

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-NINTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1983

II

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tel. 723.54.32



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Official Report of Debates

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The proceedings of the first part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume I : Assembly documents.

Volume II: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
List of representatives and substitutes	8
Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings:	
First sitting	12
Second sitting	19
Texts adopted	23
Third sitting	25
Fourth sitting	27
Text adopted	30
Official report of debates:	
First sitting	32
Second sitting	55
Third sitting	82
Fourth sitting	112
Index	134

LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
BOGAERTS August	Socialist
BONNEL Raoul	PVV
DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist
Mrs. HERMAN-MICHELSENS Lucienne	PVV
Mr. MICHEL Joseph	PSC
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP

Substitutes

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	Socialist
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
LAGNEAU André	PRL
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	Socialist
STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP
VAN DER ELST Frans	Volksunie

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BERRIER Noël	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF/CDS
DURAFFOUR Paul	Soc. (App.)
FRÊCHE Georges	Socialist
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
MAYOUD Alain	UDF
OEHLER Jean André	Socialist
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
PONCELET Christian	RPR
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist
SPÉNALE Georges	Socialist
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	Communist
WILQUIN Claude	Socialist

Substitutes

MM. BARTHE Jean-Jacques	Communist
BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BEIX Roland	Socialist
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BERTILE Wilfrid	Socialist
DELEHEDDE André	Socialist

MM. FORTIER Marcel	RPR
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
JAGER René	UCDP
JOXE Pierre	Socialist
KOEHL Émile	UDF
MÉNARD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left
PROUVOST Pierre	Socialist
ROSSINOT André	UDF
N...	

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
GERSTL Friedrich	SPD
HAASE Horst	SPD
HARTMANN Klaus	CDU/CSU
HORNHUES Karl-Heinz	CDU/CSU
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
LINDE Jürgen	SPD
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
RUMPF Wolfgang	FDP
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
SCHWARZ Heinz	CDU/CSU
SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU
VOGT Roland	Die Grünen

Substitutes

MM. BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
ERTL Josef	FDP
HACKEL Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
HANDLOS Franz	CDU/CSU
HAUFF Volker	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
HORN Erwin	SPD
JÄGER Claus	CDU/CSU
Mrs. KELLY Petra	Die Grünen
MM. LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
SCHMITZ Hans Peter	CDU/CSU
STAVENHAGEN Lutz	CDU/CSU
VOGEL Hans-Jochen	SPD
WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM. AGRIMI Alessandro	Chr. Dem.
ANTONI Varese	Communist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DELLA BRIOTTA Libero	Socialist
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
President of the Assembly	
FORMA Renzo	Chr. Dem.
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
Mrs. GHERBEZ Gabriella	Communist
MM. MONDINO Giorgio	Socialist
PECCHIONI Ugo	Communist
PETRILLI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
TRIPODI Antonio	MSI-DN
VALIANTE Mario	Chr. Dem.
VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM. AJELLO Aldo	Radical
AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
BENEDIKTER Johann Hans	SVP
CAFIERO Luca	PDUP
CALICE Giovanni	Communist
CONTI PERSINI Gianfranco	PSDI
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
GUNNELLA Aristide	Republican
MARTINO Leopoldo Attilio	Communist
ORIONE Franco Luigi	Chr. Dem.
PATRIARCA Francesco	Chr. Dem.
POZZO Cesare	MSI-DN
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
Mrs. ROSOLEN Angela Maria	Communist
MM. SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STERPA Egidio	Liberal
ZITO Sisinio	Socialist

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. BERCHEM Albert	Dem.
MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
THOSS Maurice	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM. GLESENER Jean-Pierre	Soc. Chr.
HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
PRUSSEN Robert	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry	CDA
van den BERGH Harry	Labour
BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA

Substitutes

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth	Labour
Mr. EYSINK Rudolf	CDA
Mrs. den OUDEN-DEKKERS Greetje	Liberal
MM. van der SANDEN Piet	CDA
de VRIES Klaas	Labour
van der WERFF Ymenus P.W.	Liberal
WORRELL Joop	Labour


UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Mr. Alan BEITH	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
Mr. Thomas COX	Labour
Sir Anthony GRANT	Conservative
MM. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr. James HILL	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
Mr. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Mrs. Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr. Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr. Maurice MILLER	Labour
MM. Fred MULLEY	Labour
John PAGE	Conservative
Lord REAY	Conservative
Sir Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr. Thomas URWIN	Labour

Substitutes

MM. David ATKINSON	Conservative
Ronald BROWN	SDP
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. Anthony DURANT	Conservative
Kenneth EASTHAM	Labour
Robert EDWARDS	Labour
Sir Russell FAIRGRIEVE	Conservative
MM. Raymond FLETCHER	Labour
Edward GARRETT	Labour
Harry GOURLAY	Labour
Ralph HOWELL	Conservative
Lord McNAIR	Liberal
Mr. John MORRIS	Labour
Lord NORTHFIELD	Labour
MM. John OSBORN	Conservative
Laurence PAVITT	Labour
Keith STAINTON	Conservative
John WILKINSON	Conservative



I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 6th June 1983

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (Doc. 941).
7. China and European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 945 and amendments*).
8. Address by Mr. Möllemann, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
9. China and European security (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 945 and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Jager, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. *Opening of the session*

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter, and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, the Provisional President declared open the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. *Attendance register*

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. *Address by the Provisional President*

The Provisional President addressed the Assembly and paid tribute to the late MM. Bizet and Le Montagner, members of the French Delegation, and to the late Mr. Hermann Schmidt, member of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany.

4. *Examination of credentials*

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assem-

bly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 1 had been ratified by that Assembly, with the exception of the representatives and substitutes of the Federal Republic of Germany and of Mr. Péciaux, substitute member for Belgium.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, and subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of the above.

5. *Election of the President of the Assembly*

Two candidates were nominated for the presidency, namely: MM. Blaauw and De Poi.

In accordance with Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded, by roll-call, to a secret ballot.

The sitting was suspended while the votes were counted.

The sitting was suspended at 3.45 p.m. and resumed at 4.05 p.m.

The Provisional President announced the result of the vote:

Votes cast	64
Blank or spoiled papers	3
Effective votes cast	61
Absolute majority	45
Mr. Blaauw	13
Mr. De Poi	48

The Provisional President declared Mr. De Poi elected President.

On the invitation of the Provisional President, Mr. De Poi took the Chair.

6. *Address by the President of the Assembly*

The President addressed the Assembly.

7. *Election of Vice-Presidents of the Assembly*

Five candidates had been proposed for the posts of Vice-President, namely: Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berchem, Bonnel, Pignion and Unland.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

Sir Frederic Bennett and MM. Berchem, Bonnel, Pignion and Unland were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

8. *Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session*

(Doc. 941)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session.

Speaker: Mr. Mulley.

The Assembly adopted the draft order of business for the first part of the session.

9. *Nomination of members to committees*

In accordance with Rules 39 (6) and 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the membership of the six committees as follows:

1. COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS (27 seats)

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Bonnel Dejardin Steverlynck	MM. De Decker Van der Elst Mrs. Herman-Michielsens
<i>France:</i>	MM. Duraffour Galley Mayoud Ménard Pignion	MM. Baumel Caro Schleiter Jung Spénale
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Ertl Gerstl Kittelmann Lemmrich Scheer	MM. Rumpf Hauff Lenzer Handlos Horn
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Bernini Cavaliere Della Briotta Fosson Pecchioli	MM. Calice Giust Mondino Tripodi Amadei
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Prussen	Mr. Glesener
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. van den Bergh Blaauw Scholten	MM. Tummers de Vries Aarts

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Cox Edwards Sir Anthony Grant Sir Dudley Smith	MM. Wilkinson Morris Dr. Miller Mr. Beith Lord Duncan-Sandys

2. GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (27 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Bogaerts Lagneau Michel	MM. Van der Elst Péciaux De Bondt
<i>France:</i>	MM. Berrier Bertile Lagorce Prouvost Wilquin	MM. Baumel Caro Mayoud Grussenmeyer Joxe
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Ahrens Müller Reddemann Rumpf Vogt	MM. Linde Kittelmann Böhm Ertl Mrs. Kelly
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Conti Persini De Poi Valiante Vecchietti Zito	MM. Patriarca Benedikter Cavaliere N... Rubbi
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Thoss	Mr. Berchem
<i>Netherlands:</i>	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman MM. van der Sanden van der Werff	MM. de Vries Scholten Blaauw
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Hardy Lord McNair Lord Reay Mr. Urwin	Mrs. Knight Lord Hughes MM. Hill Atkinson Eastham

3. COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	Mr. Adriaensens Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. Biefnot De Bondt
<i>France:</i>	MM. Barthe Fortier Fourré Valleix	MM. Lagorce Bassinot Bertile Galley
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Böhm Lenzer Schmidt Manfred Spies von Büllenheim	MM. Müller Schwarz Haase Stavenhagen

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Amadei Antoni Fiandrotti Forma	MM. Orione Martino Della Briotta Spitella
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Prussen	Mr. Thoss
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Aarts Worrell	Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Mr. Garrett Sir Paul Hawkins MM. McGuire Wilkinson	Lord Northfield Sir Russell Fairgrieve MM. Brown Jessel

4. COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Adriaensens Biefnot	MM. Steverlynck Bogaerts
<i>France:</i>	MM. Delehedde Jager Jeambrun Schleiter	MM. Frêche Belin Rossinot Oehler
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Haase Hartmann Schmitz Schulte	MM. Enders Lemrich Hornhues Büchner
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Martino Orione Petrilli Tripodi	MM. Cafiero Ajello Bonalumi Pozzo
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Hengel	Mr. Margue
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Tummers de Vries	Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra Mr. van den Bergh
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Durant Eastham Lord Hughes Mr. Stainton	Sir Paul Hawkins Lord McNair MM. Fletcher Grieve

5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Michel Péciaux	MM. Lagneau De Decker
<i>France:</i>	MM. Beix Joxe Sénès Vial-Massat	MM. Koehl Prouvost Delehedde Wilquin

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Antretter Linde Spies von Büllesheim Unland	MM. Büchner Schmidt Jäger Wulff
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Giust Mondino Sterpa N...	MM. Spitella Fiandrotti Romano Patriarca
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Glesener	Mr. Margue
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Eysink van der Werff	MM. van der Sanden Stoffelen
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Eastham Edwards Grieve Howell	MM. Cox Morris Osborn Jessel

6. COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS (14 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	Mr. Bonnel Mrs. Herman-Michielsens	Mr. Dejardin Mrs. Staels-Dompas
<i>France:</i>	MM. Mercier Poncelet	MM. Sénès Jeambrun
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Enders Hackel	MM. Antretter Handlos
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Agrimi Rubbi	MM. Forma Zito
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	MM. Berchem Glesener	MM. Prussen Thoss
<i>Netherlands:</i>	Mr. Stoffelen Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra	Mr. Eysink Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Fletcher Page	Mr. Gourlay Mrs. Knight

10. Address by Mr. Möllemann, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

Mr. Möllemann, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Möllemann replied to questions put by MM. Holtz, Ahrens, Vogt, Jung and Schwarz.

11. China and European security

(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the General Affairs Committee,
Doc. 945 and amendments)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Lord Reay, MM. Lagorce, Müller and Michel.

The debate was adjourned.

12. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees proposed by the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany:

- Mr. Schulte as a titular member of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges in place of Mr. Linde;

- Mr. Linde as a titular member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in place of Mr. Schulte.

13. Date and time of the next sitting

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 7th June, at 9.30 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.15 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Böhm Enders Gerstl <i>Scheer (Haase)</i> Hartmann <i>Lemmrich (Hornhues)</i> Kittelmann Linde Müller Reddemann <i>Stavenhagen (Rumpf)</i> Schulte Schwarz Spies von Büllenheim Unland Vogt	Luxembourg MM. <i>Prussen (Berchem)</i> <i>Glesener (Margue)</i> Thoss
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts <i>De Bondt (Bonnell)</i> Dejardin Mrs. Herman-Michielsens Mr. Michel Mrs. Staels-Dompas		Netherlands MM. <i>van der Sanden (Aarts)</i> <i>Worrell (van den Bergh)</i> Blaauw Stoffelen Tummers Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Mrs. van der Werf- Terpstra)
France	Italy	
MM. Baumel Berrier Caro <i>Jager (Jeambrun)</i> Jung Lagorce Pignion <i>Galley (Poncelet)</i> <i>Ménard (Schleiter)</i> <i>Fourré (Sénès)</i> <i>Bassinnet (Spénale)</i> Valleix Vial-Massat	MM. Agrimi Bernini <i>Spitella (Bonalumi)</i> <i>Giust (Cavaliere)</i> De Poi Forma Fosson <i>Conti Persini (Mondino)</i> <i>Martino (Pecchioli)</i> Petrilli Valiante	United Kingdom Lord <i>McNair (Beith)</i> MM. <i>Stainton (Sir Frederic Bennett)</i> Grieve Lord Hughes Mr. Mulley Lord Reay Lord <i>Northfield (Urwin)</i>
Federal Republic of Germany		
MM. Ahrens Antretter		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	Mr. Foschi Mrs. Gherbez MM. Rubbi Tripodi Vecchietti	United Kingdom Mr. Cox Sir Anthony Grant Mr. Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins MM. Hill Jessel Mrs. Knight Mr. McGuire Dr. Miller Mr. Page Sir Dudley Smith
MM. Duraffour Frêche Mayoud Oehler Wilquin		
Italy	Netherlands	
MM. Antoni Della Briotta	Mr. Scholten	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 7th June 1983

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. China and European security (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 945 and amendments*).
2. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 948*).
3. Twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 942*).
4. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 948*).
5. Political activities of the WEU Council – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 944 and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. China and European security

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 945 and amendments)

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. van der Sanden, Prussen, Bassinet and Scheer.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Caro, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Vogt:

2. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Speakers: MM. Vogt, Müller, Caro and Vogt.

The amendment was negated.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Fourré and moved by Mr. Bassinet.

1. At the end of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

“and, in particular, no longer subject the latter to Cocom restrictions on trade with the eastern countries”.

Speaker: Mr. Caro.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Bassinet and Mr. Fourré.

4. At the end of paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

“and refrain from any position which might prevent the return of Taiwan to China;”.

The amendment was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Vogt:

3. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Appeal to the People’s Republic of China to stop the tests of atomic weapons and delivery vehicles, especially in the Pacific, in order to comply with the deep concerns of the Pacific peoples about such activities of the atomic powers, thereby setting a good example in the interest of the survival of mankind;”.

Speakers: MM. Vogt, Scheer and Caro.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended-draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 393)¹.

4. Twenty-eighth annual report of the Council

(Presentation by Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 942)

The report of the Council to the Assembly was presented by Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. Cheysson replied to questions put by MM. Dejardin, Lagorce, Blaauw, Vogt, Jäger and Scheer.

5. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

One candidate was proposed for the vacant post of Vice-President, namely: Mr. Blaauw.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-President by acclamation.

Mr. Blaauw was elected Vice-President by acclamation.

The President informed the Assembly that, according to age, the order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents was as follows: Mr. Pignion, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bonnel, Berchem, Unland and Blaauw.

6. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 948)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Dejardin and Bassinet.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

Mr. Pignion moved that the report be referred back to committee.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the reference back to committee.

The motion for reference back was agreed to and the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was referred back to the committee.

7. Political activities of the WEU Council – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 944 and amendments)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Forma.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

Amendments (Nos. 1 and 2) were tabled by Mr. Lagorce and others:

1. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “the latest decisions by NATO bodies in regard to defence plans” and insert “all the latest technological developments in this field”.

2. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “the decisions taken by the NATO Defence Planning Committee in December 1982” and insert “all the latest technological developments in the armaments field”.

Speakers: MM. Lagorce and Ahrens.

The amendments were agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

1. See page 23.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 394) ¹.

8. Change in the membership of a committee

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure the Assembly agreed to the following change in the membership of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges proposed by the Italian Delegation:

- Mr. Valiante as a titular member to fill a vacant seat.

9. Date and time of the next sitting

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.30 p.m.

1. See page 24.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

<p>Belgium</p> <p>MM. <i>Péciaux</i> (Adriaensens) <i>De Bondt</i> (Bonnell) Dejardin</p> <p>Mrs. Herman-Michielsens Mr. Michel Mrs. Staels-Dompas</p>	<p>Federal Republic of Germany</p> <p>MM. Ahrens Antretter <i>Lenzer</i> (Böhm) Enders Gerstl <i>Scheer</i> (Haase) <i>Hackel</i> (Kittelmann) Linde Müller <i>Jäger</i> (Reddemann) Schulte Schwarz Spies von Büllenheim Unland Vogt</p>	<p>Luxembourg</p> <p>MM. <i>Prussen</i> (Berchem) Margue <i>Glesener</i> (Thoss)</p>
<p>France</p> <p>MM. Baumel Caro <i>Fourré</i> (Frêche) <i>Jager</i> (Jeambrun) Lagorce Pignion <i>Galley</i> (Poncelet) <i>Ménard</i> (Schleiter) Sénès <i>Bassinot</i> (Spénale) Valleix Vial-Massat</p>	<p>Italy</p> <p>MM. Agrimi Forma Valiante</p>	<p>Netherlands</p> <p>MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) <i>Worrell</i> (van den Bergh) Blaauw Stoffelen Tummers</p> <p>Mrs. <i>den Ouden-Dekkers</i> (Mrs. van der Werf- Terpstra)</p>
		<p>United Kingdom</p> <p>Mr. Grieve Lord Hughes Mr. Mulley Lord Reay Mr. <i>Wilkinson</i> (Sir Dudley Smith) Lord <i>Northfield</i> (Urwin)</p>

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<p>Belgium</p> <p>Mr. Bogaerts</p>	<p>Italy</p> <p>MM. Antoni Bernini Bonalumi Cavaliere Della Briotta Foschi Fosson Mrs. Gherbez MM. Mondino Pecchioli Petrilli Rubbi Tripodi Vecchiotti</p>	<p>Netherlands</p> <p>Mr. Scholten</p>
<p>France</p> <p>MM. Berrier Duraffour Jung Mayoud Oehler Wilquin</p>		<p>United Kingdom</p> <p>Mr. Beith Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Cox Sir Anthony Grant Mr. Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins MM. Hill Jessel Mrs. Knight Mr. McGuire Dr. Miller Mr. Page</p>
<p>Federal Republic of Germany</p> <p>MM. Hartmann Hornhues Rumpf</p>		

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 393***on China and European security***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the priority given to internal development in the People's Republic of China is directing it on a lasting basis towards the search for international peace;
- (ii) Considering that the People's Republic of China is an essential factor in the world balance and that the development of its economy should lead it to play an increasingly important rôle in international relations;
- (iii) Considering that in spite of differences in their political and social régimes the interests of Western Europe and of China converge in many fields;
- (iv) Considering that the development of trade and co-operation between Western Europe and China is in their joint interests;
- (v) Considering that the People's Republic of China is now making proposals to European states and firms for co-operation of mutual interest;
- (vi) Reaffirming the commitments which closely link Western Europe with the United States, particularly for all aspects of defence and security,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that the Western European countries start regular consultations with the Government of the People's Republic of China in the most appropriate frameworks on matters relating to the maintenance of peace in the world;
2. Carefully examine in the appropriate frameworks the possibility of increasing Western Europe's trade and economic co-operation with China;
3. Remove as far as possible all current obstacles to the development of this trade and co-operation and, in particular, no longer subject the latter to Cocom restrictions on trade with the eastern countries;
4. Impress this point of view on the United States and on its partners in the OECD;
5. Insist that the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons do not allow the Soviet Union to deploy in Asia weapons withdrawn from Eastern Europe;
6. Urge its members to pursue a concerted policy in order to lay the foundations for lasting peace in Eastern Asia and, inter alia, to endeavour to re-establish an independent state in Cambodia and to facilitate the search for a negotiated solution for Hong Kong.

RECOMMENDATION 394***on the political activities of the WEU Council –
reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Reaffirming its determination to fulfil the whole range of its duties by dealing as thoroughly as possible with the many aspects of European security;
- (ii) Recalling that the exercise of its responsibilities calls for a meaningful dialogue with the Council;
- (iii) Convinced that this dialogue will be easier to develop if the Council plays a more active rôle in concerting European activities in areas within its competence;
- (iv) Welcoming the full-bodied report on European political co-operation submitted by the Council but noting that, in exercising its mandate, the Council does not yet seem to have taken account of the desire expressed by several of its members to strengthen their co-operation in various fields relating to their security;
- (v) Welcoming the transmission by the Council of the declassified version of the study by the Standing Armaments Committee on member countries' armaments industries and noting that in its reply to Recommendation 379 the Council confirmed the task given to the SAC;
- (vi) Recalling that the mandate instructing the SAC to promote European armaments co-operation implies that it take account of all the latest technological developments in this field,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Apply its competence in full by studying and tackling certain security problems which call for a concerted European approach;
2. In that context instruct the SAC *inter alia* to complete its study without delay, with the addition of proposals to remove economic and legal obstacles to better co-operation between the armaments industries of member countries and transmit the results of this study to the Assembly;
3. Instruct the SAC to study the possible implications for European armaments production of all the latest technological developments in the armaments field.

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 7th June 1983

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Burden-sharing in the alliance (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 947 and amendments*).
2. Address by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
3. Burden-sharing in the alliance (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendation and draft resolution, Doc. 947 and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the Appendix.

2. Burden-sharing in the alliance

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 947 and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur.

3. Address by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe

General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, addressed the Assembly.

General Rogers replied to questions put by Mr. Blaauw, Lord Reay, MM. Vogt, Scheer, Pignion, Dejardin, Haase, Biefnot, de Vries, Spies von Büllenheim, Holtz and Wilkinson.

4. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

5. Burden-sharing in the alliance

(Debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 947 and amendments)

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Grieve.

Mr. Blaauw, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Linde, Vogt, Tummers, Dejardin, Baumel, de Vries, Jäger and Caro; (points of order): MM. Wilkinson and Stoffelen.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

Mr. Stoffelen moved that the report be referred back to committee.

Speakers: MM. Blaauw, Stoffelen (point of order), Wilkinson, van der Sanden (point of order) and Blaauw.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the reference back to committee.

The motion for reference back was agreed to and the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was referred back to the committee.

6. Date and time of the next sitting

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 8th June, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.40 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Enders <i>Scheer</i> (Gerstl) Haase Hartmann <i>Lemmrigh</i> (Hornhues) <i>Hackel</i> (Kittelmann) Linde <i>Jäger</i> (Reddemann) <i>Stavenhagen</i> (Rumpf) Schulte Spies von Büllenheim Unland Vogt	Netherlands
MM. <i>Pécriaux</i> (Adriaensens) Bogaerts <i>De Bondt</i> (Bonnell) Dejardin Mrs. Herman-Michielsens Mr. <i>Biefnot</i> (Michel) Mrs. Staels-Dompas		MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) <i>de Vries</i> (van den Bergh) Blaauw Stoffelen Tummers Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Mrs. van der Werf- Terpstra)
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Baumel Caro Lagorce Pignion <i>Galley</i> (Poncelet) <i>Bassinot</i> (Spénale) Valleix	MM. Agrimi Forma	MM. <i>Stainton</i> (Sir Frederic Bennett) Grieve Lord Hughes Mr. Mulley Lord Reay Mr. <i>Wilkinson</i> (Sir Dudley Smith) Lord <i>Northfield</i> (Urwin)
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Ahrens Antretter <i>Lenzer</i> (Böhm)	MM. Berchem Margue <i>Glesener</i> (Thoss)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	Italy	Netherlands
MM. Berrier Duraffour Frêche Jeambrun Jung Mayoud Oehler Schleiter Sénès Vial-Massat Wilquin	MM. Antoni Bernini Bonalumi Cavaliere Della Briotta Foschi Fosson Mrs. Gherbez MM. Mondino Pecchioli Petrilli Rubbi Tripodi Valiante Vecchietti	Mr. Scholten
Federal Republic of Germany		United Kingdom
MM. Müller Schwarz		MM. Beith Cox Sir Anthony Grant Mr. Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins MM. Hill Jessel Mrs. Knight Mr. McGuire Dr. Miller Mr. Page

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 8th June 1983

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. The law of the sea (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 946 and amendments*).
2. Analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly Recommendations 383 on the problems of nuclear weapons in Europe and 388 on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 943*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. The law of the sea

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote of the draft recommendation, Doc. 946 and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Mr. Pignion, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Fourré, Spies von Bülllesheim, Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers and Mr. Beix.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Spies von Bullesheim:

1. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "seabed mining régime" leave out "but" and insert "and".

Speaker: Mr. Spies von Bülllesheim.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Fourré:

3. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "the policy split" to the end of the paragraph and insert "the individual and divergent positions which the member states of Western European Union, the EEC and NATO have taken up as to whether the convention should be signed;"

Speakers: Mr. Fourré, Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers and Mr. Lenzer.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Fourré:

4. At the end of paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add "more particularly in relation to the developing countries;"

Speakers: MM. Fourré, Spies von Bülllesheim and Lenzer.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Fourré:

5. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "to adopt policies" and insert "to sign the convention on the law of the sea".

Speakers: MM. Fourré, Spies von Büllenheim and Lenzer.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim:

2. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper and insert a new text as follows:

“4. Pursue its efforts to seek co-operation with the United States with a view to establishing a universally-acceptable system of the rule of law for the world oceans.”

Speakers: MM. Spies von Büllenheim, Beix and Lenzer.

The amendment was negatived.

Following the agreement to Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Fourré, a consequential drafting amendment was moved by Mr. Lenzer in paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation to leave out “this split” and insert “these positions”.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 395)¹.

4. Analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly Recommendations 383 on the problems of nuclear weapons in Europe and 388 on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism)

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 943)

The report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Dejardin, Rapporteur, and by Lord Reay in the absence of Mr. Page, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Vogt, Müller and Enders.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Dejardin, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly took note of the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

5. Adjournment of the session

The President adjourned the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly.

The sitting was closed at 12.25 p.m.

1. See page 30.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts <i>De Bondt</i> (Bonnell) Dejardin	MM. Antretter <i>Lenzer</i> (Böhm) Enders Gerstl Haase Hartmann <i>Hackel</i> (Kittelmann) Müller Schulte Spies von Büllenheim Unland Vogt	MM. Berchem <i>Prussen</i> (Margue) <i>Hengel</i> (Thoss)
Mrs. Herman-Michielsens Mr. <i>Biefnot</i> (Michel) Mrs. Staels-Dompas		Netherlands
France		MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) Mrs. <i>den Ouden-Dekkers</i> (Blaauw) MM. Stoffelen Tummers Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Mrs. van der Werf- Terpstra)
MM. <i>Beix</i> (Berrier) Caro <i>Fourré</i> (Frêche) <i>Jager</i> (Jeambrun) Lagorce Pignion <i>Galley</i> (Poncelet) Sénès	Italy	United Kingdom
	MM. Agrimi Valiante	Lord Hughes Mr. Mulley Lord Reay

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Rumpf Schwarz	Netherlands
MM. Baumel Duraffour Jung Mayoud Oehler Schleiter Spénale Valleix Vial-Massat Wilquin	Italy	M. van den Bergh Scholten
Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Antoni Bernini Bonalumi Cavaliere Della Briotta Forma Foschi Fosson Mrs. Gherbez MM. Mondino Pecchioli Petrilli Rubbi Tripodi Vecchietti	United Kingdom
MM. Ahrens Hornhues Linde Reddemann		Mr. Beith Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Cox Sir Anthony Grant MM. Grieve Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins MM. Hill Jessel Mrs. Knight Mr. McGuire Dr. Miller Mr. Page Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Urwin

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 395***on the law of the sea***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the Council's reply to Recommendation 377 on implications of the law of the sea conference that the aim pursued by the governments of member states was to reach a universally-accepted international convention on the law of the sea, which would constitute an important factor in maintaining peaceful and friendly relations between states, especially between western industrialised countries and developing countries in the third world;
- (ii) In agreement with the Council's opinion that a satisfactory international regulation of deep-seabed mining was strategically and economically of great importance, especially for industrialised Western European countries which are highly dependent on imports of raw materials ;
- (iii) Conscious of the third world's claims to a share of deep-sea mineral resources ;
- (iv) Aware of the shortcomings of the proposed seabed mining régime and regretting the individual and divergent positions which the member states of Western European Union, the EEC and NATO have taken up as to whether the convention should be signed;
- (v) Considering that these positions may be detrimental to Europe's strategic position in the world, more particularly in relation to the developing countries;
- (vi) Aware of the danger of losing what has been gained in some fourteen years of negotiations and the benefits to be derived from the convention for the greater part of the globe, whereas the navies of the signatory countries, including those of the Soviet bloc, may derive far-reaching advantages with the backing of international law,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine the strategic and tactical disadvantages of the present situation and seek to eliminate the differences in the policies of member countries towards the draft law of the sea convention ;
2. Request the Governments of France and the Netherlands to devote their efforts in the preparatory commission to the introduction of rules and regulations to govern the seabed mining régime in an equitable manner with less state control and protectionism than proposed by the Soviet bloc and many third world countries ;
3. Request the Governments of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom to adopt policies with a view to making full use of Europe's political and industrial influence in the preparatory commission to achieve constructive and acceptable solutions to problems relating to the seabed mining régime;
4. Pursue its efforts to convince the United States Government of the negative consequences of its policy and of the advantages of a duly-signed unambiguous convention on the law of the sea and, consequently, the rule of law of the world oceans, as opposed to a mere customary law situation which cannot be enforced.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 6th June 1983

SUMMARY

1. Opening of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Address by the Provisional President.
4. Examination of credentials.
5. Election of the President of the Assembly.
6. Address by the President of the Assembly.
7. Election of Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
8. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session (Doc. 941).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Mulley.
9. Nomination of members to committees.
10. Address by Mr. Möllemann, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Replies by Mr. Möllemann to questions put by: Mr. Holtz, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Jung, Mr. Schwarz.
11. China and European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 945 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Caro (*Rapporteur*), Lord Reay, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Müller, Mr. Michel.
12. Changes in the membership of committees.
13. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Jager, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. Address by the Provisional President

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, it is to seniority in years that I owe the privilege – which, you may well imagine, I

was in no hurry to enjoy – of being allowed to address you for the second time as the *doyen d'âge*.

I have the opportunity today to look back in more serious vein than usual over my past and, through it, over the recent past of a Europe of which I have been able to witness – and, in some respects, indeed experience – both the destruction and the renaissance.

The time perspective also enables me to appreciate how lucky we are to have been living at peace for nearly forty years: an entire generation is now reaching maturity without having experienced the horrors of world wars, even though families have been bereaved and peoples impoverished – as they still may be – by murderous and devastating local conflicts.

This peace, which I hope our children and grandchildren will long be able to enjoy, is not, however, a gift of nature. On the contrary, it is the result of an unremitting effort, an effort, which is all the more difficult for Europeans because, confined as they are within a restricted area, they still bear the marks of the dissensions which are the legacies of an incomparably rich history or of those generated by ideologies, and because they do not have sufficient resources to match up to the major military powers.

1. See page 18.

The President (continued)

As a militant European, I have rejoiced at the successes of economic reconstruction but have also felt bitterness and disappointment at the setbacks and limitations of the political building of Europe: personally, I am still absolutely sure that without political union – and defence obviously forms part of this – Europe will be no more than the mere sum of its parts and nations without ever being able to constitute a single entity, in short, that Europe will remain incomplete.

While the Council of Europe goes on patiently spinning its legal web and extending areas of agreement, the EEC is getting bogged down in a morass of national interests.

Western European Union itself, the only European organisation empowered to deal with defence questions, seems to be doing little more than vegetate, even though, as all of us here are aware, this outward appearance of inactivity conceals much conscientious and fruitful work, especially within this Assembly. Our institution is awaiting the touch of the magic wand which will awaken it from its slumbers and give it the renewed impetus which it needs.

This revitalisation of Western European Union has already been proposed more than once by France, in the person of Michel Jobert in 1973 and of Georges Lemoine in 1981, without, it must be admitted, their proposals having aroused sufficient interest to produce the electric shock required to revive this institution – that is, its Council and the two technical bodies which are subordinate to it.

This reactivation of WEU seems to me to be called for by the international circumstances to which I shall refer briefly later. But it is clear that it cannot be based on the initiative of a single country; it can only be brought about through the joint determination of governments and through the efforts of all those who, especially within this Assembly, play a part in the work of this organisation.

Western European Union, which in theory guarantees the joint security of the European countries, can in fact make a vital contribution to the security of Europe at a time when this appears to be a prey to increasingly serious doubts.

For Europe, our second country, is now in danger. In the face of the Soviet threat, Europe is not only unsure of itself but also distrusts its American ally. In short, Europe, like the United States, is tempted to withdraw into isolation, even though an effort is made, in the statements issued at the end of summit meetings such as that at Williamsburg, to dispel any

danger of misunderstanding within the Atlantic Alliance.

We here are all aware that the growth in the power of the Soviet Union has changed the balance of forces and altered strategic thinking to the ultimate detriment of the security of Europe. Détente, desirable though it is, has from this point of view only served as a smoke-screen concealing the stepping-up of the Soviet armaments drive and, in particular, the stationing of SS-20s, as a result of which Soviet military superiority on the European continent – already considerable in conventional arms alone – is now crushing. This first-strike capacity which the Soviet Union now holds in relation to the NATO forces cannot be matched by the Europeans unless they deploy the Pershing and cruise missiles as they decided to do in December 1979. This is merely a matter of applying the logic of the balance of forces, which experience has shown to be the best guarantee of peace. Deployment of these weapons in no way upsets the balance of strategic forces since the range of the Pershing missiles is not great enough to threaten an appreciable proportion of the Soviet Union's intercontinental missiles.

In reality, as a consequence of this Soviet armament effort, the West – that is, first and foremost, our American ally, on whom our security fundamentally depends – no longer has an adequate safety margin. The narrowing of this margin has already led to the abandonment of the doctrine of massive reprisal; its virtual disappearance casts doubt on the possibility of maintaining the doctrine of flexible response; the position of potential inferiority in which the West is placed as a result of the inadequacy of its conventional forces means that the western countries now have to bear the responsibility for nuclear escalation and its suicidal consequences.

Such a situation can give rise to legitimate doubts as to the United States' real determination to defend Europe, that is, if necessary, to die for it. Personally I do not share this doubt, but I must admit that proposals such as those made in the journal *Foreign Affairs* by four of the most senior men formerly responsible for United States defence policy are not calculated to reassure those of less sanguine disposition. The idea of a no-first-use commitment, that is, an undertaking not to be the first to use the nuclear weapon, seems to me to be both illusory and a danger to Europe.

Illusory because, even if there were reciprocity, it is hard to see the value of such a commitment, which would obviously have the same final outcome as all those which were entered into between the two wars, in an effort to ward off the second world war.

The President (continued)

This proposal is also dangerous, because it increases the risks of a conventional war, which, in Europe, would be scarcely less devastating than a nuclear war and because, more fundamentally, it reduces the credibility of the American commitment, thus making a reality of the danger – a mortal danger for Europe – of breaking the link with the United States.

Such a proposal is, moreover, all the more harmful because of its false attraction for all those who, in Europe, appalled by the arms race, take refuge in dreams of pacifism and neutralism. As history has shown us, the pacifist reflex, however noble the sentiments which inspire it, leads to war.

In order to be better able to counter this pacifist temptation, let us try – as we have already done before in the course of our discussions – to understand its causes. Let us remember in particular that, in addition to being a more or less rational reflex due to fear or a matter of principle, this is the simple reaction of people who are suddenly realising that having weapons may, in some cases, provoke aggression: this danger has always existed, but there was a tendency to forget it so long as the weapon remained in the holds of a submarine. Today nobody can ignore it any longer, now that missiles which are so many priority targets for the enemy are liable to be stationed in the immediate vicinity. Beyond the paradoxical aspect of such an attitude, which, taken to its logical conclusion, leads to basing security on complete and unilateral disarmament, there is an element of truth: possessing weapons is in fact dangerous for anyone who does not appear to be determined to use them.

This being so, it seems to me that one of the rôles of the Assembly of WEU is to strengthen this will to defend ourselves, without which there can be no security for Europeans: the balance of forces is a genuine deterrent only if it is based on a sufficiently-firm collective determination.

In the global poker game of East-West confrontation, psychological factors count just as much as objective realities such as technological performance or economic dynamism.

In this connection I should like to emphasise here that if the western countries were to embark too suddenly on rearmament at the expense of the whole balance of the economy, this effort would in fact fail to fulfil its purpose since, by undermining the morale of the nations concerned, it would weaken that very spirit of self-defence without which there can be no effective deterrence.

But collective determination to defend ourselves can lead to united European defence only if it can be based on sound and dynamic institutions.

For Europe, the basis is, of course, the Atlantic Alliance, because our security will always ultimately depend on the guarantee provided by America. But the institutions of WEU can play a worthwhile rôle if we are willing to regard it as the other pillar on which our joint determination to defend ourselves could rest, as the outward and visible expression of the ties of deep-rooted solidarity which unite the countries of Europe: legal ties resulting from the Brussels Treaty, which, in the event of aggression, far from leaving the allies free, as does the North Atlantic Treaty, to determine the nature of their support, on the contrary imposes on them the obligation to render military assistance; also the de facto solidarity between countries whose geographical position puts them in the front line in the defence of the West, and makes them into a battlefield right from the start of any world war.

In these circumstances, it is WEU's task to serve as the place, par excellence, not only for a realisation of this solidarity, but also for "joint thinking about security problems" – to quote the words recently used by Mr. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing – where thought might be given in particular to ways of dovetailing a strategy based on the alliance and a strategy based on national independence or European autonomy.

This antithesis between alliance and independence is not easy to overcome even at national level, especially for a country like France which might have difficulty in reconciling its obligations within the Atlantic Alliance with the overriding requirement of independence on which the credibility of its policy of nuclear deterrence is based.

Knowing the quality of the work of our Assembly, and the conscientiousness and experience of its members, I am certain that its resources are commensurate with its ambitions, provided that you believe that we should – to borrow the actual words used by Mr. Pierre Mauroy – "contemplate the prospect of a political entity possessing an autonomous defence capacity".

The confidence which I am expressing here in the work of our Assembly is primarily esteem for its members; it is in that spirit that I should like to pay a tribute to the memory of the colleagues who left us before the opening of this session: Emile Bizet, member of the French Delegation to the Assembly between 1967 and 1983; Louis Le Montagner, member of the French Delegation to the Assembly between

The President (continued)

1980 and 1983; and Hermann Schmidt, member of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Assembly between 1967 and 1973 and from 1977 to 1983.

I offer the condolences of the Assembly to the families of the deceased members and to their national delegations.

I invite you to observe a minute's silence in their memory.

(The Assembly stood in silence)

All that remains for me to do, before presiding over the voting, is to express the hope that our newly-elected future President will continue the good work and help to give the institutions of Western European Union their rightful place in this long-term undertaking of building Europe. *(Applause)*

4. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of credentials.

The list of representatives and substitutes attending the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union has been published in Notice No. 1.

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, all these credentials were ratified by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 25th April 1983 and are attested by a statement of ratification which has been communicated to the President, with the exception of representatives and substitutes of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany and Mr. Pécriaux, substitute in the Belgian Delegation, nominated since the session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

It is now for the Assembly to confirm these credentials in accordance with Rule 6(2), and subject to ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly. They are in order under our rules, and there has been no objection.

If the Assembly is unanimous, we may proceed to ratification without prior reference to a Credentials Committee.

Is there any opposition?...

These credentials are therefore agreed, subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

I welcome our new colleagues to the Assembly of WEU.

5. Election of the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day now provide for the election of the President of the Assembly.

Rule 7(2) of the Rules of Procedure provides that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

Furthermore, Rule 10(2) and (10) states that no representative may stand as a candidate for the office of the President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more representatives. Representatives who are members of a national government may not be members of the Bureau.

I have received two nominations, correctly submitted in the form prescribed by the Rules of Procedure. They are, in alphabetical order: Mr. Blaauw and Mr. De Poi.

Voting will take place by secret ballot in accordance with Rule 10. This states that, if after two ballots no candidate has obtained the votes of a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of representatives of the Assembly, that is, forty-five or more, the candidate who on a third ballot receives the greatest number of votes is declared elected. If there is a tie, the candidate senior in age is elected.

Under Rule 24, all representatives or substitutes must sign the register of attendance. I request members who have not yet signed the register to do so without delay.

Voting papers bearing the names of each candidate, together with an envelope, will be distributed.

I will now draw by lot the names of the two tellers who will be responsible for counting the votes.

Mr. Agrimi and Mr. Reddemann have been drawn.

Each representative or substitute who has signed the register of attendance will be called to the rostrum in order to place in the urn the envelope containing the voting paper bearing the name of the chosen candidate.

We shall now proceed to a roll-call. The roll-call will be taken in alphabetical order and I will now draw by lot the name of the member to be called first.

The roll-call will begin with Mr. Pignion.

The voting is open.

(A vote by secret ballot by roll-call was then taken)

The President (continued)

Does anyone else wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

I call upon Mr. Agrimi and Mr. Reddemann, the tellers, to withdraw into the office behind the rostrum in order to count the votes.

The sitting will be suspended during the counting of the votes. It will be resumed in about twenty minutes.

The sitting is suspended.

(The sitting was suspended at 3.50 p.m. and resumed at 4.05 p.m.)

The sitting is resumed.

The result of the vote for the election of the President is as follows:

Votes cast	64
Blank or spoiled papers	3
Effective votes cast	61
Absolute majority	45

The votes were as follows:

Mr. Blaauw	13
Mr. De Poi	48

Mr. De Poi having obtained the necessary majority, I proclaim him President of the Assembly of Western European Union. *(Applause)*

I congratulate him most warmly on your behalf and invite him to take the chair.

(Mr. De Poi then took the Chair)

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to begin by expressing my gratitude and by saying how much I appreciate the confidence which the Assembly has shown in me by doing me the honour of making me its President.

I can assure you that I shall devote all the enthusiasm of my European convictions to the service of the noble ideals which inspired the framing of the treaty which created WEU.

I should also like to express my thanks to our *doyen d'âge*, who has presided over the opening stages of our twenty-ninth session with an authority which he derives both from his great experience and from the wisdom reflected in his speech.

I wish both to express my own feelings and to speak on your behalf by telling Mr. Mulley how much we have appreciated the cheerful autho-

riety with which he has presided over our debates. Mr. Mulley was well acquainted with our Assembly, of which he had previously been a member twenty-five years ago. Before returning to us he occupied the highest offices, especially that of Secretary of State for Defence, in his own country. To succeed him is a daunting task. I shall endeavour to be worthy of it.

Lastly, I have to announce to you the departure of one of the most senior members of the Office of the Clerk, Miss Cohen, who has run the financial and administrative section most efficiently since the Assembly was formed. On your behalf I thank her most sincerely for her devoted service and extend to her our best wishes for the future.

It is fourteen years since an Italian last mounted the steps of this rostrum as president of the only European assembly empowered to deal with matters of defence. I wish to say that I am proud that this honour has been bestowed upon me and shall endeavour to be deserving of it.

Not that Italy has been absent from your debates. May I remind you that the two – if I may say so – most sharply-directed reports on the future of our institution since the masterly study on the subject made by Kai-Uwe von Hassel in 1980 have been, in chronological order, the report which I myself had the honour to devote to European union in December 1981 and that of my colleague Vecchiotti, who a year later emphasised the need for a more constructive and effective relationship between the Assembly and the Council in order to conform to the spirit and aims of the modified Brussels Treaty, which set up our union.

These Italian initiatives in the Assembly of WEU support the exemplary line taken by the French Government.

The then French Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Georges Lemoine, told us during the London symposium on co-operation in the field of armaments that the two-way transatlantic traffic must be preceded by an intra-European two-way traffic, that is, co-operation among member countries of WEU.

The same applies to the North-South dialogue, which I consider should start within WEU and, before crossing the Mediterranean, be resumed on the European shores of the Mediterranean. We must not forget the members of the Atlantic Alliance, such as Spain, Greece or Portugal, which are seeking a European identity as regards defence within the alliance.

I am convinced that action to establish a European defence, forming the basis of that spirit of defence often spoken of in Paris, has

The President (continued)

never been as necessary as it is today. I am convinced that France's ability to stand firm against the upsurge of pacifism and neutralism is due to the fact that it represents, within the Atlantic Alliance, a decision-making centre which appears credible to the younger generations of Frenchmen called upon to defend their country. I am, conversely, equally convinced that it is the absence of a credible intermediate decision-making link between the national centres and the strategic decision-making centre on the other side of the Atlantic – a link not perceived by the younger generations – that explains the smaller degree of resistance shown by certain member countries of WEU to the more or less externally inspired campaigns which call upon us to lower our guard.

Under these circumstances it seems to me that in the transitional period in which we live it is around WEU and its bodies that a start should be made on strategic European consultation with a view to co-operation on armaments; for the modified Brussels Treaty, our treaty, is in fact the only reference for the European Community for defence matters and brings together the only countries in Western Europe which, up to the present, have felt it their duty to defend themselves, WEU's doors remaining open to any others which may feel the same sense of duty.

There cannot be any deterrence without a consensus of the peoples, and this consensus calls for the progressive establishment of an autonomous European decision-making centre in all fields. Millions of unemployed do not make good soldiers, nor can uncommitted young people understand that our Europe, formerly an initiator, has become a mere object of politics. One does not fight for that kind of status and one does not feel protected by weapons which may not be fully under one's own control.

Turning to those young Europeans who made up the bulk of the supporters of the pacifist movements in some countries, I should like to tell them first of all that, being thirty-seven years old, I belong to the generation which came of age in 1968, but I did not take part in the riots.

I should also like to tell them that I share their aspirations for peace, freedom and development – privileges which we in Western Europe enjoy but are denied to millions of other young people in Eastern Europe and in other continents.

What the younger generations must realise is that the peace, the freedom and the development which we enjoy depend on delicate balan-

ces, the credibility of which is threatened by pacifist campaigns, to the benefit of those very political régimes which deny these privileges to their young people.

That is why it saddens me to see thousands of young people setting off in good faith along the road to the dead end of pacifism and neutralism, rather than choosing the course which other young people, including myself, have chosen: that of playing a part in the great European adventure whose purpose is to help to bring the possibility of peace, freedom and development to those who, all over the world, are denied them.

The multiple polarity now emerging in the world offers Europe, and hence my generation, a great opportunity of participating in the decisive choices for the security of today, on which tomorrow's peace depends.

Instead of losing themselves in the blind alley of pacifism and neutralism, young people must ensure that Europe is present and that its measure is put over in the worldwide negotiations which are starting both in the East-West context and within the North-South dialogue.

Let there be no mistake – I am of course in favour of the deployment of Euromissiles in Europe in view of the glaring imbalance of forces between the NATO countries and those of the Warsaw Pact. But I am afraid that, for the immediate future, assertion of Europe's identity as regards defence will be the price which will have to be paid in order to ensure that these Euromissiles are accepted without too much public opposition in our countries. In other words, it is only by building, around WEU, a European pillar of the alliance such as was called for by President Kennedy as far back as 1962 that the credibility of the defence of our European peninsula can be restored.

That is why I think it necessary to preserve at the very least the achievements of WEU and to hold them in reserve in Europe against any untimely attempt to curtail its resources in terms of staff and funds, modest though these are – as if the hundred and fifty-seven officials of WEU and its austere budget were the cause of the serious economic and financial crisis which we are experiencing.

Why are we not as aware of our European potential as the Chinese, whose invitation to us last April to send them a delegation of our Political Committee is the best recognition of the defence rôle of Europe and of our WEU.

I am, to be sure, the last to deny the European Community and its parliament, elected by universal suffrage, a right to take cognisance of security problems. The simple fact is that, in view of the urgency of the decisions to be

The President (continued)

taken, I believe that – once again at least for a transitional period, however long it may prove to be – we ought to make full use of Western European Union in order to stimulate the European reaction which seems to me to be a matter of life and death in order to counter the undermining of our societies now taking place daily before our eyes, in a very difficult economic and social context.

There were ideas of postponing this half-session, as attendance at our Assembly was reduced – but not to such a great extent, as far as I can see – because of parliamentary elections in the United Kingdom and Italy. I was not in favour of doing so, because we should have missed the opportunity of affirming our unique rôle in the field of defence on the eve of a historic meeting of the North Atlantic Council due to be held in Paris for the first time since France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated command structure in 1966.

Despite orders of the day which do not perhaps cover all current matters of concern, I hope that there will emerge from this half-session a clear message expressing the determination of Europeans to defend themselves, with the indispensable assistance of our American allies, but gradually assuming our rightful responsibilities in order to re-establish the confidence of our peoples, without which all our efforts will be in vain.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I will conclude by expressing a hope: that in 1984, the year of the thirtieth anniversary of the foundation of Western European Union, this event will be commemorated by our Assembly in an impressive manner, with each political committee called upon to make a review, which must of necessity be brief, of the achievements of these thirty years, but with the main emphasis on the future.

Thank you, Ladies and Gentlemen, for your attention and I now call upon you to proceed to the business of the session. (*Applause*)

7. Election of Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day now provide for the election of Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Rule 7(2) lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

Under Rule 10, no representative may stand as a candidate for the offices of President or Vice-President unless a proposal for his candi-

dature has been sponsored in writing by three or more representatives, and representatives who are members of governments are not eligible for nomination for the Bureau.

Five nominations have been properly made in the form prescribed by the rules.

These are, in alphabetical order: Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Berchem, Mr. Bonnel, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Unland.

The last seat will be filled later.

If there are no objections, I propose that the election of the Vice-Presidents be by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Berchem, Mr. Bonnel, Mr. Pignion and Mr. Unland duly elected to be Vice-Presidents and congratulate them.

8. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session

(Doc. 941)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly, Document 941.

The Assembly will note that Mr. Fiandrotti's report on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council has been withdrawn from the order of business at the request of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, which has not yet completed its work on it.

The draft order of business has been distributed.

Are there any objections?...

Mr. MULLEY (*United Kingdom*). – First, Mr. President, I thank you warmly for the kind remarks that you made about my privilege of being your President for the past three years. I also want to say how much I appreciate how your remarks were received by our colleagues in the Assembly and the tremendous co-operation that I had from members and staff of the Assembly during my period in office.

Secondly, I want to be the first person to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your election and to wish you well. I hope that you will have a most successful period as President of our Assembly. As you said, it is an impor-

Mr. Mulley (continued)

tant post and this is an important Assembly. I am sure that you will do all that you can to maintain its position.

As you well know, Mr. President, I speak on the draft order of business because, as a result of the election problems in your country and mine, we have had to curtail our arrangements. The matter was raised at the Presidential Committee and several people – I have in mind particularly my conservative colleague, Mr. Wilkinson, who is coming out just one day before voting especially to present his report – hope that you will do your very best to keep to the timetable. That is particularly important when people are coming especially to present reports or to participate in debates in the difficult circumstances in which we all find ourselves on this occasion. As I would not be President, I could not give such a guarantee. I know that you will do your best, but I undertook to raise that point on behalf of Mr. Wilkinson and the Presidential Committee. I hope that, if it is possible, we shall keep to the times in the draft order before us.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Mulley, you can imagine how much your congratulations mean to me and how greatly I appreciate your good wishes. I assure you that I shall heed your remarks, bearing in mind particularly that the course of this part-session is somewhat unusual because of the forthcoming elections. I shall endeavour to meet the requirements of the members of the Bureau.

Are there any objections to Document 941?...

The draft order of business is adopted.

9. Nomination of members to committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the nomination of members to committees.

The candidates for the Assembly's five permanent committees and the Committee for Relations with Parliaments have been published in an Annex to Notice No. 1, which has been distributed.

In accordance with Rule 39(6) and Rule 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, these nominations are submitted to the Assembly.

Is there any objection to these nominations?...

The nominations to the committees are therefore agreed to.

10. Address by Mr. Müllemann, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Müllemann, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

I apologise to the members of the Assembly and to Mr. Müllemann for the fact that our proceedings are behind schedule.

I thank Mr. Müllemann in advance for his willingness to answer questions put to him. I propose to the Assembly that Mr. Müllemann should take the floor immediately and that we should then hear Mr. Caro's report.

I call Mr. Müllemann, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Parliamentary Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, first of all I should like to thank you for your sympathy at your session last December, when I had to cancel my visit to the WEU Assembly at short notice because of an accident. Since then I have been eager to resume the dialogue with you at the earliest possible date, and I am glad that this is possible today.

Mr. President, you have just been elected President of this Assembly. Allow me to convey to you my government's and my own congratulations on your election to this distinguished post. At the same time we wish to thank your departing predecessor, Mr. Mulley. I am confident that under your presidency, too, the good relations between the Council and the Assembly will be further strengthened and intensified; my government will contribute to this endeavour.

A good relationship of trust between the Council and the Assembly is important, not least because the Assembly is still the only European parliamentary body dealing with defence issues. My government therefore follows the Assembly's debates and recommendations with particular interest and great attention.

Of course, this also applies to the Assembly's discussions on the adaptation of Western European Union to the changes that have occurred since its foundation in the real political situation on our continent. Here the Council and the Assembly have the joint task of undertaking sensibly and realistically the adjustments needed to ensure that Western European Union remains a viable and functioning body in the

Mr. Möllemann (continued)

1980s. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany notes with satisfaction that initiatives pointing the way ahead have been launched by the Assembly, including Recommendation 380, adopted in June 1982. The Federal Government welcomes and thanks the Assembly for the trust it has shown in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the central goal of German foreign policy is actively to safeguard peace. This means ensuring a defence capability on the basis of the western alliance and German participation in the shaping of East-West relations.

As a divided nation at the interface between East and West, the Federal Republic of Germany has constructed its defence policy on the solid foundations of western solidarity. Proceeding from this stable base, it continues to seek, within the CSCE context, a dialogue with Eastern Europe on political, economic and humanitarian issues. This western solidarity is likewise the basis of the Federal Republic's efforts on behalf of disarmament and arms control.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation guarantees our security, which is the vital condition for our active policy of peace and at the same time the alliance creates the general framework of German political, economic and social stability.

In close proximity to this session of the WEU Assembly in terms of both time and place, the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance will meet here in Paris on 9th and 10th June 1983. Let me take this opportunity to describe the unique historical rôle played by the alliance, which has now been safeguarding peace in Europe for more than three decades.

Unlike the Warsaw Pact, this alliance is not a military bloc forcibly imposed on others and under authoritarian control. It is a community of free peoples, founded on shared convictions. On the basis of common values and security interests in the face of the undiminished threat posed by the Soviet Union, the democratic states of Europe and North America united in the alliance constitute a community with a common destiny, whose vitality and determination to defend itself are unbroken. Developments in Europe since the establishment of the North Atlantic Alliance have shown that it is, as stated in its charter, an association for purposes of defence alone, without any expansionary goals. None of the major, dangerous European crises of the last few decades was provoked by the West. Even when it enjoyed nuclear superiority, the principles of modera-

tion and renunciation of force came first with the alliance. This was reaffirmed in Bonn a year ago by the heads of state and government of the alliance. They stated clearly and without reservation that none of the alliance's weapons will ever be used in the future either, except in response to an attack.

The security afforded by the alliance has not simply fallen into our laps. It demands efforts from all member countries which would be hard to bear if they were not made in a spirit of partnership and fair burden-sharing. We are grateful to the United States for finding the strength, despite economic difficulties, to respond to the Soviet arms build-up with outstanding defence efforts. We Europeans, too, are committed to shouldering our share of responsibility for our collective security. We have never neglected this principle in the past and have taken Europe's growing economic strength into account.

Of the alliance's joint defence expenditure, 44 % is now borne by Europe against no more than 25 % in 1971. The rise in the German share has been well above the average of the other non-American allies. The federal armed forces are the cornerstone of the alliance's defence capability at the dividing line between East and West in Central Europe. Their contribution to the alliance's potential in Central Europe accounts for 50 % of the land forces, 50 % of the land-based air defence, 30 % of the combat aircraft, 70 % of the naval forces in the Baltic and 100 % of the airborne naval forces in the Baltic.

Besides the 490,000 soldiers of the federal armed forces, there are approximately 350,000 allied troops stationed in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, whom we support in the common interest, for instance by providing buildings and land.

This density of troops brings home to the people of the Federal Republic of Germany that they live at a highly sensitive point in the tense East-West political constellation. For us the active pursuit of a peace policy is therefore – as Chancellor Kohl said in his policy statement on 4th May 1983 – both a political necessity and a moral obligation.

The Federal Government is wholly committed to the Atlantic Alliance's basic political concept, founded on firmness and a readiness for dialogue, a concept whose validity will be reaffirmed at the forthcoming meeting of NATO foreign ministers. This concept also underlies NATO's twofold decision, pursuant to which American intermediate-range missiles will be deployed in Europe from late 1983 onwards unless a concrete negotiated settlement

Mr. Möllemann (continued)

has by then rendered such deployment superfluous. I am certain that the NATO foreign ministers will reaffirm their commitment to both parts of the decision and thus demonstrate once more the alliance's unity and predictability.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we note with concern that there are still no solutions in sight to the problems that have imposed serious strains on East-West relations in recent years. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan continues, with more than half a million victims to date, and there has been no discernible easing of the Soviet arms build-up, which greatly exceeds that country's legitimate security interests. The change of leadership in Moscow has not resulted in any shift in Soviet foreign policy. In Poland, the release of the internees and the suspension of martial law have not yet led to the national consensus that the Polish leaders had hoped for. Despite the serious strains on East-West relations and the existing ideological and political differences, the Federal Government subscribes to a policy aimed at reducing tensions, creating trust and reconciling opposing interests.

However, a policy geared to the development of constructive and stable relations between East and West and to genuine détente can only be successful in the long run if it is based on reciprocity and if the countries of the Warsaw Pact, especially the Soviet Union, contribute to it by exercising restraint and displaying responsibility in international relations. East-West relations have always been marked by a mixture of confrontation, competition and co-operation. This is not likely to change in the foreseeable future, but the opportunities for reconciliation, progress and co-operation must be perceived and utilised.

Consequently, the Federal Government regards the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe as a model for shaping East-West relations in the interests of peace. The Helsinki final act enunciates what is attainable by means of agreements between East and West in terms of political relations, human rights, contacts between people, exchange of information, security matters and economic and cultural co-operation. The final act does not expect any more of a participating state than it has undertaken by signing the act. Some things have been achieved since 1975, but much remains to be done. This process must therefore be kept alive and reinforced, and we must continue patiently to encourage and demand contacts between people and the exchange of information and ideas. The Federal Government therefore attaches the utmost importance to an early, successful conclusion of

the Madrid meeting with a substantive and balanced final document. Even at the current stage of negotiations the draft document would open up opportunities for progress and improvements for people in Europe and would enable a conference on disarmament in Europe to be convened. The moderate revisions to the document suggested by the West do not ask the impossible from any participating country. Having declared its readiness to accept the neutral compromise proposal, the Soviet Union cannot refuse to agree on a few revisions. The final document may not live up to everybody's expectations, but failure in Madrid would neither benefit the people, nor promote the achievement of human rights, nor advance the efforts on behalf of security and arms control. We need a positive outcome to the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting as an important part of the political framework for our peace policy and work for disarmament and arms control.

In the elections on 6th March Chancellor Kohl received a vote of confidence supporting the consistent continuation of these endeavours. The Federal Government is determined to do its utmost in accordance with this mandate to help bring about balanced and verifiable arms reductions. This political aim is especially crucial to us because it would take account of the anxieties and concern of large sections of our population over the horrors of nuclear war.

A realistic peace policy calls for disarmament in East and West alike. Unilateral disarmament, as demanded by some representatives of the peace movement in our country and other allied countries, does not foster greater security, but, on the contrary, insecurity. Concerned as we are for peace, we must not be guided by fear, but must take sensible decisions to preserve peace. This includes being prepared to defend ourselves together with our partners in the Atlantic Alliance, as well as working unceasingly for peaceful reconciliation between East and West, and especially for balanced arms reductions. However, the path of agreed mutual arms reductions calls for patience and perseverance. But one thing is certain: prior concessions and unilateral disarmament merely invite coercion and blackmail. This does not make peace any safer.

The alliance has submitted arms control proposals to the East that embrace all areas of the military balance of forces and aim at concrete results. Our citizens undoubtedly place their hopes above all in early results at the Geneva INF talks. On 29th March the alliance submitted a proposal for an interim agreement, designed to secure parity of the Soviet and American potentials at the lowest level acceptable to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Möllemann (continued)

Since then, Mr. Andropov has announced in Moscow that the Soviet Union is willing to accept warheads as the criterion for calculating the ratio of forces. This is undoubtedly an advance, but a point of criticism is that the Soviet Union persists in its demand that British and French systems be counted, which is unacceptable to the Western European allies. The opportunities for progress afforded by this change in the Soviet Union's position must now be examined at the negotiating table. The western proposal for an interim agreement has provided the negotiators with a flexible framework for exploring the possibilities.

Despite the importance and topicality of INF, we must not neglect arms control in the conventional sphere. We must continue our efforts to come to grips with the problem of the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional weapons, not only by means of defence policy, but also through arms control. This is why we shall continue to seek a solution through MBFR and why the Federal Government attaches so much importance to a conference on disarmament in Europe, which now offers an opportunity to achieve an attempt at arms control in negotiations covering the whole of Europe as far as the Urals.

The Federal Government also attaches particular importance to the work of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, which is the only forum for negotiations on disarmament and arms control on a global scale. It urges that all of the talks in the Committee on Disarmament be stepped up. Mr. Genscher underlined this emphatically once more in his statement to the committee on 3rd February 1983 at the start of this year's session.

The negotiations on a worldwide, comprehensive and dependably verifiable ban on all chemical weapons are a matter of top priority for us. In the course of time these negotiations have led to agreement in some areas and to some initial convergence on the key question of a reasonable and reliable verification régime, which must include systematic on-site inspections. To help resolve this very question, the Federal Government has made constructive contributions in the form of proposals submitted in March and September 1982 and presented a model for a comprehensive verification régime. The Federal Government believes that an agreement banning all chemical weapons is attainable and will continue to exploit every opportunity of influencing these difficult talks in a constructive manner and of actively expediting them. Here in particular we put our trust in the support of our western allies.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in a year of such decisive political importance worldwide as this one, we place even greater reliance on these many and varied political and security activities on behalf of maintaining peace. The Federal Government is firmly convinced that these activities can succeed through the joint efforts of the allies. The western alliance owes its strength and cohesion to the fact that it is a voluntary association, based on a wide range of shared ideals and political values. If this community of values of the free democratic countries of Europe and North America is to survive, a permanent dialogue is needed. The Federal Republic of Germany concurs with you, Ladies and Gentlemen, in the view that the WEU Assembly can and will make an important contribution to this dialogue in the future, as it has in the past. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank Mr. Möllemann for his address and for his good wishes for the future of the Assembly.

I would now ask him to be so kind as to answer questions from the members of the Assembly.

I call Mr. Holtz.

Mr. HOLTZ (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to ask the Secretary of State about the Federal Government's position on a WEU protocol in which the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes not to manufacture certain types of weapons and means of mass destruction, such as atomic, biological and chemical weapons. This protocol states, however, that it will refrain from doing so in its national territory. Does this undertaking by the Federal Republic of Germany mean that it may manufacture or co-operate in the manufacture of such weapons outside its own territory?

You referred to the community of free peoples when describing the alliance. I regard this not only as a statement of fact but, where Turkey is concerned, for instance, as an exhortation. How does the alliance, how do the other countries intend to use their influence so that the Turkish people can make free and democratic decisions once again?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – During the Franco-German consultations in October of last year the two sides agreed that their discussions should be extended to include security and defence matters. It would surely not be presumptuous to ask the Secretary of State to provide this Assembly, which he too considers to be the

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

only parliamentary body permitted to discuss European defence and disarmament questions, with some details of the content of these consultations.

A second question I should like to ask is this: the Secretary of State is familiar with the proposals and suggestions various French ministers have propounded here, all amounting to a call for a more active WEU Council and Assembly. I would be interested to hear what the Federal Republic of Germany and the Federal Government think of these proposals and what your own views are.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The Secretary of State said that the result of the elections on 6th March 1983 was also a vote in favour of balanced and verifiable arms reductions. Is he not perhaps going too far in supporting the NATO arms build-up, and perhaps even regarding the elections of 6th March 1983 as a majority vote in favour of this concept? That is my first question.

Second, does the Secretary of State share my view that the "arm to disarm" formula has failed where disarmament is concerned? Does he not also agree that disarmament on this basis has never made any progress and that it would be foolhardy to try this formula again now, at so dangerous a time, when a further increase in nuclear stockpiles might lead to annihilation?

My third question is this: you say that the strength of the western system is that it is a voluntary association. Now that the Sinus study has revealed that some 60 % of the population of the Federal Republic of Germany are opposed to the deployment of these medium-range weapons in their country, would you not agree that there is no question of any voluntary acceptance of these next steps in the arms build-up?

Fourth, you did not explain why the Soviet Government's desire to include French and British missiles, in a balance of warheads, for example, is unacceptable. I should like to know why you think this is unacceptable and how the Federal Government would argue the case if, as a result of independent armament, Czechoslovakia, for instance, had missiles of its own, as France and the United Kingdom have. Would the Federal Government not take it for granted that such missiles should be included in a numerical comparison?

Finally, since you have said that as a result of the elections on 6th March 1983 the Federal Government is interested in balanced

and verifiable arms reductions, I should like to hear from you whether it could not also take steps in favour of establishing a genuine disarmament agency, a genuine European disarmament committee, possibly under the auspices of WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jung.

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. Minister, I should like to congratulate you on the effort made by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to promote European development and for everything that you said to us a few moments ago.

But I consider that it would be equally interesting to hear an analysis from you of the military potential of East Germany, because we are all very much aware that, in the present situation, there are certain problems; and you are the man best placed to talk about these.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Möllemann.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Parliamentary Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to begin by answering Mr. Holtz's two questions. The undertaking to which he referred extends not only to our own territory but also to the types of weapon which have been mentioned here. We have undertaken not to manufacture A, B and C weapons, and we do not do so, anywhere. The Federal Government intends to abide by this position. As to the situation in Turkey, the Federal Government joins with its partners in the Council of Europe, I believe, and in Western European Union and NATO, in advocating that the timetable laid down by the Turkish military government for the reintroduction of democracy should be observed so that democratic principles and human rights may soon be fully restored in Turkey. This is after all one of the criteria which must be met by every member of the alliance.

The controversy in our parliament in the Federal Republic of Germany, and probably among parliamentarians in the other countries too, concerns the best way of influencing the Turkish military government in this respect. We are convinced that we should use our contacts, honour the commitments we have entered into and continue to co-operate on this basis while calling on the Turkish Government to observe the timetable it has adopted, in preference to suspending these contacts or disregarding our commitments. We are relying on our assessment of the situation in Turkey and the course of historical developments.

Mr. Möllemann (continued)

Secondly, I should like to address Mr. Ahrens and answer his two questions. Franco-German co-operation in defence policy has only recently begun in earnest: the consultations in fact fulfil the Elysée agreement in an area to which it had not previously been applied. In view of the special rôle played by France in the alliance, it is natural that co-ordination, information and consultation between two neighbours, who moreover have a particularly prominent part to play in national military defence, should be stepped up in this way.

In a speech he made some time ago the French President explained what is not included in this co-operation. It does not extend to nuclear weapons or a nuclear strategy, nor does it imply the formation of a kind of alliance within the alliance. What it does concern is the practical co-ordination of all matters and plans relating to national defence so that neither the structure of the two countries' armed forces nor their training, equipment and weaponry develop along conflicting or parallel lines, but can be brought into rational harmony with each other.

The second question concerned the proposals that have been made here and elsewhere for the future planning of WEU's work. You referred to the French proposals, and there are others. We feel that all these proposals should be very carefully analysed, taking two questions in particular as the criterion.

Is it possible that there is a duplication of effort here, that work is being taken on which is already being done efficiently elsewhere? For example, in some of the proposals made by Mr. Hintermann, for whom I have the greatest respect, I see a danger of duplication of very important work that is already being done elsewhere. I feel that at a time when we all have enough to do and when all good people, simply because they are good, are working to capacity, we should beware of burdening them with work that involves a repetition of something that has already been done.

Nor do I think we should create the impression that there is something like rivalry between this and other organisations. On the contrary, its work must be complementary to the others'.

To Mr. Vogt I would say that election results can, of course, be interpreted in different ways, depending on how they affect us personally and on the criteria we apply. This is particularly fascinating in an international body.

It is surely indisputable that the present Federal Government won a clear majority on 6th March 1983. I believe it made its position on the NATO twofold decision which we are

now discussing very clear to the public before the elections. It must be assumed that the public voted as they did because of rather than despite this position.

Your second question concerned the "arm to disarm" formula. There would indeed be little point in using it in this way. As far as I can remember, I did not mention the phrase in my statement just now. The very essence of the twofold decision consists in attempting to reach agreement on disarmament before arming, in other words, to involve the other side in the extent of our own armament. This is a co-operative approach which did not exist until the twofold decision was taken. I would have been very pleased if the Soviet Union had proposed to the western alliance that it would make its deployment of SS-20 systems dependent on prior arms control negotiations, rather than confronting us with their deployment as a *fait accompli*. The Federal Government and, I believe, the western alliance will maintain this other approach, namely the attempt to proceed on a co-operative basis. One thing is clear, however: where imbalances have arisen as a result of pre-emptive armament and where they cannot be eliminated through negotiations, we must restore the balance with defence efforts of our own. In this respect, the western alliance is pursuing the goal not of parity of numbers, as the twofold decision makes perfectly clear, but of parity of options.

In your third question you referred to my contention that one of the strengths of the western alliance is that it is a voluntary association. I fail to see how your counter-argument refutes this argument, but I will nevertheless take up your question.

You said that a survey had shown 60% of the citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany were opposed to the deployment of American land-based, medium-range missiles in their country. Like most of the members here, I expect, I am familiar from my work with a great number of very sound public opinion polls on alliance policy and the various aspects of defence policy, and I know that the findings vary very substantially. I do not therefore think it is wise to pick out just one such poll and one set of answers. The Federal Government has sufficient evidence to show that, if it advocates both elements of the twofold decision with equal credibility, it will continue to enjoy the support of the majority of the population. Not the least important factor in this will be whether all the parties represented in the parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany which have hitherto backed both elements of the twofold decision, and particularly the progenitors of this decision, will stand by their offspring.

Mr. Möllemann (continued)

You have asked me why British and French warheads cannot be included in the INF talks in Geneva as the Soviet Union has demanded. I said that the western alliance considered this demand unacceptable because it would mean including these warheads twice. As you know, the ceiling fixed at the SALT talks provided for the de facto inclusion of the French and British systems in the western weapons count, although this was not explicitly stated.

Of course, one might object that SALT II has not been ratified. But I believe we are all satisfied for SALT II to be treated by both sides as if it had been ratified and that the two sides mutually confirm this. Over and above this, however – and someone else ought to be advancing this argument: it is not really up to me – a statement by President Mitterrand before the German Bundestag and various remarks by Mrs. Thatcher have made it clear that there are other factors preventing the French and British Governments from agreeing to the inclusion of their systems in the count. I have stated the objective reasons, which are of paramount importance to us.

I do not think – and I now refer to your last question – that there is any shortage of international bodies or forums to deal with disarmament. It is my impression that the West's disarmament proposals have created so wide a range of possible arenas for action that it is now a question of finding the political will actually to make reductions as a step towards practical and verifiable agreements. The West is ready to do this.

I now come to Mr. Jung's question. It is difficult to do justice to your request for information on the development of the Warsaw Pact's military potential in the German Democratic Republic, but there have undeniably been unwelcome changes which have further upset the balance or tipped it against the West in two areas: conventionally equipped land forces, and air forces. There has been a further shift in the Warsaw Pact's favour in both these areas.

Mr. President, I shall conclude by reverting to one of Mr. Vogt's questions, which I overlooked just now. He asked me somewhat rhetorically how we would react if Czechoslovakia, for example, should hit on the idea of going it alone nationally, as it were, and producing and deploying nuclear systems. I believe we are all quite clear that the realities of the situation make this question extremely rhetorical. He was comparing the situation in Czechoslovakia with the situation in France. I feel that objectively the position of these two countries in relation to their own system of alliance is so different that no further comment is needed. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The Secretary of State's last remark prompts me to put a supplementary question. In an assembly such as this it should be permissible to use what might be termed logical aids, as I have done with the hypothetical case of missiles being deployed in Czechoslovakia. I feel we should agree on that.

I should like to extend the question somewhat. Do you not think that if the negotiations in Geneva do fail and SS-20s continue to be deployed without restriction and if NATO similarly proceeds to the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles, the attempt to arrive at negotiations by means of a postponement, in other words, to involve the other side in the agreed extent of armament, must be considered just as much of a failure as other disarmament formulas? Are you not also concerned that, as I have heard, the Soviet Union might move its medium-range missiles, hitherto confined to its own territory, closer to the Federal Republic of Germany, to Western Europe, thus enabling it, with its SS-20s, to match the shorter early-warning period which NATO's Pershing IIs would allow? Would you not then agree that the effect of the arms build-up already under way in NATO – to the extent that preparatory construction work is going ahead in Italy, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany – might well be the opposite of what the advocates of this concept hope to achieve and substantially increase the danger of a nuclear war, especially one caused by mistake?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. SCHWARZ (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I should like to ask the Secretary of State if he took account of last week's events in Turkey in his answer, in which he said that the generals would keep to the timetable and that he would do everything he could to help. A party founded under recently introduced Turkish legislation has been banned and sixteen politicians have been sent into exile. Does he agree that it is more important for democratic freedoms to be restored in Turkey than for the timetable to be observed, and therefore for the elections on 6th November to be free and democratic as we understand these terms rather than a mere sham? Does he also agree that the Federal Government must make a great effort to obtain the release of the sixteen politicians who have been arrested, if Turkey's relations with the Council of Europe and with the Federal Republic of Germany are to remain as cordial as they have been in the past?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Möllemann.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Parliamentary Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I shall begin with Mr. Vogt's questions. It would, of course, be regrettable for everyone concerned if the negotiations being conducted in Geneva on the basis of the twofold decision failed to produce agreement to the zero option on both sides or at least an interim solution. The decision the alliance has taken would then leave it with no other alternative than to compensate for the imbalance that has since developed, by deploying its own land-based, medium-range Pershing II and cruise missiles.

However, having assessed the progress of the negotiations so far, my impression is that such pessimism is at present of a very hypothetical nature, to say the least. I should like, Mr. President, to give you three brief examples in support of this statement.

First, the Soviet Union began by rejecting negotiations on the twofold decision in any form and in fact demanded its withdrawal or at least its suspension.

Second, it refused to negotiate on warheads. All it would discuss was missiles, launcher systems. For obvious reasons, that was out of the question, since the Soviet launcher systems carry three warheads, while the Pershing II, if it is now deployed, will carry only one.

Third, the Soviet Union repeatedly said at the beginning of the talks that it could not make substantial concessions because there was virtual parity in this area. Mr. Andropov's recent speech, however, clearly indicates that the Soviet Union is prepared to accept a greater reduction in its missiles. In other words, it admits to an imbalance of forces. It would be altogether too blatant if it did not, Ladies and Gentlemen, since it is quite literally phenomenal that a power like the Soviet Union should have managed to conduct a positively gigantic propaganda campaign since 13th December 1979 against the possible deployment of western systems from December 1983 onwards, while itself deploying a fresh SS-20 launcher every week. This is known colloquially in my country as the "Stop thief" method. The unfortunate thing is that some people still fall for it.

You also said that in this situation the Soviet Union might move its SS-20s forward. The mobility of these systems allows them to be moved backwards and forwards, which explains why not only Japan but also the ASEAN countries have now become worried.

I feel, however, that you have misunderstood the statements made by the Soviet leaders last week. They referred not to the movement of existing systems but to the deployment of additional systems in Warsaw Pact countries to the west of the Soviet Union, which would indeed increase the discrepancy in the balance of power.

Lastly, the deployment of one hundred and eight Pershing II systems can in no way be seriously related to the first strike concept. A system which cannot even reach Moscow, which flies just two thousand kilometres and so cannot reach the main control centres in the Soviet sphere of influence, which corresponds to just 10% of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear potential – to describe this as a first-strike capability is, objectively speaking, completely without justification. The philosophy formulated by Helmut Schmidt and Hans-Dietrich Genscher was to secure, in this area too, deterrence not on the basis of numerical equality but of efficiency in terms of parity of options.

To conclude, I turn to Mr. Schwarz. I fully agree that last week's events did not come up to our expectations – on the contrary – and that the assurances given to the West did refer not only to a period of time but also to matters of substance. Of course, as champions of the idea of freedom, we parliamentarians must support our counterparts in Turkey – and most of them are former colleagues – and appeal for their release. The Federal Government and the other countries of the western alliance would do well to bring their influence to bear in every way they can. However, I have the impression, Mr. Schwarz, that this will be the more convincingly and effectively achieved, the clearer we make it to Turkey that, if these requirements are satisfied, it will retain its place in our alliance, because we want to go on co-operating with Turkey as a partner. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Secretary of State, we have probably taken up too much of your time. Thank you again for giving such precise answers to the questions put to you. I, and my colleagues, hope that we shall have the pleasure of receiving you again in this Assembly in order to continue a fruitful exchange of views.

Owing to the particularly heavy work-load for this part-session, I propose to the Assembly that, in accordance with Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, speeches in all the debates, except those of committee chairmen and rapporteurs, be kept to five minutes.

I would remind you that, under the same rule, the Assembly must vote on this proposal without debate.

The President (continued)

Please understand the rather special situation in which this session is taking place.

Are there any objections?...

The proposal is agreed to.

11. China and European security

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 945 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on China and European security and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 945 and amendments.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I, in turn, should like to congratulate you on your election. I am happy to see you presiding over our discussions and our work in the spirit which you described, which, I hope, found favour with all our colleagues.

The report which I have the honour to present on behalf of the General Affairs Committee was prepared after a visit by this committee to the People's Republic of China. The Rapporteur's first duty, which I find particularly pleasant, is to express our warmest thanks to the Chinese authorities, who invited the committee, gave it the best possible reception, even arranging for it to have a talk with the Prime Minister, Mr. Zhao Ziyang, for an hour and a half, and provided it with all the information it asked for.

I should like to extend a special greeting to the representatives of the Chinese Embassy who are attending this debate. I also wish to thank my colleagues on the General Affairs Committee, especially our Chairman, Sir Frederic Bennett, who is unable to be present today, and our secretariat.

I ought to explain, by a few words of introduction, why China is the subject of study by Western European Union.

I was able to observe, during the joint meetings between the Assembly and the Council in Brussels only just over a fortnight ago, that the representatives of the governments of our seven countries considered, as we do, that relations between Europe and China are not merely an economic matter but also lie within the area of foreign policy and joint security.

I therefore welcome this recognition by both the Council and the Assembly that China is now an essential factor for equilibrium and peace in the world.

An institution which is responsible for the security of Western Europe can no longer ignore the fact – any more than the People's Republic of China did when it invited a committee of our Assembly to pay a visit – that Western European Union is the only European organisation with competence with regard to security. This is indeed what Mr. Tindemans, Chairman-in-Office of both the Council of Western European Union and the EEC Council, made clear when he addressed us in order to present the point of view of the Seven and the Ten on their relations with the People's Republic of China on the very day when the Council had just been discussing this question.

This being so, a report taking stock of the questions which China poses for Western Europe from the point of view of its security could not be restricted to the purely military sphere. It could not even devote a great deal of space to it.

China has its defence policy, its strategy, geared to its requirements and above all to its resources, which are immense in terms of space, time and numbers of people but limited in terms of the factors relating to modern technology. We have our policy, which reflects what we are. The convergences are restricted to the overriding importance to us both of maintaining a peace which can only be based on a worldwide balance of forces.

Neither Europe nor China can be happy to see a shifting of Soviet intercontinental missiles from East to West; but the important thing for us is to assess to what extent China is now and will remain for the foreseeable future a partner we can trust.

That is why a large section of this report is devoted to China's economic and political development since the disappearance of Mao Zedong in 1976 and especially during the last two years, because it was not until then that the trends which were emerging became established, took clearer shape and gained ground in many fields.

There is no point in my repeating now what is in the report before you, and I should therefore like to confine myself to mentioning briefly a few points which do not appear in the report but which to my mind confirm and reinforce the ideas outlined in it.

It should be said straight away that it appeared to us that China, after a long period of ideological intoxication when its leaders seem to have thought that everything was possible, had

Mr. Caro (continued)

reverted to a rational, moderate and above all realistic view of things. Recognising that their country was still, despite obvious progress, an underdeveloped country, China's present leaders set themselves the task of lifting their country out of this state and of creating, by way of plans which have been repeatedly modified since 1976, the basic conditions for a genuine economic advance. This entailed recourse to private enterprise, which had been missing from China for decades, and the restoration of certain freedoms, which were primarily but not exclusively economic. Those of us who had visited China previously were impressed by the extent to which it had advanced in this direction.

Since the drafting of the report which I have the honour to present to you, certain further events, which in my opinion merely confirm the conclusions reached by the General Affairs Committee, have taken place. While the most important of these is President Mitterrand's visit to China, there is also the adoption of common positions on China by the European ministers who met at Gymnich early in May, as Mr. Tindemans, the Belgian Minister for External Relations, in his capacity as President-in-Office of the European Political Co-operation Council, informed the members of our Assembly at the meeting in Brussels on 17th May. Mention should also be made, however, of Mr. Tindeman's visit to the United States and of the American Government's relaxation of the Cocom ban on the export of certain products to China. As a result, several of the recommendations which the General Affairs Committee is asking you to approve already correspond to the joint policy of the member countries of WEU, and your Rapporteur can only welcome this.

Thus, the principle of regular political consultation between the Ten and the Government of the People's Republic of China, mentioned to the committee by the Prime Minister, Mr. Zhao Ziyang, was adopted by the Ten at the Gymnich meeting, and the Ten also appear to have decided to explore, within the European Economic Community, ways and means of increasing economic co-operation with the People's Republic of China.

Furthermore, Mr. Tindemans openly admitted that in his opinion and that of his European partners it was not right to apply to the People's Republic of China the restrictions which are imposed on the export to the Soviet Union of products which could have a military use. It is fortunate that the United States has since agreed to an appreciable easing of these restrictions in the case of China, but Western Europe can and must demand and obtain more than this. There are no grounds for regarding

the People's Republic of China as a potential enemy, because, as far back as twenty-three years ago, it severed most of its links with the Soviet Union and now considers, as we do, that the Soviet Union's formidable military power is at present the main threat which it faces.

With regard to President Mitterrand's visit, while it probably helped to promote greater economic co-operation between France and China, its main result was a substantial rapprochement of views on the only political problem about which there was still a major difference of opinion between Europe and China: that of Cambodia. True, none of our countries was prepared to recognise as a *fait accompli* either the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam or the régime which the latter has set up there. But they all felt the greatest loathing for the previous régime, the Khmer Rouge whose bloody tyranny is a matter of common knowledge. The argument that the Khmer Rouge is the most powerful element in the resistance to the Phnom Penh régime cannot be allowed to make us forget the recent past. But if China now has as its objective the establishment in Cambodia of an independent, democratic state based on self-determination for the Cambodians and willing to associate itself with the other countries of South-East Asia, there are no longer any divergences between China and Western Europe.

For in fact China's other main objectives, namely the recovery of the parts of the Chinese territory which were taken from it by the one-sided treaties of the 19th century, do not clash either with Europe's interests or with the principles which it upholds - whether it be Hong Kong, where the United Kingdom intends to defend the interests of both the local population and the international community, but not the treaties of the 19th century, or Taiwan, which all our countries have recognised as forming part of the territory of China but whose reversion to China depends primarily on domestic developments both in Taiwan and in the People's Republic of China. The present movement towards greater freedom in China warrants the hope that the day will soon come when it will be possible for the proposals which it recently made to the Taipei régime for a status giving a large measure of autonomy to be considered by a government which itself also claims to be Chinese. A recent contact with representatives of Taiwan convinced your Rapporteur that the gulf separating the two political entities claiming to represent China is not in fact as wide as it might seem.

The West should at least be careful to avoid encouraging a certain intransigence on the part of the Taipei authorities stemming, in particular, from the supplying of sophisticated armaments which the People's Republic of China

Mr. Caro (continued)

lacks. The consistently peaceful policy pursued by the People's Republic of China in recent years should warrant reconsideration of the desirability of these deliveries. This is an argument which Western Europe probably ought to press more strongly in dealing with the United States, whose true interests are no different from ours on this subject.

In the absence of the Chairman of the committee, I ought to give you some idea of the course of its deliberations. The first point to note is that the report which I am presenting was adopted unanimously – in other words that, basically, it reflects general agreement on the analyses and conclusions which it puts forward.

This does not mean, however, that there was complete identity of views among all the members of the committee, or even among those who had visited China. Some of them felt that the report was not sufficiently critical of the domestic situation in China, especially as regards respect for freedom and human rights, and this caused the Rapporteur to make certain changes to his explanatory memorandum and calls for comment here.

The first point is that the subject of our study was neither Chinese society nor Chinese political life, but what China represents for European security. This is not the Council of Europe, and China's domestic situation concerns us only from the point of view of its possible repercussions on China's relations with the rest of the world.

The second point is that the committee's visit to China did not allow it to extend its investigations to this area. There could be no question of dealing in the same way with matters for which the Rapporteur possessed direct information and those about which the only information he has is indirect, unverifiable and often contradictory. I have therefore adhered, on certain points such as that of greater freedom for national minorities or for what have come to be called "democratic parties", to official documents provided by the People's Republic of China, without going into the matter further.

But the third, and probably the most important, reason is that I felt it to be unjust and unprofitable to make judgments on these subjects by reference to absolute values, which would in fact be the standards of our western societies, which mean so much to us. I thought it much fairer and much more in keeping with a sound assessment of realities to note current developments rather than attempt to define China's precise position. While it is true that many freedoms are still lacking, the fact remains that the evolution which began

seven years ago and has speeded up to a remarkable extent during the last two years is in the direction of a very considerable increase in all kinds of freedoms, and not just the economic freedoms on which my report mainly concentrates. That, to my mind, is the most significant aspect.

I would add that many restrictions of freedom and violations of what we regard as inalienable human rights are not primarily due to the political system but are attributable to the state of a society which has remained rural and archaic in many respects. Only through the transformation of this society, and through the economic transformation of the country, can any real, permanent progress towards greater freedom be made. It therefore seems to me important for us to examine how China has set about the task of remedying its present state of underdevelopment, while continuing to denounce the violations of the rights of the individual which have taken place in the past and are probably occurring today. Because I am convinced that these violations are incompatible with China's most legitimate national aspirations, as territorial unification can only take place peacefully if acceptable and credible guarantees can be offered to all Chinese without exception.

In reply to another objection expressed to the committee I should also emphasise that the fact that neither Western Europe nor China is participating in the Geneva negotiations on the limitation of nuclear armaments does not mean that international equilibrium can be a matter of indifference to either of them. While the Chinese are very ready to denounce the "dual hegemony", they are perfectly capable of distinguishing between a threat and an error of diplomacy. On the European side it would be completely wrong to regard the threat represented by the Soviet armies, tanks and missiles as being on the same plane as any objections, however justified, we might have to this or that aspect of American policy.

At least the fact that we remain allies of the United States does not prevent us – far from it – from urging upon it what we consider to be fair and reasonable, as Mr. Tindemans has just done, not without success, with regard to his country's trade with the People's Republic of China. The purpose of this report is in no way to set a European, pro-Chinese policy against an American policy which is less so, but to urge Western Europe to persuade the United States to recognise interests which are common to the West as a whole. The prospects of an opening-up of China to the international community, which our diagnosis suggests are sound and probably lasting, do not, however, justify any attempt on our part to make China into a new market just for ourselves. On the contrary, they impel us to lay great emphasis on

Mr. Caro (continued)

the areas of convergence between China and Europe with a view to strengthening international peace, developing co-operation and trade and organising an international community embracing the whole of the world.

The purpose of the report which I am presenting to you today is to contribute to this work, which, by its very nature, is in accordance with WEU's terms of reference. Taking its place among reports on European union, the activities of WEU, the relations between Europe and the United States and, indeed, on pacifism and neutralism, it will contribute, if you approve its recommendations, to defining Europe's position in a world which is seeking to achieve and organise a peace based on the elimination of underdevelopment, on economic and social progress and on free trade as well as on the balance of forces and the limitation of armaments.

Europe and China for mutual security – that is a task worthy of WEU. The time at our disposal is probably short. Let us make sure that we seize the opportunity squarely for the sake of our peoples, our youth and peace. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Caro, for your very full and clear report. I consider it most important, after the visit to China by our Assembly's General Affairs Committee, for us to be given such a concise summary in the presence of the distinguished guests whom I can see in the gallery, and to whom I offer our respectful greetings.

The names of eight speakers are down for the general debate. I would remind you that speaking time is limited to five minutes. I shall insist on this, because we are already behind schedule.

I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – Before my allotted time begins, let me be the first of the European Democratic Group to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your electoral victory this afternoon. Having followed your leadership in China during the visit of the sub-committee after it had left Beijing, I have no doubt that you will become a popular and dynamic President of this Assembly and that you will bring much credit to its reputation.

I associate myself with Mr. Caro's remarks of appreciation to the Chinese authorities for the manner in which they received us. They did so with great courtesy. They received us at a high governmental and administrative level and with the determination that we should fully learn their political position in the world, as

well as their economic aspirations and achievements. At the same time, they were determined that we should enjoy some of the glories, both natural and man-made, of that great country. On every account it was a journey of quite exceptional and absorbing interest, as I am sure everyone who took part will agree.

By every account China has made considerable economic progress in the seven short years since the cultural revolution ended. Although I had not visited China before, I was surprised among other things by the number of cars in the streets and the amount of construction, particularly of apartment blocks, that had taken place. China is now free from the destructive conflict of the ten-year-long cultural revolution and is able to organise and concentrate its immense energies on the long-term task of turning itself into a great economic power. I have no doubt that in twenty-five years' time China's rôle in the world's balance of power will look very different.

The second striking phenomenon of China today is that for the first time in its history it is systematically setting out to get to know, and have a contact with, the rest of the world. There are various explanations for that which I shall not go into, but the deepest is that China is preparing a pattern of greater involvement in world affairs that is more appropriate to a country that sees itself as a great power of the future.

The third phenomenon is that, as China hurries to modernise itself internally and to develop constructive partnerships internationally, ideology will plainly not be allowed to become an obstacle to economic progress. Private ownership and private economic activity are given considerably greater encouragement than before. If anyone wishes to obtain the full flavour of that pragmatism, he should read the 1982 constitution – a most interesting document – particularly Article 13.

The West should welcome and respond to this opening out of China. We should do business with China. I am certain that China is ready to do business on attractive terms with western companies. We should also have regular exchanges of views at political level, above all on strategic matters, and, to the extent that we have a common interest, we should maintain common policies.

China makes three major complaints against present Soviet policy – the continuing occupation of Afghanistan, which we tend to forget is a neighbour of China; Soviet support for the regional hegemony of Vietnam over Cambodia; and the massive presence of Russian troops along China's borders. We should continue to call for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from

Lord Reay (continued)

Afghanistan and refuse to recognise the puppet régime in Cambodia. We should also seek to remove possible sources of conflict between our countries and China. In this respect I am pleased by the inclusion in the recommendation of a recognition of the need for a negotiated solution for Hong Kong. I find it hard to believe that the two powers concerned, in friendly relations with each other, will not be able to resolve this problem satisfactorily. Plainly, a solution is desirable sooner rather than later.

We should avoid any actions that are likely to delay or obstruct a peaceful Chinese solution to the Taiwan problem. There remains the problem...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Will you please wind up your speech, Lord Reay?

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – I am just about to conclude, Mr. President.

I am sure that you will take account of the fact that as the first member called in the debate, I find it difficult to adjust and to halve the length of my speech, particularly when discussing such a delicate question. We can do little more than seek to influence and steady the policy of the United States by our example along the general lines that I have mentioned as being desirable for western interests.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Lord Reay, for your warm words on behalf of your group. I am grateful to you for them and for your support.

I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, China is in no way a threat to international security. But that country's position and development are and will remain crucial factors for world peace. It is therefore in the interests of Europe, China and overall balance that stable and trusting relations be established between Western Europe and China. But the subject prompts me to make a few remarks, none of which, of course, in any way detracts from Mr. Caro's excellent report.

The first concerns the fact that, with the sources at present available to us, China's medium-term development makes much of our information and many of the deductions which we draw from it more intuitive, it seems to me, than reasoned and, above all, more concerned with today than forward-looking.

My second remark concerns the need to put the very comprehensive picture of the present situation painted by Mr. Caro in its chronological perspective. On first consideration, it

looks as if China will need peace until at least the year 2000. With this prospect it is therefore important that Europe should endeavour, fairly and without exerting pressure on it, to establish with China links such as will enable it to continue along this road and adhere to this course, which is of vital importance to everyone.

This aim prompts my third observation, concerning the need for Western Europe to establish extensive, balanced economic relations with China as quickly as possible. The dominant economic position of Japan, the emergence as world market competitors, during the last few decades, of certain nations – of which Korea is a significant but not isolated example – are indications, indeed lessons, which must be taken into account.

Experience in fact shows nowadays that economic co-operation often means the creation, for the more distant future, of a definite danger of competition. Competition created by the establishment of economic links between Europe and China, so rightly recommended by Mr. Caro, is no exception to the general rule. But this is a calculated risk which Western Europe must take. The absence of Western Europe from China's economic development during the last part of the century would, in my opinion, be irreparable. For China has abiding features and constituent elements which neither its leaders nor the international community can afford, now or in the future, to disregard. China is a communist state and a developing and temporarily unaligned country.

The fact that China will one day be transformed from a developing country into an industrialised country will inevitably shift the economic axis of the world. This will influence, among other things, strength relationship and North-South political positions. China already has an influence and interests in Asia, especially the South-East part of that continent.

Two by no means absurd hypotheses can be envisaged. The first is that of a Sino Japanese economic association. What effect would this coalition have on the world economy and on Europe's standard of living? The second hypothesis, even more dangerous, is that of a change in Sino-Soviet relations. What would happen to the world if, tomorrow, Russia, with its allies, were to form an alliance with an economically developed China?

Especially as there are still two major unknown factors in the Chinese situation. One concerns the present and foreseeable attitude and internal influence of its army. What is it? What is it thinking? Whom, if the situation calls for it, will it obey? Will it be the great imponderable or, more in line with

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

tradition, will it follow the example of the warlords or of the Latin American, *pronunciamientos*? There is not, I believe, at present anything certain enabling an objective and precise answer to be given to this question.

The second question concerns the real holders, at present and in the immediate future, of political power within the Chinese Communist Party. Is the present team – the successor of many others since the long march – solidly based or is it merely a transient phenomenon? Who knows? From the passage of time we can deduce one – albeit by no means decisive – fact. The next two decades will see the gradual arrival on the scene, at successive levels of the government hierarchy, of those who have been schooled in Moscow.

These considerations raise – without solving – the not unimportant question of the holding and use of power in China. There can thus be no absolute certainty in the present state of western and eastern society. But I nevertheless still think, as the great writer Albert Camus might say, that “there is nothing to prevent us from hoping that these two societies, if they do not destroy themselves in a general suicide, will fertilise each other and enable something new to be created”.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I will call two more speakers – Mr. Müller and Mr. Michel – so that we can close the sitting at 6.15 p.m.

I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to begin by thanking the Rapporteur, Mr. Caro, very much for his report. I see it as a documentary record. As a member of the delegation, I had the same experiences and took notes on the same discussions as our Rapporteur, and from my notes I can see how accurately Mr. Caro has brought everything together in this report. It will stand as a permanent and valuable documentary record.

When we comment on China, we must not forget that Europe once had a very peculiar relationship with this country and that the philosophical sentiments that have emerged here at times still haunt the minds of Europeans to some extent. I have only to remind you that the phrase the “Yellow Peril”, was once banded about even in the political debate in Europe, and you will know what I am talking about. So the General Affairs Committee’s visit to China has helped to correct certain ideas that may have lingered in the minds of

Europeans. That was what made this visit so valuable.

I should like to comment very briefly on three problems.

Firstly, I feel that more interest should be taken in economic co-operation. As we were able to see for ourselves, this enormous country has to import technical know-how. One of China’s trading partners that is not a super-power, not one of the hegemonic powers to which constant reference was made in China, happens to be Western Europe. This might prove useful.

In the same context, I believe it is also important to consider co-operation between China and the industrialised countries of Western Europe in the third world. I raised this question myself in a discussion with the Prime Minister, and he gave a very affirmative response. This is a point we should bear in mind for the long term.

As regards China’s foreign policy, I will simply say on the subject of Cambodia that I was very impressed to hear on all sides that the Chinese are obviously allowing Cambodia to follow an independent course. They know, as they often told us, that the key lies with the Soviet Union, without whose help Vietnam could not pursue its present policy towards Cambodia.

This brings me to my third point, the relationship between China and the Soviet Union. It became increasingly clear to me at informal meetings as well as in the official discussions that the Chinese know that the Soviet Union is the only colonial power left in the world, large areas of Asia having been conquered under the Tsars. Reference was made to the unfair treaties concluded at that time. China feels itself particularly badly affected, and although I know that China does not intend to use force to solve this problem, the Chinese will never forget and will always regard this as an encroachment on their sovereignty.

The question of Afghanistan also arises here, the Soviet attack on Afghanistan being seen by the Chinese as a direct threat to China’s sovereignty since it has a common frontier with Afghanistan. We were repeatedly told that we in the West must remember that the policy pursued by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan is merely a first step towards the Middle East and may be followed by others.

To conclude, I am pleased to see that paragraph 135 of Mr. Caro’s report refers to China’s opinion on the reunification of Germany. It seems to me very important – and we are very grateful for the Chinese attitude – that they

Mr. Müller (continued)

refer to the indivisibility of Germany and approach the problem in this way.

Let us be under no illusions: China is without doubt an extremely important factor in Europe's security. Even a passive participant in world politics influences the balance of power. But we should forget any ideas of its possibly becoming an ally if, for example, we should be threatened by the Soviet Union.

I will conclude by quoting Mao Zedong: "Distant water will not put out a nearby fire". This applies to us too, if we try to include China in our calculations in relation to our own security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Michel.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should first of all like to add my congratulations to those of the previous speakers to our President and to the Rapporteur for his objective and lucid survey.

I think it can be said that the General Affairs Committee's visit to the People's Republic of China was a success. It follows on from a previous report produced by Sir Frederic Bennett and it was very necessary.

It was a success both internally, that is, from the standpoint of security and European defence, and externally, that is, as a step taken on behalf of Western Europe as a whole. The Chinese with whom we talked were in fact very well aware that the WEU delegation was speaking on behalf of Western Europe, but within its own special field.

I will make four points. First, the People's Republic of China appeared to us, in all its uniqueness, to be a world apart whose external relations are dictated by its internal economic situation and its age-old traditions. China's foreign policy can only be understood through a knowledge of this background.

Second point: this country is in the throes of economic, social and demographic change. Taking a realistic attitude, the Chinese authorities understand that they must direct their economy towards intensive agricultural development and promotion of the essential capital goods industries. Rigid theoretical principles have been abandoned in favour of concrete, useful projects. If we wish to extend our economic relations with this great country, we must bear in mind these fundamental decisions taken by the Chinese authorities.

Third point: there is a broad measure of agreement, indeed a similarity of views, bet-

ween the People's Republic of China and Western Europe about most international political problems. Whether it be concerning the problem of South-East Asia, namely Cambodia, or those of the northern frontier of Afghanistan, the Middle East or, above all, with regard to missiles, we find a remarkable degree of agreement. The People's Republic of China's determination to oppose any kind of hegemony is in line with the attitude of Western Europe, which is ardently pursuing peaceful aims. From this angle, too, our attitudes should continue to move closer together in the future.

Fourth point: contacts between Western Europe and the People's Republic of China should be intensified and extended, because they are a condition of world peace and the balance of forces, even though the military strength and political influence of the People's Republic of China are at present relatively slight and limited.

I think that we should decide here and now to extend our relations and develop our contacts with each other in order to contribute in future to a peace which we both desire. Further action is necessary at an early stage in order to take stock of the situation and promote our mutual progress towards peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As intended, we shall now adjourn the debate until tomorrow morning.

12. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany proposes the following changes in committees. They are now submitted for the ratification of the Assembly in accordance with Rule 39 (6):

Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges: Mr. Schulte as titular member in place of Mr. Linde; Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration: Mr. Linde as titular member in place of Mr. Schulte.

Is there any opposition ?...

These nominations are agreed to.

13. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 7th June, at 9.30 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

The President (continued)

1. China and European security (Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 945 and amendments).
2. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 948).
3. Twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (Presentation by Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Document 942).
4. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the

Council (Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 948).

5. Political activities of the WEU Council – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 944 and amendments).

Are there any objections ?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.15 p.m.)

SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 7th June 1983

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. China and European security (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 945 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. van der Sanden, Mr. Prussen, Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Caro (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Vogt, Mr. Müller, Mr. Caro, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Caro, Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Caro.
4. Twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 942*).
Replies by Mr. Cheysson to questions put by: Mr. Dejaradin, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Jäger, Mr. Scheer.
5. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
6. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 948*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Prussen (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Dejaradin, Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Prussen (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pignion, Mr. Prussen.
7. Political activities of the WEU Council – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 944 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Ahrens (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Forma, Mr. Ahrens (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Ahrens.
8. Change in the membership of a committee.
9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

1. See page 22.

3. China and European security

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 945 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The first order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on China and European security and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 945 and amendments.

In the resumed debate, Mr. van der Sanden has the floor.

May I remind speakers that they are limited to five minutes.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to start by expressing my thanks for the great amount of work done by the Rapporteur, Mr. Caro, in producing this report, both in the preparatory period in France and also during our stay in China itself. I think that he has been extremely successful in portraying the relationship between the economic and the politico-military problems which we encountered in China.

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

These issues are not merely related, they are interdependent. I wish to make the point that the Chinese authorities missed virtually no opportunity of emphasising this relationship and interdependence to us. In particular they drew attention to the changes in Chinese policy after the cultural revolution, which were also mentioned by yesterday's speakers.

In the first place more emphasis is now being placed on agriculture and on agrarian activities aimed at feeding the thousand million mouths in mainland China. In the second place, there is the change from heavy to light industry and the shelving of the ambitious plans for China's military apparatus in favour of programmes of a markedly less ambitious character.

In the light of the situation we found in China I consider these changes to be fully justified. In the few minutes of this brief statement I do not wish to go into details. We must, however, appreciate that China feels itself threatened on three sides: along the northern frontier, which is very extensive and where a million Russian troops are stationed; on the western frontier, which has witnessed the unjustifiable military intervention of the Russians in Afghanistan, and, finally on the southern frontier, where a régime supported by Moscow has invaded Cambodia from Vietnam and virtually occupied the country.

There is naturally a direct connection between my initial remarks, which are also expressed in the report and which relate to the change in China's approach to internal issues, and the relationships which this Assembly, and in particular the General Affairs Committee, has had to examine, i.e. the relationships between European security and the position in which China currently finds itself.

It is clear that the present Chinese Government needs to do its best, short of an all-out effort, in the interests of world peace for at least the next twenty years. This outlook was made very clear: China needs to modernise its industry, to reverse the appalling consequences of the cultural revolution and to ensure that the standard of living within its vast territory is once more considerably improved.

Mr. President, in view of this situation we must be quite clear in our own minds – and this is the main point which I wish to emphasise to the Assembly today – that we have to deal with the position as we find it in China at the present time, with a certain policy and line of conduct pursued by today's Chinese leaders. How delicate the situation can be we know from the last three months, when the Foreign Minister, following his visit to Moscow and his

utterances there, quite quickly vanished from the political scene in China.

If I say that, in the present circumstances, I can fully endorse the line taken in the report and if I add that I recognise the interests of Western Europe and China with regard to their security and the threat posed to both by the Soviet Union, that does not mean, if I may speak quite plainly, that, as regards our independence and freedom and the security of the established liberties of our western democratic community in the broadest sense, we should in any way depend on any support from China. We remain dependent primarily on co-operation in Western European Union and NATO and therefore on collaboration with the United States of America.

This is the main point which I wish to emphasise today in order to ensure that we do not deviate from the fundamental policy which we have chosen in the West, but are fully aware of the possibilities which exist in China for achieving the goals which the present Chinese Government has set itself and which may lead to changes in the policy and military posture of the Chinese Government.

I would like to conclude this brief statement by once more expressing my thanks for all the work done by the Rapporteur.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Prussen.

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Caro's report on China and European security is a most valuable document, which cannot be discussed as fully as it demands in five minutes. I shall therefore confine my remarks to the problem of Taiwan, as earlier speakers have already made important comments on the problems as a whole.

Just as it was ridiculous to ignore the People's Republic of China politically for many years, it is now equally absurd to ignore Taiwan with its population of eighteen million, huddled on an island four hundred kilometres long and eighty-five kilometres wide; they are dissidents and refugees from a communist régime, whose sole ambition is to live in peace, to be free to decide their own fate, to have the right to hold and express whatever political and religious views they like, in short to enjoy all human rights as we understand them and as they are not respected in the People's Republic of China.

The governments of the free world have nothing to be proud of in their behaviour towards Taiwan. Overnight, they abandoned nationalist China, their long-standing friend, and established diplomatic relations with its

Mr. Prussen (continued)

hostile brothers who had become a more powerful force in the interval and seem likely to become a more interesting economic prospect in the immediate or more distant future.

I am sorry to have to say that the governments of the free world use a different yardstick when it comes to the application of human rights to Taiwan.

On the one hand, we sympathise with the dissidents in the communist countries and deplore the fate of the victims of communist oppression in Poland and of the Afghan refugees and rebels, but, on the other, we deliberately ignore the presence in Taiwan of eighteen million dissidents, opposed to a communist régime, who have been able to flee to that island. It would be wrong, therefore, to underestimate the strategic importance of Taiwan, the sole reliable anti-communist bastion in that part of the world, which is unquestionably a prey to communist infiltration.

It is very satisfying to note that, despite the absence of diplomatic relations with nationalist China, friendly, cultural and economic approaches involving the countries of Western Europe are increasing in frequency, either unknown to, or with the tacit consent of the various governments. The breaking of diplomatic relations with Taiwan has thus been circumvented by large numbers of cultural and economic missions, which are proof of great friendship and sympathy for this brave, hardworking people.

Please do not misunderstand me, however. While I am speaking up for Taiwan, I am enough of a realist not to underestimate the political importance of the People's Republic of China and the need for our countries to have good relations with it. I have had the opportunity to visit the People's Republic of China. I was not won over to its political ideology but I did fall under the spell of the beauty of that vast country, of the welcoming charm of its people, of its open-handed hospitality and of its age-old culture.

It would be foolish to deny the social and economic progress which that vast country has achieved over the last few years.

Mr. Caro's report identifies very accurately the present difference between the Russian and Chinese communist systems, with China moving gradually towards a more liberal régime pursuing a peace policy and preferring at the moment to invest rather in the economy than in armaments. These are points which should decide us to continue our efforts to extend relations with the People's Republic of China in order to help it to solve its economic prob-

lems, particularly after its disappointments with the Soviet Union. Collaboration between the countries of Western Europe and the People's Republic of China is bound to give added impetus to the process of liberalisation, provided the present policy keeps up the effort and is not reversed as happened at the time of the cultural revolution. Everything will depend on the succession of the present leaders.

We should agree with Mr. Caro that any study of the realities of the Chinese situation which does no more than record the ideological obstacles liable to set continental China against Western Europe would be inadequate and pointless. This kind of study and this sort of policy are not even applied to the East European countries. Why apply a different policy to continental China, always provided we remain cautious and vigilant?

The situation is not made any simpler by the attitudes of the two antagonists both claiming to represent the whole of China. Both agree on the need for peaceful reunification. But Taipei has not yielded to the temptation of Beijing's most recent proposals as reported by Mr. Caro. For Taipei, reunification will only become a possibility if liberalisation becomes a reality, Marxist-Leninist theories are abandoned, political freedoms and human rights are restored and policy is again inspired by the three great principles of Sun Yat Sen, based on nationalism, democracy and the common weal, which were the fundamental principles of the 1911 republic.

In conclusion, I should again like to stress the need for political and economic relations with the People's Republic of China and the need for technical co-operation of the kind urged by the countries of Western Europe in the spirit of the North-South dialogue.

At the same time, I should also like to awaken both the public and governments to the very special political situation of Taiwan, in the hope that our relations will become less restricted or even normal, out of respect for human rights which we are always preaching, leaving the two opposing parties to solve their problems in the Chinese fashion, with a great deal of patience and finesse.

I hope that the People's Republic of China will adopt a slightly more flexible attitude towards those who do not wish to abandon their friends in Taiwan overnight, towards the Western European organisations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Prussen you are overrunning your time. I must ask you to conclude.

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – By seeking to establish friendly, cultural and

Mr. Prussen (continued)

economic links with their Chinese friends in Taiwan, these countries will be making a genuine and sincere move towards Taiwan, with a view to peaceful reunification.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bassinet.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should first like to thank the Rapporteur for his excellent report which gives the whole of our Assembly a complete and detailed picture of China, its situation and its importance in the world.

I also wish to endorse the conclusions of the report concerning the need for the western countries to develop their relations with China and to support its efforts to maintain world peace.

In this context, I welcome the opportunity which recently fell to France to set the example by way of the visit paid to China by the President of the Republic, François Mitterrand; I also welcome the prospects for better economic and cultural collaboration which emerged from his stay there. Here, I would remind you that France was the first western country to establish diplomatic relations with China by recognising it as long ago as 1964.

These meetings culminated in the conclusion of an agreement on the principle of French participation in the construction of a power station in Guangzhou province and in preliminary talks on achieving a second power station in Kiangsu province. The Chinese also showed great interest in offers to co-operate on railway and airport equipment.

In line with this report France appears clearly as a European power anxious to have close economic and cultural relations with the People's Republic of China and it is to be hoped that the same may be true for all the western countries. France also has long-standing relations with all the South-East Asian countries.

The improvement of economic relations between the Western European countries and the People's Republic of China is of the greatest importance now that some observers suggest that Sino-Soviet trade is being re-established.

While there may be signs of a détente in Sino-Soviet relations, the exact extent of this resumption of contacts has to be measured in the light of the war in Cambodia which sees the two countries on opposite sides.

The obscurity surrounding the progress of political and economic relations between the

People's Republic of China and the USSR is such that the western countries must keep a very close watch and must take account of it in their relations with the two countries.

Our colleague's report also stresses the need to support the People's Republic of China in its efforts to maintain world peace. I cannot but endorse this conclusion which is in accord with the spirit of independence at the heart of France's foreign policy and its determination to maintain world peace effectively.

I would, however, like to express one small doubt regarding the possible development of China's foreign and defence policies. Mr. Caro's report is perhaps a little over-optimistic in saying that the recent reform of institutions together with China's domestic economic situation will probably help to keep that country on the path towards world peace. I believe that we can take a positive view of China's present rearmament as being a contribution to its deterrent policy. At the same time, the western countries must be on the watch for any diversion of use for the benefit of a third bloc.

At risk of repeating myself, I must insist on the need for the fullest possible development of trade relations between Europe and China. Indeed, economic co-operation has always been a very good guide to two countries' views of international relations as a whole. Its development opens the way to useful compromises on many bilateral and other questions.

Before concluding, I must refer to the problem of Taiwan. As I have already said, France was the first western country to recognise the existence of the People's Republic of China. We can, therefore, only deplore the ambiguous attitude of certain countries, and of the United States in particular, to the question of Taiwan. The WEU countries should adopt a united approach in this matter. I have in fact tabled an amendment on this point, which Mr. Fourré has also signed. This amendment is wholly in line with the logic of the arguments developed in Mr. Caro's report. I am, moreover, surprised that there is no reference to Taiwan in the operative text of the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – In our view, or rather in the view of the German Social Democrats in the Socialist Group, the Caro report is altogether remarkable and I would like to make a number of points relating to future prospects. There are some important elements here which call for comment. The first point relates to the convergence of Chinese and Western European interests.

Mr. Scheer (continued)

If the main criterion of China's foreign policy is the dismantling of the existing hegemony – and that means chiefly the hegemony of the two atomic superpowers – then it follows in effect that anything we can do in Europe to reduce tension and overcome the polarisation which separates both the two atomic superpowers and the eastern and western blocs with their ideological differences automatically coincides with the Chinese aim of overcoming the existing hegemony.

Building on a variety of experiences, part of the Chinese foreign policy naturally consists in establishing a kind of equidistant posture – a position which we ourselves cannot adopt. However, since about the time of NATO's 1967 Harmel report we have seen the important part which can be played by a European policy of détente, which is also in complete accord with Chinese ambitions. It follows that there are no fundamental contradictions in this area, even if for a long time the Chinese failed to understand, as they are now perhaps beginning to do, the European policy of reducing tension. It is therefore all the more important that we should not now abandon the political concept of détente.

A second point: in an address a few days ago the former Federal German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, drew attention to the importance for the future of adding to the two fundamental principles of NATO policy developed since the end of the sixties, security and détente, a third element in the shape of support for the economic development of the third world. This also fundamentally accords with Chinese foreign policy, as in its own eyes China is basically a developing country with its own highly individual pattern of development. This third element must increasingly become a prominent part of our policy. However, support for the third world must not impair its freedom as a bloc if third world policy is not to become involved in the East-West conflict. Here is an important area where there is an identity of interests, provided that European policy is developed along the lines which I have just described.

There is a third point I should like to comment on.

There is one aspect of Chinese foreign policy which, in my estimation, will be reviewed over the next few years. I refer here to the extent to which China will take part in international negotiations to end the arms race. The Chinese position hitherto has been that preliminary steps should first be taken by the two atomic superpowers. That is to say, there should first be a considerable reduction in the

level of nuclear armaments before China would be ready to take part in such negotiations. It is of the greatest importance for the peaceful political development of the world that at some point a situation should be created in which China can participate in negotiations of this kind. This will largely depend on progress being made in nuclear disarmament.

I conclude with the comment that we have a major, dynamic rôle to play here. Present prospects hold no great promise of substantial progress. Indeed, all present here have much ground to make up.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The general debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – May I first thank all my colleagues who have taken part in the debate on the report which I presented on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. Whatever shades of opinion they have expressed, I wish to thank them for supporting the conclusions submitted to the Assembly. I should now like to take up a few of their points.

I detected in Lord Reay's remarks one of the points which I feel are of particular concern to us. While backing to the full the free world's fundamental ideas on defence and the pursuit of our ideals, particularly as regards security and human rights, we in Western Europe are entitled to take our own line and to speak up for ourselves. The European identity is a fact and it is for us to ensure that it survives. So far as China is concerned, insistence on this fact was unquestionably the most important point, regardless of shades of view. This was apparent from the questions asked, even though some of them have still not been answered in full.

Like Mr. Lagorce, I am waiting, I am worried, I have doubts concerning a political and economic element which has not yet emerged but is just below the horizon – what might be called the China-Japan pairing.

In all the commercial and export conquests of the Asian genius, the pairing of China and Japan is a fact which cannot be ignored. Like us, Mr. President – as you saw for yourself during our three-week visit, which was inadequate and far too short for such a continent – you were struck by the kind of admiration for western technology, especially American technology, and by the almost universal presence of Japanese machinery.

Since we in Western Europe have managed to combine our economies and our efforts in a single market might not this solution be adopted tomorrow in Asia? Europe has a major

Mr. Caro (continued)

rôle to play in this. I warmly welcome Mr. Lagorce's remarks on this point.

In reply to Mr. Müller who, like other speakers, referred to relations between China and the USSR, I would say that the problem remains as it was. But is not a kind of tension between China and the Soviet Union to be regarded almost as abnormal? They are neighbours, linked by communist ideology. Signs of a formula for understanding or rapprochement may well be expected. But the terms for rapprochement have been totally rejected by the Chinese leaders. In broad terms, they have agreed to an "attempt at normalisation" – and here I am quoting the exact terms.

A new phase has therefore opened and will no doubt continue through diplomatic moves and the influence of the great powers. Europe is interested in the problems of Sino-Soviet relations, including the threat to Chinese security posed by the encirclement referred to by all our speakers.

Mr. Michel mentioned the words used by the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China on the multiplication of contacts. As I said in my introductory remarks, I recognise – as I am happy to do in reply to a Belgian colleague – the great importance of Mr. Tindemans's visit to China, which cleared the way for our work. The decision taken by the Ten – of which we were informed in Brussels – that each country succeeding to the chair of the European Council will establish contact with the Chinese Government both to improve relations and to try to identify areas of agreement is fully in line with the committee's recommendations and with the requests of the Chinese themselves.

Close relations must be maintained in order to understand each other and to act together. I am therefore very glad that this point was raised by Mr. Michel and other speakers.

I agree entirely with the substance of Mr. van der Sanden's remarks. Our credibility with the Chinese, whom we heard, understood and want to help, depends essentially on the correctness of the behaviour of us Europeans. We have not become spokesmen for the People's Republic of China. The Chinese are big enough to speak for their own ideas and policies. We speak for the people of Europe who firmly believe that in the new world order now taking shape, Europe has a major rôle to play. We shall only be credible to our Chinese friends if we are accepted as men and women who keep their promises, are true to our way of life and are determined to preserve the civilisation which has been the glory of Europe through all adversities.

That is why we must not compromise on our diplomatic undertakings, our belief in human rights and our instinctive denunciation of any violation of those rights. It is for this that the Chinese respect us and will continue to do so and it is also the reason why we may perhaps play an effective rôle.

My friend, Mr. Prussen, showed his usual courage in his moderate and well-argued speech on the problem of Taiwan which was also mentioned by Mr. Bassinet. Mr. Prussen, you are well aware that the committee gave considerable thought to the problem and decided unanimously to adopt a very cautious approach.

Mr. Bassinet said a few moments ago, with particular reference to the United States, that ambiguous positions must be avoided. Ambiguous, if you like. I assume he was referring to the delivery of arms to Taiwan. At the same time, it must be recognised that the change in the diplomatic order within the world community, particularly as regards Chinese representation in the United Nations, is the result of the policy adopted by the United States Government after President Nixon's visit.

For the European countries, the recognition or non-recognition of Taiwan or of the People's Republic of China was a political decision taken more as a matter of principle and perhaps even as a matter of commercial interest. But its effect on the equilibrium of world peace was immeasurably less than a decision such as that taken by the United States of America. I cannot agree therefore that the American position is ambiguous. As the Chinese themselves say, it is correct that the United States makes mistakes liable to jeopardise further progress towards the reunification of Chinese territory. It is up to us Europeans to help in getting it under way but in so doing we must respect to the full the friendship and solidarity which bind us to the United States.

On the fundamental issue of the difference of régime and of respect for human rights, which Mr. Prussen raised, may I be allowed to quote – I sometimes have good sources; I will, therefore quote my own words which I used in my introductory speech and which meet his point in full. I am referring to violations of personal rights. I said yesterday that, in my view, such violations are incompatible with China's most legitimate national aspirations, because there can be no peaceful reunification of territory unless acceptable and credible safeguards can be offered to all Chinese. I repeat these words deliberately, because they are the heart of our thinking on the problem.

If some among you, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, have heard reports of the

Mr. Caro (continued)

debates now taking place in the National People's Congress in Beijing, they will have noted that new proposals have just been tabled for the reunification of China with Taiwan, which go beyond the confidential information given to the committee and repeated on various occasions, more particularly in diplomatic negotiations, indicating that the problem is under consideration.

I am dealing with this point now so that I do not have to come back to it when the amendments are discussed and so that Mr. Bassinet will appreciate that the absence of a paragraph on Taiwan from our report is not an oversight.

The members of the General Affairs Committee are responsible enough to weigh the terms of their proposals which we discussed at length. This is a difficult problem – we must be willing to recognise the facts – and its solution depends basically on previous and future relations between China and Taipei.

Should we have tabled a motion on this point? You yourself, Mr. Bassinet, have acknowledged that this is the basic line taken in the report. It is not in opposition to what you ask and what your amendment urges. We thought however that, in this matter, it was best to rely on the wisdom of those concerned. We are all aware of the fundamental decision taken by the United States of America, based essentially on the issue of security, of the bastion, to use Mr. Prussen's word, and of course on the issue of human rights. We also know however that there has been a tremendous change in the People's Republic of China and that since Deng Xiaoping took over the leadership, the question is being pursued with determination and with wholly oriental wisdom.

Let us, therefore, leave the wise men now at the head of the People's Republic of China to handle the matter, while expressing the hope, set out in clear terms in the explanatory memorandum to the report, that this will be achieved with due respect for freedoms and reserving the right to come back to the question if by chance it is not resolved as we would wish.

I shall now reply to Mr. Scheer concerning the third world. It is true that the third world forms part of the triptych to which he referred and that it is of special interest to the People's Republic of China as it is to us.

I must however observe that here again – and you have not argued to the contrary – there is convergence and a European interest. In fact, while it is the ambition of the People's Republic of China to become in future a great country, capable of spreading its culture and imposing – at least as we hope – its wish for peace in

that part of the world, we also know that the People's Republic of China looks upon itself as part of the third world and will continue to do so.

However, China's economic needs are so great and its financial resources so limited and carefully husbanded – we know that the Chinese currency is not convertible and that the scope for Chinese trade is restricted by shortage of foreign currencies – that the amount of financial aid which the People's Republic of China can give to the third world countries, in Asia alone, is immeasurably less than the Chinese themselves would wish in order to fulfil their ambition to win the leadership of the Asian third world.

While determined to remain loyal to the third world, China is equally determined to advance to the level of the dialogue between the great powers.

This is where Europe has a part to play because its policy is exactly the same in the last analysis; its wish to help the third world has run into economic difficulties. In the concert of nations, we can undoubtedly succeed in the enterprise urged by the committee by adding what brings us together and by seeking to resolve the differences which still separate us, particularly as regards our philosophies.

Finally, Mr. President, I do not think I am giving a purely personal impression because we have frequently exchanged views on the subject, when I say that things are moving so fast and everything is changing so swiftly, and moreover the need for rapprochement and security is so great that China is making a colossal effort. Our time is certainly limited; China will not really need Europe for ever.

Europe has only a short time to succeed in its mission. We must act promptly. We must call on the governments to act. Speaking for the committee, I shall allow myself to be optimistic and I wish to thank the members of the Council for the favourable reception which they gave in Brussels to the essential elements of the proposals in our report.

In view of my comments I hope, Mr. President, that the Assembly can agree to adopt the report which I had the honour to present.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Caro, for your replies to speakers and for your excellent report.

We will now consider the amendments to the draft recommendation.

Four amendments have been tabled. They will be taken in the order in which they refer to the text. They are Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Vogt, Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Fourré,

The President (continued)

Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Bassinet and Mr. Fourré and Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Vogt.

Amendment 2 is worded as follows:

2. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

I call Mr. Vogt in support of his amendment.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a source of some astonishment to me that a draft recommendation concerned with the relations between Western Europe and the People's Republic of China should have been used to confirm yet again our special relationship to the United States.

Mr. Caro has just been talking again about European identity, and I find it somewhat inappropriate that this European identity should be asserted by underlining the special relationship, or, as we might say, the special dependence, which links Europe to the United States. To be brief, I feel that this particular reference is objectionable, especially in a context which lays stress on sovereign and autonomous relations with another, very powerful, nation.

I therefore suggest that this paragraph be deleted from the text, although this proposed amendment may sound somewhat terse and unreasoned.

So much for one proposed amendment. I do not know if this is the time for me to add my reasons for the second proposed amendment. Perhaps I might return to that later.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I say that I reject the amendment proposed by Mr. Vogt. I believe that our purpose is not to incorporate in the report any kind of wishful fantasies or expectations but to portray things as they really are. The real situation is as depicted by our Rapporteur, Mr. Caro. The fact is – as was indeed constantly reiterated in the discussions at which I was present in China – that the countries of Western European Union belong to a military alliance, to NATO, and that this alliance – as has also been stated in the last day or two in this Assembly – rests, in Kennedy's words, on the twin pillars of the European and the American contribution. To deny or attempt to eliminate this fact is to blind oneself to reality. But we are practical politicians, and

it is therefore our wish that the text of Mr. Caro's report should be allowed to stand.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – The committee is in full agreement with Mr. Müller, whom I wish to thank. This amendment would certainly be very unwelcome to our Chinese friends; in order to speak for a policy which we seem to share with the Chinese authorities, it is not necessary to gloss over anyone or anything which is absolutely fundamental for the existence of our western community.

I read in a newspaper this morning an extract, with commentary, from a statement made yesterday by the Chinese Prime Minister to the People's Congress in Beijing. Referring to Sino-American differences, Mr. Zhao Ziyang said: "Let us stop doing anything which may prejudice Sino-American relations".

I believe that the Assembly of Western European Union will find it difficult to accept our colleague's arguments which, even though they are based on what I am sure is sincere conviction, I cannot endorse.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I must nevertheless point out that the obligations of the Western European NATO countries towards the United States of America are already familiar enough. I see no reason why they should be specially mentioned again in a document of this kind. I also consider it unwise to make such a reference as, from the standpoint of another power, which is after all always alluded to between the lines, it might well create a fear of encirclement and so introduce an element of instability into the world political situation in which we find ourselves. There is, Mr. Müller, another kind of reality, which is concerned to avoid the constant reawakening of anxieties which might trigger a fear of encirclement or even a panic reaction on the part of the Soviet Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I must ask you to conclude.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I will conclude at once by summing up. I do not regard it as an expression of reality but rather as a grotesque demonstration of the dependence of the Europeans on the United States of America that this should be stressed in a document concerned with the relations between Western Europe and China.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

I call Mr. Bassinet to speak in support of Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Fourré, worded as follows:

1. At the end of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

“and, in particular, no longer subject the latter to Cocom restrictions on trade with the eastern countries”.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – As both speakers and the Rapporteur have welcomed the growth of trade relations between China and the Western European countries, adoption of this amendment would seem to be automatic.

I would remind the Assembly that in the report which I presented at the last session, I argued that the Cocom rules needed to be re-examined.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – The existing third paragraph of the draft recommendation more or less covers the point argued by Mr. Bassinet. The amendment therefore simply supplements the text and is in line with the committee's thinking. The committee can accept it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Fourré to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

Mr. Bassinet and Mr. Fourré have tabled Amendment 4 worded as follows:

4. At the end of paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

“and refrain from any position which might prevent the return of Taiwan to China;”.

I call Mr. Bassinet to speak in support of the amendment.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – As the Rapporteur has informed us that the General Affairs Committee was unanimous on this point, I withdraw the amendment.

I still insist, however, on using the word “ambiguity” with reference to United States

policy. China did of course join the United Nations after being recognised by President Nixon, but there have since been much more complex developments.

I withdraw the amendment therefore but regret doing so because it was justified by the report itself.

I do not believe that the authority of an assembly is enhanced by saying things which are not supported by the facts.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The amendment is withdrawn.

I call Mr. Vogt to move Amendment 3:

3. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Appeal to the People's Republic of China to stop the tests of atomic weapons and delivery vehicles, especially in the Pacific, in order to comply with the deep concerns of the Pacific peoples about such activities of the atomic powers, thereby setting a good example in the interest of the survival of mankind;”.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I have noted with some satisfaction that a very wise recommendation is being put forward here to the effect that, if the Soviet Union can be induced to withdraw the SS-20s as a potential threat to Western Europe, such a step should not, of course, operate to the disadvantage of another region. On the other hand, the position is that the People's Republic of China has itself become a disquieting factor. This is particularly apparent in the fact that, like other atomic powers, the People's Republic of China has chosen the Pacific as a testing ground for its missiles. The People's Republic of China is using the Pacific as a testing ground for atomic weapons and is thereby acting very much against the vital interests of the inhabitants of the surrounding areas.

Where a resolution of this kind contains a recommendation to another atomic power – and I welcome the recommendation addressed to the Soviet Union – then I think reference should also be made to the fact that China too, as an atomic power, should make an initial concession. In particular, China should desist from disturbing this Pacific region – one third of the earth's surface, after all – with its atomic weapon and missile tests. I will expand on this a little further by adding that is intolerable for the countries of the Pacific that the basis of their food supplies – especially the fish catch yielded by the sea – should be harmed by the destructive effects of atomic tests. The position is exactly the same as if one were to test nuclear missiles in the large wheat-growing

Mr. Vogt (continued)

areas of the United States of America, accepting the concomitant atomic pollution, or as if one were to test atomic weapons in China's rice fields with the consequent nuclear contamination of nutritional resources and foods.

It may be said that an organisation – Western European Union – which includes a country like France – I shall shortly conclude what I have to say, but in this context one must be allowed to state the argument, Mr. President – which is also causing disquiet in the countries surrounding the Pacific by its atomic tests, lacks credibility when it makes such recommendations to another atomic power. In my opinion it would be a dereliction of duty quite equal to that of our parents with regard to the Nazi crimes if we were to remain silent while the weapons of world war three are being tested and in response to atomic tests whose consequences are fully equivalent to medical experiments on living organisms.

In this connection, I should like to remind you that when gunpowder was invented, it was not the Chinese but the Europeans who used it as the foundation for a policy of destruction. In the present situation it would be highly appropriate if the Europeans, faced with the unleashing of nuclear fission, were to develop a common policy, in collaboration with China, say, to free us from this scourge of humanity. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the problem raised by this amendment has been aired in the second part of Mr. Vogt's remarks. The problem arises from the fact that, while on the one hand an appeal is being directed towards the People's Republic of China – an appeal which I consider to be proper, timely and necessary – on the other hand those for whom we are speaking here have perhaps in the past not been absolutely wholehearted – to put it mildly – in the seriousness of their endeavours to arrive at a real test-ban agreement – and I refer here not just to one of the European partners. It is a disgrace that no progress in this direction has been made anywhere in the world since the partial test-ban agreement of 1963.

The fact remains that we can scarcely make an appeal to China on a matter to which we ourselves give too little attention and which is not pursued with the necessary dedication. As a new delegate I do not know if what I have to say is in order, but I suggest we adopt this amendment in a modified form. The import of this minor modification could be that, in an endeavour to achieve a comprehensive test-ban

treaty, we are also appealing to the People's Republic of China. The endeavour referred to is that of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, which has before it a joint proposal – tabled by the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and a number of other European partners – directed towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty. This would serve the purpose of creating a measure of credibility, which would further our cause. I therefore propose that the amendment be adopted in the following modified form: "In the endeavour to achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty we also appeal to..." after which the text could stand.

I take it that it is now for you to decide, Mr. President, whether you will allow this change.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I understand, Mr. Scheer, but it is impossible at this stage of the procedure to amend an amendment.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I believe that the Rules of Procedure allow the person tabling the amendment to accept this proposal for a change in the wording of the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – No further speakers can be taken at this stage in the proceedings.

What is the committee's view?

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this amendment, tabled by Mr. Vogt, raises a fundamental issue going far beyond the report which I have presented.

I agree with Mr. Scheer. We cannot say anything to you on this subject for the committee, because it was not on the agenda for our talks with the people we met in China. Nor did we discuss it in committee. We could of course go into it if we so wished, but I am speaking now for the committee only.

Furthermore, this paragraph reminds me strangely of the debate we held not so long ago on pacifism and neutralism. I simply wonder who is served by this paragraph. To whom is such an appeal directed? Seeing that both Western Europe and the People's Republic of China are faced by the same problem of insecurity – created by the only enemy of peace and security, recognised as such by both East and West – I mean the Soviet Union and I am repeating the actual words of the Chinese leaders – is it possible to ask any country seeking to restore its security to abandon military nuclear energy at the end of the 20th century?

This is my problem. But it is not the problem which concerns you, Mr. Vogt, because you were honest enough to speak of

Mr. Caro (continued)

France. I wonder, in the final analysis, whether your amendment may not be aimed more at my country than at China.

Furthermore, the debate must be seen in a wider context where everyone can express his views. The effort now being made by the People's Republic of China in the field of nuclear defence is following the same course as in the western countries. Have we a single yardstick for the whole world or are we simply willing to accept what is happening in Europe? Because, ultimately, we are very happy to shelter behind the American shield and I would like to know in what kind of situation certain European nations which are still free today would now find themselves if we had not had that shield at the end of the second world war. We might not perhaps have been here to discuss the question.

Secondly, in dealing with the People's Republic of China this is not the right point in the debate to launch an appeal of this kind. This being so, even though there has been no discussion in committee, I oppose the amendment in the name of the committee and in line with its work.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the matter concerns a point of procedure which you should not disregard.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Vogt, I cannot allow the author of an amendment to speak several times.

I put Amendment 3 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

We now vote on the amended draft recommendation as a whole.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

4. Twenty-eighth annual report of the Council

*(Presentation by Mr. Cheysson,
French Minister for External Relations,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 942)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for External Rela-

tions and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, of the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council to the Assembly, Document 942.

I wish to welcome Mr. Cheysson and to apologise to him for a few minutes delay in starting the debate. I am sure that Mr. Cheysson, who knows our Assembly well and is moreover greatly appreciated by members, will understand that our procedures have to be observed.

I now invite Mr. Cheysson to address the Assembly.

Mr. CHEYSSON (*French Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – May I begin, Mr. President, by congratulating you on behalf of the French Delegation and the French Government on your election yesterday. It is a source of great satisfaction to us, and may I say, speaking for my colleagues, to the Council also to have at the head of this Assembly such a convinced European as yourself and a man so well versed in the problems debated here and brought to the attention of our peoples through the Assembly.

I was particularly interested by the analysis which you made yesterday of the reasons why our countries' defence effort is perhaps better understood here than elsewhere. I cannot say too strongly how much we agree with your analysis, which serves only to confirm what we already know of your clear-sightedness on the subject.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to be here. I previously had occasion to address you very briefly last spring. I am happy to be able to do so again this year, but this time in my dual capacity as Chairman-in-Office and as representative of the French Government.

In accordance with the usual practice, I will first, as Chairman-in-Office, present the Council's twenty-eighth annual report. I will deal in turn with relations between the Council and the Assembly, the activities of the Council and its subsidiary bodies and, lastly, but not with much pleasure, budgetary questions.

The WEU Assembly occupies a unique position. Your Assembly is the only European parliamentary body empowered by treaty to debate defence questions.

The Council greatly appreciates the conscientious and serious manner in which the Assembly discharges its duties, the importance of which has no need to be stressed in present circumstances. The Council welcomes the reports presented by your parliamentary committees. It is pleased to note that in response to the appeal from Mr. Lemoine, then Secretary

1. See page 23.

Mr. Cheysson (continued)

of State at the French Ministry of Defence, the Assembly has made a detailed study of the question of nuclear weapons in Europe, of security problems and of the possibility of maintaining the balance of forces in Europe by pacifism and neutralism.

In 1982, the Council made every effort to assist the Assembly to fulfil its rôle effectively by maintaining a meaningful dialogue on matters covered by the modified Brussels Treaty, including questions dealt with by the governments of WEU member states in other international bodies. As evidence of this, I would mention: the earlier communication of a detailed report on the activities of the Council and its subsidiary bodies in 1982; the replies of substance given to Assembly recommendations; the informal contacts held after the ministerial meetings in London on 19th May 1982 and in Brussels on 17th May last, with the Presidential Committee, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments; the attendance, encouraged by the Council, of ministers, and particularly of defence ministers at Assembly sessions; the authorisation given to the international secretariat of the SAC to collaborate on technical matters with the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in the study on the problem of harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields.

May I be allowed to express a wish: in view of the number and solid content of the reports drawn up by committees, the Council would like to receive them as long as possible before each session. It considers this essential for a more fruitful dialogue.

On the subject of its own activities and those of its subordinate bodies, the Council reaffirmed in its report the importance attached by the member countries of WEU – the only exclusively European organisation empowered by treaty to deal with defence matters – as I said earlier – and the determination of those countries to honour their commitments under the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty and more particularly the commitment to legitimate collective defence under Article V.

The Council conscientiously ensured that the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols were applied and avoided, as required by the treaty, duplication of its work with that in which the member states of WEU participate elsewhere.

At political level, the ministers, meeting in London on 19th May 1982 and in Brussels on 17th May this year, discussed East-West rela-

tions, with due attention to the problems created by pacifism and neutralism. They also considered the work of the CSCE, and the situation in Afghanistan and in Poland. They exchanged views on the situation in the Mediterranean area, with which Europe obviously has ties of solidarity which must be maintained.

In military matters, the Council was careful to ensure that the provisions of the treaty and its protocols concerning control of the levels of forces and armaments of member states were implemented. It examined the suggestions made by the Assembly in Recommendation 380 regarding Annexes III and IV to Protocol No. III, in accordance with the procedures laid down in Articles II and V respectively. Regarding the implementation of Annex IV, it requested a technical opinion from the Agency for the Control of Armaments; this opinion is confidential and is at present under consideration by governments.

The Agency for the Control of Armaments, whose duties are defined in Protocol No. IV, performed those duties efficiently in the sectors subject to control. It should be stressed that it did so at low cost.

The Standing Armaments Committee updated the classified version of the first part of its economic study of the armaments sector of industry in member countries. It continued its exchanges of information and its work on a glossary of operational research terms.

At their meeting in London last year, ministers discussed the work of the SAC. Since that meeting, a new head of the international secretariat of the SAC, Mr. Hintermann, has been appointed. He brought to his duties an imaginative and practical turn of mind, which we warmly welcome. He submitted a number of proposals, mainly for fresh studies by the SAC which might provide governments with the information required to enable member countries to progress with “the standardisation, production and procurement of armaments” – to quote the terms of the Council decision setting up the SAC.

At their meeting in Brussels on 17th May last, the ministers welcomed these proposals with interest and referred them to the permanent representatives for further study and final disposal.

Lastly, to conclude this first part of my speech, in 1982, as in the previous year, the Council was compelled by the financial situation in member countries, to apply a strict budget policy. It nevertheless intends that all the WEU bodies shall continue to work smoothly together in furtherance of the aims of the treaty. It is determined to provide all of these

Mr. Cheysson (continued)

bodies with the necessary funds to discharge their duties in a fully effective manner.

Mr. President, I have been greatly interested by the reports prepared by Assembly committees in reply to the Council's annual report. The Council will give due attention to the recommendations you will be forwarding at the end of your debates.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall now continue, not as Chairman-in-Office of the Council but, in accordance with normal practice, as French Minister for External Relations.

Voices are sometimes heard querying the value of WEU and seeming to suggest that our organisation has outlived its use. This is no doubt true in some respects which will have to be discussed in due course. It will then be time to concentrate on the basic direction to be taken for the future. For the moment, however, I note and again repeat that WEU is the only European organisation empowered to deal with defence matters, where the elected representatives of our peoples can discuss problems affecting the security of Europe. This is the clear justification of the organisation's existence. Any attack on it would be contrary to our unyielding determination that opinions, followed by due reflection and finally decision, must be combined in all matters affecting the security of every man and woman in our countries. If your Assembly did not exist it would have to be created.

What do we see around us? Our nations are asking questions about conditions for the security of our continent and they must know the factors on which that security depends. It would be both absurd and dangerous to underestimate the anxiety which is felt. The questioning must be understood. Above all, the reasons for decisions and policies must be explained to our peoples after their views have been heard when those decisions and policies are being prepared. Ladies and Gentlemen, this is what you WEU parliamentarians have to do.

Nuclear weapons are arousing fears and even worse. Yet, we in France believe absolutely that the deterrent so created has made war in Europe unthinkable for more than thirty years and is continuing to do so. Fears must not lead unwittingly to abdication, thus helping to revive the threat. This is the danger today, because – and this we cannot repeat too often – any weakening on our part would embolden potential enemies who are unaware of, or do not recognise, the fears of their peoples.

To take only today's burning question, the need to modernise the American nuclear potential in Europe, it is quite apparent that the

tremendous propaganda battle now in progress is aimed at increasing the imbalance which the Soviet Union has established in the European theatre in respect of nuclear weapons targeted on nearby countries but incapable of reaching the distant areas of the alliance. Can anyone reasonably doubt that the source of the present imbalance is to be found in this over-arming? This imbalance must be corrected. And of course, France, like all its allies, is most anxious that this should be achieved at the lowest possible level and by negotiation. All eyes are now on Geneva.

Again, the INF negotiations must be conducted on a sound basis. Here, it is unfortunately the case that one of the two partners sometimes tries to divert the discussions from their true purpose. Is this an attempt at greater concealment of the real issues? The spotlight is thus turned on to the forces of the other countries, France and the United Kingdom; but these have never been intended as a counter to medium-range weapons but, in the strategy of the weak against the strong, as a means of deterring any enemy from using the whole of its arsenal or even of threatening to do so. In face of the vast capabilities of the superpowers, these forces are, as everyone knows, the guarantee and condition of the independence of their possessors. France's nuclear forces are therefore not negotiable. That is out of the question.

The true stake in the negotiations lies elsewhere. How could our continental NATO allies be prepared to live under a threat which does not reach their powerful allies across the Atlantic and for which there is at present no counter of the same nature? How could they agree to being denied the right of cover by the deterrent of their ally from across the Atlantic? How could they allow the Soviet Union such, what might be called, a mathematical right to superiority?

There are other negotiations to which, as you know, my country attaches importance. I am referring to those which should take place at a conference on European disarmament when, as we hope, the Madrid Conference finally succeeds in agreeing terms of reference enabling it to be convened even before the end of 1983, let us hope. The European neutral and non-aligned countries have put forward proposals for a final compromise which, with a few improvements, should enable agreement to be reached. Any agreement in Madrid will cover both the mandate of the conference on European disarmament and a document by which human rights and contacts between persons will be given their proper place in the CSCE procedures.

Mr. Cheysson (continued)

The CSCE is the only forum where the East-West dialogue, the internal European dialogue, is at present continuing as a global exercise. The final act of Helsinki, which is sometimes harshly criticised, insists on the fact that the problems of security and co-operation in Europe cannot be limited to the military dimension or to the confrontation of two blocs.

We still share this approach to European realities which takes account of human aspirations and the permanence of nations, beyond the inertia of political systems and the weight of bureaucracies. This is the only approach which can ultimately heal the wounds which are tearing our continent apart.

Armaments control cannot be restricted to narrow, limited geographical areas. There is one clear fact which the importance of the present nuclear debate in Europe must not be allowed to obscure; the unbalanced stockpiling of conventional weapons on European soil has been and still is one of the main sources of tension and danger on the continent. It is that stockpiling which, as we know, has brought about and still requires the presence of large numbers of nuclear weapons. It is therefore vital that we should direct all our efforts to this, seeking to bring armaments down to lower and more stable levels.

In the present circumstances, the French Government will – and I wish to state this in the clearest terms to this Assembly – maintain its defence policy in accordance with the doctrine laid down and proclaimed since General de Gaulle, as is demonstrated by the military programme now being debated in parliament. France will not lower its guard. Its defence is the guarantee of its security and therefore of its independence. The funds will be provided, therefore, despite the present state of the economy.

The prime consideration for us is to maintain the credibility of our nuclear deterrent; no one should have any doubts on that score. And, as I have said, this deterrent is designed to counter all the resources of the potential enemy. In this way we ensure, and will continue to ensure, the protection of our national territory and of our vital interests.

The French Government, standing foursquare with its allies in the defence of Europe, in accordance with the treaties by which we are linked to them, is determined that our country shall be able to play its part. The programme law therefore provides for some reorganisation of our conventional forces, whose firepower and mobility will be enhanced, in order to increase the power and speed of our intervention, if at any time we have to take a political decision to

intervene in complete independence and at our sole discretion.

Lastly, you know that France is planning to improve its capacity to intervene in other theatres, in order to fulfil its undertakings, to come to the assistance of friendly countries who ask for help – I quote the case of Lebanon – to protect its nationals. We have therefore decided to reinforce our capacity for external action, and this again will involve heavy but essential demands on the budget.

In the context of our plans for our conventional forces, may I make one remark concerning the so-called “Rogers doctrine” which lays the emphasis on conventional armaments. France has several times stated its view on this subject, notably in November last through my friend the Minister of Defence. I will simply add that the excellent idea that conventional forces must be strengthened must not give the false impression – which General Rogers clearly does not share – that at the present stage the deterrent can be sought in non-nuclear forces. Nor should the impression be allowed to gain credence outside the alliance that the countries belonging to the integrated military structure – which do not include France – have lost confidence in the American nuclear deterrent. This is an area where doubts easily arise and this is dangerous.

I shall conclude by speaking of the work of your Assembly. I have already said that France greatly values your responsibility in the matter of security. Our interest is proved by the speeches of my predecessors, including what I said myself last year. We expect a great deal of you and I agree and reaffirm that you should have the necessary resources.

In my view, the “revitalisation” of the Assembly – to use an incorrect word which seems to have gained general currency – is to be achieved in two ways. As several speakers have said, the Assembly should be able to study all the problems affecting the security of our countries and to debate them in all their complexity. It is a vast field. Your committee reports show that the guidelines have been clearly set. Work must continue with the same determination and wish to know. The Assembly is one of the three bodies set up under the treaty. Relations between the Assembly, the Council and the Agency, forming the “triad” to which I add the Standing Armaments Committee, should be more flexible, more direct and fuller in content. The international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee should continue to help you as it has done for a number of years; it could profit from being expanded. In the same line of thought, you could be briefed on some of the work of the SAC. I am convinced that the dialogue

Mr. Cheysson (continued)

already started is valuable and that both the Assembly and the SAC can benefit from it.

On the subject of the Standing Armaments Committee, you are aware that the head of its international secretariat has put forward a number of proposals. We feel that they are a move in the right direction and that they are in line with the thinking of our countries. They have been referred to the permanent representatives for consideration. I hope that priorities will be identified and that the first studies will quickly be under way.

These comments on the work of WEU may seem modest. They are nevertheless such as to help in strengthening the organisation's rôle.

The present situation, Mr. President, calls for the fullest efforts from us. Europe must take an active part in the strategic debate. Its determination to defend itself must first be expressed in Europe. It is for Europe to play the full rôle cast for it by history. In this Assembly, the European dimension of security is clear for all to see. WEU was the first collective security organisation set up immediately after the world war. It must remain the living and renewed expression of our solidarity. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Minister, both for your very kind remarks addressed to me personally and for what you said regarding the strengthening of our organisation, which naturally implies the strengthening of our Assembly.

I should also like to thank you in advance for the replies you will be giving to any questions which members of the Assembly may now wish to put to you.

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. Minister, as you said, our Assembly has in the recent past heard repeated statements from the present French Government declaring its wish to strengthen WEU. The Italian Government has taken exactly the same line, and this position was not repudiated by the previous Chairman of the Council of WEU, Mr. Tindemans.

Furthermore, I seem to remember that you stated in the French National Assembly that WEU should be strengthened through the parliamentary Assembly and that its executive, the Council, had little future.

Are you not afraid that, since the Paris Agreements of 1954 and the Council's subsequent decision preferring that political consultations concerning Europe should take place in the wider European framework of the Ten, we

are moving towards a real break up of our organisation and its transformation into a mere debating society?

Should not any abandonment by the WEU authorities of their powers in respect of arms limitation and control be regarded as likely to hasten this regrettable development?

Lastly, would you clarify your statement to the French National Assembly, which appears to refer to the Council's marked political lethargy in the matter of building the European pillar of western defence?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. Minister, as always your statement was extremely full and complete.

May I nevertheless ask one question or at least ask you for clarification: what rôle does the French Government see for armaments control between the member countries of an alliance? Does it consider that it is solely a matter of past history or that updating of the lists of weapons subject to control by the WEU Agency would be of advantage for the future of Europe?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – The Paris air show has just ended. I was there and I noticed that it is becoming more and more a weapons show. The minister who opened the debate talked about standardisation. The air show revealed much competition, particularly in weapons. Most governments subsidise such weapons to produce them competitively. Perhaps we should consider the matter more and use the SAC to study the possibility of increasing standardisation. The Assembly always calls for greater standardisation but today there is less standardisation. Perhaps we can change that.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, in your capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council you referred to the existence of an extensive propaganda campaign and said, if I understood you aright, that the peace movement was one of the results of this propaganda campaign. Can you conceive of the possibility of independent grounds for disquiet, quite unconnected with any propaganda campaigns which might be waged by the superpowers concerned, which might induce people to speak out against any further deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe?

Mr. Vogt (continued)

The second part of my question is this: is it conceivable that the very violent rejection of the efforts of the peace movement in the European NATO countries by the French Government might be connected with the fact that in its overall nuclear defence concept the French Government regards the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany as a kind of forward battleground for its own defence? May I add that, if this is indeed the case, it is quite unacceptable to us, as we see all these weapons from the standpoint of the "end-user", the future victims, whether the weapons concerned are the Pluto 1 and 2, the Hades, the SS-20, the Pershing II, cruise missiles or the so-called "tactical" nuclear weapons located in the territory of the Federal Republic.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jäger.

Mr. JÄGER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, may I preface my two brief questions by thanking you most warmly for your address, which was distinguished by its clarity.

Minister, my first question is whether the French Government's refusal, which you have just confirmed, to allow its nuclear forces to be included in the Geneva disarmament talks is to some extent influenced by the complete disparity of the demands made by the Soviet Government in calling for the inclusion of both the French and the corresponding British forces, which comprise chiefly seaborne nuclear weapons, whereas the Soviet Union itself has not the slightest intention of including its own extensive seaborne medium-range missiles in the disarmament talks, but only its land-based weaponry. It would interest me to know whether this is an important factor in the French Government's decision.

Secondly, I should like to know what you think of the Soviet Government's attitude to the disarmament talks which you have described in such detail. How do you assess the action of former General Secretary Brezhnev in declaring on his own initiative in spring 1981 that the Soviet Union would henceforth unilaterally refrain from any further deployment of medium-range missiles directed against Western Europe? At the time, western observers counted approximately two hundred and twenty to two hundred and fifty systems in place. Today, two years after Mr. Brezhnev's promises, observers estimate that the number of systems has increased by about one hundred. How does your government view the fact that the Soviet Government clearly did not even dream of keeping its promise to refrain unilaterally

from installing further medium-range missile systems aimed at Europe?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, I should like to refer to the French attitude towards the negotiations on medium-range weapons which you have already mentioned today and ask again why the potential of our French friends should not be taken into account, or alternatively, on what conditions it should be included – "inclusion" being interpreted in a very broad sense?

I make this point firstly because the NATO twofold decision was concerned with European nuclear arms control – an issue not covered by SALT II; secondly because, as you yourself pointed out, the French systems naturally assist the western deterrent and are therefore to some extent part of the overall spectrum; thirdly because the earlier, SALT I and MBFR negotiations made some provision for the inclusion of these systems; and, fourthly, because the success of the negotiations may very largely depend on their inclusion. I refer here essentially to serious proposals which have been made on this subject in the West over the last two years.

I would remind you that there is talk of considering at the START negotiations whether this matter might be brought into conjunction with the INF talks. In the INF negotiations we are faced with the problem of discussing three artificially separated topics: (a) medium-range weapons only, (b) land-based, medium-range missiles only and (c) these issues considered possibly only in the Soviet-American context. This makes the negotiations very much more difficult, particularly since it was originally envisaged in 1979 that the matter should be dealt with in a round of SALT III talks, not in a separate round of negotiations.

Now I come to the question: bearing these points in mind and interpreting the idea of inclusion very broadly, on what terms could you conceive of the French systems being included? Let me add that I quite understand the French attitude in rejecting discussion of their systems at negotiations to which they are not party.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Scheer, please ask your question.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Please forgive the lengthy introduction.

My question is: could you in certain circumstances visualise direct participation by France in these negotiations – an idea hardly

Mr. Scheer (continued)

discussed at all so far – in that such a step might open up a new path leading to a solution with implications extending beyond the INF negotiations?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. CHEYSSON (*French Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – The relevance and interest of the various questions are in themselves sufficient proof of the value of these meetings.

It is true that we have several times – I myself have had the honour in the French National Assembly – stated the position of the French Government, which is that we consider WEU to be indispensable for the discussion and formulation of decisions which link Europeans in the matter of security. This also enables them to state their views better in other forums where security problems are discussed, either from the purely political standpoint in an organisation which has no powers in the matter and which we do not want to have any powers, that is the European Community, or in an organisation with specific operational competence in defence matters – the Atlantic Alliance, within a limited geographical area I would remind you – but with no right to interfere in anything other than defence matters.

WEU can cover a very wide range of subjects – as you showed this morning by debating China – in general political debates between Europeans. WEU is therefore indispensable. It is so because of the institutions it has set up, as I said in my address. Here, I would recall that the Agency for the Control of Armaments has responsibilities which are of importance to us as the guarantee that the undertakings entered into by certain countries concerning the non-manufacture of some armaments and the control of levels and equipment are fulfilled.

WEU and its permanent institutions, responsible to the Council, have the resources for promoting standardisation and for studying a whole series of common problems regarding armaments, but, in our view, WEU is primarily essential – and this is the fourth time I have said this today – because your Assembly is the only forum where the elected representatives of our peoples can debate all aspects of defence and security.

Never before has it been so important and so essential that our peoples should be involved in thinking on the subject, and that action be taken to throw open the debate which has too long been kept from public view, chiefly for technical but justified reasons that have led

governments to take decisions, adopt policies and enter into undertakings. This debate must take place. It can take place in the street and our government certainly has no wish to place obstacles in the way of public demonstrations, so that our country and neighbouring countries can display their desire for peace and security, that is their capacity for defence. This is the crux of the present debate.

Will peace be ensured by pacifism? Who dares say it will? Peace means first of all that war is impossible, that war is rendered so unthinkable that it cannot even be mentioned. The prime objective – as I have no hesitation in repeating here yet again, Ladies and Gentlemen – is to deter any country from thinking in terms of war or in terms of threats. At the moment and for, I hope, a long time ahead, I hasten to say, there is a credible deterrent. Horribly credible I agree but credible. That is why we believe that at present – I repeat this without fear of criticism from those who will find me provocative – nuclear weapons are weapons for peace, because they render war unthinkable and absurd. Will this always be so? I do not know, but so long as these weapons are a perfect deterrent we should be failing our peoples if we did not stress the fact.

Let us think hard of the responsibility we would have to bear if we encouraged the threat by lowering our guard – and I am not even saying if we encouraged a war. I am sure that the generation of leaders who experienced the second world war cannot countenance the idea of a war for an instant. I am utterly convinced that leaders throughout the world want peace, but I do not want them to have the means to mount a threat. What I do not want to happen is that, if changes take place in one or other country, men who have fewer memories of the second world war should be tempted to brandish the threatening weapon. The balance of forces is the precondition of peace. This balance should be at the lowest possible level and where a deterrent is possible it would be a serious matter not to have it.

Believing that nuclear weapons render war unthinkable, France insists on having its own. France is the sole judge and the sole master on this issue. The President of the Republic and no one else has the authority to use it, could threaten to use it, could use it as an argument and no one in the world will take this right away from us.

We have no intention of joining a system where we would have to ask any country in the world to tell us the minimum level at which we think we should keep our nuclear weapons so that we, a weak people, may have credibility in face of the strongest.

Mr. Cheysson (continued)

As I said in my address, French nuclear weapons are not intended for the protection of all the countries of the alliance, of the continent of Europe. These countries are now threatened by a new incredibly accurate rapid-strike weapon. At the moment they have nothing on their soil to counter this new weapon. The only response lies in escalation to the ultimate strategic weapon which is American. And such escalation is regarded as less likely now that nuclear forces have become unbalanced in the European theatre.

We believe that there is a balance at world level. The experts will tell us that it is more or less steady and that there may be doubts as regards particular kinds of weapons. I am speaking in political terms and I accept that there is a world balance; as the Russians themselves have recognised it has existed for several years now. But if the theatres are taken separately, there is no longer a balance in Europe and it is in this imbalance that lies the danger which will have to be dealt with. These are the sort of problems which the public must be made to understand, which must be debated and on which our peoples must show and demonstrate their true capacity and determination to defend themselves.

In our democracies, the most important subjects are naturally debated most publicly through our elected representatives, who can give more time to thought on the problems and to the scrutiny of reports and can be more fully informed of the reasons and of the arguments for and against which can lead to conclusions. This is the unique rôle of your Assembly. I do not mean by this that the other WEU institutions should disappear. Certainly not. The structure created by the modified Brussels Treaty should remain intact. What value would some people attach to the commitments entered into under the treaty if all or part of it were put on ice or dismantled? Our determination must be made quite clear at a time of great trouble and anxiety. This is our best protection.

At this time, the fact that you, Ladies and Gentlemen, are elected representatives, is of vital importance. The Assembly is the real focus of our interest in WEU. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Cheysson. I am certain that your remarks concerning the defence of your country and its commitment to our organisation have been noted by everyone present. Once again, thank you, Mr. Minister.

5. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly was invited yesterday to appoint its six Vice-Presidents. One vacancy reserved for the Netherlands was not filled.

I have received the nomination of Mr. Blaauw, which is in order. I welcome this nomination.

If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose to proceed to this election by acclamation.

Are there any objections?...

I therefore nominate Mr. Blaauw a Vice-President of the Assembly and I wish him success in his duties.

I would remind the Assembly that under the terms of Rule 10(7) of the Rules of Procedure, the Vice-Presidents take precedence in order of age. The order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents is as follows: Mr. Pignion, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Bonnel, Mr. Berchem, Mr. Unland and Mr. Blaauw.

I should also like to offer a few words of welcome to a former President of this Assembly, Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel, who is present today. I extend the warmest welcome to him, both personally and on behalf of the Assembly. *(Applause)*

Mr. von Hassel, we have not forgotten your example as a great president of this Assembly or your efforts to create a more unified and safer Europe. Thank you for attending.

6. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 948)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 948.

I call Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur of the committee.

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to begin by thanking everyone who helped with the preparation of this report and in particular the Chairman and members of the Committee on

Mr. Prussen (continued)

Defence Questions and Armaments, and the tireless secretary of our committee.

Mr. President, as in previous years the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments received the following chapters of the Council's annual report from the Presidential Committee: relations between the Council and the Assembly, as regards defence questions; activities of the Council, part B, defence questions; Agency for the Control of Armaments and Standing Armaments Committee.

The committee's report which I have the honour to present follows the main lines of last year's report which was largely approved by the Council and ministers. Their words of approval are partly quoted in Section I of the explanatory memorandum, entitled "Relations between the Council and the Assembly", while as recently as yesterday Mr. Möllemann expressed his approval of Recommendation 380.

The committee's report deals principally with the present defence activities of the Council, but not defence questions in the wider sense which some people would like the Council to take up; the question of the competence of the WEU Council and of the other Atlantic and European institutions in the matter of defence is discussed in the committee's other report on burden-sharing in the alliance, which my colleague, Mr. Wilkinson, will present this afternoon. The committee did not want the Assembly to have to hold the same debate twice.

What are the present activities of the Council in the field of defence and armaments?

May I remind you that, disregarding any question which a member state may wish to raise – because the governments no longer raise wider defence questions in WEU – the Council considers that it has four fields of activity: the level of forces of member states, the stationing of certain United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe, the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee.

The main theme of the committee's report is that, while the basic commitment to mutual defence written into the Brussels Treaty has exactly the same validity today as when the treaty was signed, Western European Union should on the other hand be adapted as far as possible to the needs of the eighties. Meanwhile, the Assembly's reports and debates and its exchanges with the Council ensure the continuing validity of the treaty.

As regards the level of forces of member states, it is often forgotten that Protocol No. II

to the Brussels Treaty sets upper limits for those forces which may only be exceeded by unanimous decision of either the WEU Council or the North Atlantic Council according to the category of forces involved. The Council of WEU still applies the prescribed procedure, but modified for French forces stationed in Germany, a category of forces which does not appear to have been allowed for in the 1954, 1956 and 1957 texts which govern the question. Today, it is no doubt superfluous to set upper limits for our own forces, but the treaty makes no provision for modifying the relevant commitments. The committee finds that in 1982 the Council duly applied the procedure prescribed by the texts in force.

In the case of United Kingdom forces stationed in Germany, Article VI of Protocol No. II sets minimum levels which can be varied by the Council and are at present fifty-five thousand men plus a tactical air force. After repeated requests from the Assembly, the Council and the United Kingdom Government agreed that current figures for these forces should be included in the annual report. The committee finds that the United Kingdom fulfilled its undertaking in this respect in 1982. But as the committee's report notes in paragraph 2.6 of the explanatory memorandum, the planned reorganisation of the British Army of the Rhine over the period 1983 to April 1984 seems to involve a net reduction of about two thousand men. The committee hopes to have an assurance that in future years the figure of fifty-five thousand British troops stationed in Germany and placed under the command of SACEUR will at all times be respected by the United Kingdom.

The publication by the United Kingdom of the real level of its forces in Germany is a voluntary act on the part of the United Kingdom Government. It has no such obligation under the treaty. The committee considers, and a proposal is included in paragraph 6(a) of the draft recommendation, that the value of the Council's annual report would be enhanced if all the WEU countries agreed to include in future annual reports a statement of the levels of forces which they make available to NATO and of the French forces in Germany.

As regards the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the controls stipulated in Protocols Nos. III and IV to the Brussels Treaty, the committee recognises the value of the work done by the Agency but considers at the same time that the controls imposed by the treaty serve no further purpose and should be reduced to a minimum. Fortunately, the situation is not the same as for the ceilings imposed by the treaty for the forces of member states and the treaty itself allows certain changes to the controls. Consequently, in paragraph 1 of the

Mr. Prussen (continued)

draft recommendation the committee repeats the whole of the proposal made last year for cancellation of the two remaining sections dealing with the conventional weapons which Germany has undertaken not to manufacture on its territory. Last year the Council "received with great interest and are considering the Assembly's recommendation to cancel paragraphs IV and VI".

Paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation refers to the list of member states' armaments subject to quantitative controls on the mainland of Europe. In reply to the recommendation sent by the Assembly last year for a reduction of that list, the Council said that it "was considering the technical, military and political aspects of this problem". This year, therefore, the Assembly proposes that the Council should submit to the Assembly the results of its consideration and should take into consideration the possibility of deleting the list concerned, except for atomic, biological and chemical weapons.

At its joint meeting with the Council, three weeks ago, I was very pleased to be able to hear General Rambaldi, Director of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, who with the permission of the Council was able to speak for the first time to explain the work of the Agency. The committee's report proposes that advantage be taken of all constructive aspects of that work. In paragraph 6(b) therefore we ask that the valuable information collected by the Agency on the production and procurement of armaments in member countries be included in future reports of the Council as they were in reports prior to 1982.

In paragraph 3 we further propose closer co-operation between the Agency and the United States agency. Such co-operation was organised on a number of previous occasions. At a time when the activities of the United States agency are unfortunately being whittled down by the American administration, the committee considers that the WEU Agency should extend its studies of the principles of control, verification and exports of armaments in co-operation with the United States agency, and should make its findings available to the alliance as a whole.

Lastly, Mr. President, the committee welcomes the fact that the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU is now helping with the preparation of certain committee reports but asks that such assistance be extended to collection of the necessary information, which does not seem to be the case at the moment. The committee also proposes that the study of the European armaments industry, started by the committee

some years ago, be extended to include a study of the status of the two-way street and an analysis of the factors which would help to increase the proportion of European equipment in the armed forces of all allied countries.

Mr. President, these are the proposals of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and I hope that the Assembly will endorse them by agreeing to the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). - I wish to comment on two points in the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council of WEU and Mr. Prussen's reply to that report. These are: the renewed request to the Council to cancel the ban on manufacture by the Federal Republic of Germany and the quantitative limitation for other member states, in the case of the conventional weapons listed in Annex III - paragraphs IV and VI - and Annex IV of Protocol No. III; and the study of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU, carried out by the SAC, and Mr. Prussen's proposal that this study be extended to include "the status of the two-way street and an analysis of the factors which would help to increase the proportion of European equipment in the armed forces of all allied countries".

The straightforward cancellation of the prohibitions and limits relating to the conventional armaments of the member states of WEU have consequences which are not very clear to see for a possible, subsequent speeding up of the arms race. One thing is certain however: the initiators of such straightforward cancellation would bear a heavy share of responsibility if the race were in fact speeded up.

This is, however, only a first assessment. Equally, it may be argued objectively that while it is certainly possible that total freedom for the member states of WEU in the case of conventional armaments might well speed up the arms race, it is equally undeniable that the imposition of limits on those states alone prevents them from exerting any major active impact on the progress of world disarmament. How can one negotiate without a bargaining counter?

At present, however, it may be doubted whether the European members of NATO are able or willing to play such a rôle, because of their position as vassals of the United States. This was demonstrated yet again recently at Williamsburg in the unexpected declaration on security. Can anyone stand up against the dollar these days?

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

In 1954, the Paris Agreements gave WEU powers in four directions: economic, social and cultural, political and legitimate collective defence. Since then, our organisation has steadily been dismantled. WEU has at no time exercised its economic powers, except when the dialogue between the Six and the United Kingdom from 1963 to 1970 was linked with that subject. A very proper concern to avoid duplication resulted in WEU standing down in favour of European organisations very actively concerned with economic questions such as the OECD, the EEC and EFTA.

The same concern to avoid duplication led to the relinquishment of social and cultural activities to the Council of Europe. Again, the Council of WEU thought it better that political consultations affecting the whole of Europe should take place in a wider context, namely ten-power Europe. In this area, WEU has become a debating organisation, operating mainly in our Assembly which deals with important political subjects; but it is now only a debating organisation.

It is in the defence field that WEU still has practical, tangible substance in everyday affairs. Admittedly, exclusive authority for the operational control of forces, defence planning and other related matters was transferred to NATO as long ago as 1950. But WEU still has a real, specific rôle to play because of the arms limitations and controls for which it has powers under the Paris Agreements, quite apart of course from the vital Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, providing for automatic military assistance between the seven members of WEU. The record of WEU activities in 1983 is as follows: in economic matters, nil; in social and cultural matters, nil; in political matters, nil; in defence matters: (i) Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, (ii) arms limitations and controls.

In the case of defence, there is also of course the work of the SAC. But while this activity is a fact, it is on a very small scale and limited to specific matters. Is this comment contradicted by the current study of the armaments sector of industry in the member states of WEU? Far from it, having regard to the unacceptable dragging out of the study.

In the present circumstances and state of ideas, many people feel that the limitation and control, of conventional armaments at least, are somewhat antiquated and that they introduce a contradictory and out-of-date element into an alliance for legitimate collective defence. I would observe, however, that their cancellation and the consequent elimination of a major part of the ACA's activities would mean reducing

the activity of WEU to a point which might put an end to its practical activities unless it develops in another direction at the same time. The other activity which might breathe fresh life into WEU is called for by the needs of the day: the standardisation of armaments and co-ordination of the production and procurement of arms. This is the field of the SAC.

Nevertheless, despite member governments' declarations of good intentions towards WEU, it is an undeniable fact that they lack a sufficiently clear and coherent political will on the subject. For example, the SAC was instructed in 1977 to study the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU. That was six years ago, and the study has still not been completed; the work done is now having to be brought up to date.

This raises a question regarding Mr. Prusen's otherwise apposite proposal for an extension of the SAC study: how long will such an extension further delay the completion of the study?

Consequently, without questioning the Assembly's important rôle as a debating body only, or the importance of the military assistance clause in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, it is essential, if WEU is to continue to have any meaning for Europeans, that our organisation does not shed its duties in the matter of armaments limitation and control.

Furthermore, any extension of WEU's rôle as the European pillar of western defence must be achieved in particular by obtaining from the governments of member states an adequate guarantee of their commitment in the now essential area of co-operation on the production and procurement of armaments, despite the cancellation of Annex III, paragraphs IV and VI of Protocol No. III, which would be one more step towards destroying the activity of WEU as an organisation and sooner or later towards the disappearance of the active elements in the organisation and its final transformation into a debating society.

Mr. President, I shall wait to hear the Rapporteur's reply before deciding how I shall vote on the whole recommendation; I repeat that I am opposed to the first paragraph of the recommendation and reserve my position regarding paragraph 4.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Bassinet.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). — May I first congratulate the Rapporteur on his thoughtful and excellent report.

However, in view of what Mr. Dejardin has just said, it is perhaps — no certainly — to be

Mr. Bassinet (continued)

regretted that no reference is made to what WEU does. Moreover, our authorities and institutions were deserving of more attention and respect.

Mr. Prussen's report has positive features, particularly as regards the Standing Armaments Committee and the possibility of its collaborating with our Assembly. At the same time, it should perhaps be regretted that this collaboration is slow to take effect and that difficulties which could easily have been removed still persist. This is a major new development which will be positive for both the Standing Armaments Committee and for the Assembly.

I would, however, like to refer to a specific point in the draft recommendation in Mr. Prussen's report which raises a problem for French socialists.

The draft recommendation calls on the Council of WEU, in application of Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, to cancel paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III. The proposal is for the lifting of the permanent ban on the possession by the Federal Republic of Germany of the weapons and factories earmarked solely for their production, listed in those paragraphs.

I would remind the Assembly that paragraph IV is concerned with long-range missiles and guided missiles, which today means long-range missiles, while paragraph VI is concerned with bomber aircraft for strategic purposes. This relates to categories of weapons and means of production which the countries with nuclear weapons now possess. As things stand at present, both are still banned to the Federal Republic of Germany.

The draft recommendation also calls on the Council "to submit to the Assembly in the near future the results of its consideration of the technical, military and political aspects of varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III in application of Article V of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, while taking into consideration the possibility of deleting the list concerned except for atomic, biological or chemical weapons".

Variation or deletion of the list would therefore involve lifting the ban imposed by Section 8 of Protocol No. IV: "All warships powered by means other than steam, diesel or petrol engines or gas turbines". This means nuclear-powered warships, which completely change the dimension of a war at sea. Long-range missiles, bomber aircraft for strategic purposes, nuclear-powered warships: every one of these is capable of striking from a distance.

And this seems inappropriate to us in the light of the situation in Central Europe.

We must respect the powers of our Council and the nature of our Assembly. The organisations which claim to defend our countries as a whole through defensive structures, within which Germany like the other countries has obligations, supplement each other. As Mr. Cheysson, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, recalled a short time ago, WEU, Atlantic Alliance and NATO are not superimposable terms but cover different sets of facts.

European and global defence, of course, but our experience shows us that the overall structure is still necessary and that one must not be confused with the other. There must be no major disturbance of the balance of systems which has provided a deterrent and ensured the defence of the West in a wholly satisfactory manner for almost forty years.

This analysis is confirmed by the evolution of the situation in Europe. In view of the radical changes involved in the measures proposed by Mr. Prussen - I fully recognise that this is not the first year that the proposal has appeared in a recommendation - and in view of the way it could be exploited politically - it is sufficient to note what is going on in some European countries - the French socialists for whom I speak call on the Assembly to pay particular respect to the rôles of the two organs of WEU and to leave to the Council matters within its authority.

We shall therefore not vote for the draft recommendation before the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The general debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). - In reply to Mr. Dejardin, I would observe that the report was very fully discussed in committee and that the final approval of the recommendation by fifteen votes to one shows that the decision was clear and definite.

Mr. Bassinet seems to be in error in referring to Section V of Annex III to Protocol No. III concerning warships with the exception of smaller ships for defence purposes. This paragraph was in fact cancelled two or three years ago.

In my view, the cancellation of paragraphs IV and VI is no more than doing justice to Germany by removing the last restrictions and putting it on the same footing as the other member countries of WEU. The retention of this paragraph could lead to arguments and might even cause distrust. I would observe that the same recommendation was put forward

Mr. Prussen (continued)

last year and was given a very big majority, so that there can be no going back on that decision.

As regards armaments control, I would remind the Assembly that France withdrew from control of nuclear weapons and means of launching such weapons. It would not therefore appear to be in a very good position to criticise this article in the recommendation.

I have no further comments and I urge the Assembly to approve the draft recommendation in the form approved by the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – I must apologise for the fact that the Chairman of the committee has not much to say: he cannot at this stage speak for the committee because he was not involved in dealing with the question as the person responsible for the committee.

What Mr. Prussen said concerning the vote in committee is correct. I myself in fact voted in favour of his report. Members involved in the committee's work know that I submitted a number of amendments; since they were accepted, I would have found it hard to argue against Mr. Prussen's conclusions and not to admit at least the excellence of his report.

When anyone agrees to discuss a draft, he must if his proposals for amendment are accepted, also accept the report as a whole. That is why I find myself greatly embarrassed, Mr. Prussen, because I have taken a further close look at the question. It is correct that remarks were made by my compatriots. I shall not commit either the committee or myself as its Chairman. If I had to speak as a member of the Assembly, I would prefer, in view of a certain lack of precision pointed out by Mr. Bassinet and of the fact that Mr. Dejardin added a number of points giving the committee a clearer view, that the question be referred back to the committee, if no one objects, so that the obstacles can be removed, if possible according to the rules. But I am, I repeat, speaking for myself only.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Are you, Mr. Chairman, formally requesting reference back to the committee?

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – As you put the direct question to me, my answer is "Yes". I insist, however, that I am speaking not as Chairman but as a member of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As a formal request has been made, I must observe

that under the terms of Rule 32(3) of our Rules of Procedure: "In a debate on the above matters, the following only shall be heard: the proposer of the motion, one speaker against the motion, the Rapporteur and the Chairman of any committee concerned".

Does anyone wish to speak against?

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – The draft recommendation differs very little from last year's which was agreed to by a big majority. You will remember all our discussions on the subject.

The present report has been considered twice in committee, once at Pisa and once in Brussels and the draft recommendation was adopted by fifteen votes to one.

I see no reason why the report should be referred back to the committee and I maintain my request for a vote on the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now ask the Assembly to vote by sitting and standing on the reference back of the report to the committee.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The motion for reference back is agreed to.

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I ask for a count of members present. I do not believe that there is a quorum.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Prussen, as there has been no request for a vote by roll-call, I refer to Rule 36(2) of the Rules of Procedure under the terms of which all votes other than votes by roll-call shall be valid, whatever the number of representatives or substitutes present, unless, at the request of a representative or substitute before the voting has begun, the President has ascertained that the number of representatives or substitutes who have signed the register of attendance is less than a quorum.

As this is not the case, the procedure has been properly carried out.

7. Political activities of the WEU Council – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 944 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs

The President (continued)

Committee on the political activities of the WEU Council – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 944 and amendments.

I call Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur of the committee.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report which I have to present on the political activities of the Council of Western European Union is one of the permanent features of our deliberations and is always discussed at the first part-session. Last year's report, which you have before you, was prepared by Mr. Vecchietti, and mine can follow on from his.

I have the impression that for about a decade, since the United Kingdom joined the Common Market, WEU has been living in a kind of limbo. The lively criticism of our organisation exemplified by the remarks of Mr. Bassinet and Mr. Dejardin is, in my view, an expression of frustration. That is something we have all experienced.

Of late, however, I seem to have perceived some signs of greater activity, no doubt because in our countries generally as well as in national politics the issues of defence and peace policy have become more central topics of discussion. But views have also been expressed in our Assembly – yesterday for instance and again this morning – which leave us in no doubt that WEU will have to play a more active rôle in future. The most encouraging comments are the ones we have heard from the French Government.

This morning the Foreign Minister of the French Republic said that if WEU did not exist it would be necessary to invent it. We may be sure that he was thinking not just of the Assembly but of the Council as well, since the various organs of WEU constitute a whole.

Yesterday we listened to the Parliamentary Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, who said that the French efforts to strengthen WEU should be supported. Things therefore seem to be on the move, although we are still very far from making full use of the potentialities of WEU. I am sure you will not object if I do not here recite in repetitive detail the points contained in my written report. I simply want to comment briefly on the relationship between Council and Assembly.

I would like to revert here to two examples quoted in my report. Eighteen months ago,

Mr. Lemoine, French Secretary of State, told us in this place that he considered it proper for the Standing Armaments Committee to be concerned with the preparation of the decisions and resolutions of the Assembly, and that the committee should be placed at the disposal of the Assembly. We thereupon approached the Council, which gave what I would call a very evasive response. The Council drew attention to the undisputed fact that the Standing Armaments Committee was created by the Council for the purpose of promoting collaboration in the area of armaments. The Council said that, while the international secretariat might from time to time render assistance to the Assembly, this would have to be done by a procedure calling for the intervention of the Council on each occasion.

That is what I call an evasive response. In the Assembly we shall observe very closely how the initial activity of the Standing Armaments Committee on behalf of our Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions operates in practice. We are not aiming at any organisational or structural change; we simply want this committee to be allowed to work for the Assembly as well, along the lines proposed by Mr. Lemoine.

The second example which makes the relationship between Council and Assembly appear in an unsatisfactory light is the procedure adopted in respect of the study of the European armaments industries, which the Standing Armaments Committee has been submitting to the Council in instalments since 1978. The Assembly has now received a copy of this report, but it is not a copy of the complete report. What we have received is an abridged version intended for publication from which important passages have been excised. This means that we have to ask further questions, which may already have been answered in the report. Nor do we feel to be fobbed off with a version intended for publication is compatible with the self-respect or political weight of the Assembly.

There is, then, much room for improvement in the relationship between the Council and the Assembly, especially in the light of the statement by the French Minister for External Relations this morning to the effect that this Assembly is the only venue in Europe where parliamentarians discuss the most important questions currently confronting our continent – those of defence and peace.

My feeling is that an observer and well-disposed onlooker might detect a few good will gestures towards improving co-operation – but no more than that. The Assembly, and its General Affairs Committee in particular, will carefully monitor developments. We shall

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

have to check up again next year, to see whether the expectations expressed in our report have been fulfilled or not.

Mr. President, as the previous committee chairman is not present and a new chairman has not yet been appointed, may I perhaps mention that the report has twice been discussed in detail in the General Affairs Committee and that the committee unanimously recommends its acceptance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now call Mr. Forma, the only speaker registered for the general debate.

Mr. FORMA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. Ahrens's report was discussed several times in committee and I believe that it will meet with our approval. It seems to me that the tone of this document is rather less indulgent in its arguments, which I can largely endorse, as compared with the previous report, particularly as regards the progress of relations between the Assembly and the Council. The report highlights a number of points which justify the request for clarification and more than purely formal replies to the questions and proposals included in the reports submitted last year, for example by Mr. Vecchietti.

In fact – and here I think I am quoting the words of the Rapporteur – it cannot be said that the report for 1982 throws much light on the obscure points raised last year, on which clarification was sought. In my view, the very clear remarks made last year by the German Minister and this morning by Mr. Cheysson, taken together with Mr. Colombo's earlier proposals, pinpoint exactly what was requested and what should be done. Defence integration inevitably raises the issue of political integration; which comes first is an old question, but reticence in some quarters clearly hints at divergent attitudes to aid for the common defence and the promotion of a political community of the people who would have to provide that defence. The establishment of a defence capability matched by a realistic European spirit might well upset some existing institutions; on the other hand it might transform a possible area of disagreement into a contribution to equilibrium. I believe that these things are understood by the members of the Council of Ministers, which as the embodiment of the treaty should progressively seek to increase effective action through the parliamentary institutions.

I realise that to talk of "unity" may be asking for the impossible at the moment; let us therefore use the word "union" instead, but we should at least like to be able to believe that

such union, without which there can be no security, is visibly on the way to being achieved. To quote the German Secretary of State, when we think of European security we must think of the integration of all of its constituent parts and of NATO. In my opinion, the only political body through which integration can be achieved is WEU, which furthermore is alone qualified to debate armaments control and therefore peace in a responsible manner, particularly in the present situation, as was clearly described this morning.

In my view all these arguments must give due consideration to the practical achievement of integration, which will take account of present circumstances, including the financial situation, and, beyond mere words, will avoid certain pressures, which at this very moment give the lie to very recent statements on the subject and are adding further to Europe's difficulties by diverting funds from research and from the creation of the instruments required for the defence we are seeking to establish.

In this context, Mr. Ahrens draws attention to a number of obstacles, including some of a legal nature, which distort proper collaboration on an equal footing. On the same point, he remarks that the Council of Ministers makes friendly gestures towards the Assembly but that in reality the time has come for the political organ to shoulder the tasks assigned to it by the treaty. It cannot be denied that there has been a definite thaw and our Rapporteur stressed the fact that there is some convergence on foreign policy and that some decisions within the Council's competence have been referred, formally at least, to the WEU Assembly on such issues as the Polish, Afghan and Falklands crises and certain aspects of relations between Europe and the United States.

Mr. President, in approving this report we cannot but endorse the Rapporteur's statement that it remains to be seen what the real outcome will be of the Council's close attention to the Assembly's debates, which are said to assist the Council in its deliberations. It also remains to be seen what the outcome will be of another request to consider relations between the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee; and lastly, it remains to be seen whether and how our suggestions for removing some obstacles to European armaments production will be implemented.

My conviction has been strengthened by one of the remarks made this morning by the French Minister for External Relations. The great fear of a conflict in which we should be the battlefield and the need to prevent such a conflict, which will certainly not be achieved by peace marches, should urge us towards the

Mr. Forma (continued)

integration of defence and the fuller measure of integration whereby our Europe of separate countries will be transformed into an entity which, while retaining all the special characteristics and traditions of its parts, will be a real, united force among the major forces on the world political scene.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Rapporteur to reply to speakers.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to place on record my thanks for the appreciation of the report expressed by Mr. Forma. I am pleased that he shares my views and considers it right that this report should have been framed in a more critical spirit than reports of past years on this subject.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The general debate is closed.

Before taking the vote on the draft recommendation, we have to consider two amendments in the order in which they refer to the draft recommendation. They are Amendments 1 and 2 tabled by Mr. Lagorce and others.

Amendment 1 is worded as follows :

1. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “the latest decisions by NATO bodies in regard to defence plans” and insert “all the latest technological developments in this field”.

I call Mr. Lagorce to speak in support of the amendment.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – I will speak in support of both amendments together because they have the same purpose; one applies to the last paragraph in the preamble to the draft recommendation and the second links this paragraph to the recommendation proper.

We agree that the SAC should carry out in full its task of promoting European armaments co-operation. However, in line with our country's policy, we consider that it cannot be required to take account of the decisions of NATO, an integrated organisation to which, as you know, France does not belong.

Instead of this specific reference to NATO alone, we propose that the SAC should take account of all the latest technological developments in the armaments field. This we believe will be completely in accord with the rôle of the SAC which, like the Rapporteur, we do not wish to see reduced, but progressively extended.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?

What is the committee's view?

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I cannot state the committee's views on the two amendments as we have not discussed the subject in committee. I would just like to say that this additional text and the reference to NATO were not contained in our original report. They were adopted at the final meeting at the suggestion of a French colleague, though not a member of the same party as my friend Pierre Lagorce.

However, as I perceive that the French react variously to references to NATO and as we are not changing the substance – it has been expressly stated that this new version is more comprehensive than the wording in the report – I believe the sense of the committee would be to agree to these amendments. I should therefore like to recommend acceptance of both the proposed amendments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Lagorce to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

Amendment 2, tabled by Mr. Lagorce, is worded as follows:

2. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “the decisions taken by the NATO Defence Planning Committee in December 1982” and insert “all the latest technological developments in the armaments field”.

The author has already spoken in favour of this amendment.

I now put it to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

I now put to the vote the amended draft recommendation as a whole.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

8. Change in the membership of a committee

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Italian Delegation proposes the following change in the membership of the Committee on

1. See page 24.

The President (continued)

Rules of Procedure and Privileges: Mr. Valiante to be a titular member to fill a vacant seat.

Are there any objections?...

The nomination is agreed to.

**9. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Burden-sharing in the alliance (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and

Armaments, Document 947 and amendments).

2. Address by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
3. Burden-sharing in the alliance (Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendation and draft resolution, Document 947 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.30 p.m.)

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 7th June 1983

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Burden-sharing in the alliance (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 947 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Wilkinson (*Rapporteur*).
3. Address by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
Replies by General Rogers to questions put by: Mr. Blaauw, Lord Reay, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Haase, Mr. Biefnot, Mr. de Vries, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Mr. Holtz, Mr. Wilkinson.
4. Adoption of the minutes.
5. Burden-sharing in the alliance (*Debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 947 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Linde, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Baumel, Mr. de Vries, Mr. Jäger, Mr. Caro; (points of order): Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Stoffelen; Mr. Wilkinson (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Stoffelen (point of order), Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. van der Sanden (point of order), Mr. Blaauw.
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Burden-sharing in the alliance

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 947 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The first order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on burden-sharing in the alliance, Document 947 and amendments.

I welcome Mr. Wilkinson, the Rapporteur, who has made the effort to be here with us today even though he is involved in an election campaign.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – It is a pleasure for me, Mr. President, to be invited to

move this report on burden-sharing at so early a stage in your presidency, which I wholeheartedly endorse and to which I extend every good wish.

I earnestly believe that the report is one of the most important to be presented to our Assembly in recent years. It has the support of the great majority of the Defence Committee, with the particular exception of one member who voted against it on the ground that he opposed paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation and its endorsement of the twin-track decision of the NATO Alliance of 12th December 1979 on INF modernisation.

On a subject as significant to the relationship between the European and North American components of the alliance, consensus is the touchstone of the credibility and authority of any report. That is why we in the Defence Committee worked so long and hard to secure agreement. It is noteworthy that this report, which was referred back for me to reconsider by the committee at an earlier stage in our deliberations, was eventually passed by fourteen votes to one with only two abstentions.

I am particularly grateful for the positive and constructive contributions of my colleagues on the committee, whose enhancement of the European dimension of the report may prove of especial value and particular significance for the future of this Assembly and for the rest of WEU in European defence.

1. See page 26.

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

I thank the Clerk to the committee, Stuart Whyte, and his staff, for their tireless help and assistance. The knowledge and expertise of Stuart Whyte were invaluable to me and on more than one occasion he put me on the right lines. The wise advice that he gave, as well as the copious briefings of many members of governments, serving officers and officials, both here in Europe and in the United States of America, were invaluable. I trust that all who study this report, its draft recommendations, resolution and accompanying explanatory memorandum will acknowledge that this is a carefully researched document that does not jump to any hasty conclusions.

The inspiration of much of what I have written has its origins in the Defence Committee's highly informative visit to the United States, which took place in March. We should all be aware of the strength of public and Congressional feeling on the issue of burden-sharing in the United States, although there is no doubt that, as the last Eurogroup communiqué, which I quote in paragraph 4.7 of this report, makes clear :

"Eurogroup countries participating in NATO's integrated military structure make a substantial and significant contribution to the alliance's military forces. Their active armed forces ... provide approximately 75 % of NATO's readily available ground forces in Europe, 75 % of the tanks, 65 % of the air forces and 60 % of the warships ..."

The fact is that in the United States these figures are not fully comprehended and there is a considerable credibility gap between what we provide for our common defence in Europe, which contributes so much to the defence of the alliance, and what is acknowledged and understood by our friends on the other side of the water.

In percentage terms, since the advent of the Reagan administration, the United States defence expenditure has grown significantly more than it has in the European alliance. That is not the full story, because during the 1970s the reverse was so. In that decade the European build-up was greater than the improvement in American preparedness. It is appropriate that in Paris we take into account the considerable contribution by France to the total defence effort by the Atlantic Alliance. It is impossible to attempt to construct a realistic and credible defence for Europe without a contribution by France, which is of key significance to our security in Western Europe.

The new booklet published by the Eurogroup in the past few days, "The Defence of

Europe", produced in co-operation with the French authorities, makes it clear that, if we include the French armed forces, the European contribution in percentage terms is an even greater proportion of the sum of the alliance's defence effort. That booklet states:

"Concerning ready forces in Europe who are stationed there in peacetime, Europe provides 90 % of the ground forces, 80 % of the combat aircraft, 80 % of the tanks and 90 % of the armoured divisions."

We recognise that in emergency or war we are dependent on rapid reinforcement by the United States. We are equally dependent on the ultimate nuclear guarantee for our security, which is the backbone to our deterrent. None the less, in peacetime we Europeans provide the greater part of our own defence.

In United States political circles, and generally in the United States, that fact is not fully recognised. How should we address ourselves to the problem? First, we must make a political and informational effort. In the United States, this should be through the embassy of the Eurogroup chairman-in-office - at present the Norwegian Defence Minister - and through the embassy of the nation which provides the Eurogroup secretariat, the United Kingdom. In Europe, there is also a political and informational effort to be made. This is where the Western European Union Assembly should come in. It is the natural interlocutor between the national parliaments and public opinion.

We could use the Assembly more effectively to propagandise and to provide information about European defence efforts, and particularly to explain to Europeans who do not fully appreciate in the widest sense the nature and extent of the United States' contribution to the defence of Europe and the importance of the United States' nuclear guarantee for Western European security.

In an era of depressing anti-Americanism, which is a cancer among the free democracies in Western Europe, I hope that members of the Assembly will address themselves vigorously to explaining in full to our more sceptical friends back home the extent and nature of the United States' contribution to our defence.

Secondly, a practical effort must be made by Europeans to meet our alliance commitments in full. The political and informational effort is the natural course for parliamentarians, but we also have a duty to ensure that our governments execute our commitments to the full.

I shall explain some of the ways in which we can practically assist our common defence effort, enhance it, and improve our relationship

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

with the United States. I do not shrink from putting this at the top of the list, but first we must support the twin-track decision on INF modernisation. Secondly, in Western Europe we must meet the alliance's target for increased defence expenditure in real terms. We must also meet the biennial force goals agreed by the governments on the recommendation of the Supreme Allied Commander, who honours us with his presence this afternoon.

Thirdly, we must improve combat sustainability. A total of thirty days' stocks of fuel, ammunition, stores and consumables is surely not too much to ask of an alliance that believes in flexible response, wishes to keep the nuclear threshold as high as possible and to make its conventional defences credible. For conventional defences to be credible effective reserves are important, as Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley, the former Commander, North, observed in *The Times* yesterday when he urged the United Kingdom to build reserves on the lines of the United States air national guard squadrons which are so critical to reinforcement for Western Europe in emergency or war.

Fourthly, we must maximise our conventional fire power by using new technology to the full. That should have great appeal to those who are anxious about the apparent need of NATO to resort to nuclear weapons early in a conflict. Of course that will be a costly process and the procurement of such weapons systems must be on an equitable and alliance-wide basis.

As has been so eloquently and cogently argued in many other forums, that must surely be one of the ways to evolve tactical and war-fighting doctrines to enhance our overall deterrence. We must also improve the flexibility, effectiveness, mobility and readiness of European conventional forces to improve the value of the contribution to the allied mobile force and to compensate for any requirement by the United States to deploy elsewhere in Europe forces originally earmarked for NATO.

It would be foolish to ignore the increasingly global nature of the Soviet challenge. The way that Soviet forces have evolved in the twenty years since the Cuban crisis means that it is that global intervention capability on which they place so much emphasis – the development of a blue-water navy, the use of sea power as an adjunct to political influence and the creation of large mobile air forces. We ignore such developments at our peril. We Europeans cannot cast a blind eye at these developments if we value our security and the security of our economies, which are even more dependent than that of the United States upon access

to the energy resources of the Arabian Gulf and South-West Asia, upon access to the raw materials of Africa and elsewhere and upon access to worldwide markets.

To make a reasonable and proper response to that global challenge we should facilitate deployments of our allies out of the area. Why should the Soviet Union have a monopoly of the projection of military force beyond the NATO theatre to underpin its political aspirations? If there are instances, and we know that there are, where the Europeans can assist in peacekeeping out of area – where they have a particular expertise, perhaps where they have developed a relationship from imperial days or where they have an appropriate force structure – it is reasonable that our American friends should expect us to share with them some of the burdens out of area. In this regard I have in mind the French and British, who have been particularly active.

Reciprocally, we should reasonably expect our American friends to remove some of the apparent inequities – and there are inequities – in the relationship. These are most glaring in the procurement sector, and we have stressed that in many forums, not least the symposium that this Assembly held in London last spring. We ought to bring about a genuine two-way street. Interestingly enough, the Eurogroup meeting earlier this month stressed that point very clearly.

The new Chairman of Eurogroup, Mr. Sjaastad, the Norwegian Minister of Defence, at a press conference on 1st June referred to this imbalance and stated that the ratio of equipment trade between the United States and Europe ranged between one to five and one to fifteen, averaging one to ten in favour of the United States. He said that Western Europeans were "very impatient" with United States' restrictions imposed by Congress, such as the Speciality Metals Act and the Export Administration Act, although he rightly admitted that the Reagan administration was trying 'to remedy the situation. I entirely endorse those remarks.

A more equal political relationship between the Americans and the Europeans demands some institutional reforms on our part in Europe to build up the European pillar of the alliance. The Eurogroup has its advantages, and Mr. Lagorio, the outgoing Chairman, the Italian Minister of Defence, writing in *NATO Review* for April 1983, said:

"Eurogroup is in fact the most representative assembly of the European Ministers of Defence",

and referred to the way in which

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

“European NATO countries have increasingly come to realise the value of having a forum for frank and informal discussion of military and strategic questions.”

The problem is that our French friends do not regard Eurogroup in quite the same light as the other European members of the Atlantic Alliance. That being so, we must use other institutions as well. The one that springs to mind here is Western European Union itself. It could be the inner council on European defence. The Brussels Treaty has more explicit and binding mutual defence commitments than the NATO treaty, and five of the Brussels Treaty signatories – all the WEU countries except France and Luxembourg – have on their soil the new Pershing IIs, and ground-launched cruise missiles are to be deployed.

The report suggests that we should enhance the rôle of the Council of WEU, but we do not think that it is practical to invite other countries within the Eurogroup to sign the Brussels Treaty and to join Western European Union. We feel that the rôle of this Assembly can most definitely be built up for example, by inviting observers from the parliaments of other Western European countries that are members of NATO to take part in our deliberations. There is the fairly modest and practical suggestion that they should help with our deliberations on Sir Dudley Smith's important new study on European security. In fact, we cannot envisage a valid study on European security that does not take into account the position of the Norwegians on the northern flank, of the Turks isolated on the far side of the Aegean Sea and of the Greeks. This is a valuable initiative and I hope that it will be a precedent upon which we can build.

I hope that members will not feel that this is too over-ambitious a report. It has not attempted to be. It has attempted to be a moderate, middle-of-the-road, pragmatic study that has had the virtual consensus of our Defence Committee and upon which I hope this Assembly can agree.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson.

3. Address by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate will now be interrupted for the address by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, whom I welcome to the Assembly.

I should like to thank General Rogers for agreeing to answer questions put to him. I should also like to thank him for attending the proceedings of this Assembly for the second time in two years. In view of the major events we shall be witnessing in the days and months to come, we shall listen to what he has to say with special interest.

Your personal friendship with many members of this Assembly – who greatly respect you – is an indication of the atmosphere, General Rogers, in which you will be speaking to us.

I call General Rogers. (*Applause*)

General ROGERS (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – Ladies and Gentlemen, members of the Assembly, it is a great pleasure for me to have this opportunity to address this distinguished Assembly for the second time during my period as Supreme Allied Commander Europe. It is a privilege for me because this influential Assembly makes a valuable contribution to the defence efforts of Western Europe. As one of the men in uniform who has the opportunity to implement agreed allied defence policies, I respect the open, analytical and often tough debate that is customary in this chamber. While complementary to other similar assemblies within the alliance, the special European base of this Assembly provokes the study of security issues that are peculiarly European-orientated and which would, perhaps, in other circumstances not be subjected to the scrutiny that they merit.

How best to provide for West European security will continue to hold the centre of the stage within and among our western nations. However, the differences that exist do not reflect any fundamental disagreement over the ends that we wish to achieve. We have a solid consensus within our western nations about the future that we want – a future in which we maintain peace with freedom, in a world environment in which there are lower tensions and reduced and balanced levels of forces. If that is the future to which most of us aspire, how do we achieve it? It is on that question that we encounter the divergent views as to the approach that can lead to our goals.

It is my conviction that the future that I describe requires that we in Western Europe, and specifically within the alliance, achieve two tightly intertwined security objectives. First, we must maintain a credible and robust deterrent to deter overt aggression but also to deter political intimidation, which may result if we are perceived by the other side to be incapable or unwilling to defend our security. The second objective, which is mainly dependent upon the first, is that we must negotiate successfully equitable and verifiable arms

General Rogers (continued)

reduction accords for all categories of forces and arms. Only such accords can halt the military growth on each side, start to reduce it in a balanced way and put some predictability into the military position.

I do not need to tell this group that neither of those objectives – deterrence or arms reduction and control – can be achieved from a western posture of weakness and unilateral restraint. The major obstacle to the future that we seek is the continuing threat to our security posed by a nation that does not embrace our western values and does not practise our restraint. However, the Soviet Union is a nation that respects strength, if nothing else, and can be expected to recognise in the future, as it has in the past, that negotiated restrictions on armaments can be in its best interests. Thus, we must provide the Soviets with adequate incentive to negotiate seriously.

The achievement of our security objectives requires that our alliance be viewed as politically cohesive and militarily strong. More specifically, the political imperative of unity requires that, as the previous speaker noted, we must first implement NATO's decision of December 1979 on the modernisation of its intermediate-range nuclear forces – the INF – while we continue to try to negotiate their elimination. Secondly, the political imperative requires that we overcome the transatlantic tensions that are caused in the main by different perceptions about how to deal with East-West relations. As some of you have heard me say on other occasions, those tensions can be reconciled if we are patient enough to listen to each other, but more especially if we are wise enough to take into account the problems and the interests peculiar to individual nations.

I hope that I shall contribute a small amount to this afternoon's theme of the sharing of security burdens. The fulfilment of the political imperative that I have described can provide our nations with a requisite foundation for maintaining a strong deterrent and successfully negotiating arms reduction accords.

There is a military imperative that must be met. We must be viewed as being strong, resolute and capable of implementing our strategy of flexible response. I wish to talk about that deterrent strategy of flexible response for a few minutes, because it is sometimes misunderstood. I want to remind you that three possible responses are envisaged in that strategy. First, the preferred response is direct defence to defeat an attack or to place the burden of escalation on the shoulders of the aggressor. The second response is voluntary

escalation on our part. The third response is the general nuclear response, which is the guarantor of our deterrence.

We also envisage the triad of forces – the strategic nuclear, the theatre nuclear and the conventional. That deterrence strategy of flexible response is still as appropriate today as it was in the 1960s, provided that adequate forces are furnished for each leg of the triad. Today, I must say to you that, in contrast with the 1960s when we adopted the strategy, NATO has been surpassed in all three categories of forces necessary to implement it. Do not misunderstand me! Allied Command Europe, with which I am associated, gets stronger every year because of commitments that are met, but the gap between the NATO forces' capabilities and those of the Warsaw Pact continues to widen every year. Fortunately, the United States and the United Kingdom are taking action to restore the deterrent value of our strategic forces. If we are to follow through that two-track decision of December 1979 we shall fill the gap in our spectrum of deterrence which caused us to make the decision to modernise our forces within NATO.

However, it is in the conventional, non-nuclear arms area of NATO that the nations have not shown similar resolve to overcome their deficiencies. While nations continue to fail to meet commitments to improve conventional forces, NATO has mortgaged its defence to the nuclear response. Instead of possessing genuine flexibility, our current military posture will require us, if attacked conventionally, to move fairly quickly to the second response of our strategy – deliberate escalation on our part. The plain fact is that if conventional war comes we shall be unable to sustain ourselves for long with the manpower, ammunition and war reserve stocks to replace material loss on the battlefields.

For me that judgment is a sobering view of the alliance's current military posture, but it is by no means hopeless. Though it is unfavourable, NATO's military situation is not yet unmanageable; nor is it beyond restoration. We are a defensive alliance. We do not need to match the Warsaw Pact one for one in any area of force comparison.

But we must resolve to act before it is too late. There is an alternative to the posture that we find ourselves in and that is what we have established as our objective in Allied Command Europe to provide a credible adequate conventional capability by the end of this decade that will bolster our deterrence by providing a reasonable prospect of frustrating a conventional attack without initiating the use of nuclear weapons.

General Rogers (continued)

What are the implications of bolstering conventional defence along those lines? Translated into specific terms, what does it mean? Let me begin to answer that by saying what it does not mean. It does not mean, as one European newspaper put it yesterday, that Europeans should be the "footsloggers" of NATO. Although as an infantryman I may have different views of footslogging from others, since I have personally done a lot of it, there is no implication in what I am seeking that European nations should be relegated to any lesser, more mundane, rôle than their American allies. On the contrary, the steps that I recommend should, and indeed must, be shared by all if they are to be effective.

What developing an adequate conventional deterrent does mean, however, is that we must, as a first priority, do better with the forces already committed by bringing them up to the Allied Command Europe standards that have been agreed in manning, equipping, training, sustaining and reinforcing.

Secondly, we must continue to modernise our forces, as we are, with new tanks, aircraft and equipment, and as we do and as was recommended by Mr. Wilkinson, we must take advantage of the technology that is emerging and exploit it in order to give us a capability to look deep into the enemy's rear, to locate his targets and to attack them with conventional weapons before the forces that continue to follow on get to our general defensive positions, so that we can make manageable the numbers of those forces that reach a general defensive position. That capability is there today to be exploited when we decide to do so. We should exploit that technology to ensure that we have what we refer to as the electronic warfare capability in order to disrupt the very centralised control of the forces in the Warsaw Pact from the operational units.

The conventional capability that I have described can generally be met if nations will fulfil their force goals on the timescales set out therein. The force goals that are current today are 1983-88. The force goals comprise the only tool available in NATO to cause nations to commit themselves to reaching out to fulfil force improvements. I therefore plead with nations to meet their force goals.

They ask me how much it will cost. We calculate that, if every nation fully meets its force goals in that six-year time frame, it will require an average annual real increase in defence expenditure per country of 4% for each of those six years. I ask them: "But what does the 4% mean for those of us who have to pay taxes?" It means that, for every man, woman

and child in the alliance in 1983 – the first year – meeting those force goals with the increase by nation would require \$23 additional sacrifice for every one of us.

It is \$11 additional sacrifice for every man, woman and child in the West European nations of the alliance. That is an average; it is more for some nations, less for others. It is \$38 in the United States because of the force goals which it agreed and the base from which it started. I happen to believe that, despite the economic problems of nations, the citizens of our countries would find the amount that I have described as being affordable and reasonable as a small additional premium on an insurance policy for the maintenance of peace with freedom.

If we achieved such conventional forces, what would be the result? First, we would enhance our deterrence; secondly, we would raise the nuclear threshold; thirdly, if the Soviets decided to attack with the Warsaw Pact and we were successful in frustrating that attack, they would have two options – first, to withdraw; secondly, to be the first to escalate to the use of theatre nuclear weapons. They are no more anxious to do that than we are because of the mutual uncertainty as to whether that will lead to further escalation, to a strategic nuclear exchange, which is something that they abhor as much as we do.

In calling for an adequate conventional capability which will reduce our dependence on the nuclear response I am in no way implying that NATO should declare a "no-first-use" policy for nuclear weapons or eliminate those weapons from its inventory. Improving our capability will not allow us to forego an adequate and appropriate spectrum of nuclear weapons for deterrent purposes which, coupled with the uncertainty of our first-use policy, will in fact continue to deter a potential aggressor by pointing out that the risks of aggression outweigh any advantages to which he might aspire.

Meeting the political and military imperatives in the manner that I have discussed will, I believe, permit us to achieve those security objectives – deterrence of aggression and intimidation against us and the successful negotiation of arms reductions – which lead to our long-term goals of peace with freedom and reduced levels of forces.

As is recognised by the report before you on burden-sharing, the consensus which is so important to successful deterrence is undermined by several misconceptions which have unfortunately gained a hold in the minds of many of our fellow citizens. As I travel in the United States, I sometimes hear it said that,

General Rogers (continued)

after almost forty years of the United States' postwar involvement in European defence, now is the time to leave the security of Europe to Europeans.

That view fails to recognise, first of all, that a free and independent Western Europe is a vital American interest and essential to the defence of the United States and the values that it treasures. Secondly that view is often fostered by the belief that European allies are not bearing their share of the common defence burden. That misconception underestimates the substantial contributions that Europeans are making today to their own defence. Many of the European costs are not readily apparent, such as the human and social costs of relying on conscription to man their forces and the hidden economic costs of using European real estate without reimbursement, on a continent where real estate is scarce, for stationing and training allied forces. For example, there are about nine hundred military facilities provided to the United States free of charge by nations in Western Europe.

Also, many Americans do not realise, as Mr. Wilkinson said, that during the 1970s, while United States defence spending was declining in real terms, its European allies increased their defence spending by about 2% per year in real terms. While the European allies have only about half the total population and gross national product of the alliance, as Mr. Wilkinson said, 90% of the land forces and three-quarters of the sea and air forces initially available to SACEUR would be West European. When all factors are weighed, I believe that European NATO nations as a group – as I have told the Congress – are shouldering their fair share of the common defence burden. That judgment was confirmed by the conclusions of the Eurogroup meeting in Brussels last week.

All that having been said, my travels also have confirmed that the two perceptions that I have mentioned – that European security should be left to Europeans and that European allies are not bearing their share of the common burden – are firmly held in many sections of my country, and particularly in the Congress. Therefore, I believe that we must all take every opportunity, as Mr. Wilkinson said, for the sake of cohesion within the alliance and in the West, vigorously to disprove those ideas and avoid giving opinion-makers in the United States any reason either to encourage a United States withdrawal of its contribution or to doubt European nations' commitment to the collective defence of the West. We must also, as he pointed out, take into account the worldwide commitment of the United States to

protect the collective vital interests of its allies, irrespective of where they may be found and may be aggressed against on the globe. The challenge facing NATO this decade is not to get Europeans or just Americans to do more for defence; our challenge is to get all NATO nations to do more.

In the immediate future there would be no more unmistakable display of allied willingness to share the burdens and the risk of deterrence than the deployment of the intermediate-range nuclear forces. NATO's INF decision was taken in order to modernise our INF and fill a growing gap in our spectrum of deterrence caused mainly by the Warsaw Pact's growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threatened Western Europe. At the time of NATO's decision, in December 1979, 450 SS-4s and SS-5s and 140 SS-20s had been deployed. Now, over 350 SS-20s and approximately 250 SS-4s and SS-5s are deployed; with refire missiles for the SS-20, this exceeds 2,350 warheads, over two-thirds of which can reach Western Europe. NATO's response to the Soviet INF build-up is the planned deployment of 572 nuclear warheads, linked to the provision that for every new warhead deployed NATO will remove a nuclear warhead currently in Europe, so that there will be no addition to nuclear forces. In addition, when NATO made that decision in December 1979 it made another decision to withdraw one thousand nuclear warheads from Western Europe. In my United States rôle as Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces Europe, I was charged with that withdrawal, and we completed it in November 1980. My point is that, far from increasing its nuclear capabilities after the December 1979 decision, as the Warsaw Pact has done, NATO will have significantly fewer warheads on European soil, even after the INF deployment.

It is with respect to the arms reduction track of the INF decision that one finds misunderstandings that undermine NATO's chances for successful negotiations. Everyone seriously interested in such successful negotiations must realise how the Soviet Union views arms control in general and the INF talks in particular. The Soviets do not share our goal to promote stability and to achieve the deepest possible mutual arms reductions. For them, arms control is an effective means to secure western restraint and codify Soviet advantages. In the INF negotiations two dominant Soviet objectives are apparent: first, through skilful propaganda and manoeuvring, to split the United States from its western allies; secondly, to prevent or reduce NATO's INF deployments with few or no concessions on the Soviets' part and thereby force the Soviet view of European security upon Western Europe. If NATO's

General Rogers (continued)

leaders and public will keep these Soviet objectives in mind, they will understand the reason equitable arms reductions are difficult to achieve and what we must do to give our side the greatest chance of reaching acceptable accords.

The major incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously will come only from their viewing the Atlantic Alliance as politically cohesive and unified and militarily strong and resolute. It is wishful thinking to believe that arms reduction negotiations can be successful without our demonstrating the will to take the necessary actions to preserve our security. The events leading to the current INF negotiations confirm that it was only the resolve the allies displayed in the December 1979 decision which brought the Soviets to the bargaining table and caused them to abandon their initial intractable position. Continuing to convey that determined and unwavering resolve to put those INF missiles on our soil will, more than anything else, promote eventual success at those talks. Even if the Geneva deadlock continues, it will be neither necessary nor desirable to postpone deployment in order to give the negotiations more time to succeed. The obstacle in the negotiations is not lack of time. Postponement would serve only to remove the incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously and would hand the Soviets a gratuitous negotiating success at no sacrifice to them. They could then resort to their well-rehearsed ploys for dragging out negotiations, as they have for nearly a decade at the Vienna talks on reducing conventional forces. Thus, postponement would allow the Soviets to prevent both deployment and success in the negotiations.

If one sorts through the various western criticisms of the American INF proposals, one finds that the most frequently cited criticism is not that the United States proposals themselves are flawed or inequitable. The most frequent criticism is rather that the United States proposals are not being accepted by the Soviets, and therefore, by some strange logic, the United States proposals are too idealistic and unrealistic. Such a double standard leads to pressure on the United States to abandon its position, when, of course, no similar pressure can be applied to the Soviets.

I am convinced, in both my United States and my international rôles, that the United States and its allies are negotiating in good faith and will seriously consider any reasonable Soviet proposal. But those voices in Europe or the United States calling for greater United States concessions and failing to point out the patent and pronounced inequities in the Soviet proposals do not help us to achieve an

equitable agreement in Geneva. More attention needs to be drawn to the fact that in the one and a half years since the INF negotiations began, the Soviets have fielded more SS-20 warheads than the grand total of 572 that NATO plans to deploy eventually, between December 1983 and 1988, should the negotiations fail.

If, within our NATO nations, we promote dispassionate and realistic judgments about the INF negotiations, we can dispel the incipient notions that the United States and its allies will be to blame if no agreement is reached in Geneva. Simply by being fair and factual, we can thwart Soviet efforts to split the Atlantic Alliance, to retain its INF monopoly and thereby hope to hold Western Europe hostage.

But negotiations will be long and difficult. We must be patient. We must maintain our patience and resolve, remembering that the overall goal of the INF decision is NATO's security. The preferable way to achieve that goal would be an arms reduction agreement that would reduce or eliminate our need to deploy new missiles. But the worst outcome is not that in the absence of an agreement we must begin deployment; our quest for mutual arms reductions can continue after deployment begins. The worst outcome would be a collapse of our resolve to deploy these missiles if need be. Such a collapse would: leave NATO with a serious gap in its spectrum of deterrence and mean NATO's acceptance of a major INF imbalance; decisively undermine our chances to achieve mutual arms reductions and controls; lose the opportunity to eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapons; signal that NATO is unable to carry out a decision deemed vital by its members but opposed by its potential adversary; equate to giving the Soviets a veto over what weapons systems NATO should deploy in order to deter Soviet use of nuclear weapons it has already deployed. Surely we do not want to establish that precedent.

However, I remain optimistic that our alliance will maintain its resolve for INF modernisation. With it, we can negotiate an INF reduction agreement that will preserve western security while reducing significantly the number of nuclear warheads.

The sustaining of favourable public attitudes requires the efforts of leaders and influential citizens like yourselves. Defence issues, particularly nuclear issues, undeniably strike sensitive chords with our people. But that sensitivity need not lead to timidity on the part of our political leaders. Supporters of NATO's defence policies have the moral high ground; our cause is just. We will never resort to the

General Rogers (continued)

first use of any weapon to attack any nation. That is the moral high ground.

We must deal forthrightly with our people, speak out loud and clear, and lead them along the path that is in their best interests. I would earnestly solicit your support energetically to encourage your own governments, as appropriate, to act on the peoples' behalf in the manner I have proposed. I believe that our people will respond to such leadership and candour and will see the wisdom of maintaining NATO's cohesion and strength, the crucial ingredients for the achievement of the goal we all seek: peace with freedom with reduced levels of forces. The path to that goal passes through Geneva and Vienna at the negotiating table. The gateway to that path is constructed from the political and military imperatives which we must and can meet, if we resolve to do so.

Thank you, Ladies and Gentlemen. Those are some of the things that are on my mind. I look forward to hearing what is on yours. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, General, for dealing in your statement with many of the interpretations, some far from correct, of your strategy.

Nonetheless, in accordance with the tradition of our Assembly, some members would like to put questions to you. I would ask them to confine themselves to asking their questions and to avoid making comments.

I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I have two questions. At present we have the START negotiations and the INF negotiations. One of the reasons for the latter has to do with what are called grey area weapons. By neglecting the new family of weapons such as the SS-22 and SS-23 we create a new area. Should not the alliance decide quickly to start negotiations in that area?

My second question is about battlefield weapons. Many people believe that their main value is political but others believe that it is taking too long to take a decision. What is General Rogers's opinion of the political value of battlefield weapons and of how a battlefield commander may make use of nuclear battlefield weapons?

The PRESIDENT. – General Rogers, do you wish to answer now or later?

General ROGERS (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – I shall answer later.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – There was nothing in General Rogers's brilliantly argued and convincing speech with which I disagreed, but if the deployment of SS-20s continues at its present rate, could not the planned numbers for the deployment of land-based cruise and Pershing missiles between now and 1988 prove insufficient?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – General, in the Federal Republic of Germany you are reported as saying that the Pershing II missile could have a flight time of up to fourteen minutes. This leads to the conclusion that the missile has a potential range of 2,400 kilometres. May I ask you if you have been quoted correctly, as other figures are being mentioned here?

Secondly, still on the subject of Pershing II, on which I am concentrating because we consider it to be particularly hazardous, I would like to ask two further questions:

To what extent are you able to confirm or deny the statement that the Pershing II represents an entirely new standard in high-precision, high-velocity nuclear weapons and consequently marks the transition from a deterrent strategy hitherto considered stable to an unstable first-strike strategy, inevitably conducive to war?

My next question: to what extent can you confirm or deny my contention that thanks to their short flight time a surprise American attack with Pershing IIs launched from the Federal Republic of Germany against the vital centres of the Soviet command structure could paralyse any Soviet reaction for the critical half-hour needed by the United States for the subsequent destruction by its own missiles of the Soviet IBMs and missile submarines targeted on the United States?

I have many more questions but I will limit myself to two: to what extent can you confirm or deny my contention that the deployment of the first Pershing II missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany and the consequent abrupt reduction of the warning time for an attack on the Soviet Union to only a few minutes will result in the automation of response decisions hitherto taken by humans and hence in an enormously increased technical fallibility of the Soviet command structure?

And my last question: we suspect, indeed fear, that the United States might force us to deploy these weapons against the growing opposition of the peoples of Europe and against the will of the majority in the Federal Republic

Mr. Vogt (continued)

of Germany. I should like to have your opinion on this, as military commander.

Finally, there are fears that the actual stationing of Pershing IIs, not just the preliminary work, might start as early as September this year, well before the results of the Geneva talks can be assessed. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – General, I have four questions. In the first place I would like to ask whether it is realistic to provide for a budget increase of 4 %, in view of the fact that for years – since 1978 in fact – we have had a 3 % target which has not been achieved by anyone in Europe. Would it not be more reasonable, instead of straining to achieve objectives which in the practical circumstances of all our countries now appear unrealistic – a case of pride leading to a fall – to introduce graded qualitative objectives, which would, of course, differ from country to country? I think that would be an important step forward.

Second question: I am very much in sympathy with your plan to raise the nuclear threshold by improving conventional capabilities. I think you were wrongly criticised for your previous speech on the subject in this place. The question which occurs to me is this: the interdiction concept of frustrating a conventional attack which you advocate seems to me to be questionable in one respect, as conceived at present. If interdiction weapons of the same type can be fitted with either conventional or nuclear warheads, this could operate against the aim of raising the nuclear threshold and might, indeed, have the opposite effect by rendering arms control and verification still more difficult. I would therefore be pleased if you would expand on this point.

A third point: I do not know where your main emphasis lies in the negotiations. On the one hand, as planned in 1979, you have made the issue of deployment conditional upon, or even subject to the outcome of the negotiations. You have stressed this more than once. On the other hand you have stated that a breakthrough in the disarmament negotiations may be possible only after the new weapons have been deployed. Is that now the alliance's view as you see it? If so, it is not strictly compatible with the emphasis which in 1979 was laid on negotiations prior to any weapons deployment. We have constantly reiterated the need for the most strenuous efforts.

A fourth point: at the end of your address you insisted on the no-first-use policy, and I

warmly welcome this declaration. But the question then arises: how can this be reconciled with your previous repudiation of western ideas about no first use, as voiced by McNamara, McGeorge-Bundy and other recent speakers? A no-first-use policy naturally calls for changes of concept, and this you have hitherto rejected. If you now enunciate it as clearly as you have just done, this means that it would be only a short step to making renunciation of first use into a basic concept for the West. This is the question I would like to put to you. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Scheer, your questions are always very interesting, but I would appreciate it if you could put them a little more briefly.

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – General, my question will be brief and in fact follows on from the last question put by Mr. Blaauw.

How can your proposals regarding conventional equipment, which have come to be known as the "Rogers doctrine", be reconciled with recent statements by President Reagan, which, in view of the development of the advanced technologies in the armaments field, have come to be known as Star Wars?

Does not the option of developing conventional weapons and thus, through the force of circumstances, prolonging indefinitely the flexible response, conflict with the idea of the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, to which France is committed, as are all our allies, if the 1974 Ottawa declaration is to be believed?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I have two questions to ask General Rogers, one concerning Turkey, the other INF.

NATO claims to be the organisation which defends democracy, which includes human freedoms and rights. One of NATO's member countries is today violating human rights and the fundamental principles of democracy common to us all. Torture by the so-called forces of law and order is common-place, and ethnic and cultural minorities are being cruelly persecuted.

Is this consorting with the Turkish dictatorship not harmful to NATO's credibility, and do you not think it would have been better not to hold large-scale NATO manoeuvres in Turkey while the Turkish armed forces were engaged in a military operation against the Kurdish minority?

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

With regard to INF and the balance of nuclear weapons, what do you see as the optimal threshold? The ability to destroy the world twenty-five times? Twenty-six times? Would once not be enough? In other words, how important is the number of SS-20s aimed at Europe? What difference is there between five hundred and two thousand warheads threatening Europe? What value should Europe today attach to the possibility of being protected by American strategic missiles?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Four members still wish to put questions. I would ask them to be brief.

I call Mr. Haase.

Mr. HAASE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – General, thank you for your lucid exposition. I have a supplementary question, however. What is your opinion of the build-down proposal made by the three American Senators Nunn, Cohen and Percy that multi-warheaded missiles should be replaced by single-warheaded missiles? Do you think this is a practical and reasonable suggestion in military terms and that the remaining medium-range missiles should then be further discussed within the ambit of the START negotiations?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Biefnot.

Mr. BIEFNOT (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I have two brief questions to put to General Rogers.

He has referred to the financing and infiltration of the peace movement by foreign powers. Could he be a little more specific on the subject? I should like to hear his views on the trend in American political opinion, specifically on this peace movement, on the position of the churches and the bishops, the Senate, Canada and the statements that have been made by Elliot Trudeau. I am not talking about the unanimous agreement reached in Williamsburg but about shades of opinion before and after this summit meeting.

I should also like to hear General Rogers's views on the differences in the positions held by Presidents Reagan and Carter and their administrations and what he thinks of the positions adopted by the Carter administration and confirmed by President Carter's collaborators. I am thinking specifically of Paul Warnke, who once occupied an important post and now believes that the Geneva negotiations will fail, that they are strictly political and that deployment will be considered a factor in the negotiations. In his opinion, the only useful discus-

sions will be those which begin after Geneva, as part of global negotiations, the START talks.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Vries.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). – I have only one question concerning flexible response. This morning the French Minister for External Relations, Mr. Cheyssou, told us that nuclear weapons made war unthinkable. But today, as he has before, the General has told us that in a flexible response strategy we need a whole range of nuclear weapons.

Does the General agree that one of the greatest anxieties of our population at the moment is how this flexible response strategy concerns nuclear weapons? How does he conceive that that strategy will be implemented should the need occur?

General ROGERS (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – I do not understand the question. Please will you repeat it?

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). – Do you understand that much of the anxiety in Western Europe about nuclear weapons is created by the adoption of a flexible response strategy, which includes nuclear weapons? Do you understand why many in our population do not believe that nuclear weapons fit into a flexible response strategy?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – General, in the context of our defence, what importance do you attach to the AWACS early warning system? How satisfied are you with the progress of AWACS as part of our defence build-up so far? To what extent does the AWACS system necessitate close co-operation with the British Nimrod system? How do you assess the present state of co-operation between Nimrod and AWACS?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Holtz.

Mr. HOLTZ (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen. After listening to the General's speech, I have the impression that the concept of peace is being defined purely in military terms. I would like to ask you, General, especially now that you have told us about the additional per capita military expenditure to be borne by the populations of Western Europe and the United States, whether it is not crucially important to improve the social and economic well-being of our peoples, thereby also making a major contribution to the cause of peace?

Mr. Holtz (continued)

Briefly, peace is surely not merely the absence of war; it also means the creation of fairer, friendlier and more caring relationships and conditions between nations and also between military blocs?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I ask one last question to clarify General Rogers's admirable and comprehensive speech. He referred to refire missiles for the SS-20. Including those notional refire missiles, he made the total of warheads against NATO as 2,350. We have read in the press that the launchers could be reusable. They could have a second, perhaps even a third, missile. Are second missiles operationally deployed by the Soviets on the SS-20 system?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call General Rogers.

General ROGERS (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – Thank you for the questions. I hope that I have understood their gist. I have depended upon the interpreters, but it is my fault not theirs if I have misunderstood.

The first question, as I understood it, related to the START and the INF negotiations. We started the INF negotiations to remove what was described as a grey area. I was asked whether, by ignoring missiles of shorter range than the SS-4s, SS-5s and SS-20s, such as the SS-21s, SS-22s, SS-23s and those which they are replacing, we were not creating another grey area. It may well be that such an area is created. There is no question but that somewhere in the negotiations attention must be paid to missiles that can be placed on East European soil and that have a range from 175 kilometres to 975 kilometres – almost 1,000 kilometres – and that are modern weapons systems with great mobility and accuracy. Therefore, we must pay attention to that. At some time in the negotiations some consideration must be given to putting some kind of control on such weapons systems on both sides.

If I understood the next question, I was asked how we could reduce battlefield weapons and how we could use them. First, we do not need to wait until we have reached the kind of conventional capacity that I have described before the SACEUR considers whether we can reduce the number of warheads that we have deployed here in Western Europe. Most people do not realise – there is no reason why they should – that every year the SACEUR must look at the type and number of warheads

in what is known as the nuclear weapons requirement study. As SACEUR, every year, I must submit that study to the nuclear powers. If you were in SACEUR's position, I submit that you would wish to have a fairly high confidence in the rationale that you have developed and from which you draw your guidance to send to major subordinate commanders so that they can tell you of their requirements according to type and distribution.

The SHAPE staff spent two years – finishing almost a year ago – developing a rationale in whose logic I have a high level of confidence and from which I can determine for my nuclear weapons requirement study the numbers that we need by type and by location. Whether that rationale, in the next nuclear weapons requirement study, will call for a reduction in the number of warheads believed to be required, I cannot say, but I can say that since 1974 those requirements have been reduced from almost 1,500 to less than half that number. Through this system, I expect that before I leave my present position – I now have a minimum of two years left to serve – I shall be able to stand before my political authorities and say that I am not asking for one more warhead than I need. I have not been able to say that in the past, but I expect to be able to do so. I hope that that rationale will lead to a reduction.

The second question was whether, if the deployment of the SS-20s was continued, 572 would be a sufficient number for us to deploy. In my opinion, it would. When I became SACEUR in mid-1979, as the high-level group was reaching its conclusions on what should be done to deter the use of the Soviets' intermediate-range nuclear forces, the question came up: "Will 572 be enough for you, SACEUR, from a military point of view?" The answer was: "Yes, 572 will be enough. It is not as many as we would have liked to have for strictly military purposes, but it achieves the political objective which was set, that of deterring the use of weapons systems from their soil on to ours in the belief that we could not respond from our soil to theirs – which ends up achieving deterrence".

The deployment of the SS-20s continues despite the moratorium announced in March 1982, at which time there were thirty-two sites each having nine launchers. Today, there are thirty-nine sites each having nine launchers, and we are watching the fortieth being completed; there are others that we expect to be opened.

The third question, which I may have misunderstood, was about the flight time of the Pershing II. It is correct, as was suggested, that

General Rogers (continued)

the flight time is about fourteen minutes. The time that is often given is six minutes and it continues to be reduced. One speaker the other day said that it had a flight time of only a couple of minutes. In fact, it takes closer to fourteen minutes if it is fired at its extreme range, which is about 1,800 kilometres. The flight time for the Pershing II at that range is about equal to the flight time of the SS-20 if fired at that range.

I was asked whether the Pershing II did not make the military situation unstable. I should like to put this in the perspective of the real world as it exists today and has been existing. We in Western Europe have been under a short flight time threat for a number of years. The United States has been under the threat of a very short flight time for many years from the nuclear submarines of the Soviet Union with nuclear warheads aboard just off the east and west coasts of the United States – a flight time which is shorter than the maximum flight time of the Pershing II. The United States has been living for many years under the threat of a very short warning time. I cannot feel sorry for the Soviet Union, since it has placed us in that condition for a number of years, if it now finds itself, when the Pershing II is deployed, under that short flight time threat. That is not inequitable or unfair to it.

I believe that one part of the question was, could the Americans fire the Pershing II from Federal German soil by surprise, which might paralyse the Soviet Union? Let us put that also in perspective. In the first place, no weapons will be fired until SACEUR asks his political authorities for the release of nuclear weapons. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom, nor any of the other major nations, has the ability or the power to release those weapons unilaterally. I must go to the political authorities and the political authorities must make the decision, and give their advice on whether nuclear weapons should be released to SACEUR for use on targets which he has designated for the political authorities with weapons systems designated by him for the political authorities' information, which lays out which nations have the capability within their inventory of weapons to attack those targets.

I must lay out what information I have in terms of what will be the civilian casualties and I will lay constraints on myself in the type of warheads I use associated with civilian casualties. Finally, the targets that I select must be militarily significant to us and to the other side, so that we do not strike population centres with our weapons systems; my guidance does not permit that. As I go forward, I must

list all these things each time – not just the first time – that I request the use of theatre nuclear weapons. Therefore, I think that the scenario which has been suggested is not possible.

The same questioner asked, is it planned that these weapons systems should be stationed on our soil in September of this year? There has been no change in the decision that was made, that, if there is no breakthrough in the negotiations between now and December 1983, those weapons systems will then be deployed upon the soil at Greenham Common and the Pershing IIs in Germany and those ground-launched cruise missiles at Camiso. We are not talking about September, November or October. It still is December.

If I had been asked, do preliminary steps need to be taken to prepare to receive those missiles and base them on our soil in December, I would answer that of course there has to be some preliminary training and construction. That is being done and will continue to be done. But do not let what you have read in the press over the last two or three days mislead you. There is no intention of putting those missile systems on our soil until December of this year. I do not expect that there will be any change in that. What you have read recently in the press has been misleading, in my opinion.

Another questioner asked whether 4% was realistic when we had not been meeting the 3% target. Again, I want to put into context what the 4% really means. I told you that the only tool we have for force improvement is the force goals in our planning procedures and that every two years my staff and the staffs of ministries of defence develop force proposals for a six-year period. Today, we are working with nations on the 1985-90 period.

As we move through this decade, I expect that those force improvements will still require about a 4% real increase – but remember that the 4% was suggested for meeting fully the force proposals for 1983-88. If those are fully met, which will give us generally, as we move through this decade, the kind of conventional capacity that I think we should have by the end of the decade, that would require a 4% real increase on the average per year.

Is it realistic to meet the 4% target? That is up to the people whom you represent. You have to make a choice of priorities. We have not yet convinced the people – on either side of the Atlantic, I think – that there is in fact a threat to their freedom – not of an attack out of the blue from the East, although we must be prepared for that, but rather a threat to their freedom from political intimidation and economic coercion and blackmail as a result of the

General Rogers (continued)

widening gap which I mentioned and which continues every year until we one day wake up to find that the military situation has become unmanageable unless we do two things.

The first is to show the resolve in December of this year to follow through on the decision of December 1979 if we do not get a breakthrough. The second is to show the resolve to start taking action to overcome our conventional deficiencies and to be perceived by the other side as being prepared to do what is necessary to implement our strategy. If that resolve is perceived, I think that incentives will be provided for serious negotiations by the Soviets at the negotiating table, and therein, I believe, lies the answer to the kind of future that we all want.

As to the interdiction concept, I am advocating an ability to locate a mobile target in the enemy rear and, secondly, once located, the ability to target it and to bring it into a joint tactical fusion centre where human judgment can be exercised as to which weapons system has the better capability of dealing with that target. Should it be manned aircraft, which is all that we have today and which find it increasingly difficult to penetrate the Soviet air defences, or should it be – and this is what I am seeking – surface-to-air missiles with area coverage submunitions or terminally-guided submunitions and surface-to-surface weapons systems of the same type? We must be able to strike the bridges, tunnels, defiles and choke points that cause those forces to bunch up and which present them as a lucrative target at which we can strike.

Some have maintained that this Allied Command Europe concept of the attack of follow-on forces means what they read in the United States air-land battle 2000. That is not our concept. We do not envisage masses of forces attacking eastward across the inner German border towards Prague and Warsaw. My mission is not to gain one additional foot of territory for Western Europe. It is to give up the least amount with the fewest civilian and military casualties and to regain what territory we lose. We should use these weapons systems to interdict.

Can they be identified by the other side as such types of conventional weapons? Yes. I am not asking that Trident missiles be buried in the ground of Western Europe to be used for such missions. One would be confused about whether they had conventional or nuclear warheads.

I was asked whether it would be automatic that we would deploy these weapons systems if

there were not a breakthrough in Geneva. That question has been answered by our political authorities, which in a number of communiqués have said that, if there is no breakthrough, they will be deployed. That was said only last week at a meeting of ministers.

I was asked how I reconciled the no first use of weapons with my argument that the gang of four in the United States was wrong to advocate no first use. Let this be understood. I said that the moral high ground is ours because NATO will not use weapons first against any nation in an offensive mode. We shall not attack any nation by the first use of weapons. But as we defend our territory, we must retain the first-use option for a number of reasons. First, nothing is certain in time of war. Secondly, uncertainty associated with the first-use policy equates with deterrence. Thirdly, there are tactical military reasons why the first-use option should be retained. One happens to be that Soviet doctrine calls for massing its forces for attack. They must decide whether it makes sense to mass their forces if they are uncertain about the first-use policy and whether we shall use it. Does it make sense to amass such forces, thus making them a lucrative target for the other side?

Fourthly, if we adopt a no-first-use policy, it could be viewed here as a lessening of United States commitment, which could lead to the decoupling of the strategic nuclear umbrella for the protection of Western Europe, and we cannot permit that.

The gang of four and I agree that in our plan we should include the development of the conventional capacity that I have described. They say that once we reach that point, we should give up the first-use policy. I say that we must retain it and the uncertainty associated with the array of nuclear weapons that I mentioned so that we can deter their use.

Another member spoke of the Rogers doctrine. It is not. It is the Allied Command Europe concept for the attack of follow-on forces. No matter what it is called, I was asked how I reconciled it with the Star Wars concept. Today we have nuclear weapons. We cannot wish them away. They can only be negotiated away. How do we defend our nations against the use of nuclear weapons? There are two ways. First, either we develop a defensive capability that can strike those nuclear weapons systems before they strike the homeland, or, secondly, we have a counter-offensive capability. That is the policy that we have adopted in the West for many years. Weapons are put on our soil to deter their use by the other side. By deterring them, we shall never have to use them.

General Rogers (continued)

We can also try to defend ourselves with weapons systems that can interrupt flight before the enemy's weapons reach our soil. That is what the Star Wars concept is. But let me hasten to add that the United States has pointed out that if ever that concept comes into being – at the end of this century at the earliest, if it is feasible – it may well be feasible to use such a defensive weapons system here in Western Europe, thereby reducing the number of weapons on our soil for the counter offensive purpose of deterrence.

We must understand the conditions that existed in Turkey at the time of General Evren. I say that with some personal knowledge, because in those days I visited him about once a month as we worked together to bring the Greek military forces back into the integrated military structure of Allied Command Europe. I was aware of General Evren's great anxiety about what was happening to his country. Parliament could not function, anarchy existed and thirty of his citizens were killed every day.

I cannot give advice to the Assembly, but I submit that we should not try to create Turkey or any other nation in the image of another nation. Conditions in Turkey are different from those in Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, the United States or England. Conditions in Turkey must be dealt with in the manner decided by those who are determined that what happened in 1980 should never happen again.

General Evren will bring back the democratic principles that Atatürk introduced seventy years ago. We are talking of an Islamic country that has made mind-boggling progress in the last seventy years.

I may be asked whether it makes sense to conduct exercises such as those by the ACE Mobile Force in eastern Turkey when the military is still supreme there. It may not make sense to some, but it does to me. My mission is to prevent war. The intention is that the force be used on the flanks. Air and land troops from seven nations are involved. Their purpose is to put across the message: "We know that you are up to something; we do not like it and we shall do what is necessary as an alliance to prevent it." That is a deterrent to be deployed only with the authority of the political leaders.

We send two messages in the use of that force. We send a message to ourselves to reassure us that we have that capability. The second message is to the other side so that it knows that we have the capability and are exercising it. I think that that makes sense.

I have been asked about the build-down proposal to modernise our forces. As we modernise we can reduce the number of warheads but have no major impact on our deterrent capability and therefore upon our security. That argument is often lost on those who advocate freezes. Imbalance and freezes are bad enough, but they reduce our opportunity to modernise the weapons systems so that they are more stable, reliable, penetrative and able to survive. I am not prepared to say whether build-down is applicable to other areas.

I do not remember saying today that we have been infiltrated by the pacifist movement. That is not in my text, which I followed fairly carefully. However, if asked I should say: "Yes, intelligence confirms that in various movements one segment consists of front personnel who are the dupes of the Soviets." We know that they are there, but we do not need to pay attention to them because they are not important. Another segment comprises activists who are exhilarated by demonstrating for pacifism or unilateral disarmament, often not knowing what they mean. We can ignore that group.

We must pay attention to a third group. I refer to the large group of adults and young people who are thoughtful, concerned, intelligent and worried about war, particularly nuclear war. They cast about to find a solution. They often believe that pacifism or unilateral disarmament is the answer. They are neutralists. They fail to reflect on history, which confirms that pacifists can maintain peace, but at what price? We want peace with freedom. We could maintain peace but lose our freedom. By unilateral disarmament we disrobe ourselves of military might in the presence of an iron giant. We then have to depend on the good will and grace of the other side. History confirms that unilateral disarmament is not followed by disarmament by the other side.

The 1930s should convince most Europeans and Americans that just because a country declares itself neutral does not necessarily mean that it will not become involved. Geography plays a part in neutrality. A country must demonstrate its will to do whatever is necessary to defend sovereignty from whatever direction and in whatever manner it is threatened. We must have a dialogue with the neutralists.

The Soviet Union understands the history of unilateral disarmament and neutralism. People who attach themselves to such movements do not provide the incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously. That must be our objective. I hope that by showing the resolve

General Rogers (continued)

that I have described we shall provide the incentive so that we can negotiate seriously.

Mr. Cheysson said this morning that nuclear weapons made war unthinkable. I have been asked whether I understand that much of the anxiety is caused by our strategy of flexible response. I understand that. I dislike the thought that if we are attacked conventionally, because we may be unable to sustain ourselves for longer than a few days in ammunition, manpower and tanks to replace losses in the battlefield, I must request the release of nuclear weapons. I do not like that.

As a minimum I should like us to improve our forces and take advantage of the emergent technologies to bring us to the point where it is not the early use of nuclear weapons that we face. I should like to create a perception in the other side's mind by the end of the decade that we have the capability to frustrate a conventional attack and that if it attacks, it has only two options – to withdraw or be the first to escalate.

What is our option if we do not escalate? It is to capitulate. That is just as unviable as the first use of nuclear weapons. To me the answer is to try to prevent any kind of war through raising the nuclear threshold by enhancing our conventional capacity.

If Mr. Cheysson were here this afternoon he would agree that his government's strategy is different from that which I must implement in NATO. Were it not so the French forces would still be integrated in our military structure. I am trying to build a firebreak between peace and any kind of war – conventional or nuclear – rather than a firebreak between conventional and nuclear war. I want the firebreak to be between peace and any kind of war. Doing these things requires resolve. By building up our conventional forces and putting these weapons systems on our shores this December we can create the perception on the other side that will help deter war.

You have heard me say before what I believe to be the greatest menace that we face. It is not a war that comes out of the blue from the East. Rather it is political and economic intimidation that arises from being viewed as being incapable or unwilling to defend ourselves.

I ascribe considerable importance to the airborne early warning system in NATO. I was asked whether it would be feasible to function with Nimrod. The answer is yes. I was also asked whether I was satisfied with the progress being made on building up to the eighteen AWAC aircraft and the eleven Nim-

rods. Again the answer is yes. One of the major successes in the alliance today is the airborne early warning programme. It is a commonly funded weapons system met by twelve nations that is coming in on schedule and below cost. That latter is surprising to many people. The cost was set by the political authorities.

Someone said that from what I had said I had suggested that peace was determined by military means. Our goal is peace with freedom at reduced and balanced levels of forces. I did not mean that it can come only through military means. My mission is the deterrence of war. That is a political mission, a mission assigned to a military man.

I was also asked whether the economy played a part in deterrence. Do politics, social programmes, diplomacy and psychology have a part to play? Yes, they do. Do political leaders have to deal with all of those aspects? Of course. One can say that SACEUR, not being responsible for those other factors within a country, is speaking only in military terms. There are arguments on both sides. I agree with Sir John Slessor, who told us that in a democracy it is customary to be unhappy about the allocation of resources for security purposes because that tended to be counter-productive in terms of social progress. He also pointed out that the greatest social programme a nation can have for its people is to keep them alive and free. I believe that. Others can argue, on the economic side, that such matters must be solved before we can allocate additional resources to security. I maintain that, if you do not have your freedom, you will not be able to be in charge of allocating national resources or trying to take care of economic problems. I recognise that there are others who take a contrary view.

I mentioned 2,350 warheads. There are 250 SS-4 and SS-5 systems still deployed. They are single warheads. There are over 2,100 SS-20 warheads deployed. There are 351 launchers deployed today. There are three warheads to each launcher and there is a second missile deployed at the launcher site. Multiply 351 by three by two and that gives the total number of warheads attributable to SS-20s. It has been pointed out that there is some uncertainty whether there may be three missiles deployed at each launcher, one on the launcher, a second one that we know of and, perhaps, a third.

I have enjoyed this opportunity to be with you. I appreciate your patience, your attention and your questions. I hope that I can join you again some time. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – General, the warmth of the applause which followed your concluding remarks is proof of the interest

The President (continued)

our Assembly has taken in what you have to say and of our appreciation for the lucidity with which you have answered the questions put to you.

Thank you once again, and I hope to see you again soon, during forthcoming debates.

4. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The minutes are agreed to.

5. Burden-sharing in the alliance

(Debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 947 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on burden-sharing in the alliance, Document 947 and amendments.

I call Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – I cannot speak this afternoon without first referring to three ancillary matters. First, I congratulate you, Mr. President, on your election as President of this Assembly. You have devoted great service to WEU, and your friends in the Assembly applaud the actions of the entire Assembly in voting you into office. I offer you my warmest congratulations.

Secondly, I cannot follow the one and a half hours that General Rogers has devoted to our Assembly this afternoon without saying how impressed I was by how he replied to our questions and how those questions manifested his deep anxiety for world peace and the philosophy that he brings to the heavy burdens that he bears on behalf of all of us.

I was particularly impressed by the way in which he dealt with Mr. Dejardin's question about Turkey. I shall have occasion to refer to that again.

Further, I want to congratulate my friend, Mr. Wilkinson, on a report that is thoughtful, cogent, well-reasoned and a mine of information. He deserves the thanks of the entire Assembly, as, indeed, do those in the secretariat

who have aided him in its preparation. He also deserves our gratitude for having come here at what could be great cost to himself this afternoon to present his report to the Assembly. Everyone here knows that the day after tomorrow is polling day in my country. Mr. Wilkinson has done what a great many parliamentary candidates would not have done: he has left his country forty-eight hours before the poll to come here to present this important and valuable report to the Assembly. It shows the value that he, and we in the British Delegation, attach to the Assembly. I should like to congratulate him warmly and I am sure that in doing so I echo the sentiments of all those here. We are all parliamentarians and we all know what it is to leave our country at the moment when we are seeking the suffrage of our people once again.

This is almost certainly the last time that I shall address the Assembly as one of its members. It has been a source of pride and pleasure to me to serve WEU for the best part of fourteen years. That is a long time in a parliamentary career and I attach enormous value to the work that the Assembly does. Did I not attach such value to the Assembly and to the Council of Europe, which those present also serve, I should long ago have abandoned it. However, I believe that we are here playing our part in maintaining peace in Europe and in the Council of Europe we are playing our part in achieving, however remotely, the more united Europe that is the hope of us all.

I desire to make only three points on this full report. One could not possibly discuss it in detail and nobody would thank me were I to do so on this rather hot afternoon. I agree entirely with the statement in paragraph 9.7 on the British and French nuclear deterrents. They are not negotiable. It says:

“The British and French independent nuclear forces constituting an additional centre of strategic decision and national riposte to potential Soviet aggression afford an extra dimension to overall western deterrence and must not be bargained away.”

That must be made clear by all who participate in all the negotiations which are rightly going on for force and nuclear arms reductions. As Mr. Cheysson said this morning, they are the independent means which our two countries are lucky enough to have to deter aggression from outside. We should maintain them and they are not negotiable. I am sure that I speak for nearly all my fellow countrymen in making that point to this Assembly.

Curiously enough, my second point relates to the question that Mr. Dejardin asked and with which General Rogers dealt so effectively this

Mr. Grieve (continued)

afternoon. It relates to paragraph 3.7 and the extremely valuable Appendix II to this report. It is pointed out that three of the poorest countries of NATO – Turkey, Portugal and Greece – contribute well beyond the average of their gross national products to the defence of the free world. I am glad to read, and I entirely support, that part of the draft resolution which calls on the parliaments of Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Turkey to appoint observers to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to participate in the preparation of its forthcoming report on the state of European security. They should have the right to speak and we ought to hear from them.

Those countries make an invaluable contribution to the peace of Europe. That is a peace which we, of the Brussels Treaty, are obliged to defend. In that connection I hope that those of my colleagues who have reservations about the position in Turkey – and I understand them, but they were fully answered by General Rogers this afternoon – will cease this continual sniping at a Turkish régime which took office to deal with a state not of democracy but of utter anarchy, which was bringing about the dissolution of the state and society and ruining the economy. General Rogers referred to the thirty murders a day but not to the inflation which was running at 120%. That was not democracy; that was anarchy. General Evren has gradually shown that he is fulfilling his pledge to restore democratic government in Turkey, as military régimes since Atatürk westernised the country have done more than once before.

(Mr. Blaauw, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

It does no good to the defence of the free world and Europe that there should be such continual sniping at Turkey and, indeed, the effort in some quarters for a purist concept of democracy to drive Turkey out of the comity of Western European nations. Turkey wishes to be a part of Europe. The Turkish ministers and politicians whom I saw when I visited Turkey several times last year all said, even those who were most bitterly opposed to the present régime, that we should not drive them out.

Finally, it is obvious that Turkey is an indispensable bastion in the defence of Europe. General Rogers made that point this afternoon. One must recognise the backwardness of Turkey in many ways, but those who snipe at Turkey on human rights are doing no service to the free world. The present régime must be judged by its results and it has so far fulfilled

the promises which it made to the people when it took over. Last year General Evren set about establishing the constitution which, in November last year, resulted in free elections.

The PRESIDENT. – Will you please conclude?

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – Yes, I am about to do so. I did not realise that I had taken any time at all. That shows that I have been carried away, but I hope not inebriated, by my own verbosity. Having made those two points, I am invited by the President to conclude and I am happy to do so.

I have been deeply interested in the problem of Turkey for the past two years. I invite my colleagues to give the report their firm support and to unite with me once again in thanking our Rapporteur not only for his report but for coming here in the circumstances in which he has presented it.

As this is my valedictory speech, may I say how happy I have been to serve with my colleagues in WEU.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Grieve. I should like to thank you for all the years that you have spent in WEU. You have been a member since 1970, which means that you have served for more than twelve years. You have served on many committees and not having you with us will be a great loss to the Assembly. You have produced many reports and for a couple of years you have been the guardian of rules and procedure in the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. We wish you the best of luck after you step down as a parliamentarian. It is because you are not seeking re-election that we are lucky enough to have you here. I wish you all the best in the name of WEU. That is why I allowed you a couple more minutes to make your speech.

(Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

(Translation). – I call Mr. Linde.

Mr. LINDE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as a newcomer to this esteemed Assembly it is a great honour for me to speak after Mr. Grieve, who has just made his farewell speech. I hope you will bear with me if I differ from the previous speaker not only in the fact that I am speaking here for the first time but also in my assessment of Mr. Wilkinson's report. Naturally, I endorse the thanks, already expressed, for the work of the Rapporteur and the committee itself. I also believe that this report provides a good foundation for further efforts. After all, the subject is central to the purpose of Western European Union and, properly handled, can

Mr. Linde (continued)

help to enhance the activities and the significance of WEU in the areas of defence, security and peace policy.

Nevertheless – and please give me your close attention here – I feel that the draft recommendation is not yet ready for adoption, as important questions which have lately gained in political significance have not been included. If we are to agree here to a recommendation on “burden-sharing in the alliance”, then all members of this Assembly should, if possible, be given a chance to support the recommendation and the report. This would greatly enhance the effectiveness of the report.

Properly handled, the subject should be considered not merely in relation to defence burdens within the alliance but in the wider context of its defensive function, security and the maintenance of peace in the world. I therefore give notice now that, before a decision on the draft recommendation is taken here, a motion will be tabled to the effect that the draft recommendation and the report should be referred back to committee so that certain points which I shall now mention may be included in the discussion.

There are a number of objections to the report, quite apart from its highly quantitative approach, which I should like to see accompanied by a qualitative analysis of the defence situation in the Western European sector of the alliance. I also note a failure to make distinctions between the various national positions, as for instance whether countries have compulsory military service or not. Looked at from the standpoint of the Federal Republic of Germany, this report should also take account of the special constitutional position in an internally divided country, especially as regards action outside the NATO area proper.

I could also wish that greater emphasis had been laid on the European defence contribution as compared with the burdens borne by the United States of America, which seem to me to be described here more fully than the European contribution. Finally, the point should be made that a report on defence burdens must be incomplete if it does not also address itself to the question of disarmament, since, according to the Harmel report and the current NATO doctrine, security is guaranteed by defence and détente by disarmament. However, they constitute an indivisible entity, and this essential unity should therefore also find expression in the report.

Ladies and Gentlemen, let me turn my attention briefly to three specific points. Paragraph A.1 (a) of the draft recommendation pro-

per states quite dogmatically: “increase in defence expenditure ... as long as the Soviet military build-up continues”. I take it that this should be read in conjunction with paragraph 3, which curtly restates the terms of the NATO twofold decision. As of now – early June 1983 – nobody can predict whether it may not yet be possible, on the basis of the NATO decision of December 1979, to bring about the withdrawal of the Soviet Union’s intermediate-range missiles and thereby avoid an arms build-up in the West. But it is just because no verdict can be pronounced at this time that reference must be made to the possibility here. It would well become Western European Union to encourage both parties to the negotiations to do their utmost to reach a successful outcome and to avoid an arms build-up.

I think we should try to dispel any impression that a different interpretation is now being placed on the NATO twofold decision, in that the West might be moving closer to an arms build-up simply with the passage of time. As I understand the NATO twofold decision, crucial factors are: substantial negotiating offers and equality of security, with the additional object of removing the threat of the SS-20s.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I would remind Mr. Linde that it was decided yesterday that speaking time would be limited to five minutes during this part-session. I would therefore ask him to conclude.

Mr. LINDE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Then please allow me to summarise briefly.

We think a great deal of time has been wasted. On the subject of disarmament, this report is incomplete unless it says something about the current general discussion of an arms freeze. This should be included as a matter of urgency.

My second point is that it is crucial to ensure that the subject of the use of NATO troops outside their own territory arises only on condition that vital interests are at stake. Clearer and more explicit premises need to be defined here to avoid any risk of automatic horizontal escalation. These material conditions would have to be satisfied.

My third and final point is this: any discussion of the defence of Western Europe in relation to trouble spots throughout the world is incomplete unless it brings home the point that genuine freedom from dependence on blocs is of the utmost importance to international stability. Concern for that freedom, if it is to be achieved, takes precedence over the kind of defence plans emphasised in this report. A

Mr. Linde (continued)

reference to ensuring freedom from dependence on blocs should be added to the report.

To sum up: I proposed reference back to committee in preference to a controversial vote. Then there is, firstly, the question of our attitude to the Geneva negotiations; secondly, definition of the procedure to be followed in the event of an external crisis; and, thirdly, emphasis on freedom from dependence on blocs. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Linde, for your understanding. I would ask the remaining speakers to follow his example. The discussion with General Rogers was a long one, and we must keep strictly to the speaking time that has been fixed.

I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, like Mr. Grieve I should like to take the liberty of referring quite briefly to what General Rogers said. Unfortunately, and I take it that the lack of time was chiefly to blame, he failed to answer my last question, which I have before me in the official report. Politically speaking it seems to me to be a central issue. The wording was: “We suspect, indeed fear, that the United States might force us to deploy these weapons against the growing opposition of the peoples of Europe and against the will of the majority in the Federal Republic of Germany. I should like to have your opinion on this, as military commander”. No answer was forthcoming, and I should like to state here why this issue is central to the discussion.

If, as General Rogers said, the purpose of NATO is to secure peace with freedom, it would be a perversion of this objective to deploy a weapons system for the defence of freedom against the will of the majority. The end would be traduced by the very means used to achieve it. That is why it seems to me so important to have answers to questions of this kind in future.

As far as the rules of procedure are concerned, I am in agreement with Mr. Linde, so I will be brief. Another motive for brevity is that I would like to take a little more time tomorrow over the subject of the problems of pacifism and neutralism on the simple grounds of fairness. As there are not so terribly many people in this Assembly who share my point of view it would be fair to allow more than a mere five minutes to expound a philosophy which differs from the prevalent one in this Assembly. I would therefore prefer not to use up all my time now and would ask for adequate time to speak tomorrow. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The important thing about a debate is not the length of statements but the arguments advanced and their validity. It is the same whether one or more members express their views. The members of this Assembly are sufficiently attentive to understand the validity of the arguments put forward. We must abide by the rules of procedure which we have adopted.

Thank you for your understanding.

I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am glad to be on my feet in view of the wretched seating, which you know about.

I should like to make a few brief comments on the Wilkinson report. I have not been closely involved in the debate within the committee, but on 14th February I did mention to Mr. Wilkinson that he should take heed of a passage from an address by the President of the World Bank to the United Nations in December. The President drew attention to the “absurd relationship between the expenditure on all kinds of military projects and the ease with which such expenditure was sanctioned when compared with so many other vital issues”.

As you know, our Assembly was based on collaboration in three spheres: social, economic and cultural. These areas of collaboration were transferred to the Council of Europe in the belief that economic issues, especially, would be effectively handled by the Council. That is why little attention has been paid to this area, which probably explains the absence of a clear and straightforward economic section in the Wilkinson report. I refer to a kind of political economics covering all aspects of armaments. This may possibly have been thought unnecessary, now that economic matters have been passed over to the Council of Europe. I regret that.

Every national budget raises questions as to the allocation of resources: shall we, and can we, increase or reduce expenditure? Where is the money to come from, and which other worthy causes will suffer? I am glad that during the discussion with General Rogers just now, someone said that peace was not simply something that could be maintained by the interest and resources of the military. Peace also has to be supported in innumerable other quarters of society in order to create a peaceful community correspondingly less in need of military support.

However, this report is redolent of a kind of militaristic attitude which, in my opinion, conflicts with the spirit of the WEU treaty. The WEU treaty brought the former axis

Mr. Tummers (continued)

powers into the union, which precluded any harmful militarism on their part. Nevertheless we must be on our guard against other kinds of militarism which might threaten us. The technocratic militarism implicit in the Wilkinson report is incompatible with the spirit of the treaty.

I would further draw attention to national economic circumstances, to the question of public opinion, which must become more aware of what is happening in WEU, and to the inevitable cost increases – that is to say, the familiar 4 % from Brussels. I feel we should take another look at the three areas of economic, cultural and social collaboration which we handed over to the Council of Europe – I refer mainly to the way in which these questions are being handled. In considering the twenty-ninth report – WEU will then have been in existence for thirty years – we should assess and evaluate the consequences of having handed over responsibility for these matters. This will enable us to refer explicitly to these issues in our deliberations. There is no compelling reason why military should mean militaristic, something divorced from many other issues. This area must be reintegrated with the other vital questions necessarily involved in the achievement and maintenance of peace. Equally important is the elimination of any threat to peace. I shall table a formal motion by way of a resolution calling attention to this topic for the twenty-ninth report.

I find it highly regrettable that the above issues were not automatically included in the Wilkinson report. I am also sorry that the reference to the statement by the President of the World Bank was not properly understood. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I must admit that I agree with a great deal of what Mr. Tummers said.

This report is undoubtedly very interesting and very complete. But, as I said at the meeting in Pisa, the North Atlantic Assembly would have been a more appropriate place for it than the Assembly of WEU. I appreciate, of course, that, since the Pisa meeting, Mr. Wilkinson and the secretariat have made a great effort to add a number of paragraphs and to modify certain others. Nonetheless, I do not feel that a proper balance has yet been struck.

Mr. Tummers referred to the militaristic tone of this report. It is something which I too regret.

Furthermore, having been unable to attend the meeting in Brussels owing, as you know, Mr. President, to a prior engagement – I was attending a meeting of the Steering Committee on Migration in Strasbourg on the Assembly's behalf the same day and obviously could not be in Brussels and Strasbourg at the same time – I was surprised to find that paragraph 7.2, which concerns Belgium, had not aroused any comment.

Mr. Wilkinson, the Belgian forces do not consist solely of conscripts. The operational units include 50 %, sometimes as many as 70 % or 80 %, volunteers, even if they are "short-term" volunteers. I mention this for what it is worth, but I hope that references to my country will be accurate in future.

When, moreover, you say that there is some doubt about continued Belgian participation in the vital Hawk SAM screen, you are right and you are not right in that, according to a recent statement by the Belgian Minister for National Defence – who does not have my political support since I am a member of the opposition – Belgium is going to dismantle certain Nike units and is considering the replacement of the Hawk network, possibly with the Patriote system. This is also an important point if you want to get a full picture of the situation.

Another criticism that can be made of this report, following on from what I have just said, is that, if we Europeans agree to organise the defence of Europe simply because the United States of America has taken it upon itself to play the rôle of world policeman, we are virtually endorsing, in our view, what the Americans have done in the recent past in Santo Domingo and Vietnam, what they may now be doing in Nicaragua and El Salvador and, let us not forget, what they did in Chile almost ten years ago.

If we are going to talk about the world rôle played by the United States of America, I feel something should be said about its own global concept of its rôle. It is not for us to assign this vocation to the United States of America or to recognise it.

In the same context, when I hear all these little phrases, all these asides about the possible consequences of events outside the NATO area and the commitment to deploy forces outside this area, I cannot help thinking of Williamsburg and the idea toyed with there – which aroused some resentment in this Assembly not so long ago – of extending the NATO area beyond its present limits.

Think back, Ladies and Gentlemen, to a debate we had on South Africa and the Southern Atlantic. And now we are supposed

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

to look to the Far East. Is it for us to become involved in such schemes?

It is for the British or French naval forces to decide, at their sole discretion, whether they should defend, as Mr. Cheysson said, vital interests of their countries which may lie outside their respective territories. It is for them to take this decision. But must we follow them down the same road? That, I think, would be extremely dangerous. Frankly, it is not my concept of defence.

The more so as we shall be starting the debate on the law of the sea tomorrow. I know that Belgium is very interested in the sea, by virtue of the interests of such hyper-capitalist companies as Union Minière and Société Générale, but I say that the interests of these companies are not the interests of the people and the working class in Belgium. Let there be no mistake about that either. There should be no question of a commitment to operations outside the NATO area to safeguard the privileges of private and capitalist companies which do not do their duty by the taxpayers of the country to which they claim allegiance. That is a point to be remembered.

General Rogers has now come up with a figure of 4 %, instead of 3 %, but I find that in the final version of the report Mr. Wilkinson and the committee have deleted "3 %" while continuing to refer to an increase in defence spending in real terms.

Let us therefore be realistic, as another speaker has said. In Belgium with its right-wing government, which I would say is neo-Thatcherite and a very firm supporter of the Atlantic Alliance, defence spending in 1983 underwent negative growth, declining by 2.4 % in real terms.

If this is the situation with so firm a supporter of the Atlantic Alliance as the present Belgian Government, what would it be like for a government which took a different view of the economic and social problems we face in our countries today?

I should also like Mr. Wilkinson to go into greater detail in his study or to tell us what he really thinks of the two-way street. I seem to remember that an appendix to the report says that the European member countries of the alliance will soon have used thirty American systems, whereas the Americans, in their generosity, have accepted five European systems. Is that a two-way street? Is that what is meant by co-operation between the United States and ourselves in this area?

I do not agree to the reference in paragraph A.3 to "vigorous united support" for the

United States' efforts in Geneva. What is at stake is the future of Europe, which does not have a say in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on INF. It would be preferable to look at the problems from the other angle and perhaps to talk about the concern felt by the public and the pressure that must be exerted if the discussions in Geneva are to be brought to a successful conclusion. It was Mr. Helmut Schmidt who, in an interview with the Washington Post, cast doubt on the willingness of the United States to join in genuine negotiations and to reach an agreement in Geneva.

I shall end with a quotation with which you are familiar, Mr. President, because we both applauded it. Mr. Pertini, the President of the Italian Republic, said in Strasbourg on 27th April: "Today, Gentlemen, peace is based on the balance of nuclear forces of two superpowers, but it is absurd to speak of peace over which the threat of a nuclear catastrophe hangs."

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). - Mr. Wilkinson's report is both very interesting and very disappointing. In view of the many criticisms that have been voiced, it would therefore be wise, in my opinion, to refer it back to the committee.

Why is it disappointing? Because it does not place sufficient emphasis on WEU's essential rôle. We are not at the Conference of NATO Parliamentarians, which will be taking place in Copenhagen in eight days' time, but in the only organisation which discusses European defence. And I wonder what mysterious process has resulted in WEU having so many scruples and being so modest about asserting its defence rôle. Could this be due to the original sin of its creation or to the fact that some of its members will accept it only if it is weak, defenceless and without resources? That is a question that might be asked.

We for our part take the opposite view that, in addition to the marked imbalance between East and West, there is the equally marked imbalance within the western camp itself. In other words, thirty years after the establishment of this alliance, which is needed and must on no account be dismantled, it would be unnatural for a desperate effort not to be made, right here, to strengthen the European pillar so that the defence of Europe may be assured with Europeans who are willing to defend themselves.

This is the problem with WEU. Western European Union includes, on the one hand, old

Mr. Baumel (continued)

nations with a sense of their history, a national vocation, the will to defend themselves and, on the other, a number of small nations that willingly accept the protection of a remote country, which allows them to make no effort themselves.

How long will this unbalanced system continue? At all events, it seems to me that it should be brought to an end as quickly as possible either by revitalising WEU – as successive French Governments have demanded here regardless of the expense involved – or by changing the relations between certain member countries of WEU. I am increasingly in favour of a Franco-German understanding on military matters that leads to agreements on planning, the merging of general staffs, the pursuit of clearly defined objectives, so that the national sanctuary may become a European sanctuary.

What European statesman will have the courage to say that the integrity of the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany is as important as that of his own country? But it is a fact. What European statesman will dare to state publicly in his country that any aggression against German territory will be regarded as aggression against the whole of the European alliance and his own country? Who will it be? I look, I listen, I hear no one.

I believe this is the direction we must take. Such a Franco-German military agreement is the cornerstone of security in Europe. We must all give it our support, particularly the British, for there are three major military countries in Europe: France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. Europe's security is largely ensured by France's independent nuclear force, the German army of infantrymen – 1,200,000 strong – the British fleet and, to a great extent, its nuclear force, which is not independent. Everything else plays a subordinate rôle. How much longer will it be before these three elements combine to provide our continent with the guarantee it needs? That is the real question in our debate on Mr. Wilkinson's report. It concerns the future of WEU.

We must give the matter some very serious thought. At all events, people in France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom are increasingly thinking along these lines.

Of course, whatever the course adopted, there is absolutely no question of disturbing Europe's security system, which is based on respect for the frontiers drawn in 1945 and non-access for German forces to nuclear weapons. Let there be no mistake about that. It does not mean

that France will share nuclear weapons with the Federal Republic of Germany. It means that the nuclear and conventional forces of France, the Federal Republic of Germany and probably the United Kingdom, if the British could stop dreaming of their special relationship with the United States of America and become rather more European, should be combined. We shall then have a defence base that is far more effective than the present WEU system.

These are the reasons, Mr. President, why I personally request that this report be referred back to the committee, because I feel that, if the Assembly approved it in its present form, it would do so without enthusiasm.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Vries.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I greatly appreciate the opportunity of speaking in this Assembly today for the first time on so important a subject. I have had to overcome some hesitation, after hearing my colleague Mr. Baumel explain that only three countries are actually important to the defence of Europe. I take the liberty of dissociating myself to some extent from this view.

Of course, France is not an unimportant country, neither is Germany and neither, again, is Great Britain, but there are a number of other countries in Europe which are not unimportant. I do not believe that the way ahead for us entails a few European countries inflating themselves to proportions which have more to do with the past than the future. I believe that we in Europe must try to find a collective answer to the problems of security and neither I nor many others in Europe would like to see any one of the three countries mentioned in a dominant rôle.

Mr. President, at one of the WEU committee meetings I had an opportunity to give my opinion on the report before us. I complimented the Rapporteur on the abundance of detail in the report. Nevertheless, I have one fundamental criticism, which dovetails with previous remarks by fellow delegates. This report gives a very one-sided analysis of burden-sharing and at the same time broaches subjects which have very little to do with burden-sharing.

When we talk about burden-sharing, we generally mean the relationship between the United States and Europe, but this relationship does not imply identical security situations. The security interests of the United States are different from our own, and we must realise this. If this were not so, this Assembly and Western European Union should be disbanded forthwith. There are great differences, and these are not related to the problem of burden-sharing. Burden-sharing – as the report itself

Mr. de Vries (continued)

shows – is a theoretical problem. If we look at the figures, it is obvious – irrespective of the criterion applied – that the Europeans are making an extremely significant contribution to the defence of the alliance. The point at issue is the foreign policy pursued by Europe in general and the foreign policy advocated in the United States, as well as the military policy pursued on the two continents.

Talking about foreign policy and thinking about the future, let me observe at once that if before long the United States should feel obliged to elect for military intervention in Central America, this would not be understood by most Europeans and many would be provoked to strong opposition.

As far as military policy is concerned, we have had the pleasure this afternoon of listening to General Rogers, whom I greatly admire; I am happy to say so publicly. I must, however, point out that his argument in favour of a flexible response is one which can only dismay us Europeans. We cannot live with that quantity of nuclear weapons and that strategy.

What is the Rapporteur now asking of us in his recommendation? Support for the Americans in Geneva. It may well have to come to that, but where will this support lead? To a new treaty which will not be ratified? To negotiations begun two years too late and with no time to reach fruition? Must it lead to negotiations which are artificially divorced from each other?

I would remind you that a joint resolution by the United States Congress also states that the two rounds of negotiations must be combined if a solution is to be reached. Must it – and this is a question which concerns us Europeans – lead to negotiations which are unrealistic as regards European nuclear weapons?

Paragraph 8.16 of the report contains a reference to the fact that in Europe it has always been recognised, as it is by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, that any attempt to measure “nuclear balance between East and West can only be done globally, taking account of all categories of nuclear weapons on both sides”. That means that negotiations about INF are artificial unless they are related to the total quantity of nuclear weapons – not only the American ones, but also those of our friends, France and England.

Mr. President, I know you would like me to conclude my comments. I shall do so forthwith, though not without observing that the draft resolution calls upon the Turkish Parliament to send delegates to our committee as observers. I find this an offensive proposal. I

am strongly opposed to it and I consider that as no amendment will suffice to rectify it, the proposal should be rejected immediately.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jäger.

Mr. JÄGER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I first of all say a word of thanks to the Rapporteur, Mr. Wilkinson, for his excellent, comprehensive and – in my opinion – balanced report, which presents an accurate picture of the subject under discussion. I should like to endorse what has been said by Mr. Grieve. It is a great sacrifice for a parliamentarian to come here on the eve of his country's elections, and I wish to express my very personal thanks to him for doing so.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the report points out the danger implicit in isolationism in the United States, a danger which has always been present in a latent state and which could increase unless the Europeans show sufficient appreciation of the American contribution to our joint security. The report is right in saying that appreciation of this contribution is incumbent on us. The reception given to General Rogers in this Assembly, partly as an American officer, has no doubt served to give some practical expression to this appreciation, and that is a cause of satisfaction to me. However, we must also speak out clearly on the subject of the growing anti-American propaganda which is gaining ground in most of the countries of Western Europe, including the Federal Republic of Germany, and which is quite plainly under communist control from Moscow. It is a regrettable fact that the pacifist trends which call themselves peace movements have not so far found the courage and strength to dissociate themselves with sufficient forthrightness from this communist-inspired anti-American propaganda. This point has not yet been grasped by many of our fellow citizens or by many politicians, or even by many of our fellow parliamentarians. I should therefore like to take this opportunity of placing on record my thanks to the Congress and Government of the United States for its protection and for guaranteeing the security of Europe.

On 17th June this year, that is to say in a few days' time, it will be the thirtieth anniversary of the crushing of the popular rising in central Germany. On that occasion, thirty years ago, the Soviet army suppressed the German people's desire for freedom with unprecedented brutality. Since then we have all known what fate would be in store for us in the free part of Germany and Europe if we should be deprived of the protection and guarantee of security of our allies, and of our American allies in particular. It follows that this security, these gua-

Mr. Jäger (continued)

rantees and this protection must be maintained. In this respect Mr. Wilkinson's report makes, in my opinion, a specially important contribution to our joint deliberations on burden-sharing in Europe.

There is just one minor critical comment I should like to add. We are aware, Mr. Wilkinson, that developments may occur in the world which confront us with problems beyond the frontiers of the alliance. I refer here to paragraph 2(a) of section A of the draft recommendation proper. This causes us some concern. You all know that it is particularly difficult for us Germans to commit ourselves to the far-reaching implications of this demand. It is our view that what is needed first of all is a consistent joint allied strategy which takes account of likely future developments and ensures that the military measures which would have to be taken in such cases would also be weighed against the security interests of the territory of the alliance. Not until a joint strategy of this kind has been agreed could we endorse the far-reaching recommendation made in paragraph 2(a).

I would also like to make it very clear that we are grateful to the Rapporteur for having addressed and considered this problem, even though we may be unable to go along with him on each individual point.

May I say in conclusion, Ladies and Gentlemen, that I cannot share the opinion of those who wish to refer the report back to the committee. In spite of a few difficulties I think it is a good report and I recommend that it be accepted in its totality. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I should like to begin by thanking Mr. Wilkinson for the contribution he has made to this very important debate and particularly for his efforts to take account of the opinions that have been expressed, sometimes presenting both sides of the argument in a way that has probably been beneficial.

I say "probably" because, of course, everyone has his own way of seeing things, and I have the good fortune to have my own. The way in which each of us views this report depends on his basic outlook.

Allow me to quote a very simple sentence we heard in Brussels a fortnight ago at the joint meeting with the Council, when Mr. Tindemans, speaking on these matters, said: "There is the defence of Europe and there is European defence." Everything depends on how we

look at things. He had his opinion, and each of us has his.

In fact, this draft recommendation is strictly in keeping with one concept of the defence of Europe, within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, but it does not answer the basic question that some people ask: European defence itself, within the framework of NATO, of course.

I shall confine myself to two observations, Mr. President, in order to keep to the time I am allowed.

The first concerns paragraph A.2 of the recommendation, to which Mr. Jäger referred in his typical way of looking at things, with which I for my part do not agree.

Events outside the NATO area are, of course, covered by the NATO treaty. The explanatory memorandum explains at length how these matters should be handled in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. But as we see it, it is not the allies but the members of Western European Union who are concerned here. I would fully agree to these questions being discussed at the level of the Atlantic Alliance, but we sit here by virtue of a treaty, and once again I shall refer to our treaty, our protocol, and ask you to look at paragraph 3 of Article VIII, which says that the Council – and this is the Council of WEU – shall be convened and must consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.

Is that not, Ladies and Gentlemen, a basic point of reference that allows us to determine, at procedural level and on the basis of the treaties, the equal commitment of each member country of Western European Union? There is absolutely no need to resort to the contortions of attempting to distinguish the allies who are affected from those who are not, joint action from individual action, thinking now of France, then of the United Kingdom and later, as the draft resolution does, of Portugal or other countries which are not, for the moment, members of Western European Union, because that is the subject that interests us.

Mr. Jäger referred to sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph A.2. As a Frenchman, I must refer to sub-paragraph (b). But that would take us outside the confines of this debate.

The draft resolution meets our request to Mr. Wilkinson in Brussels in that it seeks to strengthen the European pillar. That is very good, Mr. Wilkinson, but here again, we should emphasise the need to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance through agreement among all the European allies. But what

Mr. Caro (continued)

of the mandate to be given to Western European Union? It would be a pity if we did not put our house in order before calling on others to join us. We speak only of NATO, of the allies. But what are we going to do about Western European Union, the Council of WEU, the Council of Ministers which was not even convened at the time of the Falklands crisis? This is the question that interests us, committed as we are to European defence and to European union, and respecting the promises we have made.

But Mr. Wilkinson knows all this. I am repeating myself, but I shall not be the one who brings the proceedings of this Assembly to a standstill. We must make progress. When I see the work that has been done by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, our Rapporteur's efforts, the progress that has been made, I am convinced that we shall go further. That is why I shall back the Rapporteur to encourage him to go further down the road which, I believe, is the right one for us.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – There are no more speakers listed.

I wish to inform the Assembly that I have received a motion from Mr. Stoffelen requesting that this report be referred back to the committee.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Do I not have the right of reply to the speakers in the debate before we vote on the reference back to the committee?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – My interpretation of Rule 32(2) of the Rules of Procedure, this being a question of procedure, is that this motion takes precedence since it seeks to suspend the debate.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I tried to say that I intended formally to move the reference back after the debate and before the vote. I meant it to be after the reply by Mr. Wilkinson, which I would be very happy to hear first.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Stoffelen, if you prefer to present your motion after Mr. Wilkinson has replied to the speakers, I can agree.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I am grateful, Mr. President, because I wanted the courtesy of being able to answer the important

speeches made by my friends and colleagues in a debate that will be critical for the future of our Assembly.

First, I cannot adequately repay the generous tribute paid to me by Percy Grieve, but I share all his views about the excellence of the speech by SACEUR. It was particularly fortuitous that this debate should have coincided with his visit.

I am glad that Percy Grieve referred to paragraph 9.7 of the report, in which I said that the French and United Kingdom nuclear forces should not be negotiable in SALT. I am glad also that he welcomed the proposition that representatives of Turkey be observers at the sitting of our Defence Committee, because Turkey is especially important for security and for Europe.

Mr. Linde made an impressive and fluent maiden speech and I thank him for his generous remarks about me. I am pleased that he hopes that the work of WEU will grow in importance and significance, but I must take exception to his suggestion that this report should be thrown back to the committee. I shall talk about that later, when Mr. Stoffelen moves his motion.

Conscription in the Federal Republic of Germany is mentioned in paragraph 3.4. Throughout the report I was particularly aware of the special circumstances of the Federal Republic of Germany, both over conscription and because it has to have foreign troops stationed on its soil, with all the attendant social and infrastructural costs.

As for there being no mention of the need for disarmament, I refer specifically in paragraph A.3 to the twin-track decision, the basis of which is that we seek mutual and balanced reductions in intermediate-range nuclear forces – reductions which are acceptable to both sides. That will surely be a major step towards disarmament, if it comes off.

Mr. Linde then spoke about intervention forces. The Bonn communiqué, to which I referred in the text, makes it clear that the allies jointly recognise that there can be issues that affect their vital interests out of area, but an ally can decide that he does not wish to participate or help. The communiqué is printed in full in paragraph 2.7 and it is well worth referring to in this context.

Mr. Vogt may have a different way of looking at things, and I shall not deal with his intervention here.

Mr. Tummers admitted that he did not take an active part in the committee. It is a pity that he could not do so, but I do not believe that the report neglects the economic aspects of

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

defence: far from it. Nor is it in any way militaristic. It is based on the essential requirements for our security in terms of manpower, the common foreign policy of the alliance and the dispositions which the several member states make for their common defence.

Mr. Dejardin was his usual flamboyant self and also accused the report of being militarist. He said that it should have been a North Atlantic Assembly report. I do not accept that. We had valuable contributions from Mr. Caro, Mr. Baumel and others, which greatly modified the content of the report, very much for the better.

I am extremely glad that we had that modification and that earlier reference back in committee.

Mr. Dejardin then spoke about the SAM belt. I have related in the report merely what I was told by SHAPE. If SHAPE is wrong, I am prepared to be corrected, but I stand by the advice that I was given.

As for America being a world policeman with a global rôle, determining our strategy in Europe, that is 180 degrees wrong. The commitment of the United States to NATO has always been recognised by it as its prime commitment outside the defence of its own sovereign territory on North American soil.

Mr. Dejardin's somewhat intemperate remarks betrayed what Mr. Jäger called the all-too-prevalent anti-Americanism which is increasingly poisoning our analysis of security and disarmament questions. I am always struck by the fact that there are many refugees trying to get into America but not very many trying to climb over the Berlin wall from West to East.

Mr. Dejardin then spoke about the double-track decision and was against paragraph 8.3 of the report. So be it: let us take it to a vote on a specific amendment, but that decision is fundamental to NATO's present strategy, as SACEUR himself so amply demonstrated.

Mr. Baumel is a law unto himself. He is always immensely stimulating and I greatly admire his experience and the originality of his mind, but I do not believe that a *Festung Frankreich* based on a Franco-German axis with perhaps an English appendage is the way to ensure Europe's security. It is, as Mr. de Vries made clear, in a sense to downgrade the important contribution of the other members of the Atlantic Alliance here in Western Europe, not least the Dutch, but of course the threat could equally well be on the northern or southern flank. The Mediterranean zone is

just as crucial to France, perhaps, as the central zone itself.

Mr. de Vries asked what was the purpose of backing the United States in Geneva. Well, really! If we want the negotiations to succeed, as we do, and if we want a general and balanced and verifiable agreement before December, that is much more likely if the alliance gives our American friends the full support they deserve.

I welcomed the generosity of Mr. Jäger's remarks about the report and his warning about the dangers to us in Europe if isolationism in the United States became more prevalent. I accept what he said about the increasingly strident anti-American propaganda here and I am glad that he reminded us that 1983 is the thirtieth anniversary of the tragically suppressed uprising in East Berlin.

As to paragraph 2(a) of the draft recommendation about the facilitating of out-of-area operations by the allies, I understand the German view. However, in that sub-paragraph there is no question but that we are putting the defence of Europe first. That should be clearly understood.

Mr. Caro was a most generous spirit as ever, and I welcome his constructive and valuable contributions both in committee and here this afternoon. It is not just a semantic issue whether we are talking about "*défense de l'Europe*" or "*défense européenne*". There is a genuine distinction. Given that WEU as it now exists has a limited membership, and given that when we attempted to enlarge it previously we failed – for example, the Danes turned down an invitation to join – it is not realistic to go beyond the somewhat modest proposition that I have put today.

As for consultation on out-of-area emergencies that could affect our security, I suggested in the Defence Committee at the time of the Falklands war that the Council might meet by invoking Article VIII.3 of the treaty. That never happened, because presumably the governments, particularly the United Kingdom Government, did not wish it. The consultation process as envisaged under Article VIII.3 of the Brussels Treaty is in essence in no way different from that in the NATO treaty, except that joint action only is limited in the NATO treaty, and paragraph 2.7 of the report refers to that important question.

I very much hope that I have answered some of the points that were made. This has been a valuable and useful debate. If we were not now to proceed to a satisfactory conclusion – in my judgment, the passage of this report – it would be a regrettable precedent for the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen to speak in support of his motion that the report be referred back to the committee.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I rise as Chairman of the Socialist Group. On behalf of that group, and taking into account Rule 32(1), I request reference back to the committee. I do so because, as the debate has demonstrated, for various reasons socialists and many other colleagues have serious objections to the draft recommendation and resolution. In fact, they are so serious that we cannot accept them and we shall be obliged to vote against them.

There is no doubt that the report, the draft recommendation and draft resolution are extremely controversial. As examples I cite the following five passages from the draft recommendation and draft resolution. The first is the recognition of deterrence made by the independent nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom. Secondly, recommendation A.1 (a) refers to “maintaining collectively the NATO target of a real increase in defence expenditure”. It takes into account the defence expenditure of the Soviets but not the alarming level of unemployment and the difficult economic situation in our own countries. Thirdly, in more than one part of the draft recommendation there is a positive attitude to the developments and tasks of NATO and of member countries outside NATO. Fourthly, the report contains vigorous and united support for the United States on behalf of the alliance to secure satisfactory arms control agreements and, failing that, by the end of 1983 to proceed with the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles.

Fifthly, a passage in the draft resolution calls on the parliament of Turkey to appoint observers to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to participate in the preparation of its forthcoming report on the state of European security.

At the last meeting of the Presidential Committee we discussed the likelihood that at this session the composition of the Assembly would not reflect its normal composition because of the absence of most British and Italian members. During that meeting – the Rapporteur is well aware of this – most members came to the conclusion that it would be wrong if the Assembly as composed at this session took decisions on really controversial matters. We must face the fact that as a roll-call vote will be needed, it is doubtful whether more than half the representatives are present.

Secondly, I doubt whether anyone could predict the outcome of a vote in this Assembly. If any member can ensure that such a

vote taken today will reflect the normal composition of the Assembly, I admire his genius. Thirdly, several aspects of the draft recommendation and draft resolution are so controversial that they require further discussion in committee.

For all those reasons, and bearing in mind Rule 32(1), I request reference back.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Blaauw, who wishes to oppose the motion.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – On behalf of the Liberal Group, I oppose the reference back, not because of the thoughts behind the Socialist Group's idea but because we must abide by the rules. It was decided in the Presidential Committee that we should continue with this session, and yesterday enough members were present to elect a new President.

Many circumstances may mean that our Assembly is not fully attended. Next time, for example, there may be elections in two other countries or a flu epidemic. That is no reason to refer a report back to a committee. If members are against parts of a report or parts of a recommendation, they can table amendments and seek to change them. But, according to the rules, reference back means that a report must be rewritten. This report has already been accepted by the committee. It was debated in Pisa and Brussels, and it was accepted by fourteen votes to one, with two abstentions.

It was entirely correct to produce the report. Some members may not agree with it, but that is a political consideration. That is why we are here. If it is felt that not enough members are present to vote, let us have a roll-call, but do not let us refer the report back to the committee. That means that we shall have to start again on a report that has already been adopted. I call on the Assembly not to refer back the report. Let us have a roll-call.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, I have to inform you that, according to the register of attendance, a quorum does not exist.

But I should like to know if ten members of the Assembly wish to request a vote by roll-call.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I formally moved the reference back and, according to Rule 32, you invited a delegate to speak against it. I am curious to hear the Rapporteur's comments, but afterwards we should vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Stoffelen, you are being too hasty. I simply wanted

The President (continued)

to clarify this point before giving the floor to Mr. Wilkinson.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – With his usual charm and courtesy, Pieter Stoffelen gave me notice that he intended to move the reference back. I shall take the argument in two stages. First, what would be the effect on the NATO commitment of the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces from December if we did not come to a conclusion on the report today? The matter would still be hanging over us at the next session in December. That would be the worst time to debate the issue. The move is an attempt at political procrastination. If we approved the reference back, we should assist those who hope to prove that we do not have the resolve and will to carry through the twin-track decision of December 1979.

The move is almost an insult to SACEUR himself, because much of his speech was geared to the report and its contents. It would be an insult to the Defence Committee, which considered the whole question at great length and with immense care, trying to accommodate the views of all its members. I spoke in my speech of the consensus that I sought.

Mr. Stoffelen talks about the United Kingdom Delegation being absent. Delegates who wanted to be are here. The leader of the British Delegation, Sir Frederic Bennett, wanted the report to be put through. He knew that I was coming here and was delighted that that should be so. The report has the implicit support of the Italian Delegation. The former Chairman, Mr. Cavaliere, supported the report and wished it a fair wind in Brussels in May when he knew that the Italian election was to take place in June.

Mr. Stoffelen referred to purely political matters, such as the annual increase in expenditure in real terms, whether the issue should be included in the SALT talks, out-of-area deployment, the Bonn Declaration and whether Turkish members of parliament should sit on the Defence Committee as observers. Those political matters should be dealt with by amendment and not by a procrastination ploy.

Of course we cannot predict the outcome of votes, but I have an idea that after 10th June when the votes are counted back home fewer socialists will be in the British Delegation. That might make it even harder for Mr. Stoffelen's view to prevail in December.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the motion tabled by Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*). – On a point of order, Mr. President, I am a little embarrassed by the information provided by Mr. Stoffelen and Mr. Blaauw. Is there any information about the decision by the Presidential Committee on whether a controversial report should be voted upon?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. van der Sanden, I can answer your question. It was decided to hold the part-session on the scheduled dates, but no specific decision was taken on this point.

The procedure adopted by the committee and the inclusion of the report in the orders of the day are a clear indication of the desire that the report should be presented to the Assembly.

We shall therefore now vote on the motion that the report be referred back to the committee.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – May we have a roll-call?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does this request have the support of ten members of the Assembly?...

It does not.

I therefore put the motion tabled by Mr. Stoffelen to the vote, which will be taken by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The motion for reference back is agreed to.

Document 947 will consequently be referred back to the committee.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 8th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. The law of the sea (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 946 and amendments).

The President (continued)

2. Analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly Recommendations 383 on the problems of nuclear weapons in Europe and 388 on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 943).

Are there any objections ?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6. 40 p.m.)

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 8th June 1983

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.

2. Attendance register.

3. The law of the sea (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 946 and amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Lenzer (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Fourré, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers, Mr. Beix, Mr. Lenzer (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Mr. Fourré, Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers, Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim,

Mr. Fourré, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Mr. Beix, Mr. Lenzer.

4. Analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly Recommendations 383 on the problems of nuclear weapons in Europe and 388 on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 943*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Dejardin (*Rapporteur*), Lord Reay, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Müller, Mr. Enders, Mr. Dejardin (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stoffelen (*Chairman of the committee*).

5. Adjournment of the session.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. The law of the sea

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 946 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on

Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the law of the sea and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 946 and amendments.

I call Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur of the committee, to present the report.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, for the second time I have the honour of presenting a report on the law of the sea on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. I should like to begin by expressing my thanks for the help I received from the other members of the committee when drawing up this report. We discussed the subject matter very thoroughly several times. My thanks also go to the committee's secretary, Mr. Huigens, for his valuable help.

In this context, I must also mention the French expert, Admiral Labrousse, who addressed the committee and helped us to come to grips with this extremely difficult and complex subject matter. Almost unbeknown to the public, something that has major political implications has been going on over the last few years. Without the general public being aware of the fact, a new régime has been introduced to govern and redistribute a large part of the earth's surface.

Perhaps the whole thing can be brought under three heads: firstly, the general political aspect; secondly, the defence aspect, which is

1. See page 29.

Mr. Lenzer (continued)

of particular interest to us here in the WEU Assembly, and lastly, the economic considerations which have to be linked with some of the provisions.

I will begin with a brief résumé of the most important results of the third United Nations conference on the law of the sea. As regards the general international law of the sea, coastal states were granted the right to extend their coastal waters to twelve nautical miles from what is known as the base line. Of the one hundred and thirty-four coastal states, some seventy-six have so far taken advantage of this right in various ways. This coastal zone is extended by a contiguous zone, also of twelve nautical miles, where coastal states may apply their customs, fiscal, emigration and sanitary regulations.

Over a hundred important straits, which may now be regarded as coastal waters as a result of the extension of the territorial sea limit, are now governed by an arrangement that is strategically very important, the right of transit passage. The archipelagoes, of which there are seven, mostly in the Pacific, are granted the right to draw limits round certain outer islands. In addition, and this is also especially important, an exclusive economic zone of up to two hundred nautical miles from the baseline is introduced.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I could, of course, now go on to detail the various provisions of the law of the sea at great length, which would undoubtedly be extremely boring. However, in the context of the report before you, I do not think this will be necessary. Of primary importance are what I would call the economic aspects: that is, the provisions governing deep-sea mining. This is the widest-ranging régime to come out of the conference, governing access to natural resources on the seabed off the continental shelf bordering coastal states. This régime is based on United Nations Resolution 2749, adopted as long ago as 1970, when the General Assembly unanimously approved the concept of the common heritage of mankind in respect of natural marine resources. It is a concept which, of course, requires interpretation in international law and is relatively imprecise. This common heritage of mankind should also be exploited jointly by all the countries concerned, that is to say, on the one hand, the industrialised countries and, on the other, the developing countries, which are often the ones with the natural resources.

During the conference, neither side was, of course, exclusively successful in gaining acceptance for its demands. One side had the industrial know-how and the necessary capital,

the other had the natural resources, which meant an arrangement had to be found to provide the legal safeguards for co-operation. Agreement was finally reached on the "parallel system", whereby mining licences are granted both to the enterprise of the seabed authority and to private and state entities. This system was first applied to the mining of manganese nodules, to which constant reference is made in the public debate. They consist of several different minerals: 25% manganese, 1% nickel, 1% copper and 0.4% cobalt. These important resources could be, if they are not at present, a significant future source of minerals.

An international seabed authority was set up to determine policy on the exploitation of deep-sea natural resources anywhere in the world and to decide on the allocation of mining licences. This seabed authority has various organs: the Council, on which thirty-six states are represented, the Assembly, consisting of representatives of all the countries which have signed the convention, the secretariat and the joint seabed company called the enterprise. The first operation undertaken by the enterprise is to be financed by the member countries. Start-up costs are estimated at \$1,200 million. As you see, a great deal of capital is involved.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall not give you a breakdown of all the costs, which are really substantial. Discussion on these became quite heated from time to time. They also became heated over the idea of using provisions of the convention to force the industrialised countries to exploit deep-sea resources jointly with the developing countries and countries which have natural resources of their own, thus more or less enforcing access by the developing countries to technical know-how by compelling the industrialised countries to transfer technology to countries with natural resources. All this eventually gave rise to the difficulties we discussed during the last debate on this subject in the Assembly.

From there I should like to go on to the present state of the discussions as we now see it, and as it entered into the deliberations of our committee.

We had to interrupt our discussion of this subject in the WEU Assembly on 3rd December 1981 because of the international debate on the law of the sea convention and also because the United States had decided to replace the head of their delegation and to adopt a new posture on the law of the sea. In this Assembly on 3rd December 1981 we adopted Recommendation 377 on the implications of the law of the sea conference and produced a first report. Even then I pointed out that the results achieved, especially in deep-sea mining arran-

Mr. Lenzer (continued)

gements, leant strongly towards dirigism and protectionism. Nevertheless, member countries of WEU were of the opinion that a new international convention might establish the rule of law on the world oceans, which might forestall many difficulties in the future and would constitute a factor in maintaining peaceful and friendly relations between states. They were also aware of the importance of such a convention between western industrialised countries and developing countries of the third world.

The Council, in its reply of 20th April 1982 to this recommendation, stated further as its opinion that a satisfactory regulation of deep-seabed mining was strategically and economically of great importance, especially for the Western European industrialised countries, which were highly dependent on imports of raw materials to be extracted from the deep seabed. WEU member governments were therefore prepared to take part in a constructive manner in the forthcoming consultations and negotiations to arrive at a system which would take into account the interests of all concerned.

On 30th April 1982, the last day of the third United Nations law of the sea conference, the delegates of the participating countries then voted on the draft convention, all efforts to reach a consensus having failed. The convention was approved by one hundred and thirty votes to four, with seventeen abstentions.

Now for some details of the voting pattern of the participants. Israel, Turkey, the United States and Venezuela opposed the convention. The Soviet Union and countries of the communist bloc, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom abstained. France and Japan voted in favour of the convention. Turkey and Venezuela voted against because they objected to provisions on the delimitation of marine and submarine areas between states with opposite or adjacent coasts. Israel objected because the text gave recognition to the PLO. Albania and Ecuador did not participate in the voting. The Soviet Union and the eastern bloc countries abstained on 10th April 1982 because they did not agree to the first investors, or "pioneers", as the terminology has it – that is the highly industrialised countries of America and Western Europe – having an advantage and because they thought that the establishment of an equitable economic order, taking into account the interests of all countries, was not assured.

The full conference met twice more in 1982: in New York from 22nd to 24th September to act on the recommendations of the

drafting committee and for the last time in Kingston, Jamaica, from 6th to 10th December for government representatives to sign the draft convention.

After the convention is signed, its ratification by sixty states will bring it into force twelve months after ratification by the sixtieth state. The United States of America and several WEU member countries did not sign the convention in Kingston on 10th December 1982 mainly because it contained a deep-seabed mining régime which they could not support. They did agree, however, that the convention on the law of the sea contained many positive provisions consistent with their interests and in the interests of all those who are maritime powers and use the seas.

Ladies and Gentlemen, this brief description alone will have shown you that the positions adopted during the voting on this convention sprang from a wide range of interests: political interests, interests arising specifically from the geographical position of the various countries, and also economic interests, with certain countries wanting to encourage free access guided by market economy principles without any form of compulsion and without the compulsory transfer of technology. There was therefore no question of block voting based on uniform motives and, as the debate continues, it must be remembered that a specific voting pattern developed according to the specific situation of individual countries.

One thing must be made clear. All the experts were surprised to find how many countries supported the convention and what a large number signed it at the conference in Kingston. A majority of that size had not been expected.

I should therefore perhaps say a few words about the distribution and motives of the signatories at this closing conference in Montego Bay from 6th to 10th December 1982. Of one hundred and twenty world countries eighty-six signed. There were, however, a number of important countries among the non-signatories, including Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Libya, Madagascar, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Venezuela and Zaïre. As regards the eight small countries which did not come to the conference it can be assumed that their absence was caused by limited political infrastructure rather than lack of interest.

Most of the third world countries which did not sign were motivated by particular reasons, not as a group. There was thus no common stance. I stress this once again because it is a very important point. All the eastern bloc countries signed the convention. Here again, they may have been motivated by political considerations, simply wanting to reinforce their policy towards the third world.

Mr. Lenzer (continued)

Of the western countries a majority – eighteen out of twenty-five – signed the convention, although most of these countries are small and have no direct interest in deep-seabed mining. Of the large countries potentially capable of deep-seabed mining operations – the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany – France was the only one to sign. However, Japan expected to sign in early 1983. Of the other potential deep-seabed mining countries – Belgium, Italy, Canada and the Netherlands – Canada and the Netherlands signed. Italy and Belgium have not ruled out the possibility of signing in the fairly near future.

The signatories therefore fall into the following categories: most countries with long coastlines have signed, most land-locked countries have signed and about half the great seafaring nations have signed. On the other hand, non-signatories such as the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, both members of WEU, were prompted less by shipping considerations than by the economic aspects of the provisions on deep-seabed mining.

Most of the archipelagic countries and countries bordering on important straits have signed. Here again, there are, of course, major exceptions.

Ladies and Gentlemen, to conclude, a few words about the draft recommendation and report proper. The report and the draft recommendation seek to reduce the likelihood of confrontation arising from the differences of interests that undoubtedly exist among the various countries. There is no point in denying this fact or trying to sweep it under the carpet: differences exist and that is that. I consider it more important to reduce confrontation and strengthen co-operation than to point an accusing finger and try to exert pressure on certain countries to make them sign the convention. That would undoubtedly be counterproductive.

Thirdly, it is important to seek practicable solutions. Although these solutions must be based on the political realities, they must also take account of the technical possibilities and the enormous amount of capital required for all the activities involved in the exploitation of deep-seabed resources. We must not introduce any compulsory measures.

Despite occasional differences of opinion, the draft recommendation largely succeeds in reflecting this attitude. It proceeds from the assumption that this kind of international convention on the law of the sea has many

positive aspects, since it is a universally-accepted agreement which more firmly establishes the rule of law. It also recognises that the regulation of deep-seabed mining is economically and also strategically of great importance for the countries of Western European Union. It is fully conscious that every country should have a share in these deep-sea mineral resources, and that no country should be excluded, for instance because it does not have the technical or financial capacity to take prompt practical action on its own behalf. But it also takes account of the shortcomings of the convention, particularly as regards its protectionism and dirigism, and it regrets the differences of opinion that still persist among the industrialised countries of the West.

It concludes by recommending the Council to do everything in its power to achieve the following goals, which I will summarise once again: less confrontation, closer co-operation among the various countries concerned and, lastly, practicable solutions without coercion or dirigism.

Ladies and Gentlemen, a number of amendments have been tabled. I shall state my views on these amendments after they have been moved. I believe we shall be able to reach a consensus in the Assembly today.

I submit this report and recommendation for your approval and thank you for your attention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Lenzer, for your excellent report.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Fourré.

(Mr. Pignion, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

Mr. FOURRÉ (France) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I first of all congratulate Mr. Lenzer on his efforts and on the full report which he has just presented.

The draft recommendation which we have before us today contains “a request” addressed directly to the only two WEU member states – the Netherlands and my own country, France – which last December signed the international convention on the law of the sea. They are requested, and I quote here paragraph 2 of the recommendation “to devote their efforts in the preparatory commission to the introduction of rules and regulations to govern the seabed mining régime in an equitable manner...” etc. I therefore feel called upon, as a Frenchman, to tell you of my personal reactions to this “request” and to the report in general.

Mr. Fourré (continued)

It is true, and on this point I am entirely in agreement with the draft recommendation, that in its present form the convention has shortcomings as regards the regulations governing deep-seabed mining. Here, I am thinking especially of the compulsory transfer of technology, of the financing of the future authority entrusted with the management of what it has been agreed to call the "common heritage of mankind" and of the indispensable surveillance systems needed for this work.

Further problems could be added to the list. However, these deficiencies, however significant, should not conceal the considerable value of the legal instrument which is the outcome of the past nine years of negotiations.

Whether this relates to defining the concept of territorial waters, to the creation of economic zones, to shipping passing through straits, to arrangements for islands and states which are archipelagoes or to regulations governing pollution and scientific research, the result is one of very great import, to which France has thought it fitting to give solemn recognition despite the extent of the problems that remain.

It is therefore a cause of regret that the persistence of self-seeking nationalism during the negotiations has prevented the unanimous signature of a document whose importance had been unanimously recognised. It seems to me that the draft recommendation is not sufficiently clear on this point.

The United States has not signed the convention for the reasons stated in the report, which relate not only to the alleged unworkability of the international seabed authority but also, and I think chiefly, to the damage which private mining interests would suffer. Yet the United States was one of the prime movers in the preparation of this convention.

The most important point, however, is that of the WEU member states, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and Italy – five countries out of seven – did not in the end sign the convention. Are these countries not, then, aware of the immense impact which these rules could have on improving our relations with the developing countries? I think this unlikely. What then are we to conclude?

In every European forum, concern is constantly being expressed about the inadequacy of the North-South dialogue. Why in that case, when it comes to making crucial decisions, do the states concerned withdraw to positions which cannot be justified in the long term?

By enshrining in law the concept of national sovereignty over territorial waters, the commercial ownership of the resources of the economic zone and, above all, by establishing in legal and technical terms the principle that the immense deep-sea resources should be shared, the convention enables the developing countries to manage their own affairs more effectively and to take a more relaxed view of their relations with the developed countries. Why then deprive ourselves of what would amount to a big step forward in our commercial and political relations with these countries and would furthermore certainly contribute to the maintenance of peace in the world?

So those who did sign the convention are authorised to negotiate on behalf of those who did not agree to the convention once the latter to accede to the convention once the controversial points are considered to have been resolved. On this issue, France, for its part, intends to participate fully in the work of the preparatory commission and will do everything in its power to ensure that the efforts to solve the problems concerning the deep-seabed are successful. This was stated on 8th December 1982 by Mr. Le Pensec, then Minister of Maritime Affairs, at the final session of the conference.

But would it not be more constructive if the states which refused to sign, were to change their minds and accede to the convention, and so play an active rôle in the negotiations instead of waiting somewhat passively until they feel that they can sign?

I can think of no better way of concluding than by quoting the remarks of Admiral Labrousse to the Scientific Committee on 15th February 1983: "I think there is every interest in the countries of Western European Union exploiting the wealth granted to them by the convention. They must also set up a surveillance system, a means of controlling these European economic zones so that the wealth may be better protected. I am convinced there is now a possibility of greater European co-operation centred on this new wealth and these new economic interests and also capable of leading to further military co-operation."

Perhaps you will also allow me to quote from the reply given by the Council to Recommendation 377 in April 1982: the Council said that it was particularly aware of the advantages such a convention might have with respect to a better establishment of the rule of law on the world oceans... It could forestall in the future many difficulties and therefore constitute a factor in maintaining peaceful and friendly relations between states. The Council went on to say that "a satisfactory international regula-

Mr. Fourré (continued)

tion of deep-seabed mining is strategically and economically of great importance... ”.

All these arguments should persuade the member countries of our Assembly to sign the convention so that they can work more effectively in the preparatory commission and we can together raise the barriers which allow the United States, among others, to maintain a negative attitude, which, in the long term, is detrimental to the interests of our planet.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Mr. Fourré. I was becoming concerned, and not before time, as you had used up the allotted time.

I call Mr. Spies von Büllenheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, so many countries have signed the convention that the non-signatories rather find themselves in the dock. As you have already heard, five of the WEU member countries have not signed. Nor has the United States. Most of the countries that have not yet signed are major industrialised countries which are expected to make a very considerable contribution financially and otherwise.

I should like to take this opportunity to explain the position of the Federal Republic of Germany, to show you why it did not sign the convention and why it has no intention of signing it in its present form. We do not deny – on the contrary, we should like to stress – that the convention contains many positive provisions, which we acknowledge: freedom of navigation, transit passage through straits, the provisions on marine pollution, the regulations governing coastal waters and the continental shelf, overflight, the laying of cables, fishing and the freedom of scientific marine research. We regard all this as positive, we endorse it and we help to finance it. There are no problems in these areas.

Like most of the countries that have not signed, the Federal Republic of Germany has objections only as regards the deep-seabed mining régime. This is the point we cannot accept, because the deep-seabed régime has protectionist and dirigist aspects which cannot be accepted as such in an international treaty and must not be allowed to set a precedent for arrangements yet to be made in other areas. Nor can the compulsory transfer of technology be accepted, because it might have adverse repercussions on other international agreements if the outcome was what might be termed a “social obligation” to pass technological know-how on to others. This would be bad for

everyone, not because technology should not be passed on – it should be disseminated – but because technology can only develop through private initiative and investment, and private companies which have been successful in their developments must be able to profit by them, otherwise there will be no further development.

The danger inherent in the provisions of the convention is that the results will fall short of our common wish, which is the exploitation of deep-sea mineral resources to the benefit of all mankind. For this, private initiative is required.

We would also have constitutional problems in the Federal Republic of Germany if we agreed to an arrangement which required companies investing in deep-seabed mining to pass on the fruits of their labour free of charge. There would also be constitutional objections if the German Parliament was bypassed, which might be the case if an amendment was approved by a three-quarters majority and consequently had to be accepted by all the signatories. The only alternative would be to withdraw, which politically would be a very sensational thing to do.

Mr. President, it has often been said – Mr. Fourré has just broached the subject again – that the five WEU countries and the United States should at least sign and then work together on the convention, as France is doing. It is a point of view, but there are some very cogent arguments against it. I would point out in the first place that France also has considerable doubts about the deep-seabed mining régime. When signing the convention, France stated that modifications and improvements would have to be made on this score. To this extent, therefore, the sixth country – France – agrees with us that changes are needed.

If there are such serious doubts, the question is whether it would be politically wise to sign now and so imply that we may after all join in and approve this régime. We believe this would result in disappointment, which would lead to a deterioration of North-South relations. Having adopted such a clear position, it is better to wait, undivided, and hope that the points complained of can be improved.

To conclude, Mr. President, the Federal Republic believes that nothing is to be gained from signing the convention as it now stands. We think it better not to sign now, raising hopes which we may dash later on. We believe that while fully acknowledging the good points in the convention in all other areas, we shall best serve the common goal by making it quite clear that something will have

Mr. Spies von Bülllesheim (continued)

to be changed where deep-seabed mining is concerned. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Spies von Bülllesheim.

I call Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers.

Mrs. den OUDEN-DEKKERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in 1609 my compatriot, Hugo Grotius, laid the foundations of an international doctrine based on the freedom of the seas. Over three and a half centuries later a new international code has been drawn up for the sea and its natural resources. The need for peaceful coexistence between nations also demands that the riches of the seabed be utilised for the benefit of the populations of the world as a whole.

Years of negotiations on a worldwide basis finally resulted in the law of the sea. The common heritage of mankind can now be shared but it is always the wills with many legacies that lead to the worst conflicts. The establishment of the convention confronts us with the entire North-South problem, especially with regard to deep-sea mining. The developed, industrialised countries have the technology and the capital required for the exploitation of the seabed and many developing countries are adjacent to marine areas in which the minerals are located. But these countries have to contend with a chronic burden of debt and lack the technological know-how which they would need in order to do any deep-sea mining at all on their own.

Without disregarding the military and strategic aspects of the convention, I wish to emphasise its political and economic implications. A number of industrialised countries are opposed to the law of the sea, as their refusal to sign and ratify it openly demonstrates. Why? Because these countries do not believe that the convention will work.

The Soviet Union and the eastern bloc countries have in fact signed it, arguing that since the convention will not work anyway, why not sign it? One evaluation, different conclusions. We must recognise that by signing the convention the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc countries are in fact also rejecting it. We must face this squarely as discussion and amplification of the convention proceeds. All the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc countries are doing is to make political capital in the developing countries out of signing the convention, at no cost to themselves.

The economic North-South problem will thus still have to be resolved primarily by the western industrialised countries together with

the developing countries. It is therefore particularly unfortunate that the United States and major EEC countries reject the convention, missing what may be a unique opportunity of exerting their influence and driving themselves along the road of bilateral agreements and disastrous protectionism.

Rejection by these western industrialised countries also supports the Soviet Union's efforts to increase its ideological power in the third world, which will be further encouraged by any intensification of the economic and associated social contrasts between North and South. The technological and capital resources of the West must be used to exploit the seabed. At the same time the developing countries must be supported in their advance towards independence.

Their opportunities for participation must be increased so that they too have their share of the treasures of the sea. This is equally important for Europe and America; it is not for nothing that the interdependence of all countries is constantly emphasised.

For this reason alone, EEC countries which have signed the convention must try to convince the other industrialised countries of the necessity to sign in the interests of the western world. The disunity of Europe weakens the future negotiating position of the EEC, causing it to lose its political influence. By not signing America is alienating the third world rather than promoting a greater degree of economic and ideological rapprochement. Poverty and weakness create obligations for rich and poor alike. That does not mean that we see much point in an international institution for administration and development. All that we can expect from this is a big, cumbersome bureaucracy which constantly lags behind in the economic interplay of supply and demand. That is certainly not in the interests of the third world.

We have placed our hopes mainly in production, taken enterprise by enterprise, and the free exchange of technology and goods, albeit subject to limiting conditions which will close the gap between rich and poor countries. In order to achieve this aim, the western industrialised countries must close ranks with regard to the law of the sea as well.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers, you have kept well within the time allowed. I am most grateful.

I call Mr. Beix.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the convention which, it is suggested, should be signed by member states which have not yet done so is

Mr. Beix (continued)

the outcome, or rather the outward expression, of substantial difficulties, as indeed is every convention relating to international law. That is self-evident. The purpose of a convention of this kind is not totally to eliminate or smooth away the difficulties – let nobody be under any misapprehension on that point – but simply to propose regulations.

Admittedly, as Mr. Fourré and Mr. Spies von Büllenheim pointed out, on a whole series of issues such as the waters of archipelagoes, straits opening into territorial waters, financial participation in the international body set up to apply the rules and undertake a certain amount of research, pollution and the real ability of an international authority to discharge its duties, we are some distance, indeed we are very far, from resolving or even starting to solve, by way of a text proposed for signature – not yet ratification – the difficulties which may arise and will no doubt continue to multiply for decades to come.

However, it is my view that the positions of the states which have already signed and of those which have not yet done so need not at this time be considered to be entirely contradictory. Mr. Fourré has just explained in reference to the French position a point which must be clearly understood. It is that we are at the initial stage of deciding our attitude to a document. We have not yet reached the end of the process, because we are fully aware of a number of difficulties. It is therefore inappropriate to make a hard and fast distinction between the states which have signed and those which have not. All we can do is encourage the states which have not yet signed to go ahead and do so.

Behind the formal arguments relating to the difficulties involved in the application of a convention of this kind, which highlight the enormous problems which may have to be faced by some countries of the world, the expression of these difficulties of a formal character must not be allowed to serve as a screen for unwillingness to agree to economic co-operation. The economic argument needs to be stated clearly.

Behind the refusal of some countries to sign the convention lies their wish to mine the seabeds which are particularly rich in nodules containing a variety of metals. These countries really cannot base their refusal to sign on legal grounds.

Let us speak plainly! The question is: who is going to mine these seabeds and for whose benefit, that is to say, to whose disadvantage? This is the debate now starting in the devel-

oped countries. And for how long are these arguments to last?

Mr. Lenzer's report quoting a statement by Admiral Labrousse is perfectly clear on this point: the United States view is that the riches of the seabed are there and should be exploited quickly. Do we have the same confidence, and does this attitude safeguard the political standing of the developed countries, which run the risk, if they do not sign such an important document, of appearing to be ruthless speculators exploiting a range of resources to the detriment of third and fourth world countries?

What, then, is the political stance which the developed countries should maintain?

Let us not forget that the economic interests of the third and fourth worlds are vitally affected by a convention of this kind. The future of two thirds of the waters of the globe and of the deep seabeds depends upon it. Not only the economic future but also the political position of the developed countries we represent is at stake.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The general debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I will begin by thanking members for the kind words they have used in thanking me for drafting this report. I thank them for their suggestions, which fully coincide with the line followed in this report and particularly the draft recommendation, which is that an understanding should be reached without the various positions being in any way abandoned.

The basic premise from the outset has been that there are differences of interests. This was inevitable with something as difficult as the law of the sea convention. But we also agreed that we would discuss these problems openly and then try to arrive at satisfactory provisions by means of an on-going study of the legal position and attendant discussions, without compulsion, without protectionism and without a confrontation, which would eventually have to be paid for yet again by the politically and also economically weaker countries.

This being the case, I think we should try not to put any country in the dock, as Mr. Spies von Büllenheim suggested. Mr. Fourré, Mr. Beix and also Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers have once again emphasised a number of different points, explaining, for example, why the French position is as it is, that France signed the convention in spite of its shortcomings and that despite national egoism an appeal should be made to the member countries of WEU to overcome these difficulties.

Mr. Lenzer (continued)

As I am again speaking as Rapporteur, I should like to take this opportunity to quote a few figures so that we may appreciate the economic and financial significance of compulsory measures. The administrative costs of the enterprise, the deep-seabed mining company, are estimated at \$ 20 to \$ 40 million a year. The twenty-five year licence fees for mining a deep-sea field are put at between \$ 1,000 and \$ 2,000 million. There are also considerable discretionary powers as the provisions governing the distribution and licensing by the deep-seabed mining authority of mining and usufruct now stand.

Another factor that distorts competition is the exemption of the deep-seabed mining authority from the payment of any fees or costs for ten years. Against this background, it is hardly surprising that the industrially strong countries, which alone have the technical know-how and financial potential to mine the deep seabed, should have serious objections: these are simply the logical economic and also political response. It would be wrong to point the finger at those countries. Taking the Federal Republic of Germany as his example, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim tried to make it quite clear how a highly industrialised country can be perfectly happy with the political, strategic and defence aspects, but still find it impossible to sign the convention at present.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we have discussed all the points raised by Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim and Mr. Beix several times. I see this as confirmation of our efforts to arrive at common solutions. We intend to keep a critical eye on this subject-matter in the future work of our committee and also to continue our discussions in the search for generally-acceptable solutions.

However, we should again give some thought – and this is, of course, the object of some of the amendments – to converting this into practice later by means of appropriate wording in the draft recommendation. Perhaps I may be allowed to add that much, Mr. President. I will wait until the amendments have been moved before commenting further. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank the Rapporteur for his statement.

Before voting on the draft recommendation we have five amendments to consider: Amendments 1 and 2 tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim and Amendments 3, 4 and 5 tabled by Mr. Fourré.

We shall take the amendments in the order in which they relate to the text of the draft recom-

mendation: Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Fourré, Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Fourré, Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Fourré and Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim.

These amendments refer to the draft recommendation in Document 946.

Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim reads as follows:

1. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “seabed mining régime” leave out “but” and insert “and”.

I call Mr. Spies von Büllenheim to speak in support of his amendment.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLENSHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I can be very brief, Mr. President. The word “but” between two parts of a sentence implies an antithesis, whereas the shortcomings referred to here are actually the consequence of the deep-seabed mining régime and the cause of the policy split. On purely linguistic grounds, therefore, to avoid an artificial antithesis the word “but” should be replaced by “and”.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's view?...

I note that the committee is in favour. I now put Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Fourré reads as follows:

3. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “the policy split” to the end of the paragraph and insert “the individual and divergent positions which the member states of Western European Union, the EEC and NATO have taken up as to whether the convention should be signed;”.

I call Mr. Fourré to speak in support of his amendment.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – The explanation of this amendment is quite simply that the five countries which have not signed the convention have quite different reasons for not doing so, and that the original text gave the impression that there was a rupture or deep political split between two blocs – a fundamental divergence of view – which caused some countries to sign and others to refuse.

Mr. Fourré (continued)

Having listened to the Rapporteur and read the document itself, it is clear to me that is not the case. Even though there are sometimes arguments which allow a number of countries to unite in their refusal, I do not think that this is why they all refused to sign the convention. I would therefore prefer the wording "the individual and divergent positions ..." etc.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?

Mrs. den OUDEN-DEKKERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it must be clear from my remarks that the omission of the word "regretting" is contrary to their purpose. We do greatly regret the political disunion in Europe. We therefore oppose the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I think, Madam, that you are guilty of a slight error of interpretation.

The amendment relates to paragraph (iv) where it is proposed to leave out from "the policy split" to the end of the paragraph and insert "the individual and divergent positions which the member states of Western European Union, the EEC and NATO have taken up as to whether the convention should be signed", but the word "regretting" stands.

I trust you are satisfied with this expression of regret.

What is the committee's view?

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I too support Mr. Fourré's amendment. I believe he is concerned to establish that the differences referred to are not political but simply divergent opinions. And the wording he proposes expresses this better than the draft preamble.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Fourré to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Fourré reads as follows:

4. At the end of paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add "more particularly in relation to the developing countries";

I call Mr. Fourré to speak in support of the amendment.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – The intention here is to stress the possible detri-

mental effect of the split on Europe's strategic position. Paragraph (v) of the preamble already makes the point but I took the view that, considering the argument developed in the report, we should lay special stress on that position in relation to the developing countries.

That is why I propose that the words "more particularly in relation to the developing countries" should be added to the end of the paragraph.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I oppose this amendment. Although I sympathise with Mr. Fourré's intention, I believe it would bring us into greater conflict with the developing countries if we were all to sign, apparently agreeing to everything and then, later, the national parliaments refused to ratify the convention. That would put us in a very much worse position. I therefore suggest that this amendment should be rejected as over-emphatic.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this is a difficult decision to make. The committee will have no opportunity to discuss this question in depth. My initial reaction is that this amendment does not represent any dramatic new direction. I am unable at the moment to share Mr. Spies von Büllesheim's anxiety.

The subject is out in the open. There is no point in shutting our eyes to the problem of relations with the developing countries. Let us put it in by all means, if by so doing we can get on and save ourselves a long debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – So that the members of this Assembly can be quite clear before voting, I will read out the paragraph in its amended form: "Considering that this split may be detrimental to Europe's strategic position in the world, more particularly in relation to the developing countries".

I would point out that this matter has been raised before and I think that the thoughts of the committee have been conveyed to us by its Rapporteur.

Is Mr. Spies von Büllesheim still opposed to the amendment?

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have just said that I fully understand the purpose of Mr. Fourré's amendment. But I feel that far from improving anything it

Mr. Spies von Büllersheim (continued)

makes matters worse. I shall therefore vote against it. But I am not seriously concerned.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I was trying to be conciliatory and I now put Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Fourré to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Fourré reads as follows :

5. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “to adopt policies” and insert “to sign the convention on the law of the sea”.

I call Mr. Fourré to speak in support of the amendment.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the amendment I propose relates to a point which I and several colleagues raised unsuccessfully in committee.

What is proposed is that the five countries which have not signed the convention on the law of the sea should be asked to do so. The whole of my previous speech was in fact directed to this point, and I shall not go over the basic facts again.

In the present situation, and to repeat my central argument only, I think it is vital that the WEU member states should realise that, if we really wish to do more than merely express good intentions and want to establish a law of the sea matching our ambitions, most of the countries concerned must sign the convention, thereby expressing a constructive and positive attitude, and must take part in improving the law within the preparatory commission.

I therefore propose that these countries should be called upon in clear and unequivocal terms to sign the convention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I need only refer to what has been said before, Mr. President. As the United Kingdom, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, five of our member states, have not signed the convention and a sixth, France, has done so but has serious doubts about the deep-seabed mining régime, we cannot, in my view, have a recommendation calling upon our countries to sign in spite of their objections. I

am therefore definitely in favour of rejecting this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly has heard the objection.

What is the committee's view ?

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to confirm what Mr. Spies von Büllersheim has said in support of his opposition to this amendment. We have already discussed the same subject at the meeting on 18th May in Brussels and divergent views were expressed there. But it was in the interests of an agreed solution and in order to avoid forcing the issue that we did then decide in favour of the rather more neutral and cautious formulation. We felt we could make more progress by further discussion and by talks than by virtually requiring – not to say compelling – some countries to sign the convention. I ask you to leave it at that and not to comply with Mr. Fourré's request.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Fourré to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is negated.

Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllersheim reads as follows :

2. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper and insert a new text as follows :

“4. Pursue its efforts to seek co-operation with the United States with a view to establishing a universally-acceptable system of the rule of law for the world oceans.”

I call Mr. Spies von Büllersheim to speak in support of the amendment.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in view of the much-mentioned fact that the great majority of our member countries have not signed, I do not think that it can be the job of the WEU Assembly to try, as paragraph 4 seems to imply, to persuade the United States that it is right to sign when this does not even coincide with our own position.

That is why I have suggested a new wording. It has already been pointed out that our aim as WEU and the aim of our countries and of Europe is to reach agreement with the United States on this matter, in order then to accomplish something as regards deep-sea mining and generally make some progress on the law of the sea. But it cannot be our job to

Mr. Spies von Büllesheim (continued)

attempt, as this formulation does, to persuade the United States that its present policy is wrong. We have absolutely no justification for this ourselves, since most of us have not signed the convention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). – I do not think that the change in wording introduced by Amendment 2 would greatly modify the power structure behind the negotiation of a convention of this kind.

No doubt this amendment relies ultimately on the rule of customary law, for which I have a great deal of respect even if it does contain many ambiguities. But it seems to me that we should keep to the wording of Mr. Lenzer's report.

Consider the negative medium- or long-term effects of a policy pursued by a state which failed to abide by the rules governing the oceans and the seabed and thereby damaged its political credibility. A situation of this kind would not promote greater harmony in economic relationships.

The wording of paragraph 4 of the recommendation is entirely adequate. With regard to the United States, it is somewhat firmer than that suggested by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim. I therefore recommend that the Assembly allow it to stand.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I owe the Assembly an explanation, especially in view of Mr. Beix's intervention.

At the meeting in Brussels on 18th May 1983 to which I referred, where we discussed this draft and adopted it in its present form, we decided, partly in view of the pressure of time, that this wording should be left as it was. I had a very uncomfortable feeling about it at the time, but did not insist on any further changes. In presenting this report I am again acting on the premise that it should not point the finger at anyone, that no one should be forced to adopt a certain political attitude, that confrontations should be reduced and that common, generally acceptable solutions should be sought. I also tried at the time to use in the report the wording now suggested by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim in his proposed amendment. In my personal opinion his amendment should

be adopted. In such an important matter I naturally do not wish to prejudge the issue in any way and it is now up to you to vote on how the original version should read. My personal opinion, as the Rapporteur and not as the Chairman of the committee, is definitely in favour of the version suggested in Mr. Spies von Büllesheim's amendment. I personally, as the Rapporteur, shall vote for the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I must apologise, Mr. President, but I should like to make a further small point before we vote. We ought to make another minor, purely formal change. Paragraph (iv) of the English text of the preamble contains the phrase "the policy split". Adoption of Mr. Fourré's amendment would cause the word "split" to disappear.

But paragraph (v) contains the phrase "considering that this split", referring to something which is no longer in the text. I therefore ask you to agree to the inclusion of Mr. Fourré's wording here, too, so that the text will read: "these positions". This is just a small, formal point and I apologise, Mr. President, for not having thought of it before.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – This seems to me to be a drafting amendment designed to clarify the text, with which I am sure the Assembly will be in sympathy.

Does anybody wish to speak against the amendment?...

I now put to the vote the amendment just proposed by the Rapporteur.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The drafting amendment is agreed to.

I now put to the vote the draft recommendation contained in Document 946, as amended.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

At this point I wish to thank and congratulate the Rapporteur.

1. See page 30.

4. Analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly Recommendations 383 on the problems of nuclear weapons in Europe and 388 on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 943)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments on the analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly Recommendations 383 on the problems of nuclear weapons in Europe and 388 on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism, Document 943.

In the absence of Mr. Page, I call Mr. Dejar-din, Rapporteur of the committee.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it seems to me that the Committee for Relations with Parliaments has taken a somewhat novel step, firstly in choosing to analyse together the texts of two recommendations previously adopted by the Assembly and, secondly, in entrusting the presentation to two Rapporteurs who, as you are well aware, differ considerably in their political positions.

On behalf of Mr. Page, and taking my cue from his recent statements to the Committee for Relations with Parliaments in Birmingham, I can say that both he and I are delighted with the chosen formula – all the more so as the subject to be analysed is of great immediacy, or, as we might say, a burning issue.

The points under consideration, if we need reminding, are Recommendation 383, adopted in June 1982, on the problems of nuclear weapons in Europe, and Recommendation 388, adopted in November 1982, on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism – one of a number of highly controversial topics.

Interventions in parliament provided us with abundant material for examination: oral questions, written questions, Council replies and public statements made by governments. But we should not have such an inflated opinion of ourselves as to believe that this parliamentary activity has been due to the work of the WEU Assembly. That would be too much to hope. The topic is the subject of very lively controversy in each of our member countries and we should recognise – my colleagues are aware of my habit of straightforward speaking – that the activities of the members of the Assembly in this area can certainly not be compared with the vigorous action of the pacifists in our member countries.

Four issues have been deliberately selected: negotiations on the limitation of armaments; the deployment of new missiles; informing public opinion; and, finally, concertation at European level.

We should not fail to remark on what seems to us to be some reticence on the part of governments in this matter, and we shall return to this point when discussing the problem of informing public opinion. The complaint is heard in some quarters that public opinion is supplied with information from one side only. We have not found in the attitude of the authorities and governments of the member countries any great urge to inform public opinion or to seek a dialogue or public debate on the issue.

As far as concertation at European level is concerned, you will observe that in the report we have used the term “Inter-allied consultations”. I do not know whether, in English, the two terms are synonymous, but in French they do not mean quite the same thing, and I refer you here to the precise wording of the report to avoid speaking at excessive length. Moreover, Lord Reay, who is taking over from Mr. Page, who has had to stay in the United Kingdom because of the election campaign, will enlarge on what I have to say.

Once again, I wish to stress the interest attaching to a comparison of the action taken on Assembly recommendations. Here I appeal not only to all our colleagues but also to those whom I would not normally be entitled to address, that is to say the permanent secretariats of the delegations.

While some efforts have indeed been made, I would like to see more spontaneity injected into the action taken, which, although a source of some satisfaction today, strike us as being somewhat inadequate.

There should be a more automatic mechanism for passing on to the WEU Assembly all the information which can be gleaned about the relevant parliamentary activity in member countries, as well as about public statements made by parliamentarians and members of government. However, this calls for vigorous action by parliamentarians outside this chamber.

Although I may not make any new friends by saying so – but as you are all aware that is not what I am looking for – I must point out that, having yesterday applauded Mr. Cheysson and what he had to say about reviving the activity of the WEU Assembly, we must remember that such a revival depends on ourselves and on our dynamism in the cause of WEU. The credibility of the Assembly will depend on how far its members display true commitment within their

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

national parliaments and in dealing with public opinion, away from the annual sessions of the Assembly held in Paris.

As you see, I shrink neither from controversy nor, if necessary, from broaching provocative subjects. Please believe that it is not my intention to take you all to task – far from it. But the opportunity to say something really could not be allowed to pass.

I draw the attention of members of the Council to the terms used by the committee in its report to describe the Council's reply to Recommendation 388. We considered this to be inconsistent, mollifying and, in places, inaccurate. I shall return to this point.

May I also take this opportunity of asking our executive to speed up the dialogue with the Assembly. In other words, it should do its utmost not to wait six months before replying to documents transmitted to it.

There is no such thing as a dialogue between the Council, its various organs – the SAC and ACA – and the parliamentary Assembly, when we have to wait six months for a reply to a recommendation on an issue of such immediacy as that dealt with in the recommendation first drafted by our colleague Lagorce. This is unacceptable, and replies should be speeded up so as to encourage the parliamentarians themselves to react more quickly.

Still on the subject of the dialogue between the Assembly and the Council, I must beg leave to repeat publicly what many fellow members mentioned to me yesterday in the corridors, that is to say, their dissatisfaction at the performance, here in this Assembly, of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, who failed to reply to the questions put to him. That is not a dialogue – that is not a proper relationship between an assembly and its executive, even if it is only consultative in character. Such a situation is untenable for us, and I can speak all the more freely as I share the Chairman's philosophy and political doctrine.

Not merely have we not had replies to questions; we have had to witness the Chairman of the Council putting on a show here, with radio and television and, on the benches, a captive audience which vanishes as soon as the Minister leaves the chamber! This is a thoroughly improper relationship between the Assembly and the WEU Council.

That was something I had to say with the utmost clarity because, if we truly wish to restore credibility to Western European Union, words must be matched by actions and the will to act of governments must find expression

beyond the statements made in this forum by their representatives who are kind enough to come and visit us.

The problem which came to our notice while scrutinising this report, and which to some extent we suspected in advance, lies in the absence or the inadequacy of the information spontaneously supplied to members of parliament by their governments.

Of course, we live in democracies where governments are accountable to parliament. While it is true that governments are reasonably faithful to this obligation, even when they are given special powers, it is extremely rare for a minister to convene a committee, say the external affairs committee – or foreign affairs committee depending on the country – or the defence committee, to serve as a spontaneous channel of information for members of parliament.

This is a problem which we should look into closely at a later stage, as I would like to know the parliaments in which the government reports on its activity to WEU and where the WEU parliamentary delegation reports back on our activities.

This obligation, which is embodied in the rules of some parliaments, is rarely respected. Belgium is a case in point: the standing orders of the chamber require a report to be submitted by the delegation attending the Council of Europe and WEU, but during my twelve years in parliament I have never heard a word about such a report!

So, we have a problem. The work of WEU must extend beyond this building and must be brought to the notice of public opinion. A two-column article, twice a year, in a French, English, German or Belgian daily newspaper is not enough to alert the public to the work of WEU and give it credibility.

The problem, then, lies in inadequate publicity and also lack of motivation among parliamentarians. The question of motivation might, by itself, provide matter for a report. However, you will note that, during our work, Mr. Page and I have suggested that the General Affairs Committee should resume its study of the effects of peace movements on current allied policy. What is more, this speaker would have liked a report on the current state of parliamentary and public opinion on the subject of European security.

We have felt obliged to record this evident impotence at political level of Western European Union, the future of which calls for an effective and speedy remedy.

I would now like to give you my personal assessment, and please, Mr. President, do not

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

ask me to be brief just because pacifism is my theme. Never fear – what I have to say will not be subversive!

As you will read in the committee's report, we must be mindful of the generation gap which is now opening up. Yesterday, we referred in this chamber to the generation which experienced the 1940-45 war and which still bears the scars. Some of us were born just before or after that war. But young people know nothing about the war – and it is well that it should be so, as those who did live through it remember that it was no time for rejoicing. Consequently they do not share the same attitudes towards ideas of security and power relationships. In the eyes of some people, the young are doubtless at fault in this. But it is not enough to tell young people that they are wrong, they must be made to understand why.

Opinion polls repeatedly tell us that there is at present in Europe a large minority, or perhaps even a majority of those who are apolitical or insufficiently politically educated, who are prey to a deep anxiety which finds expression in opposition to the deployment of Euro-missiles and armaments.

At the same time, while our governments remain faithful to their undertaking of 12th December 1979 and introduce no change into their publicly-declared attitudes, we may note that one of the effects of the action conducted mainly by a younger generation not wishing to experience the horrors of war has been, curiously enough, the resumption of the Geneva negotiations and the adoption by the governments of the member countries of attitudes which are not entirely in line with the unqualified determination of December 1979.

We must not hide our heads in the sand. It is, indeed, the pressure of public opinion which has induced our governments, some members of parliament and even some military leaders to review their positions and update their thinking. If the movements of 1981 and 1982 had not happened, what would be the situation today? Nobody knows.

To conclude, we must not act like ostriches and assert, for example, that peace movements are successful because they are funded by Moscow. That would be both untrue and laughable. I am sure that the CIA has as many resources as the KGB. With my responsibility for young people, I have been subject to influences from both sides; sometimes, they seem to be taking over.

In Western Europe, those in favour of the deployment of Euromissiles have very ready

access to the free press and to all the information media, but those who take this view have not yet been able to marshal a sufficient body of opinion to support their cause. They shelter behind parliament, when they should be educating the people.

If one has faith in one's own position and the courage of one's convictions, one should not fear confrontation and discussion. We must act as free people, in good faith and under no misapprehension that the truth is entirely on our side, as truth is a commodity in which everybody has a share. It is only in the arena of free discussion that we may hope to find that common ground on which democracy in our countries is founded.

I suggest that WEU should take the bold step of organising a colloquium and – why not – of inviting the representatives of movements with a clearly pacifist line. We should not be afraid of the devil. I, for my part, am not afraid of God. We can then have a dialogue with them. To say they represent nothing at all merely betrays ignorance of what they stand for and is tantamount to missing the whole point of all these major and concerted movements at national and European level.

To those who are apprehensive, to those who, like General Rogers yesterday, declare that our aim must be peace in freedom, I say that there are none among us who assert the contrary. Unfortunately, there are those who hold that the stated objective of "peace in liberty for all" is not always honoured. As far as our credibility as men and women politicians is concerned, we must be responsive to the expectations of young people, who demand first and foremost that our actions should match our words and that our political attitudes should be consistent with what we say. Someone once told me that the young needed examples more than lectures.

In conclusion I would like to quote the final paragraph of my report and declare in the most calm and amicable manner but with all the concern I can muster that: to endeavour by hook or by crook to impose nuclear overarmament in Europe and to caricature the positions in this matter of all concerned would in the long run turn the people of Europe completely away from any collective defence system or military alliance and consequently would most certainly frustrate the ambitions of WEU and its Assembly as well as our ambition to restore to WEU its rôle as a European pillar in the defence of western democracy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In the absence of Mr. Page, I call Lord Reay, who will speak for the committee.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – The report consists of several chapters. First, there is an attempt to trace any influence which two selected recommendations of the Assembly have had on action taken in national parliaments of the member states. We have heard what they are from Mr. Dejardin. The report admits that it has not been very successful in tracing any links between those recommendations and actions taken in national parliaments. It explains that, as these matters were important in everyone's eyes, many questions were put to governments on the subjects raised in the recommendations without it being possible to know whether they were inspired directly or indirectly by the recommendations adopted by the Assembly of WEU.

It goes on rather poignantly to say: "The fact that such questions were or were not put" – questions in the national parliaments – "by members of the WEU Assembly or even of its Committee for Relations with Parliaments is not sufficient to prove that this was or was not the case." The report implies that on future occasions the committee might be advised to choose a less formidable or less noteworthy subject. However, as the committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Stoffelen this morning, chose to pursue for its next inquiry the subject of the effect of the recommendation that was adopted here on Monday on China and European security, I fear that it may continue to have the same sort of experience.

The committee's problem is that we adopt here resolutions on matters of topical interest, and, by definition, that implies that governments and members of national parliaments will also pursue those matters at the same time. Therefore, it will not be possible to establish a relationship of cause and effect between one and the other, and, probably, in all honesty, such a relationship does not exist.

The report goes on to supply an analysis of the two recommendations, including a complaint, which Mr. Dejardin repeated, over the delay which customarily takes place in the reply of the Council to the Assembly. It includes a selection of various exchanges on the subjects which have occurred in national parliaments.

Finally, there are two chapters on the substance of the recommendations – one by each of the Rapporteurs, Mr. Page and Mr. Dejardin. Mr. Page waves the flag of multilateral disarmament which he calls "the path of hope", and I agree with him. He points out that the Soviet Union is and has been responsible, by its introduction of intermediate nuclear missiles targeted on Europe, for the gap which has grown up between the two sides on the continent of Europe and which

needs to be filled again by carrying out NATO's twin-track decision.

Mr. Page points out that the West has made valid disarmament proposals. As General Rogers said yesterday, there is an unfortunate tendency amongst elements in the West to criticise any western disarmament proposal that is rejected by the Soviet Union simply because it is rejected by the Soviet Union, particularly if it is rejected with contempt. The Soviet Union knows perfectly well that it has the chance of undermining public confidence in such proposals precisely by that tactic.

Mr. Page points to the involvement of the Soviet Union. That was taken up in another sense by Mr. Dejardin. He points to the Soviet Union's provision of financial support for the various peace movements, for which there is considerable evidence. Of course that is the case. Looked at from the Soviet point of view, the Soviet Union has an overwhelming interest in seeing the so-called "peace movement" travel as far as possible, and it has the means to assist that process.

Mr. Page also says that parliamentarians must take the arguments out to the public and fight the battle in the towns and villages rather than just in the debating chamber. That is true and it is happening at what is the proper point of contact between parliamentarians and the public in the electoral process. It happened in Germany in the electoral campaign which ended on 6th March in the public rejection of an SPD which was evidently moving increasingly leftward and which was becoming increasingly less robust in its defence of the western alliance. It has been happening over the last few weeks in the United Kingdom, where defence has played a large part in the election campaign and all the evidence is that the general public are profoundly uneasy at the unilateralism of the Labour Party.

I think that Mr. Dejardin is wrong when he seems to imply in paragraphs 106 to 113 of the report that the move towards unilateralism is continually gaining strength and may now even account for a majority of public opinion. I am not in favour of his proposal for a colloquy between WEU and elements of the peace movement. The proper meeting place, as I have said, is in the electoral process. His suggestion would be a dialogue of the deaf, with parliamentarians presenting themselves as willing to listen and be persuaded, but hearing only a one-sided presentation by a group entirely committed to a single point of view. Mr. Dejardin's proposal was not the agreed conclusion of the committee.

Mr. Page ends, as I should like to do, with a condemnation of unilateral disarmament. Uni-

Lord Reay (continued)

lateral disarmament supposes that the opposing party will also therefore disarm. All history, all logic and all knowledge of human behaviour suggest that precisely the reverse would happen. If an aggressively armed and expansionist power sees its opponents disarming, it will take advantage of that fact to submit its erstwhile opponents to its will.

Mr. Page quotes the words of a famous churchman – I wish that he had named him: I fear that he must be dead –

“It is futile for sheep to pass resolutions in favour of vegetarianism unless the wolves are prepared to do the same.”

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have received two requests to speak in the general debate, one from Mr. Vogt and the other from Mr. Müller, who wish to overrun considerably the time allocated to speakers by the Assembly.

I propose to grant ten minutes to Mr. Vogt and seven minutes to Mr. Müller.

I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Why does he get the floor for ten minutes and I get it for seven?

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Perhaps I could say something about this. As ten and seven make seventeen, I suggest that we should each confine ourselves to eight minutes.

I should also like to make another point. I tried yesterday to persuade the President, Mr. De Poi, that it would be a good idea in the case of a subject like this where there is a clash between two different attitudes, to allow the side which is accused in this report of being damaging to European defence, the side of the pacifists, an equal say. I think we can demonstrate this here. It would at the same time be an encouragement for the new approach to disarmament policy which we call the “policy of calculated prior concessions”. I shall explain what this is later. I am encouraged by the fact that the President has given me the floor today for ten minutes, and also by the committee’s decision to appoint two rapporteurs, enabling them to present two opposing views. As Mr. Dejardin has already said something about the peace movement and thus corrected a few optical illusions – as I like to call them – to which our opponents are prone, I will confine myself to putting forward, from the German standpoint, the viewpoint of the ecology and peace movement, a few points which he did not make.

It is repeatedly asserted – and this is unfortunately also reflected in Mr. Page’s view of the peace movement – that it is Soviet-controlled and that there is a touch of anti-Americanism about it, an anti-American outlook. I should like to refute this. Firstly, I should like to say that this Soviet control does not exist. As proof of this I should like to give a brief account of how the new peace movement in the Federal Republic developed. It can be said that in 1979 there was no peace movement left in the Federal Republic. There were just a few stragglers and more or less antiquated remnants of the old peace movement. But there was the ecology movement. At that time this movement, in its organised form, for instance via the *Bundesverband Umweltschutz*, took the initiative by urging, even before the Brussels decision of 12th December 1979, that the Soviet attitude as expressed in the Brezhnev appeal should be taken seriously in the first instance as possibly containing elements of a new approach to disarmament. We called this the “policy of calculated prior concessions”.

The point at issue then was the Soviet Union’s proposal – since in fact implemented – to withdraw twenty thousand men and a thousand tanks from the German Democratic Republic. At that time all parties and most of the press dismissed this as eyewash. We regretted that the offer had been dismissed in this way and said that the West ought to try to take a similar – not necessarily the same – step. The difference between the previous policies officially aimed at disarmament and this “policy of calculated prior concessions” is that in the former case a proposal is made, but its implementation is made dependent on the simultaneous implementation of a similar or identical measure by the other side. We have observed that this approach has never worked, any more than two punctiliously polite Germans have ever succeeded in getting through a door together. In other words, if you make several attempts to build a house and never end up with a sensible design, you will have to think of a new layout. That would be a reasonable attitude.

We believe that as negotiations have never in the whole of history actually led to disarmament, the time has come to try new lines of approach. The policy of calculated prior concessions does not make a measure of disarmament conditional on disarmament by the other side; It announces a measure and carries it out, while, however, expressing the clear expectation that in the foreseeable future – the time-limits can be stated – the other side will take a similar step. This can lead to a de-escalation of armament or, ideally, to a disarmament race. We are a new kind of movement with a new way of looking at the dangers

Mr. Vogt (continued)

by which mankind is beset on all sides. These are on the one hand dangers arising from over-industrialisation – that is why we are an ecology movement – but on the other hand also dangers of military self-destruction, of extinction.

We have tried to find a common denominator for both the environmental dangers and that of military annihilation. I should like to emphasise this following the – to my mind terrifying – arguments put forward by Mr. Wilkinson yesterday in connection with burden-sharing. He said that, specifically because of our interests in the Arabian Gulf, our oil supplies, we need to become militarily stronger and to establish a greater degree of burden-sharing between Europe and the United States. We offer an alternative formula. We say that a life-style and production methods based on a constant supply of foreign raw materials and entailing a correspondingly wasteful use of these materials is also a motive for the military or predatory acquisition of such materials. Against this we contend that a different, ecological way of life, which is more self-sufficient and mindful of the fact that it is possible to dispense to a great extent with such foreign raw materials – the wastage of oil, for instance – is in itself a contribution to the maintenance of peace. In other words, the maintenance of peace is the responsibility not only of institutions and governments but also of peoples. We make the most of this argument in every possible quarter, not only in the West but in the East as well.

A few members of this Assembly may know that on Ascension Day some Bundestag representatives of the Green Party staged a demonstration in East Berlin. We – including Petra Kelly, Gerd Bastian and myself – unfurled a banner in East Berlin with the device “Swords into ploughshares”. That is the symbol of the independent peace movement in the German Democratic Republic. This demonstration was intended to encourage the peace movement, and we shall go on trying to encourage the peace movement in both East and West in order to show that the creative powers of the population must come to the aid of governments in initiating new approaches to disarmament. We believe that all of us, we here in the Assembly and the population as a whole, have absolutely no alternative: we must find a new approach to disarmament.

I should have liked to say a little more, but will keep to my self-imposed time-limit. Our viewpoint covers not only this new approach to disarmament, the policy of calculated prior concessions, but also support for the principles of non-alignment and non-military defence.

Perhaps there will be an opportunity to present these views on another occasion.

Much of this may be new to you, much of it may be unthinkable, but if we are to avert the unthinkable, namely the extinction of mankind, there is nothing else for it: we must reinvent the world. Erich Fried, a German poet living in London, expressed it differently: “Anyone who wants the world to remain as it is does not want it to remain at all”.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, first, a brief and purely explanatory comment to Mr. Dejardin concerning information to parliaments about the work of WEU. In the Federal Republic the government regularly reports to parliament on the Council's activities. In addition, parliament is informed about the activities of our delegation here by a special publication, which also contains all the speeches made. I think that meets your requirements.

To turn now to the discussion started by Mr. Vogt, it would be fascinating to have a long debate on the subject now. Mr. Vogt said that we shall have plenty of opportunity for this in the future and I can assure you that I, for one, will be very interested in such a debate.

One thing I object to is that this is all represented as something new, as if a *deus ex machina* had been born in 1979 of the marriage of ecology and the peace movement. Of course there is nothing new about it at all. The idea already existed on Monte Verità in Ascona in the famous commune of 1914, it also existed between the wars, and in the post-1945 debate many approaches to this problem were proposed.

Our problem today in the debate with pacifism lies in the fact that the worthy aim of preserving peace by means of unilateral pacifist concessions may, in borderline cases, have the opposite effect. I do not wish to resurrect the whole debate about the extent to which the pacifist movement helped to bring about the second world war. There is the famous letter by Karl Barth to a Dutch parson claiming that the Dutch pacifists indirectly helped to strengthen dictatorship and increase injustice under Adolf Hitler. I could quote the Zürich theologian, Emil Brunner, who said: “Pacifism is not an automatic guarantee of peace; it may even be the cause of war”. That is undoubtedly true. There is no harm in our holding such a fundamental debate here, but it must be based on fact and draw on historical experience.

Mr. Müller (continued)

At this point I should like to refer to something that Mr. Dejardin said in connection with public opinion polls. I think it is a great mistake for politicians to take any notice of opinion polls. I have never taken any notice of them myself, any more than did Konrad Adenauer, who was firmly convinced that the policy that was right had to be organised and carried out. If you heed opinion polls, if you want a plebiscitary democracy, you will always find that a country will produce majorities in favour of the death sentence and the persecution of foreign minorities. But that cannot be the purpose of a sensible policy in a representative democracy.

With regard to the peace movement in Europe as such, it exists in many forms. There is no doubt, and Mr. Vogt cannot dispute this either, that the Soviet Union and its supporters are naturally interested in strengthening a movement which benefits them in the debate about armament and disarmament, because there is no need for them to conduct it on their own doorstep; it is conducted only in the opposite camp. There is no doubt about it, and the proof is there; people have been caught red-handed passing sums of money in Norway and Denmark. We can see from the example of the Novosty press agency in Switzerland, a neutral non-NATO country, the influence exerted on the peace movement in Switzerland by means of this Soviet agency. We know the history of the World Peace Council, which was originally established in Vienna and was expelled from neutral Austria because it was a communist organisation.

I should also like to make a point about the prior concessions which have been mentioned here. The Soviet Union naturally made a great deal of propaganda about the withdrawal of twenty thousand men. The West made a big mistake in not shouting it from the rooftops when the Americans withdrew four thousand nuclear warheads from Europe without using the move in a propaganda campaign, because this would have been a good opportunity to claim that they, too, had made a prior concession.

May I make one last comment. I am afraid that the debate about pacifism and neutralism may lose its way and that there is some confusion here between pacifism and neutralism. Switzerland, which succeeded in remaining neutral throughout the first and second world wars, was only able to maintain this neutrality because it represented a deterrent in itself. You doubtless know about the study made for the general staff of the German Wehrmacht, which concluded that Switzerland could certainly be conquered, but at too high a

cost to the Wehrmacht. Consequently in the second world war, in 1940 when Adolf Hitler was at the height of his power, neutral Switzerland was not attacked.

That is an historical example which shows that peace can be maintained by a country that represents a deterrent force in itself. I believe this is a lesson which we must heed at present. Any other course, however fine-sounding, is difficult to follow through successfully in practice. I am one of those who do not think much of fine-sounding philosophies which may lead in practice to certain consequences, because the originators of these philosophies cannot subsequently undo the consequences when faced by a *fait accompli*. We should therefore always keep the debate open, always go on discussing and setting one opinion against another. That is the purpose of a representative democracy and this Assembly can serve that purpose too.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Enders.

Mr. ENDERS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, many generations accepted the proposition that “War is the father of all things”. This was in accordance with a great deal of hero-worship and also with the way in which history was presented in many school textbooks which often presented history as if it were nothing but a succession of battles and wars. What this attitude led to is familiar to many of us who have experienced the consequences of two world wars, or at least of the last world war. So I think that for our time and our generation we should adopt the slogan: “Peace must be the father of all things”. This attitude is not as new as some speakers here have suggested.

I should like to remind you that the former Social Democrat President of the Federal Republic, Gustav Heinemann, established an Institute for Research into Peace and Conflict, or at least contributed largely to its inception. This institute studies the causes of conflicts and tries to devise ways of preventing and forestalling them. Unfortunately and to my great regret the appropriation for this institute has recently been curtailed and it looks very much as if funds will be discontinued altogether after 6th March, which would mean the end of a valuable organisation.

In any case I do not see the peace movement as having a one-sided communist orientation, when we think of what has been going on in the churches in recent times and of the massive popular support for the peace policy. Perhaps you who come from neighbouring countries have been following this too. The Evangelical

Mr. Enders (continued)

Synod opens today in Hanover. On this occasion thousands upon thousands of young people are going to demonstrate for peace by wearing violet scarves.

I should like to add a comment of my own. More attention should be paid in our schools to active work for peace and the study of peace initiatives. In other words, the presentation of history which I described to start with should be replaced by efforts by teachers to impress on young people how important it is to work for peace, to be prepared to avoid conflicts and to preserve peace for mankind.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, the general debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I note that, in essence, this debate has centred on German concerns, but that little has been said about the fundamental problem of making the work of the Assembly known outside this chamber or about the rôle to be played by members of parliament.

I thank Mr. Vogt for drawing attention to the existence of peace movements in the countries of the East. These are a reality, a harsh reality, for those who have the courage to take part in unofficial peace movements, especially in the USSR. This morning's papers carry the news of the three-year prison sentence imposed on Mr. Alexander Chatravka, a young man of thirty-two, for his "anti-Soviet agitation" in writing and signing a petition for the elimination of nuclear weapons in both East and West, and for his close ties with the unofficial peace movement.

I wished to report this item of news to the Assembly, firstly in order to condemn any government and any authority, whichever and wherever it may be, which does not respect freedom of opinion, freedom of expression and human rights, and secondly to draw attention to the existence of a deep-rooted movement whose merits are all the greater in that it entails painful consequences for those who are brave enough to voice their opinions in parts of the world still under an authoritarian régime.

On the point made by Mr. Müller, I realise that, as responsible politicians, we must treat the results of public opinion polls with reserve. However, on one of the few occasions when these results are favourable to us I beg leave to refer to them.

But I also say, with Mr. Müller: let us not deal with the issue in the context of an election campaign since, dear colleague and fellow Rapporteur, there are other questions which

affect the choice of a candidate. Let us rather take the course of a public debate on the problem of European security and on the deployment of nuclear weapons, and let us end the debate with a public referendum. As we both believe that we are in the right, let us have the courage to carry our arguments to their conclusion and consult the public. In spite of my reservations about referendums, this seems to be the least bad solution.

If the USSR is interested in promoting the peace movement, I very much regret that, faced with the selflessness underlying the efforts as well as the statements and commitments of these movements, which are fighting in the cause of peace, whether we call them pacifist or not, the western democracies display no involvement and wait for others to undertake the work of mobilising public opinion, if not actually of propaganda, in order to reverse the trend.

Believe me, Ladies and Gentlemen, abusive language and invective never convinced anyone. If you think the younger generations are making a mistake and you want them to return to the fold one day, you will not persuade them to do so by calling them clowns, folksy drop-outs and a string of other names.

Just be careful! When we say that peace is based on deterrence, we do not mean *Pax Romana*. Force provokes force.

In conclusion I repeat the memorable words uttered by Mr. Pertini in Strasbourg on 27th April last, which we applauded so enthusiastically: "No peace is possible in the shadow of the missiles".

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – The committee had two rapporteurs who each represented different sides of the political spectrum. Rumour has it that the committee has a sense of humour. Of course that is true. It was not a bad decision to ask both rapporteurs to report. The committee is not political. I have to say that even after today's debate.

We must ensure that there is a follow-up to our work here in the national parliaments and by the public and the press. We therefore decided to select the two texts and to ask the two rapporteurs to analyse the follow-up. They did that eloquently.

I thank Lord Reay, who helped us with the problem caused by the election in the United Kingdom. We all have our personal feelings, but as Chairman of the committee I do not feel competent to speak about that. I am grateful to Lord Reay for replacing Mr. Page.

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

I emphasise that we reached common conclusions, three of which I should like to repeat. It would be preferable if the Council could give an answer sooner than six months later. Normally, in relations between a parliament and the Council of Ministers it would be unsatisfactory if the delay were longer than three or four weeks. However, we are a modest Assembly and merely think that it would be preferable if replies were given sooner.

My second remark concerns the answers given by the Council. I shall not comment on the content of the speech of the Chairman-in-Office. However, it was also my impression that he did not have much success in answering all the questions put to him. As an Assembly we must emphasise that we want real answers from our Council and, therefore, from our Chairman-in-Office.

My final remark relates to the conclusion with regard to the General Affairs Committee. It was: "The committee wishes the General Affairs Committee to be asked to prepare another report on nuclear weapons and the reactions of public opinion." Why at the same time did Mr. Page and Mr. Dejardin agree on the text when there were some differences of opinion between them? Both must realise that a discussion is taking place in six of the seven member countries. There are discussions between politicians and those in the peace movements. Yesterday, General Rogers admitted that in the peace movements are many young people and adults who are worried about the situation. Discussions are continuing, and we as an assembly must take that into account. I hope that the General Affairs Committee will be good enough to study the problem of the gap that exists between parts of the peace movements and politicians.

My committee wants to see how we can promote a better follow-up. The tradition is that during the last minutes of our sessions we express our anxiety and compare public awareness of Western European Union with public awareness of other European institutions. I shall not do so this time. We must continue to discuss really topical matters just as we did last time. If I may say so, this session may perhaps have been better had we restricted ourselves to matters that have a direct relationship with the aim of Western European Union. If we discuss topical matters in a newsworthy way, the journalists will undoubtedly pick up the story. I am sure that all my colleagues want to promote a better follow-up for the sake of European security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You yourself alluded to the objectivity required of you as chairman.

I, also, would not wish to abandon the objectivity required of the chair, but as a member of the Assembly I recognise that your committee has branched out in a new direction and believe that its work has been appreciated. I hope it will lead to other things.

The Assembly takes note of the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

5. Adjournment of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That concludes our work.

I declare the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union adjourned.

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.25 p.m.)

INDEX

INDEX OF PROCEEDINGS

	Page		Page
A			
Address by:		Credentials	
– the Provisional President	32-35	Examination of –	35
– the President	36-38	L	
– Mr. Möllemann	39-42	Law of the sea	
– Questions and answers	42-46	Presentation of the report	112-115
– Mr. Cheysson	65-69	Debate on the report	115-120
– Questions and answers	69-72	Amendment 1 by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim	120
– General Rogers	85-90	– Adoption of the amendment	120
– Questions and answers	90-97	Amendment 2 by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim	122-123
Analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly Recommenda- tions 383 on the problems of nuclear weapons in Europe and 388 on the problems for European security aris- ing from pacifism and neutralism		– Rejection of the amendment	123
Presentation of the report	124-128	Amendment 3 by Mr. Fourré	120-121
Debate on the report	128-132	– Adoption of the amendment	121
Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council		Amendment 4 by Mr. Fourré	121-122
Presentation of the report	72-74	– Adoption of the amendment	122
Debate on the report	74-77	Amendment 5 by Mr. Fourré	122
Reference back to committee	77	– Rejection of the amendment	122
Attendance lists	18, 22, 26, 29	Drafting amendment by Mr. Lenzer – Adoption of the drafting amend- ment	123
B			
Burden-sharing in the alliance		Vote on the amended draft recom- mendation	123
Presentation of the report	82-85	O	
Debate on the report	98-108	Order of business	
Reference back to committee	109-110	Adoption of the –	38-39
C			
China and European security		Orders of the day	12, 19, 25, 27
Presentation of the report	47-50	P	
Debate on the report	50-53, 55-61	Political activities of the WEU Council – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council	
Amendment 1 by Mr. Fourré	63	Presentation of the report	78-79
– Adoption of the amendment	63	Debate on the report	79-80
Amendment 2 by Mr. Vogt	62	Amendment 1 by Mr. Lagorce	80
– Rejection of the amendment	63	– Adoption of the amendment	80
Amendment 3 by Mr. Vogt	63	Amendment 2 by Mr. Lagorce	80
– Rejection of the amendment	65	– Adoption of the amendment	80
Amendment 4 by Mr. Bassinet and Mr. Fourré	63	Vote on the amended draft recom- mendation	80
– Withdrawal of the amendment ...	63	President	
Vote on the amended draft recom- mendation	65	Election of the –	35-36
Committees		Address by the –	36-38
Nomination of members to –	39		
Changes in the membership of – ...	53, 80-81		

INDEX

	Page
R	
Report of the Council, twenty-eighth annual – (see also: Application of the Brussels Treaty; Political activities of the WEU Council)	
Presentation by Mr. Cheysson	65-69
– Questions and answers	69-72

	Page
S	
Session	
Opening of the –	32
Adjournment of the –	132

	Page
T	
Texts adopted:	
Recommendations	
– 393 – China and European security	23
– 394 – Political activities of the WEU Council – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council	24
– 395 – Law of the sea	30

	Page
V	
Vice-Presidents	
Election of –	38, 72

INDEX OF SPEAKERS

	Page		Page
A			
Mr. Ahrens (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):			
Question put to Mr. Möllemann ...	42-43		
Political activities of the WEU Council – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council	78-79, 80		
B			
Mr. Bassinet (<i>France</i>):			
China and European security	58, 63		
Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council	75-76		
Mr. Baumel (<i>France</i>):			
Burden-sharing in the alliance	103-104		
Mr. Beix (<i>France</i>):			
Law of the sea	118-119, 123		
Mr. Biefnot (<i>Belgium</i>):			
Question put to General Rogers	92		
Mr. Blaauw (<i>Netherlands</i>):			
Question put to Mr. Cheysson	69		
Question put to General Rogers	90		
Burden-sharing in the alliance	109, 110		
C			
Mr. Caro (<i>France</i>):			
China and European security	47-50, 59-61, 62, 63, 64		
Burden-sharing in the alliance	106-107		
Mr. Cheysson (<i>French Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council</i>):			
Address by –	65-69		
Replies to questions	71-72		
D			
Mr. Dejardin (<i>Belgium</i>):			
Question put to Mr. Cheysson	69		
Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council	74-75		
Question put to General Rogers	91-92		
Burden-sharing in the alliance	102-103		
Analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly Recommendations 383 on the problems of nuclear weapons in Europe and 388 on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism	124-126, 131		
Mr. De Poi (<i>Italy</i>):			
Address by the President	36-38		
Election of Vice-Presidents	38, 72		
E			
Mr. Enders (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):			
Analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly Recommendations 383 on the problems of nuclear weapons in Europe and 388 on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism	130-131		
F			
Mr. Forma (<i>Italy</i>):			
Political activities of the WEU Council – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council	79-80		
Mr. Fourré (<i>France</i>):			
Law of the sea	115-117, 120-121, 122		
G			
Mr. Grieve (<i>United Kingdom</i>):			
Burden-sharing in the alliance	98-99		
H			
Mr. Haase (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):			
Question put to General Rogers	92		
Mr. Holtz (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):			
Question put to Mr. Möllemann ...	42		
Question put to General Rogers	92-93		
J			
Mr. Jäger (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):			
Question put to Mr. Cheysson	70		
Burden-sharing in the alliance	105-106		

	Page
Mr. Jager (<i>France</i>):	
Address by the Provisional President	32-35
Examination of credentials	35
Election of the President of the Assembly	35-36
Mr. Jung (<i>France</i>):	
Question put to Mr. Möllemann	... 43

L

Mr. Lagorce (<i>France</i>):	
China and European security	... 51-52
Question put to Mr. Cheysson	... 69
Political activities of the WEU Council – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council	... 80
Mr. Lenzer (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):	
Law of the sea	112-115, 119-120, 121, 122, 123
Mr. Linde (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):	
Burden-sharing in the alliance	... 99-101

M

Mr. Michel (<i>Belgium</i>):	
China and European security	... 53
Mr. Möllemann (<i>Parliamentary Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany</i>):	
Address by –	... 39-42
Replies to questions	... 43-45, 46
Mr. Müller (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):	
China and European security	... 52-53, 62
Analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly Recommendations 383 on the problems of nuclear weapons in Europe and 388 on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism	... 128, 129-130
Mr. Mulley (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Draft order of business	... 38-39

O

Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers (<i>Netherlands</i>):	
Law of the sea	... 118, 121

P

Mr. Pignion (<i>France</i>):	
Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council	... 77
Question put to General Rogers	... 91
Mr. Prussen (<i>Luxembourg</i>):	
China and European security	... 56-58
Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council	... 72-74, 76-77

R

Lord Reay (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
China and European security	... 50-51
Question put to General Rogers	... 90
Analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly Recommendations 383 on the problems of nuclear weapons in Europe and 388 on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism	... 127-128
General Rogers (<i>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</i>):	
Address by –	... 85-90
Replies to questions	... 93-97

S

Mr. van der Sanden (<i>Netherlands</i>):	
China and European security	... 55-56
Burden-sharing in the alliance	... 110
Mr. Scheer (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):	
China and European security	... 58-59, 64
Question put to Mr. Cheysson	... 70-71
Question put to General Rogers	... 91
Mr. Schwarz (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):	
Question put to Mr. Möllemann	... 45
Mr. Spies von Büllenheim (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):	
Question put to General Rogers	... 92
Law of the sea	117-118, 120, 121-122, 122-123
Mr. Stoffelen (<i>Netherlands</i>):	
Burden-sharing in the alliance	... 107, 109
Analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly Recommendations 383 on the problems of nuclear weapons in Europe and 388 on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism	... 131-132

Page	Page
T	
Mr. Tummers (Netherlands):	
Burden-sharing in the alliance	101-102
V	
Mr. Vogt (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Questions put to Mr. Möllemann . . .	43, 45
China and European security	62, 63-64, 65
Question put to Mr. Cheysson	69-70
Question put to General Rogers	90-91
Burden-sharing in the alliance	101
Analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly Recom-	
	mendations 383 on the problems of nuclear weapons in Europe and 388 on the problems for European secu- rity arising from pacifism and neu- tralism
	128-129
Mr. de Vries (Netherlands):	
Question put to General Rogers	92
Burden-sharing in the alliance	104-105
W	
Mr. Wilkinson (United Kingdom):	
Burden-sharing in the alliance	82-85, 107-108, 110
Question put to General Rogers	93

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