outside WEU should be invited to participate in work of this kind.

I revert to my original theme. The ultimate solution of the difficult problems confronting Turkey and Greece should be the responsibility of those two countries, not of WEU. The suggestion that WEU should become more closely involved sounds attractive at first sight, but such action could produce imponderable difficulties for WEU.

The fact that the problems of those two countries would be fought out more or less in open forum might not add strength to the cause of either Turkey or Greece. In fact, it might subtract to some extent from their resolved intentions to try to reach satisfactory conclusions. It might well strengthen entrenched positions on either side.

Since the Rapporteur referred in paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation to the United Nations, I should have preferred him to include a more specific and direct reference to the United Nations Security Council and to the United Nations Secretary-General, who has already been asked to use his personal good offices to bring about a settlement through the forum of inter-communal talks which are held under his auspices.

It is well known that there have been one or two difficulties in getting the two sides together, but I understand that these difficulties arise largely on purely procedural issues. However, I agree with Mr. Dankert, who earlier today referred to the difficulty that would arise if WEU became involved in the dispute. He said that we should not consider taking on tasks

which we could not shoulder. I also agree with Mr. Schwencke, who spoke along the same lines and suggested that WEU should keep out of the dispute.

I conclude by sincerely hoping that the delegates to the Assembly will examine very carefully the six-point draft recommendation before casting their votes in favour of any or all of those recommendations. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Urwin.

I call Mr. Amrehn.

Mr. AMREHN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the Rapporteur has been extraordinarily successful; he has succeeded in getting the representatives of both Greece and Turkey to congratulate him not only on a well-balanced report and objective treatment of the problem, but also on the observations and proposals he has made. I would like to associate myself expressly with their praise and to extend it to include the fact that he deliberately confined his remarks to the problem of the Eastern Mediterranean. We did not, for reasons which are set out in the report, wish to discuss today the problem of the Western Mediterranean, and Mr. Mendelson, for reasons beyond his control, has been unable to submit his report.

Since, however, Mr. Radius has given us his ideas on the question of Spain, I would like to reply at least briefly. I share his view that stabilisation of the situation in Spain depends to a large extent on the economic aid which Western Europe, the EEC, gives that country. However, it must not be overlooked that stabilisation is something which depends on confidence that can spring only from the results of the referendum and of the elections. I would not reverse the order of events, but would press with even greater urgency that democratic elections in Spain should take place as planned in the first half of 1977, so that a duly-elected parliament can create the conditions for internal stability. The confidence needed to encourage investment in Spain would then return of its own accord. I would stick to this way of doing things and to this order of events.

And now, the report itself. It is entitled Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems. The subject is wider than a discussion of the Cyprus problem. Unfortunately, every time we want to deal with this problem we run the risk — as has happened in large measure

Mr. Amrehn (continued)

today — of reducing the whole discussion on Mediterranean problems to Turkey's relations with Greece or, more specifically, the quarrel about Cyprus. I believe it would be wrong if we were to persist, as we have done in the last two years, both in Committee and here, in this habit of making our Assembly a public forum for quarrels between these two countries over Cyprus. Public discussion of this question does not get us any further.

For some time we hoped that the help, suggestions and proposals which came from this Committee, and were treated confidentially, might result in some progress being made in the talks between the two countries aimed at settling the Cyprus question. But by doing as we do here, with the representatives of these two countries publicly taking up opposing positions, we are only contributing ourselves to a hardening of the situation; neither side can openly make concessions without being severely criticised as a result of political pressures at home.

Which leads me to think that we ought not to start, as we have done again today, delving back into history to find whether the chicken or the egg came first. Arguing who really started off the quarrel does not bring us one step further forward.

I would like to draw a further conclusion which might help us to escape from this deadlock. I take it that in this Assembly and its Committees we are all prepared to make our contribution, make suggestions and issue invitations so as to bring both Greece and Turkey closer to Europe, and very close to the European Community; and both to an equal extent. The Assembly has nothing to gain from giving one preference and letting the other progress more slowly. We are, quite simply, in duty bound to treat both sides alike and to encourage effective rapprochement between these countries and the Community in a like manner.

It is simply a question of reciprocal interests. The security of Central and Northern Europe depends of course on the security of Southern Europe. And the security of Greece and of Turkey depends on the assurance of stable security in Western Europe. This reciprocal interest should lead us all to make sensible proposals.

That is very easily said and in itself does not get us much further. But what I wanted to do

before any further discussion of political problems was to establish a principle, and from this principle draw the conclusion that a conflict can be solved only by concrete proposals, without which the solution will have no chance of lasting. So I reiterate, we shall not get any nearer to our objective by constant public discussions and quarrels. And by now all the arguments have been done to death; we know them all by heart.

In this dispute each side must make concessions. Today the Minister, Mr. Stavropoulos, said that Greece is willing to contribute towards positive achievements and solutions. I take it that is also the desire of Turkey. All I wonder is whether by itself this goodwill on both sides can be translated into acts when the two sides are face to face. Here I take a point of view which differs from that taken a moment ago by my friend Sir Frederic Bennett. I believe the two parties, if they are to have any chance of succeeding, must call upon the services of a third party, whom they must choose themselves, on whom they must agree and whose proposals they must examine seriously. When there are really unbridgeable differences, the third party must submit objective proposals likely to restore peace, proposals which will be recognised by both sides as being serious and helpful. Whether this third party could be the Secretary-General of the United Nations, I simply do not know. Perhaps the two countries will agree on somebody else, another government or some other body; perhaps the Council of Western European Union. I do not know. But what is important, I believe, is that both parties should agree to use the good offices of a third. Otherwise I see no chance of progress being made.

There are some further conclusions that I would like to draw. It would be pointless if either of the two parties were to try to become more closely associated with the EEC than the other. My understanding of what the representatives of both countries said is that neither would raise any obstacle to the other becoming a member of the Common Market. There must not be any fresh rivalry arising on this score.

There is a further conclusion to be drawn from today's debate. As the report suggests, it makes no sense if one side or the other makes its political agreement conditional upon concessions which are not relevant to the matter under discussion. It would be senseless, for example, if such concessions were extorted by threats such as loosening ties with the Community or with the Alliance, or leaving the Community or the

Mr. Amrehn (continued)

Alliance — though today we have heard from the Greeks that they are again seeking closer ties — or even entirely recasting previous policy. Whenever such threats are used in the debate, it seems to me that it is a form of behaviour which gratuitously hampers a solution of the problems.

Finally, may I make the following points in the interests of these two countries, Turkey and Greece. I do not think it is quite right when Mr. Burckel's report says that the economic assistance given to the Eastern Mediterranean must be based on a common defence policy. Unfortunately, neither the Nine, nor even the seven amongst the Nine, have so far succeeded in arriving at a common defence policy, or even a standardisation of weapons. Such a demand goes too far. I would however agree with the report saying that the Alliance must be maintained unchanged if there is to be enough stability for the economic aid given to the Eastern Mediterranean area to make sense at all.

There is moreover one thing I would like to warn against: in the report, the demand that both Greece and Turkey should become full members of the Community within the relatively near future plays a very important rôle. I want to sound a very clear warning against this. The Community of the Nine has its hands full maintaining its own internal cohesion and securing its continued existence for the future. Things would be made even more difficult for the Community and it would probably harm the associated States, if the attempt were made to achieve full membership for both these countries immediately or at an early date. Such full membership would further burden, politically and economically, the relations of the Nine with each other and would make it more difficult to give the aid which is looked for by Greece and Turkey. We should agree to consider these political problems too in relation to our own proper task, to proceed very cautiously and on a long-term basis, and for the time being to be satisfied with an association relationship until the Nine are themselves stable enough to admit further members. (*Applause*)

(*Mr. de Niet, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Tanghe*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Calamandrei.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, on the subject of sixteen Italian Communist representatives' stance of abstention on this report and its draft recommendation, as on other items on the Orders of the Day, I wish nonetheless to make a few brief remarks.

The first is that, beyond all possible doubt, not only are the consolidation and development of security and co-operation in Europe inseparable from the establishment of relations of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean, and especially bringing under control the tension and clashes that are still disturbing the Eastern Mediterranean, but also, I think, that such a solution would be one of the essential factors overcoming the severe economic problems from which Western Europe is now suffering: for to do that we have to restore order to each of our countries' own economies, and at the same time to international economic relationships in which a cardinal point is the establishment of fresh equilibria in relations between Western Europe and the oil- and raw materials-producing countries: clearly such equilibria intersect with the Mediterranean and in particular its eastern sector, and with a détente and stability which are still far to seek in the Mediterranean area.

Mr. Burckel's report recalls the amplification which the interest taken by the two superpowers in the Mediterranean chessboard has often threatened to bring to local crises in that area. Even if, as I think, we should not realistically overlook the fact that, at the most serious junctures, such interest has at times resulted in a convergence of views that has been decisive in preventing the crises from assuming catastrophic proportions, we are still bound to agree that the opposing presence of the two superpowers and of bloc policies has been, and still is, fundamentally at the origin of tensions in the Mediterranean, and that the mutual and balanced reduction of the opposing forces and their prospective gradual elimination are the *sine qua non* for relieving such tension by establishing a bedrock of security and co-operation.

This does not signify, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, that it is not at the same time vital, urgent and practicable for us to bend every effort to diminish and abolish the local and regional causes of such conflicts. It is to this task, no less than to the other major one, that Western Europe and its bodies can and should make a decisive contribution. In this direction everything possible should be done to

Mr. Calamandrei (continued)

induce Greece and Turkey to sit down together in the European and Europeanising bodies on which depends, or may depend, the promotion of safety and co-operation on our continent, and which may help to mend the quarrel between Greece and Turkey in the Mediterranean, about which elsewhere, outside the Mediterranean, beyond Europe's confines, more than one serious mistake has been committed which has not helped to facilitate a solution but only to make matters even more complicated.

We should therefore — I would not in this respect subscribe to the opinion expressed just now by our colleague from Federal Germany — welcome the imminent accession to the EEC of a Greece restored to democracy, and the Turkish agreement of association is also a quest for regular forms of contact between the two countries and the activities of our Assembly. This quest too may perform a positive function, at any rate of confrontation. But over and beyond this, I wonder, Mr. President — I imagine something of the same question-mark, the same puzzlement, is reflected in the result of the vote just now on the question of urgency — I wonder, and would ask of the Rapporteur, whether at this stage a closer and more permanent association of Greece and Turkey inside WEU bodies might, instead of helping to narrow the gap, not tend to maintain and widen it at that central point of intersection which is, as many speakers have already said, the problem of Cyprus, of its integrity, independence and neutrality, in that — I think it was another Federal German representative who pointed it out — it cannot be resolved without the participation of Cyprus's own representatives. And Cyprus is able to be a member of the Council of Europe but not of WEU, so that a conflict of primary concern to the fate of the Cypriot populations might, to say the least, appear to be taken care of above their heads, and out of the hands of their institutional representatives.

I would add one or two brief observations on the Lebanon. It is devoutly to be desired, as the draft recommendation says, that the countries of Western Europe will concert their endeavours with a view to making an adequate contribution to an effective solution of the Lebanon problem on the field which now seems luckily to be open, though not without aspects of precariousness and uncertainty as well as peril. A contribution not, alas, truly made by our countries as a whole

in the months during which the fighting in the Lebanon was dragged out in such a bloody and cruel fashion.

However, I do not think, Mr. President, Mr. Rapporteur, it is any use, for constructively defining the function of WEU, to formulate concerning the Lebanese tragedy such a severe criticism of the United Nations as is levelled by the draft recommendation. What is more, this criticism is extended, very pessimistically, to all the performance by the United Nations of its institutional mission, and to all the other world-wide organisations. In my view, such severe and sweeping criticisms, already lopsided in themselves, are also inconsistent with what the draft recommendation rightly says, in positive terms, in paragraph 6, namely that a key requirement to which our WEU ought to address itself, is that of urging the United Nations and other worldwide organisations to adhere firmly to the commitments entered into and decisions taken, on all possible occasions but particularly in the Middle East. What this implies, Mr. President, is the downright safeguarding of the right to their own existence and territorial integrity of every State in that sector, including of course that of Israel; it also implies that the implementing of United Nations resolutions on withdrawal from the territories occupied during war is one of the prerequisites for solving a national problem vital to peace in the Middle East, such as, let us not forget, that of the Palestinian people. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you very much, Mr. Calamandrei. We have come to the end of the list of speakers who are members of this Assembly. The intention is that tomorrow afternoon we will hear the intervention by the Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey. Then the Rapporteur will answer, as far as he considers necessary, the intervention of this afternoon. After that we will have the vote on the draft recommendation.

I am now glad to give the floor to our colleague from Greece who is present as a parliamentary observer to the Assembly. Mr. Stephanopoulos has the floor.

Mr. STEPHANOPOULOS (*Observer from Greece*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am glad to be able to thank the Rapporteur for the constructive way he has carried out his task following his enquiries on the spot in Athens and Ankara. He has given us proof of genuine impartiality, though that does not mean to say

Mr. Stephanopoulos (continued)

that we are agreed on all points. In any case, I have seen for myself that the second report — the revised version — is more impartial than the original one drafted during your General Affairs Committee's visit to Athens.

I feel it my duty to point out a rather uncompromising attitude shown by the distinguished Turkish representative, who does not seem to appreciate that the Greek Government — and I hope the Turkish Government too — is sparing no effort to find a peaceful solution to the problem.

The Turkish representative has alluded to the Bern agreement, I would point out to your Assembly that this agreement does concern the Aegean question but not at all Cyprus.

The distinguished Senator then spoke of the number of Greek Cypriot refugees. 200,000 Greek refugees have lost their possessions and their homes. Some of them may be housed in the homes of Turkish Cypriots, but what a difference from living in one's own home!

There may be a few Turkish Cypriots living in London, but you must know that they are greatly outnumbered by Greek Cypriots.

Referring to the Turkish Cypriot minority, the Turkish representative said that it was not a minority but a community. In doing so he stopped short on a formal quibble, without bothering himself about the facts. Possibly it is a community, but a minority community of under 18 %, whereas the Greek community is one of 80 %.

I now come to the very delicate question of Soviet naval units passing through the Straits. In the case of the Kiev, this is a very old story. I do not believe that the Soviets are so feeble-minded as to build expensive warships without prior authorisation from the Turkish Government to sail them through into the Mediterranean.

I always thought that the members of an alliance were equal, but it looks to me as if some are more equal than the others! So you can imagine how one member of an alliance can engage in bilateral negotiations to obtain economic and financial advantages for himself. Our whole history reflects Greece's fidelity to its alliances, whether in antiquity or in modern

times. You all know the history of the other countries in our Alliance.

The Turkish Senator spoke about Greek Americans lobbying the United States Government. Like yourselves, I am sure that in America there are only Americans, and that there is no meddling at all by Greece in United States elections or government decisions. That is no concern of ours; it only concerns the citizens of the United States.

The Senator put some specific questions to the Greek Secretary of State as if he had been addressing the Rapporteur of the document you are discussing. But after the address by the Greek Secretary of State a debate took place and it was then that the Turkish Senator had an opportunity of asking his questions, not now, when Mr. Stavropoulos is unable to reply.

Lastly, the question of the islands in the Aegean and that of European economic union were raised. I do not think that any of us seriously thinks that a few sparse islands, remote from the Greek mainland, could serve as bases for a Greek offensive against Turkey. On the contrary, the solid Turkish land-mass is close to the Greek islands, and that is the crucial point.

Greece wants to see Turkey enter the Common Market, as the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs has already said. We shall be glad to welcome them in, because we believe that in one and the same Community there will be no differences to resolve. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — We are now at the end of our discussions for today in the debate on Mr. Burckel's report. As I have already said, the voting will be postponed until tomorrow after the speech of the Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey, the reply of the Rapporteur and — I forgot to mention this earlier — the comments of the Vice-Chairman of the Committee on the debate.

6. European oceanographic activities

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 722)

The PRESIDENT. — The last Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on European

The President (continued)

oceanographic activities. We must endeavour to conclude the debate this afternoon by voting on the draft recommendation, Document 722.

I call Mr. Craigen, Rapporteur of the Committee, to present the report as briefly as possible.

Mr. CRAIGEN (*United Kingdom*). — This is the first full Assembly of the WEU that I have attended. As I expected to be called at about 3 o'clock, I now realise the feelings experienced by the condemned man while waiting for the sentence of execution to be put into effect.

I took over this report from Mr. Ray Carter, who became a Minister in Her Majesty's Government when Mr. Callaghan became Prime Minister. Therefore the subject of the report was not of my choosing. Indeed, most of the work on the report had necessarily to be carried out in the late summer. In that respect I am grateful to the Secretary of the Committee, who pushed me on to prepare the report for the meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on 16th November. The report received its endorsement at that meeting. I emphasise that this is essentially a progress report.

A number of points were made by the Committee. One of them was that the report perhaps overemphasised the environmental problems. Western Europe, which is a densely populated part of the continent, must be greatly concerned with anti-pollution measures and must be alive to the implications for water consumption and also for the fishing industry, which is an important supplier of food. To that extent it is essential that the ecological aspects of oceanography should be regarded as being of paramount importance.

Secondly, the point was made by Mr. Valleix that in some respects the title of the report was misleading and ought to include the term "maritime". Western Europe is an important trading bloc. To that extent, the free passage of imports and exports is essential to the lifeblood of the domestic economies of the member countries of WEU. The question of the management of sea traffic will assume greater importance in the years to come.

Thirdly, on the matter of defence there are a number of gaps in the report. For instance, Mr. de Bruyne referred in Committee to the

importance of nuclear developments and the development of nuclear stations. That is an aspect that I did not develop in the report. However, it could be included in a more thorough subsequent report.

There is also the question of submarine activities. Here, however, Mr. Roper will be presenting a report later to the Assembly. I did not think it essential to concentrate on that topic as I felt that I should otherwise be duplicating too many of his efforts.

Turning to the recommendations in the report, my original draft included the sub-title "The search for a common denominator", as I think that that is essentially what I am recommending in the report.

The recommendations are perhaps modest, but I think that this fact makes them more realistic. We must recognise that we are at the beginning of a struggle for the mastery of our seas, not least because they contain so much wealth below the seabed, in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean, which is of importance to Western Europe. The seas are of strategic importance for shipping and as a means of sustaining the domestic economies of individual member nations.

In the first recommendation I hoped for an elaboration of national maritime policies with the object of identifying common interests. I believe that attempts are being made by individual countries in that context. It would be helpful to establish the extent to which individual member countries are clear on their oceanographic and maritime objectives.

The implications of the report go beyond WEU member countries. Indeed, they go beyond Europe itself. We are waiting for the final deliberations of the current Law of the Sea Conference before we may obtain a clearer picture. One of my initial impressions is of the vast number of intergovernmental agencies, many of which seem to be doing much the same work. There is a tremendous amount of duplication.

National governments must recognise and prepare themselves for defence against terrorist attacks, not least on the oil and gas installations in the North Sea and elsewhere. Moreover, there are other types of hazards such as oil tankers and oil slicks. This is an area in which a strike force, with recognised experts who would be immediately available as a kind of fire service, might be worth studying at intergovernmental level.

Mr. Craigen (continued)

There is also the question of the policing arrangements for the sea areas in the North Sea and the Mediterranean. The question is whether there is a will on the part of individual governments to implement existing anti-pollution treaties.

This is essentially a progress report. It is one that caused me a great deal of thought. I came to it essentially as a layman. As I progressed in my examination of this vast subject, I came to realise how important it was for parliamentarians in WEU member countries to become aware of the implications of oceanographic matters for their domestic political situations. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you for your maiden speech, Mr. Craigen. I must now apologise to our British colleagues who, but for my fellow countryman Mr. van Kleef, completely fill the list of those wishing to speak. Mr. van Kleef has asked to have the floor as the first speaker. After him, the floor will be given over to the four British speakers who have entered their names. I should point out that Mr. van Kleef is also making his maiden speech. (*Applause*)

Mr. van KLEEF (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I speak both for myself and for my colleague Mr. van Ooijen. I was keenly interested by the Craigen report on activities in European territorial and extra-territorial waters. Though at first sight the report gives an almost complete picture of activities in, on and under the sea, I believe there is one topic to which no attention has been paid and to which I think attention ought to have been paid. It is that of the plans that seem to be afoot in the Netherlands, in Belgium and in the United Kingdom for building artificial islands in the North Sea, even outside territorial waters, for industrial purposes. In September this year a working party made up of mainly Dutch firms published a report on the opportunities that creating such an island or islands could offer to industry. The Dutch Government, in turn, has set up a working party to study the pros and cons of constructing such industrial islands, and to work out what the repercussions might be for the economy, for jobs, for the environment, for planning, for international law, military strategy and so on. One may guess that building islands of this kind has attractions for industry — one can, for instance, imagine mooring facilities for very big oceangoing ships, such as those with a

cargo capacity of over half a million tons; storage facilities for liquid gas and other highly dangerous substances; sites for oil refineries, for chemical works and for factories needing vast quantities of water for cooling. Yet the questions one can raise about the possible adverse consequences of building such islands are very considerable. First of all, it is still not clear whether building an artificial island in the open sea is technically economical and practical, even for the Dutch who have a lot of experience in creating land out of water. Then there is the question of what the repercussions would be on the social and health environment, and from the viewpoint of international law. It is still too early to say whether or not building these islands would make sound sense. I thought it was well, however, to draw this Assembly's attention to the plans that various interested groups in our countries have for constructing artificial islands off our coasts, and even outside our territorial waters. I did wonder, too, whether we ought to amend the draft recommendation in the report from Mr. Craigen with this in mind; but on reflection I do not think this is called for, since the recommendation is couched in wide enough terms that it can be taken to cover the point I have been discussing. In spite of the comments I have just made, I therefore gladly support the recommendation put forward by Mr. Craigen. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Lewis.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — This is the first time in thirty-three years of consecutive membership of parliament that I have had the honour of congratulating a maiden speaker. On this occasion I am particularly fortunate because I can congratulate two maiden speakers, one from the Netherlands and one from my own country. Let me direct my congratulations mainly towards Mr. Craigen, although they apply to our comrade from the Netherlands.

Mr. Craigen is to be congratulated on several scores. He did not explain to us that he was pitchforked into the job within a week of taking over from Mr. Ray Carter. He was dragooned into it. In addition, he has been waiting here for two hours to make his maiden speech. He has done exceptionally well in the report that he has drawn up but more particularly in the way in which he has presented it.

I am a member of the Committee, and I am glad that it took up the subject of oceanography, if only because we will now have a better oppor-

Mr. Lewis (continued)

tunity of studying the results — or, should I say, the lack of results, of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. The appendix gives the results of the fourth and fifth sessions of the conference. We can therefore ascertain the difficulties to be overcome before a definite law of the sea can be submitted for approval to our respective national assemblies or parliaments.

However, a number of solutions have emerged from the conference and these are now being worked into legislative proposals for our parliaments and assemblies. For instance, it is now commonly accepted that the territorial sea should be kept within narrow limits in the interests, as the Rapporteur rightly said, of freedom of navigation, trade and transportation. The limit is agreed to twelve miles from the base line, and passage through straits used for international navigation has been agreed to. It is clear that this is of great importance for the navies of our various countries.

In the package solution, an economic zone for the seabed and marine resources not exceeding two hundred miles from the base line has been agreed upon and adopted. The most significant change which has been introduced is that an overwhelming majority of the members of the international community now also support the view that coastal fishing grounds form an integral part of the natural resources of coastal States within two hundred miles.

Conservation of fisheries is vital both to the fishing countries and to the peoples of the world as a source of food. I am therefore glad that the coastal States are considering this problem. I am sure that there will have to be regional functions and supplements to national jurisdiction. There will be many arguments and debates. I only hope that these will be conducted on a friendly basis and that we do not see a repetition of what happened recently between Britain and Iceland. I hope that we can resolve the problems by discussion without getting into more serious difficulties.

I would recommend delegates to read Ian Smart's book, "The political implications of North Sea oil and gas", in which he refers to the large number of organisations throughout Europe concerned with oceanography and maritime affairs. He believes, as I do, that there are far too many of those bodies. None of them, however, has sufficient power or authority to

implement the necessary measures. It is claimed, rightly, that the Community should play a decisive rôle in the development of North Sea oil and gas, which is of such great importance to all of us in Western Europe.

It is often felt that, when a national administration decides not to hand over authority to the Community or to some international organisation, it is defending its own somewhat parochial interests. This is, of course, true. Britain is not the only country which acts in such a manner. When the Treaty of Rome came into being, many countries annexed to that treaty a long list of subjects which they felt were special assets and over which they wanted to retain their national rights, but within a few years most of those items had been dropped as being insufficiently important. Time does, therefore, help to resolve these problems. When Britain, Denmark and Ireland joined the EEC, we found that there were problems arising from national interests which we felt needed consideration, but most of them are now being resolved. I am certain that eventually this will apply also with regard to these oceanographic and maritime policies. It is a question of time, of discussion and of effort to reach agreements that will benefit all concerned rather than one particular country or group of countries.

I agree with the recommendation of the report. Some may argue during the course of the debate that it does not do enough to set up a Community régime for the development of North Sea gas and oil, something which, it will be claimed, would be advantageous to all European countries. It could be argued that a common programme and strategy for the policing of the two hundred mile economic zone might not be enough to arrange for a fair sharing of the burdens associated with that task. It must be realised that, while we in Britain will obviously undertake the major part of the policing with our naval forces, there are and will be costs involved. At the moment it is the British who are landed with these costs. If, therefore, the benefits are to be shared, so must the costs involved.

On the basic maritime research and development, a far more open policy could and should be pursued. It must be realised that while most of the countries here represented have a long maritime tradition, this tradition is not communicated to others. For instance, there is very little collaboration even today between, say, the French navy and the British. The oceanographic

Mr. Lewis (continued)

services of the various countries cannot even compare the results of their research and development efforts at the moment because there is no kind of joint discussion arrangement.

There is also the possibility that the wealth which is being created in the North Sea will lead to a sort of greedy, national desire to keep it all for one's self. This is a natural thing and it is happening now in Britain. I would even go so far as to say that it occurs on a regional basis, as my good friend Jim Craigen, one of the great patriots of Scotland, knows. We have our problems in Britain because there are those who say that the oil is Scottish oil. If we are also to have problems with more European countries demanding a share, Mr. Craigen will have something on his plate when he develops this subject. I am serious when I say this: we could have a similar situation in Norway between Oslo and the northern countries.

I am glad that the Rapporteur referred to the problem of balancing economic growth with the need for conservation of the environment. It will not be much good if we solve our oil problems and in the process kill off all the fish and spoil the entire area in other ways. We must, therefore, look at the question in its entirety rather than consider it as a series of smaller national problems.

In the background of the discussions on the law of the sea, the military aspect is of great importance. The outcome of the conference will have considerable influence on the military possibilities for the maritime nations. We have only to think about the nuclear submarines which now pass without the authorisation of coastal States.

As a first exercise, the report is excellent and the draft recommendation is a good one. The Rapporteur says that he started off as an uninitiated amateur. I believe that, after a very good beginning, he must now develop the subject, to the ultimate benefit of all the European countries and Western European Union. I wish him well in his further endeavours and I support the recommendation. (*Applause*)

(Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Hawkins.

Mr. HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to join my colleague Mr. Lewis, although we are on opposite sides of the fence in the House of Commons, in commending the report to the Assembly. Mr. Craigen has done a first-class job, as has his secretary and everybody else who helped with the report.

I should like to confine my remarks entirely to one aspect, that of food. I live very close to the North Sea, on the east side of Great Britain. We have the oil rigs and we shall soon have the policing of the two hundred mile limit, to which I shall not refer. It is on the question of pollution, possibly from oil rigs and other methods, that I want to draw attention to the dangers that we are facing, not only to the total food supplies in the world but to the fish supplies from our seas.

We have lost herrings as a major food commodity from the North Sea. We have landings of greatly reduced numbers of cod, on which we in Great Britain depend for fish and chips, which seem very important to most people. But little progress has been made on new breeding programmes or finding new varieties of fish, perhaps from levels deeper than those at present fished, or new varieties of fish which we could accustom the housewife to like. I believe that as a Community, and as a European policy, we must press on with this. It is said in the report that ecologists know that if the oceans die man must die, but I doubt whether even ecologists know that, even if the average politician or man in the street realises it, he certainly does not have it at the front of his thinking.

I do not know whether anybody read a report in *The Times* the other day stating that our food supplies, which represented three months' supply for the whole world in the 1960s, are now below three weeks' supply in the 1970s. This is very dangerous. We often hear of mountains of beef and butter, but, looking at the world as a whole, we are running very close to rationing or starvation and we must preserve the fish in our seas and discover fresh species of fish not yet known to man. We must also learn how to breed fish within our waters, in fisheries, so that we can replace the food supplies which have been lost to us in the world. I believe that if only the average man in the street — or perhaps I should say the average housewife in the kitchen — could realise how close we are running to rationing, a great deal more thought would be taken by governments about producing more food, not only from the land but from our seas.

Mr. Hawkins (continued)

With that particular point in mind I commend the report of Mr. Craigen to the Assembly and hope that it will be passed unanimously. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Hawkins.

Mr. Hardy has the floor.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — I shall certainly not take long, Mr. President. I believe we are all agreed that development of man's use of the sea and the exploitation of that which is under the sea should be subjected to amicable and sensible arrangement. The report points along part of the very necessary way and, therefore, I am happy to agree with previous speakers in offering my commendation of the report and congratulations to those responsible for it, especially my colleague, Mr. Craigen, even though, as Mr. Lewis has pointed out, he is as yet undeveloped.

Previous speakers have recognised the scale of the problem, and I would not disagree with them, but we ought not to be excessively pessimistic. I recognise that there are very great complications and complexities but, while greater international co-operation is essential, something is already being achieved. The deliberations of the Law of the Sea Conference and recent agreements in Europe which are becoming quite extensive are evidence of this. It is essential that progress must be maintained, and we need to reach agreement not only on points already made but on detailed questions of the economic exploitation of areas within and outside the two hundred mile zones. This seems to me to be a very urgent question which the world will have to solve.

We also need to see amicable acceptance of the need for each nation to defend its own interests, not merely in the way in which we in the United Kingdom are providing for the protection of our oil industry off our shores but in the way in which nations deal with the allocation of fisheries arrangements within their two hundred mile limits. Obviously, each nation must protect its own essential interests — that is beyond dispute — but in many areas quotas can be awarded to neighbouring countries, and every international gathering should be prepared to support that principle.

Even more important than national economic concerns is the need for the world interest in environmental wholesomeness to be well served. In addition to looking at immediate economic questions, every international gathering ought to require action to stress the need for oceanic health and maritime decency. The poisoning of the sea has gone on for far too long. I am a little reassured by the Community's action earlier this year in seeking to promote maritime decency. That is more than necessary, because some areas of the sea are becoming rather disgusting zones of domestic and industrial effluent.

If Europe can build on the recent accord — a welcome feature of 1976 — it will make a valuable contribution to the future not only of Europe but of international health. I am glad the report illustrates that the recklessness of pollution is showing a disregard for global interest. I was pleased to note in the report that the cost of undoing such damage is now usually greater than the cost of preventing it. That is a very important message which I hope will be widely noted. There are a number of points in the report which deserve recognition, but I believe that that one is particularly significant since it contributes to the process of very necessary education. For that reason more than any other, I am pleased to support the recommendation, to welcome the report and to congratulate Mr. Craigen and his colleagues on an excellent job. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. McNamara.

Mr. McNAMARA (*United Kingdom*). — This has been a unique debate because all the speakers in it, apart from our Netherlands colleague, have been representatives of the United Kingdom. Of those representatives, I am the only one who has a fishing constituency. It is into my constituency that the great trawlers of England, while we still have them, come to discharge their cargoes. I wish, therefore, to deal with two points contained in the draft recommendation and to draw the attention of the Assembly both to their importance and to the fact that they might to a certain degree be exaggerated.

I refer first to recommendation 3(a): "the defence by national coastguard forces or navies of oil rigs and other installations which come within that area but which are outside territorial waters". Before we all rush off to start making big or little navies for ourselves, it is important

Mr. McNamara (continued)

that we should sit down and consider the nature of the threat that might be posed to what is commonly known as the "offshore industry".

I suggest that there are three types of threat. The first is the natural calamity. That is not something which is to be met by a navy. Secondly, there is the question of terrorism. The question then arises whether conventional naval forces are the best means of protecting oil rigs and similar installations from terrorism or whether such installations are likely to be targets, because terrorists seeking to do damage could do so far more effectively and speedily against land-based installations than they could with all the difficulties attendant upon approaching a rig many miles out at sea.

The third problem that we are likely to encounter is that arising from conventional or perhaps even nuclear warfare. The question then arises whether these rigs are likely to be regarded as suitable targets for the highly expensive and highly sophisticated type of rocketry that would be needed to destroy them.

Therefore, I suggest to the Assembly that we must examine very carefully the problem of what we consider to be the threat to offshore installations and whether it may not be wiser to look at other means of defence rather than a system which is based upon outdated conventional ideas which, I feel, would be far more expensive than something perhaps less ambitious and more feasible.

That leads me to the second point, namely, the policing of the new two hundred mile limit. It seems to me that too much attention is being paid to the conventional idea of the protection of fishery limits, fishery protection vessels and support fleets. If within the Community we come to some kind of agreement with third-party nations outside the Community — what that agreement should be is a matter for future debates, although I could put forward a very strong case for what I believe it should be for the United Kingdom — or whatever might be the outcome of that negotiation, we could have a far more effective and efficient way of policing limits nowadays than in the past by the licensing of vessels and by limiting countries to a specified number of days' fishing efforts in various fishing grounds. The fishing grounds could then be adequately and easily policed by

the use of aircraft and the withdrawal of licences from offending parties if necessary.

That would be far better and easier than any artificial quota system that could be more honoured in the breach than in the observance. Indeed, it would also be a more powerful and adequate way of policing than the odd spot check by a fishery protection cruiser which might by chance on occasions find vessels which had been poaching.

I urge my colleagues on the Committee, when they are examining and expanding the excellent report of Mr. Craigen, to look very carefully at those questions. In my opinion, they go to the root of the problem in terms both of defence of the rigs and of adequate policing of fishery limits. It would be possible, not cheaply but not at exorbitant expense, to find a system that is capable of protecting the rigs and of enforcing proper fishing policies for both catch limits and conservation.

While I congratulate the Committee and my colleague Mr. Craigen on the excellence of the report, I urge them to give consideration to the suggestions I have made. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. CRAIGEN (*United Kingdom*). — In the interests of brevity, I wish only to thank those members of the Assembly who have contributed to the debate. All the points that have been raised are very pertinent to the report and are matters at which the Committee would wish to look.

I regret that, other than Mr. van Kleef, there were no contributions from other member countries, but perhaps we can make up for that in the Committee at a later stage.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — I congratulate the Rapporteur. He has done a first-class job. Although in the British parliament much time in the coming session will be spent in trying to get rid of Scotland, I assure the Assembly that we shall try to keep Mr. Craigen, particularly as we have heard recently that President Amin is ready to be the new king of Scotland!

We greatly value the contribution to the debate. We look forward to the development of Mr. Craigen's report at future sessions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Assembly now has to vote on the draft recommendation.

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

*The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously*¹.

7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 1st

December, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 721 and Amendments).
2. Address by Mr. Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg.
3. Relations with Parliaments (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 724).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.)

1. See page 29.

TENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 1st December 1976

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Doc. 721 and Amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Cornelissen (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Treu, Mr. Bagier, Mr. Bernini.
4. Address by Mr. Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg.
5. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Doc. 721 and Amendments).
Speakers: Mr. Brown.
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments? ...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 721 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The first Order of the Day is the presentation of and

debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 721 and Amendments.

I call Mr. Cornelissen, Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I will begin, Mr. President, by saying how sad I am that our old colleague Pierre de Montesquiou is no longer with us, because it was really he who took the initiative of compiling this report.

Energy is of enormous importance to the industrialised world. Energy is essential to the third world, for overcoming poverty and want. So what is the picture today where energy is concerned? I do not believe there need be any substantial imbalance, in the short term, between the demand and supply of oil, which is at the moment our major source of energy. There are more and more indications, however, that in the 1980s the demand for oil will rise to such an extent that it must seem out of the question for it to be able to be met, since many of the oil-producing countries are putting a limit on their output. The various talks I have had, as Rapporteur, in the United States and Western Europe, have shown me that following a fall-

1. See page 31.

Mr. Cornelissen (continued)

off in energy consumption in 1974 and 1975, this is now rising again sharply in spite of the very much higher prices. The spontaneous tendency to be sparing in the use of energy seems to have waned. I cannot help getting the impression that after being jolted awake by the oil embargo we are beginning to nod off again. We did not learn much from the energy crisis. So it seems to me that if there were another unexpected oil embargo a very serious situation would again arise in the industrialised countries of the western world; and I would not discount military conflict as a possible result. When one talks about energy, it is plain that the security of Western Europe is at stake. I do not only mean by this a direct threat to our security, but also a threat to our security in the sense that if energy supplies were to be permanently disrupted life in this part of the world would be thrown so severely out of joint that measures would have to be taken. Even without an oil boycott, the results of the likely developments in the energy field are already very serious. The generally-expected price rise of 10-15 % in the price of oil means an immediate worsening in the balance of payments of the OECD countries as a whole of 15 to 22,500 million dollars. Since there is no earthly reason to suppose that this will be the final increase in crude oil prices, I would first of all stress the need for a common policy on the part of the importing countries.

I do not flatter myself that the French President, before leaving for the summit conference in The Hague, had read through the whole of my report, but it did make me very happy that in The Hague he used the same words as those in the second paragraph of the recommendation. A resolute attempt will have to be made, based on a common policy among the oil-importing nations, to find a lasting solution to the energy problem, one in which — in proper consultation with the third world — a universally-acceptable policy on the use made and the price paid for the present-day energy media, and on the development of new sources of energy, is worked out. In other words, we need a world energy agreement between the rich and poor nations.

When I see that the United States and the nine EEC countries, with one-eighth of the world's population, account for one-half of the world consumption of energy, it is clear to me that we cannot avoid a drastic cut-back

on the growth in energy consumption in the western world. Between 1960 and 1973 energy consumption in the countries in WEU rose from around 500 to about 900 million oil-equivalent tons, an annual increase of 4.5 %. Continuing at this rate would mean that by the year 2000 consumption will be three times what it is today. I do not believe our society can afford this. And I believe this would be unacceptable, since it is a matter of using up scarce and finite fuel resources. This is why I want to urge, very emphatically, a limit on the growth of energy consumption in the industrialised world. I think this is one of the great challenges facing us in the decades to come, a challenge that can only be faced by pooling all our national and international efforts and all available technical and industrial know-how. It is against this background that one must see the proposal I make in paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation on organising a conference. The recommendation suggests that this conference should be held in the framework of OECD and not of the International Energy Agency, since France is not a member of this agency but is in OECD. If however it should appear from statements made by President Giscard d'Estaing at The Hague that French policy is changing in this respect, and that France wants to become a member of the International Energy Agency, then such a conference might perhaps better be organised by that body. Alongside governments and parliamentarians, there should be employers' and workers' organisations, and representatives of the building world, consumers' and women's organisations at this conference. The primary objective of the conference, I think, would be to mobilise all strata of society and then to work out an energy-saving strategy that would put a sharp brake on rising consumption. What I would have in mind is a halving of the current rate of growth within the next ten years — in other words, a gradual reduction in growth to 2 % a year by the end of the 1980s. With a policy like this I believe it would be possible to keep the total growth in energy consumption in the WEU countries over the next twenty-five years down to something like 50 %. This would give us time to develop new sources of power, such as solar energy, that can play an important rôle in the next century. I would urge, too, that good use be made of the time there is available, for instance for more research into the advantages and drawbacks of nuclear power. I do not think there can be any question of making a large-scale use of nuclear energy so long as there is no solution to the many problems that still

Mr. Cornelissen (continued)

exist in respect of safety and the storage of radioactive waste. Calling a halt to research and development in this field, as many people especially in my own country would like to do, would however be an ostrich-like policy to adopt, and it would be shirking our responsibilities and opting out of the game.

Finally, I would like to contribute one or two items towards the energy-saving plan I have been advocating. When talking about making savings, we might distinguish between three important categories — the public authorities, industry and the domestic user — because differing criteria have to be applied to each of these. I see the greatest opportunities for a short-term saving of energy in the home, in particular in the heating of houses, though I would add that there is still a great deal to be gained in the industrial and transport world on the fuel-saving front. I say “gained”, because saving a barrel of oil yields just as much profit as consuming a barrel of oil. It goes further than that, even. Saving, and not using, a barrel of oil provides many more advantages than using it.

Following on the discussions I have had with numerous people, I would put forward the following ten-point programme for making real savings :

1. Dramatic improvements in the way we insulate our homes and other buildings. The heat-loss from otherwise similar buildings under identical circumstances is, in the Netherlands, twice that in Sweden, because of the poor insulation of Dutch houses. Savings of the order of 25 % could be made at relatively low cost.
2. Legislation on the maximum permissible energy consumption for new buildings. A first step towards this might be to make it compulsory to provide an energy consumption schedule when designing new buildings.
3. Restricting the consumption of energy for heating purposes by encouraging area town heating, by combining the generation of electricity in the power stations with heating homes and public buildings — and other large buildings — using the area heating system. I would think, too, of having separate consumption meters in each dwelling, as well as improving the efficiency of heating installations.

4. Matching the tariff and tax system to the contribution made towards energy saving, thus making economic use of energy genuinely worth while financially.

5. Encouraging industry to make an economic use of energy by replacing old and inefficient plant and by developing energy-saving processes, by providing allowances and tax facilities. In the United States, for instance, the amount of energy needed to produce one ton of steel fell, between 1960 and 1968, by 13 % through the introduction of a new type of furnace.

6. Measures to increase the seat-occupancy of aircraft and other modes of transport, and a policy on the part of the authorities aimed more at promoting public ground transport than at supersonic civil aviation. The amount of fuel used per passenger/mile for Concorde is fifteen times that of a bus or train.

7. Introducing compulsory speed limits for road vehicles, in countries where this is not already the case.

8. Providing all major items of domestic equipment with an energy consumption label.

9. Research into the energy and health aspect of lowering room temperatures in homes, schools and offices. From data obtained from leading doctors in the United States, West Germany and the Netherlands, I gather that staying for a longish time in a room with a high temperature and dry air is less healthy than in one with a somewhat lower temperature. I think, therefore, that the overall upward trend of ambient temperatures that we have seen over recent decades is not without its drawbacks from the public health viewpoint, let alone that of energy consumption. In almost all public and other big buildings it is much too hot to be, never mind to work. A good start would be, it seems to me, to cut the temperature in government buildings back to, say, 20° centigrade.

10. Information and education of the public, to teach them to make sensible use of energy. There is a specially important job here for education, certainly where the young are concerned.

I appreciate that there are many arguments that can be put up against the ten points I have just listed, and that there are of course many other sides to the question. But I think it would be a good thing to discuss these points. Let us

Mr. Cornelissen (continued)

look at the pros and cons, and then come to a conclusion that can be based on balanced arguments for and against. The ten points I have given you should be seen as a spur to discussion, one that I feel is crucially needed. As politicians we cannot be content with merely saying over and over again that energy consumption must be reduced. I think we must go further than that, and put forward concrete suggestions on how we think it is to be done. I am well aware that what I have proposed is not always likely to be pleasant; but I feel that we have a duty to ask unpleasant things of people if this is necessary. And I am sure this is something where effort by everybody is well worth while.

Let me finish by saying that I am sure our children will, later on, be grateful to us. And thank you for listening so attentively to what has been a rather long speech. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In the debate, I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I will begin by congratulating my fellow-countryman Mr. Cornelissen, and the Committee, on the report and its recommendation, and further by congratulating the Rapporteur on his excellent explanatory memorandum. I do so not only because this is traditional in our Assembly, but because this is an extremely interesting and, to a very large measure, convincing report, and because the recommendation is certainly worthy of being adopted.

Before talking about the report itself, I want to make a couple of comments on the by no means new question of whether WEU should once again be producing a report on energy supplies and new energy sources. It is a fact that the European Communities do concern themselves a great deal with these problems, and bring out report after report on the subject. It is also a fact that the Council of Europe has adopted a number of reports, recommendations and resolutions on the subject. It is a fact, too, that OECD and the International Atomic Energy Agency have published a great deal on the subject — so why yet another WEU report after the earlier one on energy problems? Because, the Committee and Rapporteur tell us, there is a close connection between European security and the energy problem. I do not deny that this is true; so I looked at once for a more

searching examination of this connection. But apart from two or three sentences I found practically nothing. It is incredible, but true. The report and recommendation talk, among other things, about nuclear energy. We all know that to operate breeder reactors you have to process and transport plutonium 239. Now plutonium 239 has a half-life of more than twenty-four thousand years, and is looked on as one of the most poisonous substances there is. If you inhale one-hundredth of a milligram of plutonium, you will very probably get lung cancer. A lump of plutonium the size of a grapefruit contains enough to kill everybody on earth, if it were spread out evenly among everyone. We know, too, that eight to ten kilos of plutonium 239 is enough to make a nuclear bomb with the power of the Hiroshima bomb; which means that non-proliferation is enormously important from the viewpoint of security. The report says not one word about this, while one of the member States of WEU — France — has not signed the non-proliferation treaty. I do therefore beg the Rapporteur and the Committee to look at this extremely important matter.

Now I want to say something about Western European Union in connection with energy problems and security. I might point out that Protocol No. III to the modified Brussels Treaty tells us that the Federal Republic of Germany has undertaken not to produce on its territory any nuclear or biological or chemical weapons, as defined in Annex II to the Protocol. In paragraph 1 (c) of this Annex nuclear fuel is defined, *inter alia*, as uranium enriched to over 2.1 % by weight. If at any time an enrichment plant were set up in the Federal Republic and this kind of uranium were produced there, this would not necessarily clash with the provisions of the Protocol, since it would depend on the use to which the uranium was put. Yet this WEU report says not one word about this. I ask the Rapporteur and the Committee, therefore, whether or not such uranium can be used in the Federal Republic for industrial purposes of a non-scientific kind, and if it can be used for industrial purposes whether it may be used without any restriction. If I cannot be given an answer now, I would be grateful to have one later.

Now I come to the report and the recommendation itself. There are three comments I want to make. In the first place, the report says, quite rightly, that the conventional sources of energy are likely to run dry, and that therefore we must both avoid wasting energy and develop alter-

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

native sources. If we do not, things could grind to a halt. As a matter of fact, I do feel it is unwise to work from the assumption that by the end of this year there will be a 10 or 15 % increase in oil prices, since at the moment, at least, an increase is no more than being discussed. Nonetheless, the Rapporteur is right, things are getting into a fix. Making sensible use of energy, and avoiding waste in using it, are very necessary. So on first hearing I can wholly go along with the ten points the Rapporteur has listed. My first comment is that there is an indivisible link between energy consumption and economic growth and the nature of that growth, which is why industrial production must be looked at from the viewpoint of its usefulness to society. Needless production — and this could well be point 11 on the list — must be cut back or prevented. After all, what in heaven's name is there to be gained from the tenth different kind of electric toothbrush, or the 83rd brand of washing powder? Then, we need to improve manufacturing techniques. An OECD conference on saving energy could be very useful, and women's organisations and nature and environmental conservation bodies should take part in it.

My second comment concerns nuclear power. The recommendation is excellent — no large-scale nuclear programme is acceptable while all the safety problems have not been solved. But the report comes either from someone other than the author of the recommendation, or from someone caught up in a violent internal struggle with himself. The report comes out 100 % in favour of nuclear power, which it describes with the words "inevitable" and "impossible to dispense with". I would remind you once again, as the Rapporteur himself did this morning, of the very serious risks that attend the use of nuclear power: the release of heat, the transport and storage of large quantities of radioactive waste, the risk of accidents, the dangers of proliferation, and the problem of society's acceptance or rejection of nuclear energy. These are vast problems, which demand serious study; and so long as no proper answer has been found to them, the commercial application of nuclear power — to more than a limited extent — is unacceptable. I agree entirely with the Rapporteur about this, and so I cannot agree with the report.

Now to my final comment. It is still very much open to question whether the use of

nuclear power on a large scale is inevitable. There is, for instance, the alternative scenario in the second report to the Club of Rome, which sets out, timewise and spacewise, three strategies. In the short term, that of assuring oil supplies in the quantities needed for the social and economic stability of the industrialised countries not to be endangered. The medium-term strategy calls for using coal and, subsequently, liquefying and gasifying coal as a supplement to other primary energy media. With a world population limited to 10,000 million, known deposits of coal should be sufficient to cover all energy needs until well after the year 2100. Reserves are, today, estimated at four-and-a-half billion tons. In this medium term the related environmental and safety problems — the many mining disasters, for example — will be, if not wholly overcome, at least mitigated.

The long-term strategy is based, among other things, on the use of solar energy. This form of energy supply certainly offers immense possibilities. Every day the sun beams to the earth radiation equivalent to 4,200 billion kilowatt-hours, and every day about 2,000 billion kWh of this remain to be absorbed by the earth's surface. The energy the sun radiates to the earth is 5,000 times greater than the heat transmitted from the earth's core to the surface by conduction, and about 60,000 times greater than the potential mechanical energy of the tides. Expressed in coal-equivalent units, the solar energy reaching the earth each year corresponds to the heat energy from 185 billion tons of coal, or forty times our coal reserves. Supplying 10,000 million people with energy from the sun would call for a surface area totalling something over 1 % of the earth's land surface. Such an area could easily be found in the earth's great desert regions. They could be found in Africa in regions which, now and in the future, have an expanding rôle as a primary energy supplier. And it would do away with their fear that when the oil wells have been exhausted they would once again have nothing left but the sun and the sand.

Summing up, I must say that all things considered the recommendation is an exceptionally sound one, and we shall gladly support it. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — We have before us a thoughtful report. Most of us would agree with its general assessments. First, I

Mr. Hardy (continued)

compliment Mr. Cornelissen and his colleagues on their report. However, we should be grateful that the report offers no detailed prophecies. Estimates of future energy requirements have over the past twenty-five years provided fruitful sources of prophetic error. More people have fallen flat on their faces in attempting to tell the world how much energy it would need than has been the case with those engaged in any other field of human activity.

One point which I think should be welcome is the fact that the report makes clear that there is an acceptance that there must be continued reliance on fossil fuels. Clearly those responsible recognise that sooner or later fossil fuel reserves will dry up and that if there are no alternatives man will face desolation. That, however, may be further off than some people have recently assumed.

There are reasons for hoping that we may extend the life of the use of the world's fossil fuel reserves. One method of doing so is conservation. It is right to stress that we should not waste any form of fossil fuel reserves. But there is a disadvantage in that. If we were able to achieve massive savings in our use of fossil fuels, and especially in our use of oil, we ought not automatically to assume that that would reduce our import bills. Naturally, if OPEC countries sell a good deal less oil, they will nevertheless still wish to receive similar revenues and, therefore, the price of the smaller amounts of oil that they will sell will be increased.

It might be more useful for us to seek to extend the life of our coal reserves. We can do that by ensuring that gasification processes are developed and by ensuring more efficient burning of coal. The United Kingdom's most efficient coal-fired generating station uses only 35 % of the energy that the coal contains. Every 1 % improvement in the use of the coal is worth millions of pounds. If we adopt sensible policies of research and development, we can extend the life of our coal reserves by many years. We can certainly do that before the end of this century.

Many people imagine that oil prices are already high, but in some countries it could be argued that they are not high enough. In the United States of America petrol costs sixty cents a gallon, and at that price the necessary research and exploration is not stimulated. If

oil prices were to rise for the United States and other countries, the desire to discover greater quantities of oil would be stimulated, so that once more the life of the world's fossil fuel reserves would be extended.

It is unnecessary for any country at this stage to opt on a mammoth scale for the development of thermonuclear reactors. That would be dangerous, not from the point of view of safety but simply because uranium is also a fossil fuel and reserves of it would diminish more quickly than those of coal and oil which it was sought to replace. Capital costs are also considerable.

There would be no advantage in developing large numbers of thermal reactors if that meant that the world's uranium reserves were rapidly gobbled up so that the demand for oil was reduced and OPEC merely increased its prices. Those concerned with thermal reactors have not taken sufficiently into account that man has not so far paid a proper and economic price for the disposal of nuclear wastes. That situation will be remedied within the next five years, and when that happens the economics of thermonuclear reactors might not be as attractive as was thought five years ago.

I am not adopting an anti-nuclear position. Nuclear research and development must proceed intensively. We have to ensure the development of the fast-breeder reactor, although I do not think we should be over-enthusiastic about an early realisation of commercial operation. Certainly the fast-breeder reactor presents a great scientific challenge, but most of us here would agree that there is a great political challenge which is almost as severe. I do not believe, for example, that any country should pursue energy policies which meant that it would be tempted to cut corners in the development of fast-breeder reactors merely because it had over-committed itself on nuclear power.

In some countries where fast-breeder reactor technology is proceeding apace there is a reluctance to accept, for example, that boiler technology may not be quite as satisfactory as those countries would like the world to believe. This is too dangerous a matter for the world, not merely for individual countries, to ignore. Therefore, the world must continue to rely on fossil fuels for a long time.

The world has rather more fossil fuels than it has been fashionable to admit. We in Britain have discovered a great deal of offshore oil in

Mr. Hardy (continued)

recent years, but the world may not realise the extent of the vast quantity of coal reserves which have resulted from exploration and development in Britain during the last ten years. I am grateful for the reference in the report to gasification, but I would have preferred a slight shift of emphasis in favour of coal and away from solar power.

A massive amount of energy is available from the power of the sun, and that will have to be tapped. But in many countries, particularly in Northern Europe, the idea may not be so attractive. We must accept that labour costs are likely to rise. The use of solar energy holds implications not only for such simple processes as cleaning which can become increasingly expensive. If we were to harness large quantities of solar power, the polar ice cap might melt more quickly, and some countries, particularly that of Mr. Stoffelen, might very soon find themselves under water.

We must continue research, particularly into the power of the wind. In paragraph 54, the report suggests that 12% of the electricity requirements of the United Kingdom could be produced from wind power. The report does not, however, say that to achieve this we should have to erect a windmill every 1,500 metres along two-thirds of our coast and that there would have to be a large windmill twice the size of Big Ben on almost every point of high ground. Some of us do not believe that to be without environmental offence, and there would be many critics of such a policy in the United Kingdom. I would be among them.

The report does not refer adequately to the use of the waves and tide. There are serious problems here. The cost of development and the risks to navigation are important. In Britain, however, and in one or two other areas there are at least prospects for a fairly early development of an alternative energy source. The Severn barrage, for example, could be developed this century. It would save, on present estimates, the equivalent of about five million tons of coal a year. Europe could greatly increase its research into this subject. Britain is already spending a good deal on energy research. Next year our total expenditure across the board in this area will exceed £250 million. I do not know whether the recent decline in the value of the pound will cause that figure to be increased. We are com-

mitted, however, to a fairly wide interest and concern in the development of energy in a number of forms. I believe that Europe could, with greater benefit, co-operate in areas of research. There is a good deal of co-operation already, but I am not satisfied that it is yet sufficient. Certainly it must proceed.

Europe cannot afford to put all its eggs in the nuclear basket, nor can the coal- and oil-producing nations of Europe afford not to ensure that their use is efficient and economic. The rest of Europe would do well to remind those countries that they have an obligation not only to their own future but to the future of their neighbours and friends.

The report is welcome above all because, while it touches on that which is novel, the flirtation with novelty — so excessive where energy is concerned — is certainly not repeated here. The basic, sensible concerns are not ignored. It treats a serious subject without levity. One can respect the approach which it adopts and one cannot quarrel with its conclusions. While no one can provide precise long-term answers to energy problems, Europe is in a position to face the long term with confidence because so far it has managed to keep its options open. It must stay in that position. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — In his report, Mr. Cornelissen describes one of the most serious economic problems which Europe has been and still is obliged to face in very stark terms and with great clarity. How can we look for continued growth *ad infinitum* when energy resources that can be exploited economically are available only in limited quantities? To cope with the strains that have developed on the petroleum market, the western governments have in general decided to develop other sources of energy.

The French Government took a very long step in this direction when in January 1975 it adopted an energy supply programme whose main feature is to provide for a reduction by 1985 of more than 30% in the share of oil in overall energy consumption and an increase of more than 22% in the share of nuclear energy.

Most western countries have embarked upon comparable programmes, which they have justified by using similar arguments: the supply of uranium ore is very much more secure than

Mr. Valleix (continued)

the supply of oil, the various nuclear reactor families are today well known, and their production costs are competitive ; electricity is the form of energy whose consumption is expanding most rapidly ; and lastly, the cost of nuclear-based electricity depends to only a small degree on the cost of the materials imported. Today, however, as Mr. Cornelissen points out, all these arguments in favour of rapidly increasing the production of nuclear-based electricity must apparently be severely qualified. Nuclear energy should not be abandoned, but it is important not to throw caution to the winds in developing it.

In the first place, nuclear energy will not enable Europe to free itself from a certain degree of dependence ; for the bulk of the world's uranium ore reserves is held by four countries : South Africa, Australia, Canada and the United States. Europe's supplies are therefore drawn from countries lying outside the continent, and their economic interests do not always coincide with our own.

So far as the different nuclear families at present in use are concerned, there are still many uncertainties with regard to their cost effectiveness. We lack precise assessments on the coefficient of availability of the reactors over a long period, on the length of time that they can operate, on the trend in building costs and on the way in which the cost of dismantling installations will evolve.

Finally, people everywhere in Europe are wondering whether the ecological effects of nuclear operations are acceptable and whether the harmful effects peculiar to nuclear energy — thermal pollution and radioactive waste, amongst others — have not been underestimated.

All these sources of concern about nuclear energy are shared by every European government. Nevertheless, we have failed to embark at European level on any real and large-scale co-operation in the nuclear sphere, or indeed in connection with energy problems quite generally. The hopes that were raised when in 1974 the Nine set themselves common energy targets have not been matched by any concrete achievement.

True, certain joint projects are being put through. Two European uranium enrichment facilities are under construction, and joint research work is being carried out on thermonuclear fusion, which could in theory lead to

the provision of practically inexhaustible reserves of clean and safe energy. Measures of co-operation are, however, either modest and scattered, or else devoid of any immediate practical significance. It is, for instance, estimated that the form of thermonuclear fusion which the nine member States of the EEC are seeking to develop will be usable for electricity production only in the year 2000 or thereabouts.

Thus, despite the fact that the European countries have similar approaches to the study of nuclear energy problems, and despite the fact that the energy situation affects them all, they are showing that they are incapable of forming a united front to resolve the problem of their energy shortages. Yet there is an extremely serious risk that Europe may see its industries forced to pay a considerably higher price for their energy requirements than its main competitors will be paying. The loss of Europe's industrial competitiveness could lead to a decline in its world position and, if the worst came to the worst, to the loss of its independence. It is accordingly necessary that the States of Europe should manage to pool their technical capacities and their energy resources in the context of a global strategy.

Among the main guiding principles for a European energy policy, which we have seen to be indispensable, we must include, as Mr. Cornelissen points out, the development of new sources of energy.

Mr. Cornelissen's approach, however, gives rise to a number of problems. It primarily consists in enumerating and describing fresh sources of energy. It would help perhaps if the Rapporteur proposed certain methodological criteria for classifying these sources of energy — we discussed the point in Committee, and I accordingly hope that you will be able to return to it — in accordance with the possibilities for their use and the priorities which should be laid down for their development.

In my own opinion — and here, I believe, my views coincide with those of our colleague, Mr. Hardy, who spoke just before me — two new sources of energy should be developed as a matter of priority : first, geothermal energy, because it has great potentialities, in particular in some regions where there are apparently "dry hot rocks" which could be exploited industrially. Efforts to promote research in this field as a matter of urgency are therefore imperative.

Mr. Vallex (continued)

Second, solar energy is immediately available for local use — on a small scale, it is true — especially in the southern and central parts of Europe. Unfortunately — and we must be clear in our minds about this — large-scale production of electricity based on solar energy still seems to me to be impracticable.

I have already referred to thermonuclear fusion. That constitutes an extremely interesting source of energy, but the prospects of effectively harnessing it are distant. Nonetheless, current research work must be maintained and, if necessary, speeded up.

Joint research at the European level is likewise essential in the field of fast-breeder reactors. These nuclear reactors, which produce more fuel than they burn, would make it possible to reduce Europe's dependence on uranium ore considerably, if it became possible to use them on a large scale.

These few lines of thought set in train by the existence of new types of energy should not lead us to forget that Europe has at its disposal sources of conventional energy which ought perhaps to be used to better effect. Oil resources should be made the subject of joint decisions on the tempo of their extraction and the amount of investment necessary. The European countries cannot forget the far-reaching solidarity which unites them and exploit their oil resources regardless of the aims they have agreed on. Here again, I would associate myself with Mr. Hardy.

Turning to coal — and here France's position is very different from that of Britain — we might, inasmuch as coal is often forgotten, once again call it a new source of energy; the only one which Europe possesses in abundant quantities. We ought to improve our coal-mining methods through considerable efforts in the field of research and development. I can see that in this sector a budgetary effort would have to be made and agreed, if possible, at the European level. We must, in particular, not overlook the fresh possibilities that the gasification of coal and lignite may hold out.

It is thus apparent that Europe's possibilities for action in the energy field are very great but the States of Europe will have to draw from within themselves the political will to make a genuinely joint effort in this matter.

To do so, it seems, Europe must open its eyes to two basic realities. First, it must realise how exceptional is the position in which it finds itself. The other industrialised powers have to face less serious problems in the energy field, particularly the United States which has at its disposal vast reserves that can be easily and quickly tapped. Consequently, these differing situations, which deepen the gap between Europe and the United States, lead quite naturally to a diversity of interests of which due account must be taken.

It is accordingly in specifically European bodies that the particular interests of Europe can best be defined and the appropriate solutions worked out. This remark leads me to express some regret that Mr. Cornelissen seemed to prefer that the conference on energy saving which he advocates should be held in the framework of OECD rather than in a more specifically European organisation such as the European Economic Community, WEU or the Council of Europe. But perhaps we could come to some agreement on this point. The amendment which I have tabled — and which is, I hope, now being distributed — follows these lines.

The second reality which Europe must take into account in working out an energy policy is the need to stabilise and improve relations between the third world and the industrialised countries. In the long term, the interests of OPEC and of the European States tend to converge, as OPEC wishes to avoid an unduly rapid exhaustion of resources while the Europeans want to cut down their oil imports. In the short term, however, we may frequently run into considerable difficulties. They must be overcome in a spirit of mutual understanding, with a clear awareness that solving the energy problem will demand special efforts on the part of the industrialised countries.

If Europe — and this is my conclusion — is capable of appreciating the true character of its situation, and if it shows itself ready to discuss and co-operate with the oil-producing countries, a joint energy policy will still be possible. I hope that the moment when this policy will be translated into acts is not too far distant; and in voting for the recommendation, I trust that we shall be contributing to that end. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Treu.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the subject matter of Mr. Cornelissen's report, and his conclusions, as to the urgent necessity of a rational planning of Europe's current raw materials availabilities, together with improved energy supplies — and so civic and social progress in all our countries — certainly command our approval and support. What I would rather underline is the truly astonishing dispersion in this area of studies, researches, conferences at technical, political and economic levels, whether nationally or internationally. And this is already in itself, I venture to say, a waste of effort.

If some of the points made in the report have the merit of originality, it is because they add up to what I would diffidently call ten commandments for bringing home to both individuals and collective bodies that there shall be no more waste of electrical energy, heat, transport and what not. But really, the whole of mankind seems to fail to appreciate this. Yesterday's *Le Monde* carried for its leading article and comments on The Hague summit of heads of government, which ended yesterday, the headline: "From failure to pipe-dreams". You would really think that, every now and again, heads of government and politicians — not technicians, who are a different breed altogether — wake up at the sound of a bell whenever, say, OPEC predicts a rise in crude oil prices, or some incident or other of a physical or technical character occurs in the realm of research. Then they rouse themselves and frantically set about studying what other people have already examined and found a solution for.

Without any pretention to being original, dare I point out the possibility of following one first fairly concrete track: rational research into and exploitation of certain substitute raw materials for petroleum and natural gas? As far back as 1957 it was proclaimed that liquid fossil fuels — open-chain petroleum products and closed-chain products like benzene — were raw materials doomed to rapid exhaustion, or at any rate to become no longer economically exploitable. The technicians had already told us so. Now we are realising, perhaps a bit late in the day, that even the 1957 forecasts were over-sanguine. We were to have been able to go on using petroleum to the year 2000, whereas in a very few years — two or three at most — we shall be compelled to start the countdown. So there we have, in my humble opinion, the first track to be followed: working to exhaustion two or three raw materials

still in abundant supply on earth. I will go so far as to say that exploitation of tidal power, wind power and even solar energy seems to me to belong to science fiction. Jules Verne might return from the dead to help us build the enormous windmills, dotted along the coastline, the previous speaker, our British colleague, was talking about, or dam the Straits of Gibraltar. These are utopian schemes. But I do think we could set about an immediate and rational exploitation of bituminous shales and geothermal power. We should also bear in mind the possibilities for using coal: the Germans showed us the way, in the later stages of the war. There is, however, the difficulty of achieving an economic and rational use of low-grade gas. But there is no reference, in the whole voluminous report, to oil shales. These cover vast areas, open-cast residues of bygone geological eras, which have not yet had the oil leached out of them. Solar energy can only be harnessed in certain parts of the globe. I have in mind a town of over 80,000 inhabitants in the Negev where the sun's heat beating down upon the houses supplies all possible services, with no need for any thermal power station, turbo- or oil-fired generators. But, as I say, this is only possible in certain regions where there is no cloud cover: it cannot be done in countries like Norway where normal temperatures are low and the climate foggy.

In the medium term, therefore, we should have recourse to coal-distillation and geothermics. Mr. Valleix is quite right, there are rock formations, steeped in liquid and gaseous fuels at high temperatures. We have had some in Italy along the Tyrrhenian coast capable of supplying a big city with thermal energy. But here is the second track: first or third generation nuclear power plants, with rapid accelerators or other coolant systems, are bound to be the next step. But even nuclear power is doomed to exhaustion, not only because of the risks and perils involved in the siting of the plants but because the raw materials — uranium or plutonium — are in limited supply, and not all countries are willing to use or distribute them as is the case for liquid fuels.

The second generation nuclear plants, now lined up on the fission process, constitute one of the stages humanity is fated to pass through. There are risks involved, but two different attitudes towards them: one optimistic, which says that the dangers of explosions and incidents during transport are now unlikely hypotheses, and the other pessimistic, holding that it is dangerous to site a nuclear plant near a centre

Mr. Treu (continued)

of habitation. Even in Italy, which stands in such great need of energy, there have been demonstrations against having nuclear power stations near populated centres because of the great accumulation of thermal energy due to the presence of such a plant. Just because the latter, to be able to produce the thousands of megawatts required has to be located by the waterside, the heat does not necessarily have to raise the temperature of the sea or river — in our case it might be on the river Ticino.

Indirect use of a nuclear power plant may set in train an operating system to guard against the danger of heat pollution, tapping off the heat to feed a thermal reservoir.

Lastly, there is a third track to which Mr. Cornelissen refers in paragraph 21. In my opinion, this third track could be the use of nuclear energy using fusion instead of fission. The United States has always wavered between enthusiasm and gloom, but has now resumed consideration of fusion — deuterium or heavy hydrogen — which has two positive aspects: on the one hand, ready availability of the material — you can find water anywhere — and on the other, possibility of using the "Bethe cycle" which leaves no residues and so fails to rouse those terrifying misgivings about uranium ore residues, which may indubitably endanger the world.

In sum, the nuclear material hydrogen is widespread, especially in sea-water, and its fusion leaves no residues. The big problem is obviously the transition from the laboratory to the industrial stage. But, Ladies and Gentlemen, none of us witnessed the birth of the electrical engineering industry on the morrow of Galvani's experiments or the Voltaic cell. It took a mighty long time to go forward from the theory of electrical currents to the modern thermo- or hydroelectric power plants.

These then are the three points I wanted to make. But let me remind you especially of the need for improved European — and not only European — organisation of the problem. Mr. Valleix is right: it is not only a matter of OECD or EEC. We have to get a larger gathering around one of the numerous round or square tables at which such matters are aired.

Why is there no mention of Euratom? It was one of the European institutions whose task

— unluckily left unfulfilled — it was to examine in a European forum the various methods of exploiting atomic resources, including energy.

Someone also mentioned the JET, Joint European Torus, project. I have no wish to wrap myself in a veil of nationalist sentiment, but I recall that this large organisation for the study and exploitation of nuclear fusion had chosen to establish itself at Ispra. Today everything has gone back into the melting pot. As usual, no sooner is an attempt made to carry out a defence project under European auspices than there spring up suspicions, difficulties, privileges, claims for priority. Even here we find *gaspillages*, dispersion of effort, waste of energy and of research whenever there is failure to proceed from the study phase to that of coherent political commitment, which is the most important.

I therefore think, Ladies and Gentlemen, that we must go on using certain existing materials: as I said, coal, oil shales and, of course, liquid gas. But above all we must press on toward the future, toward the form of energy which, maybe around the year 2000, will yield thousands of megawatts for a few grammes of ore, without any dangerous waste or residue, and will be available to one and all. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Bagier.

Mr. BAGIER (*United Kingdom*). — First, I congratulate the Rapporteur on his report mainly because I believe that questions like transport and energy tend to be left to one side in world fora debates. Everybody gets excited about different kinds of government, but nobody gets to what I call the nitty-gritty of what makes countries tick. In that sense the report is an important document because it will give rise to a debate of a far-reaching nature.

I wish to comment briefly on some of the proposals, in particular that leading to the recommendations on nuclear power. There is no doubt that this is one of the most important and emotive ways of raising energy in the world today.

Everybody is worried about safety measures. While it is true that the safety and health hazards involved in nuclear power are great, let us be honest and admit that the safety and health hazards involved in nuclear power about which we worry are in connection with accident potential, with some kind of sabotage

Mr. Bagier (continued)

and with the releasing of a danger of which we are all aware and the damage it can cause. This is the basic problem.

We talk lightly of the production of coal and having adequate coal reserves. This should not pass without its being said that coal is not easily acquired in the world today and that there is a large health hazard in the production of coal. Many people are killed while producing coal. There is the great health hazard of dust getting into men's lungs. Therefore, let us not easily forget this serious health hazard in the production of coal.

Recommendation 1 of the report refers to a worldwide convention on both primary and energy resources and to the developing and developed countries. Some of my colleagues, including Mr. Hardy, have spoken about the cost of United States oil at sixty cents per gallon and have referred to the fact that the United States, Canada and New Zealand do not charge what they call an economic price. I have a strong feeling that none of the member countries represented here would have been charging that economic price had it not been for the fivefold increase in the price of oil which came from the Middle East. Nothing crystallises the mind more quickly than the fact that one has to pay more for oil and that there is no alternative. Let us not be mealy-mouthed and believe that it would be easy in the democracies of those three countries to increase the price of their oil to the extent that we here have had to increase the price during the last couple of years. We have not done this lightly. We certainly did not do it because we wanted to conserve fuel. The drastic measures we have had to take have seriously affected our economies and the political popularity of whatever government happened to be in power. In considering recommendation 1, least of all should we forget the high price of fuel when talking about conserving energy by price. This would have its most drastic effect on the developing countries as against the developed countries.

On recommendation 2, I can be charitable to the Rapporteur by believing that, when he referred to the increase of 10 to 15 % this year, he may have been expecting to present the report in February or March in the belief that he would then have been rather more accurate. He must be regarded as a Job's comforter when he refers to an increase of 10 to 15 % this year.

On recommendation 3, which deals with joint planning, it is delightful that only this week we have been able to read the announced decision of President Giscard d'Estaing that he has now been converted to the idea of a joint energy approach to European problems. We welcome this and hope that such an approach will spread further afield.

It is to recommendation 5 that I wish to address most of my remarks. I suggest that public awareness of the shortage, or possible shortage, of oil has been brought about only by price. Nobody worried too much about it until oil suddenly shot up in price. Our greatest difficulty in persuading people to cut back will be because they do not think that a world shortage of oil or, indeed, of any of our natural resources is on the horizon. They will be persuaded because oil becomes expensive.

To give an example, one of the best natural resources in England is water. During the past summer, when we had a very long dry spell, we suddenly found that we were desperately short of water, and everybody became excited about it. One of the most successful ministers in the British parliament was appointed to deal with the water shortage problem, ably helped by one of our immigrant friends who, apparently, is able to pray for it. That minister is now our most successful minister and we are trying to get rid of our immigrant friend because, although the tap was turned on again, it was not known how to turn it off. That is our problem.

On the subject of oil and of how one is to activate people's minds to keep their energy requirements within reasonable bounds, in my view we must once again get right down to that which affects people most closely.

This will be the difficulty for us as parliamentarians. If we are to effect savings, we shall affect people and what they regard as their natural way of life. I do not know how many of my colleagues waited until the end of last night's sitting before going to the reception. However, if they wanted to arrive quickly it would have been easier to walk over the tops of the motor cars lined up outside the hall than to travel by car. The majority of the cars each contained only one person. They occupied space on the roads, their drivers having previously found places in this beautiful city in which to park all day.

Mr. Bagier (continued)

If we are talking about a wide-ranging conference, we must be prepared to say that our people cannot bring their motor cars into our cities. That involves a challenge which must be faced by each of our member governments in finding the capital expenditure with which to provide the alternatives. That will not be cheap. We must think in terms of rapid transit systems, fast, clean and efficient trains, and means of carrying passengers in bulk. We must examine whether we can afford to have numerous lorries going everywhere and carrying small loads when our railway systems are not fully utilised. All this involves interference with the ordinary, natural desires of our electors. We must convince the electorate that it is necessary to face the challenge.

In paragraph 65 of the report, the Rapporteur states: "It took hundreds of millions of years to accumulate these resources of the earth and with the exception of coal they are due to run out in a relatively short time at the present rate of consumption."

That is a statement of fact. Those reserves will not be replaced. But how am I, for example, to translate that into telling my daughter that she must not play a record of the Beatles in her bedroom while a pop group broadcasts on the radio in the bathroom, while her father wants to watch the news on television in the living room and while her mother uses an electric toothbrush? All these appliances use energy. They are luxuries and consumers of energy which must be looked at with thought and restraint.

I am not sure how to solve the problem of how best to utilise fuel and to educate consumers. The Rapporteur is living somewhat dangerously near the mark. I think he may be trying to be facetious when he says he believes that we may return from jet to propeller aircraft. That is an example. The more exotic forms of transport use more fuel.

I am in favour of pursuing studies to find alternatives such as the small electric town car. However, one of the most important factors is to implement item 5 of the draft recommendation. We must fully educate the people who elect us to our parliaments to an acceptance of the fact that we may interfere with their lives to bring about the desirable aims to which the report points. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I now call Mr. Bernini.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would like briefly to express our appreciation of the report by Mr. Cornelissen and the draft recommendation on the table before us, all the more topical because of the new strains on the market and the possible rise in oil costs.

My own and my colleagues' appreciation is not so much for the merits, however stimulating and worthy of further, even critical, development the document may be, as for the context in which it is presented, that of security of Europe's energy supplies, and of the search for new forms of energy which has commanded so much attention in this debate. To the question as to whether Western Europe should not, in order to safeguard its supply lines and thereby its own development and security, promote not merely European and Atlantic, but worldwide, intergovernmental co-operation, we agree with the Rapporteur that the answer can only be in the affirmative. Indeed, the growing necessity of diversifying sources of energy supplies in order to mitigate any adverse consequences of fresh crises and international strains, and thus ensure greater independence and security, together with the ever more serious risks for the environment, safety and health of the population arising from the spread of nuclear power, which place impassable tangible limitations on its spread and production capacity; the urgency, in consequence, of the development of research into the improved use of classic energy resources: petroleum, natural gas, coal, and above all of speeding up the production and application of alternative forms, starting with solar energy — though, as many preceding speakers have stressed, not only that; and lastly, the pressing need for saving, economising energy to counteract possible strains on supply caused by industrial growth — all these are problems whose solution postulates wider international collaboration, and which will in our view no longer allow governments to postpone a commitment transcending not only the inadequate national and intergovernmental level but also that of the consumer industrialised countries and direct relations with the producer countries, to further and strengthen, with Europe's aid and in the framework of renewed world co-operation, a short- and medium-term world energy policy capable of guaranteeing, together with the interests and growth of the third world producer countries,

Mr. Bernini (continued)

the security of supplies for growth of the industrialised countries and for the progress, peace and security of Europe and of the world.

To this end, Mr. President, we take the view that the recommendations may provide food for thought for, and stimulate initiative by, governments and parliaments, as well as making up for the lost time several speakers have deplored. Considerable importance attaches to preparation of the world energy conference which we think ought to be the widest possible and be open to all countries, and to the convening of a conference on energy-saving, also open to the fullest participation of all economic, social and political forces, as indicated in the Rapporteur's draft proposals. We also believe every effort ought to be made to ensure the success of these initiatives by the importance assigned to an energy policy.

I will conclude by saying that others before me have emphasised the meaning of our abstention, irrespective of any judgment on the merits of the debate. For these matters, our abstention is intended to carry also a particular sense of appreciation, of attentive consideration, thus corroborating the spirit in which we are attending this Assembly, and our pledge to pay heed, and contribute, to today's proceedings and the work of Western European Union. (*Applause*)

4. Address by Mr. Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I am going to interrupt the debate for us to hear an address by Mr. Gaston Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

We know you well, Mr. Thorn, from your appearances at the rostrum in the Council of Europe and the WEU Assembly. We admire in particular your ability and stout-heartedness in drafting proposals that are a really concrete contribution to the construction of Europe. I still remember a splendid speech by you on monetary union. After yesterday's meeting of the European Council in The Hague, we shall hang on your words with particular interest. You have the floor. (*Applause*)

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg*) (Translation).

— Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in these days when democratic governments are dwindling in numbers the whole world over, it behoves all of us to bear witness to our indefectible attachment to traditions of democratic control over not only our national institutions but also the institutions we have created for organised international co-operation. This presupposes regular contacts and sustained dialogue between Ministers of State and the representatives of their own nations gathered together in the various international assemblies.

It is in this spirit that I have particular pleasure in talking to you about the current status and future prospects of European unification.

Mr. President, glancing through the agenda of your Assembly, I can see with what lively concern you watch over the process of unification in all its ramifications, and what a wide spectrum you subject to your analysis, for you do not flinch from considering the most highly technical questions. Similarly, the prominence of defence matters on your agenda shows yet once more the original and, for a good time to come, irreplaceable rôle played by your Assembly in this most sensitive of areas. WEU is in fact the only one of our European organisations in which member countries enter into precise commitments on defence matters and, if I may say so, what commitments! Whereas the North Atlantic Pact only places on each of its signatories the obligation to "take such action" as it may consider necessary in the event of "an armed attack on the territory of any of the parties in Europe", Article V of the Brussels Treaty, on the contrary, requires its members to intervene, and I quote, with "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power", if any of them should be the object of an armed attack.

That makes you wonder, when you remember that these provisions were made before the North Atlantic Treaty was even negotiated.

Similarly, the creation in 1955 of the Standing Armaments Committee laid on WEU the task of dealing with standardisation and even the joint manufacture of armaments by its seven member States.

The upshot of all this is that this Assembly's powers to handle problems of the defence of Europe are not only politically and legally indisputable, but even unique of their kind, since no other European assembly has been specifically

Mr. Thorn (continued)

given such a remit. Moreover, being eminently competent in defence matters, it is also the only assembly having statutory powers to consider as a whole interlinked problems of policy and strategy. Consequently, it is only proper and right that you should be anxious to see your present function fully preserved within the framework of the future European union.

In this connection, I must heartily congratulate my friend Mr. de Bruyne on the remarkable report that he has devoted to this problem. Mr. de Bruyne's analysis, and the recommendation that your Assembly has just agreed to on a motion by him are, if my information is correct, a token of your total open-mindedness as to the future and of your uncompromising defence of the achievements of WEU.

If it is to live up to its name, the future European union will necessarily, at any rate at an advanced stage of its implementation, have to be given competence for defence and security matters.

Furthermore, to avoid duplication of work and for the sake of efficiency, we must, when the time comes, seek to integrate WEU into the European union rather than develop new institutions in areas where WEU has well-founded legal competence. However, until such powers are wholly transferred to the European union — and it will not be tomorrow — there can be no question of detracting from existing structures.

In this respect, your Assembly will no doubt be curious to learn the current status of the problem of the European union's powers, the day after the debate on the Tindemans report by the European Council at The Hague.

I must draw a distinction here between the document in the form of a commentary on the Tindemans report that the Ministers for Foreign Affairs have submitted to the European Council, and the action taken by the European Council on that document.

Let us first take a look at what the Foreign Ministers had in mind in their comments on the suggestions made by Mr. Tindemans concerning security and defence.

The first point to be noted is that the term "defence" does not even appear in the Ministers' comments. *A fortiori*, there is no question, as

Mr. Tindemans had proposed "regularly to hold exchanges of views on specific problems in defence matters... Exchanges of views of this kind will one day enable member States to reach a common analysis..." of these problems.

The Foreign Ministers simply felt "there ought to be greater co-operation between the nine member States in the field of détente and security". They suggested — and I underline that word — that in the case of international conferences on this topic, "the Nine adopt common attitudes".

Contrary now to what the Belgian Prime Minister proposed, it is not stipulated that such co-operation — and I quote Mr. Tindemans — "will also have to include that element of obligation which distinguishes a common policy from mere co-ordination".

The second point: as regards Mr. Tindemans' proposal to encourage co-operation in the field of armaments production, the Ministers felt that efforts in hand should be pursued with a view to harmonising the equipment programmes of the European countries of the Alliance and developing the implementation of joint projects. There is no question either of an organisation to standardise armaments on the basis of joint programmes or of any need for setting in train an industrial policy of arms production. The view is simply taken that continuance of the ongoing efforts will give a boost to industrial co-operation.

Further, "as regards the creation of a European armaments agency, the Ministers consider that this proposal will need to be discussed at a later stage, when sufficient progress has been made on the various points that have just been mentioned".

A third point, and a more general one — what came of Mr. Tindemans' proposal that: "Parliament should be able, from now on, to consider all questions within the competence of the union, whether or not they derive from the treaties"? This idea, too, was rejected by the Foreign Ministers. Moreover, as the Ministers nowhere propose to invest the European union with new powers in defence matters, it seems clear that there will be no substantial change in the foreseeable future in the European Parliament's occasional forays into security matters during debates on co-operation by the European union. It may therefore be inferred that a European union having full powers in matters of defence and security is not about to see the light of day.

Mr. Thorn (continued)

Western European Union is therefore called upon to continue its mission on the same basis as in the past. I am convinced that it will do so with the same authority and competence as before.

I have been speaking about the portion of the Tindemans report devoted to security problems. As regards the other chapters of my Belgian colleague's report, the gap between what he proposes and what has been accepted by my fellow Foreign Ministers and myself in our comments is pretty much the same as in the case of security.

But I must now say a word about how the Foreign Ministers' comments were received by the European Council. At first sight, the European Council had three possible options: to take over the comments in its own name and elevate at least part of them to the status of a decision, to postpone any decision until later — a three-month and then a six-month postponement were mentioned, or to pigeon-hole the report. In fact, it opted for none of the three alternatives.

As some of the bigger EEC countries felt that the time was not ripe for any decisive, qualitative progress or genuine decisions carrying a future commitment, the first option had to be very quickly discarded.

The utmost the European Council would do was to accept the Foreign Ministers' comments and state, in the communiqué you have certainly read, that it was agreeable to some of the broad lines indicated.

How many of our colleagues have pointed out to me that when, in 1972, it was decided at the Paris summit presided over by Mr. Pompidou to achieve European union by the end of the 1970s, they merely proceeded on the postulate that, by then, the treaties, and the actions, so to speak, implicit in them, such as economic and monetary union and a common energy policy, would have been implemented. As this is now unlikely to be the case, many feel that we should refrain from any fresh initiative at this stage.

Allow me a slight digression; the communiqué urges emphatically that all the possibilities available under the treaty should be exhausted. In fact, in Paris in 1972 it was felt that "union" could be interpreted in two ways: full application of the treaties, and the addition to it of something new. Today, we have to admit it will still take us some time simply to exhaust the pos-

sibilities under the treaty, and we may even have to come back to it in certain fields.

Further, from the same standpoint, it would be pointless for them to resume this discussion at the next meeting. So, the European Council simply approved the broad lines of the comments by the Foreign Ministers and "called on the latter and the Commission... to report to it once a year on the results achieved and on the progress to be made in the short term in the various spheres of the union which would make a reality of the common conception of European union". Only the future can tell whether the Tindemans report will survive, or what will survive from it.

What are the conclusions to be drawn from this situation?

First of all, I want to say quite clearly that there is no question of my allowing myself to be downhearted and giving up the struggle for a Europe ever-united and ever more capable of assuming its responsibilities. And since the "realistic yet feasible" approach, to use the phrase employed by Mr. Tindemans in the letter accompanying his report has, in any event, yielded disappointing results, we just have to appeal to our peoples over the heads of their governments. No sincere democrat could cavil at that.

Opinion polls prove that our peoples, all our peoples, are prepared to go farther towards European integration than their governments. They feel instinctively that not only their future well-being but even their security depend on it. So the peoples must be enabled to make their voice heard more directly. It is what we shall be doing in electing the European Parliament by universal suffrage.

Ladies and Gentlemen, is it not paradoxical and yet at the same time significant, that twenty-five years after the signature of the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, we should be unable to find anything more effective to advance the cause of Europe than the implementation of a commitment incorporated in that very treaty? This speaks volumes about the insight and truly prophetic vision of the founding fathers of a united Europe.

I am certainly not one of those who would contest the democratic character of the existing European Parliament, or indeed of your Assembly. It would be ungracious of me to do so. An election at one remove is still a fully valid one, and the resulting institution one having full democratic legitimacy.

Mr. Thorn (continued)

On the other hand, what we hope to obtain through direct elections is increased political authority for the parliament, an enhanced rôle and responsibilities for the parliamentarians, who will be given a mandate directly from their electors and be accountable for it, more direct participation by the citizens of our countries in European affairs, and a clearer perception by public opinion of European problems and achievements.

Oh, I certainly do not expect to see masses of our compatriots crowding into the polling booths as soon as the first European ballot is held.

Hitherto, our communities have projected an image too technocratic and unprepossessing to arouse more than a flicker of interest in the ordinary man in the street, in spite of his basic support for the cause of European unification. However, I do not doubt that, by the second or third election, the situation will be different and our compatriots will bestow on European politics at least the same degree of interest as on national politics. All the more so because, by then, our political parties will have fully acquired a European dimension. A good deal of my endeavour is devoted to that.

Indeed, once our major political families have finally formed their ranks at whole Community level, and marched together into the electoral fray, they will gradually learn to attack the problems of the day no longer in a national but in a European perspective.

But please do not misunderstand me. There is no question of sweeping aside national interests and sacrificing them on the altar of Europe. On the contrary, it is a matter of hammering out, by thorough studies and discussions within each "European political federation", proposals for solutions compatible with the interests of the European nations as a whole and with the specific character of each political grouping.

In this way, and more than in the past, the Council and Commission will find themselves supported in the mission of unification by the personal efforts not only of members of the future European Parliament but also of the rank and file of the parties to which these belong. Political proposals hammered out in this way will of course also commit the national MPs and the Ministers wearing the same party political colours.

In this way, our government representatives will to an increasing extent adopt stances in the EEC Council that will no longer be purely national but will already represent a consensus of at any rate part of public opinion in the other member States. In other words, the search for a common denominator will not merely be left to the Council or to the Commission, whose debates are enshrouded by such discretion, but will have the active participation of the peoples of Europe, making their voices heard at the polls and through their broad political affiliations. Thus, through direct democracy, to which we are all attached, and through participation, we shall enable Europe to gain the "second wind" it needs so terribly.

In Luxembourg we are in the happy position of having all the parties except the communists long since won over to the cause of election of the European Parliament by direct suffrage. It comes as no surprise to us that the Communist Party should be against it; on the contrary, it makes the situation rather less obscure, more clear-cut, less ambiguous than in other countries. Here we have a party which for decades has plugged "proletarian internationalism" and scorned the "sovereignty of nations" as an outmoded class concept. Now, all of a sudden, it has rediscovered this concept and become the champion of the interpretation given to it way back in the depths of the nineteenth century, when at the drop of a hat, the ruling classes hurled nations at one another's throats in the name of national greatness and pride.

Such an about-turn can only have but one explanation, namely that in communist eyes election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage is likely to make the propagation of communism more difficult and put a spoke in the wheel of a certain country that would like to expand over our continent. And that is what I think too. There can be no European independence without a strong Europe, and no strong Europe without the direct participation of our peoples.

But there will be no election by direct suffrage until 1978. Are we going to stand by with folded arms until then waiting for it to resolve all our problems, like some *deus ex machina*? Of course, there can be no question of doing so.

The Hague summit meeting clearly showed that on the brink of a winter which promises to be, economically, the bleakest since the war ended, and with economies that have not ceased to evolve

Mr. Thorn (continued)

in opposing directions, the continuance of our efforts towards economic and monetary union is more vital than ever. That is still what everyone thought at The Hague.

Similarly, the final phase of the North-South dialogue and the imminence of a decision on oil prices by OPEC make more cruelly felt than ever our lack of any common energy policy, three whole years after the last energy crisis, when we swore we should never be caught out that way again.

Besides, a second wave of accessions is on the way. It is inconceivable that we should enlarge the Community to take in countries which will as a matter of course bring with them their own problems without having made, by the date of signature of the accession agreements at latest, any decisive progress in certain areas I have just mentioned, and without any net improvement to the efficiency of our institutions.

Do you remember, Ladies and Gentlemen, how, in 1969, we used to joke about a "triptych"? Even at that time, we meant a deepening, a strengthening and a widening. Today, alas, we all too often forget the deepening and the strengthening, and only talk about widening.

How shall we set about it then? The results that could not be carried off in one fell swoop, in the full flush of the Tindemans report will now have to be painstakingly won by attrition, bit by bit, by the tactic of stubborn and persistent harassment which it will be, *ex officio*, for the Commission to apply.

To begin with, we shall have to take stock of the often bold proposals put forward by the Commission in recent years and now lying dormant in Council pigeon-holes. We shall find not only that most of them are still valid, but also that the solutions to many of our problems have already been carefully and realistically propounded and that all that is lacking is the political will to put them into effect.

Next, it will be for the new Commission that we have just appointed at The Hague to make further proposals, do battle for them, and, if necessary, appeal to public opinion over the governments' heads. Even if these proposals are not accepted as such, there is every likelihood of their leading to more advanced decisions than could be obtained by simple intergovernmental concertation and co-operation.

Sometimes, too, such proposals will only bear fruit long after. Do you remember, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the proposals made by the European Commission in 1965 on "own resources" and powers of budgetary control? At the time, they caused a great uproar, but five years later were accepted and, on some points, we have even — happily, let me add — gone even farther. So we need more than ever a strong Commission, faithfully playing the rôle of "provoker" or "prophet" in which it has been cast.

Incidentally, I wonder whether the Commission ought not to try and reactivate some of the ideas in its own report on European union, particularly on institutional matters. After all, if we pick and choose among the ideas in the Tindemans report, why should we not do the same with reports by the Commission, by parliament, the Court of Justice and the Economic and Social Committee?

But unless the member States "pull themselves together", and I think that each of them has realised this, the Commission's efforts will still remain largely inoperative.

Now, the European Council has reached the end of its probationary period, and even the person responsible for its creation no longer seems entirely happy about the way it operates. Yet, the worse our economies fare, the worse Europe fares, the more we need an institution to supply the impetus essential and necessary to the sectoral Ministers, the more we need an institution to cut Gordian knots, hack through administrative red tape and possibly kill off the sacred cows of divergent concepts of economic philosophy.

But this vital rôle can at this stage only be played by the European Council; hence the growing necessity of that institution. Yet it will be unable to play it by improvising, as all too often in the past, or by trying to restrict itself to "fireside chats".

I think that the European Council should harness itself to two kinds of task: first, deciding lucidly and boldly on the basic options referred to it by the Council of Ministers at its various levels, on major problems which, after having itself made every possible effort, and I repeat only after exploring every possible avenue, it finds it cannot solve. This should be the exception and not the rule.

Mr. Thorn (continued)

Second, to hold exchanges of views, possibly even unrehearsed, on the general situation of the Community and its member States, but with the precise aim of identifying the obstacles lying in their path, and so in due course give the Council of Ministers precise instructions, with a set time-table and a deadline for reporting, where appropriate, to the European Council.

Only by distinguishing sharply between these two kinds of activity and doggedly pursuing them will the European Council eventually become the essential, efficient cog in the Community machinery that its promoters feel it ought to be.

In doing so it will by no means, and never could, take the place of the Council of Ministers, whether the "Grand Council" of Foreign Ministers or the "sectoral" councils which will, as in the past, bear the brunt of the task of approximation and unification of our national policies.

I trust that everyone will be conscious and mindful of this. But it will be for these specific councils to attack their assignment with greater determination, for notwithstanding the prospective election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage, there will be no short-cut to a united Europe. The nature of the results that we shall achieve at the end of what we might call the long march we are setting out upon, even though we do it sitting down, will above all be proportionate to the effort we are willing to invest in it and what we know very well will be the sacrifices we are willing to bring to it. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Thorn. We have listened to your address with the keenest attention, as the interest of what you had to say never flagged for one moment. As is customary in this House, you have kindly agreed to answer any questions asked by the members of the Assembly.

I call Mr. Leynen.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I would congratulate the Prime Minister on his address, which is a frank analysis of the situation as he sees it. I appreciate above all the fact that he has avoided no difficulties and that he has given us an objective account of all the relevant discussions.

His address was that of a one-hundred-per-cent European. Unfortunately, after these prelimi-

nary remarks, I have to say that the part of his speech in which he made himself the mouthpiece of the meeting at The Hague left us hoping for more. If I understood aright, the Tindemans report has been rescued from the flames, but that is all.

Secondly, one of the points I noted — and I presume that I understood you correctly — was that the future European Parliament, elected by direct universal suffrage, would not even be allowed to discuss problems of defence and of general policy. If such is the case, it will not be a European parliament, but a rump parliament.

Accordingly, Mr. President, although I subscribe to the advice given by the Prime Minister not to give up the struggle — that is how I interpreted his words — I would ask whether we could not envisage something else if European union is not for tomorrow.

Could we not envisage the possibility of merging the WEU and Common Market treaties? If that course were adopted, our Assembly would be absorbed into the European Parliament — a directly-elected parliament, which would automatically have responsibilities in that sphere. This is a suggestion which I venture to submit to you in the guise of a question.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Thorn.

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg*) (Translation). — You said first of all that the Tindemans report has been rescued from the flames. Yes, and that is no mean achievement, for it contains so many proposals that one could live on them for very many years. Moreover, Mr. Tindemans never thought that the ideas contained in his report would be put into practice in the very first year. It was essential that the Heads of State or Government should accept the Tindemans report or approve the main outlines of the commentary which, incidentally, has not dealt with all the chapters, for it has not yet pronounced an opinion on economic and monetary union or on certain other chapters. But where a commentary was available, the Heads of State or Government approved the broad lines and agreed to consider each year what progress can be made. Is the glass half empty or half full? I am not in a position to give an opinion on the subject here and now. The future will enable us to pronounce on the matter calmly. One battle is over, the next one is in the offing.

Mr. Thorn (continued)

Secondly, you express regret that the European Parliament, which will, we hope, be elected in 1978, may not be allowed to discuss defence. It has not been stated that it would not be allowed to do so, it has not been forbidden to do so, and I simply pointed out that the commentary of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs did not endorse the passages in the Tindemans report where it was proposed that the parliament's competence should be extended to cover defence.

The Ministers kept a low profile and, remaining strictly within the provisions of the existing treaties, expressed no opinion on the question. It has not therefore been stated that the parliamentarians will not discuss defence. We have not widened the field of responsibilities in this respect.

In order to meet this concern, you suggest merging the treaties and even the assemblies. I should like to be able to say that your idea is practicable. I fear it is not, for you are dealing with different treaties to which different countries have adhered, so that a merger of this kind could result only from agreement among the different governments. At that juncture, we should once again be up against the same difficulties that we have encountered in extending areas of competence as we were going through the Tindemans report. The problem will have to be discussed and the reactions will be the same. I even believe that at this stage, and in view of the difficulties with which we are familiar, some countries which are not represented in WEU would make greater difficulties about adopting this indirect approach, preferring the other more open and more European course. But this is a personal opinion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Radius.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, in your excellent address you expressed or conveyed your doubts about an early enlargement of the European Community.

I would accordingly like to ask you whether this already applies to the negotiations under way with Greece and Portugal, and also to the candidatures that will probably be presented in the near future by Spain and Turkey.

You tell us that you see enlargement as coming after development in depth. Very well. But do you think that Western Europe can long

remain divided up between member States and non-member States of the Community? And until such time as this development in depth is accomplished, what arrangements do you envisage for relations between the Community and the candidate countries?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg*) (Translation). — How many minutes do you give me to answer this question and how much will you pay me if I produce the solution? (*Laughter*)

What Mr. Radius is asking me to do here is very difficult. Allow me, as a token of the friendship I feel towards him, to correct his original remark. He is asking me: can Europe remain thus divided up between the Community and the rest?

I have never seen — and you, too, have never seen — the Community as a divisive factor. I have always considered the Community as an essential factor in unification, and even as the strongest unifying force in Europe.

Let us not get on the defensive — I do not use the word defence in the sense in which you are discussing it — and do not let it be said that we are a divisive factor. What did I say about enlargement? I do not say that we must deepen and strengthen the Community to the utmost before enlarging it. I simply recalled the fact that in 1969, when we were meeting in the Hall of the Knights at The Hague, and when we were talking about opening negotiations on enlargement with the United Kingdom, Denmark and Norway, we were at one in feeling — to varying degrees, of course — that enlargement would be all the easier if what had so far been achieved by the Community were consolidated and our foundations were firmer. After all, we were going to absorb eighty million more people into the Community. One country said no. Countries like Greece and Spain today, and Portugal and Turkey tomorrow, may be candidates for accession to the Community, with their different economic standards and different histories. And these enlargements will unquestionably create problems for the Community, which is at present only adding to its list of problems without resolving them. It will thus be adding further problems, and that is a fact. Moreover, we have not over the past few years concentrated our energies on developing the Community in depth, so unless we avail ourselves of the opportunity now offered

Mr. Thorn (continued)

to us by these requests for enlargement to rethink the structure and decide how far we can strengthen the foundations, I fear that we shall be faced with the dilution we feared — and many people were afraid of it before me — ten years ago. This does not mean we are saying no. I share your view that when the countries you have mentioned have carried through the democratisation process which we all wish to see — and with some this has already occurred, whereas with others it is still going on — they will all have a claim to become members of the Community. I should like to see them enter it as soon as possible, but I should also like them to find on the day of their entry that the Community they have joined is really alive.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Bruyne.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — As Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, I apologise for reverting once again to a procedural problem which the members of this Committee hold to be important and which we discussed yesterday in the presence of Mr. Thorn's French colleague, Mr. Taittinger. The General Affairs Committee has always asserted that it could not consider an exchange of questions and answers with the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers at an informal meeting — a luncheon, for example — as a joint meeting with the Council intended to ensure a real exchange of information and thoughts between the Council and the Committee.

Does the Minister consider that the previous joint meetings between the Council and the General Affairs Committee have, because of something done by the Committee, presented difficulties for the Council? Does he consider that an informal meeting, like the one planned for next spring, constitutes a satisfactory setting for the joint thinking which both the Council and the Committee claim to be seeking?

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg*) (Translation). — In reply I can only give Mr. de Bruyne my personal opinion. I do not know when this problem was first put to me. It was eight years ago, I believe, that I first took the Chair at the WEU Council. I do not know whether the matter was being talked about as long ago as that. Since then, it has been talked about again and again.

I personally look with equal favour on formal and informal contacts, but I would add frankly

and with conviction that, depending on the subject under consideration, it is not always the formal meetings which are the most productive. We see that even in the European Community, where discussions between the Council and the Parliament amount to nothing more than an exchange of polite and vague-worded remarks which cause frustration to both parties — to the person who has to make these comments on behalf of the Nine as well as to those who were expecting something rather fuller — whereas at informal meetings over a luncheon we can afford to ask all sorts of questions about which you will not be told that the person questioned is not empowered to reply. As the meeting is informal, it is possible to go further — often even much further — than merely giving a polite answer.

I would say that your eagerness to follow one course rather than the other is as great as your desire to obtain more specific and detailed answers.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, in reply to an oral question yesterday by Mr. Taittinger, French Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I stressed the need for co-ordination between the work of the European programme group and that of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee, necessary also in order *a fortiori* to avoid finding ourselves at cross-purposes and, why not say it, possibly duplicating work.

Mr. Minister, do you think it is possible to say how such co-ordination could be effected, hoping, admittedly, that it would be done with a modicum of flexibility?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg*) (Translation). — Pray excuse me, Mr. Valleix, but do not take it amiss if I confess frankly that over the last few days I have been more out of touch with these matters than with some others, and that is why I have consulted persons better briefed on the subject than myself.

One first reaction is this. I am in all things opposed to a multiplication and dispersal of efforts which, as your President knows very well, are always liable to cause more contradictions. Everything I can do — all too little, alas, so far — towards achieving co-ordination, I shall always

Mr. Thorn (continued)

keep on trying to do. I am determined to pledge myself to even more efforts along this path, still largely unexplored. At the present time, when the Council of Ministers is seized of this kind of problem, everyone smells a rat. One must act with the circumspection and discretion that the prevailing political environment demands, but, in principle, keeping clear of duplications and cross-purposes. As for co-ordinating, how is it to be done? That is quite another problem, and we shall not be solving that one in a hurry.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Cornelissen.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, although I should of course like to know whether, at the meeting in The Hague, enough time was found to talk in the corridors about such a pressing problem as the intolerable pollution of the Rhine, I will limit myself here to asking two questions about energy problems.

They follow on what Prime Minister Thorn said, and to make discussion easier I will try to put them in English.

(The speaker continued in English)

After the meeting at The Hague, how and within what framework will the Council of Ministers promote a common European strategy on energy? Is the Council aware of the dangers to European security if Europe's energy supplies are not safeguarded in future?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Thorn.

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg*) (Translation). — I shall first answer the question as to whether we had time at The Hague to speak, either officially or in the lobbies, about pollution. Even at The Hague there is a great length of corridors. I cannot tell you what may have been said in them. I can only confirm that, in plenary session, there was no mention of it as you imagine. Was there any talk over luncheon? I do not know. But it had been announced that no other topic could be added to the agenda, which it was not possible to complete.

To your second question my reply will be the same. The European Council is fully aware — I thought I said as much in my address — of the

problems that arise from the lack of a common energy policy, and particularly in the event of any further rise in oil prices, not to mention any crisis of a politico-economic order.

Without wanting to set up as a commentator on any particular shade of opinion, you will see from today's press that the Nine were practically unanimous in deploring the lack of a consensus and that the European Council at The Hague should not have come up with any concrete measures.

This negative aspect is giving way to a positive reaction, which is that at The Hague everyone deplored the absence of a more forceful policy and professed unanimity in declaring that something would have to be done immediately to start the ball rolling by proposals for concrete action. But what sort of action, and when, and who by? That is where the negative aspect comes back again.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Segre.

Mr. SEGRE (*Italy*) (Translation). — May I ask, Mr. Prime Minister, what are the elements of information and appraisal on the basis of which, referring to the distribution of political forces on the problem of election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage, you defined as less ambiguous the situation in Luxembourg as compared with other European countries? In particular, would you please tell us, first, what countries you allude to as being in a more ambiguous situation than Luxembourg; second, whether you do not intend to mean, specifically, Italy; and third, if so, whether you do not think your appreciation is at odds with repeated statements by the Italian Prime Minister, Mr. Andreotti, and other members of the Italian Government, who have on many occasions underlined the vital significance to Europe of the convergence of views on the matter among the democratic forces in Italy; and lastly, whether you do not think that in this particular case, should the answers to the two previous questions be in the affirmative, your words stand in flat contradiction to the positive appraisals arrived at by Minister Tindemans following the talks he had in Rome with the various political formations in the framework of the mission he had been charged with?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg*) (Translation). — I am grateful to you for asking me these three questions. Please do not forget that I have not been speaking here as the Common Market's President of the Council, but in my own name, as a politician.

I take it on my own head to say what I think of the attitude of one party or another. I do not think there is any contradiction between my statements or views and those of Mr. Tindemans. I say that in full knowledge of his views and beliefs, which are often the same as mine.

If there was a shade of difference between the opinions of a European politician and those of one of the ordinary sort, it would not shock me or displease me in a pluralistic democracy, particularly when speaking at the level of the Nine.

I think, and trust, that there is sufficient margin for differences of opinion and even of appreciation between the two sorts. All the same, no one in France worries about the communist party line in Luxembourg. I am not making any criticism or negative appraisal when I say that there is a great deal of argument going on at present on shifts in the communist party line in other European countries, whether in the case of the Italian communist party or the new-formula French communist party with its latest programmes.

In Luxembourg the communist party was the only one to speak out in support of the occupation of Czechoslovakia and not to be sorry today for having done so. That is why there is no mistake about it in Luxembourg. It is outspoken and clear. We need have no cause for anxiety there. There is no ambiguity.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — May I add my thanks to those already offered to the Minister for the freshness and fullness of the report that he has brought to us from The Hague? Enthusiastic federalists must be disappointed that the Ministers have discovered that one cannot run before one has learned to walk, but many of us will welcome the realistic appreciation of the Tindemans report and the commitment to a continuous study of that document.

I have two questions to put to the Minister concerning what he said about the development

and deepening of co-operation in security and détente. He said that the Ministers did not wish to extend the competences of the Community into defence. Is the distinction between security and defence that security is what Foreign Ministers talk about and defence is what Ministers of Defence talk about but that very often the two overlap? The Minister said that there would be a continued deepening of co-operation in the preparation of international conferences. Does that include preparations for meetings of the North Atlantic Council?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg*) (Translation). — My reply to the first question put by my honourable friend Mr. Roper on the distinction between security and defence is yes.

When we talk about defence, we mean military defence, armaments and armed forces. When we talk about security, we mean one element in general policy, of politics pure and simple, that may also come within the purview of the Foreign Ministers.

That is why, in a context of political co-operation, you may even happen to touch on security without its being the main object of such co-operation, without going so far as defence matters which are only dealt with elsewhere.

Moreover, as regards the preparations of international conferences, there can be no question here of consequences in the North Atlantic framework. Whether it is those who are members of the North Atlantic organisation, or those who are not members of the North Atlantic military organisations, or those who are not parties to the treaty, like the Irish, no one wants such conferences to be discussed or prepared in a Community framework.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Sir John Rodgers.

Sir John RODGERS (*United Kingdom*). — First, I wish to thank the Minister for his realistic speech. In considering the possibility of further enlargement of the Community, will the Council of Ministers bear in mind not only the economic and financial aspects of the new applicants but the possible political and other complications for nations which still hope to become members of the EEC?

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg*) (Translation). — My reply to Sir John is that, in considering the possibility of an enlargement, there can be no question of only bearing in mind the level of economic, or even financial development, or their financial implications. Fundamentally, the problems are essentially political.

Of course, as my friend Mr. Harmel would have said, "You cannot have the one without the other". We must not overlook the political problems that the accession of certain countries may create for third parties.

All that deserves to be pondered over, as do many other elements, such as the institutions, their efficiency, and the like. To give you just one example: we have got as far as seven languages in the Community. If we add another three, simultaneous interpretation and translation of all documents into all the official languages will become even more difficult. We are overtaking the United Nations on this point and I do not think there is any corresponding gain in efficiency for the Community.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The unusual number of questions asked proves yet once more the interest that the Assembly has taken in your address. And, as Oscar Wilde said, in the end it is not the questions that are indiscreet but the answers. (*Applause*)

5. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 721 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We resume the debate on Mr. Cornelissen's report.

I call Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). — I feel somewhat diffident about intervening in this debate because I am a substitute member of the Committee and was unable to attend the meeting at which the report was discussed simply because of the "pairing" arrangements of the parliament of my country. The Rapporteur and I are very old friends and I am sure he will forgive me for making a somewhat critical approach to his report. I would rather have done so in the Committee than in the Assembly.

The Rapporteur has entitled his report "Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy", but my real criticism is that he does neither of those things. All he has finished up with is a recommendation for using the oldest of all forms of energy — coal. Paragraph 4 of the report indicates very clearly his argument that coal is in abundant supply everywhere. The inference, therefore, is that we should use it more than anything else. Of course, this completely ignores the fact that the thermal efficiency of coal when used for generation is only about 30 %. It ignores the problems of transportation and the handling of this commodity. And what of the dirty nature of the product itself? This was our very reason for seeking other sources of energy, so that we might in future discard it.

In paragraph 7, the report asks whether there are any alternatives to nuclear energy. It is sad that the report does not answer this most important question.

In paragraph 12, the Rapporteur produces what purports to be the history of the International Energy Agency. I cannot accept the terminology he uses with regard to the American policy of confrontation. The setting up of the IEA resulted from the fact that a number of European nations, as well as the United States, came together to support one another and to defend their economies because of their total reliance on petrol and fuel oil. It was always my view that France went it alone because she thought she could get a better deal that way. In the end she was unsuccessful. I am satisfied that paragraph 12 is, in fact, making history rather than recording it.

The whole issue has been very succinctly put in paragraph 31, which I feel is important. The Rapporteur states: "It seems impossible to dispense with this type of energy although its disadvantages have to be acknowledged." He has summed it up very well. It is a pity, therefore, that in the report he did not take this as his starting point and argue from there.

Paragraph 34 substantially understates the present position. In the United Kingdom, for example, some 20 % of our electricity demand is being satisfied by nuclear power.

Paragraph 37 makes a somewhat limited comment on the light-water reactor and its safety aspects. Here again, once the Rapporteur had written paragraph 31, in which he argued that

Mr. Brown (continued)

nuclear power was here to stay, I should have liked him to develop the subject much more, so as to demonstrate to all in Europe and certainly in WEU the inherent dangers of the American light-water reactor.

My colleague has heard me discourse on this many times in the past. His document would have been a useful vehicle in which to examine some of the dangerous practices now associated with these reactors. Their proliferation throughout Europe — this was why I referred to paragraph 34 — has occurred because the various national regulatory authorities have continually referred back to the same fount of knowledge for assurance about safety factors — that is to say, the manufacturers themselves. It is not surprising that the manufacturers of these light-water reactors should argue that they are safe. My friend would have done a great service to this Assembly if he had examined that aspect a little more closely so that we could have had an informed debate on this issue.

In Part V, the report discusses the development of alternative energy resources, beginning with solar energy. After examining that resource, the Rapporteur concludes with paragraph 52 which says, among other things: "The most cautious estimates nevertheless show that such power plants would be five to ten times more costly than conventional thermal power plants." I am sure that my friend is not really asking governments to set out on a course which will cost them five to ten times more than the programmes they already have. What he is, in effect, saying is that it is too expensive.

The report goes on to deal with wind energy. The statement made in paragraph 54 — "In Britain, it is estimated that 12 % of electricity demand could be met with wind power" — is based, I think, on a statement made to my own select committee which was given an estimate by enthusiasts for wind power. Their figure was reached by putting fifteen windmills on fifteen hills in the southern part of England and extrapolating large-scale results from that exercise.

Now I understand how history is made. This bit of fiction put to us by enthusiasts will undoubtedly become fact, because my friend has reproduced it in his report as if it were fact.

However, I should like to draw the Assembly's attention to paragraph 56, which states, rather frankly: "Unfortunately, wind power,

like solar power, runs up against the obstacle of storage. Moreover, wind is come-and-go, and thus not as reliable for electricity. Alternate, usually fossil-fuelled, stand-by systems will have to be kept on hand for windless spells." What that is saying, in the sort of words I understand, is that it is no good and that we cannot have it.

The Rapporteur goes on to discuss geothermal energy and concludes with paragraph 61, in which he says — again, rather disarmingly: "A major factor standing in the way of exploitation of geothermal energy is the high cost of transmitting the energy over any distance. Another technical problem is that of extracting energy from hot rock reservoirs, where there is no water underground to bring the heat to the surface." If that is translated into Dutch, it means that it is no good.

In the conclusions, the Rapporteur is really saying that, as far as he is concerned, he is going to do nothing, apart from what is contained in his interesting paragraph 72. It will be noticed that this contains a bit of a mystery. The Rapporteur begins by discussing solar energy research and half-way through he changes to the discussion of a common European floor price per barrel. I am not quite sure of the actual purpose of this paragraph, but perhaps Mr. Cornelissen can help me with that. It was my fond belief that Europe had an agreed floor price for a barrel of oil which, to the best of my knowledge, was \$7 a barrel at the time to which reference is made, although I understand that the agreed price is now \$7.50.

I understood, however, that there was at least some agreement in Europe about the base price we wanted for it.

Turning to the draft recommendation — "considering that no nuclear programme on a large scale is acceptable" — I would emphasise to the Rapporteur that a very large programme is going on apace. Many countries are not only committed to having programmes but have them or are going to have them. They are going in for research on the next generation of fast-breeder reactors. The question to which we should really be addressing ourselves is what form of mid-term solution one has before the fast breeder comes along, around the mid-1990s, because in my submission — and I thought that this was the Rapporteur's view in paragraph 31 — it is too late to stop that which is already installed.

Paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation acknowledges "the need to reduce consumption

Mr. Brown (continued)

of all forms of energy". I am bound to say that that is something of a pious hope. That has been a constant theme. Certainly, during the second world war and subsequent to it, and at various intervals meanwhile, there have been attempts to make people fuel-conscious. At one time in my history I was a fuel officer responsible for trying to persuade people to turn off lights. Every enlightened industrialist will know that one can keep that pressure at a peak only for about two months and that thereafter it is a waste of time. The Rapporteur puts that in his report as representing a major step forward. I am bound to say that I consider it to be about seven steps back.

Paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation, which starts with the words "Convinced that alternative sources of energy...", seems extraordinary to me. I felt that in paragraphs 52, 56 and 61 Mr. Cornelissen had absolutely persuaded me that there was no alternative and that none of those sources was of any value at all in terms of usefulness in substitution for nuclear power. I do not quite understand, therefore, why he makes that statement, having proved conclusively in the report that it was not on.

I come finally to recommendation 3 which refers to accepting "joint planning for the improved use of energy resources". In all this the Rapporteur talks in terms of coal production. Mr. Hardy and I, and possibly Mr. Bagier, would disagree. The arguments for continued use of coal production beg the problems associated with it.

I am sorry that Mr. Cornelissen was not able to develop some comment on the references by my friend Mr. Bagier to the filthy terms on which coal has to be extracted from the earth. In my country, miners are desperately anxious to get themselves put into a special category for earlier retirement than any other group of workers because of the health hazards involved in extracting coal from beneath the earth. Therefore, if one is to argue for a continuation of that form of extraction of that material, there should be some discussion as to how we satisfy the environmental lobby which is so anxious not to have any new coal seams in our country. Mr. Hardy did not mention that, perhaps because of his interest in a constituency matter, but the new coalfield in Yorkshire to which he was referring is now the subject of a great campaign by the environmentalists who are seeking to

ensure that it is not opened because of the resulting slag-heaps and mess that will proliferate the environment of the area.

Knowing Mr. Cornelissen, as I do, to be a far-sighted man anxious to go for the future, it seems extraordinary to me that he should have chosen to go back a hundred years finally to discover the resource of coal and to consider that it is that to which we should look forward for the twenty-first century. In all kindness to my friend the Rapporteur, I must say that his report is really too pessimistic. We need to challenge the future and to harness the resources of our advances in higher technology to the service of mankind. Let us solve the problems, not run away from them, as the report suggests. We need to bequeath to posterity as many of the benefits of research and development as it is possible to give.

In his winding-up speech Mr. Cornelissen spoke of what we had in trust, and he trusted that our children will be grateful to us. I would rather say to him that if we accept his report historians will record that while the twentieth century saw many catastrophes it also saw a failure in our ability to see the kind of future which his and our children ought to have. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall defer the remainder of the debate to the next sitting.

6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy (Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 721 and Amendments).
2. Relations with Parliaments (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 724).
3. European security and East-West relations (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 726 and Amend-

The President (continued)

- ments) ; Mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee — Motion for an Order tabled by Mr. Delorme and others (Document 728).
4. Address by Mr. Duffy, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom.
 5. Address by Mr. Feyzioglu, Minister of State, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey.
 6. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems (Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 719 and Amendment).
 7. European security and East-West relations (Resumed Debate on the Report of the

Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and on the Motion for an Order and Votes on the draft Recommendation and Motion for an Order, Documents 726 and Amendments and 728).

8. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy (Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 721 and Amendments).

Are there any objections? ...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak? ...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.)

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 1st December 1976

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Change in the Orders of the Day.
Speakers : The President, Mr. Warren (*Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*), the President.
4. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 721 and Amendments*).
Speakers : The President, Mr. van Kleef, Mr. Cornelissen (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Warren (*Chairman of the Committee*); Mr. Cornelissen, Mr. Treu, Mr. Cermolacce (explanation of vote).
5. Address by Mr. Duffy, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom.
Speakers : The President, Mr. Duffy.
Replies by Mr. Duffy to questions put by : Mr. Roper, Mr. Farr, Mr. McNamara, Mr. Watkinson, Mr. Treu.
6. Address by Mr. Feyzioglu, Minister of State, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey.
Speakers : The President, Mr. Feyzioglu.
Replies by Mr. Feyzioglu to questions put by : Mr. Urwin, Mr. Cordle, Mr. Hunt.
7. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 719 and Amendment*).
Speakers : The President, Mr. Burckel (*Rapporteur*), Sir John Rodgers (*Vice-Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Stavropoulos (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece*), Mr. Inan (*Observer from Turkey*); Mr. Lewis, Mr. Roper, Mr. Urwin (*points of order*).
8. European security and East-West relations (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 726 and Amendments*); Mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee — Motion for an Order tabled by Mr. Delorme and others (Doc. 728).
Speakers : The President, Mr. de Koster (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roper, Mr. de Bruyne, Mr. Radius, Mr. Rivière, Mr. Watkinson; Mr. Roper, Mr. de Niet (*points of order*).
9. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.
Speakers : The President, Mr. Roper, the President.

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will

be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Change in the Orders of the Day

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — For reasons of personal convenience and also because some of our colleagues are obliged to leave, we can resume the sitting with Mr. de Koster's report, Document 726.

I call the Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, with respect, we could conclude our report, Document 721, within thirty minutes. We would be grateful if this were possible, because Mr. Cornelissen, the Rapporteur, has to leave, and we hope that you could conclude with

1. See page 34.

Mr. Warren (continued)

a vote. That would enable Mr. Duffy to address us as arranged at 3.30 p.m. May we, therefore have the privilege of completing consideration of our report?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I know very well, Mr. Warren, that we have to settle a dilemma worthy of Corneille. Indeed, Mr. Cornelissen does have to leave, and his compatriot, Mr. de Koster, has to go, too. Mr. Delorme has consented to put off presenting his report until tomorrow morning. I have had to negotiate all this concluding part of the debate.

4. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new sources of energy

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 721 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — There are still three speakers on the list. If they would be willing to forgo the right to speak on Mr. Cornelissen's report, we could call the Rapporteur and the Chairman right away and Mr. de Koster might possibly be able to present his report before Mr. Duffy arrives.

Are the three speakers whose names are on the list present in the Chamber? If Mr. Adriaensens, Mr. van Kleef and Mr. Leynen would kindly relinquish their right to speak, to help us settle this procedural problem, they would facilitate our task, just as Mr. Delorme has agreed to postpone presenting his report until tomorrow morning.

Mr. Adriaensens and Mr. Leynen seem to be in agreement.

Mr. van KLEEF (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I cannot give up my right to speak.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — If perhaps each of you would limit your speeches to only one or two minutes, that would enable us to get through the Orders of the Day for this afternoon fairly quickly and this would be convenient for those of our colleagues who have to return to their countries.

Please be very brief, Mr. van Kleef, I beg of you — it is not for my own sake but for that of your colleagues that I make this request.

Mr. van KLEEF (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I did not originally put my name down to

speak on this report, Mr. President, because I could agree with the recommendation. Despite the fact that the report talks a great deal about making use of nuclear power, there is nothing about this in the recommendation. Now, however, Mr. Vohrer has put forward an amendment. I have serious objections to nuclear energy being developed further, in particular because the safety aspects of transport and of storage in saltmines have not been thoroughly examined and because the consequences of processes in these power stations getting out of control would be catastrophic, especially for future generations. Our colleague Mr. Stoffelen, too, has called attention to these dangers. I am a physicist, so I do know what I am talking about. As more and more nuclear power stations are built and developed, the risk of accidents grows; and this is why I have no need at all of the amendment that has been submitted. It takes it for granted that one agrees with building nuclear power stations. I have no use for it, and I even have serious objections to it. I certainly do not want to see dramas of the kind we have recently seen at Brokdorf. So far as I know, there was no prior consultation at all of people living in the area. So I suggest to Mr. Vohrer that he consider withdrawing Amendment No. 3. If he does not feel he can, and if the majority of this Assembly wants to adopt this amendment, then I would ask him, as member of the FDP which shares responsibility with the West German Government and has provided that government's Foreign Minister, to urge his colleagues in the Bundestag to see that the content of this amendment does not remain a dead letter, but is in fact put into effect in future. I would ask Mr. Cornelissen whether he shares my feeling that the scope of this amendment also covers the expansion of the UC project at Almelo, which is currently under discussion. Enriched uranium 235 is, after all, the basis on which nuclear power stations operate. If he does agree with me, will he please use his influence to allow people living on the German side of the border to have a say in the matter before the decision on this expansion is taken? Bearing in mind the prevailing winds in this part of the continent, it is people living in Germany who would be the first victims of any disaster.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Before calling on you to reply, Mr. Cornelissen, may I ask you if you accept the amendments that have been tabled. If so, we can take the vote after hearing the Committee Chairman.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I am grateful for the many appreciative remarks that have been made about the report, though here and there I did seem to detect one or two notes of asperity. A number of people made the point that certain things were missing from the report, and I agree with them. There are many things that have much to do with the problems of energy, and if I had dealt with them all properly in the report, it would have become far too long. My colleagues in the Committee will know that separate reports are to appear, or have already appeared, on a number of topics. There would be a danger, otherwise, of being unable to see the wood for the trees, which I noted was the case with Mr. Brown, for example. He did not attend the Committee. I am not blaming him for that, but I do find that he has misunderstood certain passages in the report. It would have been much better if he had taken part in the Committee discussions; and, besides, several of his comments belong really to discussions within the Labour Party back in Britain. I suggest, therefore, that he make his points there. I shall be glad to discuss matters further with him in the Committee.

We saw very clearly this morning, from what Mr. Thorn told us that there is unhappily no question of a common European policy on energy. I gathered that there is nothing beyond an expression of the wish for a common energy policy. Absolutely nothing has been done about putting this wish into practice, and I find this extremely disappointing and indeed unacceptable. It underlines the need for what we are urging in our report.

There were varying opinions expressed, too, on the developing of new sources of energy. I would not wish to contradict the many experts in our midst, but it does seem to me that it is not for this Assembly to judge which new, alternative sources of energy will or will not prove successful. I feel our job is to call loudly for more research and for more studies to be made of these problems, as a matter of urgency. We shall have to await the answers but we must not kid ourselves that we can expect any of the new and alternative sources of energy to make a substantial contribution, within the present century, towards solving the problems that face us today and will become especially acute from the 1980s onwards in Europe where energy supplies are concerned.

Mr. Stoffelen made quite a lot of the fact that attempts at non-proliferation had found no place

in the report. I entirely accept that he is quite right, but as a seasoned veteran of this Assembly he will know better than I that we shall be getting a special report from our organisation on the application of the Brussels Treaty and its protocols. Non-proliferation will naturally, and quite rightly, be included, so I invite him to join me in waiting to see what this produces.

Mr. Stoffelen has more or less accused me, where nuclear power is concerned, of not making my mind up where I stand — of hopping from one foot to the other. I might comment that this is quite a common way of proceeding, because it is the most practical way of making forward progress. It may be, however, that he has failed to grasp properly some passage about nuclear energy. I believe that in future nuclear power, too, is going to have to make some contribution to our energy needs. We shall not be able to do without it, in spite of the many dangers and many disadvantages it presents. Besides, when I talk about nuclear power, I mean in particular nuclear fusion and not nuclear fission, because fusion has far fewer attendant risks.

Where nuclear energy is concerned, I think we must press ahead with research and development. I sometimes feel that "nuclear energy" is something of a dirty word, and that we ought to find some other term. We have, too often, a tendency to treat all cases alike when the idea of nuclear power is mentioned or can be dragged in in one connection or another. I do not, however, think this is a sophisticated approach of the kind one might expect of serious-minded politicians. I get the impression that it is mainly ignorance of nuclear energy and its risks that lies behind this. People do not know what the risks are. I cannot, therefore, agree with Mr. van Kleef, who is against any further research and development in this field. This is putting our heads in the sand, and would be opting out. If one wants to do that, one should not come here. A politician must, if he is responsible, have the courage to tackle difficult problems; he cannot pick and choose the nice bits, and he must be prepared to get his hands dirty when necessary.

Mr. Hardy made a passionate apologia for coal, and I have done the same in the recommendation. He quite rightly pointed to the environmental objections to windmills, but also to a wider use of coal in the future. This is the main problem, but it is no cause to talk as Mr. Brown did and to say that arguing in favour of windmills means putting the clock back a hundred

Mr. Cornelissen (continued)

years. That is a very conservative attitude to take, and I do not think that any British political party would back it. It is burying your head in the sand and shutting your eyes to the potential of modern technology. It is up to us to ask experts in the subject to look at the problem, bearing in mind the environmental aspects, and to find an answer. But it is just too silly to accuse the Rapporteur of putting the clock back. Mr. Brown is hiding his head in the sand, and I get the feeling he is scared of getting his hands dirty. This attitude to problems does not appeal to me in the slightest. It is more than time that politicians in his country came round to realising that they will have to get their hands dirty. In short, I do not agree with him.

Mr. Valleix made a number of comments we would do well to take to heart. I was very pleased that he, coming from a parliament that we still occasionally ask ourselves a number of questions about, laid stress on the need for solidarity and on the need for co-operation in Europe. I was especially happy at this remark. Mr. Treu spoke very knowledgeably about the potential of new sources of energy. He mentioned in particular the second generation of nuclear reactors; he said, very soundly, that we must not restrict ourselves to a "little-European" approach, because these are problems that have to be tackled at a worldwide level. I think it is more than time for us to appreciate, and accept in deciding our policies, the fact that this cannot be just something for the rich countries. If we really mean anything with the ideals we try to preach, let us be honest and confess that the present situation, in which one-eighth of the world's population consumes half the world's limited supply of energy, is intolerable. We must strive, urgently, towards agreements on energy that will do justice to the legitimate interests of both the rich and the poor nations. I was, therefore, very glad to hear Mr. Treu calling for a worldwide approach to this problem.

Mr. Bagier mentioned the consequences, from a health viewpoint, of developing further the use of coal and stressed the need for a fundamental change in attitude. I had this in mind when, under number ten in my list, I referred to an energy-saving plan in which education in particular will have a big contribution to make. It comes down to our being prepared to change part of our life-style, and alter our mental

attitudes. I am, of course, also pleased to have had support from Mr. Bernini.

I hope I shall have an opportunity sometime of giving Mr. Brown a roasting in Committee. I am annoyed with him at not coming to Committee; if he had been there, we could have had a far more profitable discussion of the matters he raised. I get the impression that he is beginning to slow down a bit, which is a serious matter in politics.

In reply to the remarks made by Mr. van Kleef, I would point out that Mr. Vohrer has somewhat modified his amendment, and in the revised version I can go along with it. It deals with the fact that in some frontier areas in Europe very important decisions are being taken that could have serious effects for those living on the other side of the border, without them having been involved in the decision in any way. It is madness that nuclear power stations are all built alongside borders, so I am entirely in sympathy with his amendment. To answer the question about the UC project at Almelo, I would only urge Mr. van Kleef not to bury his head in the sand, but to take a share in the responsibility. In the Almelo case, the German, Belgian and Dutch Governments are all involved. So in each of those parliaments there is ample opportunity to buttonhole the government ministers responsible. Mr. van Kleef must know that in the Dutch parliament at least this is certainly what happens.

Finally, I would add that I am in entire agreement with the amendments that have been put forward. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to thank Mr. Cornelissen for his most spirited defence of his report. His must have been one of the finest Rapporteur speeches we have heard. He said that we had not learned much from the energy crisis, but I am afraid that all of us have learned how to pay for it. If a price rise is imposed by the greedy OPEC countries, some people in the third world will probably pay with their lives. Therefore, alternative sources of energy are important not only to Europe but to the whole world. I hope that the report will commend itself to the whole assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I have to thank you twice over Mr. Warren. First of all for your chairmanship, and secondly for

The President (continued)

the brevity of your contribution. Three amendments, including a revised one, have been tabled. Amendment No. 1 tabled by Mr. Cornelissen is, at the beginning of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, to leave out "during which equal consideration should be" and insert "equal consideration being".

Amendment No. 2 tabled by Mr. Valleix is, at the beginning of paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, to leave out "in the framework of the OECD" and insert "with the concurrence of the OECD and in the framework of the EEC".

Amendment No. 3 tabled by Mr. Vohrer is to insert the following new paragraph after paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper :

"To draft further safety regulations for nuclear energy production, harmonised at Western European level, which should allow any population concerned, especially in frontier regions, to be involved in a democratic decision on the siting of nuclear plants ;"

The amendments have been accepted by Mr. Cornelissen. Since the Rapporteur has accepted them, it seems to me fit and proper to write them into the final recommendation.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation as amended.

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

There are some abstentions. That being so, I am obliged to take the vote by roll-call, and we shall take this at the end of the sitting, in view of the reasons of personal convenience that I have already mentioned, and because some of our colleagues have to leave.

I am hurrying the proceedings somewhat because of the circumstances. I am sorry that we have fallen behind, but it is not our fault.

I call Mr. Cornelissen.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*). — Would it be possible to have the vote right now and not at the end of the day ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — As we are not unanimous I am obliged to take a vote by roll-call, which requires twenty minutes. The Minister is waiting and it would not be right to hold up his address.

It is not my fault, Mr. Cornelissen, if you held the floor for twenty-five minutes.

I call Mr. Treu.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, our communist friends will, for the sake of an expeditious application of the rules without taking a roll-call, refrain from declaring their abstention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Our Italian colleagues, out of courtesy and in order to facilitate the work of the Assembly — for which I thank them — have withdrawn their abstentions. But for that — it is the very strict and to my mind pointless procedure of this Assembly — we would have had to take a roll-call vote.

I call Mr. Cermolacce.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — I should like it to be placed on record that I, too, am withdrawing my abstention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I also thank Mr. Cermolacce for his gesture.

It is a technical point, on which we are ideologically agreed ; we are not going to quarrel or quibble about it. Consequently, for the sake of good order and to allow Mr. Duffy to take the floor, we shall rightly consider the recommendation to have been adopted unanimously ¹.

Thank you.

5. Address by Mr. Duffy, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now hear an address by Mr. Duffy, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence

1. See page 36.

The President (continued)

for the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom Government.

Before welcoming you to the rostrum, I had the pleasure and honour of taking lunch with you, which was an agreeable way of starting the afternoon.

We know your ability, and your zeal in helping to solve the problems and advance the construction of Europe. We are very happy to welcome you here. We shall now ask you to speak and, when you have finished, shall take the liberty of putting some questions to you, as is the custom in this Assembly. You have the floor.

Mr. DUFFY (*Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I have chosen to address you today on the subject of anti-submarine warfare. This is something to which the NATO Alliance attaches the greatest importance. The sea is still the high road of commerce, and the Atlantic Ocean is the very heart of our Alliance. It is vital to us for economic purposes, for the deployment of a major part of NATO's strategic deterrent force and for mutual support and reinforcement in time of tension or war. In his report on anti-submarine warfare, the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments underlines tellingly the importance to NATO of the use of sea in those three respects.

Today, I shall naturally be speaking from the point of view of the United Kingdom. This means that much of what I say will have as its backcloth the United Kingdom's rôles in the Atlantic and Channel areas. These areas would be very important for the passage of reinforcements from the United States, the power base of the Alliance.

We must all agree that the deterrence of an attack on NATO Europe depends — as, in the event, our defence would depend — to a marked degree on our evident ability to effect such reinforcements, including the deployment of allied strike fleets and air forces over three thousand miles of the Atlantic Ocean from North America. Immense numbers of servicemen and their equipment would need to be transported to Europe in a time of tension to reinforce those already there. However, much of what I say will be equally relevant to the ability of the

Alliance to use freely the narrow seas around Europe for intra-theatre support.

Unless the Alliance is able to present a stalwart defence at sea, quite as much as on land, any one of the three major aims to which I have referred could be called into question by the Soviet Union. In that case, the credibility of our strategy on land would be at risk and the effect on the Alliance's cohesion and political stability would be profound.

Given that background, I want first of all to say a word about the Russian attitude to sea power before going on to discuss in specific terms the threat to NATO's free use of the sea. The years following World War II have seen a new emphasis on naval power in the Soviet forces, and the Soviet navy has expanded from a coastal defence force into a truly ocean-going navy, second in size only to that of the United States. But, unlike the majority of western countries, the Soviet Union does not depend on overseas trade for survival, nor does she have vital maritime trade or reinforcement routes to protect in the event of war.

In terms of natural resources, the Soviet Union has within the boundaries of the Warsaw Pact almost all the resources that she can properly consider vital. The Soviet navy's main tasks in times of peace or tension are to carry out surveillance of, and to gather intelligence on, the naval forces of major maritime powers, to provide a naval presence, particularly in times of tension, and to provide a means of establishing control of a local sea area. It must be remembered also that her fleet is supported by the largest hydrographic fleet in the world, the largest fishing fleet and a rapidly expanding merchant fleet, all under central and immediate control.

With the forces now available, the Soviet navy increasingly has the option of contesting the sea routes vital to the reinforcement of NATO forces and to support or conduct European land operations with its amphibious forces. The Soviet Union is now able to provide surface and submarine forces in widely dispersed ocean areas in support of its political aims. The deployment of new ships such as the Kiev and advanced land-based naval strike aircraft, together with an advance in logistic support ships and the use of friendly sea and air bases in many areas, will improve Russia's capability in a wider area than hitherto. General Haig himself emphasised the global nature of the threat in an address in London last week.

Mr. Duffy (continued)

In brief, recent years in particular have seen a phenomenal development of Soviet maritime power. The Soviet Union now deploys well-balanced submarine and surface forces supported by a powerful maritime air force. Not only are these forces numerically strong, but their quality is daunting; and we see a continuing growth not only in Soviet military capability but also in areas of influence and possible operation. Therefore, while in this talk I shall concentrate on anti-submarine warfare, none of us ought to assume that Soviet surface and maritime air threats can be ignored. Nevertheless, it is the Soviet submarine with its ability to deploy over immense distances which represents the greatest threat to our ability to make free use of the seas in war.

I should like now to concentrate on the nature of that threat and address myself specifically to Soviet submarine forces. On average, almost every six weeks a Soviet nuclear-powered submarine is launched. Over the past five years more than fifty nuclear-powered submarines have been brought into service and nuclear-powered submarines now account for more than one-third of the total operational Soviet submarine strength of over three hundred. The Soviet nuclear-powered submarine launches a ballistic missile which has also undergone marked improvement, resulting in a quintupling of the size of the submarine-launched ballistic missile threats to NATO since 1970.

The recent introduction of the Delta class, with its missile range of over 4,000 miles, has brought all Europe, China and most of North America within range even from its home ports in the north. It now constitutes the core of the submarine-launched ballistic missile force, supported by greater numbers of the Yankee class. In addition, there are nuclear-powered Victor class attack submarines designed to attack NATO's own submarines and, of course, surface ships, and the Charlie, Echo and Juliet classes, which provide a missile threat to surface shipping. This is a formidable force; and yet it is expected that the proportion of nuclear-powered submarines will continue to rise. Furthermore, there is no indication that the Soviet Union intends to scrap older vessels at a rate commensurate with additions of new types.

Without commenting specifically on the detailed statistics, the comprehensive nature of

the Soviet threat is clearly demonstrated in the report on anti-submarine warfare which this Assembly will be considering tomorrow. If one accepts the serious nature of the Soviet submarine threat — and I do not expect anyone here to doubt it — the question is: what can the Alliance do about it? The particular question we must ask ourselves in this Assembly is: what are the European members of the Alliance doing about it? Before going on to consider this, however, it is necessary to have regard to the nature of anti-submarine warfare, the problems it presents and the kind of forces it requires. Only then is it possible to have a proper understanding of why NATO's anti-submarine warfare forces take the shape they do and how effective they are likely to be. Necessarily, therefore, before addressing myself to the all-important question of our response to the threat, I must look more closely at anti-submarine warfare.

This is divided into a number of related phases. First the submarine must be detected. Next it must be classified, and then it must be tracked while we select the right moment for attack. When that point arises, it is necessary to localise the submarine and to pinpoint its position with sufficient accuracy to allow weapons to be directed at it with a good chance of success. When localisation is complete, one can attack with whatever weapon is best suited to the circumstances. I shall say a few words about each of the five phases which I have described.

I believe that the difficulty of detecting submarines is already well understood. Nevertheless it is not impossible, but, since the submarine presents few opportunities for detection, extreme vigilance is required at all times. This is as much a product of sound training and experience as good equipment. But good equipment is required if the anti-submarine warfare commander is to find and attack his elusive target. Thus, considerable effort has been and continues to be devoted to means of submarine detection. Both active and passive techniques are employed. It is necessary to employ all methods which can be deployed by ship, submarine and aircraft. I might say in passing that the nuclear-powered attack submarine is particularly suitable as a detection platform since, in the same way as an enemy submarine can position itself so that the local characteristics of the sea give it the best chance of evading detection, so also can the attack submarine position itself to make the most effective use of the same characteristics.

Mr. Duffy (continued)

Classification also depends upon these detection methods allied to a knowledge of the characteristics of enemy submarines and their methods of operating. This, in turn, underlines the need for good intelligence built up over a number of years by surveillance and observation of Soviet operations. Once detected and classified, an enemy submarine must be tracked prior to attack. It is in this phase of anti-submarine warfare that the quick reaction capability of the maritime patrol aircraft and large, shipborne helicopters is particularly important. Both are able to relocate, track and attack a submarine which may have been detected and classified by, for example, another unit, surface ship or submarine.

In translating these techniques into practice, the concept of defence in depth in anti-submarine warfare has been developed, particularly in the case of operations designed to protect a force of ships, be it strike fleet or reinforcement group. In these circumstances the anti-submarine warfare commander requires a balanced mix of forces comprising maritime patrol aircraft, submarines, and large and small anti-submarine warfare helicopters, as well as surface ships. These will be employed in co-ordinated operations ahead of and above the line of advance of the force being defended. Swift reactions are called for, because with modern weapons and equipment the time an enemy submarine requires to locate and attack a surface target by missile or torpedo is small. Perhaps I may put this into the context of a hypothetical scenario based on a group of ships and aircraft, dedicated to addressing the submarine threat.

The front line, at a considerable distance ahead of the force, would be represented by the maritime patrol aircraft, possibly following up detections by nuclear submarines. The maritime patrol aircraft would use sonobuoys to assist in relocation, and would then attack with a suitably selected weapon such as a lightweight torpedo.

Operating in this way, far ahead of the force, the chances of destroying the long-range missile-firing submarine are enhanced. The second line of defence would be provided either by MPA or large helicopters in close support using sonobuoys or large helicopters using their unique dipping sonar techniques backed up by long-range sensors in surface escorts. Detections from all sources are promptly relocated and attacked

by large ASW helicopters embarked in major units in the force, or smaller helicopters embarked in the escorts themselves.

Finally, a ring of escorts, some with helicopters embarked, and further large ASW helicopters, can integrate to form a screen around the defended force in order to detect and destroy any submarine which may have been able to close the force without detection. I need only add, I think, that the problems of command and control of such a large force, which may be spread over hundreds of miles, should not be underestimated.

This is one means by which anti-submarine warfare is prosecuted. But it is not enough simply to wait for the enemy to come to us and then seek to defeat him as he attacks our surface forces. This would leave the initiative with him and allow him to concentrate his forces to best effect without regard to the possibility of attack.

For this reason, direct support operations in defence of a force of the kind I have described must be paralleled by offensive operations on an area basis to attack the enemy submarine before it approaches our defended forces. In this respect I notice that the report by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments suggests that direct support operations and area attrition operations may be alternatives. In fact I believe, with respect, that they are complementary.

Such area attrition operations naturally, however, call for systems with long range and endurance and a very high detection capability, even if such operations are carried out in areas where intelligence suggests that enemy submarines may be found. At present this is best done by maritime patrol aircraft and nuclear attack submarines which may operate independently or in co-operation in search of an area with a view to the destruction of enemy submarines before the allied force arrives.

These two systems are complementary. The maritime patrol aircraft obviously has the advantage of high speed and, therefore, the ability to move rapidly from one detection to another. The nuclear submarine can deploy large sonars to best advantage and is the only vehicle which can continue to operate in an area of enemy air superiority. This means that it can take the battle to the enemy to an extent which the latter cannot ignore and which thus applies considerable constraints to his operational flexibility.

Mr. Duffy (continued)

The enemy's geographical problem must be exploited by creating barriers through which enemy submarines must pass in order to reach their patrol or operating areas. In this case a further mix of forces is required in which the maritime patrol aircraft's quick reaction capability towards detection by a submarine on barrier patrol is an important option.

The methods of anti-submarine warfare which I have described are particularly relevant to operations in deep water such as the Atlantic. But the principles apply in general to operations in the shallow waters of the continental shelf around the Eastern Atlantic approaches and Channel areas. The particular problems of detection in shallow water, with the increased level of sea noise, may suit some systems better than others. For example, active sonars are likely to be more suitable than passive systems, but certainly the best flexibility is possessed by forces which can operate effectively in both deep and shallow water. At the same time, the shallow water opens up the possibility of containing the submarine threat by the laying of minefields as barriers at focal points; and, of course, aircraft and helicopter air support will be more readily available from ashore.

To expand on mining for a moment, clearly this can be an attractive method of denying enemy submarines the use of certain sea areas, perhaps so that they can be funnelled into an area where conditions are favourable to us. Minefields can be fact or bluff, of course, and in either case resources need to be tied up in clearing the fields or proving that they do not exist. Minefields can also be two-edged as they may restrict our own submarine operations, but their uses in ASW warfare are many and must not be overlooked.

I have described the threat and some techniques for dealing with it. Now, what of NATO's response? The most powerful maritime contribution to NATO is, of course, provided by the United States, which has the Second Fleet in the Atlantic and the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. For this reason, we Europeans cannot ignore the need for close co-operation with the United States. However, the need for co-operation between European forces in the maritime field is equally important. European NATO navies have an indispensable part to play, not least in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel

areas, where their ready forces would be the first to confront the northern-based Soviet maritime forces.

In considering the European contribution, we must not forget that one of the most important is that which geography enables us to make. The Soviet Union is to a great extent landlocked. The Black Sea fleet can emerge only through waters controlled by NATO countries. The Baltic fleet is in a similar position, and even the Soviet northern fleet, the Soviet navy's strongest force, is subject to passage through seas dominated by NATO's northern flank and NATO's island commands. This is a great advantage held by NATO.

But, of course, it is not simply the advantage provided by its geographical position that the European members of NATO contribute. Looking at the Eastern Atlantic and Channel commands of NATO, on which I said at the start of my presentation I would concentrate, one finds that European nations contribute a range of anti-submarine warfare systems of the kind I have described: destroyers and escorts, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters.

What, however, of the United Kingdom's contribution? I felt that at this stage you would be looking to me for a brief description of the United Kingdom's contribution to the Eastern Atlantic and Channel areas and, of course, to our own ASW contribution in particular. I believe that sometimes our much publicised economic problems tend to obscure the formidable contribution that the United Kingdom makes to NATO's forces. I can well understand some people falling into that error. But it is, for example, relevant that the defence review, the major review of two years ago, and subsequent adjustments to defence spending have left our maritime contribution in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel areas virtually undiminished. The United Kingdom still provides the bulk of NATO's ready forces in these crucial areas, including a contribution to all three legs of NATO's triad of forces — conventional, theatre nuclear and strategic.

The United Kingdom has a growing force of nuclear-powered fleet submarines, of which nine are already in service and a further three are being built. The United Kingdom is the only European member of NATO to operate these. Our growing strength is also shown by improvements to the Royal Air Force's Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft and the increasing deployment of the large Sea King helicopter. When on task

Mr. Duffy (continued)

a Sea King provides a formidable anti-submarine capability equivalent in this respect to a frigate. Hence the importance of adequate decks from which to operate them. At present, Sea Kings are deployed in our helicopter cruisers such as HMS Blake and Tiger, in HMS Hermes, now being converted to the ASW rôle, and in the aircraft-carrier Ark Royal.

A major improvement to our anti-submarine capability will be provided by the new class of through-deck cruisers, of which three are planned to enter service. The first of these is well advanced in construction and the second has been ordered.

These new vessels will be able to deploy considerable numbers of Sea Kings, and will carry Sea Harrier V/STOL aircraft for quick reaction operations against enemy ships and aircraft. The through-deck cruiser will also deploy the Sea Dart missile system for area air defence against enemy aircraft and missiles launched perhaps from those very submarines that we are hunting, and will provide command and control facilities for naval task groups. We all appreciate how vital that will be.

These major fleet units are supplemented by conventional submarines, destroyers and frigates. Three new classes of destroyers and frigates are being introduced, all of which have a high degree of anti-submarine capability. The Type 22 frigate is configured primarily for the ASW rôle with a secondary air defence and anti-surface ship capability. It can carry two new Lynx helicopters, anti-submarine torpedoes and a new computer-based hull-mounted sonar. It will also be armed with the Sea Wolf anti-missile point defence system and the Exocet anti-ship missile. The first vessel, HMS Broadsword, has been launched and a further two are under construction. The new class of Type 42 destroyer — of which the first two are in service and six more are being built — although primarily an area air defence vessel armed with Sea Dart, has good secondary anti-submarine capabilities, being fitted with advanced sonar and carrying the Lynx helicopter, while the Type 21 general-purpose frigate — four are now in service and four more are under construction — has good sonar and a computerised operations room and operates the Wasp anti-submarine helicopter, which will eventually be replaced by the more versatile Lynx helicopter.

Nor is progress confined to the new construction ships and aircraft and helicopters. We are modernising our Leander class escorts to make further improvements. Amongst the anti-submarine fits will be the Ikara anti-submarine missile system, variable depth sonar and the Lynx helicopter. The United Kingdom has a major programme for the deployment of new, advanced sonars, while our ASW weapons are being improved with the deployment of both new heavyweight torpedoes to be used by our submarines in ASW operations and the United States Mk. 46 lightweight torpedo to be used by the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft and our ASW helicopters. A future, very advanced lightweight torpedo is under development. The development of new shipborne anti-submarine torpedo systems is well under way. All told, I believe that any impartial observer would see in these facts proof of the major contribution that the United Kingdom makes to NATO's anti-submarine warfare effort.

Finally, I should like to draw your attention to two major variables, tactics and equipment. The ASW force that we possess must be capable of keeping the seas throughout the whole spectrum of hostilities, surveillance in a period of tension, where we might have to face up to a long and exhausting confrontation, and right through all the escalatory steps, if need be, to total war. As the circumstances change, so will the relative values of each part of our equipment capabilities change. Hence the need for composite forces able through their equipment to respond adequately to all the tactical scenarios — not just one.

I move to my conclusion. I have tried in this talk to emphasise, albeit briefly, the need for strong anti-submarine warfare forces, and in particular what ASW demands in the way of equipment and tactics. I am conscious that the report by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has been able to go into some aspects of the subject in greater depth than I have done. However, I hope that when you come to consider that report tomorrow you will feel that what I have said has provided a useful, complementary commentary by one NATO nation, but also a nation which continues to make a considerable contribution of hardware and expertise to this crucial area of NATO's capabilities. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Minister, for your most important contribution on a highly technical problem,

The President (continued)

which the uninitiated often find it difficult to grasp. You have enriched our knowledge of the subject.

In accordance with the usual practice, the Minister has agreed to answer any questions he may be asked.

Because of the lateness of the hour, the fact that there are other items on the Orders of the Day for this afternoon, and the reports which have to be presented by a particular deadline in anticipation of the departure of several of our colleagues, may I request you simply to ask questions and not take the opportunity of making a whole speech.

I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I thank the Minister for his remarks, which, I consider, act as a good curtain-raiser to the debate that will take place tomorrow.

The Minister gave us an elaborate pattern of the kind of screen which would be needed either for a carrier strike force or for a reinforcement force moving across the Atlantic. Will he say how far we should need to increase NATO forces to provide that sort of screen for the various reinforcements we should expect to move across the Atlantic in time of war or threat of war? Secondly, he referred to the use of sonobuoys. Will he say what progress, if any, has yet been made with the reading by one NATO nation's navy of the sonobuoys of another NATO navy?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Duffy.

Mr. DUFFY (*Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom*). — I can answer both questions briefly. I indicated in my speech that the United Kingdom is predominantly responsible for the ready forces in the two crucial areas to which the questioner has referred. The view is taken that existing ready forces are adequate for any expected need. His second question concerned sonobuoys. I hope he will understand when I say that I cannot enter into a detailed explanation of that.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Minister, for your very precise answer.

I call Mr. Farr.

Mr. FARR (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to congratulate Mr. Duffy on what he said. Will he relate to what he told us today Dr. Kissinger's view on the capabilities of the Russian naval force and, in particular, their submarine forces? Mr. Duffy pointed out that Russia has the largest fishing fleet, a very large merchant fleet and a naval force which is the second largest in the world. Yet in a recent speech Dr. Kissinger, as has been stated in the document we shall be discussing later today, seemed to belittle the Russian naval capability. Has the Minister seen Dr. Kissinger's statement? Would he care to comment upon it?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Duffy.

Mr. DUFFY (*Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom*). — Let me refer Mr. Farr to what I said. Without making explicit reference to Dr. Kissinger, I described not merely the extent of Soviet maritime forces but the speed of build-up in recent years and the growth of quality, which I believe I described as daunting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. McNamara.

Mr. McNAMARA (*United Kingdom*). — I think that my friend and colleague Mr. Duffy was quite right to point out the vulnerability, which exists to a certain extent, of the Russian fleet and the way in which, because of the situation in the Black Sea and the Baltic and the landlocked nature of the Russian State, people tend to get overexcited about numbers. However, I think that he underplayed the relative rôle and strength of the Russian naval air service and its ability to mount a counter-offensive against surface ASW vessels. Will he comment on that in view of the time-lag during which any European NATO fleet must hold the Atlantic gap between Greenland and the North Sea while awaiting reinforcements from the United States?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Duffy.

Mr. DUFFY (*Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom*). — I take Mr. McNamara's point. He has described one rôle, among others, which the new throughdeck cruiser is intended to fill to make sure that we are equal to any

Mr. Duffy (continued)

such threat that the Soviet maritime air forces may present in the Atlantic, as well as to ensure that there is no gap anywhere in air cover.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Watkinson.

Mr. WATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). — I thank the Minister for his contribution. Will he indicate to the Assembly how effective is the present level of anti-submarine warfare? Is it still possible for submarines to lose themselves? Will it ever be possible for us to have a system which would be completely effective in tracing all the movements of Soviet submarines?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Duffy.

Mr. DUFFY (*Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom*). — It is certainly possible for submarines to lose themselves deliberately, as I think one of the members of the Assembly will be well aware and which he may already have described through his report to you yesterday. The configuration of the seabed is sympathetic to this move, and there can be no doubt that the Soviet navy will be well aware of it. I have already stressed that the Soviet navy has the largest hydrographic fleet in the world, and we can expect that it will be taking steps to harness that configuration to the movements of its submarines. We are alive to that threat and we are also aware of its possibilities.

If Mr. Watkinson was also wanting to know whether submarines could lose themselves perchance, I can assure him that I am not aware of any such instance on the part of our own forces. I was at our own major submarine base only a week ago today and I saw something of the results of recent patrols by our submarines, including strategic patrols. I looked at the results, which had been subjected to the most searching analysis, and I was immensely encouraged by them. At the moment, we have every reason to believe that our own submarine forces are capable of deployment at a very high level of skill and effectiveness.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Treu.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — I have just one brief question to ask the Under-Secretary of State: among the naval surface

forces he mentioned as being on the stocks or already in commission, but especially submarines, under-water weaponry, is there any experience of the operation and control of nuclear propulsion systems? Do you understand my question? Certain new, extremely novel, systems of naval, or especially military, craft stay for long periods at particular bases. Now, is it true that there have been controlled experiments concerning possible environmental damage that may be caused by such nuclear-propelled submarine units during exercises and operating from their bases?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Duffy.

Mr. DUFFY (*Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom*). — When I was visiting our premier submarine base and, a few days before that, the command of one of our flag officers, whose responsibilities include the deployment of submarines, and also during the course of two such visits, I inevitably met the commanders of both nuclear submarines and nuclear ballistic submarines. I gained the impression that those submarine commanders were less afraid of their own flotilla leaders, even less afraid of their flag officers, and certainly a good deal less afraid of their Minister who was visiting them, than they were of the chairman of a committee which exists in the United Kingdom, the name of which is not a household name and which is scarcely known but the work of which is concerned with safety to provide, presumably, for the kind of contingencies which might be in Mr. Treu's mind. I hope he will accept that as an assurance that the submarine commanders, while they may be subject tactically to their own uniformed senior officers, overall must work within a tight frame of regulations drawn up by the committee and which have been designed predominantly to ensure safety.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Minister, for your gracious and pertinent answer. I am sure I am voicing the unanimous view of this Assembly in thanking you for your contributions. (*Applause*)

6. Address by Mr. Feyzioglu, Minister of State, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, we are now going to hear an

The President (continued)

address by Mr. Feyzioglu, Minister of State, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey.

Mr. Feyzioglu is an old acquaintance ; we have often met in Strasbourg at the Council of Europe. We have touched on a number of problems that he is going to talk about, and we know he will give us some food for thought and that his address will be helpful to all of us in this Assembly.

Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, would you please come to the rostrum to deliver your address ?
(*Applause*)

Mr. FEYZIOGLU (*Minister of State, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should first like to tell you how glad I am to be able to attend your deliberations and to be given this opportunity of seeing old friends. I was very sorry not to have been able to welcome personally the members of the General Affairs Committee who visited Turkey recently. I am therefore delighted to find my friends here today ; and it gives me very special pleasure to be able to convey the greetings and good wishes of the Turkish Government to the distinguished members of this Assembly. And I should like to thank you for kindly giving me an opportunity of presenting to you some thoughts on various aspects of the item on your agenda entitled Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems.

I have examined Mr. Burckel's report and the relevant draft recommendation with very close attention. May I be allowed, first of all, to express my congratulations to the members of the General Affairs Committee and in particular its Rapporteur for the vast amount of work they have put in on it. This highly interesting document lays great emphasis on the importance of the political and military links between the Mediterranean countries of South-East Europe and Western Europe. The report's analysis of these very close and very special links leads us to the problem, in my view of capital importance, of the future of these relations.

Allow me now to bring you some comments and further particulars, on questions that are of especial concern to my country.

I should first like to say a few words about the system set up by the Montreux Convention concerning the passage of warships through the

Straits. In view of the fact that this region is under its sovereignty, Turkey is in time of war entitled to take any measures there which it deems necessary for its defence. The passage of warships through the Straits in peacetime is, as you are aware, governed by the special provisions of the convention, and subject to the Turkish Government's being notified within the prescribed time-limits and in the prescribed form. Turkey has under the convention supervisory rights and duties, given, I repeat, the fact that the region forms an integral part of its own territory. It has to ensure that these obligations are fulfilled in accordance with the provisions of the convention, concluded in 1936, strictly within the framework of this convention and in accordance with the letter and spirit of its enactments. It is a difficult and delicate task that devolves upon Turkey, and all other seafaring nations should fully appreciate this. It must, in particular, be able to count on the understanding and support of all the other signatories in the performance of its duty. I emphasise that Turkey's conception of its rôle pursuant to the terms of the Montreux Convention will not allow it to be swayed by any considerations alien to maintenance of the system of passage established by this important international instrument. Moreover, its attitude to this question has hardly wavered throughout the forty years that have elapsed since the agreement was signed.

On Turco-Greek relations, the report stresses that misunderstandings have accumulated over the years that render disputes between the two countries difficult to solve. It is a very fair comment, and I shall try to explain to you briefly Turkey's attitude about the real causes of the misunderstandings, doubts and suspicions, which prevent any speedy solution of the existing disputes between the two countries.

As for the problem of Cyprus, its solution has in the past been rendered very difficult because of the attitude of those who believed they could indulge in flagrant and systematic violation of the treaties establishing the State of Cyprus. This attitude was unfortunately encouraged by the indifference of world public opinion to the inequalities and persecutions to which the Turkish Cypriot community was subjected. That Archbishop Makarios should have, only a few years after their signature, openly violated and denounced the Zurich and London agreements ; that Greece should, in defiance of those treaties, have sent an army of 20,000 men, commanded by

Mr. Feyzioglu (continued)

Greek officers, to Cyprus ; and that the Turkish Cypriot population should be living in acute distress for eleven long years — all this was accepted with a certain equanimity which, it must be said, shocked our public opinion. The Turkish intervention in 1974, which was carried out pursuant to the treaty of guarantee and resulted in the island being delivered from tyranny together with, as a by-product, the restoration of democracy in Greece, was “understood” and approved by our friends.

The second military operation, which had become inevitable, was criticised. Some of our friends, argued that it would have sufficed for Turkey to have driven out Sampson and his clique, and then to have immediately recalled its troops, even if it meant leaving the Turkish community in the lurch once more, hostages to the notorious “national militia”. But this second operation had become necessary for the protection of tens of thousands of Turks, scattered about the island in a hundred or so enclaves and encircled by the Greek militiamen. The promise made at Geneva to lift the siege from these Turkish enclaves was not kept, and I should add that Turkey was only obliged to carry out this second operation following the rejection of a Turkish proposal to create a ten-kilometre wide demilitarised buffer zone or no man’s land placed under the control of United Nations forces.

After long years of patience, we were driven to intervene in this manner. It was for us a moral duty which we were obliged to perform, whatever sacrifices had to be accepted. In these circumstances it was perhaps not very appropriate to call upon us to leave the island the very moment that the operation was concluded, and before we had ensured that the only possible political solution, the federal solution, had been accepted once and for all and the security of the Turkish community guaranteed.

Consequently, the political manoeuvrings whose aim it was to confuse the issue, internationalise the problem and whip up an international opinion that was sometimes ill-informed, only acted as an irritant on Turkish public opinion, already hypersensitised.

Today Archbishop Makarios is claimed to be Head of State in Cyprus, but nobody wants to remember that the Cypriot State in fact represents a compromise between Turkey and Greece.

There is no Cypriot nation, but two national communities. The Cypriot State can only be formed on the legal basis that these two national communities exist.

I should like to remind you that the Zurich and London agreements instituting a State founded on the two communities, were applied, after a fashion, for three years. It was not until 1963 that the Greek Cypriot side put an end, through the use of force, to the constitutional order with the object of imposing its will on the Turkish community, its partner and co-founder of the State of Cyprus, and the intention of reducing the Turkish Cypriots from the status of citizens to that of vassals. The Greek Cypriots prevented the Vice-President of the Republic, as well as the Turkish Cypriot ministers, members of parliament and officials from performing their duties, and unilaterally declared themselves sole representatives of the island.

What was more, a systematic campaign of intimidation, massacres and expulsions was organised against the Turkish Cypriots in order to force them to accept under a reign of terror this violation of the constitution. There you have the reason for the formation of the hundreds of enclaves alluded to in Mr. Burekel’s report, which were in fact merely open-air concentration camps for the Turkish Cypriots, who were leading the lives of prisoners in their own country. This tragic situation lasted eleven years. Now what is wanted is to find a solution, a realistic, viable and lasting solution, which would make it impossible for such a tragedy to recur.

Our view of such a solution is well-known. We still favour an independent Republic of Cyprus, having the status of a non-aligned State and organised in the form of a bi-regional federation, with both ethnic communities participating on an equal footing in the administration.

What is important, and constitutes the real problem in Cyprus, is to try again to lay the legal and political foundations for a State within whose framework both communities could live in a climate of security and mutual confidence. Hence the territorial aspect of the Cyprus conflict cannot be given precedence and should not relegate to second place the real problems that have to be overcome if a final solution is to be found. The only way to arrive at such a settlement is through intercommunal talks.

From the outset Turkey set its face against any initiative designed to internationalise the

Mr. Feyzioglu (continued)

Cyprus question, in the firm conviction that the only effect would be to complicate the problem still further and hold up negotiations, which would be in nobody's interests and definitely not in those of the Western European countries.

It would be a mistake to believe, as the report seems to imply, that Turkey is worried about Enosis and Greek designs on the Aegean mainly for fear of finding itself cut off from Europe. Such questions constitute in our view problems of direct concern to our most immediate national interests, I would even say, vital interests. What has been at stake for us in Cyprus throughout the last twenty years has primarily been the fate of a Turkish community. In the Aegean, it is the challenge to Turkey's natural rights, as an Aegean riparian State, by another coastal State, which is the crux of the problem. True, if Turkey failed to win Europe's understanding on issues of such direct concern to its national life and concerning rights it deems legitimate, there might well result a certain estrangement which it emphatically does not want and would deplore. As I said, however, these are for Turkey primarily domestic matters.

If you will allow me to express my personal opinion, I would say that no international issue has been so misunderstood as the problem of the Aegean. Over a long period of years, during the colonels' régime in Greece, it was impossible for us to establish a dialogue with Athens on this question, since the reply we were given was that there was nothing to discuss; and the Greek Government in fact behaved as though, given the concepts that were being worked out under the new law of the sea, annexation of the Aegean to their country was already an accomplished fact. The dialogue was reopened with the government of Mr. Karamanlis two years ago. But throughout this entire period we were repeatedly told that there was nothing to discuss and no room for negotiation, the issue being a purely legal one, and that we should simply agree to bring it before the International Court at The Hague. On what provision of the law of the sea would the court be asked to pronounce? On an article of the 1958 Geneva Convention, we are told, which accepts the principle that islands also possess a continental shelf.

Is that really so, and is the problem so simple? The 1958 convention accepts a principle, but does it not also provide that special cases should

be settled by negotiation? Does not subsequent case law of the International Court confirm this latter provision? Furthermore, as the question is still at the discussion stage at the Conference on the Law of the Sea, and has still not been resolved, will every single island or islet, regardless of size and position, or whether populated or not, be entitled to claim a continental shelf? On what rules of international law could the court base its judgment, and would it have the authority to anticipate the findings of the Conference on the Law of the Sea in the matter?

Moreover, is the question of the Aegean, as it is claimed, a purely legal one? Is its present status, as established by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, based on the rules of the law of the sea in force at the time? In the Aegean, we find islands under Greek sovereignty only a few kilometres off-shore from Anatolia; is that in conformity with the law of the sea? In 1923, the very entangled interests of Turkey and Greece were settled in the context of a general political compromise, a political package deal. As the new law of the sea introduces fresh concepts in this particular sea, squeezed in between the long coastlines of two riparian States and unique of its kind, the solution will again have to be a political one.

As regards the new concepts themselves, will the law of the sea enact, from a purely legal standpoint, that coastal islands, situated very close to the mainland and actually on an immediate geological extension of it, can deprive the continental State of all rights over its marine shelf? At a time when even land-locked countries claim a right to the riches of the seas, how can the Anatolian mainland be deprived of its rights in the Aegean, when there are ten million inhabitants on its Aegean coast?

It is a long and difficult task to elaborate all these points, and on being faced with this seemingly very simple proposal: "Let us bring our dispute before the International Court at The Hague", Turkey was placed at a disadvantage in having to state a case that can only be understood in all its complex ramifications. I must say it was to our detriment. However, the question is better understood now, since the simultaneous appeals by Greece to the Security Council and to the Court at The Hague had the results we know. After so many efforts, and the concurrent resolution and decision by the Security Council and the Court of The Hague, Turkey secured acceptance for the idea that the problem should be settled by negotiation.

Mr. Feyzioglu (continued)

This was the spirit in which, to our satisfaction, the talks on the question of the Aegean continental shelf were at last restarted in Bern at the beginning of November. The negotiations will no doubt take time. But Turkey hopes that they will reach a solution founded in equity, which is in fact the only valid criterion for a question unique of its kind.

We have known happier times in which the tightly-entangled interests of Turkey and Greece were reconciled by a political compromise. Why should it not be possible to resolve our conflicts under present conditions? The major interests of the two neighbouring countries make this imperative. I am among those who are persuaded we shall succeed.

Let me now explain to you the reasons for the difficulties we are having to contend with in our relations with the EEC.

I will remind you that Turkey is firmly attached to the principles of democracy as understood and applied in the countries of Western Europe, and I should point out that, in the already lengthy chronological period which has elapsed since the end of the second world war, Turkey has often been the only country in its region to remain attached to parliamentary democracy.

We share the same pluralist philosophy of organisation of our societies and, in the light of geopolitical realities, the same destiny. And we trust that our political resolve, if it encounters a matching political resolve on the part of our western partners, will suffice to help us over the difficulties we are at present wrestling with in the economic area.

Whereas the Community can delay the application of its contractual obligations by spinning out the negotiations, Turkey is compelled to fulfil its own automatically.

In recent years, despite the existence of our links of association, which rest on reciprocal concessions and advantages, the Community has shown greater generosity and understanding towards third countries in the agricultural sphere. The periodical review machinery does not function at all. Indeed, Turkey has been patiently waiting for more than three years for the first agricultural review to be completed, whereas under the terms of the agreements we should already be entering the third stage.

Today, Turkish public opinion is getting increasingly restive about the usefulness of an association which works one-sidedly and in fact puts Turkey in a less favourable position than a number of non-associated countries. With regard to the free movement of workers, the Community purely and simply refuses to apply, even gradually and with safeguard measures, Article 12 of the Ankara agreement and Article 36 of the additional protocol. It has shown no sign of flexibility in the matter. However, we believe that a balance will somehow have to be struck between the obligations and advantages stemming from Turkey's association with the Community. We incline to think that the difficulties will not prove insurmountable so long as there exists, on the part of the member countries and of Turkey, a political will to maintain these special links.

As for political co-operation in Western Europe, we believe that its success on the southern flank depends not only on the political determination of the countries in that region, but to a large extent on the attitude and policy towards them adopted by Western Europe.

The Nine are currently examining other applications by European countries for accession to the Common Market. It is possible that in a few years' time the Common Market may become a greatly enlarged organisation as a result of the accession of new member States, having relatively weaker economic structures. This will mean problems for economic integration, and we may come to look at the problems of solidarity and political co-ordination in a fresh light.

I, for my part, associate myself unreservedly with the report's conclusion in paragraph 82 that Turkey must, and I quote: "be associated as soon as possible and to the same extent as Greece with the European foreign policy and defence consultations..."

Before concluding, I should like once again to offer my sincere congratulations to the Rapporteur, Mr. Burekel, on his report, so rich in substance, and indicating by its conclusions the direction and scope of important political orientations. It gives me pleasure to express my warm thanks to the Assembly of Western European Union and its President, Mr. Nessler, for their kind thought in inviting me to this session and receiving me here in my capacity of member of the Turkish Government. I want to say that my government appreciates to the full the significance of this gesture and the intention behind it. And I cannot refrain from repeating how

Mr. Feyzioglu (continued)

happy I am to meet again some very old and dear friends on this occasion.

I am particularly glad to have been given the opportunity of explaining to your Assembly, albeit only briefly, some of my government's views on important problems affecting the Mediterranean region, which looms so large in European security and continental political equilibrium. I make bold to assert — and here I believe I am in full agreement with the Rapporteur — that in present circumstances the rôle of this region is growing in importance. I should therefore like to reaffirm the Turkish Government's constructive intentions for solving the disputes with which we are beset.

Conflicts between neighbours can and must be resolved. Mutual goodwill will enable us to settle our disagreements. These are the fundamental political realities which count. It is these which, in the final analysis, determine decisions. Here, the interests of Turkey and Greece make it imperative that relations of good neighbourliness and co-operation be re-established between them. It is likewise of vital importance for Europe and the free world that agreement should prevail between them.

Turkey will, as in the past, be fully mindful in its actions of these realities. It will, patiently and perseveringly, pursue a policy of peace and reconciliation in order to make possible solutions that are realistic, viable and lasting. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — As is customary in this Assembly, Mr. Minister, you have kindly agreed to expose yourself to the cross-fire of questions which the members of our Assembly may put to you.

I would urge our colleagues once again merely to ask questions and not to seize the opportunity of making speeches themselves.

I call Mr. Urwin.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — First, I wish to congratulate the Minister on the wide-ranging and very objective address that he has given to the Assembly this afternoon. I want to address myself specifically to a very substantial part of his address which related to the difficulties existing between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus. I take fully into account what he said in the early stages of his remarks about the ultimate solution of this very difficult problem

when he referred to the fact that the solution must be determined on an intercommunity basis. I believe that I picked up the interpretation of the Minister's words correctly.

Bearing in mind the vast importance to NATO of an ultimate satisfactory conclusion to that dispute, and not least bearing in mind the importance of a solution for the Greek and Turkish Cypriot people who are most vitally and immediately affected, would the Minister subscribe to my belief that the solution, when he talks about deciding on an intercommunity basis, would be best reached without any intervention from either Western European Union or any of the other European institutions? If any intervention at all is required, would he further agree that it should be on the basis of that which has already been procured through the good offices of the United Nations and its Secretary-General?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. FEYZIOGLU (*Minister of State, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey*) (Translation). — I thank the last speaker for the kind things he had to say about my address. I shall attempt to answer his specific questions.

In my initial remarks I stated that the only means of arriving at such a settlement is by inter-community negotiations, by talks between the two communities.

By that I meant that no solution can be found to this problem in large public bodies used for propaganda purposes with the sole object of casting mutual aspersions. I believe that the dialogue between Athens and Ankara can and should ease the way for concluding an agreement between the two communities. The countries of Western Europe which have a genuine interest in my view, a vital interest, in securing a just, durable and viable solution to this problem can help us by trying to adopt an attitude that does not encourage a continuance of the propaganda war between two nations, between the two communities, but an attitude cautious enough to enable agreement to be reached between the two communities.

From the outset, Turkey has always proposed direct negotiations between Athens and Ankara; even before the coup of 15th July 1974, at the time of the colonels, we proposed, at Ottawa, to the Greek Government of the day, negotiations between the two countries to solve all conflicts

Mr. Feyzioglu (continued)

— the Aegean, Cyprus, minority and other problems — outstanding between us. We met with a blank refusal. After the events of 15th July, which had as a side-effect the restoration of democracy in Greece, the first gesture by the head of our government at the time was to propose to Mr. Karamanlis that an immediate start be made on direct negotiations with a view to solving all the problems on which we were divided; we again met with a refusal.

Turkey's policy has always been unilateral and straightforward, insisting on a solution, the elements of which are familiar to you, being found by way of inter-community negotiations.

If Western Europe is told: "We ought to negotiate, help us to do so", if Mr. Christophides goes off to Lima or to Colombo to accuse the western countries represented in this Assembly of having instigated at Brussels in the NATO headquarters the invasion of a small non-aligned country, saying that it was western imperialism that caused the occupation of the island, and so forth, and when our Greek friends accept a proposal by Soviet Russia for convening a large conference that would include all members of the Security Council, such attitudes are hardly compatible. We say that a solution to the problem can only be found in negotiations between the countries and communities directly involved, and that only the countries which want peace in this area can help us.

That is my reply.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Cordle.

Mr. CORDLE (*United Kingdom*). — I refer to the Minister's remarks about the Common Market. In the event of an invitation being extended by the EEC countries to Turkey, would such an invitation be acceptable to his country?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Feyzioglu.

Mr. FEYZIOGLU (*Minister of State, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey*). — Do you mean an invitation to assume full membership?

Mr. CORDLE (*United Kingdom*). — That is right.

Mr. FEYZIOGLU (*Minister of State, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey*). — For economic reasons, Turkey is not ready to make an appli-

cation for full membership. Other countries are free to make such an application, but we do not intend to make an application based only on political considerations, as we feel that it would not be economically acceptable for Turkey to join the EEC as a full member at this stage.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Hunt.

Mr. HUNT (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. Feyzioglu has repeatedly expressed his opposition to any internationalising of the Cyprus problem. While he apparently will not forget for the moment the direct negotiations which he wants, would he care to give us his views on the desirability of a Balkan initiative following the meeting in Paris of experts from the five Balkan countries, Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria? Does he see that kind of meeting as a useful and a sensible forum in which the current difficulties between Greece and Turkey might be discussed and, we hope, resolved? Is that perhaps a new initiative that might be helpful?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Feyzioglu.

Mr. FEYZIOGLU (*Minister of State, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey*) (Translation). — I answer frankly that we cannot hope for a solution to problems as complex as that of Cyprus or the conflict in the Aegean from a conference of Balkan countries having sometimes different régimes, standpoints and interests. But we accepted the invitation made by the Greek Government for convening representatives of all the Balkan countries to examine the means of establishing better co-operation among them at economic, cultural, technological and other levels. We think that this kind of co-operation between all the countries of the Balkans may be very useful.

We have co-operated with these countries in the past and we shall continue to do so. We maintain excellent relations with all the countries you have mentioned, in economic, technological and cultural affairs. I do not think that this can be the best forum for discussing or resolving the Cypriot conflict and that of the Aegean, but we support co-operation between the Balkan countries.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Minister. Once again, the Assembly has listened to your words with great interest. (*Applause*)

7. *Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems*

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 719 and Amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Assembly now has to hear the replies of the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee before proceeding to vote.

Mr. BURCKEL (*France*) (Translation). — I should also like to thank the Turkish Deputy Prime Minister for his report. I do not intend to reply to each of the speakers, but merely thank them for having come forward.

I think that everyone has taken due note of the problem that exists in this Mediterranean region and of the aims that we must set ourselves in the years to come. We also hope that, for once, men will evolve as quickly as ideas. The need is all the greater in that we are convinced that the security of Europe depends on the security of that part of the Mediterranean.

I would also thank Mr. Radius for having raised the problem of the Western Mediterranean, but he knows quite well that, in this respect, another report will be complementing the present one at the next session.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Sir John RODGERS (*United Kingdom*). — The report which is before the Assembly and which is submitted by Mr. Burckel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee is a good one and should be commended to the Assembly. I am delighted to have here today two old friends from my Council of Europe days, Mr. Stavropoulos, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece, and Mr. Feyzioglu, the Deputy Premier of Turkey. Both Ministers have left no shadow of doubt that there are long-standing problems between Greece and Turkey, and it is a tragedy for the free world, particularly for Western Europe, and of course for Greece and Turkey, that there has been so little progress in dealing with the problems which have bedevilled relationships between the two countries over so long. Mr. Feyzioglu has mentioned that among the problems are questions of relationships with the EEC and the issue of the continental shelf in the Aegean. However, there is also the problem of Cyprus, and that is more immediate and more urgent.

Speaking, as I do, for the General Affairs Committee, I should like to urge a resumption of talks between the two sides as quickly as possible. It is a pity that Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash are no longer in a position to continue the talks. We all want to see continuity of the sovereignty of Cyprus, with Cyprus a non-aligned sovereign State in its own right, and it seems inevitable that the only solution lies in some form of loose federalism. By that system there would be a federal government which would control foreign affairs, defence, communications and currency matters while leaving housing, social services, education and so on to be dealt with individually by the two communities.

I do not say whether it would be helpful to have a further United Nations participation in getting the talks started or whether there could be a European initiative, either through the EEC countries or through the Council of Europe. However, I agree that it is important that the talks should be started and that there should be community conversations between the two sides as quickly as possible. That is our pious hope.

Mr. Burckel's report was unanimously approved by the Committee. Some members, including myself and Mr. Urwin, who were required at home because of domestic problems in our parliament, were unable to be present. However, the report was unanimously agreed by all those present and I therefore hope that Mr. Urwin might feel able to withdraw his amendment. If he does not, I shall have to ask the Assembly to vote it down. I hope that the report will be accepted unanimously. I extend my thanks and the thanks of the Committee to Mr. Burckel for his excellent report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I am intervening personally to clear up a slight misunderstanding. Yesterday, we heard the representative of the Greek Government and this afternoon we have heard the representative of the Turkish Government. I welcome the fact that, despite the underlying passions we know all about, both speeches were made in measured terms. It happens that Mr. Stavropoulos is a member of the Greek Government and attended this afternoon's sitting as an observer. He was not down on the list of speakers, but asks — and I presume he does so in an entirely conciliatory spirit — whether he can make a very brief statement to put an end to the matter. We are not

The President (continued)

going to reopen the debate. You have made it quite clear, Mr. Stavropoulos, that you wish only to say a few words.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). — No!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Stavropoulos, you may speak for a minute or two.

Mr. STAVROPOULOS (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece*) (Translation). — I thought we had come to an arrangement...

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). — Then I will also ask to speak afterwards!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — This is becoming impossible.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). — Yesterday, two of my colleagues spoke as well as two Greek parliamentarians. In all fairness I ought to speak immediately after Mr. Stavropoulos.

Mr. STAVROPOULOS (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece*) (Translation). — It was agreed yesterday that I could say a word or two. I understand that you are in a hurry, Mr. President, and I shall limit myself to one. (*Laughter*) This is the second time I have heard His Excellency Mr. Feyzioglu, as well as other speakers, say something that could be taken as a very bad joke — words to the effect that, speaking about the invasion of Cyprus, this invasion delivered the island from tyranny and led to the re-establishment of democracy in Greece.

I assure you that we could have had the colonels for two or three years more without any invasion of Cyprus.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). — No!

Mr. STAVROPOULOS (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece*) (Translation). — Yes.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — This is not reopening the debate; it is a historical point, and incidentally rather controversial. Mr. Stavropoulos has had his say.

Mr. Inan, you are here as an observer, please let me conduct the proceedings the way they should be.

We shall now consider the draft recommendation in Mr. Burckel's report.

Amendment No. 1 has been tabled by Mr. Urwin to leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.

I put the amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The amendment is negatived.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation as a whole.

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation?...

Are there any abstentions?...

I note that there are some abstentions.

We shall therefore take a vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Pecchioli.

The voting is open.

(*Sir John Rodgers, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler*)

(*A vote by roll-call was then taken*)

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	53
Ayes	25
Noes	1
Abstentions	27

The draft recommendation is adopted².

1. See page 35.

2. See page 37.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. May I ask you to explain the rules? According to that result the abstentions won, yet you declared that the recommendation was agreed to.

The PRESIDENT. — According to the rules before me, I am afraid that the abstentions do not count in the voting. It is twenty-five for and one against.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. You have just said that the abstentions do not count in the voting, but they presumably count for the purpose of ascertaining whether a quorum is present. Perhaps, therefore, you could correct your ruling.

The PRESIDENT. — They do count, but they do not count for the vote, whether they are in the majority or not.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — On a further point of order, Mr. President. It is clear that the decision was taken by what is a minority vote. How does that stand as far as the record of the Assembly is concerned?

The PRESIDENT. — As I understand it, the record will show that twenty-five were in favour, that one was against, that there were twenty-seven abstentions and that the motion was carried.

8. European security and East-West relations

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 726 and Amendments)

Mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee — Motion for an Order tabled by Mr. Delorme and others

(Doc. 728)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on European security and East-West relations, Document 726 and Amendments.

I call Mr. de Koster, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. de KOSTER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, if ever it was clear that WEU, and this Assembly in particular, had an important job to do, then it

is today, when debates dealing with a variety of topics have run on so much that, to my great regret, we are almost two-and-a-half hours behind schedule and I shall be unable to reply to those speaking on this report. I regret this very much, and offer them my apologies. I did indicate some months ago that I would have to leave around six o'clock this evening, and I am very sorry that I shall have to miss a no doubt lively debate on this report.

In a democratic community like ours it is of course important to say firmly that we shall continue to defend democracy, that democracy represents one of our highest values, that — as was shown a few moments ago in this chamber — we can come to decisions in our own way, and that our populations can decide what governments they want. It does sometimes seem that courage is needed to stand up for this system in a world where it can clearly be seen in the United Nations that the democracies are now in a minority. Not all republics that call themselves democratic can be regarded as such by our lights.

Six weeks ago in one of these democratic republics elections were held; since 99 % of the voters — 98 % of the population — voted for the same list, it was a real people's festival of democracy. That is not democracy. Under these conditions it is obvious that power is still what matters in the international community, in the forum, and that military power — and alongside this one must nowadays also mention economic power, especially the power of decision over scarce raw materials — is a major factor both in creating tension and in the relaxing of tension that we so sorely need.

WEU needs to keep careful watch over the process of armament and disarmament, though unhappily we hear less about the second. We must let no opportunity slip to co-operate in lessening the burden of defence, because in our countries there is so much else which, in a world of rampant inflation and unemployment, demands priority treatment.

Within this framework of the defence of our crucial values, values we dare not jeopardise, this report is one of a series. We do not want a return to the cold war. We look critically on all unnecessary stepping-up of armaments; but we have a duty to maintain the military balance so far as possible, because we cannot but conclude that in the conventional sphere the Soviet Union is already several times stronger than we

Mr. de Koster (continued)

are. It is precisely with this in view that I have given figures in the report for the future balance — though it might be better to talk of imbalance. I have once again set these figures out clearly, one set against the other.

In this connection, too, I would like to draw attention to paragraph 14, in which I have quoted Dr. Kissinger. He reminds us that the Soviet Union has always felt the need to have a conventional military superiority. It seems quite plain, too, that too marked a preponderance on the part of the Warsaw Pact can result in political pressure.

Round about a month ago was the fourth anniversary of our starting the talks about a balanced reduction of forces — MBFR. When a great statesman, today President of one of our member countries, was talking to Brezhnev at that time about their families' futures and he asked whether his son, then still at school, would one day be able to play a useful part in the MBFR talks, Brezhnev's answer was "Your grandson should be able to make a good living out of them, too". I hope Brezhnev's gloomy forecast will not be fulfilled.

Here, I would like too to call attention to the fact that the Soviet Union is preparing in yet another way for the possibility of a third world war. In the Soviet Union — and some neutral countries in Europe are doing the same, though I believe the WEU countries are lagging far behind — the last year has seen a great stepping-up of civil defence. This does not, of course, form part of MBFR, but it is something that I thought worth mentioning.

On the negotiations in Vienna, I have the following points to make: a phenomenon that we have seen in East-West negotiations is that of the Soviet Union remaining immovable for a long period and then suddenly being ready to take a step forward just when everyone has given up hope. This was the case, especially, in the bilateral talks with the United States, a power respected and recognised as such by the Soviet Union.

Evidently, I hope that something of the kind is going to happen in Vienna.

Another aspect I ought to highlight here is the fact that in the Soviet Union the taking of decisions is done by a mere handful of politi-

cians. It may well be that it is impossible for the Soviet Union at one and the same time to be constructive in negotiations on both MBFR and SALT. If this is in fact so, it should become clear at the moment when the SALT talks — and this should happen in October 1977, because that is when the present agreements terminate — end in success.

I have focused attention, in the report, on the fact that there has been a growing number of Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons targeted on Western Europe in recent times. There are two European countries that are nuclear powers. Yet discussions on strategic nuclear arms are going on, and they take place between the Soviet Union and the United States. Even if the United States delegation, on its way to or from Moscow, calls in at Brussels and tells its NATO partners what is going on, this does not I believe mean that, as Europe too becomes more and more "nuclear" and as the countries of Western Europe become greatly at risk, the situation can be accepted by the WEU member States. I emphasise once again the increasingly important rôle, on the Soviet side, of the SSX-20 missile.

This is why — and I attach special importance to this — I have, in paragraph 28 of the report, called for a Euro-strategic sub-committee so that Europe can have a say, albeit through the voice of the United States, on these problems which are so enormously important to us all.

"East-West" must also mean, of course, that we look at how far the Helsinki final act has been applied. The report examines the way the confidence-building measures have been carried out. Things have got under way very slowly in Moscow, for instance in respect of prior announcements about manoeuvres which in the beginning did not reach us at all, though I must assume that there were in fact manoeuvres during that period. Afterwards, some information was given, and a few Warsaw Pact countries even invited observers. I have learned from these observers that they were not able to observe very much, and that the facilities made available to them were fairly limited. On the other hand, I will sound a note of optimism, in that although originally we believed that there would be no information forthcoming from the Warsaw Pact countries, and no facts, we have in fact been given information even though only to a modest extent.

With your permission, I will touch now on something that really has more to do with the

Mr. de Koster (continued)

work of the General Affairs Committee, that of free movement. It is however worth looking at for a moment, because in a couple of areas there have — though this involves primarily the Federal Republic and the bilateral arrangements it has managed to make with a number of Warsaw Pact countries — been some exchanges.

It is certainly interesting that over several months last year five million citizens of the Federal Republic visited the GDR, although honours will only be even when a similar number of people from the GDR have been to the Federal Republic. One topic I hope will also be discussed in Belgrade is freedom of movement for people between the Warsaw Pact countries themselves. It is interesting, in this connection, to report that if a Bulgarian family wants to go to Romania to visit members of the family there, they are not allowed to stay with those relatives — they have to sleep in a hotel, which entails a lot of expense ; in other words, such exchanges between people living in Warsaw Pact countries are made quite impossible because they cost too much. This, too, is something I think the West should give attention to.

The University of Georgetown is at this moment doing a computer analysis of data on implementation of the Helsinki final act. These data are giving a definite mathematical picture, and will I think be very interesting to look at. I can imagine that if one finds that a given foreign newspaper which used to sell ten copies in Moscow now sells a hundred, it would be possible to talk of there having been a 900 % increase in exchanges of this kind. Even in a city like Moscow it is very hard indeed to come by a foreign newspaper ; and even if it should be made possible for Russians to buy foreign newspapers, the price is almost prohibitive.

A number of amendments have been submitted, one of which relates to the account I would like to see rendered in Belgrade of progress in the MBFR talks in Vienna. I would point out that during discussions on the final act, both in Helsinki and in Geneva, many speakers for the West emphasised the importance of progress in the MBFR talks. Originally there was a link between the two, a link that was broken by Kissinger without consulting the West ; that was something we had to put up with. But even at the time the final act was signed, there were strong comments from a large number of Heads

of State and Government about the Warsaw Pact countries which came down to saying that while Helsinki was important, real détente could only come about when there was also a slowing down of the excessive arms race.

This is why I feel it important for the West to stress this side of things when a balance is being struck in Belgrade. An amendment seeking to do away with this has been defeated by a large majority, and I am glad of this. We, as good democrats, do however take account of the comments made in committee by minorities, and for this reason I have agreed to this minority — small though it is — having its viewpoint set out in the report. I feel that this way of doing things, in itself, is positive.

The Luxembourg Prime Minister made a particularly good speech this morning. Usually, Ministers read out manuscripts written by highly-competent civil servants, but Mr. Thorn did not do that. He did not limit himself to that, and he gave us a lot of information. He said, besides, that Europe must be strong enough to prevent decisions dangerous to our democracy being taken because of political pressure. Europe has, it is true, got over the wounds it dealt itself in two world wars, and memories of those two world wars are limited only to the most tenacious among us — even those who took an active part in the second world war are getting decidedly grey-haired ; but those who fought in that war know that if in 1936 a number of Western European countries had decided on even a limited amount of rearmament, then World War II might quite well have been avoided. One of our jobs is to see to it that any shift in power relationships in Central Europe does not have disastrous consequences. No price is too high for preventing a third world war. It is also our job to give advice to our governments. By doing so, we are accepting a share in the responsibility should our countries prove not to be strong enough to withstand the political pressures I have mentioned.

A busy member of parliament appreciates the honour of being appointed as a Rapporteur to WEU, but he would be incapable of doing his work without the help of the very competent staff of this organisation. In my case, I would like to voice my gratitude to Mr. Whyte. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — On behalf of the Assembly I should like to thank you, Mr. de Koster, for the clear and concise way in which you

The President (continued)

presented the report and opened our debate, on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, on this important subject of European security and East-West relations.

There is a motion for an order inviting the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to follow attentively the implementation of the mandate given to the Standing Armaments Committee, Document 728, which was tabled in the name of Mr. Delorme and others. I understand that Mr. Radius will stand in for Mr. Delorme and speak on the subject. Under Article 30 of the Rules of Procedure, this motion may be put to the vote without being referred to the Committee. Is there any opposition to holding a joint debate on this motion at the same time as on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — This order was not circulated, although the amendments were circulated. Could you, Mr. President, give us some indication of the text of this draft order ? Could you give us some indication of how you would hold a joint debate, if we agreed to it straight away ? I understand that there are also some amendments from Mr. Rivière and from some of his colleagues. May we be told what we shall do and in what order we shall eventually vote ? That will assist the Assembly in coming to a decision on this matter.

The PRESIDENT. — The motion was circulated. Copies have been on the desk outside since Monday. Therefore, it has been freely available to you and to other members of the Assembly. I am afraid that I do not have a copy of the motion before me, so that I cannot read it out.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Assuming that we agree to give precedence to this matter, what would be the order of the debate, Mr. President, and how would you propose to conduct such a debate on the original text, the draft order and the amendments ? In what order would they be taken and voted on ?

The PRESIDENT. — We suggest to the Assembly that we should hold a joint debate but not take it in any specific order. Those who wish to speak to the motion may do so, those who wish to speak on the paper may do so and those who wish to speak on both may also do as they wish.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am sorry. I am asking in what order the Assembly will vote.

The PRESIDENT. — I understand that we shall deal first with the amendments to the paper, secondly with the recommendations and thirdly with the draft order.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, as a co-signatory of the draft order I should like to ask a supplementary question.

The meaning of this draft order surely cannot be that from now on this matter will no longer fall within the competence of the General Affairs Committee. At least, that is how I understood it when I signed it.

The PRESIDENT. — I do not have the French text of the draft motion before me. It invites the Committee, and it refers the matter back to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. I think that that answers the point.

I now call on Mr. Radius to speak to the motion.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, would you like me to speak to the draft order at this stage ?

The PRESIDENT. — For the sake of Mr. Roper, you may speak as briefly as possible and tell him what it is all about.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Before I interrupted you, Mr. President, you were about to ask the Assembly to give Mr. Radius permission to do that. That has not yet been done.

The PRESIDENT. — I do not think I have to ask the permission of the Assembly.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I understand that you asked whether there were any objections.

The PRESIDENT. — I did not ask for objections.

It would be in order if I were to ask the Assembly now if it agreed to a joint debate on the motion at the same time as on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Would you like me to take the vote again and count it ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — We have just had the vote. It was clearly defeated. Two people voted in favour ; five or six voted against.

The PRESIDENT. — If the Assembly is willing to accept those figures, the proposition has been defeated.

May I go back a little ? Does the Assembly agree that we hold a joint debate on the paper from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and on the motion ? That is the first question.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Fifteen members voted for the motion and thirteen voted against it. Therefore, we shall hold a joint debate.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like the floor, for an explanation of vote. I should like to say that my vote for the motion, as I intended it, did not mean that the matter should be taken out of the hands of the General Affairs Committee.

I wish to make that clear.

The PRESIDENT. — There is some doubt as to the exact figures. This time, I shall ask the Clerks to count. I am sorry to have to trouble members but this is an important matter.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Thirteen members have voted for the motion and fifteen have voted against. Therefore, we shall not hold a joint debate.

That brings me to the first speaker in the debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Mr. Rivière.

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the few comments that I feel impelled by Mr. de Koster's report to make follow on from those that I had the honour of putting to the Assembly during the debate on the report submitted by Mr. de Bruyne last Monday.

The recommendation adopted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, by a procedure whose haste I deplore, presents all the defects that I condemned when I congratulated Mr. de Bruyne on not having been guilty of them.

The first of these is to purport to be addressing the WEU Council while in actual fact addressing others, to wit, the member governments and

ultimately, through them, chiefly the North Atlantic Council. The fact that the WEU Council should use this kind of presentation as a pretext for not replying to the recommendations made to it does not seem to have discouraged the Rapporteur, whose absence I regret.

However, this type of approach also has drawbacks of another kind. It means, in fact, denying that the WEU Council has any real powers, and simply using it as a letter-box for documents intended for others. Where those others are the North Atlantic Council, this method puts French parliamentarians in a very real quandary, as we know that that body carefully distinguishes between the decisions that it is able to take in cases where all members of the Atlantic Alliance participate in its work, and those which it takes without French agreement, ever since France's withdrawal from the integrated military structures of NATO.

In the circumstances, it does not seem possible to me for a French parliamentarian to address a recommendation to the NATO Council with the object of associating in an enterprise designed to relieve the WEU Council of the exercise of the powers conferred upon it by the modified Brussels Treaty, with a view to transferring them to another organisation, in which France's participation is of a less permanent kind.

This first point leads me to support a first amendment to the beginning of the substantive recommendation, requesting the Council to urge member governments to ensure that the North Atlantic Council makes careful preparation for the meeting to be held at Belgrade in 1977. I would add that in this particular case preparation for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe was undertaken in the European framework of political consultations among the Nine, and I do not see why, when all the members of WEU take part in these, WEU should address itself to NATO.

The first amendment *ipso facto* carries with it two other amendments concerning paragraph 1 (b) of the substantive recommendation. The first proposes to replace the expression "all members of the Alliance" by the words "all members of WEU" since, obviously, the WEU Council cannot address itself to members of the Atlantic Alliance who are not at the same time members of WEU. The amendment further seeks to replace the word "Alliance" in paragraph 1 (b) (ii) by the words "jointly-defined".

Mr. Rivière (continued)

First of all, the amendment is aimed at preserving the policy of European construction and co-ordination within the framework of both the Nine and the Seven. Second, one may wonder what the content of an Alliance policy might be. An Alliance as such has no policy other than to apply the treaty that gave birth to it, unless it includes a decision-making organ, as is the case with WEU, created by the modified Brussels Treaty, but as is not the case with NATO, which was not created by the North Atlantic Treaty.

By referring to a "jointly-defined policy", the recommendation would be strengthened, since it would require WEU members to defend the jointly-defined policy as a whole, whether in the context of NATO, political consultations among the Nine, or WEU. Such a wording in no way prejudices any preference for one or other of these institutions. The change should obviously be accompanied by one to the second paragraph of the preamble, in order to define its scope. That is why I suggested adding the words "Western European Union and the European Economic Community" after the words "Atlantic Alliance". That is self-explanatory.

The scope of these comments is, I think, far-reaching, for they concern the overall orientation followed for many years past by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the effect being to deny to the WEU Council the prerogatives conferred upon it by the modified Brussels Treaty in defence matters and foreign policy.

As I told you the day before yesterday, I am firmly decided, and a number of my friends are of the same mind, not to give my vote any longer to recommendations addressed to organisations other than the Council of WEU. Unfortunately, these comments are not my only ones, and I must ask you similarly to amend paragraph 1 (b) (iii) of the draft recommendation submitted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by deleting, at the end of the paragraph, the words "and to report on the progress or lack of progress of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions".

We know in fact that the French Government has always refused to take part in these negotiations, which it regards as extremely dangerous because they considerably weaken the deterrent capability of the Atlantic Alliance by demonstrating that the European countries are quite

willing to forgo any real effort in the defence field. The effect of this would be to increase considerably the relative power of the United States and the Soviet Union, and so give them the possibility of settling among themselves the fate of the whole of Western and Eastern Europe, and all matters of policy, strategy or disarmament in Europe.

No one could wish more than I that political agreements on the lines of those concluded at Helsinki should, in the last analysis, bring about real disarmament, but disarmament is not a means of achieving political détente, particularly in the case of disarmament by those who are precisely the least well-armed. But the effect could be to reinforce the hegemony of the great powers over the medium-sized and smaller ones. Any tentative disarmament not aimed at general and complete disarmament is by its very nature a dangerous undertaking for those who have only limited military resources.

The reasons for my asking you to delete paragraph 3 of the recommendation are of the same order. What indeed does paragraph 3 mean — and this is in my view the most important clause of all — if not a negotiation between Western Europe and the Soviet Union involving total disarmament of the former against partial disarmament by the latter, in certain categories of nuclear weaponry? In particular, it implies the relinquishment of the French nuclear force without any *quid pro quo*.

If Western Europe were to forgo having nuclear weapons on its soil in exchange for renouncement by the Soviet Union and its allies of nuclear weapons targeted at Western Europe, its own nuclear powers would immediately cease to be nuclear and would lose the essentials of their potential deterrence without any comparable loss to the Soviet Union, which would retain its nuclear weapons, with the sole proviso that they were pointed in other directions.

The Soviet Union's nuclear forces could be very swiftly redeployed, and Europe would then have lost everything and be at their tender mercies. That is not, I think, what either the Rapporteur or the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments have in mind.

Finally, the last passage that I propose for amendment is the last paragraph in the preamble, to which I propose adding, amongst the effects expected from détente, the one which would enable the division of Europe into antagonistic

Mr. Rivière (continued)

military blocs to be attenuated. The purpose is to underline that what I am after is not in the slightest any disarmament, more apparent than real, whose effects on Europe could only be disastrous unless accompanied by a genuine process of détente directed at breaking up the military blocs. We ought, on the contrary, to set out from détente and proceed as far as possible in that direction before examining what effects it might have in the military area.

Thus, behind all the amendments I am moving, is a twofold opposition to the orientation which Mr. de Koster and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments have imparted to the recommendation on which you are to vote today.

First, I am radically opposed to any policy involving the abandonment of WEU, its Council and, ultimately, its Assembly. I propose, on the contrary, that since we function in the WEU framework, we ask the Council to exercise its powers to the full so that Europe may keep at its disposal the only existing truly European organisation in the defence area.

Secondly, I call upon the Assembly to reject any policy of military abandonment and consequently of abandonment pure and simple, such as is gaining ground in our various countries and whose effect can only be to increase Europe's dependence, probably, at an initial stage, on the United States but in due course vis-à-vis the Soviet Union which, in the last analysis, is readier than the United States to seize upon any slackening in the European will for defence.

The policy proposed by Mr. de Koster in fact involves total renunciation of any defence of Europe by the Europeans, relying instead upon the good will of the Americans to make up the deficiency.

The policy that I propose is to maintain and build up the military strength of Europe, to enable it to play its proper part not only in the process of détente but in that of defence too, in agreement with our American allies, to be sure, but quite independently of them. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rivière, for your contribution to the debate.

It is getting late. I propose to call one more speaker, Mr. Watkinson, then to adjourn and resume the debate at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Mr. WATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). — The report is a balanced and dispassionate account of the present state of East-West relations and is in strong contrast to that presented to this Assembly by my colleague Sir Frederic Bennett at the last meeting of WEU. In his report "Détente and security in Europe", it seemed to me that Sir Frederic was presenting an extremely pessimistic view of the results of the Helsinki agreement and to be giving support to the thesis that the West had been dangerously deluded. In so far as it was a warning against excessive expectations, this view should be welcomed; but anyone who approached Helsinki realistically would have accepted that there could be no miracles overnight. Indeed, there have been none.

Perhaps certain commentators set their expectations too high. Perhaps people were led to believe that we were on the road to Utopia in international relations. We all know that that is not the case. Helsinki provides no panacea. What détente means is that there may well be certain specific areas in which West and East can get together and seek a diminution of tension. Much as I might wish that Helsinki had global significance, the brute fact of the matter is that it is specific in character.

It would be incorrect to interpret the post-Helsinki world as one in which western morale has collapsed and in which the status of the USSR has been advanced. It is necessary to strike a balance and to consider, for instance, the shambles in which Soviet policy in the Middle East now finds itself, the continuing Chinese-Russian conflict and the claims being made by the communist parties in Europe for an independent stance.

It is also worth quoting, as did the Rapporteur, from the remarks of Dr. Kissinger in his Alastair Buchan memorial lecture, in which he said that "the Soviet Union suffers endemic weakness in its industry and agriculture; recent studies indicate that this chronic inefficiency extends even into their military sector." It is, therefore, very easy to concentrate on the threat which is posed from the East, to underestimate the difficulties which the East itself faces and, at the same time, to play down the strength of the West.

In that same lecture, Dr. Kissinger pointed out the overwhelming superiority of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. I endorse the remarks made by Dr. Kissinger because, as a member of the Committee on Defence Questions

Mr. Watkinson (continued)

and Armaments, I visited NORTHAG in Central Europe and at the end of our briefing from the NATO personnel there one of the principal spokesmen pointed out: "I hope I have made it clear that a balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact cannot be struck by mere comparison of manpower, combat units or equipment. Qualitative factors that cannot be reduced to numbers, such as training, morale, leadership, tactical initiative and geographical positions, are also of vital importance and indeed may be dominant." It is important for the Assembly not to underestimate the qualitative advantages which we have even now in Central Europe.

That is not to say that I advocate that we underestimate the imbalances which exist there, but at the same time we must take into account the advantages which accrue to us. On deterrence, it is worth emphasising some of the positive factors which have emerged since Helsinki. The first factor to be drawn to the attention of the Assembly is that it would be incorrect to say that the West has been lulled into a false sense of security. There has been no move to disarm unilaterally.

Secondly, it is worth pointing out that the conference did not endorse the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. The USSR wanted it but did not get it. And written into the final act is respect for the sovereignty of all participating States, irrespective of their political, economic and social systems. This respect for the sovereignty of other States must extend to Soviet allies. I note that the Polish constitution of 1976 introduced a note of sovereignty and independence of the Polish people. This is a development worth noting. The Rapporteur has pointed out that there have been some positive steps in respect of advance warning of manoeuvres, and of observers being able to watch what is going on in those manoeuvres. Admittedly it is only tentative at this stage, but it is a step in the right direction. Also, under basket 3 of the agreement some advances have been made in respect of co-operation in humanitarian and in other fields. The Rapporteur referred to this fact, though it is still difficult for newspapers to be obtained in the East. Nevertheless, there is some significant improvement in this area.

The Rapporteur also pointed out what has been borne out: that there has been some easing in travel and emigration. And there is an

important passage in the final act in which it is established that there is a formal link between peace, good relations and respect for human rights. Thus, this enables governments to raise with the Soviet Government and other parties issues such as the problems facing dissident groups. When Mr. Ponomarev was in our country, the government were able to draw to his attention the strong feeling which exists in our country about the problems facing dissidents. The important factor about Helsinki in this area is that it has now been written into the agreement that respect should be shown for dissidents, for those who disagree.

The important fact is that, while progress may be slow, nevertheless those in the eastern sector are able to use, and are using, the Helsinki agreement as a means whereby they can express their views and opinions.

In conclusion, I would say that détente cannot mean an end to the ideological battle. We in the West believe in free discussion and, therefore, must be prepared to go on arguing our case as against theirs, but we must also remain clear about the ulterior motives of the Soviet Union and its objectives and be prepared to defend ourselves if that be necessary. Those who set expectations of Helsinki too high have been disappointed. It is clear that progress will be slow. Nevertheless, we should not be disillusioned by Helsinki. We should move forward, and I hope that we shall be able to make progress at Belgrade next year. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Watkinson, for your very helpful contribution.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. I wonder whether, for the better conduct of our business in future, you might be able to help me with a ruling from the Chair which would clarify a certain amount of misunderstanding that occurred earlier this afternoon when we voted on a resolution. I believe that twenty-five voted in favour of it, with one against, and that twenty-seven abstained. It might be that members of the Assembly, in reading Rule 34(4), which states that only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast, added together twenty-five and one, and, seeing that that was less than one-half of the Assembly, suggested that there was therefore no quorum.

I should be glad if you would rule that, taking Rule 34(4) together with Rules 35 and 36, the

Mr. Roper (continued)

reference in Rule 34(4) to only affirmative and negative votes counting really has significance only for the quality of the majority obtained, as described in Rule 35(a), (b) and (c), and that as far as the ascertainment of a quorum is concerned the positive and negative votes and stated abstentions all count in determining how many members are present. It is, of course, the number of members present, not the number of affirmative and negative votes cast, which determines whether or not a vote is valid. I should be most grateful, Mr. President, if you could confirm that that is the case, to prevent any possible misunderstandings in future.

The PRESIDENT. — I apologise for any shortcomings of the Chair, but I was pitchforked into it without any warning and without even knowing the business of the day. The President was in the Chair when we started. My understanding is that the normal method of voting is by sitting and standing, and that a roll-call vote can be claimed by ten members. This was not the case in this instance.

As that was not the case we added the votes — which were not very easy to take — cast by sitting and standing.

As to the actual vote itself, the President was in the Chair at the time but, as I understand it, subject to correction, having now read the rules twice, the presence of members voting in the affirmative or against, or abstaining, is taken into account in determining whether or not there is a quorum ; but that is not taken into account in deciding how the vote has gone. One does not add one section to another but takes only for and against.

I should like to reserve this, and you may like to ask the President tomorrow whether he will confirm my ruling. You have asked an important question and it ought to be answered authoritatively. I have given you the best answer I can, but I would not be absolutely sure that it was an authoritative one.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Further to that point of order, Mr. President. I am most grateful for your ruling, which corresponds with my own interpretation of the rules, but in view of the fact that there was misunderstanding I thought it important to get this on the record. It might be useful, if you thought it appropriate, to bring the matter to the attention of the Presi-

dent, who will be able to consult the verbatim record of these proceedings and can, if necessary, make a statement tomorrow morning when he comes to present the minutes of today's sitting for confirmation.

The PRESIDENT. — I am most grateful to you, Mr. Roper, for that very helpful suggestion. I have to leave to go to a meeting of the Bureau at any moment, and I shall put the matter to him and tell him what has happened.

Mr. de NIET (*Netherlands*).— Mr. President, am I right in concluding that your view and that of Mr. Roper is that to decide whether a majority of the members of the Assembly have taken part in the voting one must add those who have said "Yes", those who have said "No" and those who have said "Abstention", and that this decides whether or not there has been a quorum ; but that in order to decide whether a proposal has been accepted or rejected one counts only those who have said "Yes" and those who have said "No ?"

The PRESIDENT. — That is my interpretation, Mr. de Niet, but I think it would be best, since this question has now been raised, that the President himself should confirm this tomorrow. I shall ask him to do that as he was in the Chair at the time in question.

Mr. de NIET (*Netherlands*). — That is not necessary. The rules are precise. It is not a question of interpretation.

The PRESIDENT. — That disposes of the matter for the time being, I hope. The debate is adjourned.

9. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 2nd December, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Relations with Parliaments (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 724).
2. European security and East-West relations (Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 726 and Amendments).

The President (continued)

3. Mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee — Motion for an Order tabled by Mr. Delorme and others (Document 728 and Amendment).
4. Anti-submarine warfare (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 725).
5. Address by Mr. Wischnewski, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
6. Anti-submarine warfare (Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 725).

Are there any objections ?...

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — In view, Mr. President, of the number of items on the agenda for tomorrow, including the important address by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany,

Mr. Wischnewski, will the Bureau of the Assembly give urgent attention either to the sitting opening at 9 a.m. rather than 10 a.m. or to making arrangements for the continuation of the debates in the afternoon? Otherwise, we shall have an absurd amount of indigestion.

The PRESIDENT. — I am afraid that I am not in a position to give a ruling on that question. At present, the officers inform me that the sitting will open at 10 o'clock. I doubt whether we would be able to inform all the staff and everybody else involved that they should arrive earlier at 9 o'clock, so I think we had better leave the time for the opening of the sitting at 10 o'clock. We can discuss your suggestion, Mr. Roper, at 10 o'clock as to whether the sitting should extend into the afternoon.

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 6.20 p.m.)

TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 2nd December 1976

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
Speakers : The President, Mr. Roper, the President.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments*, Doc. 724).
Speakers : The President, Mr. Delorme (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Radius (*Chairman of the Committee*).
4. European security and East-West relations (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 726 and Amendments).
Speakers : The President, Mr. Dankert, Mr. La Combe, Mr. Roper.
5. Address by Mr. Wischniewski, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Speakers : The President, Mr. Wischniewski.
Replies by Mr. Wischniewski to questions put by Mr. Péridier, Mr. Hulpiau, Mr. Roper, Mr. Faulds, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Mendelson, Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. de Niet.
6. European security and East-West relations (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 726 and Amendments).
Speakers : The President, Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Scholten, Mr. Mendelson, Mr. Cavaliere.
7. European security and East-West relations; Anti-submarine warfare; Mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee — Motion for an Order tabled by Mr. Delorme and others (*Reference back to Committee of the Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and withdrawal of the Motion for an Order*, Docs. 726 and Amendments, 725 and 728 and Amendment).
Speakers : The President, Mr. Critchley (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Delorme.
8. Close of the Session.

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I should be glad if a correction could be made to the minutes of the last sitting, which, as you say, Mr. President, have been distributed, because you will see that at Item 9 of the minutes it is stated that the date, time and Orders of the Day of the next sitting were announced. If, however, you look at the verbatim report of the last sitting, you will see that I spoke on that item, but my intervention is not recorded in the minutes. It would appear to be normal in the activities of this organisation that the fact that I spoke should be mentioned.

Secondly, further to that point, Mr. President, you will see that in replying to my remarks the acting President, Sir John Rodgers, told me that I would be able to raise this matter with you this morning. Although I suspect that he was not in order in so doing, I should like your permission at least to point out to you, Sir, that we are an Assembly primarily concerned with matters of defence, but unfortunately, owing to the organisation of the business of the Assembly in this part-session, neither of the two major reports from the Defence Committee — that of Mr. de Koster, who is not present this morning, and that which I had the honour to submit — will have adequate time for debate. I ask you, Mr. President, to bring this remark to the attention of the Presidential Committee and to request that in future proper time may be allocated for debates on defence, which are one of the major reasons for the existence of our Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Your comments have been noted, Mr. Roper.

While it is quite clear that our field is a limited one, it is very difficult for politicians not to encroach on other fields. All the same,

The President (continued)

we can extend the session, should that prove necessary. We shall see towards half past twelve; if need be, we shall hold an additional sitting this afternoon. That should satisfy you.

Are there any other comments?...?

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Relations with Parliaments

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 724)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The first Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 724.

I call Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I come before you again to report to you on the work of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. I shall also be reporting on the results of interventions by our colleagues following decisions taken by ourselves, notably the options taken by our Committee on the recommendations approved by your Assembly, which have been the subject of a number of parliamentary questions and, I may say, of a number of replies too.

It is interesting to find that questions by our members are increasingly eliciting replies from the appropriate ministers and governments, which is most encouraging; it means that we ought to persevere.

My presentation today differs from that accompanying previous reports. The fact is, we have tried to enliven a presentation that often tends to be abstract and dry as dust; as what we bring you is a statistical paper, our endeav-

our has been, with the unanimous support of our Committee, to present you with a working document, which is why my report goes into the terms of reference given me by the Committee.

Need I remind you that prior to 1968 we were only a working party? That we have since become a fully-fledged committee and now make every effort to communicate to the Assembly studies of parliamentary methods and activities and, in particular, parliamentary activities and powers at European level? We have had too a series of studies and reports presented by my friend Mr. Péronnet on regional assemblies and national, regional and European parliamentarians.

I should now like to give you a picture, based on a survey we carried out of the position of members of parliament in respect of the information available in parliaments. The first chapter is entitled "Members of parliament and defence". The report goes on to give an account of our traditional activities, and the results which I have the honour of bringing to your notice.

As regards members of parliament and defence matters, an assembly such as that of WEU is in our view a privileged forum to which parliamentarians from member States can bring valuable, concrete information on the state of defence in their own countries from which the broad lines of a European defence policy can be worked out for submission to national executives.

Your Rapporteur therefore considered it useful and necessary to study the rôle of parliamentarians in the defence policy of each member country and ascertain the means available to him for fulfilling this rôle. From that basis, it would perhaps be possible to decide how a national parliamentarian can handle defence matters at European level and what contribution he should make to plans for European security.

Many members of the WEU Assembly have been enthusiastically dealing with defence matters for years. With various means, but above all with faith and enthusiasm, they have been tackling all these matters from the most pragmatic angle, which is no doubt an element of the realism shown in the Assembly's studies and recommendations. The aim of the study now before the Assembly is not to "theorise" about this realism but on the contrary to make it more

1. See page 40.

Mr. Delorme (continued)

effective by making us aware of the contributions we can bring to Europe and exchange with one another.

The time available to your Rapporteur was too short for him to expand and develop these considerations in full. He therefore proposes to submit a plan for study and research which he intends to complete with the assistance of fellow members.

The next report will give the results of this enquiry and seek to set out a few guidelines for improving our work. Proper co-ordination of defence problems must be based on co-ordinated democratic action by representatives of the nations of Europe which are members of WEU.

Let us take a quick look at the member of parliament's scope in defence matters. At first sight, defence does not appear to be any different from other legislative or political subjects and therefore seems to come within the general scope of members of parliament. Closer study shows that in almost all political systems defence occupies a specific place in the constitutional order. It is thus possible, by examining the various traditional duties of members of parliament, to see what place they occupy in national security matters in each country.

Parliamentary powers definitely form a whole and it is arbitrary — although traditional — to divide them up. Nevertheless it is a fairly practical approach to take each aspect separately.

Without wishing to give you a professorial lecture on the rôle of parliamentarians, it is customary to distinguish three parliamentary functions: legislation, supervision, information. For each country, therefore, the extent and importance of the rôle of members of parliament in the exercise of these functions in the very specific sector of defence will be assessed.

In the case of the legislative functions, in most European countries, defence is considered an essential prerogative of government in view of its continuing nature, speed of implementation and magnitude of the means involved. Most constitutions, written or unwritten, make the Head of State or of Government responsible for defence with supreme command over the armed forces. This is the case in France, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Italy, and also in the United States.

However, the development of parliamentary democracy in the last 150 years has led to the powers of the executive being limited to the strict field of defining and setting in motion the military means of defence. Because defence involves the use of force, places at stake the very life of the nation and lays constraints upon the population, it must be made subject to rules which guarantee its effectiveness without it becoming a threat to democratic institutions.

The rôle now incumbent on parliaments, and thus their members, has therefore developed in three legislative respects: prior authorisation to the government to set in motion the military aspect of defence; definition of conditions in which the population may be called upon to defend their country; the status, rights and duties of regular servicemen.

Preliminary information obtained by your Rapporteur on these three points shows that solutions, and thus the rôle of members of parliament, differ widely from one country to another. They will be studied in detail in the next report. Parliamentary authorisation for declaration of war, for instance, varies considerably and has been affected radically by the formation of nuclear deterrent forces.

I need merely mention the notorious "hot lines", with their telephones of red or some other colour, which are able in certain cases to initiate operations, i.e. to open hostilities.

As regards the defence obligations of the population, the prescribed responsibilities of members of parliament vary from country to country, as also for the status of servicemen. Here too, where fundamental freedoms are concerned, a comparative study may prove interesting. It would complement the many investigations that have already been made; I myself acted as Rapporteur for a report by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the use of reserves, their real existence, and any original features they present in each of our countries. Consequently, this is another area where we might usefully help to enlighten our Assembly and above all clearly define the rôle that each can play.

Then we have the supervisory function, the most important of all. Insofar as action on defence matters is essentially a matter for the government, parliaments have given priority to supervision. This is where members of parlia-

Mr. Delorme (continued)

ment individually or collectively have important duties.

There are two aspects to supervision: political, linked with supervision of government action as a whole, and administrative, to verify the efficiency and realism of defence activities.

Here too procedure in the various western countries, although there are many points in common, involves original solutions which should be studied in greater detail.

The scope of members of parliament is both varied and important, ranging from the apparent absence of any organised means at the one extreme — and I have already mentioned how my friend Mr. Roper told me at our previous meeting in Brussels that while I had in one respect got things slightly wrong, in another respect he had excellent news for us about one of the reports tabled in the Assembly here that had been chosen as a discussion topic by one of the parliamentary committees in his own House — to the rôle played by the parliamentary commissioner for the armed forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, not to speak of the special powers of the defence committees in States such as France, Italy, Belgium, the Federal Republic, etc.

Interesting lessons may certainly be drawn at European level for improving the conditions in which the action of members of parliament is exercised in defence matters and, let me add, we may try and co-ordinate these harmoniously so that, as in the field of armaments where we are attempting to achieve unification, we may among the Seven find some means of harmonising our systems and our parliamentary proceedings.

Finally, information plays an important rôle: it has three fundamental aspects.

At national level, members of parliament are a privileged contact with defence policy whose various aspects and technical structures are not well-known to the public that often bears the heaviest burden. Defence, or the need for defence, is almost always the subject of a general consensus, and members of parliament with sovereign power must maintain this consensus throughout the nation. How can this be done? Here again the solutions adopted by each WEU State deserve consideration at European level.

Still at national level, members of parliament also have the privilege of conveying the nation's feelings on defence matters to the executive. The defence apparatus is inherently cumbersome and difficult to change. In expressing the desires and feelings of the people, members must urge the executive to keep a permanent watch on its thinking and the means of implementing its policies.

To take only France as an example today, the action taken before the war by President Paul Reynaud in favour of an armoured force may be recalled, or more recently that of a large number of members of parliament from all parties for adapting to the present state of society the conditions of national service, changes in rules governing military discipline and improved conditions of military service.

Thirdly, information: here I come to the point our Committee considers the most important, for information and its dissemination are, I believe, of capital importance to our Assembly. It must be local, it must be national, it must be European to remain fully effective in face of the crushing strength of a possible threat. Who can better ensure a link and co-ordination between these two aspects than the parliamentarians who have been appointed by their respective parliaments to form the WEU Assembly?

I have had what may possibly be called the effrontery of asking in my own parliament for the mass media — radio and television — to devote one hour a week to Europe, its problems and its defence.

I do not want to go out on the end of a limb, but if you asked the ordinary man in the street, in the Avenue du President Wilson, the simple question "What is WEU?", that would not be what the radio quiz calls the "64,000 dollar question", but it might be if you were to ask how many nations are represented in our Assembly, or even put the same question to some of our fellow members.

The point is, there is at the "grass roots" a certain lack of information, or at any rate it could do with some improvement. Indeed, now that we are about to debate the problems of Europe and tackle the most burning issue, the one which in the coming months will confront each and every one of us with questions of basic principle, that is to say elections to the European Parliament by universal suffrage,

Mr. Delorme (continued)

obviously the whole gamut of defence questions is also going to arise.

Reading Mr. Tindemans' report, you notice that the proposals it puts forward quite simply imply that our Assembly will be incorporated in another body, and cease to exist.

So there are problems of information. There is much for us to do in this connection. We also have to shoulder our responsibilities. The rôle played by our Assembly in defence matters is often little known and perhaps misused by our own governments. We range far afield in quest of systems and reforms and often forget what we have on our own doorstep, just as we overlook the fact that our own civil code already contains the very solutions that are being proposed, and ignore what parliament did fifty years ago.

But to come back to the defence problem, it is true that our Assembly possibly fails to fulfil its rôle to the utmost, precisely because, for a start, people forget the circumstances in which it was created. I have mentioned a sensitive matter, elections to the European Parliament by universal suffrage. I remember what happened in 1954-55 when the problem arose which even split certain political parties, that of the EDC. And I remember that our Assembly was created as a direct result of the stillbirth of the organisation they were trying to set up at the time.

Consequently, we need increased information, and also need to develop all possible means of achieving this end.

I shall only skim through Chapter II of my report. The questions with which we ply our respective governments do occasionally elicit important answers. These answers could be disseminated, and reported, for example, in the press. So I turn now to the press.

We have the advantage of having a Press Counsellor in WEU. We appreciate his work and his function. I have a feeling that we could make better use of him and of all the services that he can provide us with. I say so in my report. I think our Assembly should give some thought to the dissemination of information, let us say simply to the publicity we could give to our work. Our Press Counsellor could pass on to the media news items concerning our action and questions about the Assembly's activities. The members of the Assembly could pass on to

the press services information about the publications in which they would like to see a reference to the speeches they make or the questions we deal with here. I am only throwing out a suggestion.

It would not mean automatic publication — I say so quite objectively — but it would make the activities of members of our Assembly better known in their own constituencies. These are suggestions that would require the active participation of the secretariats of the regional delegations ; some are worth trying.

Resolutions 45 and 49 and Orders 35 and 44, of 1970-71 and 1974, asked that procedure for hearings — e.g. of our Rapporteurs — be adopted by the foreign and European affairs committees and by the national defence committees of our respective parliaments, and that relations with parliaments be developed and intensified and, where possible, extended to other interested institutions.

To sum up, your Rapporteur feels that one of the tasks of member countries' delegations could be to arrange for such hearings, and another could be to widen the Assembly's relations with parliaments. The Committee proposes that its Chairman, and possibly its Rapporteur, together with the members of its secretariat, should attend a meeting of each delegation in order to set up such machinery. I would add that we are sending each delegation a questionnaire to serve as the basis for an information exercise for your Committee, though it will also be useful to you, in your own parliaments, for putting questions, that may be sometimes indiscreet, to your committees.

I have finished now, Mr. President. I shall be happy to give any further particulars that may be asked for by any of my friends here in WEU. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Radius, Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — I have nothing to add, as Mr. Delorme's report is a very full one.

I can only express a twofold wish, on the one hand, that his appeals may be heard and, on the other — and here I share his position — that all our colleagues will read this report with attention, speak in their national parliaments and do everything possible to spread this information — this publicity, as it were — about our

Mr. Radius (continued)

Western European Union, which needs such publicity in the interests of the union itself and of peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Note is taken of Mr. Delorme's report.

4. European security and East-West relations

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 726 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on European security and East-West relations and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 726 and Amendments.

In the resumed debate, I call Mr. Dankert.

Mr. DANKERT (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the draft recommendation accompanying the report by Mr. de Koster has a fault familiar to us all. It says, in forceful terms, how we should behave towards the Russians in the current and coming negotiations, but says nothing at all about what we should do to make relations better.

The report itself — on which I would compliment Mr. de Koster if he were here — is a good deal more balanced. I would, therefore, describe it as a good report, even though here and there I have comments to make. The report provides us with an enormous number of statistics. I will not deny that these figures are useful; yet it would not be sensible to take these figures as giving a picture of the security situation in Europe. The Rapporteur, too, is evidently aware of this, seeing his comments on the still undiminished technological superiority of the West and the lack of flexibility in the decision-making procedures and structures of the Kremlin.

There are one or two comments I want to add, but first I will say this: where the situation in Central Europe is concerned, I, too, admit the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact. The question is, what this numerical superiority means for us and for Moscow. I believe finding the answer to this is far more difficult than just listing the totals of tanks, troops and so on. It is certainly possible to offer a number of partial answers, and I shall try to give you

some. Anyone looking at the world with the suspicion that is usual in the Kremlin and having to plan how many divisions the Soviet Union will need in the years ahead, will undoubtedly allocate a sizable number to keeping the situation in Eastern Europe under control. If the same man has to evaluate the East-West relationship from the military viewpoint, I think he will, to be safe, count in the East European divisions available to him only to a limited extent, and will tend to make up for this weakness by extra effort on the Russian side.

My second comment is that another factor that is undoubtedly to the West's advantage — and which is obliquely referred to in the report — is the ponderous bureaucratic structure of the Soviet Union, one that also embraces the military apparatus. The flexibility that is needed to cope with crisis situations, the freedom of manoeuvre that lower-echelon commanders need to be able to act effectively, the individual responsibility which has for instance, made western pilots into such excellent fliers, are all qualities the Soviet system lacks, or at least does not exhibit to anything like the extent we do.

My third comment is that we quite cheerfully lump together all the forces available to the Warsaw Pact, though we know that the Soviet Union equips its allies' troops appreciably less well than it does its own, and that it is common practice, when renewing equipment, to leave old gear with the Warsaw Pact units.

This brings me to the general remark that statistics cannot be translated into a relationship of strength. Only careful analysis will show exactly what the relationship is. Figures do not tell us anything at all about security, which is a far wider concept. So I think we must stop continually presenting the threat in terms of tanks, aircraft and artillery. Not only because this gives us a false picture, but because this false picture has a demoralising effect on public opinion, which provides the basis for our defence efforts in the West. Nothing is more dangerous in the West than to demoralise the public. People begin to think, after they have been frightened for a few years with statistics about Russian arms production, that if the threat really is so formidable, then what is there left to do about it? We have to be very careful about this. We must not always be pointing to the Warsaw Pact, and if we do it is as well to say something at the same time about our own military efforts, about the improvements in quality achieved on

Mr. Dankert (continued)

our side, and about the quality of the co-operation in our alliance and of society in our alliance.

We must underline, too, that with our defence posture parity is not an absolute essential, and that we can keep our political and military end up with less effort than it takes the Warsaw Pact countries. I am glad to know that Mr. de Koster shares this opinion, from hearing his comment that we can be satisfied with maintaining the present day real level of defence effort.

As I said a moment ago, security is a much wider concept than defence effort. I doubt you would want to give me the time to develop this idea further, so I will keep to just one aspect, that of the MBFR talks. These negotiations are making slow progress, we know. But as long as people are talking, they are not fighting. In the past I have voiced my doubts about the need for absolute parity; yet achieving this total parity has been the starting-point for the negotiators. I have misgivings about this, much though I appreciate the difficulty for the West of abandoning this starting-point because it would mean the West enshrining the Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority in a treaty. This we cannot do of course. The West cannot give up the option of parity in the MBFR zone. The question is, however, whether this rules out percentage reductions; I believe that a solution can be found.

The West cannot agree to reductions being made on the basis of national sub-ceilings. Reductions in the second phase of the negotiations apply to all those directly concerned, taken together, or they are not made at all.

The de Koster report does not mention, though I think there was every reason to do so, indignation at the behaviour of our common ally France. This country has, by deciding to pull out 10,000 troops from the Federal Republic, not only substantially strengthened the relative position of the Federal Republic in the defence of the West, but — and this is far more serious — has, by refusing to allow French troops in Germany to be counted for the purposes of the MBFR ceiling, in fact created a situation in which the MBFR talks can move forward only if the West is prepared to bow to the Russian hobbyhorse of imposing national sub-ceilings. I have already said that these national sub-ceilings are unacceptable; they must remain unaccept-

able. To this I would add that present French policy is the same. So I hope that Paris will in the end manage to find some way of getting rid of this question of national sub-ceilings.

Finally, I want to say something about the recommendation. As I have said, I find its language a little on the strong side. A number of amendments have been put forward, toning it down, and I might be able to vote for the recommendation if some of the amendments were accepted. Yesterday, the Rapporteur did not show himself all that keen on this. It seems to me that at all events paragraph 1 (b) (iii) will have to be dropped. This — and I have submitted an amendment on this point — involves separating MBFR from the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, because — as the Rapporteur emphasised yesterday — these two sets of talks were made totally self-contained by a decision of the West itself. Although politically they naturally have a great deal to do with each other, it is not necessary to link them again formally. Moreover, and this seems much more important, the Rapporteur himself says that he sees a link between MBFR and SALT. I, too, think that there is such a link. Why, then, does the recommendation try to tie MBFR and CSCE together again?

An amendment has been tabled by Mr. Rivière, No. 2. I find that I can wholly support the first two parts of this, but not the third which has to do with maintaining an independent French nuclear force. The result is that procedurally I find myself forced to table an amendment of my own which is identical to the Rivière amendment where the first two paragraphs are concerned, but does not of course follow it in respect of the third. I hope that by accepting these amendments the Assembly will make the recommendation what I would like it to be. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. La Combe.

Mr. LA COMBE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. de Koster's report is one which really expresses a tremendous amount of distrust — tremendous distrust of the eastern bloc countries; and unfortunately this is not quite in line with what we might have been entitled to hope from the Helsinki conference. I utter the words Helsinki conference because, as you are aware, much ado was made about this conference and a certain feeling of hope was born among the peoples. Unfortunately, we are bound to admit that the results have proved somewhat meagre.

Mr. La Combe (continued)

Who is to blame? I will begin, if I may, with the eastern bloc countries. It is obvious that, as long as the Soviet Union continues to keep its doors closed and to maintain the attitude which it adopts towards the rest of the world, the distrust expressed in Mr. de Koster's report will only grow deeper. Indeed, as long as the doors remain shut in the realm of the family, in the realm of the press, in the realm of books and culture, in the realm of movement and transport, and in the realm of tourism, as long as the peoples do not enjoy reciprocal rights to talk to each other, final and lasting peace, the peace for which we hope, is not near at hand.

Obviously, that is the negative aspect of the Soviet and satellite régimes but, seen from another angle, should we in Western Europe maintain the same attitude? Should we harbour the same feeling of distrust? That is a question which may legitimately be asked, and I think that Mr. de Koster's report expresses a somewhat excessive degree of distrust.

The last speaker held it against France that this country was perhaps inclined to stand aloof from the efforts the West is making to assure peace. He must not believe that France is opposed to peace. Far from it! I would, however, simply remind you that our country is perhaps in a bad position on the world's chessboard, as it has suffered a number of invasions in the past few centuries and that the distrust felt by France is quite legitimate. Accordingly, when France attempts to retain some measure of independence both from the West and from the East, I think that a number of those who are sitting on these benches will be able to understand the reason quite easily.

On the one side, you have the formidable armaments of the Russians, who are stationed a few hundred kilometres away from our frontiers, and on the other you have far-distant America which has, indeed, twice come to "get us out of the mess", but which is all the same rather a long way off. In consequence, France's attitude, if we look at things from a very general standpoint and without dwelling unduly on the minor incidents of everyday political life, is perfectly explicable.

That is why a little while ago I tabled Amendment No. 3, which expresses just this slight degree of independence vis-à-vis the Atlantic Alliance and this modest attempt by France

to preserve a certain measure of independence, not just for France but for Europe as a whole.

I do believe that when I plead in favour of some measure of independence for Europe, I am at the same time pleading the cause of peace, so that we are able both to voice those reproaches which have to be addressed to the Soviet régime and yet to persevere untiringly with the dialogue, however many obstacles arise to hamper the attempts to talk.

I am going to comment very briefly on Amendment No. 3 which I have tabled, so that I do not have to revert to the subject when it comes up for discussion. This amendment reflects a concern that has already found expression on many occasions in the course of the Assembly's discussions. Its purpose is to ensure that the recommendation made by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments should in fact be addressed direct to the Council of Ministers of WEU instead of being made the sole concern of the North Atlantic Council.

Mr. de Koster's text, as at present drafted, assigns vital duties to the North Atlantic Council, whereas it leaves only subsidiary tasks to the WEU Council of Ministers, which mainly consist in bringing pressure to bear on France to participate in the negotiations on force reductions at Vienna and to give up its nuclear deterrent without any safeguards.

It seems to me more in keeping with the proper rôle of WEU than with that of NATO to co-ordinate the action to be taken by European States in connection with the meeting to be held at Belgrade as a follow-up to the Helsinki conference. Indeed, active concrete consultations are already taking place at this moment in the European Community to prepare for the Belgrade meeting. WEU's contribution to these consultations would be decisive because, with the responsibilities that this organisation holds in the military sphere, it could complement from the angle of security and defence the deliberations being conducted in the EEC framework, which generally reflect a too exclusive concern with economic or trade matters.

Furthermore, it seems to me necessary to point out that a recommendation addressed to the North Atlantic Council by the WEU Council of Ministers has no chance of receiving an answer. As it showed in its reaction to Recommendation 288, the WEU Council in fact refuses to react to texts of this kind. As for the North Atlantic

Mr. La Combe (continued)

Council, it does not react either, since our Assembly is not juridically entitled to submit them.

If this amendment were not to be adopted, the Assembly would be obliged to vote on a useless text which would remain unanswered. Such is the tenor of this amendment.

Coming back to my initial remarks, I think that the balance of our Assembly must be maintained by remonstrating with the eastern countries about their attitude and, at the same time, by persevering untiringly in our action. As my friend has said, it is better to talk than to fight. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I should begin by expressing my own sympathy with the Rapporteur, Mr. de Koster, who unfortunately is not able to hear what I have to say. I can only hope that he will have a chance to read what I say. I would begin by making a few remarks on the subject of the military balance, which is treated in Mr. de Koster's report in a very balanced way, although, of course, trying to collect numbers on this subject is, as Mr. Dankert has indicated, a very difficult task which always creates ambiguities.

Like my colleague Mr. Watkinson, who spoke yesterday, I think that the quotation from Dr. Kissinger which is given in paragraph 14 of the report is a very clear one and assesses the real situation. He uses these phrases: "Let us not paralyse ourselves by a rhetoric of weakness... The fact is that nowhere has the West been defeated for lack of strength". There is a danger of remarks being made on some occasions in the United States, where different branches of the armed forces bid against each other to get a larger share of the defence budget, which paint the threat unduly black.

That is a temptation which occurs occasionally in countries on this side of the Atlantic also where, for interests of domestic policies, the threat is sometimes painted unduly black by political leaders. This, however, is not the occasion to go into that.

No one doubts that there is a problem, but it would be wrong for us to overstate it and to have unduly coloured descriptions of it. One does not

need to ask only the question "How much is enough?" One also wants to know "Enough to do what?" — because one needs to work out exactly in what situation we should be needing these forces and what kind of forces might be necessary.

Considerations of numbers, characteristics and capabilities of opposing forces are necessary for designing an optimal force structure and an optimal posture, but that in itself is not sufficient. A posture consists of more than simply a force structure. It also includes the policies and practices that govern the use of those forces, the morale of troops, their quality and the quality of their exercises. In many respects, the way things are used is just as important as what they are, the more so when they are used ineffectively. It is some of these qualitative factors that are often missing from the purely numerical military balances which appear all too often. I very much appreciate, therefore, what has been said by the Rapporteur, in particular in quoting from Dr. Kissinger.

I should like to say a few words on the section dealing with the SALT negotiations. It is sometimes suggested that, as these are negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, they are no concern of ours, but if the strategic deterrent were to fail it would be Western Europe which would be more likely to suffer than any other continent. It might be that the Soviet Union could survive a first strike. It is certainly spending enough on civil defence now. It may be that with its vast distances the United States too could, in some limping way, survive a first strike. It is much more difficult for us to see how Western Europe could survive even a first strike. Therefore, quite clearly strategic armaments limitations are of essential importance for us on our continent.

Mr. de Koster speaks of the possibility of limiting deployment of cruise missiles as one way to ensure a SALT agreement. This is an interesting point, but it must be pointed out that the Soviet Union already has such missiles deployed and there are some problems of balance in this respect. I should like to refer to one of the developments in missile technology which, I believe, is of even more critical importance in this field but which, unfortunately, is not referred to in Mr. de Koster's report.

It is the development of what are called MARVed (not MIRVed) missiles — those with manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles. This device does

Mr. Roper (continued)

not merely have a ballistic missile going to one part of the world or another. Once it approaches its target it will have terminal guidance mechanisms very similar in some ways to those which exist in the cruise missile, enabling it to come to a much more precise target. Those MARVED missiles are at present being built by the United States and, one assumes, by the Soviet Union.

But I have recently been reading in the American journal *Foreign Policy* a most interesting paper by Congressman Downey of New York, who has had access to members of the House Armed Services Committee for a good deal of American briefing on this material. This paper warns that the MARVED missile is one of the most destabilising factors as far as the future effective use of the deterrent is concerned. Therefore, we have a common interest that in the SALT II and SALT III negotiations a ban should be imposed upon the further development of MARVED missiles, because if we go over that horizon it will be more difficult for us to maintain stability and there will be increased risk that our continent will be the victim of the technologies of these superpowers.

Further, I should like to say a word on the section which Mr. de Koster referred to as **EUROSALT** — that is, strategic armaments limitation talks dealing with weapons in Europe, forward-based systems as well as the deterrents of Britain and of France. This is a very stimulating section of his report. There is, indeed, a gap between discussions on technical forces and ground forces within MBFR and discussions between the superpowers as far as strategic armaments are concerned. But I do not think that the forum suggested by Mr. de Koster of a sub-committee of the bipartisan SALT between the United States and the Soviet Union is necessarily the most effective way to discuss these Eurostrategic problems.

I think that this is something to which we as an Assembly will have to return. Nonetheless, I am glad that this has been put before us by Mr. de Koster in his report.

Finally, like those who have spoken earlier, and particularly Mr. Dankert, I wish to come to the question of the MBFR discussions. Mr. de Koster yesterday referred to Mr. Brezhnev's recent remark that there would be work for our children and our grandchildren in MBFR. That

may be the case. It will be a long and continuous process. But that is not a reason why we should not attempt to make some progress in the reasonably near future. Quite clearly, unless military détente accompanies political détente, the possibility of further political détente will be significantly reduced. I am, however, in agreement with Mr. Dankert, and on this occasion with Mr. Rivière and his colleagues, in that I am not altogether happy about the linkage between the MBFR negotiations and the Belgrade conference. I think that MBFR was kept very separate from Helsinki, and I believe that it would be right to maintain this separately from the important conference that will take place next year in Belgrade. I shall, therefore, want to support Mr. Dankert's amendment to delete that particular part of the recommendation when we come to the vote.

As far as the Belgrade conference is concerned, I would say this. I was recently in Moscow, and in discussions with the Russians it became quite clear that they see détente as a matter of State-to-State relations. But they believe, quite rightly and quite openly, that the ideological struggle between different philosophies and different sets of ideas should go on. I recognise that and I respect it, but I expect them to respect it too because, if we are to have in our countries a debate of ideas and an ideological struggle, this is something which should go in two directions. One must ensure in that respect that basket 3 of the OSCE is respected and that there is not merely a nominal presence of western newspapers in Eastern Europe but also an opportunity for the ideas of our societies to be discussed and known in that society, as well, of course, as ideas of theirs to be known in the West. This must be a dialogue if there is to be an effective "ideological struggle" — to use the Russians' words — and an ideological discussion.

This is an important report. I am glad that we have had a chance to debate it. I hope very much that, with the amendment proposed by Mr. Dankert, we will be able to accept the recommendation. (*Applause*)

5. Address by Mr. Wischnewski, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall adjourn the debate in order to hear the address by Mr. Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, Minister of

The President (continued)

State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

On behalf of this Assembly, I bid you welcome, Mr. Minister. We are always interested to listen to the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany in a forum which came into being through a treaty that restored to your country, at a moment when it was entering the concert of nations, appropriate and now very extensive means of assuring its defence and contributing to our joint security.

For that reason, whenever a representative of the Federal Republic of Germany comes to this rostrum, the Assembly hears him with particularly keen attention; and in that spirit I too am preparing to listen to you with the closest attention.

Will you kindly come to the rostrum, Mr. Minister, to make your statement.

Mr. WISCHNEWSKI (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I must thank you for the invitation to take part in this debate. I am very glad to have the opportunity of putting to you one or two ideas on the present state of European politics as seen against the background of world events, from the viewpoint of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The new Federal Government will be taking office in the next day or two. It will keep steadfastly to the past line of foreign policy on the assumption that the general state of tension between East and West and between North and South will continue to determine international events and needs to be resolved.

The Atlantic Alliance is and remains vital for us in two ways: as the guarantor of our security, and as the indispensable backing for our policy of détente. We are therefore determined to continue playing an active part in the Alliance. We know that we are at one with our partners in considering that security and détente are the two main objectives of the Alliance.

The continuing political and ideological differences between the countries with a communist régime and the free democracies of the West can be kept under control only by a realistic policy of détente. The danger of a nuclear catastrophe gives both sides convincing grounds for exercis-

ing reason and restraint. Confrontation must be replaced, wherever possible, by co-operation and trust.

It would however be dangerous to overlook the continuing causes of tension which can at any time lead to a conflict situation in East-West relations. It is on this basis that the western participants are negotiating in Vienna for a mutual and balanced reduction of forces. The allies taking part in the MBFR talks have as their aim the creation of a more stable balance of forces in Central Europe, and with this in mind have suggested establishing approximate parity in the form of common collective ceilings for the ground forces of both sides within the reductions area. They are convinced that success in this field would be an important contribution towards the reduction of tension and the strengthening of peace and security in Europe.

Disarmament and control of armaments on a world scale must be given the highest priority. For one thing, the efforts to achieve détente, peace and security will end in failure if the armaments race continues unchecked. For another, the squandering of scarce resources is a burden on mankind in every part of the world.

Disarmament and control of armaments cannot be ends in themselves; they must help to secure peace. It ought to be possible to lower the burden of armaments, and at the same time to maintain or create as stable a balance of forces as possible both worldwide and in individual parts of the globe. To do this, it is necessary to remove the political causes of tension. It also needs mutual confidence that agreements which have been entered into will be respected, backed by appropriate, effective supervisory measures.

In our efforts to strengthen security and co-operation in Europe we must make use of the possibilities afforded by the final act at Helsinki. In so doing we must not allow our vision to be distorted by what has not been achieved to date as regards implementation of the final act. It represents a programme for the future and we must press for its implementation, precisely because it is here that our basic political values are reflected.

No State that has signed the final act should overlook the fact that its will to achieve détente will be judged by what it does to carry out the measures contained in the act. What is at stake is the credibility and continued existence of the policy of détente, which is still an essential part of our whole policy.

Mr. Wischnewski (continued)

In the second major field of tension, the most serious problems are those caused by the unequal distribution of material wellbeing amongst the peoples of the world. The third world is rightly disappointed that the gap between most developing countries and the rich industrialised nations has become not smaller but even greater. Organisation of the commodity markets, increased exports of industrial products by the developing countries, more aid for the least developed countries have become particularly urgent problems.

In the current negotiations at the United Nations, at the Conference on World Trade and at the Conference on International Co-operation in Paris the problem is not just one of finding a new strategy for development aid. The objective is a just and balanced world economic order which ensures that the developing countries are fully integrated into the world economy. If we do not succeed in getting the North-South conflict moving on constructive lines there will be disturbances, in a world economy based on a division of labour, which in the last resort will be a threat to the peaceful coexistence of nations.

Changes in the price of oil in recent years have shown the extent to which international conflict springs from the endeavour to obtain a fair distribution of resources, and to ensure the economic and, ultimately, the political stability of the western nations. The recession in the world economy has also hit the oil-producing countries.

Fortunately however there are also encouraging signs that the will to co-operate has grown throughout the world.

The Federal Government will make its contribution to achieving real progress towards a sensible rearrangement of economic relations between industrialised and developing countries. In the current negotiations on new forms of industrial co-operation, which are urgently necessary in the interests of both parties, we do not however look for salvation through worldwide dirigism.

It would be a mistake to believe that the market economy works solely in favour of the industrialised countries. A worldwide economic dirigism would destroy the efficiency of the world economy, cripple world trade and destroy the conditions required for effective development aid, and so run counter to the interests of the developing countries.

We are not pessimistic, but we reckon that the North-South dialogue will demand from all concerned much stamina, patience and willingness to co-operate. In the end we shall have to arrive at a result which is acceptable to all, for there is no alternative to such a policy.

In view of the size of the problem and the play of forces in the modern world, uniting Europe is and will remain the great historic task of the European countries. Each country on its own would be condemned to remain without influence in the very matters which will decide our future. Only European union, goal of the present stage in the policy of unifying Europe, offers the chance of a lasting political merger and of establishing an effective political entity and which will really match the scale of world policy problems.

However, anybody who wants to see in Europe a third force between the superpowers is deluding himself or is starting from a false analysis of the political situation in the world. Relations between Europe and America are characterised by shared ideas about freedom and human rights. Even if Europe were to pool all its military resources, it could not provide a counterweight to the military might of the Soviet Union. A united Europe will be a Europe which is politically and economically stronger, and thus more capable of defending itself. But it will not be an alliance alongside the Alliance, but rather bring a strengthening of the one Alliance, through increased European efficiency.

Undoubtedly the interests of Europe and America are not identical in every respect. By reason of its geographical situation, its lack of sources of energy and raw materials and its historical relations with the third world, Europe certainly has interests which differ from those of the United States. What is decisive, however, are the bonds which stem from common democratic traditions and basic values. All attempts to define a European identity by making a distinction between Europe and the United States must therefore fail.

The security of Europe is based for as far ahead as one can see on the Alliance with the United States and Canada. But security is also one of the essential preconditions of European unification. The countries of Europe must, as is stated in the declaration on the European identity in December 1973, "make constant efforts to insure that they have adequate means of defence at their disposal".

Mr. Wischniewski (continued)

Concern for our common security is thus one of the questions which directly affect European union. The Federal German Government agrees with the proposals of the Belgian Prime Minister, Mr. Tindemans, for a regular exchange of views on European defence problems and on the European aspects of multilateral security negotiations, and for increased co-operation on armaments among the Nine. A European foreign policy must one day include defence policy ; and a European economic policy cannot ignore the problems of the armaments industries.

We attach especial importance to co-operation on armaments. Here too we must find solutions which match up to the specifically European security problems, shaped as these are by the needs of the Atlantic Alliance and the aim of European unification. In our opinion the recently created European programme group should be at the centre of this co-operation on armaments. The European programme group was set up in order that, with French co-operation, a fresh start could be made on improving European co-operation on armaments ; it works in the spirit of the Atlantic Alliance, and it is meant to establish the basis for a dialogue with the United States about achieving a more equitable balance between the supplies of arms by the European and by the American allies. Everything the Europeans undertake together must contribute effectively to the greater security of the West.

The WEU member governments decided in May 1976 to entrust WEU's Standing Armaments Committee with the task of preparing, by the end of the present year, a programme for a study of the problems of the European armaments industry and a description of its proposed method of work. The modified Brussels Treaty which set up WEU combines in a very constructive way the two objectives which must guide Europeans in their efforts to strengthen the European component of NATO — consolidating the Atlantic Alliance and uniting Europe. The WEU Treaty forms part of the Paris Agreements of 1955, which made the Federal Republic of Germany an equal partner in NATO and WEU. WEU has from the outset relied on the military structures of NATO. It ought to be possible both to use the possibilities available in the Standing Armaments Committee and to make the efforts necessary to centralise European co-operation on armaments within the framework of the European programme group.

The WEU Assembly, too, keeps its eyes on the twin objectives of European security and unification. Your Assembly is making its contribution to mobilising both the aspirations and the material forces of our peoples in pursuit of these two objectives. Because its efforts are directed towards the twin needs of European security and progress in the unification of Europe, the Assembly has a unique position in European politics. The special rôle played by the WEU Assembly was honoured in the speeches at the commemorative meeting held in Bonn in May 1975 on the occasion of the Assembly's twentieth anniversary.

Today the Community of the Nine is on the way to becoming a truly political community. One important step is the firm decision to hold direct general elections to the parliament of the European Community in 1978. For the first time there will be a European Parliament whose legitimacy is European, and not national. In taking this decision we are carrying out an obligation undertaken in the Treaties of Rome. We must not expect immediate and spectacular results, for direct elections do not solve the problem of the powers of the European Parliament. A direct European mandate will however mean a considerable increase in authority. A member of parliament who has been elected for Europe cannot be debarred from discussing any problem which concerns Europe. We are entitled to expect that his European authority will confer on him a corresponding political influence.

In his report on European union, Mr. Tindemans raised in a much discussed footnote the question of the future rôle of the WEU Assembly. He raised the question on the assumption that the powers of the European union and of the European Parliament would be extended to cover those matters which have so far been discussed by the WEU Assembly.

I am glad that this House welcomes direct elections to the European Parliament and that you are urging your governments to move ahead on the basis of the Tindemans report. I would particularly like to congratulate the Rapporteur on his excellent report on European union and WEU. I agree with him that the WEU Assembly has not lost its *raison d'être* simply because the Community has, by instituting direct elections, taken a decisive step towards a democratically-constituted Community ; and I do so for two reasons.

First, the treaty establishing WEU is still there. It is part of the general network upon

Mr. Wischniewski (continued)

which the security of Western Europe is based. As I have already pointed out, the Federal Republic of Germany became an equal partner in NATO and WEU thanks to the Paris Agreements of 1955, of which the treaty creating WEU forms part. The Assembly is still required under the treaty to watch over the application of the modified Brussels Treaty.

Secondly, from the very beginning the WEU Assembly has been more than Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, on which it is based, would by itself suggest. Indeed, it can, through its well-informed reports and debates covering all aspects of security — military, political, economic and technological, probably provide valuable new ideas for NATO as well as for the European Community, and it will retain this function.

The particular set of political forces that permeate the complex problems of European security, lying as it does between the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community, calls for parliamentarians who can keep their eyes on both. They will probably work more closely with their colleagues in the European Parliament as the discussion of security policy develops in the European Parliament. Your special contribution however will be then as now to have, as a result of the mandate conferred upon you by the WEU Treaty and your twenty years of experience, an overall view of the way in which European security interests tie in closely with NATO. Your ideas penetrate into the thinking of the Alliance — as a specifically European contribution which continuously keeps before our allies the political reality of unification in Europe. At the same time your ideas should be a valuable contribution to the shaping of public opinion on foreign affairs in the Community, which must not be allowed to develop in disregard of the facts concerning security in Europe.

In the present state of world politics, which is determined more and more by powers of continental scale and, in negotiations, by large blocs, the European Community is having, under the pressure of the outside world, to back up its policy of unification by joint action abroad. At the same time it is being pressed on all sides to speak with one voice on the international stage and to exert its full weight. Acting as a Community in external affairs is a decisive element in creating European union.

In the shaping of its external relations and the establishing of political co-operation inside Europe, the Community has developed a set of instruments with which to prepare joint action abroad. The Community's achievements in the field of foreign affairs to date have accustomed the world to the process of European unification. But they have also aroused expectations both inside and outside Europe. The Nine do not find it easy to live up to these expectations. Our decision-making apparatus in the Community, and even more so in the individual member States, has not kept pace with worldwide political developments. This is nothing new; instances can be seen again and again in history. We are in the middle of the difficult process of adjusting our structures to the new realities.

I believe that you, who are at one and the same time European and national parliamentarians, have a very special rôle to play in this difficult process. You will have to arouse greater understanding in the national parliaments of the need for a common European foreign policy which — as with any European policy — will always or at least in very many cases have to be a compromise. I believe that many of the frequently cited instances where, on the international scene, European policy has broken down — I am thinking in particular of certain votes taken in the United Nations — came about simply because, in our national parliaments and our political parties, there is still a lack of understanding for the initial steps towards a European foreign policy that are being taken today. In this connection I have no desire to spare governments. I wish to make that quite clear.

The preparations being made for direct elections will certainly strengthen the political party federation. It would be an important contribution to the nascent European foreign policy if the European political party groupings were to decide that, in the national parliaments, a line of foreign policy agreed by the nine governments will not be questioned without overwhelming cause. Unity in dealing with the outside world is today an important element in Europe's solidarity.

The Community's problems are proving to be more difficult than the founding fathers of Europe imagined. The Community is still far from being the single economic area we have been trying to achieve. Under the pressure of the world economic crisis, the economies and living standards of the Community countries have

Mr. Wischnewski (continued)

grown apart, and action to bring them closer together again is now a prime objective of European policy. It is difficult to find procedures for arriving at joint decisions, which are often blocked because of internal interests peculiar to this or that country. Since we can only build a Europe in which the partners have equal rights, concepts like the establishment of a directorate or similar proposals are inappropriate, as they give an unfair preponderance in the decision-making process to the larger or more highly-developed countries. In this situation the European Council, created two years ago, must manage to prove itself as the highest political authority. Finally, the second wave of new members which will, later on, join the Community will make the establishment of a single economic area and of an effective decision-making process even more difficult. The Community will, however, have to cope with this problem together with the acceding States, even if this means, perhaps, seeking new solutions. Mr. President, only a Europe which has achieved solidarity will in the long run be a unified and democratic Europe. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Minister, I thank you for your statement, which was so full and in certain respects so exhaustive.

As is customary, you are ready to expose yourself to the crossfire of questions which will be put to you by members of the Assembly.

I call Mr. Périquier.

Mr. PERIDIÉ (France) (Translation). — My question needs no commentary, Mr. Minister, as it is very clear: do you consider that the withdrawal of 10,000 men belonging to the French armed forces from the territory of the Federal Republic, in order to equip them with tactical nuclear weapons, constitutes a strengthening or a weakening of joint defence?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. WISCHNEWSKI (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — The Federal Government quite appreciates the need for structural changes being made in the French army. The Federal Government has had excellent contacts with the French Government as regard the matter raised by Mr. Périquier.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Hulpiau.

Mr. HULPIAU (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I was glad to hear the remarkable address by the Minister, Mr. Wischnewski. A large part of his address was devoted to the problems of armaments, defence and security. It is in this context that I venture to submit two concrete questions for his attention.

The first, which is in certain respects similar to that asked by Mr. Périquier, is as follows: do you consider, Mr. Minister, that the withdrawal of British forces from the Army of the Rhine, of which notice has been given, would constitute a significant weakening of joint defence? Has this proposal been referred to the WEU Council?

A second question: do you consider that the mandate given to the WEU Standing Armaments Committee can contribute to strengthening Europe's share in common defence within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. WISCHNEWSKI (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — May I say quite categorically that while the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom did refer to the financial burden involved for the United Kingdom, this remark was not linked with the announcement of the withdrawal of United Kingdom troops serving with the British Army of the Rhine. I want to make this point quite clear.

As regards the second question, I would answer this with a definite "Yes".

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I thank the Minister for that last answer. I do not now need to ask the first of my two questions, but my second is as follows. While honouring the modified Brussels Treaty, would the Federal Republic of Germany be prepared to consider developments and modifications of the rôle and membership of the Western European Union Assembly to ensure more effective links and co-operation between national parliamentarians in the fields of defence and security questions in our seven countries, if such proposals were put forward by the Assembly?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. WISCHNEWSKI (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — The Federal Government will always be ready to support any proposal which is likely to improve co-operation between representatives of the national parliaments, and in particular where questions of security and defence are concerned.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Faulds.

Mr. FAULDS (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to ask the Minister, perhaps in more detail, about the subject which he seemed to me to skirt over. The WEU organisation is concerned primarily with the security of the West. Nothing is more essential to the security of the economies of the West than an assurance of energy supplies and good relations with the raw material producers of the world. In this context many of us — I must be honest with the Minister of State — feel profoundly disturbed by the attitude adopted by Chancellor Schmidt at the recent discussions of the Nine, and his attitude towards the North-South negotiations in Paris. His attitude seemed unhealthily in line with that of the United States, which is not as exposed as are most of the economies of the West on the question of raw material supplies.

It seemed to us that trade and aid concessions towards the developing world should have been made with an intention — this was openly discussed — of mollifying the Arab oil producers. Such a conciliatory gesture on debt relief and on price guarantees for raw materials for the developing world might have helped those very people in OPEC such as Sheikh Yamani who are trying to restrain the demands of other OPEC members for a rise in oil prices. It is significant and disturbing that the OPEC meeting planned for 20th December in Qatar is likely to be postponed. Would the Minister care to comment in more detail on this most crucial matter?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. WISCHNEWSKI (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Yes, I shall be very glad to comment.

As a start, I should like to state that the Federal Chancellor has a thoroughly positive attitude towards the North-South dialogue; last year, when efforts to get this dialogue going were

first being made, he committed himself very firmly to the Federal Republic's making its contribution towards making this dialogue possible.

The fact that no decision was reached in The Hague at the last meeting of the European Council was due to a number of reasons. Firstly, it so happened that all the heads of government were unanimous — yes, unanimous — that an increase in the price of oil affects the production capacity of the industrialised countries, and consequently their capacity to help the developing countries. It was noted that for the OECD countries an increase of 10 % in the price of oil means a difference of approximately \$14,000 million and that there are quite a number of countries — some of them represented here today — which as a result of such a situation would find themselves in serious difficulties. I think that it is not only the right but the duty of the heads of government to speak quite frankly on this problem in order to draw the attention of those who are responsible for discussing questions of higher oil prices to this state of affairs to do so bearing in mind the fact that oil prices have quadrupled in the last three and a half years, with the result that not only a number of industrial countries but in particular a large number of developing countries too are now in difficulties.

In order to achieve a result applicable as far as possible to the whole of the world, all the large industrialised countries must be given an opportunity to state their views on this question. Everybody understands that at the present time the United States is not in a position to do this, but that by February or March next year it will be much easier.

May I remind you that the idea of postponing the dialogue did not come in the first place from the group of industrialised countries but originated with the developing countries, and was based on their realistic assessment of the situation with which they are faced. I believe a solution ought to be found in which the most powerful industrialised country in the western world can be fully involved. The Federal Government will try, for its part, to contribute towards a result which helps the developing countries to solve their problems, but which on the other hand does not weaken the industrialised countries to such an extent that they are no longer in a position in which they can really meet their obligations to the third world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). — Concerning the elections to the European Parliament which are due to take place in 1978, may I ask the Minister to give his opinion on what the effects would be if either one or two of the nine countries comprising the Community failed to make the necessary arrangements for elections in time, so that the next parliament, from 1978 to 1982, continued to have nominated members ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. WISCHNEWSKI (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — What really matters is the agreement that the elections will take place in 1978. All the governments hope that ratification and the requisite national legislation — for national legislation will of course still be required in order to establish the relevant electoral law — will have been completed in time for elections actually to take place in 1978. Should that not be possible, there will in many member countries of the European Community be great disappointment among large sections of the public. That is why we hope that all countries will be in a position to ratify the agreement and complete their national legislation in time to enable the elections to be held in 1978. If it had to be, a delay of a few weeks or months would not matter. But that all the nine European countries should vote at the same time is a matter of enormous political importance, and we must in no circumstances dispense with it. Moreover, I take it as axiomatic that one must avoid the European Parliament being placed in a situation where it has members of differing status — some of them directly elected by the people and others who have been delegated. I hold those colleagues who have been delegated in high esteem ; but, if one country were to use one method and another a different one, that would result in debates which would not, I believe, be helpful to the development of Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Mendelson.

Mr. MENDELSON (*United Kingdom*). — My question arises out of the last answer but one given by the Minister. I particularly welcomed the first part of his answer but I should like to follow the second part, of which I was more critical. When he said that not only the Chancellor of the Federal Republic was very critical of the proposed further increase in oil prices, he was speaking for many of us in the British

House of Commons, because the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Callaghan, in a major speech in London on a major public occasion, was one of the first to issue this warning. The Minister was absolutely right in saying that the poor, underdeveloped countries have suffered even more severely than the advanced industrial countries as a result of the last very high increases.

I wish to intervene because I think it would be unfortunate if the Minister went away with the impression that the agreement that many of us gave to the first part of his answer should be carried through to the second part. When my colleague, Mr. Faulds, referred to the disturbance in the minds of many parliamentarians about the slow development of the conference that is to deal with aid and a new trade agreement for the underdeveloped countries which often depend for their entire future prospects upon these negotiations, it ought to be said that progress is woefully irregular and woefully slow. The Minister ought to take away the impression that people who go along with him in his reference to the oil kingdoms are deeply dissatisfied about the attitude of many of our governments in not doing much more to make a better agreed solution possible without delay and urge him and his colleagues to make haste in helping those underdeveloped countries with largesse, friendship and courage.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I would request members simply to ask questions and not to state their viewpoints.

The interest aroused by your contributions to the debate, Mr. Minister, lead me to ask if you will also answer two additional questions which have been put down at the last minute.

Do you wish to reply first to Mr. Mendelson ?

Mr. WISCHNEWSKI (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — May I begin by saying that I am glad Mr. Mendelson is obviously in full agreement with the first part of my answer.

As for the second part, I do not see any difference of opinion between us. I am in favour of speeding things up as much as possible. But my opinion remains unchanged. I am in favour of matters developing as quickly as it will be possible to bring the United States into the decision-making process as well. I do not believe there can be any worldwide settlement without the United States taking part in the decision-

Mr. Wischnewski (continued)

making. Provided this condition is met, I am in favour of speeding things up as much as possible, so as to get results as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mrs. von Bothmer.

Mrs von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the Minister spoke of the relative strengths of the two big blocs, and of the rôle of Europe. He stressed that only a strong and united Europe could be a worthwhile partner of the western alliance, and that means of the United States too. There is no doubt about that. What I would like to know, however, is how the United States itself sees this stronger, united Europe, should it emerge — and this would also presuppose unification in, for example, matters of defence. Can the Minister tell us whether the United States has a positive attitude towards a Europe which, strengthened in this way, would stand beside it? I put this question because I have to date heard no pronouncements on this matter from the United States.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. WISCHNEWSKI (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Little information has come out of the United States since the presidential elections. The President-elect of the United States has however given his views on his relations with Europe in an interview. He said quite clearly that he had sympathy for the efforts being made to unite Europe, that he took it for granted that consultations would be stepped up — and added in so many words that it would of course be wholly agreeable and acceptable to him if the Europeans wished to speak with one voice when dealing with the United States. Such is the firm information available on the new American President's attitude to European questions.

I am sure that we shall have an opportunity of hearing more about this after 21st January 1977; but I am convinced that on the question of a positive relationship between the United States and a Europe in the process of unification there will be no great change in the attitude so far adopted in the United States.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Niet.

Mr. de NIET (*Netherlands*). — Regarding the matter raised in the last question, does not the Minister agree that it is rather fanciful to speak about that whole subject? We were here listening to Mr. Thorn yesterday, and we have read the newspapers. The only message that is very clear is that Europe is not speaking with one voice, and will not do so in the near future, about any really important subjects for the future except the one that the Minister has mentioned — and that is a simple farce, if I may say so.

Apparently, the Minister has told us that European Ministers were all agreeing in The Hague just a few days ago that there is a very serious link between the price of oil and the extent of what Western Europe — even the richest countries of Western Europe — can do about aid for and solidarity with the poor parts of the world to help mitigate their situation. I know that that is the theory, but I see that there are big countries in Western Europe, rich and powerful countries, which have not reached half the percentage of aid — the capital flow from public sources — agreed upon in the forum of OECD years ago. They never reached an important and imposing percentage even when growth was still taking place. Therefore, the political will is not present. Thus, we are also stuck about the credibility of what we have to say in North-South relationships in UNCTAD and so on.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. WISCHNEWSKI (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I do not share the view that what we say in international conferences is not to be believed. Some people may, however, be more hesitant than others to say something, because they assume that what is said must in fact be carried out. I, too, greatly regret that the recession in the industrialised countries of the West has contributed to a situation in which quite a number of countries have fallen far short of the 0.7 % target. I hope that economic developments in the coming year will be such that all the industrialised countries will make fresh efforts to reach the 0.7 % target as soon as possible. You may rest assured that the Federal Government will make every effort to draw closer to this target as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Minister, for your kindness and for the competence with which you have answered the

The President (continued)

questions put to you. I would add that, for many of our colleagues, points which had still been obscure have now been made clearer to us; and you have enlarged in an admirable manner on the Federal Republic's view on the problems that concern us.

On behalf of the Assembly, I would convey to you once again our very warm and unanimous thanks. (*Applause*)

(*Sir John Rodgers, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler*)

6. European security and East-West relations

(*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 726 and Amendments*)

The PRESIDENT. — The debate now continues on Mr. de Koster's report.

I give the floor to Mr. Cermolacce.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, in the text submitted for discussion in this Assembly, its Rapporteur, Mr. de Koster, propounds a number of themes which are both mischievous and devoid of any foundation. Unfortunately, we have only too often had occasion to hear them in this House.

The first theme is that of the threat posed by the alleged over-arming of the Soviet Union, both qualitatively and quantitatively. To buttress this allegation, tendentious statistics are presented. An attempt is thus made to prove that the States of the Warsaw Pact supposedly enjoy overwhelming military superiority in Europe. In these statistics, however, we never find any explicit mention of the 5,000 aircraft that the United States can transfer very swiftly to Europe or of the 7,000 tactical nuclear missiles, which give the NATO forces a fire-power that is far greater than is attributed to it by the Rapporteur.

The most striking example of this propaganda may be found in the very numerous comments about the appearance of a few warships flying the Soviet flag in the Mediterranean. Yet the armoured cruiser Kiev, about which so much fuss is at present being made, is a vessel of very modest size when compared with the enormous aircraft-carriers of the Sixth Fleet, which are permanently in the Mediterranean.

The second theme advanced by the Rapporteur concerns the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. Throughout his analysis of the work performed by the different East-West conferences on détente and disarmament, Mr. de Koster seems to have no concern other than to preserve the cohesion of NATO. Under cover of a declared resolve to participate in the disarmament process begun at Vienna and at Helsinki, the Rapporteur's main concern is to forestall by all possible means any centrifugal tendency within the Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, in his eyes, the main interest of the negotiations on force reductions and of the Belgrade negotiations is not the reduction of tension and the slowing down of the armaments race, since he asserts in paragraph 15 that: "The real problem facing the West as far as the defence effort is concerned is that of maintaining the effort at the present level...".

On the contrary, what Mr. de Koster hopes for is that NATO will keep its homogeneity throughout the disarmament negotiations and that its character as a military bloc will never be affected by their results.

Here there is a blatant contradiction. The Rapporteur cannot claim to accept the present trend towards disarmament whilst elsewhere he is urging that the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance be maintained. In fact, the proposals concerning the negotiations on force reductions in Europe are only so much eyewash. When Mr. de Koster calls on the NATO countries to persevere with firmness along the lines at present followed in the Vienna negotiations, he is in fact expressing the hope of seeing these negotiations bogged down for good. What is holding up all progress in the Vienna negotiations is, in particular, the refusal by the United States and its allies to accept genuine ceilings for the forces of each European country. It is clearly apparent in these negotiations that NATO is seeking to keep its structure as a military bloc intact, thus preventing any independent action by States in the disarmament process.

The third theme, which has been repeated so often in this Assembly and which the Rapporteur uses again for his own ends, is that of the socialist countries' alleged failure to apply the Helsinki agreements. Questions may arise, for nothing can be settled in a day, on one side or on the other. None the less, since Helsinki the socialist States have offered the countries of little Europe more opportunities than ever

Mr. Cermolacce (continued)

before of co-operating in the economic, scientific, technological and cultural spheres.

The proposals recently made by Comecon to the European Economic Community provide the most concrete and important illustration of this unwavering determination to promote co-operation.

Accordingly, how is it possible to speak of a refusal to apply the agreements reached at the conference on security and co-operation in Europe? Indeed, what irks the Rapporteur — and incidentally many of his friends as well — is his inability to use the Helsinki agreements as much as he would wish to bring pressure to bear on the socialist countries and to interfere in their internal affairs.

This determination to increase the lack of understanding between European countries with different social systems finds perfect expression in paragraph 1 of the recommendation, where the Rapporteur calls upon the NATO countries to co-ordinate their action in order to transform the third basket agreements into a veritable war-machine directed against the socialist countries.

The Rapporteur affects not to be openly opposed to the negotiations on détente and disarmament. In fact, his proposals are, as a whole, designed to hold them up and obstruct them.

It is, moreover, symptomatic that there is a tendency to pass over in silence certain negotiations which, if they were to succeed, might bring in their wake extremely favourable results for Europe. Thus, no mention is made of the negotiations at the Geneva Conference, although it has a number of constructive decisions to its credit and, in particular, the ban on biological weapons. Nor is any position taken up as regards the world conference on disarmament recommended by the United Nations General Assembly, which might provide an opportunity for the different States to express their views clearly and publicly, uninhibited by their membership of different military blocs.

The whole text presented by Mr. de Koster is clearly negative and dangerous. At no point does it part company with cold war logic, which is characterised by excessive armament and the division of Europe into military blocs. It totally fails to recognise the general desire of the European peoples to bring about comprehensive and

controlled disarmament. On this terrain we cannot follow in the Rapporteur's footsteps.

The PRESIDENT. — I now give the floor to Mr. Scholten.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Netherlands*). — Thank you, Mr. President.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

(Translation). — I listened to Mr. de Koster's report with great interest. It is an excellent report, containing useful information, and I congratulate Mr. de Koster on it. I am very sorry that alterations in our agenda have made it impossible for Mr. de Koster to take part in the debate himself.

My feeling is that the language used in the report is a little strong. The recommendation speaks, in paragraph 1 (a), of "a full report", and in paragraph 1 (b) of "any proposed new items", while in paragraph 2 it refers to "concessions" the USSR must make. These are, it seems to me, clear examples of the fairly robust approach taken by the report. I have moved an amendment to the text of the recommendation, in an attempt to improve it, and I would be glad if the Rapporteur or his representative could see their way to accepting this.

In paragraph 4 of the report we are told that "détente certainly cannot be divisible". This indivisibility might perhaps be put in more concrete terms than it is in the report. We must distinguish between worldwide détente in the geographical sense, on the one hand, and on the other showing that this is not a matter solely of military and political détente, but also of economic and cultural relations and co-operation in the humanitarian sphere as we conceive this; the Helsinki third basket, in fact. I do not think the report stresses this enough.

Helsinki made it possible to discuss certain humanitarian issues which could scarcely be broached before. That is a major gain. Anyone who expects rapid results is bound to be disappointed. Détente is a long-term thing. The third basket is pushing up against a number of sensitive thresholds in Eastern Europe and the USSR. The West must not go to Belgrade simply with a list of what the Soviet Union has not done — it must go with more positive intentions, though these need not rule out vigilance. Bearing in mind the amount and nature of armaments in the East, such vigilance is necessary. There is, of course, a connection between

Mr. Scholten (continued)

Belgrade and Vienna, between CSCE and MBFR. We cannot get all that far in Belgrade if matters are at a standstill in Vienna. But the relationship the report makes is not I think the right one. When it says that the NATO countries "had linked" the CSCE and MBFR, it is as well to recall that on 8th December 1972 the North Atlantic Council said, in these words, "While considering it inappropriate to establish formal and specific links, these Ministers reaffirmed their view that progress in each set of the different negotiations would have a favourable effect on the others".

This is quite different from what the report says; the report goes rather too far in establishing a formal link. When, furthermore, it calls for a full report on the "lack of progress" for the Belgrade meeting, I must reject this out of hand, and so I shall firmly support the amendment from Mr. Dankert seeking to delete this passage from the draft recommendation. Too close a tie-up between the two conferences would not square with the statement by the North Atlantic Council I have just quoted, and I do not think it will help the process of détente in Europe. This is an immensely important process, not perhaps for us personally or for political personalities in the USSR and Eastern Europe, but for all the peoples of Europe who want to live their lives in peace and security.

This security is under threat. In this connection, I think paragraph 3 of the recommendation is interesting and important. The report makes a plea for setting up a forum where the Euro-strategic nuclear weapons systems can be discussed. I will gladly endorse this notion. But I doubt whether the arrangement suggested in paragraphs 28 and 29 is sufficiently realistic. I feel that France, especially, needs to be more closely involved. A discussion on how to arrange for Europe to take a part would be well worthwhile. The strategic weapons mentioned in the report are targeted on Western Europe, and Mr. de Koster reiterated this in his introductory speech. It is a complicated matter, particularly since the American weapons form a dominant component on the western side and since the various weapons systems are closely interlinked in the NATO strategy. MBFR and SALT II talks do not seem the right place for this more especially European problem. If SALT II comes to a successful conclusion, then SALT III — though with Europe, and especially France, tak-

ing part — might provide a good solution. Or there might be a special forum, alongside the SALT negotiations. I am in favour of our Assembly in particular looking at these specific questions, which are vitally important for our part of the world, for the European continent and, most of all, for Western Europe. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Scholten.

I now give the floor to my colleague Mr. Mendelson.

Mr. MENDELSON (*United Kingdom*). — I wonder whether you want us to continue the debate at this stage, Mr. President, and whether you will have time to take all the votes and amendments, in view of the fact that it is now 12.15 p.m. Have you any advice for us?

The PRESIDENT. — I should advise you to make your contribution now. There is only one other speaker after you. We shall deal with the points you have raised after that.

Mr. MENDELSON (*United Kingdom*). — The debate in which we are now engaged ought, in my judgment, to have come in the middle of the week's proceedings and before we adjourn the work of the Assembly I wish to put on record my very great regret that, because of circumstances that were both inevitable and beyond his control, this debate has had to take place in the absence of the Rapporteur, Mr. de Koster, whose knowledge and very great experience of defence and international political affairs are well known to us all.

I hesitate to discuss critically the details of Mr. de Koster's report in his absence. I therefore do not propose to do so to any great extent, because it is not possible for him to reply and because it is unrealistic to criticise the report without being able to hear the reply of the man responsible for it. I therefore hope that there will be a future opportunity, with our Rapporteur present, for us to return to this important subject.

On the political situation which forms the background to the report, we must realise that any aspect of European security must be embedded in world security as a whole. This is not a very controversial statement; it is one that will find general agreement. As I have been following French political affairs for very many years, it therefore surprises me that Mr. Rivière and other well-informed members of the French

Mr. Mendelson (continued)

parliament who take an interest in these affairs should so often try to advise us apparently from a fairly isolationist point of view.

One of the French contributors to the debate this morning felt obliged to say that it would be rather strange to think that France did not care about peace because she had a certain point of view about the position of her own nuclear force. He went on to say that there was, of course, no need to assure this or any other assembly that France cares very much. There is no need to tell us that, although I would not accept that all those who take part in the political life of France are equally concerned about the *force de frappe*. I do not believe that we can take at all seriously an assertion from a representative of a French political party that it is almost treasonable to suggest that it is desirable for all Western European countries to hope for a successful outcome of the major nuclear negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union because the result would be to leave Europe naked and disarmed. The implication was that, if the two major powers were to come to a strategic nuclear agreement, far from greatly increasing the security of all West European countries — as we all hope it would — there would not be, if the French were to take part in such an agreement, an independent French *force de frappe* and this would leave Europe naked and disarmed.

Does anybody in the French political party which supports that point of view seriously ask us to believe, in an assembly of this kind, that there is any Frenchman concerned with these matters who considers that France would unilaterally use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union? I hardly believe that one could find anyone in French politics who would take such a lunatic point of view. I do not know of anyone in Britain who believes that Britain could on her own use nuclear weapons against anyone. The whole thing is dangerous nonsense.

The reality of the situation is that there are weapons at the disposal of a number of countries which have never been tried in real war, where people on both sides do not know what the actual physical consequence would be if these weapons were ever used. This is a new and tremendous fact of life in the second half of the twentieth century which sets it apart from all other periods of recorded history. In such a situation we must, year by year, hope and pray that there will be

enough wisdom among those in charge of our affairs to make quite certain that at no time in the future will these weapons ever be used by anyone on either side against the other. It is beyond my comprehension how anyone can talk as if it did not matter to the people whom we represent whether or not we do everything we can to see that these negotiations between the Soviet Union and America succeed.

Therefore, I put on record that the first task of all of us is so to conduct ourselves that we make a major contribution to the success of realistic negotiations between the major partner of our Alliance, the United States of America, and the major partner of the eastern alliance, the Soviet Union. Looking at one of my primary tasks as a British parliamentarian, which, as has been classically said, is to secure the security of the people of Britain, that is one of my first preoccupations.

Secondly, we ought to see to it that what we discuss here makes sense to the non-experts in our own countries. Here many of the underlying attitudes of the de Koster report, details of which I do not want to discuss in Mr. de Koster's absence, are only superficially realistic. They are too pessimistic because they start from a datum line of exaggerated optimism. To take one example — the expectations concerning the post-Helsinki situation — I was one of those who for more than ten years argued in the British House of Commons that the British Government ought to take part in the conference on European security, and for ten years many people opposed my point of view.

In the end, the decision that Britain should take part in such a conference was made not by a government of my own party, the Labour Party — not that that matters at all — but was made on behalf of Britain by a Conservative government. The Foreign Secretary at that time was Sir Alec Douglas-Home, now Lord Home. In recommending that we in Britain should take part in the conference on European security, and first recommending to us British participation, he had these words of wisdom to say in the House of Commons: "We should take part as long as we do not have any exaggerated expectations of the result of the conference". That was a Conservative Foreign Secretary on first recommending the holding of the conference. He never went into it with the exaggerated hopes that many of those who never wanted the conference now pretend to have had and who now try to diffuse exaggerated pessimism because hopes

Mr. Mendelson (continued)

that never existed and were always impossible are not now being fulfilled.

I say before concluding that I am second to none in wishing to reap the maximum benefit for freedom, for freer exchanges and for human rights as the results of the holding of the security conference. But I am profoundly opposed to pretending that a limited instrument like the security conference could be burdened with the task of solving a whole series of accumulated international problems that have not been solved in thirty years and could never have been the subject matter of the security conference. There is no doubt at all that the main task, as we pursue our work in this situation, is to see to it that we pursue both better relations and security.

And here we have a right to ask concrete questions. Just because all my life I have worked for co-operation with countries in Eastern Europe having political systems different from our own, I want today to ask one question that I have recently put to a number of Soviet diplomats wherever I have met them, a question that we are entitled to ask of them: "What is the reason for the enormous amount of armaments that the Soviet Government are accumulating at the present time?"

During the whole time since I entered public life, and in periods when the security of the Soviet Union could have been held to be rather less secure than it has now been for many years and than it is today, the Soviet Government have never produced as many armaments as they are producing today. Looking back today upon my own thirty years of public life, I am certain that the Soviet Union is safer than it has ever been before and there is nobody who has any hostile intention towards her. Yet the Soviet Union is spending these tremendous sums of money on heaping armaments upon armaments in every possible sector.

There seems to be no clear justification for that except the answer we occasionally hear that the Soviet Union wants to be able to be consulted everywhere. That seems to me a very poor answer. I have often criticised excessive arms expenditure in the West. It is very important that we should ask those in the Soviet Union who make policy why they think it necessary to have increased arms expenditure at a time when there is no danger to their own security

and when, in my judgment, there is no danger to international peace.

Finally, I consider that a number of the amendments moved by Mr. Dankert deserve support, and if it comes to a vote, I shall vote for them. But it would be far better if we found opportunities for further consideration of the many important points raised in the report and debate. Whatever might be the view today about the precise details under discussion, I hope it will not be done too hurriedly and that we shall have either enough time today or more time on a future occasion to return to this vital subject. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Mendelson, for the clarity with which you have expressed your point of view.

I come now to the last speaker in this debate before calling the Chairman of the Committee, and I would ask Mr. Cavaliere to be as brief as he can.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, on this matter I shall be expressing the view of the Italian Christian Democrats which is all the more needful as, due to the fact that my colleague Mr. Maggioni happened to be unable to attend the proceedings in Committee, it went by default. May I rather seize the opportunity, Mr. President, of requesting that yourself and the Committee Chairman always bear in mind that the Italian Delegation unfortunately express among themselves different, sometimes opposing, views; so that, for instance, it is quite impossible to have a Christian Democrat standing in for a Communist, or vice versa, because the groups' attitudes would be completely falsified.

Such being the case, Mr. President, I will say only a few words on the present topic, not because it is not of vital importance but because I have a feeling it has been discussed long enough. Time is getting on, and I have no wish to try anyone's patience.

I want to start with an axiom: everyone of us has a pre-eminent interest in the security, independence and freedom of his own country, which he represents in this Assembly. Therefore, starting from this hard and fast fact, everyone of us must try and find a way of safeguarding the security and independence which we hold dear. I think it self-evident that none of the WEU member countries is capable of looking after its own defence and security off its own

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

bat. This has been self-evident from the beginning, so much so that this political organisation was made so big and vigorous, that it has not yet completed its task and should, and will, long continue to perform it. Not even the richest countries would be able, unaided and imperturbably, to look after their own security. So the best way of doing so has to be found, and it is that of European union. Clearly, if we unite our efforts, the goals we have all set ourselves can be attained. And in this prospect we also have to bear in mind who we have to defend ourselves against, by hypothesis, who is liable to attack our security. This is important, because I think it impossible to accept from anyone the opinion that we have to adopt the same stance towards both the superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States. Such an opinion is untenable because it conflicts with our history, our interests and a clear-eyed and objective vision of reality.

Obviously, therefore, in the light of these hard facts, we have got to find the right way of being able to take care of the security of every West European country and Western Europe as a whole. Keeping this purpose in mind does not mean straying from the path of negotiation and peaceful coexistence. Rather, *détente* has always been the principle imbuing every member country of WEU and the European Community itself. As the Rapporteur Mr. de Koster has reminded us, *détente* has been pursued through bilateral contacts between the two superpowers and between the EEC and WEU as a whole and the world of the States signatories to the Warsaw Pact.

Some progress has been made, we even managed to arrive at the final act of the Helsinki conference. But let us not lose touch with reality. The reality is that even if progress has been made towards *détente*, we find ourselves up against a Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries having a conception totally different from our own, of the State and, I might add, of the individual too. We are up against countries that call themselves democratic but are certainly no such thing in the meaning we give to the term. I should also remind the meeting that in this respect WEU and the EEC hold very strong views from which we have never departed and to which we admit no exception. I remember, for instance, the EEC's firm attitude towards the Greece of the colonels when they

ignored the calls being made for a return to the principle of democracy, the pluralistic principle *par excellence*. What we are up against are countries which, if they had every concrete factor in their favour and asked to join the EEC, could not be admitted because they have conspicuously dictatorial and monolithic State structures.

That is one point we must always stand firm upon and never lose sight of .

As regards, for example, the point about the Helsinki final act, concerning the respect of civil rights, I refute what one speaker said yesterday, that nowadays dissidents would encounter broad understanding and be entitled to citizenship. All I need do is recall that the attitude of the leaders of the USSR ends up by making us even give credit to General Pinochet for exchanging a few political prisoners. This being so, we must stand pat on our positions, not only keeping our sights on the bearing on which WEU came into being and along which this Assembly has always striven — towards Europe's political union, for which a big step forward will be taken in 1978 with the direct elections for the European Parliament, but also not forgetting what the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany reminded us of — for which I feel I owe him thanks — I mean, even when — soon, as we hope — we have fully attained European unity, in a Europe capable of expressing more than can be done at present in respect of defence and security, we shall still need the collaboration of our natural ally, the United States. So, to come here and make speeches about our having to remain equidistant from the Soviet Union and the United States is to lend ourselves to the designs of those who would like to see us divided in order to facilitate Russia's manoeuvre to remain ever more preponderant in European and world realities.

I have listened to what our British colleague said about the armaments race in the Soviet Union being truly impressive. We cannot lag behind for the sake of the *détente* we all aspire to. Anyhow, the news given by the British Representative chimes with what we were told yesterday by the United Kingdom Under-Secretary of State for Defence, who reported some highly significant facts.

What are we to conclude from all this? That at times Mr. de Koster's motivations may even be thought to be not quite founded and acceptable. But they are to be completely accepted,

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

and I assert that the Italian Christian Democrats subscribe to them, and therefore do accept them. *(Applause)*

(Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

7. European security and East-West relations

Anti-submarine warfare

Mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee — Motion for an Order tabled by Mr. Delorme and others

(Reference back to Committee of the Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and withdrawal of the Motion for an Order, Docs. 726 and Amendments, 725 and 728 and Amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — In the absence of our Rapporteur, Mr. de Koster, I wish to make three procedural points. First, I must move a motion for an order in the name of Mr. Delorme, which would invite the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to follow attentively the implementation of the mandate given to the Standing Armaments Committee.

I also wish to move back both the de Koster report and the Roper report to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments for further consideration.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In the absence of the Rapporteur who was unable to attend the sitting, I consider the proposals by the Chairman of the Committee to be very wise. The document has been very carefully prepared but nonetheless deserves to be brought up to date and, as we have an opportunity of improving it, I for my part can see no objection to adopting the suggestion made by the Chairman of the Committee.

Are there any objections?...

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — I should just like to have the position made quite clear with regard to the motion for an order that I had the honour of submitting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I shall put it to the vote.

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — I should like to mention that, after the very pertinent comments made yesterday by Mr. de Bruyne, an amendment was tabled to my motion for an order and the amendment now forms part of my proposal.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall vote on the motion for an order with the amendment, but since the report as a whole will be further studied and new proposals made at a future session...

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — I am reluctant to complicate matters. However, I should like the Assembly to vote on the amendment as I believe that the matter should go to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and not to the General Affairs Committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I shall read Amendment No. 1, submitted by Mr. Delorme, to the motion for an order; it reads as follows: "after the words: 'invites the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments' insert 'and the General Affairs Committee, each within its own sphere of responsibilities'".

I put this amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amendment is negatived.

I shall put the motion for an order to the vote.

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — In view of the absence of Mr. de Bruyne and the comments that have been made, I withdraw the motion for an order which I have had the honour of submitting. I am fully entitled to do so.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you.

The report as a whole is therefore referred back to the Committee, which may, if not recast it, as it is well drafted, at least complement it in the light of the many events that will take place between now and 1977.

The fate of Mr. Roper's report will be the same, an enviable one since it remains on the agenda for our forthcoming business.

8. *Close of the Session*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Assembly has now come to the end of the business for the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session.

I should like to add that this business has proved very satisfactory from every point of view. We have heard some extremely interesting speeches and some eminent guest speakers.

We have adopted a number of recommendations in circumstances that were entirely normal. This session is therefore a red-letter occasion.

I declare closed the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 12.50 p.m.)

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