

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-NINTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

November 1983

IV

Minutes
Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

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ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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IV

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The proceedings of the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist	
BOGAERTS August	Socialist	
BONNEL Raoul	PVV	
DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist	
Mrs. HERMAN-MICHELSENS Lucienne	PVV	
Mr. MICHEL Joseph	PSC	
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP	

Substitutes

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	Socialist	
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP	
DE DECKER Armand	PRL	
LAGNEAU André	PRL	
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	Socialist	
STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP	
VAN DER ELST Frans	Volksunie	

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist	
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR	
BEIX Roland	Socialist	
BERRIER Noël	Socialist	
BOURGES Yvon	RPR	
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS	
FRÈCHE Georges	Socialist	
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left	
JUNG Louis	UCDP	
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist	
MAYOUD Alain	UDF	
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist	
RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.	
SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist	
VALLEIX Jean	RPR	
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	Communist	
WILQUIN Claude	Socialist	
WIRTH Frédéric	UCDP	

Substitutes

MM. BARTHE Jean-Jacques	Communist	
BOHL André	UCDP	
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.	
DELEHEDDE André	Socialist	
DREYFUS-SCHMIDT Michel	Socialist	
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist	

MM. GALLEY Robert		RPR
GRUSSENMEYER François		RPR
HUYGHUES des ÉTAGES Jacques		Socialist
KOEHL Émile		UDF
MATRAJA Pierre		Socialist
MERCIER Jean		Dem. Left
NATIEZ Jean		Socialist
OEHLER Jean-André		Socialist
PROUVOST Pierre		Socialist
ROSSINOT André		UDF
SOUVET Louis		RPR
VERDON Marc		Socialist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl		SPD
ANTRETTET Robert		SPD
BÖHM Wilfried		CDU/CSU
ENDERS Wendelin		SPD
GERSTL Friedrich		SPD
HAASE Horst		SPD
HARTMANN Klaus		CDU/CSU
HORNHUES Karl-Heinz		CDU/CSU
KITTELMANN Peter		CDU/CSU
LINDE Jürgen		SPD
MÜLLER Günther		CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard		CDU/CSU
RUMPF Wolfgang		FDP
SCHULTE Manfred		SPD
SCHWARZ Heinz		CDU/CSU
SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf		CDU/CSU
UNLAND Hermann Josef		CDU/CSU
VOGT Roland		Die Grünen

Substitutes

MM. BÜCHNER Peter		SPD
ERTL Josef		FDP
GANSEL Norbert		SPD
HACKEL Wolfgang		CDU/CSU
HANDLOS Franz		Republican
HAUFF Volker		SPD
HOLTZ Uwe		SPD
JÄGER Claus		CDU/CSU
Mrs. KELLY Petra		Die Grünen
MM. LEMMRICH Karl Heinz		CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian		CDU/CSU
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang		CDU/CSU
SCHEER Hermann		SPD
SCHMIDT Manfred		SPD
SCHMIDT Hans Peter		CDU/CSU
STAVENHAGEN Lutz		CDU/CSU
VOGEL Hans-Jochen		SPD
WULFF Otto		CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM. AGRIMI Alessandro	Chr. Dem.
ANTONI Varese	Communist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DELLA BRIOTTA Libero	Socialist
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
President of the Assembly	
FORMA Renzo	Chr. Dem.
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
Mrs. GHERBEZ Gabriella	Communist
MM. MONDINO Giorgio	Socialist
PECCHIOLO Ugo	Communist
PETRILLI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
TRIPODI Antonio	MSI-DN
VALIANTE Mario	Chr. Dem.
VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM. AJELLO Aldo	Radical
AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
BENEDIKTER Johann Hans	SVP
CAFIERO Luca	PDUP
CALICE Giovanni	Communist
CONTI PERSINI Gianfranco	PSDI
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
GUNNELLA Aristide	Republican
MARTINO Leopoldo Attilio	Communist
ORIONE Franco Luigi	Chr. Dem.
PATRIARCA Francesco	Chr. Dem.
POZZO Cesare	MSI-DN
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
Mrs. ROSOLEN Angela Maria	Communist
MM. SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STERPA Egidio	Liberal
ZITO Sisinio	Socialist

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. BERCHEM Albert	Dem.
MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
THOSS Maurice	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM. GLESENER Jean-Pierre	Soc. Chr.
HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
PRUSSEN Robert	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry	CDA
van den BERGH Harry	Labour
BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA	
Anne Maria	CPA

Substitutes

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN		Labour
Elisabeth		CDA
Mr. EYSINK Rudolf		Liberal
Mrs. den OUDE-DEKKERS Greetje		CDA
MM. van der SANDEN Piet		Labour
de VRIES Klaas		Liberal
van der WERFF Ymenus P.W.		Labour
WORRELL Joop		

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Mr. Alan BEITH	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
Mr. Thomas COX	Labour
Sir Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Mr. Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr. James HILL	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
Mr. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Mrs. Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr. Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr. Maurice MILLER	Labour
Sir John OSBORN	Conservative
Mr. John PAGE	Conservative
Lord REAY	Conservative
Sir Dudley SMITH	Conservative
MM. Thomas URWIN	Labour
John WILKINSON	Conservative

Substitutes

MM. David ATKINSON	Conservative
John BLACKBURN	Conservative
John CORRIE	Conservative
Kenneth EASTHAM	Labour
Robert EDWARDS	Labour
Edward GARRETT	Labour
Harry GOURLAY	Labour
Ralph HOWELL	Conservative
Earl of KINNOULL	Conservative
Lord McNAIR	Liberal
MM. John MORRIS	Labour
Michael MORRIS	Conservative
Christopher MURPHY	Conservative
Lord NORTHFIELD	Labour
Lord NEWALL	Conservative
MM. Laurence PAVITT	Labour
John STOKES	Conservative
John WARD	Conservative

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FIFTH SITTING

Monday, 28th November 1983

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Resumption of the session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 952).
5. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 959*).
6. Address by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO.
7. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendation and draft resolution, Doc. 959*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The President announced the resumption of the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stating that that Assembly had ratified the credentials of representatives and substitutes with the exception of MM. Bourges, Ruet and Wirth, Representatives of France, and MM. Bohl, Croze, Dreyfus-Schmidt, Matraja, Souvet and Verdon, substitute members for France, and Mr. Gansel, substitute member for the Federal Republic of Germany.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, and subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of the above.

4. Tributes

The President paid tribute to the memory of Senators René Jager and Georges Spénale, members of the Assembly since 1978 and 1980 respectively, and of Mr. Jacques Westhof, Legal Adviser of WEU since 1965.

5. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session

(Doc. 952)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session.

Mr. Blaauw proposed changing the order of business on Thursday, 1st December, to take the report on Middle East crises and European security before the report on Africa's rôle in a European security policy.

Speakers: MM. Böhm and Caro.

Mr. Jessel proposed starting the morning sitting of Thursday, 1st December, at 9.30 a.m.

Speakers: MM. Dreyfus-Schmidt, Cavaliere and Müller.

Mr. Blaauw withdrew his proposal.

The proposal by Mr. Jessel was agreed to.

The Assembly adopted the amended draft order of business for the second part of the session.

Speakers (points of order): Mr. Page, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. John Morris.

7. *Changes in the membership of committees*

In accordance with Rules 39 (6) and 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees:

COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>France:</i>	MM. Bourges Huyghues des Étages Natiez Pignion	MM. Matraja Baumel Wirth Verdon
<i>United Kingdom:</i>		Lord Newall (vacant seat)

GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

<i>France:</i>	MM. Caro Ruet	MM. Dreyfus-Schmidt Wilquin
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS

<i>France:</i>	MM. Bassinet Fourré Souvet	MM. Lagorce Croze Barthe
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COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION

<i>France:</i>	MM. Beix Bohl Jeambrun Oehler	MM. Frêche Rossinot Delehedde Ruet
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COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES

<i>France:</i>	MM. Delehedde Koehl Vial-Massat Wilquin	MM. Sénès Beix Bohl Prouvost
<i>United Kingdom:</i>		Earl of Kinnoull (vacant seat)

COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS

<i>France:</i>	MM. Mercier Sénès	MM. Verdon Jeambrun
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**8. European security and burden-sharing
in the alliance**

*(Presentation of the report of the Committee
on Defence Questions and Armaments,
Doc. 959 and amendments)*

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur.

**9. Address by Mr. Luns,
Secretary-General of NATO**

Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Luns replied to questions put by Sir Frederic Bennett, Sir John Osborn, MM. Blaauw, Gansel, Caro, Dr. Miller and Mr. Rumpf.

**10. European security and burden-sharing
in the alliance**

*(Debate on the report of the Committee
on Defence Questions and Armaments,
Doc. 959 and amendments)*

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Sir Anthony Grant, MM. Tummers and John Morris.

Mr. Pignion, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: Dr. Miller, MM. Jäger, Garrett, McGuire and Bernini.

The debate was adjourned.

11. Date and time of the next sitting

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 29th November, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.15 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹ :

Belgium	MM. Enders <i>Schmidt</i> (Gerstl) Haase <i>Hackel</i> (Hartmann) Hornhues <i>Gansel</i> (Linde) Müller <i>Jäger</i> (Reddemann) Rumpf <i>Holtz</i> (Schulte) <i>Lemmrich</i> (Schwarz) Spies von Büllersheim Unland	Netherlands MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) <i>de Vries</i> (van den Bergh) Blaauw Scholten Stoffelen Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Tummers)
MM. <i>Van Der Elst</i> (Adriaensens) Bogaerts <i>Péciaux</i> (Dejardin) <i>Lagneau</i> (Mrs. Herman- Michielsens) Michel <i>Stevelynck</i> (Mrs. Staels-Dompas)		
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Bassinet <i>Dreyfus-Schmidt</i> (Berrier) Caro <i>Natiez</i> (Frêche) Jung Lagorce <i>Galley</i> (Mayoud) Pignion Valleix	MM. Agrimi Bernini Cavaliere <i>Conti Persini</i> (Della Briotta) Forma Pecchioli Valiante <i>Martino</i> (Vecchietti)	Mr. Beith Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. <i>Edwards</i> (Cox) Sir Anthony Grant Mr. Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins MM. Hill <i>John Morris</i> (Lord Hughes) Jessel Mrs. Knight Mr. McGuire Dr. Miller Sir John Osborn Mr. Page Lord Reay MM. <i>Ward</i> (Sir Dudley Smith) <i>Garrett</i> (Urwin) Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Ahrens Antretter Böhm	MM. <i>Prussen</i> (Berchem) <i>Glesener</i> (Margue) Thoss	
The following representatives apologised for their absence:		
Belgium	MM. Ruet Sénès Vial-Massat Wilquin Wirth	Italy
Mr. Bonnel		MM. Antoni Bonalumi Foschi Fosson Mrs. Gherbez MM. Mondino Petrilli Rubbi Tripodi
France	Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands
MM. Baumel Beix Bourges Jeambrun	MM. Kittelmann Vogt	Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

SIXTH SITTING

Tuesday, 29th November 1983

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendation and draft resolution, Doc. 959 and amendments*).
2. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and*
3. Rôle and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 960*).

debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 948).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance

(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendation and draft resolution, Doc. 959 and amendments)

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Stoffelen, Galley, Caro, Natiez, Beith (point of order), Hardy, de Vries, Spies von Büllenheim, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Haase, Scholten, Cavaliere, Beith and Blaauw.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur, and Mr. Pignion, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

Amendments 4, 5, 6 and 7 tabled by Mr. Cavaliere were not moved.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Bernini and others:

1. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (viii) and insert:

“Aware of the seriousness of the interruption of the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, of the risks of a further increase in rearmament and of the ever-growing dangers for European security that ensue;”.

Speakers: MM. Bernini, Wilkinson and Pignion.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Bernini and others:

2. Leave out paragraph A.2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“To promote steps for bringing about significant action by the great powers, postponement of the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles and the start of the dismantling of the SS-20s in order to encourage, with the help of the European countries, the resumption of the Geneva negotiations and the conclusion of an agreement on the level of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe at the lowest level of balance;”.

Speakers: Sir Anthony Grant, MM. Wilkinson, Pignion.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Bernini and others:

3. Leave out paragraph A.3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“ To help to define adequate mutual confidence-building and joint security measures to ensure the complete success of the forthcoming Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe ; ”.

Speakers: MM. Wilkinson and Pignion.

The amendment was negatived.

Speaker: Mr. Stoffelen.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 37 votes to 29 with 2 abstentions; 5 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote. (This recommendation will be published as No. 396) ¹.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Hardy.

The draft resolution was agreed to. (This resolution will be published as No. 69) ².

Speakers (point of order): Mr. Gansel and Mr. Huydecoper van Nigtevecht, Ambassador of the Netherlands.

4. Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 948)

Speaker: Mr. Pignion.

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur.

The previous question was moved by Mr. Lagorce under Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure, Document 964.

Speakers: MM. Lagorce, Blaauw and Prussen.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the previous question.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Page.

The previous question was negatived on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix III) by 28 votes to 13 with 0 abstentions; 32 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote.

5. Date and time of the next sitting

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 1 p.m.

1. See page 21.
2. See page 23.

APPENDIX I

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts <i>De Decker</i> (Bonnel) <i>Péciaux</i> (Dejardin) <i>Lagneau</i> (Mrs. Herman-Michielsens) Michel <i>Steverlynck</i> (Mrs. Staels-Dompas)	MM. Ahrens Antretter Böhm Enders <i>Schmidt</i> (Gerstl) Haase <i>Lemmrich</i> (Hartmann) <i>Lenzer</i> (Hornhues) <i>Gansel</i> (Linde) <i>Wulff</i> (Müller) <i>Jäger</i> (Reddemann) Rumpf <i>Hackel</i> (Schwarz) Spies von Büllesheim Unland	MM. <i>Prussen</i> (Berchem) Margue Thoss
		Netherlands
		MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) <i>de Vries</i> (van den Bergh) Blaauw Scholten Stoffelen Tummers
		United Kingdom
France		Mr. Beith Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. <i>Edwards</i> (Cox) Sir Anthony Grant
MM. Bassinet Baumel <i>Dreyfus-Schmidt</i> (Beix) <i>Huyghues des Étages</i> (Berrier)	Italy	MM. Hardy <i>Corrie</i> (Sir Paul Hawkins) Hill
Bourges Caro <i>Natiez</i> (Frêche) Jung Lagorce <i>Galley</i> (Mayoud) Pignion Sénès Valleix <i>Matraja</i> (Vial-Massat) <i>Prouvost</i> (Wilquin)	MM. Antoni Bernini Cavaliere <i>Conti Persini</i> (Della Briotta) Forma Pecchioli <i>Martino</i> (Rubbi) Valiante Vecchietti	Lord Hughes MM. <i>Ward</i> (Jessel) <i>Murphy</i> (Mrs. Knight) McGuire Dr. Miller Lord <i>Newall</i> (Sir John Osborn) Mr. Page Lord Reay MM. <i>Michael Morris</i> (Sir Dudley Smith) <i>Garrett</i> (Urwin) Wilkinson

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	Italy	Netherlands
MM. Jeambrun Ruet Wirth	MM. Schulte Vogt	Mrs. Gherbez MM. Mondino Petrilli Tripodi
Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Netherlands
Mr. Kittelmann	MM. Bonalumi Foschi Fosson	Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 1 by roll-call on the draft recommendation on European security and burden-sharing in the alliance (Doc. 959) ¹:

Ayes.....	37
Noes	29
Abstentions	2

Ayes:

MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts)	MM. <i>Corrie</i> (Sir Paul Hawkins)	Lord Reay
Sir Frederic Bennett	<i>Lagneau</i> (Mrs. Herman-Michielsens)	MM. <i>Jäger</i> (Reddemann)
MM. <i>Prussen</i> (Berchem)	Hill	Rumpf
Blaauw	<i>Lenzer</i> (Hornhues)	<i>Hackel</i> (Schwarz)
Böhm	<i>Ward</i> (Jessel)	<i>Michael Morris</i>
<i>De Decker</i> (Bonnell)	<i>Murphy</i> (Mrs. Knight)	(Sir Dudley Smith)
Caro	Margue	Spies von Büllenheim
Cavaliere	<i>Galley</i> (Mayoud)	<i>Steverlynck</i> (Mrs. Staels-Dompas)
<i>Conti Persini</i>	Michel	Unland
(Della Briotta)	<i>Wulff</i> (Müller)	Valiante
Forma	Lord <i>Newall</i> (Sir John Osborn)	Valleix
Sir Anthony Grant	Mr. Page	<i>Matraja</i> (Vial-Massat)
Mr. <i>Lemrich</i> (Hartmann)		Wilkinson

Noes:

MM. Adriaensens	MM. <i>Péciaux</i> (Dejardin)	MM. Pecchioli
Ahrens	Enders	Pignion
Antoni	<i>Natiez</i> (Frêche)	<i>Martino</i> (Rubbi)
Antretter	Haase	Scholten
<i>de Vries</i> (van den Bergh)	Hardy	Sènès
Bernini	Lord Hughes	Stoffelen
<i>Huyghues des Étages</i>	MM. Lagorce	Thoss
(Berrier)	<i>Gansel</i> (Linde)	Tummers
Bogaerts	McGuire	<i>Garrett</i> (Urwin)
<i>Edwards</i> (Cox)	Dr. Miller	Vecchietti

Abstentions:

MM. Beith
Bourges

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX III

Vote No. 2 by roll-call on the previous question moved by Mr. Lagorce (Doc. 964) ¹:

Ayes.....	13
Noes	28
Abstentions	0

Ayes:

MM. Antoni <i>de Vries</i> (van den Bergh) Bernini <i>Huyghues des Étages</i> (Berrier)	MM. <i>Natiez</i> (Frêche) Lagorce Pecchioli Pignion	MM. Stoffelen Thoss Tummers Vecchietti <i>Matraja</i> (Vial-Massat)
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Noes:

MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) Beith Sir Frederic Bennett	MM. <i>Lemmrich</i> (Hartmann) <i>Corrie</i> (Sir Paul Hawkins) Hill <i>Ward</i> (Jessel) Jung <i>Murphy</i> (Mrs. Knight)	MM. <i>Jäger</i> (Reddemann) Rumpf <i>Hackel</i> (Schwarz) <i>Michael Morris</i> (Sir Dudley Smith) Spies von Büllesheim Unland Valiante Valleix Wilkinson
MM. <i>Prussen</i> (Berchem) Blaauw Böhm Caro Cavaliere <i>Conti Persini</i> (Della Briotta) Sir Anthony Grant	Lord <i>Newall</i> (Sir John Osborn) Mr. Page Lord Reay	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 396***on European security and burden-sharing
in the alliance***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the manifold difficulties of comparing national defence efforts but concluding that the European allies for the most part now carry a very reasonable share of the agreed burden, a share which has increased from 24% to 38% in the last twenty-five years, and increased most significantly in the decade of the 1970s; recognising that because of its substantial strategic nuclear deterrent and world rôle, the United States spends a higher proportion of its national wealth on defence than its European allies; but believing that certain specific improvements in defence efforts are required;
- (ii) Noting the existence of the independent nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom;
- (iii) Considering that an important factor in the continuing burden-sharing debate arises from the differing approaches of the European allies and the United States administration to relations with the Soviet Union, and consequently from the different views on the necessary size and composition of the allied defence effort;
- (iv) Believing that these differences call for increased consultation between the European allies on strategic policies and defence issues;
- (v) Convinced that within the alliance the political relationship between the European members and the United States should reflect more fully their economic, political and defence contributions to the security of Western Europe in the fullest sense;
- (vi) Aware that isolationism in the United States is likely to grow to the detriment of western security unless the European members of the alliance can convince American public opinion and Congress of the adequacy of the European contribution to the NATO defence effort, and unless European public opinion and parliaments show reciprocal appreciation of all aspects of the United States contribution to allied defence;
- (vii) Welcoming therefore the annual report to Congress by the United States Secretary of Defence on allied contributions to the common defence ; proposals by WEU ; and statements by Eurogroup which identify the size of the European contribution;
- (viii) Believing that allied defence plans and commitments entered into in the Brussels Treaty must take account of the possible consequences of developments beyond the NATO area, and that in the case of such developments which the allies jointly recognise as directly threatening the vital interests of the alliance, the ready assistance of all allies must be forthcoming within the area to facilitate United States deployments beyond the area;
- (ix) Recalling that problems of common defence and the support of public opinion for national defence projects cannot be isolated from the quality of economic, political and monetary relations between the United States and the members of WEU,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

- A. Urge the WEU member governments concerned to define jointly for the attention of the North Atlantic Council the measures necessary :
 - 1. To maintain and in the following specific cases improve their defence efforts :
 - (a) by maintaining collectively the NATO target of an increase in defence expenditure in real terms as long as the Soviet military build-up continues, and by adhering to the biennial force goals approved by the nations;
 - (b) by augmenting the combat sustainability of the alliance by providing a minimum of thirty days' stocks of fuel, ammunition, spare parts and consumables and by improving the capacity of reserve forces;

- (c) by maximising conventional firepower and raising the nuclear threshold through the progressive introduction of proven systems incorporating emerging technologies jointly developed and produced on an equitable Atlantic-wide basis;
 - (d) by improving the flexibility, mobility, effectiveness and readiness of European intervention forces, both to improve national contributions to ACE Mobile Force and, in a crisis in Europe, to compensate as far as possible for any diversion outside the area of United States reinforcements destined for Europe;
2. In the case of developments beyond the NATO area affecting their vital interests :
- (a) to facilitate by all necessary measures within the area the deployment of forces of any NATO country beyond the area ;
 - (b) in the case of those WEU member countries with appropriate military capability to participate in such deployments ;
3. To lend vigorous united support to the United States efforts on behalf of the alliance to secure satisfactory balanced and verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union in the field of both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces and, failing the latter by the end of 1983, to apply the decisions taken on 12th December 1979 by the NATO member countries concerning the deployment of GLCM and Pershing II missiles ;
4. (a) To deepen and improve European defence deliberations within the WEU Council and the informal consultations in Eurogroup and arrange for the European position to be expounded clearly in the United States, especially to Congress committees and staffs, through a public information effort co-ordinated by the Washington embassies of those countries which provide the Eurogroup secretariat and Chairman-in-Office ;
- (b) To undertake a similar effort with the assistance of the Assembly of WEU to explain to the European public and parliaments the contribution which the United States makes to allied defence ;
- B. Consider and report to the Assembly on :
- 1. The expansion and deepening of the European defence activities of the Council, last defined in 1957 ;
 - 2. The obligation to invite all members of WEU to contribute to strengthening the European pillar of the western alliance.

RESOLUTION 69***on European security and burden-sharing
in the alliance***

The Assembly,

Reaffirming its rôle as the only European parliamentary assembly empowered by treaty to discuss defence matters ;

Stressing the need for the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance to be strengthened through agreement between all European allies on the basic principles of alliance defence policy and strategy ;

Recalling its Resolution 15,

CALLS on the parliaments of the European NATO countries not members of WEU to appoint observers to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to participate in the preparation of its forthcoming report on the state of European security ;

DECIDES that such observers shall have the right to speak.

SEVENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 29th November 1983

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (*Debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 948 and amendments*).
2. Rôle and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 960*).
3. Assessment of advanced technology in Japan (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 956*).
4. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – Part II (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 963 and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the Appendix.

2. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council

(Debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 948 and amendments)

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Bernini, Spies von Büllenheim, Cavaliere, Wilkinson and Tummers.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Lagorce:

1. In the last line of paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “by reducing”.

Speakers: MM. Lagorce and Prussen.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Lagorce:

2. Leave out paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Speakers: MM. Lagorce, Prussen, Pignion and Prussen.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Lagorce:

3. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “while taking into consideration the possibility of deleting the list concerned except for atomic, biological or chemical weapons”.

Speakers: MM. Lagorce, Prussen and Pignion.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Lagorce:

4. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers: MM. Lagorce, Jung and Prussen.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 397)¹.

1. See page 27.

3. *Rôle and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime*

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 960)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Pecchioli, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Cavaliere.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Pecchioli, Rapporteur, and Mr. Pignion, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 398) ¹.

4. *Assessment of advanced technology in Japan*

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 956)

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Lord Northfield, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Böhm.

Mr. Berchem, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: Sir John Osborn, Lord Kinnoull, MM. Fourré and Lagorce.

The debate was closed.

Lord Northfield, Rapporteur, and Mr. Lenzer, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 399) ².

5. *Adoption of the minutes*

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

6. *Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – Part II*

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 963 and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Sir John Osborn, MM. Wilkinson and Forma.

The debate was adjourned.

7. *Changes in the membership of committees*

In accordance with Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees proposed by the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany:

- Mr. Gansel as alternate member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in place of Mr. Horn ;
- Mr. Haase as alternate member of the General Affairs Committee in place of Mr. Linde ;
- Mr. Enders as titular member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in place of Mr. Linde ;
- Mr. Ahrens as alternate member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in place of Mr. Enders.

8. *Date and time of the next sitting*

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 30th November, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6 p.m.

1. See page 29.
2. See page 30.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Böhm Enders Hartmann Hornhues Lenzer (Kittelmann) Gansel (Linde) Müller Lemmrich (Rumpf) Hackel (Schwarz) Spies von Büllesheim Unland	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts <i>De Bondt</i> (Bonnel) <i>Pécriaux</i> (Dejardin) Michel <i>Steverlynck</i> (Mrs. Staels-Dompas)		MM. Aarts <i>Worrell</i> (van den Bergh) Blaauw Stoffelen
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Bassinet Baumel <i>Huyghues des Étages</i> (Berrier) Caro <i>Natiez</i> (Frêche) Jeambrun Jung Lagorce <i>Croze</i> (Mayoud) Pignion <i>Fourré</i> (Ruet) Sénès Valleix <i>Souvet</i> (Wirth)	MM. Antoni Bernini Cavaliere <i>Conti Persini</i> (Della Briotta) Forma <i>Benedikter</i> (Fosson) <i>Fiandrotti</i> (Mondino) Pecchioli <i>Martino</i> (Rubbi) Valiante	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) MM. <i>Corrie</i> (Sir Frederic Bennett) <i>Edwards</i> (Cox) Earl of <i>Kinnoull</i> (Sir Anthony Grant) Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord <i>Northfield</i> (Lord Hughes) MM. <i>Atkinson</i> (Jessel) <i>Ward</i> (Mrs. Knight) McGuire Dr. Miller Sir John Osborn Mr. Page Lord Reay Lord <i>Newall</i> (Sir Dudley Smith) MM. <i>Gourlay</i> (Urwin) Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Ahrens Antretter	MM. <i>Prussen</i> (Berchem) Margue Thoss	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Petrilli Tripodi Vecchiatti
Mrs. Herman-Michielsens	MM. Gerstl Haase Reddemann Schulte Vogt	Netherlands
France	Italy	MM. Scholten Tummers Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra
MM. Beix Bourges Vial-Massat Wilquin	MM. Agrimi Bonalumi Foschi Mrs. Gherbez	United Kingdom
		Mr. Hardy

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 397***on the application of the Brussels Treaty
- reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the wide agreement between the Council and the Assembly on the application of the Brussels Treaty, revealed in Recommendation 380 and the Council's reply thereto, and on the proposition that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s ;
- (ii) Noting that the Council has received with great interest and is considering the Assembly's recommendation to cancel the few remaining restrictions on the production of conventional weapons in one member country, and is considering the technical, military and political aspects of the Assembly's recommendation to vary by reducing the list of weapons subject to quantitative controls ;
- (iii) Aware that the controls on atomic and biological weapons provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty have never been applied, but considering in the present circumstances that it is no longer appropriate to apply them ;
- (iv) Believing that the fullest use should be made of the qualified staffs of the Standing Armaments Committee and of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, both for the study of problems within their respective competence for the benefit of the alliance as a whole, and to assist the Assembly in the preparation of its reports, and warmly welcoming the first tentative experiment in the latter connection, in implementation of the Council's reply to Recommendation 331;
- (v) Deploring the severe reductions which the present United States administration has imposed on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with which the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments has co-operated from time to time ;
- (vi) Welcoming the inclusion in the Council's annual report, in response to Recommendations 331 and 348, of specific information on the levels of British ground and air forces assigned to SACEUR, and recognising that no provision of the Brussels Treaty requires this information to be included ;
- (vii) Regretting however the Council's refusal in recent years to include in annual reports various other items the Assembly has requested,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. In application of Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III;
2. Submit to the Assembly in the near future the results of its consideration of the technical, military and political aspects of varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III, in application of Article V of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, while taking into consideration the possibility of deleting the list concerned except for atomic, biological or chemical weapons ;
3. Instruct the Agency for the Control of Armaments to extend its studies of control, verification and exports of armaments, in co-operation with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with a view to assuming for the benefit of the alliance as a whole certain tasks which the latter agency is no longer in a position to undertake ;
4. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to extend its study of the European armaments industry to include a survey of the status of the two-way street and an analysis of the factors which would help to increase the proportion of European equipment in the armed forces of all allied countries ;

5. Request the international staff of the Standing Armaments Committee to assist within its competence in the preparation of reports of Assembly committees when these so request, and to extend such assistance to the collection of the necessary information ;
6. To include in future annual reports:
 - (a) a statement of the levels of forces which the WEU countries make available to NATO, and of the French forces in Germany ;
 - (b) information as full as in reports for 1981 and earlier, on the production and procurement of armaments in member countries ;
 - (c) as far as possible the latest approved lists of chemical and biological weapons subject to control.

RECOMMENDATION 398***on the rôle and contribution of the armed forces
in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime***

The Assembly,

- (i) Having taken note of the results of the information study conducted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of WEU on the rôle and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime;
- (ii) Aware that the fundamental institutional task of the armed forces is to ensure national defence and security;
- (iii) Recognising the rôle of guidance and co-ordination incumbent on the civil authorities in establishing research and civil defence bodies, planning means of intervention and mobilising local authorities and the various civil protection agencies in order to afford assistance and relief to the victims of disasters;
- (iv) Stressing the essential contribution which the armed forces have to make in this context by affording relief and assistance in the hours immediately following disasters;
- (v) Stressing the international value in terms of human solidarity of the exchange of assistance between member countries in the event of disasters and of participation in assistance and relief operations in third countries thus struck,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To pay particular attention to the rôle and contribution of the armed forces in studying and planning civil protection means;
2. To this end to promote co-operation between member countries through:
 - (a) the exchange of information and experience;
 - (b) mutual invitations to and attendance at periodical national and, if possible, transfrontier civil protection exercises; and
 - (c) the conclusion of bi- or multilateral agreements on mutual assistance and relief;
3. Together with NATO, in co-operation with the United Nations relief agencies, utilising such humanitarian aid as provided by the EEC, and in collaboration through the Council of Europe, to contribute to assistance and relief to third countries struck by a natural or collective man-made disaster by establishing the necessary structures and means.

RECOMMENDATION 399***on the assessment of advanced technology in Japan***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the limitations imposed on Japan's defence capabilities under Article 9 of the Japanese constitution restricting its military forces to defensive purposes ;
- (ii) Conscious of the growing industrial power of Japan and of Japan's success in the field of micro-technology, in exploration of space and the oceans and in energy ;
- (iii) Considering that defence-related expenditure is about 5 % of the total budget and that Japan has by far the lowest per capita defence expenditure in the free world ;
- (iv) Considering also that, although Japanese technological research and development is not directed towards military goals, new weapons systems or possibly the export of armaments, electronic developments make the dividing line between civil and military high technology increasingly difficult to trace ;
- (v) Aware of projects of Japanese collaboration with the EEC and ESA, in OECD and with various member states and manufacturing companies in WEU and the United States in advanced technology and of the impetus given by decisions at the Versailles and Williamsburg summit meetings on areas of co-operation ;
- (vi) Noting the similarity of problems and of the approach to them by WEU member states and Japan ;
- (vii) Convinced of the need for a joint approach to problems in the fields of science, technology and aerospace,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to study Japanese progress in military high technology, or technology which may have military applications, together with its prospects and submit the conclusions of this study to the Assembly ;
2. Examine the whole field of possible collaboration with Japan so as to promote more joint projects on a bilateral or a multilateral basis ;
3. Examine in particular the possibility of collaboration with the Japanese Institute for New Generation Computer Technology (ICOT) on the project for a fifth generation computer ;
4. Examine the possibility of collaboration in production of military and civil aircraft ;
5. Examine with the authorities of EEC member states how to make fuller use of the present arrangements for scientific and executive staff, government officials and others to familiarise themselves with Japanese culture, management techniques and scientific development by courses and periods of study in Japan ;
6. In order to develop practical collaboration in space, and taking account of the fact that Japan has just appointed a permanent representative to Paris for space matters, propose the nomination of a permanent representative of ESA to Japan to enable ESA to consult continuously on collaborative projects.

EIGHTH SITTING

Wednesday, 30th November 1983

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – Part II (*Resumed debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 963 and amendments*).
2. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 954*).
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1982 – the Auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 953 and addendum*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – Part II

(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 963 and amendments)

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Galley, Antoni and Worrell.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur, and Mr. Lenzer, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Worrell:

1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "European states", leave out the remainder of the sentence.

Speakers: MM. Worrell and Bassinet.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Worrell:

2. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "extensive" and insert "promising".

Speakers: MM. Worrell and Bassinet.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Worrell:

3. In the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

"4. Strongly support the need for co-operation within the Independent European Programme Group."

Speakers: MM. Worrell and Bassinet.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 400)¹.

1. See page 34.

4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 954)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Pignion, Mrs. Knight, MM. Cavaliere, Stoffelen, Sir Paul Hawkins, MM. Michael Morris, Antoni and Fiandrotti.

The debate was closed.

Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft budget.

The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 was agreed to.

5. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1982 – the Auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 953 and addendum)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the motion to approve the final accounts.

The motion to approve the final accounts of the administrative expenditure for the financial year 1982 was agreed to.

6. Date and time of the next sitting

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12 noon.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. <i>Schmidt</i> (Gerstl) Hartmann <i>Lenzer</i> (Hornhues) <i>Gansel</i> (Linde) Müller Schulte Unland	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts <i>Lagneau</i> (Bonnell) <i>Pécriaux</i> (Dejardin)		MM. <i>Worrell</i> (van den Bergh) Blaauw Scholten Stoffelen <i>Eysink</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra)
Mrs. Herman-Michielsens Mr. Michel Mrs. Staels-Dompas		
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Bassinet <i>Huyghues des Étages</i> (Berrier) Bourges Caro <i>Natiez</i> (Frêche) Jeambrun <i>Galley</i> (Mayoud) Pignion Sénès <i>Souvet</i> (Valleix)	MM. Antoni Cavaliere <i>Conti Persini</i> (Della Briotta) Forma <i>Fiandrotti</i> (Mondino) <i>Martino</i> (Pecchioli) Valiante	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) Sir Frederic Bennett MM. <i>Atkinson</i> (Sir Anthony Grant) Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes Mr. Jessel Mrs. Knight Dr. Miller Earl of <i>Kinnoull</i> (Sir John Osborn) Mr. <i>Michael Morris</i> (Page) Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith MM. <i>Garrett</i> (Urwin) Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Ahrens Enders	MM. Berchem Margue Thoss	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Haase Kittelmann Reddemann Rumpf Schwarz Spies von Büllenheim Vogt	MM. Petrilli Rubbi Tripodi Vecchiatti
MM. Baumel Beix Jung Lagorce Ruet Vial-Massat Wilquin Wirth		Netherlands
	Italy	MM. Aarts Tummers
Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Agrimi Bernini Bonalumi Foschi Fosson Mrs. Gherbez	United Kingdom
MM. Antretter Böhm		MM. Cox McGuire

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 400***on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting with satisfaction that the governments of the WEU member countries have declared that they are fully aware of the security interests which determine European collaborative projects in high technology fields, including aeronautics, space and microelectronics;
- (ii) Considering that it is essential to master the principal branches of technology covering all material needed by the armed forces of member countries and that the evolution of defence research makes it necessary to develop intellectual capabilities by a sustained effort of continuous education at various levels – engineers, technicians, operatives;
- (iii) Considering that mastery of research and development in the defence field would strengthen the defence capability of the European states if they could co-operate without restriction in their respective financial and technological efforts;
- (iv) Considering that the growing cost of armaments programmes for the WEU countries calls for increased and balanced co-operation in a European framework so that the armaments industries of the member countries may contribute fully to defence by mastering new technology to the best of their ability;
- (v) Considering that intra-European exchanges of technology are already promising, as is the joint production of sophisticated devices of European design, and that further progress can be made in this direction by exploiting new technology to the full ;
- (vi) Considering that the balance of technology exchange between member states and the United States favours the latter and results in a markedly unequal relationship within the Atlantic Alliance;
- (vii) Considering that it is essential not to confuse new technology, weapons systems and strategies but that on the contrary our countries should master new tactical concepts, any European effort in the field of emergent technology having to take account of the real possibilities of high technology co-operation and, as a first stage, of the possibilities offered by the existence of the Standing Armaments Committee for independent European thinking,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to prepare for it a study in the form of a review and proposals on the possibilities of co-operation between member countries in advanced technology for the development of future weaponry, this study, covering both research and the industrialisation of the products of such research, to include inter alia:
 - an analysis of the decision-taking structure and the budgetary facilities of each member country;
 - an analysis of means available and the possibilities of making optimum use of these means to protect innovative capabilities and ensure competitive production costs;
 - proposals on the direction the research and development policies of member countries should take to provide Western Europe with the industrial base necessary for components for future weaponry;
2. Invite the governments of member countries to encourage contacts between the responsible authorities in their industries with a view to promoting the establishment, as soon as possible, of a strong, co-ordinated European industry for advanced military technology meeting our defence requirements;
3. Invite the governments of member countries to give preference to the procurement, as and when necessary, of new weapons whose design and production are the fruit of co-operation between several member countries.

NINTH SITTING

Wednesday, 30th November 1983

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Economic relations with the Soviet Union (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 958 and amendment*).
 2. The Assembly of WEU and the North Atlantic Assembly
- Impact of the existence and work of the North Atlantic Assembly on relations between the WEU Assembly and national parliaments and on public awareness of the existence of WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 955*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Berchem, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Economic relations with the Soviet Union

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 958 and amendment)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Ahrens, Müller, Hardy, Cavaliere and Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. van der Werff, Benedikter, Galley, Dr. Miller, Mrs. Knight, MM. Lagorce and Unland.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur, and Mr. Michel, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Galley:

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (e).

Speakers: MM. Galley and Atkinson.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published at No. 401)¹.

4. The Assembly of WEU and the North Atlantic Assembly - Impact of the existence and work of the North Atlantic Assembly on relations between the WEU Assembly and national parliaments and on public awareness of the existence of WEU

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 955)

The report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Murphy, Tummers, Page and Enders.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly took note of the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

5. Date and time of the next sitting

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 1st December, at 9.30 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.10 p.m.

1. See page 37.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. Müller <i>Jäger</i> (Reddemann)	MM. <i>van der Werff</i> (Blaauw) Stoffelen Tummers
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts <i>De Bondt</i> (Bonnel) <i>Péciaux</i> (Dejardin)	Schulte Unland Vogt	
Mrs. Herman-Michielsens Mr. Michel Mrs. Staels-Dompas	Italy	United Kingdom
	MM. Bernini Cavaliere <i>Benedikter</i> (Fosson) <i>Fiandrotti</i> (Mondino) Valiante	Mr. Beith Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Cox <i>Atkinson</i> (Sir Anthony Grant) Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes Mr. <i>Stokes</i> (Mr. Jessel) Mrs. Knight Mr. McGuire Dr. Miller MM. <i>Murphy</i> (Sir John Osborn) Page Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith MM. <i>Garrett</i> (Urwin) <i>Corrie</i> (Wilkinson)
France	Luxembourg	
MM. Berrier Bourges Caro <i>Natiez</i> (Frêche) Lagorce <i>Galley</i> (Mayoud) Pignion	MM. Berchem Margue Thoss	
Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands	
MM. Ahrens Enders Hartmann <i>Gansel</i> (Linde)	Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (van den Bergh)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Gerstl Haase Hornhues Kittelmann Rumpf Schwarz Spies von Büllesheim	MM. Forma Foschi Mrs. Gherbez MM. Pecchioli Petrilli Rubbi Tripodi Vecchietti
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix Jeambrun Jung Ruet Sénès Valleix Wial-Massat Wilquin Wirth	Italy	Netherlands
Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Agrimi Antoni Bonalumi Della Briotta	MM. Aarts Scholten Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra
MM. Antretter Böhm		

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 401***on economic relations with the Soviet Union***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that for several decades the development of the Soviet economy has given priority to the armaments effort and that in many sectors these armaments now exceed those of the countries of the Atlantic Alliance;
- (ii) Considering that Soviet military power is being developed at the expense of the standard of living of the population and that it is helping to keep several countries in a state of dependence;
- (iii) Hoping that the opening or continuation of various international negotiations on the limitation of armaments will allow the Soviet Union to apply new guidelines for its economic development;
- (iv) Regretting that the members of the Atlantic Alliance have not managed to define a common code of conduct for their trade with the eastern countries or to apply sufficiently-concerted economic sanctions in response to instances of Soviet abuse of military power;
- (v) Noting that the shooting down by Soviet military aircraft of a South Korean civil aircraft together with its crew and passengers on 1st September 1983 is an unacceptable violation of international law;
- (vi) Considering the allegations that forced labour was used for the construction of the Siberian gas pipeline to Western Europe,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Promote consultations between all democratic countries with a view to working out jointly the limits they would accept to ensure that their trade with the eastern countries does not help those countries to accumulate armaments and inter alia:
 - (a) to ban all exports of advanced technology which might be used for armaments purposes;
 - (b) to avoid long-term contracts making western signatories economically dependent on eastern countries;
 - (c) to avoid undue promotion of Soviet resources at the expense of those of the West or the third world;
 - (d) to avoid granting over-favourable credit terms to the eastern countries and not to tolerate their incurring too great a burden of debts;
 - (e) to refuse the principle of countertrade;
2. Adapt these principles accordingly in the light of results obtained in international negotiations on the limitation of armaments;
3. Urge the preparation, in the framework of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, of new international air navigation regulations to make a repetition of an incident such as occurred on 1st September 1983 impossible;
4. Investigate and report on all evidence of forced labour used on the Siberian gas pipeline;
5. Request the international staff of the Standing Armaments Committee to assist within its competence in the preparation of reports of Assembly committees when these so request, and to extend such assistance to the collection of the necessary information;
6. To include in future annual reports :
 - (a) a statement of the levels of forces which the WEU countries make available to NATO, and of the French forces in Germany ;
 - (b) information as full as in reports for 1981 and earlier, on the production and procurement of armaments in member countries ;
 - (c) as far as possible the latest approved lists of chemical and biological weapons subject to control.

TENTH SITTING

Thursday, 1st December 1983

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>1. Africa's rôle in a European security policy - Chad (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 957</i>).</p> <p>2. Address by Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence.</p> <p>3. Africa's rôle in a European security policy - Chad (<i>Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs</i></p> | <p><i>Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 957</i>).</p> <p>4. Middle East crises and European security (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 965 and amendments</i>).</p> |
|---|---|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Africa's rôle in a European security policy - Chad

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 957)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Müller, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Caro, Cavaliere, Galley, Mrs. Gherbez, MM. Beix and Vogt.

The debate was closed.

4. Address by Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence

Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Hernu replied to questions put by MM. Müller, Caro, Lagorce, Blaauw and Beix.

5. Africa's rôle in a European security policy - Chad

(Replies to speakers and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 957)

Mr. Müller, Rapporteur, and Mr. Michel, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 402)¹.

6. Middle East crises and European security

(Reference back to committee of the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 965 and amendments)

Mr. Michel, Chairman of the Committee, moved that the report be referred back to committee.

Speaker: Lord Reay.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the reference back to committee.

The motion for reference back was agreed to and report of the General Affairs Committee was referred back to the committee.

7. Close of the session

The President declared the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly closed.

The sitting was closed at 12.17 p.m.

¹. See page 40.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Blaauw Stoffelen <i>Eysink</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra)
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts <i>Lagneau</i> (Bonnell) <i>Pécriaux</i> (Dejardin)	MM. Ahrens Kittelmann <i>Gansel</i> (Linde) Müller Unland Vogt	
Mrs. Herman-Michielsens Mr. Michel Mrs. Staels-Dompas		
	Italy	United Kingdom
France	MM. Cavaliere <i>Benedikter</i> (Fosson) Mrs. Gherbez	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) Sir Frederic Bennett MM. <i>Ward</i> (Sir Anthony Grant) Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes MM. <i>Stokes</i> (Jessel) <i>Howell</i> (Mrs. Knight) McGuire <i>Corrie</i> (Sir John Osborn) Lord <i>Newall</i> (Page) Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith Mr. <i>Murphy</i> (Wilkinson)
MM. Bassinet Beix Berrier Bourges Caro <i>Dreyfus-Schmidt</i> (Frêche) Jeambrun Lagorce <i>Galley</i> (Mayoud) Pignion Sénès <i>Huyghues des Étages</i> (Vial-Massat) Wilquin	Luxembourg MM. Berchem <i>Glesener</i> (Margue)	
	Netherlands Mr. Aarts Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (van den Bergh)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Schulte Schwarz Spies von Büllenheim	MM. Valiante Vecchietti
MM. Baumel Jung Ruet Valleix Wirth		Luxembourg Mr. Thoss
	Italy MM. Agrimi Antoni Bernini Bonalmi Della Briotta Forma Foschi Mondino Pecchioli Petrilli Rubbi Tripodi	Netherlands MM. Scholten Tummers
Federal Republic of Germany		United Kingdom Mr. Cox Dr. Miller Mr. Urwin
MM. Antretter Böhm Enders Gerstl Haase Hartmann Hornhues Reddemann Rumpf		

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 402***on Africa's rôle in a European security policy - Chad***

The Assembly,

- (i) Condemning the invasion of Chad by Libyan armed forces as a threat to peace in an area which is of particular interest to the Western European countries;
- (ii) Considering that Libya is far better armed than the states of Central and West Africa as a whole;
- (iii) Considering that France's sending a military force to Chad at the request of its government and with the approval of a large number of African states is likely to discourage Libyan intervention;
- (iv) Considering that the respect of internationally-recognised frontiers is essential for the maintenance of peace on the African continent;
- (v) Approving the measures taken by France at the request of the Government of Chad to help to restore peace in Chad;
- (vi) Considering that the WEU member countries cannot disregard the maintenance of peace in Africa or the redeployment of a member's armed forces;
- (vii) Regretting that no member invoked Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty to call for relevant consultations between the signatories,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that France's partners are kept informed of the political and military measures taken as a result of the invasion of Chad by Libya;
2. Express the solidarity of the member countries in regard to the measures taken by France in Chad;
3. Examine the possible political and military consequences of these measures;
4. Express its desire for the early restoration of unity, integrity and peace in Chad.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

FIFTH SITTING

Monday, 28th November 1983

SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Examination of credentials.
4. Tributes.
5. Address by the President of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 952).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Bohm, Mr. Caro, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Muller, Mr. Blaauw; (points of order): Mr. Page, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. John Morris.
7. Changes in the membership of committees.
8. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 959 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Wilkinson (*Rapporteur*).
9. Address by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO.
Replies by Mr. Luns to questions put by: Sir Frederic Bennett, Sir John Osborn, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Gansel, Mr. Caro, Dr. Miller, Mr. Rumpf.
10. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance (*Debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 959 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Sir Anthony Grant, Mr. Tummers, Mr. John Morris, Dr. Miller, Mr. Jäger, Mr. Garrett, Mr. McGuire, Mr. Bernini.
11. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

I declare resumed the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union, which was adjourned on Wednesday, 8th June 1983, at the end of the fourth sitting.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of the credentials of new representatives and substitutes appointed during the adjournment of the Assem-

bly whose names have been published in Notice No. 5.

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, those credentials are attested by a statement of ratification communicated to me by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, with the exception of certain members nominated since the meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. These are Mr. Bourges, Mr. Ruet and Mr. Wirth, representatives of France, Mr. Bohl, Mr. Croze, Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt, Mr. Matraja, Mr. Souvet and Mr. Verdon, substitute members for France and Mr. Gansel, substitute member for the Federal Republic of Germany.

It is now for the Assembly to examine their credentials in accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure.

The nominations have been made in due and proper form in accordance with our Rules of Procedure and have not been opposed.

If the Assembly is unanimous, we may proceed to ratification without prior reference to a Credentials Committee.

Is there any opposition?...

1. See page 15.

The President (continued)

These credentials are therefore agreed, subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

These representatives and substitutes are therefore admitted to take their seats in the Assembly of Western European Union.

I welcome our new colleagues.

4. Tributes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Since our last sitting we have learnt with great sadness of the death of two of our colleagues who were members of the French Delegation: Mr. René Jager, a member of our Assembly since 1978, and Mr. Georges Spénale, a member since 1980.

We also have to lament the passing of Mr. Jacques Westhof, Legal Adviser of WEU since 1965.

I offer the Assembly's condolences to the families of the deceased and to their national delegations and I suggest that we observe one minute's silence in their memory.

(The Assembly stood in silence)

5. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, since our last session many issues giving rise to uncertainty and questioning have built up on the international horizon.

The Geneva negotiations on intermediate nuclear weapons have been broken off unilaterally by the USSR. In view of the policy pursued by the Soviet Union since 1977, Western Europe has had no option but to continue its efforts to keep the peace while at the same time strengthening its own security. We must, however, recognise frankly that the powder keg now presents an ever greater threat. The West has demonstrated to the Russians the consistency of its policy, and it must now maintain this consistency while at the same time negotiating tirelessly to reduce the danger which threatens the whole of mankind.

President Kennedy, who was assassinated exactly twenty years ago, said that, while negotiations should not be dominated by fear, we should not be afraid to negotiate. A kind of national or, even worse, nationalistic *Ostpolitik* no longer makes any sense. What we have to create is a European *Ostpolitik*, and WEU can both provide the institutional basis for this and promote close consultation with our American allies.

At the Stockholm conference and when West European heads of government travel to the East, let us not appear with gaps in our ranks! WEU has now acquired a degree of experience which may be useful in Stockholm, and we should be mindful of the contribution which can be made to the methodology of controlled disarmament by a body as highly qualified in this field as the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

At the same time, there have been and still are moments of extremely serious tension, not only in the Near and Middle East, but also Africa and Central America.

In dismembered Lebanon, the soldiers of the multinational peacekeeping force are killed at daybreak – the victims of mindless terrorism. Let us turn our thoughts for a moment to the contingents which represent both the United States and three WEU member countries: France, which has just paid a heavy price for its part in maintaining security, Italy and the United Kingdom.

(The representatives stood and observed a minute's silence)

Let us not forget, however, that the Europeans' mission is one of peace, and must continue to be so. It follows that the activities of the European countries on the spot must be effectively co-ordinated so as to avoid misunderstandings, making appropriate use of WEU to that end and so that our countries may act as credible and accepted mediators.

In another instance, Libya has shown aggression in Chad, where France acted in the conviction that it was also defending the strategic interests of the member countries of WEU, although, in line with what has become a sorry custom, not one of those countries thought of calling for consultations between allies in implementation of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. In another context, consultations should have taken place between Europeans and Americans in connection with the Grenada issue, quite irrespective of the well-founded concern which prompted the latter to take action. And again, how can we overlook the conflict between Iraq and Iran which, in my view, may hold even greater threats for the stability of the region and for Europe's energy supplies.

Faced with this worrying state of affairs, Europe, still disunited and vulnerable, displays impotence and confusion. It was left to the Council of WEU, notwithstanding its well-known reticence, to salvage the honour of the paralysed European Community by its condemnation of the aggressive act which destroyed the South Korean Boeing on 3rd September. It may be noted in passing that this goes some way

The President (continued)

to confirming that it is WEU which brings together the members of the European Community truly involved in the military defence of Europe. That said, we can only express general disappointment at the deadlocks reached by the European institutions created in the fifties and at the part played by the heads of European countries in squandering a great heritage of collective values and political will.

In pursuit of its tasks, the sole European assembly competent in defence matters, the Assembly of WEU, is kept informed by excellent reports of all the challenges to Europe presented by non-European industrialised countries, by the oil-producing countries and by the developing countries, including the scientific and technological challenge of the year 2000, which Mr. Bassinet has admirably described in the study presented to us.

I would have liked to dwell at greater length on the conflicts which surround us and on the lessons to be drawn from them regarding the rôle which WEU should be called upon to play as it approaches its thirtieth anniversary. I would have wished to pass on to you many other thoughts indicative of a personal commitment which goes well beyond the set term of the high office which you have entrusted to me, so great is my conviction that our Assembly now has a mission of capital importance to fulfil in reinforcing Europe's will to defend itself and the identity of a Western Europe faced by a mounting tide of neutralist pacifism and an immense need to educate a worried public.

However, we have to keep a sense of priority and, at a time when the effectiveness and influence of our Assembly, to which our governments are continually paying lip service, are threatened by an attack on its budget, I should be failing in an elementary duty if I did not tell you what is liable to happen.

On 26th September last, our Committee on Budgetary Affairs, whose action under its Chairman, Sir Dudley Smith, I applaud, unanimously approved a very reasonable draft budget in full awareness of the fact that, despite the dynamism of its parliamentary institution, WEU was still unbeloved of governments, or, to take up a journalistic point which has since been amply confirmed "the Cinderella of European institutions". This draft budget was subsequently adopted by the Presidential Committee and transmitted to the Council, which has to give its unanimous approval to our "permitted" budget. I would remind you that this budget succeeds admirably in balancing the need for economy, of which we are all aware as we do not live on another planet, against the continued effectiveness of our

Assembly in a tense world situation where it is without substitute.

Leaving aside the sums allocated to pensions, this budget of administrative expenditure for 1984 represents an increase of only 6.8% over that for 1983. As French inflation is liable to exceed this figure, that actually amounts to a reduction of the operating budget. The Assembly should really have been the recipient of the Council's congratulations, instead of which, owing to internal differences, the Council has been unable to reach a decision. Put plainly, that means that our budget is not acceptable to all members of the Council.

Ladies and Gentlemen, as you have knowledge and political insight enough, I will say no more than that this amounts to a procedure, to which you as parliamentarians, irrespective of delegation and political grouping, could not lend your name.

So that, next Wednesday, the Assembly can express its view in full knowledge of the facts, it is necessary that the President – without lowering himself to the quibbling in which our allocated budget has led a number of governments to engage – should briefly turn to this matter, which, though petty in view of the paltry sums involved, is of capital importance politically to the future of our mission and represents a real test of our will to assert a minimal degree of autonomy and dignity.

The draft budget unanimously adopted by our competent committee and ratified by the Presidential Committee incorporates a number of proposals, including the following: the maintenance of two Grade A.6 posts in the establishment of the Office at the Clerk; the regrading of a Grade B.3 post to Grade B.4; the transformation into a permanent post of a temporary Grade A.3 post approved by the Council for one year.

I would remind the Assembly that, the post of Clerk Assistant having been abolished, the Council agreed in 1981 at the instigation of my predecessor, Mr. Mulley, who took the Assembly's interests very much to heart, to allocate two Grade A.6 posts to the establishment of the Office of the Clerk. The holders of these posts, nominated by the Clerk in order of seniority, are required to assume increased responsibilities under the Clerk in order to make up for the present lack of a Clerk Assistant. Unfortunately, my dear colleagues, the quibbling now even involves the number of typewriters needed!

I will not go into detail. We have formulated our proposals in the draft budget, and we consider these vital to the proper functioning of the Assembly. Looked at from a more general standpoint, I repeat that we are all agreed on zero growth in budget expenditure.

The President (continued)

All our proposals are in line with this concept with the proviso that pensions, which have nothing to do with the functioning of the Assembly in this context, are excluded. Otherwise, to take the extreme case, the absurd situation might arise of a budget covering the whole range of pensions but not the operation of the Assembly.

But we are concerned here with the pattern to be established for the future. The Assembly will know what is to be done. I suggest that the Assembly should approve this reasonable budget pending the conclusions of the reports dealing with the future of WEU, which will be submitted to the Assembly by its various committees during the session marking its thirtieth anniversary in June next year.

I am not therefore one of those who, using the budget as a tool, wish to reduce WEU to silence. The reports which I have written on the subject prove the contrary, and I ask that, if savings have to be considered, the thrust should be directed towards other institutions and should spare the Assembly of WEU, whose secretariat has happily proved an exception to Parkinson's Law. It is in this context that I declare my solidarity with the European Parliament in the battle being waged around the Community budget.

I do not wish to get involved in any kind of war between European institutions by drawing comparisons between our staff establishment and that of the European Parliament. I wish merely to point out that the moment has now arrived when we must put to the test our governments' real commitment to Europe, whose future and whose rôle must not be allowed to be diminished in the present international situation and on the eve of the European Council meeting in Athens by the quarrels of shopkeepers who blame the common institutions when they are no longer able to make a profit over the counters of their petty national concerns. We need to keep a sense of proportion, a sense of the ridiculous even, as an element in our democratic make-up when faced with an insistence on savings which seem derisory as compared with the very real wastage which still occurs on the national and international economic scene. On this occasion, before we begin to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of WEU, we must all demonstrate which side we are on; and to our governments I put the question: which side are they on in this matter?

For my part, I am on the side of WEU, its Assembly and European union, and, after this necessary but painful intermission and faced with the perils which threaten and the mission which awaits, I call upon you to resume the course of our work in the service of Europe and peace. (*Applause*)

6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session

(Doc. 952)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session, Document 952.

I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – On behalf of the Liberal Group in WEU, I propose that we change the draft order of business so that the first subject for debate on Thursday is the report on Middle East crises and European security, with, in the afternoon, the subject being Africa's rôle in European security policy. We feel that that order of business would be more convenient for the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Blaauw suggests that Lord Reay's report be put down for Thursday morning at 10 o'clock and Mr. Müller's report on the problem of Chad and Africa for the afternoon of the same day.

I call Mr. Böhm.

Mr. BÖHM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I oppose this amendment. Mr. Müller, the author of this report, would not be available in the afternoon. He in fact asked me to make this clear in case an amendment like this should be tabled.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to ask a question, but I do not know if I am in order.

The draft order of business before us lists an address by Mr. Hernu, Minister of Defence of the French Republic, for Thursday, 1st December, followed by a debate on Chad. Would we not be showing some disregard for this interesting juxtaposition if we were either to require the Minister to alter his programme or to conduct the debate in his absence?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Caro, I remind you that the statement by the Minister, Mr. Hernu, is to be general in character and not linked to any particular debate. It can therefore remain in its allotted position in our draft order of business.

I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – It is not for me to say, but would it not help towards a solution if – on the assumption that there are no committee meetings fixed for the beginning of Thursday morning – the session began at

Mr. Jessel (continued)

9 a.m.? Might it not then be possible to complete everything before lunch?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I take your point. I think it really would be more sensible to start the Thursday morning sitting at 9.30 instead of 10 a.m.

Does the Assembly agree with Mr. Blaauw's proposal and with Mr. Jessel's suggestion that the time set for the first sitting on Thursday, 1st December, should be changed?

Mr. DREYFUS-SCHMIDT (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as this is the first time that I have attended this Assembly, I ask that I may be excused for speaking so soon.

However, I find it difficult to understand how the Assembly could express its views on Chad with a proper knowledge of the facts before hearing the French Minister of Defence, who might give us some interesting information on this very subject. It seems entirely reasonable that the debate should follow the address rather than precede it.

I would add that the committee has not yet examined Lord Reay's report on Middle East crises and European security in its entirety, or anything like it, and it strikes me as reasonable that it should be allowed a little more time to discuss the report thoroughly.

In other words, I oppose the suggestion that the order of two debates be reversed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Be that as it may, as far as the report on Chad is concerned, it must be borne in mind that the Assembly, irrespective of any statement which might be made by any minister of a member country of our union is already in possession of sufficient information to present a report.

In the course of his address, the Minister, Mr. Hernu, may well provide additional matter for our parliamentarians to think about, but you must of course remember that it is planned to continue the debate on Chad after the Minister has spoken.

Does the Assembly agree with the proposal to reverse the orders of the day and with the suggestion that the sitting on Thursday, 1st December, should be opened at 9.30 a.m.?

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – If I have understood correctly, Mr. President, you wish the two proposals to be voted on together. I think that it would be better to take separate votes.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I agree, Mr. Cavaliere. I thought that the second pro-

posal was not essential, but you were right to draw attention to the Rules of Procedure. I therefore ask you to vote on the first proposal, which is the one tabled by Mr. Müller, for an amendment of the orders of the day.

I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The amendment was not tabled by me, Mr. President. On the contrary, I should like to leave the agenda as it is. I shall not be here on Thursday afternoon. The report would therefore have to be debated in my absence since I have made my arrangements on the assumption that it will be debated on Thursday morning.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Blaauw, do you wish to reconsider your proposal?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I agree that we should start half an hour earlier. We should start with Mr. Müller's report. There is no connection with the speech of Mr. Hernu, because it could be argued that it was vital to have his speech after the discussion on Middle East affairs. However, I understand the problem of my colleague, Mr. Müller, and I shall come to his aid because he cannot physically be present. I was not informed of that, so I give your compromise, Mr. President, my full support, and think that it is only right for the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – After this short debate which has thrown some light on the ideas of Assembly members, I would propose, with the agreement of Mr. Cavaliere, that the draft order of business should stand on the understanding that the Thursday morning sitting will start at 9.30 a.m.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

I now put to the vote the draft order of business, as amended.

The draft order of business, as amended, is adopted.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – I apologise for intervening, Mr. President, but I was expecting you to announce a possible change in tomorrow's order of business. We are all keen to listen to Mr. Luns this afternoon, and we hope that there is some chance of the debate on Mr. Wilkinson's report continuing until tomorrow morning. Is that possible?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The vote has already been taken and we cannot revert to the draft order of business. In the light of the debate to follow Mr. Luns's address, we shall see if we have time to continue or if it has to be deferred until tomorrow. I hope you will leave this decision to the President's judgment.

The President (continued)

As the orders of the day for this part of the session are particularly full, I propose, in accordance with Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, to limit the time allowed for speakers, other than committee chairmen and rapporteurs, to five minutes in all debates.

I remind you that, under the same rule, the Assembly has to vote on this proposal without debate.

The proposal is accepted.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President, I apologise for intervening, but there is some confusion. We have voted for the order of business and I have no wish to go back on that: it has all been settled and agreed. However, on behalf of the group of which I have the honour to be Chairman, I received a direct message to the effect that the debate on Mr. Wilkinson's report could continue until tomorrow morning. I understood that that was possible as the number of speakers is limited by your reception tonight, Mr. President, and that we could vote on it tomorrow as well.

My colleague, Mr. Page, mentioned the matter. It does not involve a change in the agenda and means only that it will take a little longer. I received a message this morning and understood that the debate could not be expected to be completed today and would be continued with the vote, tomorrow. That information came from the Clerk. With respect, I do not think that Mr. Page was trying to alter the Assembly's decision. He was merely trying to clarify it, and I should like you to do that, too.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I fully understand your realistic approach, Sir Frederic.

The number of speakers is such that we shall have to defer the vote until tomorrow morning, but you should also understand that, not having been formally advised by the Assembly of this point concerning a change in the order of the day, I cannot put it to the vote.

Mr. Morris.

Mr. John MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). – I was not sure from your reply, Mr. President, to Sir Frederic Bennett, whether the vote on Mr. Wilkinson's report was to be taken today or tomorrow morning. It is an important report, and I think that it would be unrealistic – given the many speakers involved – to expect a vote tonight. With respect, I did not understand from your reply to my colleague what you were indicating. It was far from clear.

Secondly, given the importance of the report, I beg to draw to your attention the fact that in

the interpretation that I heard it was said first that speeches other than those of the proposers and the Chairman would be limited to fifteen minutes, and a few seconds afterwards that they would be limited to five minutes. It is an important vote. I should like to know which limit is correct. I ask leave to press the point that it is not possible to do justice to such an important subject in a mere five minutes. Something much more realistic should be proposed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – My dear sir, I would remind you and the other members of the Assembly that the agenda is very full, and I think I have explained myself clearly enough on this point. Consequently, we should push ahead. I repeat that the time allowed each speaker will be limited to five minutes.

I am not responsible for the interpretation. I do not know what your colleagues understood, or on what understanding they cast their votes. I am responsible for what I say, not for what others understand.

As far as the continuation of the debate is concerned, a proposal by the Federated Christian Democrat Group has just been brought to my attention. I was not formally aware of this before, but I am convinced that Sir Frederic's point is very close to the truth and that, in all probability, the vote will be deferred until tomorrow morning.

7. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We now have to consider the changes in the membership of committees.

The Assembly has to decide on the changes in the membership of committees requested by the British and French Delegations.

These changes have been published in Notice No. 5 which has been distributed.

They are subject to ratification by the Assembly in accordance with Rule 39 (6) and Rule 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure.

Is there any objection to these ratifications?

The changes are agreed to.

8. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 959 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and

The President (continued)

Armaments on European security and burden-sharing in the alliance, Document 959 and amendments. I remind the meeting that we shall interrupt the debate at 4 p.m. to hear Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – It is a great honour to present this report on European security and burden-sharing in the alliance on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. It is the culmination of almost a year's work, thanks to the decision of the Assembly in June to refer back my original report to the committee. Having interrupted my general election campaign just two days before the poll to introduce personally my previous report on burden-sharing and to reply to the debate, I found that the referral back was not exactly welcome. However, I am sure now, with the benefit of hindsight, that the Assembly was wise. I am pleased that it has happened and at having the opportunity of two bites at the same cherry.

The report has been strengthened considerably in the intervening five months, not least by a fuller analysis of the INF talks in Geneva, a greatly strengthened Section V on the European pillar of the alliance and a much more detailed breakdown in Section VII on the forces of WEU countries. Above all, this expanded report deals with burden-sharing in the context of European security.

Therefore, the report is not an abstract academic study of burden-sharing alone but a practical assessment of the current military security of Western Europe and the contributions made by the countries of the alliance towards it. Without doubt the European members of the alliance contributed a much higher proportion of NATO's total budget in the early 1980s than in the early 1970s. In the aftermath of the Vietnam war, the American contribution went proportionately steadily down, whereas that of the European members went up. However, the accession of President Reagan to office in 1980 stimulated a major increase in American spending on defence, a trend that had its first impetus following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the abortive United States mission to rescue the American hostages from the United States embassy in Teheran in 1980.

In this decade, the 1980s, whereas the United States has consistently exceeded the 3% per annum increase in defence expenditure in real terms, which is the NATO target, no other NATO nation has done so regularly, although SACEUR himself, in this very chamber, made it clear that an increase of no less than 4% per

annum in real terms was necessary if NATO was to construct a wholly credible conventional defence.

At current levels of spending there is no doubt that, in the event of a massive Warsaw Pact conventional attack in Europe, NATO would soon be faced with a stark and awesome demand from its military commanders to escalate the conflict by initiating nuclear retaliation, as there is little likelihood that the western alliance's line of forward defence would hold for long. However, that is not as unwelcome to governments as it might appear at first. Dependence on tactical nuclear weapons to the present extent permits savings in manpower and material and thus reduces cost. It also enhances nuclear deterrence. Whether that is so popular with the people of the NATO nations is another matter. It is certainly not a full strategy of flexible response as I understand it.

However, it would be misleading to consider the effectiveness of NATO's defence in input terms alone. The 3% target of budgetary increase per year in real terms was selected by NATO as a yardstick for political convenience rather than as a precise measure of the annual military improvements required within the alliance. Whereas NATO's long-term defence improvement programme is agreed by all the nations and is reasonably secure, the same cannot be said for the national inputs. The geographic, economic, social, industrial, historical and political situations in the various NATO countries differ so markedly that, whereas we may state the 3% target relatively easily, it is difficult to analyse precisely the value in terms of military capability that each country derives from its military spending. It is also difficult to judge objectively what a reasonable contribution should be for each member country.

For example, with their independent strategic nuclear deterrents, the United Kingdom and France are in a special position. So are the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom with all regular forces. So, perhaps, is West Germany with its major programmes of host nation support and of financial aid for poorer NATO countries such as Turkey and Portugal.

However, there are certain basic principles that we can enunciate with confidence and that are applicable throughout NATO. They are the lowest common denominators of defence capacity within the alliance. First, the 3% target should not be lightly ignored, certainly not while the Soviet military build-up continues – it most certainly continues at present.

Default on that target by some NATO nations increases the importance of adherence to it by the others – not, as some governments would have us believe, the contrary. Likewise, once

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

nations have agreed the biennial force goals, they should stick to them.

Secondly, the alliance must augment its combat sustainability. The lesson of modern wars, as in the Middle East and the Falklands, is that we must expect the consumption of munitions, stocks and supplies to be very intensive. The destruction of equipment and casualties among personnel are likely to be severe. There is a desperate need on the part of NATO for war stocks of consumables to be expanded and for larger reserve forces to be built up.

As the Warsaw Pact has the advantage of shorter interior lines of communications whereas most of NATO's reinforcements and resupplies would come from across the Atlantic, a sufficiency of in-place war stocks adequate to last at least thirty days of intensive combat, plus well trained and swiftly mobilised reserve forces of all three services, are vital. In this connection I mention particularly adequate air reserves. We should learn by the Israeli example, especially as regards the high loss rate of close support aircraft to surface-to-air guided weapons in the 1973 Sinai campaign. The attrition rate in North-West Europe could be even worse.

Of course West European democracies have the population, the industrial and technical base, together with economic resources, to create for themselves a formidable defence capability. A secure defence for Europe is completely practicable whereas a wholly European defence is not. The ultimate credibility of our defence in this continent is assured by the stationing of 300,000 United States troops in Europe and by the United States nuclear guarantee. However, the demands of our electorates for higher living standards and improved social welfare programmes pre-empt resources for defence in a way unknown behind the iron curtain, where demands of the military have top priority in national budgets. Furthermore, the unholy alliance of the KGB and the military, with the emergence of Mr. Andropov to power and, of course, his subsequent disappearance from public view since September, have heightened our anxiety about the character and future policies of the Soviet leadership. As a result of the emphasis that the Soviets place on military spending, the NATO in-place forces on the central front are out-numbered two to one by the Warsaw Pact, which also has a large numerical superiority in tanks, artillery and combat aircraft. In terms of quality of equipment, furthermore, NATO has a less clear advantage than in the past. This preponderance of military power on the part of the Soviet Union can be offset only by superior NATO firepower and technically more advanced and capable NATO weapons systems.

Fortunately, the technologically superior and more innovative free enterprise western economic system gives NATO a material advantage over the Warsaw Pact of crucial significance. It is an advantage that must not be put at risk by ill-judged high technology transfers to Warsaw Pact countries or by over-generous financial credits that enable the USSR and its satellites to increase their military potential.

Above all, we must set clear goals for exploiting the West's technological advantages to the full. A high priority should be to develop weapons systems that will offset the Soviet's prime advantage, which is in manpower and armour. For this NATO needs to improve its capability to interdict the battlefield and to strike at the Warsaw Pact's follow-on forces. Many Europeans suspect that the well-publicised advocacy of such doctrines of follow-on force interdiction by SHAPE and NATO merely serve the interests of the United States military-industrial complex, which, in the view of certain sceptical Europeans, stands to gain most from the procurement within the alliance of new weapons systems. However, it is crucial to emphasise the paramount need not just in this one area but right across the board for genuine progress towards the establishment of an equitable, balanced, Atlantic-wide market in armaments. It certainly does not exist today.

West Europe has an adverse trade balance in defence equipment of some six to one overall with the United States. The Glenn-Nunn-Roth amendment of May 1982 on NATO's industrial co-operation is an admirable legislative initiative but in practice we know that the economic recession has strengthened protectionist pressures upon governments on both sides of the Atlantic to buy national equipment whereas a more economical course might be collaborative procurement or purchase from the Americans.

When we are considering arms collaboration, a concomitant, if not a prerequisite, for that Atlantic-wide arms partnership is, of course, for the alliance to make the best use of all its limited financial resources for defence. To do this we in Europe must start by improving our co-operation here. Raising the nuclear threshold, which is the objective of these follow-on force doctrines, is a worthy objective, and certainly worthier than the motives behind some protectionist pressures, although by no means all.

Lastly, because our forces in NATO are numerically inferior to those of the Warsaw Pact and because, since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Soviet challenge has become global, we must respond to it and have forces that are more flexible, more mobile, more combat-ready and, above all, more versatile. Budgetary constraints as well as the global nature of the Soviet challenge put a premium on flexibility within NATO. In

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

other words, we should concentrate less on holding ground and more on the positive need of being able to concentrate decisive forces rapidly at the critical point to defeat the potential aggressor.

The decision of France to expand its three-division *force d'action rapide* to no fewer than five divisions is a step in the right direction, as in a small way is the British decision to make 5 Infantry Brigade a fully air-portable force. Not only does SACEUR's mobile force need to be expanded but, as recent events in Lebanon, the Falklands and Chad have shown, there is a continuing rôle for European intervention forces outside the NATO area, reluctant as many of us in Europe are to see that. I recognise that some European countries, such as West Germany, by reason of their constitution would concentrate totally on the NATO rôle and compensate for the redeployment of United States forces out-of-area. It is the European members of NATO who are more dependent on trade, overseas sources of raw materials and markets than their American counterparts and yet we seem to be less prepared than them to assure our overseas interests.

It is notable that there are areas around the world where, for reasons of history, geography and experience, the Europeans have more influence and more scope for effective action than the United States. It was a remarkable development when President Reagan himself withdrew his AWACS and F-15 aircraft from the Sudan during the Chad crisis because, he declared, Chad was a French sphere of influence. Undoubtedly, French military intervention has since then successfully stabilised the situation and prevented a Libyan takeover of the whole country.

Often, a small European force in a potentially sensitive strategic area such as Belize or Djibouti has influenced the stability and security out of all proportion to its numbers, as the British and French garrisons have demonstrated in these small, newly-independent states in strife-torn Central America and the embattled Horn of Africa respectively.

If our United States friends are not to feel that West European members of NATO are free-riding, we must at the very least provide staging facilities to assist the United States in out-of-area operations and be prepared to compensate from our own military resources for the troops and matériel that they may have to deploy away from Western Europe to fulfil their global rôle.

An operation, for example, to keep open the Strait of Hormuz would clearly be in West European security and economic interests and well

worth the diversion of United States resources from Western Europe to achieve.

However, out-of-area operations, as was shown by the intervention of the United States Marine Corps and 82nd Airborne Division in Grenada, at the behest of the Governor-General and the local democracies, can precipitate marked differences of view within the alliance. That episode showed the paramount need for the closest prior consultation.

I mentioned earlier the United States nuclear guarantee, which is the ultimate assurance of our security and freedom here in Europe. The fact that NATO is now modernising its intermediate-range nuclear forces with the deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing IIs, in spite of Soviet blandishments and bullying, is evidence that the member countries of WEU are not prepared to be intimidated or enticed by the USSR into neglecting their vital security interests. Their common resolve is admirable and should be a matter of self-congratulation here today.

The principle of the balance of power as a foundation for national security is particularly important in this nuclear age. We should not allow ourselves – nor will we – to be bullied into a position of inferiority in which we could be blackmailed either into surrendering without a shot being fired or cajoled by *force majeure* into the Soviet sphere of influence.

The USSR has been accorded a six-year lead in the modernisation of its own INF, a period during which NATO deployed no new theatre nuclear weapons until this month. In that period, we consistently demonstrated our willingness to negotiate away the INF missiles, East and West, provided that the appropriate safeguards could be agreed with the USSR. By walking out of the Geneva talks when the deadline for NATO INF deployment was reached, the Soviet Union has shown that it is determined to preserve nuclear superiority for itself and not prepared to share our principles, which are of verification and balance. Furthermore, the USSR has decided to heighten tension by its decision to deploy SS-21s, SS-22s and SS-23s in Eastern Europe and the new submarine-launched ballistic missile systems.

Those unwelcome developments, which were the culmination of a long period of Soviet military build-up and came at a time of uncertainty in the Soviet leadership, make the close cohesion of our alliance imperative – and we need that cohesion at a European level, too.

The WEU nations provide the inner core of Europe's defence. Our own organisation, as the sole European assembly with a treaty responsibility for defence, has a key rôle to play. Britain and France are nuclear powers in their own right. Britain and the other WEU countries are

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

accessories to the NATO twin-track decision of 12th December 1979.

I would support Mr. Mauroy, the French Prime Minister, when he calls our Assembly a "privileged forum for reflection" but WEU has a Ministerial Council, a Standing Armaments Committee, and an Agency for the Control of Armaments as well. It is therefore more than just a talking shop. Its rôle is especially important when the pacifist and unilateralist movements in Europe have been seeking to create an irresistible tide of public opinion which would force our governments to respond to the Soviet challenge of SS-20 missiles targeted against us with one-sided nuclear disarmament. The strict mutual defence guarantee, the Brussels Treaty, also heightens the United States' nuclear guarantee.

To their credit, the electorates of the WEU countries in Italy, West Germany and the United Kingdom rejected the unilateralist option. I am proud and pleased that my country, along with Italy and West Germany, is now deploying intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

We have in WEU a privileged and special position. We are even more privileged than members of the European Parliament, whom we greatly welcome here today. We are privileged because, as members of our national parliaments, we vote our defence budgets, we question our ministers, we sit on our national defence committees. It is that interrelationship between policy formulation for defence at a national level, and at a European level, here at WEU, that makes our Assembly so useful.

I am sure that the debate that we shall have on this report will be one of the liveliest in our history. We are especially privileged, pleased and proud to have the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Luns, to address us today, because few people have contributed so much as he in his long and distinguished career both to the construction of Europe and to the security of our continent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Mr. Wilkinson for your excellent report, which will serve as an introduction to any debate on the address to be given by Mr. Luns, concerning which you have anticipated some remarks which I wanted to make myself.

9. Address by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, the presence here of Mr. Luns is especially important to our Assembly in view of

the rôle which he has played in recent years in the Atlantic Alliance, his outstanding personality and his very special commitment to the cause of democracy and the West, which it is also our mission to defend.

Mr. Luns, I have very great pleasure, shared I am sure by every member of the Assembly, in inviting you to take the floor. (*Applause*)

Mr. LUNS (*Secretary-General of NATO*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should first of all like to thank the President for his kind welcome, and also Mr. Wilkinson, whose highly flattering words I much appreciate. Actually, they were too flattering, but I was nonetheless delighted to hear them!

(The speaker continued in English)

It is not easy for me to make a forceful statement following the report from Mr. Wilkinson because not only was it excellent – and I listened to it with the greatest interest – but it is difficult to criticise any part of it. It will be read with interest in NATO circles and it will not fail to be referred to at our NATO Council meeting on Wednesday when we talk to the ambassadors, and we shall advise them to study it, the more so when we remember that a number of members of NATO are not members of WEU. Towards the end of my remarks I shall make some more general comments. I am minded to do so as Mr. Wilkinson made some general comments in his statement.

Burden-sharing in Europe is a highly complex matter, as Mr. Wilkinson pointed out. It is frequently emotive and partly subjective. There is no mechanical formula to be devised to produce a fair determination of the burden. Although selective criteria are sometimes used, they fail to reflect both the complexity of the alliance and the relationship inherent in membership. Therefore any formula may be divisive, even damaging. Nevertheless, so long as NATO has existed the burden-sharing problem has been with us.

As Mr. Wilkinson pointed out, the United States has made a study of this problem, and the results are available to Congress. However, we continue to hear complaints about how Europe is shouldering an unfair share of the common defence burden. Therefore, I repeat that it is useful for everyone – those inside and outside WEU – to have had such a thorough and balanced statement from Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. Wilkinson's statement is to be warmly welcomed, especially the emphasis he placed on the danger of using early and rapid quantitative indicators such as defence expenditure as a share of GNP. Many hidden factors must be given due acknowledgment, and I remind members of the Assembly of some of them.

Mr. Luns (continued)

Western Europe contributes enormously to the civil infrastructure of the alliance, and this must be taken into account in the way in which it is reflected in the burden-sharing formula. The Federal Republic of Germany makes available to United States forces stationed in Europe real estate valued at about DM 40 billion, and DM 1 billion must be paid annually for rent and taxes. That contribution is an important factor in the burden-sharing process. The rising value of the dollar in exchange rate terms has placed an extra burden on the allies, which pay in dollars for substantial procurement from the United States, including, of course, fuel imports.

Most of the European allies rely heavily for their military manpower on conscripts. If their pay were at United States rates, that sum would be appreciably increased in terms of the funds contributed by Europe for burden-sharing. Although the recruits receive some salaries – more in some countries than in others – it is a considerable burden overall.

I hope that I have made it clear that to make comparisons on this issue is not easy, and this transatlantic problem – and I stress that it is transatlantic – will not disappear, even after Mr. Wilkinson's excellent report. Like the poor, the problem will always be with us.

Another point well brought out in the report is a difference in the allied perception of these issues and the best way to manage them, and here I come to one of the major problems now facing the countries of the alliance, especially in Europe. It is a sad reflection to note that too often the United States and Soviet Union are put on the same level, as if they could be compared in terms of ideology, politics and other activities of government. That is most unfair to the United States because they cannot be so compared. The forty-eight members of the Commonwealth now meeting in India make the same appeals to the United States as they make to the Soviet Union. I repeat, it is not fair to do that and it irks the United States Government and public opinion in that country when it is done. I speak, of course, about the military side.

Economic relations are a case in point. Some criticism of the United States might be levelled on the pipeline dispute. That issue has faded away and I think that the United States perhaps exaggerated its importance. In all, it will meet about 5% of its needs. That is all that the pipeline will provide, although a disturbing factor about the pipeline is that a large number of dollars will be channelled to the Soviet Union and help to alleviate its financial difficulties. As I say, however, the problem of the pipeline has faded away.

Europeans have a good case to make on the burden-sharing issue. As the report states, those countries are now meeting about 48% of the agreed burden. Put in another, more dramatic, way, if war broke out tomorrow, Europeans would provide about 90% of the land forces and 75% of the air and naval forces available. I say "available" because if the war dragged on – as it certainly would – the full might of the United States would make itself felt. But in the first instance Europe would have to bear the main burden.

These facts must be put across to opinion-formers in the United States because there has been too little traffic in that direction, just as there has been too little traffic in transatlantic East-West talk.

Much must be done to make this a two-way street. I am sure that in Washington, as elsewhere, there is now a somewhat greater awareness of the absolute need to establish this two-way traffic.

Arms co-operation is being considered more favourably, especially by the United States Government. Indeed, Secretary Weinberger seems to be convinced that it should be given high priority. There are more than enough examples of where a two-way street would be most useful to the alliance and to the Americans.

The tripartite minesweeper programme unites France, the Netherlands and Belgium. As a result, fifteen MCM ships will be built in France, fifteen in the Netherlands and, in due course, ten in Belgium. The ships are modern and involve a new concept in shipbuilding. They are made of some sort of plastic and will be far cheaper than if they had been built in the United States of America. There must now be a programme for new MCM ships.

Representatives should consider how some countries in the alliance have heavy trade deficits with the United States of America. Indeed, the Netherlands is America's most important client by far. Last year, the trade surplus was about \$6.4 billion. Many countries are in more or less the same position and we could redress the situation by placing more orders with, for example, the Netherlands. We are not asking for forty minesweepers to be built in the Netherlands, Belgium and France, but it would be a good idea for a couple to be built in those countries, thus alleviating the high cost of their defence budgets.

Burden-sharing may become more of an issue as the allies adopt unilateral measures in order to alleviate their defence requirements. There has just been an enlightened discussion in the NATO Council about infrastructure. The sum involved amounts to perhaps 2.5% of the whole budget of alliance countries. However, it is

Mr. Luns (continued)

extremely difficult to make enough funds available to carry out the programmes that have been agreed. In order to continue more or less as we are, without a new programme, we need about \$2.6 billion to be shared by all members of the alliance. The military authorities have asked for about \$4 billion for high-priority subjects. Some of the alliance countries are unwilling to go beyond \$1.8 billion. That greatly worries the military commanders.

An electronic warfare programme unit was built with infrastructure money and it took years longer to complete than originally envisaged. It is a magnificent new device. I would give a thorough explanation, but the subject is highly technical and I cannot repeat a word of what I heard.

However, I am satisfied that it represents a useful and necessary step forward. The second part of the programme still has to be agreed, but it is a good omen that the first part has been agreed.

Out-of-area contingencies are mentioned in the report. I think that we all agree that the defence of NATO must always be given the highest priority. I would be critical of any plans to extend the territory governed by NATO or to make NATO assume different responsibilities. If we were to do that, we should have to increase our defence budget considerably, which is out of the question. Alternatively, we should have to weaken Europe's defence, which would be extremely dangerous. Countries responsible for problems outside the area should handle them. In any analysis of America's position we cannot escape the conclusion that its foreign policy after the war has led to a diminution in the responsibilities of the European countries. They are now responsible for next to nothing outside Europe. Indeed, I pay tribute to the United States of America. It has succeeded in creating an efficient arm that can make itself felt outside the NATO area without having to appeal to NATO forces.

We tend not to count our own successes. For example, last year and this year the rapid deployment force was deployed with the active participation of Egypt, the Sudan, Somalia and Oman. Hundreds of American paratroopers were dropped in Oman, having come via Egypt. The armed forces of America, Egypt and the Sudan were active in co-operation. Representatives should reflect on the situation in Egypt and in the Gulf some years ago. The change is like imagining that the Soviet Union had held manoeuvres in Morocco with the active participation of Syria and Libya, and with hundreds of Russians dropping over Morocco: we should feel very dismayed.

The United States of America has made great strides towards fulfilling its obligations. However, there is another aspect of the issue that merits some thought. If the Soviet Union went for the oil in the Gulf, the United States would resist that. The United States would have to use its military power. The Soviet Union might then either reply with military action where it hurts – in the Atlantic Ocean – or on America's territory. However, at once fifty more countries would be its enemy. Alternatively, Russia would have to fight with one arm tied behind its back. The United States would then be free to strike wherever it thought most effective, such as at Murmansk.

There will be a dilemma about proper cohesion and making the most rational use of existing resources. European countries have a duty to perform in that respect.

The United States might be engaged in a conflict, perhaps with the assistance of some of its allies, for example, France and the United Kingdom. If the United States had withdrawn some of its forces in Europe, as Mr. Wilkinson said, the other allies would have to make their facilities available to compensate the United States for forces diverted from Europe. Fortunately, that is not an immediate interest, but it might come to that.

Burden-sharing cannot be completely divorced from risk-sharing. The INF talks are welcome, but they are not directly related to burden-sharing. The deployment of United States nuclear weapons on European territory has shown European willingness to share the nuclear risk while at the same time benefiting from the nuclear umbrella.

This problem has been widely discussed in Europe in the past few months. Sovietism has been a dismal failure in most sectors of human activity: in all respects – liberty of the individual, freedom of the press, the impartiality of judges and the well-being of the population – there has been a failure. However, in three sectors there has been a success – first, in defence as we all know; secondly, in propaganda; finally, in the activities of the secret services. Some people say that without the excellent KGB the Soviet Union would not be such a powerful régime. It is a fact that the Soviet Union has been successful in keeping the lid on its population.

The propaganda offensive of the Soviet Union has been felt noticeably in the great movement against the deployment of INF missiles in some European countries. If one thinks about the origins of that campaign, one cannot fail to point a finger at President Carter. It all started with the neutron shell. The American President decided to lay before the NATO Council a ques-

Mr. Luns (continued)

tion that it was not competent to judge – whether the United States should produce that weapon. I felt it my duty to point out to the American President that every country of the alliance had an absolute right to decide, with no interference from other countries, what weapons it deemed necessary for its defence, and that it was not for the NATO Council to give permission for the United States to produce the neutron shell.

Therefore, the guidance given to defence ministers when NATO debated the matter was that the United States was not asking permission to produce the weapon. It asked merely for the opinion of NATO countries. The consequence was that the United States was perfectly at liberty to produce that weapon even if all the other countries were against it. In fact, all the other countries expressed their support for the neutron shell.

Then started the movement in Western European countries against the neutron shell. When the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Helmut Schmidt, told the United States Government that Germany was prepared to accept the neutron shell, suddenly the United States President cancelled the whole programme. There was laid the foundation of the strong feelings about the INF. Suddenly, countries such as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada and Portugal had the impression that they somehow had a small share of the responsibility for the nuclear deterrent. Before that they had left it to the United States.

Then, the Soviet Union, which feared and still fears that battlefield weapon, was strongly against it. It encouraged protests in Europe. There has now been a decision to withdraw 572 missiles from our arsenals in Western Europe and to put in 572 new missiles. The only difference is that the new missiles can reach the Soviet Union and that is its problem.

Public opinion has given too little weight to NATO's decision in 1979 to withdraw 1,000 missiles from Western Europe. That was followed a month ago by the decision to withdraw a further 1,400 weapons from our arsenals in Western Europe. Although military leaders had some misgivings about the security of NATO, they said that they could just live with it. The decision was taken and will be implemented. It means that 2,400 missiles will be withdrawn plus the 572 that are to be replaced by the new modernised missiles now beginning to trickle into Europe.

Like Mr. Wilkinson, I compliment the British Government and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. I pay tri-

bute to the positive decision that they took, notwithstanding the extreme pressure that they faced from vociferous groups. Italy especially deserves a compliment. A decision was taken on 19th December 1979, but some weeks before the Italian Government informed the allies that, whatever the outcome of the debate in the NATO Council, Italy was prepared to deploy the weapons. That was an encouraging and heartening gesture. Successive Italian Governments have stood firm.

Of course, we should also pay a compliment to the French President. During his state visit to Belgium, I heard him say at a special dinner in Brussels: "I am very much against Euromissiles – they are very bad weapons – but we should remember that they are all in the Soviet Union, whereas the peace movement is in Western Europe." That point was not received with great gratitude by the Belgian socialists.

The credibility of our deterrent was jeopardised, and that was a dangerous development. The maintenance of world peace depends on the credibility of the deterrent nuclear forces of the United States and, in a small way, those of Great Britain and France. Nuclear war is such a terrible thing and such a frightful prospect that all countries – certainly the Soviet Union and the United States – know that such a war cannot be won. President Reagan said that very strongly in Washington about ten days ago.

The Soviet Union knows it, too. It knows that it cannot be defeated by armies or air forces but that it can be defeated by nuclear weapons. The "dissuasion aspect" – to use a French term – is based on credibility. The SS-20 has lowered the threshold of credibility. That weapon has a range of 5,000 km, and contains three pre-targeted warheads, each more destructive than the bomb which fell on Hiroshima or Nagasaki. The alliance has no weapon to counter that threat.

People will say that, after all, the United States has its strategic component, but does anyone really think that the Kremlin would readily believe that the United States would use those frightful strategic arms against Soviet territory in order to protect Europe against attack by SS-20s – with the certainty of a frightful reply against the United States within thirty minutes?

The effect of these strategic arms would be terrible beyond words. The bomb dropped on Hiroshima weighed 4,000 kg but the fissionable material in it was only a couple of grammes. A megaton is 1,000 million tonnes of TNT. If a one-megaton bomb were dropped on Manhattan, there would be a fire column nearly three miles high, with a heat comparable with that of the sun. A dreadful firestorm would destroy the whole of Manhattan and the suburbs of

Mr. Luns (continued)

New York. Then there would be the fallout, not to mention the explosive power of the device.

Therefore, I repeat: the Kremlin might well believe that the United States would not use the dreadful weapons that it possesses against the Soviet Union because of the certainty of a frightful response.

Moreover, the strategic arsenal of the United States is targeted against military installations in the Soviet Union, whereas the Soviet strategic arms are targeted on the inhabited centres, the big cities, of the United States. We have established credibility by our decision to deploy weapons which are far less powerful than the SS-20 but which can reach western Russia, and of which there are sufficient if necessary for a second strike.

Therefore, I am not too pessimistic. I am, rather, heartened by events in Europe over the last week, because we have thereby secured a credible deterrent. So long as a deterrent is credible, especially of course in Soviet eyes, we may be confident that peace will be preserved.

The peace movement plays on the fears of the population. It is always talking about a nuclear war. Nobody – not the President of the United States, not the Commander-in-Chief in Europe, not the governments of the alliance, not the experts in these matters – knows whether nuclear devices would be used in time of war. I have my own ideas about it, but nobody knows. That is because the aim of the nuclear arsenal is to preserve the peace – and for nearly thirty-five years we have succeeded.

It is interesting to note that the same people who now protest against the alliance's deployment of 572 missiles were fond of saying, when the Soviet Union was building up its nuclear forces: "The Soviet Union must have the option of these weapons because it cannot do nothing under the threat of American nuclear weaponry." They defended the Soviet Union then. I maintain that if NATO had made an SS-20-type weapon and deployed it in Europe, those who now protest against NATO deploying modernised weapons in Europe would say that the Soviet Union was right to modernise its arsenal to counter the frightful threat by the alliance. In other words, with some people you cannot win.

I have gone a little wider than this excellent report in order to give some of my own ideas on the present state of the defences of the alliance, with the emphasis on the nuclear deterrent. I shall be pleased to reply to any questions. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Mr. Secretary-General for your extremely full and comprehensive review.

Several members of this Assembly wish to ask you questions, and I thank you in anticipation for replying to them.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – As always, I listened enthralled to Mr. Joseph Luns, who is not only a valued colleague but a very old friend. I know that I speak for everyone present when I say that the defence and security of free Europe will be the poorer when he finally decides that he must relinquish his onerous responsibilities.

Those members who know "Pilgrim's Progress" will understand the dedication of a small book that I wrote to "the Dr. Standfast of our times" in the person of Joseph. No one in this room, whatever his political inclination, would disagree with that as an apt description of Mr. Luns in his battles to maintain certain principles throughout his tenure of office as Secretary-General.

I should like to ask a specific question. Since the arrival of the first missiles in Britain after an overwhelming parliamentary majority in favour, followed by the Italians and the Germans, the Russian counter-threat, although they already have the advantage of one thousand intermediate warheads over none, is to propose to put either some of the thousand, or possibly new, weapons nearer our border in Czechoslovakia or East Prussia. I do not see how that makes the situation any worse from our point of view, because there are about one thousand warheads capable of being deployed against Western Europe, each one capable of reaching the west coast of Ireland or beyond. Each of those weapons has a capability twelve times that of the Hiroshima bomb. Since there is already gross overkill capacity with these 1,000 bombs, how has the situation become more frightening for any of us because of the Soviet counter-threat which was made a few days ago?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Luns.

Mr. LUNS (*Secretary-General of NATO*). – First, let me thank Sir Frederic Bennett for his kind words. If he had not said so, members would know by now that he is an old friend of mine.

I agree with his answer to his own question. We are not nervous about the Soviet Union deploying these weapons in the countries of its allies, because there are already thousands of them in those countries. They have also got more than enough missiles and submarines to reach the United States. The new Soviet sub-

Mr. Luns (continued)

marines, which are about ten miles outside the harbour of Murmansk, can reach both San Francisco and Tokyo. Therefore my reply is as Sir Frederic Bennett anticipated.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – All of us value the contribution that Mr. Luns has made as Secretary-General over the years. He has given us all great confidence. The total commitment is not quite the same as the total NATO commitment in the European context. I welcome his observation that in the event of a war 75% of the land forces – I think the figures are correct – would be of European origin. Mr. Wilkinson stated that the United States accounts for 40% of the total manpower and 62% of expenditure. The problem is that all western governments have undertaken more public expenditure than their taxpayers are prepared to finance. In the United States the budget deficiency is no exception to that generalisation. Is not the challenge still that the American taxpayer is paying too much by way of taxation for the defence of Europe, whether nuclear or conventional?

Bearing in mind Mr. Wilkinson's excellent report, may I ask what has been the measure of the improvement in the years that Mr. Luns has been Secretary-General? What in his view is the measure of improvement for which we can hope? I share his view that what the United States has done is not sufficiently appreciated in Europe. What can Western European Union do about that?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Luns.

Mr. LUNS (*Secretary-General of NATO*). – I agree that the countries of the alliance should be appreciative of what the United States has done, is doing and will do for the defence of Europe. Of course the United States Government is defending its own country but it is a far-sighted policy that allows a country so far from Europe to maintain 320,000 troops in Europe so long after the last war, thereby ensuring that, whatever happens, America will at once be involved in any conflict. The presence of these troops is also a guarantee that peace can be maintained.

Unlike the Nazi leaders, the Soviets do not consider war as something that would steel the population, make them more virile and all the nonsense that the Nazis believed. The Soviet Union is not keen on war. Only if all the cards are for them and only if they are assured of a quick victory will they go to war. They might make a mistake and might get into a war without

realising what they are doing. They know that it is not important whether they win the first, the third, the fifth or even the seventh battle but that they must win the last battle, because by then the immense industrial capacity and might of the United States will have come into play. In that respect they have learnt the lessons of the last war.

I was asked for my judgment of the improvement of the allied military position in Europe in the twelve years that I have had the honour of serving the alliance. Allied armies, navies and air forces are much stronger than they were twelve years ago but, unfortunately, as is always the case when talking about the risk of war, the gap between our resources and those of the Soviets has increased. We have about 14,500 main battle tanks in Europe. In 1972 the Soviet Union had 14,300 main battle tanks in Europe; now it has about 45,000. The same sort of figures apply to nearly all the components of modern warfare.

When one listens to people advocating peace one gets the impression that they consider conventional conflict as being like a tournament in the middle ages. It is not. Conventional war is terrible to envisage. In the last war there were 51 million victims. In another war there would be more. People forget that more people were killed by the conventional bombing of Dresden than at Hiroshima. One British battalion has more firepower than a whole division in the last war. Conventional war is frightful.

The number of Soviet troops near the iron curtain in the middle of Europe is only 20% of what it would be if there were no nuclear deterrent. That means that the warning time for the alliance is longer, and warning times are all-important. My worry is that the countries of the alliance will not profit from the warning time and that there will be a tendency not to mobilise and take special measures lest the crisis worsen. The necessary measures must be taken in time.

I agree with General Rogers that our conventional position is still marginal enough to fulfil its task so that the reinforcements can come into Europe in time. It will be touch and go, but let us remember, as I said during my speech, that so long as we have a credible nuclear deterrent we should not fear a new conflict.

It is a constant worry for Commander-in-Chief Rogers that countries accept goals and then do not meet them. Many times when as Defence Secretary I had the honour to be a member of the Netherlands Government I asked in the Council of Ministers: "Is it really necessary, Prime Minister, to add another \$1 billion to the agriculture budget?" The reply would be: "However much one may regret it, that was decided last week in Brussels, and we must carry

Mr. Luns (continued)

out that decision." Not so in the defence sector, and that is one of the weaknesses in defence affairs.

At the time when all our budgets were blossoming – were almost going out of control – the defence budgets only crept upwards. A fallacy one often hears about our conventional armaments – indeed, about arms generally – is that we are conducting an arms race. We are not, because there is no arms race. If it were a race, it would be a race of tortoises, often with them walking backwards.

The countries of Europe that are members of the alliance spend only about a half on defence of what they were spending twenty-five years ago, expressed as a percentage of the gross national product. In real terms, our defence expenditure always crept up a little, but, because the GNP increased so greatly, it appeared to rise faster. In fact, the burden of defence that we are bearing has not become greater. That is not because we are spending so much on the social sector. For example, of the Netherlands total budget, 51% of GNP, \$145 billion, is spent on that sector while less than \$5 billion goes on defence. That cannot be described as an unbearable burden.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I should like to take this opportunity to put a question to the Secretary-General in his own language. My question follows on from the one asked by Sir Frederic Bennett and concerns the deployment of the SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23. The SS-20 problem and the INF talks are not the only important factors here: the decision taken during the talks in Montebello to reduce the NATO arsenal by 1,400 nuclear weapons must also be borne in mind. This decision has again been played down by the press on the grounds that these are old weapons but at least there are 1,400 of them. On the other hand, we have the unparalleled modernisation of the SS-20. If these weapons are deployed in the Soviet Union's satellite countries, Western Europe will also be within range. What must NATO do, in the Secretary-General's opinion?

In the Dutch parliament a motion has been adopted by a large majority calling on NATO to open early negotiations on a reduction in such strategic weapons as the SS-20. What, in the Secretary-General's view, is the likelihood of this happening, and what action can we expect NATO to take?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Luns.

Mr. LUNS (*Secretary-General of NATO*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I believe I am allowed to speak in Dutch. This is a rare opportunity. On the one hand, new weapons are dangerous. On the other, we can reach almost all the Warsaw Pact countries with our tactical weapons, so whether a few are added or taken away does not matter a great deal. We are in a position to respond. As long as that is so and as long as we have a second-strike capability, it is not such a problem. Nevertheless, agreement on these weapons is desirable.

Firstly, we have nothing to offer – the 572 cruise missiles are intended for other purposes – and secondly, there is absolutely no sign of the Soviet Union being prepared to discuss them. We do not even know whether it is prepared to continue the talks in Geneva since the latest statement by Mr. Andropov, who does not appear to be in the best of health. It is doubtful that the Soviet Union will return to Geneva. If it does not, that will certainly prove that it never wanted an agreement. All it wanted was an agreement which would prevent even one modernised weapon from being deployed by the alliance.

In short, I am not worried.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – Mr. Luns said many extraordinary things. There are many questions I should like to put to Mr. Luns but, as this is my first time in this Assembly, I shall restrict myself to one. In defending the deployment of middle-range Pershing II and cruise missiles, Mr. Luns said that only camels could believe that the United States would risk a Soviet nuclear attack on American cities within thirty minutes by keeping its nuclear umbrella over Western Europe in case the Soviet Union should threaten Western Europe only with middle-range SS-20 missiles.

Have we, you and me, all been camels when the United States withdrew its middle-range missiles in 1962-63 from Western Europe and Turkey and accepted that the Soviet Union should keep more than 650 middle-range SS-4 and SS-5 missiles over all these years?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Luns.

Mr. LUNS (*Secretary-General of NATO*). – Mr. Gansel must remember that the weapons about which he is speaking were deployed in Europe and could be replied to. The policy of the alliance is to have as few weapons as are acceptable in the nuclear sphere. There is no question of piling up nuclear weapons on our side. As for talk of removing obsolete weapons, nuclear weapons remain very unpleasant even when, say, ten years old.

Mr. Luns (continued)

Although I agree that our position in Europe is not enviable, Mr. Gansel may have forgotten that Mr. Khrushchev proposed to NATO the taking out of 200,000 first-line Soviet troops from Europe if only America would not deploy nuclear battlefield weapons in Europe. We had to refuse that offer because it was a guarantee of conflict. I am not saying that all possibilities of conflict have now been eliminated. In times of conflict there must be some uncertainty. That is one reason why we cannot say that NATO will never use nuclear weapons first. Uncertainty must be maintained in the Kremlin. The use of such weapons is a political decision that we shall not forgo.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, my question is addressed to the Secretary-General of NATO, who is also a great European, and it bears on very recent events in that it relates especially to the latest political discussions between the President of the French Republic and the Federal German Chancellor.

The concept of European defence seems to be gaining ground, and the fact is that this Assembly in which we are now deliberating was created in the aftermath of the disheartening failure of the European Defence Community. Burden-sharing involves not merely an annual 3% increase in the defence budget but also the shouldering of our own responsibilities.

Mr. Secretary-General, could you give us your views on a possible change of government political attitudes to Europe, so that we may be able to establish, within the Atlantic Alliance, a European bulwark to match the real facts of today's world?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Luns.

Mr. LUNS (*Secretary-General of NATO*) (Translation). – First of all, I can confirm that it was the decision to unite of the six European members of WEU which led to the creation of NATO. In Washington, the determination shown by the six European nations in establishing a military union, however weak, against possible attack, made such an impression that, during the following weeks, telephone messages were passed to Europe to the effect that America was considering how it could be associated with that decision. This was the beginning of NATO, and it represents a great service rendered by WEU to the cause of European defence.

Sir, you talk of European defence, but I fear that we cannot defend ourselves without American support, and that will continue to be the case

for a long time to come. One sometimes wonders why many countries of Europe whose national product is higher than that of the Soviet Union – more than twice as high in fact – and exceeds that of the United States, countries whose reserves of gold and hard currencies are greater, whose merchant navies and industrial structures are more highly developed and whose populations are larger, are unable to defend themselves as one might wish against a threat which is plain enough to all.

The Soviet Union devotes a far larger proportion of its income to defence, so that its population, compared with that of Europe, has far fewer material advantages. There is no doubt that our priorities have changed. I have already referred to our expenditure on welfare and I should be the last to advocate that this policy should be changed. That would be impossible, and the underlying principle is no longer in question. Nonetheless, expenditure on welfare services in European countries represents seven to eight times military spending, as compared with approximately three times in the United States. I repeat, that is a big difference.

America is quite certain that its defence depends on that of Europe, and we can rely on America to act. But I am in no way opposed to greater European unity in the field of defence or to closer co-operation. And I am certainly not against approaches made to America by certain countries acting individually or by member countries of the European alliance. At the moment, however, it seems to me that a purely European defence would be very difficult to achieve. Incidentally, I note that you did not say that, Mr. Caro.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to put a question that puzzles and troubles me. If the objective of the western alliance is to build up a parity of nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union so that we can deter a Russian attack, surely that implies that it was merely good luck that prevented the Soviet Union from delivering such an attack when it had superiority in nuclear weapons. Apparently, we are now determined to correct that superiority.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Luns.

Mr. LUNS (*Secretary-General of NATO*). – We are not striving for equality. There are now 360 weapons in position, each with three warheads, and there are 1,100 such devices. In addition the Soviet Union would not be very keen about starting a war with nuclear weapons as it might turn into an all-out holocaust.

The Soviet Union's aim is to break the link between the United States and Europe. That is

Mr. Luns (continued)

its aim in not allowing even one American medium-range nuclear weapon in Europe. I have said that a nuclear war cannot be won. However, if one party does not want to, or cannot, defend itself, there is a danger of a war that might degenerate into nuclear conflict.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rumpf.

Mr. RUMPF (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I should like to ask the Secretary-General a question concerning the growing insistence by the Soviet Union, towards the end of the negotiations in Geneva, on the inclusion of French and British weapons systems. Do you think this is likely to form a basis for future negotiations, and do you think that the Soviet Union might one day call on the Americans to include not only these systems but also Chinese missiles, because of course they too are a threat to the Soviet Union?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Luns.

Mr. LUNS (*Secretary-General of NATO*) (Translation). – Anything can happen, Mr. Rumpf. I would not exclude the possibility of the Soviet Union suddenly saying: the Chinese have missiles too, and they should be counted as well, even though China is not, of course, a member of the alliance.

Firstly, the French and British nuclear weapons are strategic weapons. Secondly, they are not NATO weapons. Their sole purpose is to defend those countries. Thirdly, if negotiations on all strategic weapons take place in the future, it is not impossible that French and British weapons might be included. But that is a decision for the two governments.

That is really all I can say.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In winding up this debate, I wish to express to you, Mr. Secretary-General, our deep appreciation of your presence here and of the consideration you have shown us. I thank you again for the mastery which you have displayed in your high office and, on behalf of us all, I wish you well in your future undertakings.

Mr. LUNS (*Secretary-General of NATO*) (Translation). – Thank you Mr. President.

10. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance

(Debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 959 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We now come to the debate on the report on European security and burden-sharing in the alliance, after

which a vote will be taken on the draft recommendation and the draft resolution.

I call Sir Anthony Grant, the first speaker on the list.

Sir Anthony GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – All of us in the chamber can rejoice that, thanks to NATO, we have all enjoyed peace for many years. We can be grateful that the guardian of NATO has been so robust and determined a defender of freedom as our great friend Mr. Joseph Luns. I am happy to say that when he spoke it was one of the rare occasions on which a distinguished speaker commanded my absolute support and agreement.

I return to the debate. Mr. Wilkinson should be congratulated on his excellent report. Two days before we faced a general election in Britain, he took the trouble to present the report here for the first time. Those of us who know the rigours of an election in Britain will appreciate his outstanding efforts in that respect.

I support all the recommendations that Mr. Wilkinson made with the exception of paragraph (ii) of the preamble. The phrase “Noting the existence of the independent nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom” is feeble in the extreme. Surely we should welcome the independent nuclear forces burden that is borne by France and the United Kingdom. Do we not appreciate the responsibility of those two countries in defending the freedom of Western Europe? If so, why can we not say so instead of using a feeble word such as “noting”?

The important theme behind the report, to which I want to address my remarks, is a better understanding between the United States and Europe, for which the report calls. I am entitled to make a contribution as in absolute terms Britain spends more on defence than any European ally. We are second only to the United States among the major allies. However, there is a need for a better understanding between the two sides. There is a need for a better understanding of defence because defence issues are all too often wrapped up in too much mumbo-jumbo of technical terms and initials. Simpler themes are necessary to explain the issues to people on either side of the Atlantic.

There are two simple themes. The simpler is the freedom for which we fought world war two. That freedom has to be continually defended by the best means possible. As Edmund Burke, a famous British parliamentarian, said, “The price of liberty is eternal vigilance.” Secondly, the fact that we have been determined to do so has preserved peace in Europe for some thirty-eight years.

The obscurity of and misunderstandings about those simple defence themes caused the recent

Sir Anthony Grant (continued)

re-emergence of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and various peace movements throughout Europe. That has created the impression of hostility to the United States, which has encouraged dangerous ambition in the Kremlin. It could encourage an equally dangerous mood of isolationism in the United States of America. The report wisely warns against that.

The CND and the peace movements are made up in part of sincere pacifists whose honesty I respect, even if I do not agree with them. They are also made up of humbugs, either those whose political affiliations lie in the Marxist underworld, of which no one knows more than Mr. Joseph Luns, or those who cannot or will not see the appalling dangers that unilateral nuclear disarmament poses to the freedom and peace of the world. There is also hypocrisy in those movements. They heap all blame and odium on the United States and never erupt into protest when the Warsaw Pact builds up a preponderance of offensive weapons, as it did in 1977 with the deployment of the SS-20 missiles and earlier in 1957 when the West abandoned chemical weapons but the Soviets proceeded to build up a huge arsenal.

In those circumstances, CND and the peace movements were absolutely silent. It is only when the West seeks to redress the balance that they take noisy action. They recently became vociferous about cruise and Pershing missiles. I am particularly interested in that. In Greenham Common there have been protests, as well as in Molesworth, which is next door to my constituency. Cruise missiles are being deployed there. Every speech that I and others made in the general election contained references to defence. The British people decided overwhelmingly that the proper course was to deploy cruise missiles.

Subsequently, there have been overwhelming parliamentary votes in favour – in the British parliament, in the West German parliament, and, Mr. President, in your parliament in Italy. The minority have misled the world into believing that cruise missiles are being foisted on Europe, when the truth is that Europe asked for them.

Our view must be expressed in the United States, but the United States' view should also be expressed in Europe. We can do this best by concentrating on what unites us and not on what divides us. What unites us is not a detestation of the Russian people themselves but a hatred of the Communist-Marxist tyranny wherever it shows itself, and our determination to preserve peace and freedom and enhance the sanctity and dignity of the individual. It is because these

proposals show the way to that goal that I hope that they will receive the overwhelming support of this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I did not wish to interrupt you, Sir Anthony, but I would ask the other speakers to keep strictly to the time allowed, as there are several more speakers to hear before the end of the sitting.

I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this is a curious report for our Assembly. In order to anticipate the criticisms that many of my colleagues will be voicing later, I shall confine myself to a few preliminary comments.

The report cannot be amended, in my opinion: it needs to be completely restructured. I shall try to demonstrate that, in particular, the thrust of the report is not in the political spirit of Western European Union and that it cannot therefore be accepted here. This thrust is evident from the Rapporteur's technocratic enthusiasm for armaments, from his lack of reservation about nuclear weapons and his optimism regarding the economic importance of arms production.

The emphasis is thus on maintaining and developing the military capacity of the various countries, the objective set out in Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. What is the problem? The political context of this treaty is completely different from the context in which the treaty that brings us together here was concluded a year earlier, the treaty that refers to what is worth defending in Europe, that opposes the growth of militarism and that seeks to construct a secure and united Europe with a peaceful future: the Brussels Treaty, the foundation of this Assembly.

I therefore doubt whether paragraph 2.1 is correct. The treaty concluded in 1948 provided for economic, social and cultural collaboration among the member states and was specifically designed to meet any aggression from the initiators of the second world war. What Mr. Wilkinson is doing is to "NATOise" this treaty.

The Assembly must not allow this. Seen from this angle, it may be understandable that Mr. Wilkinson is a believer in the political spirit that underlies the report, but this spirit must not be the inspiration of the work of WEU.

The dangers inherent in the "NATOisation" of this Assembly are apparent from Mr. Wilkinson's report and especially in the views he expresses in Section IV, the transatlantic debate, and Section VI, which discusses defence production. Colleagues of mine will be taking a closer look at the content of these sections of the

Mr. Tummers (continued)

report. At this early stage of the debate, Mr. President, I would refer to the political context of the WEU treaty that governs this Assembly. A desultory attitude to the letter and spirit of this treaty means a desultory attitude to peace and security. How can we talk about sharing the defence burden, without referring to the budgetary problems at present faced by each of the allies? How can we accept the proposition that defence production is important, when we can see that military spending is the result of normal Keynesian impulses, which do not guarantee to produce the same effect on employment as if they had occurred in the civilian sector? The impulse towards military spending is already being internally curbed, because it entails an excessive waste of resources. Mr. Wilkinson does not say anything about this. This spending is diametrically opposed to the political spirit of WEU and the Brussels Treaty, which refers to a firm basis for the European economy and was concluded to create this firm economic basis plus adequate social facilities.

Mr. President, as I have already said, a few amendments will not be enough to alter the direction of this report. I reject it. I ask you, Mr. President, to ensure that we here do not confuse the political spirit of WEU and NATO. I also ask you, Mr. President, to ensure that the clear division of responsibilities for self-defence (NATO) and security (WEU), militarisation (NATO) and anti-militarisation (WEU), arms build-up (NATO) and arms control (WEU), deterrence (NATO) and non-military resistance (WEU), and armaments budgets and socio-cultural budgets is maintained as set out in the various treaties. The spirit of Mr. Wilkinson's report is not the spirit of WEU.

I would warn once again against the "NATOisation" of the WEU treaty which is geared more closely to what is worth shielding than to the independent shield upheld by NATO. Mr. Wilkinson must not therefore allow himself to be misled by the demagogic percentages quoted by Mr. Luns because, if we are comparing these percentages, we shall, of course, have to ascertain whether this spending is achieving the objective we have set ourselves.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Morris.

Mr. John MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). - As a socialist, and although I am opposed to the broad thrust of the report, I yield to no one in the fundamental importance that I attach to the defence of Europe. When I was re-elected to the British parliament, I made clear my support for NATO. Whatever differences there may be within the British labour movement, they are

insignificant beside our general support for NATO. We believe in the importance of European defence; we believe that we should be capable of defending ordinary people. In no way can one minimise today's dangers to our system of democracy - dangers which have increased and are increasing.

I share the anxiety of those who fear nuclear weapons. That is why I believe that we should negotiate - and negotiate multilaterally - to reduce their number and the danger that they represent. As a British defence minister more than ten years ago, what I feared most of all were the hundreds, if not thousands, of tactical nuclear weapons littered all over Europe. The real dangers today - pleased though I am at the proposed reduction in numbers - are, first, the inadequacy of conventional weapons; secondly, and because of that, the increased danger of the use of technical nuclear weapons; thirdly, and following from that, the horrific danger of escalation to the use of strategic nuclear weapons.

That is why I fear that, in a time of crisis, there would be a paralysis of political control, however well built the procedures. Indeed, there is considerable danger to Western European defence from those who want simultaneously to abolish nuclear weapons and to reduce conventional weapons. This is where I fear that the report in its broad thrust has gone wrong. The title refers to European security and also to burden-sharing. It is good on burden-sharing but very poor on European security because European security must mean a substantial element of disarmament and therefore a greater dependence on conventional weapons. That is why I rebut the call for continued spending on the NATO target to increase defence without particularising in what area that spending should be. Indeed, the British Government have recognised that they cannot go on indefinitely over the years meeting the target. Therefore the report is wrong in failing to differentiate between spending on nuclear and on conventional weapons.

Secondly, endorsement is sought for the old warhorse of operations outside NATO. It will not do. There are very limited circumstances where we should be concerned with operations outside NATO. Wholesale endorsement here is completely wrong.

Thirdly, Pershing and cruise are being deployed. SS-20s continue to be deployed, I am told, at the rate of one per week. This is a continuing and worsening tragedy. History will tell us why cruise is coming; we need not go into that now. My view is that it will not increase our safety; it will endanger us. In the same way, I fear the continued siting by the Soviets of SS-20s. Two blacks do not make a white.

Mr. John Morris (continued)

The threat of cruise has failed to deter the SS-20s. One is there and the other is being deployed. Therefore, because of the failure of the deterrent, the time has come to rethink the whole matter. I regret deeply that the Soviets have walked out of Geneva. I believe there were public relations reasons, but they failed to persuade western democracies of the dangers of the deployment of cruise.

The tragedy is that at Geneva the two superpowers were negotiating European security without European participation. I hope that some kind of conference will be resumed on nuclear weapons because he who is at the receiving end, whether of a tactical nuclear weapon or of a strategic one, and whether it be American, Soviet, British or French, suffers the same fate; he may have had a glorious past but he will have an indefinite future.

I ask the Assembly to reject the report. While it is good on nuts and bolts, it is badly phrased and arranged with the wrong emphasis on the need to continue the thrust for European security, to lower tension and to lower the dependence on nuclear weapons, while at the same time ensuring that we are pledged to maintain European security and the defence of our people.

(Mr. Pignion, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to congratulate the Rapporteur on the report. It shows an enormous degree of dedication and hard work and is full of information. I hope it is completely accurate because its information is of value when we are discussing this important subject here or in other forums. However, I did not agree with the report. I join my colleague Mr. John Morris in saying clearly that my support of NATO is as good as that of anyone. I would defy anyone to say that I am not concerned about our ability to defend ourselves.

This is a hawkish report, which reflects a policy of despair. In the report, Mr. Wilkinson says that the Soviet challenge is global. The challenge of the United States and the western allies is also global. I question the basis of what we consider it necessary to build up – namely, more and more arms. I am concerned particularly about the build-up of nuclear arms. In many parts of the report there is an implication that there should be a greater build-up of arms. The report has other serious inadequacies. For example, on three occasions it mentions the steps which should be taken to ensure military

action outside the NATO area. That requires much thought and should not be embarked upon without full consideration.

The Secretary-General of NATO told us that in his view the system in the Soviet Union had completely failed to have an impact on its citizens and on the world in general. It has not been a complete failure, but it has failed compared with what has been achieved for the welfare and material standards of people in western countries. He indicated that there were three areas in which the Soviet Union was excellent, if not better than we were. I agree with him that the efficiency of the Soviet Union in providing for its citizens in the way the West has done has been grossly inadequate. I would categorise the Soviet Union as a vast bureaucratic and inefficient organisation, but that brings with it fears on the part of the Soviets. The Soviet leaders have an obvious inferiority complex. They are afraid of the West and of the greater technological ability which is much more widely spread in western countries than in the Soviet Union. While one does not agree with the Soviet leaders' reasons for their fears, one must understand them.

In paragraph 5.2 of the report, there is a reference to a speech made by Lord Carrington. He said:

“Do not let us overlook the size of existing nuclear forces in the West, not to speak of their accuracy... We must know ourselves when enough is enough.”

Later he said:

“We must make absolutely clear our belief that arms control is in everybody's self-interest, not only economically but in terms of real security.”

That is all I am asking for. I ask that that thought be taken seriously by us in the Assembly. If we had put as much effort into trying to secure peace as we have put into building up nuclear arms, we might by now have been successful in assuring our security and making war impossible to countenance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jäger.

Mr. JÄGER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to begin by thanking the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Mr. Wilkinson, for his excellent and comprehensive report. In addition to dealing with the question of burden-sharing in the alliance, this report has become a compendium on European security and defence questions, which is well worth reading by anyone interested in this subject. I congratulate Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. Jäger (continued)

Unlike Mr. Tummers, I would say that the report complies with the spirit of the Brussels Treaty, which is not one of submission but one of peace in freedom.

It is appropriate that, following the national parliaments of the NATO countries, the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union should be discussing the fundamental questions of the preservation of peace in freedom in our continent. After all, as the report rightly points out, we are the only parliamentary assembly in Europe primarily concerned with matters of defence and security.

Much of this report is certainly virtually beyond dispute. I should therefore like to make a few comments on paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation, which is quite definitely politically controversial, as the statements of previous speakers have shown. In essence, it assumes as a matter of course that if the negotiations between the United States and the USSR on a verifiable arms control agreement on intermediate-range nuclear weapons are unsuccessful, the decisions taken by the alliance on 12th December 1979 concerning the deployment of missiles will be implemented.

The United States and the Soviet leadership will only regard Europe's peace and security policy as credible and predictable if all the members of the alliance deploy these missiles. Only if free Europe remains a reliable, predictable ally, will it continue to be a force for security and thus for peace in the world.

No one should be impressed by the Kremlin's present withdrawal from the Geneva negotiating table or by the enormous propaganda campaign with which its media and their disseminators are inundating our countries and peoples. Even in 1979 the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, threatened that there would be no negotiations on intermediate-range weapons at all if the NATO dual-track decision was signed in Brussels.

When the Soviet leaders then realised that it would in fact be useful for them to participate in such negotiations, they did so without the slightest embarrassment, trusting in the shortness of people's memories in today's fast-moving world.

They will do the same again, even if the alliance progressively deploys the new weapons as scheduled to meet the monstrous threat of the Soviet SS-20 missiles. Personally I would even go so far as to say that the Soviet leaders are more likely to be prepared to compromise at new negotiations, having realised that their propaganda and the pressure of pacifist mass rallies have failed to intimidate Western Europeans or

to divert them from pursuing a consistent peace policy.

This Assembly's most valuable contribution to peace for our peoples would be steadfastly to maintain Western European Union's clear line by saying "Yes" to loyalty to the alliance and to the decisions signed in Brussels in 1979 by christian democrat, conservative, liberal and socialist heads of European governments and "Yes" to increased defence efforts by all the alliance partners.

As a christian democrat I therefore recommend you to approve Mr. Wilkinson's report. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Garrett.

Mr. GARRETT (*United Kingdom*). - I congratulate my United Kingdom colleague, Mr. John Morris, on his excellent speech. His experience at the British Ministry of Defence shows that he has not forgotten some of the important lessons that a successful minister of defence must learn if the problems that we are debating today are to be understood.

I was disappointed to hear Mr. Luns endorse - indeed welcome - the report, which has taken a year to compile. I regret to say that during that time my United Kingdom colleague, Mr. John Wilkinson, a fine man, has been seduced in certain items of the report by the overwhelming pro-American attitude to some of the issues facing us, the citizens of Europe.

The recommendations in the report are belligerent in tone. Can phrases such as "raising the nuclear threshold" give joy or encouragement to the multilateralists in approaching the issues that are facing mankind? It is the type of report that will spread dismay among our children, most of whom tend towards a unilateral point of view, and we should have substituted firmness for belligerence in our presentation.

The time has come to loosen our approach to the issues of defence. Why do almost all the reports that come before this Assembly on the question of defence take 80%, sometimes 90%, the American point of view? We are putting too much overkill into these reports and our young people will read them with dismay. They will say that we have not learnt any lessons.

The way to deal with the Soviets is with understanding - as I said, with firmness - and if we do not adopt that attitude, the conference halls and places where these issues are supposed to be discussed will remain empty. Both sides will stay apart, shouting at each other from long distances, and in the meantime the problems will continue to multiply. More emphasis

Mr. Garrett (continued)

should be placed on the need to bring our conventional forces up to a state of readiness.

We could stop conventional forces at the last moment, but the last moment for nuclear forces might be too late. On that sombre note, I ask all delegates to reject the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. McGuire.

Mr. McGUIRE (*United Kingdom*). – We have been allocated only a few minutes in which to speak, and I may have to gallop through my speech. However, first, I congratulate John Wilkinson on his industry, if not on his report. I agree with my colleague Dr. Miller that Mr. Wilkinson has put a lot of effort into the report. We know of his work, and so it is with regret that I have to tell him that I do not agree with the report's conclusions.

Like the other members of the British Labour Party who have spoken, I support NATO. Sometimes, the wrong conclusions are drawn, just because we disagree with a report such as this. Like my colleagues, I believe that we occasionally defer too much to the American point of view. I agreed with Mr. Luns that a criticism of the two superpowers is often portrayed as a criticism of two systems that are equally bad. I could not agree more that whatever our criticisms of America we do not think that it is as bad as the Soviet Union. I was also glad that he referred to the debate about cruise and Pershing missiles and to the Soviet Union's aim of breaking the link between the West and America. Such an aim would not succeed because most of us are representatives of very mature democracies.

My main criticism of the report is that, as my colleague Ted Garrett said, it seems to say that we should have more and more nuclear forces. There should have been more emphasis on conventional forces.

Any British Government, conservative or labour, must meet the argument that while they may have to spend a little more on equipping conventional forces to meet any possible threat, it would lead to a safer environment. An over-reliance on nuclear defence in turn makes our defence less secure.

Some representatives may think that I am out of touch with reality. I think that it was Dr. Miller who mentioned the speech made by Lord Carrington. Judging from the questions that have been asked in the House of Commons, Lord Carrington is destined for greater things, and may address us at some future date. In paragraph 5.2 of the report, he is quoted as saying:

“It is my view that one of the reasons for the upsurge of nuclear debate in the West is that this mood of sobriety and calm resolution has not always been encouraged by western governments.”

That is true. If we consider reality soberly, and do not behave as if a threat was imminent, and if we have conventional forces that are ready to deter any attack, Western Europe will be a safer place than it is now.

Thus, it is with regret that I am unable to support the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bernini.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, while I am appreciative of the documents before us, I too disagree with the conclusions of Mr. Wilkinson's report and with the recommendations to the Council. They accept the logic of power blocs and the policy of zones of influence which at present governs relations between the superpowers and is often pursued by military means, the dangers of which have once again been brought home to us in dramatic fashion by the recent breakdown of the Geneva negotiations, at which we should all feel concern, regardless of where responsibility lies, because peace cannot be achieved by disagreements and breakdowns.

I therefore agree that closer co-operation is needed and that the burden should be shared in a different way, in order to enhance Europe's importance and rôle in the Atlantic Alliance; but for what purpose and in what direction? In order to push on with rearmament as the report proposes, in support of a policy of force contrary to the right of nations to self-determination? This is the first question to be answered.

We have several times, as for example when Afghanistan was invaded, blamed the USSR for making the world situation worse and we have also been critical of the imbalance created by the deployment of SS-20s in excessive numbers in Europe; but, equally, we cannot ignore the element of adventurism and provocation in the policies pursued by the United States in recent years, almost always without consulting the European allies, as for example with the recent invasion of Grenada; in many cases solemn undertakings have gone unheeded, as for example the failure to ratify SALT II and the delay of almost two years in starting the Geneva negotiations. The results are there for all to see; distrust and suspicion have increased on both sides, there are potential sources of conflict all over the world, the crises in the Caribbean, Lebanon and the Middle East have become dangerously worse and the race towards ever more accurate and less controllable weapons is gaining momentum; and finally, there is a terri-

Mr. Bernini (continued)

ying increase in the risks of a nuclear war, with its growing threat to European security.

For the sake of that security, therefore, Europe's rôle in the Atlantic Alliance and in world relations must now be strengthened, but first and foremost the present dangerous trend must be reversed, fresh relations between the superpowers must be encouraged and peaceful solutions must be sought for the present conflicts, with agreement on disarmament measures replacing the arms race and the promotion of a new and more adequate system of European and world security, based not on confrontation between the power blocs, on rearmament and on nuclear deterrence but on a common effort by all involved to seek guarantees for both East and West, for their mutual defence and common security.

I believe that despite the frightening deterioration of international relations there are still opportunities and forces through which the present trend can be changed for the better. They are to be found in the West where the anti-nuclear movement is spreading and there is wide and growing awareness of the risks involved in both opposition and government circles on both sides of the Atlantic; the same is true of the East, as is shown by the line taken by the President of Romania; it is also true of the South as witnessed by the significant contribution of the independent line taken by the People's Republic of China. There is growing realisation that military expenditure must be reduced in order to resolve the problems of development and hunger throughout the world.

But all the available possibilities must be used before it is too late and for this we believe that at least two conditions must be fulfilled: one, the remaining margins for the resumption of the Geneva negotiations must be used, urging both sides to make significant moves, on the one side by delaying the operational deployment of Pershing and cruise and on the other by starting to dismantle some of the SS-20s, so that with the help of the European countries, the way to resumption of the negotiations can be smoothed and agreement can be reached at lower levels, which is essential for the subsequent maximum progress of the other negotiations; two, action must be taken at once to agree on more effective confidence-building and security measures and

to ensure the full success of the forthcoming Stockholm conference on European disarmament. This is a task to which WEU and our governments can make a major contribution.

However, neither the report nor the recommendation makes any reference to such tasks: I therefore propose that they be rejected by the Assembly because it is precisely such action which now offers the greatest possibility of reversing the present dangerous trends and of setting European security on a sound basis, by enabling Europe to fulfil its proper peacemaking rôle for the world as a whole.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is adjourned.

11. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 29th November, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance (Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendation and draft resolution, Document 959 and amendments).
2. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 948).
3. Rôle and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 960).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.15 p.m.)

SIXTH SITTING

Tuesday, 29th November 1983

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.

2. Attendance register.

3. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendation and draft resolution, Doc. 959 and amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Galley, Mr. Caro, Mr. Natiez, Mr. Beith (point of order), Mr. Hardy, Mr. de Vries, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Haase, Mr. Scholten, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Beith, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Wilkinson (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pignion (*Chairman of the committee*), Mr. Cavaliere,

Mr. Bernini, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Bernini, Sir Anthony Grant, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Stoffelen; (points of order): Mr. Hardy, Mr. Gansel, Mr. Huydecoper van Nigtevecht (*Ambassador of the Netherlands*).

4. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 948*).

Speakers: Mr. Pignion, Mr. Prussen (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Prussen, Mr. Page (point of order).

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance

(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendation and draft resolution, Doc. 959 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions

and Armaments on European security and burden-sharing in the alliance and votes on the draft recommendation and draft resolution, Document 959 and amendments.

The first speaker in the resumed general debate is Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Speaking as Chairman of the Socialist Group I have a number of remarks to make about Mr. Wilkinson's report. During our last session I had the opportunity to express and clarify our objections to the former version of Mr. Wilkinson's report. Now, again, I must express our strong objections to this well-documented, serious but unbalanced report and recommendation.

Let me make three preliminary remarks. First, we European socialists are dedicated to the security and defence of the people of Europe. We have no doubts about the need for an allied defence and a defence of Europe. We have a strong commitment to the common defence of the liberty and fundamental human rights of our people and to an adequate defence effort.

Secondly, we are aware that the people of our countries are feeling increasingly worried about the madness of the nuclear arms race. As European socialists, we have the same worried feeling that this horrifying arms race endangers the security and safety of our people at home.

Thirdly, unemployment is incredibly high in all our countries. In addition, the economic circumstances of our respective states and their

1. See page 18.

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

budget deficits make it necessary to impose serious cuts in expenditure. A substantial increase in a specific budget is in practice politically almost always impossible and unjustifiable. Bearing that in mind I must express our strong objection to the headings in this serious draft report and recommendation. They do not reflect our interest and our convictions. To be more specific, let me set out our four main objections.

The report and recommendation reflect an almost servile attitude, far too positively, to the United States in a manner that is contrary to the independence of Europe and of the member states of our union. An example is in paragraph (vi) of the preamble which states:

“Aware that isolationism in the United States is likely to grow to the detriment of western security unless the European members of the alliance can convince American public opinion and Congress of the adequacy of the European contribution to the NATO defence effort, and unless European public opinion and parliaments show reciprocal appreciation of all aspects of the United States contribution to allied defence.”

Our second main objection is that the report and recommendation propose an irresponsible and dangerous attitude to the alliance and to our member states in military operations beyond the NATO area. Examples are paragraph (viii) of the preamble and paragraphs A.1 (d) and A.2 of the draft recommendation. Paragraph A.2 reads:

“In the case of developments beyond the NATO area affecting their vital interests:

- (a) to facilitate by all necessary measures within the area the deployment of forces of any NATO country beyond the area;
- (b) in the case of those WEU member countries with appropriate military capability to participate in such deployments;”

Our third main objection is that the report and recommendation show a highly unrealistic and unbalanced request for a long-term increase in defence expenditure. Such a plea, neglecting the enormous level of unemployment and the need for a stronger effort to combat it, and neglecting the decrease of almost every vital budget, is, in our view, irresponsible.

Our fourth main objection is that the report, especially paragraph A.1 (c) and paragraph A.3 of the draft recommendation proper, shows an inclination to move further towards a nuclear arms race. That attitude is contrary to the serious anxiety of our peoples about the madness of the nuclear arms race.

We have numerous serious objections to the headings in the report and the recommendations. The socialists have considered tabling amendments to improve the text. However, that would have necessitated our tabling amendments to paragraphs (v), (vi) and (viii) of the preamble and to paragraphs A.1 (a), A.1 (c), A.1 (d), A.2 and A.3 of the draft recommendation. Such an approach is not practicable or feasible. For those reasons the Socialist Group has decided to express its numerous objections to the headings in the report by voting against the draft recommendations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Galley.

Mr. GALLEY (*France*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Wilkinson's report on European security and burden-sharing in the alliance seems to me an objective and very thorough analysis, and he deserves further credit for taking the trouble to bring it right up to date.

This analysis, on which Mr. Wilkinson has been engaged for a year, comes at a crucial moment for Europe, following as it does upon the failure of the Geneva negotiations - a failure which was foreseeable if one understands the objectives pursued by the Soviet Union, in particular the desire of the eastern superpower to increase the disequilibrium of both conventional and nuclear forces to its own advantage by any means.

The deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe, intended gradually to redress a balance that has been seriously threatened, coincides with our session and makes it acutely relevant.

These events, following upon the invasion of Afghanistan and upon tragic conflicts and accidents, show that if the Atlantic Alliance were to lower its guard, whether through weariness or through overestimation of the significance of the peace movements, the consequences could be black for our independence and, in the long term, for our very freedoms.

Yesterday evening Mr. Wilkinson spoke of a global challenge. I agree with him. The challenge does not simply lie on one side and the other of the iron curtain - it is worldwide.

Please do not misunderstand me. Far be it from me to suggest that every conflict in the world should be interpreted as part of the East-West conflict. Anyone can see that a quarrel between the Toubous, Tetbahs and Gorans of northern Chad, or a struggle between Sunni and Shiite Moslems in the Middle East, is not an East-West conflict. It is nevertheless an opportunity for the Soviet Union to advance its pawns, sell its arms, offer its advisers, provide

Mr. Galley (continued)

succour or build alliances, and thereby to create debtors who will end up as vassals.

On this point there is one fact which we may perhaps not yet have fully understood: the Soviet Union possesses a fantastic arms production machine which accounts for a considerable part of the proportion of its GNP – almost 15% – which is used for military purposes. This machine cannot cease production without creating serious economic difficulties and insoluble problems of reconversion. That is why it produced the T-70 after the T-62, and the T-62 after the T-54 – to take only the example of combat tanks.

Let nobody in Europe be under the illusion that this organisation of millions of scientists, engineers and workers, can tomorrow be affected by pacifism by a wave of the magic wand.

In the face of this immense effort, which is obviously achieved at the expense of the standard of living of the Russian people, we need organisation. Organisation, first of all, through discussions on the defence measures which our countries might have to take in the event of a crisis, while preserving, as in the case of France, independence in their decisions. Western European Union, being essentially a defence organisation, is a very suitable framework in which to deal with these issues on the political level. We should also be aware of the fact that public opinion in our countries, which is sympathetic to the idea of the construction of Europe and increasingly aware of the threat to freedom on our continent, is increasingly better able to understand the dual necessity for a specific national effort by each of our countries and for a European approach to defence problems.

Organisation, too, of joint arms production, which is an essential element in strengthening our alliance. Mr. Luns mentioned the ship-building problem. I might mention the agreements recently signed between France and the Federal Republic of Germany for joint production of a combat helicopter. European co-operation is certainly a key idea in strengthening our alliance. Think for example of the enormous areas opened up to our laboratories and arms industries for the development of defensive weapons to counter the new offensive weapons developed by the Soviets.

In conclusion, let me say that the draft recommendation is not of course perfect from the French point of view. A number of amendments could probably be tabled to bring it into line with our own view of the situation and the best way forward. Nonetheless, this recommendation has the merit of being able to win the

support of a large majority of this Assembly and, beyond that, a large majority of our peoples. An alliance like the Atlantic Alliance requires everyone's opinion to be taken into account. We shall achieve this by disregarding the differences between us and looking only at what unites us.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I would like to thank the Rapporteur, Mr. Wilkinson, for all the work he has put in since the last session in producing the remodelled text now before us and thereby further developing the political option of a European defence policy conceived within the framework of, and adapted to, the Atlantic Alliance.

Burden-sharing within the alliance indeed implies that Europe itself assume its obligations as well as its rights. Participation to the extent of an annual increase of 3% in our military budget is not sufficient as a political defence measure if it only means, in the last analysis, giving our peoples a feeling of security by placing them under the protection of the American "umbrella".

What have we done in Europe about organising political power and the defence of our community since the failure of the EDC and the Fouchet plan?

To transcend national interests and achieve something at community level is indeed a long-term endeavour. The important thing is to grasp, on each occasion, the opportunity to make progress.

As yesterday's exchange of views with Mr. Luns showed once again, the free world, and thus Europe, cannot be defended without the full participation of the United States. That is one of the realities which the Atlantic Alliance has formally recognised. Within that alliance the dialogue between nations has in fact become a dialogue between continents, a dialogue aimed at achieving an intercontinental, if not planetary, strategy.

The historic duty of building Europe politically requires the development of a European defence policy indissolubly linked to the Atlantic Alliance. That is what is meant by the European pillar. It means not simply an advanced position of the American armed forces, but the full participation of a united Europe, together with the United States and Canada, in the organisation of the joint defence of the free peoples, and the consolidation of the institutional structures of a community – the community of Europeans – whose existence is so very real. Our task, therefore, is to update our political doctrines and adapt the political development of our member states to the new realities.

Mr. Caro (continued)

Mr. Wilkinson's report as now before us opens the debate and points the way forward to new discussions and new projects. I hope that, in the present dramatic situation, it heralds a new self-awareness of Europeans, speaking with a single voice and consolidating the Atlantic partnership with the United States, that will facilitate the achievement of our common aim of the continued strengthening of the union of the peoples of Europe.

When one wants more one must sometimes be prepared to settle for less. That is why – having regard to the effort made by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and Mr. Wilkinson in particular – I shall vote for the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Natiez.

Mr. NATIEZ (France) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, permit me first of all to remind you of the French position on defence matters, as reaffirmed by Mr. Pierre Mauroy on 20th September last before the *Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale*.

It is very natural that I should do so here in Western European Union, which, as the sole European body with responsibility for defence matters, is a privileged forum in which we elected representatives can discuss problems affecting European security.

Let me therefore restate several basic principles in the light of which we would like to analyse Mr. Wilkinson's report.

In the French view, European solidarity does indeed enrich Atlantic solidarity, but the two things must not be confused.

It is also true that France has always affirmed its loyalty to the aims of the Atlantic Alliance, but it remains determined to reject the automaticity implied by the integration of forces. It was this rejection which motivated our withdrawal from the integrated military command of the alliance in 1966.

Over the last few years, the definition of the concept of collective security, hitherto based on a defensive military alliance, has been developing in several ways.

The first such development is the trend towards treating all aspects of the threat as a whole, which would imply a response that would also be all-inclusive – including, in particular, the economic field. This gives rise to the great temptation of a response to the threat which would incorporate boycott measures. Now, as Pierre Mauroy stated, “to enter into a logic of

economic blockade is to enter into a logic of war”.

The second development is the extension of the geographical scope of the alliance well beyond its original area, that is to say the whole Atlantic space north of the Tropic of Cancer. Faced with a Soviet threat held to be worldwide, some people are tempted by an equally worldwide response, which would inexorably lead us to apply a strictly East-West interpretation to all conflicts, above all in the third world.

France is concerned at these developments, and a reading of several of the reports before us today adds to that concern. This applies particularly to the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson under the title “European security and burden-sharing in the alliance”.

The first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, which introduces automaticity between the respective efforts of the United States and the European allies in regard to defence expenditure, gives us an initial reason for rejection, all the more so since the Rapporteur links the proposed collective support for the NATO objective of increasing defence expenditure in real terms to the “world rôle” of the United States.

The report proposes an increase in national contributions to the ACE mobile force and compensation, in the event of a crisis in Europe, for any deployment outside the NATO area of American reinforcements assigned to Europe. Since this is designed to facilitate the deployment of the forces of a NATO country outside the NATO area in the event of incidents outside that area affecting its vital interests, it is incompatible with our rejection of the extension of the geographic scope of the alliance to which I have already referred.

While it is true that France has just equipped itself with a rapid deployment force in addition to its existing strategic capabilities, it does not intend to be bound by any automatic linkage resulting from application of the principle of “communicating vessels” between the NATO area and the rest of the planet.

Finally, the report proposes greater exposure of both Americans and Europeans to each other's ideas via the Eurogroup. We cannot accept that a political rôle be conferred upon this competing and minor body, even if the Rapporteur, in referring to it, employs the term “informal consultations”.

French socialist members will not vote for this report because, in common with several other texts before us, it amounts to a change in the content of the alliance, which is and must remain a free contract.

Mr. Natiez (continued)

What is proposed is in fact nothing more or less than alignment of WEU's strategic thinking on defence matters with the developments that have been noted in the policy of the United States administration in this regard. The latter, as we know, lumps together defence policy and international foreign and economic policy under the heading "national security policy". The link between economics and defence is now widely accepted on the other side of the Atlantic. This has gone along with elaboration of the doctrine of "horizontal escalation", according to which the United States, if it were to find itself in difficulty in a given area, should raise the stakes by taking the conflict to Soviet "vulnerable points". It is this logic which leads Mr. William Clark to assert that his country must possess forces that can be used at one and the same time for the direct defence of NATO and for the defence of allies' interests in South-East Asia. In our view, the strategy of "horizontal escalation" thus entails the serious risk of our being dragged, via the American operational linkage, into a conflict outside the NATO area, with, moreover, the risk of this conflict extending to Europe.

Mr. Wilkinson's report, like Mr. Atkinson's report, in fact aims at aligning WEU's position with this development in American strategic options, a development which has in fact been towards the most extreme positions adopted in the United States for thirty years. Such alignment would be tantamount to misapplication of the terms of the alliance.

We shall therefore vote firmly against adoption of the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I would ask speakers to keep within their allotted speaking time, which has, I remind you, been fixed at five minutes.

I call Mr. Beith.

Mr. BEITH (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. The interpreters are finding it difficult to keep up with speeches that are sometimes read at great speed because representatives are trying to keep within the five-minute deadline. Consequently, those of us who are listening to the interpreters are at risk of losing some important passages.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Beith is quite right. The interpreters are entitled to our full co-operation. When speeches are written, the interpreters ought to be given the text to facilitate their task. However, that necessarily depends on the speakers themselves whom we can only encourage to act accordingly.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Although Mr. Wilkinson has devoted a lot of effort to his report, I regret to say that, along with other members of the Socialist Group, I cannot agree with his conclusions. Indeed, I agree with those of my colleagues who have suggested that the report is very hawkish, and perhaps the most hawkish to have been presented to the Assembly in recent years. It makes the most extensive demand for the expansion of military capacity.

Let it be understood that I and other members of my party and the socialist groups of Western Europe accept that we must maintain our western alliance and have adequate defences. We must also strive for negotiated disarmament. Usually our reports to the Assembly on security matters contain adequate recognition that there should be a full commitment to negotiation and peace and that we should aim for both nuclear and conventional disarmament on a balanced basis. The report does not go far enough along that road. There is not even the normal ritual genuflection in that direction.

The report refers to burden-sharing, but it seems concerned more with increasing burdens than with reapportioning them. I accept that the defence burden is necessary, but other economic needs should also be considered. Our people must believe that our societies are worth defending. Only 14% of my area's school leavers are getting normal work this year. If such problems do not have priority, we shall find ourselves in a more difficult position. Young people in future generations will increasingly question whether the grubbily commercial society, the widening gap between the privileged and others and the increasing rundown of our institutions make our society worth defending. I regret that unless we have different priorities more people may come to conclusions that neither Mr. Wilkinson as a conservative nor myself as a democratic socialist will find acceptable. Perhaps the rôle of Western Europe will be one of restraint. That may be true. If the United States and the Soviet Union obtain an agreement on intercontinental missiles, that restraint may be necessary.

Another cause for anxiety is the suggested extension or removal of NATO's territorial boundaries. Such an extension of frontiers could be damaging and painted as imperialism. It could exacerbate tension and lead to our being under greater pressure to endorse actions or policies about which there are general reservations in Europe, for example, America's questionable policy in Central America. The recommendation about that extension might be the most disadvantageous recommendation in the report.

Western Europe must contribute a mature wisdom to international affairs. We cannot be

Mr. Hardy (continued)

allowed to be seen as mere adjuncts of American foreign policy, for that is not necessarily in the interests of mankind or Western Europe. We may feel vulnerable to the charge that the United States bears a disproportionate burden of western defence, but to some extent that disregards the industrial and commercial benefits gained by the United States. Those benefits are substantial. We should not merely seek to effect a greater flow along the one-way street. We must commit ourselves to levels of defence spending that are realistic and serve our industrial base.

I express serious reservations about the priorities in the report. I do not merely suggest that it is inadequate in its talk of defence commitment but it is inadequate on negotiation. It is right that we should recognise current challenges. We should seek to consider them realistically. It is also right for us to seek to reduce rather than to exacerbate the tensions that face our world.

Above all, we should recognise that we already have a sufficient military capacity that can disfigure not only our time but the generations beyond. That holocaust must dominate our considerations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. de Vries.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). - The arrival of cruise missiles and Pershing IIs in Europe has been received with mixed emotions. Our people are very divided on that issue. Where our parliaments show majorities, they hardly reflect what the majority of the population feels. Despite those differences, I believe that we could agree about one thing - the arrival of Pershing IIs and cruise missiles in Europe is not the solution to the problem but part of the problem. The problem of European security is not diminishing but increasing.

I shall make a few comments on what the Europeans will have to work on in the coming years. First, the East-West dialogue has become increasingly a discussion of military confrontation. We all know that solid defence is necessary. At the same time, Europeans know that it is dangerous and without perspective to seek better security only militarily. The East-West dialogue must also explore and utilise opportunities for co-operation. That requires at the least a normalisation of the tone of conversation. It is impossible and dangerous to communicate between East and West in terms of good and evil and recrimination and condemnation. It is also impossible to build stable relationships by talking every other day about applying sanctions against each other. Euro-

peans cannot conduct an East-West dialogue via Washington. They have their own responsibilities.

Secondly, the failure of Geneva has dealt a new blow to the credibility of arms control. The record of building security by mutual agreement on limitation of armaments is not impressive. Nevertheless, we know that an arms race without understanding and appreciation of mutual security interests holds no promise for a safer world. We are on the verge of a technological breakthrough that might transfer conflict to space and turn it back from there to earth. It is of the greatest urgency that limitations on weapon development and areas of weapon application be sought by agreement. The Stockholm conference offers a new opportunity to discuss mutual security interests with the East. It is necessary that Europeans take an active rôle in the conference and do not leave that to the administration of the United States.

Thirdly, the time is long overdue for us to start developing a concept for the European contribution to western security. It will no longer suffice to list the effects of the respective European nations and encourage them to spend a little more in their own countries. We must discuss the relevance of all those contributions to the common goal. It is a show of utter incompetence by European politicians and the Assembly that we have to confine ourselves in Mr. Wilkinson's resolution to noting the existence of British and French forces. It is about time that we discussed what those forces mean, not only for the countries involved but for other European countries. We shy away from our responsibility when we do not acknowledge the meaning of our respective efforts for the common goal.

Mr. Wilkinson's report contains a wealth of information. It is well drafted and the Rapporteur can take pride in presenting it to the Assembly. Nevertheless, I have reservations about the resolution. Burden-sharing is not the core of the problem for Europe and the United States. There is a political evolution in the United States the interests of which have moved from Europe only to other areas such as the Pacific. There is also an evolution in Europe where a political identity is slowly but surely emerging. Secondly, the Rapporteur is wrong about spending money. We cannot solve our defence policy by spending on war. We have to work for better co-operation.

I have exceeded my time. Many reasons have already been expressed why I shall not be able to add my voice to those in support of the report. Nevertheless, I compliment the Rapporteur on the fine work he has done to provide us with a good basis for discussion and future work.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to begin by congratulating the Rapporteur, Mr. Wilkinson, on his report. However, unlike other speakers, I not only wish to congratulate the Rapporteur on the time he has invested and on the scope and profundity of his reflections but I can say from the start that I heartily endorse the conclusions drawn in this report. I congratulate the Rapporteur on the conclusions he has reached and I shall vote for the report.

Several speakers have expressed their doubts on a wide variety of grounds. But hardly anyone has assumed that we do not need the United States for our security in Europe, hardly anyone has claimed that we do not need American support. Nonetheless, the report has been criticised for not paying sufficient attention to this or that aspect, and in one way or another criticism has also been levelled at the Americans, although, I must add, very cautiously.

The situation in our countries, especially as far as public opinion is concerned, matches the situation in this Assembly. People are always talking about the things the Americans have done wrong and the things they should be doing. We are all in favour of NATO, but our deeds rarely live up to our fine words. We in WEU should not make this mistake. As friends, we should sometimes overlook things which are not quite to our liking. We should not allow there to be any doubt about our needing the Americans' help or indeed about our having to support the Americans, with deeds as well as words. That is why we must approve this report.

As a German I must say something about paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation and the deployment of forces from the WEU countries beyond the NATO area, a subject which has already been mentioned several times. In the first place I must point out that, in view of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, the question that can and must be asked is whether the German armed forces may be deployed beyond the frontiers of the NATO area, beyond their immediate task of defending their own country. I admit that it is a controversial topic, but this constitutional objection does exist in the Federal Republic of Germany, and it must be borne in mind.

In the second place, I must emphasise that Federal governments past and present have always adopted a very guarded attitude towards participating in military operations not immediately connected with our own area. Mr. Kohl's government maintains this attitude. I

nevertheless feel that we Germans can endorse the present wording of the draft recommendation, for two reasons.

It is certainly appropriate to enquire whether the Federal Republic of Germany has the "appropriate military capability" referred to in paragraph 2 (b). As the Federal armed forces are completely under NATO control, there are no non-NATO troops which we could deploy. Furthermore, it must be realised - and this has also been our policy in the past - that assistance can also be provided by filling gaps that occur during operations which become necessary outside our own area. The Federal armed forces could fill gaps of this kind as a means of assisting necessary operations, albeit in a different way.

If we look at paragraph 2 (b) against the background I have just explained - that we cannot take direct action beyond the NATO area - we can approve the draft recommendation as a whole, including paragraph 2 (b), which is somewhat questionable in our case. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). - Rather than spend time congratulating my friend, I shall concentrate on two or three issues, because he is already assured of my support at every stage of his work, as he is assured of the support of my conservative colleagues from Britain. I was glad to hear Mr. Spies von Büllesheim say the same on behalf of the party to which he belongs.

It is a pity that a report covering possibilities and feasibilities for an improvement in a wide area of relationships between members of the alliance should in effect have been reduced to a simple replay of whether we should have cruise missiles in Europe. That is what it is all about. That is how the press will interpret it. That is not the choice of the Rapporteur and nor is it my choice, but that is how the debate has developed.

Although there have been significant majorities in three leading countries, including an overwhelming majority in my country, in favour of having the missiles, there is an attempt at a replay in an international forum by those who failed to get their way in their own parliaments. We should stand by what we did in our own parliaments. WEU should not be used as a forum for a replay of national parliamentary issues that have been settled, although that is how the debate will be read.

I do not mind how it will be read in my country but any suggestion that the report will be defeated will be counter-productive in future negotiations. As Chancellor Kohl has said,

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

already there are indications that the Soviet Union is beginning to accept the reality of the situation. Now that we have something to negotiate about, I believe that the negotiations will be resumed. If, on the other hand, the Kremlin is induced to believe that if it keeps up the pressure by any means – through the peace movement, through international forums and so on – we shall not stand by our decisions, there will be no attempt at negotiation, because once more the Kremlin will see some prospect of getting back to the stage where it has 1,000 war-heads on land-based missiles and we have none. It is only because the Kremlin is convinced that we shall stand by our decisions that there is any prospect of a genuine arms reduction negotiation.

I ask those who take a different view from me to picture themselves in the Kremlin and ask themselves whether they think that there was the slightest indication that a decision taken by a national parliament could be overturned. Let them reflect on what their mental reaction would be.

We are now, of course, facing threats of a new type of blackmail. It is that the SS-20s will now be moved into the satellite countries. As I pointed out to Mr. Luns yesterday, I cannot understand how anyone could accept that as being anything other than an almost ludicrously blatant attempt at blackmail. With the SS-20s located where they already are they can reach well out into the Atlantic beyond the Irish coast. Why it should be regarded as an additional threat for them to be positioned so that they could reach even further into the Atlantic I fail to understand. However, it seems to have unnerved people that some of those 1,000 missiles will come closer even though their existing range is sufficient already for them to reach any part of Europe.

As to the increased number of SS-20s, it is worth remembering that at first firing of the existing missiles 12,000 Hiroshima bombs would be dropped simultaneously throughout Western Europe before any reloading. That is the degree of potential overkill. There can be no additional terror in the fact that another ten or twenty SS-20s will be sited to cover parts of Europe that the existing missiles already have the capacity to destroy.

In those circumstances I very much regret the attitude of the socialist parties in my country and in Western Germany. It was their governments who first gave their agreement several years ago to the deployment of those missiles. Now we see them behaving completely differently from how they behaved when they were in office.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Haase.

Mr. HAASE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should first like to thank the Rapporteur for his extremely interesting report. Incidentally, it reflects views which even a German social democrat can to some extent accept and endorse. In this respect the previous speaker was certainly not quite right in saying that we had changed our minds so completely that what was white yesterday is black today.

I should like to place particular emphasis on the statement made in the introduction to the report, where it says:

“Every national contribution, whether political, financial, military, industrial, in manpower or matériel, contributes towards a sharing of the joint burden of defence in the western alliance.”

I should like to endorse and emphasise this, especially because it also includes the political aspect. I am thinking here of Berlin, for example. What the Federal Republic of Germany does for Berlin is in fact an aspect of this contribution without necessarily being a military contribution.

The draft recommendation does, however, contain substantial passages with which I cannot agree. They do not coincide with the aims of the Brussels Treaty. I refer to paragraph (viii) of the preamble and to paragraphs 1 (d) and 2 (b) of the draft recommendation. In practice, these paragraphs would have the effect of extending the NATO defence area. If the United States needed troops for an operation somewhere in the world, it could simply withdraw them from Europe and Europe would compensate for them. The obvious question is: which country in Europe – Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom? There would be some disagreement and dispute over who should replace the American forces in this event – with the combat strength then being withdrawn from Europe. This would weaken rather than strengthen the alliance, because it would create new problems.

Even less acceptable is the statement that, if the governments agree, developments beyond the NATO area can be regarded as a threat to the alliance as a whole. I have read it correctly: “if the governments agree”. But this means that you are completely ignoring the parliaments of the NATO countries, that you are taking no further account of the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty in your deliberations. The North Atlantic Treaty was ratified by all the countries, which means that the parliaments are entitled to a say. If your approach now is that, provided the governments agree, a threat to

Mr. Haase (continued)

NATO can be assumed even when problems arise in areas outside NATO, you will in effect be extending the terms of this treaty without submitting it to the ratification procedure. That is unacceptable. It conflicts with the content of the treaties.

Mr. Wilkinson, this is another reason why I cannot agree to the draft recommendation you have submitted. There are a number of problems mentioned in your report, for which, unfortunately, no solutions are proposed. That is my criticism of your draft recommendation. You will appreciate that I cannot therefore vote for it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Scholten.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Netherlands*). - I begin by complimenting Mr. Wilkinson on his interesting report. He told us yesterday that he took a two-day break from his recent general election campaign to come to the Assembly in June to defend the first draft of his report. I congratulate him on the fact that that two-day break did not adversely affect the result of his campaign.

I wish to limit my comments to paragraph A.3 of the draft recommendation concerning the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles. I cannot accept that paragraph, which appeals for deployment because it does not conform with the programme of my party, the christian democrats.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

(Translation). - Mr. President, in East-West relations two countries are of central importance in military and strategic terms. Together they represent the key countries, the countries in which the most important military command centres are located. Obviously, the Soviet Union and the United States are the two key countries in East-West relations, and Western Europe and Eastern Europe outside the Soviet Union are strategic and fringe areas, however important they may be. By deploying SS-20s, the Soviet Union will not be threatening the heart of the western alliance. The deployment of the Pershing II in the strategic fringe area of Western Europe will now represent a threat to the strategic heart of the Soviet Union.

The Pershing II in particular thus represents a strategic threat to the Soviet Union. The same cannot be said of the SS-20 and the United States. The case presented by NATO's Secretary-General, Mr. Luns, yesterday is either naive or more in the nature of propaganda than politics. This is not to say that I accept the SS-20. It is a senseless threat to the peoples of

Western Europe and should be rejected in the strongest possible terms. I put this to the Soviet authorities in the Kremlin when I headed a delegation from the Dutch parliament to Moscow. But I cannot support NATO's method of opposing the SS-20.

Specifically, deploying the Pershing II is the wrong reaction to a wrong action. It will decrease rather than enhance security in Western Europe. It will encourage a European nuclear arms race. In the event of growing international tension and escalating conflict it will increase the likelihood of the Soviet Union seeking to eliminate the new weapons in Western Europe with a first strike. After all, the deployment of the Pershing II will reduce the Soviet Union's response time to less than ten minutes, whereas the United States' response time will remain the same. The risks are further increased by the fact that the Soviet Union's estimate of the range of the missiles differs from the United States' figure. So I conclude that the Pershing II represents a threat to the security of Europe and that opposition to the SS-20 should take a different form, in the wider context of the START negotiations.

Mr. President, I will conclude by saying that modernisation was meant to increase the cohesion of the alliance. It has had the opposite effect. Public opposition to NATO in Western Europe is on the increase. I take very seriously the fact that, for the first time for many years, a profound and fundamental difference of opinion has arisen between the major parties in the Federal Republic of Germany. Recent action in Grenada by our most important ally, the United States, is increasing the sense of distress in some sections of the population in Western Europe. Anyone who condemns "Poland" and "Afghanistan" - as I most earnestly do - should also condemn "Grenada". I find these developments within NATO very disturbing. After all, it is very important to the future of the western world that there should be satisfactory cohesion in NATO and that it should have the support of a broad consensus of the peoples of Western Europe. One of the first requirements would therefore seem to be that Western Europe should make a proportionally satisfactory contribution to conventional defence. I endorse the Rapporteur's approach.

I am able to tell the Assembly that on Monday - yesterday, in other words - in a new report on defence efforts for the future the Dutch Government stated that the Netherlands intends to abide by the agreements for the present. Western Europe must, however, resolutely reject any United States' propensities towards superiority. This will require greater cohesion in the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and more commitment. However vital the United

Mr. Scholten (continued)

States may be to the future of Europe, I advocate a more central rôle for the countries of Western Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe that collaboration with the United States is the bedrock of European security. There have been times when this collaboration has been disturbed by misunderstandings. It seems to me however that consultation is now more frequent in all NATO bodies and that genuinely joint decisions are taken.

At the same time, closer and more effective collaboration requires that appropriate steps be taken to improve in the European countries, the United States and Canada the rôle which individual states play within the Atlantic Alliance. Everyone must be aware of the individual contributions and burdens. Furthermore we must understand the special rôle of the United States.

This report - and here I am replying to colleagues who have expressed doubts - is not proposing that the NATO area of competence should be extended; it simply states - and this is the truth we have been proclaiming in this Assembly for ten years - that dangers and events which directly affect the security of Europe and of the NATO countries have for some time been becoming very frequent and increasingly violent outside the NATO area.

Action must, therefore, be taken to counter these dangers which, I repeat, directly affect the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and of Europe.

Today - and let us say this clearly - the situations of the United States and the Soviet Union are quite different. The Soviet Union intervenes directly all over the world making use of Libya, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Syria and all its other many allies and satellites. For action outside the NATO area where Europe's security is involved, the United States stands alone; we should therefore welcome the action it takes.

What does Mr. Wilkinson's report say? It repeats what has been said before, namely that in such circumstances, when all the NATO countries agree that intervention is necessary outside the NATO area by one country - not by NATO - the other countries should take the necessary measures to avoid any weakening of NATO itself. It is nothing more. Anyone who says the opposite has completely failed to understand.

Let us bear in mind that the Soviet Union has understood that European and western security is founded on collaboration between Europe and the United States; that is precisely why the Soviet Union has used every trick to split Europe from the United States. We must therefore remain firmly on our guard.

In my view another essential element is the restoration of a balance for medium-range missiles. This is not something the United States said; the decision taken by the NATO countries on 12th December 1979 was taken principally at the request of the European countries which were most directly affected and threatened by the deployment of the SS-20s. Everything which has happened since - the zero-option proposal and the other proposals tabled in Geneva - is the result of decisions and requests by the European members of NATO. The insinuation that Europe is simply the mouthpiece of the United States must therefore be dismissed; it is contrary to the true facts.

We have used every means, taken every possible step and put forward every possible proposal; the Soviet Union has responded by increasing its nuclear potential. In these circumstances I am amazed that some of our colleagues - the socialists - who previously approved other recommendations on the subject now seem to have changed their minds. I hope they will think again; otherwise we shall have to say that the peace movements subsidised by the Soviet Union have even spread here to Paris and that would really be a very serious matter.

These are briefly the reasons why I fully support the draft recommendation submitted by Mr. Wilkinson.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Beith.

Mr. BEITH (*United Kingdom*). - The report is extremely useful and contains a great deal of valuable detail. I agree with many of its conclusions and I find its general thrust, particularly in relation to conventional arms, entirely acceptable. However, I have some specific criticisms on which I shall concentrate as I cannot possibly do justice to the whole report or give it a balanced appraisal in such a very short time.

I welcome the emphasis that the Rapporteur put on the need for strengthening conventional arms. He argued that we needed stronger conventional arms so that we could put into practice the flexible response principle instead of being so harmfully dependent on the early use of nuclear weapons in any conflict. Of course, not all defence expenditure helps to achieve the goal of a flexible response. Indeed, in my submission and that of my party, the United Kingdom's Trident programme lessens the possibility of a flexible response because it diverts

Mr. Beith (continued)

resources from strengthening conventional weapons.

If the 3% annual increase is used significantly to develop Britain's nuclear capacity, it will not strengthen our conventional arms at all. Several member countries are already getting into more and more difficulty with the 3% annual increase. In Britain the 3% increase will be maintained until 1985-86, but not necessarily beyond that. The British Secretary of State for Defence has spoken of a new emphasis on output rather than on cash figures as a means of judging defence expenditure.

The Secretary of State for Defence has argued that defence expenditure cannot be immune from the rest of the economy. That point was argued again yesterday in the House of Commons, and some conservative members of parliament have criticised their own government for not being firm about the 3% figure beyond 1985-86. Therefore, it is not only the figures that must be considered, but the useful capacity that can be added to our defences.

My next point is more fundamental and has already been mentioned by many speakers. I refer to recommendation A.3 which deals with cruise and Pershing missiles. I should place on record why British liberals and social democrats have felt it wrong to go ahead with the deployment of cruise missiles before the end of 1983.

The wording of recommendation A.3 begs the question that is uppermost in our minds. The wording implies that the allies have given vigorous united support to an effective United States effort on behalf of the alliance to secure satisfactory, balanced and verifiable arms control agreements.

The reasons that led us to dissent from deployment before the end of 1983 included a lack of serious commitment or political will to achieve a success at the Geneva talks. That lack of commitment was very apparent in the Reagan administration, who are clearly deeply divided between hawks and doves. It was also apparent in the British Government. Our Prime Minister toured the United States of America and in echoing Churchillian utterances she made speeches using the language not even of the cold war but of the real war between 1939 and 1945. The achievement of the Commonwealth conference in its session at Goa must be remarkable if it has drawn our Prime Minister away from such rhetoric and towards the language of peace. One of the reasons that led us to dissent from deployment before the end of 1983 was the refusal to countenance the inclusion of British and French nuclear weapons in the calculations at any level of disarmament

negotiations. That position is indefensible. In addition, there has been a refusal to negotiate a dual key mechanism.

The report contains another area for anxiety, namely, the out-of-area commitment. There are clearly reasons why member countries of NATO will need to act outside the NATO area in defence of freedom or for the protection of vulnerable states. However, it cannot be assumed that those commitments apply to the rest of NATO, and we cannot extend the range of NATO's commitment merely because a member state wishes to fulfil responsibilities elsewhere.

The report is informative and useful. It underlines the need for communication and practical co-operation among European allies and for communication across the Atlantic. That was lacking during the American action in Grenada. It also underlines the need for dialogue with the Soviet Union. I hope that the spirit of the Goa declaration and the Trudeau mission can be carried into practice by the NATO countries and that we can summon up a political vision of the world in which the Soviet Union, the United States and the member countries of the two blocs can live in peace together.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). - Burden-sharing also means an increase in defence expenditure. As my Dutch colleague, Mr. Scholten, has said, a new defence white paper has just been published in the Netherlands which outlines what will be done in the next ten years. It shows a 2% real increase in defence expenditure, at a time when the Netherlands has an unemployment rate of 16% to 17%. Thus defence expenditure can be a burden because there are more and more demands for expenditure on social security and so on.

However, we still aim for a real increase in defence expenditure, because we must share the burden of the defence costs of the alliance. Burden-sharing in nuclear weapons - as in conventional weapons - is a financial and moral commitment. It also means equal shopping on both sides of the Atlantic, because there must be a two-way street. We have the Independent European Programme Group and Eurogroup. WEU also has the Standing Armaments Committee, which aims to combine the industrial possibilities for defence in Europe and to present a common picture to the other side.

WEU must concentrate on burden-sharing and put pressure on the United States to lift a number of barriers, because it is impossible for countries in Europe with high unemployment to give money to the other side of the ocean but get nothing back.

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

I refer to out-of-area operations. I am happy with the wording in the draft recommendation because it is not a blank cheque to go outside the alliance and our borders and do what one likes. It is a constraint on the manoeuvrability of member states when they are looking after their national interests. That means that any action other than those in a national interest or a specific interest of NATO should be communicated to other member states and discussed, as well as the implications for the alliance.

In the report and the recommendations much is said about cruise missiles and the nuclear burden. My party in the Netherlands supports the double-track decision of 1979. Therefore, we support deployment at the moment, but that is not all. We also support the other part of the double-track decision – that we shall continue negotiations. That is possible as long as both sides want to go to the negotiating table. Every slice of the deployment schedule could be a bench mark for the Soviet Union's attitude on co-operating in disarmament and reducing the number of nuclear weapons.

We deplore the necessary deployment of new nuclear weapons, but sometimes the medicine can be bitter. No proposals are yet on the table from the Andropov side, although there is light on the horizon. We hope sincerely that 1984 will bring proposals on the table on which East and West can meet so that we can end deployment of nuclear weapons, or reduce their deployment and the burdens on peace and the economy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The general debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur to reply to speakers.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I thank Stuart Whyte, the clerk to the committee, for the considerable help that he gave me in the report. Without the benefit of his expertise and wise advice, it would not have been the balanced document that it is.

This has been one of the most wide-ranging and important debates that the Assembly has held. Note will be taken of the result at the end of the debate. For that reason I shall call for a vote by roll-call at the end of the debate because each and every one of us should be individually responsible for his vote.

I refer first to the speech by my friend and colleague, Sir Anthony Grant. Of course, as a British member of parliament I was unhappy about the phrase: "Noting the existence of the independent nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom;". The original word was "appreciating". That is what I do regret, the

amended wording, as my colleague does. I am sure, that my French colleagues do as well, but I bow to the decision of the committee that made an amendment by six votes to five. It does not fundamentally alter the force of the report. Therefore, I greatly welcome the contribution of the British and French independent nuclear deterrents and hope that our French socialist colleagues recognise that fact in their votes at the conclusion of the debate.

The report supports the French Government's foreign and defence policies. No one could regard the defence of Europe as credible without the contribution of France. As Rapporteur I have underscored at every stage the contribution that France makes.

I hope that French socialist delegates in the Assembly will recognise that fact by their votes, none more so than my friend, Mr. Pignion, the Chairman of our Defence Committee, who voted for the report and whose letter in *Le Monde* I read with great interest yesterday. He rightly emphasised the rôle of WEU, which I underpinned and supported in my report. I hope that he, too, will vote in favour of the report in plenary as he did in committee.

As Sir Anthony Grant reminded us, "The price of liberty is eternal vigilance", in the words of Edmund Burke. We should remember that we face not just a nuclear threat on the part of the Soviets but a chemical threat. Those who advocate unilateral nuclear disarmament are advocating the dismantling by NATO of its deterrents against an equally bestial form of warfare – chemical warfare. The Soviets exercise for offensive operations using chemical weapons from the start just as they exercise for the use of nuclear weapons from the start, so if we unilaterally dismantle our deterrents, we are being irresponsible to our people.

Mr. Tummers asked what was worth defending in Europe. No parliamentarian of any free country in Western Europe need ask that question. Mr. Tummers has only to look across the iron curtain and see the misery, lack of freedom and oppression of human rights to realise how great is the inheritance that we seek to defend in the free democracies of Western Europe.

The Brussels Treaty in 1948 was not a treaty against German revanchist rearmament or the resurgence of German expansionism. It was a consequence of a sad realisation that the former allies the western powers had had in the Soviet Union were a threat to our security in Western Europe.

Mr. John Morris, my colleague from the British parliament, made, as one would expect, an authoritative speech. A former minister responsible for defence from my parliament

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

could have been expected to do nothing else. He mentioned his fear of over-reliance on tactical nuclear weapons. Yesterday, the Secretary-General of NATO reminded us of when we took the double-track decision on 12th December 1979. That decision was taken at the express request of the Europeans at a special meeting. All European members of the alliance were there, and they voted in favour of the decision. Mr. Schmidt, the then German Chancellor, reminded us of that commitment.

In December 1979 we unilaterally withdrew 1,000 tactical nuclear warheads. Just a few days ago at the time of the first deployment of cruise missiles we unilaterally withdrew a further 1,400 nuclear warheads. No such comparable unilateral step has been taken by the Soviet Union. In the report, we have particularly emphasised the importance of enhancing conventional defence, new technologies, more sustainability, more stocks and more reserves. I do not think the report is over-reliant in anything it suggests on tactical nuclear weapons.

It was said by Dr. Maurice Miller that it was a hawkish report. I hardly think that. It is profoundly realistic. Those who examine these matters ignore the Soviet build-up at their peril. One cannot but be struck by the enormous increase in Soviet military capability over the past fifteen years. There is the development of a blue ocean navy, the modernisation of its air force, which is now an all-weather force, highly trained with long-range aircraft of a kind that it has never had before, and, last but not least, the modernisation of its nuclear forces; three-quarters of its strategic land-based intercontinental missiles have been built in the past five years. There is the Typhoon class, to which the Secretary-General of NATO referred, the new ballistic missile submarines and the SS-20s.

One must face the facts. I am not trying to exaggerate fears. I am seeking to be realistic, as I think Lord Carrington was in his Alistair Buchan memorial lecture, to which Dr. Miller referred. I, too, agree wholeheartedly with the balanced and sombre tone of Lord Carrington's speech.

I was most grateful for the intervention of my friend and colleague from the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Jäger. How right he was to underscore to us all that the spirit of the WEU treaty is to protect the peace and freedom that we enjoy. Coming from a German spokesman, if I may say so, that message is all the more pertinent. Germany is a divided country with East Prussia now incorporated into the Soviet Union and with half the country under the hegemony of a non-democratic socialist régime.

The Germans know better than anyone here the price that has to be paid for the protection of peace and the ensuring of freedom. I welcome his remarks about the importance of verification in any arms control agreement. That is what we are seeking – balance and verification.

As he said, Europe must be seen to be a reliable partner in NATO. As in December 1979 we called for the modernisation of our intermediate-range nuclear forces, it would be perverse in the extreme if we decided to turn back on a previous decision, especially when the Soviet Union already had at the time of the decision no fewer than 120 SS-20s in place and was deploying one SS-20 system per week when we were not deploying any new system. If six years after the initial deployment of SS-20s we agreed to go back on what we had previously decided, it would show to the Soviets that their policy of bullying, intimidation, cajolery and blackmail had succeeded. That would mean disaster for us all.

The endorsement of the report by the Secretary-General of NATO disappointed Mr. Garrett. I did not share that disappointment. I was heartened that a statesman of the experience and the authority of Mr. Luns should have endorsed the report. Those deputies in the Assembly who vote against the report should take note of the fact that Mr. Luns endorsed it. They cannot on the one hand say that they are staunch supporters of NATO and yet vote against the endorsement of Mr. Luns himself, which is the implication of what they are doing.

I was accused by Mr. McGuire of paying too much deference to the American point of view. I do not think so. I am suggesting that Europe should do more for its own defence. That is what the Americans expect of us. After all, they have ensured the security of Europe since world war two. Naturally, it is in their interests to do so, but it is in the interests of all members of the alliance to play a full part according to their capabilities.

A greater risk of nuclear conflict was feared by Mr. Bernini. He said that Europe needed a new defence not based upon power blocs. The Soviet Union occupies half of the continent on which we live. We cannot escape from that fact. We have to coexist with the USSR on the continent of Europe. The USSR has proved itself to be an expansionist power. The Baltic states know the nature of the Soviet régime, as do the Afghans. As we have to coexist with the Soviets, we can do so only by ensuring our security in co-operation with our American friends.

I was saddened by the speech of Mr. Stoffelen, because I had thought in my naivety that the initiative that the Socialist Group took in June

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

was perhaps a one-off procedural ploy to catch us napping when the British conservatives were in their general election campaign and the Italian christian democrats were away campaigning as well. However, it was not. It was clearly a more deep-seated antagonism to what is at the heart of the report. He said that the isolationism of the United States would not be countered by the Europeans doing more. I do not believe that the Americans are isolationists. They do not need necessarily to modernise the intermediate nuclear forces of NATO. They do that because they genuinely want Western Europe to be secure. It is reasonable and right for them to expect us to do more. After all, in economic terms, Europe is about the equal of the United States.

He also said that the report's suggestions about out-of-area deployment were irresponsible. Surely we cannot ignore what is going on in the wider world. A generation back one did not foresee the expansion of Soviet influence world wide that has taken place since. It is a reality. What happens in the wider world is crucial to Europe, which is a trading continent dependent on overseas raw materials and markets.

He thought that what I said about defence expenditure was unrealistic. The level of defence expenditure is predicated not by our own wishes but by the military growth of Soviet power. That is what predicates our response. Because that power has grown, we have to do more for our defence.

I am not neglecting the unemployment problems of Europe. In fact, a strong European armaments industry, which the report advocates, would help to ease unemployment. The report is not a further step down the nuclear arms road. Paragraph A.3 of the draft recommendation suggests that we "lend vigorous united support to the United States efforts on behalf of the alliance to secure satisfactory balanced and verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union". It is not our fault that the Soviets have walked out of the Geneva talks. They knew when the deadline for deployment was. They had plenty of time to come to an agreement based on verification and balance, the only sound foundation for agreement. As one would have expected from a former minister, Mr. Galley made a powerful, authoritative and realistic speech, which I greatly welcome. His reference to the global challenge was apposite. I, too, welcome Franco-German military co-operation.

From NATO's point of view, I am sure that the new agreement to create at long last a Franco-German anti-tank helicopter is to be welcomed.

Of course, no draft recommendation is perfect, and I do not say that this one is either. However, it is worth supporting and Mr. Galley made a typically magnanimous speech which I found very welcome, as did my friend Mr. Caro, without whose help in committee it would have been impossible to produce as satisfactory a report as this.

We want a genuine dialogue of equals between the two pillars that constitute the Atlantic Alliance. We recognise the importance of the United States nuclear umbrella, but we need to enhance and strengthen the European pillar. In our recognition of that importance we are in no way diminishing our commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. Instead we are seeking to make it a more balanced and sounder structure.

Mr. Natiez referred to Prime Minister Mauroy's speech of 20th September. So do I in this report. There is quite a long section about it. Of course, WEU is, as Mr. Mauroy said, an important forum for reflection, but it is more, and I said so in my speech yesterday and in the report. There is nothing in the report that is basically contrary to the broad lines of French policy. Any deputy who, by his vote, rejects this report will be doing less than justice to the support that I have sought to give to French defence policy.

After all, we recognise the important rôle that France plays out of area. I am sure that we are all deeply conscious of and pay homage to the sacrifice by French servicemen in Lebanon and the rôle that they are playing there with the Italian, the British and the Americans. Libya might well have absorbed the whole of Chad had it not been for the intervention of French forces. We are not saying, as Mr. Cavaliere brought home to us, that, formally and statutorily, NATO's area of responsibility should be extended. But we are saying that the NATO countries should recognise what is happening in the wider world and, either individually or jointly, should respond accordingly.

The Eurogroup is, as I said, an informal association. I do not suggest that France should join. France is a member of the Conference of National Armaments Directors and is playing a useful rôle, but WEU is important and needs to be strengthened. I certainly would not wish our countries to be brought into a conflict that was outside the NATO area and did not affect their vital interests. There is no question of horizontal escalation.

Mr. Hardy said that the report was hawkish - perhaps the most hawkish in recent years. However, we must recognise the increase in Soviet military capability. The report stresses the need for disarmament, but disarmament can be only on the basis of verification and balance. After all, for ten years there have been mutual

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

and balanced force reduction talks in Vienna. It is only because the Soviets have not accepted the principle of balance in those talks that the talks have got precisely nowhere.

It does not exactly help the process of disarmament that the Soviets should have walked out of the INF talks in Geneva. I can assure the Assembly, as the report stresses, that we place great emphasis on disarmament, but it must be mutual and balanced.

Mr. de Vries, as one would expect of a deputy with a long experience in the North Atlantic Assembly, made an interesting and important speech. However, I do not believe that East-West dialogue should be conducted on the basis of confrontation or, necessarily, of recrimination. We should recognise the differences between our social systems. We should recognise that there are Gulags in the Soviet bloc but that there is none in the western democracies. The failure of the arms control talks in Geneva has not been of our making. We have made it quite clear that we wish to continue the dialogue.

On the concept of the European contribution, my report does not try to lay down how much individual European members of the alliance should spend. It recognises the different political and economic capabilities and the differing social circumstances of the respective member countries. That was reasonable and right. I was very grateful to my friend, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, for his speech, and in particular I appreciated what he said about the Americans. We certainly should support them, and I understand their preoccupations.

Of course paragraph A.2 (b) is important for the Federal German Republic, as Mr. Spies von Büllesheim and other German spokesmen have said. By virtue of the basic law of the Federal Republic, the German armed forces cannot be deployed outside the NATO area. They are engaged solely in the defence, through NATO, of the Federal German Republic. That is appropriate and right, and everyone in this chamber is deeply conscious of the German contribution. Everyone is conscious and appreciative of what the German Government have done under Chancellor Kohl's leadership. Germany was a signatory of the Ottawa declaration about out-of-area deployment, but its constitutional position is quite clear. I say in this sub-paragraph "with appropriate military capability" and I do not think that in the case of Germany that capability for out-of-area deployment exists.

As Sir Frederic Bennett said, it would be wrong for this debate about the report to become just a replay of the debate about cruise missiles.

Our national electorates and our national parliaments have stated their views and have voted. If this Assembly, by turning down this report, gave the impression outside that we, the sole European assembly with responsibility for defence, did not approve of the double-track decision and its consequences, the only people who would be glad would be the Soviet Union.

In response to Mr. Haase, I mentioned the German contribution on overseas aid to Portugal and Turkey as being a contribution to alliance solidarity and strength. So is the Federal Republic's support for West Berlin. It is critically important for the West, and I wholeheartedly applaud what it is doing in that respect, as does every country in NATO.

I am not seeking in this report to widen NATO's area of responsibility. That certainly could not happen without the agreement of the national parliaments. Mr. Scholten was complimentary about the report but said that the Christian Democratic Party in Holland could not accept the proposals for deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles. He said that the Pershings constituted a danger to the security of Western Europe. I cannot see that. The danger to that security comes from the SS-20s. They were deployed first with a six-year lead and we are seeking only to match them not with equal deployment but with sufficient deployment to achieve balance and to maintain deterrence.

Mr. Cavaliere made an impressive and fluent speech with all the authority of a former chairman of this committee. I applauded absolutely everything that he said. The Soviet Union has as its prime objective the decoupling of Western Europe from the United States, so creating dissension and division between the two components of the alliance, and he was right to emphasise that. The modernisation of cruise missiles was carried out, as he said, at our - the European - request.

I was grateful for the kind remarks of Mr. Beith, who made a thoughtful speech. It can only be for the national governments to decide how they spend the funds that they allocate for defence, and I have tried in the report to emphasise the importance not just of financial input but of output in practical terms of military capability.

I cannot be answerable for the attitude of the Liberal and SDP Parties in Britain. It is important to hold faith to the decision that has been taken, as Chancellor Schmidt has urged the alliance to do.

The refusal to include the French and British strategic deterrents in the INF talks was sensible. After all, the Russians in SALT always excluded the French and British national

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

deterrents because they regarded them as strategic; and of course the French and British strategic deterrents precede the deployment of SS-20s and cruise missiles.

Mr. Blaauw mentioned the Dutch white paper, and I understand the economic difficulties that Holland, along with other West European countries, is facing. The 2% increase in real terms is to be welcomed, because each country must make provision according to its capabilities. I do not want to create any difficulties for the Dutch coalition Government as a result of the report; it is a form of words that should be as broadly acceptable as possible. I share Mr. Blaauw's feeling about the importance of a genuine two-way street, and Holland has a particular imbalance in terms of armament procurement from the United States – indeed, an imbalance of trade – and we want to see that rectified by the sort of measures suggested in the report.

We have had a marvellous debate and I am grateful for the contributions that have been made. I hope and pray that at this historic juncture in its wisdom this Assembly will approve the report, because in doing so it will be serving the interests of the alliance as a whole.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank Mr. Wilkinson, who has defended his report with passion.

I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as you will have noticed, I have not taken part in the debate on this report and I shall not do so now. As Chairman of the committee, it is my job to transmit the committee's view. The committee approved the report by a large majority. It is therefore now up to each member of the Assembly to decide for or against, in accordance with his own conscience.

However, in presenting and illustrating his report, Mr. Wilkinson went a bit far when he said that his friend, Mr. Pignion – which is quite true – had voted in favour in committee. I shall not be asking for an amendment to the Rules of Procedure. But if votes in committee are to commit each member, we should cease debating reports and decide the issues by proportionally extrapolating the committee votes. That would be going a bit too far. Without indulging in split personality, I would simply say that if a vote in committee were to be final and cease to be subject to any kind of appraisal within the political and national groups, our debates would be severely curtailed.

What I can say, as Chairman of the committee and a member of this Assembly, is that Mr. Wilkinson's report is excellent, since it has aroused the interest and passion that we have witnessed in the debate.

But as a French socialist member I must state clearly – since my name has been mentioned – that, for the reasons already expounded by Mr. Natiez and others, I shall be unable to vote for the report as an individual member of the Assembly. As Chairman of the committee, I went along with Mr. Wilkinson. But I do not appreciate his reference to – I was almost going to say direct denunciation of – my responsibility within the committee. That is why, in a perfectly calm and clear manner, I have gone on to give my personal view.

The incident is closed, Mr. President. I have given my view, both as Chairman and as a member of the committee, as clearly, I hope, as possible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before proceeding to vote on the draft recommendation, we have to consider seven amendments in the order in which they affect the text, namely Amendments 1, 4, 5, 6, 2, 7 and 3.

If Amendment 1 is adopted, Amendment 4 will be void.

If Amendment 2 is adopted, Amendment 7 will be void.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish to withdraw all my amendments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Amendments 4, 5, 6 and 7 have been withdrawn.

I shall now read Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Bernini and others:

1. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (*viii*) and insert:

“Aware of the seriousness of the interruption of the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, of the risks of a further increase in rearmament and of the ever-growing dangers for European security that ensue;”.

I call Mr. Bernini to speak in support of Amendment 1.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, these amendments are designed to tone down the most disturbing section of the report and of the draft recommendation submitted by Mr. Wilkinson which has been the subject of considerable discussion and substantial disagreement in the Assembly; they also seek to draw attention to the most pressing problems.

Mr. Bernini (continued)

Regardless of who is responsible, we can all agree that the breakdown of the Geneva negotiations is serious and that the dialogue between the two superpowers must be resumed. Diplomatic moves must be made to persuade both sides to take positive steps towards such a resumption. In particular, the Soviet Union must move significantly towards dismantling some SS-20s – which should satisfy everyone concerned at the over-deployment of nuclear warheads targeted on the West – and at the same time the operational readiness of the cruise and Pershing missiles must be delayed; this would in any case take several months yet. We must therefore use this time to encourage the resumption of negotiations and to prepare the Stockholm conference.

This Mr. President is the purpose of my amendments which should obtain the support of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I must ask the Assembly to reject the amendment. Of course we are all aware of the seriousness of the interruption at the Geneva negotiations, but the amendment does not say who walked out of the talks. I think that that needs to be stated.

In addition, the amendment is not as simple as it appears, because it seeks to delete paragraph (viii) in the preamble, which I believe to be important. That paragraph refers to the possible consequences of developments beyond the NATO area. For those two reasons, the amendment should be opposed.

Both yesterday and today, I said quite clearly that the interruption to the Geneva negotiations was very regrettable. The blame can lie only with the other side, as we have consistently emphasised our determination to go on talking. However, we cannot talk if there is no one to talk to. To delete paragraph (viii) in order to accommodate the amendment would make it doubly wrong. I therefore ask the Assembly to reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – The committee has not had an opportunity to consider these amendments, and I can do no more than interpret the Assembly's silence.

It is indeed curious that when the President asked whether anyone wished to speak against Mr. Bernini's amendment nobody replied,

which would seem to indicate that everyone accepts it.

If we are no longer entitled to make a joke in this chamber!...

I am simply saying that the committee has not had an opportunity to consider the amendment.

Without going as far as to support Mr. Wilkinson's argument, I personally do not think the committee would have accepted it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

I shall now read Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Bernini and others:

2. Leave out paragraph A.2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“To promote steps for bringing about significant action by the great powers, postponement of the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles and the start of the dismantling of the SS-20s in order to encourage, with the help of the European countries, the resumption of the Geneva negotiations and the conclusion of an agreement on the level of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe at the lowest level of balance;”.

I call Mr. Bernini to speak in support of the amendment.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I spoke in support of all my amendments in my first speech.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Anthony Grant to speak against the amendment.

Sir Anthony GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – Just in case the Chairman of the committee should misinterpret silence as being assent to the amendment, I hereby state loudly and clearly that I am against the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Of course I cannot accept the amendment to delete paragraph A.2, which would emasculate the report. Accordingly, I ask representatives to reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – This amendment has not been considered by the committee and I would therefore leave the decision, as the saying goes, to the wisdom of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

I shall now read Amendment 3, tabled by Mr. Bernini and others:

3. Leave out paragraph A.3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“To help to define adequate mutual confidence-building and joint security measures to ensure the complete success of the forthcoming Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe;”.

Mr. Bernini has already spoken in support of this amendment.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Again, I just do not believe that the amendment, which would delete paragraph A.3 of the draft recommendation, can be accepted by the Assembly. To suggest that “adequate mutual confidence-building and joint security measures” are in any way comparable with the objective of the alliance, which is balanced and verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, is almost laughable.

We are looking not so much to the conference at Stockholm as to agreement as soon as possible at the INF talks. We greatly hope that the Soviets will resume those talks. We want mutual, balanced, verifiable arms control agreements, and we support our American allies in pursuit of that objective.

I therefore ask the Assembly to reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the committee has not considered this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 3 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

We now move to the vote on the draft recommendation in Document 959.

In accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substi-

tutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I am happy to say that one of the few aspects of the report on which the socialists and Mr. Wilkinson agree is that we need a roll-call vote so that every member of the Assembly can express his view clearly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Is this request for a vote by roll-call supported by at least five members of the Assembly?

It is.

We shall therefore proceed to a vote by roll-call.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President, while you are counting the votes. It is an important point of order and members may have sympathy with it. I am not critical of the Rapporteur. He courteously presented a serious, major report, but he will admit that in his efforts to reply fully to the debate, he spoke for the best part of an hour. I do not criticise Mr. Wilkinson. The complexity of the debate...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Hardy, you are well acquainted with the Rules of Procedure. You should have waited until the vote was finished before making that comment.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Yes, I shall raise my point of order after the vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Reddemann.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does anyone else wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows ¹:

Number of votes cast	68
Ayes	37
Noes	29
Abstentions	2

The draft recommendation is adopted ².

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I raised my point of order during the counting because I sought to save time. It is a serious point of order. I hope that Mr. Wilkinson does not feel that I am being critical. He behaved properly.

1. See page 19.

2. See page 21.

Mr. Hardy (continued)

The Assembly recognises that the report is serious. It was right that the Rapporteur should have a considerable time to present his arguments. The problem is that many members would have liked more time to present their arguments about serious and complex issues. In future, when the Assembly has to consider a report as serious and wide-ranging as this, which Mr. Wilkinson properly presented, we should be prepared to reduce the number of other items on the agenda so that we can do justice to such a report. After members have addressed the Assembly for three or four minutes, you, Mr. President, in compliance with your function, gesture to them to come to a conclusion. It is proper that the time for the Rapporteur to speak is not limited, but it is unfair for the speeches of members who wish to make serious contributions to a debate of enormous proportions to be constrained to two, three or four minutes. In that time, no one can do justice to such a report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As you know, Mr. Hardy, the Rapporteur's speaking time is not restricted. It is therefore up to him to behave reasonably.

I now put to the vote the draft resolution in Document 959.

Since a vote by roll-call has not been requested, the vote will be taken by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

*The draft resolution is adopted*¹.

I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – It is the first time in ten years as a parliamentarian that I have to ask for a correction of the official report of a parliamentary session. Yesterday Mr. Luns spoke of camels in connection with the credibility of the deterrent nuclear forces of the United States. I asked a question with reference to this phrase. In the speech of Mr. Luns in the official report the phrase referring to camels has been omitted. I accept this. I also have to accept that my question is now out of context, but I do not accept that in the report my critical question has been transformed into support for Mr. Luns's position. I do not accept that in my question by an unknown author the word "camels" has been substituted by the word "Russians". I think that fair not to the Russians nor to the camels nor to the rest of us, nor to the peacekeepers.

1. See page 23.

I ask that the report be corrected. What I said was:

"Mr. Luns said many extraordinary things. There are many questions I should like to put to Mr. Luns, but, as this is my first time in this Assembly, I shall restrict myself to one. In defending the deployment of middle-range Pershing II and cruise missiles, Mr. Luns said that only camels...

That was changed to "Russians". The passage should have continued:

"...could believe that the United States would risk a Soviet nuclear attack on American cities within thirty minutes by keeping its nuclear umbrella over Western Europe in case the Soviet Union should threaten Western Europe only with middle-range SS-20 missiles."

I then asked:

"Have we, you and me, Mr. Luns, all been camels when the United States withdrew its middle-range missiles in 1962 and 1963 from Western Europe and Turkey and accepted that the Soviet Union should keep more than 650 middle-range SS-4 and SS-5 missiles over all these years?"

It is not just a matter of poetic licence; the sense of what I said has been changed and I am sorry but I cannot accept it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – These comments will be taken into account.

I call Mr. Huydecoper van Nigtevecht, Ambassador of the Netherlands.

Mr. HUYDECOPER van NIGTEVECHT (*Ambassador of the Netherlands*). – I know that it is highly irregular to speak from this bench but Mr. Luns sat next to me yesterday when this question was put and I understood that it was a pure case of misunderstanding. His pronunciation, speaking with a Dutch tongue, must have caused the error. What he wanted to say was "Kremel", not "camels". A lot of complications have arisen from misunderstanding by the interpreters and others in the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Your Excellency, for your explanation, which I believe the speaker will find satisfactory.

4. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 948)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and

The President (continued)

Armaments on the application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council, Document 948.

I would remind you that, at its sitting of 7th June 1983, the Assembly adopted a proposal for reference back to committee. The committee has decided to resubmit the report to the Assembly without change.

I also have to inform the Assembly that, before the sitting was opened, I received notice of intention to move the previous question given by Mr. Lagorce, Document 964.

If the previous question is agreed to, this debate will be withdrawn from the orders of the day and from the list of questions before the Assembly.

We shall first hear Mr. Prussen, who will present his report, and I shall then call upon the author of the previous question to move it.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – I wish to speak.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – I would point out that this important report by Mr. Prussen and Mr. Lagorce's previous question are to be considered at a time when the chamber is emptying. I am distressed at this coincidence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – This report was listed in the orders of the day. The President of the Assembly endeavoured to keep the debate on the previous item within the time limits laid down.

I call Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur of the committee.

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I too see no problem in deferring the debate until this afternoon.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Since the orders of the day are particularly full, I would ask the members of the Assembly to continue the discussion.

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – This report was originally tabled in plenary sitting on Tuesday, 7th June 1983. You know what happened: it was referred back to committee without any amendment having been tabled. I was of course surprised by this unexplained setback, because the report and draft recommendation had been adopted in committee by 15 votes to 1 with 1 abstention.

Let me remind you of the circumstances in which the Assembly decided to refer the report back.

Few British and Italian members were present at last June's session because of the parliamentary elections taking place in their countries. On Tuesday, 7th June, I presented this report to the Assembly after it had been addressed by the French Minister for External Relations, Mr. Cheysson. Reference back was proposed – without consulting me first and without committee members having received the slightest notice – after the speeches by Mr. Dejardin and Mr. Bassinet, shortly before the close of the morning sitting, when the chamber was already emptying and only a dozen representatives remained in their seats.

Since no amendment has been tabled in the interim, the committee has not thought it necessary to change its explanatory memorandum or its draft recommendation, and has decided to resubmit the report to the Assembly.

The first important point concerns paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation, in which it is proposed that the Council, in application of Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III.

Clearly this amendment, authorised by the treaty itself, is of capital importance for our friends in the Federal Republic of Germany. It would bring about the cancellation of the last restrictions on the manufacture of conventional weapons imposed on Germany by the treaty, that is to say those referring to long-range missiles – the construction of other categories of guided missiles having been authorised for a long time now – and to strategic bomber aircraft. This cancellation would place the Federal Republic of Germany on the same footing as the other signatories of the treaty with regard to conventional weapons, on the very eve of the thirtieth anniversary of the modified Brussels Treaty, which was signed on 23rd October 1954.

The paragraph in question was moreover already contained in Recommendation 380, which the Assembly adopted on 15th June 1982 by 42 votes to 4 with 8 abstentions. It was also approved by the Council of Ministers.

The intention of the members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is to encourage the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, through a massive vote in favour by our Assembly, to embark on the procedure for cancellation of this final restriction. The discriminatory and humiliating character of this restriction has been pointed out on several occasions in previous reports.

In these circumstances, a positive vote by the Assembly in favour of cancelling this last restriction could only have a beneficial effect on the political climate, both within WEU and within the Atlantic Alliance, as it would strengthen the

Mr. Prussen (continued)

ties of friendship among the countries that signed the Brussels Treaty, and would give great satisfaction to the Federal Republic of Germany, which has so far been reluctant to commence such a procedure on its own initiative.

The Federal Republic of Germany does not of course wish to manufacture the two categories of arms in question, but its government would welcome the symbolic cancellations of this last restriction, which would require a two-thirds majority of the WEU Council.

To put the Federal Republic of Germany finally on an equal footing thirty years after the signing of the treaty would be no more than justice demands. It would also be a sign of gratitude for thirty years of loyalty, to a nation whose return to a modern democracy can no longer be in any doubt. It would be a historic act that would do away with the last consequences of the cruellest period of our century, a period, it is to be hoped, the like of which will never recur on our continent. There is no need to tell you how pleased and proud I am to be able to include in the draft recommendation a proposal of such historic importance.

For the sake of clarity in the debate, let me stress that the draft recommendation seeks no change of any kind in the treaty provisions relating to atomic, biological or chemical weapons. Under the modified Brussels Treaty, Germany has renounced the right to manufacture such weapons on its territory. The treaty contains no provision for the modification of that renunciation, nor does the committee's report make any recommendation in this respect. In reality, this provision is no longer discriminatory because, on the one hand, six WEU countries have renounced the right to manufacture biological weapons under the 1972 convention on bacteriological weapons. While, on the other hand, the five non-nuclear countries who are members of WEU have renounced the right to manufacture atomic weapons under the 1968 non-proliferation treaty.

The second important point in the draft recommendation is paragraph 2, which calls on the Council to submit to the Assembly in the near future the results of its consideration of the technical, military and political aspects of varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III, a list which may be varied under the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty. We are talking about the list of conventional weapons of all member countries that are subject to control on the mainland of Europe.

The usefulness of the controls on the conventional weapons listed in Annex IV has been questioned on several occasions, and the Assem-

bly, in Recommendation 380, last year asked the Council to "vary the list in question by reducing it." It was in response to that recommendation from the Assembly that the Council undertook the consideration referred to in paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation now before us.

Allow me to quote Mr. Lagorce, whose speech appears on page 88 of the Official Report of the debates of June 1982:

"Admittedly, the machinery for the notification of armaments and for control by the Agency is very incomplete or, partly, unsuitable. For it is obvious that, as the lists of armaments subject to control by the Agency were compiled twenty-eight years ago, the development of modern weapons requires that they be updated in the light of the new realities."

That is precisely what the members of the committee are trying to do. Some suggested making technical proposals for changes but in my opinion that is a matter for the specialists, rather than for the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

There is thus no question of dismantling either the Brussels Treaty or the Agency for the Control of Armaments - quite the reverse. Previous reports have repeatedly suggested that the functions of the Agency for the Control of Armaments should be updated, that it should be given more important tasks, and that WEU should be adapted to the needs of the 1980s.

WEU members taking part in the Stockholm disarmament conference will have a unique opportunity to propose the involvement of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, which has almost thirty years' experience in the field of arms control.

Let me briefly recall the nature of the controls envisaged by the treaty. The test checks, visits and inspections carried out by the WEU Agency concern arms for forces remaining under national command. Arms for forces under NATO command are verified by NATO.

The United Kingdom is exempt, on its own territory, from the controls laid down in the treaty, since Agency activity is restricted to the mainland of Europe.

Application of the controls envisaged in the treaty for nuclear and biological weapons has never been authorised by the Council.

Finally, the aircraft and missiles associated with the French nuclear forces are not themselves nuclear weapons and are therefore not checked by the Agency. France, moreover, has never ratified the convention on the steps to be taken by WEU member states to allow the Agency to carry out its controls effectively.

Mr. Prussen (continued)

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the international political situation, particularly the European situation, gives cause for concern. More than ever, European unity is of capital importance if the European pillar is to play its full and proper part and if the eventual establishment of a European defence community within the framework of NATO is to be envisaged. It is precisely France and Germany who will have a preponderant rôle to play in this respect.

Allow me to quote what Mr. Mitterrand said on television on 16th November 1983:

“ European defence is an idea whose impact I understand, an idea which is commendable in itself and which should constitute a major objective of all Western European political leaders... France is already performing this rôle. It is performing this rôle because it was I myself who revived the Elysée Treaty signed by General de Gaulle and Mr. Adenauer in 1963, thereby revitalising a neglected provision that allows for discussions with the West German general staff. ”

The positive and encouraging outcome of the Franco-German summit gives reason to hope that our French friends will give their backing to the recommendation proposed by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and support their President's policy of Franco-German rapprochement.

I hope, Mr. President, that these details will shed more light on the draft recommendation, and I would ask the members of the Assembly to express their approval, through a massive positive vote, of a draft recommendation that testifies to the fact that any idea of distrust or discrimination has been banished once and for all from our alliance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Mr. Prussen. We shall now consider the previous question moved by Mr. Lagorce.

I would remind you that, under Article 32 (4) of the Rules of Procedure, only the proposer of the motion, one speaker against, and the rapporteur or chairman of the committee concerned may speak. Furthermore, under Article 31 (7) of the Rules of Procedure, speaking time for each of them is limited to five minutes.

I call Mr. Lagorce to move the previous question.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have felt it necessary to move the previous question in respect of Mr. Prussen's report for three main reasons, which I shall explain briefly.

The first reason is one of bad timing. In the present circumstances, marked by the crisis over

Euromissiles and the rise of the peace movements, it seems to me politically most untimely, as all the governments of the member countries and a number of our colleagues recognise, to deal with this question now.

The second reason concerns the credibility of our Assembly. One can only wonder at the tenacity of the attempt to get the Assembly to pronounce once again on a text which it has already referred back to committee and which has now been returned without a comma having been changed.

It looks like an attempt to force matters, and I do not think we should reverse our decision in the absence of any new argument justifying a second debate.

The third reason is one of substance, and much more important. Leaving aside the forcing tactics used by the Rapporteur to impose his proposals, it seems to us that these matters must be viewed in a broader context. What is WEU? What is it capable of becoming?

The basic problem with the draft recommendation is that its principal thrust is to opt for the total elimination of controls and prohibitions on arms manufacture, which strikes at the very essence of WEU.

There can be no doubt that the time has come to look squarely at our organisation, lay down the main lines of its future development, and define our ambitions for it.

The international security context and the public concern in our countries on this matter underline, if this were necessary, the need for this appraisal, a need which is in fact much more political than technical or legal. Once certain outmoded aspects of WEU's work have been noted – and Mr. Prussen was good enough to quote one of my speeches on the subject – the real need is for a general review of the future of the WEU institutions. The possibility of doing away with controls on the level and manufacture of conventional weapons would of course have its place in such a study, just as would the search for new tasks that could be entrusted to the Agency for the Control of Armaments, whose undisputed competence could be put, for example, at the disposal of the governments and of this Assembly for the examination of questions relating to disarmament negotiations and agreements. The same applies to the Standing Armaments Committee, whose work we actively support, since European armaments co-operation meets with well-known difficulties although it is an essential element in the security policy of our countries.

Quite clearly, it was a study of such scope that our Assembly expected. We know that the Council is at present examining the question of

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

controls. It is already aware of our concerns and of our desire that restrictions on the manufacture of conventional weapons by the Federal Republic of Germany be lifted and that controls on the armaments levels of other member states be reconsidered.

Another deadline awaits us on the eve of the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Paris Agreements. This is the direction in which our work should be proceeding, and it is to this that the report under consideration should be geared. That, however, is not what Mr. Prussen is proposing.

Speaking for the Socialist Group, I therefore urge the Assembly to vote for the previous question which I have the honour of moving.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the previous question?...

I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – This report is at the heart of the Assembly. Each year we in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments prepare such a report for debate in the hemicycle. Last session, by a procedural move, the report was referred back to the committee. The committee looked again at the report and at the committee meeting no amendments were introduced. We had another vote on it and it was adopted by a large majority, and that is why it is back here now.

What Mr. Lagorce has proposed is not bad in some respects, but for a future report. He is proposing the murder of a child – a child that is born every year in this hemicycle, so to speak – because the “previous question” means, if the motion were adopted, that the report would be killed, and therefore I strongly oppose the motion and ask for a roll-call vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I completely disagree with Mr. Lagorce.

I think that now is the right time politically to demonstrate that Europe is united, that it wants to lift the last restrictions and to co-operate in building the pillar of the European defence community, which has been supported on several occasions by the President of the French Republic himself.

I fail to understand why there is talk of bad political timing, and fear that it might harm our adversaries in the eastern bloc. Nor do I see why the credibility of our Assembly would be called into question – which Mr. Lagorce did not in fact say explicitly.

If, at least, some amendments had been tabled, I would have been able to study them. That was not the case either at Pisa or at Brussels, or even between those two sessions. None of the members opposed to the report and to the draft recommendation has provided the least explanation that might have allowed me to amend them. There seems to be a fear that the Agency for the Control of Armaments will be eliminated, despite my having stressed it was simply a question of updating Annex IV and of making the Agency more effective. On this point everyone ought to be in agreement. Nor is it the first time that such a proposal has appeared in a text, since the same problem was dealt with in a previous report three or four years ago.

I am therefore opposed to a further reference back to committee or to withdrawal of the report from the orders of the day. I would even wish, given the small number of members now present, that the vote be deferred until the beginning of this afternoon's sitting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Do you want us to defer the discussion or keep consideration of this report on this morning's orders of the day?

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Upon reflection, I am in favour of proceeding immediately to vote on the previous question.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Blaauw has requested a vote by roll-call.

Is this request supported by ten members of the Assembly?

It is.

We shall therefore take a vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Forma.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Can you explain exactly what we are voting for?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We are about to vote on the previous question seeking withdrawal of this item from the orders of the day. Those who wish it to be withdrawn should vote “Yes”, while those who wish the debate to continue should vote “No”.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does anyone else wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

1. See page 20.

The President (continued)

Number of votes cast	41
Ayes	13
Noes	28
Abstentions	0

The previous question is negatived.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we shall start the general debate at the beginning of this afternoon's sitting.

**5. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (Debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 948 and amendments).

2. Rôle and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 960).
3. Assessment of advanced technology in Japan (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 956).
4. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – Part II (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 963 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 1 p.m.)

SEVENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 29th November 1983

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (*Debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 948 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Bernini, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Prussen (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Prussen, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Prussen, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Prussen, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Jung, Mr. Prussen.
3. Rôle and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 960*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Pecchioli (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Pecchioli (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pignion (*Chairman of the committee*).
4. Assessment of advanced technology in Japan (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 956*).
Speakers: The President, Lord Northfield (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Böhm, Sir John Osborn, Lord Kinnoull, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Lagorce, Lord Northfield (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Lenzer (*Chairman of the committee*).
5. Adoption of the minutes.
6. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – Part II (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 963 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Bassinet (*Rapporteur*), Sir John Osborn, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Forma.
7. Changes in the membership of committees.
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council

(Debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 948 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day now provide for the debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 948 and amendments.

1. See page 26.

I would remind the Assembly that this morning it rejected the previous question moved by Mr. Lagorce.

The general debate is open and I call Mr. Bernini.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to explain briefly the reasons why I disagree with Mr. Prussen's report and why I and my colleagues will vote against the draft recommendation; they are basically of two kinds.

Firstly, while I understand the basic line taken by Mr. Prussen in his report, I am opposed to the changes which he proposes, particularly those to the list in Annex IV to Protocol No. III to the Brussels Treaty; and I am even more strongly opposed to the cancellation of the list of weapons except for chemical and atomic weapons, as nevertheless suggested, contrary to the terms of the Brussels Treaty.

Our objections are not only on the issue of principle, on the grounds that the treaties should be implemented and not surreptitiously modified; nor are they due to reserves or discriminatory attitudes towards the Federal Republic of Germany, to which nobody – and we least of all – wishes to deny the right to organise its own

Mr. Bernini (continued)

defence and to play its proper rôle in European defence and security.

The reason for our disapproval is basically political. We do not understand the proposal to cancel the list of essentially offensive weapons when this has not been done for other types of weapons in the past. In view of the nature of these weapons, permission to manufacture them may take on special significance and lead to offensive options by the other side in a European and international situation already burdened by tension and suspicion on both sides, which Europe and with it the Federal Republic of Germany are greatly concerned to correct.

And this alone is the reason for our reserves and our opposition; our purpose is to avoid adding to the serious causes of tension which are fuelling the armaments race when it is more than ever necessary to take action to remedy the present climate of international relations by way of an agreement to reduce and control armaments on which the true security of Europe ultimately depends; this includes the security of the Federal Republic of Germany which, as we are very well aware, would be the first to suffer the cost and consequences of an increase of international tension.

Our second set of reasons for opposing the proposal before us is that it in fact means reducing or indeed completely eliminating the rôle of the Agency for the Control of Armaments which would be reduced to a kind of study agency, in collaboration with a private American agency; this raises a constitutional problem and in any case has nothing to do with the provisions of the Brussels Treaty.

I would observe to Mr. Prussen that, at the very moment when everybody is conscious of the need to strengthen European co-operation and to increase the importance and rôle of Europe in the Atlantic Alliance, for the better organisation of the common defence and security, we would be seeking to cut down the rôle of bodies such as the Agency for the Control of Armaments which can help to achieve these objectives.

In fact, these bodies should if anything be strengthened and given wider power because a common European defence policy is based on mutual confidence and therefore on joint control of the undertakings entered into by the contracting states. In peacetime these bodies must be kept in being to check that signatory states are fulfilling their undertakings, precisely so that in the event of a crisis they can help in putting those undertakings into effect. We do not understand therefore why organisations that can work effectively to that end should be deprived of all their content.

Against this background, I would remind Mr. Lagorce that we Europeans should have greater ambitions. Without question, Europe must create for itself the independent capacity to assess the existing force relationships, so that it has the knowledge to intervene with the individual states and to help in eliminating unjustifiably selfish attitudes, in encouraging agreements for arms reductions and in guaranteeing the implementation of agreements already entered into.

In all this, WEU can make a great contribution not by destroying its existing bodies but rather by strengthening them in order to increase its ability to intervene in achieving the highest level of European security.

These are the reasons for my opposition which I hope will be considered by the Assembly and will persuade other members to reject the proposals in Mr. Prussen's report and recommendations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in presenting his report Mr. Prussen said that it was a question of removing the last traces of a period of German history that would not be repeated. We Germans do not forget the bad part of our history – we remember it with humility. But we are nevertheless proud of almost thirty-five years of free German democracy that have elapsed since then and of our contribution to peace, which no one now calls into question.

In view of Mr. Bernini's kind remarks on this point, I shall refrain from further comment and simply say that we shall be voting for Mr. Prussen's report. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am in full agreement with Mr. Prussen's report not only because it was drafted and approved by the committee when I was Chairman but because I am firmly convinced of the soundness of the political arguments upon which his proposals are based.

This is not a matter of striking a blow against WEU by depriving one of its bodies, the Agency for the Control of Armaments, of all its powers and prestige, because, as times and attitudes change, some instruments and organisations have also to be changed and to be given new tasks and purposes so that they can continue to contribute to maintaining the prestige of the organisation to which they belong.

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

It is therefore not a question of discrediting the Agency for the Control of Armaments but of continuing a political process which has been going on for some years. I shall not dwell on the major tasks which fall to the Federal Republic of Germany in this Assembly and the Atlantic Alliance; I shall not dwell on how that country has set a true example of democracy and loyalty to the western countries; I shall simply point out that Mr. Prussen's proposals stem from others made previously. Basically, this is a move to give legal sanction to changes which eliminate all discrimination and suspicion regarding a country which deserves so well.

I would add that the proposals made in Mr. Prussen's report in previous years and those which he has made today appear to me to be in line with the progress achieved in the matter of collaboration and the establishment of mutual confidence with that great country, the Federal Republic of Germany.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to be brief in this intervention and I simply give my full support to my friend and colleague, Mr. Prussen, on a most important report. Almost thirty years on from the signature of the Paris protocols, whereby the German Federal Republic and Italy were invited to participate in our organisation, it is surely appropriate that we should remove the final constraints upon our West German friends.

The Federal Republic of Germany has shown itself in every way to be an exemplary democracy. It forms a key part of our alliance. Strategically it plays a vital rôle in the defence of Western Europe and NATO as a whole. Therefore it is right that the German Federal Republic should have the entitlement, which every other member of the alliance has, to produce offensive guided weapons and bomber aircraft which would be used for NATO defence and for no other purpose.

It would be wrong for us by turning down the report to give the impression that we want to perpetuate second-class citizen status for the Federal Republic of Germany, which has been in every way a full member of the organisation and which has played a wholehearted and admirable part in it. Therefore, we should support the report with a big majority.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall speak in Dutch. My

point can be made quite briefly, and I am glad you have given me an opportunity to do so. I put my name down to speak only because I want to make a comment in support of Mr. Bernini, whose remarks provoked such a reaction from Mr. Spies von Büllesheim. I do not think the partial amendments which Mr. Prussen is proposing to the Brussels Treaty should be judged against the history of the period immediately following the second world war. In my view it is unnecessary to look at matters concerning weapons technology and the Federal Republic of Germany in that light again.

I think that we should be cautious about amending the Brussels Treaty, simply because the treaty might itself be swept out of existence if we leave it so little substance that, at a given point in time, it simply ceases to be viable. Given the unique political context of the Brussels Treaty, that would be particularly regrettable. This being so, we should not adopt any far-reaching amendments and, regardless of the post-war motives that caused it to be put together in this form, as far as the remainder of its political content is concerned, we should defend the treaty against the danger of becoming redundant.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for being so brief, Mr. Tummers.

The general debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I must begin by thanking Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Wilkinson for supporting my report without reservation.

As regards Mr. Bernini's statement, I cannot see how my words might conflict with Annex IV. Having quoted Mr. Lagorce this morning, I shall now quote what Mr. Dejardin said in June of this year: "In the present circumstances and state of ideas, many people feel that the limitation and control, of conventional armaments at least, are somewhat antiquated." There can be no doubt about it: that is what he said.

Mr. Tummers introduces an inconsistent element of distrust into an alliance for legitimate collective defence. Intentions should not be questioned. Democracy is a very well established fact in Germany, and we have no reason to impose further restrictions on that country's production of weapons, which the Germans have, moreover, never said they intend to manufacture.

Furthermore, Mr. Hernu and the Defence Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany have just signed an agreement for the joint production of a series of helicopters. It is

Mr. Prussen (continued)

inconceivable that bombers or long-range missiles should be built in some small factory or other or in the back-room of a shop. It seems rather too facile to me for such a serious problem to be presented in this way.

I believe this is above all a moral problem, a restriction that is now no more than symbolic, and that, thirty years after the signing of the treaty, it should be removed from this treaty, which is quite possible, as I have said on several occasions, since the treaty makes provision for its removal.

Mr. Bernini has again advanced various political arguments. Latterly, in committee, he has referred to chemical weapons, which are not, however, involved. I do not see what political arguments there are.

In my view, it should be argued that there is a need for very close collaboration among the members of WEU and the members of the North Atlantic Treaty, even if Mr. Andropov does not like it, which should not bother us, because we must maintain a firm attitude against any sign of pressure from that quarter.

As regards the Agency for the Control of Armaments, as I said this morning, there is absolutely no question of curtailing its activities. Quite the contrary. All I proposed this morning, as I did in June, was that the Agency should be given a more worthwhile function, perhaps by having it collaborate with the ACDA, which has also proved itself and has also participated in the SALT II talks.

I do not see how it can be claimed that I called for the Agency to be abolished or for its activities to be scaled down. On the contrary, I believe it must do far more than simply count those weapons held by our forces which are not under NATO control.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does the Chairman of the committee have anything to add?

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). - No, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Before taking the vote on the draft recommendation, we have to consider the amendments.

Four amendments have been tabled. They will be considered in the order in which they relate to the text: Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Mr. Lagorce, do you wish to move your amendments separately or together?

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). - I would prefer to move them separately, but I shall be brief, because they are very simple.

They merely call for the deletion of a few words rather than the rewording of whole passages.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Lagorce reads as follows:

1. In the last line of paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "by reducing".

I call Mr. Lagorce to speak in support of Amendment 1.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). - The Council does not specify in its reply how the list will be varied. The words "by reducing" prejudice the outcome of the Council's study of the technical, military and political aspects of a variation of the list of weapons subject to quantitative controls. What we are concerned with here is modernisation and not necessarily reduction. That is the only reason for my proposal that, without changing the substance, we should delete the words "by reducing".

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). - Amendment 1, in which Mr. Lagorce seeks the deletion of the words "by reducing", conflicts with Recommendation 380, paragraph 2 of which reads: "In application of Article V of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, vary by reducing the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III".

As this recommendation was adopted by a very large majority last year, I call on the Assembly to reject this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Lagorce reads as follows:

2. Leave out paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

I call Mr. Lagorce to speak in support of his amendment.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). - According to paragraph (iii) of the preamble, it is felt that in the present circumstances it is no longer appropriate to apply the controls on atomic and biological weapons, whereas paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation refers to the possibility of deleting the list of atomic and biological weapons.

This seems inconsistent to me, unless the Rapporteur has some explanation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view ?

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I must first point out that paragraph (iii) of the preamble was adopted in committee after a lengthy discussion.

I must also ask Mr. Lagorce if France would agree to submit its atomic, biological and chemical weapons to control. If so, I am prepared to delete this paragraph. If not, I want it retained.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President I cannot remember exactly how the discussion of this subject went. Undoubtedly, there will be some inconsistency if this passage is left unchanged. Things that have never been applied are not abolished. I hope that some understanding will be shown. When we talk of updating, we mean modernising, bringing things up to date, not going back on texts which have not been applied.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I repeat: if France agrees to submit its atomic, chemical and biological weapons to control, paragraph (iii) will be withdrawn. But it has not yet ratified the convention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – All the representatives have now heard enough to decide how they wish to vote.

I put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

Mr. Lagorce has tabled Amendment 3, which reads as follows :

3. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " while taking into consideration the possibility of deleting the list concerned except for atomic, biological or chemical weapons ".

I call Mr. Lagorce to speak in support of his amendment.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – General agreement that the list of weapons subject to quantitative controls must be updated does not mean that it must be deleted. As these controls form the basis of the treaty, their removal would mean winding up the Agency and therefore WEU. Technical modifications

cannot be made until the whole question of the Agency's rôle has been considered. That was the point of my statement this morning.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view ?

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the committee spent a long time discussing paragraph 2. What Mr. Lagorce wants to leave out was the subject of an amendment proposed by Mr. Pignion, Chairman of the committee, to which I agreed.

To accommodate him, we would have to...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this really is a bit much. I am shocked at the state of my colleagues' memories.

It is true that some considerable time ago, in June, I called on Mr. Prussen to make certain changes in committee. But I defy Mr. Prussen to prove that I asked him to make this amendment. It is really becoming rather tiresome in this Assembly, the way the past is constantly used to justify the present, with arguments which carry little weight.

I should therefore like to see an end to this sort of thing and serious problems to be treated in a calm manner and these are serious problems.

I did not ask for the floor during the debate, being the Chairman of the committee. But this debate is more serious than is thought. I should therefore like to see this little game stopped, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I did not want to intervene when Mr. Wilkinson began using this kind of argument. According to the Rules of Procedure, discussions in committees should remain confidential. The Assembly is the supreme body, and committee proceedings help to form opinions in the Assembly, but the Assembly's decisions are not taken in the committees.

I therefore request present and future rapporteurs not to use this kind of argument.

I put Amendment 3 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

Mr. Lagorce has tabled Amendment 4, which reads as follows :

4. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

The President (continued)

I call Mr. Lagorce to speak in support of this amendment.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am surprised to find a recommendation of this kind in the text.

I am not, of course, a member of the committee, and I do not know what was discussed. There may be reasons for advocating such co-operation with the American agency.

From the eleventh page of the report, however, I note that this agency has been downgraded somewhat. That is no exaggeration, since the Rapporteur himself points out in a footnote :

“ Since President Reagan took office the ACDA annual budget has been reduced from \$18.5 m to \$15 m; its staff reduced from 200 to 150 and one-third of senior posts left unfilled; its operational analysis office abolished... ”.

Is it realistic to want to co-operate with this agency? Are we to be the saviours who rehabilitate it and bring it back to life? I think this is out of place here, unless there is something which escapes me, some underlying idea. I am wondering in fact whether the ACDA will not be completely abolished in the long run.

I hope, therefore, that the Rapporteur can give some explanation, because I must admit I do not understand.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Jung.

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I can well believe that some members do not understand. I feel I should therefore explain that the committee's basic idea was that we in Europe must be united in defence.

We know how vulnerable we are. We know we are living on a volcano. We know how much we need an agreement, and we can but welcome the fact that some heads of state – particularly the President of the French Republic – have reached certain agreements.

I do not understand the discussions we have here, because in the final analysis we must remember that only a united Europe, a European defence can save us from the foreign forces which threaten us. This will explain the spirit in which this vote was taken in committee.

I should simply like to congratulate Mr. Prussen on his report, because he has been very courageous in showing that we are all united on the question of defence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's opinion?

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Although the ACDA has been downgraded somewhat, we cannot tell what will become of it in a few years' time. I do not think it will be completely abolished. If that was the intention, this step would already have been taken. Furthermore, the proposal made in the draft recommendation was specifically designed to give renewed value to the agency's work by enabling it to participate in other programmes. I can therefore agree to Mr. Lagorce's amendment, over which I have no difficulty at all.

In reply to Mr. Pignion, I should like to say that, if anyone took this discussion seriously, I did, because I can assure you that, considering all the discussions that took place behind the scenes, strong nerves were needed to hold out until the end.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You therefore have an open mind.

I put Amendment 4 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 4 is negatived.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 948.

In accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Is a vote by roll-call requested by five members?...

That not being the case, the vote will be taken by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*The draft recommendation is adopted*¹.

I congratulate the Rapporteur on his success.

3. *Rôle and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime*

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 960)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the rôle and

1. See page 27.

The President (continued)

contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 960.

I call Mr. Pecchioli, Rapporteur.

Mr. PECCHIOLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in the most disturbing state of European and world relations, when there is a very serious increase in the quantity and quality of nuclear and conventional weapons and when there are bloody conflicts and acute crises all over the world, the WEU Assembly is today devoting some of its time to the unquestionably peaceful and humanitarian tasks of our countries' armed forces; I am speaking of the help which they give in the event of natural or collective man-made disasters.

I believe that our decision is of importance in the light of the need to give increasingly adequate protection to populations struck or threatened by the recurrent disasters and of the international political background against which it is being taken. In discussing this problem, WEU is restating in a responsible manner the essential values of the right to life and human solidarity, is proposing a useful area for strengthening confidence between the public and the armed forces and is offering the opportunity for dialogue and international collaboration and hence a contribution to the cause of peace and to the difficult but essential resumption of détente.

Against this background, I shall now comment briefly on the main points of the report and draft recommendation which the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has unanimously approved and decided to submit to the Assembly.

The documents under discussion are based on an analysis of experience and regulations in fourteen countries – whose governments answered our questionnaire for which I am most grateful – and on current United Nations and NATO agreements. Ignoring the varying situations arising from the differing levels of risk, the analysis shows that almost all the countries studied have regulations governing action by the armed forces in the event of disaster.

These regulations do not provide for action beyond frontiers.

Only in the United States has any branch of the armed forces – Engineer Corps – permanent responsibility for flood relief while elsewhere – even where, as in France and Belgium, there are military agencies responsible for dealing with disasters – it is the civil authorities which have power and responsibility as regards intervention by the armed forces. Acting under instructions from the civil authorities, the armed forces

employed carry out their tasks under their normal commanders, but with various forms of co-ordination with the civil authorities and with varying degrees of autonomy. Furthermore, there is no item for civil protection in the defence budget of any country. In general the civil authority acts first. The armed forces are only called in when the problem is too great to be handled by civilian services. According to the extent and nature of the disaster, the armed forces used are drawn from the engineer, signals, transport, including air force and navy, and medical services.

It is only in a few countries that the armed forces – and the civil authorities – have forward plans for the intervention and territorial deployment of troops based on forecasts of possible disasters. Lastly, two general facts emerge from this analysis; firstly, in all the countries the basic function of the armed forces is obviously defence against attacks from outside and military involvement in civil protection is regarded everywhere as a special, unscheduled duty; secondly, that there are only a very few little-known, and so far ineffective international agreements on civil defence and the same applies to bodies set up for the purpose by NATO and the United Nations. This of course in no way detracts from the many praiseworthy displays of international solidarity on various occasions. In this context, I would again like to offer my warmest thanks to the countries which gave Italy generous aid, including military assistance, after the earthquakes in Friuli and Irpinia.

Members will have seen that after summarising the position in the different countries, the report tries to outline a kind of “standard model” for intervention by troops in the event of natural and collective man-made disasters.

I should explain that this suggestion is based primarily on Italy's experience and should in no way be regarded as a claim to make suggestions to governments, as every country is naturally free to make such rules as it sees fit.

However, experience suggests a number of ideas; firstly, the armed forces, whose basic defence duties must be maintained, should be asked to help only during the first stage after a disaster – from the declaration of an emergency until the conditions for reconstruction have been established – and then only on tasks which troops are capable of handling, as there are obviously specialist civilian agencies for other tasks; secondly, that the value of the military contribution will be enhanced if the civil authority has forward plans for every type of action to handle the various types of danger, if appropriate warning and alarm systems have been set up, if there are arrangements for effective co-ordination of all forms of action,

Mr. Pecchioli (continued)

public and private, civilian and military, government and voluntary and if local, civilian authorities have been given adequate powers – particularly municipal authorities.

As regards international agreements and action, I have to say that very little has been planned or done. In order to cope with the dramatic events we are considering, much more must be done by way of practical international collaboration in the matter of warnings and alarms, scientific and technical research and the forward planning and co-ordination of action. It must not be forgotten that from time to time vast human and material resources are destroyed by natural and man-made disasters. Such calamities destroy thousands of lives and vast cultural and natural resources and the products of human hands.

Action must be taken in this field so that nations, states and governments find a way to agree and to overcome all divisions, distrust and selfish attitudes.

In this context the international organisations have a decisive rôle to play; first and foremost the United Nations and then the Atlantic Alliance, the European Community, the Council of Europe and WEU.

The United Nations, which has already adopted many resolutions on the subject, has the Office of the Disaster Relief Co-ordinator, but its powers and resources are limited.

In 1971, NATO recommended agreements between member countries on costs and frontier passage formalities and offered to make available, on demand, its own situation analysis centre and its communications system to broadcast information and requests for aid. But here again, I feel that this is much less than is needed.

There are very few bilateral or multilateral mutual assistance agreements – I may mention those between Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Luxembourg. Much remains to be done therefore.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is on the basis of this general thinking, that I am submitting to you, on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the draft recommendation which calls on member governments to pay particular attention to the rôle and contribution of the armed forces in studying, planning and using civil protection means; to promote various forms of collaboration and international agreements between the member countries of WEU; to contribute within the United Nations and other international organisations to world relief to coun-

tries struck by disaster. By so doing we shall be fulfilling a civic and moral duty and making a valuable contribution to the peace and security of mankind. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The general debate is open and I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, for once I can congratulate Mr. Pecchioli for the long and excellent report which he has produced and so brilliantly introduced to the Assembly.

It deals with a problem which unfortunately is of pressing interest because very little time elapses between the disasters which strike one or other country. Hence the need for solidarity between peoples and working solidarity between organisations and nations so that the armed forces can act rapidly and effectively to provide the assistance needed immediately after a natural disaster and to prevent even worse consequences.

Mr. Pecchioli's proposals for greater collaboration between states so that the armed forces can carry out this civilian task of protecting human life and the natural resources of the various countries to best effect are of the greatest value.

I think that the Assembly was right to agree to discuss and adopt a recommendation on the subject, following up the initiative taken by Mr. Pecchioli and carried forward in this magnificent report.

Mr. President, in concluding may I take the opportunity to endorse the Rapporteur's thanks to the countries which demonstrated by action and aid of various kinds their solidarity with the people of Italy hit by a number of earthquakes. These thanks come truly from my heart and are in praise of human solidarity in the defence of people at their worst moments and as a contribution to collaboration for peace for the triumph of civilisation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The President of this Assembly wishes to join the Rapporteur in this expression of thanks.

The general debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur to reply to the speaker.

Mr. PECCHIOLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to thank all who have helped me in this work and all members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments for their valuable contribution; I should also like to thank the officials of our committee for all the help they have given.

I hope that the Assembly will approve the report and the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should not like the debate on this report to pass without my saying a few, brief words.

To the tribute Mr. Cavaliere paid just now to Mr. Pecchioli – who very kindly returned the compliment – I wish to add that our Rapporteur has done an excellent job and taken initiatives which have turned this report into a required work of reference for any future discussion of this problem.

In such circumstances, I believe that at the human level, at the moral level, at the level of solidarity among human beings, the involvement of the military in these activities is extremely important. Unfortunately, members of the armed forces of all ranks rarely have the opportunity of coming into close contact with civilians – the idea of the “soldier-citizen”, in other words – except in circumstances of this nature.

On behalf of the committee and, I imagine, of the whole Assembly, I thank Mr. Pecchioli for the quality and value of his report, which, I repeat, will become a reference work in this field. Thank you once again, Mr. Pecchioli.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall now put to the vote the draft recommendation in Document 960.

As no one has requested a vote by roll-call, the Assembly will vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

4. *Assessment of advanced technology in Japan*

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 956)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on assessment of advanced technology in Japan and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 956.

I call Lord Northfield, Rapporteur.

Lord NORTHFIELD (*United Kingdom*). – My committee's report and the draft recommendation have a simple message. It is that Japan is a colossus, a giant that is now growing rapidly

in the world community. Our member states are, first, failing adequately to learn from its example in rapid industrial growth and in preparing for what will be the century of the Pacific in the twenty-first century. As our report indicates, we must increase our co-operation with Japan for the mutual benefit of our nations in the high technology of the new industrial revolution that is sweeping the world and that has great importance for our defence capability. That is a summary of our message.

Japan today, after its period of growth in catching up with the West, is level with the countries of Western Europe in many matters and is ahead on others. It now has an average standard of living certainly equal to that of Western European countries. It has a derisory level of unemployment, low interest rates – 5% – low taxation and it surmounted an energy crisis of enormous proportions even though it is almost entirely dependent on imported energy.

By the early years of the next century Japan's gross national product will equal the total of all the countries in the European Community. Japan's 130 million population will have a GNP equal to that of our 250 million. It is an outstanding example of growth, vitality and flexibility. Japan today already represents 10% of the world economy, having risen from a very small percentage some years ago.

In our report we analyse the reasons for that, the way in which Japan has grown since the second world war, and its ties with the United States. It is a system that has grown on the back of free enterprise that has given confidence to invest and stability, correct investment decisions in the new technologies, low defence spending. A period of expanding world trade and cheap oil helped Japan until the early 1970s. A young and ambitious work force, Confucian philosophy and cohesion in groups in Japan give a great work ethic to those in the factories. A system of indicative planning is used by the government to great effect to harness the energies of private enterprise for the total national effort.

I am a regular visitor to Japan, but in the report I have sought to indicate to some of my fellow parliamentarians why Japan is so successful. One of the reasons for Japanese success in the large firms sector, where wage levels now equal those in the West, is that management takes part in the actual production process on the factory floor. This is well understood now in those studies that examine how Japanese management transforms the companies it takes over in our countries.

One research study says:

“While we have been puzzling over the intractable problems of bringing workers close

1. See page 29.

Lord Northfield (continued)

to management through participation or industrial democracy, Japanese firms have been rooting management more firmly in the workplace."

We have set out here in the report to show how we can learn from Japanese management techniques and their management style.

In these great industries Japan has attained a rate of investment double that of western companies in recent years. It now has half the robots in the world and it pursues its success through such matters as quality control, where detection-oriented firms cut down the costs of quality control to below those obtaining in our countries. This and a whole set of other factors mean that Japanese large industries can now achieve prices, efficiency and other such factors that are well in advance of those to be found in many western companies.

This sector is backed up by another sector of small companies in which wages and costs are lower, and by a government system that is well lubricated by the Ministry for Trade and Industry - MITI - which carries out indicative planning with all the private companies involved and provides the locomotive force for the whole Japanese economy.

We have a great deal to learn from Japan, whose economy has grown to such enormous proportions so quickly. There are three examples of where we should be co-operating even more. The first concerns the area of the space agency. I refer to co-operation between the European Space Agency and the National Space Development Agency of Japan. Japan has been catching up since the late 1960s and early 1970s, when its space programme started. It has its own launchers - N-1 and N-2 - for geostationary satellites, and an impressive programme centred round the new launcher, the even heavier H-2.

All of Japan's co-operation of any moment has hitherto been with the United States, but co-operation should be developing more with ESA. I know that our space agency exchanges ideas with Japan once a year, but more is needed. The Japanese have now sent a permanent representative to keep an eye on collaboration with ESA in Paris. One of our recommendations is that we should send a permanent representative to Tokyo to make sure that that co-operation continues to develop.

It is possible to develop it in many ways. There is the beginning, for example, of co-operation in a projected 1986 observation satellite. There is already co-operation in the use of tracking sites throughout the world and in the standardisation of electronic space compo-

nents. However, now that Japan has drawn level with Europe, the whole thing needs a great burst of greater co-operation to use the benefits of technological advances here and in Japan to the advantage of both sides.

Let us consider the area of computers. The years between 1980 and 2000 are likely to be for Japan an era of sophistication and miniaturisation. There will be a new great computer with artificial intelligence and super computers that are a thousand times faster than today's machines. The importance of this for this Assembly is the huge impact that it will have for military and space matters. Our space and military systems will be revolutionised by these new super computers of the last decade of the twentieth century, the fifth generation of computers.

Japan is now well ahead on this subject and expects that some of them may be in use as early as 1992. Here again, the existing collaboration needs to be strengthened and broadened. There should be an exchange of information on the one hand and possibly, as the Japanese said to us, co-operation in task-sharing - that is, identifying those areas in which countries should specialise in the basic research that is needed for this fifth generation of computers. I cannot overstress the importance of all this for our military capability in the coming decades.

Japan is limited to developing aircraft for defence purposes only, and we should be glad to see that since my report was written Japan has joined Britain, America, Germany and Italy to develop the new V-2500 Rolls Royce engine, the development of which has reached a size when there must be collaboration between at least five countries for it to be developed effectively. It is good to see that Japan is with us on that. Co-operation on aircraft with Japan in the past has been mainly with America, with Boeing on the civil side, and most of the aircraft on the military side that we saw were being built under licence from the United States.

Where are we in all this? Europe seems to be way behind when it comes to co-operation on aircraft matters. We should be pressing our claims for co-operation with Japanese industry in developing both civil and military aircraft based on European designs, some of which are perhaps already in production here. We are way behind the Americans in co-operation in these matters.

I take those three areas as examples, and I come to our recommendations. The first is that the Council should instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to study Japanese progress in military high technology, or technology that may have military applications, together with its prospects, and submit conclusions of that study

Lord Northfield (continued)

to the Assembly. I hope that we can press ministers to give their views on pursuing this idea of closer co-operation in matters that could have military applications in future. Do they agree that it is time to step up that co-operation and improve joint activity between Western Europe and Japan?

Secondly, our conclusions are, as it were, an expression of anxiety in saying that these are all areas in which Japan is beginning to eclipse and outstrip us – is teaching us lessons – and in all of them we must step up bilateral and multilateral collaboration of a technological kind so that we get left behind rather less and co-operate rather more. That particularly applies to the fifth generation of computers that we mention in recommendation 3. Fourthly, as I mentioned, we need to examine collaboration on the production of military and civil aircraft.

Finally, we make a strong plea for the Western European countries to do something about the way in which we are failing to send enough people to Japan to understand the Japanese style of management and the growth of Japanese technology. We fail to send sufficient people from industry and key officials from government. I cite as an example the fact that only four universities in the United Kingdom have schools of Japanese studies. Here we have a great colossus, a giant growing among us in the world, but we are failing utterly to send and exchange sufficient numbers of people to understand it, learn from it and collaborate with it in the latter part of this century and the beginning of the next.

I have been praising Japan a great deal, but I am aware that many question marks will hang over Japan in the coming years. It is possible that its great momentum, vitality and flexibility of economy could get into difficulty. The anonymous kind of society that we have in the West could insinuate itself into Japan and ruin that country's tradition of hard work and application – the work ethic generally – and it is possible that growing expectations of leisure in Japan could also reduce the work ethic.

It is possible that the world economy will not expand sufficiently to allow Japan to go on growing at its present rate, remembering how dependent it is on exports to the rest of the world. It is also possible that the great investment boom that is pushing Japan further into areas of high technology and prosperity could be harmed by rising demands for social spending in that country's system – Japan's social security system being far behind that of the West – and that could dampen down the vitality of that system as it now exists.

I doubt all those expressions of fear. I believe that Japan is in the position of Britain at the beginning of the old industrial revolution and of America in the nineteenth century – that the momentum cannot be stopped for some decades and is likely to carry it through many problems that may arise. Japan is now foremost in the new industrial revolution that is sweeping the world and I repeat my committee's plea that we must understand it more, learn from it more and be ready in many more ways than we have been to seek technological collaboration for the mutual benefit of our countries and of Japan.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank the Rapporteur for his very interesting report.

The debate is open and I call Mr. Böhm.

Mr. BÖHM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me first of all warmly thank the Rapporteur, Lord Northfield, for the report and recommendations which he has put before us and which I find very impressive. He has focused our attention on the leading industrial power of East Asia, its enormous successes in many areas of modern technology and its successes in the economic field, most of which were achieved against fierce competition from our own industries. The “Japanese challenge” has become an established concept in contemporary discussions of economic and commercial policy.

In his report Lord Northfield also focuses upon the defence problems of this industrial power, at which the Soviet SS-20s are aimed, just as they are at Western Europe. Japan, however, spends only 0.5% of its gross national product on defence, compared with 5% for the United States and 3.4% for the Federal Republic of Germany.

All this compels us to co-operate in the solution of worldwide problems, but first and foremost we must get to know each other. Ladies and Gentlemen, there is still an enormous amount to be done here. Let me give you an example from my own country, Germany. Whereas there are 30,000 Japanese students of German and related subjects, fewer than 200 German students have bothered to take up Japanese studies. The same is doubtless true of other European countries.

As we try to get to know Japan we shall encounter a number of important differences from our own circumstances. Let me summarise these differences in five main points.

The first point is what I would call the rôle of the state in and for the economy, that is to say, the relationship between government and industry – which in Japan work much more closely

Mr. Böhm (continued)

together and are more clearly geared to a common goal than in our own countries. The reasons for this are mainly historical. In Western Europe industrialisation took both state and society by surprise. It was only gradually that the social problem was recognised and that the counterforces to the flood of industrialisation were developed, with the state primarily in the rôle of supervisor, involving itself in mitigating the consequences of industrialisation rather than in creating it.

Japan was different. When, to its own surprise, it entered the world arena in 1850, the government had to take charge and create the foundations of the economy. The state therefore saw its rôle from the outset in the development and promotion of industry and its long-term guidance for the national good, almost as a condition of national survival. The state is thus not merely a supervisor of the economy but its activator. Economic success is seen as a common national objective requiring a common effort.

Despite the greater importance of the state, the Japanese economy remains essentially a market economy. The state has taken on less responsibilities than in many European industrialised nations.

The second point which I would like briefly to consider is the consistently forward-looking structure of Japanese industry. In Japan there is none of that talk of "no future", which dominates the European social debate in many areas. This is a tremendous achievement by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, MITI, which developed out of the Ministry of Equipment. The certainty, indeed conviction, of being able to control their future is a powerful incentive for the Japanese.

Because of this inner conviction the Japanese also – and this is the third point – have a positive attitude to technology, which they see not as man's enemy but as his ally in overcoming the problems of the future. From this stems their obvious readiness to accept technology, again in contrast to certain trends in Europe.

All this results – this is the fourth point – in the attention paid in Japan to the rôle of the human being in the economy. Lifetime employment, the firm as the centre of one's life, and the lesser importance of people's own leisure time are factors which it is important for us to recognise.

Finally, the fifth point: the concerns operating at world level with their ability to mobilise and concentrate financial power.

Let me be clear, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am not arguing that Western Europe should adopt

these methods and forms of organisation. But I do think that we must know them in order to understand, adjust and be able to cope with them. Just as, when the Japanese made reconnaissance trips to our countries years ago, they did not uncritically accept everything they saw but adapted our methods to Japanese social conditions and the Japanese mentality, so we today must turn our attention to Japan. As we know, peace and security are indivisible in the world of today. I regard the Williamsburg declaration of 29th May 1983, when Japan, I am pleased to say, aligned itself with western disarmament and arms limitation policies, as a fundamental declaration on future co-operation between us.

The threat from the Soviet SS-20s, whose range covers Japan, China, South-East Asia and India, is one reason for that declaration, from which I would like to quote two sentences:

"The security of our countries is indivisible and must be approached on a global basis. Attempts to avoid serious negotiation by seeking to influence public opinion in our countries will fail."

Ladies and Gentlemen, the calculations of the Soviet Union have not paid off. Federal Chancellor Kohl, who visited Japan only a few weeks ago, at the beginning of November, put it as follows:

"We are not missile-hungry. But we are not prepared to accept a security demand from the Soviet Union that would turn Western Europe and Japan into a reduced-security zone. The disarmament negotiations should not be at the expense of our Japanese friends and our other friends in East Asia."

It is of inestimable value to freedom, peace and security that the Japanese should apply the same principle that governs us in our security policy, namely parallelism between readiness to reach agreement and readiness to defend ourselves.

Japan indisputably feels itself to be part of the free world and as such accepts political responsibility on a world scale. The invasion of Afghanistan, the deployment of the SS-20s and even the events in Iran have doubtless led Japan also to see and recognise security issues in sharper focus today than in the past. Ladies and Gentlemen, Western Europe and Japan must move towards each other in a spirit of global responsibility. Lord Northfield has shown us how to make a start. I would like to thank him once again for his report.

(Mr. Berchem, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I would remind the Assembly that it was decided at the

The President (continued)

beginning of the sitting that speaking time should be limited to five minutes.

I call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate Lord Northfield on his most interesting and thought-provoking report, following the visit to Japan of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. The report reflects many of the observations made by the British Select Committee on Science and Technology in 1978, when it dealt with innovation, research and development in Japanese science-based industries.

I have two reasons for speaking. First, at the last parliamentary and scientific conference in Helsinki, the Committee on Science and Technology of the Council of Europe was invited to hold the next conference in Japan. The detailed arrangements have yet to be worked out, but it could well be held in June 1985. I have read many reports of visits to Japan, but the fact remains that the balance of trade in many advanced technological and mechanical or electrical engineering products seems to be weighted against Europe.

There is a dedication and almost fanatical application of method in Japanese design and production, and that applies to both management and the shop floor. It has to be witnessed by people from similar industrial and technologically advanced countries to be fully appreciated and understood. Lord Northfield's description was very appropriate. It is fitting that the next parliamentary and scientific conference should be held in Japan. Western Europe may lead in fundamental and basic research, but Japan has many lessons for Europe when it comes to development.

My second reason for speaking is that I participated in the visit to Japan of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in 1973. Electronics, computers and the use of the chip had already become established, and the committee learnt at first hand of Japanese enthusiasm for information technology. Much of what was predicted as being the appropriate avenue for advance when we were in Japan has materialised in that country. However, I could not take part in the debate on the report, because I was transferred to the European Parliament. I joined the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and attended my first meeting for nine years only yesterday, and so I enjoyed reading about last July's visit.

In those nine years the gap in achievement between Japan and Europe has become wider. That is certainly true of my country and Japan.

There is an imbalance of trade between Japan and the European Community countries. It is much worse than the imbalance between Japan and the United States of America. Recent European Community figures have been brought to my attention. Community imports were 16,204 million ECUs and Community exports were 5,604 million ECUs. Imports were 5.3% of European Community trade and exports were 2.1% of European Community trade. Those figures show that the imbalance has continued.

Only last month, in October, Gaston Thorn wrote to the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Nakasone, about that imbalance. In reply ten days ago, the President of Mitsubishi came to the European Community and visited Britain with a view to opening up Japanese markets to European producers.

Lord Northfield referred to management techniques in Japan. Many Japanese subsidiaries in Britain and the European Community have been able to apply those techniques. This is a minor thought, but a major one for Great Britain and British Leyland, let alone European Community car manufacturers as a whole. What would be the consequences if Nissan decided to go ahead with an investment in North Wales or Humberside? I should welcome such an investment.

Lord Northfield rightly stressed management techniques and talked about the high morale and loyalty in Japanese companies, which they have derived in part from the persistent policy of involving management in factory floor problems. In my country the policy has centred on intractable problems of bringing workers closer to management through industrial democracy. Japanese firms, however, have been rooting management more in the workplace as Lord Northfield said. The sharing of disciplines has given those firms an immense advantage.

Lord Northfield also referred to the Japanese miracle and the extent to which productivity and the gross domestic product have increased. He cited as an example that in 1979 the annual output of cars per worker in Japan was forty compared with eleven in West Germany.

Lord Northfield also referred to emphasis on quality control. In 1973 there was a visit to the Mazda Toyo Kogyo works. Lord Northfield said that there was defect prevention more than defect detection. At that time, if inspectors had rejected cars on the production lines in Coventry or the Midlands as much as inspectors rejected cars in Japan, all the workers in Britain would have downed tools and walked out. That is why some of our car factories are in such dire trouble compared with their Japanese competitors.

Sir John Osborn (continued)

As you are looking at me, Mr. President, I take it that my time is up, so I shall conclude. I should have liked to talk about the use of computers, and dependence on nuclear energy, to which Lord Northfield referred. I speak as one who claims to have been involved in new technology in Sheffield, about twenty-five to thirty years ago, when I was involved in new processes and a new concept in old industries – steel founding, engineering and special steels. When I was in Japan in 1973, the dedication, conviction and sense of purpose of the Japanese greatly impressed me and contrasted greatly with what I had witnessed in Europe and my own country.

Lord Northfield emphasised that.

The unemployed today and their trade unions, which are so expert on workers' rights, need to consider the reasons for their unemployment. The Japanese, due to their sheer confidence, seem to have provided a product that those same people, when they were working, for instance making cars, wished to buy because of its value for money. Therefore, co-operation with the Japanese, particularly through the parliamentary and scientific conference, must result in a willingness to learn from Japan. Lord Northfield's recommendations are relevant to the opportunities of which Western Europe must take advantage.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Kinnoull.

Lord KINNOULL (*United Kingdom*). – I add my congratulations to Lord Northfield and his committee on an excellent report on the state of advanced technology in Japan. It is a dauntingly complex subject, but the way in which Lord Northfield's committee, in only one week's visit to Japan, unravelled the range of subjects from solar thermal energy to space support satellites – all with such clarity – is a tribute to the skill and care taken by that committee in assembling this valuable report. Lord Northfield is not unknown for his distinguished reports in our country, although perhaps he is better known in an area other than advanced technology – in agriculture.

The report describes in detail the Japanese miracle of the past twenty-five years and the skilful management of the economy. It is a remarkable achievement when one contrasts most western economies, which are suffering from perennial financial ailments. For Japan to achieve in 1982 only 2% unemployment, 2% inflation and bank interest rates of 5% represents just a dim, happy memory in the eyes of most western economists. To couple that with high productivity and low losses due to work disputes

or absenteeism is an economic miracle, so much so that one is left asking what the problems in Japan are. Perhaps that is a subject for another report.

Each of the report's six recommendations had a central theme of seeking ways to improve collaboration with Japan – in trade and knowledge, and with people. As Sir John Osborn highlighted, the member states and Japan have a distorted imbalance of trading. One has only to turn to Appendix VII of the report to see that. There are about \$499 million of exports to Japan by the Community, and nine times that figure is imported from Japan.

What can be done to reverse that trend if we are not to be left further behind? The report gives three possibilities. First, there is the responsibility of member governments to play an important rôle and to create a supportive framework by means of bilateral agreements to assist industry. I think that that is being done. Secondly, industry must now look for more areas of collaboration, for example, in aerospace, satellites and computers. There are many more areas of collaboration. Aerospace, that great absorber of research and development funds could not be a more ideal and logical partner. If another Concorde should ever be built, we should need Japanese support. The RJ-500 Rolls Royce engine is a most encouraging example of collaboration.

Thirdly, the report's fifth recommendation touches on the most important factor – the human factor. There is the value of communication and of exchange visits at different levels of information and understanding. That is an important recommendation.

I warmly welcome Lord Northfield's report. I wish it a fair wind in the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fourné.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I congratulate our Rapporteur since, having been a member of the committee which visited Japan, I can appreciate how succinctly he has summarised the mission, placing particular emphasis on the Japanese Government's general policy and endeavouring to define the essence of this policy.

However, what we undoubtedly missed most during our discussions was any kind of contact with the military or precise answers to questions on military matters.

Scientific and technical progress in Japan clearly foreshadows a great leap forward in such essential areas as advanced technology, aeronautics, communications, electronics, the marine sciences, energy and so on.

Mr. Fourré (continued)

However, as everyone is aware, there are some reasons for doubts, because of the limit restricting the defence budget, which has risen unevenly and only moderately in recent years, to 1% of gross national product.

The Japanese Government remains committed, for economic reasons, to moderating non-productive expenditure and is, consequently, influenced by the weight of public opinion which is still slow in becoming alive to defence problems.

It must nevertheless be pointed out that, despite the major weaknesses inherent in the obsolescence of equipment, the lack of operational infrastructure and inadequate stocks of ammunition and spare parts, a major effort has been made to modernise Japan's forces.

In another field, the progressive growth of the self-defence forces has quite naturally been accompanied by the development of an armaments industry that is now powerful and a major factor in the Japanese military problem. It should also be remembered that the establishment in 1957 of the first programme for rebuilding the armed forces marked the resumption of national activities in the fields of arms research, modernisation and manufacture.

Today almost 80% of the equipment used by Japan's self-defence forces is designed and manufactured under licence. Some two hundred firms share this market, with just six of them, all subsidiaries of large Japanese industrial groups, accounting for nearly half of all orders. These large companies have thus acquired know-how by financing research in advanced sectors, for civilian applications of course, but also for military applications, for which they have consequently received state aid towards purely military research and development.

Japanese technology has thus reached so high a level in certain fields – microinformatics, lasers, optronics – that the Americans themselves are demanding the transfer of Japanese technologies under the reciprocity clause in Article 3 of the United States-Japanese security treaty. The government has accepted the principle of such transfers, which it does not regard as a violation of the principle that armaments must not be exported.

The question of exports is nevertheless becoming increasingly acute, as is the question of Japan's nuclear and space capabilities, to which the Rapporteur refers in his report.

Although Japan has adopted a code of conduct based on the use of nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes and on a nuclear power station programme designed to reduce progres-

sively the country's dependence on imported energy, and although the government submits to all the controls carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency, it is clear from its capacities and resources what it could achieve, if ever its ambitions as regards nuclear weapons change.

Japan has also launched a very ambitious space programme – as we were able to see for ourselves – extending both to satellites and to launchers. Various considerations might therefore be included in our general thinking on the subject: firstly, political considerations; secondly, strategic considerations appropriate to Japan's place in the world from a military point of view.

Today the problem is no longer the nature but the extent of Japan's defence. We can no longer ignore this problem.

On the basis of the draft recommendation before us – and particularly the paragraph which calls on the SAC to study the advantages to be derived from co-operation among member countries – a new report should be envisaged, for a date fixed by the committee itself, enabling us to assess more accurately Japan's place and the state of its relations with both the United States and Europe in the military sphere over the next five years.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – I have asked to speak because I had the advantage of being a member of the mission to Japan headed by Lord Northfield that forms the basis of this masterly report. I congratulate the Rapporteur on his full and extremely stimulating review of past achievements and future prospects in advanced technology in Japan.

As regards past achievements, it must first be recognised that there is nothing supernatural about the Japanese "miracle". It stems logically from a concerted and lasting patriotic reaction; a national realignment of objectives that was radical but conventional; favourable economic circumstances in Japan and throughout the world; specific structures and attitudes; strong, prolonged and effective American support in the initial years and, above all else, a colossal effort by a whole nation, which has been united since 1945 in pursuit of this objective.

Like Germany after 1945, Japan sought and found a way to make up for its military failure in economic activity, with the aim, which also acted as a stimulant, of becoming a former defeated country that was equal and, in many respects, superior to the former victors.

This achievement, although undoubtedly due to qualities peculiar to Japan and to the extra-

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

ordinary effort made by its people, can also be attributed to factors which have received less attention but had a decisive effect.

Firstly, apart from the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan was not physically shattered like the European countries in 1945. It was virtually spared internal destruction, general occupation and Draconian, ruinous reparations.

Secondly, the provisions of the amnesty and of the peace treaty gave it effective protection, relieving it of the crushing burden of military spending that now weighs heavily on the public finances of so many countries.

Thirdly – and this is a phenomenon that has been largely ignored by the commentators – Japan has taken the trauma and humiliation of defeat without questioning its political system, its social structures or its sociological traditions. It has not changed its emperor, the system or, to any major extent, its economic principles and social relations.

Consequently, Japan has enjoyed a high level of investment, giving it an industry that has modern equipment, is extremely efficient and is geared to the “new” sectors of the world economy. As a result, it has the highest growth rate in the world. These, in my opinion, are the basic and inter-related factors underlying Japan’s success, which it has deserved but which is beginning to be restricted by its very size and evolution. Slowly but inexorably, the perspectives of the “miracle” are changing; Japan’s progress is being restricted by the poor state of the world economy. The worldwide slump in purchasing power, the poverty of the public sector, the cost of credit and rampant protectionism are and will continue to be restrictive forces.

Paradoxically, Japan is relatively backward in the technology of the military source industries: aviation, space, high nuclear technology. Furthermore, and as ever, it suffers from a shortage of raw materials, which has caused a number of additional setbacks and restrictions. Despite this, its average level of advanced technology is one of the highest in the world.

Europe is far from being devoid of advanced technology, but it must strike a new balance if it is to achieve genuine economic competitiveness, while ensuring that social justice is maintained.

Europe must collaborate with Japan in this partial, but essential recovery of mastery of all the advanced technology of the fast-approaching twenty-first century. To this end, it must overcome its natural technological handicap.

Unlike the dominant unified national blocs – the United States, the USSR, China and Japan – the European countries are divided, restricted, isolated: Europe must become a bloc whose member countries have common interests.

One of the areas in which there must be greater unity of this kind is surely technological co-operation with Japan. That is why I believe a joint position should be adopted. Within the framework of the European institutions, on any effective bilateral or multilateral basis, we must “examine the whole field of possible collaboration with Japan so as to promote more joint projects”, as Lord Northfield rightly says in his report, which has my full approval.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The general debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Lord NORTHFIELD (*United Kingdom*). – I have the pleasure to thank a number of people who made the report possible. First, I thank the Japanese themselves, who were untiring in giving us facts, figures and explanations – all with the utmost courtesy. They not only gave them but they checked them. We hope that all the figures in the report are correct, because the Japanese themselves have submitted pages of corrections to make sure that we had them all exactly right.

I thank the secretariat, and Mr. Huigens in particular, for the indefatigable efforts they made in getting all these matters together and helping to assemble the report. I thank particularly the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Lenzer, because when I had written the report, particularly the part about the analysis of the way in which Japan was evolving, I found myself absent from the committee and in Japan doing work for my town. Mr. Lenzer kindly piloted the report through the committee. I owe him great thanks for that and for his general support.

During the debate there has been mention of the Japanese trade imbalance with Europe of recent years. We should not be too defeatist about this matter. The Japanese are well aware of it and are taking energetic steps to open up their market – they even have a mission travelling Europe at the moment teaching us how to export to Japan – and they are well aware of the need for them to invest in productive facilities in Europe.

I am the chairman of a government corporation that is building a new city in the United Kingdom. We have attracted three Japanese companies to that city – two of them are among the biggest names in the world, and they have chosen my town for their European headquarters. They did so after years of negotiation by me and my staff, but always with a

Lord Northfield (continued)

willing Japanese participation by people who knew that this was the way in which Japan had to evolve. The Japanese must start building plants overseas and curing their trade imbalance by productive investment of that kind in Europe.

We should not be defeatist but we should be as efficient as the Japanese are. I can claim to have established in my town a reporting and information system that is as good as the Japanese want from their own systems in terms of efficiency. It convinced them that we were an efficient place in which to invest. We must therefore be as good as they are if we want them to come to Europe to produce goods in our countries.

Mr. Fourré was right to say that the weakness in the report was that we had not sufficiently examined the possibilities of collaboration in military hardware generally and the benefits that could arise from our military capability. However, there are limits to what one can do in a week, but I accept his suggestion that that matter should be the subject of another report.

Mr. Lagorce is more pessimistic that I am about the Japanese miracle. I think that he is wrong, and I hope that I shall be proved right that the Japanese miracle has the dynamism and momentum to carry itself through the difficult periods that lie ahead. If Japan can produce a 4% rate of growth from now on the figures that I have set out in the report will be achieved, and Japan will have a gross national product at the beginning of the next century equal to the combined GNPs of all the European Community member states. That is not a bad record to offer to the world.

I was grateful for what Lord Kinnoull said, particularly about aerospace and when he joined Mr. Böhm in suggesting that the most important part of the report is perhaps the idea that we should exchange more information so that people can understand each other. Mr. Böhm said that we should know Japan. How right he is. How few of us really know it. After many visits I am just beginning to know it. I have many Japanese friends. I am a great admirer of their culture, of their dedication and of their whole philosophy, which makes life so very different from, and possibly of a higher quality than, what we have in Western Europe. We must know and understand these factors because they provide the foundation of Japanese success in technology and are the motive force of the great miracle that is growing over there on the other side of the world.

I am grateful for all the comments that have been made about the report and for the kind

words about the recommendations. It was a privilege to be able to go with my colleagues, who were all very kind to me as Rapporteur, to this country which I personally admire so much and am gradually coming to know. I hope that they will join me in the coming years in watching this miracle go through further stages.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I must first of all return the compliment to the Rapporteur, Lord Northfield, and thank him for his excellent report.

I would also like to thank all the members of the committee who went with the delegation. It was a pleasure, as head of the delegation, to conduct the talks and make contacts.

I would also like to thank our Japanese hosts who – perhaps contrary to custom – were most willing to provide information. That, too, is probably a compliment to the Rapporteur and his subtle understanding of the people with whom we were in contact.

Finally, a word of thanks to the committee secretariat and the committee secretary, Mr. Huigens, for their excellent preparatory work.

This is of course not the first time that we have turned our attention to scientific, economic and technical progress over the years. We have talked about the technology gap, chiefly in relation to competition with the United States, we have referred to the American challenge, and we have now come to speak of the Japanese challenge and the Japanese miracle. And here I must also thank those members who have taken part in today's debate.

Taking a closer look at this "miracle", we can see that it has a human explanation and a human background. The question is: how can we get to know Japan better, so that the background to the Japanese miracle, the Japanese upswing, the Japanese success in science and technology, becomes more distinct?

I would say that the level of basic research in Europe is as good, if not better. I would also say that the European states spend at least as much, or perhaps even more money on research and technological development than Japan. Last but not least – and this is the main point – Europe has considerably more people engaged in research and technological development.

We have achieved spectacular successes. We have closed many a technological gap. I am thinking of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, where – and here I refer particularly to my own country where, for a long time after the war, work in that area was forbidden – we have now

Mr. Lenzer (continued)

reached a real break-even point with the most recent American developments. The fact that the European Spacelab could be put into orbit with a German astronaut, Dr. Merbold, a physicist from Stuttgart, on board is a spectacular success for us, the ESA and the Europeans – our entry into manned space-flight. So we can do it, if we bear certain conditions in mind.

The secret of the Japanese success – if it is indeed a secret, is that in Japan, under the direction of MITI, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, it is easier to find the appropriate organisational form for co-operation between state, science and business, a form which releases all the forces concerned yet finally concentrates them purposefully on the same goal.

Of course the improvement in the economic framework is also part of the story. We should not forget that production conditions in Japan are characterised by more favourable wage costs and even more favourable costs incidental to wages than in Europe, which naturally also gives a certain competitive edge in modern technological development.

Finally, one more brief comment on what I believe is an important point. We hear a lot of talk in Europe about hostility to technology, especially among young people. I do not believe there is any fundamental hostility to technology on the part of European youth. You have only to see the enthusiasm with which the young people of today take to the whole computer technology, home computers, video technology and electronic games. They pick it up much faster than we do. To some extent, they are growing up with these things. When, in perhaps two or three years' time, *Bildschirmtext* (screentext) is with us, our sons and daughters will play much more easily with what we still sometimes regard as "black boxes", because they will have overcome their inhibitions about them from the outset.

We politicians must help to ensure that technology is seen as an opportunity, not a curse – an opportunity to solve man's problems. I am thinking, for example, of information and communication systems that can relieve the isolation of many people. Once we have understood this, the battle will be more than half won. We shall then have no need to fear the Japanese challenge, which, far from making us give up, should act as a spur. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 956.

As no request has been made for a vote by roll-call, the Assembly will vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

5. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

6. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – Part II

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 963 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – Part II, Document 963 and amendments.

I call Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – I should point out that this is the second part of a report, the first part of which, devoted to the civil field, was introduced by Mr. Fiandrotti eighteen months ago. I pay tribute to Mr. Fiandrotti, whom I succeeded as Rapporteur.

I believe that the conclusions drawn and the recommendation adopted at that time have been particularly useful. It was suggested, for example, that there should be a list of priority areas for a joint research effort, and the Council agreed that the Standing Armaments Committee should compile a list of this kind.

I must begin by saying, however, that all the European assemblies are now devoting their attention to the development of joint research efforts, whether it be the European Community, with the Commission's Esprit programme, the Council of Europe, with the forthcoming meeting at which the research ministers will discuss the establishment of a network of research centres, or our own Assembly, which has been studying the problems posed by the harmonisation of research for several years now.

¹ See page 30.

Mr. Bassinet (continued)

The reason for this like thinking in the various assemblies, with their different rôles and purposes, is that the problem we face is important and not just a problem of the moment. We face economic and strategic difficulties and problems connected with the scale of research.

As regards the economic difficulties, it goes without saying that we must make a special effort in the present economic crisis. Consequently, the growing effort we must make individually in the various fields of research may be reduced if we can promote a policy in which greater emphasis is placed on co-operation.

Economies of scale can be achieved if we are able to increase our research potential, not by combining what is being done in each country, but by increasing and integrating our efforts.

As we must keep strictly to the subject of this report – research in the military field – I would point out that the cost of the development of new technologies in which we are engaged is rising faster than the rate of inflation. If we fail to exercise some kind of self-discipline, we shall be unable to take account of the requirements of the time and to face up to the present situation.

The report describes the present situation in the military and armaments fields. It takes stock of joint research efforts involving several countries and research and development activities in NATO. I do not think I need say any more about the Conference of National Armaments Directors, the NATO Industrial Advisory Group or the work of Eurogroup and the Independent European Programme Group.

Quite obviously, these programmes have joint objectives or are directed to specific projects, such as the NATO frigate for the 1990s, transport aircraft, helicopters and the European wind tunnel. Research and development are certainly needed in these fields.

I would add that the report tries to analyse what military research and development is going on in each of the countries, in both the early and the later stages.

It should be remembered that, alongside these institutional efforts within NATO, which have produced uneven results and in which our various countries are participating in varying degrees, there are major bilateral, trilateral and even quadrilateral research programmes. And very often these programmes produce more effective results and action, since the smaller number of participants allows both better harmonisation of objectives and more effective co-operation.

But WEU could take a greater interest in research and development efforts in the military field.

Firstly, our Assembly – as I hardly need recall – is the only European assembly whose task it is to discuss defence problems. And at a time when we are witnessing a hardening of American attitudes, particularly towards technological exchanges, we cannot leave all or most of the research and development effort to others. What is at stake is the necessary development of each of our countries and consequently of the entity we form.

In addition to the extensive network of connections, institutions and working groups I have just mentioned, there is an opportunity for our Assembly to play a full part in the research effort.

If I may dwell for a moment on the political significance of this co-operation rather than describe the technical and scientific aspects, a few points need emphasising.

I would say first that European co-operation in the armaments field is necessary for three basic reasons: the evolution of the threat, the growing cost of equipment and economic difficulties.

The evolution of the threat emanates both from the permanence of Warsaw Pact forces and the increase in their potential and also, alongside this technological research effort, the persistently large number of troops, since – and this should be borne in mind, because it is something that is too easily overlooked – military service on the other side of the iron curtain is on average three times longer than it is in our countries. We must therefore respond to this situation with the resources we have, that is, the technological progress we have made, depending on our capacity for technological response.

But if we are to continue our technological efforts, we must be able to provide the necessary financial and economic resources.

As I said to begin with, new programmes, new matériel always cost more than their predecessors, and the rise in prices exceeds the rate of inflation. Account must therefore be taken both of the need to respond to the threat and of the economic requirements.

Particularly where scientific research is concerned, technological research and development has to some extent taken a specifically military direction.

If we consider the past, we find certain periods in which military research stimulates civil research and others in which it benefits directly from civil research. At present, the needs, the specific requirements of military research and

Mr. Bassinet (continued)

development call for a separate effort, distinct from that in the civil field. This is creating an even more formidable financing problem than when it is simply a question of military research benefiting from civil research and vice versa. This is the case, for example, with high-speed microelectronics, optronics, sensors and software.

This requirement must be taken into account. Of course, military research is specific in character today. It may not always be so, and at some time or other the civil field may benefit from progress made in military research and development. But it must be remembered that civil and military research are directed to different specific subjects and needs.

This co-operation is essential, but it would be pointless to deny that there are obstacles to its achievement.

Firstly, there are legitimate national interests.

For wholly justified reasons of national independence and national prestige, each of our countries keeps some of the progress it makes in basic or advanced research clear of co-operation.

Furthermore, investment in research must pay for itself, with the result that the requirements associated with the development of the industrial companies in our countries may clash with joint requirements. National interests must be considered, and there is absolutely no point in denying that they exist.

Another major problem is raised by the timetables for the replacement of equipment. Many programmes have failed because the timetables for the replacement of equipment in our various countries did not coincide. The Franco-German tank is a good example of these abortive projects, the reason here being simply that France's requirements did not coincide with Germany's.

There are also specifications handed down from the past through the general staffs, especially geographical specifications, as countries' needs differ according to their geographical position. In such cases, wider-ranging development would be pointless.

Yet another problem will have to be solved if we intend to step up our co-operation in research and development: the free use of the technologies resulting from co-operation.

There can be no question of imposing some kind of embargo on the possible commercialisation of progress achieved jointly. Having said that, however, I know what difficulties are involved and what major problems loom.

How are we to improve this European co-operation, which is necessary but which at the same time faces inherent difficulties?

For us parliamentarians, political will is an essential element. It will not solve everything, but without a profession of joint political will, research and development efforts will not rise above their present level. However, this political will will not be enough. As we want to make progress not only in the fields of science, basic knowledge and "upstream research", to use military parlance, but also in the production of prototypes and series, in short, matériel, contacts must be made to enable the various industrial groups to co-operate.

Certain difficulties will undoubtedly be encountered in this respect.

Each of our industrial companies has its own objectives, its overriding objectives, its development needs, which we must bring into line. To this end, the various industrial groups concerned and the various research teams should be brought together.

But perhaps the objectives should also be more accurately defined. Specifying the objective or the theoretical concept or the strategic weapon or the matériel to be manufactured will be a major step forward. No programme - and this is true of both military and civil research - that is based on Utopian ideas and is not the subject of clear-cut programming, a specific objective, will ever be successful in the long run.

These research efforts, at no matter what stage of the production process, cannot succeed unless they meet clearly-specified requirements agreed by a considered decision of all the partners.

In short, we must maintain a technological potential and keep some distance ahead in this field. This lead is essential to the credibility of the defence of our countries, particularly in view of the attitude of the United States of America and the difficulties we have noted.

It would not be wise - and it would be risking the future - simply to say that we will accept what comes from the other side of the Atlantic, whatever it may be. If we are incapable of making our own effort and producing our own response - at national or multinational level, but this response will certainly require co-operation - it is quite obvious that we shall have major difficulties and that the credibility of our independence, our response, our political presence in the world will be seriously diminished.

These technologies relate to the attainment of other objectives: the survival of forces and the efficiency of equipment. The survival of forces

Mr. Bassinet (continued)

is a problem of resisting a first strike and specifically, perhaps, a first nuclear strike.

I have already mentioned the technologies in which progress must be made if we are to meet military requirements, and I do not think I need repeat them. But I believe it possible to devise a policy for industrial components stemming from current research which will enable all the requirements I have mentioned to be met. The joint development of these advanced technologies and the co-ordinated industrial production of the resulting components are prior conditions for co-operation in the weapons systems of the future.

Let us not be too ambitious. Let us limit our ambition specifically to these components, because that is a realistic and feasible approach. Once it is considered necessary, an attitude of this kind must, of course, be based on better mutual information and on a concerted approach to future requirements.

To finish where I began, I believe that the different European assemblies are today considering the development of the joint research effort because of a need felt in varying degree. We must all co-operate if we want to keep our place in the world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your excellent report, Mr. Bassinet.

The debate is now open. I call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Bassinet has demonstrated his competence in the work of the Committee on Science and Technology in the Council of Europe as well as in the Chamber of Deputies. We have before us the second part of a report, which follows that published in May 1982. He is tackling a huge subject – the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology.

I do not know whether Mr. Bassinet has ever come across a European television game called "It's a Knockout", but he reminds me of a contestant faced with a huge rubber ball that has to be picked up. The only snag is that the ball is so big that he cannot get his arms round it. I do not mean that in any disparaging way, because I congratulate him on the way he has tackled this problem. However, the subject is both large and vital, and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions – let alone WEU itself – should know more about it. I have not worked on the problem with Mr. Bassinet in committee, as I had my first meeting with the committee yesterday morning. Nevertheless, I attended and

spoke at the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982. Its success was largely due to my colleague, Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. Bassinet referred to Lord Trenchard, the former Minister of State for Defence Procurement. Lord Trenchard said at the colloquy that as an industrialist and minister, he had found no other area where cost escalation was so great a problem as in defence equipment.

The Soviet Union and, for that matter, the United States have an advantage over European countries collectively. Each has a population base of over 200 million for one government to handle the determination of specification standards and testing in defence. The United States of America has an advantage in its relationship with NATO. Within it there are agencies for collaboration, to which Mr. Bassinet referred.

I shall deal with a local problem. Rationalisation between the services and changes of defence requirement can produce agonising reappraisals in industrial countries. One example is the naval testing establishment at Jansen Street, Sheffield. It was important in world war two, but its greatest value was in world war one for testing naval ordnance, armour plate and gun barrels, all equipment of considerably less importance for tomorrow's defence where the missile has taken over from the gun.

If, as a Sheffield member of parliament, my inclination is to resist the threatened closure of that great establishment, in all honesty I must recognise that rationalisation between services in any one NATO country makes sense. Therefore, in standardisation, specification and testing, in which that establishment specialises, one must consider future national and European implications. The debate is about rationalisation within WEU countries and NATO.

Mr. Bassinet wrote about the work of the Conference of National Armaments Directors, and that greatly impressed me. He referred to the Defence Research Group and the NATO Industrial Advisory Group. However, the ten European Community countries, the WEU countries – let alone NATO countries – are all sovereign nations, and all have their own national governments, who all have their own ministries of defence and their own relationship with their ordnance and armaments industries. Western European defence has obstacles in terms of research and defence that are considerably less formidable than those in the United States or the Soviet Union, the great powers. I recognise that what I have just said is nothing new, but Mr. Bassinet spelt it out in two reports in greater detail. They should be studied.

Sir John Osborn (continued)

I shall digress a stage further. The most dynamic force in Western Europe since the Brussels Treaty has been the Economic Community. It is very much involved with industrial matters. Two German members of parliament Mr. von Hassel and Mr. Klepsch, as members of the European Parliament, have taken up defence procurement within the Economic Community. They may have interested themselves more recently with defence itself, although it is not a recognised Economic Community subject. Their country's relationship with the European Community depends on that. Mr. von Hassel was associated with WEU at one stage.

All that has coincided with initiatives taken by conservatives in the European Parliament in 1976-77, led by my colleague Mr. Tom Norman. I supported those initiatives. My involvement was due to the interest that I had developed in the problems of industrial backup for European defence while I was on the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions of WEU in 1973-75.

I recognise that industrial co-ordination is very much the province of Commissioner Davignon. Co-ordination and rationalisation may concentrate on steel and coal, but they extend to computers and information technology and inevitably certain aspects of the activities of those who supply equipment for Western European defence.

Therefore, defence supply, including the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology, will increasingly become a European Community interest. I therefore welcome the fact that observers from the European Parliament are at the Assembly. One, Peter Vanneck, is from my country. I hope that they will examine Mr. Bassinet's report and perhaps invite him and some members of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to discuss its implications with the appropriate committee in the European Parliament. However, to be frank, because of the structure and rôle of NATO, I am not yet convinced that any follow-up by NATO or the European Parliament, certainly in the short term, will make harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology easier and not counterproductive.

Mr. Bassinet's themes are cost escalation in defence and the need for collaboration. The United Kingdom spends 15% of defence equipment funds on collaborative programmes. If all western countries were to increase that figure, that would bring tangible benefits to all parties. Collaboration is not the only answer to cost escalation. Perhaps less gold-plating over speci-

fication and closer dialogue between industry and designers would produce better results.

I am glad that Mr. Bassinet referred to the United States Defence Science Board's report on industry-to-industry co-operation. It is important that western countries consider that, but perhaps the matter should be dealt with by the Society of British Aerospace Constructors and its European counterparts, and even UNICE. It is an industrial problem as much as a government problem.

In regard to Mr. Bassinet's first recommendation, is the Standing Armaments Committee the best committee to study advanced technology in future weaponry? I know this challenges the whole question of the rôle of Western European Union but this is a more suitable subject for debate on the reports we shall have in June. When those reports are prepared I hope that Mr. Bassinet and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions will be involved because of this very reason. Because this is an assembly of Western European Union, that is the best committee.

I welcome the approach in the second recommendation on a "co-ordinated European industry for advanced military technology". I should like the views of MEPs on the rôle of the Commission of the European Community on this but perhaps it is better for UNICE to comment on it as well.

Finally, he urges all governments to procure weapons with which the industries of their own countries have been involved, whether in design or production. It is good advice that I hope those governments will heed. I congratulate Mr. Bassinet on tackling a difficult problem.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). - Like my friend and colleague, Sir John Osborn, I wholeheartedly congratulate Mr. Philippe Bassinet on an excellent report that forms the second part of an important study on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. It will be a useful reference document as well as having much value from the point of view of the suggestions it makes.

I want to address myself to just one matter arising under Chapter V, which deals with research and development in individual countries, namely, a new combat aircraft for the European air forces. Mr. Bassinet rightly said that progress in harmonising requirements and in standardisation and European collaboration for procurement could not take place without political will. I can see no new project in sight

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

for which political will to create a single programme will be more important than for a new combat aircraft for the air forces of France, West Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. We need to achieve that objective by harmonising operational requirements. It will as ever be exceedingly difficult. It is a rôle for which primarily the European Independent Programme Group was designed. It has not had much success in that regard to date, but we are ever hopeful.

If one examines the operational requirements one sees clear disparities. The United Kingdom needs what I would regard as a supplemental aeroplane, one that is optimised for air combat, an air superiority vehicle that will supplement the Tornado F-2 in the interceptor rôle. It would be an air combat vehicle with a secondary offensive support capability. Jaguar will run on in the Royal Air Force for the back-up of intervention forces when it is replaced by the interdicator strike version of Tornado in Germany.

The French air force needs a Jaguar replacement pure and simple because the Mirage 2000 is to be the new interceptor. A total of 165 Mirage 2000s are being procured. The French requirement therefore is primarily for an offensive support aeroplane. The Luftwaffe will need an interceptor to replace the F-4 Phantom and the Italians will need an air superiority aeroplane to succeed the F-104G Starfighter. The time scales, too, will be different. I will not go into the details but they are apparent to everyone in the Assembly.

We must recognise that already work is in progress among the industries of Western Europe. The French company Dassault is building a demonstration fighter, the ACX. British Aerospace, with government funding, is developing an experimental combat aircraft. The existing Panavia partners, MBB, Aeritalia and British Aerospace, hope jointly to produce an agile combat aircraft. Of course, Dornier is in co-operation primarily with Northrop to build a new fighter aeroplane and is also having talks with Dassault for the same purpose. The French are talking about building a new military powerplant and the Panavia partners are keen to use the Turbo Union RB-119 engine that currently powers the Tornado for a new European fighter.

So there are all sorts of conflicting elements from the industrial perspective to be reconciled as well. All I would say is that the new aeroplane must be agile. It will have to be exceedingly manoeuvrable for the contemporary air environment of Western Europe. In my judgment it would be primarily an air combat

vehicle with an offensive support capability. There is no project of greater importance for the future of the aerospace industries of Western Europe than the new fighter aeroplane.

I support the view of the Rapporteur in paragraph 71 that Dassault should come in as well to make this a quadripartite venture. The tripartite venture of the Panavia Tornado was difficult enough to manage however. A quadripartite one will be even more difficult. We should have no illusions about that. The use of a proven power plant rather than using one which has to be developed at the same time as the airframe would make good sense.

There is no project of greater industrial or military significance to compare with that of the new fighter aeroplane that undoubtedly the four air forces will require. If we do not get this right, our American friends will be able to offer us an aeroplane off the shelf to fulfil our requirements. It may fulfil the requirements but it will not be good for European industries and it would be a great opportunity lost.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Forma.

Mr. FORMA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in discussing this subject for the second time, account must be taken of the earlier discussion and decisions, of previous speeches during this session, of the immediate context and of relations with the rest of the world. Among the points mentioned previously, I think that special attention should be given, first, to economic relations and, second, to European security and burden-sharing in the alliance.

I am bound to say that the growing financial burden to which the report devotes a great deal of attention is the most important point, the crux of the whole question. A celebrated French minister once said: *Point d'argent, point de guerre* (No money, no war); in the changed circumstances this might be paraphrased to "No defence without an adequate financial and industrial base". Fundamentally, this seems to me to be one of the main reasons for WEU's existence, in the shape of its key institution meeting here and its valuable complement the Standing Armaments Committee.

Earlier and more recent events are enumerated fully and in detail in the explanatory memorandum submitted by Mr. Bassinet. I shall not dwell on it here or on its contents which I have read very attentively; but, as regards some of the ideas put forward I should like to mention one point only where reference is made to the non-commitment of the man-in-the-street – some "peace marches" for example – and to the need to pursue with determination a costly policy, without which there can be no

Mr. Forma (continued)

industrial or technical progress and consequently no military security.

I have to say – and this is no secret – that without the backing of such technical advances what we say will carry no weight either within the alliance or in the context of world security.

Several speakers this morning referred to what we want to defend and why; in order not to waste time, I refer you to the answer given by Mr. Wilkinson. Speaking through a technical expert, the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions also seeks to say how these things can be defended; nor, it seems to me, does the report conceal the paucity of knowledge and applications in our countries, the unequal contractual and operational position in relation to the United States and the reasons for these shortcomings. It does recall the degree of co-ordination which has been achieved, by the bodies set up for the purpose, sometimes from scratch, but also hints at the distressing underlying factors which threaten to thwart such moves; these are to be found in the persistence of longstanding mistrust and political differences which are grist to the mill of certain political demagogues and in an imponderable but real effort to cause a breakdown, by organisations opposed to the interests of NATO and consequently to the effective co-ordination of technical knowledge and applications.

I would add something which may be misunderstood; for the military purpose which it is our duty to further and achieve, does the opposition – we would say the “spoke in the wheel” – come solely from the Warsaw Pact countries? May it not be true to say that some allies have doubts regarding the rights and wrongs of technological development in the widest sense and the consequent strengthening of Europe and the countries of Western Europe in NATO?

It seems to me that flames of ill-directed competition, secret jealousies and insincerity are being fanned from more than one direction. And as WEU is an effective instrument for fighting these fires, it too is subjected to overt and covert attacks.

I do not think it out of context to recall what our President, Mr. De Poi said at the start of our session, even if the interpretation of his remarks in some newspapers went further than he had intended.

I shall conclude my speech, which I have deliberately confined to general issues, by referring to one point made by the Rapporteur. He said: “The question is how the relationship between economic and social change can be influenced”. I think he might have gone a little further into

this question and made at least some reference to it in the draft recommendation.

This morning, when we heard Sir Frederic Bennett's very pertinent remarks concerning attempts in Paris to get round the decisions of national parliaments, I could not avoid thinking of the present reversal of principles still embodied – who knows for how long – in the treaties. Parliaments have decided and governments decide “because we are not a people, because we are divided”. And all these divisions are encouraged by all who have any reason for defending the tradition of “divide and rule” which is too often suffered.

Is it not for us to tear down the veils which prevent us from speaking more clearly in the same language and make it so difficult for us to share knowledge and work together? I shall therefore vote for the report and the recommendation submitted by the committee. In my view, they are a major contribution to the search for technical and economic results which will allow us to be more effective partners for the economy and defence of Europe and the free world; and they may even allow us to continue holding out our hands to those who have just withdrawn theirs at Geneva.

Free of all sentiment and pride, our hand must be strengthened by the essential and effective presence of all its sinews.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with our timetable, the debate will be continued and the vote on the draft recommendation will be taken tomorrow morning.

7. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany proposes the following changes in the membership of committees: Mr. Gansel as an alternate member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in place of Mr. Horn; Mr. Haase as an alternate member of the General Affairs Committee in place of Mr. Linde; Mr. Enders as a titular member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in place of Mr. Linde; Mr. Ahrens as an alternate member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in place of Mr. Enders.

Are there any objections?...

The nominations are agreed to.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 30th Novem-

The President (continued)

ber, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields - Part II (Resumed debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 963 and amendments).
2. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Document 954).

3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1982 - the Auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 953 and addendum).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6 p.m.)

EIGHTH SITTING

Wednesday, 30th November 1983

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.

2. Attendance register.

3. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – Part II (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 963 and amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Galley, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Worrell, Mr. Bassinet (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Lenzer (*Chairman of the committee*), Mr. Worrell, Mr. Bassinet.

4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 954*).

Speakers: The President, Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Pignion, Mrs. Knight, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Stoffelen, Sir Paul Hawkins, Mr. Michael Morris, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Fiandrotti, Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).

5. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1982 – the Auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 953 and addendum*).

Speakers: The President, Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

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3. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – Part II

(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 963 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – Part II and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 963 and amendments.

In the resumed general debate, I call Mr. Galley.

Mr. GALLEY (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I propose to make a general appraisal of Mr. Bassinet's report on harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields.

The term harmonisation covers an area which is probably much wider than harmonisation in the strict sense, since, as used by our Rapporteur, it extends to the problem of co-operation. I am especially grateful to Mr. Bassinet for having addressed himself in a very frank and detailed manner to all the

Mr. Galley (continued)

problems of co-operation. He has stressed that co-operation is vital if we are to meet in full the challenges facing the western world in the field of defence. To put it plainly, I say that co-operation is vital if we are to measure up to all the very rapid advances made by the Soviet Union over the last decade in the areas of science and technology.

We have to recognise that, in the military sphere, the Soviet Union gives scientific problems the very highest priority. To quote just one example, the present establishment of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR comprises a total of 900,000 researchers, scientists and engineers. It would, of course, be wrong to believe that all these scientists are working for the advancement and sole benefit of the armaments industries. Nonetheless, an appraisal made by specialists indicates that 40% to 50% of this establishment is more or less directly engaged in research of a military character.

It is also clear that in our western societies, where scientific research is deliberately made accessible to all, there are many dividing walls which obstruct the transfer of fundamental research to research of a military character. This is not so in the Soviet Union. There, all research is what we might call classified. The obvious consequence of this is that exchanges are much easier. Actually, in the Soviet Union there is complete continuity in the scientific field, with the result that research of a military character can interact more easily and directly with areas of fundamental research. This is one more reason, to be added to those mentioned by Mr. Bassinet, for extending our co-operation within the Atlantic Alliance.

Turning to co-operation in the field of high technology, I would widen somewhat the definitions proposed by our Rapporteur and by the experts. The definition of co-operation in the field of various electronic components contained in paragraph 141 of the report seems to me to be rather narrow. In the military sphere it is becoming increasingly clear that special priority needs to be given to problems relating to the overall area of security of transmissions and communications. I propose therefore that for future purposes and for the definition of the task to be entrusted to our experts, we should widen the field defined by Mr. Bassinet as comprising electronic components, sensors and software for processing signals or data to include the entire area of high-security, high-reliability transmission and communication techniques.

These are the comments I wished to add to my warm approval of the report and its general underlying thesis.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). - In the conclusions to his report, the Rapporteur expresses the view that there seems to be a rôle for WEU in research on advanced technology if it is borne in mind that such research is an end in itself, that the European countries the most concerned are members of WEU and that Japanese and American competition must be met. He therefore hopes for better independent European reflection in which the Standing Armaments Committee, appropriately instructed by the Council, should afford its assistance. In consequence, the draft recommendation instructs the Standing Armaments Committee to study the possibilities of co-operation between WEU member countries in the production of armaments. The purpose of this is to promote a co-ordinated European industry, potentially strong in advanced technology, to meet our defence needs. This implies the choice of weapons produced by co-operation between a number of countries.

I appreciate the work done by Mr. Bassinet, who has softened my regrets, as an Italian, that the Rapporteur was changed between the first and second reports on this subject, although both are members of the same political group. I would, however, like to refer back to the first report which was approved by the Assembly in 1982, endorsing a proposal for improved scientific and technological co-operation in advanced sectors, including military sectors. One reason for this was the desire that the standardisation of armaments, which was recognised on all sides to be essential and economically beneficial, should not in practice mean the subordination of Europe and, within Europe, a division into manufacturing and purchasing countries.

The report referred to the plans for a frigate for the nineties, transport aircraft, helicopters, the NATO-AGARD group and research more generally.

As regards the recognition that scientific and technological co-operation in military matters, and I believe more generally, are an unavoidable necessity for the countries of Europe, on economic grounds also, I should like, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, to make two general comments only, without offering any technical assessment, on which I share Mr. Bassinet's views.

The first is that defence expenditure must be governed by an overall policy aimed at achieving balanced disarmament and establishing a new international economic order on respect for the rights of all nations and the peaceful settlement of all international disputes.

Mr. Antoni (continued)

Every move in this direction, from whatever source, should therefore be supported. Here and now, all measures seeking to establish the conditions for a halt to the arms race should be supported, as well as efforts to bring about a resumption of the Geneva negotiations and a positive outcome for those about to take place in Stockholm. In this context, we consider that our proposed amendments to Mr. Wilkinson's draft recommendation on European security and more generally our attitude to Mr. Wilkinson's report, show the line which should be taken against rearmament.

The attention with which our views were heard – for which I thank members of the Assembly – and the actual result of the vote on Mr. Wilkinson's report show that this line can be taken. This approach has the support of many Europeans and of millions of people throughout the world; major political parties, not only of the left, social groups and religious communities are moving in this direction. We will continue to hope and to press for this to be accepted as the policy of governments and of Europe, and for its adoption throughout the world.

Secondly, collaboration must meet a number of requirements if it is to be effective and to produce the desired results. The first is that it must be based on national capabilities, with no one excluded, and should take up and strengthen efforts to include all of them, as the basic conditions are present in every WEU country. This has not always been the case and as the Rapporteur mentions it is necessary to set aside preconceived ideas which in practice limit possibilities for collaboration.

This is by no means a secondary matter but emerges from the part of the report listing present cases of collaboration. Yesterday, the Rapporteur Lord Northfield said that Europe is isolated and far behind in aerospace co-operation; and I would add that the European countries are still too far from each other. I think that these two points should be brought out in the report and the recommendation. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Worrell.

Mr. WORRELL (*Netherlands*) (Translation). Mr. President, before discussing its content, I should like to make a procedural point. This report by Mr. Bassinet, a major document, was preceded by a great deal of research. I should like to thank him for this, especially as the report contains so much information. Unfortunately, when so much expert knowledge has gone into the report, it was scarcely discussed at all in

committee. Only one meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was devoted to this report. The Dutch members were unfortunately prevented from attending by a very important sitting of the Dutch parliament. We have therefore been unable to discuss our questions and comments in committee. This has led me to table a number of amendments. I hope that in future enough time can be set aside for the discussion of reports of this significance to enable the members of the committee to make adequate preparations. One of the practical problems was that the final version of the report was not available until a few days before this debate. I find this extremely regrettable, both on Mr. Bassinet's behalf and also because it has prevented us from making a thorough study of the report.

Mr. President, I have only a few general remarks to make on the content of the report. Previous speakers have rightly emphasised the trouble Mr. Bassinet has taken over it. At the moment interest centres on the problem of harmonisation of research in the armaments industry. It is right, in my opinion, that attention should explicitly be drawn to the need for closer co-operation among the member states in the field of research and development in the future. In this field too, protectionism is widespread, each country pursuing its own, independent policy for reasons of prestige, for instance in the development of new weapons systems. Mr. Bassinet therefore rightly calls in his report for fresh initiatives to strengthen co-operation in this field in the future. But the question is whether we are all sufficiently prepared to convert a policy of unilateral development leading to possible commercial exploitation – often to unacceptable exports to third world countries – into one of European co-operation in the development of technology. I am far from optimistic about this, but great efforts in this direction are in any case very worthwhile.

Mr. President, as I have already said, the report calls for a greater effort to achieve co-operation and harmonisation. It also refers to the framework within which this co-operation will have to take shape. Our objection is that the report undoubtedly makes a strong case for new weapons systems. Some speakers, Mr. Bassinet among them, have called for a strong, independent policy towards the United States and the Warsaw Pact countries. I feel that Europe should indeed have its own job to do and its own responsibilities, but we must realise above all that this should not result in a race to become the third power in this world. That would greatly overtax financial resources.

Mr. President, if the report is to be understood as a call for a further arms race with the

Mr. Worrell (continued)

aim of making it more effective through the harmonisation and co-ordination of research in this field, it must be remembered that this is only one side of the coin. The other side is the call for arms control and a reduction in defence spending in view of the social and economic problems. I wish to place co-operation firmly in this context, and I believe that the question of employment is also very important here. A clear distinction should be made between the harmonisation and co-ordination of research and technical development in the present armaments industry on the one hand and the problem of employment on the other. We simply cannot allow the effect on employment to be seen as justifying the production of new weapons and possibly stepping up the arms race. Mr. Bassinet does not forge a sufficiently clear link between these problems. Co-operation in the military field cannot and must not be a goal in itself; the touchstone should always be the development of new defence strategies for the control of armaments. Co-operation in the military area is a good thing in itself, but attention must also be paid to possible harmonisation and co-ordination in the scientific field, with a view to reducing our defence spending, as Sir John Osborn said.

Mr. President, I will conclude by saying that co-operation may be very good in itself, but let us not forget that it may also give rise to fresh initiatives and that this expenditure brings export interests into play, so that many more weapons have to be exported, to the third world, for example. Special consideration should therefore be given to this point, in the Independent European Programme Group as elsewhere.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The general debate is closed.

I invite the Rapporteur to reply to speakers.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). - I should first like to thank the speakers who have commented and have all had words of praise for the substance of the report.

The report which I presented to the Assembly yesterday is the second part of a project undertaken by our Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and follows on the studies presented by Mr. Fiandrotti on behalf of the committee. I thought it proper to make this point yesterday, and I do so again today so that the position shall be quite clear. I would also point out that it was the committee which appointed the rapporteurs for both the first and second parts of the work.

Sir John Osborn gave us the benefit of his experience and wide knowledge of the various European assemblies. His ideas are all well-

judged, except his suggestion of the possibility of co-operation or joint discussion with the European Parliament, that is to say, with the assembly of the Communities. This raises a problem with regard to Article V of the Brussels Treaty. I do not think we can raise this question without having the means of resolving it, unless we wish to deny the special competence of each of the European assemblies.

Mr. Wilkinson referred in particular to the problem of a replacement for the Jaguar. This well illustrates what is possible, but not achieved, as regards European co-operation and results.

Mr. Galley to some extent supplemented the report by stressing the importance of developing research in the fields of signals transmission and communications. The report falls short on this point which should have been mentioned.

Mr. Galley underlined the need not only for harmonisation but also for co-operation if we want the European countries to measure up to the USSR and the United States. He pointed out that the organisation of scientific research in the USSR is not the same as in our countries, and may allow more effective spin-off to military applications. But our colleague also implied that the system is detrimental to the progress of civil research and civil applications, so, while we may take note of its effectiveness for military purposes, I do not think we can take the Soviet system as a model.

Mr. Forma and Mr. Antoni commented on rather similar lines. Going somewhat beyond the scope of a report dealing with the harmonisation of research, they made the use of joint research the pretext for raising the issue of the arms race. This was not the object of the report, which I compiled in the light of a threat and a hardening of exchanges with the United States.

If we wish our countries to possess the necessary weapon systems and to enjoy the technological advantages which are Europe's essential trump card, we must, of necessity, continue working towards harmonisation and, beyond that, towards co-operation.

While we may, of course, ask questions about arms reduction, any reductions must be simultaneous. While we may support any initiative directed towards halting the arms race, I do not believe that an isolated disarmament policy reflecting what must be called a posture of weakness, in contrast with the actions of others, is capable of ensuring the future and guaranteeing the defence and security of our countries. I do not wish to say any more on this subject, as it seems to me to go beyond the scope of the report.

Mr. Bassinet (continued)

Mr. Worrell raised numerous points including a question of procedure. While problems did arise in transmitting the first version of the report to the committee, these were due to strikes and other factors over which we had no control. A second meeting of the committee was devoted exclusively to a close and thorough discussion of the report, and the vote was taken this Monday, having been deferred owing to the absence of a committee member. Even though it might have been preferable to have had more time, I think I can say that we did have enough time to form a judgment on the recommendation and on the report itself.

Mr. Worrell also asked questions which go beyond the scope of this report. I have nothing against a statement to the effect that Europe should be pacifist or peaceloving. In this report I am neither for nor against; that is not its purpose.

Furthermore, Mr. Worrell alluded to social problems and to the foreseeable or desirable reduction of some military budgets. No doubt it would be a good thing to allocate more funds to meet social needs. Of course, it may appear unproductive for the future to devote large sums to increasing and maintaining defence budgets, but I do not think that we can act otherwise or take such a simplistic view of the problem. The suggested distinction, as regards harmonisation between civil research, regarded as beneficial, and military research, considered to be less so, rather ignores the fact that in the upstream stages of research, the work is not sufficiently specific in many cases for it to be placed in one or the other category. The closer one gets to applied research, to the production of prototypes and to practical applications, the clearer is the distinction likely to become.

Certainly, it may well be argued that this effort towards the harmonisation of research is not merely an intellectual exercise and that the intention is to achieve results and strengthen the armaments industries in our countries: a development which may in the long term raise problems in the field of exports. My immediate reply is: let's face the truth! Such exports are happening. If I am to believe what I hear, every one of our national armaments industries is continually acquiring markets. I repeat, let us look at the situation as it exists, and then see what can be improved.

These, Mr. President, are my reactions to the comments made by my colleagues. I would like to thank them once again for the consideration they have shown. I much appreciate all their remarks and comments and even their questions, as these provide both myself and the committee with additional matter for thought.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the committee Chairman.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I should first like to thank Mr. Bassinet very sincerely for all the trouble he has taken in drawing up this report. I must, of course, also thank Mr. Huigens for the assistance he has provided.

It is true that certain difficulties arose during the discussions that accompanied the drafting of this report. A new rapporteur had to be appointed, and I am particularly grateful to Mr. Bassinet for agreeing to take over virtually in mid-stream. This perhaps accounts for the rather hectic nature of the discussion towards the end of the committee's deliberations. All the same, I think that, thanks to Mr. Bassinet's commitment in particular, the report ultimately submitted is lucid and both comprehensive and to the point.

I have not long been Chairman of this committee and, like all the other members, I had to take the situation as I found it, but we intend to see to it in future that every member, whatever occasional difficulties he may have with his timetable, is able to make his contribution. But I believe the vote we take later will also reveal that we are quite capable of reaching agreement today.

The task we face – and this is also the background to this report – is quite simply to decide how closer co-operation in the future can lead to the more effective use of defence resources. As we know, other major problems await solution in all the member countries: labour market problems, a wide variety of economic problems, the problem of achieving stable prices and not least the problem of financing social security while the hard-fought struggles over redistribution continue. The whole purpose of this report is to find a niche, among all these highly political and explosive problems, for co-operation in research and development in the field of defence, which is, of course, almost entirely a government responsibility and has to be funded from government resources. Hence the need to state quite clearly that we Europeans must also have certain key technologies at our disposal, such as sensor technology and micro-electronics, which today play a crucial rôle in all modern weapons systems, if our defence industries are to compete in the world market.

I would remind you that in the United States the major defence programmes and also the NASA space programme, the Apollo programme and the post-Apollo programme have been instrumental in making key technologies available for civil application.

This report is designed to help draw attention yet again to a sensitive point in the debate in

Mr. Lenzer (continued)

Europe: that co-operation also has to be stepped up in the defence sector in the scientific and research fields and in the development of key technologies.

May I again thank all those who have contributed to the debate and express the hope that the recommendations will be approved by a large majority. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before voting on the draft recommendation we have to consider the amendments.

Three amendments have been tabled to this draft recommendation. We shall take them in the order in which they relate to the text: Amendments 1, 2 and 3.

Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Worrell reads as follows :

1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “European states”, leave out the remainder of the sentence.

I call Mr. Worrell to speak in support of his amendment.

Mr. WORRELL (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in Amendment 1 I proposed a change to paragraph (iii) of the preamble. The present text states that the European states must co-operate without restriction in their respective technological and financial efforts. I assume this is meant in a positive sense, but it could also be taken to mean that pressure must be exerted to increase activities in these fields, because financial and technological efforts in our countries would not be subject to any restriction. That certainly goes much too far for my liking. I have just called for spending to be reduced and for the arms race to be scaled down. I therefore feel that this paragraph should be removed from the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

What is the committee's view ?

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – The wording of this recommendation was suggested to us by one of our colleagues and I do not think we can share Mr. Worrell's interpretation of it. The committee decided in favour of this wording after a lengthy discussion. I therefore have no choice but to oppose this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Worrell reads as follows:

2. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “extensive” and insert “promising”.

I call Mr. Worrell to speak to his amendment.

Mr. WORRELL (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, what I am proposing here is a slight improvement to the text where co-operation and co-ordination are concerned. We cannot say that these exchanges are “extensive” at present, but we can say that they are “promising”. That is the purpose of my amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the view of the committee?

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – I would like to accommodate Mr. Worrell. His amendment does not alter the sense of the text, which continues to mean the same. I agree.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Worrell reads as follows:

3. In the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“4. Strongly support the need for co-operation within the Independent European Programme Group.”

I call Mr. Worrell to speak in support of his amendment.

Mr. WORRELL (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, both Mr. Antoni and I have already said in our statements that harmonisation and co-operation must, of course, also extend to our own and the Assembly's objectives. I tabled this amendment chiefly to give the Independent European Programme Group a greater opportunity to participate in the whole process so that there may also be some kind of external control and involvement.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – T committee has not considered this amendme

This report is a WEU document. It des co-operation as it exists at present. It the gives much space to what is happening i group and the Independent Europea

Mr. Bassinet (continued)

gramme Group, but, unless this amendment is prompted by an undeclared intention to substitute the Independent European Programme Group for the SAC, I cannot, in view of the text of the report and the content of the recommendation, see why the need to co-operate with the Independent European Programme Group should have to be stated in vigorous terms at this time.

If the wording had been more judicious, I would perhaps have expressed a different view, but in my opinion it is too assertive and accords neither with our aim nor with the task which was entrusted to the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 3 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 963, as amended.

Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber call for a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members present who desire a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

I thank the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the committee and share their pleasure in the success of their report.

4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 954)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 and vote on the draft budget, Document 954.

I call Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur.

page 34.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I am here today as Chairman of the Budget Committee to present the accounts for the past year and the budget estimates for the coming year. Before going into detail, I should like to make a few general remarks.

First, we should all be very conscious of the fact that WEU is under considerable financial pressure at the moment. It is no secret that the member countries are going through economic difficulties and are, as far as possible, cutting their responsibilities throughout the multifarious organisations which affect governments, particularly the democratic governments of Europe. A chill wind is blowing through many assemblies such as this. We must face the reality that we need to examine our financing very closely. If we do not, WEU is in grave danger possibly of withering away or, even worse, of coming to a complete standstill.

Although one should utter these words of warning, one should also appreciate the overriding need to maintain this organisation and its work on behalf of peace and defence within the European context.

I was appointed Chairman of this committee only a month or so ago. It has been impossible in that time for me to get to grips with the full details of the budget and to identify areas for reform. However, the members of my committee are very conscious of the need in the present climate to make economies and to examine the structure of WEU – not merely the Assembly, for which we have total responsibility, but all the other adjuncts of WEU, some of which, I know, my colleagues believe could be considerably improved by reducing expenditure.

Overall, the present position is a little difficult. The Council has not so far approved this budget, and there are suggestions that it may not do so. However, we should be failing in our task today if we did not consider the budget, comment on it in debate and then – if the Assembly were so minded – pass it. That is our duty today. It would be wrong for us to take it back.

I wrote to you in September, Mr. President, stating that the committee wished to defer the presentation of its report on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU so as to be able to make a thorough study of the problems presented by the budget. The committee asked the Presidential Committee to withdraw the report from the agenda for this part-session. I am very glad to say that you agreed to that, Mr. President, and it was withdrawn. However, that is a sign of our anxieties about some aspects of WEU expenditure.

Members have copies of the draft budget, which goes into the subject in considerable

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

detail. If there are any queries, I shall do my best, with the aid of expert advice, to answer them.

I should like to list the net percentage increases in 1984 as compared with 1983. The net total increase is 9.11%, and the total expenditure increase is 9.7%; but the total expenditure increase excluding pensions is 6.8% and the net total increase excluding pensions is 6.07%. Those figures show that, in its budget estimates, the Assembly has tried to respect a zero growth rate, which may be estimated at approximately 6%. Excluding pensions, there is an increase of 6.07% in the budget. It is because of the effect of pensions – which will rise by a monumental 182% in 1984 over 1983 – that this rate amounts to 9.11% if the net totals for two years are compared.

The various headings comprise the work of the Assembly *in toto*. First and foremost is the cost of permanent administrative staff. Expenditure on staff accounts for 56.04% of the total net budget of the Assembly. The estimated expenditure under that heading has been calculated on the basis of salaries on 1st January 1983. Following the criteria also adopted by the other WEU bodies in Paris, the adjustments made since that date and those likely to be made in 1984 have been set out together in Sub-head 2(D). These adjustments amount to an overall increase of 9% in relation to the rates given in the documents.

I am advised that the expenditure was estimated on the basis of the table of establishment adopted by the Bureau for the Office of the Clerk following the abolition of the post of Clerk Assistant. The new structure included the regrading of two Grade A.5 posts to Grade A.6 – one of which has since been vacated following the retirement of Miss Cohen – and the creation of a new Grade A.3 post which was approved by the WEU Council in 1983 for a period of one year and the usefulness of which had been appreciated by the political committees, particularly the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the General Affairs Committee.

Within this framework the proposal to regrade a Grade B.3 post to Grade B.4 has been renewed in the interest of fairness; in the ministerial bodies of WEU and in other co-ordinated organisations similar duties are fulfilled by officials with a grade higher than B.3. A detailed justification of these three proposals was given when the previous budgets were presented and in an exchange of correspondence between the Presidents of the Assembly and the Chairman of the Council during 1983.

A big drain on expenditure is, of necessity, the part-time staff we need to function here twice a

year as a session and for the committee meetings that take place from time to time throughout the year. We need interpreters, people to take the official note of our proceedings and those who run the Assembly for us if we are to do our work efficiently and properly. But it is very expensive. Head II, "Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly", groups expenditure relating to sessions, made up largely of the salaries of various categories of temporary staff, recruited on the occasions when we have those meetings, and the interpretation staff for the committee meetings that take place between sessions.

These salaries are set out in the budget on the basis of the same criteria as for permanent staff. The figures given in the various sub-heads of Head II are for salaries as at 1st January 1983. Adjustments to these salaries as from that date are estimated together under Sub-head 6 of that head. If we are to operate successfully as an assembly, we cannot do without temporary staff, although, as with all aspects of WEU, my committee intends to take a hard and close look at the various ways in which it might be possible to reduce expenditure. As I say, it is obvious that we cannot make heavy economies on temporary staff.

Running costs are part and parcel of any organisation and they must be incurred where one has both temporary and permanent staff. The running costs estimates appear in Head III, "Expenditure on premises and equipment", and these include, in Sub-head 4, the Assembly's share in the upkeep of these premises – we do not own them but we must pay our rent and dues as tenants – as worked out by the relevant services of the WEU ministerial organs.

In Sub-head 5 is reference to expenditure for the replacement of two typewriters purchased in 1968 and 1971 and some reproduction equipment, as explained in the explanatory memorandum. Only this morning at a meeting of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration queries were raised about the price of those typewriters. We intend to look at every item and aspect of equipment as and when it arises because we must monitor closely the expenditure of this organisation.

The estimates under Head IV, "General administrative costs", cover generally the foreseeable rise in the cost of public services in France – such as postage, which I understand is to go up shortly, telephones and telegrams – an expenditure on expendable equipment a equipment needed for printing and publishing Assembly documents. One of our tasks is to see that not too much paper is churned. We must try to see if some economies made in that respect, which of course will cut down on our overall running costs.

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

An important point which comes within the scope of the budget is the question of the internal expenses of the full-time staff, particularly their travel. Having looked, when I became Chairman of the committee, with a somewhat jaundiced eye at the whole budget, I do not believe that the costs of the staff, particularly on travel and administrative work, are necessarily excessive. A good deal of economy has already been practised in this area. Nor do I subscribe to the view that some people hold that, if we are to make a big impact on the expenditure of the Assembly, we should cut down greatly on travel and other activities. If we were to do that, WEU would wither away. If it means anything, WEU means taking note of what is going on and keeping in touch with various member countries. Inevitably, therefore – for members, their own governments pay the costs – we must have officials who go with members as part of the WEU set-up, and obviously that costs money.

“Other expenditure”, particularly in regard to travelling expenses, covers the President of the Assembly, committee chairmen and rapporteurs, as well as expenditure on official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk.

I have referred to Head VI, “Pensions”, which is an on-going cost and produces nothing for the Assembly. It is a heavy drain, but we are committed to it and I am sure that no one would suggest that there is any way of reducing or abolishing pensions to which, as a moral and statutory right, those who have retired are entitled. We must bear in mind, however, that pensions have escalated considerably, particularly in the past year. The increase of 182% compared with 1983 has been due to the retirement of two Grade A officials. The payment of these new pensions accounts for the 9% difference in total expenditure between 1983 and 1984.

In accordance with the procedure that has been in force for some time the WEU Assembly's draft budget for 1984 was examined by the Budget and Organisation Committee in London on 27th October and, if account had been taken of that committee's recommendations, the Council should have given its opinion on the draft budget before its being debated today here. However, I am advised that at its meeting on 17th November the Council decided to postpone its examination until its next meeting in December, and it is not beyond the realm of possibility that it will advise certain

If that were to happen, this Assembly and Budgetary Committee would have to take a strong note of what transpired.

I appreciate that many members of the committee are conscious of the need for economies and that it is a joint effort, not merely by the Budgetary Affairs Committee but by every elected member of the Assembly. We must make sure that we do our best to get sense into the accounts and get an approach to expenditure that seeks economies all the time so that the Assembly survives yet still runs efficiently. The Assembly is influential and worth while, and in the past thirty years or so it has made a significant contribution to an understanding of peaceful co-operation in Europe. It is a valuable institution that must be preserved, as I can see no other institution that could take its place.

There are those who advocate that the European Parliament should take over defence matters and that the rôle of WEU should become part of the European Community's remit. However, I do not intend to pursue that controversial point today. It is not the right way to proceed and any such move would be a retrograde step for European defence. WEU deserves to survive and will survive, but only if we all make a real effort to get to grips – whether we are elected members of parliament or paid officials of WEU – with the vexed question of expenditure.

I have great pleasure in recommending the budget to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Sir Dudley, I thank you very much for your very detailed, full and balanced report. It provides an excellent introduction to our debate.

I remind members that each speaker has only five minutes.

In the general debate, I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I will not use a cliché to congratulate our Chairman, Sir Dudley Smith. I will just tell him that his report is truly excellent.

I speak in this debate as Chairman of the French Delegation and this will come as no surprise. My country has always been firm in its support for WEU and its Assembly. This support has been expressed by France's government representatives, irrespective of party – and here I will mention only the addresses given by Mr. Jobert, Mr. Lemoine, Mr. Cheysson and Mr. Hernu – and likewise by all French parliamentarians, whatever the political differences which divide them.

I also speak for myself as a convinced European who, in the line of political duty, has done his utmost to promote European solidarity, and who, more especially, considers WEU and the Assembly to be a fundamental bastion of the Europe he envisages.

Mr. Pignion (continued)

Lastly, I speak in my capacity as first Vice-President and potential spokesman in the difficult dialogue with the Council on the budget which will take place in the coming weeks or months.

The budget, then, is a difficult issue, and I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for having, in your inaugural speech, presented with a clarity which impressed us all the problems as they stand and what is at stake in the final decision to be taken on this document – a decision of whose implications we have been reminded by the committee Chairman, Sir Dudley Smith.

Your remarks, Mr. President, have received in the press, and therefore from the public at large, the attention which they merited, and I am glad of that. Once again, we have to be clear and precise, even if that means repeating what Sir Dudley Smith has already said.

This draft budget was adopted unanimously – I repeat, unanimously – by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. It was then ratified by the Presidential Committee. It reflects, as we have already said, a dual concern for efficiency and economy. An increase of 6.07%, not including the funds allocated to pensions, lies within the foreseeable rate of inflation, on which so many hopes are set in this country. That should mean no real increase on the operating budget in 1984 – zero growth – and that seems eminently reasonable.

The President drew attention to the essential proposals of our Assembly, and our Rapporteur has also referred to them. Please forgive me if I mention them again, but these are matters which I really consider to be minor in the context of the budget: the maintenance of two Grade A.6 posts, which the Council itself decided in 1981 to allocate to the Office of the Clerk to compensate for the elimination of the post of Clerk Assistant; the reclassification of one post from Grade B.3 to Grade B.4; and the transformation to a permanent post of a temporary Grade A.3 post approved for one year by the Council.

Do I need to remind you, Ladies and Gentlemen, that the secretariat of our Assembly is made up of only twenty-eight people whose competence and devotion we have frequently had cause to appreciate, and that, within this establishment, promotion prospects are really very limited? All these proposals represent merited promotions or the real needs of the Office of the Clerk, which has been reduced to the essential minimum.

The Council has rejected these proposals, or rather said that it cannot give an opinion, which as I see it, amounts to the same thing.

Savings on staff, then: but that is not all. This penny-pinching affects every item in our budget. We will have to cut down on the costs of postage, telephone calls, office supplies, printing and publication, travelling expenses, information services, the expenditure incurred by Assembly groups and even on typewriters, as Mr. De Poi told us on Monday.

What should we infer from this?

According to my information, the economies called for represent less than 3% of the proposed budget. While this reduction may seem derisory, it is crucial, because, as we have said, our budget is tight, our resources have been cut to the minimum, and, this time, it is the work of our Assembly which is at stake.

Ladies and Gentlemen, you will not dispute the fact that, compared with the budgets of the other European organisations, the sums we are talking about are, beyond question, very modest. The economic problems afflicting our countries cannot always be invoked to justify a reduction in the funding of our organisation. If we accept such penny-pinching, we shall end up by suffering a real reduction of our ability to act. That would be contrary, would it not, to what we all believe to be the purpose of our institution?

I would not like to be forced to the conclusion that these repeated reductions are the outcome of a deliberate and concerted policy. Some of the discussions during the present session and the points relating to the responsibilities of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments do not, surely, reflect an intention to inhibit the activity of our WEU. Like our Rapporteur, Sir Dudley Smith, I should hate to think so.

Last year, at the same time, I described my fears to you in the same terms, and expressed my hope that, believing as we do in the modified Brussels Treaty we would move ahead and demand from the Council the resources needed for its full implementation.

I am sorry to have to express the same hope this year, and I trust that today will be the last occasion when I have to speak in such forthright terms.

At next June's session we will be consider the report of our colleague, Mr. de Vries, on budget of the ministerial organs. I hope this will provide an opportunity for a comprehensive look at the capabilities and of WEU.

Mr. Pignion (continued)

On Monday, our President told us that he was not one of those who wished to use the budget to reduce WEU to silence.

I hope, Ladies and Gentlemen, that we all share our President's sentiments, and I trust therefore that the draft budget will receive a massive vote in favour, thereby demonstrating our dedication to our organisation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mrs. Knight.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). - If we believe in the importance of this Assembly, we must vote it the financial means of continuing, but that does not mean that we should not question the budget.

We should never forget that we are spending not our money but the money of taxpayers in our respective countries. Moreover, we must not forget that public expenditure fuels inflation and that inflation robs and discourages savers, makes it difficult to run businesses and is likely to cause unemployment when those businesses fold. In my country, hundreds of thousands of jobs have been lost because governments have failed to curb inflation and because bodies such as ours have failed to keep their budgets within reasonable limits.

In the brief time available to me, I should like to ask a few of the questions that came into my mind on reading the documents. Why do we not set out the budget so that we know what we spent last year on each item and what we intend to spend next year? That would make it much easier to judge the budget. I find it an extraordinary notion that employers should foot the bill if their employees marry and have children; that a married man should be paid more money for doing exactly the same job as a single man or woman, and that if he has children - whether legitimate or, presumably, illegitimate - he should be paid more. Surely the important point is whether the employee is a good and efficient worker. There is a positive discouragement towards employing a married man, and heaven forbid that we should ever employ a married man with eight children.

I should like to know whether our bill is cut if the children leave home. Is it cut if the wife works or if the husband is divorced? Does it continue to go up the longer the employee keeps his children at home? Does it go down if the children go to work and earn money themselves?

The report sensibly suggests in paragraph 2 that we could save money if an unmarried girl were recruited. Why stop there? Why not say that only single women over child-bearing age need apply? That would probably

save the Assembly thousands of pounds, or millions of francs.

I should like to know whether we pay an employee less because he is employed at a late stage, in other words whether we are liable to pay less pension to an employee who works here for only a couple of years before he retires. Supposing an employee marries a wife aged twenty-one, one year before he is due for retirement, will we pay a pension to the wife for ever, after the husband has passed on? Supposing the man is receiving a pension from the Assembly, his wife dies, and he marries a young lady of twenty-four, do we go on paying the pension for the next forty or fifty years?

I have some queries about Sub-head 3. What is an offset and what is an assembler? How do they differ from ushers? I question the arithmetic on that page. The daily remuneration for the head of the sittings office is set down at 850 francs. There are two of those people. I would have put the total at 17,000 francs, not 27,200 francs. If the two of them are in Paris for ten days, the sum is wrong. It is also wrong for the Sergeant-at-Arms as well as for our old friends the offset/assemblers. For the latter, the total should be 23,800 francs, not 28,500 francs. It is all very confusing.

In Sub-head 6 we are told that we shall have to pay an increase of 58,000 francs for postage and telephones. I cannot imagine that the cost of postage has gone up so much. Another thought springs to mind when I read that there is an increase of 188,000 francs on printing and paper. All of us receive far too much paper. It costs a great deal not only to print it but to send it. Many of us receive stacks of paper at home, much too heavy to bring on the aeroplane, so we wait and pick up more copies here. Some economies should be made there. In Sub-head 2, what is the mysterious (f)? Why are bank charges set at 500 francs if we are in balance by so much and we have had some interest?

I could go on asking questions for a long time had I been allowed more time to speak. What are the mysterious "Snacks for reproduction service" in Sub-head 3.5? Why are they not paid for out of the daily remuneration? If anyone is engaged in the reproduction service, good luck to him, but why he should have snacks while he is working I cannot understand.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, next year we shall be celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the Brussels Treaty, but at this rate and in view of some pronouncements and attitudes of the Council of Ministers, I think that we shall be

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

getting ready for the obsequies of this Assembly. I say this because what is happening during this debate on the budget is truly amazing – I was going to say inconceivable. We are talking about a tiny budget, which objectively amounts to almost nothing for each of the member countries; and yet cuts are being called for under various heads which, if they were applied, would mean a laughable reduction of 1-2% on the appropriations. If, may I say, only a few government officials made a few less useless journeys this would reduce expenditure enough to enable the Assembly to operate properly. Furthermore, to take up a point I made last year, if the two separate offices in Paris and London were given up, the WEU institutions could be reorganised for the better and better use could be made of the funds provided by member states for the Assembly.

It is, in fact, the Assembly which represents Western European Union and which does the real work, by way of genuine, practical proposals for carrying out the tasks of WEU. That is why I believe that we cannot cut one franc or even one lira from the budget submitted to us. Let us not be cheeseparings – if I may use the term – with an international activity which is truly to the credit of our countries.

Otherwise, I am forced to believe that the statements made here by various ministers, to which Mr. Pignion referred, are untrue – statements to the effect that the WEU Assembly does very important work and that it should be effectively revitalised for the purpose. Or am I to believe that these statements are made simply to pull our legs or as we say in Italy to flatter us?

I think we are taking the wrong line. If the Assembly is thought to be useless let this be said clearly and let the Assembly be wound up. Otherwise, let us turn our attention to more serious issues, let us look for savings where they should be made, without however humiliating the staff and destroying their work and without humiliating ourselves by having to save on glasses of water.

For all these reasons I think that we should approve the budget as submitted, particularly as it could not have been submitted in any other way.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – It is my intention as Chairman of the Dutch Delegation to express the views of the Dutch Delegation; therefore, I intend to speak Dutch.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

(Translation). – Mr. President, I will begin by thanking the Rapporteur for his report and for the extremely competent way in which he has presented the budget for 1984. As he has rightly said, no real progress has been made with the budget on the expenditure side.

I have three comments to make on this budget. Firstly, I believe it is extremely important for every parliamentary assembly to have the right to decide on its own budget. Constitutionally, it is a remarkable situation for a parliament to be dependent for its budget on the judgment of the government or, in our case, the Council of Ministers.

Secondly, we must remember, particularly when we speak as members of the parliamentary assembly, the situation in which we work as parliamentarians in our own countries. In the Netherlands – as someone remarked earlier in the week – over 16% of the labour force is unemployed and the government's financing deficit is overwhelming. The Dutch Government and parliament are at present discussing economies of 7 to 9 million guilders or more a year. Widespread trade union action is being taken – rightly in my personal opinion – in opposition to the 3% reduction in social benefits and civil service salaries. The views of the government and opposition parties obviously differ somewhat on this issue. But we all agree that the situation is so serious that drastic economies are needed and that people must accept a reduction in their incomes.

My third comment concerns WEU. The budget we are discussing is very realistic, but I consider it important to reiterate in public now what I have already said in the Presidential Committee: it will not be long before WEU too has to decide on its priorities. I have absolutely no doubt about the need for WEU. We can be proud of the fact that this is the only parliamentary assembly that is competent in the area of defence. But then we must be realistic. I take this opportunity to state quite openly that very soon we shall have to find answers to a number of basic questions. I will mention two of these questions, and members can decide what the answers should be. First, are all the Assembly's reports and all the trips its committees make really essential to European defence and security?

My second question is this: on the basis of thirty-nine hours of extremely hard work a week would all the staff of the various organs of Western European Union be needed? I shall not answer these questions now, but they affect the credibility of parliamentarians who in their own countries must accept responsibility for appalling unemployment, for drastic cuts and the decline in many people's incomes.

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

The conclusion I reach is as follows, knowing the Rapporteur. As things stand, we have no reason to reject this budget, but I say again: both our own present and future credibility and that of the national parliamentarians is at stake.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Paul Hawkins.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate Sir Dudley Smith on his clear and sane exposition, especially since he only came into the chair a short time ago and had great difficulty getting here this morning. We should support him.

I wish to raise a few minor points and one major point.

I do not want to niggle but it seems ridiculous that every time there is a committee meeting different coloured bits of paper are sent out – red, orange, green, yellow and so on. Pencils are laid out every time we have a meeting. Unnecessary things are done. There should be an improvement in the setting out of the accounts so that we can understand them better.

We should examine the appointment of officials. We have some excellent officials. One of the most well-known has just retired, Miss Armande Cohen, who has been with us for many years and who has done a marvellous job. Should the officials not be given a chance of promotion? Should they not be seconded for a period of four or five years, keeping within their scale and having their salaries paid by the different nations, and should they not then return to their own civil service instead of remaining in this tight little community?

The total salary for each grade, though not for each person, should be set out. There are many different headings in the paper of expenditure for officials – children's allowances, allowances to be established here and so on. We should see a total for each grade.

My major point is that the Assembly's expenditure is not WEU's main financial problem. The main problems are concerned with two committees over which we have no control. There is the committee in London which criticises us for spending too much. We do not know how it spends its money, but I am sure that if we had the opportunity we would find that it incurs more stupid expenditure than there is here.

Then there is the Standing Armaments Committee, an absolute nonsense that should have been hit on the head many years ago. It is complete nonsense to have generals, air vice-marshals and admirals going round inspecting armaments works and the armies, navies and air

forces of our allies. Why the Council of Ministers has not dealt with this before now is something we should discuss with it.

The Assembly, the only group of members of parliament dealing with defence on an international basis, must be retained. We must extend the activities of WEU – but the only way in which we can do so is by ensuring that the Council of Ministers examines its own expenditure and puts its house in order before it tackles us.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Morris.

Mr. Michael MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). – I am a new member of WEU and of the Budget Committee, but I am a member of the Public Accounts Committee, which is the financial investigatory committee of the United Kingdom parliament.

I was particularly moved by the speeches of Mr. Pignion and Mr. Stoffelen. There are two fundamental questions that the committee should consider under the new chairmanship of Sir Dudley Smith. I am sure that Mr. Pignion is right, that if WEU is to function it should do so realistically and seek to achieve the objectives that it has been set, but that it needs to do so as Mr. Stoffelen said – in a questioning manner, particularly in the Budget Committee.

The papers that I have seen since my appointment are very thin and make it difficult to understand the accounts. Mrs. Knight has mentioned some of the questions that I would have raised – although I would not have raised issues about the French social security system. One of the Budget Committee's tasks under its new Chairman should be to examine historic costs over the last five years in absolute and real terms, so that we can establish the trend. We should ask the chairmen of the relevant committees to give us a programme of work so that we can provide the necessary resources. A paper that looked ahead five years would allow worthwhile work to be done.

You mentioned pensions, Mr. President, at the opening of the session on Monday. Pensions are a forecastable item – we know when officials are to retire – so it does us little credit to say a year later that some expenditure has suddenly cropped up under that heading. The Budget Committee should anticipate and allow for that expenditure. I am not clear what our relationship is with the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts, and a paper on that subject would help the Budget Committee.

As a new member, I cannot add much more. In its present form, the budget should be supported, for the reasons given by Sir Dudley Smith. However, I hope that in the months ahead we shall get down to hard, questioning

Mr. Michael Morris (continued)

work and that we shall make proposals that will ensure that those who wish to take part can do a good job, to the benefit of our communities and our countries and within realistic financial parameters.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the subject before us certainly deserves more than the five minutes we are allowed but I intend to keep within the time limit and I shall therefore try to summarise the reasons why we agree with what the Rapporteur and earlier speakers have said.

No one in any country disputes the absolute need to keep down public expenditure. In our view, however, the problems of different institutions should not be involved in this spiral because cutting their funds means cutting their activities. Furthermore, if the institutions are democratic, a cut in funds means reducing opportunities for free speech and therefore for democracy itself.

I would also like to observe, perhaps it slipped out, that when there is talk of cutting the WEU budget, the funds allocated from national budgets are such a minute percentage of total government expenditure that they do not deserve the criticisms made in the Council and elsewhere. I would like to make a further point, which is of a general nature and not confined to WEU; it is that no savings are made by cutting down on a general organisation, an activity or an institution. Indiscriminate cost-cutting is a mistaken policy because the apparent savings are swallowed up by the lack of an organisation at the level concerned, so that the expenditure is spread and is ultimately higher.

Of course, I understand the arguments of colleagues like Mr. Stoffelen, who call for economies in the management of our budget; but I would say to him and other members who have encountered problems and have asked themselves questions - some of which I agree may be well-founded - that these remain problems concerning the internal organisation of the Assembly and are individual problems; the overall question is more complex.

This brings me to the crux of the problem, to the real issue which faces us. Some speakers have said that there are those who want the Assembly to die. I wish to say to all members - and you know us to be a political party often in opposition and often in the minority - that it would be quite wrong to try to resolve the problems of a discussion and of a democratic debate on the great problems of European

defence by silencing the only democratic parliamentary assembly which discusses those problems. It would be a serious mistake first and foremost because, since these problems affect the countries of Europe, the discussion would be taken elsewhere but to what advantage - it is easy to foresee that it would be very slight.

The thought springs to mind that someone does not like the existence of a democratic parliament where parliamentarians and the democratic forces of Europe can express their views freely. It may perhaps please some to think that, considering the institutional work of other democratic organisations, a positive response to this problem might be found in a different manner. I am referring to those who argue that the activity of this Assembly should be cut and that of the Community and the new European Parliament increased accordingly. We have already stated our opposition to this idea here; we reiterate that opposition now that we are discussing the budget which, in our view, calls, as a whole, for unduly tight management with some cuts affecting the legitimate expectations of the staff, particularly as regards pensions. Instead of burying the Assembly, let us devote our thoughts to updating its aims and tasks so that it can better fulfil the purposes for which it was created and for which it has worked hitherto. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Fiandrotti.

Mr. FIANDROTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, I wish to add only a few comments. I would observe that there is never any way of knowing how much it is essential and sufficient to spend on democracy; that there is never any way of knowing in advance whether a given item of expenditure is worthwhile or not; on the other hand it can be said that any expenditure which helps to promote dialogue, deeper understanding and analysis shows positive return greatly in excess of expectations.

On the question of substance, I agree that the competent committee and the Presidential Committee are unquestionably in a position to decide how much should be economised and where, but I would point to a contradiction in the assessment of the work done by the Assembly. It may be argued that it does not produce much and that this indicates some delays in its procedures; but this should not be grounds for reducing its tasks but rather for extending the general functions of WEU.

Today, the limits which applied in 1954 when the EDC failed to materialise no longer exist: voices are heard arguing for a strengthening of common bonds and for giving greater powers to the institutions of the European Community. Within this scenario, the general problem of

Mr. Fiandrotti (continued)

defence will clearly have to take on greater importance, because there can be no common policy without joint discussion of the problems of defence and security. This will mean that the work of WEU will be used, taken over or associated with that of other supranational organisations and that greater use will be made of this Assembly in the framework of a foreseeable and desirable strengthening of Community bonds.

Admittedly, Western European Union will have to do its work better, particularly, I repeat, as we are no longer faced by the constraints of 1954; no one now asks, that is, whether Germany is a more militaristic or a more peaceful state than the other members of the EEC, as we are now all closely linked. The aim should be a definite strengthening of common policy and closer co-ordination of the various Community institutions and links.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The general debate is closed.

I call the Chairman and Rapporteur.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – We have had an interesting and useful debate. Several members have referred to a funeral, but I would not be so pessimistic. Rather than looking forward to a funeral we should be looking forward to a rebirth. If I sense the mood of the Assembly correctly, there is great determination to carry on the work of WEU but a realisation that we must do something quite drastically to cut our expenditure if we are to survive, and survive I think we shall in the long run.

I was grateful to Mr. Pignion for his kind remarks and the support that he gave to the budget in a vigorous speech. I was grateful also for the contribution of my British colleague Mrs. Knight, who characteristically strongly attacked some of the provisions.

I agree with Mrs. Knight about the need to guard against fuelling inflation. One of the great sins is that people automatically assume that inflation will rise, and they respond accordingly by marking up their prices and incomes and generally anticipating a move that does not always occur. Unfortunately, it does occur then, because they themselves have fuelled inflation considerably.

Mrs. Knight spoke of the way in which the budget was set out and the difficulty of making comparisons one year with another, a point also made by Sir Paul Hawkins and Mr. Michael Morris, and I assure them that I take the point on board. Possibly the accounts are not as readable and understandable as they might

be. I assure members that the committee will look at the matter to see whether it is possible to get a better form of presentation before we next appear before the Assembly.

Mrs. Knight also raised the question of extra payments, particularly about whether people qualified for certain grants, and the way in which they were worked out. All the payments made to members of the staff of the Clerk come under two headings, basic salary and annual increments on the one hand, and allowances on the other. The latter at present are expatriation and household allowances. I agree that the Assembly should have available information about the totality of such sums affecting any one individual, giving his or her allowances, because the sums can vary according to whether the person is married or has children.

As for pensions and people who benefit as a result of those, I assure Mrs. Knight that if a senior and ageing member of staff were so ill-advised as to marry a twenty-one-year-old girl, the rules would apply as they must apply to everybody who is legally married. The only qualification in that respect is that the marriage must have existed for one year or more. Under the rules of WEU relating to pensions, the conditions of entitlement relating to survivors' pensions, which was the point in question, say:

“ A survivor's pension shall be payable to the widow... of a staff member who died in service, provided she had been married to him for at least one year at the time of his death, except if his death resulted either from disablement or illness contracted in the performance of his duties, or from an accident. ”

The rules are very much in line with the ordinary pensions practice that we know in member countries, and are similar to those that appertain in private industry. Although there can be differences, I suggest that, in relation to pensions, we are on the right lines.

I am not so sure about the point that she raised about staff and the extra allowances that are given according to whether a person is married and has a sufficient number of children. Off the cuff, I believe that the custom in France is different from that in England and that that practice may well be the norm in other activities of government, if not in industry generally. However, I shall pursue that point, as it had not been brought to my attention before.

Mrs. Knight also queried the rather sinister omission of (f) in Sub-head 2 of the budget. She thought that something might be hidden. I asked for an explanation and was advised that (f) was for a special allowance that was done away with some years ago. It still remains on the page, because the notation needs to be the same. However, I do not know why we cannot

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

just eliminate (f). Perhaps we could bear that point in mind when we do the reformulated accounts.

Mrs. Knight also asked us to look into the question of snacks. I shall certainly do that. It escaped my eye when I read the accounts as they were originally prepared. It needs some explanation, and I shall certainly look into that. However, I am grateful to Mrs. Knight for her comments, as it is important that such queries should be raised.

Mr. Cavaliere was right to say that the Assembly was the most important element of WEU. He is a wholehearted supporter of it and a very active representative. I only wish that others were as active and enthusiastic as he is. There would then be no problem about the future of WEU. Mr. Cavaliere took his usual forthright stance, and I think that I can sum up his attitude by saying that if something is worth doing, it is worth doing well. WEU is certainly worth doing well.

Mr. Stoffelen was kind enough to mention the activities of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the need to examine that expenditure carefully. Above all, he questioned whether all the journeys undertaken on the part of the Assembly and its committees were necessary. The answer is that I honestly do not know.

With my hand on my heart I could say that some of the journeys undertaken by certain individuals or committees over the years may not have been necessary. Some journeys are more relevant than others. However, I am sure that once we started cutting such activities, WEU would be finished. It would be no use if we did not see anybody or go anywhere and merely came here from our own countries to debate. The whole spirit of WEU would then be lost. Although every part of WEU must bear the brunt of economies and everything must be looked at, we shall not save much money by being draconian about spending money on journeys. The big savings can be made in other areas.

Overall, WEU's budget, particularly for the Assembly, is small beer compared with the money lavished on other institutions. As has been said, if only some useless officials in our respective governments made nine or ten fewer futile journeys every year, the budget might be well provided for.

My colleague, Sir Paul Hawkins, made a spirited speech. Like the snacks, the different coloured paper will be investigated. I know that that has been bugging him for some time and that there has been a proliferation of such

things. Although only pennies or centimes might be saved, it would be a gesture in the right direction.

He also asked about the total salaries for each grade and the allowances. In any minute examination of the expenditure on salaries in such an organisation it would be extremely helpful to know exactly what each individual receives. Allowances can raise salaries considerably.

Sir Paul Hawkins's main point concerned the committee that sits in London and the Standing Armaments Committee. In my time as a representative I have heard similar comments from many colleagues. We are now fast reaching the time when such activities must be investigated and proved. Ludicrously enough, if we do not do that they might survive and this Assembly might go under. That would be nonsense.

Like Sir Paul Hawkins, I think that armaments inspection is unnecessary. It is not only unnecessary to inspect our allies' armaments but insulting. The sooner we stop that, the better.

Mr. Michael Morris, who is a new and welcome member of our Assembly, said that we should look at the historic cost over the past five years. We shall certainly do that. As a new member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, I am sure that he will be vociferous in pressing that point.

Pensions have been anticipated. It was known that Miss Cohen would retire fairly soon and that that would be a heavy drain on our pension fund. Nevertheless, it would be sensible for us to anticipate such an event by making a list of the senior staff members who are likely to retire in the next five years. We shall then have some idea of the commitment involved. I agree with Mr. Antoni that we cannot cut expenditure indiscriminately because that cuts away the plant's roots and it then begins to wither and die. We must be not only prudent but sensible in our approach to any economies. We must bear in mind that the good running of the Assembly should not be seriously affected if that can be avoided.

By and large, Mr. Fiandrotti supported the views of many other representatives. Today's debate on the budget may have been rather better than usual, because we are all aware that we are talking not only about dry and rather uninteresting figures, but about the future of WEU. I believe that WEU can and will survive, but it needs the combined effort of us all. If the staff are to preserve their jobs, they will need to make some of the economies. Our survival also needs the good will of the delegates from the various member countries, who obviously - judging by today's debate - believe

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

in the concept of WEU and that WEU should be sustained and improved.

Therefore, I am sure that the Assembly will adopt the budget. I promise that when we return in a year's time, I or my successor will have considered all the options open to us. I hope that we shall be able to portray a much healthier picture and that the debate will be more optimistic than it has sometimes been today.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Sir Dudley, for your very clear reply. I would also like to thank the other speakers for their commitment, even if they have sometimes expressed divergent views. This commitment alone justifies us in being fairly optimistic about the future.

We shall now vote on the draft budget for the financial year 1984 in Document 954.

As a vote by roll-call has not been requested, the vote will be taken by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 is adopted.

5. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1982 – the Auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 953 and addendum)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 953 and addendum.

I call Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – This is very much a formality. We have had the main debate and talked about various financial aspects of the matter. I formally move that the report be adopted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the motion to approve the final accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1982 in the addendum to Document 953.

No amendment has been tabled.

I now put the motion to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The motion is adopted.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day :

1. Economic relations with the Soviet Union (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 958 and amendment).
2. The Assembly of WEU and the North Atlantic Assembly – Impact of the existence and work of the North Atlantic Assembly on relations between the WEU Assembly and national parliaments and on public awareness of the existence of WEU (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 955).

Are there any objections ?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12 noon)

NINTH SITTING

Wednesday, 30th November 1983

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. Economic relations with the Soviet Union (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 958 and amendment*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Atkinson (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Müller, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Cavaliere, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. van der Werff, Mr. Benedikter, Mr. Galley, Dr. Miller, Mrs. Knight, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Unland, Mr. Atkinson (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Michel (*Chairman of the committee*), Mr. Galley, Mr. Atkinson.
4. The Assembly of WEU and the North Atlantic Assembly – Impact of the existence and work of the North Atlantic Assembly on relations between the WEU Assembly and national parliaments and on public awareness of the existence of WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 955*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Stoffelen (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Murphy, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Page, Mr. Enders, Mr. Stoffelen (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Berchem, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. Economic relations with the Soviet Union

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 958 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The first order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on economic relations with the Soviet Union

and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 958 and amendment.

I call Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – It is a great privilege for me to present this report on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. The subject is one of the most important to have come before the Assembly in recent years, because it attempts to show how the western alliance has failed to work together as allies in response to continuing Soviet threats and aggression abroad and oppression at home. It points out that, in allowing the Soviet Union to benefit from western aid in the form of trade, credits and advanced technology, we are in effect contributing to the effectiveness of the Soviet military machine and thus to the undermining of our own security. It warns that it is paradoxical for us in the West to continue to rescue a stagnant economy for a régime pledged to overthrow its creditors.

This is a report that I have been anxious to prepare for some time, ever since it became embarrassingly clear to the whole world that our response to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan had done nothing to help that country but a great deal to show how disunited we could be in the West. Then, our response to the Kremlin-inspired clampdown on Poland has done nothing to save Solidarity but has produced perhaps the most serious crisis within the alliance in recent years. Both events represented a major victory for the Soviet Union in

1. See page 36.

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

its pursuit of its strategic aims. Even more recently it has been allowed to get away with the murder of civilians shot down in international flight.

It is in reference to that crisis within the alliance last year that I want to introduce the report and to ask the Assembly to cast its mind back to those events when the United States attempted to use retrospective legislation to stop European companies selling to the Soviet Union equipment based on American technology. At issue were the turbines made in Britain under General Electric licence and the pipelaying equipment made in West Germany under Caterpillar licence. Superficially, it was President Reagan's delayed response to the imposition of martial law in Poland at the Kremlin's behest the previous December. In reality it was a clumsy expression of the anxiety of the United States that ten Western European nations, including five members of NATO, were not only providing all of the equipment, parts and technical expertise for the building of the Siberian gas pipeline, but the French and German Governments were providing \$15 billion borrowed at 15% interest and lent at 7% interest to finance the entire project.

The United States argued that the deal, the largest East-West trade deal in history, would ensure that the Soviets would not have to divert any material or capital resources to build the pipeline and that it could continue to plough both into its accelerated programme of military production. Nor would the Soviets have to divert significant individual labour to its construction since a major proportion of it in the frozen Siberian wastes would be done by Gulag prisoners.

The United States feared that Western Europe would become dangerously dependent on Soviet gas and would be vulnerable to any cut-off, reminding us that the Soviet Union has cut off, or threatened to cut off, energy supplies for political reasons on eight occasions since 1945. The United States also feared that Western Europe would ultimately become more amenable to the Kremlin's policy. To us in Europe such an attitude by the United States appeared to be utter hypocrisy when it was itself planning to renew its agreement to supply grain to the Soviet Union, a policy contrasting so blatantly with President Carter's embargo following the invasion of Afghanistan.

As we all know, in the end, common sense prevailed and the United States withdrew its threat of sanctions against European firms. In return it was agreed that the whole question of

western technology, trade and credit deals with the Soviet Union would be hammered out.

That was a crisis of confidence in the alliance following which we said: "Never again". Yet that was in itself a repetition of a similar crisis two years before when the West failed to get its act together over how to retaliate in response to Afghanistan. For example, it will be recalled that only the United States and West Germany boycotted the Olympic games in Moscow and that Australia and Argentina made up much of the grain that had been withheld by President Carter. We said then: "Never again".

Most recently we have seen another failure on the part of the free world to agree a firm, united and effective response following the downing of the Korean airliner in violation of international law. Is it a case of "Never say never again" – *Jamais plus jamais?* Or can we, free and independent nations as we are, agree some basic ground rules that can avoid such disunity and crisis in future? That is the aim of the recommendations, which attempt to provide a code of conduct for all democratic nations to agree the limits that they could accept to their trading relations with the Soviet Union and its allies. I hope that the report will be unanimously accepted by the Assembly.

First, it must be sensible to ban all exports to the Soviet Union of advanced technology which could be used to make its military machine more effective. The reason NATO is spending ever-larger sums to modernise its defences is that we have been overtaken by the Soviet Union in both quality and quantity.

The evidence is that it is we ourselves who have contributed to the Soviet Union's superiority. The list of strategic and technological transfers – legally and illegally, by fair means and foul – is legion. One of the most alarming examples occurred several years ago, when the United States authorised the sale of sophisticated ball-bearing grinding machines to the Soviet Union and the ball-bearings from those machines enabled the Soviets greatly to improve the guidance systems in the long-range missiles which now pose a serious threat to us.

What the Soviet Union cannot invent for itself it is obtaining from the West and reproducing exactly. It is still happening. We have read in the papers this week that parts of an American computer capable of being used for military purposes was illegally on its way to the Soviet Union before they were stopped in West Germany and in Sweden.

This Assembly must insist on an end to the scandal of our having to spend money to counter our own technology. Cocom must be made more effective, as a matter of urgency. Secondly, with hindsight, we can now surely agree that

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

it was wrong in principle to commit ourselves to long-term contracts that will make us dependent in some economically strategic way on communist countries, especially when there were viable alternative resources in the free world and the third world. In the case of Siberian gas, the Assembly has said in its report, Document 930, adopted last December, that Norwegian gas reserves are adequate for Europe's future needs without any risk.

Thirdly, again learning the lessons of the current crises of those countries that have defaulted on their debts – including communist countries such as Poland, where it can be said with good reason that it has been the result of their social and economic systems – we must seek general agreement to end subsidised credits to oppressive communist régimes. Lenin is supposed to have said sixty years ago that the day would come when the capitalists would fight each other for the privilege of selling the rope with which they would be hanged, but what he did not know was that we would also offer credits for the purchase of the rope.

Finally, let us accept that countertrade, paid for in compensation instead of hard currency, produces all the advantages to the communists and all the risks to the West and that we should discourage its use as a matter of principle.

The draft recommendations before us suggest that this agreed code of conduct on trading relations with communist countries should be adaptable as progress is made towards real détente and peaceful coexistence. In this respect, there will of course be plenty of opportunities for firm and sustained evidence of progress to be assessed – not just at Geneva but through the Helsinki process and elsewhere.

What we must not do is pretend, for example, that the situation in Poland is now tolerable because it is now quiet; accept that Afghanistan is now part of the Soviet Union; forget the dissidents because they are now in prison; or ignore the allegations that forced labour was used to build the pipeline to bring gas to the industries and homes of Western Europe.

In that respect, I appeal to all my colleagues not to turn a blind eye to paragraphs 109 to 119 of my report or to the appendix to the report, which refers to the conclusion reached at the international hearing in Bonn a year ago that slave labour was used in the construction of that pipeline. That is no different from the use of concentration camp labour during the last war. Each of us is morally obliged to be fully aware of that, and it is the duty of the WEU Council to investigate and to report as I have recommended.

I hope that it will be appreciated that I have not used this report to argue for the use of trade sanctions and embargoes, the use of American grain or European butter as political weapons. Those arguments may be made during the debate, but the report seeks an end to the disunity and the ineffectiveness of the free world, which has been seen every time the Soviet Union has broken international law and violated fundamental freedoms.

Of course we cannot predict accurately what new aggression the Soviet Union will perpetrate, by itself or through any of its surrogates throughout the world; nor can we anticipate exactly which new round of oppression it will impose upon its own people or its captive nations. But one thing is as certain as it is tragic – that while men live and are not free, there will always be the Sakharovs, the Walesas, the Dubceks. While the Soviet Union remains moribund in its pursuit of world domination, there will always be the Polands, the Czechoslovakias and the Afghanistans. It is in pursuit of the most effective and united anticipation of such events before they happen that I believe we can actually help to ensure that they will not happen. I hope that the Assembly will accept the report with a large majority; I have great pleasure in proposing it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before opening the general debate, I would remind you that, following the decision taken by the Assembly last Monday, speaking time is limited to five minutes per speaker.

The debate is open. I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I first express my very warm thanks to our Rapporteur for his report on a very difficult subject. I especially wish to concur with paragraph (v) of the preamble. I share the deep shock and revulsion of all the members of this Assembly at the shooting down of the North Korean civil aircraft in which defenceless people were killed to demonstrate military capability and presence.

I also share the Rapporteur's view expressed in paragraph 1(a) of the draft recommendation, according to which all exports of advanced technology which might be used for armaments purposes should be banned. I am very strongly of the opinion that the Cocom list should be expanded and updated and that its implementation should be strictly monitored. That this is possible is demonstrated by the incidents in north German ports and in Scandinavia which Mr. Atkinson has just mentioned.

Finally, I believe that the Rapporteur is right to point out in paragraph 1(b) of the draft recommendation that European states should not

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

make themselves economically dependent on the Soviet Union. This very point was at the centre of the debates in the German Bundestag before it agreed to the natural gas deal with the Soviet Union.

While it is true that under this agreement we shall be purchasing from Soviet sources 30% – quite a substantial proportion – of the natural gas consumed in the Federal Republic, the fact remains that 30% of natural gas accounts for only 5% of our total primary energy. I might also point out that in our gas industry more than 30% of the gas is supplied on the basis of contracts under which the supply may be discontinued, i.e. the gas producers are entitled to cut off supplies, thereby obliging customers to turn to other forms of primary energy.

We agreed to the deal only under these conditions. In our view German energy supplies will remain absolutely secure even after the contract comes into force. The great advantage of the deal is that it will bolster and conserve our own modest resources.

The reason why, despite this partial agreement, I am unable to endorse the report is that it unfortunately omits two points which seem to me vital. Firstly, I would have liked to see some general comments on the rôle of international trade and on the interdependence of world trade and détente. I am convinced that trade between peoples and countries not only contributes to better mutual understanding but can also lead to a relaxation of tension, or to put it the other way, that the rejection of trade relations may very easily aggravate a country's belligerent stance.

This also applies to trade with the Soviet Union and its allies. Let me repeat here that I exclude trade in sensitive goods which might be helpful to Soviet military technology. There is no question that goods of this kind should on no account be supplied.

It is also beyond question, Ladies and Gentlemen, that trade with our countries strengthens the economy of the Soviet Union, reduces the time needed for many of its projects and generally diminishes the unwieldiness of its system. That is the way it goes in trade: both parties to a deal profit, acquiring something they did not have before, even in trade with dictatorships. Anyone who does not accept this must prohibit all trade with the Warsaw Pact countries, but I am convinced that this would enhance the belligerence of the eastern bloc and increase the danger to peace.

The second point I cannot find in the report is a clear renunciation of boycotts and embargoes. Anyone who believes that the Soviet

Union can be swayed or forced into submission by boycotts and total rejection of trade is under a misapprehension and underestimates both the endurance of the Russian people and the effectiveness of propaganda under a dictatorship. He is also under a dangerous illusion about the enforceability of boycotts.

Were anybody to attempt to get the better of the Soviet Union in an economic war, I am convinced he would find that the Russians would follow their Kremlin leaders once they had explained the situation and hammered the propaganda message home day after day, night after night: tighten your belts or the West will win. Ladies and Gentlemen, some forty years ago the world witnessed the Russian capacity for endurance when they withstood the combined pressure of the Germans and Finns in the siege of Leningrad, although the military situation was hopeless.

Anybody who thinks political success can be achieved by boycotts and embargoes should consult the history books on the outcome of these measures. Only once, it is said, have economic sanctions proved successful and that was centuries ago, when Pope Urban IV declared an import and export blockade against the cities of Siena and Florence in 1261 in order to further the Angevin cause and oppose the Hohenstaufen party. Tradition has it that the embargo was successful.

That aside, all economic embargoes have misfired. Napoleon's famous continental blockade prohibited trade with Britain and in British goods. British property was everywhere confiscated, not only in France but in the Netherlands and Germany as well. In no European country could a ship be unloaded which had previously called at a British port. Ladies and Gentlemen, you all know the outcome of that blockade. In spite of Draconian penalties and rigorous controls, these measures were thwarted by daring sailors and smugglers and by subverting a good many port authorities. What is more, the continental blockade brought Britain closer to Prussia, Austria and Russia, and led to some degree of prosperity in our coastal regions.

In another instance, in 1832, the United Kingdom and France endeavoured to strangle the Belgian revolution by imposing a trade blockade. This was abandoned the following year as a failure. Otherwise our Belgian friends would not have been with us now – which I would greatly regret.

In 1887 Bismarck forbade the German Reichsbank to make loans against Russian securities. This caused a sudden drop in the value of Russian securities in Berlin, followed by a massive flow of business to Amsterdam and

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

Paris. The French retained their confidence in Russian creditworthiness, and thus began the policy of Russo-French loans with all the political consequences familiar to us.

In 1917, the allies decided to impose a complete commercial and financial embargo on a stricken Russia. This was lifted in 1921 having failed to prevent the success of the October revolution.

In 1935, the League of Nations voted for a complete cessation of trade and financial dealings with Italy because of its invasion of Ethiopia. This embargo was circumvented in particular by Germany, by then no longer a member of the League of Nations. While it was unable to make Italy abandon its policy, it did lead to the Berlin-Rome axis, which subsequently caused so much suffering in Europe and throughout the world.

In 1960 the United States decreed an embargo against Cuba; in 1963 the United Nations imposed a ban on army supplies to South Africa and in 1965 a boycott against the present Zimbabwe – all to no purpose. In 1962 the Federal Republic stopped the delivery of large-bore pipes to the Soviet Union at the request of the United States. The German supplies were thereupon replaced by consignments from a number of our neighbour states. What is more, the Soviet Union built up its own pipe production into what is today one of the largest in the world.

1980 saw the embargo against Iran. All exports to Iran, with the exception of food and medicines, were forbidden. Officially, this embargo is still in operation. It has been able to prevent neither the establishment of an Islamic republic nor any of the hideous cruelties of that system, nor yet the outbreak of the war against Iraq. Finally, turning to Afghanistan, I wholly share the view of the Rapporteur. It does not seem to me that we have had any success in this area.

Mr. President, I think that a report about trade with the Soviet Union must include a reference to the futility of measures to limit and inhibit trade, as such measures are constantly cropping up in discussions about trade with the East. It would be quite wrong to think that such measures could possibly force the Soviet Union and its allies to do or not do anything. As politicians and realists we should be honest and admit that boycotts and embargoes of this kind cannot enter into our dealings with the eastern dictatorships, because they are ineffective. We must choose other ways of sorting out our differences with the Soviet system.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as a historian, I naturally feel the urge to comment on Mr. Ahrens's remarks. I might point out, for instance, that it turned out to have been very shrewd of the German buyers to sell Russian securities to France, as French savers got nothing for them after 1917. That is another of history's lessons, and so, my dear Ahrens, Bismarck turned out to be right after all.

What strikes me about your remarks is that you have introduced into this chamber the kind of hollow bluff which is a specifically Russian invention. The report actually says nothing about boycotts or the cessation of trade between East and West. I think that is crucial. If I have understood you aright, all you want is to include a commitment ruling out the possibility of a boycott for all time, and here we differ. I do not think we can commit ourselves for decades in advance.

Where we do agree is in wanting trade to go on. Trade is going on, and here I turn again to history. The German tanks which attacked the Soviet Union in 1941 ran on fuel supplied to the Third Reich by the Soviet Union only a week before. So trade relations have always existed.

The point raised in this report is whether, in this trading relationship, the other commercial partner should enjoy unilateral advantages which we do not grant to others – developing countries and development aid apart. I think we agree that the Soviet Union and its satellites, who are engaged in an unrestrained arms build-up, should not receive development aid and subsidies from us into the bargain. We should really be making these funds available to the third world.

Ladies and Gentlemen, when we consider the credits provided not only for the Soviet Union but also for the other eastern bloc countries, the first question we have to ask ourselves is: are these private-sector credits, are they public-sector credits or are they credits which are guaranteed or subsidised from the public purse? Nowadays, private-sector credits simply do not arise. I do not think I could find a single banker in the western world today who would be prepared to lend money to, say, Poland without some form of reinsurance. That leaves only credits guaranteed or subsidised from the public purse. Here western countries run the great risk – exemplified by Poland, where my own country, the Federal Republic, is particularly involved – of becoming creditors dependent upon a debtor, reasoning that our only chance of getting any money back at all is to commit even more funds, in the hope that, in five or ten years,

Mr. Müller (continued)

say, we might recoup some of it through loan conversions.

Here I must say something about the problem of collaboration. Mr. Ahrens, you know well enough that when your party was in power, joint projects were negotiated, for example with Poland, which were to be subsidised or financed by the Federal Republic. I will not give a detailed list here, you know them as well as I do. I suppose the sum involved was more than DM 2,000 million. We know that hardly anything was achieved and that far from being used for joint copper production according to plan, the money disappeared somewhere in the mud of the Polish farmlands. There are even legal proceedings going on in Poland against former prime ministers and officials who have been asked to explain what became of the money.

I come now to a point which concerns the Soviet Union as well. In the West, constant references have been made to the umbrella theory. According to this, no matter what we supply to other countries in the eastern bloc, the Soviet Union, which is not so deeply in debt and has commodities for sale, such as raw materials, energy, gold, diamonds, etc., will hold an umbrella over those countries which can no longer meet their debts. It has unfortunately become clear that this umbrella theory is false.

Here I must say something more about trade. If this were normal trade, I could only welcome it, but unfortunately trade relations between the eastern bloc and Western Europe have reverted to the state they were in before the ancient Roman Empire. Business is conducted more or less on the principle of pearls for gunpowder, as in colonial times when trade was based on the primitive barter of cheap goods. German companies wishing to sell machinery have to hunt for a market for a hundred thousand pairs of tights, because that happens to be all that is on offer from Poland, Hungary or elsewhere.

We must remember something else which always surprises me in people who claim a special sense of obligation to the working class. A good deal of this barter trade in the eastern bloc depends on the wholesale exploitation of labour in those countries. In my own constituency there is a textile factory which used to get its unfinished products from Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore. It no longer does so, because production costs there are now too high. These goods are today being supplied by Czechoslovakia and Hungary at unbelievable prices, made possible only because the workers, or the proletariat, if I must use the word, in these countries is being exploited. Moreover they

will use any product, even if they need it themselves, to barter against high technology from western countries.

Just to remove any misunderstanding, let me say this. I am for trade, but I am for trade on fair terms. Mr. Atkinson previously referred to Lenin's dictum, according to which the capitalists would even sell the communists the rope with which they would be hanged, but we must not also offer Moscow credits for the purchase of the rope. So trade, yes, but trade on fair terms, with no one-sided subsidies and no one-sided benefits. I appeal to all our members: we must not allow ourselves to be played off against each other. We must not allow ourselves to be tricked again, as we have always been in the past. "If you won't deliver", they say, "we'll go to someone else who will give us a government loan" - for the sake of job security or for some other reason. That's how they have played us off against each other. We must all pull together. Trade - yes, but on equal terms. Then, Mr. Ahrens, we could see eye to eye again.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and Gentlemen, I think I should say that this Assembly should not be used to discuss internal German politics.

That having been said, I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). - It is perhaps appropriate for a British politician to speak at this juncture.

Mr. Atkinson has presented a substantial report that demonstrates the long-standing anxiety about western relationships with the Soviet Union. In it he has not sought to reject the concept of commercial coexistence, but he has come closer to it than have any previous proposals. I agree with him that at this stage we should be unwise to sell high-level technology of any serious military significance to the eastern bloc. However, I think that Mr. Atkinson would go much further than that.

We can expect very little to result from Mr. Atkinson's report, because the multinationals are heavily involved in trade with the eastern bloc and none of the Western European governments seems willing to control their activities adequately. I think, for example, of Dr. Hammer of Occidental and other leaders of the multinational business community. I am not here to defend the multinationals in any way, as Mr. Atkinson and his colleagues can do that much better than I can. However, it is only right to point out that complex arrangements would have to be untangled.

The Agricultural Committee of the Council of Europe considered our food trade only a few months ago. It concluded that it would be wise

Mr. Hardy (continued)

to maintain the export of food and to assist in the improvement of agricultural production in the eastern bloc. We considered the matter carefully and I believe that we reached the right conclusion. Nevertheless, it could be argued that it is not acceptable for the United States of America to interfere in Soviet and Western European relationships given the substantial flow of grain to Russia from that country. As the Soviet Union has to foot American bills, it is hardly reasonable of the Americans to try to reduce its capacity to do so.

America does not always sacrifice its commercial interest. As Mr. Atkinson may well confirm, there are economic anomalies and absurdities. The British housewife buys wheat from North America, or bread made from North American wheat, because British domestic taste does not yet like the alternative. Unfortunately, American grain is far cheaper in the Soviet Union than it is in Britain. That is rather ridiculous.

We must be careful about the United Kingdom's interests. We are about 90% dependent on overseas supplies of timber and timber products. The timber-using industry is important in Britain. After food imports, timber and timber products are the most significant import items. It would be foolish to cut ourselves off from what is an already – and may become even more – important source of raw materials.

There are other issues that the report does not deal with adequately. There is a problem with the disposal of Western European food surpluses. They are expensively produced, with a system of support that could hardly be described as limited. More and more seems to be produced at ever-increasing prices, and the surpluses have to be sold. In a poor world that is not easy. Therefore, rightly, there are whiffs of criticism of commercial arrangements for the disposal of food surpluses.

I was surprised when a year or two ago I studied the wine surplus and found that each year for five successive years at least the Soviet Union had doubled its purchases of Community wine surpluses and had secured that wine at less than 1 franc per litre. I came to the conclusion that if that development in trade continued, a pipeline to take the *vin ordinaire* from Western Europe to the Soviet Union would be necessary. As a representative of a country that foots a large part of the bill for the agriculture policy that is responsible for that absurdity, I am critical of that development.

In the House of Commons I asked whether that large and astonishing trade was part of a subtle attempt to promote détente by alcoholic

euphoria. I was assured that that was not so. However, unfortunately, that may have been the most valid reason that mankind could devise. If Mr. Atkinson's report had concentrated more on changing the sanity of our arrangements in Europe for the disposal and creation of our food surplus, I might have been more favourably disposed towards it, but Mr. Atkinson did not seem to try to pinpoint that cause of the problems about which we have expressed our worry.

There must be a hard-headed approach to East-West trade to ensure that high-level technological exports of military significance are prohibited but, as Dr. Ahrens said, the historic precedents are not encouraging. The entrepreneurial spirit of Mr. Atkinson, rooted in greed and enjoying, in all circumstances, the support of his colleagues, can find ways round regulations. Therefore, we need not merely be convinced of our rectitude but we should have sufficiently capable intelligence arrangements to defeat the greed of entrepreneurs, which is so avidly encouraged by conservative members of the Assembly.

Therefore, while we should view the Soviet Union with suspicion and abhor its abuse of human rights, we must suggest that Mr. Atkinson's report is not particularly practical. While I would find abhorrent any evidence of forced labour, perhaps recommendation 4 should be dealt with separately. Unless there is hard evidence of extensive abuse, it would be inappropriate for the recommendation to be contained in the report. The Council of Europe rather than this body should consider the matter, or, if not the Council of Europe, other international organisations with primary responsibility for human rights.

However, I do not have the same reservation about recommendation 3. There is direct economic significance in the destruction of an airliner. When that happened I suggested that the Assembly should consider the matter on its own. The Bureau took a different view, but I endorsed the statement that it issued. I welcome this first opportunity that we have had as a parliamentary assembly to make some critical remarks. Unfortunately, that part of the report goes too far. I maintain the view that it would have been better for us to look into the matter entirely separately.

Economic coexistence is important. There are too many dangers in the world today for us to take a further step towards crisis. That would be the result if the whole of Mr. Atkinson's report were approved by the Assembly. We need to maintain caution and restraint. So far this week the Assembly has not shown the restraint that is necessary in view of the present grave condition of international affairs.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The three last speakers either used up all their speaking time or spoke twice as long as they should have. I must therefore ask the other speakers who have put their names down to limit themselves to five minutes, otherwise it will be impossible for us to finish the orders of the day.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, to anyone who may be surprised that I am yet again on the list of speakers, I would say that we are here to take an active part in the Assembly's work and that I feel it my duty to give my view, even if there are those who do not agree with me.

Mr. Atkinson, who has done a first-rate job, does not propose a complete economic embargo on the Soviet Union; basing himself on a real situation, he is trying with the rest of the Assembly to find a solution which will help us to escape from a worrying deadlock.

The purpose of the West's moves for détente in all directions and for the development of economic and cultural contacts was to try to establish mutual confidence between the eastern and western countries and to initiate more effective co-operation in assuring a better future for the world. Thus, we opened credits, made loans on easy terms and provided all kinds of facilities to the Soviet Union and the other eastern countries almost as if they were underdeveloped third world countries.

But how did the Soviet Union and the eastern countries respond to this policy? In a way which is causing us great concern and anxiety. I am not thinking merely of violations of human rights and of the Helsinki agreements, which even the Soviet Union signed; but rather of the fact that economic aid, wider contacts and other facilities have not been used to raise economic and social levels in the Soviet Union but to produce ever more sophisticated weapons.

This cannot be disputed; the introduction of this policy coincided exactly with the start of out-and-out rearmament in the Soviet Union, not in order to catch up technologically with the West but to take the lead with both conventional and nuclear weapons.

This shows that our more open policy has enabled the Soviet Union to pursue an increasingly aggressive policy. I am referring not only to Afghanistan but also to the even more frightening episode of the shooting down of the South Korean Boeing and of the closing of the Madrid conference which was greeted as a success by those who favour a policy of détente. Yet, immediately after the end of the Madrid conference, Mr. Gromyko, in an official statement, maintained that the Soviet Union

had been right to shoot down the Boeing and that it would do exactly the same in any similar case in future.

There are, therefore, two courses open to us, Ladies and Gentlemen: either we raise a white flag and surrender...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I must ask you to conclude, Mr. Cavaliere. You have already overrun your speaking time by one minute.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – I shall conclude now but I would point out that other speakers spoke for fifteen to twenty minutes. I am coming to my conclusion, but as the microphone was not working, I shall have to repeat a remark which was not perhaps heard by everyone.

There are only two possible policy options for dealing with the Soviet Union: either we raise the white flag and give in to whatever the Soviet Union does or we adopt the measures proposed by Mr. Atkinson. He is not proposing that trade relations with the Soviet Union be broken off but that we act in such manner that our economic relations do not encourage aggressive behaviour by the Soviet Union and do not increase the danger to the West.

I am bound, therefore, to support Mr. Atkinson's conclusions and I think that the Assembly should take the same line, out of concern for the future and the safety of the western world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we have already discussed Mr. Atkinson's report several times in committee. It will certainly be no surprise to Mr. Atkinson to hear that I do not agree with the contents, conclusions or recommendations of the report. While I fully respect what he has to say in his excellent piece of work, I do not share his basic assumptions. Indeed, I am opposed to them. Mr. Atkinson proceeds from the basic assumption that trade is a weapon, and that East and West are attacking and exploiting each other.

In his presentation, Mr. Atkinson categorically denied that his report contains any propaganda or proposals for a boycott. It is true that he does not use those words as such, but in the draft recommendation we read: "... sanctions ... ban ... avoid ... avoid ... avoid ... refuse". I would ask him whether this is not in fact a form of promotion in favour of a boycott. That, in any case, is how I read it. Of course trade can be used as a means of bringing us closer together. I agree that trade agreements between the allies could be improved, not in order to set us against the Soviet Union but to achieve better

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (continued)

co-operation through trade. But I do not agree that this should be done via NATO or Western European Union. There are bodies more appropriate to the purpose than this Assembly.

Mr. Atkinson has included in his report a paragraph which says that the Russians spend so much money on defence that the living standards of the Russian people suffer. Maybe they do, but why should we be pointing an accusing and hypocritical finger at the Soviet Union? During yesterday's debate on Mr. Wilkinson's report, my colleague Mr. Stoffelen pointed out that of course the same applied to us. If we spent no money on defence we would naturally have more available for other purposes. For instance, we would not have to cut back on social services, as many Western European countries are doing at present.

Whether or not Mr. Atkinson still believes in such measures – I assume he does – I am not at all convinced by them. Anyone who studies the history of the Soviet Union carefully can see that there is no way in which that country is going to let us tell it how to run its national economy. In other words, even if I agreed with the idea, I would have no belief in its effects. The inclusion in the report of a reference to the shooting down of the Boeing – something we all deplore – was not Mr. Atkinson's own idea. It was requested by the Presidential Committee. I can therefore understand why he included it, but I do not think it was right to do so. Our Presidential Committee, in my view, ought to have found some other course of action which would have avoided the imbalance which this paragraph has created in the report. Other methods should have been used for a condemnation of this kind.

Mr. President, a final word, about the peace movement. I think I can fairly say that writing and talking about the peace movement is one of Mr. Atkinson's hobby horses. In this report too we find – I would refer you to paragraph 9 and to the conclusions – remarks about the peace movement and, naturally, its connection with the Russians.

Mr. Atkinson and many of his colleagues believe that the peace movement is not only activated but actually paid for by the Russians. He has not said as much in this particular report, but I have heard it often before. Mr. Atkinson, if you think that it is always the Russians who are getting all these people to protest and all these political parties to oppose the arms race, then you must think them extremely clever! If so, it seems to me wrong to imagine, Mr. Atkinson, that your proposals will enable us to impose our will on the Russians. Clever people do not usually let others tell them

how to act or react. Nor, Mr. Atkinson, will I find a cheque from the Soviet Union on my doormat when I get home. The Russians will not be paying me for what I have said nor for my opposition to your proposal. It is my own decision. It is the political conviction of my party. The Russians are no friends of mine: I reject their system. Nor would I like to live in the Soviet Union under the present régime. But that does not make the Russians my enemies, nor will I consider them as such.

I believe in dialogue, even with people who may not resemble us in every respect, but are none the worse for that. I do not believe the sort of measures proposed in the report can be effective in bringing about disarmament. Let us hope that we parliamentarians can at least help towards the achievement of disarmament via dialogue, and that we do not have to resort to the measures proposed by Mr. Atkinson.

(Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As the last speaker was a lady, the Chair allowed her to overrun her speaking time. Other speakers will, however, have to keep to the five minutes on which we decided.

I call Mr. van der Werff.

Mr. van der WERFF (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as an old Russian woodcutters' saying puts it: "Be polite to the bear, but always keep your axe within reach." That saying would serve as an ideal text for Mr. Atkinson's report. The Liberal Group supports that principle and wishes to compliment Mr. Atkinson on his report. This support does not mean, however, that I shall cease to hold fast to free and unrestricted trade as the key to trade relations. It is a time-honoured principle, owing something to Tom Paine, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Jean-Baptiste Say. The interesting thing about it is the underlying idea that free trade promotes peace, because people get to know each other, learn to appreciate each other's culture and, through an interweaving of interests and integration, become concerned about each other's continued existence. In the nineteenth century we find again and again that it is the same people who advocate free trade and are active in the peace movement. Since the second world war both these ideals seem unattainable.

The Soviet Union has always had a tendency towards isolationism – a striving for self-sufficiency, coupled with fear of the free movement of goods and the unrestricted exchange of ideas. Another factor, of course, is that the Soviet Union, with all due respect for the modernisation and industrialisation brought about by Marx's ideas and later by western

Mr. van der Werff (continued)

influence, is still in fact a peasant society. The question is to what extent the free West, with its free-market machinery, plays by the same rules as the Soviet Union. Now, the Rapporteur has shown very clearly that it does not and that this is now the real stumbling block in the relationship. Western Europe, moreover, is more interested in trade than the United States, which is of course closely geared to its own free market and fears communist ideology like the plague.

Nevertheless, there have been clear signs of tensions in Washington too. I identify three parties in the United States. On the one side there are the industrial circles, which want to keep on supplying goods, and on the other side there is the government, which also wants to consider Western Europe and the countries belonging to WEU. Finally, of course, there is the Pentagon, which would rather not export anything at all. As trade increased, the Kissinger philosophy, which harked back to the philosophy of the beginning of the nineteenth century, was hesitantly edged into place. However, the attempt to overcome the fundamental differences between East and West by building up a system of mutual relations in the commercial and cultural fields, based on common rules of conduct, has failed completely.

Fortunately, the Western European and American governments have drawn closer together since *La Sapinière*, and NATO and OECD ministers have in recent months worked to dispel internal disunity and tension and to establish a united, systematic approach to Eastern Europe. In working out the political line, attention must be paid to the agricultural sector and not simply to the export of high-value product technology. We consider that extremely important. According to recent estimates the USSR has been purchasing twenty-five million tons of grain a year. This fact must be borne in mind.

I can back the Rapporteur's recommendations, at present, since I do not find them as weak as some socialist speakers do, but I must concede that careful consideration is required if trade relations are to be used as a political tool; this should on no account be done on an ad hoc basis, but as part of a longer-term policy. I do not like hasty, inappropriate and ineffective boycotts or sanctions, which only soothe one's own disquiet or serve one's own moral gratification. Moreover, we should be addressing the system itself, rather than its consequences. That is not and can never be wholly successful. We have to understand exactly what is at stake. We should not take the possibility of a total economic breach too lightly. It simply must not happen, both for practical reasons and for reasons to do with the functioning of existing

trade relations. Just now it seems that the economic situation in the eastern bloc countries is improving and there is a chance of a gradual reduction in their burden of debt. What does the Rapporteur think of this?

Mr. President, our collective efforts should now result in our restricting ourselves very clearly to the Cocom lists, as Mr. Atkinson's report has in fact already suggested. However, our ultimate goal should be to revive the old liberal ideal and recognise that a free, open market as a mechanism for equally free trade relations, without heavy state interference, is the world's only chance, both as regards welfare and well-being and as regards human rights and cultural development.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Benedikter.

Mr. BENEDIKTER (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen. While I can support most of Mr. Atkinson's conclusions, I have difficulty in agreeing with them all. It is true that the West has failed in this sector and has thereby undermined its own security to a dangerous degree. It is undoubtedly true that, in the economic development of the Soviet Union, absolute priority is given to arms production at the cost of the general standard of living. The consequences of such a policy are well known, and I point here to the shortages in Poland, which are familiar to us all. What is less well known is that the Soviet Union suffers from similar shortages. For example, a new ministry, the Ministry of Fruit and Vegetables, was created shortly before Brezhnev died. At the present time, official Soviet sources mention shortages of baby's nappies, needles and thread, soap and washing powder, toothpaste and cosmetics.

On the other hand, and this is a point which has been insufficiently emphasised, I agree with Mr. Ahrens that the Soviet economy has already achieved a level of output which is capable of supporting an active foreign policy and an intimidating military policy even in times of negative growth.

I should like to issue a clear warning about two illusions which, although they have long since been overtaken by events, are constantly being raised, even in the reports of this organisation, and which in my opinion are not necessarily helpful.

As Mr. Ahrens pointed out, economic actions against dictatorships are a blunt sword, which generally injures the person wielding it. The experiences with the pipeline embargo and, even more, the pitiful *dénouement* of the American wheat embargo confirm this. Some speakers ought to be bringing this fact home to our American ally. That, I think, is what is needed

Mr. Benedikter (continued)

at the moment. Exceptionally, I must also make a slight correction to what Mr. Müller had to say. The draft recommendation does, indeed, call for concerted action in the application of economic sanctions in response to the abuse of military power by the Soviets. This, too, strikes me as questionable.

The second illusion I would like to warn you against is expressed in the view that expenditure on armaments may well, in time, cause internal political destabilisation of the Soviet régime. This opinion is particularly potent in American politics, but in my opinion it is foolish. A dictatorship can impose unlimited sacrifices on its people, whereas the free countries of the West cannot. So it is really the Soviets who can expect destabilising effects in the West; for the sad truth – and it is indeed sad that such a thing has to be said – is that it is chiefly the armaments-related deficit of more than \$200,000 million in the budget of the Reagan administration which is keeping interest rates high throughout the world and thereby playing a major part in the fall in investments and the rise in unemployment in the member countries of this organisation and elsewhere.

It follows that special emphasis must be laid on the importance of worldwide non-discriminatory and dynamic trade at a time of political confrontation and sabre rattling between East and West. I agree with Mr. Ahrens: free trade and its status should have taken on – or been given – rather more importance and space in Mr. Atkinson's report.

The development of trade relations at a time of economic depression is useful to everybody, not only to the East. The assertion that the advantages lay chiefly with the East, while the risk was mainly borne by the West surprised me. I think this is something of an exaggeration. In the West, too, the effect is to preserve jobs. It is also a mistake to argue that long-term contracts may make western countries economically dependent on the countries of the eastern bloc. This is equally true of the energy sector. It is nearer the mark to say that the Soviets and their allies are dependent on advanced technology and the granting of further credits by the West. The West should certainly be granting these credits with greater discretion, more political sensitivity and less senseless rivalry. The prohibition of all exports of advanced technology which could be used for armaments purposes is vital. A number of NATO partners have in the past been guilty of serious transgressions in this area.

To conclude, the problem of the growing burden of debt incurred by certain eastern bloc countries gives grounds for deep concern, and

ultimately carries with it the danger of political destabilisation. A far-sighted defence policy – and here I call on all of us gathered here – renders absolutely vital the kind of approach for which Mr. Atkinson has appealed, that is to say, the establishment of a common code of conduct. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Galley.

Mr. GALLEY (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I think the report is very comprehensive, highly polished, and a very important contribution to the work of our Assembly. It stresses, in particular, the fact that over the last ten years the USSR has devoted its main effort to equipping its armed forces.

The report makes a detailed analysis of investment expenditure under the ninth plan which clearly reveals the slower growth of gross investment expenditure. The proportion of the Soviet gross national product spent on non-military investment is to be very sharply reduced, whereas “state reserves”, which mainly cover the acquisition of military equipment and the development of industries of potential benefit to the state through advances linked with the modernisation of military equipment, are increasing rapidly.

On reading this report, one conclusion seems obvious: for the development of items which we would classify as “for general consumption”, the Soviet Union is counting on relations with western industry. One could almost go as far as to suggest that the more East-West tension increases – and the suspension of the Geneva negotiations is undoubtedly a sign of this – the more the Soviet Union, concentrating its efforts on its armaments industries, will develop its trade relations with the West. This is a paradox whose implications should be fully understood.

How should we respond to such a situation? Is it, for the West, purely negative? Or does it, in particular, offer any economic advantages to members of the alliance seeking to develop their manufacturing or research facilities to cope with the crisis? What is the likelihood of technology acquired in the West being put more or less directly at the disposal of the Soviet military potential? To put it more clearly, is the West, in marketing products used for civilian purposes, making a direct contribution to the development of technologies directly applicable to military equipment?

Such are the questions raised by the report, which the Rapporteur attempts to answer, at least partially, in his conclusions.

On this point let me make three remarks, intended as contributions to the report, which I

Mr. Galley (continued)

trust Mr. Atkinson will not take as a general criticism.

The first remark is that we must remember that nowadays Russia can turn to others apart from us – which adds a new dimension to the problem. I am not referring, of course, to our Japanese friends, who subscribe to Cocom, although everyone would agree that their capacity for innovation, industrial development and large-scale production might one day, if we started to lag, tempt them to take over from us more or less directly. The idea would be insulting, in view of Japan's solidarity with the western world and its close alliance with the United States in many areas.

But let us not forget that a number of countries, for example, the countries of South-East Asia – I am thinking of Singapore – are now developing quite remarkable research and production capabilities independently of Europe.

This should make us very cautious about a policy of embargo. I agree with Mr. Ahrens that such a policy has never achieved anything, except to encourage smugglers and increase tension.

There has been much talk about the problem of gas. However, apart from the fact that gas is a useful but by no means indispensable energy source for the Western European economy, the situation seems to me comparable to the situation with regard to grain, where the disposal of grain surpluses is very useful to the farmers of the mid-west without this meaning that closure of the market in question would be a national catastrophe for the American economy.

My second remark concerns an aspect of the report which I must say worried me seriously: trade with eastern countries other than the Soviet Union. The report does not seem to me to have drawn the appropriate distinctions, and the draft recommendation applies the preamble and proposals indiscriminately to all eastern countries.

Like the Rapporteur, I am perfectly aware that selling high-technology products to Czechoslovakia amounts to exactly the same thing as selling them to a factory in the Leningrad region: the day after they arrive in Prague there will be copies or plans of the products in Leningrad. Moreover, the presence in the West of a very powerful industrial espionage network, whose agents work for the Soviet Union although they are nationals of other eastern countries, is sufficient proof of this.

Should we nevertheless drive the Poles to despair, when Polish workers are struggling so bravely to loosen the communist grip? Should

we deny their government credits and prevent them from buying basic necessities? Should we stop supplying them with products and machines because they are over-indebted, and thereby deprive them of the means of production that would enable them to loosen the Soviet grip, however slightly?

These questions, it seems to me, necessarily introduce moral considerations that should cause us to moderate our language – especially Mr. Atkinson, who has just been so severe about the loans we grant them.

Are we to remain indifferent to the efforts of the Hungarians to modernise their industry and free themselves from their present dependence on the USSR for the supply of modern machinery? Are we to draw no practical conclusions from Romania's courageous efforts to achieve some independence by adopting a political attitude that, while not exactly independent of the USSR, is different from and not aligned on Kremlin policy?

A little while ago the Rapporteur quoted Lenin as saying that the capitalists would fight each other for the privilege of selling the rope with which they would be hanged. Bear in mind also that we must not, by adopting too severe an attitude and failing to distinguish between the Soviet Union and the other eastern countries, get ourselves into a situation in which we cause those countries, because of their own misery, to draw together in solidarity with the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, my third remark can wait until I table my amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for being so helpful, Mr. Galley.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I am genuinely sorry that Mr. Atkinson has brewed up a concoction that is so heavily laced with anti-Soviet bias. His talents are worthy of a less one-sided report. He said that the report called for an end to disunity in the free world in the face of the Soviet Union's aggressive policies. However, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the report represents a declaration of economic war on the Soviet Union. It is one thing, for our own security, to regulate high technology exports to the Soviet Union through fear that they might be used for arms, and it is quite another to apply that to virtually every aspect of trade with the Soviet bloc.

It is not difficult to compile a catalogue of criticisms of the Soviet Union that amount to an indictment. However, no country would escape from such a determined exercise. Representatives should imagine what they would see if any of our member countries were put under the

Dr. Miller (continued)

microscope. All of our countries could be portrayed – and sometimes are – as embodying everything that is evil. It is not only the Soviet Union and its satellites that could portray us like that but third world countries, too.

I have no wish to assume the rôle of the defender of the Soviet Union. However, like Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, my complaint is that there is a lack of balance. We should be aiming for closer co-operation through trade and other means with those countries with which we must coexist. But that aim is not helped when recommendations include unsubstantiated allegations. Paragraph (vi) of the preamble says that we should take into account “allegations that forced labour was used”. That sort of allegation does not serve our purpose. Recommendations should refer to issues that are beyond dispute.

We seem to have a rather meddlesome rôle. Trade and commerce will be carried out by the Soviet Union and by entrepreneurs and governments outside Russia regardless of what WEU or some governments may decide. The problems of American farmers and American grain and the insulation of the Siberian gas pipeline have already been mentioned. Multinationals are already involved in trade. The book-publishing trade between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union is tremendous. Why do we always attack the Russians and use the big stick instead of the carrot? Is there nothing in Soviet society of which we can approve? I am not talking about making ridiculous comparisons between the Soviet Union now and under Stalin, or about another country and that aberration of time when it was under a Nazi régime.

In paragraph 10 of the report, the Rapporteur states that it is his hope “that the report will draw some lessons from these events and will contribute to policies which will avoid such damaging crises occurring within the western alliance again”.

That should not be the object of the report. Its object should be to encourage trade between western countries and countries such as the Soviet Union, with which we must learn to live in peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Knight.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – It will not come as a surprise or a shock to members of the Assembly that I dissociate myself from the remarks just made by my colleague from Britain. He seems to think that we should never mention things such as shooting down the airliner, slave labour or Afghanistan. In other words, we should go about our work

blinkerred, with our eyes closed and ears shut. In those circumstances, that cannot be effective.

I too congratulate my friend and colleague, Mr. Atkinson, on his report. I shall make some points that I hope will be helpful to him. I suggest that in paragraph (v) of the preamble he drop the word “unacceptable” from the phrase “unacceptable violation of international law”.

I should have thought that we accepted that there is no such thing as an acceptable violation of law. Either it is law and one must not violate it, or it is not. If my colleague dropped the word “unacceptable”, that would improve the paragraph.

In the introduction, my colleague mentions the pipeline and the American attitude to it. About twenty months ago, when the pipeline was first discussed in America, I was in Washington. There was a lot more to the Americans' anxiety than merely a retaliatory measure against the Kremlin. At the time I read many journals and spoke to many politicians. There were three main objections, all of which have proved to be right.

First, the Americans were worried about the danger of the Soviets cutting the pipeline, thus depriving nations in the West of power at what might be a time of great danger. The Rapporteur discusses that matter in paragraph 102. He acknowledges that we should consider that. Apparently, West Germany does not feel that it is a great danger, but other countries have not made a contribution to the report.

Secondly, the Americans were bothered about the technical expertise that inevitably would be sent across to the Soviets. Thirdly, they were worried about slave labour, which is mentioned in paragraphs 109 to 119. With all the evidence in the report that slave labour is being used on the pipeline, it would be ludicrous if my colleague disregarded what the Commission concluded. I fear that western money is being used for a project making use of slave labour. Are the whips and chains bought with western money? Are the poor wretched shelters in which those people live or the thin clothing that they wear bought with western money? It worries me that we are allowing that to go on and that we are fuelling it with our money.

In paragraph 11 the Rapporteur has taken on board the build-up of power in the Soviet Union, but he says that in almost all areas except the navy the balance of power is shown to be strongly in favour of the Soviets. Will my colleague consider the suggestion that there is a sinister aspect to the dramatic build-up of the Soviet merchant fleet? Bearing in mind how small is the Soviet use of the merchant fleet, there could not be a use for all the ships that

Mrs. Knight (continued)

have been built. The suspicion voiced in some quarters is that they are intended to be used for mine laying. I ask my friend and colleague to consider that matter.

In paragraphs 90 to 98 my colleague mentions Afghanistan in an extremely interesting and moderate section. He mentions neither the long-term project of Afghanistan nor what the Soviets are doing there. He mentions merely their use of the gas in Afghanistan. It should have been made clearer on what terms the gas is being used by the Soviets. Did the Afghans agree to it?

Mr. President, I deeply appreciate your courtesy and gallantry when you said that lady members might be treated differently. However, I shall not trespass on that. There are few ways in which we can make our opinions felt. There are few sanctions that we can use. We have made representations to the Soviet Union and raised the matter in the United Nations. However, we may as well run a feather down the back of a rhinoceros. There is no effect.

Therefore, Mr. Atkinson is right in his recommendations to the Assembly in the first part of the report. I warmly commend them to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, Mrs. Knight, and thank you in particular for keeping within your speaking time.

I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the community of interests apparent at world level has found particularly vigorous expression in Europe.

WEU is among the institutions we have together created in order to maintain a genuinely European area of freedom. France, moreover, is a faithful ally within the Atlantic Alliance, which it actively promotes. This alliance has military and defence aspects within a contract freely entered into. Consequently, as regards the balance of forces, we state our own view clearly and, despite the heavy-handed and vain insistence of the Soviet Union, we reject any approach which seeks to include our forces in strategic negotiations to which we are not party.

Now, in his report, Mr. Atkinson is presenting the WEU Assembly with a proposed modification of the content of the Atlantic Alliance, a proposal which is addressed moreover - if I understand it correctly - to a much wider audience than this Assembly. The proposals in question appear contrary to the undertakings of the countries represented here, who have never

declared themselves in favour of an integrated economic and military command.

On the military level, it is true that the Soviet Union has acquired clear superiority in several categories of conventional armaments, an impressive superiority in chemical weapons, and has made a unilateral breakthrough in regard to strategic weapons aimed at European targets.

What needs to be said first of all, however, is that the approximate overall balance between the central Soviet and American nuclear systems remains unchanged and that the alliance is entitled to scale down Soviet superiority in certain conventional areas in accordance with the nature, quality or organisational structure of its forces.

On the economic level, however, with which our colleague is mainly concerned, one is struck by the contradiction between the quality of the documentation and the weakness of the - predictable - political conclusions. The report shows, in essence, that the trade which developed during the détente period made a direct and decisive contribution, both technically and financially, to enabling the Soviet Union to build up its modern armaments.

Mr. Atkinson considers that this has brought the Soviet Union into a state of dependence, of which the alliance can today take advantage, in order to throw the Soviet economy out of gear and disrupt Soviet armaments policy, by imposing a general embargo on that country and the whole of Eastern Europe and thereby exploiting the more acute dilemma of defence versus growth which is confirmed by what we know of the ninth Soviet five-year plan for 1981-85.

Might one suggest to the Rapporteur that he may be underestimating the autonomy and political stability of the Soviet system in his speculations about the consequences of eastern self-sufficiency, which the Soviet Union, notwithstanding large but judicious imports of western capital, can maintain successfully, except in the case of foodstuffs?

France cannot accept his line of argument. We refuse to link trade to the results of arms limitation talks. To do so would be to confuse two separate issues to the benefit of an overall strategy pursued by Mr. Reagan. France refuses to use food as a weapon. It bans only technological exports which may have direct military application.

As regards the sale of capital goods, it is by no means proven - as my compatriot Professor Sokholov has recently pointed out - that these items are imported by the Soviet Union for

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

armaments purposes or that they clearly provide it with additional resources.

Given the Rapporteur's liberal perspective, how can he maintain that trade between the OECD and eastern countries is on such a small scale that there would be no harm in reducing it, while at the same time claiming that counter-trade must be abandoned because, in his opinion, it may adversely affect the general trade interests of the OECD countries?

How can he maintain that East-West trade should be totally regulated by the Atlantic Alliance, while affirming the interest of the OECD countries in defending what he calls an open, non-discriminatory and dynamic system of international trade?

While I recognise the quality of the report, which nevertheless seems to me considerably lacking in a sense of fine distinction, I trust that the Rapporteur will be willing at least to answer these questions and explain the paradoxes to which I have drawn attention in concluding these brief remarks.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Unland.

Mr. UNLAND (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen. The English are considered to have invented fair play. As a lot of things have been imputed to our colleague, Mr. Atkinson, which I regard as inappropriate, I should like to use the rules of fair play to defend him against these imputations. I believe a lot of people have been setting up Aunt Sallies, reading things into his report which are just not there.

I should like to draw everybody's attention to the crucial paragraph 174 of Mr. Atkinson's report which states that the free development of international trade is a factor of peace and prosperity. I believe this to be an absolutely central statement which we should not obscure with any kind of insinuations.

Interesting though it would be to say something about countertrade and barter in kind - a development in East-West trade which takes us back to the first millennium - in view of the short time allowed I will limit myself to a few brief observations. Although this report is only concerned with trade with the Soviet Union, it in fact bears on all East-West trade. All the CMEA countries must be considered together, if the problem is to be properly assessed.

Two quite distinct systems are involved here - which has not been made sufficiently obvious today - and we must surely accept that East-West trade and trade between the free

countries of the West have to be measured by different criteria. We do not have one free country competing with another free country, but two different systems in competition. If you look at the position as it were from the standpoint of the supplier, you will see that in the free countries there is generally competition between free business enterprises, each defending their commercial interests to the last ditch. The other side is represented by civil service economists with no basic liability for the soundness of their actions. That is why I say that these things cannot be measured with the same yardstick.

But that is probably also why the two economic systems differ so completely in their performance. With the exception of armaments and, perhaps, space technology, Eastern Europe, if my judgment is correct, can boast scarcely one economic sphere in which it could be said to be superior to the West. On the contrary, their system is generally inferior.

But because their system is inferior, the eastern countries need our currencies - we know it, and that is what we have been talking about today. This need for foreign currency is behind many of the problems affecting East-West trade. Only because the eastern countries are under an absolute compulsion to acquire western currencies are their suppliers forced to throw their goods away at virtually any price in order to get a chance of obtaining western machinery or items of equipment.

In the eastern system this is possible, because they have no normal estimating procedure like ours, in which certain costs are incurred and have to be recovered in the product price. In their system you can sell at any price. There the sole criterion is how expensively their goods can be sold in the West as a means of acquiring hard currencies.

That all this operates at the expense of the working population of Eastern Europe has been said several times, and need not be repeated.

Constant references are made to dumping, but, Ladies and Gentlemen, perhaps this is not dumping in the traditional sense of selling below cost. To them cost accounting is unknown. On the other hand, we may certainly refer to what I should call system-related dumping, that is, dumping which is inherent in the economic policy we have to deal with.

From the discussion, or from the substance of what I have been trying to say, I would like to draw three conclusions. I do not think that anything need be added to what Mr. Atkinson has said in his report about the need for commerce as the basis of a peace policy. There are nonetheless three practical problems: firstly,

Mr. Unland (continued)

in trading with the Soviet Union and the CMEA countries we must take care to ensure that no deals are made which circumvent the agreements or self-limitations which, as you all know, the European Community and other countries entered into in accordance with GATT. I will mention as an example only the so-called world textile agreement.

The facilities available in the countries of Eastern Europe must not be used to arrange by-pass deals, with the result that trade between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany allows goods whose export is restricted to find their way into the free countries of the West. We know that the other side does not honour international agreements of this kind.

Secondly, we are an organisation concerned with defence policy. While admitting the need to do business with eastern countries, I must say that, to my mind, this should not extend to purchasing strategic goods for our armies from the East. Take, for instance, the manufacture of uniforms in eastern countries. In this connection it has been observed during a number of military exercises that the proper level of defence capability is no longer guaranteed. I believe we must appeal to the countries where this occurs, to stop these practices.

The third point has already been referred to briefly, and Mr. Atkinson has also mentioned it: there must be no competition over credit terms for trade with the East. We can be thankful that an OECD code covering export credits has been issued, but as any intelligent person knows, the code is full of loopholes and can be evaded. The Soviet Union and Soviet bankers are past-masters at extracting easier post facto credit terms by, for example, applying higher prices to supply contracts. Here again, we have to make sure that such devious tactics cannot be used.

Ladies and Gentlemen, let me say in conclusion: East-West trade, yes; growth in East-West trade, yes; but subject to the proper criteria. That is where our interests lie, and the pursuit of self-interest is, in international politics, the best guarantee of a policy which is sensible and compatible with all the issues involved. I therefore hold that the same principle should be applied to East-West trade.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The general debate is closed.

I trust the Rapporteur now has at his disposal a sufficient number of comments, both in support of and critical of his proposals, to enable him to reply to the different speeches which we have just heard.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to thank all those colleagues who have spoken, regardless of whether they agreed or disagreed with my report. I am particularly grateful to Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. van der Werff and Mr. Galley for their support. Mr. Galley mentioned the morality of stopping trade with Eastern Europe. I agree that our disagreement is not with the people of Eastern Europe or of the Soviet Union. We disagree only with some of the policies of their governments, particularly those policies that threaten our security. None of us would want to deny food or aid to the people of Russia or Poland. That is not the purpose of any of my recommendations.

Mrs. Knight reminded us, rightly, of the suspicious build-up of the Soviet merchant fleet. That matter would be a worthy subject for a separate report. She also wondered whether the Afghans were given the opportunity to approve the export of their gas to the Soviet Union. I suspect that they had no choice and that the same applies to the 4,000 Vietnamese who, it is reported, were used as labour on the Siberian pipeline as a contribution to paying off their country's debts to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Hardy used the opportunity of this debate to work out his prejudices against the European Community. He said that cheap wine – “plonk” – was being sold to the Soviet Union. I do not know whether that is particularly relevant. In any case, the Soviet Union has a large alcoholism problem. Why we should make it worse, I do not know, although I suppose that that is one way of sabotaging the Soviet Union.

Mr. Hardy asked whether the report should have referred to allegations of the use of forced labour in the building of the pipeline. That is a matter of opinion. I believe that it is important that WEU should be aware of those allegations, but that does not mean that the Council of Europe will not be aware of them also. I shall be drawing attention to them in a report on human rights in the Soviet Union which I am preparing for a debate in the Council of Europe next May.

I have been asked why the report refers to the Korean airliner disaster. As Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman said, it was at the request of the committee that we should not allow that episode to be passed over without comment. This report is the vehicle for that comment.

Mr. Lagorce accused me of seeking to break up the Soviet economy by linking economic relations with arms control and proposing the use of trade in food as a weapon against the Soviet Union. I wonder whether he has read my report, because it does none of those things.

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

I wonder whether the Soviet group in the Assembly – I mean the Socialist Group; but perhaps that is the right description after all – has read my report. The group seems to have taken a schizophrenic approach. Mr. Ahrens said that he could not approve of my report, although it had his general support, because it did not go far enough in linking trade with détente. But nowhere in the report do I recommend the use of boycotts or sanctions. As Mr. Unland said, anyone who reads paragraph 174 will see that I acknowledge the development of international trade as a force for peace.

There would be no point in recommending the use of embargoes and sanctions, because history shows that they do not work. They did not work, for example, against South Africa or Rhodesia. They tend to hurt those who try to apply them rather than those against whom they are applied. There would certainly be no chance of their working against the Soviet Union, which is self-sufficient in so many resources.

We all know of examples of bad trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. About eight years ago, the then labour government of my country used the taxpayers' money to subsidise the building of ships in Poland when our own shipyards desperately needed that kind of business.

We should learn the lessons of the past. My report proposes modest, moderate and sensible measures. Those measures pose the question how we in the free world should retaliate – if we should retaliate at all – to the continued examples of oppression and repression by the Soviet Union. It acknowledges past failure in this respect and simply seeks to achieve a more united and effective approach in future. I should have thought that those sentiments were worthy of the unanimous support of WEU; I hope that that support will now be given.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – May I join in congratulating the Rapporteur on his admirable report, which is a concise, sound and restrained piece of work.

While some members of the Assembly have disagreed with the report's conclusions – and it is normal that opinions should differ – I have heard no criticism of its quality, and that is something I wish to stress. This report should not be criticised by reading into it things it does not say.

Certain speakers have referred several times to embargo and boycott. The Rapporteur has

once again firmly stated that this is not what is intended. Nowhere in the report is there any reference to an embargo on or boycott of trade with the Soviet Union and its satellites.

We continue to affirm that trade between peoples, whatever their different opinions or doctrines, is a means of negotiation, a means of achieving peace. Of course we continue to subscribe to the position adopted at Helsinki and Madrid. We have never renounced those agreements. We state once again that we must talk to each other and exchange goods, ideas and cultural products, in order to advance and secure peace in the world.

Nowhere in his report does the Rapporteur contradict the beliefs common to us all. But he wisely notes certain facts, particularly the fact that the supply of sophisticated material has enabled the Soviet Union to equip itself with sophisticated armaments and to build up an excessive military potential. He goes on to say: "For goodness sake let us not be so naïve as to hand over our sophisticated products and secrets to the Soviet Union for what is in fact a not even proper payment, which we then immediately return in the form of advantageous loans at no interest – behaviour which is indeed the height of naïvety." The essence of the report is the warning: "For goodness sake, let us not be naïve."

This should be acceptable to all of us. Nor do I think exception can be taken to the Rapporteur's conclusion that exports of advanced technology contributing to Soviet armaments should be banned. That must be done if we are to avoid a repetition of the excesses of the last few years and further inadequate payment due to our naïvety.

We should also agree with the Rapporteur when he asks us to be cautious about long-term contracts that can bind us hand and foot.

Mr. Atkinson also asks us to avoid unduly promoting Soviet resources at our own expense, which is elementary. Here again, there is no overstatement: the points made in the report are all eminently reasonable. One might have imagined that a report on a subject like this would be expressed in much more violent, exaggerated terms. This report is deliberately very cautious and confined to recommending that we avoid the mistakes we have been making for some years now, because we have lacked unity and solidarity and have all been working in different directions.

We must not repeat our mistakes. We must therefore conduct our trade with the Soviet Union prudently, in a way that is good for improved trade, but without being naïve. That is what Mr. Atkinson's report is all about. It is

Mr. Michel (continued)

very well argued, and I call on the Assembly to approve it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before proceeding to vote on the draft recommendation, we have to consider one amendment.

Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Galley, reads as follows:

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (e).

I call Mr. Galley to speak in support of this amendment.

Mr. GALLEY (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am happy to repeat the complimentary remarks I made about the report a short time ago.

I do nevertheless feel that the draft recommendation and contents of the report are slightly out of step with each other. As the Chairman of the committee has just observed, the report in no way rules out the supply of consumer goods and makes only very distant mention of an embargo which would be an economic equivalent of the Berlin wall.

On the other hand, I have some doubts concerning the recommendations. Five points are made, (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e).

Everyone will agree with point (a), and I doubt whether, if a vote were to be taken, there would be a single member against a ban on the sale of advanced technology that might be used for armament purposes. This point is linked directly to the Soviet military effort.

Point (b) concerns the threat of blackmail that might be used against Western Europe were the eastern countries to make us economically dependent upon them in some respect. Our freedom depends on our economic independence. We can therefore fully approve point (b).

In point (c) the Rapporteur quite rightly asks us to avoid undue promotion of Soviet resources. The word "undue" is a judicious qualification implying that we by no means rule out the promotion of some Soviet resources – oil, for example, through the construction of chemical factories.

Point (d) recommends us to avoid granting overfavourable credit terms. The Rapporteur will agree that here we are a long way from our objective of avoiding facilitating the accumulation of armaments by these countries. Point (d) probably needs amendment, but I have not taken this up and I accept it as it stands.

On the other hand, the recommendation in point (e) not to accept the principle of countertrade is extremely serious, indeed grave, because it refers exclusively to commerce and not to arms production.

First of all, the sale by Siemens, Philips or Thomson of telecommunications equipment, or of saucepans or basic consumer products on the world market, even at dumping prices, is a purely commercial issue that has nothing to do with arms policy.

Secondly – and this ties in with what I said earlier – when eastern countries like Poland, who are bled white by the Soviet Union, no longer have any foreign currency to buy the western equipment indispensable for their survival, what option have they but to engage in countertrade? That is what happens in practice, and I would even say that, between the Federal Republic of Germany and East Germany, it is happening every day. That is why such a categorical refusal of countertrade in this context seems to me to be going too far.

Finally, paragraph 174 of the report, which states that "the free development of international trade is a factor of peace and prosperity" and paragraph 140, which says that "industrial compensation agreements must be judged case by case", together implicitly rule out the idea that the principle of countertrade should not be judged case by case. Given paragraph 140, I think the Rapporteur ought to approve my amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – In the report in paragraphs 131 to 148 I go in some detail into the many good reasons why in principle we should be opposing countertrade, and that is all that I am recommending. I appreciate that this system has not been declining over the years and that it will take a long time to dislodge from our trading practices. I ask the Assembly to accept that it is in principle wrong. It is a system from which the West gains nothing but which carries all the risks. It is playing the game of the Soviet Union and eastern bloc interests. It encourages their growth, production and trade, often at the expense of our own.

Therefore, I ask the Assembly to oppose the principle of countertrade in the hope that we shall keep all the aspects of the matter in mind in attempting to swing over to the use of hard currency, sound money, rather than bartering, as is involved in countertrade.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation in Document 958.

Rule 34 of the Rules of procedure stipulates that the Assembly shall vote by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

Since a vote by roll-call has not been requested, I now put the draft recommendation to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

4. *The Assembly of WEU and the North Atlantic Assembly – Impact of the existence and work of the North Atlantic Assembly on relations between the WEU Assembly and national parliaments and on public awareness of the existence of WEU*

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 955)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments on the Assembly of WEU and the North Atlantic Assembly – Impact of the existence and work of the North Atlantic Assembly on relations between the WEU Assembly and national parliaments and on public awareness of the existence of WEU, Document 955.

I call Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – In a way, it is a tradition that the Committee for Relations with Parliaments should present its information report on the last day of our session when only about ten representatives are present. This time, it is the second to last day of our session and I can hardly believe it, but there are double the number of representatives present compared with usual. I am grateful for that.

Another tradition is that the Rapporteur of the Committee for Relations with parliaments

emphasises the need to promote increased knowledge and better public understanding and awareness of our Assembly's activities. I should like to follow in that tradition.

What does this Assembly do? We are members of the only parliamentary assembly in Europe that is concerned with defence issues, and we should be proud of that. On the whole, we produce and discuss good and sometimes excellent reports. Without being critical of the European Parliament, and with due respect to it, I invite members to compare its reports with ours. Our excellent reports are relevant to European defence and security. However, we desperately need some follow-up in our respective parliaments. For the sake of European defence, we should make the public more aware of our existence and activities.

As others have said, it is a fact of life that in practice awareness both among members of parliaments and the public of our activities is almost nil.

We have often discussed the fact that people confuse the European Community, the Council of Europe, WEU and NATO. There is no doubt that the activities of the North Atlantic Assembly have an impact on our efforts to communicate WEU's activities more widely and effectively. For that reason I want to compare the North Atlantic Assembly with this Assembly and to try to draw some conclusions. The information in my report about the North Atlantic Assembly is based on information about NATO itself. Nevertheless, critical and independent as we are, we evaluated that information and it has been double-checked by every member of the committee to ensure that it is correct.

The North Atlantic Assembly is an interparliamentary association of member countries of the alliance, and as such it provides a forum for North American and European parliamentarians to meet and discuss problems of common interest. The North Atlantic Assembly is completely independent of NATO and constitutes a link between parliaments and the alliance. It acts as a forum through which NATO policies and activities are discussed by parliamentarians of the alliance. The North Atlantic Assembly acts as a medium for disseminating precise military information about NATO's defence and strategic aims.

If representatives studied our own history, they might be a little prouder of our Assembly. In 1950, the United States of America asked its European allies for Germany to be associated with the Atlantic Alliance. In that year, Mr. Plevin, the then French Prime Minister, proposed that a European army be set up to include all the forces of the European member

1. See page 37.

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

countries of the alliance. In May 1952, there was the plan for the European Defence Community. On 30th August 1954 there was the famous, or perhaps notorious, incident when the French parliament rejected that proposal. On 23rd October 1954 the Brussels Treaty was modified. Its aims were to reaffirm the member countries' faith in fundamental human rights and in the other ideals proclaimed in the charter of the United Nations, to preserve the principles of democracy, to strengthen the economic, social and cultural ties by which they were already united, by co-operating to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery, to afford assistance to each other in resisting any policy of aggression, to promote unity, and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe.

Europe's unity and security were considered to be closely linked, together with its economy and defence, and that explains the place accorded to that in the framework of WEU in respect of armaments co-operation and the establishment of mutual confidence. At the time, that implied the collective control of levels of forces and armaments.

The cornerstone to the framework can be found in Article V of the treaty and it explains the difference between WEU and NATO. It states that if any of the contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other contracting parties would afford the party attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power. That assistance would be given almost without any conditions.

Thus a comparison can be made. As a result of the Brussels Treaty the Assembly of WEU has an official status that the North Atlantic Assembly lacks. The WEU Council and its member governments have commitments to the Assembly, although sometimes members may doubt that. However, it must be kept informed of all matters covered by the modified Brussels Treaty. The Assembly's recommendations must be followed up even if this is restricted to the seven countries having to reach agreement on the replies to such recommendations.

WEU benefits from the fact that the member countries are in close proximity geographically, thus enabling there to be more frequent committee meetings than for the North Atlantic Assembly. WEU has two plenary sessions each year, but the North Atlantic Assembly has one. The WEU reports are prepared in closer touch with political events and public opinion and the debates are better able to portray those reactions. For instance, it would be interesting to compare the discussions in the North Atlantic

Assembly on Turkey and those not so much in this Assembly but in the Council of Europe.

The North Atlantic Assembly has more subcommittee meetings that prepare well-documented reports. It has no permanent chamber in which to hold sessions in the capitals of the various member countries. It has the advantage of much better press coverage and, in the end, better public awareness.

We want to compare the activities of both assemblies so that we can draw conclusions, but our task is to promote better understanding and a better follow up. Everyone who has the opportunity to look at the report will see that we reached five main conclusions. First, we should be aware of the activities of the North Atlantic Assembly and its committees.

Do we really know what activities are pursued in the committees of the North Atlantic Assembly or which subjects were discussed in the last plenary session of the North Atlantic Assembly? If we do not know, that is silly and not right.

In a way, both assemblies deal with comparable subjects. For that reason, our first conclusion is that we must improve existing links between both assemblies. Each should know what is going on in the other. At least we have the advantage that some members of this Assembly are members of the North Atlantic Assembly. It should be possible for the Presidential Committee to work out how in practice we can use that double function so that we are better informed of the activities of the North Atlantic Assembly. The opposite should be done, too. We must avoid duplication of work and we should profit from each other's activities.

Secondly, apparently the North Atlantic Assembly faces the same problems as we do over information policy. In sad moments when I am tired and have doubts about awareness of the assemblies, I am comforted by reading a resolution of the North Atlantic Assembly. It is a comfort that it is considering the pressing need for the alliance to promote better public understanding of its rôle in the service of peace. It considers that the citizens of member countries of the alliance should be informed clearly, fully and objectively of NATO's decisions in military matters as well as of decisions by the West to control and reduce the number of nuclear weapons. It confirms that it is necessary to develop a new and more forceful information policy, to be implemented by NATO. The aim should be publicly to promote the principles of NATO as a free and peace-loving association of nations bound together by common values. It recommends that the Council make every effort to strengthen its rôle and the scope for initiatives, improve the facilities of NATO's

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

international staff, and strengthen the press and public relations services of the various bodies of the Atlantic Alliance. That is a comfort for and a good example to the Assembly.

It would be better if my committee could have discussions with the same relevant committee of the North Atlantic Assembly.

The third conclusion is not new. We know that journalists are not willing widely to publicise many of our discussions. We must discuss topical subjects. We are a defence community. The subjects that we discuss should be closely linked for the sake of the security and defence of Europe. I cannot blame journalists who put difficult and critical questions about the relationship between South American and European countries. We can give no answers. The question is understandable, but we must restrict ourselves to debating European security and the defence of Europe.

The fourth conclusion is that "it would be in the interest of our Assembly to organise sessions more often in the capitals of member countries other than the one in which it has its seat".

We did so in the past. We had Assembly meetings in London, Rome, Brussels and Bonn. If I compare the practice of the North Atlantic Assembly, I must admit, although I do not like it, that the press coverage of its meetings, not just in Dutch newspapers, is very good. The North Atlantic Assembly also has the advantage of speeches made by ministers, for example Paul Nitze. I cannot see why such speeches would not be possible in this Assembly. We must think about that. That speech was of great value not just to the members of that Assembly but to the press.

Our final conclusion is about our name. I know that it is in the statute and that we can change it, but that is not so easy. However, let us face reality. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe changed its name. Its official name is "Consultative Assembly". That Assembly worked out how, without changing the rules, it could change its name.

How many people know what Western European Union is? Other colleagues have told me that people are convinced that WEU is a well-known international football club. We know that it is not. It is not a multinational company. It is involved with European defence. However, no one can work that out if they look at our name. Modest as we are in our committee, we suggest that: "the competent authorities consider the possibility and usefulness of changing the Assembly's name in order to give a better idea of its security and defence responsibilities". It need not be an official

change of name but it should be made clear that what we are doing here is for the sake of European security and defence. It should be made clear that the Assembly is concerned with that.

I end my introduction of the report by stressing that all our activities are of great value but if we cannot promote parliamentary follow-up and if people at home do not know about the existence, activities and decisions of the Assembly, we are wasting our time. I am sure no one here wants that.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Stoffelen, for an extremely interesting information report which raises important questions and items for consideration by the Assembly.

The debate is open. I call Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY (*United Kingdom*). – I speak as a new delegate to Western European Union, conscious of the privilege of representing both the United Kingdom and the British Conservative Party in this august body. I am speaking of the public awareness of the existence and the activities of WEU because I believe that this organisation can greatly assist in the defence of the concept of freedom that we in the seven democratic countries represented here should hold dear. That concept of freedom stems basically from a recognition of common sense.

It becomes increasingly evident that there is a need to show by example, by diplomacy and by due attention to the close co-operation of Western Europe that there is a true and successful alternative to the creeping forces of Marxism in all parts of the globe. The case for democracy and the western way of life must be presented, argued and supported. It must not be allowed to fall by default, inaction and incapacity.

Our way of life and the fundamental concept of freedom reflect the commonsense attitudes of our countries.

The philosophy of common sense is the acceptance of the primary beliefs of mankind as the ultimate criteria of truth. Normal understanding, good practical sense in everyday affairs and the general feeling of the community are all natural examples of that throughout our countries. Common sense believes not in change's sake, but only in orderly change that benefits us all. It listens to instinctive wisdom. I applaud personal and national pride because it still runs deep. It is profoundly conscious that human nature is the most powerful force in society. Common sense stands for stability, for standards, for choice and for self-fulfilment. It stands for the people of a democratic Western Europe.

It is incumbent upon WEU to understand the commonsense views of our countrymen, but it is

Mr. Murphy (continued)

an approach that must be taken to a far wider audience for it to appreciate if our free world is not to shrink the faster from the shadows of oppression. WEU must bring to international counsels the knowledge and evidence that there is a better life than our foes will permit. WEU must show the benefits which nations can enjoy so that our countries and other peoples can have hope rather than despair.

As a member of the European Democratic Group my support for the concept of freedom and its reflection of common sense is total. May I caution those not of the centre right who follow the socialist creed that the public awareness of WEU must never be sullied by their philosophical stance, for that could assist the aims of those very opponents of democratic Europe? The document before us emphasises the need for greater public awareness of the existence and the activities of WEU. It could be achieved by its defending democracy in Europe. It is this approach that should be resoundingly endorsed by member countries and that should form the foundation for gaining more public awareness of WEU.

In an increasingly dangerous and hostile world the values of democracy and its underlying basis of common sense must be positively defended if the benefits of freedom, for which so many Europeans fought and died, are not to be lost. That should be the essence of the achievement of public awareness in the 1980s.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). - Mr. President, my contribution really is intended to be a contribution to the report which my friend and colleague, Mr. Stoffelen, has drawn up on the basis of his long experience of European affairs.

I am very worried about the effect of the matter which figures in the subtitle of the report. I have reason to doubt that the public have any real knowledge of WEU or NATO - or rather the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty - or of the relationship between the two. The same applies to parliamentarians who are not delegates to this Assembly.

Twice during this part-session I have drawn attention to the need for a clearer view of the history of the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty, and of the original political context of the treaties and their development since 1948. I am very glad that all those who voted on Mr. Prussen's report are now present, because Mr. Prussen was so disappointed at the small attendance when he was speaking. He was speaking on precisely one of those vital

topics that can arise in this Assembly. I pronounced this "in quotes", so to speak, as you will realise.

The public have no idea of the actual content of the treaties, nor have our parliaments found any occasion to acquaint the public with their contents. We are all familiar with political meetings in our constituencies at which, following the question "Where are you going to get the money from?", someone shouts out "from defence!". This is usually taken as a welcome informal contribution or, at worst, a somewhat anarchic embellishment of the meeting. At the present time, in a year of debates and demonstrations about the deployment of Euromissiles, we even find senior officials making similar noises at congresses, especially when crisis budgets for social or cultural institutions are under discussion. This phenomenon indicates a whole new development.

The implications for defence are that a choice is being made between the political contexts of two international treaties, the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty. The choice is made unwittingly - the content of the treaties is not known. It should be part of the job of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments to spread knowledge of both treaties, particularly the different political thinking behind each of them. The report in its present form, Mr. President, does not tackle this problem. At this moment in history it is urgently necessary to point out the differing political contexts. For the sake of brevity let me quote from a booklet which we ourselves published. "The Brussels Treaty of 1948 provided for economic, social and cultural co-operation between the member countries and included provision for automatic mutual assistance." The North Atlantic Treaty states, in Article 3, that the parties will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist attack. Its principal aim is to guarantee security by deterring aggression. This is where the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty part company: they choose different routes.

We, our Assembly, our Committee for Relations with Parliaments, must make this clear. The main reason why I opposed Mr. Wilkinson's and Mr. Prussen's reports was because I detected a clearly demonstrable tendency towards "NATOisation", that is to say, a tendency to take from the WEU political context and give to the political context of NATO. That will not do; it is confusing and obscure for the public. That is why I think it wrong for the same person to be a member of both the NATO and the WEU assemblies.

The "hot autumn of 1983" is the most succinct evocation of a time when millions of people, coming together in the streets and linked

Mr. Tummers (continued)

via the media, gave widely varied expression to their fears about the risks of stepping up military capacity in various parts of the world. These millions of people were demonstrating at the same time the inverse image of that fear. This tableau is comparable to the historical collective expressions of opposition to apocalyptic threats which in that context we admire as cultural manifestations.

In contrast to the North Atlantic Treaty, the earlier "Brussels/WEU Treaty" clearly identifies the function of the common shield in the protection of peace and security. It states explicitly that Western Europe's common heritage must be protected. In the post-war Europe of 1948, besides economic recovery this meant above all raising the standard of living, including the corresponding social welfare provisions. It also meant the protection of civilisation and cultural relations. That is not something that can be achieved automatically by stepping up military capacity. Its realisation depends on the political selection of various types of expenditure.

During the period 1954 to 1962 various things happened to the Brussels Treaty. I think this was harmful. A kind of crack appeared in the treaty which could now lead to its being torn up altogether, as NATOisation proceeds. Changes took place in WEU. Tasks were transferred to NATO and the Council of Europe, social and cultural ones to the latter and aspects of military operations to NATO. But this did not mean that WEU and our Assembly were absolved from responsibility for these areas. This was not only made clear by my compatriot, Professor Patijn, when the transfer took place, but confirmed by the Council of Ministers, the WEU Council, in 1960.

These differences – I am not talking about the history for its own sake – must be clearly brought out. The difference in political significance between the WEU Assembly, with its recognised status, and the North Atlantic Assembly, which has no such status, must be maintained. If we mix the two up, then we shall be confusing, muddling and neglecting an extremely topical and important aspect of the treaty on which our Assembly is based. I hope that, no amendments having been tabled, publication of this report will speedily be followed by another report that deals in more detail with the aspects I have mentioned, which are naturally open to further amplification.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Page.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Stoffelen, as always, has set an excellent example of economy. He is doubling as Rapporteur and

Chairman, yet he is asking for no extra pay or allowances. I congratulate him on the report, of which he is very much a personal author, and on having recently been awarded a Lion's Medal in his country. We all know that he fights like a lion for the rights of our committee, and although I often do not agree with his political views, I admire his appetite for work.

We get too introspective about the fact that WEU is not a household word. The fact that everyone knows a certain washing powder does not mean that they admire it more. My image in my constituency is greatly improved when I speak and do not put out press reports, because people then do not know how many views I hold with which they would disagree.

We should congratulate our small public relations staff on the increasing coverage that we are getting. I hope that colleagues will use the telex that we now have, I have to admit that I have not used it myself, but I may send this speech over. If it is not used, it will be considered an unnecessary expense. For me, an international conference without a telex is like a *sole bonne femme* without the *bonne femme*. The real importance of WEU is that our discussions are influential in informed circles.

Mr. Stoffelen referred to three major recommendations in his report. I go all the way with two of them but not so far with the middle one. I agree that we should try to improve our existing links with NATO. The North Atlantic Assembly gets press coverage because it is the forum for NATO. It is NATO which is newsworthy, not the Assembly. Nevertheless, the visit of Mr. Luns brought a sense of reality to our deliberations. I should like to encourage closer links with the North Atlantic Assembly.

I am not so enthusiastic about the suggestion that we should move around to different cities. I am not sure that would create much more news value. Our committees meet in different countries. If we gave our deliberations a little more "sex appeal", the newspapers of those countries might show more interest.

The third recommendation was that we should consider a change, or a different emphasis, in the name of our Assembly. My well-informed colleague, Mr. Murphy, has done a good deal of research on this matter. He tells me – what is self-evident – that a change in the name of Western European Union would mean changing the treaties altogether.

However, we could give our Assembly a nickname that would finally stick. The Chairman of the British parliamentary group has offered a prize of a bottle of champagne for the best suggestion for incorporating the concept of defence in our name. Mr. Murphy and I wonder whether we should not become the "Par-

Mr. Page (continued)

liamentary Assembly for Western European Defence". In a way, that encapsulates the work that we are trying to do, the work over which you, Mr. President, have so ably taken the chair at this conference.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Page, for endowing WEU with a sexual dimension!

I call Mr. Enders.

Mr. ENDERS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish first of all to express my warm thanks to our committee Chairman, Mr. Pieter Stoffelen, for the report which he has so zealously and expertly compiled. I should also like to thank you, Mr. President, for your kind words about our work at the beginning of the debate.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like at the outset to refer to the table of action in the parliaments of member countries in Appendix I of the report. I note with regret that in 1982 we had only fifty-four actions to record – the smallest number since 1975. The number has diminished in every parliament. Why is this, Mr. President? Is it because of indolence in terms of parliamentary activity, or has some aversion arisen towards WEU as an institution?

There is no disguising the fact that in the Federal Republic, too, voices, albeit isolated ones, are raised against NATO. I wish to emphasise here that the German Social Democratic Party has come out clearly in favour of the alliance, specifically at the recent national party conference in Cologne. I should like to read two extracts from the conference record which bear this out:

"The SPD will base its policy on the principles of 'defence capability' and 'readiness to negotiate', as laid down by the Atlantic Alliance in the 1967 Harmel report, and will carry on the strategic discussion in the Federal Republic and in the alliance, taking due note of the interim report by the 'New Strategies' study group set up by the party conference in Munich."

And a few lines later:

"The SPD is guided by the following principles. Our security policy aims at an equal partnership within the alliance, as formulated by President Kennedy twenty years ago. The only effective national defence policy for our country is the prevention of war. That must be the goal of the German Federal armed forces and of the policy and strategy of the alliance. The alliance, NATO and the Ger-

man Federal armed forces are indispensable to the achievement of this goal."

The above passages clearly define our response to a certain amount of opposition and hostility.

Mr. President, faced with this kind of situation, we, as parliamentarians in the WEU Assembly, must do our utmost to maintain contact and develop our association with the organs of NATO. Unfortunately, there seems to have been some negligence about this in the past. We in the committee are endeavouring to overcome these problems so as to avoid a situation in which the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing.

The Rapporteur also said we should bring home to the public what the WEU Assembly actually is. In this connection, I draw your attention to the orange-coloured booklet entitled "Western European Union", which Mr. Berchem presented to us last year with a report. In the table of contents, Chapter III is the WEU Council, Chapter IV Agency for the Control of Armaments and Chapter V Standing Armaments Committee. We have to wait for Chapter VI to find the Assembly and then we are tucked away on page 29 in the final third of the booklet. Another point which I noticed only today during the discussion is that in this morning's budget debate a number of the bodies listed ahead of the Assembly were regarded as superfluous. Consideration was given to cancelling the funds allocated to these bodies.

Let us therefore join forces to achieve the objectives outlined by Pieter Stoffelen: let us enhance the standing of our WEU Assembly, strengthen its impact on the public and deepen and extend its contact with NATO. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The general debate is closed.

I call Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Although we sometimes have different political opinions, the great majority of members here share the opinion that a better knowledge and understanding of the activities of WEU are needed.

I thank Mr. Murphy for his, in some ways, encouraging and certainly profound speech. I had the feeling that he tended to mix up Marxism with democratic socialism, but perhaps that was my fault. By coincidence, I know the Chairman of the Socialist Group and, so far as I know, he has declared on behalf of his group that European socialists are devoted to European defence and to the security of the people of Europe. As Chairman and Rapporteur of this committee, I know that at least every member of

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

this committee – especially the Chairman and Rapporteur – shares that opinion.

What we in WEU are doing is taking steps not primarily in relation to European defence but in relation to the liberty of our people at home. We are concerned with their fundamental rights, their right to live in security and peace. That is at stake – their way of life – and we are deeply convinced that that way of life is best. There is no difference of opinion among us about that and, because of that, Mr. Murphy shares our common opinion that we must do all we can to promote a better understanding of our activities.

Mr. Tummers was right to say that there is a difference between the treaties of 1948 and 1954. In my opening remarks I quoted from the modified Brussels Treaty. That makes it clear that what is at stake is not primarily a military or defence operation but something quite different. The preamble says that the "...contracting parties... reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights... and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations... to... preserve the principles of democracy and... the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united" as "a firm basis for European economic recovery". It is clear that even in 1954 this Assembly adopted the task – indeed, still has the task – of acting on a matter that is more than one of defence. Rather than being a defence task, it is concerned with the security and safety in the widest sense of the people of Europe.

Thus, it is different from the North Atlantic Assembly. Clearly, it is a little exaggeration that WEU is just an appendix. We are independent, and have our own organisation. However, we need to know what the North Atlantic Assembly is doing and what reports it is discussing. We need the advantage of its experience. We should try to avoid duplicating work. Equally, the North Atlantic Assembly must try to avoid duplicating our work. Thus we should be aware of each other's activity.

It is not for us to comment on the decisions of the NATO member parliaments or to say whether the same delegates should be sent to the North Atlantic Assembly as to this Assembly. I try not to be a dogmatic politician. I do not believe that membership of an assembly means that that person is its property. At least some members of the North Atlantic Assembly are very sensible and prudent people who know perfectly well they can perform a worthwhile and critical task there. There is no reason to exclude them from membership of this Assembly.

I thank Mr. Page for his kind remarks. It would be interesting to take up his suggestions

for a more pleasant way of life after our session, but I fear that it is not my duty as Chairman and Rapporteur to do so. However, perhaps Mr. Page and I could meet after 6 p.m. tonight. Nevertheless, we agree that it is advisable to have more links with the North Atlantic Assembly. In practice, another name, or perhaps a nickname, is also advisable. I am sure that we do not need the prize of a bottle of champagne to encourage the creativity of someone to think of a nickname.

Mr. Page was slightly critical of my earlier suggestion and implied that I wanted to turn the Assembly into a travel club. That was not my intention. I merely asked why we should not occasionally hold a session in another city. Members of the Assembly have often criticised the fact that sometimes – although not this time – there have been only French journalists present. I remember quite well the enthusiastic remarks after our session in Bonn. I think that I remember Mr. Page making positive remarks then, too. However, as long as Mr. Page is not too enthusiastic I know that it means that he has a positive attitude.

(The speaker continued in German)

(Translation). – My good friend and colleague Mr. Enders has drawn our attention to the fact that our parliamentary activities have not improved at all during the past year – quite the contrary. I think it was a good idea to alert us all to this fact at this session. I cannot explain the reasons which have led to this situation, but it is quite clear that we all have a contribution to make by taking the work we do here home with us.

I was not at all surprised to learn that the SPD is staunchly loyal in its attitude to NATO. I do not think anybody in this Assembly was surprised. According to my understanding Mr. Enders fully shares our conclusions and is most willing to support our efforts to upgrade the activities and public impact of the WEU Assembly.

Once again I have discovered that we are not only personal and political friends but are also of the same opinion on this subject.

I will now continue in English.

(The speaker continued in English)

It was a great pleasure to be Rapporteur of the committee. Our debate has made it clear that we all see the relevance of making a comparison between the North Atlantic Assembly and this Assembly. We all agree that we must all do our best to promote a better understanding and to increase the chances of a parliamentary follow-up. It has been a pleasant task for me to conclude the debate, and I thank you, Mr. President, and the Assembly, for your support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – It is I who thank you, Mr. Stoffelen. I believe that the sense of your suggestions has been understood by the members of this Assembly, by all those who have taken part in the debate and also by those who have not taken part.

The Assembly takes note of the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

**5. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 1st December, at 9.30 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Africa's rôle in a European security policy – Chad (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 957).

2. Address by Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence.

3. Africa's rôle in a European security policy – Chad (Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 957).

4. Middle East crises and European security (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 965 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.10 p.m.)

TENTH SITTING

Thursday, 1st December 1983

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. Africa's rôle in a European security policy - Chad (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 957*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Müller (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Caro, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Galley, Mrs. Gherbez, Mr. Beix, Mr. Vogt.
4. Address by Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence.
Replies by Mr. Hernu to questions put by: Mr. Müller, Mr. Caro, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Beix.
5. Africa's rôle in a European security policy - Chad (*Replies to speakers and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 957*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Müller (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Michel (*Chairman of the committee*).
6. Middle East crises and European security (*Reference back to committee of the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 965 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Michel (*Chairman of the committee*), Lord Reay (*Rapporteur*).
7. Close of the session.

The sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. Africa's rôle in a European security policy - Chad

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 957)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The first order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee

1. See page 39.

on Africa's rôle in a European security policy - Chad, Document 957.

I call Mr. Müller, Rapporteur.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we meet at this early hour to discuss the situation in Africa and specifically Chad, and I should like to begin with a remark that my colleague Mr. Gansel has just made: the benches in this forum are about as sparsely populated as Chad. He has thus highlighted a problem: the country we are now discussing is relatively large, more than twice the area of France, the largest country in Western Europe. But it has a population of only slightly over four million.

Nonetheless, since it achieved independence in 1960, Chad has repeatedly attracted attention - of an unpleasant nature, if I may put it that way - because it has never really settled down. The central government has always been disputed, and it was this that sparked off the present crisis. It would be an over-simplification to represent the situation in Chad as a dispute between North and South, although it is constantly so described. It is often assumed that the dispute is between the predominantly Moslem North and the predominantly Christian and animistic South. The majority of the population lives in the South, which is also the part of Chad where the economy flourishes, since climatic conditions limit the growing of cotton and other crops to this area. But, as I

Mr. Müller (continued)

have already said, it would be too simple to put everything down to a conflict between North and South. The leaders of the two opposing factions in Chad at the moment, Oueddei and Habré, both come from the North. Despite this, they are adversaries.

The disputes began at the time of the first president, Tombalbaye. The French troops stationed in the country under a treaty of assistance and alliance concluded with Chad were withdrawn a few years after independence, but had to be recalled by President Tombalbaye in 1968, and they stayed until 1971.

The next major crisis began in 1973, when Libya occupied part of the North of Chad known as the Aozou strip. In itself, this is a completely desolate area, which – as I once put it – European travel agencies would not even advertise for an adventure tour. However, valuable minerals are believed to exist in this area, although there is no reliable information. There may even be uranium deposits in the area, which might make it particularly interesting. I should point out that Colonel Kadhafi was not the first Libyan leader to think of occupying, or one might even say annexing this strip of land in the North of Chad: Libya sought to extend its sphere of influence to the South even while King Idris, Kadhafi's predecessor, was in power and at the time of the Sultans, in the days of the great Ottoman rulers.

It must never be forgotten that Chad acts as a bridge. As I said just now, it is itself divided into a predominantly Islamic North and a Christian South. It could be said to mark the precise division between Northern and Central Africa. This is what makes it particularly interesting.

The assassination of President Tombalbaye on 13th April 1975 was followed by a military coup and the installation of General Malloum as President. But he too was unable to keep the peace in Chad, and not long afterwards, on 31st August 1978, Hissène Habré, the leader of the Toubou rebellion – named after a northern tribe that has always played a significant rôle – became Prime Minister for the first time. This protest movement in the North was founded at a very early stage in Sudan under the name of Frolinat. The suspicion was always being voiced that this movement was connected in some way with the 13% minority of Arabic-speakers in the country. This was not the case, however, since neither Habré nor Oueddei belongs to the Arabic-speaking section of the population.

The dispute then led – and we now come to the more recent headlines – to the replacement

of Habré by a transitional national union government, as it was known, consisting of eleven militarily organised fractions and headed by Goukouni Oueddei. This government did not last long either. Since June 1982 Habré has again been in charge of N'Djamena, the capital.

It was at this time that the present complications began. Habré was evidently able to bring the country under something like control. Some of the people he has included in his government previously belonged to the transitional national union government. Chad's southern population is particularly well represented. He has also succeeded in being recognised by the Organisation of African Unity.

The loser in this conflict, Oueddei, who had fled to Cameroon, now returned. And he returned in force, if I may put it that way, since he had Libyan support, and this was not just a case of a few mercenaries equipped with ancient muzzle-loaders intervening in an African civil war, but of units equipped with the latest weapons, tracked vehicles, aircraft and so on.

This Libyan assistance has this year resulted in the virtual partition of the country and in Hissène Habré's central government in N'Djamena calling for the help of French troops under the treaty of assistance. I can imagine that the French Government did not find it easy to take this decision, especially after the recent change of power in France. But the new government was confronted with treaties that it simply had to honour. After some hesitation France provided not only logistical support but also combat troops, crack troops – some 3,000 men – who, fortunately, have not yet been directly involved in hostilities with Libya. They have helped to ensure that the red line, as it is called, dividing the two powers, has been respected. It is comparatively easy to draw a line of this kind in the desert because of the few lines of communication – caravan routes – that can be used there.

At present, then, Chad is virtually partitioned, with Libyan units in the North and French troops in the South backing the central government under the treaty of assistance. The French have been joined by troops from Zaïre and other countries of the Organisation of African Unity, who have been called into Chad before. The Organisation of African Unity is concerned that Chad may develop into a new trouble spot which could affect its neighbours. It is generally believed that the attempted or successful coups in recent months and years in Upper Volta and the Gambia, to name but two examples, were masterminded in the North.

However, the concern felt in the Organisation of African Unity does not stem only from the view that developments of this kind might

Mr. Müller (continued)

spread. Another aspect must also be considered: one of the basic principles of the Organisation of African Unity is that the frontiers drawn during the colonial period should be respected, that there should be no frontier changes. Any solution in Chad that resulted in frontiers being changed would conflict with this basic principle of the Organisation of African Unity and would, of course, be followed by a string of similar disputes in other African countries. After all, there is hardly a country in Africa or a member state of the Organisation of African Unity in which new frontiers have not been demanded on ethnic or historical grounds. Such a solution in Chad would therefore produce a chain reaction.

Why are we in WEU concerned about Chad?

One reason is that troops from a WEU member country are stationed in Chad and therefore not available for the defence of our own area, even if only 3,000 men are involved. After all, these are crack troops, and there is no knowing what such involvement may lead to, or what it may entail for our defence system. That is one factor.

The second is that all the member countries of WEU must be concerned about the possibility of "Europe's soft underbelly" in Africa getting into difficulties if the conflict in Chad spreads, with all the repercussions this would have on security and defence here in Western Europe.

We very much regret – and I say so in my report – that we have not made use of the instruments provided in the modified Brussels Treaty, as the treaty in fact implies. I am referring to consultations in which France, as a party to the treaty, would have explained the position. It can also be said that the other parties to the treaty did not request such an explanation. But no matter who may be blamed for not taking the decisive step, it was not taken, and in my opinion that is regrettable. The last time there were consultations was at the time of the Falklands crisis. They were requested by the WEU Assembly. The committee shares my view that there should also have been consultations in this case.

What does the future hold for Chad? That too is something that should concern us. In recent months there have been repeated contacts between the two sides in Chad. Contacts were made at the Franco-African conference in Vittel, for example. Nothing concrete has yet emerged, however.

The report that gives us most hope at present is that Habré, who continues to represent the central government in N'Djamena, has agreed that peace talks, or negotiations, should be held in Addis Ababa, the seat of the Organisation of

African Unity, although no date has yet been fixed.

Everyone wants to negotiate. Even Libya wants to negotiate, although it is interesting to note that while the Libyans are in favour of negotiations they claim that they are not really involved in any way because, they say, there are no Libyan troops in Chad, a statement that is regarded as very strange by everyone familiar with the situation in that part of the world.

To summarise, it must be in our interest to ensure that Chad does not become yet another of the world's divided countries. We already have enough worries over divided countries throughout the world. We know that, far from being a security factor, divided countries lead to insecurity in world politics.

We must also have an interest in the withdrawal of foreign troops who have intervened in unilateral support of a group rebelling against the central government, other than those sent to Chad under a treaty of assistance. We must call for the restoration of peace to this country. Ladies and Gentlemen, Chad is one of the poorest countries in the world. Children are dying of starvation there. It is unacceptable that the situation in a country of this kind should be further aggravated by civil war and by foreign intervention as well. Peace must be restored, the weapons packed away and the reconstruction of Chad begun. That would certainly benefit the people of Chad and it would also benefit the WEU member countries if a period of steady development under peaceful conditions and without foreign intervention could be initiated in Chad. It must be our aim to help, and it could be our business to advise. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Mr. Müller for your very interesting and full statement.

The debate is open. I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I first wish to express my gratitude to Mr. Müller for the report he has just presented, which I was able to discuss with him in the General Affairs Committee, which has very properly approved it.

This report contains a description which, though brief, gives a complete and objective picture of a matter of extraordinary complexity. It seems to me entirely reasonable that WEU should be apprised of this situation and that, in the recommendations which we shall be considering, we should have due regard for the links which exist between this particular problem and the major issue of security, in which Europe, as an entity, has such an important rôle to play.

Mr. Caro (continued)

In Chad, we are once more witnessing a most unmistakable and blatant example of the great effort being made to destabilise all that has been built up over a long period by the free western nations with their political institutions founded on pluralist parliamentary democracy and which we still wish to preserve today, that is to say, a world of freedom and respect for the rights of man.

It is not by chance that these destabilising moves are directed to Chad. They are being orchestrated by a mastermind we encounter everywhere, and the political stance of the Soviet Union at every conference in which it takes a direct or indirect part only illustrates the advantages which this imperialist power is able to extract from every case of destabilisation in the free world. Libya happens to be the current vehicle. There is no need to add to the details provided by our Rapporteur.

It is true, nonetheless, that in Chad military operations are made relatively easy by the exploitation of a very special situation. Chad, which is really only an agglomeration of ethnic groups, comprises two parts: one virtually desert and the other inhabited, one nomadic the other settled, one warlike and the other, in the south, made up of peaceful farmers. It is the latter element which has provided what is called Chad political tradition, especially during that large part of Chad history subsequent to independence under President Tombalbaye. Everything else originates from the north – from the nomads used to constant warring and the subjugation of the settled southerners whom they use to supply their needs. One part of the country worked while the other played around.

Libya with consummate expertise – and let us not forget that Libya and Chad share a common frontier – exploited this situation very quickly and without worrying too much about the actual personalities involved in the conflict, be it Mr. Goukouni Oueddei or Mr. Hissène Habré. It was the opportunity which created the crime. The lawless lifestyle established in this northern part of the country has been transformed into a political operation which has totally destabilised Chad, which forms a kind of buffer zone between the Moslem north and the western equatorial part of Africa and Sudan regions where, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, little had previously occurred to disturb the security of the local populations.

In this situation, France has played a part which we may judge differently according to our standpoint. It is true that Chad is now cut in two. But, could not a French buffer force – to use a term currently in vogue – have quickly thwarted any Libyan intention to invade the

north of the country, instead of now holding the advance at the famous red line?

Should WEU have been consulted? I think it should. I expressed the same view at the time of the Falklands affair when the WEU Council was not consulted. This time, France could have done so. This is a question of solidarity between member countries of one and the same organisation. If we want Europe to speak with one voice, the member countries must, without making it a political act seeming to abandon the tradition of secret, diplomatic consultation, adopt the habit of using their meeting place as a council for co-operation and mutual assistance. This is the way to implement the Brussels Treaty.

For all these reasons, with France this time acting as the vehicle for European action in Africa – an Africa closely involved in the future security of the free world in the context of an integrated Mediterranean strategy, which is close to all our hearts – we have before us an ideal case. Let us learn from what has happened and formulate for the Council of Ministers a more clearly defined policy, calling on them to act whenever the need arises.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Israel has always been blamed for the destabilisation of the Middle East and Africa, but the facts show that the most dangerous originators of the destabilisation which threatens Europe's security are entirely different, the principal offender being the Soviet Union with the unresisting collaboration of the countries which it assists, arms and controls.

The Chad "affair" is one of the events occurring outside the NATO area but directly or indirectly affecting European and western security; for that reason, as Mr. Wilkinson's report confirms, NATO must consider compensatory measures when any member state has to intervene in such areas which threaten stability outside the NATO area.

Events in Chad are of particular concern because it is a country which needs peace in order to develop its economy and cannot be left to the manoeuvrings of countries which are precisely seeking to set up the conditions for destabilisation and are pursuing an expansionist policy, thereby creating a situation which directly affects Europe's security.

France is, therefore, to be congratulated and supported for having intervened outside the NATO area in order to restore conditions which should further and guarantee Europe's security. I would, however, point out to members

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

that, if we are in favour of such intervention, we cannot express horror at the United States intervention in Grenada with the co-operation and agreement of other Caribbean states, because the events in Grenada directly affected the security of a NATO member state and therefore directly or indirectly the security of the West. The conditions for destabilisation and insecurity were created by the Soviet Union and its allies - Cuba - who had installed themselves in that small country in order to increase the influence and power of the Soviet Union itself. When certain situations arise, it is the duty of affected states, which can do so, to intervene in order to guarantee conditions which, in the final analysis, favour peace, progress and democracy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Galley.

Mr. GALLEY (*France*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I congratulate Mr. Müller and thank him for having expounded such a complex question so clearly in his report. He has interpreted the situation in exactly the way in which I, personally, have come to see it. His recommendations are so moderate and concise that they have my unqualified approval.

My friend, Jean-Marie Caro, has mentioned most of the points I wanted to make myself, and I shall therefore only add to what he had to say by stressing a single idea.

Although, during the 1978-79 conflict, Libya was basically content to encourage and stir up the trouble by supplying military equipment to the Toubous and by substantially reinforcing the Islamic region - to which I shall return later - 1983 has seen a fantastic build-up of the use of Libyan troops to foment the conflict. In 1978-79, we had the Islamic Legion, made up of impoverished workers brought from Mali, Niger and Sudan who, as soon as they arrived, were sent to a camp and given a uniform. These men, who had been lured into Libya by the promise of money, were then recruited by force - the Islamic Legion was just that - and put under Libyan officers. While, at that time, the force was truly an Islamic legion, in 1983, as far as we can discern, the formations committed to the conflict are élite Libyan units which are among the best which that country has.

That was my first point. It follows, as Mr. Müller says in his report, that we may well be seeing an invasion of northern Chad by Libyan troops proper, not just assistance given by Libya to a Toubou rebellion.

In the second place, I do not think that we can regard Libya's position in the Chad conflict as

simply an extension of Libya's occupation of the Aozou strip, although that occupation, which has enabled Libya to establish military aerodromes and bases, is no doubt a factor which is understandably prompting Libya to extend its action and grab Borkou and Tibesti in the same way.

But that is not enough. It seems to me that our Assembly could at some time address itself to the question of the whole range of Libyan activities, extending from the repeated attempts to assassinate President Nimeiry of Sudan to the conflict which has split Libya from Egypt and to distant corners like Djibouti where, by providing the rebels with arms, Libyan actions are designed to destabilise the government of President Hassan Gouled. Whether we are concerned with the fomenting of the conflict in Mauritania, which I have personally witnessed, or with the unloading in Niamey or Ouagadougou of crates of arms under cover of the Libyan Red Cross, all these events should, as the Rapporteur and my friend Mr. Caro have said, be tied in with the general policy of destabilisation pursued by Libya on the African continent.

Everywhere, then, we see the hand of Colonel Kadhafi trying to topple governments and support revolutionary movements, whatever their nature and however extreme their policy, as though Libya's ultimate objective were to turn Africa into one gigantic hotbed of disruption.

Here we must accept the fact of Soviet involvement. Everywhere, the weapons supplied are Kalashnikovs and SAM-7s and, plainly, the Soviet Union cannot be held to be indifferent. After all, without the USSR, these revolutionary movements could not have such weapons.

We are therefore faced with an issue far wider than the mere Chad conflict, and I wish, Mr. President, to make that point here, while expressing my complete approval of Mr. Müller's report and saying how much I personally share his conclusions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mrs. Gherbez.

Mrs. GHERBEZ (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies, Gentlemen, today we are discussing the place in European security policy of a whole continent like Africa, which is close on the map and stretches out to the north along the Mediterranean, just as our continent stretches out to the south. Clearly, therefore, the economic, political and military interests of both European and African countries - and, let us remember, of other countries from other continents - converge on the Mediterranean; what is more, their navies are operating there. In a word, it is a strategic ocean and a world

Mrs. Gherbez (continued)

nerve centre where many interests are concentrated.

Today, our overall policy as Europeans must be to work for peace, détente and disarmament by every possible means. We are not all agreed on how this is to be achieved but in view of the recent development of powerful movements pursuing those objectives, we should turn our thoughts to the necessity and possibility of aligning the different views and of launching more vigorous official, government moves for the resumption of the dialogue and negotiations and for the reduction of conventional and above all of nuclear weapons.

There is no doubt that we could direct our efforts to more specific matters, such as the safeguarding of peace and peaceful coexistence in a part of the world of particular concern to us, namely in the Mediterranean, between the surrounding countries; and such efforts should be accompanied by moves to increase the volume and improve the quality of trade and of cultural exchanges in the widest sense.

At the same time, the African countries can and should work for the same objectives. The situation in Africa is of course different. It is often stressed these days that problems remain unresolved not only as regards boundaries but also national feeling, the non-existence of which in some cases is misunderstood by those who have such feelings; the result is endless confrontation and tension. Underdevelopment is by far the most serious source of problems in many of these countries: problems in regard to food supplies, health services, lack of education. All these seriously affect the lives of the African peoples and the destiny of their countries. The poor countries are the most vulnerable and find it difficult to sustain and maintain their independence and sovereignty, so that they can easily fall prey to the political interests of those to whom they turn for help and of those who speculate on need and poverty.

The European countries are of course helping with the economic development of the African countries. There is the Lomé agreement; we are financing several international organisations for the countries we support. There is therefore the problem of increasing this co-operation but of doing so in such manner that it is not merely assistance which is wasted expenditure. We must seek forms of support which will at the same time allow the individual countries to be governed independently. They must be helped to resolve internal disputes, and forces working for the unification of countries with divided territories must be supported, by way of peaceful proposals and initiatives. Measures must be devised enabling the countries concerned to

resolve their own problems without military intervention.

Today, Chad is divided and France has large forces there. Libya has occupied part of the country, which must find the way to achieve full independence, economic development, autonomy and sovereignty. And this must be achieved without massive armed intervention from outside and certainly not by taking up arms against the Libyans as favoured by the United States Government, which looks on Chad as a barrier to Libyan expansion; it will not be achieved by widening the conflict and involving other non-African countries but by discussion round the negotiating table. Africa's rôle is certainly very important for the peace and security of that part of the world; it is of equal importance, however, that the European and African countries, or vice versa, should work together to achieve these objectives by way of dialogue, agreements, numerous exchanges and help – not assistance – from us, given in a form which will allow the African countries to develop independently. In a word, the African countries, like ourselves, have a rôle in establishing a climate of security and détente in Europe.

Perhaps, following the debate and the adoption of the corresponding recommendation before us, for which we shall vote, we might propose a meeting of European and African heads of state or government to review the situation, exchange ideas and thoughts on the main issues of peace and collaboration and also to launch a series of practical measures for the integration of the various countries, for a levelling up between north and south and for the genuine sovereignty, autonomy and independence of the developing African countries, as a follow-up to earlier, but not yet fully successful moves in the same direction, as the Rapporteur pointed out.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Beix.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I congratulate Mr. Müller on his work and I thank the committee for including in the agenda for this session a question that is important for France and its European partners. I do so for two reasons.

First, it is formal proof that the Assembly of Western European Union is fully capable of considering important and difficult topical questions which primarily concern one of its member countries. Second, it demonstrates that our Assembly is fulfilling the rôle we have given it as a means of expressing the views of all our countries on political and military problems.

I should also like to thank the Rapporteur and the members of the committee for openly

Mr. Beix (continued)

supporting and approving the French intervention in Chad, which was designed – as the French speakers pointed out just now – to discourage Libyan intervention and expansionism and to keep the peace in this country, with which France has particularly clear-cut historical links under the bilateral Franco-Chad agreements of 1976.

In Mr. Müller's report I have found a number of justified remarks to which we must reply. They are slightly critical of France's attitude towards WEU, particularly as regards the information supplied to the other member countries.

On this point, I would observe that we do not regard the fighting in Chad as an international conflict involving major East-West relations at the highest level, even though the original issue of guaranteeing Chad's frontiers has now been complicated by the emergence of new factors which have turned it into more than a mere local conflict.

President Mitterrand's strategy in this affair is to do no more than ensure Chad's territorial integrity and stability by as peaceful means as possible. It is not designed to topple Colonel Kadhafi. By confining himself to undertaking this mission in accordance with the 1976 agreements, the aim of the President of the French Republic is simply to prevent the conflict from degenerating into an international East-West confrontation.

We know, of course, that this conflict and the French presence in Chad are a clear demonstration of intent to the neighbouring countries, because we realise that the frontiers which were drawn in straight lines during the colonial period took liberties with the geopolitical realities and that these frontiers are regularly threatened by ethnic groups trying to push them back from both sides.

Despite the difficulty of this debate on frontiers, the presence of French troops to protect Chad's frontiers has a pacifying effect on the other countries of Africa. France's intervention is therefore an indication of its desire to confine this conflict to one over frontiers, a preventive presence aimed against Libya, of course, but without French participation in a civil war and without French interference in Chad's internal disputes, which it is not for us to settle. It must also be remembered that the French forces have been deployed behind the Chad units.

In his excellent report Mr. Müller refers to the claim by various observers that earlier and more resolute action would probably have dealt Libya a fatal blow. We must give a clear answer to

this question. I believe that Mr. Hernu, the French Minister of Defence, who will be addressing us later, will do the same. This point aroused some controversy in my country. The President of the Republic was criticised by those who believed that earlier, preventive action should have been taken. This debate has since petered out.

At official meetings in the French National Assembly, representatives of all shades of political opinion agreed that France intervened at the right moment and could not have done so earlier. For one thing, the troops and equipment needed for the intervention would have had to be transported the 8,000 km from France to Chad. For another, the infrastructure needed to receive, in particular, certain elements of the French air force would have had to be available. As it happened, it proved impossible to meet this latter requirement effectively until a few days or even a few hours before the actual intervention.

Nonetheless, we recognise that the substance of Mr. Müller's report and the questions it contains are fully justified and that we have a duty to answer these two main questions.

France did not see the conflict in Chad as a threat to peace within the meaning of Article VIII, and this for the reasons that I have previously mentioned: it is a local conflict and intervention took place under a bilateral agreement. However, it must be admitted that each member country of WEU may have its own interpretation of this article and that each country could at any time have called on the Council to consider the Chad affair or any other affair in which we are involved, such as the Falklands dispute. That could have been done on previous occasions.

Let us not forget that all the member countries largely agree on this report.

It is clear, and I have heard other speakers point this out, that there is no military situation in Chad in the strict sense if there is no political agreement. We are concerned here with an African state and we must consider the nature of that state; its rôle is confined to redistributing a limited amount of revenue and it is only a bargaining counter with other countries on the international stage.

Chad must not fall prey to Libyan expansionism. Nor is it a territory enjoying the protection of a French oxygen tent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vogt, the last speaker on the list.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have read Mr. Müller's report carefully and listened intently to his intro-

Mr. Vogt (continued)

duction. In his conclusions he states that a large majority of the General Affairs Committee had expressed approval of France's intervention. This statement disguises the fact that the Greens at least oppose this intervention, and I would have been grateful if the Rapporteur had included a few words about the opinion of the minority in his report. I will briefly explain our position.

I agree with Mr. Müller that peace must be ensured in Africa: peace, yes, but *pax africana*, not peace brought about by Europeans or other powers – the United States, if you like – by threats or any other means.

One of the arguments advanced by Mr. Müller was, I would say, rather revealing. Referring to the region we are discussing here, he spoke of Europe's soft underbelly. We really must stop looking at things in this way. Of course, former colonial powers, having once incorporated certain African territories, may still be suffering from the kind of phantom sensations which follow an amputation. Nevertheless, we should choose our words more carefully.

We should admit, as a previous speaker indicated, that we are dealing with the body of Africa itself. We should be helping this independent body to develop, not thinking of it as Europe's soft underbelly. Africa itself is an independent body, and it must be encouraged and assisted as such.

When Europeans feel compelled to make some kind of statement about Africa or to intervene there, the military approach must be avoided at all costs. What we need is a non-military approach, for instance Africa's powers of resistance could be strengthened through the more equitable distribution of goods. This also means sending goods in aid to the hungry – Mr. Müller talked about starving people – whether or not the area concerned is affected by hostilities. This would be one way of providing support through direct aid.

Mr. Müller went on to say something that heightened my aversion to intervention of this kind even more. He said that any such involvements might lead to others. What he presumably meant was that we in Western European Union are expressing our views on France's intervention because we are concerned about France and its rôle within Western European Union. But the conclusion I draw from the argument that further involvement might ensue is that Europe as a whole might be faced with situations in which it was constantly involved in fresh interventions in Africa or elsewhere. That, in our view, is not the direction Europe should be taking.

Europe should be, as it were, a friend to such countries, supporting them and providing civil aid where it is needed. But Europe should not be a power prepared for military intervention.

Another speaker – Mr. Cavaliere, I think it was – also made a revealing comment. He compared Chad with Grenada, claiming that we could not condemn the intervention of the United States in Grenada while simultaneously approving this intervention by France. That is another reason why I cannot approve France's intervention in Chad: this comparison shows what it can lead to. It will eventually lead to that unfortunate form of fraternal aid that the Soviet Union has developed over the years. The Soviet Union has a tradition – and I say this with all the irony I can muster – of providing unsolicited fraternal assistance.

The United States, on the other hand, has a tradition of being forced to help. And now a third version has emerged in Grenada's case, almost casually at that, the United States having been forced to assist at the request of third parties. If we think this through, we could have Italy calling on the Federal Republic of Germany to intervene in Malta to restore "peace in freedom", according to somebody's interpretation of peace, or of freedom. In other words, the whole thing would become absurd. We cannot allow Europe to be eroded by such a policy.

To conclude, I would say that problems also arise from the argument that this is an area outside NATO's competence, that European countries have a quasi-automatic responsibility when requests for help are received, or on other legal grounds, where NATO is not competent. As soon as NATO is even thought of in this context, and as soon as such great stress is laid on Moscow's involvement in this region, these countries will inevitably be drawn ever deeper into the East-West conflict. That would be a disastrous development, which we must check before it is too late.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The general debate is closed.

4. Address by Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Charles Hernu, French Minister of Defence.

I welcome Mr. Hernu. His presence among us, following that of Mr. Claude Cheysson at the first part-session last June, shows once again the great interest which the French Government takes in the work of our Assembly.

The President (continued)

May I ask you, Minister, to come to the rostrum.

Mr. HERNU (*French Minister of Defence*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, for the second time since 1981, I have now been given an opportunity to address your Assembly and reply to your questions.

May I first of all thank Mr. De Poi, who, as President of the Assembly, invited me to address you. I particularly appreciated this invitation and am most grateful to him for it.

Since 1981 the President of the Republic and the French Government, in particular the Prime Minister and the Minister for External Relations, my friend and colleague Claude Cheysson, have on several occasions affirmed France's interest in Western European Union. Because the WEU assembly is the only parliamentary body authorised by treaty to study and debate problems concerning the defence of the states of Western Europe, and because, under the modified treaty of 1954, the WEU member states solemnly undertook to afford assistance in the event of aggression against any one of them, I wish here to reaffirm how irreplaceable and indispensable we consider the set of institutions comprising Western European Union – the Council, the Assembly, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments – for strengthening the security of our countries. Through WEU we must build up a coherent whole that respects the identity of each country and is, at the same time, the expression of a solidarity woven from a common history. It is regrettable that certain people – as happened quite recently, in fact – sometimes talk about European security as if WEU did not exist.

However, by its very existence, and despite ups and downs and difficult periods, WEU has increased public awareness in Europe of the threats to peace. It has also helped to weave lasting bonds of solidarity which member states' governments have had occasion to affirm in many different circumstances. The seven nations which form our union indeed have the same outlook when they come to consider matters affecting their security.

Thus it is that in the debate about the re-establishment of the balance of forces at the lowest possible level, a debate that is of crucial importance for the future of Europe, our states have all shown the same resolution. It is no mere coincidence that all the states which have accepted the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons on their territory in the event of failure of the negotiations are members of WEU. Similarly, the active rôle played by our

seven countries in ensuring that the Conference on Disarmament in Europe should meet in satisfactory conditions has been particularly noted. Finally, we may recall that, at the time of the Falklands conflict, the WEU member states were able to express common points of view, as indeed they are able to do in the debates on peace and security in the United Nations.

This shared experience and common heritage, on which we will have occasion to dwell even more fully next year, when we celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the Paris Agreements, should enable us together to take up the challenges facing us.

We are aware that the period through which we are now living is without doubt a turning point in the post-war history of the European continent. In a few years historians will be able to assess the importance of this period at their leisure. I believe, however, that we, as leaders of our countries and representatives of our nations, can already assert that the present constellation of imbalances and tensions will have an influence on our history at least as great as that of the Berlin or Cuban crises. The future of Europe and the security of our peoples depend on the outcome – on our response to the present crisis.

What is this crisis – if I may be permitted to dwell on it for a few moments – and what are its origins? I believe, as the President of the French Republic reminded us recently, that the risk is that of a failure in deterrence due to the imbalance of forces that has arisen in Europe, particularly as regards medium-range nuclear weapons. The end of deterrence in Europe means the re-emergence of the risk of war. It may also mean the temptation to take political advantage of the legitimate fear to which this risk of war gives rise.

What we see around us is nothing less than renunciation, abandon, ignorance and, if I may be allowed to say so, perhaps sometimes even cowardice.

Europe can live in peace only by deterrence based on the balance of forces. That balance has, however, been disrupted by the continued deployment of SS-20s – 135 in 1979 and 360 today – which makes hostages of more than two-thirds of the world's population and is aimed at splitting the security of the non-nuclear states of Western Europe from that of the United States.

Everyone is aware of the decision taken by the members of NATO in 1979: to open negotiations with the Soviet Union with a view to restoring the balance of forces through arms reductions, and thus to render the deployment of new arms superfluous. The facts, however, are stubborn. The reality cannot be avoided. For

Mr. Hernu (continued)

seven years the deployment of SS-20s had been continuing unabated and new nuclear weapons – like the SS-21s – had been deployed over the last few months, while the negotiations had produced no results.

The German parliament and, earlier, the British and Italian parliaments therefore reaffirmed their decision to start deploying NATO medium-range systems, whereupon the Soviet Union decided to break off negotiations. That decision was indeed in accordance with the Soviet leaders' prior declarations, but that is no justification. The United States did not find it necessary to break off negotiations when the Soviet Union was continuing to deploy the weapons to which I have referred. During those two years of talks, the Soviet Union installed some ninety-nine SS-20s. We hope that the negotiating process will soon resume, with the desire to reach agreement.

The future has to be built – and in that WEU has an essential rôle to play.

Given the challenges facing us and the anxieties that have emerged, WEU is the most suitable forum in which we can together discuss our common security requirements while continuing to respect the specific characteristics of each of our states. We share common values, converging concerns and the same desire to see Europe increasingly assert itself as a reliable and available partner for the states of the third world, a partner concerned to ensure their security and independence as well as their development. There are many in the developing world who have measured the risks of the East-West conflict spreading to the whole world. We know that local conflicts, of regional dimensions, become inextricable when one or other of the two great powers tries to impose its views. Intervention by the one is speedily followed by the presence of the other. The Middle East is experiencing the traumas that such logic produces.

In most cases, however, the third world states, too weak to act alone, feel the need for support or backing, without which negotiations succumb to the weight of ambitions and rivalries.

Our own states, themselves, are open to dialogue and prepared to take on the responsibilities necessary for the maintenance of peace and the negotiated settlement of conflicts.

That is how France sees its rôle, and I note with interest, though without surprise, that all Frenchmen are profoundly attached to it.

Let me say here that France considers it its duty to contribute, when it is asked and has undertaken to do so in agreements, to the secur-

ity and integrity of states facing quite direct threats. Similarly, France is helping, alongside Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, to further the chances of a permanent solution to the Lebanese crisis by working towards the unity of Lebanon, the re-establishment of civil peace and, therefore, towards national reconciliation in that country.

The French military presence – whether in Chad, which you were discussing a short while ago, or in Lebanon; whether in Beirut or in the framework of UNIFIL – has only one purpose: to restore peace and promote a negotiated settlement of conflicts. France has no ambition for hegemony, nor any desire for power. Its only ambition is to serve the cause of peace, even if it may have to pay dearly, as it has unfortunately had to do recently – and yet again at dawn today.

This policy, moreover, is understood by those in Lebanon and Chad who really want peace.

That is why, far from undermining the conditions for security in Europe, our policy, like that of our partners, demonstrates that we are ready to take the same risks for the peace of our allies that we would take in order to ensure and defend our own security and freedom.

As your debates have shown, we are all aware of the need to develop, among Europeans, our thinking on defence. I repeat that this in no way conflicts with the development of relations between the Western European states and the United States of America. Our determination to see the balance of forces maintained in Europe rests precisely on the conviction that for a long time to come the security of our closest partners, those with whom we are associated on the economic level within the European Community, cannot be ensured without the guarantee of the United States and the latter's presence in Europe.

That, however, neither conflicts with nor excludes the development of links between Europeans. On the contrary, in view of the new challenges facing us, the Europeans – with WEU taking a leading rôle – must formulate their own demands, that is to say, their own priorities.

In my view, the thirtieth anniversary of the Paris treaty should affirm and demonstrate the ability of Europeans to advance along the path of common security. The Paris Agreements enabled the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to return to the family of nations. But, for all that, they did not wipe out all the consequences of the immediate post-war period. Fixation on the past is not helpful in preparing the future, especially as those whose expectations we today have to satisfy did not live through that period of history. The mounting energies of youth are sometimes distorted by the

Mr. Hernu (continued)

prism of pacifism, a theory which does not result in peace. Those energies might give way to dangerous illusions or easy temptations if the European states proved incapable of asserting their identity in new forms. Even if, for France, the objective remains to break down the order that is the heritage of Yalta, we all know that any attempt to do so today could lead to war. The only acceptable solutions must therefore be slow and gradual so that no one feels his existence or security threatened. As far as France is concerned, I can tell you that we see this anniversary as a challenge and that we are engaged in detailed study of the measures that ought to be looked at with a view to giving WEU the full status that is its due.

You have no doubt noted that in the course of recent months I have met most of the defence ministers of the European countries. Only a few days ago – the day before yesterday to be precise – I met my Netherlands counterpart and, shortly before that, I had extremely detailed discussions with the Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Wörner, on the subjects that you yourselves have been debating since the beginning of this session. A few days earlier I met the Italian Defence Minister. This close consultation that has developed between European defence ministers clearly demonstrates that we all feel the need for links between Europeans and that these links can and must be strengthened.

In a sense, we could in this way give WEU the second wind it needs to overcome present obstacles and prepare the way, under the best possible conditions, for the enterprise to which we are all so attached: the self-assertion of a Europe master of its own security.

In saying this, I am fully conscious of setting a goal that corresponds to the hopes of many of our compatriots, but I am also aware of the risk – which should not be forgotten or underestimated – of raising hopes that could speedily be disappointed or, even worse, of carelessly reviving old quarrels. The President of the Republic was right when he said recently in Bonn that, if we advanced slowly but surely, we could conceive of pooling enough of our security resources for our peoples at last to regain their self-confidence. But he was just as right to add that we shall not build our future security by destroying our existing one, and that he had no wish to see Europe buried under the debris of Yalta.

Since 1954 WEU has asserted a European defence identity. Today it must express a will that is the assertion of a need. This means that we must neither deny our history or respective histories, nor freeze our common future in the

past. The renewal to which France is looking must be carefully and clearly thought out. It must proceed by stages and be securely based on facts that are justified because they carry within themselves the seeds of future developments.

This applies in particular to armaments co-operation. In this respect WEU, via its Standing Armaments Committee, has played an indispensable rôle. France has made proposals for further increasing the rôle of this Committee. I know that the Secretary-General, for his part, has suggested initiatives which I can only support. We, on our side, have worked towards a renewal of the joint armaments programmes, something for which your Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and your Assembly itself have called on numerous occasions. If armaments co-operation is to succeed, it must be pragmatic.

Not all programmes can be carried out with the same partners: the needs, specifications, renewal schedules of the different armies vary, and the industrial interests involved are too dissimilar and conflicting. It is therefore better to adapt the structures through which we co-operate in order to provide the best chances of success. On the other hand, WEU should be the vehicle for the expression of common European priorities and convergent options. There can be no effective common policy without close co-operation over armaments.

As you know, the French Government has also given priority to this approach by relaunching co-operation with the Federal Republic of Germany under the treaty concluded between our two countries, which has just produced an agreement on a combat helicopter. I consider this agreement of great importance because it demonstrates, in the view of the French Government, that the difficulties affecting industrial co-operation because of the economic crisis are not insurmountable, even where armaments are concerned. It is true that since the mid-1970s, very little progress has been made in this field. No major agreement has been signed, and one might even say that in certain respects the last decade has seen some falling back.

The helicopter agreement that we have now concluded is thus of exceptional significance. Speaking here last year, I said that, given our successes with the Jaguar, Alpha-Jet, Roland, Hot and Milan programmes, "we should go further", and that, in this spirit, we were looking for co-operation arrangements for the major programmes which our armies will need in the coming years. We are therefore very anxious to conclude new agreements as quickly as possible.

To this end we have resumed detailed discussions with the United Kingdom in liaison

Mr. Hernu (continued)

with the Federal Republic of Germany. Great attention has been paid to defining a combat aircraft that could be available by the end of the century. There can be no doubt that significant progress towards the joint implementation of such a programme would open quite new perspectives.

Parallel to this, a few weeks ago I went to Rome where my Italian counterpart, Mr. Spadolini, and I worked out an outline agreement laying down the basis for lasting co-operation. I have also concluded agreements with Belgium, Spain, Greece and Denmark.

This constitutes, as far as I am concerned, a policy, under the authority of the President of the French Republic, deliberately aimed at achieving the closest possible links between Europeans.

It is vital that Europeans be able to assert their presence in the current technological competition. The emerging new generation of conventional weapons is a technological and industrial challenge which, we must not forget, is also military and strategic.

If we want Europe to be able to achieve mastery over the conditions for its own security by the end of this century, it is vital that we maintain our scientific and industrial potential and that we carefully, consciously and constantly ensure that it remains competitive. That is one of the facts bearing within itself the seeds of future development which I mentioned a short while ago.

While it is true that, in order to satisfy its defence needs, Europe must possess the means of producing the most up-to-date conventional armaments, Europe must also, on another level, that of arms limitation negotiations, be able, through WEU, to assert its own views. To avoid any misunderstanding on this point, I shall try to be as precise as possible. There can be no question of wishing to extend bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning their nuclear arsenals to include other parties. That is not what I mean.

France has stated the conditions on which it would be prepared to participate in discussions between the five nuclear powers. Let me repeat them clearly.

First of all, the two superpowers would have to reduce their nuclear potentials in such a way as to change the existing relationship between their arsenals and the potential of the other nuclear powers.

Secondly, the existing imbalance of conventional forces in Europe would have to have

been significantly reduced and the threat of chemical weapons eliminated.

Finally, the raising of the stakes – for that is what is going on – in the form of anti-missile, anti-satellite and anti-submarine weapons would have to have ceased.

WEU's rôle is therefore elsewhere. But elsewhere does not mean nowhere at all.

It is a good thing that, in regard to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe or the negotiation of other treaties such as the ban on the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, the WEU states should be able, within the framework of WEU where they have technical expertise available, to add to their knowledge and develop their joint thinking on arms limitations, in accordance with their own security concepts. This dimension, already present in certain of the reports which your Assembly has examined, could, it seems to me, be made more systematic and thus help to enlighten the Council.

The limits to such an enterprise must be clearly set, however, as otherwise its chances of success will be jeopardised. There can be no question of intervening in the negotiation processes or of questioning the existing consultation machinery. On the other hand – and that might be a new dimension for the Agency for the Control of Armaments – it would be very useful for the European states to conduct studies, discussions and technical investigations in the field of arms limitation.

Those, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, are the views of the government of which I am a member. They show once again that there is no conflict between independence and solidarity.

Through its strategy of independent deterrence, France contributes to the security and maintenance of a non-war situation on the continent of Europe. That is why the law on military programmes for 1984-88, passed by the French parliament last spring, provides for the continued modernisation of our nuclear capability.

The idea of imitating the superpowers and ourselves engaging in the arms race is very far from our minds. Our programmes are geared exclusively to the need for our deterrent force to be credible and invulnerable. In 1975 our nuclear potential was less than 3% of that of each of the superpowers. By 1995, having regard to the modernisation which both the United States and the Soviet Union are pursuing, particularly as regards their bombers, the relationship between our nuclear force and those of the two great powers will still be of the same order. Let no one think up false arguments for involving us in any kind of accountancy exercise.

Mr. Hernu (continued)

We remain faithful to a strategy of minimum deterrence – the strategy of the weak towards the strong.

Parallel to this, we are updating our conventional weapons – our nuclear weapons too, but proportionally to a lesser extent – and this will account for 70% of equipment expenditure over the next five years. At the same time, we are rapidly restructuring our forces in order to increase their flexibility, mobility and fire-power. The establishment of a new army formation, the rapid deployment force, heavily equipped with helicopters and anti-tank weapons, will give our military machine greater flexibility, at the free disposal of the French political authorities, essentially the head of state.

As I have already said, the rapid deployment force will be able to operate both in Europe and overseas, on the government's initiative, at such time and under such conditions as it may determine. The establishment of the rapid deployment force does not imply any automatic action. It does however provide the government with the means – to which I draw your attention because they are absolutely new – of intervening at the side of our allies, if the force were or had to be deployed somewhere in Europe.

In this respect, certain people, who argue for development of conventional defence weapons, sometimes seem to underestimate – I occasionally read this in the newspapers and I even hear it from the lips of certain authorities – the extent of the effort that France has undertaken in regard to what is called “conventional” defence since the adoption of the law on military programmes.

Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to refute those who say that we talk more than we act.

The rapid deployment force will constitute a major advance in the rationalisation of our defence capabilities. It will be an integral part of overall French deterrent strategy. As a conventional force, capable of delivering a rapid blow, it will be able to operate independently of our nuclear capabilities. But a potential aggressor in Europe could not but hesitate physically to confront the forces of an independent, continental nuclear power such as France. Indeed, France cannot claim to defend its neighbours by means of its nuclear force.

The effort that France has been putting into its defence, on a national level, is therefore consistent with the three guidelines we have followed since 1981: first, protection of our territory, its sea approaches, and what we consider to be our vital interests; second, the

ability to honour commitments to our allies in Europe, in the framework of both WEU and the Washington Treaty; finally, the certainty that we can ensure the security of states with which we have concluded defence agreements, particularly in Africa.

At the same time it is apparent that our national effort – because it is not a selfish one, if I may be permitted to say so – promotes European security and the development of a European security strategy.

We, the governments, have a historic responsibility towards the younger generations. We cannot leave their questions unanswered. We must find in what is best in us – that is to say, our values of freedom and respect for human rights – the strength to meet their expectations and all the conviction necessary to convince them that we are doing so.

Democracies are destined to die only when they cease to be democracies, when they cease to be themselves.

As this century draws to a close, Europe can – for everyone, and above all for youth – once again become the hope for peace. That, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, is what I wanted to say to you, and to express here my pleasure, joy and emotion at having been able to speak before you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for the direction which your initiatives are taking, and thank you in advance for your answers to the questions that will be put to you by members of the Assembly.

Before giving the floor to those who have asked to speak, I would like to join with all of you, Ladies and Gentlemen, in paying a silent tribute to the sacrifice which another French soldier this morning made for the cause of peace in Lebanon.

(*The representatives rose and observed a minute's silence*)

I call Mr. Müller to put the first question.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I should like to ask the Minister of Defence two questions in connection with his statement in support of joint defence and of solidarity woven out of a common history.

Addressing the French National Assembly he “categorically rejected”, according to *Agence France Presse* of 4th November, any extension of the French nuclear shield to include France's neighbours. Does he feel that this attitude is compatible with the spirit and letter of the modified Brussels Treaty in the event of an attack?

Mr. Müller (continued)

Secondly, the Minister referred in his statement to the meetings he had had with the Italian, German and Dutch Defence Ministers to discuss co-operation in the development of armaments. Does he consider it possible not only to conclude bilateral agreements on such co-operation but also to achieve more broadly based co-operation among member countries of WEU in specific cases?

Mr. HERNU (*French Minister of Defence*) (Translation). – Mr. Müller, the Brussels Treaty is merely an inter-state agreement. It is not a rehash of the European Defence Community. I am well aware of its significance since I was working with Pierre Mendès-France when consideration was being given to setting up the EDC and when WEU was created.

Each European state retains the right to use its forces as it wishes, whatever they may be. While certain European countries have delegated part of their military sovereignty to an integrated military organisation, this is in accordance with decisions taken in a framework other than WEU, i.e. NATO. But this was not France's choice and nothing in the WEU treaty places an obligation on our country.

Each WEU member state undertakes to afford assistance to any other member victim of aggression, including the use of military means, but Article V of the Brussels Treaty leaves it to the member states to decide how to apply this provision. There is no supranational authority to dictate our conduct. The WEU treaty transfers no responsibilities and does not limit member states' freedom to make assessments.

I would add that French nuclear deterrence is that of national sanctuary. This is the true definition of all nuclear deterrence. It is true for the British but also for the United States.

It is quite evident, as you pointed out, that when the President of the French Republic speaks, or the Prime Minister, at the *Institut des Hautes Études de la Défense Nationale*, for instance, or when I speak in the National Assembly, we always refer to the defence of France and of its vital interests which, put more clearly, means that it is for us to define those interests. From a military strategic point of view, this represents an additional uncertainty which would weigh on the decision to be taken by a possible aggressor. This is no small thing considering the pressure brought to bear on France in this respect.

With regard to military and armaments bilateral co-operation agreements – with the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, Denmark and perhaps soon another European country – these

are bilateral. Should they be multilateralised, to use your own words? In truth, I am not convinced that they should be and I will tell you why.

If four or five countries started developing a system of this kind, there would be a risk of creating a military directorate of three, four or five countries, which would not be welcomed by the other countries not taking part and this system would gradually replace the normal framework of WEU meetings.

Organising a large number of bilateral agreements and participating in them is therefore a way of envisaging and preparing European security. But let us not create a kind of European directorate which would take the place of the European nations. In this connection, great caution is therefore required.

Furthermore, industrial technological complexities and the non-concordance of the dates on which certain countries need such and such a weapon make it easier to proceed towards your goal through bilateralism since one might wonder whether tackling such questions multilaterally would not condemn certain initiatives to failure. That is why I myself am very cautious.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Minister, I found what you had to say very interesting and to be applauded in spite of the fact that I am a member of the opposition.

Humour being allowed here, I must acknowledge that, in defence matters, the “government of change” which you represent is displaying a remarkable degree of continuity which enables many of us to go along with your approach.

I applaud you because of your references to the attitude of France towards the rôle of WEU.

I particularly noted some of your remarks and especially the highly desirable idea of establishing a European security strategy.

A short time ago, replying to our colleague Mr. Müller, who earlier presented a notable report on Chad, you rejected, for reasons of caution and pragmatism, the idea of giving a multilateral character to some of the bilateral agreements we have concluded with our neighbours. You said that in this matter the idea was not to take the place of the various countries or, of course, of WEU, which was the proper framework for this task.

Could you, Sir, enlarge on your reply to our colleague and say whether the WEU Council of Ministers should not be asked to put on its agenda the appraisal to which you have com-

Mr. Caro (continued)

mitted yourself on this platform. Can you promise that reciprocal consultations will take place, irrespective of any initiatives taken with regard to European security, on questions including, for example, the Chad issue?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. HERNU (*French Minister of Defence*) (Translation). – As far as Chad is concerned, France ordered its soldiers to cross the Chari on 6th August this year because troops from another country, Libya, had clearly invaded that territory.

France's defence agreement with Chad is not the same as that concluded with certain other African countries. It provides for military co-operation and, as the situation in Chad developed, as you are all aware, President Hissène Habré, the lawful leader of that country, invoked the agreement first to call for the help of French troops in training and equipping Chad's forces and later for their actual presence on the ground.

We are therefore present in that country in implementation of an ordinary agreement on military co-operation, just as we are present in many other African countries at the request of their governments. Apart from Chad, we also have a presence in, for instance, the Central African Republic, to mention a country where I am due to inspect our troops in a few days' time.

Should France, which has defence agreements with African countries, consult the WEU Council? If this is the question you asked, and I have understood it correctly, the answer is definitely no.

On what grounds, indeed, could the implementation of our defence agreements with these countries be made subject to the consent of WEU? There is no such provision in the WEU treaty or in the agreement which we signed.

But you are no doubt alluding to Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Brussels Treaty, which I know well. Although this provides that reference can be made to the WEU Council in certain cases, the article in question imposes neither an obligation nor an automatic procedure. To reply fully and unambiguously, I will go so far as to add that I do not quite see how it could be applied to French operations in Chad. Again, how could it have applied to British military operations in the Falklands, or to the presence in Lebanon of the contingents making up the multinational, Italian, French and British peace-keeping force? If it could, the presence of the

Dutch force in UNIFIL would also have to be discussed, and so on.

The WEU treaty allows each country to retain complete control of its armed forces. This is stated in Article VIII. If you mean that a WEU committee or the Council should be briefed on the geostrategic situation in Africa, I cannot see why that should be prohibited or impossible. That said, I repeat that the WEU treaty contains neither an obligation nor any automatic procedure for reporting the presence of French forces in Chad to the WEU Council. France is the sole arbiter of its actions in this area.

A short time ago, as you observed, I made reference to the French rapid deployment force, which I characterise as the force with the three widening spheres of action. It can operate in France, or close to the national frontiers in the European theatre, or, again, in external, and especially in overseas, territories. I particularly mentioned Africa, and I pointed out that this rapid deployment force is under the authority of the President of the Republic, as Commander-in-Chief, and of the Defence Minister. Our forces intervene outside France at the request of heads of state and of legitimate governments under defence agreements, and they do so exclusively on French political authority.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro, who wishes to ask a supplementary question.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Thank you, Sir, for your carefully considered reply. Perhaps the terms in which I expressed myself were too vague. Actually, I was in no way questioning the right of each country to act as it sees fit, especially where Chad is concerned.

But if we wish to reactivate and revitalise WEU – and this is what you have said in terms which have my unqualified approval – we must be concerned not only with the protocol to the Brussels Treaty, but also with the issue of political will and attitudes.

You yourself have said that Article VIII imposes no obligation, but on the subject both of the Falklands – as we have said in this forum – and of Chad, quite apart from an exchange of information...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Please finish what you have to say, Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – ...France could have taken the initiative and encouraged the other nations to discuss within the WEU Council of Ministers problems relating directly or indirectly to security. There is nothing inconsistent in this. That was the substance of my question.

Mr. Caro (continued)

Forgive me, Mr. President, but this is a crucial problem which comes up at every session.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. HERNU (*French Minister of Defence*) (Translation). – I take your point, Mr. Caro, but WEU already has a great deal to do – as we would wish, and as I have stated – if it is to fulfil its proper rôle and discuss European security and armaments in a manner which is at once realistic, meaningful and convincing. That is the heart of the matter. Do you not think that, for the time being, that is a sufficient task, without worrying about military events in Africa?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Minister, my question is very specific and concise.

The effectiveness of aircraft like the American AWACS is, I believe, generally recognised, and their presence alongside fighter aircraft would appear to be useful, if not essential, in the event of a conflict. I ask for no proof of this beyond the fact that, when the Americans withdrew their AWAC aircraft from the Chad area, a French newspaper carried across five columns the headline “Mirages blind without AWACS”. This message aroused grave disquiet among the French public.

In the first place, is it true? Is the statement not somewhat exaggerated? And, if not, are the Warsaw Pact air forces equipped with comparable aircraft?

Secondly, if the WEU countries do not have similar planes, should they not think about buying a number of AWAC aircraft from the Americans at some point in the future?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Defence Minister.

Mr. HERNU (*French Minister of Defence*) (Translation). – You say that the Americans withdrew their AWACS from a country close to Chad, and that this may have caused problems for our troops deployed in Chad.

Let us review the facts.

At the time in question, American naval exercises were taking place in the Mediterranean, and, while the American fleet was engaged in these manoeuvres, some AWAC aircraft were stationed “as a gesture” initially in Egypt, from where two of these planes were later moved to Sudan. This happened by a pure coincidence at the very time when our troops were arriving in

Chad at the request of the lawful Chad Government. We did not ask the United States to station AWAC aircraft in Sudan. They took this action without receiving any advice from us, and, when their exercise was finished, they withdrew the planes without asking our opinion.

Do you think that, when our aircraft arrived in N'Djamena, we were going to put them at risk? Certainly not.

Let me tell you, without going into details – as this matter, as you will understand, is subject to the rules of military secrecy – that we sent over our Bréguet-Atlantic aircraft after we had made some highly-sophisticated technical modifications to them. Believe me, these furnish us with information which, while it may be less sophisticated than that supplied by the AWAC aircraft, is nonetheless very valuable to our air force in providing intelligence about what is going on beyond what some people still refer to as the “famous red line”, but which I, more cautiously, call the “red zone” since, to keep watch on a line, it is necessary to observe what is happening on both sides of it.

With regard to airborne detection aircraft, you pose a general question. Should we buy AWACS?

What is the mission of these aircraft? As you yourself have said, it is to counter low-altitude intruders, and this is essential for France. Full ground-based radar coverage would have to be so dense as to preclude such a solution, in our opinion. The plan is therefore to monitor the airspace round sensitive points by means of ground-based radar equipment and that is the policy which we are pursuing.

However, airborne radar units are also needed. You have mentioned AWACS. Grumman, Boeing, SNIAS, Hawkeye and Transall systems also exist. The French air force is currently carrying out tests, and others will follow. I already know which companies have been eliminated. Allow me to point out that we have to take proper account of the capability of the systems we are looking at together with their cost, the delivery times, the industrial trade-off to be given to France by the countries from which we buy and a whole range of variables which will lead us to the choice of system.

If, Sir, I were to give you the name of the firm which we have chosen, or which we shall choose, I should be a very poor defence minister, and I would destroy my entire negotiating position. Perhaps therefore you will allow me to remain silent on that point.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I have two unrelated questions for the Minister. The first concerns the SS-21, 22 and 23 missiles, which the Minister mentioned in his speech. During a recent visit to Moscow by Dutch political leaders, the existence of at least two of these three weapons systems was denied by the Soviets. How far has France verified the existence of the SS-21, 22 and 23 missiles, and what is the extent of his knowledge about their location? There are rumours that some are deployed in the German Democratic Republic and that others are in Czechoslovakia. What could NATO and WEU countries do to counter those weapons?

I listened with interest to the Minister's comments on bilateral agreements. Mr. Müller asked a question on that subject. It is interesting to me because the Netherlands has an interest in such agreements. With France and Belgium we are a wholehearted partner in the tripartite building of minehunters. The Minister has just visited the Netherlands. Did he discuss there bilateral agreements on some aspects of defence co-operation and, in particular, defence equipment procurement?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. HERNU (*French Minister of Defence*) (Translation). – I have just been looking again at the detailed maps showing the sites of Soviet weapons. These maps are kept up to date very efficiently, and I am therefore able to give Mr. Blaauw an accurate reply.

SS-21s have a range of 120 km, and began to be deployed in January 1982. When we state the range of the SS-21 and say that some are already deployed, the location is revealed by their range of 120 km. The inference is simple: with a range of 120 km some must be sited in the German Democratic Republic.

SS-22s have a range of 90 km and, if I am correctly informed – as I think I am – they are not deployed as part of an operational system, but rather on a trial basis. This means that, for the time being, the SS-22s are sited in the western part of the USSR.

The SS-23-X missile will have a range of 500 km, and several trials have been carried out. I believe the Soviets are currently engaged in test work and have even had some minor setbacks with this weapon. It would appear that progress has now been made, but I can assure you that they have not yet deployed this weapon, unless you are better informed than I am.

With the Netherlands – a country of fourteen million inhabitants, with a very powerful, very well equipped and very modern navy having no ship over twenty-five years old and almost

wholly modernised, and with an air force and army, we have not – and I will answer you in precise terms – signed a co-operation agreement or a bilateral agreement of the kind we have concluded with the other countries which I mentioned earlier. We have merely talked about the possibility with the Netherlands minister.

The President of the French Republic will be paying an official visit to the Netherlands on 7th and 8th February next year. He will have discussions with Queen Beatrix and the Prime Minister and, after this official visit, the Netherlands Defence Minister will come to Paris, where he will be officially received at the Defence Ministry in the Hôtel de Brienne.

In the meantime, the Netherlands Secretary of State for Equipment – and that is his official title, corresponding in France to that of *Délégué Général à l'Armement* – will have some talks with his French opposite number. We shall then see whether we are in a position to sign such an agreement. As of now, however, it has not been signed.

If you ask whether there are currently any joint projects in progress, the answer is yes. These are exemplified by a notable success in the shape of a minesweeper called the Tripartite, which is being jointly built in Dutch naval shipyards – which I have visited – by Belgium, the Netherlands and France under a programme covering ten ships, of which six have already been delivered and four are still to be launched.

We have talked at length about the future strike helicopter. The Netherlands, which has a very good aircraft industry, would like to acquire certain manufacturing know-how relating to helicopters. We shall look into this request, which I discussed as recently as yesterday with executives of SNIAS and Bréguet-Dassault. We have also spoken about naval projects involving electronics technology – the Tripartite, for example, is equipped with French electronic systems – and a number of other subjects. The possibilities are extensive.

I am grateful for your question, which underlines that the French Defence Minister visits these countries not as an arms salesman – which is what I am sometimes reputed to be – but as the minister responsible for defence and industrial co-operation, which is something quite different. The countries of Europe should be linked together in co-operative projects. This is as much a necessity here as it is for African countries. In the armaments field what we have to do is not sell, but provide technical assistance – a very different concept.

Mr. Caro observed that in defence matters I am the minister of continuity in a government of change. I would reply that, even in the

Mr. Henu (continued)

matter of armaments, I am endeavouring to develop industrial co-operation between our countries still further and to ensure that there is real technical assistance between them. That is the way to solve Europe's equipment and armaments problems. This question had enabled me to make the point clear, and I thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Beix.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). - Minister, if I asked whether France was going to derive from its presence in Chad - a subject which has engaged our attention this morning - any clear-cut lessons relating to armaments, you would no doubt reply in the affirmative. If such lessons merely concerned the size of tyres for military vehicles, that in itself would be a useful point, but the major interest certainly does not centre on such matters.

I would be grateful if you would let us know your reaction to references which have been made to the "technological level of the conflict" which, in Chad, has brought French armaments up against other weapons possessed by Libya.

When we come to consider the long-term lessons to be learnt from a conflict which also involves aircraft, I feel that the matter transcends conventional questions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the Minister.

Mr. HERNU (*French Minister of Defence*) (Translation). - The WEU Assembly shows great ability in making me talk about a subject which I said I would prefer not to discuss - that is, Chad, where the forces of Mr. Goukouni and President Hissène Habré have confronted and engaged each other.

I use the perfect tense because, since French troops have been in Chad, there has not been a single engagement. Their mere presence therefore has a deterrent effect. Even the minor disturbances reported in southern Chad have now more or less died out. They were, in any case, the acts of minor gangs of ruffians rather than political phenomena.

As long as Mr. Goukouni's and President Hissène Habré's military groups were in confrontation, the situation was one of a desert war. It remained a desert war despite the highly intelligent use by one side of Soviet guns mounted on Japanese Toyota vehicles and by the other of equipment like jeeps, admittedly supplied by the French.

I thank you for asking a serious question, the answer to which is not widely known.

The Libyan forces are by no means negligible! There are on one side of the "red zone", in forward and support units, at least five to six thousand regular Libyan soldiers equipped with modern hardware and supported by a powerful air force based principally at Aozou. Facing them on the other side are forward units comprising almost three thousand French troops.

As long as Goukouni's and Hissène Habré's men were in confrontation, they were engaged in a desert war. The fighting has now stopped, but do not put words into my mouth. If, regrettably, the two armies engaged each other, make no mistake - it would be no desert war which ensued! The equipment deployed on each side is so modern and of such a type that the war - which I do not think will happen - would be a modern, sophisticated conflict including electronically-controlled weapons. The fact is that France, knowing what the other side has, had to equip itself with highly modern systems. There is therefore much substance in your question.

The presence of troops has a deterrent effect. There, too, in the context of Chad territorial integrity and contrary to what has been said, there should be action by... I leave aside the question of the Aozou strip, which is an old story. The Aozou strip was being discussed as far back as 1934 by Pierre Laval and Mussolini. At one time, Pierre Laval, the head of the French Government, hoping to prise the Duce away from Adolf Hitler, went so far as to suggest that the former should "Just take the Aozou strip and add it to the Italian territory of Libya". An agreement to this effect was almost ratified by the Italian and French parliaments in 1939, and perhaps would have been had not the second world war broken out. We shall not settle the future of the Aozou strip today. That is a problem for the United Nations Security Council.

In a word: the integrity of Chad, a government of national reconciliation and the evacuation of Chad by foreign troops, and by "foreign" I mean Libyan and French.

I will add something I should not say but as Mr. Cheysson is not here, I shall go ahead and say it all the same: all foreign troops must leave Chad, but I should prefer it if ours were the last to leave.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - As the members of the Assembly have no more questions to put to you, I would like to thank you, Minister, for the patience that you have shown and for your very full replies.

The President (continued)

I add my personal regards to the compliments which I convey to you on behalf of this Assembly.

Thank you Minister. (*Applause*)

5. *Africa's rôle in a European security policy - Chad*

(*Replies to speakers and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 957*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now resume consideration of the report of the General Affairs Committee on Africa's rôle in a European security policy – Chad, and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 957.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me briefly summarise the debate we had before the Minister made his statement.

I am very pleased that there was hardly any criticism and that the committee's and Rapporteur's views were by and large endorsed. I should, however, like to take up two points raised during the debate.

First, there was Mr. Beix's reference to the difficulty of completing preparations for the intervention of French troops in the time available. He pointed out that air transport first had to be arranged. I believe that this statement in particular very clearly demonstrated the repercussions an intervention of this kind can have on the defence capability of the WEU member countries – and, in this instance, of France.

Turning to the Minister – he is no longer here, but of course I am commenting on what he had to say about Chad – I personally feel that this intervention in Chad is not something which WEU should ignore as a minor, private incident somewhere in Africa. Let me remind you that a former French Foreign Minister, Mr. Jobert, openly expressed the hope, in 1973, I think it was, that WEU would also consider African questions. France's obligations not only to Chad but to many other African countries too should prompt us always to remember this. As Mr. Hernu himself said, the same is true, in a different sense, of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. As I said, I therefore believe that we should remember this, rather than shelve the matter as closed or irrelevant.

I must now, of course, say a few words to Mr. Vogt, but not because this is a specifically German problem. However, as he said, he was

speaking on behalf of the Greens, and I have two comments to make.

First, the expression "soft underbelly" is not my invention. It was coined by Winston Churchill and was used at the Casablanca talks and then at the Teheran conference. I simply made use of the expression.

I was really rather surprised to hear you say, Mr. Vogt, that Africa is one thing and Europe is another. I always thought it was one of the basic principles of the green movement to view the world as a whole, to consider the challenges facing the world as a whole and not, as it were, to isolate certain zones and then to say what happens there has nothing to do with us. As I see it, the world is becoming smaller and smaller and our interdependence is increasing all the time. This is precisely why we must also concern ourselves with problems that occur elsewhere.

Second, I believe a distinction must be made. You referred to fraternal assistance and rightly alluded to the Soviet Union. But, in my opinion, there is no comparison with the situation in Chad. What we have here are treaties based on entirely different principles. The French army certainly did not, as we have all seen and have heard again today, march into Chad with flags flying and trumpets blaring. France simply had to honour a not entirely welcome commitment, under a treaty. It was under an obligation to provide assistance.

That is essentially what I wished to add to this debate. I thank all those who have taken part and I am very pleased that we have achieved a broad political consensus.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I congratulate our Rapporteur, Mr. Müller, who is an expert on this African issue and whose report on Chad follows on from his earlier 1979 report, in which he analysed a situation of far wider scope. He has produced an excellent document on a subject with which he is familiar.

I have practically nothing to add to the Rapporteur's summary in reply to speakers, except to say that the intervention by France was both necessary and lawful. Necessary for the restoration of peace, and lawful because it was in conformity with the treaties and undertaken in response to appeals not only from Chad but from all the countries of the Organisation of African Unity.

However, reverting to the words of Mr. Hernu who stated that France's permanent policy was to restore peace in order to facilitate the settlement of conflicts by negotiation, I

Mr. Michel (continued)

should like to express the hope that the rôle of WEU will not be underestimated.

We have criticised the members of WEU for not raising the issue of the intervention in Chad as soon as the events occurred. We must insist that WEU cannot be satisfied merely with counting cartridge cases or measuring the size of weapons. It has a political rôle to play.

It would serve no purpose to repeat endlessly that this is the only assembly with authority in defence matters but the point must be emphasised, since it is our whole rôle which is at stake. We cannot be content to consider only strictly limited technical questions. We must assert our political rôle.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 957.

Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly will vote by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members present who wish to request a vote by roll-call?...

As a vote by roll-call has not been requested, the vote on the draft recommendation will be taken by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

6. Middle East crises and European security

(Reference back to committee of the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 965 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the report on Middle East crises and European security, Document 965 and amendments.

I call the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – The Assembly should now consider the problems of the Middle East, with special emphasis on Lebanon, concerning which a very large number of amendments with wide-ranging implications and with an important bearing on the substance of the report have been tabled.

It does not seem to me reasonable to answer these amendments with a simple "yes" or "no". I therefore urge the Assembly to refer

1. See page 40.

the report back to the committee so that all the amendments can be carefully considered. My proposal should enjoy general support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Chairman of the General Affairs Committee has proposed that the report be referred back to the committee.

Under Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure only the proposer of the motion, one speaker against and the rapporteur or chairman of the committee concerned may be heard.

I remind the Assembly that under Rule 31, paragraph 7, of the Rules of Procedure, the time allowed to each speaker is limited to five minutes.

Does anyone wish to speak against the motion?...

I therefore call the Rapporteur, Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you for allowing me to speak, Mr. President. I entirely support the proposal of the Chairman of the committee to refer the report back to the committee. It is far too late to start such an important debate at 12 noon on the final day of our session. It would have been all right to do so had we agreed on the recommendation, but there is a long list of fifteen amendments, some of which are contentious and many of which are important. Much work has gone into them. It is only correct that they be considered by a full and representative assembly, which I do not expect there to be by the time we reach the amendments.

On those grounds, I support the Chairman's proposal that the matter be referred back to the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As a vote by roll-call has not been requested, the vote on the motion for reference back to the committee will be taken by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The motion to refer the report back is agreed to.

This document is therefore referred back to the committee.

7. Close of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The business of the session is now completed. I declare closed the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.17 p.m.)

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IMPRIMERIE ALENÇONNAISE
Rue Édouard-Belin, 61002 ALENÇON
Dépôt légal : 1^{er} trimestre 1984
N° d'ordre : 99140

PRINTED IN FRANCE

