

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-FOURTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1988

I

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

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ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-FOURTH ORDINARY SESSION

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June 1988

I

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

The proceedings of the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume I: Assembly documents.

Volume II: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	SP
BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
DERYCKE Erik	SP
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
MM. STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP
VREVEN Alfred	PVV

Substitutes

MM. DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
EICHER Bernard-J.	PS
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
NOERENS René	PVV
VAN DER BIEST Alain	PS
VAN HECKE Johan	CVP

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
de CHAMBRUN Charles	National Front
COLLETTE Henri	RPR
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GREMETZ Maxime	Communist
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
KOEHL Emile	UDF
Mrs. LALUMIÈRE Catherine	Socialist
MM. MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PORTIER Henri	RPR
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
ANDRÉ René	RPR
BICHET Jacques	UDF
BOHL André	UCDP
BORDU Gérard	Communist
CHARTRON Jacques	RPR
CHÉNARD Alain	Socialist

MM. DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAULT Xavier	UDF (App.)
LACOUR Pierre	UCDP
MONTASTRUC Pierre	UDF
PONTILLON Robert	Socialist
PRAT Henri	Socialist
RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.
SIRGUE Pierre	National Front
SOUVET Louis	RPR
Mrs. TRAUTMANN Catherine	Socialist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
HITSCHLER Walter	FDP
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. LUUK Dagmar	SPD
MM. MECHTERSHEIMER Alfred	Die Grünen
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
NIEGEL Lorenz	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
SCHMITZ Hans Peter	CDU/CSU
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

Mr. ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU
Mrs. BEER Angelika	Die Grünen
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
MM. BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
DUVE Freimut	SPD
FELDMANN Olaf	FPD
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM. GLOTZ Peter	SPD
KLEJZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
Mrs. PACK Doris	CDU/CSU
MM. SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TIMM Helga	SPD
MM. WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU
ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU
ZYWIETZ Werner	FDP

ITALY

Representatives

MM. CACCIA Paolo	Chr. Dem.
FILETTI Cristoforo	MSI-DN
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
GABBUGGIANI Elio	Communist
INTINI Ugo	Socialist
KESSLER Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MALFATTI Franco Maria	Chr. Dem.
MARTINO Guido	Republican
NATALI Antonio	Socialist
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLO Ugo	Communist
PIERALLI Piero	Communist
RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SALVI Franco	Chr. Dem.
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
TARAMELLI Antonio	Communist

Substitutes

MM. ANDREIS Sergio	Verdi
CANNATA Giuseppe	Communist
CAPANNA Mario	Prol. Dem.
CARIGLIA Antonio	PSDI
FASSINO Giuseppe	Liberal
FIANDROTTI Filippa	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM. GIAGU DEMARTINI Antonio	Chr. Dem.
GRECO Francesco	Communist
MANZOLINI Giovanni	PSDI
PANNELLA Marco	Radical
PASQUINO Gianfranco	Ind. Left
RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
RUBNER Hans	SVP
SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STEGAGNINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
TRIGLIA Riccardo	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. BURGER René	Soc. Chr.
GOERENS Charles	Dem.
LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

Mr. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
Mrs. HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
Mr. KONEN René	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry	CDA
de JONG Frans	CDA
de KWAADSTENIET Willem	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal
WORRELL Joop	Labour

Substitutes

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth	Labour
MM. de BEER Leopold	Liberal
DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob	CDA
EISMA Doeke	D66
Mrs. HERFKENS Eveline	Labour
MM. MARIS Pieter	CDA
van der SANDEN Piet	CDA

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

MM. COLEMAN Donald	Labour
COX Thomas	Labour
EWING Harry	Labour
Dame Peggy FENNER	Conservative
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
MM. GARRETT Edward	Labour
HARDY Peter	Labour
HILL James	Conservative
JESSEL Toby	Conservative
Sir Russell JOHNSTON	Liberal
Earl of KINNOULL	Conservative
MM. MORRIS Michael	Conservative
PARRY Robert	Labour
SHELTON William	Conservative
Sir Dudley SMITH	Conservative
MM. SPEED Keith	Conservative
STOKES John	Conservative
WILKINSON John	Conservative

Substitutes

MM. ATKINSON David	Conservative
BOWDEN Andrew	Conservative
FAULDS Andrew	Labour
GALE Roger	Conservative
HOWELL Ralph	Conservative
HUNT John	Conservative
Lord KIRKHILL	Labour
MM. LAMBIE David	Labour
LITHERLAND Robert	Labour
LORD Michael	Conservative
Lord MACKIE	Liberal
Lord NEWALL	Conservative
MM. RATHBONE Tim	Conservative
REDMOND Martin	Labour
Lord RODNEY	Conservative
Ms. RUDDOCK Joan	Labour
MM. STEWART Allan	Conservative
THOMPSON John	Labour

Threat assessment

ADDENDUM ¹ TO THE REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Stokes, Rapporteur*

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REVISED DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on threat assessment

ADDITIONAL EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Stokes, Rapporteur

APPENDIX

NATO/Warsaw Pact battle tank and artillery comparison in Europe – 1970 and 1987

1. Adopted in committee by 9 votes to 5 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Kittelmann (Chairman); MM. de Beer, Fourné (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle (Alternate: Baumel), Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Cariglia, Cox (Alternate: Lord Newall), De Decker, De Rycke, Fiandrotti, Fioret, Hardy, Irmer, Jung, Konen, de Kwaadsteniet, Mrs. Lalumière, MM. Lemmrich, Matraja, Pecchioli (Alternate: Cannata), Scheer, Sinesio, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Speed, Steiner, Steverlynck, Stokes.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Revised draft recommendation**on threat assessment**

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising that any assessment of the threat which the Atlantic Alliance faces from the Soviet Union requires first an informed political assessment of the Soviet Union's external policy and behaviour, and its presumed intentions, as well as realistic comparison of the military capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact;
- (ii) Underlining the importance of verifiable conventional arms control measures leading to a more stable and secure balance of forces at lower levels (for which assessment of the threat is an essential forerunner);
- (iii) Aware that friendly relations cannot develop adequately while the Soviet Union pursues directly or by proxy a policy of repression, both military and by other means, in a number of countries, including Afghanistan and the Baltic states (although the Assembly welcomes particularly the recent decision to begin withdrawing Soviet troops from Afghanistan);
- (iv) Welcoming recent moves towards greater openness in the Soviet Union and urging removal of one of the last stumbling-blocks to further East-West agreement: the free movement of people across Soviet borders;
- (v) Reiterating the importance of public support for the necessary allied defence effort, which must be seen to be based on a credible comparison of the forces of a potential adversary with those of the alliance;
- (vi) Deeply concerned about the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional forces in the northern and central European region dating from the immediate post-war period, noting that qualitatively these forces have been continuously improved since then and that geography here favours the Soviet Union;
- (vii) Noting also the continuing growth in Soviet nuclear, chemical and maritime forces in the last twenty-five years, and noting in particular the submarine threat to the vital transatlantic sea routes;
- (viii) Aware that the agreed NATO force comparisons on which consistent official statements can be based could be more comprehensive and issued more regularly;
- (ix) Believing that a joint European programme for technical sources of defence intelligence would be cost-effective, which the three independent national programmes in WEU countries cannot be,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Impress on member governments the need for defence policy to be based on a credible, objective and consistent assessment of the threat as a whole, both political and military:
 - (a) which takes account of both allied and Soviet security requirements;
 - (b) which takes account of both qualitative and numerical factors and the reinforcement capabilities of each alliance;
 - (c) which compares the forces of the Soviet Union and its allies with allied forces;
2. Urge allied governments:
 - (a) to draw as far as possible on the agreed NATO force comparisons in their public statements, so as to present a more consistent picture of the size and capabilities of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces;
 - (b) to press for further improvements in the comprehensiveness of the agreed force comparisons published by NATO, and for an urgent resolution of the dispute currently preventing their publication;
 - (c) to encourage the Soviet Government to follow up its newly-declared attitudes towards openness and the reduction in international tension by matching words with further deeds;
3. Co-ordinate the present disparate programmes of three member countries by initiating a joint European programme for technical sources of information such as observation and signals intelligence satellites and electronic listening posts.

*Additional Explanatory Memorandum**(submitted by Mr. Stokes, Rapporteur)*

1. Since the issue of the committee's report on "Threat assessment"¹ in November 1987, provoking a flurry of interest in the whole question of the balance of force between East and West, two important, although unconnected, reports have also been issued.

2. The first is an update of part of the 1984 NATO document "NATO and the Warsaw Pact: force comparisons", issued by the Federal German Press and Information Office, Bonn, in December 1987, and entitled "Force Comparisons 1987".

3. The second document is "Beyond the Bean Count - Realistically Assessing the Conventional Military Balance in Europe", issued by Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defence, on 20th January 1988.

4. Senator Levin's report elaborates and adds to the attempts at objectivity expressed in recent reports on threat assessment by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and its analysis will prove invaluable for the follow-up report planned by the committee for early 1989.

5. One aspect of force comparison has been highlighted especially over recent months and that concerns the numbers of tanks and artillery pieces on each side. The report by the Federal German Press and Information Office concentrates on this issue, which is why what is said is worth reproducing here, together with the two accompanying tables which illustrate so graphically the latest figures available:

"Looking back, it can be seen that the Warsaw Pact's present superiority over NATO in land forces stationed in Europe has grown steadily. This is true for the total number of available weapons systems and as a percentage of qualitatively similar equipment.

Since 1970, the number of NATO battle tanks has risen by about 7 300 and the Warsaw Pact has procured 22 000 additional armoured vehicles, almost three times more.

The trend in artillery potential is even more disturbing. Whereas, during the same period, the number of guns (including multi-barrelled rocket launchers) has remained practically the same on the NATO side, the number on the Warsaw Pact side has risen by 24 500.

So far, NATO has tried to offset the Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority by the superior quality of its own weapons systems. Until the late seventies, this seemed possible. In 1970, for instance, it could be considered that about 30% of its battle tanks were modern compared with 12% for the Warsaw Pact, which left about the same number in real terms. Although - considering the overall potential - NATO has since increased the percentage of its modern battle tanks in Europe to more than 50% (equipping them inter alia with firing stabilisers, automatic rangefinders and integrated fire control systems) and the Warsaw Pact to more than 40%, i.e. slightly less, this nevertheless means that compared with the 9 700 modern tanks deployed by NATO in Europe, the Warsaw Pact has about 22 800 of comparable quality.

For artillery, since 1970 the balance of forces in Europe has deteriorated considerably to the detriment of NATO. Thus, Warsaw Pact superiority, which was then 1.5 to 1, is now 3 to 1. This strengthening of artillery has affected every command level of the Warsaw Pact land forces. For instance, the number of pieces of ordnance available to units at that time (battalions) has increased by 25% and practically all the tank regiments have been equipped with new artillery.

The two alliances are still using a relatively large number of old artillery systems. In this connection, it should be specified that pieces of ordnance are among the equipment which, on the whole, remains the longest in service with the armed forces. In 1970, the two alliances had almost the same number of artillery systems in the category of qualitatively modern weapons. At present about 20% of their respective artillery potentials can be considered modern. Absolute figures thus show the general superiority of the Warsaw Pact, including for modern artillery. This is mainly due to the fact that, since the second half of the seventies, the Warsaw Pact has brought into service far more pieces of ordnance - for instance 122 mm and 152 mm howitzers and other self-propelled guns - than NATO. In particular, this has improved tactical mobility, the protection of gunners and the support efficiency of armoured units. Warsaw Pact artillery is now better able to assemble forces at all levels at short notice

1. "Threat assessment", Document 1115, 2nd November 1987. Rapporteur: Mr. Stokes. (Adopted in committee by 15 votes to 0 with 4 abstentions.)

and to deploy them at equally short notice when necessary.

The qualitative advance that NATO artillery still had in the early seventies, from the standpoint of tactical mobility and immediate battle support capability in particular, no longer exists. ”

6. There remains a great deal to be discussed in further reports on threat assessment, which is


obviously a highly dynamic subject, occupying as it does hundreds of experts, both officials and academics, whether in Geneva or Vienna, or the various institutions or universities.

7. The common aim for all, as it has been for this report, is to reach understanding and agreement so that, through realistic arms control measures, lives may be saved and the world become a slightly safer place in which to live.

APPENDIX

*NATO/Warsaw Pact
battle tank comparison in Europe - 1970 and 1987*

(forces on the spot, excluding reserves at depots)





a. including France.

b. including France and Spain.

*NATO/Warsaw Pact
artillery comparison in Europe - 1970 and 1987*

(forces on the spot, excluding reserves at depots)



a. including France.
b. including France and Spain.

AGENDA

of the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session Paris, 6th-9th June 1988

I. Report of the Council

Thirty-third annual report of the Council
(second part)

II. Political questions

1. Organisation of European security –
reply to the reports of the Council
2. Co-operation between Europe and the
United States and Canada in security
matters

*Report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of
the General Affairs Committee*

*Report tabled by Mr. Pontillon on behalf of the
General Affairs Committee*

III. Defence questions

1. Disarmament
2. Naval aviation
3. Threat assessment

*Report tabled by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments*

*Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments*

*Report tabled by Mr. Stokes on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments*

IV. Technical and scientific questions

European co-operation in armaments
research and development – guidelines
drawn from the colloquy

*Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and
Aerospace Questions*

V. Budgetary and administrative questions

Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial
organs of Western European Union for the
financial year 1987 (revised) and 1988

*Report tabled by Mr. Morris on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administra-
tion*

VI. Rules of procedure and privileges

Revision and interpretation of the Rules
of Procedure

*Report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf
of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Priv-
ileges*

VII. Parliamentary and public relations

Impact of the WEU Assembly's activities
on parliaments and public opinion

*Report tabled by Mr. Chénard on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions*

ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session
Paris, 6th-9th June 1988

MONDAY, 6th JUNE

Morning

Meetings of political groups

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Opening of the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session by the provisional president.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business of the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session.
7. Action by the Presidential Committee:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Sarti, Vice-President of the Assembly.
Debate.
8. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.

4 p.m.

9. Address by Mr. Serra, Minister of Defence of Spain and Chairman-in-Office of the Independent European Programme Group.
10. European co-operation in armaments research and development – guidelines drawn from the colloquy:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.
Debate.

TUESDAY, 7th JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

1. European co-operation in armaments research and development – guidelines drawn from the colloquy:
Resumed debate.

11 a.m.

2. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.
3. European co-operation in armaments research and development – guidelines drawn from the colloquy:
Vote on the draft recommendation.
4. Threat assessment:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Stokes on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Address by Mr. Mellor, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
2. Naval aviation:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

WEDNESDAY, 8th JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Organisation of European security:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
2. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Morris on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Joint debate.

11 a.m.

3. Presentation of the second part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council by Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
4. Organisation of European security; Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988:
Resumed joint debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Address by Mr. Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
2. Organisation of European security; Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988:
Resumed joint debate.
Votes on the draft recommendations.
3. Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Pontillon on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.

THURSDAY, 9th JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters:
Resumed debate.

11 a.m.

2. Address by Mr. Manzolini, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.
3. Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters:
Vote on the draft recommendation.

4. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure:

presentation of the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Debate.

Vote on the draft decision.

5. Disarmament:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Kittelmann on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.**1. Disarmament:**

Resumed debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. Impact of the WEU Assembly's activities on parliaments and public opinion:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Chénard on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Debate.

Vote on the draft order.

CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ORDINARY SESSION

*Communications from the Chairman-in-Office of the Council
concerning the meetings of senior officials from
the ministries for foreign affairs and defence
of WEU member states on the situation in the Gulf
held in The Hague on 14th October and 7th December 1987*

The Hague, 20th October 1987

Dear President,

During the talks that my defence colleague, Mr. van Eekelen, and I had with the Presidential Committee in The Hague on 13th October, I announced that a third meeting of senior officials on the Gulf would be held the following day, 14th October.

Like the meetings held on 20th August and 15th September, this third meeting allowed guidelines for the press to be drawn up for the presidency, a copy of which is enclosed.

I assure you once again how much I appreciated our exchange of views on 13th October.

Yours sincerely,

Hans van den Broek

Mr. Charles Goerens,
President of the Assembly
of Western European Union

Guidelines for the press

Senior officials from the ministries for foreign affairs and defence of the WEU member states met in The Hague on 14th October 1987 to continue their consultations on the situation in the Gulf region.

They noted that the naval forces of five member states are to be deployed in the region. They discussed means of improving contacts between them so as to enhance practical and technical co-ordination with full respect for the national nature of their respective activities.

They decided to pursue their consultations.

The Hague, 9th December 1987

Dear President,

In order to keep you up to date with activities in the framework of WEU relating to the Gulf, I wish to inform you that a fourth meeting of senior officials from the ministries for foreign affairs and defence of WEU member states was organised in The Hague on 7th December 1987 to exchange views on the situation in that region.

The meeting also provided an opportunity for the senior officials to pursue their discussion on co-ordinating minesweeping activities by the naval forces of various WEU countries operating in the Gulf. It was also agreed to consider the possibility of some degree of rationalisation of presence in the region.

Furthermore, I wish to take the opportunity of saying how much I appreciated the particularly fruitful exchange of views that I had with the WEU Assembly at its plenary session on 1st December.

Yours sincerely,

Hans van den Broek

Mr. Charles Goerens,
President of the Assembly
of Western European Union

***Communication from the Chairman-in-Office of the Council
concerning the meeting of senior officials from
the ministries for foreign affairs and defence
of WEU member states on the situation in the Gulf
held in The Hague on 15th February 1988***

Press guidelines for the Presidency

High officials from the ministries of foreign affairs and defence of the member states of the Western European Union met on 15th February 1988 in The Hague. They again underlined the need to maintain solidarity.

They reviewed developments in the Gulf region since their last meeting on 7th December 1987 and reaffirmed their intention to further deepen their consultation process and to consider possibilities for rationalisation, fully respecting the national character of their respective missions.

They reviewed the activities of the naval points of contact for intensifying co-ordination in mine counter measure activities between WEU member nations in the Gulf.

The next meeting of the naval points of contact will be held in Paris.

*Communication from the Chairman-in-Office of the Council
concerning the meeting in The Hague on 27th April 1988
between senior officials from Belgium, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom on co-operation between their navies
in the Gulf and possibilities of improving co-operation*

The Hague, 28th April 1988

Dear President,

I have the honour to inform you that a high-level meeting was held on 27th April 1988 between the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands to examine present arrangements for co-operation between their navies in the Gulf and possibilities of improving it. The following communiqué was issued the same day:

“ In the context of the WEU decisions over recent months and following the ministerial statement of 19th April 1988, a high-level meeting took place at The Hague today between officials and naval staffs of Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to review the co-operation between their naval forces in the Gulf against the background of the renewed mining in the Gulf.

They noted with satisfaction the speedy and effective response by their forces, resulting in the clearance of recently-laid mines.

They reaffirmed their desire to continue to contribute to the safety of shipping and freedom of navigation in the Gulf.

They reviewed how the present arrangements between their three countries within the framework of Western European Union could be further strengthened. In this respect they discussed means by which the integration of their respective forces could be achieved. ”

Yours sincerely,

Hans van den Broek

Mr. Charles Goerens,
President of the Assembly of WEU

30th May 1988

*Communication from the Chairman-in-Office of the Council
concerning the meeting in The Hague on 11th May 1988
between senior officials from the ministries for foreign affairs
and defence of WEU member states on the situation in the Gulf*

The Hague, 19th May 1988

Dear President,

Further to my previous communications on the subject, I have the honour to inform you that senior officials from WEU countries met again in The Hague on 11th May 1988 to discuss developments in the Gulf.

On that occasion, they adopted press guidance for the presidency which is appended to this letter.

I would draw your attention in particular to the third paragraph of this press guidance in which, for the first time, WEU member countries maintaining a naval presence in the Gulf have set out publicly in a joint text their will to assist shipping in distress.

Yours sincerely,
Hans van den Broek

Mr. Charles Goerens,
President of the Assembly
of Western European Union

Press guidance for the presidency

Following the statement adopted by the Ministerial Council of Western European Union at its meeting of 19th April 1988 at The Hague, high officials from the ministries of foreign affairs and defence of member states met on 11th May 1988 at The Hague to discuss recent developments in the Gulf.

They reiterated the importance of maintaining the freedom of navigation and safety of shipping in the Gulf.

They noted that the WEU members which maintain a naval presence in the Gulf provide, in accordance with long-standing time-honoured maritime traditions, assistance to shipping in distress, in application of established international rules.

They expressed appreciation for all measures which could contribute to achieving those aims and they noted with great interest the recent statement of the United States Government in this respect.

They will continue their diplomatic efforts, particularly within the EPC framework, to support all endeavours towards the full and early implementation of Resolution 598 of the Security Council, which is the only framework for an overall solution to the problems raised by the Iraq-Iran conflict.

*Public relations activities of the WEU Secretariat-General**Letter from Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU,
to Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly*

London, 16th December 1987

.....

During the very interesting debates held by the Assembly on 3rd December on the report by Mr. Burger on security and defence matters in WEU member countries, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg raised a number of questions concerning the secretariat's public relations and related tasks. As President of the Assembly, you told Sir Geoffrey that you wished to be able to provide an early answer to the questions he had raised and that you therefore wished the Secretariat-General to give you information on the subject as soon as possible.

I hasten to give you the following information.

My colleagues in the Secretariat-General and I are keenly aware of the importance of tasks linked with keeping the press and public informed. These tasks form a large part of the activities carried out by staff of the secretariat on behalf of the Council.

I intend to accord them growing importance. My proposals to the Council concerning the reorganisation of the administrative structures of Western European Union are directed in this sense, moreover, since they provide for a strengthened press and information section.

As soon as the Council has been able to finalise its decisions on this reorganisation, I shall, with its agreement, proceed to the necessary appointments. In this context, you will perhaps be surprised to learn that I have not yet appointed the grade A4 official already included in the present organogram. In point of fact, I considered it wiser to wait for the restructuring of the ministerial organs to have been completed so that I might recruit in an overall context allowing me to choose the best candidates while respecting the national balance. I would add that this restructuring of the ministerial organs might provide an opportunity for certain budgetary adaptations enabling me – even in the framework of the zero growth principle – to make available to the public relations section of the Secretariat-General the minimum financial resources without which such a section cannot really operate satisfactorily, thus making it of little use.

This being so, the Secretariat-General, acting on behalf and in accordance with the instructions of the Council, has been far from inactive in this connection, as the following should prove:

(a) A grade A official has been seconded from the political division to work wholly on press, information and public relations matters. He and his secretary form a small unit for this purpose and I am happy to say that it is giving me full satisfaction. Its work is sustained and amplified by the whole of the political division to whose services it may resort and also, when necessary, to those of the agencies for security questions.

(b) The small unit responsible for press, information and public relations matters answers the many requests for information from research institutes, firms, groups or interested persons. Information and explanations are given orally or by sending documentation. The information sent generally includes the WEU treaty, communiqués issued after ministerial meetings, a brief background document, articles on the reactivation of WEU that I have drafted for various reviews and, finally, a complete set of international press cuttings on certain events or aspects of WEU. We have received many letters of thanks, thus showing that in general those concerned are satisfied with this material.

(c) The same unit prepares a daily international press review intended first of all for the permanent representations to WEU but also for the various circles showing an interest in it. This press review is generally very much appreciated by its readers. I must specify that for budgetary reasons I unfortunately have to limit its circulation in spite of the growing number of requests for it received by my staff. Special issues of the review were circulated on particular occasions such as the adoption of the platform on European security interests by the Council of Ministers in The Hague on 26th and 27th October.

(d) An increasingly dense network of relations has been set up with the international press, including, but not exclusively, the press of WEU member countries. This network is the result of constant action by the press, information and public relations unit and the Deputy Secretary-General, members of the political division and myself. This involves a considerable amount of preparation, organisation and follow-up work which produces increasingly satisfactory results, as testified by the growing number of articles and commentaries on Western European Union and references to it in the spoken and written media.

(e) Noting the importance for the organisation of more intensive public relations action, I follow directly everything that is done in this area and am endeavouring in this connection to develop the following activities in person:

- more and more lectures in the various member states (see list at appendix), articles written either for specialised reviews or for the daily press (see list at appendix) and various contacts, in particular with the press with which I am careful never to refuse an interview, whether the journalists are from WEU member states or not. (In this connection, to quote only a few examples, I have been interviewed by the Portuguese, Spanish, Turkish, United States, Canadian and Japanese press.)

I very much hope that you, the Presidential Committee and the Assembly as a whole will be convinced of my awareness of the need to develop, on behalf of the Council and on its instructions, the public relations action that I have embarked upon with my colleagues in the Secretariat-General and of my will to pursue it.

By acting in this way, I can assure you that I am responding to the will of the governments of the seven member states as expressed at Council level. Further testimony to this is that the Council wishes a booklet to be prepared on the stages in the reactivation of Western European Union. This project is now being studied and should very soon be brought to fruition, thus forming a further element in the public relations effort.

I trust that the information contained in this letter will meet the desire for information of you yourself, Sir Geoffrey, the Presidential Committee and the Assembly as a whole.

.....

(Signed) Alfred CAHEN

Articles

« La défense européenne : perspectives nouvelles ouvertes par la réactivation de l'Union de l'Europe occidentale », publié dans *L'annuaire européen*, Vol. XXXIII, 1985, sous les auspices du Conseil de l'Europe, Strasbourg.

« L'UEO pour quoi faire ? », publié dans *Studia diplomatica*, Vol. XXXVIII, 1985, n° 6, Bruxelles.

« La coopération politique européenne et la sécurité », publié dans *L'Europe et la sécurité européenne* par le European Political Studies Group.

“ The WEU and NATO ”, publié dans *Estrategia*, n° 1, printemps 1986, Lisbonne.

« Un rôle nouveau pour l'UEO ? », publié dans *L'Europe en formation*, numéro spécial sur « L'Initiative de défense stratégique : guerre ou paix des étoiles ? », n° 262 bis, hiver 1986, Paris.

“ Western European Union ”, published in *NATO's Sixteen Nations* of June 1986, volume 31, n° 3.

« Le processus d'intégration européenne et sa dimension de sécurité ; remarques introductives », publié dans *Revue d'intégration européenne*, 1986, IX, nos 2-3, Canada.

“ Relaunching Western European Union – Implications for the Atlantic Alliance ”, published in *La Revue de l'OTAN*, n° 4, August 1986, Brussels.

« Quelle place pour l'Union de l'Europe occidentale ? », publié dans *Le Monde Atlantique*, September 1986, n° 36, Brussels.

« La coopération politique européenne et la sécurité », publié dans « Textes et Documents » – Collection *Idées et Études*, 1986, n° 334 du ministère des affaires étrangères, Bruxelles.

« L'Europe et « sa dimension sécurité » : l'heure est-elle venue ? », publié dans *Le Soir*, 27 November 1986.

“ Possibilities for an Independent European Defence ”, publié dans *Vite*, 15 April 1987 (Congress Brochure).

« Dimension européenne de la sécurité et solidarité atlantique – L’Union de l’Europe occidentale réactivée peut-elle rencontrer ces deux exigences ? », publié par l’Agencia EFE, Madrid.

« L’Europe et sa sécurité », publié dans *La libre Belgique*, March 1987, Brussels.

« La dimension européenne de la sécurité : les expériences de la coopération politique à Douze et de la réactivation de l’Union de l’Europe occidentale, » à publier dans *Les mélanges Gorielly*, Bruxelles.

« L’Europe et sa sécurité : le grand débat », publié dans *La libre Belgique*, July 1987.

“ Western European Union – An essential part of the building of Europe ”, publié dans *The European*, September-October 1987, United Kingdom.

“ Why a reactivated Western European Union ? What is Western European Union? ” to be published in *The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, United Kingdom.

Conferences

1985

14 October – Brussels

« Pourquoi l’UEO ? » à l’Institut royal de relations internationales.

23 October – Brussels

« L’IDS et l’UEO », colloque organisé par le Centre d’études de défense.

26-27 October – Lisbon¹

« L’UEO et la sécurité européenne » à l’Institut des études stratégiques du Portugal.

8 November – Brussels

« Sécurité, relations Est-Ouest et identité européenne » à Réalités européennes du présent.

10 November – Brussels

« Le rôle de l’UEO dans le contexte de la construction européenne et de la solidarité atlantique » (conférence Olivaint).

21 November – Brussels

« Quel rôle pour l’UEO ? » à l’Institut royal de défense.

6 December – Brussels

« L’UEO et la construction européenne », au Mouvement socialiste européen.

17 December – London

“ WEU : where is it going ? ” au Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House.

1986

23 January – Bruges

« Dimension européenne de la défense », au Collège d’Europe.

28 January – Madrid

« L’UEO vue dans la perspective du processus de construction européenne et de l’Alliance atlantique » à l’Institut diplomatique de Madrid.

13 March – Liège

« La sécurité de l'Europe, les technologies nouvelles et l'Union de l'Europe occidentale » à Études et expansion.

18 April – Monaco

« La dimension européenne de la sécurité » à l'Académie de la paix.

23 April – London¹

« L'Union de l'Europe occidentale : problèmes et perspectives », à l'International Institute for Strategic Studies.

5 May – Paris

« L'UEO », à la Maison de l'Europe de Paris et Foyer de rencontres internationales.

16 May – Brussels

« L'Europe et sa sécurité. Quelles options ? » à l'American and Common Market Club.

21 May – SHAPE¹

« L'UEO dans l'Europe et dans l'Alliance atlantique », à l'Association des officiers du SHAPE.

26 May – Lisbon

“ The Western European Union ”, à l'Institut de défense nationale.

27 June – Rome

« La sécurité européenne et l'UEO », à l'Istituto affari internazionali.

18 September – Leicester

“ Creating a European Defence Union : the role of WEU ”, à l'Université de Leicester.

20 September – Brussels

« La dimension sécurité dans l'Europe de demain », au Cercle du Champ de Mars.

25 September – London

“ WEU, the European construction and the Atlantic solidarity ”, au Mid-Atlantic Club.

9 October – Brussels

“ The security of Europe : challenges and options ”, à l'Association anglo-belge de Belgique.

13-23 October – États-Unis²

Washington

- Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs – Center for Strategic and International Studies
- School of Advanced International Studies de l'Université John Hopkins

New York

- Council on Foreign Affairs
- Institute on Western Europe de l'Université de Columbia

Cincinnati

- Council on World Affairs

Boston

- Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
- Center for European Affairs et Center for International Affairs de l'Université de Harvard.

Pittsburgh

- World Affairs Council
- University Center for International Studies de l'Université de Pittsburgh.

6 December – Toledo

“ Fora on discussion on Western Defence Policy ”, à l'Associacion de Periodistas Europeos.

1987

6 January – Rome

“ European unification and the European security dimension ”, au Collège de défense de l'OTAN.

10 April – Brussels

« Perspectives de l'UEO », à la Maison de l'Europe à Bruxelles.

23 May – Amersfoort

“ WEU en het Europese Veiligheidsbeleid in het kader van de Atlantische solidariteit ” pour Stichting Vredespolitiek (SVP).

15 June – The Hague

“ Europees Veiligheidsbeleid na Reykjavik ” pour Young Europeans for security.

30 June – London ¹

« L'Europe et sa sécurité : à quoi sert l'UEO ? », à la Belgo-Luxembourg Chamber of commerce.

3 September – Steyning

“ The contribution of WEU to the defence of Europe ”, à Wilton Park Conferences.

11 September – Cambridge

“ The WEU and the European arms cooperation process ”, à la Standing Conference of Atlantic Organizations.

25 September – Brussels

“ The security of Europe in the framework of an evolving transatlantic relationship – what rôle for the WEU ? ”, au Centre for European Policy Studies.

18 October – Bocholt

“ International organizations and the defence of Europe: the rôle of the WEU in arms procurement and control ”, au Europa Institut Bocholt pour Young Europeans for security.

23 October – Maastricht

“ Western Europe's quest for security : a 'Third Force' or a viable partner ? ”, à l'Institut européen d'administration publique.

28 October – Utrecht

“ De rol van de gereactiveerde WEU ”, à la Utrechtse Studentenvereniging voor Internationale Betrekkingen.

25 November – Bonn

“ Die WEU im Dienst Europas und der Atlantischen Solidarität ”, à la Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik.

28 November – London

“The revival of Western European Union and the process of European integration”, au European Movement.

11 December – Brussels

«La dimension européenne de la politique de sécurité» à la table ronde du Groupe d'études politiques européennes de la Fondation universitaire.

14 December – Newcastle upon Tyne

“The emergence and the rôle of the WEU”, au Fulbright Colloquium, à l'Université de Newcastle.

Forthcoming conferences in 1988

4 January – Rome

«L'unification européenne et la dimension de la sécurité européenne», au Collège de défense de l'OTAN.

12 January – Brussels

«État actuel des efforts pour une réforme de l'UEO», à l'Union européenne démocrate chrétienne et au Parti populaire européen.

11 February – Birmingham

A l'International Affairs Society de l'Université de Birmingham.

26 February – Dayton (Ohio)²

A un symposium sur les relations Est-Ouest organisé par l'Université de Dayton.

13-16 March – Washington²

“WEU and West European perspectives on strategic and theater defence” pour un colloque marquant le cinquième anniversaire de l'IDS organisé par l'Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.

1. Although the title appearing on this list is in French, the conference was given in English.

2. Due to the limitations of the WEU budget, the cost of the round trip London-United States-London and expenses, was borne by the organisations which had invited me to speak.

Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*²
by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT DECISION

on the revision of Rules 33, 34, 40, 48 and 51 of the Rules of Procedure

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur

1. Adopted in committee by 14 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (Chairman); Mr. Lacour (Vice-Chairman); MM. André (Alternate: Bohl), Antretter, Bordu, Caccia (Alternate: Stegagnini), Cerexhe, Filetti (Alternate: Fassino), Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Mr. Jessel, Lord Kirkhill, MM. Maris (Alternate: van der Sanden), Pasquino, Pécriaux, Scheer, von Schmude (Alternate: Niegel), Sirgue, Stoffelen, Thompson, Taramelli, Unland.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Decision

on the revision of Rules 33, 34, 40, 48 and 51 of the Rules of Procedure

The Assembly

DECIDES

To amend Rules 33, 34, 40, 48 and 51 as follows:

1. *Rule 33*

At the beginning of paragraph 1, leave out “ The Assembly shall vote by sitting and standing ” and insert “ The Assembly shall vote by show of hands ”.

2. *Rule 34*

Replace sub-paragraph (a) by the following text:

“ on the one hand, for the adoption of amendments to the Charter, for the adoption of a motion to disagree to the annual report or to any part of the report or for the adoption of a request for urgent procedure without prior reference to committee and, on the other hand, for acceptance of a draft budget that does not conform with the Council’s opinion: a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of representatives to the Assembly; ”

3. *Rule 40*

At the end of paragraph 4 (b), add:

“ However, even if this quorum is not obtained, the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges may vote on a report as a whole provided all the national delegations are represented and there is no opposition when the vote is taken. ”

4. *Rule 48*

At the end of paragraph 3, add “ which shall express a prior opinion ”.

Add the following new paragraphs after paragraph 3:

“ 4. When the prior opinion of the Council includes reductions in appropriations, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration may, in consultation with the Presidential Committee, present a draft budget to the Assembly which does not conform with the prior opinion of the Council. Acceptance of such a draft budget shall require the votes of a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of representatives to the Assembly.

5. If the Council refuses to adopt the draft budget accepted by the Assembly in these conditions, the Presidential Committee shall be responsible for settling the dispute with the Council and ask for a joint meeting to this end. The Presidential Committee shall report to the Assembly on the results of any such meeting and, if necessary, propose that it ratify whatever action it had to take, including acceptance of the budget as amended by the Council. ”

Renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly.

5. *Rule 51*

Insert a new paragraph 1:

“ The Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges may at any time consider the expediency of revising the Rules of Procedure. At its request, the Presidential Committee shall include in the agenda of the Assembly a report by the committee on the revision of the Rules of Procedure. ”

Former paragraph 1 becomes paragraph 2, the first sentence being drafted as follows:

“ Furthermore, motions for decisions to amend the Rules of Procedure may be tabled by ten or more representatives. ”

Renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly.

*Explanatory Memorandum**(submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur)***Rule 33**

1. The introduction of voting cards allows the Assembly to vote clearly without resorting to the irksome procedure of sitting and standing. It is thus possible to bring the Rules of Procedure of the WEU Assembly into line with those of the Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Rules 34 and 48

2. The proposal to amend the Charter tabled by Mr. Pannella and others allows a dialogue to be organised between the Council and the Assembly in the context of procedure for adopting the draft budget of the Assembly and, in the event of disagreement, strengthens the latter's authority by stressing the value the majority of members of the Assembly attach to maintaining appropriations included in the budget.

3. However, the Assembly cannot obtain appropriations without the agreement of the Council. It should therefore be specified that the draft budget is accepted, not adopted, by the Assembly, since the Assembly's vote is not an enforceable decision. Consequently, the provisions of Article VIII of the Charter should be retained. It is Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure that should be amended.

4. Because the Assembly may make transfers not only between sub-heads but also, in the context of its budgetary autonomy, between heads of its budget not relating to permanent staff, if the Assembly wishes to demonstrate its disagreement with reductions made by the Council, a vote by roll-call should be taken on the initial draft budget as a whole (the only way to show that there is an absolute majority) rather than only on the sub-heads including appropriations modified by the Council.

5. After an absolute majority of the Assembly has accepted a draft budget that maintains credits refused by the Council, procedure for settling disputes should be introduced. It is the Presidential Committee that should be responsible for asking for a joint meeting with the Council to negotiate a solution likely to meet the Assembly's requests.

Rule 37

6. The purpose of the motion tabled by Mr. Pannella and others is to form a joint group of all representatives and substitutes who do not belong to a political group. Inter alia, this group would share the funds now divided between four political groups. Conversely, it would be represented on the Presidential Committee not by a de jure member but by two observers without the right to vote.

7. The aim of political groups is to co-ordinate the action and representation of the ideas of parliamentarians who share certain political views. A heterogeneous group such as the one proposed could ensure neither co-ordination nor representation, nor could any members selected be sure of being able to represent the group's views or agree to any decision.

8. However, the Presidential Committee, before taking a decision concerning members of the Assembly as a whole, whatever their political tendencies, consults in an adequate manner an appropriate number of representatives belonging or not belonging to a political group. This would meet the democratic requirement that allows all tendencies in the Assembly to make themselves heard.

Rule 40

9. It is proposed to facilitate the adoption of basically technical amendments to the Rules of Procedure that are endorsed by all the delegations or arouse no opposition, all the delegations being represented.

Rule 51

10. It appeared necessary to complete the provisions of the Rules of Procedure on amendments to the Rules of Procedure. At present, the most current practice is to include in the agenda of the Assembly a report on the amendment of the Rules of Procedure at the request of the committee concerned.

PETITION¹

*from Mr. Hintermann, former Assistant Secretary-General of WEU,
to Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly*

(Rule 46 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly)

Paris, 25th February 1988

.....

I the undersigned, Eric HINTERMANN, former Assistant Secretary-General of Western European Union, domiciled at 95, rue des Morillons, 75015 Paris, have the honour to submit the petition "Ten proposals for WEU" in accordance with Rule 46 of the Rules of Procedure of WEU.

The aim of this petition, after having examined the working of WEU, is to make a group of proposals to make this European organisation, the only one responsible for defence matters, more efficient and offer it important prospects in the framework of its task which is to "encourage the progressive integration of Europe" in its own area.

Having served WEU for more than five years and being deeply attached to its European aims, I thought it was my duty to make proposals in a constructive spirit and to submit them for debate.

.....

Eric HINTERMANN

Mr. Charles GOERENS,
President of the Assembly
of Western European Union

Message to the WEU Assembly

Ten proposals for Western European Union

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am addressing this petition – ten proposals for Western European Union – to you as a citizen and a European who has recovered his freedom after five years of high-level responsibilities in WEU as Assistant Secretary-General, Vice-Chairman and Head of the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee, Director of the Agency for Armaments Development and Co-operation and finally as Co-ordinating Director of the agencies for disarmament studies, security and co-operation.

I am doing this because of my European conviction and with a view to being useful to WEU. Such an experience must contribute to the unification of Europe, in particular its security dimension, where WEU is the only organisation now having responsibilities. It can be placed at the service of parliamentarians members of the Assembly of Western European Union with a

view to making the organisation more efficient and important throughout Europe and the West.

The WEU crisis

I chose to address myself to the Assembly because the parliamentarians have shown how interested they were in the future of WEU. The Assembly can play a decisive rôle in removing WEU from the deadlock in which its executive, the Permanent Council, is in the process of enclosing itself.

WEU is indeed in a state of crisis without its own parliamentarians being informed. Instead of tackling the major problems of Europe's security, at a time when the politico-strategic environment is changing, the Permanent Council is joyously devoting itself to permanent bureaucratic restructuring and endless clashes over the place of collocation.

1. This petition was declared in order and referred to the General Affairs Committee.

Is it known that, meeting right in the middle of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting, the Permanent Council did not spend one second discussing Europe's rôle and security? It spent its time discussing how to reduce the staff in WEU's Paris office and sack its officials!

At a time when Western Europe's security should be the subject of in-depth reflection among Europeans, those mostly concerned by "discriminate deterrence" and other forms of American "decoupling" being considered on the other side of the Atlantic, the Permanent Council deliberately struck a blow at WEU's Paris office and the organisation's three study agencies responsible respectively for disarmament, security and co-operation in armaments matters.

The Permanent Council having decided on 18th December 1987 to put an end on 31st December 1987 to the duties of the directors of the Paris study agencies, WEU's Paris office is now without a head apart from the "correspondents" chosen by the Secretary-General in London. The agencies are given no more tasks as if London did not wish to give them any work so that they can then say that they are doing nothing.

A twofold blockage

Above all, WEU has no great European ambition at a point in history at which the non-existence of a united Europe at security level – its division goes as far as its concepts of its defence, armaments and disarmament – is allowing the United States and the Soviet Union to decide on its fate in its absence. Is it right to hold a meeting of ministers for foreign affairs and defence in The Hague in April without any plans of importance in order to settle WEU's internal organisational problems that the Permanent Council has not been able to solve? The rôle now imposed on WEU by certain authorities is one of mediocrity.

These five years of high-level responsibilities have led me to the conclusion that WEU is suffering from a twofold blockage on two different levels: the absence of European political will and inefficient executive structures. The aim of this petition is to find a remedy by proposing on the one hand more efficient structures and on the other major European political goals. This step is being taken in a positive spirit.

1. *A new Council*

The first proposal is to change the composition of the Permanent Council, the WEU executive that has its seat in London. It consists at present, apart from a United Kingdom Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, of member coun-

tries' ambassadors to London. These are generally remarkable diplomats. That is not the problem. But they are overburdened with bilateral questions. They do not have time to spare for WEU. Nor do their governments give them the necessary authority to take decisions.

It took them a whole year, for lack of instructions, to accept our proposal to transmit to the Assembly, in a declassified form, our study on defence policy and the Japanese armaments industry. They have been placed in the position of having to hold lengthy discussions on the status of a chauffeur, etc.

It should be noted that in the present discussions on structures no mention is made of the Permanent Council. Yet it is here that the most serious operating problems arise. If the Council had shown the slightest interest in serious things, this petition would have been addressed to it and it alone. In the present context, this text would have been immediately buried like all the others.

In five years as Assistant Secretary-General, we did not once manage, in spite of numerous attempts, to hold an in-depth discussion to advance Europe's defence dimension, for instance through co-operation in the armaments sector.

That is why the Secretary-General, Mr. Alfred Cahen, former Political Director at the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, introduced meetings of representatives from the capitals.

The only document of importance drawn up by WEU, the security platform adopted in The Hague in October 1987, was a result of these intergovernmental meetings.

Our proposal is that the Permanent Council should henceforth be composed of those responsible for WEU in the ministries for foreign affairs of member countries. If one really thinks about it, this solution has only advantages. These very senior officials, being by definition the best informed of national policies towards WEU, would be capable of taking decisions and finding compromises between delegations. The Council would rediscover its prerogatives, now lost where the major files are concerned to make way for intergovernmental missions. Moreover, there is nothing to prevent political directors or their assistants replacing those responsible for WEU from the ministries for foreign affairs if a Council meeting were to be held at a higher level. Since the enhanced Council would take on the political executive rôle, the Assembly for its part could exercise its supervisory powers. Finally, the formula proposed is not as expensive as would be the appointment of ambassadors responsible solely for WEU on the lines of the representatives to the Atlantic Alliance.

2. *A political secretary-general*

The second proposal concerns the Secretary-General.

Since with its present structure the Secretariat-General has no authority, the Permanent Council administers in its place. Furthermore, without invoking the persons themselves, who are remarkable, the appointment of ambassadors to the Secretariat-General does not give political authority to the function. The Secretary-General is reduced to being an ambassador meeting among his peers. It is as if some were afraid of a strong personality taking over in the Secretariat-General and, by so doing, ensuring that Western European Union had influence.

Our proposal is that the Secretariat-General of WEU should henceforth be assumed by a political personality. This is already the case in NATO and the European Communities. The two organisations and the governments have had no reason to complain.

It would be logical for WEU to be placed on the same level. It must hold a certain rank among the Atlantic and European organisations.

From the point of view of the running of WEU, the Secretariat-General could, if it were given sufficient authority, effectively administer the organisation. It is in the greatest need of this. The Council for its part would stop devoting itself (badly) to administration in order to devote itself (well) to the major problems of Europe's security.

3. *The Standing Armaments Committee*

The third proposal is to bring back into operation the Standing Armaments Committee that has its seat in Paris since WEU cannot expect to fill the space reserved for Europe's defence while showing no interest in the means necessary for its defence.

Yet, since September 1985 the Council has condemned the Standing Armaments Committee to inaction in spite of our repeated requests to meet, backed by an agenda. We were forbidden to convene a meeting. Knowing how interested the Assembly was in this body, on 17th November 1986 the Council answered Written Question 271 as follows: "The SAC will meet in the not too distant future."

Would it not have been more elegant and honest to tell the parliamentarians that no meeting was planned, thus provoking a debate which might have allowed the latter to express their opinions?

The Standing Armaments Committee is the only European body with responsibility for

co-operation which has the benefit of a link with parliamentarians. The Liaison Subcommittee on the joint production of armaments allows the Standing Armaments Committee to hold meetings with parliamentarians duly appointed for this purpose by the WEU Assembly.

From the simple point of view of democracy, it is important for parliamentarians to be associated with developments in co-operation in the armaments sector. Is it not logical for co-operation to be debated by the only European assembly with responsibility for defence matters? There should also be links between the WEU Standing Armaments Committee and the Independent European Programme Group which is composed of all the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance. In this way, the parliamentarians could be informed of developments in European co-operation in the widest sense.

4. *Agencies to carry out high-level studies*

The fourth proposal is that the agencies responsible for studying disarmament, security and co-operation in WEU's Paris office should start work again in order to promote high-level European thinking on all Europe's defence problems in the new politico-strategic environment.

WEU's Paris agencies had great merit. They managed to produce forty-four studies after their creation on 1st January 1986 covering disarmament, the trend of the threat, resource management, technology transfers, technological policy, a review of co-operation in the armaments sector, etc., in spite of the incessant obstacles placed in their way. For lack of unanimity in the Permanent Council, the agency on co-operation even had to wait for its tasks until November 1986, ten months after it was set up!

The agencies were ill- and under-used. The agency on disarmament had to spend months recording Soviet declarations on disarmament. Since it was led by a remarkable man, a former chief-of-staff of the Italian army and former military attaché in Moscow, it could have used his talent and that of his staff to propose European concepts on disarmament. The agency on security proposed to conduct a public opinion poll on Europeans and defence. This was refused. The third proposed that co-operation in the armaments sector should start at the research stage. It contacted industrialists in sectors of high technology in the European countries. It was told to proceed no further.

The studies were intended for governments. Some of them should be transmitted to the Assembly in a declassified form. They were usually filed away, in spite of our proposals. To make things easier, we voluntarily produced

studies, such as the review of armaments co-operation and the study of technological policies in member countries, without classification. To no avail! The parliamentarians will have no possibility of debating them before European public opinion.

Let us take an example to show the usefulness of transferring certain studies to the Assembly. The agency for the development of armaments co-operation produced the first review of co-operation since 1954. Would it not have been useful to have a wide-ranging debate between the parliamentarians of member countries on this review? If it had been considered weak from the standpoint of member countries' total production of armaments or in comparison with requirements, such a discussion would have helped to induce governments and public opinion to give impetus to co-operation. This example shows how the study agencies and the Assembly could be complementary in the services they render Europe.

Finally, if WEU intends to play its full rôle in concerting the positions of European countries in order to achieve a consensus on the various defence problems, it will need preparatory high-level thinking. Produced by experts from member countries, working together in a European spirit, the studies on disarmament, security and co-operation in armaments matters would help the rise of WEU. They would raise the level of the organisation and propel it into the future.

5. *Collocation if possible*

The fifth proposal is that WEU, now divided between two capitals, London and Paris, should if possible be collocated.

Everyone agrees on the principle, be it the governments or the Assembly. Conversely, there is complete disagreement on the choice of a city: Paris on the one hand, Brussels on the other.

Paris has the advantage of being the capital of a country very favourable to WEU, of being the seat of the Assembly whose authority would be enhanced by its proximity to the Secretariat-General and of offering the most economical solution. The organisation's present premises, where there are many empty offices, could easily accommodate staff now in London.

Is the advantage of Brussels, proposed because the Belgian capital is the seat of both NATO and the European Communities, not rather a disadvantage? Squashed in between these two "monsters", little WEU, already weakened by its present crisis, would have obvious difficulties in surviving. Its absorption by NATO would run counter to the affirmation of a European Europe, of Europe as the second pillar of the alliance. Is this the aim sought?

However this may be, the question of collocation has assumed too much importance. It has reached the point of dominating present discussions in WEU to such an extent that it is paralysing the entire organisation. It is dividing countries instead of uniting them. It is concentrating attention on a single point. WEU must have more important aims than restructuring.

If collocation were to prove impossible, it would be better to accept the situation as it has been since 1954, with WEU based partly in London and partly in Paris. Multinational firms work perfectly well on several continents. It is hard to see why WEU could not do so on each side of the Channel. It has done so since 1954 without problem.

6. *Enlarging WEU*

The sixth proposal is that WEU should be enlarged to include European countries which accept the modified Brussels Treaty instituting it and the European platform of October 1987.

Portugal has officially applied for membership, Spain unofficially and other countries, such as Norway, are pondering on the matter. To date, WEU has given them dilatory answers which are in the long run detrimental to the rise of the organisation.

No one is taken in by the flippancy of the answer that WEU must first be restructured. The first effect of a country's accession would, moreover, be to force WEU to change its organogram to make room for nationals of that country.

WEU's refusal to expand has created unnecessary tension between the seven member countries and the other European countries which together belong to the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and the Atlantic Alliance. If WEU were to show drive and openness, Europe would admittedly be moving at several speeds from a defence point of view. The dynamism of the countries the most determined to unify Europe would prevail as always. Progressively, WEU, the IEPG and Eurogroup, without forgetting FINABEL, would cover the same nations. This is the goal to be attained. Once gathered together, the European defence organisation would become a pillar of the alliance on the same basis as the United States. Everything starts with the enlargement of WEU.

7. *Think disarmament*

The seventh proposal is that Europeans use the framework of WEU – the only one available – to reflect on disarmament which should not be a matter exclusively for the United States and the Soviet Union.

How could this old continent, so often devastated by war, lose interest in disarmament? And do not the conditions for disarmament concern Europe to the highest degree? It was quite clear during the Reagan-Gorbachev summit meetings in Reykjavik and then in Washington: Europe is at the hub of discussions.

Because of its geographical position, Europe necessarily has areas of security that are not exactly the same as those of the United States. We will endorse these words of President Mitterrand: "Europe must not be a silent witness and the passive stake in East-West relations. Europe's personality must be expressed strongly, if only because Europe's security interests can be only imperfectly identified with those of the two blocs confronting each other."¹

Europe is, however, in a stupefying state of unpreparedness vis-à-vis the various arms limitation options that concern it. This is because it has until now – and this includes WEU – bowed to American pressure. For instance, the WEU study agencies did not tackle the fundamental problems of disarmament in Europe although one of them was specifically responsible for doing so. Europe urgently needs to define a disarmament philosophy of its own in relation with its security requirements.

WEU must serve at one and the same time the aims of détente and security in Europe. The two are as closely linked as the two sides of a coin.

8. *Think security*

The eighth proposal is that WEU should give continuous thought to the facts of European security in the new politico-strategic environment.

The Americans have reached a point that General de Gaulle described as follows to President Dwight Eisenhower: "You, Eisenhower, you would wage nuclear war for Europe because you know the interests that are at stake. But as and when the Soviet Union develops its ability to strike the cities of North America, one of your successors will undertake to wage nuclear war only in order to counter an attack of the same kind against North America."²

New American concepts, including "discriminate deterrence", confirm the view of that great European. "Decoupling" was already in transatlantic minds where strategic nuclear weapons were concerned. The Americans quite

naturally think first of their own security in a world in which they exercise global responsibilities not confined to Europe.

As the United States establishes a new balance in the direction of the Pacific because of its population, investment and trade, it feels Europe to be the part of the world in which there are the most risks. It is the only area where a conflict can degenerate and rise to the extremes. It must therefore be kept within limits that make any escalation impossible. This paves the way for political blackmail by the Soviet Union because of its conventional superiority and geographical proximity.

In the recent Iklé-Wohlstetter report, Europe appears to be merely an object and not an actor in a policy in which Japan and China are hailed as the rising powers.

Europe will exist when it is united, including its security dimension. WEU offers an appropriate framework for reflection.

9. *Think armaments co-operation*

The ninth proposal is for WEU to give decisive impetus to co-operation in the armaments sector.

In this respect, the decisions taken by the ministers for foreign affairs and defence in Bonn and Rome have remained a dead letter.

The existence of a European armaments industry is a fundamental necessity, not only because it creates employment and industrial activity and makes regions live. It avoids having to spend defence budgets abroad. It facilitates the adoption of military budgets. It contributes to the spirit of defence.

It ensures the maintenance of an industrial and technological base in Europe. Europe's future depends on the existence of advanced technology on its territory. If it had to depend on the outside world, its industrial base, the life of the regions and employment would be affected. Without the most sophisticated technology for military purposes, it would be weakened in the concert of nations.

"The paradox of Europe these days is that it invented science and is spending twice as much on research and development as Japan, but it is still lagging in the high-technology race to the future... it is not thinking on the scale of the world, let alone the continent."³ Its national frontiers jeopardise its growth. This is particularly true in the armaments sector where Europe remains more partitioned off than in civil sectors.

1. François Mitterrand, interview on East German television on 6th January 1988, quoted in *Le Monde*, 8th January, page 5.

2. Quoted by Vernon A. Walters in "Services Discrets", *Plon*, page 256.

3. James Reston, *International Herald Tribune*, 1st June 1987.

Decisive initiatives are necessary: co-operation at the research stage, establishment of a common armaments market, cross-participation between industries across frontiers, etc.

WEU, which groups countries with a comparable level of development, is certainly the best placed to start this process even if it then has to be extended as quickly as possible to other European nations.

10. *A European political will*

My whole is a European political will. Without it WEU reforms would serve no purpose.

Europe is moving towards economic unification even if it is having difficulties. At political level, Europeans elect their parliament, even if its powers and audience are limited. In the defence area, that of WEU, it is stagnating and falling behind. At this rate, the European edifice will resemble a building without a façade.

Europe is mainly preparing for the "great market" of 1992. But can it be just a commercial area? Would it be this, moreover, if it did not include armaments?

Europe's inexistence at defence level is most alarming at a decisive time in history when the United States and the Soviet Union are settling, as far as possible bilaterally, without Europe, the fate of the world.

If Europe is just a vast common market, without real political structure or military unity, it cannot influence world developments. It is consulted as a matter of form but plays no real part in defining the new peace being worked out between East and West. This will continue as long as Europe is composed of different rival nations.

How much weight does Western Europe carry today in the Middle East, the source of its energy supplies, or in Afghanistan, where the rights of human beings and a nation are being violated by the Soviet occupant, to take two examples on different levels?

A European Community is not conceivable at economic level alone. Have we ever seen a federation of peoples be independent and master of its own destiny, including its economy, without having the means of defending itself?

The great historian Fernand Braudel said: "Europe cannot really be built culturally unless there is a political framework, unless there is a European government, unless there is a European parliament with wide powers, *unless there is joint European defence.*"⁴

In their wisdom, those who drafted the birth certificate of WEU, the modified Brussels Treaty, signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954, specified in the preamble that the high contracting parties were resolved "to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe". Thirty-three years have now passed without WEU doing anything to this end.

Without common European political will, WEU is just a poor little shrunken territory offered up to national rivalries. That is the reason for its present crisis. Inspired by a great European ambition, enlarged WEU could play a major rôle in the unification of Europe by contributing its defence dimension. Thirty-three years after being created, it is time it devoted itself to the "progressive integration of Europe".

It is because we have a passion for Europe that we submit to the parliamentarians and governments and, beyond them, public opinion, these ten proposals for WEU.

4. *Le Monde*, 13th December 1983.

*Impact of the WEU Assembly's activities
on parliaments and public opinion*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations ²
by Mr. Chénard, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Lady Jill Knight (Chairman); Mr. Tummers (Vice-Chairman); MM. Büchner, Burger, de Chambrun, De Bondt, De Hoop Scheffer (Alternate: Worrell), Faulds (Alternate: Shelton), Fiandrotti, Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: Lenzer), Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, MM. Salvi (Alternate: Caccia), Seitlinger (Alternate: Chénard), Vreven.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Order

*on the impact of the WEU Assembly's activities
on parliaments and public opinion*

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling Order 44 and Resolution 78;
- (ii) Welcoming the special information action taken by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations in all member parliaments;
- (iii) Concerned, however, at the persisting difficulty of adequately following up the work of the Assembly in member countries, even at a time when the importance of WEU is growing,

INSTRUCTS ITS COMMITTEE FOR PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

- 1. By establishing contact with national delegations, to ensure that national parliamentary committees responsible for matters handled by the Assembly accord greater attention to its reports;
- 2. In permanent co-operation with national delegations, to encourage more representatives to speak in their parliaments on the basis of texts adopted;

INVITES ALL ITS COMMITTEES

- 1. To apply scrupulously Rule 39(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly by examining action taken on texts adopted on the basis of their reports;
- 2. To draft their reports so that they may be easily used in debates at national level.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Chénard, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. When the WEU Assembly was set up by the modified Brussels Treaty, the contracting parties were aware that WEU's responsibilities were squarely within areas where member states still had full sovereignty. No consideration was therefore given to forming the Assembly of members elected by direct universal suffrage at European level, the signatory countries preferring it to consist of members of their parliaments.

2. Furthermore, in Article IX of the treaty, the contracting parties provided that the Assembly would be composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which has no security or defence responsibilities. This does not facilitate the formation of national delegations or the task of members who must follow up the work of the WEU Assembly.

3. At the information meeting organised by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations at the Second Chamber of the States-General in The Hague on 23rd February 1988, a Netherlands member of the North Atlantic Assembly asked what influence WEU Assembly recommendations had on decisions taken by ministers who are members of the Council. This question went straight to the heart of the problem since recommendations addressed to the WEU Council can be effective and influence governments only if there is pressure at the national parliamentary level.

4. In view of the importance of parliamentary participation in crucial decisions on security and defence matters in a democratic European system, it must constantly be shown that the current system for forming the WEU Assembly, even if not ideal, nevertheless ensures that its activities are followed up effectively through political action in member countries and that it exercises a direct influence on government decisions. If that is not so, we must not be surprised if questions are put about the Assembly's effectiveness.

5. In the present report, therefore, a detailed examination will be made of the technical and political conditions in which the work of the WEU Assembly can be included in the process of reflection and decision by those politically responsible for defence and security matters in Western European countries. To this end, a ques-

tionnaire was sent to national delegations on 27th January 1988¹.

II. The rôle of WEU in the work of national parliaments

(i) National committees and the WEU Assembly

6. Undeniably, much of the dialogue between parliaments and governments on foreign policy – and particularly security and defence policy – takes place at meetings of the appropriate national committees. Matters of interest to WEU are handled mainly by the foreign affairs and defence committees and, more rarely, other committees. Without underestimating the importance of other national committees, it must be in the interests of the WEU Assembly's work for a large number of members of national delegations to the Assembly to be represented on the foreign affairs and/or defence committees of member parliaments.

7. Members of the WEU Assembly are now represented in the abovementioned committees as follows:

	Seats in WEU Assembly	Representation in national foreign affairs committee	Representation in national defence committee	Representation in the two committees combined
Belgium (Senate and Chamber)	14	11	9	20
France (National Assembly and Senate)	36	11	3	14
Federal Republic of Germany . . . (Bundestag)	36	20	8	28
Italy (Chamber and Senate)	36	13	4	17
Luxembourg . . . (Chamber)	6	2	2	4
Netherlands . . . (First and Second Chambers)	14	9	7	16
United Kingdom (House of Commons)	36	0	1	1

1. See Appendix I.

8. This table shows that members of the WEU Assembly are best represented in national committees in Belgium and the Netherlands. Conversely, in the House of Commons, the United Kingdom Delegation has only one member in the Defence Committee and is not represented in the Foreign Affairs Committee. However, the situation in the United Kingdom is rather different to that in other parliaments since the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees have only eleven members each and it is not possible to belong to both committees at the same time.

9. In parliaments where members of the WEU Assembly are well represented in the foreign affairs and defence committees, account must also be taken of the proportion of members of the WEU Assembly compared with the total number of members of those committees. Three examples may be quoted:

- In the *Federal Republic of Germany*, the *Bundestag* Foreign Affairs Committee has seventy-four titular members and alternates, including twenty members of the German Delegation to the WEU Assembly, which is a satisfactory percentage. But the proportion is less favourable in the Defence Committee, which has fifty-eight titular members and alternates, only eight of whom, however, are members of the delegation.
- In the *Netherlands*, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the *Second Chamber* now has forty-seven titular members and alternates, of whom five are members of the delegation. In the *First Chamber*, the corresponding committee has twenty-four titular members and alternates of whom four are members of the delegation.

The Defence Committee of the *Second Chamber* has forty-six titular members and alternates, two of whom are members of the delegation, while the corresponding committee of the *First Chamber* has twenty-four titular members and alternates, three of whom are members of the delegation.

- In *France*, the *Senate* Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee has fifty-two members, four of whom are members of the delegation to the WEU Assembly. The *National Assembly* Foreign Affairs Committee has seventy-two members of whom nine are members of the delegation; the Defence and Armed Forces Committee, which also has seventy-two members, includes only one member of the delegation.

10. In four member parliaments, the delegation chairmen are members of the abovementioned committees (in Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Luxembourg). In the circumstances, it is therefore mainly up to members of those committees who are on the delegation to WEU to take personal steps to ensure that the Assembly's work is followed up but, in reality, this aim proves difficult to attain.

11. On 4th December 1974, the WEU Assembly adopted Order 44 inviting national delegations "to promote relations between the Assembly of WEU and national parliamentary committees, inter alia by rapporteurs of the Assembly of WEU being heard by these committees when matters are being discussed which have been dealt with in reports submitted to the Assembly of WEU". Luxembourg is the only member country in which this order is occasionally applied for matters of particular interest.

12. No delegation has reported that such hearings are forbidden by its parliament's rules of procedure. The appeal made in Order 44 should therefore be renewed.

13. Another proposal made a long time ago was received favourably in several parliaments, i.e. that, if a national parliamentary committee was preparing to discuss a matter already debated in the WEU Assembly, it could ask the secretariat of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations a few weeks in advance to send it a file containing our Assembly's reports, debates and texts adopted on the subject. However, if the committees concerned do not take the initiative of contacting the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly early enough, it will be difficult for the latter to guess what the programmes of work of these committees will be since in most countries their debates are confidential.

14. Nevertheless, advance information about the work of national committees can certainly be improved. The United Kingdom Delegation, for instance, has recently started to send the Office of the Clerk press communiqués issued by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees which describe the current work and programmes of visits of those committees. Thus, we learn that the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee is now studying the political consequences of the arms control and disarmament process and in the context of that study it is planning to visit several European capitals and NATO headquarters. After consulting the United Kingdom Delegation, the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly sent the Assembly's latest report on disarmament to that committee's secretariat for information.

15. It would be useful if similar contacts could be established with committees in other parlia-

ments. It would also be useful to give further consideration to plans for organising joint meetings between the appropriate committees of the WEU Assembly and the corresponding committees in national parliaments.

(ii) *Use of WEU Assembly reports
in the political activities of parliaments*

16. If parliamentarians are to use WEU Assembly reports in political debates in their country, they must first be able to read them while they are still topical. Reports are published in two stages, the first being just after they have been adopted in committee.

17. Reports adopted by Assembly committees are printed immediately and then distributed to members of the Assembly and secretariats of national delegations. But it is already difficult, if not impossible, to work on these documents in Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands because they are not – or only partly – translated into the official language or languages of these countries; in the Netherlands, they are translated only on request. Furthermore, in none of the parliaments are these documents distributed automatically to members of the foreign affairs and defence committees.

18. The situation in the various parliaments is as follows. The staff of the *German* Delegation usually translate only draft recommendations and resolutions. Explanatory memoranda are translated only if they are of special interest to the German Delegation or if the rapporteur is German. Translated texts are circulated regularly to members of the German Delegation before each session. Untranslated parts of reports may be communicated to interested members of parliament, but only on request.

19. In *Belgium*, reports are not translated into Flemish or sent automatically to non-member parliamentarians but a list of texts adopted is sent to all members of the Chamber and the Senate. The French text of these documents may be obtained on request.

20. In *France*, texts are sent to interested parliamentarians only on request and this is also the case in *Italy*, *Luxembourg* and *the Netherlands*. However, in these countries the delegation secretariat draws up a list of reports which is sent to all committees. In *the United Kingdom*, reports are available only on request.

21. Problems of transmission are therefore added to linguistic problems. Only in *Belgium* and *the Netherlands* can all members of parliament take cognisance of matters dealt with in reports adopted by Assembly committees thanks to a list sent by the secretariats of their respective delegations.

22. The second stage of publication occurs after texts have been adopted by the WEU Assembly in plenary session. In accordance with Rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, during the session the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations selects from the texts adopted by the Assembly those which, in its opinion, should be debated in parliaments.

23. Immediately after each session, the President of the WEU Assembly sends texts selected by the committee (recommendations proper without their explanatory memoranda) to the presidents of all member parliaments in the hope that “these texts will be of interest to your parliament and will be the subject of speeches or questions”.

24. In *Belgium*, this letter is translated into Flemish and published in the country's two official languages at appendix to the summary record of the first subsequent meeting of the Chamber and Senate. This publication, however, does not explain why the texts were transmitted.

25. In *Luxembourg*, the President of the Chamber announces in public sitting that he has received the letter from the President of the WEU Assembly, while in *the Netherlands* this letter is included – without translation – in the list of documents received and deposited with the Clerk during plenary sittings of the Second Chamber. In the First Chamber, the letter from the President of the Assembly is sent to the appropriate committees in its original version.

26. In none of the other four parliaments – *France*, *the Federal Republic of Germany*, *Italy* and *the United Kingdom* – is it ensured that parliamentarians are informed of the contents of this letter. For that reason, it has practically no impact at present.

27. In *the Federal Republic of Germany*, however, all the texts adopted by the Assembly are printed in German after each session and distributed automatically to all members of the Bundestag, but only for information. The same procedure is followed in *Italy*.

(iii) *National delegation information reports
on Assembly sessions*

28. It is gratifying that six of the seven delegations distribute regular information documents on the activities of the Assembly and its delegations. It is of course for each delegation to decide in what form and by what means such documents are to be prepared and distributed. However, your Rapporteur ventures to make the following suggestions for improving the impact of these reports.

29. Since they are widely distributed in parliaments, it is suggested that all delegations pub-

lishing such information reports add a paragraph informing readers of:

- the specific texts selected by the committee, emphasising the reasons for the choice, i.e. that they should be the subject of debates;
- the content of the letter in which the President of the WEU Assembly transmits selected texts after each session.

30. Since the United Kingdom Delegation is the only one not to prepare a special document, your Rapporteur suggests that it consider possible ways of drawing the attention of the United Kingdom Parliament to the texts selected by the committee and to the content of the letter from the President of the Assembly.

*(iv) Use of the orange booklet
in national parliaments*

31. After each part-session, the WEU Assembly publishes an orange booklet containing texts adopted and a brief account of the session in the five official languages of WEU, a specific number being sent to the secretariat of each delegation.

32. In *Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands*, delegations distribute the booklets automatically to all parliamentarians while in *France and the United Kingdom* they are sent only to delegation members, other interested persons having to ask for copies. In *the Federal Republic of Germany and Luxembourg*, the booklets are not distributed automatically.

33. Your Rapporteur believes that these booklets should be distributed automatically in all parliaments – and not on request – at least to members of the foreign affairs and defence committees. It is a useful document for anyone wishing to learn about the texts adopted and what was said in the debates. Information documents prepared by delegations cannot replace this booklet since a document is required which all WEU parliamentarians can take as a basis.

34. No effort should be spared to ensure the circulation of this booklet within a reasonable lapse of time. However, it is difficult to make this text available quickly since it has to be translated into all the official languages of WEU. This might be facilitated if the delegations concerned could have it translated by their own staff.

*(v) Requests for information on WEU
in national parliaments*

35. Three of the seven delegations have notified an increase in requests for information. In *France*, requests for information on the activities of WEU and its Assembly are sometimes sent to the French Delegation to the Assembly. They often emanate from parliamentary com-

mittees; students preparing university theses also put questions to the delegation. The document that has been consulted most often recently is the address by Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of France, to the WEU Assembly in December 1986, advocating that a European security charter be drawn up.

36. In *Italy*, the secretariats of the Senate and Chamber have recently noted renewed interest in WEU. In particular, the platform adopted in The Hague on 27th October 1987 has been the subject of many requests for information from parliamentarians and others. *The Netherlands* Delegation also reported an increase in requests for information, but gave no details.

37. No delegation has notified any special interest by parliamentarians or the public in Assembly documents, the special interest shown by the press and public in Mr. Stokes's report on threat assessment (Document 1115) being an isolated case. This lack of interest is very disturbing and cannot be ignored by the Assembly at a time when parliaments, media and the public seem to have been showing more interest in the evolution of WEU in general, particularly since the adoption of the platform in The Hague. Does it mean that most of the Assembly's reports are practically confined to the area of its members' activities and are not effectively circulated to other circles concerned (see Chapter II (ii) above)?

**III. Action taken in parliaments
on texts adopted by the WEU Assembly**

38. At its meeting in Paris on 3rd December 1987, the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations decided to draw the attention of parliaments of member countries to the following recommendations:

- 449 on the political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council;
- 450 on the military use of computers – towards a joint European defence research programme; and
- 452 on disarmament.

39. In a letter dated 12th January 1988, Lady Jill Knight, Chairman of the committee, sent committee members draft questions relating to subjects covered in the selected recommendations, emphasizing that “in order to strengthen the impact of the Assembly's work in our national parliaments, it is essential for as many members as possible to put questions on the basis of the texts adopted or to use them for speeches or interventions in parliament”.

40. Furthermore, on 3rd December 1987 the Assembly adopted Resolution 78 inviting

national delegations "to ensure that debates on defence and security... are organised so as to bring the greatest possible attention to the work of the WEU Assembly".

41. It is to be noted that the rôle of WEU and the activities of its Council are now often discussed in parliaments. However, in regard to work based on texts adopted by the Assembly, only three parliaments have sent in information. On 10th March 1988, Mr. Hill made a speech on WEU in the House of Commons, recommending that members interested in Europe's defence should study the abovementioned reports. He also put several questions on Recommendations 449 and 453. Other questions on WEU were put by Mr. Knowles, Sir John Biggs-Davison, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Martin and Sir Anthony Grant.

42. On 12th November 1987, the Bundestag held a debate on the platform adopted in The Hague, with speeches by Mr. Mechttersheimer, Mr. Lippelt, Mr. Soell, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mrs. Schoppe and Mrs. Kelly. On 21st January 1988, a debate was held in plenary session in the Bundestag on the basis of oral questions put by Mr. Soell and Mr. Klejdzinski on Recommendations 449 and 452. The Federal German Government also answered written questions put by Mr. Böhm, Mr. Antretter and Mr. Scheer on the abovementioned recommendations.

43. On 3rd and 15th March 1988, the Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs answered written questions put by Mr. Burger, Mr. Konen and Mr. Hengel in the Chamber of Deputies on Recommendations 449 and 452.

IV. Special information action taken in member parliaments by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations

44. The action taken by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations in April 1985 to organise information meetings in all member parliaments in order to familiarise parliamentarians with the Assembly's work was completed with the meetings held in The Hague on 23rd February and in Brussels on 24th February 1988.

45. The committee held the following meetings:

- in Paris, at the Senate, on 17th April 1985;
- in Rome, at the Senate, on 11th June 1985;
- in Bonn, at the Bundestag, on 20th February 1986;
- in London, at the House of Commons, in the presence of Mr. Cahen, Secretary-

General of WEU, on 17th November 1986;

- in Luxembourg, at the Conference Centre, on 28th April 1987;
- in The Hague, at the Second Chamber of the States-General, on 23rd February 1988;
- in Brussels, at the Chamber of Representatives, on 24th February 1988.

46. The recent meetings in The Hague and Brussels were based on briefings by Mr. Shelton on Western European Union, Mr. Burger on the WEU Assembly and Mr. Tummers and Mr. De Bondt on WEU, the Atlantic Alliance and the European institutions. In both parliaments, the interest shown by the parliamentarians invited and their participation proved very encouraging, and a lively discussion was held on a number of subjects raised by the speakers.

47. It is interesting to review the subjects raised by external participants. Inter alia, they put questions on:

- the influence of recommendations on government decisions;
- co-ordinating the activities of the WEU Assembly with those of the North Atlantic Assembly;
- alliance concepts following the INF agreement and WEU's position on the denuclearisation of Europe;
- the extension of Franco-German co-operation in defence matters to other interested countries;
- the enlargement of WEU;
- co-operation between European institutes conducting research on security and defence matters;
- the future composition of the WEU Assembly.

48. While several United Kingdom and German members of the committee and one Belgian parliamentarian deplored their parliaments' meagre knowledge of or interest in WEU matters, there was no such complaint by Netherlands participants. On the contrary, two of them considered that WEU was now well known, particularly since the adoption of the platform, and that it had assumed greater importance thanks to the Gulf crisis. At the meeting in Brussels, the interest of Belgian parliamentarians was demonstrated by the large number of participants in spite of the difficult position of the Belgian Parliament at the time following the recent elections.

49. A general review of this special action shows that there was an encouraging response to

the meetings organised in Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands while the response to the meetings organised in the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom was disappointing.

50. However, the meeting in the Bundestag was the only one which aroused the interest of Soviet journalists, and the meeting in the House of Commons was particularly interesting because of the questions put to the Secretary-General of WEU by a journalist from a leading British daily newspaper.

51. Among the questions raised at the last two information meetings, two perhaps deserve special mention. First, the influence of recommendations on government decisions. Parliamentarians' dialogue with governments on the basis of recommendations might be easier if the texts were more succinct and concentrated on a few well-defined subjects on which firm proposals were made. This goal is admittedly difficult to attain since, if a large majority is to be obtained, account has to be taken of the positions of all the political tendencies represented in the Assembly.

52. Second, several members of the committee have underlined the growing importance of the dialogue between Western Europe and the alliance partners across the Atlantic, and above all with representatives of the United States. Several members therefore said they were in favour of the committee being authorised to visit the United States for talks with congressmen.

V. Public relations activities of the WEU Council and Secretariat-General

53. At the time of writing, the second part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council has not yet been transmitted to the Assembly. The first part, covering the period January to June 1987, includes a very brief paragraph on informing the press and public, although nothing very specific is said.

54. Conversely, the communication from Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, to the President of the Assembly, dated 17th December 1987, on the public relations activities of the WEU Secretariat-General (Document 1132) gives some details.

55. It is gratifying that the Secretary-General's proposals to the Council on reorganising the administrative structures of WEU include provision for a stronger press and information section. It is now important to know what this involves.

56. Also gratifying is the Secretary-General's statement that such a section cannot really work satisfactorily and usefully without a minimum of financial resources.

57. The impressive public relations activities of the Secretary-General personally should also be acknowledged. However, he cannot assume entire responsibility for this task himself. A more open Council information policy should be worked out for implementation by member governments.

58. The committee notes with interest that a booklet on the various stages in the reactivation of WEU is to be published in the near future by the Secretariat-General. Would it not be possible to issue a regular bulletin, too?

VI. Conclusions

59. At a time when the importance of WEU has visibly increased thanks to the Council's recent activities, it must be ensured that due account is taken of the Assembly's views in centres of reflection and decision on defence and security matters, i.e. in member governments and parliaments.

60. These views are expressed specifically in Assembly reports and recommendations, but the response to this work at national level is still too feeble. With the present composition of delegations, the WEU lobby in national parliamentary committees responsible for matters handled by the WEU Assembly is not strong enough in most parliaments.

61. Moreover, Assembly reports are generally distributed only on request and, in four parliaments, the situation is worsened by the problem of having to translate reports into the official language or languages of the country concerned.

62. The appeal made by the President of the Assembly and the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations after each session that the texts selected by the committee form the subject of interventions or questions remains a dead letter in the majority of parliaments.

63. If the Assembly fails to increase member countries' interest in its work, the governments will have no impelling reason to speed up procedure in the Council for concerting answers to recommendations or to make special efforts to ensure that the Council follows up the substance of recommendations; on the other hand, the arguments of those who advocate a more "European" composition for the Assembly might be helped by the fact that its present composition has not proved itself.

64. It is therefore essential for the encouraging example set in recent months by members of the German, Luxembourg and United Kingdom Delegations, who have endeavoured to start a discussion with their governments on the basis of recommendations adopted, to be followed by the other delegations.

APPENDIX I

Questionnaire

*for secretaries of national delegations in preparation for the report by
the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations
on the impact of the WEU Assembly's activities
on parliaments and public opinion*

(Paris, 28th January 1988)

1. Which members of your delegation to the WEU Assembly are at present members of:

- (a) the foreign affairs committee;
- (b) the defence committee

of your parliament?

2. The Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly regularly receives parliamentary bulletins and reports of debates in plenary sitting in member parliaments. Conversely, it has very little information on the activities of national foreign affairs and defence committees since, in most parliaments, their discussions are not public.

To improve information on matters discussed by the foreign affairs and defence committees of your parliament, would it be possible henceforth to receive their agendas on a regular basis?

3. Reports prepared by WEU Assembly committees contain a draft recommendation followed by an explanatory memorandum and are printed immediately after their adoption in committee for subsequent distribution to members of the Assembly and secretariats of national delegations.

What procedure does your secretariat follow on receipt of these reports?

- (a) (This question does not concern the French and United Kingdom Parliaments.)

Are reports translated by your staff into the official language(s) of your parliament?

- (b) When and to what extent are interested parliamentarians who are not members of the WEU Assembly able to study the full texts of these reports?

- (c) Are reports or their translations made available to members of the foreign affairs, defence or other interested committees in your parliament?

- (d) Are they also made available to political groups in your parliament?

- (e) Are they sent by your services to the press or other institutions or persons outside parliament?

If so, please give details.

4. Immediately after each session of the WEU Assembly, its President transmits a selection of texts adopted (recommendations proper without their explanatory memoranda) to the presidents of all member parliaments in the hope that "these texts will be of interest to your parliament and will be the subject of speeches or questions".

What is the procedure in your parliament for following up the texts transmitted by the President of the WEU Assembly?

- (a) (This question does not concern the French and United Kingdom Parliaments.)

Are the letter from the President of the WEU Assembly and its appendices translated by your staff into the official language(s) of your parliament?

- (b) To what extent are all interested members of your parliament informed as quickly as possible of this communication from the President of the WEU Assembly?

5. Have you any proposals or suggestions for making the transmission of the texts adopted to your parliament more effective and improving means of bringing these texts to the attention of members of your parliament without delay?

6. Is it customary in your parliament for committees to organise hearings of members of the WEU Assembly (rapporteurs, for instance) when discussing matters dealt with in reports submitted to the WEU Assembly, as proposed in Order 44 adopted on 5th December 1974?

7. After sessions of the WEU Assembly, does your parliament receive regular written, published information reports prepared by your delegation?

- (a) If so, please send us the text of the most recent information report.
- (b) Are information reports prepared by the delegation discussed and approved formally by the appropriate committees or at a plenary sitting of your parliament?
- (c) If the reports are published, how are they distributed?
- (d) If they are not published, how is your parliament informed of the activities of members of your delegation to the WEU Assembly?
8. Does your delegation to the WEU Assembly organise working meetings between Assembly sessions?
- If so, how often and for what purpose?
9. After each session, the WEU Assembly publishes a booklet containing texts adopted and a brief account of the session, a specific number of which are sent to the secretariat of each delegation.
- Are these booklets distributed by your services automatically or on request:
- (a) to members of the delegation?
- (b) to members of the foreign affairs and defence committees?
- (c) to other interested parliamentarians?
- (d) to the press?
- (e) to other institutions or persons outside parliament?
- If so, please give details.
10. Are the booklets requested often?
11. Have requests to your parliament for information on WEU and the activities of its Assembly increased in recent years?
- If so, please give details of the types of request you receive and say how you answer them.
12. How does your country's government inform your parliament of the activities of WEU?
- (a) in regular written reports?
- If so, please send us the most recent report.
- (b) by regular hearings of members of the government:
- in plenary sitting?
- in committee?
- (c) only sporadically or on request?
- (d) by other means?

APPENDIX II

ORDER 44 ¹*on national parliaments and the WEU Assembly* ²

The Assembly,

Regretting that the work of WEU is little known in the parliaments of member countries;
Anxious to develop a sense of European solidarity in the parliaments of member countries,

INVITES THE MEMBERS OF EACH NATIONAL DELEGATION

1. To take steps for parliaments to ask governments to present a report, during debates on foreign policy, on their position on matters considered by the Council or Assembly of WEU and the action they intend to take on Assembly recommendations;
2. To promote relations between the Assembly of WEU and national parliamentary committees, inter alia by Rapporteurs of the Assembly of WEU being heard by these committees when matters are being discussed which have been dealt with in reports submitted to the Assembly of WEU.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1974 during the second part of the twentieth ordinary session (11th sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments (Document 653).

APPENDIX III

RESOLUTION 78¹*on public information activities on security and defence matters
in WEU member countries²*

The Assembly,

- (i) Anxious to make public and parliamentary opinion more aware of the European dimension of security and the specific aims of WEU in this context;
- (ii) Stressing that it is of the utmost importance for more members of the Assembly to intervene in their national parliaments on the basis of texts adopted in order to draw the attention of government authorities and public opinion to the work of the WEU Assembly;
- (iii) Welcoming the initiative taken by the Netherlands Government in communicating to the Second Chamber of the States-General its position on the future prospects of WEU under Netherlands presidency;
- (iv) Regretting nevertheless that the remarkable efforts made by certain member governments to keep the public – and in particular the younger generation – in their countries informed of security and defence problems only exceptionally give adequate information on the rôle of WEU,

INVITES NATIONAL DELEGATIONS

1. To ensure that debates on defence and security in parliaments, in the political groups and with governments and the public are organised so as to bring the greatest possible attention to the work of the WEU Assembly;
2. To urge governments to improve the co-ordination, with the appropriate WEU bodies, of their national activities in keeping the public informed, and in particular the younger generation.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1987 during the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session (12th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Burger on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations (Document 1112).

Replies of the Council to Recommendations 449 to 454

RECOMMENDATION 449¹

*on the political activities of the Council –
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council²*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that developments in the Atlantic Alliance make it essential to strengthen its European pillar and that at the present juncture WEU is still the only organisation capable of forming this pillar;
- (ii) Considering that the way to achieve this result is through the early implementation of the Rome declaration and welcoming the fact that the adoption of the platform on European security interests marks the starting point in the effective reactivation of WEU;
- (iii) Noting with satisfaction that the platform on European security interests adopted by the Council on 27th October 1987 responds, in the main, to Assembly Recommendations 420, 429, 432, 438, 441, 442 and 446;
- (iv) Welcoming the development of consultations between member countries in the framework of WEU and expressing its satisfaction that the Council implemented Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty for the first time in summer 1987 in the context of the Gulf crisis;
- (v) Regretting, however, that co-ordination of the action taken by member countries in that region was limited;
- (vi) Noting that the thirty-second annual report of the Council gives only a very inadequate account of the Council's activities in 1986;
- (vii) Regretting the Council's slowness in answering the Assembly, the ever-later dates on which it transmits its reports and the very inadequate information it gives;
- (viii) Noting that the informal procedure increasingly practised by the Council is not likely to alleviate this shortcoming;
- (ix) Stressing that the Assembly's own needs are wholly independent of those of the ministerial organs and that restructuring must not affect the independence of either the Assembly or the Office of the Clerk vis-à-vis the ministerial organs,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Speed up its procedure to allow quicker transmission to the Assembly of the substantial information it needs in order to exercise its responsibility of supervising the Council's activities under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, respect a time-limit, under normal circumstances, of eight weeks for answering questions and adopt a normal schedule of dates so that the Assembly might receive its half-yearly reports in time for preparing useful replies;
2. Ensure the immediate implementation of the intentions expressed in paragraph III (a) 4 of the platform which it adopted on 27th October 1987;
3. While respecting the time-limit of 31st December 1987, take the measures to restructure the organs of WEU allowing these new requirements to be met and, in pursuance of this, invite the Assembly to comment on the draft organogram being prepared by the Secretary-General before its submission to the Council for approval;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st December 1987 during the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session (8th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1117).

4. Pursue the full implementation of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, and in particular its paragraph 3;
5. Examine carefully the development of bilateral co-operation between its members on security matters with a view to extending this co-operation to all member countries without thereby diluting the results of bilateral co-operation;
6. In consultation with the Presidential Committee, ensure satisfactory co-ordination of the presence of ministers at Assembly sessions, and in particular the participation of the presidency in all debates on the Council's reports;
7. Ensure that the permanent structure of the ministerial organs allows the establishment of a unit responsible solely for implementing an active policy for informing the public and the press and continue to give and improve information to the Assembly and the public on meetings of the WEU Council at the level of the enlarged Council;
8. Keep the Assembly regularly informed of meetings and the results of the work of the special working group and its sub-groups;
9. Accord the Assembly without delay the funds and staff necessary for restructuring the Office of the Clerk;
10. Ensure that the Secretariat-General is in a position to assist the Council in all its activities.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 449***

1. The request of the Assembly to speed up transmission of substantial information, in order to enable it to exercise its activities under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, is a point well taken up by the Council. The Council endeavours to send all relevant information as soon as possible to the Assembly. It should however be borne in mind that the drafting of reports and written answers which need the agreement of all seven members of WEU requires a certain amount of time. Nevertheless, in order to accommodate the Assembly as much as possible, the Council has been examining this problem, and has been looking for improvements in the procedure for answering recommendations and questions, and for drafting the bi-annual reports. Direct telecommunications between the capitals were envisaged as an important means to this end. The WEU member states have therefore now set up a network of direct communications.

2. The intentions expressed in paragraph III (A) 4 of the platform on European security interests constitute a basis on which further discussions are being held within the WEU framework, in particular in the Special Working Group. They are certainly not to be seen as distant goals set out by the member states, but on the contrary indicate commitments which the WEU countries are already fulfilling. For instance, improvement of consultation and co-ordination in defence and security matters has been brought about, as well as a stronger involvement of defence ministers and their representatives at WEU meetings. The concertation of policies on crises outside Europe is another case in point where considerable progress has been achieved.

3. Pursuant to the decisions taken at the Ministerial Council meeting in The Hague, the Council has continued its discussion on the restructuring of the ministerial organs, in particular of the three Agencies for Security Questions. The Council did not finalise this restructuring process at the end of 1987 and this subject is still being considered. It is the Council's view that matters concerned with the internal functioning of the ministerial organs are the responsibility of the Council itself and the Assembly has therefore not been invited to comment on the draft organigramme before its submission to the Ministerial Council for approval.

4. Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty was implemented for the first time when a series of meetings took place between high-level representatives of the ministries of foreign affairs and defence of the WEU countries on matters pertaining to the situation in the Gulf area. These meetings brought about a process of exchange of information, consultation and concertation, fully in line with the intention expressed by the ministers in Rome in October 1984 to consider whenever appropriate the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world. As stated in the platform, the WEU member countries have committed themselves to concert their policies on crises outside Europe in so far as they may affect their security interests.

5. Bilateral forms of co-operation in the field of security between West European countries have formed an important aspect of the common defence within the Atlantic Alliance in the post war period. At the Ministerial Council meeting in The Hague in October 1987, the French and German ministers of defence briefed their colleagues on the actual state of affairs in their bilateral co-operation, thereby pointing out its non-exclusive character. They stressed that the partners would be kept informed of new developments concerning their co-operation. These developments are being followed with great interest by the Council.

6. The Council will co-ordinate as far as possible, together with the Presidential Committee of the Assembly, the presence of ministers at the plenary sessions of the Assembly. In this respect, the Council would like to underline that the increased presence of ministers at Assembly meetings over recent years reflects the great interest that the Council takes in these sessions. The Presidency of the Council normally attends all plenary sessions of the Assembly during which the Council's reports are being debated.

7. A separate press and information unit in the Secretariat is under consideration as part of the Council's continuing review of the restructuring of the ministerial organs.

8. The Special Working Group and its sub-groups, consisting of representatives from capitals, have been set up under the responsibility of the Council as instruments for consultation on security matters. In order to facilitate their discussions, however, these consultations between senior members of the min-

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th April 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 12th April 1988.

istries of foreign affairs and defence, which form a valuable addition to those in the Council and between the political directors, must remain confidential. Bearing this in mind, the Assembly, in accordance with Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, will be kept duly informed of the activities of the Council and its working groups in the biannual reports of the Council.

9. As stated in the letters from the President of the Council to the Assembly, of 15th July 1987, and from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly, of 23rd November 1987, the proposals concerning the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk cannot be tackled separately from the overall review of the reorganisation of the ministerial organs. The possible establishment of new posts in particular can therefore only be envisaged within the framework of this overall reorganisation. The outcome of the total restructuring process will enable the Council to determine whether the requests for the creation of new functions in the Office of the Clerk could be met.

10. In the framework of the reorganisation of the ministerial organs, a strengthening of the Secretariat is envisaged so as to enable this body adequately to assist the Council in its activities.

RECOMMENDATION 450¹*on the military use of computers –
towards a joint European defence research programme²*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the converging views observed at European level on more active participation in the East-West dialogue and any disarmament initiatives;
- (ii) Considering the results of work conducted in the IEPG recalling the interest of a European defence market;
- (iii) Considering that an essential prerequisite for a modern and competitive European defence industry is Europe's mastery of the whole range of microelectronics;
- (iv) Considering the conclusions drawn in the report "Towards a stronger Europe", indicating Europe's relatively weak position as compared with its main competitors in certain areas of defence electronics and specifically microelectronics;
- (v) Considering the close relationship in research and development between military and civilian microelectronics;
- (vi) Noting the striking contrast between the repeated public announcements of the WEU member countries' determination to take the necessary steps in the European Community to strengthen Europe's own technological capability and achieve the creation of a technological community on the one hand and the endless bickering leading to an unsatisfactory agreement on a European framework programme for 1987-91 on the other hand;
- (vii) Considering that the early harmonisation of national operational requirements and the interoperability of the military computer systems are of primordial importance,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Stop making solemn statements on the determination of the WEU member countries to create a technological community for as long as their action is turned in the opposite direction, and instead:
 - (a) attach higher priority to IEPG co-operative technology projects than has been the case hitherto;
 - (b) convince member countries of the need to increase the budget for the European framework programme and for Esprit in particular;
 - (c) pay attention to the risks stemming from the protection of American and Japanese markets which calls in question the rules of international trade and threatens Europe's legitimate interests;
 - (d) make a major effort to harmonise national operational requirements for military computer systems;
2. Initiate a joint European defence research programme associating round the WEU member countries all the Western European countries wishing to take part.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1987 during the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session (9th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Fourré on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 1118).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 450

1. WEU member countries remain convinced of the need for Europe to have at its disposal a modern and competitive defence industry, to which end the creation of a technological community is indispensable, as reaffirmed by the foreign and defence ministers at their meeting in Bonn in April 1985. The IEPG is the main forum in which WEU members and other European allies devote attention to the subject under consideration.

2. At their meeting in June 1987, IEPG ministers of defence underlined the importance of greater co-ordination of national research and technology efforts in Europe. They specifically directed that efforts be made to increase the number of co-operative technology projects (CTPS). They also agreed that research co-operation should be developed on a systematic basis, concentrating upon areas of technological priority. Within this context, special attention is given to related technological research in the civilian sector. The Council fully supports the approach of the IEPG which will be worked out in future discussions at expert and political level. The colloquy arranged by the WEU Assembly on European co-operation in armaments research and development, to be held in London in March of this year, may also contribute towards furthering European defence research as envisaged by the Assembly. As far as the funding of European defence research and development is concerned, IEPG ministers recommended during their June 1987 meeting that financial arrangements for stimulating co-operative research be considered, including the earmarking of funds from national budgets and arrangements similar to those employed in Eureka.

3. Civilian programmes, such as Esprit, may have a military spin-off. However, at this stage, there are no direct links between civilian programmes and the application of their results in the defence field.

4. The IEPG and its member countries have on many occasions asked for the removal of legal and other impediments to free trade and will continue to do so. The Council firmly believes that competitiveness is the sole basis for international technological co-operation.

5. Within the framework of the IEPG's co-operative projects, considerable attention is given to the harmonisation of operational requirements of the military systems involved. This also applies to the operational requirements of military computer systems.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th February 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 1st March 1988.

RECOMMENDATION 451 ¹

replying to the thirty-second annual report of the Council ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the Council's continued close consultation on European security and disarmament questions and its determination not to allow Europe to be sidelined in the present strategic debate;
- (ii) Welcoming the commitment in the platform on European security interests adopted by the Council on 27th October 1987 to build a European union;
- (iii) Welcoming in particular the active rôle of the presidency of the Council in initiating consultation, including the first consultation on a threat to peace arising outside Europe;
- (iv) Welcoming also the establishment of the Council's high-level special working group to improve co-operation between Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Defence in all member countries;
- (v) Stressing the need for a decision in 1988 on the co-location and restructuring of all Council organs and WEU institutions;
- (vi) Calling for an early decision thereafter on the accession of the countries which have expressed a wish to join WEU;
- (vii) Recalling the continued importance of the long-standing institutional responsibilities of the Council concerning troop levels and the remaining internal arms control,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue its discussions on all aspects of European security and disarmament and ensure that European interests are safeguarded in the present strategic debate;
2. Decide to co-locate all Council bodies and WEU institutions and to define the new tasks of the agencies for security questions;
3. Reinstate in its annual reports the information previously given on the number of control measures carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1987 during the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session (10th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Scheer on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 1116).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 451

1. The platform on European security interests, adopted at The Hague on 27th October 1987, constitutes an important element in European security co-operation. Further harmonisation of views on specific conditions of security in Europe continues to take place within WEU on the basis of the platform. The high level Special Working Group has been requested to elaborate upon different aspects of it. Regular discussions also continue both in this group, in the Permanent Council and between political directors and their counterparts in ministries of defence in the framework of the reinforced Council, on current developments and the major issues in European security. With regard to the situation in the Gulf, the member states of WEU are continuing their concertation at all the appropriate political and operational levels.
2. At the ministerial Council meeting of The Hague on 26th-27th October 1987, all WEU countries expressed their agreement with the principle of collocation. It was decided to merge the three Agencies into one, under the authority of the Secretary-General. No agreement was reached on the future location of the WEU ministerial organs.
3. On the basis of the Council's decisions, a draft organigramme has been presented by the Secretary-General to the Council defining a rationalised, collocated and cost-effective unit capable of flexible operation and better equipped to fulfil its future tasks in support of the Council and the working groups. This is now being considered by the Council.
4. The information concerning the number of control measures, which are still being carried out as part of the residual tasks of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, will be provided in the report on the activities of the Council over the second half of 1987.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 18th March 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 13th April 1988.

RECOMMENDATION 452 ¹on disarmament ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Calling for the collective defence effort to be maintained at all times at the level necessary to ensure the security of all countries of the alliance, while negotiations are actively pursued on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments to the lowest levels compatible with that essential security, in full accordance with the long-standing policy of the alliance;
- (ii) Welcoming the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union based on zero-zero proposals agreed by the alliance as a whole which it believes must be in the long-term security interests of countries both of the alliance and the Warsaw Pact, and noting that the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments will report fully on all aspects of the anticipated agreement when the text is published;
- (iii) Welcoming also the approach to a bilateral agreement to reduce strategic nuclear weapons;
- (iv) Stressing the importance of respect for the existing ABM treaty and notional limitations of the SALT accords which can be modified only by agreement between the parties to them, and recalling in this connection the reply of the Council to Recommendation 413;
- (v) Noting with satisfaction the improved prospects for the conclusion of a multilateral treaty to ban all chemical weapons and a bilateral agreement to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons tests;
- (vi) Noting both the similarities and the differences between the security policy declared by NATO most recently in Reykjavik and the military strategy enunciated by the Warsaw Pact in Berlin, and welcoming the positive aspects of the Berlin proposals for consultations between the two alliances to discuss military doctrine and a search for ways of removing imbalances and asymmetries in different armaments and forces;
- (vii) Noting in this connection that in Prague on 10th April 1987 General Secretary Gorbachev confirmed the existence of such imbalances and asymmetries for historical and other reasons;
- (viii) Calling in general for the councils of both alliances to give careful consideration to all arms control proposals of the other,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Press for the earliest opening of negotiations on conventional stability mandated to discuss asymmetrical reductions of conventional forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals so as to establish a stable and non-threatening military balance in Europe and the various regions concerned at the lowest possible levels;
2. Express full support for a verifiable bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce the strategic warheads of each party to 6 000, and continue to ensure that any such bilateral agreement imposes no restrictions on the forces of European countries, who are not parties to it;
3. Urge on the two parties the importance of fully respecting the existing ABM treaty and notional limitations of the SALT accords, which can be modified only by agreement between them;
4. Call on the North Atlantic Council to consider positively the Berlin proposal of the Warsaw Pact for consultations between the two alliances to compare military strategy, and to find ways of removing asymmetries in types of armaments and forces through reductions to the lower level in each case, and in general to give proper consideration to all arms control proposals of the Warsaw Pact countries with a view to identifying those elements which may provide a fruitful basis for mutually-advantageous negotiations;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1987 during the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session (10th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Scheer on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 1116).

5. Call on the Warsaw Pact to renounce its offensive military and technical doctrine and give its armed forces a structure clearly designed for defensive purposes and which does not allow it to undertake an offensive against other countries;
6. Call on NATO and the Warsaw Pact to renounce offensive technical capacities in favour of the creation of mutual non-provocative, confidence-building defence structures;
7. In the framework of disarmament, ensure that in each case both sides make reductions to the lowest level.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 452***

1. The Council underlines the importance of verifiable conventional arms control measures leading to a more stable and secure balance of forces at lower levels. The WEU countries as members of the Alliance will actively pursue the launching of new negotiations leading to the elimination of disparities and of the capability for surprise attack as well as large-scale offensive action in the whole of Europe. These negotiations on conventional stability from the Atlantic to the Urals should be opened at the earliest possible time. It is expected that they will begin later this year. However, since these negotiations will take place within the framework of the CSCE process, it has to be recognised that their mandate has to be part of a balanced and substantial outcome of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting.
2. The WEU countries pursue an active arms control and disarmament policy aimed at the enhancement of stability and security. In this context, the WEU countries not only welcome the INF agreement, but also attach great importance to rapid progress towards reductions in the field of strategic nuclear weapons and support the objective of the United States and the Soviet Union to achieve 50% reductions in their strategic arsenals.
3. In this connection, the agreement in principle between the United States and the Soviet Union not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a period to be determined is welcomed by the Council. The Council hopes that this development will facilitate reaching an agreement on strategic nuclear weapons.
4. The WEU countries have clearly stated in the platform they adopted on European security interests that arms control is an integral part of their security policy. In their search for stability and openness through effective arms control measures, proper consideration is given by them to all proposals in this field.
5. The WEU member states do not consider that military doctrines can form the subject of negotiations. On the other hand, they believe that greater transparency in this field could throw light, particularly on the levels, structures and deployment of conventional forces in Europe. Hence they consider that the future negotiations on confidence-building and security measures between the 35 states participating in the CSCE process could provide an opportunity of emphasising this idea of transparency in the sphere of military doctrines. An exchange of views within the 35 framework could, in addition, only be beneficial to the negotiations among the 23 on conventional stability. It is in this context that the discussions on military doctrines should take account of the capabilities and the structures of the armed forces which have direct influence on the fundamental conditions of security in Europe.
6. The Council fully supports all measures which can contribute to increased openness and stability in Europe.

1. Communicated to the Council on 12th April 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 12th April 1988.

RECOMMENDATION 453 ¹*on recent developments in Soviet external policy* ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that, if confirmed and pursued, the policy of reform and openness undertaken by the Soviet Union opens the way for a far-reaching change in relations between Eastern and Western Europe, important disarmament measures and a consolidation of international peace;
- (ii) Noting that the prospects for “reality and guarantees for a secure world” expressed by Mr. Gorbachev on 17th September 1987 very largely respond to Western Europe’s aspirations, but considering that Soviet practice should correspond more to these words;
- (iii) Considering that the CSCE is the framework in which the conditions for new relations between the two parts of Europe can be worked out, provided adequate progress is accomplished in each of the three baskets;
- (iv) Welcoming the progress achieved in the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons but noting that Western Europe’s security also requires agreements on the verified limitation of strategic weapons, on a balance of conventional weapons and on banning the use of chemical weapons with the progressive destruction of existing stocks;
- (v) Noting that the principal threats to international peace now originate in regions outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty;
- (vi) Stressing that a concern of the WEU Council should be to concert the action of member countries to restore peace by the application of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 and to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf;
- (vii) Welcoming the fact that the Assembly has been able to start a dialogue with the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union on the conditions of European security and hoping that it will be possible to continue these exchanges of views,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine regularly the evolution of relations between Eastern and Western Europe;
2. Urge both the United States and the Soviet Union to implement any Soviet-American agreements on the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons, while assuring Europe that there will be a determined and vigorous effort to achieve an early, satisfactory outcome to negotiations on other categories of weapons;
3. Through close consultations, seek to uphold joint positions in all meetings held in the framework of the CSCE in order to obtain substantial, balanced results in negotiations held in the context of each of the three baskets, including:
 - (a) the early conclusion of an agreement on the limitation of conventional weapons restoring the balance of forces in Europe and including a satisfactory system of verification;
 - (b) the liberalisation of exchanges of ideas and the free movement of persons between Eastern and Western Europe;
 - (c) the definition of the obligations of each country taking part in the conference, particularly in regard to human rights and the environment;
 - (d) the development of economic, scientific and cultural relations between the two parts of Europe;
 - (e) respect for the sovereignty and independence of all states.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1987 during the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session (11th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Péciaux on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1111).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 453***

1. The situation in Eastern Europe and the evolution of its relationship with the West are being followed carefully by the Atlantic Alliance and within European political co-operation. The WEU, both at the level of the Council and in the Special Working Group, focuses its attention on the politico-military aspects of East-West relations and on their implications for European security.
2. At the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels on 11th December 1987, ministers welcomed and fully supported the Washington INF treaty and urged its early entry into force. This result was made possible thanks to the solidarity and resolve shown by the alliance as a whole. The treaty is all the more meaningful because it sets precedents which will be useful in negotiations on other areas of arms control.
3. Joint positions on various aspects of the Helsinki process, in particular regarding the Vienna follow-up meeting and the document which it is hoped will emanate from this meeting, are being developed both through the European political co-operation framework and within the Atlantic Alliance. The WEU countries thereby actively strive for substantial and balanced progress in the CSCE framework, in line with the goals set out in the Assembly's recommendation.

1. Communicated to the Council on 26th February 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 1st March 1988.

RECOMMENDATION 454¹
*on European armaments co-operation –
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council*²

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that ever since the Rome declaration in October 1984 the Council as a whole and its members individually have stated that WEU should provide political impetus to the development of European co-operation in armaments matters;
- (ii) Dissatisfied that during the three years that have elapsed since October 1984 the Council has failed to provide proof of this much-vaunted political impetus, notwithstanding the primordial rôle of the WEU countries in the IEPG, their geographical and military position and the size of their defence industry;
- (iii) Welcoming the organisation in 1988 of a first European defence study session to advance knowledge of the European dimensions of security matters;
- (iv) Recalling the final communiqué of the IEPG ministers' meeting held in Seville on 22nd June 1987, in which the ministers endorsed the long-term objectives of the European defence industry study (EDIS) report and expressed their determination to develop an action plan for a step-by-step approach towards an open European market for defence equipment;
- (v) Considering that neither the division of work between the Standing Armaments Committee and the IEPG, dating from 1978, nor the agreement regarding co-operation between the presidency of the IEPG and the Secretary-General of WEU, dating from 1986, are being observed;
- (vi) Considering that the IEPG ministers have declined to establish an international secretariat for the IEPG,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Take the lead in implementing the action plan for an open European market for defence equipment as recommended by the EDIS report by committing its members to reach agreement on common operational requirements for each major piece of defence equipment they will need from now on;
2. Conclude its three-year reflections and deliberations on the reorganisation, future rôle and tasks of the SAC and Agency III and instruct the new ministerial organs to conduct studies connected with the IEPG ministers' decision to develop an action plan for a step-by-step approach towards an open European market for defence equipment;
3. Increase its efforts to guarantee that appropriate international bodies and national administrations provide all the information needed by the body which takes over to conduct its studies;
4. Ensure that the division of work between the SAC and the IEPG dating from 1978, if considered obsolete, is replaced by an up-to-date agreement and that the 1986 co-operation agreement between the presidency of the IEPG and the Secretary-General of WEU is observed;
5. Arrange for the presidency of the IEPG to address the Assembly once a year to inform it about developments in European armaments co-operation;
6. Instruct the Secretariat-General to ensure periodical meetings of European defence study sessions and to co-ordinate national initiatives in this connection with a view to setting up a European defence research institute as soon as possible.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1987 during the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session (12th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Bassinet on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 1119).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL***to Recommendation 454***¹

1. In order to enhance effective European armaments co-operation, the Council attaches great importance to the relationship between WEU and the IEPG.
2. The different fora of European armaments co-operation could be used in a complementary way. Therefore, the IEPG action plan for an open European market for defence equipment as recommended by the EDIS report should be drawn up by the organs of the IEPG, in accordance with the Seville decisions of June 1987. However, the possibility of the WEU conducting studies for the IEPG could be examined by the Council if the IEPG makes such a request. In general, the contacts between the WEU and the IEPG should be further developed. In this context the Council would support an invitation by the Assembly to the Chairman of the IEPG to address the Assembly in order to exchange views.
3. As far as point 6 of the Assembly's recommendation is concerned, it should be mentioned that, for the time being, instead of striving towards establishing a European Defence Research Institute, the Council's action is directed towards encouraging co-operation between existing institutes, and towards encouraging the organisation by such institutes of seminars on European security aspects, the first of which is to be held at the IHEDN in Paris, in November 1988.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 2nd March 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 7th March 1988.

*Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada
in security matters*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Pontillon, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); Mr. Burger (Alternate: Konen) (Vice-Chairman); MM Aarts (Alternate: Eisma), Bassinet, Baumel, van der Biest, Coleman, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Foschi, Hill, Hirschler, Koehl, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Martino, Mechttersheimer, Müller, Natali, Pécriaux, Pieralli, Pontillon, Reddemann, Ruet, van der Sanden, Sarti, Shelton, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Mr. Stoffelen.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

*on co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada
in security matters*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the determination of the WEU member countries to contribute, by reactivating the organisation, to the building of Europe means tightening links between Europe and its American allies, as stated in the platform adopted in The Hague;
- (ii) Welcoming the confirmation of a consensus in this respect between the two sides of the Atlantic, as testified by the President of the United States' public approval of the reactivation of WEU and the platform adopted in The Hague;
- (iii) Convinced that the maintenance of a large American force on the territory of Western Europe is a factor of deterrence essential to the security of all the members of the Atlantic Alliance;
- (iv) Noting with satisfaction that the United States Government does not intend to call in question its conventional and nuclear military commitment in Europe;
- (v) Aware of the need to show the authorities and public opinion in the member countries of the alliance that the existence of a European pillar is necessary for strong, balanced transatlantic co-operation;
- (vi) Reaffirming the need for equitable burden-sharing accompanied by a better sharing of political responsibilities in the Atlantic Alliance and in any event underlining the need for regular political consultations and a real European-American partnership;
- (vii) Anxious that the development of negotiations on security and co-operation in Europe, disarmament or the limitation of armaments, which it trusts can be started in 1988 and lead to positive results, should not call in question the political and military bases of joint defence;
- (viii) – Also convinced that European co-operation in security matters and the interests of the alliance mean taking account of the risks that might arise from events outside the North Atlantic Treaty area;
 - Welcoming the mutual understanding regarding operations undertaken by various countries to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf;
 - Noting that these operations demonstrate the need for continuous and close co-operation between the member nations;
- (ix) Wishing to develop, increase the regularity of and institutionalise its exchanges with the United States Congress and Canadian Parliament,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Keep the governments and parliaments of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance regularly informed of its activities;
2. Provide adequate information on a regular basis to the American media and public regarding the nature, scope and aims of the reactivation of WEU, the specific constraints of the WEU countries in security matters and European co-operation in that area;
3. With the assistance of the WEU agency, study views on the future of the Atlantic Alliance published in the United States;
4. Include burden-sharing in the agenda of its forthcoming meetings, taking account of the concerns and contradictory analyses being presented in the United States and in Europe on this question;
5. Instruct the agency to prepare a study of every factor to be taken into account in assessing the burdens incumbent upon each member of the alliance for ensuring joint security and communicate this study to the Assembly before the end of 1988;
6. Examine the consequences for the security of Western Europe as a whole of Canada's decision to transfer to the Federal Republic the brigade now deployed in Norway;

7. Continue to study the implications of the platform of 27th October 1987 with a view to defining the disarmament and arms control aspects of European security requirements:
 - (i) in particular, specify the importance for Western European security of conventional disarmament establishing a balance at the lowest level in that field without which any agreement to reduce short-range weapons would worsen the consequences of the present imbalance;
 - (ii) urge the early conclusion of a fully satisfactory agreement on chemical disarmament, i.e. providing for stringent verification procedure;
 - (iii) urge the United States Government not to reduce the levels of American troops stationed in Europe without a satisfactory agreement on duly-verified conventional disarmament;
8. Regularly exchange information as necessary with the United States Government on the aims and action of forces of member countries and the United States in the Gulf;
9. Extend its own exchanges of views to include all threats to international peace.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Pontillon, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Paragraph I.4 of the platform on European security interests adopted by the WEU Council on 27th October 1987 defines relations between Europe and the United States in security matters as follows:

“... the security of the Western European countries can only be ensured in close association with our North American allies. The security of the alliance is indivisible. The partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic rests on the twin foundations of shared values and interests. Just as the commitment of the North American democracies is vital to Europe's security, a free, independent and increasingly more united Western Europe is vital to the security of North America.”

Such words would certainly have met with the approval of the signatories of the 1949 Washington Treaty setting up the Atlantic Alliance and, moreover, the preamble to that treaty includes very similar statements. They convey perfectly well the convictions behind the development of NATO, the establishment of the European Communities and the modification of the Brussels Treaty in 1954 and circumscribe a situation that has been undeniable for more than three decades and still dominates international life today. The question is perhaps whether it will continue to dominate the world of tomorrow and in any event in what manner.

2. There are a number of reasons for questioning the permanency of that situation and for wondering to what extent the United States will consider for much longer that “a free, independent and increasingly more united Western Europe is vital to the security of North America”. During their visit to Washington from 11th to 13th April 1988, the Assembly's General Affairs Committee and Presidential Committee certainly heard soothing remarks from representatives of the present administration. There is some satisfaction in this but it must not be forgotten that the proximity of presidential elections does not encourage the expression of views that might not be orthodox. Conversely, the members of Congress the committee met made no secret of the fact that the American public's views of United States participation in joint defence were evolving very rapidly, particularly because of the financial burden involved.

3. In the economic area, it very soon became clear to the Americans that the emergence of a European Community organised round a Com-

mon Market had serious drawbacks for the United States, particularly because, as from about 1970, its balance of payments deficit became a permanent factor. Europeans are continually urging the United States to restore order in the international financial system by reducing its deficit and re-establishing confidence in the dollar through a balanced budget. However, the imbalance in the balance of payments and the budgetary deficit provide the United States with a way to finance its military and political commitments in the world and in Europe in particular. Asking them to restore a healthier financial situation implies that Europe will take over a share of the burden. Is Europe prepared to do so?

4. Furthermore, while the progressive establishment of a European Common Market, which should, in 1992, lead to the complete abolition of obstacles to trade within the European Community, is viewed by its supporters as a move towards free trade and the unification of Europe, the United States sees it from a quite different angle since it implies the emergence of a powerful economic entity capable of protecting itself against competition from American products and gaining an important place for itself on the world market at the expense of those products. The fall in the exchange rate of the dollar in 1986-87 allowed the United States to avoid some of the disadvantages of this competition. A stable or, a fortiori, higher exchange rate for the dollar would strengthen Europe's trade positions. Moreover, the introduction of a European currency might affect the power that the near-monopoly of the dollar gives the United States in creating means of payment. American public opinion is therefore constantly tempted to consider the emergence of a European power to be dangerous for the United States and its world rôle.

5. In recent years, many observers have noted, however, that Europe was no longer, as in the past, the privileged commercial and economic partner of the United States. Increasingly, a shift in American external trade from East to West, accompanied by the move of many industrial activities, particularly among the most advanced sectors, from the Atlantic to the Pacific front, has had a growing effect on the course followed by the United States. It is therefore inevitable that the place attributed to Western Europe in thoughts on the security of the United States is less important than ten, twenty or thirty years ago.

6. These various considerations largely explain the trend of American public opinion in viewing Europe's place in the security of the United States. Although there has always been a

tendency towards isolationism, i.e. unwillingness to accept commitments abroad, this tendency seems to have strengthened in recent years due to disillusionment with Europeans and significant setbacks in American policy in other parts of the world, for instance in Vietnam and, more recently, Iran. It should be added that, justified or not, some parts of American public opinion were quite bitter about the attitude of certain European governments which did not wish to show solidarity with the United States, in particular in 1986 when Tripoli was bombed in retaliation to Libyan-backed terrorist acts.

7. Whatever the United States administration may have said, President Reagan's speech of 17th March 1983 announcing the strategic defence initiative which was to give new impetus to preparatory research on the deployment in space of a system of defence against any ballistic nuclear missiles that an enemy might launch against American territory was designed to show the world and American public opinion that the government intended to give the country a defensive shield making its security independent of forces deployed abroad. It has indeed been rightly said that the less vulnerable the United States is the more credible will be its commitment to use every means at its disposal, even nuclear, to defend Western Europe. But it is difficult to believe that the choice of such an expensive, long-term undertaking as the SDI is intended for any purpose other than to lay new foundations for the country's security and that it can be pursued to its conclusion at the same time as the deployment of other elements of American forces is strengthened. The fact that so far the SDI budget has been about 50% of what was estimated in 1983 indicates that the United States is not trying to rush the completion of a defence system which separates it from Europe. But the continuity of the effort and the steady refusal to allow it to be taken into account in negotiations with the Soviet Union on disarmament, even so far as to risk breaking off negotiations, clearly illustrate how intent the President of the United States is on protecting American territory.

8. Developments in American-Soviet disarmament negotiations also revealed some disturbing signs for Europe's security. One of them was the text on which the October 1986 Reykjavik summit meeting eventually foundered because the European members of the alliance then weighed up the risk they might run due to an American decision taken rapidly and without prior consultation. Others stem from present uncertainty regarding the firmness of the intentions now being expressed by the United States Government in certain areas such as short-range missiles, chemical weapons and conventional forces and the fact that they might be called in question after the 1988 elections. In view of the part played by the United States in the system that ensures Europe's security, it may be wondered to what

extent Western Europe can tie its security to an American guarantee that is in fact the very subject of these negotiations. In this connection, the platform adopted in The Hague gives useful pointers to the place of deterrence and nuclear arms in European security requirements.

9. What is in point of fact at stake, even if neither the European governments nor that of the United States wish to admit it, is the maintenance of American forces in Europe. There are known to be many Congressmen, and a section of public opinion which is difficult to assess, in favour of at least a partial withdrawal of these forces. Their arguments are based, in particular, on financial considerations and their views are apparently borne out by the need to correct the balance of payments and balance the budget. The call for a better sharing of the financial burden of western defence between the United States and its allies has become a major topic in debates in Congress on security matters. One way or another, it shows that a large section of American public opinion feels that the United States does too much and pays too high a price in economic terms, while its allies take advantage of the situation to improve their financial and commercial positions in the world.

10. Moreover, the decision to destroy medium- and shorter-range ground-based nuclear weapons implied by the signing of the agreement of 7th December 1987, the prospect of the withdrawal or destruction of short-range weapons and the withdrawal, prior to any agreement on destruction by both sides, of American chemical weapons stockpiled in Europe will quickly affect the significance of maintaining American forces in Europe. Until now, this clearly showed any possible aggressor that they would play an active part in defending Western Europe by using weapons appropriate to any challenge that might arise. But if they are left with only conventional weapons when Soviet forces are numerically far superior to NATO forces as a whole, they might soon be reduced to a position in which the United States Government has to choose between using strategic nuclear weapons or sacrificing its expeditionary force. In this case, the deterrent value of the American presence in Europe would be considerably lessened. Above all, American public opinion would find it increasingly difficult to accept the maintenance of a relatively large force in Europe that might become hostage to a powerful aggressor. Addressing the Wehrkunde meeting in Munich on 7th February 1988, Mr. Carlucci, new United States Secretary of Defence, said: "I'd have to look at whether we should keep our forces here" in the event of American tactical nuclear weapons being withdrawn from Europe.

11. These remarks are not based on your Rapporteur's personal impressions but stem clearly from many statements by leading Europe-

ans and Americans several of whom are not at all in favour of such a withdrawal. Here mention may be made of Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State, and Admiral Sir James Eberle, Director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in the Independent of 6th January 1988. It is essential for European public opinion to be aware of these warnings so that, should such events occur, it would not panic but be prepared, at the appropriate time, to assume its due responsibilities.

12. There must obviously be no question of anticipating events or taking measures that might encourage a trend that no European wants. The idea often put forward of a European officer being appointed as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), for instance, is in no way commensurate with the requirement for Europe to do its utmost to ensure the continued presence of American forces on its territory. Conversely, the decision taken by our seven governments to revive WEU, the way they have, in this context, increased consultations on security and disarmament matters and, finally, the adoption of the platform on European security interests on 27th October 1987, without prejudicing the future, help to prepare Western Europe for anything that may happen.

13. Clearly, that is how the United States interpreted these facts: proof is to be found in President Reagan's speech to the world on Worldnet television on 4th November 1987 since, after introducing the future treaty on intermediate nuclear forces and announcing that there was no question of the United States going back on the SDI, he recalled that "the commitment of the United States to the alliance and to the security of Europe - INF treaty or no INF treaty - remains unshakeable". In the same speech he then welcomed the affirmation by the WEU member countries of their identity in collective security matters, while maintaining their commitments to NATO, and expressed his satisfaction at the new defence co-operation between France and Germany and also between France and the United Kingdom as nuclear powers. These statements were subsequently confirmed by Mr. Carlucci in Paris on 11th January 1988.

14. It is thus quite clear that the United States Government considers that the development of continuing European consultations on security matters is neither a reason nor a pretext for restricting the American presence in Europe. If, however, such a measure were to be taken, the reactivation of WEU would have helped to allow Europeans to prepare themselves realistically and effectively.

15. The General Affairs Committee's visit to the United States and Canada in April 1988 allowed it to improve its understanding of the American point of view in this connection. It had interesting talks at the Department of State and

the Pentagon and obtained useful indications regarding the will of the present administration to pursue a policy in which the defence of Europe continued to be given priority. Thanks to the Atlantic Council, it met several persons who examine the long-term aspects of security. In Congress, it held talks with the subcommittee of the House of Representatives that is preparing a report on burden-sharing and is thus able to assess the seriousness of the movement that is emerging in United States public opinion on this subject. The present report will try to draw conclusions from these meetings.

16. The committee's visit to Canada was also of value because that country, so different from Europe because of its geographical situation, the nature of the dangers it has to face and the means at its disposal, has recently adopted a defence policy that brings it close to Europe in many respects. Admittedly, having no nuclear weapons, Canada cannot expect to play a rôle in the alliance comparable to that of the United States, but in the context of a defence policy based on deterrence its active participation in the alliance has a special rôle and your Rapporteur will devote a chapter to analysing what he learned while in Canada, where, in addition to Mr. Perrin Beatty, Minister of National Defence, the committee also met members of parliament, senior officials and representatives of universities with whom it was able to have particularly detailed discussions thanks to the remarkable way the visit was organised.

II. Questioning American commitments

17. Since the Vietnam war and the acknowledgement by United States public opinion and the administration that United States policy in South-East Asia did not have the support of its European allies, a large section of well-informed public opinion in the United States seems, like Mr. Kissinger, to consider that there is a deep-rooted difference between United States policy, an overall, worldwide one, and that of the Western European countries, a regional one, dominated by theatre preoccupations in security matters. This interpretation of relations between Europe and the United States was endorsed in January 1988 by a commission set up by Mr. Weinberger, then Secretary of Defence, to advise the government on defence policy matters. For the first time, its report to the President of the United States brought out the strategic implications of these views.

18. Certain European countries have taken an active interest in one or other region outside Europe in the last twenty years, but many Americans consider this interest is attributable to erstwhile colonial activities and not to a view of the world balance of forces. The United States welcomed action that coincided with its own views,

as was the case in Lebanon and now in Chad and particularly in the Gulf. It also endorsed European initiatives that did not affect Washington's idea of the balance, such as the British Falklands expedition. But it saw the refusal of certain European countries to co-operate in American operations, in particular in the Middle East, Latin America and Libya, as cracks in western solidarity. Whatever such actions may have been, the United States was unable to consider them as expressions of Europe's worldwide vocation since they were always undertaken by one or several countries, never by Europe as such. On the other hand, attempts to co-ordinate action by WEU member countries in the Gulf, although so far too modest, have nevertheless helped considerably to give those responsible for American external policy a favourable opinion of the reactivation of WEU. They probably also largely explain the cordial tone of President Reagan's statement on 4th November 1987.

(a) *Financial aspects*

19. It is not surprising that it is often wondered in the United States whether the breakdown of the American military and budgetary effort does not lean too much in favour of Europe, where the prospect of an armed conflict seems hardly probable, to the detriment of areas where there is a greater threat and which are also important for American interests such as the Far East, the Gulf area and even certain parts of Africa and Latin America. It is naturally very difficult to assess what share of the United States defence budget is earmarked for each theatre, but some believe that Europe benefits from more than 50% of the budget. It is easier to indicate the number of forces stationed there: of 540 000 men stationed outside United States territory, 324 000 are in Europe. Of 771 000 ground forces, 217 000 are stationed in Europe. Some consider this deployment excessive. For instance, in January 1987 Mr. Brzezinski proposed to the Senate Armed Forces Committee that 100 000 men stationed in Europe be repatriated to the United States. However, a realistic assessment of the military challenges that American forces might have to face shows that, even if there is at present no serious crisis in Europe, it is there that the greatest numbers and best-equipped enemy forces would be deployed in the event of hostilities, even if the situation were the result of confrontations in other regions. Almost two-thirds of the Soviet army is deployed opposite Western Europe, not to speak of the armed forces of the people's democracies.

20. This tendency to consider American participation in Europe's security excessive is not a new one: for the last ten years, Senator Mansfield has regularly tabled amendments to the United States defence budget calling for the partial withdrawal of American forces from Europe in response to what he considered to be the inadequate share

Europeans assumed in their own defence. In July 1984, when Senator Sam Nunn took up this proposal, he failed by only one vote in the Senate. This shows the strength gained by the school of thought he represented due to a number of new circumstances, the most important of which are economic and financial.

21. While, after he was first elected President of the United States, Mr. Reagan obtained a considerable increase in the defence budget, which rose from \$173 300 million in 1981 to \$286 800 million in 1985, particularly under heads relating to research and development on the one hand and equipment procurement on the other where the amount doubled, there have been no increases since 1986 due to the financial concerns in United States policy. The country's budget deficit and its balance of payments have deteriorated simultaneously. The following figures speak better than words.

\$ billion			
Financial year	Budget deficit	Trade balance deficit	Balance of payments deficit
1982	- 127.9	- 33.4	- 8.7
1983	- 207.8	- 67.8	- 46.2
1984	- 185.3	- 112.5	- 107.0
1985	- 212.3	- 122.1	- 116.4
1986	- 220.7	- 144.3	- 141.4
1987	- 147.5 (estimate)	- 171.2	- 159.2
1988	- 123.3 (estimate)		

22. While the United States GNP may be estimated at about \$4 000 billion, it must be noted that the budget deficit is close to 5% of GNP, that the national debt, which exceeds \$2 000 billion, represents 50% and that the external debt, about \$300 billion, is increasing considerably. The fall in the dollar exchange rate has done nothing to improve this trend. In December 1985, an agreement between the President and Congress provided for automatic measures to reduce each head of public expenditure so as to reduce the budget deficit in stages until it disappeared in 1991. 50% of this decrease would have applied to the military budget. A Supreme Court verdict in July 1986 annulled the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act that had resulted from the agreement, declaring it unconstitutional, which means that, although the intentions of the President and Congress remain, reductions are no longer automatic. The 1987 deficit admittedly dropped to \$148 billion, but this was due to a series of circumstances which had not been foreseen at the time of the adoption of the budget whose deficit was \$187 billion, not all of which will recur. In September 1987, the Presi-

dent and Congress agreed to delay by two years application of the measures planned in 1985, thus deferring their effects until after the 1988 presidential election.

23. Having had the public debt ceiling removed, President Reagan can therefore, in 1988, again confine himself to steps to reduce the budget deficit by limited savings allowing him to increase the defence budget to slightly above its 1985 level, although expenditure authorisations started to fall in 1986, while avoiding a further increase in taxation. However, the rise in the deficit in the balance of external accounts, which produces lower dollar rates, the impossibility of significant cuts in interest rates and some inflation continue to make recovery measures necessary and there is every reason to think that the next administration, whether Republican or Democrat, will have to make major cuts in all heads of the budget, including defence, which was not reduced by much in the financial year 1988.

24. However, the new administration will probably wish to take spectacular measures with speedy results if only to take maximum advantage of the authority that will have been conferred on it by the recent elections in order to ensure acceptance of lower home consumption and to show that the sacrifices citizens are required to make are not without effect. Expenditure voted on an annual basis will be affected first, i.e. expenditure on research, training and staff, whereas appropriations for expenditure on investment, in particular in the SDI, are commitments covering several years and cannot be decreased very considerably at short notice. They increased by 54% between 1980 and 1985 and current programmes will have to be continued so as not to waste the initial outlay and provision will have to be made for maintenance of the equipment acquired.

25. Hence it is, to say the least, very probable that from the beginning of 1989 the United States administration will have to make a considerable reduction in its defence budget over a period of several years and that, in this budget, expenditure for the maintenance of American forces in Europe will be among the easiest to reduce. The fact that the United States spends 6.7% of its GNP on defence, whereas its European allies spend only 3.7% on average and many of them have not fulfilled their 1984 undertaking to increase their military expenditure by 3% per annum, can but bring grist to the mill of those who advocate reducing American expenditure on the defence of Europe.

(b) Burden-sharing

26. This is the background to the question of burden-sharing to which the United States is now paying close attention, and any analysis of future prospects shows that the problem will become even more acute in the next few years. The people

the committee met in the United States did not hide the fact that, apart from objective considerations, the problem was mainly a political one, since the administration feared Congress's reactions and the latter was very sensitive to pressure from public opinion to ensure a better sharing of defence efforts among the allies.

27. There is in fact nothing more difficult to assess than the true effort each country makes for joint defence. It is convenient to compare the defence budget with the gross national product but this is of only very relative value in view of the fact that when calculating GNP account is not always taken of all economic data, that certain defence expenditure may not be included in the military budget and that it is impossible to separate expenditure on the defence of special interests from expenditure intended for joint defence, particularly in regard to strategic nuclear forces and forces deployed outside the NATO area. Then there are all the arguments about the burden on the economy of compulsory military service, maintaining reserves, the regular army and the respective efficiency of one or the other in military systems with weapons of very varying degrees of sophistication. Your Rapporteur does not intend to go into the arguments raised by this problem of assessing efforts made for joint defence. He will confine himself to a few remarks.

28. It is evident that allocating 1% of GNP more or less for defence purposes, representing between 2.5% and 5% of tax levied depending on the country, makes a considerable difference, particularly if it is continued for several decades in the form of productive investment. There is no doubt that the economic progress of Japan, the percentage of whose GNP allocated to defence has constantly been less than 1%, has been boosted by its low military expenditure, while the United States' heavy defence budget partly explains why its expansion has slowed down. While the European countries all fall between these two extremes, certain inequalities in the expansion of some of them may also be due to similar considerations. Arguments based on such differences cannot therefore be entirely refuted.

29. A country's ability to resist, and hence to participate in a policy of collective deterrence, depends largely on the nature of its social consensus. A sharp rise in fiscal pressure is liable to endanger this consensus. This implies on the one hand that Europe must remain attentive to the reactions of American society and on the other that no European country can entertain a sharp increase in military expenditure. When NATO decided on an annual increase of 3% in member countries' defence budgets many of them were unable to fulfil this undertaking.

30. There is inevitably a price to pay for playing a leading rôle in an alliance. This means that there is necessarily a link between United States

leadership, which it wishes to retain, and the burden incumbent upon it. Further to that, any change in burden-sharing should lead to a new sharing of responsibilities.

31. The fact that some of the United States' allies, which are admittedly not members of WEU, are trying rather cynically to evade the burdens and responsibilities of a defence of which they intend to have the benefit, moreover, is on the one hand completely immoral and on the other hand helps American public opinion to grow weary of efforts to defend all its allies. The adoption by the Danish Parliament in April 1988 of measures to ban nuclear weapon-carrying vessels from Danish waters – while Soviet submarines can in fact pass unimpeded through the Danish straits – is an act of this kind.

32. The inequality in exchanges of defence equipment between Europe and the United States to a certain extent – admittedly difficult to assess with accuracy – restores the balance of burdens on either side of the Atlantic.

33. For all these reasons, your Rapporteur concludes that, while it seems impossible to find a perfectly satisfactory solution to the burden-sharing problem, it is essential in present circumstances for Europe to make an effort, even limited, to prove its good will and also its determination to achieve a better sharing of the burden. It must also make clear that it requires political compensation for its efforts in the form of increased consultation in NATO and more information about the various operations outside the NATO area. It is also essential for Europe to endeavour to explain its views to its American allies, and in particular to public opinion and Congress. The WEU Assembly has taken useful steps in this direction by attempting to develop its relations with the United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament. Such exchanges must henceforth be made as permanent as possible. Everyone the committee met in America, whether in the government or parliament or private individuals, expressed their full support, but this is an area in which there is often a great distance between good intentions and their implementation.

34. However this may be, your Rapporteur believes that any dialogue on the matter requires a detailed knowledge of all the relevant facts. He therefore wishes agency experts to be asked to submit a technical report setting out all the facts which might serve as a basis for discussing these questions at the colloquy that the General Affairs Committee is organising in spring 1989. This means that the report must be transmitted to the Assembly before its December 1988 session.

35. Speaking to the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Taft, the United States Deputy Secretary of Defence, stressed that he was to visit European capitals in spring 1988 in preparation for a report

on burden-sharing that was to be submitted to Congress before the end of the year. This visit should allow European and American members of the alliance to explain what they mean by the term burden-sharing and where the necessary effort should be made so as to avoid the misunderstandings that now seem to be emerging, at least at the level of public opinion and in the United States Congress. It is essential to avert any measures that might threaten the unity of the alliance.

(c) Strategic aspects

36. This prospect certainly did not escape the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy set up by Mr. Weinberger, the former United States Secretary of Defence, to reflect on the future of American defence policy after 2000. This commission, chaired by Mr. Fred Iklé, then Under-Secretary of Defence, and Mr. Albert Wohlstetter, had eleven other members including Mr. Henry Kissinger, Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, General Vessey and General Goodpaster. After fifteen months' work, it submitted a report some sixty pages long to President Reagan on 13th January 1988 entitled "Discriminate deterrence". The committee was able to hold detailed talks with one of the authors of the report, General Goodpaster, in Washington on 12th April 1988.

37. This report is in no way a government text but merely gives an opinion. Nevertheless, the authority of the members of the commission and the fact that they have had important responsibilities in both Democrat and Republican administrations, on the one hand, and the way this opinion meets the current concerns of American public opinion, on the other, indicate that the text will carry considerable weight in United States defence policy in coming years, or more accurately that it reflects ideas that are destined to play a considerable rôle during that period. Furthermore, a Pentagon official told the committee that the United States Government had paid \$1.8 million for this document to be prepared, which shows the value it attached to this work. In the Times of 18th January 1988, Mr. David Hart said the new Secretary of Defence, Mr. Carlucci, "has said on television that the Pentagon is already proceeding with some of the report's recommendations, including the development of new technologies, and that it will study the report and proceed with those recommendations it considers appropriate". Similarly, in a lecture to the National Press Club in Washington, reported by Jane's Defence Weekly of 23rd January 1988, Mr. James Webb Jr., then United States Secretary of the Navy, endorsed most of the contents of the report "Discriminate deterrence", inter alia by contrasting the static defence strategy adopted by NATO with the need for units that can be deployed and fight wherever needed without it

being necessary to negotiate stationing rights and having to become involved in local disputes implied by such stationing rights. The Secretary of the Navy admittedly decided to resign from the government a few weeks later as a protest at the reductions in the navy's budget forced upon him.

38. In any event, the authors of the report were well aware that this text, intended for publication, would go not only to the American authorities but also to the leaders of the entire world, in particular those of the United States' allies, for whom it was admittedly not to be an expression of American policy but a useful indication of a tendency. Your Rapporteur does not know whether the WEU Council has used indications given in the report as a guideline for its own reflections.

39. The starting point for that commission's deliberations is the fact that the United States is a world power whose interests lie at one and the same time in the Pacific region and that of the Atlantic, and also the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. It considers that this means that American defence must be based on a global strategy. It is not a matter of calling in question American commitments towards the Atlantic Alliance and Europe but merely of viewing these commitments in the context of global strategy. Hitherto, American strategy sought to meet two challenges: an attack by strategic nuclear weapons and a large-scale conventional attack in Central Europe. Both seem to him very improbable in the immediate or foreseeable future, whereas there are now true threats to United States interests in other regions of the world, and even on the American continent.

40. A number of new factors seem liable to change radically the conditions in which United States security can be ensured:

- (a) the emergence of new military powers, important at global or regional level, such as China and Japan;
- (b) the strengthening of secondary powers, particularly in Asia and the Middle East;
- (c) the development of new technologies and new armaments industries in countries which had hitherto not been very large producers, such as India, Korea, Egypt and Brazil;
- (d) the upsetting of traditional balances of forces due to these new technologies;
- (e) the emergence of new nuclear powers;
- (f) the United States' growing difficulty in reaching agreement with friendly countries for obtaining or maintaining American bases on their territory, particularly in Asia and the Middle East,

but also in Europe, where Denmark, Spain, Portugal and Greece are proving to be increasingly difficult partners, thus limiting American intervention capability in the event of crisis;

- (g) the reluctance of the United States' European allies to be of assistance when American forces have to be deployed. In this connection, the report refers to France's refusal to allow American aircraft to fly over its territory when Tripoli was bombed in 1986.

41. These are not new preoccupations: they have been expressed several times since the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the Iranian revolution. The Americans then held that it was in the interests of the West as a whole for them to have means of intervention in the Gulf region, even if this meant redeploying for this purpose part of their forces in Europe, and they asked their European allies to arrange to replace these forces in the event of crisis. But the European members of the alliance, like the Americans responsible for the defence of Europe, quickly pointed out that, if there were to be a Soviet-American confrontation in the Middle East or elsewhere, this would increase the threat to Western Europe by encouraging the Soviet Union to take advantage of the weakening of the American presence to try to force a decision in a particularly sensitive region. The Canadian 1987 defence white paper makes the same remark, moreover. The United States Government endorsed this view in 1984. What is new in the American commission's report is that it rejects this hypothesis and considers that possible success, in the Gulf for instance, "would confer a major economic and geostrategic advantage on the Soviet Union and deal a possibly decisive blow to the unity of the western alliances. History and common sense both suggest that if indeed they attacked, the Soviets would try to limit the war to one or a few of the Gulf states". It adds: "In the Gulf and elsewhere, the Soviet Union will generally prefer to limit its operations to a region which it can win while minimising the risk of a wider war. The United States should not want to fight only at a time and place selected by the enemy. We should plan both on defending in the region attacked, with the defence including deep conventional air and missile strikes, and on conducting naval operations elsewhere." But this retaliation would involve no escalation either at world level or at nuclear level.

42. Studying the possible consequences of this strategy for Europe, Mr. Lothar Rühl, German Deputy Defence Minister, points out in a major article reviewing the American plan published by *Die Welt* of 19th January 1988 that the report raises neither the question of Europe's security nor that of maintaining sea links between Europe and North America which would be of vital

importance in time of crisis. But he notes that the text answers these questions indirectly by referring to the limits which will necessarily affect the American defence budget in the next few years: "The challenge will be to defend our interests in many different places, although we lack the resources necessary to give our allies and friends more support in peacetime. It is clear that the Pentagon will have to give priority to mobile forces that can be deployed anywhere and can counter aggressions through their capacity to retaliate quickly and at an appropriate level to a wide range of attacks."

43. From these considerations stems the concept of discriminate deterrence, i.e. deterrence that adapts its means and the aims assigned to the weapons at its disposal to the possibilities and risks of each specific situation, which calls for greater strategic flexibility and mobility for American forces of all kinds. This means maintaining a maximum of nuclear options, be it offensive armaments or defensive armaments to be developed in the context of the SDI, the development of air and naval transport means or obtaining bases near regions where peace is threatened, particularly in the Middle East.

44. It is clear that this course runs counter to the one followed by NATO for so long and endorsed by the governments of most European members of the alliance since, for them, it is a matter of deterring any form of aggression in Europe by a stance which gives maximum credibility to intervention with American strategic nuclear weapons. Taking the results of the NATO summit meeting in March 1988 as a basis, the General Affairs Committee's interlocutors in the United States stressed the continuity of this policy. It may indeed be considered that it is the deployment agreed by members of the Atlantic Alliance in Europe that makes such an aggression improbable: to weaken the close link between the defence of Europe and certain mutual destruction might be a destabilising factor in Europe itself. In any event, as Lothar Rühl notes, it would mean that the United States must ask its European allies "to assume more responsibility for defending Western Europe with their own forces in order to allow the United States, a world power, to use its military resources in a more economic manner".

45. One possible expression of the policy advocated in the report on discriminate deterrence might be for the United States to reserve the right to redeploy forces stationed in Europe to theatres of operations outside the NATO area, without prior consultation. The governments of the European member countries of the alliance would find it particularly difficult to oppose this since they have no interest in NATO being seen as more of an obstacle to the mobility of American forces, but they will have to make arrangements to be able to replace the redeployed American forces immediately.

(d) The defence of Europe

46. Another trend had been looming up for some time in American strategic thinking, however, which Europeans have every reason to be concerned about, i.e. the idea that nuclear escalation is no longer considered as a means of deterrence designed to associate American strategic nuclear arms with Europe's security but as an instrument for fighting and winning against a possible aggressor. It states: "The alliance should threaten to use nuclear weapons not as a link to a wider and more devastating war – although the risk of further escalation would still be there – but mainly as an instrument for denying success to the invading Soviet forces. The nuclear weapons would be used discriminately in, for example, attacks on Soviet command centres or troop concentrations", i.e. behind the enemy's lines. This means the United States must have short-range precision-guided weapons with nuclear warheads, i.e. sophisticated tactical nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the rôle assigned to French and British nuclear weapons would no longer be one of global deterrence but of selective deterrence against Soviet nuclear strikes in Europe. An attempt would first be made to stop the aggressor by means of purely conventional weapons whose performance would have to be similar to those of nuclear weapons so as to benefit to the maximum from the West's technological superiority. This would imply heavy investment in the development of such weapons, particularly stealth aircraft and missiles, smart munitions, anti-ballistic defence systems and better space capability. It would also mean resorting very quickly to tactical nuclear weapons. It is also known that those taking part in the Atlantic summit meeting in March 1988 were far from unanimous on the question of modernising theatre nuclear weapons.

47. In the article quoted above, Lothar Rühl, the German Deputy Defence Minister, points out that NATO deployment, unlike Soviet deployment, is not intended to wage a war combining the use of both conventional and nuclear weapons, in particular because it has only a limited number of command posts and air bases, which would make it easier for the Soviet Union to take rapid, effective and discriminate (including nuclear) action against alliance forces. He also says that NATO deployment is purely defensive, which limits its possibilities for discriminate offensive actions as envisaged by the authors of the report and he notes that concern to avoid recourse to extremes of nuclear war should lead the West to avoid reaching Soviet territory with nuclear missiles. This "would mean, in fact, a conception of limited nuclear war in Europe without the umbrella of American strategic weapons". "The consequences of such a strategy for Western Europe's security would be as fatal as returning to the summary alternative between a nuclear artillery duel on the battlefield and mas-

sive retaliation with thermonuclear weapons of mass destruction in the event of an attack on Western Europe", concludes Lothar Rühl, who considers the American proposals to be the ruin of the flexible response doctrine which is the basis of NATO strategy. The mistrust regularly voiced in France about the words "flexible response" shows the same concern, forcefully expressed *inter alia* by President Mitterrand, not to accept any hypothesis involving a risk of nuclear war in Europe.

48. In any event, for many years there has been a tendency towards a reorientation of defence policy in the United States. Europe should take this tendency even more seriously since new circumstances have given it greater credit.

49. (a) The economic and financial position of the United States, which indicates that the United States will not be able to associate support for a defence policy based on NATO doctrine with the choice of discriminate deterrence proposed by the commission.

50. (b) The platform on European security interests adopted by the WEU Council on 27th October 1987 is a prior response but is appropriate to a possible evolution of American policy:

- (i) because it provides for Europeans to assume a larger share of the defence of Europe, which meets the American concern and probably explains its warm reception by President Reagan and Mr. Carlucci, Secretary of Defence;
- (ii) because it stresses the value the European members of the alliance attach to deterrence based on both the nuclear and the conventional arms of the allies;
- (iii) because it is associated with a reactivation of WEU whose aim is to give Europe the means of expressing and putting over its views on security and defence matters.

51. (c) The Washington summit meeting on 7th December 1987 which led to the INF agreement being signed and started or revived a series of negotiations on arms reductions. This may be turning United States defence policy in different directions from those advocated in the report since it seems difficult to pursue at one and the same time disarmament applying *inter alia* to tactical nuclear weapons and a defence policy based on a concept of discriminate deterrence which, on the contrary, implies improving and possibly using such weapons. Furthermore, the report on discriminate deterrence advocates pursuing the SDI, considers verification of a possible chemical disarmament agreement difficult but also proposes a large reduction in stocks of strategic nuclear weapons and the dismantlement – and hence not simply the withdrawal – of American

and Soviet conventional units stationed in Europe. These questions concern first and foremost Europe's security and it would be highly desirable for the United States' European allies to be asked to give their views on the subject.

52. The question obviously arises of whether or not the measures which may be taken by the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to compensate for a possible withdrawal of American forces from Europe may not lead to or speed up withdrawal measures. The fact that the American authorities speak encouragingly about any efforts towards the joint organisation of European security is ambiguous in this connection. It certainly means these efforts suit the United States Government. But, insofar as that government seems to be leaning increasingly towards a new redeployment of its forces, it may be thought that any step towards Europeans taking over from them will suit them whereas, for Europeans, the continued presence of the American umbrella is a factor of security that is difficult to replace.

53. However, it is quite clear that the American decisions were taken and will continue to be taken in the light of considerations in which Europe occupies only a very secondary place. There is certainly no question of decoupling America from Europe politically, and no American specialist proposes this. The aim is to defend as well as possible American interests in the world and the security of United States territory. Europeans must obviously emphasise the importance of the European theatre in the world balance and the fact that, were there to be a major conflict, Europe would be the main theatre of operations. They should also recall as strongly as possible the value they attach to a strategy of deterrence and their fear of any strategy of confrontation. They have, moreover, considerable support from a section of well-informed public opinion in the United States and, in particular, on the part of military leaders in NATO. However, it is to be feared that their lack of cohesion may facilitate a change in American strategy just as much as their co-operation may provoke a change.

54. It therefore seems that Europe can try to convince its ally to continue to deploy its forces so as to ensure a deterrence to protect Europe and at the same time itself take all necessary steps to maintain an adequate level of deterrence, even in the event of the departure of American forces, so as to avoid such withdrawals resulting in Western Europe being discouraged, leading to political and military dispersion and the weakening of its will to defend itself, which is an essential factor in deterrence. The reactivation of WEU and the adoption of the platform in The Hague were mainly intended to strengthen European participation in Europe's security and to overcome the moral crisis which followed the twofold NATO decision of December 1979. If they become the effective foundations of a European defence policy, they can therefore help to inform the Ameri-

cans of European views on security matters and prepare Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own defence.

55. In this connection, it may be regretted that the Franco-British summit meeting held in late January 1988 failed to produce results in the essential field of co-operation in the production and use of nuclear weapons in spite of the principle accepted by the seven governments in The Hague that bilateral co-operation had a place in European security policy. The question of a return of French forces to NATO integrated command should, today, be even less of a prior condition for Franco-British understanding since the Seven had nothing like this in mind when they drew up the platform. Discussions about the future of NATO, which have become very widespread in the United States and consequently in Europe in the last few weeks, make such a return, that French public opinion apparently finds unacceptable, most unlikely. Conversely, all observers can see that there has been a firm and steady rapprochement in recent years between France and the other European members of the alliance on security matters. During the London talks, France, moreover, took another step in this direction by agreeing to consider the use of its sea ports by its allies in the event of an emergency. Conversely, France's entire technological and financial effort in the last thirty years, first to develop independent nuclear weapons and then to procure the wherewithal to come swiftly to the assistance of its allies in the event of a crisis while retaining the capability of intervening if necessary outside the NATO area, would lose much of its significance if these forces were to be brought back under integrated command. The conditions in which British nuclear weapons were constituted are quite different, but it is time consideration was given to whether these differences still preclude any form of co-operation.

56. The French proposal for Franco-British co-operation in nuclear matters corresponded to the platform adopted in The Hague and took its place in the context of the decisions taken by NATO in Montebello in 1983, at the request of the United States, to modernise all categories of weapons deployed in Europe. The Soviet-American treaty on intermediate nuclear forces in no way alters this decision. On the contrary, it makes its application even more urgent because American intermediate-range land-based nuclear weapons are probably destined to be eliminated in the near future and deterrence will then be exercised only by other weapons which some believe should consequently be as sophisticated as possible, whether equipped with nuclear warheads or conventional explosives. Mrs. Thatcher, United Kingdom Prime Minister, insisted strongly on this point when addressing the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 17th February 1988, remarking that disarmament related to the number and not the quality of weapons of the two

categories. Progress in recent years, moreover, has tended increasingly towards the same means of delivery being used for both categories. The Soviet Union is deploying new weapons such as the SS-25 and the committee was told in the United States that no reduction in the Soviet military effort could yet be discerned.

57. One of the aims of the dialogue between Europeans and Americans would certainly be to allow the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to gain a clearer perception of the American view of the implications of the worldwide dimension of United States responsibilities. For instance, it is not illogical for the United States to consider using the troops it maintains in Europe as a reserve that could be used elsewhere if required, and Europe has too great a need for these forces to be kept in Europe, in view of their deterrent rôle, to object to their being made more mobile to meet the requirements of United States' worldwide strategy. Hence, arrangements should be made for them to be replaced by European forces in the event of an emergency making it necessary to redeploy them quickly outside the NATO area.

58. On the other hand, the General Affairs Committee's talks in Washington showed that the Americans still needed to be convinced that attempts such as the reactivation of WEU were not intended only to strengthen the alliance's military action and to support American policy but that European union was still considered a major objective. WEU cannot be encouraged when it holds consultations in the Gulf and discouraged when it wishes to discuss disarmament because both contribute to the search for unity of reflection and action among Europeans. In certain cases, this search may hamper American policy. This is a drawback that the United States will have to accept if, finally, it wishes the Europeans to be a strong ally in whom it can have confidence.

III. Disarmament

59. The signing on 8th December 1987 of a treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States on the destruction of their medium- and shorter-range missiles was clearly a milestone in the evolution of relations between the two great powers, but also between Europe and the United States. By adopting Resolution 77, our Assembly on the one hand showed that it approved this agreement and on the other asked the United States Senate to ratify it. The adoption of this resolution, before the treaty was signed, confirmed a fundamental Assembly position in favour of disarmament and conveyed the view that the INF agreement did not endanger Western European security. For some, perhaps it also showed fundamental hostility to all nuclear weapons. Others, on the contrary, consider that Europe's security is ensured

mainly by the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons but that the contribution of ground-based medium-range missiles is not decisive for such deterrence. The latter had been worried about the turn taken in the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik in October 1986 and in particular the American proposal to destroy all ballistic missiles before 1996. The 1987 treaty had no such drawbacks and above all did not jeopardise the bases on which Europe's security has been based for almost forty years. Finally, it had been the subject of exchanges of views between the Americans and their allies. Everyone is aware, however, that the INF treaty has given rise to discussion in both Europe and the United States as can be seen from the discussions in the relevant United States Senate committee and the testimonies it receives, particularly from military staff who have served in NATO commands. As the Assembly voted clearly on this matter and there is every reason to believe that the United States Senate will ratify the treaty without amendment, otherwise further negotiations on the amended texts would be necessary, your Rapporteur feels he has no need to go into the discussion further.

60. However, the Washington meeting led President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev to examine the prospect of further negotiations on various aspects of disarmament and to envisage either giving new impetus to negotiations which have already been under way for a long time – such as those on chemical weapons – or starting new negotiations in areas where nothing had yet been done – short-range nuclear weapons, for instance. Since January 1987, in fact, the Soviet Union had been making many proposals in this sense and, since the Washington meeting, it and the United States have continued to work out and present proposals aimed at extending disarmament to other sectors.

61. It is therefore more than probable that in future years a number of separate negotiations will be held, not always with the same participants, since the European members of the alliance will be participating in some of them, in particular those on conventional forces, while others will remain on a bilateral level between the United States and the Soviet Union and not necessarily for the same period of time. If Western Europe wishes its interests to be defended everywhere, it must spell out what its interests are in due time and inform its American allies accordingly, otherwise it cannot hope to have its views taken into proper account.

62. At the moment it may be said that the WEU countries' positions on disarmament are not identical. All certainly agree that disarmament must be tackled in such a way as to give them maximum security at the lowest possible level of armaments in every area. They would probably also agree that the abolition of chemical weapons should be achieved as soon as possible,

that the abolition of nuclear weapons can be a long-term aim and that peace in Europe is linked with a degree of respect for human rights and disarmament that also ensures peace in the rest of the world. But there are fairly wide differences in points of view on the application of these principles and, in particular, on the priority to be given to each sector of disarmament. Geographical reasons and the fact that certain countries have weapons not available to others also explain these differences, which were reflected in the discussions in committee. Some members wish absolute priority to be given to nuclear disarmament and do not agree to French and British weapons being included in alliance deterrence.

63. On the Soviet side, and whatever opinion one may have of Mr. Gorbachev's motivation, sincerity and aims, it is inevitable that his country's security interests should be taken into account in the proposals made or positions defended on disarmament matters. Consequently, apart from the advantage the Soviets, like everyone else, may derive from limiting expenditure on armaments, it is already clear that the aim of the Soviet Union is:

- (a) to bring Europe's interests into opposition with those of the United States insofar as possible so as to weaken Europe's confidence in NATO for ensuring its security. From this point of view, any withdrawal of American forces from NATO would be a victory;
- (b) to obtain the denuclearisation of Europe which would be of benefit to Soviet conventional superiority;
- (c) to bring out differences of views among Europeans so as to paralyse any progress towards the unification of Western Europe and above all to prevent it becoming a political, military and nuclear power.

64. This threefold aim is quite clear from the remarks made by Mr. Honecker in October 1987 and then by Mr. Shevardnadze in Bonn in January 1988. Their purpose was to exploit the Germans' legitimate fear of their territory becoming the battlefield in a nuclear war and their equally legitimate wish to develop relations with Germans in the GDR in order to rally public opinion at least, if not the government, to their views. Conversely, the Soviet Union is constantly criticising France for wishing to maintain nuclear deterrence. For instance, during Mr. Chirac's visit to Moscow on 14th May 1987, Mr. Ryzhkov, Soviet Prime Minister, said: "Today the Soviet Union is naturally wondering about the rôle that France can and should play at this turning point in the destinies of Europe and the world. Unfortunately, we do not see France among those who are against mutual nuclear deterrence, who wish to

stop the roulette of nuclear peril in Europe and lower the risk of self-destruction. There are disturbing aspects to the policy of the French Government, particularly where nuclear missiles are concerned." The intention behind these words, intended to turn the Federal Republic and France against each other, is quite clear. The aims are in no way new but the fact that the situation in Europe seemed less stable than in the past was encouragement to the Soviet Union to take advantage of this to advance its cause.

65. Again, on the American side, the same reasons for querying the scale, nature and trend of overseas commitments lead to positions being adopted towards disarmament that are not necessarily those of Europe:

- (a) there is a strong anti-nuclear current flowing through American public opinion which wishes the United States to stop linking its security with the threat to use nuclear weapons;
- (b) this current joins the opinion of those who fear American territory may be threatened with mass destruction because of matters that do not concern it directly.

66. These two attitudes of opinion can but encourage American leaders to seek to protect United States territory either by weapons of a new type or through disarmament and to try to keep any confrontation in Europe at a conventional level. Yet so far the American authorities have never given up the principle of deterrence and have opposed the idea of denuclearising Europe, just as they have rejected proposals to withdraw American forces from Europe.

67. While the negotiations to reduce long-range ballistic missiles by 50% seem to be progressing quite satisfactorily, although it does not seem possible to reach an agreement in spring 1988 because of verification problems, other negotiations, whether under way or only planned, seem destined to be long drawn out in view of the complexity of the problems to be solved. Your Rapporteur is not in a position to say what progress has been made in each series but merely wishes to try to define where Europe's interests lie in the various areas. In doing this, he realises that European views are far from identical on such matters and he will try to describe the differences that exist and seek positions on which they might be overcome.

68. Prospects for true disarmament must obviously be examined in strategic terms and present uncertainty about the doctrine for the use of American forces can but make it more difficult to obtain a clear view of the next stages. Even the signing of the INF agreement is giving the United States problems which are now being discussed by the Senate Armed Forces Committee, such as what to do with the nuclear warheads mounted on

the missiles that are to be destroyed. Will they be mounted on short-range missiles just when negotiations are to be opened on reducing such missiles? Will they be mounted on ship- or airborne medium-range missiles not subject to limitation or destruction agreements? Will they be destroyed? What will become of the Trident programme on which depends the necessary modernisation of British nuclear weapons? The fate of these nuclear warheads is clearly not just a technical matter, but above all a matter for strategic decisions. It will therefore be a means of assessing the United States Government's intentions.

69. Because of the development of disarmament negotiations, on the one hand, and the changes taking shape in American security concepts, on the other, there is now a European strategic area governed by European considerations. It is the subject of separate disarmament negotiations. It will be outside the SDI protective system to be deployed to cover the United States. In any event, it will continue to be the area most threatened in the event of hostilities because it has the densest concentration of forces and weapons and the populations are the most vulnerable. It is therefore essential for Europe to be able to make its voice heard in disarmament matters and on alliance strategy. The platform adopted in The Hague is an acknowledgment of this situation and it must now be carried into effect both in WEU and in NATO. Just as the latter has decided that its weapons should be modernised, it should also define its plans for disarmament so that many aspects of this undertaking do not remain the prerogative of Soviet proposals and American concessions.

(a) Strategic nuclear weapons

70. Negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons are still purely bilateral. At the present stage, the purpose is only to reduce by 50% the number of Soviet and American strategic missiles. Since there is a relative balance between the two great powers in this area, with a number of missiles that far exceeds the requirements of maintaining a second strike capability for a country already devastated by a first nuclear attack, such a reduction would admittedly not have very great strategic consequences, i.e. it would not call in question the reciprocal deterrent capability. This situation would change only if the deployment of an anti-missile defence system became effective enough to have to saturate it by firing far more missiles than it could cope with in order to pierce it and attain enemy territory. It is therefore either the start of second negotiations on a larger reduction in the number of means of delivery or the development and early success of the SDI which would call in question the principle of mutual assured destruction (MAD), the basis of mutual deterrence. Information now available about the development of the SDI and its budgetary prospects indicates that there is no immediate risk.

71. The Soviet Union has stated several times, however, that it would not agree indefinitely to British and French nuclear forces being left out of negotiations. But the number of strategic ballistic missiles held by the United Kingdom and France is kept to the minimum necessary to be deterrent. Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union possess between 10 000 and 12 000 strategic missiles each, France has only 300 and the United Kingdom even less. To include European means of delivery in the inventory of western missiles which have to retain parity with the number of Soviet missiles would amount to renouncing what gives these forces a deterrent value, i.e. the independence of the authorities required to decide on their use. To insist on a proportional reduction in these forces, or *a fortiori* a reduction equal to that made by the two great powers, would remove most of their effectiveness.

72. Your Rapporteur is aware that there are strong currents hostile to any deployment of national nuclear weapons in Europe either for radically anti-nuclear reasons or because of the inequality that the coexistence of nuclear and non-nuclear powers creates among European countries. But he notes that in the platform adopted in The Hague the seven WEU member governments accepted that Europe's security was ensured by deterrence and that the latter depended above all on nuclear weapons. At the present juncture, keeping French and British strategic nuclear forces at a level which makes them sufficiently credible is the corollary of this, particularly at a time when the United States is wondering about the rôle of deterrence in its own strategy. In the event of a drastic reduction in the strategic arsenals of the two great powers, this obviously does not prevent the United Kingdom and France taking part in global disarmament aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons. But that day is still a long way away.

(b) Short-range nuclear weapons

73. Starting with the negotiations that led to the Washington agreement on the double zero option, the question arose as to whether this should not be turned into a treble zero option which would have led to the elimination of nuclear weapons with a range of less than 500 km. Finally, the American negotiators postponed this proposal for examination at a later stage. Furthermore, the Soviet Union seems to have accepted that the elimination of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe could not be achieved without a significant, controlled reduction in conventional forces and armaments ensuring a satisfactory balance in this area beforehand. However, the establishment of a conventional disarmament programme to be negotiated in Vienna in a multilateral framework is running into serious difficulties because of the many factors that have to be taken into account and the necessary verification measures. The number and complexity of

the questions that have arisen suggest that these negotiations will be very lengthy. The list of items to be included in the agenda is still being drawn up.

74. The specific problem of short-range nuclear weapons was the main subject of discussion at the Wehrkunde meeting in Munich on 7th February 1988. It led to Mr. Carlucci, United States Secretary of Defence, adopting a clear position against any denuclearisation of Europe and in favour of the modernisation of tactical air-to-surface missiles and nuclear artillery in order to protect the flexible response strategy once the INF agreement came into force.

75. It must be noted that this is a matter which divides the Western European countries most, and in particular France and the Federal Republic. The German positions were expressed very clearly by a former member of our Assembly and former Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic, Peter Corterier, now Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Assembly, in an article entitled "After double zero" in *Le Monde* of 4th February 1988. He said "many West Germans are tempted to turn the double zero into a treble zero by accepting the Soviet proposal to do away with theatre nuclear weapons in Europe". If account is taken of "the idea that weapons rather than political tension are the cause of insecurity, it has to be noted that this is what is shared the best by public opinion in Germany", which leads to German political forces "evolving towards a consensus on this question". Mr. Corterier considers that "this political fact has consequences far more serious than the neutralism that Parisian circles suspect are tempting the Federal Republic". He concludes that "a categorical no to negotiations on nuclear weapons would have disastrous effects for the alliance because public opinion would not understand it". The obvious consideration that German territory – both the Federal Republic and the GDR – would inevitably be where short-range nuclear weapons would find their target is a perfectly plausible explanation for the slogan he quotes: "The shorter the range of the nuclear weapon, the deader the German." The zero-zero option seems to a certain extent to protect Europe's western and eastern fringes (i.e. the Soviet Union) from nuclear destruction by a possible first strike: the nuclear threat is so to speak concentrated on German territory, which is obviously not at all pleasant. It should be recalled, however, that the number of medium-range ship- or airborne nuclear weapons is far greater than the number of surface-based weapons that are to be destroyed in both East and West, which means that all European countries are still threatened by such weapons, in both East and West, and that, after the INF agreements, the threat to German territory would be no greater except insofar as the level of deterrence is reduced by these agreements.

76. In an interview granted to the *Nouvel Observateur* on 19th December 1987, President

Mitterrand said French nuclear weapons were not targeted on German territory. These weapons were not a means of combat but of deterrence whose rôle was pre-strategic, i.e. intended solely to give the enemy a final warning before strategic nuclear weapons were used. "The ultimate warning is intended for anyone who might constitute a threat. This is not the rôle of short-range weapons", he specified. But Mr. Corterier considers that this distinction, which eliminates constraints linked with the weapons themselves, is not enough to convince the Germans that the weapons turned in their direction are not intended to be used but only to deter a third power. However, the French view that the aim of any European security policy is not only to avoid nuclear war but to prevent any form of war in Europe remains fully valid. The withdrawal from Europe of weapons that the Americans call tactical and the French pre-strategic would weaken the deterrent capability of the forces of the Atlantic Alliance and make conventional war more likely. The consequences for Germany and for Europe as a whole might be just as tragic as nuclear war.

77. Mr. Corterier therefore proposes a number of measures to overcome this Franco-German difference.

78. (a) He recalls that "for the West German Government nuclear disarmament must continue to be linked with conventional disarmament and go hand in hand with it". The United States and the Soviet Union now seem to share this view. It is indeed perfectly logical in the context of a strategy of confrontation in which there is recourse to tactical weapons when it becomes obvious that the enemy offensive has not been contained by the use of conventional weapons. It is less suitable in a strategy in which pre-strategic weapons play the rôle of warning the attacker that strategic nuclear weapons will be used. Nevertheless, a reduction in conventional capability sufficient to avert the risk of a surprise attack would make the nuclear warning afforded by pre-strategic weapons less necessary and consequently negotiations linking the two considerations might be acceptable to all.

79. (b) He considers that the situation makes it "more or less inevitable that ceilings on theatre nuclear forces will soon be negotiated" since "the maintenance of nuclear deterrence based on the transatlantic relationship" is, in his view, "a more satisfactory solution than a third zero option". Your Rapporteur can but endorse this view: from the moment short-range nuclear weapons are designed only to enhance deterrence through the possibility of a last warning, there is no need to deploy very many of them to obtain this effect. This would not be so in a strategy giving priority to a fighting capability. However, nuclear ordnance and missiles with a range of less than 500 km number in the tens of thousands on both sides. This adds nothing to their deterrent

effect but helps to convince a potential enemy that the West would not resort to strategic weapons. Conversely, the total elimination of these weapons "would be dangerous because it would further weaken the American guarantee and the credibility of flexible response", Mr. Corterier adds.

80. (c) While considering the withdrawal of French forces from the NATO integrated military structure to be irreversible, Mr. Corterier asks French leaders to convince the Germans "that the French would become involved without hesitation at the outset of hostilities on the eastern frontiers of the Federal Republic". This concords perfectly with the modified Brussels Treaty and the platform adopted in The Hague which commit the French Government. But when he criticises French political circles for "tending too much to concentrate on the possibility of France affording the Federal Republic nuclear cover in the event of a disaster", your Rapporteur considers he is overlooking the reality that France is doing its utmost to prevent any such disaster. When he asks for "the greatest possible equality between the French and German level of security", he is in direct line with the constant preoccupations of France which cannot imagine its security being dissociated from that of the Federal Republic.

81. (d) Your Rapporteur sees only one of Mr. Corterier's proposals as a problem, i.e.:

"Gestures would be useful at the level of nuclear planning, but they are found rather in information and consultation: target identification of French short-range surface missiles would be a major step towards establishing full confidence between the two countries' leaders."

The targets of short-range surface missiles are inevitably military targets in the person of an enemy on the move and it is hard to see how they could be defined beforehand.

82. (e) Mr. Corterier's most important proposal is the last one, which should be quoted in full:

"However, we must go further at political level. At a time when the tendency in East-West relations is towards the reduction of armaments, the western allies should define a position in this area or at least a series of points beyond which they do not intend the superpowers to venture. However welcome, the platform on European security interests adopted by WEU in October 1987 is not enough. In regard to conventional disarmament in particular, an alliance policy must be worked out that takes account of the specific interests of its European members."

The very purpose of the WEU Council's work is to draw consequences from the platform in vari-

ous areas. Your Rapporteur for his part is trying to do so within the framework of his subject.

83. Chancellor Kohl's position at the Wehrkunde meeting seems quite close to the one described by Mr. Corterier in *Le Monde*: aware of the danger involved in the complete withdrawal of tactical weapons, the Federal Chancellor stressed his wish for negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons to be started without delay – but he did not insist that they be concluded before other negotiations. The aim should be to reduce but not necessarily eliminate such weapons. In view of the large number of tactical weapons deployed in Central Europe by both sides, this is perfectly reasonable and leaves ample scope for negotiation between the Federal Republic and its American and French allies who are all more anxious to improve the accuracy and range of their weapons than to increase their number.

(c) Chemical weapons

84. On chemical disarmament, all the parties concerned fully agree that the aim should be to ban the production of such weapons and destroy stocks. Negotiations are now being held in Geneva to define satisfactory verification conditions. Another problem arises from the time the two powers with large stocks of chemical weapons say they need to destroy them, i.e. ten years as from the coming into force of the agreement. With the slow pace of the negotiations, we shall probably have to wait at least thirteen years before destruction is completed. This is a long time during which the Soviet Union alone would have chemical weapons on the European continent. This situation would be tolerable if it could be guaranteed that these thirteen years would be a period of détente, continued disarmament and promotion of confidence-building measures. But no one can guarantee this, not even Mr. Gorbachev. That is why France has made legal provision for starting production of chemical weapons but without starting production, however. Your Rapporteur considers all the European members of the alliance should be able to agree to call upon the two great powers to speed up the negotiations and ratification of the future agreement and to reduce to the minimum the time needed to implement the destruction of stocks as agreed. For the same reasons, it seems to your Rapporteur very risky to initiate a drastic reduction in short-range nuclear weapons as long as the Soviet Union has a near-monopoly of chemical weapons in Europe since the latter would be far more valuable if they were to remain the only instruments of mass destruction deployed on European territory.

(d) Conventional weapons

85. At first sight, no negotiations seem as difficult to bring to a successful conclusion as those on

conventional weapons. The discussion triggered in the international press by the report submitted to the Assembly by our colleague, Mr. Stokes, on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, which was not adopted by the Assembly because it was referred back to the committee, underlines the difficulties encountered in an objective assessment of this aspect of the threat. It also reveals that there is no way out of this discussion in the context of a strategy of confrontation because of the difficulty of defining a balance which would take account of the number of troops, the standard of their training, their devotion to the cause they are supposed to be defending and also the number, quality and age of armaments, offensive or defensive, their sophistication, etc. Your Rapporteur has no means of giving a verdict on this discussion but feels it more useful to try to define what the alliance's conventional forces are intended for in order to deduce Western Europe's requirements in that field.

86. The rôle of conventional forces is, in any event, not to win a hypothetical victory in a war in Europe which, for the sake of argument but most improbably, would be kept to the conventional level. In his very recent book entitled "Blundering into disaster", Mr. Robert McNamara, who was for seven years Secretary of Defence under the administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, underlined that Europe would always be the cornerstone of United States strategy but, while it is possible to envisage purely conventional defence in other regions of the world, demography, the fragile way of life, the concentration of economic activity and the degree of urbanisation in Western Europe make both conventional and nuclear war inconceivable. Several hundred sensitive points (sources of water and energy, and first and foremost nuclear power stations, oil installations and communications centres) might be destroyed outright by a purely conventional strike, which would condemn to death a large part of the population of Europe without it being necessary to use nuclear weapons. "In other words, a conventional war in Europe would be lost before it started", concluded French General Buis in his report on Mr. McNamara's book in *Le Monde Diplomatique* of February 1988.

87. Moreover, while some might have had the illusion that the West could win a conventional war in the centre of Europe, it is enough to look at the two flanks, with Norway, whose continued presence in the western camp is vital for the defence of sea and air lanes across the North Atlantic, hence for the air bridge that the United States would have to maintain with Western Europe in the event of crisis, or with Turkey, the threshold of the Mediterranean and Middle East, to realise the stupidity of such a hypothesis. Moreover, the reticence of our governments about accepting as members of WEU – and hence allowing them to accede to Article V of the modi-

fied Brussels Treaty – countries which are not in the centre of Western Europe shows clearly that they cannot undertake to defend such a country if it were attacked. As General Gallois notes in an article entitled “Europe-United States: the file on a great departure”, published in the spring 1987 issue of *Politique Internationale*: “In Europe, NATO’s conventional forces will never have any power to intimidate because, if they had to fight, they would have no chance of winning.”

88. However, this does not mean that conventional weapons are useless if they are assigned their due place in a system of deterrence as provided for in the platform of 27th October 1987, but it is quite different from the one referred to in the Iklé-Wohlstetter plan and the so-called air-land battle strategy which is now the United States defence doctrine in Europe.

89. Its first rôle seems to have been well defined by General Fricaud-Chagnaud in an article entitled “How to rearticulate European security and American power” published in *Le Monde Diplomatique* of February 1988. He wrote: “Through reorganisation, conventional forces... can show their ability to refuse to submit; in fact, it is a question of not ‘leading into temptation’ a possible aggressor by allowing him to believe that any encroachment could be made without starting a war.” On the one hand, it is clear that nuclear deterrence does not work against minor aggressive operations – it did not prevent the Berlin blockade in 1947 – and on the other hand it leaves too much leeway regarding the limits beyond which we are determined to use nuclear weapons. Conventional forces therefore fit perfectly into a strategy of deterrence, as stressed in the platform adopted in The Hague, moreover.

90. A second rôle, closely linked with the first, is to give a warning in the event of crisis and before nuclear weapons are used. As General Buis wrote, referring to the use of a conventional threat at the time of the Cuban crisis: “Such management of the quarrel, in the calming, omnipresent shadow of the megatons, could be ensured only by an adequate conventional instrument. It is therefore essential to have it for this purpose, but for this purpose alone.” It is in this context that one can understand the importance Europeans attach to the presence of American conventional forces in Europe, where they provide this very “shadow of the megatons”.

91. In these conditions, it becomes possible to say what Western Europe can hope from negotiations on conventional weapons:

- (i) that they will put an end to speculation which, under the pretext of shifting the war to enemy territory, advocates offensive strategic action which might induce the potential enemy to anticipate such action by prior conventional or nuclear attacks on allied lines and

its rear positions. The purpose would be to prevent nuclear disarmament leading to over-armament in the conventional sector, which would be especially dangerous for peace because it is not very deterrent in itself;

- (ii) that, without leading to a withdrawal of all American forces stationed in Europe, they will allow their partial withdrawal to be offset by proportional withdrawals of Soviet forces from territories they occupy west of the Soviet Union;
- (iii) that the level of forces and conventional weapons, as well as theatre nuclear weapons, on both sides in Central Europe will be limited to a low-enough level to exclude any surprise attack, which implies very reliable, strictly applied verification procedures;
- (iv) that, in view of the ease with which Soviet reinforcements can be brought into Central Europe and the difficulty of bringing in American forces in case of crisis or hostilities, the overall level of forces on both sides will be kept within specific and verifiable limits;
- (v) that the link between conventional deployment and nuclear deterrent forces will be clearly shown.

(e) Security and co-operation in Europe

92. Although so far the only aspects of defence questions to be tackled in the framework of the CSCE have been confidence-building measures, which consist mainly of declaring manoeuvres of a certain scale and inviting observers from the other side to attend them, henceforth they may be of far greater importance in view of the decision taken in Vienna in 1987 to handle conventional disarmament in that framework, and perhaps tactical nuclear weapons also. However, the European members of the Atlantic Alliance believe that the main aim of that conference should be to promote conditions for true détente which alone can create the mutual confidence necessary for the success of duly verified disarmament. For them, it is not therefore a matter of beating an enemy but of fostering an evolution in the Soviet Union and among its allies towards a more open, freer society and the development of East-West exchanges of all kinds.

93. However, work at the Vienna negotiations, which are being held at a time when the Soviet Union is moving noticeably in the desired direction, indicates that there have been differences between Europeans and Americans over what was to be expected of the conference, as Senator Pécriaux noted in the report on recent develop-

ments in Soviet external policy that he presented on behalf of the General Affairs Committee in December 1987, the draft recommendation in which the Assembly then adopted. These differences relate to the fact that, even at a time when the disarmament negotiations are particularly active, the United States does not really seem to believe in the possibility of a deep-rooted change in the political, economic and social organisation of the Soviet Union. It seems to view disarmament negotiations and agreements merely as relations between one great power and another, without bearing in mind that the lasting nature of their possible success depends specifically on the nature of the society in whose name the Soviet negotiators are acting. Without wishing to revert to Senator Péciaux's apposite remarks on this subject in his report, your Rapporteur has to note that the views conveyed to the committee in the United States were not significantly different from those of the WEU parliamentarians.

94. After reviewing all the disarmament negotiations under way or about to be opened, the principles Europe should wish to be respected in this context might be recapitulated as follows:

(i) The immediate aim of disarmament should be to establish a nuclear balance at the lowest possible level, i.e. at a level sufficient to exercise deterrence. As Robert McNamara explained in his book already mentioned, the safety catch still has a rôle to play in our societies, and nuclear warheads – a few hundred and not fifty thousand as at present – will unfortunately, for many more years, be mounting their deterrent guard.

(ii) Europe's geographical situation precludes any thought of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, limited to our part of the continent. The parallel withdrawal of American and Soviet forces would be better than a unilateral withdrawal of American forces but would create an imbalance that might encourage surprise attacks. The denuclearisation of Europe alone would boost Soviet conventional preponderance and, above all, weaken deterrence, which has so far safeguarded peace.

(iii) The fact that two European countries have nuclear weapons is at the present juncture an essential guarantee of Europe's security and these weapons must not be called in question. On the contrary, they need to be adapted to European security requirements.

(iv) For the same reasons, the parallelism between conventional and nuclear disarmament must be respected. Elimination of nuclear weapons can be considered only if the level of conventional weapons has fallen low enough to preclude an attack.

(v) The time-scale for chemical disarmament is too long to give Europe the security it needs in

this area. As long as chemical disarmament has not been completed, the prospect of eliminating short-range nuclear weapons will be disturbing for Europe, already ill-prepared to face the chemical weapons accumulated by the Soviet Union.

(vi) Disarmament has a chance of lasting only if it is accompanied by détente allowing the past forty years of confrontation to be replaced by the development of East-West relations and a move towards more justice and freedom of societies. Furthermore, the development of confidence-building measures such as those agreed at the Stockholm meeting of the CSCE in 1986 is a major factor of détente.

95. The fact that disarmament is now on the agenda of meetings held in the framework of the WEU Council offers hope of our governments reaching an understanding on the basis of principles close to those which have just been listed since they conform wholly with the provisions of the platform adopted in The Hague. But they will have a chance of being carried into effect only insofar as they are accepted by the United States Government. The fact that they are based largely on views held by Robert McNamara indicates that they meet the concerns of certain influential people in the United States. During its visit to the United States, the committee saw that on these matters there was apparently no serious difference between its views and those of the United States administration. This means the situation is favourable for exchanges of views between Europeans and Americans in order to ensure that the Atlantic Alliance presents a united front in all negotiations on disarmament. It is not by avoiding often thorny consultations on the subject that Europeans will manage to do so but by pursuing and developing the exchanges that now take place in the framework of WEU. But the WEU Council's silence on this point and the absence of a communiqué after the ministerial meeting on 19th April 1988 make one wonder whether the Council was able to make real progress in this direction.

IV. Outside the NATO area

96. Questions raised by events occurring outside Europe and the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty cannot be overlooked when examining relations between Western Europe and its North American allies. The balance that has long existed in Europe itself between the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact gives great stability to the states, frontiers and régimes which emerged after the second world war and this seems to preclude a major conflict starting in Europe, at least for some time to come. Conversely, because of decolonisation, the formation of a large number of new states and the political uncertainty prevailing in many of them, there are many unstable areas in the rest of the world where

hostilities have increased since 1945 and it is mainly in Asia, Africa or even Latin America that crises may arise which, in the long run, might undermine stability in Europe. Europe could not be spared in a war in which the two great powers took part and there would be every chance of it being the main battlefield.

97. Furthermore, whereas difficulties encountered in direct relations between Europe and the United States in economic and defence matters raise serious problems which it has always been possible to tackle in an appropriate framework and find solutions that were more or less acceptable to all concerned, this has not always been so for matters arising outside Europe where everyone acts in accordance with his views and interests, generally without prior consultation. Although the European countries sometimes hold exchanges of views or even consultations in the framework of political co-operation or, more recently, in the WEU Council, they are not united when overseas problems arise. Each country has its own interests, different resources and specific constraints. When several of them have been involved in the same problems, as in Lebanon, each one has made a point of emphasising that it was acting on its own account. In most cases, as in Chad and the Falklands, the European states have carefully avoided prior consultations although the measures they were taking might have had consequences for European security as a whole.

98. The American public certainly feels that the United States constantly has to face subversive operations against international order which are to various degrees armed, inspired and directed by the Soviet Union. Since the Cuban crisis, it has felt that Latin America has become the theatre for such operations under the heading of indirect strategy. Since the Korean war, it has also considered the Soviet Union was pursuing an operation aimed at taking over Asia against which the United States was directly involved in Vietnam and continues to be involved in Afghanistan. Similarly, the presence of Soviet or Cuban advisers in many African and Middle East countries meant that disturbances in those regions fitted into an East-West confrontation stretching well beyond the local aspect of the problems.

99. To a large section of the American public, this means that there is continuity between United States participation in the defence of Europe and NATO and its action in Korea, Central America, Vietnam and the Middle East to counter communism. In the circumstances, any sign of ill-will on the part of the United States' European partners is taken to be a form of betrayal of the joint cause of western security. The Vietnam war clearly showed that Western Europe was not prepared to stand firmly shoulder to shoulder with the United States in all circumstances. More recent events, including the crisis in relations between Iran and the United States and then, in 1986, the bombing of Tripoli in

response to a terrorist operation in which American citizens had been casualties have again illustrated the different attitudes of partners in the Atlantic Alliance and kept alive the American public's mistrust of the European members of the alliance.

100. Such events naturally did not affect directly an alliance which contains no mutual undertaking in regard to action outside the area defined by the North Atlantic Treaty. However, they started a trend in American external policy and commitments of which the Iklé-Wohlstetter report is the most recent expression and they explain the apparently well-rooted feeling in the United States that Europe has a parochial approach to events whereas the United States tackles them from a worldwide standpoint. They also help to make the question of western security burden-sharing particularly complex.

101. There is thus no doubt that any re-examination of the functioning of the alliance should include a review of mutual commitments outside the NATO area, failing which possible misunderstandings may jeopardise the cohesion of the alliance, including cases involving the defence of Europe. On the other hand, there can be no question of Europe automatically endorsing American views, particularly as the Americans are the first to recognise that in certain cases European countries are best placed to take effective action without extending the conflict as might be the case if a great power intervened. Thus, several French interventions made necessary by crises in Africa were welcomed or even discreetly assisted by the Americans.

102. At present, the United States is most concerned about the Middle East, be it the Palestinian affair or the war between Iraq and Iran. The close relations between the state of Israel and the United States ever since the former's creation explain the steady support it has had from the United States. The proximity of the American elections and events in Israeli-occupied territories in recent months, with the harder line adopted by the Israeli Government, have not allowed the Secretary of State to advance the proposal to convene a conference between the two great powers and the nations directly concerned to try to define the bases for lasting peace.

103. The Gulf war is now of even greater concern to the United States for several reasons: the Soviet Union is a neighbour of the countries at war, the revolutionary strength of Shiite fundamentalism is a threat to most régimes in the Muslim world and, above all, developments in the oil market. When the 1973 crisis made oil prices shoot up, the OPEC countries having restricted their output, the United States had to develop its own production capacity to ensure its essential requirements. But it was in a saturated oil market in which prices were already falling, amplified by

the weakened dollar, that war broke out between two major oil-producers. Now, eight years later, Iran and Iraq have been forced to use their income from oil to pay for the war which has accelerated the fall in prices, forcing the United States to close many of its own wells and preventing OPEC from taking any effective measures to limit output and halt the fall in their income.

104. However, estimates of oil reserves show that American resources are running out. Experts estimate that output at the current level could be maintained for seven to ten years. If, therefore, the United States does not wish to find itself in the near future at the mercy of the whims of the Middle East producer countries, it will soon have to stop drawing on its own reserves and, through peace in the Middle East, reconstitute a world oil market before it is too late. Its first aim is therefore to stabilise the political and economic situation in the Gulf region, starting by ensuring freedom of navigation in the Gulf, at least for ships sailing to non-belligerent countries. Thus, the American fleet in the Indian Ocean has been constantly strengthened in recent years and, in 1987, the protection of the American flag was granted to Kuwaiti ships. Several Iranian attacks on these ships have been averted by the United States navy and air force.

105. The decision taken by the WEU member countries in summer 1987 to take part in various ways in mine-sweeping operations in the Gulf to ensure respect for freedom of the seas was therefore in line with the views of the United States Government which welcomed the convergence of European and United States operations. The committee witnessed this favourable response which should, moreover, help the Americans to take a more flexible view of the share of the joint defence burden borne by the members of WEU.

106. Development of tension in the Gulf region nevertheless led the United States Government to wonder about the expediency of deploying ground forces as well as naval and air forces. The idea was not to station large numbers of American forces near the Gulf but to equip forces stationed in Europe or in the United States for rapid deployment in the event of a serious crisis in the Gulf region. In this connection, the proposals in the Iklé-Wohlstetter report merely confirm ideas already announced several years ago whose implementation had been started. The report confirms the very special attention the United States is now paying to the Gulf region. It indicates that American intentions might not be confined to defending the freedom of the seas but also involve defending a number of Arab countries if they were threatened by Iranian imperialism or if the Soviet Union, which has so far been most discreet in the region, were to intervene. Mr. Gorbachev's announcement in February 1988 of a programme leading up to the evacuation of Afghanistan by

Soviet forces in the second half of 1988 and then the signing of the Geneva agreement on this withdrawal may indeed result in greater Soviet freedom of action in the Middle East.

107. From Europe's point of view, the interest shown by the United States in the Gulf region raises a number of questions. As indicated in Chapter II of this report, the first relates to the permanency of the American contingent stationed in Europe, part of which might in time of crisis be sent at very short notice to the Middle East, thus weakening the western system in Europe just when there was a threat to peace and necessitating the redeployment of European contingents in NATO. The second concerns Europe's involvement, in one way or another, in American action outside the NATO area causing tension in the alliance as in the case of the bombing of Tripoli in 1986. The third relates to the aims of action either might take: although in agreement with the United States to defend freedom of navigation in the Gulf, would Europe also agree to combat the Iranian revolution? It is doubtful.

108. The United States and Europe admittedly have the same interests in the Middle East: to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf, prevent the development of local imperialism, counter international terrorism, ensure world oil supplies, avoid wild fluctuations in oil prices and, finally, work to restore peace between Iraq and Iran, all of which are in the general interest. Several European countries have specific interests in the region, yet not all necessarily share the United States' views on how to take effective action. It is not therefore possible for them to adhere systematically and continuously to the view that there is just one western interest and that the United States alone is responsible for safeguarding it.

109. The adoption by the Security Council in July 1987 of Resolution 598 favouring a return to peace on the basis of the status quo ante bellum was the sign of a broad convergence of views, not only European and American but also Soviet, for finding a reasonable solution to the conflict. Since this resolution was accepted by Iraq but not Iran, which persists in insisting on the removal of the Iraqi leaders, the question of applying sanctions to Iran to induce it to revise its approach then arose. The Soviet Union has so far been against applying sanctions but information that many western countries, including the United States and also several European countries, have continued to supply arms to Iran in recent years, in spite of all the decisions announced earlier, makes one wonder whether it is possible to apply a true policy of sanctions and to isolate Iran. Nevertheless, a British text intended to define conditions for an embargo on sales of arms to Iran is now being studied by the five permanent members of the Security Council.

110. The Soviet Union for its part is now believed to link its participation in sanctions,

which is essential if they are to be effective, with a proposal to set up a United Nations naval force to patrol the Gulf. This would allow the Soviet navy to enter the region, which might be somewhat embarrassing for the United States.

111. The Gulf question is therefore becoming a major international matter necessitating both intra-European consultations, such as those held in the WEU Council, and also exchanges of views between western allies, if we are to avoid unilateral measures being taken that might disturb the mutual confidence needed for the smooth running of the alliance in Europe itself. There seems to be little reason to bring the United States, a world power, into opposition with Europe, a regional power, over the Gulf region. The participation of warships from several WEU countries in surveillance and minesweeping operations in the Gulf alongside the United States fleet implies consultations between allies on matters that concern the alliance as a whole.

112. Analysing overall United States policy outside the NATO area, David Owen, former British minister and leader of the Social Democrat Party, notes in an article in *The Times* of 29th January 1987 that:

“Reagan outside Europe neither speaks nor plays for the West. There is a serious gap in the co-ordination of western foreign policy, not because the key foreign ministers – George Shultz, Sir Geoffrey Howe, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Jean-Bernard Raimond – do not get on together, but because whereas Shultz has managed to bring Reagan’s policies in range of his allies over Europe, he has nowhere near as much influence over Reagan’s policies to the rest of the world. Nor does he even appear to devote much time to trying to achieve such co-ordination. This means that the Soviet Union is presented with innumerable opportunities, not only to exploit western divisions over the third world, but also to capitalise on western mistakes.”

113. There is no need to recapitulate here all these mistakes in the Far East, Africa, Latin America and Palestine. It is enough to note that Mr. Gorbachev is far better armed than his predecessors to exploit them and, as Mr. Owen says, capitalise on them. It is for the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to seek, not necessarily new institutions, but a dialogue with the United States on all these questions within adequate frameworks. It is not evident that the United States is at present prepared for such a dialogue, unless it is about a few matters in which the European countries are actively involved, such as in the Gulf.

114. One committee member rightly stressed the concern of both the United States and the Soviet Union to extricate themselves from ven-

tures outside the NATO area. The recent Geneva agreement on Afghanistan is the latest demonstration of this. It should be recalled, however, that rarely have the great powers deliberately embarked upon military ventures of this kind and the fact that they cannot keep control of a situation, as is now the case in the Near and Middle East, is not necessarily reassuring locally or even, in the medium term, for détente.

V. Canada

115. Canada is one of the earliest members of the Atlantic Alliance and has constantly kept forces on the European continent. However, in the last few years it has been faced with a new situation and new dangers, mainly because of the development of Soviet naval and submarine power, obliging it to pay more attention to security-related matters which had been somewhat neglected heretofore. Canada has no nuclear forces and its defence, like that of Western Europe, is closely linked with the deterrence exercised by United States nuclear power. However, its territory and territorial waters lie on the route taken by Soviet submarines or missiles on the way to United States territory and, whether it likes it or not, it is the northern rampart for the defence of the United States. It is responsible for controlling the North-West Passage between Greenland and Labrador, the shortest route for submarines passing under the ice cap from Soviet Arctic Ocean bases towards the United States east coast and the North Atlantic route, Europe’s vital security artery in time of crisis. It also shares control of the North Pacific and sea lanes from America to the Far East. Finally, although its immense northern territories would probably not be the route for a large-scale invasion of the American continent from the north, they nevertheless have to be monitored very closely – a difficult task in view of their area and climate – to ensure that an enemy does not install surveillance, guidance or military posts there.

116. From a strictly military point of view, Canada’s security is thus largely merged with that of the United States and there is little fear of a United States disengagement. On the other hand, its population and armed forces are too limited to cope with this security and leave it with but limited political possibilities. A Canadian commented to the committee that faced with a European pillar of the alliance Canada had little to expect of an American pillar which would leave it alone at the side of the United States. Canada is therefore at one and the same time in favour of restructuring the alliance to bring about a better balance between America and Europe and afraid of being isolated by a bi-polar organisation of the alliance, which would make it more dependent on the United States. This is why Canada welcomes the reactivation of WEU but strives to maintain and develop relations of all kinds with Western

Europe – and also with Japan. During its visit to Ottawa, the General Affairs Committee benefited from this concern of the Canadian Government and Parliament and drew the conclusion that the WEU Assembly should develop its exchanges with the Canadian Parliament.

117. The defence white paper entitled “Challenge and commitment – A defence policy for Canada” published by the Canadian Government in June 1987, followed in March 1988 by a booklet entitled “Defence update 1988-89”, complete the information given to the General Affairs Committee during its stay in Ottawa. These publications are a turning point in the determination of the Canadian Government to abandon a certain complacency and negligence of its security requirements and to make a serious effort to play its part in an undertaking that Canada cannot envisage outside close Atlantic solidarity.

118. The first sign of this recovery is a significant increase in the country's defence budget. This had fallen from 3.5% to 1.7% of the GNP between 1962 and 1974 and, after a slight recovery since 1980, it is now 2.2%, one of the lowest percentages among the alliance countries. It should be noted that most of this increase was allocated to essential investments to replace weapons that had become obsolete and the Canadian forces now have modern weapons. Investment programmes in the next few years should make them among the best equipped armed forces in the world. The main programmes are for the development of naval and submarine forces. Overall, Canada has spent \$7 400 million on defence, thus placing it in sixth place among the NATO countries. Its troop levels remain low, however: 85 000 men plus 21 000 first reserves and the same number of second reserves.

119. Two Canadian army brigades are now stationed in Europe, one in Norway, the other in the southern Federal Republic. The fact that its forces were dispersed in Europe exceeded Canada's logistic resources and it has therefore decided to group the two brigades in a division in the south of Germany at the end of 1989. The ensuing weakening of NATO's northern sector raises very serious problems for the allied commander, but is in no way a reduction of Canada's participation in joint defence, it is even to be increased. A battalion stationed in Canada is also to be assigned to the NATO mobile force for possible deployment in Northern Europe, and a strong air force is to be assigned to Europe or to the rapid transport of this battalion or reserve units to Europe in case of crisis. These facts illustrate the statement made to the committee by several Canadians, including the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Perrin Beatty, that the Canadian Government is convinced that the defence of Europe forms part of the defence of Canada.

120. Similarly, the European members of the alliance should consider that the Canadian Gov-

ernment's efforts to modernise its naval force by speedily building twelve new frigates specially equipped for anti-submarine warfare and procuring nuclear-propelled attack submarines will make a major contribution to joint security, in particular by allowing a better watch to be kept on the North-West Passage, which is essential for the protection of NATO's supply lines. Furthermore, the build-up and modernisation of the air forces and installing a new surveillance system on both sides and to the north of Canada will add greatly to the defence of the American continent and hence of the United States nuclear forces against possible attack.

121. The strengthening of Canadian defence will help to promote military co-operation between Europe and Canada, already considerable in the land sector with the adoption of the Leopard II tank by the Canadian army and in the naval sector with the production of new frigates. Canada's decision to procure nuclear-propelled submarines may become an important part of this co-operation since, because the United States will not agree to supply nuclear engines to its neighbour, the United Kingdom and France are competing for this market.

122. Although a few years ago Canada could be criticised for not playing its full part in the western security system, the effort made in the last five years, which is described in the 1987 white paper, is in the process of solving the problem raised by the existence of a vast, inadequately defended area to the north of the United States and north-west of the Atlantic. On the other hand, Europe must respond to the Canadians' concern that they should not be marginalised by the development of a European pillar of the alliance, this problem being more political than military. This is particularly important since Canada pursues an active policy outside the NATO area through the high level of development assistance it grants and its participation in several international forces, mostly under the aegis of the United Nations, in the Middle East in particular. In other words, consultations with Canada should not be confined to NATO but also include matters relating to Africa and Asia. Obviously this in no way affects the reactivation of WEU, of which Canada is very much in favour, but it must be kept closely informed of all that is done there.

123. Canada's place in the alliance is also of considerable interest because, although geographically speaking the country is American, it has many interests that bring it close to Western Europe. It can do much to ensure that the building of a European pillar of the alliance does not lead to a clash between European and American allies. This is a major reason for Europe to take the utmost account of Canadian concerns, which were described very frankly to the General Affairs Committee during its visit to Ottawa on 14th and 15th April 1988. Inter alia, there are signs of a significant convergence between European and

Canadian views in that it was clearly acknowledged in presence of the committee in Ottawa that, if there were to be a major conflict, whatever its origins, it would be waged mainly in Europe. At a time when the United States seems more than ever hesitant to admit this fact, it is highly satisfactory for the European members of the alliance to find support from Canada.

VI. Conclusions

124. In an article entitled "NATO's middle course" in the winter 1987-88 issue of Foreign Policy, Professor David P. Calleo of the United States analyses the various trends of thought that divide American public opinion over American commitments in NATO. He first notes some weakening in the American position in the world in the last thirty years which he attributes not to any decline in the United States – and even less to a strengthening of the Soviet Union – but to the very success of the policy adopted by the United States following the second world war: a halt to Soviet expansion, the recovery of Western Europe, the development of Japan and the emergence of a number of third world countries mean that henceforth the idea of a bi-polar world on which American performances are still based has now been overtaken by events. The Soviets "are threatened more by the rising new powers than by the United States, and it is not their moribund economy that challenges America's pre-eminence. Instead, the world is no longer susceptible to anyone's hegemony. The danger is not a Pax Sovietica but global anarchy. The post-war institutions have so depended upon American predominance that the whole system seems likely to collapse without it".

125. However, Professor Calleo considers the United States administration has been unable to cope with this phenomenon and is still attempting to play the same geopolitical rôle it played in the fifties, although it no longer has the political, military, economic or financial means, thus condemning the United States to either exhaustion or isolation. He thus blames those who wish transatlantic relations to retain the political, military and strategic bases they had until now, even if this means constantly adapting the doctrines for the use of weapons that underlie flexible response which is, in fact, no longer what it was when Robert McNamara defined it.

126. Professor Calleo notes the emergence of increasing criticism in the United States of this trend which burdens it with most of the political, military and financial weight of international order and the maintenance of peace in Europe at the cost of monetary disorder that is detrimental to all and crises in the alliance each time the United States changes its strategy, intervenes outside Europe or encounters a turning point in its relations with the Soviet Union. The excessive

rôle played by the United States provokes criticism in Europe, but above all in America, which generally leads to proposals for more or less total disengagement. "A hegemony-or-nothing mentality drives American thinking." Nationalist neo-conservatives now join isolationists in calling for disengagement based on condemnation of Western Europeans' attitude of always being ready to seek accommodation, particularly economic, with the Soviet Union and its allies, fleeing before the prospect of burden-sharing in joint defence and ill-prepared to endorse American policy outside the NATO area. They are in conflict with the present administration and those who favour maintaining the status quo and who would like better burden-sharing to allow other aspects of the American commitment in NATO to be preserved.

127. The author proposes what he calls devolution, which might be described as a new way of sharing both the burden and responsibility. Considering the wealth of Western Europe, its interest in developing peaceful relations with Eastern Europe, its relations with the third world, its military capability, its democratic régimes and its desire for peace, he asks the United States to continue to support it but at the same time allow it to assume more responsibility. The purpose would be to:

- (i) maintain NATO and the United States' nuclear guarantee in Europe;
- (ii) reduce American forces assigned to NATO by more than half so as to leave Europe most of the responsibility for its defence, while demonstrating the continuity of the American guarantee;
- (iii) assign the duties of SACEUR to a European, leaving his American deputy powers over the use of American nuclear weapons;
- (iv) encourage and even assist the development of European nuclear forces;
- (v) develop political and military consultations in the framework of NATO.

128. Your Rapporteur is far from considering that these proposals meet Europe's present interests. Europe does not have the nuclear means to ensure adequate deterrence. It is still desirable to keep an American SACEUR and relatively large United States forces in Europe, *inter alia* because of political differences between Western European countries over security matters. Early devolution might split Europe up, which is certainly not intended by the author of the proposals who, like many Americans, does not take enough account of the fact that European union is still an objective for many Europeans but is far from being a fact. Perhaps too he has not paid due attention to the relative fragility of European societies on which it would be difficult to impose any

great increase in military expenditure without provoking serious internal crises which would jeopardise any prospect of European defence.

129. Your Rapporteur feels, however, that Europe must be prepared for an inevitable evolution in the alliance and what Professor Calleo advocates is not the worst solution. It would be better to have the devolution he envisages than the revision of United States global strategy proposed in the Iklé-Wohlstetter report or disengagement, because it is the only solution allowing every aspect of the international house to be put in order: economic, financial, political and military. To be prepared for it in no way means provoking or precipitating it. But the risk of a far more dangerous solution being forced upon us is such that, if necessary, Europe should foster the adoption of this one. Reactivation of consultations in the framework of WEU between our governments on all matters relating to joint security can be an excellent means of handling this matter, provided the governments really wish to deal with this matter and stop putting their heads in the sand and trying to evade the danger by refusing to think about it. Your Rapporteur noted that on this point some members of the General Affairs Committee did not share these views and did not consider the evolution he foresees to be inevitable.

130. Naturally, consultations in WEU would not be enough since the main discussion must be with the Americans themselves and hence in the North Atlantic Council to which all the members of WEU belong. The first thing to be obtained is for the Americans to express their intentions clearly and agree to discuss every aspect of them with their European partners before locking themselves up in decisions already taken and in the process of implementation, whether in matters relating to defence policy, disarmament or the division of their commitments throughout the world. The problems to be solved are the same for everyone and solutions are needed to which more than lip-service is paid while retaining all kinds of mental reservations. They must be truly accepted by everyone following a cool assessment of realities and possibilities.

131. The General Affairs Committee's visit to the United States probably did not allow it to measure the breadth of the Americans' reassessment of their defence policy overall. The fact that it was made during a pre-electoral period when the true or expected reactions of American public opinion to matters of direct concern to it, such as burden-sharing in the alliance, probably veiled other aspects of the true situation. Perhaps the committee managed to give the Americans a better idea of Europe's concerns and to pave the way for subsequent, more frequent, exchanges of views, particularly between European and American parliamentarians, so as to define a possible

security policy for Europe in the coming decades and to pursue a valid dialogue with our governments on this vital subject.

132. One of the most remarkable aspects of American society is the openness of the discussion about all matters that are essential for the future of the United States and the world. To an outside observer, the obvious result is an impression of uncertainty and incoherence. He has to sort out what is essential or of secondary importance, fundamental or of passing interest, binding on the future or hot air. Your Rapporteur has attempted to find his way in this labyrinth of ideas and theories and regrets that in Europe he is unable, in spite of the freedom that exists there, to find the same will to go to the heart of problems and express ideas on this subject which do not follow the orthodox line. He would like the present text to give the WEU Assembly an opportunity of doing so in order to help Europe to think about the future of its security in realistic terms.

133. Internal developments in the Soviet Union and its new external policy, on the one hand, and questions raised in the United States, in particular about the economic and financial implications of its defence policy, on the other, place Western Europe in a new situation: the reactivation of WEU gives it an instrument for examining the consequences for its security. But it must want and know how to use it. The results of the ministerial meeting in The Hague on 19th April, as far as the Assembly has been able to ascertain, make one wonder whether this is really the case. Yet it is essential to strengthen European co-operation if the alliance is to be reorganised so as to improve transatlantic co-operation in areas affecting joint security.

134. Some committee members rightfully emphasised the considerable progress made in the first months of 1988 towards détente in relations between the two great powers. This feeling is based first of all on the development of a dialogue through increased meetings between the two countries' leaders at all levels, including the highest. This offered the prospects of an early start to new negotiations on many aspects of disarmament or the limitation of armaments and the completion of negotiations that had long been marking time on other aspects of the same question. A rapprochement of views on problems in the Middle East and Cambodia is clear. Negotiations on security and co-operation in Europe have taken a new turn, at least where conventional disarmament is concerned. Negotiations on the evacuation of Afghanistan have reached a successful conclusion. Europe can but welcome this evolution if it is confirmed. It will inevitably have a rôle to play while ensuring that its security is not thereby jeopardised. The reactivation of WEU and consultations between its members on defence and disarmament matters must therefore take a place in a period of détente just as it did

when international confrontations made it necessary to give priority to defence measures. The need for a European pillar of the alliance is not

due to East-West tension but the natural result of the emergence of a European presence in international life.

*Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada
in security matters*

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Soell

1. Leave out paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
“ Convinced that the negotiations on security and co-operation in Europe, disarmament and the limitation of armaments should help to strengthen the basis of joint defence; ”

Signed: Soell

1. See 6th sitting, 9th June 1988 (amendment amended and agreed to).

*Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada
in security matters*

AMENDMENTS 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 ¹

tabled by Mr. Pontillon

2. Leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
“ Noting with satisfaction that the United States and Canadian Governments do not intend to call in question their conventional and nuclear military commitment in Europe; ”
3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, before “ American ” add “ North ”.
4. At the end of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, add “ and Canada ”.
5. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ the United States ” and insert “ North America ”.
6. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ deployed ” and insert “ ear-marked for deployment ”.

Signed: Pontillon

1. See 6th sitting, 9th June 1988 (amendments agreed to).

Organisation of European security

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur*

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on the organisation of European security

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); Mr. Burger (Vice-Chairman); MM. Aarts (Alternate: *Eisma*), Bassinet, Baunel, van der Biest, Coleman, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Foschi, Hill, Hitschler, Koehl, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Martino, Mechttersheimer, Müller, Natali, Pécriaux, Pieralli, Pontillon, Reddemann, Ruet, van der Sanden, Sarti, Shelton, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Mr. Stoffelen.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on the organisation of European security

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the progress made towards the reactivation of WEU under Netherlands presidency, in particular the adoption of the platform on 27th October 1987, the co-ordinated action of member countries to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf and the invitation to Portugal and Spain to join WEU;
- (ii) Regretting, however, that the WEU ministerial organs have not yet been collocated and that their restructuring has not been completed;
- (iii) Also regretting the impossible position of the Assembly because of the tardy communication of the annual report of the Council to the Assembly, deploring the Council's reluctance to inform the Assembly of its activities through the channels provided for in the treaty and the Charter of the Assembly and, finally, insisting that ministers see to it that their officials comply with the time-scale agreed with the Council;
- (iv) Noting that international public opinion is still hardly aware that WEU is being reactivated;
- (v) Considering that reactivation implies not only increased intergovernmental activity but also a redefinition of the specific rôle of the organisation's permanent structures;
- (vi) Noting that the number of budgetary posts still vacant in the WEU ministerial organs would allow the Assembly's requirements to be met without waiting for the restructuring of the WEU ministerial organs to be completed;
- (vii) Also noting the petition addressed to the Assembly on 22nd March 1988 by Mr. Hintermann, former Assistant Secretary-General of WEU,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue to study the various implications of the platform adopted in The Hague and transmit the results to the Assembly;
2. Ensure the maintenance of a co-ordinated naval presence of its members in the Gulf as long as freedom of navigation is not guaranteed and, at the same time, take new steps to promote the application of Resolution 598 of the Security Council;
3. Inform international public opinion more adequately of the nature and scale of its operations in that area;
4. Pursue urgently the negotiations on the accession of Portugal and Spain to the modified Brussels Treaty and their effective participation in the Western European security system;
5. Specify how it intends to implement the political impetus it decided to give, in the Rome declaration, to co-operation in armaments matters;
6. Define an active rôle for the Secretariat-General in the procedure for consultations between member countries that it has just introduced and in the regular communication of information to the Assembly and the public on its activities, including the transmission on time of the annual report of the Council;
7. Describe forthwith the status and tasks of the WEU agency and transmit to the Assembly the text of the studies it has undertaken to communicate to it;
8. Start or pursue, in the appropriate framework and with the possible assistance of the agency, consultations on burden-sharing in the alliance, disarmament or the verified limitation of armaments and problems facing Western Europe's security because of measures taken by its allies which might modify the deployment of NATO forces and, finally, inform the Assembly of the results of these consultations;
9. Accord the Assembly here and now the wherewithal to restructure the Office of the Clerk in accordance with its 1987 memorandum.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The fortieth anniversary of the signing of the Brussels Treaty was recalled fairly discreetly on 17th March 1988. Some observers stressed the importance of the event by drawing a parallel with the reactivation of WEU. Others, on the contrary, took this as an opportunity to point out that the present crisis in the restructuring of the WEU ministerial organs was calling in question the task started forty years ago by the founders of the first European security system. It is still a moot point whether the Brussels Treaty was the start of a slow process leading to the definition of a European defence policy or merely the first step towards what was to become, in 1949, the Atlantic Alliance.
2. Your Rapporteur is again prevented from answering an annual report from the Council that had not reached the Office of the Clerk on 9th May, the time-limit fixed by the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly for the adoption of reports by committees. It would appear that there has been no response to the Assembly's repeated complaints about the delays that prevent any serious dialogue between the WEU organs.
3. In truth, since the last session, the Assembly has received very few official communications on the Council's activities, but certain information culled from the press or from various other more or less reliable sources gives some idea of the situation of WEU. Even after the ministerial meeting in The Hague on 18th and 19th April no communiqué was issued, as used to be after the official spring ministerial meetings. Only two brief notes, one on enlargement and the other on the Gulf, were communicated to the Assembly and the press. Your Rapporteur was unable to attend the joint meeting following the ministerial meeting because the time of the meeting was brought forward without the Office of the Clerk being given enough time to warn members of the change. He has therefore received only indirect information about what was said on that occasion.
4. Furthermore, the Assembly has received a petition from Mr. Eric Hintermann, former Assistant Secretary-General of WEU and Director of Agency III until 31st December 1987, the date on which his contract expired. The Council having failed to take a unanimous decision on renewing the contracts of the agency directors, he then found himself without a post. His petition covers all the activities of WEU and, at its meeting on 17th March 1988, the Presidential Committee therefore agreed to refer it to the General Affairs Committee.
5. This petition sets out considerations on the reactivation of WEU and thus comes within the scope of the present report. The main elements are therefore included in the substance and considered in the corresponding chapters of the report. Conversely, the parts of the petition that may be considered to relate to particular problems are not covered in this report.
6. The questions put by public opinion about the reactivation of WEU have in effect already been the subject of comment and discussion in the press, including an article by Mr. Joseph Fitchett in the International Herald Tribune of 14th March. The reactions of the Secretary-General, Mr. Cahen, are moreover known from two interviews he granted to Defense News on 7th March and The Times on 15th March and were clarified in his explanations to members of the Presidential Committee at its meeting in The Hague on 17th March. Although this was not a public meeting, your Rapporteur has been given some idea of what the Secretary-General said. Finally, the Secretary-General has been invited to answer the General Affairs Committee's questions in Paris on 9th May 1988.
7. The discussion in fact is concerned with the reality and nature of the reactivation of WEU. According to some observers, the organisation's work was seriously jeopardised because any decision by the Permanent Council was blocked by the clash between member countries over where to collocate the WEU ministerial organs, there being insufficient political will among the governments to overcome what, after all, are minor differences. Although the Secretary-General does not deny this blocking action, he believes it affected only matters of secondary importance and not the truly political activities of WEU.
8. Your Rapporteur wishes to point out that these two views are not so contradictory as they may seem. Intergovernmental consultations on the Gulf, how to follow up the platform adopted in The Hague and other truly political matters were pursued normally. Conversely, everything relating to the restructuring of WEU has been completely paralysed since the end of 1987. The question, therefore, is what is meant when WEU is referred to. Does it mean the meetings between representatives of the seven governments, or an international organisation which should have its own personality, so to speak separate from the action of each of its member governments, just as, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Contrat social*, to conform to the requirements of reason the general will must be distinct from the sum of individual wills? Hence, the question is how far are

Rousseau's words about human societies valid for an international organisation.

9. Your Rapporteur considers it evident that the answer to such a question cannot be clear and unequivocal. On the one hand, the very text of the modified Brussels Treaty, and particularly Article IX on which our Assembly is based, plainly shows that it does not consider that European society already exists and it does not detract from the sovereignty of states. On the other hand, the doctrine constantly upheld by our Assembly, as testified by the report on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance prepared by Mr. Masciadri, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, in 1984, is that the organisation as such should be able to take certain initiatives, if only to help to bring the government's views closer together when necessary and to give them the impetus necessary to apply the treaty in the way defined in the preamble. This was, for instance, the significance of the call for a political Secretary-General.

10. Undoubtedly in this connection the trend since the Rome declaration of October 1984 has been towards a weakening of the rôle of the organisation in favour of that of intergovernmental activities as witnessed by the successive changes in the agencies with the elimination of all their independent activities, no meetings of the Standing Armaments Committee since 1985, the fact that the Agency for the Control of Armaments whose statutory tasks have been virtually reduced to nought has not been recuperated so that the experts it employed could help to prepare a treaty on conventional disarmament, the prominent rôle played by the chairmanship-in-office and the proliferation of meetings for which the Secretariat-General does not provide the secretariat. This trend has been accentuated by the crisis in the restructuring of the ministerial organs since the end of 1987. It is a major concern of your Rapporteur that developments towards a more clearly intergovernmental organisation could have a negative influence on the strength and cohesion of WEU. To make this point quite clear, your Rapporteur wishes to underline that the Permanent Council, as well as the Secretary-General, will be more or less "away" from the forums in which discussions are prepared and decisions taken. He fears that progress in the restructuring of WEU will become fully dependent on the bureaucracy that is available to the Chairman-in-Office and that therefore the know-how of the organisation as a whole will no longer have a fixed position in the Permanent Council and the Secretariat-General. Moreover, the position of the Assembly is at stake as well. As your Rapporteur stated before, the Assembly is dependent on information from the Council of Ministers, the Permanent Council and the Secretary-General. These organs are the backbones of the organisation not only for its effectiveness but also for relations with the Assembly. When these organs are hampered in their functioning or when

one organ does not know what the others are doing, the constant flow of information to the Assembly, which is essential for its work, will also prevent the Assembly from fulfilling its duties.

11. Often there are advantages in this evolution. For instance, it is easier for the chairmanship-in-office to take certain initiatives than for the Secretariat-General, particularly when convening meetings of government representatives under Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the treaty. Conversely, there are serious drawbacks for the continuity of the Council's work and, above all, the statutory exchanges with the Assembly. As the General Affairs Committee has often emphasised, informal meetings with the Presidential Committee, a body that is only relatively representative, whose political responsibilities are limited and whose meetings are confidential, cannot replace normal dialogue between the Council and the Assembly. Increasingly this dialogue, and in particular the most official example, the annual report of the Council, has been losing much of its significance. A belated report devoid of political content is no longer the main part of a statutory dialogue between the two WEU bodies. If it is to be hoped, for instance, that the institutional crisis in WEU will be overcome, at least in part, before the Assembly's June 1988 session, what sense will there then be in debating a brief, expurgated report on activities prior to the crisis? It should be added that, when they are not prodded by officials concerned about the smooth running of the organisation, national administrations are not very scrupulous about applying the treaty, particularly when it is a matter of answering Assembly recommendations and written questions. Several committee members have complained about the deteriorating quality of these answers and their slowness in reaching the Assembly since 1984.

12. While one may therefore join the Secretary-General in welcoming the fact that the difficulties stemming from the deadlock in the restructuring of WEU have not had serious repercussions on intergovernmental political activities in WEU, it must also be admitted that this deadlock has many disadvantages and dangers for further reactivation of WEU.

II. The European pillar of the alliance

13. As the ministers stressed in the platform adopted in The Hague, the aim of the reactivation of WEU is to form a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. This formula, which seems to have been accepted by all the partners, is sufficiently vague, however, to cover a broad spectrum of facts and meet a great diversity of views. The adoption of the platform allowed definite progress to be made towards defining what this pillar might be, but from the moment it was a matter of passing from words to the first deeds it quickly

became clear that this unanimity of expression concealed many differences as soon as tangible shape had to be given to European co-operation in all the areas within the purview of WEU.

14. It cannot be claimed that the NATO summit meeting in Brussels on 3rd and 4th March 1988 showed that this pillar actually existed. It was even the United States Delegation that seemed to be doing most to reconcile the views of representatives of the WEU member countries on the main question on the agenda, i.e. disarmament.

15. However, in De defensa of 10th March 1988, an observer noted:

“... an indirect success for WEU insofar as certain points in the communiqué of the NATO summit meeting refer to the platform of October 1987 and the strengthening of the European pillar is specifically approved. According to the same source, similarities with the platform ‘are certainly not due to chance... and it must be seen as the affirmation of a European defence identity’. Moreover, no attempt is made by the Americans themselves to conceal this. Shortly before the summit meeting, Pentagon officials did not hide, in informal talks, their favourable view of the platform adopted in The Hague and the parts they wished to be borrowed from it for the texts issued at the conclusion of the summit meeting. This fact may be viewed in various ways: a subject of satisfaction for WEU, certainly, but also acknowledgment that, behind the apparent cohesion shown at the summit meeting, the alliance – or in any event its principal members – had nothing to add to what had been said in The Hague in the framework of WEU.”

These remarks point to the fact that for the first time WEU has effectively exercised this rôle of European pillar of the alliance which, according to the platform, is its vocation. It must be noted, however, that this was helped particularly because the United States, intent on having the INF agreement and its further disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union approved at the NATO summit meeting, showed the greatest concern to meet its allies’ wishes on the other matters and argued few of its own views on the other items on the agenda. In all likelihood this will not always be so and in other circumstances it will be more difficult to have NATO accept a policy defined beforehand in the framework of WEU.

16. However this may be, it is in France on the one hand and the United Kingdom on the other that the most radically conflicting views have been expressed on what the pillar should be, in particular at the Franco-British summit meeting on 29th and 30th January 1988. At that meeting, Mrs. Thatcher, United Kingdom Prime Minister,

firmly emphasised her wish to examine the possibility of Franco-British nuclear arms co-operation only if France again placed its forces and territory under NATO integrated command. French leaders could not be expected to share this view of European co-operation. An indication is that they readily speak of a pillar of the alliance whereas the British prefer the expression “pillar of NATO”. Here to some extent the platform adopted in The Hague gave a ruling by referring to the constitution of a “pillar of the alliance”.

17. It is now twenty years since France withdrew from the NATO integrated commands. For various reasons, this seems to meet with the agreement of a large majority of French public opinion since, in the 1988 presidential elections, no French political party is proposing that France return to the integrated commands. Conversely, France is proving ever more willing to co-operate with its allies in all aspects of European security. The fact that, in December 1986, Mr. Chirac proposed defining a European security charter, which became the platform of The Hague, that France has constantly strengthened its links with the Federal Republic in security matters and that it allowed the platform to specify that application of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty would start “at the borders” of member countries are clear, repeated signs of France’s will to play an effective part in the joint defence. The countries which adopted the platform subscribed to the idea of defining European security as outlined by Mr. Chirac. They expected that, in reactivating WEU, the French defence system could be brought closer to that of NATO. In their view, this is also an advantage inherent in Franco-German co-operation that they explicitly approved in the text of the platform itself, in spite of some countries’ wariness about the development of bilateral relations which might upset the balance between allies. Your Rapporteur again wishes the Assembly to note his concern, in regard to these bilateral relations between the large countries, or some of them, that within WEU there should not be two kinds of member countries with the smaller countries in second position and having to adopt, after the event, decisions already taken by the larger ones.

18. Everyone must well understand, however, that the reactivation of WEU is not intended to start an independent European security system that might call in question the fundamental concept of the Atlantic Alliance as the basis of Western Europe’s security policy and, above all, the deployment of the forces necessary to ensure that security. It is hardly probable that any present European government, including those of countries not taking part in NATO integrated force deployment, would now be prepared to endorse a trend which would jeopardise the close links that NATO ensures between Europe and the United States.

19. In this connection, it should be recalled that the five European security criteria proposed by Mr. Chirac when addressing the Assembly on 2nd December 1986 and taken up in the charter adopted in The Hague include an affirmation by the Seven that "the substantial presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces plays an irreplaceable part in the defence of Europe" because they "provide the indispensable linkage with the United States strategic deterrent". This passage throws light on the nature of the relationship between Europe and the United States in the Atlantic Alliance and contains a clearly-adopted position towards the triple zero option and all proposals for the denuclearisation of Europe as well as any attempt to organise European defence on the basis of a military, and hence political, decoupling of the two shores of the Atlantic.

20. Conversely, because it will make a stronger contribution to the Atlantic Alliance and allow a balanced Atlantic relationship to be formed, the strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance should adapt the alliance to the realities of a world which has changed profoundly since 1954.

21. It is from this consideration, endorsed by President Reagan's statement on 4th November 1987, that the programme announced in the platform stems, i.e. to:

- (a) improve procedure for consultation and extend co-ordination;
- (b) make the best possible use of the institutional mechanisms of WEU;
- (c) aim at a more effective use of existing resources by expanding bilateral and regional military co-operation;
- (d) concert national policies on crises outside the NATO area which might affect European security;
- (e) work out a global European concept of disarmament;
- (f) exploit all the possibilities of true détente, inter alia in the framework of the CSCE.

The application of the various aspects of this programme will allow the political activities of the WEU Council to be assessed.

22. Several committee members wondered about the possibility of forming a true European pillar of the alliance in view of the ambiguities they believed remained in the respective rôles of WEU and NATO. It is obviously difficult to draw a clear frontier between the military rôle of NATO, at least in the area it covers, and WEU's own area. Uncertainty still prevailing about current developments in both organisations probably makes it impossible, a priori, to do so. However, if one considers the relationship that appears to exist between WEU's response to Spain's candidature and the evolution of Spain's

position towards the problem of its military relations with the United States, the positive rôle of the European organisation in favour of transatlantic relations can be seen. Similarly, according to testimonies obtained by the committee in the United States, operations by certain member countries, co-ordinated by WEU, in the Gulf region were a positive factor in the American view of burden-sharing in the alliance.

23. Three areas remain in which the European pillar has not yet proved itself: the deployment of forces, disarmament and – as stressed by the Americans – the sharing of burdens and responsibilities in the alliance. These matters are covered in the report submitted by Mr. Pontillon on co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters. Working groups are known to have been set up in WEU to consider the first two questions and the Assembly can but trust that the Council will keep it informed of the results achieved.

III. Political activities of the Council

24. 1987 will probably be a milestone in the history of WEU insofar as, for the first time, the Council seems to have taken truly political action.

(a) The platform adopted in The Hague

25. A feature of the year was the preparation and adoption of the platform on European security interests, effectively bringing up to date the commitments entered into by member countries in the 1954 Paris Agreements. Unlike the changes made in 1954, this updating in no way affects the treaty itself but shows how member countries intend to apply it in vastly different circumstances. Your Rapporteur will examine certain ambiguities he has noted in this platform. These shortcomings must not conceal the essential contribution it makes to European security policy by marking a new stage in the progress towards a European union which was revived by the single European act.

26. The parallelism between the WEU and NATO approaches in both defence and disarmament matters, burden- and responsibility-sharing in the alliance and détente is particularly striking. On all these points, the platform is an extension of what was proposed in the Harmel plan except that many problems which were only theoretical ten years ago have now, due to circumstances, become practical, urgent problems. President Reagan's endorsement of the platform emphasises this essential aspect of the reactivation of WEU.

27. If the seven governments take their accession to this platform seriously, it should be possible to solve many questions that have now arisen. As is stated in the platform:

“ To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk.

The substantial presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces plays an irreplaceable part in the defence of Europe. They embody the American commitment to the defence of Europe and provide the indispensable linkage with the United States strategic deterrent.

European forces play an essential rôle: the overall credibility of the western strategy of deterrence and defence cannot be maintained without a major European contribution not least because the conventional imbalance affects the security of Western Europe in a very direct way.”

A start has been made on solving other problems such as the enlargement of WEU, its restructuring and its relations with NATO and the United States, although there are still serious differences between member countries on certain aspects.

28. Since January 1988, a Council working group has been examining the application of this platform. The only information received by your Rapporteur in this connection is that the first question tackled in this context is that of “ defence at the borders ”. This fact, together with the recent development of bilateral Franco-German relations in defence matters and the Franco-British agreement of January 1988 on the use of ports and infrastructure on French territory for the possible reinforcement of the NATO system, indicates that one of WEU's main tasks, i.e. to keep France in close contact with the NATO defence system, is being carried out in a more or less satisfactory manner.

29. In another respect, the Assembly would like confirmation of the statement attributed to the Secretary-General in Defense News of 7th March 1988 that “ WEU criticised the decision not to invite NATO Secretary-General Lord Carrington ”, to the Franco-German Cheeky Sparrow manoeuvres held in autumn 1987. It would be most important to know who expressed this opinion, when, in what form and exactly what was said.

(b) Security and disarmament

30. The Assembly knows that the working group on disarmament, which did not meet in 1985 because of an approach by the United States, has started work again. Several reports that Agency I has been asked to prepare were designed to inform governments of certain aspects of the

question, in particular Soviet tactics in the disarmament negotiations. It knows no more, nor has it been informed of the activities of the working group on European security.

(c) WEU and the Gulf

31. It is about the Gulf that the Assembly has been the best informed thanks to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council sending guidelines apparently adopted by the Council in preparation for the press conferences it has held after certain intergovernmental meetings on this subject. Your Rapporteur covered most aspects of this in the report adopted by the General Affairs Committee in November 1987.

32. Since then, two new pieces of information were transmitted by the Chairman-in-Office, following the meeting on 15th February 1988 and the ministerial meeting on 19th April. The first refers to the development of co-operation between member countries in the Gulf at several levels: representatives of ministries of defence and of naval commands on the spot. The outlines transmitted give only a fragmentary, incomplete and sometimes cryptic picture of developments and decisions taken. Your Rapporteur therefore felt he should ask the Secretary-General for an explanation of these matters. He received the following answer in a letter dated 25th March:

“ In reality, the Gulf affair is a ‘first’ for Europe.

It is indeed the first time European countries are acting together – under the aegis of a European organisation to which they belong – on problems which do not touch upon the immediate area of defence but whose evolution may threaten their security in the broadest sense.

Past events prove this.

When in 1978 European interests and persons were in danger in Shaba (Zaire), the two European countries particularly concerned, France and Belgium, reacted in a manner which was not only independent, but also in competition, not to say divergent.

In 1984, mine-sweeping operations proved necessary in the Red Sea. Three countries reacted, but in separate ways: the United Kingdom in the framework of an American-British-Egyptian operation, France and Italy each taking their own separate ways.

As I said, the case of the Gulf was therefore a ‘first’.

This ‘first’ will be developed, as is normal in view of the novelty of this action, step by step and in a pragmatic manner.

First through political consultation. When the freedom of navigation in the Gulf seemed threatened, the United States decided to strengthen its naval presence. Two European countries traditionally present in the region, the United Kingdom and France, decided to strengthen theirs. In these conditions, the Netherlands presidency of Western European Union convened in The Hague on 20th August 1987 a WEU political consultation at the level of political directors and their counterparts from the ministries of defence of the member states. On the basis of this political consultation, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium (the latter two countries through joint operations under the protection of the British fleet) decided to send naval units – mainly mine-sweepers and support vessels – to the Gulf. These were *national operations*. But they are being conducted on the basis of WEU political consultations which are since being pursued in the framework of meetings held approximately once each month.

Subsequently, a demonstration of WEU solidarity was added to this political co-operation. The Federal Republic of Germany and Luxembourg were unable to send naval units to the Gulf, the former because of the limits imposed in this respect by its constitution, the latter because it did not have the necessary units. The Federal Republic agreed to replace the units withdrawn by other countries for the operations in the Gulf, in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. Luxembourg took the initiative of making a financial contribution.

Finally, to this political consultation and this manifestation of solidarity was added a co-ordination of operations:

- co-ordination on the spot between fleets,
- co-ordination in the capitals between admiralties. This was what was meant by the ‘naval points of contact’ mentioned in the guidelines for the presidency for informing the press adopted after the meeting of senior officials held in The Hague on 15th February 1988 and to which you allude in your message. These ‘naval points of contact’ are ‘correspondents’ nominated in naval headquarters who maintain close contacts between each other in regard to operations in the Gulf and who may be and indeed have been convened at the initiative of the presidency.

Political consultation meetings (political directors or their representatives and their counterparts from the defence ministries)

such as the ‘naval points of contact’ are generally held at the seat of the presidency, i.e. at present The Hague. The ‘naval points of contact’ were nevertheless convened to meet in Paris on 3rd March last.

Everything above constitutes an important *precedent*. It indicates that the member countries of Western European Union might henceforth resort to similar procedure for jointly facing up to other threats outside the immediate area of their defence but which are aimed at their security in the widest sense of the term.”

33. The ministerial meeting on 18th and 19th April was held at a time of new crisis in the Gulf, due in particular to further mines having been laid, probably by Iran, in the central part of the Gulf. An American frigate had just been seriously damaged by one of these mines, leading the United States to retaliate against Iran, destroying three oil terminals close to the Iranian shore of the Gulf. An American helicopter was lost during this operation. The WEU member countries did not take part in these reprisals, but mine-sweepers belonging to four of them – Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom – came into action and detected several mines. Having received advance warning, they had moved out of the area before the American retaliatory operations took place.

34. The declaration on recent events in the Gulf adopted by the Council at its ministerial meeting on 19th April refers to the ensuing situation and reaffirms member countries’ will to safeguard the right to free navigation. However, it includes a new element compared with earlier statements by the WEU countries since, after appealing to those responsible for mining activities and attacks against merchant shipping, it stated that “such activities can call for measures for self-defence”, admittedly rather timid wording, but given some weight by the retaliatory operations the Americans conducted against Iran.

35. Furthermore, the Council usefully marks out the responsibilities of European political co-operation and its own by assigning to the former the task of supporting “all endeavours towards the full and early implementation of Resolution 598 of the Security Council, which is the only framework for an overall solution to the problems raised by the Iraq-Iran conflict”. This phrase seems to be a clear position in favour of the American proposal for sanctions against Iran if it persists in refusing to applying the resolution, which the Soviet Union has so far refused. One may wonder whether the Twelve will be as capable as the Seven of adopting a firm position on this question.

36. The importance of this matter from the WEU point of view should be stressed. First, it was the first time Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty had been applied.

Second, application was followed by action. Further, this action is outside NATO because it is being conducted in an area not covered by the Atlantic Alliance. Finally, a form of co-ordination of national action has been developed corresponding to what each country can do and to the intergovernmental nature of WEU.

37. This co-ordination now has to be adapted to the changing situation in the Gulf and the declared intention of certain governments not to keep their naval forces in the region for very long. According to information received on 19th April, all the members of WEU are determined to remain in the area at least until July.

38. It is difficult, however, to measure the effect of the action of WEU member countries in the Gulf. Their ships have destroyed only a few mines, not by any fault of their own, but because no more mines seem to have been laid by the belligerent parties between August 1987 and April 1988. It may nevertheless be considered that it is the presence of these ships and the United States navy that stopped Iran continuing its mine-laying operations during this period because it knew there was every chance of the mines being removed before they could destroy ships. In fact, as soon as mine-laying started again, the mine-sweepers resumed their operations and allowed the shipping lanes in contaminated areas to be opened again fairly quickly. This militates in favour of keeping WEU naval forces in the area as long as the peril remains.

39. The General Affairs Committee considered, however, that, while each member government tried to derive personal advantage from the operations carried out by its own ships, the press and public opinion were not sufficiently informed of the co-ordination of these operations by WEU and it expressed the wish that the Council and the governments represented there remedy this situation, which helps to discredit the reactivation of WEU.

(d) Co-operation in armaments matters

40. As far as your Rapporteur knows, the Council has done nothing to implement paragraph III.3 of the Rome declaration in which it entrusted the WEU ministerial organs with the task of giving political impetus to European co-operation in armaments matters. There having been no meetings of the Standing Armaments Committee since 1985 shows that this obligation has been shirked. In fact, the only impetus to such co-operation was provided by the Assembly, in particular through the colloquies organised by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. This is not at all what the Rome declaration proposed to the Council.

(e) Informing the Assembly

41. In several public speeches, the Secretary-General has claimed that the reactivation of WEU has become a fact and that the difficulties encountered by restructuring were minor matters in view of the success of the Council's political activities. There are signs that he is right. However, the Council can hardly expect the Assembly to take note of this political activity if it does not report on it. In practice, it has not yet done so.

42. One committee member regretted that the press cutting files on WEU prepared by the Secretariat-General were not circulated on a regular basis to members of the Assembly, together with a translation into WEU's working languages.

IV. Restructuring

43. The 1984 decisions made it necessary to effect a major transformation of the WEU structures: abolition of most armaments controls, development of intergovernmental activities with the participation of defence ministers and political impetus to co-operation in armaments matters. However, it now seems quite clear that this transformation was not carried out satisfactorily, first because requirements were not defined in sufficient detail, second because, for understandable but sometimes questionable reasons, the Council did not manage or did not wish to make staff changes too quickly, third because national interests relating to the seats of the institutions or the staff employed often took priority over the general interest and, finally, because there seem to have been serious differences between governments about what should be expected of the reactivation of WEU, a problem which was dealt with in the earlier chapters of this document. In a letter to your Rapporteur on 25th March 1988, the Secretary-General, Mr. Alfred Cahen said:

“As for the presentation of the activities of the various organs acting under the authority of the Permanent Council, I confirm the pertinence of your exposé in the excellent report of the General Affairs Committee last autumn.”

44. It should be stressed that the Assembly had anticipated several of these difficulties and warned the governments, inter alia by frequently underlining that the tasks assigned to the new agencies, created in 1985, were far from satisfactory. The Assembly has made several proposals in this connection and your Rapporteur emphasises the disarray caused by the Council's negligent handling of the matter.

(a) The Council

45. There is little to say about the activities of the Council of Ministers which appear to have been conducted correctly. We may welcome the efficient preparation of the ministerial meetings

which allowed the platform to be adopted on 27th October 1987. The information your Rapporteur has been able to obtain on the meetings of political directors or senior officials is not detailed enough to allow him to assess what has been done in this context but, as the Secretary-General has stressed in several of his speeches, reactivation has from this point of view become an established fact. Its results have been considered in the previous chapter. It should be noted, however, that these various meetings – apart from ministerial meetings – are held in forms and frameworks and under titles which vary constantly and about which the Assembly is not well-informed. Your Rapporteur asked the Secretary-General to give details on these points and has reproduced the information obtained in his previous report. He approached the Secretary-General again on 29th February 1988 and received the answer quoted in paragraph 43 of this report.

46. Until the adoption of the platform, the Permanent Council had no true political activities. It is now endeavouring to prepare the Council's ministerial meetings and act as an intermediary between the capitals of member countries. It is regrettable that because of the blockage referred to in paragraph 7 of this report no recent results have been achieved by the Permanent Council or by the ministers in collocating the ministerial organs. It is certain that many of the administrative tasks that occupy it could be delegated to the Secretary-General. Moreover, contrary to what was thought until now, it is henceforth no longer the Permanent Council that has to apply Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty, but the new intergovernmental bodies which have at last started to do so. The introduction of a modern communications network between the capitals should provide the necessary wherewithal.

47. It is nevertheless true that because the administration of WEU and most of what concerns relations between the Council and the Assembly has to pass through the ambassadors in London there is a screen between the active organisation and the existing organisation. The more direct participation of representatives of the ministries for foreign affairs effectively responsible for WEU's political activities in its administration and in keeping the Assembly informed of these activities seems highly desirable. An organisation of this kind, and also the application of Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the treaty, should be made much easier by the introduction of a high-speed communications network between the capitals of member countries, as announced to the Assembly by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council at the December 1987 session. Whatever this system may be called – it was first called "Correu" in the specialised press and then "WEU-Com" – its introduction was announced at the close of the ministerial meeting on 19th April. It should radically change the working of

WEU. The Council should draw the consequences of this for its own work and share between the Secretariat-General and representatives of central administrations the administration of WEU and responsibility for exchanges between the Council and the Assembly. On the other hand, the idea of convening the Council organs in one capital or another pending a possible agreement on a single seat for the ministerial organs seems detrimental to the efficiency of the intergovernmental organs.

(b) The chairmanship-in-office and the Secretariat-General

48. There is still another ambiguity about the respective rôles of these two bodies. Until 1984, the Secretary-General was responsible for running the organisation at every level, apart from ministerial meetings which had gradually been reduced in number, length and content. Since 1984, the chairmanship-in-office has taken over most of WEU's activities, including, to a certain extent, administration and relations with the Assembly, which has allowed the development of "informal" relations between the Council and the Assembly and made it easier to solve certain problems, particularly financial ones. For example, we owe to the initiative of successive chairmen-in-office the application of Article VIII, paragraph 3, in the Gulf affair, the solution of the budgetary problem the Assembly was facing over WEU staff pensions, the participation of the Assembly's Presidential Committee in the preparation of meetings of the Council of Ministers and the provision of better information to the public on WEU's activities. This new action by the chairmanship-in-office therefore responds largely to the Assembly's oft-expressed wish that a "political secretary-general" be appointed.

49. Furthermore, the Secretary-General himself has gained new authority through his initiatives with the press and the public, his addresses to the Assembly and his activities in non-member countries of WEU, in particular virtual or official candidate countries and the United States. The Secretary-General has also taken in hand the work of the agencies and, since 1st January 1988, their direction and administration.

50. It has to be noted, however, that the new breakdown of responsibilities between the chairmanship-in-office and the Secretary-General is not wholly satisfactory. Being an international organisation, the chairmanship rotates and is better suited to taking initiatives than to ensuring the continuity of an action. Moreover, the Secretary-General's outside activities and the fact that he is the only member of the Secretariat-General to take part in intergovernmental meetings other than those of the Permanent Council seem, so to speak, to have made him an interlocutor and government spokesman at political level but, to some extent, to have detached him from the organisation itself. An outside, ill-informed

observer's view of WEU must make him wonder about the rôle played by the staff of the Secretariat-General who have been considerably increased in number in recent years without it being clear that their duties, limited in fact to the secretariat of the Permanent Council, have been increased accordingly.

51. Should we again ask that the post of Secretary-General be assigned to a politician better prepared to take political initiatives? This is not evident insofar as in recent years the chairmanship-in-office has exercised most of this rôle. But if at any time the country having the chairmanship was not convinced that it should exercise it in this way, which can always happen for all kinds of reasons, the organisation would be paralysed. Furthermore, the entire Secretariat-General should be more closely associated with all the Council's political activities so as to be better able to ensure continuity. The present crisis is that of an organisation which has not been adapted to the new direction of WEU's activities, and this is the fault of the Council, which has not managed to define its new rôle.

(c) The agency

52. It is obviously in the case of the agencies that reactivation has clearly failed. In his interview in *The Times* on 15th March, the Secretary-General presents no other view. But, whereas some attribute responsibility for this failure to the Council, which has not managed or has not wished to make use of the work done by the agencies, others intimate that it is the agencies that have not managed to prove themselves. It is even rather surprising that the Secretary-General should have announced in his interview in *The Times* that the agencies whose direction he had just taken over were "slowly dying" and that they had nothing to do whereas he is the one who should be assigning them tasks.

53. The Assembly has only a fragmentary, inaccurate idea of the tasks assigned to the agencies since 1984 and, of the forty-four studies that the agencies are believed to have prepared for the Council, only three were transmitted to members of the Assembly, contrary to the Council's explicit promises at the ministerial meeting in Bonn in April 1985.

54. Several times since 1984, however, the Assembly has pointed out a number of facts which give the impression that the Council did not really wish to charge the agencies with tasks corresponding to the true requirements of WEU or of Europe. The Assembly has never been informed of a definite rôle being assigned to the agencies and it still does not really know what the Council expects of them. It must feel surprise at the Deputy Secretary-General's words in his letter dated 25th February 1988 transmitting Agency II's report on "Recent developments in Soviet

attitudes to Western Europe and their implications for security policy": "These documents reflect the opinions of their authors alone and cannot be considered to engage the responsibility of either WEU member states or the Permanent Council." This means that the agencies are no longer considered to be dependent organs of the Council and Secretariat-General although, since January 1988, the Secretary-General has personally taken over the direction of each of the agencies. From 1984 until now, the Council had in fact always described the agencies as organs closely dependent on it. It may also be wondered why, if this is not the case, the Council was against most of the agencies' reports being transmitted to the Assembly. This opposition implied that the Council, like the Assembly, attached political value to these reports. Should this no longer be so, documents from the agencies would be no more than information documents with far less impact than the Assembly's reports. In view of the number of subjects dealt with in these reports, the question of the classification of the information given does not seem to be a serious argument.

55. On several occasions, the Assembly expressed concern at three other aspects of the problem. To what sources did the agencies have access for their studies? What means did they have for processing the information they received? What use did the Council make of these studies? It has never obtained any satisfactory information on these three questions.

56. At the ministerial meeting in October 1987, two decisions concerning the agencies were announced: reducing them to a single agency with a small staff and collocating this single agency with the Secretariat-General. As everyone knows, these measures have not yet been carried into effect because the Council has been unable to reach the necessary decisions. France, which is apparently anxious to prevent staff being moved from Paris to London, has, since December, opposed any decision that did not cover the whole question. This attitude would probably have been welcome in 1985 because it would have forced the Council to state clearly what it expected of the agencies and to take the necessary steps to give them useful work. In December 1987, the result was to add to the confusion, *inter alia* by preventing the Council from renewing the contracts of the directors of the agencies which expired on 31st December. It may be wondered, however, why the Council felt it could renew the contracts of other members of the staff of the WEU ministerial organs which expired on the same date but not those of the directors.

57. Mr. Holzheimer's words in his letter, saying that the agencies' reports reflect the opinions of their authors alone, remove the main reason for collocating the agency with the Secretariat-General and the Permanent Council. If this agency is to become a more or less independent

think tank it should, on the contrary, in order to work satisfactorily, be as free as possible from every point of view. This is not at all what was announced and undertaken between October 1984 and October 1987.

58. Everything indicates, therefore, that the Council still does not know what it expects of the agency. The Assembly for its part has always been sceptical about the will of the governments to make real use, for their information, of one or more WEU agencies and has said that it considers the only justification for a WEU agency would be to pursue a permanent executive rather than research task. The control of armaments in application of the protocols to the Paris Agreements was such a task. The international secretariat of the SAC had another. The organisation of a European institute for defence studies could have been a third. In 1984, the governments rightly decided to abolish most controls. Since 1985, they have not wanted the SAC to meet. They left it to national initiatives to arrange the meeting of European trainees to study European defence. It may therefore be wondered whether the single agency decided upon in The Hague has more chance than the three previous agencies of meeting needs which have not really been defined. The agencies' misadventures between 1984 and 1988 indicate that more effort has been spent on sparing national or individual interests than in giving WEU useful, effective instruments.

59. One committee member recalled the experience acquired by the Agency for the Control of Armaments and proposed that the activities of the new agency be mainly directed towards implementing the platform adopted in The Hague, with particular regard to working out an agreement on conventional disarmament and, subsequently, its application. Your Rapporteur can but endorse this proposal in view of the rôle that the European members of the alliance will have to play in these negotiations. The same member proposed that controls be extended to include sales of arms to third countries, recalling the lack of such controls for sales to countries in the Gulf region. This proposal raises quite a different kind of problem since, until now, sales of arms have never been the subject of agreement between the WEU member countries. The experience of the Agency for the Control of Armaments shows that there can be no controls without very precise prior agreement on aims and procedure for controls. Only a decision to boycott a country, for instance following its refusal to comply with Security Council Resolution 598, might provide a juridical basis for such control. To date, the Soviet Union has accepted no measures of this kind.

(d) Collocating the ministerial organs

60. Collocation, decided upon in The Hague on 27th October, seems a matter of elementary logic. To the best of your Rapporteur's know-

ledge, everyone agrees that it is logical but collocation has encountered difficulties which have not yet been overcome and which are now paralysing the necessary restructuring of WEU.

61. The facts of the problem were described to the Assembly at its December session by Mr. David Mellor, the United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and by Mr. Jean-Bernard Raimond, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. The United Kingdom Government proposed that collocation be in Brussels so as better to associate WEU with NATO, particularly by arranging for the permanent representatives of member countries to NATO to form the Permanent Council. It had the explicit support of most governments. But the United Kingdom proposal was rejected by the French Government for the very reason that it wants to avoid a situation in which WEU might be too closely identified with NATO. France proposed that collocation be in Paris. Since then, Sir Geoffrey Howe, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, was reported in the Netherlands newspaper NRC Handelsblad of 14th March 1988 to have said that the United Kingdom might be content with collocation in London. Your Rapporteur does not know how this suggestion was received by the other governments.

62. The governments' attitudes probably took into account certain special interests. The fact that ministers from two countries announced their positions in public speeches, however, did not make a subsequent compromise easy. Furthermore, the reasons given for the positions adopted show disagreement about the place of collocation and also about the very nature of WEU. For some, the reactivation of WEU seems desirable only insofar as it is closely linked to NATO. Others consider it acceptable only if WEU remains independent of NATO, even if the defence of Europe is primarily a matter for the Atlantic Alliance. This is not a new discussion. Only the diplomatic ability to use the same words to describe different facts allowed the platform to be adopted in The Hague and the text is ambiguous on this important point.

63. There is probably little hope of this fundamental discussion being resolved quickly. Apparently at the meeting on 19th April 1988 the Council agreed to keep the WEU organs in their present premises for a further transitional period and to ask the Secretary-General to prepare an appropriate organogram. The Assembly naturally expects this organogram to be communicated to it. For the rest, events may possibly bring about a progressive solution because of developments in the alliance and member countries. Enlargement of WEU might also change the facts of the problem. What the Assembly can now ask the Council is not to allow this quarrel about its seat govern the completion of the restructuring of WEU. A

provisional solution, acceptable to all, should be found even if it falls short of full satisfaction. There would be no hope of forming a European pillar of the alliance if such a secondary matter were to continue to jeopardise it.

V. Enlargement

64. For reasons that the Assembly has never considered relevant, the Council decided to defer consideration of the possible enlargement of WEU until restructuring was completed. On 27th October 1987, the Council announced – admittedly very prematurely – that restructuring had been completed. If there is enlargement, the structures of WEU will have to be re-examined since they cannot remain the same if the number of member countries is increased.

65. Since 1985, the Assembly's position in favour of the accession of Portugal to WEU has been crystal-clear. It took the necessary steps to allow a Portuguese Delegation to take part in all its activities without delay. The Presidential Committee in turn visited Portugal on 22nd and 23rd February 1988. In these two days, members of the Presidential Committee met members of the Portuguese Government and Parliament. Following these meetings, Mr. Charles Goerens, President of the Assembly, sent Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, the following message:

“ Following its meetings with members of the Portuguese Government and Parliament, the Presidential Committee noted that there was a consensus among the principal political parties in favour of a defence effort designed to allow Portugal, one of the founder members of NATO, to play its full rôle in the alliance and demonstrate in an effective manner its solidarity with the other members in the event of attack.

Portugal is equally convinced of its commitment to the building of Europe. This has already been expressed in the framework of the European Community and political co-operation and should be confirmed without delay in the framework of the modified Brussels Treaty.

Portugal is clearly prepared to assume the undertakings embodied in this treaty and to apply the principles defined in the platform adopted in The Hague, giving them, together with the other member countries, the full significance implied by the requirements of European security.

The Presidential Committee thus confirms the importance the Assembly attaches to its Recommendation 446 and urges the Coun-

cil, at its next ministerial meeting, to make the necessary arrangements for Portugal to take its due place in WEU. ”

The firmness of the position adopted by the Presidential Committee is due inter alia to information it has received on the trend of Portugal's defence policy in the last ten years. It considered the transformation of an army designed primarily for colonial-type action into a modern army designed for the defence of Europe and part of the North Atlantic Ocean, with the creation of a brigade prepared to intervene in Northern Italy in the event of an emergency, a decisive argument.

66. The Assembly has not adopted such a clear position in favour of the accession of other countries such as Spain or Norway mainly because it has received no specific information about the possible candidature of Norway. Spain's candidature requires explanations about how it intends to apply Article V of the treaty and the aspects of the platform adopted in The Hague relating to deterrence and the defence of allies at their borders. Norway's candidature would correspond perfectly to the framework for enlargement fixed in The Hague on 27th October. Your Rapporteur hopes that, should there be an application from Norway, this would also bring that country closer to the European Community.

67. Conversely, your Rapporteur considers that the modified Brussels Treaty should in no event run the risk of being distorted by an enlargement of WEU. He considers it neither necessary nor desirable to revise the treaty at the present time and feels that anything which might weaken Article V would jeopardise the task of reactivation that is under way. He therefore thinks it impossible to enlarge WEU to include Eastern Mediterranean countries entertaining political disputes and which have taken up arms against each other quite recently. Candidate countries must settle these problems between themselves; it is not for WEU to adapt its basic texts to suit the candidates. He also wonders what the undertaking that defence should start on the frontiers would mean in the case of countries whose territory is far from the other members of WEU.

68. One committee member stressed the interest of enlarging WEU to include all the European member countries of NATO so that it might form a true European pillar of the alliance. This is naturally a long-term objective that might be considered, but it must be noted that the Northern European countries have not yet applied for membership. Furthermore, the policy recently adopted by Denmark on the passage of allied ships carrying nuclear weapons through its territorial waters makes it impossible, as matters now stand, for it to accede to the platform adopted in The Hague.

69. This would not be so for Norway, but as it is not a member of the European Community its

possible candidature would again raise the rather nebulous question of the obligation to belong to the Community before joining WEU. Because of the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty, it obviously conforms with the nature of WEU to contribute to the building of Europe, as recalled in the invitation addressed to Portugal and Spain, and this can but encourage the Assembly to develop its exchanges with the Community and the European Parliament, as the Presidential Committee undertook to do several years ago. It does not seem possible to go any further at present either with enlargement to include the European members of the alliance or with the requirement for membership of both WEU and the Community, but this is obviously a problem that will arise in the fairly near future.

70. In any event, the Assembly was happy to note the "Draft invitation for Portugal and Spain" adopted by the Council of Ministers on 19th April. It is pleased the reasons given by the Council include not only the principles defined on 27th October 1987 but also the fact that the two countries "are fully committed to the process of European construction", which shows clearly WEU's place at the side of the European Communities in this construction.

71. "The appropriate discussions" with Portugal will probably not encounter any major difficulties. Those with Spain will doubtless take longer since there is still some ambiguity about how that country intends to fulfil its joint defence obligations. It can already be noted, however, that Portugal and Spain immediately accepted the offer and this is probably why the Spanish Government immediately afterwards became more flexible in its interpretation of its ban on allies stationing nuclear weapons on Spanish territory. If this is so, it would be striking confirmation of the positive rôle played by WEU as the European pillar of the alliance.

72. It is probably too early to consider here and now the juridical consequences of enlarging WEU, but a number of questions will inevitably be raised and your Rapporteur proposes that the General Affairs Committee examine them for the Assembly's next part-session.

VI. Relations between the Council and the Assembly

73. Starting from Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, these relations have been developed in a new manner during the reactivation period although their former structure has not been abolished officially. Because of this situation, the Assembly has to complain that the Council's commitments are not respected and it is unable to come seriously to grips with the question of keeping the Assembly informed. In the present state of the reactivation of WEU, a complete re-examination of this matter seems essential.

74. (a) *Information given to the press* on the Council's activities is still fragmentary and inadequate. Consequently, for much of the press, the Assembly remains the main source of information about the activities of WEU as a whole, which is not at all satisfactory. The Assembly for its part is first, and sometimes only, informed of the Council's activities through the press and has no idea of the source of the information given. All this inevitably leads to misunderstanding, confusion and suspected leaking of information to the detriment of the smooth running and good name of the organisation.

75. Your Rapporteur understands full well the Council's difficulty in reaching agreement on the wording of a communiqué at the close of each of its meetings. He regrets, however, that the Council of Ministers did not issue one at the close of its only official meeting of the year. He notes, too, that, when it agrees on the text of guidelines for the press, they are scrappy, brief and often difficult to understand. He recalls that the Assembly has regularly asked the Council to set up a body empowered to establish the necessary exchanges with the press. Today, he suggests that the Secretariat-General be instructed to draw up a bulletin – on a monthly basis, for instance – reporting on meetings held under the aegis of the Council, giving their agenda and the results achieved, to allow the general public, and the Assembly in particular, to know what is happening in WEU.

76. Let there be no mistake. Public opinion, which in 1984 was convinced of the governments' will to reactivate WEU, is becoming increasingly sceptical. It is no longer enough for the Secretary-General to proclaim that reactivation has become a fact for him to be believed. The facts must be made public. The Assembly's criticism of the Council's activities is at present the main source of information for the public and press, and this probably gives a distorted picture of the Council's activities. The Council often complains about this, but it should find a remedy.

77. (b) *The annual report of the Council* is the normal, statutory means of keeping the Assembly informed of the Council's activities. It is the basis for the Assembly's assessment of the governments' action in WEU. Since 1984, it has been received so late that it cannot be used for the Assembly session following its publication and is, for this reason, an out-of-date document of no interest by the time the Assembly can debate it. Furthermore, it is an extremely brief text, mainly administrative and without political impact. Is this how a Council which claims to have effectively reactivated WEU in the political area thinks it can meet the Assembly's wishes and convince public opinion that reactivation is a fact? Whatever efforts the governments may have made to give effective substance to the platform

adopted in The Hague, it will be to no avail as long as the Council fails to inform the Assembly and public opinion of its actions.

78. (c) Everything has been said about the good conditions in which the *informal dialogue* between the Council and certain Assembly bodies, in particular the Presidential Committee, takes place. This is to be welcomed, but your Rapporteur has to recall that a parliamentary assembly forms a whole and exchanges of views without minutes between some of its members and the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, while useful and allowing many matters to be tackled frankly, cannot replace official exchanges of views with the Assembly as a whole.

79. (d) The last aspect of exchanges between the Council and the Assembly is the *participation of ministers in sessions*. They are entitled to participate, but their attendance must be organised to ensure that the presence of ministers does not upset the orderliness of sessions which have to be fitted into periods that are too short. Several parliamentarians have complained that ministerial addresses unduly disturb the efficient conduct of sessions. Your Rapporteur believes such addresses are important and that the Assembly would lose a great deal if it changed its Rules of Procedure, which authorise ministers to address it whenever they wish. However, ministers should do so only when they have a special message to convey. Thus, the presence of Mr. Mellor and Mr. Raimond at the December 1987 session allowed the Assembly to hear details of their positions prior to the crisis which was to arise in the restructuring of WEU at the beginning of 1988. Your Rapporteur also wishes to stress once again how much the Assembly would appreciate the Chairman-in-Office playing an effective part in the debate on the annual report of the Council provided this were not limited to an address followed by questions and answers or to a silent presence throughout the rest of the debate.

80. Generally speaking, your Rapporteur fears that relations between the Council and the Assembly will be unable to develop satisfactorily until the permanent ministerial organs have been restructured and gained the necessary authority to convince the Council that it should make meaningful communications to the Assembly in a satisfactory manner: the annual report, by all means, but also answers to recommendations and written questions, the standard of which has deteriorated sharply since 1984. One of the permanent tasks of the Secretariat-General is to encourage various Council bodies not to make do with the easy solution of vague statements or evasive answers but to understand that Article IX is as important a part of the treaty as the others and that the reactivation of WEU concerns it too.

81. (e) The question of *restructuring the Office of the Clerk* is constantly deferred by the Council, which claims that it is linked with completion of

the restructuring of the ministerial organs. There is no longer any valid reason for this in view of the significant reductions in staff carried out in recent years at the expense of the agencies. Unfilled budgetary posts exist and could be transferred to the Assembly without any increase in the global budget of the organisation. Empty offices in WEU's Paris premises could easily be assigned to the Office of the Clerk now that it is known that the ministerial organs will not be collocated in Paris.

82. The reactivation of WEU has led to an increase in the Assembly's work and hence in the work of the Office of the Clerk which, even after the completion of the restructuring it has requested, will remain extremely small. To gear this restructuring with completion of that of the ministerial organs, which is still very hazardous and probably will be delayed further, is tantamount to depriving the Assembly of the means of work that are both essential and urgent.

VII. Conclusions

83. The ministerial meeting in The Hague on 18th and 19th April threw a little more light on the state of the reactivation of WEU. Certain matters which have so far held it up have been, if not solved, at least reduced to reasonable proportions. Thus at least a provisional solution seems to have been found to the problem of the seat of the ministerial organs and above all major decisions have been taken on the enlargement of WEU.

84. Does this mean that the reactivation of WEU is thus completed? Your Rapporteur fears that many questions which have been outstanding for a long time will remain because realistic governmental decisions on relations with the Assembly, the tasks of the agency, the rôle of the Secretariat-General and public information have not yet reached maturity. Concealed behind these questions, at first sight secondary, is another, more serious one: the nature of relations between WEU and NATO which, in spite of the platform adopted in The Hague, continue to perturb the Council's political action.

85. Let there be no mistake: to speak of the reactivation of WEU solely from the standpoint of intergovernmental political activities is not enough. There cannot be effective reactivation without setting up structures corresponding to the new requirements and there is no indication that the governments are prepared to tackle restructuring in the light of the interests of European security alone.

86. The present crisis in WEU probably concerns only the institutional aspect of reactivation. But the institutional crisis stems from more deep-rooted causes and may swiftly lead to political paralysis. In the past, the Assembly has proposed

a number of remedial measures. Your Rapporteur proposes that the committee include the following points here and now in its recommendation:

- (a) Those responsible for WEU in the ministries for foreign affairs of member countries should be associated more closely with the work of the Permanent Council through the use of modern means of communication.
- (b) The Secretary-General should be made responsible for and given greater autonomy in the administration of the ministerial organs and keeping the Assembly and the public informed of the political activities of WEU.
- (c) Action should be taken on the Council's decision to give political impetus to the production of armaments and this rôle should not be left to Assembly initiatives alone.

(d) The agencies should be kept in existence only insofar as the Council is determined to give them a statute and specific tasks and the Assembly is sent the text of their studies without delay. The Assembly should also be told how the Council intends to follow them up.

(e) It should be ensured that the working groups on disarmament and security provide without delay the elements necessary for measures to implement the platform adopted in The Hague.

87. To these points should be added those relating more specifically to exchanges between the Council and the Assembly as set out in Chapter VI of the present document, and a request for a systematic policy for informing the press, public opinion and the Assembly about the activities of WEU, for instance through a monthly bulletin prepared by the Secretariat-General.

Organisation of European security

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Pieralli

1. Add the following new text at the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper:
“ and take action to facilitate the accession to WEU of all the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance ”.

Signed: Pieralli

1. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1988 (amendment withdrawn).

Organisation of European security

AMENDMENT 2 ¹

tabled by Mr. Pieralli

2. Add the following new text at the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper:
“ and take action to facilitate the accession to WEU of all the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance who wish to join and who commit themselves in advance to the same conditions as governed the Portuguese and Spanish cases; ”

Signed: Pieralli

1. See 5th sitting, 8th June 1988 (amendment agreed to).

Naval aviation

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur*

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GLOSSARY

1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 1 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Kittelmann (Chairman); MM. de Beer, Fourré (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle (Alternate: Baumel), Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Cariglia, Cox (Alternate: Wilkinson), De Decker, De Rycke, Fiandrotti, Fioret, Hardy, Irmer, Jung, Konen, de Kwaadsteniet, Mrs. Lalumière, MM. Lemmrich, Matraja, Pecchioli (Alternate: Cannata), Scheer, Sinesio, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Speed, Steiner, Steverlynck, Stokes.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Introductory Note

In preparing this report *the Rapporteur* had interviews as follows:

Netherlands

Ministry of Defence, The Hague, 2nd and 3rd July 1987

Mr. W.F. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence;
Captain Eyff, Commander Klavert, Lt. Col. Bücher, Defence Staff;
Mr. Fortuin, Public Affairs Department;
Mr. Kreemers, Senior Policy Adviser.

Valkenburg Naval Air Base, 3rd July 1987

Commander W.J. Bottema, Commander Valkenburg Naval Air Base.

France

French Naval Staff, Paris, 9th July 1987

Vice-Admiral Doniol, Head of French Naval Air Service;
Captain Dubourg, Military Assistant.

Dugny Naval Air Base, Le Bourget, 9th July 1987

Admiral Pinelli, Commanding maritime patrol aircraft.

Lann-Bihoué Naval Air Base, Lorient, 9th July 1987

Rear Admiral Sajous, Commanding Lorient maritime area;
Commander Bernaudin, Base Commander.

Landivisiau Naval Air Base, Brest, 10th July 1987

Captain Meysonat, Base Commander.

United Kingdom

Headquarters Commander-in-Chief Channel, Northwood, 17th September 1987

Air Vice Marshal A.L. Roberts, RAF, Chief-of-Staff 18 Group;
Captain C.O.L. Quarrie, RN.

RNAS Yeovilton, 9th and 10th March 1988

Rear Admiral R.C. Dimmock, Flag Officer Naval Air Command;
Captain C.L. MacGregor, RN, Flag Captain;
Captain T.S. Taylor, RN;
Commander S. Lidbetter, RN, Commanding Officer 899 Naval Air Squadron;
Lt. Commander T.J. Eltringham, RN, Commanding Officer 846 Naval Air Squadron;
Lt. Commander R.T. Love, RN.

Iceland

Headquarters Iceland Defence Force, Keflavik, 18th September 1987

Col. Bujalski, USAF, Second-in-command, Iceland Defence Force;
Col. Christiansen, Danish Air Force.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Reykjavik, 18th September 1987

Mr. Hannes Hafstein, Secretary-General;
Mr. Eyjolfur-Konrad Jonsson, Chairman Foreign Affairs Committee;
Ambassador Ingolfsson, Head of the Defence Department;
Mr. Robert T. Arnason, International Department;
MM. Hannes Heimisson, Sturla Sigurjonsson, Magnus Bjarnason, Defence Department.

Canada*Greenwood Canadian Maritime Patrol Air Base, Nova Scotia, 25th September 1987*

Col. Kirkwood, Canadian forces, Base Commander;
 Lt. Col. Aube, Commanding Officer 405 MP Squadron;
 Lt. Col. Morrison, Base Operations Officer;
 Lt. Col. Jamison, Base Technical Support Officer.

United States*The Pentagon, Washington DC, 28th September 1987*

Vice-Admiral Dunn, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Air Warfare;
 Rear Admiral Edwin R. Kohn, USN, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Air Warfare;
 Mr. Bruce Powers, Captain B. Johnson, USN, Air Warfare Department.

Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina, 28th September 1987

Brig. Gen. Michael Sullivan, USMC, Commanding General Second Marine Aircraft Wing;
 Col. William Gilliland, Group Commander Marine Air Group 32;
 Col. Jerry Inos, Chief-of-Staff;
 Lt. Col. Ben Myer, Commander Training Squadron;
 Lt. Col. David Horton.

Headquarters SACLANT, Norfolk, Virginia, 29th September 1987

Admiral Lee Baggett, USN, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic;
 Mr. Roy Haverkamp, State Department, Special Assistant for International Affairs to SACLANT;
 Rear Admiral David G. Ramsey, USN, Chief-of-Staff SACLANT;
 Rear Admiral Joannes Wendel, Netherlands navy, Deputy Chief-of-Staff Support;
 Rear Admiral Peter W. Cairns, Canadian forces, Deputy Chief-of-Staff Operations, ASW Plans;
 Rear Admiral Glen E. Whisler, USN, Deputy Chief-of-Staff Policy;
 Commander K. Hindle, RN.

Federal Republic of Germany*Glücksburg Marine Headquarters, FRG, 15th October 1987*

Rear Admiral Jürgen Dubois, Commander-in-Chief Fleet.

Naval Air Station, Eggebek, 15th October 1987

Captain Volker Liche, Station Commander, Naval Air Wing 2, Eggebek.

Spain*Ministry of Defence, Madrid, 18th and 24th February 1988*

Rear Admiral R. Marti Narbona, Head of Naval Aviation Division;
 Commander J.A. Font, Naval Assistant;
 Major M. Montojo, Spanish Marine Corps.

Aircraft carrier "Principe de Asturias", El Ferrol, 19th February 1988

Captain A. Leon Garcia, Commanding Officer.

Portugal*IBERLANT, Oeiras (near Lisbon), 23rd February 1988*

Rear Admiral S.E. Bump, USN, Deputy Commander-in-Chief IBERLANT;
 Commodore C.W. Gotto, RN, DCoS, Plans and Operations.

Norway

AFNORTH, Kolsås, Norway, 18th March 1988

General Sir Geoffrey Howlett, CINCNORTH;
Lt. General Schibbye, Norwegian Air Force, Deputy CINCNORTH;
Rear Admiral Steindorff, Federal German Navy, Chief-of-Staff;
Major General Schriver, Danish Army;
Brig. General Rowe, USMC.

Norwegian Defence Headquarters, Huseby, 18th March 1988

Rear Admiral Per Sollien;
Col. Nils Sverdrup-Thygeson;
Lt. Col. Hans-Peter Roeder.

Ministry of Defence, Oslo, 18th March 1988

Mr. Chris Prebensen, Director-General Press and Information Department;
MM. Baard Dredrup Knudsen, Harald Stoeren, Dr. Mari Heiberg, Security Policy Department;
MM. Finn Sollie, Tomas Ries, International Relations Institute.

Italy

Aircraft carrier "Garibaldi", La Spezia, 7th April 1988

Captain Giorgio Biraghi, Commanding Officer;
Commander Angelino, Commander (Air).

Ministry of Defence, Rome, 7th April 1988

Vice-Admiral Mario Castelletti, Plans and Policy Division;
Captain Martinotti, Naval Assistant;
Captain Dicieco.

The committee as a whole held a meeting on board HMS "Ark Royal" setting sail from Portsmouth on 13th October 1986 and was briefed by:

Captain (now Rear Admiral) J.L. Weatherall, RN, Commanding Officer;
Captain C.R.K. Cameron, RN, Head of Defence Studies (Royal Navy);
Commander A.F. Hutchison, RN, Commander (Air).

On 14th October 1986, the committee met at Headquarters Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel, Northwood, where it was briefed by:

Admiral Sir Nicholas Hunt, Commander-in-Chief Channel;
Air Vice Marshal Derek Hann, RAF, Chief-of-Staff Maritime Air Forces, Eastern Atlantic;
Rear Admiral R. den Boeft, RNLN, Chief of Allied Staff.

The committee as a whole also visited the Tactical Fighter and Weapons Training Centre, Goose Bay, Canada, on 23rd and 24th September 1987 and was briefed by:

Lt. Col. Jodouin, Canadian forces, Acting Base Commander;
Col. Christiaans, Royal Netherlands Air Force, Commander RCAF Detachment Goose Bay;
Col. Schneider, German Air Force, Commander German Air Force Training in Canada;
Major Clements, United States Air Force Detachment;
Squadron Leader Smith, Royal Air Force, Commander RAF Detachment Goose Bay.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their special thanks to all the officials and senior officers who met the Rapporteur or briefed the committee in reply to questions.

Draft Recommendation*on naval aviation*

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that the security of the highly-industrialised countries of Western Europe depends on access to overseas markets and sources of raw materials;
- (ii) Conscious that the defences of Western Europe and of North America are interdependent and that the coalition defence of Western Europe provided through the NATO alliance depends on the maintenance of secure lines of communication across the North Atlantic for the essential process of reinforcement and resupply from Canada and the United States, for which SACLANT's Striking Fleet Atlantic with its naval air and anti-submarine assets plays a key rôle;
- (iii) Noting that both recent events in the Gulf and experience in other previous conflicts have demonstrated the importance of seapower generally and of organic naval air power in particular, and not only lead to the recognition of the strategic and economic necessity for Western Europe to retain possession and availability of national merchant fleets of adequate size, but justify the suggestion that developments in the structure and ownership of international merchant shipping merits serious consideration;
- (iv) Recognising that the strong growth and development of the Soviet navy since the early 1960s into a formidable bluewater instrument of long-range projection of power and political influence is one of the most significant strategic developments of recent years;
- (v) Approving warmly the construction of new aircraft-carrying vessels by France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, to operate a variety of air defence, attack and STOVL aircraft as well as anti-submarine, assault and AEW helicopters;
- (vi) Welcoming the enhancement of naval and maritime aviation being undertaken by the navies and air forces of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom;
- (vii) Anxious that the remarkable sophistication and impressive operational capability, as well as the large numbers of Soviet submarines should not be allowed to affect adversely the balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact;
- (viii) Believing that the current superiority in naval aviation and especially in strike carriers enjoyed by NATO is a strong factor in favour of effective deterrence and the preservation of peace which ought to be maintained, unless and until a multilateral and verifiable agreement with the USSR to reduce this capacity is secured;
- (ix) Appreciating the inherent flexibility, speed of response and freedom of operation without the constraints of fixed land bases which endow naval aviation with a uniquely important rôle in exerting political influence in crisis management and limiting the escalation of conflict;
- (x) Understanding that war at sea or hostilities outside the NATO area, such as the war between Iran and Iraq, could precipitate wider conflict unless controlled by the appropriate application of external political pressure and, if necessary, force, and that consequently the western alliance must retain assets such as naval aviation which are as relevant to operating outside the NATO area as within it and to limited conflict as to all-out war,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge Western European nations to maintain their significant naval force improvement plans:
 - (a) by encouraging France to pursue its aircraft carrier construction programme through the entry-into-service of two CHARLES DE GAULLE-class ships;
 - (b) by encouraging the United Kingdom to put into service at least one aviation support ship to complement the aviation training ship RFA ARGUS and thereby to retain a capability for heliborne amphibious assault, and to proceed as soon as possible to upgrade Sea Harrier aircraft to FRS 2 standards;
 - (c) by encouraging Italy to procure STOVL aircraft, preferably with an air defence capability, to supplement the ASW helicopters presently embarked in the aircraft-carrying cruiser, GARI-BALDI;

- (d) by encouraging the entry-into-service on the part of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal of new, or new versions of existing maritime patrol aircraft;
- 2. Persuade at least the member countries with naval forces currently in the Gulf to work together to create a European standing naval force with organic naval aviation including air defence, airborne early warning, attack, anti-submarine and heliborne assault assets for deployment under single command and unified control to areas outside the NATO theatre where Western Europe's security interests are at stake in emergency or war;
- 3. Affirm its support for naval collaborative equipment programmes such as the EH-101 and NH-90 helicopters, the T-45 Goshawk and AV-8B aircraft, and the NFR-90 anti-submarine frigate, and related weapon systems;
- 4. Discuss with NATO governments ways of ensuring that priorities between purely air force and maritime air missions are so organised that:
 - (a) naval commanders have a sufficiency of air assets under their direct control which cannot be diverted elsewhere by national air forces;
 - (b) the procurement of new air force maritime attack aircraft such as a replacement for the Buccaneer and the A-7 Corsair in Royal Air Force and Portuguese Air Force service respectively receive the priority which from the naval point of view they deserve;
- 5. Explore with the governments of the United States, Spain, the United Kingdom and possibly Italy, the feasibility of co-operation in the field of Harrier pilot training on the lines of the tri-national Tornado training establishment (TTTE).

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. Apart from reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments concerning regions where maritime considerations naturally apply (for example "European security and the Mediterranean"¹), the committee's reports over recent years have rarely touched on naval strategy and even less on such comparatively esoteric subjects as aviation at sea.

1.2. At a time when the situation on the central front appears fairly stable (most dynamism is expected to be reserved for the various arms control forums), it is appropriate to turn the spotlight on to an area of operations which has been steadily increasing in importance within the normal zone of the Atlantic Alliance and elsewhere on the globe. This report will examine Western Europe's rôle, not only in and above her own waters, but also in other areas where her security interests are very much at stake.

II. Dependence on the sea

2.1. In Western Europe we must remind ourselves just how much we need the sea. We depend vitally on the free use of the sea to sustain ourselves. None of our nations is self-sufficient and to feed ourselves and maintain our industry we must import food and raw materials. To pay for these we need to export.

2.2. Our populations nowadays tend to think mainly in terms of air travel but, as far as trade is concerned, the most practical and economic means of transport is still by sea and 95% by weight of our entire trade is carried in ships. Western Europe could not survive without a minimum of 1 000 shiploads every month of essential foods and critical raw materials. On any one day there are over 300 ocean-going merchant ships and a further 400 smaller vessels loading or discharging their cargoes in ports on our coasts.

2.3. Freedom to use the seas for the peaceful purpose of trading is therefore vital to us – not only to our economic trading position and prosperity, but in the case of our imports of food and minerals (oil especially) to our very survival.

III. The potential threat

3.1. It would be quite wrong to suggest that the only potential threat to our interests and security both at home and abroad is that posed by the

Soviet Union (indeed the most immediate threat, recognised by the WEU Council, is currently that posed to the free movement of our shipping in the Gulf, as a result of the Iran-Iraq war). But militarily there is no escaping the fact that the Soviet Union has devoted a relentless effort towards improving the strength and capability of her armed forces. Despite serious economic problems and moves towards greater openness in other realms, Soviet defence expenditure still accounts for some 14-16% of her GNP: nearly three times the level of the average in the western alliance.

(i) The Soviet Union

3.2. The position of the Soviet Union is very different from that of Western Europe. The Soviet Union is a great continental power, one of the largest oil producers in the world, and the majority of her raw materials and other essential needs are found within her own borders. Her lines of communication, unlike those of Western Europe, are not dependent on the sea but are all internal roads, railways, canals and her great rivers. As she has a long land border, she maintains, as always in her history, a large army with today its large supporting air force. The history of Russia has been characterised by a succession of overland invasions from both East and West and we should not forget that 20 million of her citizens died in the last world war. This experience accounts to some extent for the Soviet leaders' preoccupations with military strength and their suspicion and distrust of the outside world.

3.3. Such arguments however cannot totally justify the extent of Soviet power generally and the development of the Soviet navy in particular. Yet the growth of Soviet maritime power represents one of the most significant shifts in the balance of world power over the last 25 years. This massive build-up of the Soviet fleet in both strength and quality is visible evidence that the Soviet Union understands the value of sea-power to exploit any opportunities that the possession of such power presents. The Soviet Navy has been transformed into a major force capable of projecting Soviet power and threatening western economic and security interests worldwide.

(ii) The Soviet Navy

3.4. Before 1960, Soviet warships were seldom seen on the high seas, but today the Soviet Union has established a wide-ranging pattern of ship and submarine deployments. They now provide a worldwide presence with the world's largest submarine force, a growing number of fast, well-

1. "European security and the Mediterranean", Document 1073, 14th October 1986, Rapporteur: Mr. Kittelmann.

armed modern warships and an increasing number of embarked as well as land-based naval aircraft. Why should this be?

3.5. Twenty years ago, in 1968, Marshal Sokolovsky of the Soviet Union wrote in his book, "Military Strategy":

"The main aim of fleet operations in naval theatres is to defeat the enemy's navy and to disrupt his maritime communications. It may be necessary to deliver nuclear missile attacks on coastal targets, carry out joint operations with ground forces, provide transport and protect one's own sea communications. Nuclear submarines...armed with missiles will make decisive naval operations possible against a powerful maritime enemy.

One of the navy's main tasks...will be to sever the enemy's ocean and sea transport routes. Eighty to one hundred large cargo ships would arrive daily at European ports in the event of war. Operations against enemy sea-lines of communication should be developed on a large scale..."

And this has remained the naval philosophy of the Soviet Union, guided with remarkable continuity by the Head of the Soviet navy for most of the post-war era, Admiral Gorshkov. As a result, unlike the predominantly coastal defence navy of the past, the Soviet Navy today is a powerful ocean-going fleet, capable of operating worldwide (a "bluewater" navy).

3.6. The largest ships of the Soviet fleet are the aircraft carriers of the KIEV class. These four ships carry a mix of vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft and anti-submarine helicopters. They are armed with powerful anti-ship cruise missiles with a range of 300 miles. A new class of larger aircraft carriers of about 65 000 tons is in production with the first unit fitting out and a second following closely behind. Other surface forces include two helicopter carriers, 40 cruisers and 265 destroyers and frigates, many of them capable of operating the latest naval helicopter.

3.7. Soviet amphibious forces are also continuing to improve. The specialist class of ship, IVAN ROGOV, can carry hovercraft for landing assault troops over the beach as well as an entire naval infantry battalion and supporting vehicles, tanks and helicopters.

3.8. All these ships provide the Soviet Navy with an increased flexibility and the capability to project their influence worldwide. To support these operations, composite replenishment ships like BEREZINA or fleet oilers such as the BORIS CHILIKIN-class are in service.

3.9. The Soviet submarine fleet is the world's largest, with nearly 450 submarines (including about 80 in reserve). 77 carry ballistic missiles and about 65 are fitted with 300-mile range anti-ship cruise missiles; 300 others are attack sub-

marines, both conventional and nuclear-powered. Their job is to protect their own missile-firing submarines, sink shipping and lay mines. On average, over recent years, a new submarine has been launched every six weeks.

3.10. The Soviet naval air force supports naval operations and together with some elements of the long-range air force provides a formidable reconnaissance, anti-submarine and anti-ship capability. A force of over 900 fixed-wing combat aircraft, including more than 400 bombers, plus over 300 combat helicopters, continues to be strengthened with the regular entry-into-service of additional swing-wing, supersonic bombers and now also has 100 VTOL aircraft.

3.11. The Soviet merchant fleet has also been expanded considerably. In 1960 it consisted of less than 800 ships; today, after a massive investment programme, it is more than six times that number. Their ships operate with subsidies at much lower costs than the West could contemplate, and provide a growing economic threat to our own merchant marine, whose numbers, by comparison have fallen from 2 700 to around 800 today. Potential military requirements are taken into account in Soviet design and construction, resulting in speeds and capabilities not dictated solely by commercial considerations.

3.12. The Soviet Union also possesses the world's largest fishing fleet and deploys a greater hydrographic research effort than any other country. All four fleets, navy, merchant, fishing and research, come under central national control from Moscow and, together with a vast fleet of special intelligence-gathering vessels, provide a worldwide network, unparalleled in peacetime, of readily-available eyes, ears and logistic support wherever required to project Soviet influence and political pressure.

3.13. What makes these developments in Soviet potential so serious for us in the West is that the challenge is on the seas: an element which is not essential to the health of the Soviet economy, but one which is vital to our economic survival. Soviet maritime policy aims to develop maritime resources compatible with superpower status. This involves challenging western maritime power, projecting the Soviet Union's image worldwide, developing trade: in short taking full advantage of sea-power in the traditional sense.

IV. Meeting the challenge

4.1. How do we meet this challenge and what part do the Western European navies play? The first point to remember is that the business of all our armed forces is not primarily "war", it is rather "keeping the peace"; in other words, "exercising deterrence", and to do it we have to show any opponent that the risks he will run in using force against us are not worth any gain he is

likely to achieve. To be effective, deterrence means displaying the ability and will to fight and to win – if necessary. Deterrence is a matter of perception by a would-be aggressor. To be credible, the forces of our nations must be seen to be sufficient, well-trained, well-equipped and ready to fight at short notice.

4.2. The Brussels and Washington Treaties were signed and our alliance created to deter aggression through military readiness and to maintain peace. This has been achieved for the past forty years in Europe. Our forces are interlocking and interdependent (or at least complementary where not participating in the unified command structure).

4.3. Just as the alliances's maritime forces face a powerful Soviet fleet of growing strength and complexity, so on land and in the air, the Warsaw Pact poses a similar challenge to alliance ground and air forces. To show our determination to defend ourselves our armed forces must be seen to be prepared and to this end, Belgian, British, Dutch, French and, of course, German forces are stationed together with Canadians and Americans on the central front in West Germany to form a powerful forward line of defence. But these "in place" conventional forces are considerably outnumbered by those of the Warsaw Pact and would need to be increased if hostilities appeared "imminent". Such reinforcement would require over a million American servicemen, 9 million tons of equipment and ammunition and 14 million tons of fuel to be transported across the Atlantic. Five hundred shiploads a month would be needed to sustain these reinforcements. This is in addition to the shiploads required each month to support the basic economic and civilian population needs of Western Europe.

4.4. An evident ability to reinforce and resupply Europe is a key factor in maintaining an effective deterrent to Warsaw Pact military adventurism in Europe and in sustaining the confidence of the United States and Canada, and of the Western European nations in the alliance itself. If the Soviets ever thought that they could successfully cut Europe off from North America in war and that they would have only to deal with "in place" forces, they might be much more ready to try their hand. If the West Europeans came to believe this also, their will to resist could be greatly weakened. And without it the Americans might be much more reluctant to leave their ground and air forces as "hostages" in Europe. In war itself of course, any weakening of the alliance's capability to reinforce across the Atlantic would inevitably lead to a very dangerous lowering of the nuclear threshold. It is therefore eminently obvious that maritime forces are crucial to the whole of alliance strategy, on land as well as on the sea itself.

4.5. In a period of rising tension, control of most of the forces belonging to those nations which participate in the integrated command structure would pass to NATO. A special feature

of naval forces during such a period is that their early deployment to an operation area or their declaration to NATO may not necessarily be seen as a provocative or aggressive act because of the neutral nature of the high seas, but in displaying military capability, readiness and political will, they could make a very important contribution to deterrence.

4.6. The aim would be to maintain control of the sea to allow the reinforcement and economic shipping to transit safely across the Atlantic, across the Channel or through the Mediterranean, and to enable us to deploy our maritime and land forces wherever they may be needed to counter any threat against the countries of the alliance. In particular, Western European navies would operate with and give support to the United States carrier strike fleet, primarily by "hunting and killing" enemy submarines.

4.7. There are two major potential threats to our ships at sea. The major one is posed by torpedo-firing attack submarines, the other by a formidable array of ship, submarine and air-launched missiles designed specifically to sink surface ships. To counter such threats we need to maintain a number of different types of forces. And fortunately for the present, we in Western Europe are managing to maintain a reasonably-balanced fleet. The need for this balance is well-illustrated in the team necessary for hunting submarines.

4.8. One of the principal anti-submarine warfare vessels is the submarine itself. France and the United Kingdom operate nuclear-powered attack submarines which can remain submerged for weeks at a time and dive to great depths; they are faster than most surface ships and are largely unaffected by surface weather conditions. These submarines are armed with both anti-ship and anti-submarine torpedoes and some have anti-ship missiles as well. Working alongside the nuclear submarines are the diesel-powered submarines. Although slower and of less endurance than the nuclears, they are extremely quiet and difficult to detect and ideal for operations in shallower waters. Most navies in Western Europe are equipped with such submarines.

V. Naval and maritime aviation

5.1. The most versatile assets possessed by the European nations are however on the surface and, especially, above it. For airpower, both sea- and land-based, has a rôle to play in the maritime context. Naval aviation figures largely in the repertoire of European nations. Ten countries in Europe possess "naval air forces" or "air forces operating in the maritime rôle": France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of the WEU members, plus Denmark, Greece, Norway, Spain and Turkey from the rest of NATO. Together these

countries could field over 200 combat aircraft, 375 helicopters and some 150 maritime patrol aircraft. As to the aviation-capable ships involved, the European countries possess 10 fixed-wing and/or helicopter carriers, plus approximately 100 frigates and destroyers which are able to operate anti-submarine helicopters (see Appendix I).

5.2. Naval fixed-wing aircraft are based either on land, as are the Tornados belonging to the Federal Republic of Germany's naval air arm (which operate over the sea areas of the southern Baltic or the North Sea), or are embarked in the six carriers operated by the European navies: FOCH, CLEMENCEAU (France); INVINCIBLE, ILLUSTRIOUS, ARK ROYAL (United Kingdom); and PRINCIPE DE ASTURIAS (Spain). (See Appendix II for details.)

5.3. The Spanish carrier would be used either in the western Mediterranean, or more likely in the Atlantic, operating the AV-8B version of the Harrier. The Italian "aircraft-carrying cruiser", GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI, is at present equipped only with helicopters, and as such has an anti-submarine rôle in the central Mediterranean.

5.4. The United Kingdom's anti-submarine aircraft carriers, with their sophisticated communications, command and control equipment and the facilities for the co-ordination of widely-spread maritime forces engaged in complex anti-submarine operations, are fully integrated into the NATO structure for operations in the eastern Atlantic, especially in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gaps. The battle is controlled from the operations room where computerised tactical display systems enable decisions to be made rapidly and accurately. These carriers deploy highly-capable Sea King anti-submarine helicopters to search out submarines, with either sonobuoys, which listen and transmit to the helicopter any underwater noise they detect, or with an active sonar which is lowered into the water. Submarines would be attacked with homing torpedoes.

(i) Helicopter-carrying frigates and destroyers

5.5. Other ships involved primarily in anti-submarine warfare are the frigates and destroyers, the most modern of which are fitted with the latest submarine detection devices. If a submarine is detected close to, the ship will attack using her own ship-launched acoustic torpedoes. For delivering torpedoes further away, quickly and accurately, frigates carry their own embarked helicopters. One of the most effective such helicopters is the Lynx, a highly manoeuvrable naval helicopter which can operate day or night in nearly all weather conditions and is, without doubt, one of the finest deck-landing helicopters in the world. The Lynx, armed with anti-ship missiles, is also an effective anti-surface vehicle.

(ii) Maritime patrol aircraft

5.6. The final member of the anti-submarine team is provided by maritime patrol aircraft: the British "Nimrod", the Franco-German "Atlantic" and the American "P3" (which in its different versions is sometimes known as the "Orion" or by the Canadians "Aurora"). These land-based aircraft are used to detect and track submarines at long range from the force, using sonobuoys or maybe "magnetic anomaly detection" (MAD). To sink submarines, they drop torpedoes which, once in the water, home in on their target. Patrol times are often in excess of ten hours, and many such aircraft are now fitted with an in-flight refuelling capability to increase time on task.

5.7. Operating zones for the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany are the North Sea and the Baltic, although Holland has an Orion based in Keflavik in peacetime and would probably deploy a number of aircraft to the west coast of Scotland in time of tension. Italy looks after the central Mediterranean area, including the Adriatic. Spain's zone is the axis through the Straits of Gibraltar from the eastern Atlantic through to the western Mediterranean.

5.8. The United Kingdom operates maritime patrol aircraft over the North Sea, up into the Norwegian Sea and out into the eastern Atlantic. French aircraft look after both western Mediterranean and eastern Atlantic areas. In addition, the French navy operates the Alizé aircraft which is carrier-borne. Originally this aircraft had an anti-submarine rôle, but with the advent of the nuclear submarine, the Alizé has been assigned more of an anti-surface task as well as surveillance.

5.9. All these maritime patrol aircraft, even in peacetime, have virtually a permanent operational mission, monitoring and updating the positions of Soviet vessels, both naval (especially submarines), and merchant marine. This enormous and growing task is shared amongst the navies of the western alliance, especially when it is a question of tracking Soviet naval forces deploying over long distances. There are regular exchanges of intelligence between the allies and co-operation in this domaine is excellent. For the future, there may be a case for cheaper aircraft to work at closer ranges to the shoreline, patrolling Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). The Netherlands example, using two Fokker 27 (maritime) aircraft in the Caribbean might be worth adopting. The British Department of Trade and Industry is responsible for the operation of civilian aircraft in this rôle, a rôle which incidentally would be eminently suitable for the Royal Auxiliary Air Force.

(iii) Aircraft ashore and afloat

5.10. Embarked fixed-wing aircraft are the first line of defence against air attack. Where the alliance is concerned, our air defence will be aug-

mented by American aircraft from the United States carrier strike fleet or aircraft operating from ashore (although often shore-based fighter aircraft are something of an unknown quantity for the naval commander). Even when such aircraft have a definite maritime capability, they are not necessarily totally dedicated to such a rôle and their operational controller could potentially use them for more immediate needs, such as protection of bases and home installations. The United Kingdom air force's "Buccaneer" aircraft are another case to examine, quite apart from the questionmark regarding their replacement as they reach the end of their useful lives. The naval commander may prefer such assets to be directly under his control as with the Tornados in Schleswig-Holstein operated by the German Navy. Whether this is the most rational use of air power is another question.

5.11. Airborne early warning (AEW) to detect targets beyond or beneath the cover of the ships' radars is an essential part of defence against aircraft or missile attack and NATO now has its own AWACS aircraft to try and take care of this problem, supplemented by American "Hawkeye" aircraft embarked in the strike fleet carriers. The British and the Spanish also operate modified naval "Sea King" helicopters carrying the Searchwater radar to provide a useful if more local airborne early warning facility within the fleet when other allied aircraft are not available.

(iv) Aircraft carriers

5.12. The two French aircraft carriers are the only two traditional purveyors of airpower at sea "owned" in Europe. With the Crusader F-8E aircraft for air defence, Super-Etendards for strike attack, photo-reconnaissance Etendards IVP and the Alizés mentioned earlier, these carriers could contribute significantly to sway the balance of power in any future conflict in European waters.

5.13. Aircraft carriers have contributed greatly to most naval conflicts since being "invented" in 1917. But this contribution has changed considerably over the years. To begin with, carriers were considered an extension of traditional maritime power: being used in particular to attack and destroy enemy naval forces and merchant shipping, or, by providing air cover over task forces and convoys, preventing the enemy from trying to do the same.

5.14. By the end of the second world war, the carrier was fully established as a fleet unit and had taken over the rôle formerly played by the battleship. At the time of Korea and later, in the Vietnam war, the threat to the carrier was minimal and aircraft were used increasingly for attacking land targets. The conflict in the South Atlantic in 1982 could certainly not have been fought and won without carrier airpower, (the Sea Harrier

and the Harrier were used extensively for ground attack as well as air defence). On the other side, however, the carrier "25 DE MAYO" was effectively neutralised because of British submarine superiority.

5.15. In 1982 it became obvious for the first time that "short take-off, vertical-landing" (STOVL) aircraft were not only extremely useful in combat but could bring new dimensions to naval airpower. In addition to being able to take off without their platform having to make all the complex manoeuvres which characterise traditional fixed-wing carriers, Sea Harriers could also "land on" in visibility so poor as to defeat conventional aircraft. The fleet was reinforced by aircraft ferried to the war zone aboard a commercial container ship, a concept which has been further elaborated with the recent entry into Royal Naval service of the RFA ARGUS (incidentally the same name as the Royal Navy's first carrier).

5.16. During amphibious operations in 1982, Harriers flew from a temporary metal hard standing laid on boggy ground (as they do regularly when dispersed in West Germany). Perhaps the most remarkable exploit was the flight of four Harriers from the United Kingdom, via Ascension Island, to the South Atlantic where the pilots made their first ever shipboard landings.... No. 1 (Harrier) Squadron of the RAF began operations in the South Atlantic from a Royal Naval aircraft carrier before going ashore. This would be the pattern of operations for the USMC AV-8Bs (see paragraphs 6.1 and 6.2 below).

5.17. The world of naval aviation is still divided, however, between the advocates of conventional carrier aircraft and those navies which have become enthusiastic about STOVL. The United States navy and the French navy are determined to acquire new generations of traditional carrier aircraft. The Soviet Navy is producing a new class of large carrier (c. 65 000 tons), although it is not certain yet how traditional it will be. Britain and Spain in Europe are maintaining and renewing their STOVL aircraft; Italy is all set to begin, (India has a sizeable force of Sea Harriers, with two carriers). The world's second largest seagoing air force, the US Marine Corps, has announced its intention to convert completely to STOVL by the year 2015.

VI. Current developments in naval aviation

(i) United States Marine Corps

6.1. In the last ten years the US Marine Corps has taken the lead in the development of STOVL aircraft. The AV-8B Harrier has already demonstrated a great advance in performance and safety over the AV-8A. Just over 90 aircraft have been delivered to operational units. In simulated air combat the AV-8B has demonstrated a kill/loss ratio of 2:1 over the F-18 and 4.5:1 over the F-14.

In addition, the AV-8B costs less to maintain than other aircraft. A night-attack capability is planned and a more powerful more durable engine – the Pegasus 11-61 – which should be introduced in 1990. Nevertheless, for the time being, the USMC operates a mix of STOVL and conventional aircraft: AV-8Bs, F-18s, F-4s and A-4s in both the regular force and the reserves, all optimised for establishing and defending a beach-head ashore.

6.2. McDonnell Douglas, the United States manufacturer, and British Aerospace are studying a further development – the International Harrier II Plus with a bigger engine and a multimode radar. This is intended to provide greater capability for the USMC as well as producing a multi-rôle shipboard STOVL aircraft which could be offered to other customers. In the long term the USMC would like to replace all its current combat aircraft: AV-8Bs, F-18s, F-4s and A-4s with a single STOVL advanced combat aircraft (ACA) starting, perhaps, in 2005. The target operational capabilities would include a mission radius of 300 to 400 nautical miles and a speed of Mach 1.4.

(ii) Spanish Navy

6.3. The Spanish navy first conducted trials with the Harrier in 1972 and has been operating the AV-8A Harrier (Matador) at sea in the carrier DEDALO for nearly ten years. The carrier aviation component of the Spanish navy is currently being completely renewed. Two of the first AV-8B Harrier (Bravo) aircraft flew directly to Spain in October 1987 from the United States while the first sea trials of the aircraft carrier PRINCIPE DE ASTURIAS started in early November 1987 and are still taking place with very satisfactory results. The total order of twelve aircraft is expected to be completed by midsummer this year and landing trials will then begin on the PRINCIPE DE ASTURIAS which will be their normal operational platform. The ground base for the aircraft (which will be flown by the 9th Escuadron) will be at Rota near Cadiz on the southern coast of Spain.

6.4. Three Sea King helicopters of the Spanish navy are currently undergoing an AEW conversion with installation of the British Thorn-EMI searchwater radar. These three aircraft (which will be part of the 5th Escuadron) will be carried on board the PRINCIPE DE ASTURIAS to provide advanced radar cover for the future battle group.

6.5. In addition, the first Sikorsky Seahawk LAMPS III ASW helicopters are expected this year. Spain has ordered six of them for its frigates. The Spanish air group will be expected to participate in NATO naval deployments and manoeuvres and should prove an excellent asset. For budgetary reasons, the Spanish navy has had to drop its plans to create a second battle group, at least for the time being.

(iii) Italian Navy

6.6. A further potential asset for NATO belongs to Italy. The aircraft-carrying cruiser GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI was handed over to the Italian navy in July 1985 but, since under a 1923 law the air force is the only branch of the Italian armed forces allowed to operate fixed-wing aircraft, the GARIBALDI was originally designed to carry ASW helicopters. However, changes to this law would allow the navy to operate STOVL aircraft which is why the GARIBALDI is already equipped with a ski-jump ramp.

6.7. Fortunately, helicopter pilots in the Italian navy already undergo fixed-wing training before obtaining their rotary-wing qualifications, so a transition period once Sea Harrier or AV-8B aircraft have been agreed need not necessarily be too extensive. (An interesting idea would be to form a Harrier-pilot training unit, jointly between the United Kingdom, United States, Italy and Spain, to ensure a common approach for the exploitation of this aircraft's unique features.)

6.8. It is obviously too early to decide exactly which STOVL aircraft is likely to be procured by Italy, although one with a definite air defence capability is to be preferred, given the likely rôle of GARIBALDI protecting reinforcement shipping in the Mediterranean. The ship's hangar can accommodate twelve Sea King helicopters or potentially ten Harrier aircraft. In addition, the GARIBALDI possesses excellent command and control facilities and already makes a significant contribution to NATO assets. Long-term plans envisage a sister ship if the budget allows.

(iv) Royal Navy (United Kingdom)

6.9. Finance is also the determining factor in the United Kingdom, where the Ministry of Defence is aiming for budgetary approval in 1988 for a conversion of the Royal Navy's fleet of FRS-1 Sea Harriers to FRS-2 standard. The Royal Navy successfully pressed its case for organic STOVL airpower at sea in the 1970s, but was authorised to acquire Sea Harriers only on condition that changes from the Royal Air Force's Harrier GR-3 were kept to a minimum. The naval aircraft was accordingly fitted with a Ferranti Blue Fox radar and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles which restricted it to clear air combat. This limitation was something of a drawback during the 1982 South Atlantic conflict when the Sea Harriers were confined to visual combat air patrol below the cloud base. As a result of that experience, the Royal Navy doubled the number of Sidewinders carried to four and replaced the 100 gallon drop tanks with 190 gallon units, thus extending patrol times. The up-grade to FRS-2 standard represents a much more comprehensive improvement. The AMRAAM missile operating in conjunction with the new Blue Vixen pulse-doppler radar will allow the aircraft to engage targets beyond visual range in all weathers. A Pega-

sus Mark 106 turbofan will provide longer engine life than the present Mark 104.

6.10. Recent budget constraints have already resulted in the cancellation of the radar modernisation plan for the Lynx helicopter which was to be fitted with a Super Searcher 360-degree system. Eventually of course the Lynx in RN service is to be replaced with the Anglo-Italian EH-101 helicopter, but the new radar would have provided an interim updating of capability at comparatively minimal cost, and this cancellation is undoubtedly to be regretted.

6.11. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) ARGUS (22 000 tons) has recently been accepted into service as the Royal Navy's new aviation training ship. Laid down as MV "Contender Bezant", a container ship which was used in support of United Kingdom operations in the South Atlantic and converted for her new rôle, RFA ARGUS will replace the current helicopter training ship, RFA ENGADINE.

6.12. This ship will support a training throughput of some 150 pilots and observers per year, operating a variety of naval helicopters. In addition the ship has facilities for the operation of up to twelve Sea Harriers (although the presence of the ship's superstructure forward prevents the fitting of a ski-jump).

6.13. Even if not specifically designed to operate assault helicopters in their amphibious rôle, RFA ARGUS could perhaps be useful in this respect until the two projected aviation support ships are procured to replace the capability to land a Royal Marines Commando (using assault helicopters) lost when HMS HERMES was sold to India.

(v) *French Navy*

6.14. It is the French naval air arm which presently has the greatest all-round capability in Europe. The potential ship-borne component comprises 60+ Super Etendard attack aircraft, 12 F-8E Crusader interceptors, 20 Etendard IVP reconnaissance aircraft, 21 Alizé anti-ship and tactical surveillance aircraft, and 26 Lynx ASW and anti-ship helicopters. These aircraft are mainly operated from the two aircraft carriers, CLEMENCEAU and FOCH, while some of the helicopters are used on frigates and corvettes. In service also are 16 Super Frelon helicopters, used today mainly for transport and search and rescue missions. They are scheduled to be phased out of service from 1995 onwards.

6.15. The coming decade will be an important time for French naval aviation. During this period, several major modernisation programmes should be implemented. The Crusaders, the Etendard IVPs, the Super Frelon and the aircraft carrier CLEMENCEAU will have to be replaced and successors to the Super Etendard and the aircraft carrier FOCH will need to be decided on if a modern carrier force is to be maintained. There is

a further requirement – to replace the fleet of Breguet Alizé with a fully-AEW-capable aircraft. The Alizé will reach the end of its useful life between 1995 and 2000. An AEW aircraft at sea is an absolute must (more than 40 years ago this major lesson was learned during the great carrier battles of the last war, Midway and the Coral Sea: much of the action took place over the horizon) but there is no obvious purely national option available.

6.16. The replacement of the Crusaders and the Etendard IVPs is doubtless one of the most difficult problems facing the French navy today. The main difficulty lies in the timetable. Ordered in 1963, but first flown in the United States in 1956, and delivered shortly thereafter, the Crusaders should be deactivated in 1993. The same applies to the Etendard IVP. However, the ACM ("avion de combat marine" = naval combat aircraft), a navalised version of the ACT ("avion de combat tactique" = tactical combat aircraft) will not enter service before 1996 to ensure the transition. Therefore a number of solutions are still under consideration. In 2003 to 2005 the Super Etendard will also reach its age limit. To replace it, the French navy plans to acquire some 80 ACMs, i.e. about 25% of the 330 aircraft of the ACT/ACM programme. In the meantime some 20 Super Etendards are being modernised to enable them to carry the ASMP medium-range air-to-surface missile and also to increase their electronic support measures capability.

6.17. To embark these aircraft, the new carrier, CHARLES DE GAULLE, is planned to enter service in 1996, followed perhaps by a sister ship after 2000. Nuclear-powered and of similar size to the current French carriers (the same dock as at present will be used and is a determining factor), these ships will presumably be based, as now, in the Mediterranean, although they could certainly play a very definite rôle in the North Atlantic, especially if there was any delay to the arrival of the US strike fleet.

VII. Reserves

7.1. The French navy operates an interesting system where its pilots are concerned. Many of them serve on an "active service, reserve officer" list, "officier de réserve en situation d'activité" (ORSA), and this might well be worth developing in other navies.

7.2. One of the greatest problems in the world of naval aviation is that of having enough pilots to keep aircraft flying during a conflict of any length. (Even in 1982's short battles in the South Atlantic, the pilots were at the limits of physical endurance, with very few reserves to call on.)

7.3. Building up the reserves must be a priority for all West European navies operating aircraft. And this might even have an effect on regular

pilots' retention in the service: the possibility of joining a reserve instead of making a complete break with military flying could help in the effort to retain at least a pool of available expertise.

7.4. In the United States, a determined effort is in progress to update the aircraft available for reserve squadrons. The plan is for the US Navy to have two full air wings in the reserves, with current carrier qualifications, and another reserve air wing for the US Marine Corps. It must be said that the reserve system in the USN/USMC has worked very well over the years. Indeed the fourth squadron to receive the F-18 Hornet was a USN *reserve* squadron.

VIII. European procurement

8.1. The recent WEU colloquy held by the Assembly in London at the beginning of March 1988 on European co-operation in armaments research and development², underlined the advantages of such co-operation and pointed the possible way ahead. In the field of naval and maritime aviation, a number of successful joint projects have been developed over recent years, the Anglo-French "Lynx" being a particularly good example.

8.2. Advancing technology is bringing helicopters with improved aerodynamic performance. The British experimental rotor programme (BERP) is yielding dramatic improvements: a Lynx using BERP blades has established a new helicopter airspeed record. Using this technology, the Anglo-Italian EH-101, an aircraft 50% heavier and 50% faster than the Sea King it is replacing, is being built with the same rotor diameter and configuration. Other collaborative helicopter projects such as the NATO helicopter for the 1990s (NH-90) will also benefit from similar advances in technology. Fruitful co-operation across the Atlantic on fixed-wing aircraft includes the AV-8B Harrier and the T-45 Goshawk trainer.

8.3. For the future, many alliance nations will be constrained to replace their maritime patrol aircraft and there may be the possibility of doing this by developing the European multi-rôle sup-

2. "European co-operation in armaments research and development - guidelines drawn from the colloquy", Document 1141, 10th May 1988, Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson.

port aircraft for the purpose. The idea of a "NATO-sponsored" tanker programme for air-to-air refuelling is presently gaining credence; why not take the concept a stage further, into the maritime patrol arena?

IX. European co-operation

9.1. In 1987, the WEU Council invoked Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty for the first time. The reason for this precedent was the threat perceived by member governments to European interests in the Gulf and has resulted not only in political co-operation between WEU nations, but in practical measures to give life to that co-operation.

9.2. Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom all have naval forces in the Gulf area; the Federal Republic of Germany has agreed to replace alliance naval units withdrawn from European waters; Luxembourg, with no naval forces is making a financial contribution. Political and naval consultation now takes place between national capitals and on-the-spot practical common-sense co-operation is practised by national naval commanders.

9.3. Present in the Gulf zone and Indian Ocean is a *de facto* Western European naval force operating to protect European interests by a combination of mine-hunting and escort duty for nationally-flagged shipping. Assets include mine-sweepers, frigates and destroyers, plus the French aircraft carrier, CLEMENCEAU, and associated support vessels.

9.4. "Here is an indication that the member countries of WEU might henceforth resort to similar procedure for jointly facing up to other threats outside the immediate area of their defence, but which are aimed at their security in the widest sense of the term" - thus wrote the Secretary-General of WEU on 25th March 1988.

9.5. What better way could there be but to build on this present experience by the creation of a European standing naval force, with all the versatility implicit in maritime operations, for deployment to areas outside the NATO theatre where Western Europe's security interests are at stake in emergency or war?

APPENDIX I

NATO naval air assets

Country	Carriers	Ships	Aircraft
Belgium	NIL	NIL	3 × Alouette III Helos; 5 × Sea King (SAR)
Canada	NIL	14 × DDH	35 × Sea King Helos; 18 × Aurora MPA; 29 × Tracker MPA
Denmark	NIL	5 × OPVs	8 × Lynx (fishery protection)
France	2 × CVAs 1 × LPH	10 × FFH/DDH	61 × Super Etendard; 12 × Etendard (recce); 22 × Crusader; 20 × Alizé; 36 × Atlantic MPA; 5 × Gardian MPA; 37 × Lynx; 17 × Super Frelon
FR Germany	NIL	6 × FFH	72 × Tornado; 19 × Atlantic MPA; 14 × Lynx (ASW); 22 × Sea King (SAR)
Greece	NIL	5 × FFH/DDH	13 × AB212 Helos (ASW/ECM); 4 × Alouette III (ASM)
Italy	2 × LPH	2 × CCH/2 × DDH/14 × FFH	36 × Sea King (ASW); 62 × AB212 (ASW); 14 × Atlantic MPA
Netherlands	NIL	16 × FFH	22 × Lynx (17 × ASW, 5 × SAR); 13 × Orion MPA
Norway	NIL	NIL	5 × Orion MPA; 6 × Lynx (coastguard)
Spain	2 × CVA	6 × DDH/FFH	10 × "Harrier" (FGA); 13 × Sea King (ASW/AEW); 11 × Hughes; 12 × AB212 (CMND/RECCE); 6 × P3A MPA
Turkey	NIL	2 × FFH	22 × Tracker MPA; 6 × AB212 (ASW); 3 × AB204 (ASW)
UK	3 × CVSA	13 × DDH 35 × FFH	37 × Sea Harrier; 76 × Sea King (ASW); 24 × Sea King (CDO); 8 × Sea King (AEW); 78 × Lynx; 31 × Nimrod MPA; 25 Buccaneer
(All totals global)			
Sub total	10	130	240 × Combat F/W; 410 × Armed helos; 200 × MPA
USA	15	219	1300 × Combat F/W; 310 × Armed helos; 400 × MPA
NATO total	25	349	1540 × Combat F/W; 720 × Armed helos; 600 × MPA
Warsaw Pact total	6(+2)	52	100 × VTOL; 550 shore-based F/W; 320 × Armed helos; 180 × MPA

Source: IISS Military Balance 1987-88 (modified)

APPENDIX II

Europe's light aircraft carriers

	"Invincible-class"	"Giuseppe Garibaldi"	"Principe de Asturias"
Displacement	19 500 t	13 858 t	16 200 t
Length	206 m	180 m	196 m
Beam	27.5 m	23.4 m	24.4 m
Flight deck area	168 × 32 m	174 × 33 m	175 × 29 m
Propulsion system	4 RR Olympus TM3B gas turbines ; 2 shafts (reversible gear box)	4 FIAT GE LM-2500 gas turbines ; 2 fixed-pitch 5-bladed propellers (reversible couplings)	2 GE LM-2500 gas turbines ; single variable-pitch propeller
Speed	28 kt	30 kt	26 kt
Range (miles)	5 000 at 18 kt	7 000 at 20 kt	7 500 at 20 kt
Radar/Sonar	Full radar and sonar fit	Full radar and sonar fit	Full radar fit
Armament	SAM: Twin Sea Dart Guns: 2/3 Phalanx CIWS 2 × 20 mm single	SSM: 4 Tesco 2 launchers for Otomat Mk 2 SAM: 2 Albatros × 8 launchers for Apside missile (48 missiles) Guns: 6 × 40 mm (70 Breda) MB guns (twin) A/S: 6 Mk 32 A/S torpedo tubes (2 triple)	Guns: 4 × Meroka 20 mm (12 barrels) CIWS
Complement	670 (+ 284 air group)	550 (+ 230 air group)	790 (+ air group)
Aircraft (in hangar)	8 Sea Harriers 9 ASW } Sea kings 3 AEW } (12° ski-jump)	12 Sea Kings (6° ski-jump)	17 (AV-8B/Sea Kings/ AB 212) (12° ski-jump)

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1986-87.

APPENDIX III

Maritime patrol aircraft

	Atlantic	Nimrod	"P3"
Maximum speed:	355 kt (high altitude) (658 km/h)	500 kt (926 km/h)	411 kt (761 km/h)
Weight:	43.5 t	87 t	61 t
Service ceiling:	32 800 ft (10 000 m)	42 000 ft (12 800 m)	28 300 ft (8 625 m)
Range:	4 854 nm (8 995 km)	5 000 nm (9 266 km)	4 150 nm (7 670 km)
Time on task:	8 h at 600 nm 4 h at 1300 nm	7 h at 600 nm 5 h at 1000 nm	8 h at 600 nm 3 h at 1300 nm
Endurance:	Up to 18 hours	12 hours (typical sortie)	approx 15 hours
Power plant:	2 x Rolls-Royce Tyne Mk 21 turboprops	4 x Rolls-Royce Spey Mk 250 turbofans	4 x Allison T56-A-14 turboprops
Armament:	Bombs; Depth charges; Homing torpedoes; Rockets	Bombs; Torpedoes; AS missiles; Sidewinder air-to- air missiles (Magnetic anomaly detection (MAD); Full-range ASW detection equipment)	Mines Depth bombs Torpedoes AS missiles
Operated by:	France (navy) FRG (navy) Italy (air force/navy)	UK (air force)	Canada (air force) Netherlands (navy) Norway (air force) Spain (air force) USA (navy)

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1986-87.

APPENDIX IV

French carriers

	Clemenceau/Foch	Charles de Gaulle (1996)
Displacement (full load):	32 780 t	36 000 t
Length:	265 m	262 m
Beam:	32 m	32 m
Flight deck area:	265 x 51 m	262 x 64 m
Propulsion system:	2 x Parsons geared turbines	Nuclear propulsion (2 x K15 PWRs)
Speed:	32	28
Range (miles):	7 500 at 18 kt	(45 days' endurance)
Radar/sonar:	Full fit	Full fit
Armament:	SAM: 2 x Crotale	SAM: 2 x Crotale 2 x Sadral
Complement:	1 338 (+ 580 air group)	1 150 (+ 550 air group) (accommodation for 1 950)
Aircraft:	16 Super Etendard 3 Etendard IVP 10 F-8E Crusader 7 Alizé 2 Alouette III	up to 40 (23 in hangar) (provision for ski-jump in design, in addition to catapult)

Source: "Flottes de combat", 1986-87 (modified).

APPENDIX V

*Country by country*³*(a) Western European Union**Belgium*

Hel: 3 SA-316 Alouette III; 5 Sea King

Federal Republic of Germany

Frigates: 6 Bremen (Type 122) with 2 Lynx hel

Naval air arm:

FGA: 3 sqns with Tornado
 FGA/recce: 1 sqn with Tornado
 MR/ELINT: 2 sqns with Atlantic
 Liaison: 1 sqn with Do-28-D2
 ASW hel: 1 sqn with Sea Lynx Mk 88
 SAR hel: 1 sqn with Sea King Mk 41
 Equipment: 91 combat ac, 14 armed hel

Aircraft

Tornado: 72 (54 FGA, 18 FGA/recce)
 Atlantic: 19 (14 MR, 5 ELINT)
 Do-28: 19 (17 liaison, 2 environmental protection)

Helicopters

Sea Lynx: 14 (ASW)
 Sea King: 22 (SAR)
 (On order: 40 Tornado, 8 Sea Lynx hel)

*France**Carriers:* 3

2 attack: Clemenceau : capacity 40 ac (2 flts with 20 Super Etendard, 1 with 7 F-8E Crusader, 1 with 6 Alizé, 1 det with 4 Etendard IVP, 2 Super Frelon, 2 Alouette III hel)
 1 ASW (LPH): Jeanne d'Arc (trg): capacity 8 Lynx hel

Destroyers (hel): 11

5 Leygues (C-70) ASW with 2 Lynx hel
 3 Tourville (F-67) with 2 Lynx
 1 T-56 with 1 hel
 1 T-53 with 1 Lynx
 1 C-70 (AA) with 1 Lynx

Amphibious assault ships (hel): 2

2 Ouragan with 3 SA-321 Super Frelon or 6 Gazelle/Alouette hel

Naval air force:

Strike: 3 flts with Super Etendard (AN-52 nuclear weapons)
 Ftr: 1 flt with F-8E (FN) Crusader
 ASW: 2 flts with Alizé (mod)

3. Source: IISS Military Balance 1987-88 (modified).

MR: 6 flts, 4 with Atlantic, 2 (in Pacific) with Gardian (Mystère-Falcon 20)
 Recce: 1 flt with Etendard IVP
 OCU: Etendard IVM; Alizé, Zéphir
 Trg: 5 units with N-262 Frégate, Piper Navajo, EMB-121 Xingu, MS-760 Paris, Mystère Falcon 10MER, Rallye 880
 Misc: 3 comms/liaison units (1 VIP) with Falcon 10MER, N-262, Xingu, Navajo;
 1 trial unit;
 2 lt ac units with 15 Rallye 880, 8 CAP-10
 ASW hel: 3 sqns with Lynx
 Cdo hel: 2 assault sqns with SA-321 Super Frelon
 Trg hel: SA-316/319 Alouette II/III
 Misc hel: 2 comms/SAR units with Alouette II/III, 1 Dauphin (civil-manned); 1 trials unit with Alouette II/III, Lynx, Super Frelon
 Equipment: 149 combat ac, 54 armed hel

Aircraft

Super Etendard: 61 (strike); 22 in store/maintenance. Total of 50 to be mod for ASMP
 Etendard: 35 – IVP: 12 (recce); IVM: 23 (trg)
 Crusader: 22 (ftr)
 Alizé: 27 (20 ASW – 5 trg – 1 misc)
 Atlantic: 36 (MR) (2 ATL 2)
 Gardian: 5 (MR)
 Zephir: 17 (trg)
 Nord 262: 25 (15 trg, 10 misc)
 Navajo: 12 (3 trg, 9 misc)
 Xingu: 16 (9 trg, 7 misc)
 Rallye 880: 16 (trg)
 CAP-10: 8 (trg)
 MS-760: 9 (misc)
 Mystère-Falcon 10MER: 6 (misc)

Helicopters

Lynx: 38 (37 ASW, 1 misc)
 Super Frelon: 20 (17 cdo, 3 misc)
 Alouette: 50 (12 trg, 38 misc)
 Dauphin: 1

(On order: 1 nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, 16 Atlantique ASW ac (total of 42 to be bought))

Italy

Carrier (hel): 2

1 Garibaldi with 14 SH-3D hel (to get AV-8 ac)
 1 Vittorio Veneto with 9 AB-212 ASW hel

Cruisers: 2 Andrea Doria with 4 AB-212 ASW hel

Destroyers: 2 Audace with 2 AB-212 ASW hel

Frigates: 14

8 Maestrale with 2 AB-212 hel
 4 Lupo with 1 AB-212 hel
 2 Alpino with 2 AB-212 hel

Naval air arm: 83 armed hel

ASW: 5 hel sqns with 36 SH-3D Sea King, 62 AB-212
 Trg: 20 AB-204 hel
 ASM: Marte Mk 2

Luxembourg

No navy or naval air arm

*Netherlands**Frigates:*

2 Tromp (flagships) with 1 hel
 2 Van Heemskerck AD with 1 hel
 10 Kortenaer ASW with 1-2 Lynx hel
 2 Van Speijk ASW with 1 Lynx hel

Naval air arm:

MR: 3 sqns (1 trg) with P-3C Orion II, F-27 (assigned to navy by air force)

ASW hel: 1 sqn with Lynx SH-14B/C

SAR hel: 1 sqn with Lynx UH-14A

Equipment: 13 combat ac, 17 armed hel

Aircraft

P-3: 13 (MR)

Helicopters

Lynx: 22

SH-14: 17

SH-14B: 9 (ASW)

SH-14C: 8 (ASW)

UH-14A: 5 (SAR)

*United Kingdom**Carriers:* 3 Invincible ASW each with:

ac: 8 Sea Harrier V/STOL

hel: 12 Sea King: 9 ASW, 3 AEW

Destroyers (hel): 13

1 County with 1 Lynx HAS-2 hel (retired 1987)

12 Birmingham (Type-42) with 1 Lynx hel

Frigates (hel): 35

8 Broadsword (Type-22, 1 trials) with 2 Lynx hel

6 Amazon (Type-21) with 1 Lynx hel

19 Leander with 1 Wasp/Lynx

2 Rothesay with 1 Wasp hel

Fleet air arm (FAA):

AD/attack ac: 3 sqns with Sea Harrier FRS-1

ASW hel: 8 sqns: 7 with Sea King HAS-5, 1 with Wasp HAS-1 (in indep flts, Lynx HAS-2/-3 replacing)

ASW/attack hel: 2 sqns with Lynx HAS-2/-3 (in indep flts)

AEW hel: 1 sqn with Sea King AEW-2

Cdo/assault tpt hel: 3 sqns with Sea King HC-4

Trg: 3 sqns: 1 with Jetstream ac, 1 with SA-341 Gazelle HT-2 hel, 1 with Wessex HU-5 hel, Chipmunk T-10, Sea Devon C-20 ac

Flt spt: Canberra T-18/-22, Hunter T-7/-8, GA-11, PR-11, 3 Mystère-Falcon 10 (civil registration, operated under contract)

Liaison: HS-125 (VIP, operated by RAF), Sea Heron, Sea Devon

Equipment: 37 combat ac, 160 armed hel

Aircraft

Sea Harrier/Harrier: 37

Sea Harrier – FRS-1: 34 (some being mod to FRS-2)

T-4N: 2 (trg)

Harrier – T-4A: 1 (trg)

Canberra: 10 (3 spt, 7 store); Hunter: 26 (spt); HS-125: 2 (VIP tpt); Mystère-Falcon 20: 3 (spt); Jetstream: 20; T-2: 16 (trg); T-3: 4 (trg); Sea Heron: 4 (liaison); Heron: 1 (liaison); Sea Devon: 3 (2 liaison, 1 in reserve); Chipmunk: 14 (trg)

Helicopters

Sea King: 111. HAS-5: 76 (56 ASW, 20 trg); HC-4: 24 (cdo); AEW-2: 11

Lynx: 78. HAS-2: 45; HAS-3: 33

Wasp HAS-1: 15 (to be retired by 1988)

Gazelle HT-2/-3: 22 (trg)

Royal Marines

Hel: 12 SA-341 Gazelle AH-1, 6 Lynx AH-1

(On order: 1 hel carrier trg auxiliary ship, 9 Sea Harrier FRS-1, 4 Jetstream Mk 3 ac, 14 Sea King (5 HAS-5, 9 HC-4), 7 Lynx HAS-3 hel)

Royal Air Force:

2 sq Buccaneer S-2A/B (assigned maritime, with Sea Eagle ASM), 52 ac (25 attack, 9 ocu, 18 reserve)

4 sq Nimrod MR-1/-1A/-2 (Harpoon ASM, Sidewinder AAM), 34 ac (3 ECM, 31 MR-2)

*(b) Other European NATO countries**Denmark*

Frigates: 5 fishery protection (4 Hvidbjomen, 1 Beskytteren) with 1 Lynx hel

Hel: 8 Lynx (up to 4 embarked)

*Greece**Destroyers (hel):*

2 Gearing with 1 SA-316 Alouette III hel

1 Sumner (facilities for 1 Alouette III hel)

Frigates (hel): 2 Kortenaer each with 2 AB-212 hel

ASW: 1 hel div: 3 sqns:

2 with 13 AB-212 (10 ASW, 3 ECM)

1 with 4 Alouette III (with ASM)

Norway

SAR/recce: 1 hel sqn with 6 Westland Lynx (coastguard)

Portugal

No naval air arm

Spain

Carriers: 2

1 Principe with 20 ac: 6-8 AV-8B ac, 6-8 Sea King, 4-8 AB-212 hel

1 Dédalo (9 AV-8A, 24 hel)

Destroyers (hel):

5 US FRAM with 1 ASROC, 1 Hughes 500 hel

Frigates (hel):

1 Santa Maria (US FFG-7) with 2 Sea Hawk (LAMPS III) hel

Naval air arm:

FGA: 1 sqn with AV-8A Matador (Harrier II), TAV-8A

Liaison: 1 sqn with 6 Comanche, Citation

Hel: 5 sqns:

ASW: 2 sqns: 1 with Hughes 500; 1 with SH-3D/G Sea King
(modified to Delta standard)

AEW: 1 unit with SH-3D (Searchwater radar)

comd/recce: 1 sqn with AB-212 (marines)

Equipment: 10 combat ac, 40 armed hel

Aircraft

AV-8: 10 (8 AV-8A; 2 TAV-8A) FGA

Citation II: 4 (liaison)

Helicopters

AB-212: 12 (comd/recce)

Sea King: 13 (10 ASW, 3 AEW)

Hughes 500M: 11 (ASW)

AH-1G: 4 (tac)

Bell 47G: 8 (liaison)

(On order: 4 FFG-7 frigates (2 Lamps III (Seahawk) helos); 12 " Bravo " (AV-8B) ac; 18 SH-60B helos (Seahawk Lamps III))

(N.B.: Maritime Patrol – The Air Force operates 6 Orion P-3A for maritime reconnaissance and has acquired some Fokker F-27. Of the 10 P-3B Orion LRMP aircraft returned to Lockheed, 5 will be modernised and transferred to Spain.)

*Turkey**Frigates (hel):*

2 Berk each with 1 hel

Naval aviation: 22 combat ac, 9 armed hel

ASW: 1 sqn with 22 S-2A/E/TS-2A Tracker ac (Air Force owned, Air Force and Navy crews); 3 AB-204AS, 6 AB-212 ASW hel

(On order: 12 AB-212 hel)

APPENDIX VI

European naval air-to-surface missiles

Country/ Manufacturer	Name	No.	Launch weight (kg)	Power plant	Guidance	Max. range (km)	Warhead (kg)	Remarks
<i>France</i> Aérospatiale	Exocet	AM39	650	2 stage solid fuel rocket	Inertial cruise Active radar homer	50-70	165 HE	Variants: MM39 ship launched version of AM39 with 40 nm range; SM39, projected submarine- launched MM39
Aérospatiale	-	AS20	140	2 stage solid fuel rocket	Radio command	7	30 HE	In service
Aérospatiale	-	AS30	520	2 stage solid fuel rocket	Radio command or laser	11	240	In service
Aérospatiale	-	AS15TT	100	2 stage solid fuel rocket	Radar and radio alt	15	30	Anti-ship
<i>FRG</i> Messerschmitt- Bölkow-Blohm	Kormoran	-	600	3 stage solid fuel rocket	Active radar	37	160 HE	Suitable for all fixed - and rotary - wing aircraft. Antiship
<i>Italy</i> OTO-Melara	Sea Killer Mk2/Marte (Vulcano/ Marte)	-	300	2 stage solid rocket motor	Radar or optical	20	70 HE	For use in helicopters "Mariner" version for small ships. Sea-skimmer
<i>UK</i> British Aerospace Dynamics Group	Sea Eagle	P3T	-	Gas turbine	Radar/radio control radar homing	c100	-	Carried in Buccaneer, Tornado and Sea Harrier aircraft
British Aerospace Dynamics Group	Sea Skua	CL 834	145	2 stage solid fuel rocket	Radar/radio control radar homing	20	320 HE	Developed for use from helicopters
<i>European co-operation</i> <i>France/UK</i> Matra-British Aerospace	Martel	AS37/ AJ168	530	Solid fuel rocket	TV on AJ168; passive radar homing on AS37	60	HE	Carried by Atlantic MPA; superseded by Sea Eagle in UK
<i>FRG/France</i> Messerschmitt- Bölkow-Blohm Aérospatiale	-	Air- launched ANS	910	Rocket and booster	Inertial/ active radar	100	-	Anti-ship successor to AM39 Exocet and Kormoran

GLOSSARY

ac	aircraft
ACA	advanced combat aircraft
ACM	naval combat aircraft
ACT	tactical combat aircraft
AEW	airborne early warning
AMRAAM	advanced medium-range air-to-air missile
ASM	air-to-surface missile(s)
ASMP	medium-range air-to-surface missile
ASW	anti-submarine warfare
AWACS	airborne warning and control system
CCH	helicopter carrier
cdo	commando
CIWS	close-in weapon system
comd	command
CVA	traditional aircraft carrier
CVSA	light aircraft carrier
DDH	destroyer operating helicopters
det	detachment
div	division
ECM	electronic counter-measures
ELINT	electronic intelligence
FFH	frigate operating helicopters
FGA	fighter(s), ground-attack
flt	flight
fr	fighter (aircraft)
F/W	fixed-wing
HE	high explosive
hel	helicopter(s)
kt	knot
LPH	landing platform, hel
m	metre
MAD	magnetic anomaly detection
Mk	mark (model number)
mod	modified/modification
MPA	maritime patrol aircraft
MR	maritime reconnaissance
OCU	operational conversion unit(s)
OPV	offshore patrol vessel
recce	reconnaissance
SAR	search and rescue
sqn	squadron
STOVL	short take-off, vertical-landing
t	tons
tac	tactical
trg	training
V(S)TOL	vertical(/short) take-off and landing

*Second part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council
to the Assembly of Western European Union*

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I. Activities of the Council

The intergovernmental organs of WEU have continued their work of reflection and concertation on major issues affecting European security, both in the framework of defence, East/West relations and arms control, and in connection with crises outside Europe. This has included diverse subjects such as European co-operation in the field of armaments, and security in such specific regions as the Gulf and the Mediterranean. They also exchanged information on other activities such as the initiatives taken within the framework of bilateral co-operation. Thus, the French and German ministers briefed their colleagues at The Hague about the efforts being made to strengthen Franco-German military co-operation.

1. European security interests: Platform

The most significant event in WEU of the six-month period from July-December 1987 was the adoption by ministers at their meeting on 26th and 27th October in The Hague of the platform on European security interests¹. This resulted from work undertaken by the Special Working Group of the Council – comprising senior representatives (or their deputies) from foreign and defence ministries – in fulfilment of the mandate handed to them by ministers at their meeting at Luxembourg on 27th-28th April.

The purpose of the platform was to define the conditions and criteria for European security and the consequent responsibilities for the WEU partners in respect of western defence, arms control and disarmament and the East-West dialogue and co-operation.

This document also mapped out WEU's work programme for the foreseeable future.

The introductory section of the platform emphasises the twin foundations of WEU reactivation: in the process of creating a security dimension to European integration on the one hand, and in the reaffirmation and strengthening of alliance solidarity on the other:

“ We recall our commitment to build a European union in accordance with the single European act, which we all signed as members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence. ” (point 2)

“ We intend therefore to develop a more cohesive European defence identity which will translate more effectively into practice

the obligations of solidarity to which we are committed through the modified Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties. ” (point 4)

The theme of Europe and the alliance is repeated throughout the platform. The member states declared that it was “ our conviction that a more united Europe will make a stronger contribution to the alliance, to the benefit of western security as a whole. This will enhance the European rôle in the alliance and ensure the basis for a balanced partnership across the Atlantic ”. The member states were “ resolved to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance ”. (III,a,2).

The Worldnet speech delivered by President Reagan on 4th November 1987 proved that the attachment to this link was reciprocated across the Atlantic: the President welcomed the platform and emphasised the unshakeable nature of the United States' commitment to the alliance and to European security. The platform itself is unambiguous about the significance of the North American presence in Europe: “ ...the security of the Western European countries can only be ensured in close association with our North American allies. The security of the alliance is indivisible ”. (I.4). And “ The substantial presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces plays an irreplaceable part in the defence of Europe. They embody the American commitment to the defence of Europe and provide the indispensable linkage with the United States strategic deterrent ”. (II.3).

The platform also sets out WEU member governments' “ conviction that the balanced policy of the Harmel report remains valid. Political solidarity and adequate military strength within the Atlantic Alliance, arms control, disarmament and the search for genuine détente continue to be integral parts of this policy. Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary ”. (I.5).

The North Atlantic Council, at its meeting on 11th December 1987, also welcomed the adoption of the WEU platform, which underlined a number of basic principles and affirmed “ a positive identity in the field of European security within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, conducive to the strengthening of the transatlantic partnership and of the alliance as a whole ”. (point 10 of the communiqué).

The media paid particular attention to The Hague ministerial Council on 26th-27th October, and to the platform². The platform marked an important step in the media's growing awareness of the rôle of WEU in European defence and security, as reflected by the coverage of the ministerial meeting.

2. A press review of the ministerial Council on 26th-27th October at The Hague is available at the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly.

1. See Annex I.

2. *Situation in the Gulf*³

The practical value of co-operation within WEU for European security and western solidarity has been exemplified in relation to the crisis in the Gulf. At the invitation of the Netherlands presidency, senior officials from the WEU ministries of foreign affairs and defence met in The Hague on 20th August to consider the different aspects of the situation in the Gulf area. The meeting was held pursuant to Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and, more recently, to the decisions taken by ministers in Rome in October 1984 to consider, whenever appropriate, the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world. This was the first meeting of its kind held within the reactivated WEU.

The representatives had a thorough and useful exchange of views. They stressed that United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 should be fully implemented forthwith so as to bring the conflict between Iraq and Iran to an end and that the WEU member countries would continue to support all efforts aimed at achieving this. And they affirmed that Europe's vital interests required that the freedom of navigation in the Gulf be assured at all times and that member states strongly condemned all actions contrary to that principle.

The participants also took note of the measures already undertaken or envisaged by individual member countries. They agreed to continue to consult each other and to exchange information in order to develop further the progress of concertation and co-operation.

Since this meeting, the Governments of Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium have each decided to send naval forces to the Gulf. France and the United Kingdom had already decided to strengthen their naval presence in the region. Subsequently, the two WEU member countries not present in the Gulf expressed their solidarity with their partners. Although the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany precludes it from taking part in such operations, the German Government agreed to deploy replacements in the alliance area to cover for partners' forces sent to the Gulf. The Government of Luxembourg made a financial contribution to the maintenance of the Belgian and Netherlands naval forces in the region.

The 20th August meeting was followed by two others in The Hague on 15th September and 14th October, during which participants discussed in particular ways of improving their contacts in order to enhance co-ordination on the practical-technical level, fully respecting the national character of their respective activities.

3. See Annex II: letter from Chairman-in-Office of the Council to the Assembly President informing him of the 20th August meeting; press guidelines issued by the presidency for the meetings on 20th August, 15th September and 14th October.

WEU ministers reviewed in some detail the Gulf situation at their meeting in The Hague on 26th-27th October. They noted with satisfaction the consultations between WEU member countries and instructed their officials to continue and improve this work at all appropriate levels.

Accordingly – and again at the initiative of the Netherlands presidency – other meetings were held between senior officials from the foreign and defence ministries of the Seven and, on the basis of a British proposal, a consultation process initiated between the chiefs of staff in the capitals. Furthermore, regular on-the-spot contacts and exchanges of information between the naval commanders of the five WEU countries present in the Gulf were established.

This process of co-operation and concertation has continued into 1988.

This contribution of Western European Union to improving political and military co-ordination of various national activities is viewed positively by the member states. It is to be hoped that it will continue and develop further, as it can serve as a model for future co-operation.

3. *East-West relations*

Member states continued consultations covering East-West relations in general and arms control issues in particular in the regular sessions of the Permanent Council as well as in the meetings of the enlarged Council (comprising the political directors of foreign ministries and appropriate representatives of defence ministries). On this base ministers in The Hague reviewed developments in East/West relations and arms control, particularly in relation to negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the global, verifiable elimination of intermediate nuclear forces. They recalled that the allies concerned at Reykjavik in June had agreed to develop further a comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament and to work within the framework of this concept as envisaged in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the NAC communiqué of 12th June 1987.

4. *Security in the Mediterranean*

A working group on Mediterranean security, comprising representatives of the foreign and defence ministries of the Seven, was set up following the ministerial mandate formulated at Luxembourg in April. It met twice during the second half of 1987, and examined in detail a preliminary joint study submitted by the French and Italian delegations. This recognised that some conflicts in the Mediterranean region could seriously affect the security interests of Western Europe, and that analysis of these conflicts could usefully take place within WEU. An interim report based on

this study was submitted to ministers at their meeting in The Hague who took note and instructed the sub-group to continue its activities.

5. Defence resources

The group of defence ministry representatives met during the second half of 1987 to discuss various aspects of the management of defence resources. This was followed by a workshop organised by Agency II. Ministers at The Hague stressed the need to aim at a more effective use of existing resources.

6. Defence seminars

A Netherlands proposal to host a seminar on the management of defence resources in the spring of 1988 was welcomed by ministers at The Hague.

The Council has also been informed of the plan of the French Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale (IHEDN) to organise in Paris a first European session of a defence teach-in in November 1988.

II. Activities of the ministerial organs

The Council and its working groups continued in the reporting period to receive the assistance and support of the same teams as before at the Secretariat-General and the agencies. They have fulfilled the tasks requested of them by the Council.

1. *The Secretariat-General's* workload increased in the second half of last year, in line with the growing number of meetings of the Council and its working groups. This reflected the development of WEU in the post-reactivation period, and the establishment of its place in the European security framework. The greater public consciousness of WEU has also led to a growth in the press and public information activities carried out by the Secretariat on behalf of the Council.

The Secretary-General continued his public relations activities in the form of conferences, articles and interviews.

2. *The Agencies for Security Questions* continued to carry out the tasks assigned to them by the Council. The Assembly was informed of these in a letter dated 24th March 1987 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly. A copy of this letter was included in Annex II of the first part of this report⁴.

4. See Document 1123, Annex II.

3. Annexed to this document are notes about the *institutional tasks* connected with:

- (a) the implementation of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty⁵;
- (b) the control procedures for A, B, C weapons⁶;
- (c) the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee's working groups⁷.

III. Institutional reforms

1. In response to the mandate for work on institutional reform and possible collocation of the WEU ministerial organs handed down by ministers at their April 1987 meeting in Luxembourg, the Permanent Council tasked an institutional working group to examine these issues in detail. On the basis of the group's work, ministers took two important decisions in The Hague on 26th and 27th October, one to merge the three Agencies for Security Questions into a single unit under the direct authority of the Secretary-General, the other to collocate the WEU ministerial organs in one capital. They also required the Secretary-General to submit a draft organigramme for a collocated WEU to the Permanent Council before 1st December. This was done.

2. No consensus emerged from subsequent Permanent Council discussions on the timing of the implementation of these decisions. In the meantime, the mandates of two of the three agency directors came to an end on 31st December 1987, as implied in the decision reached in Bonn on 23rd April 1985; the third director retired in September 1987. Neither was there a consensus during the reporting period on the choice of capital in which to collocate. At the end of December 1987, there were four candidatures: Brussels, London, Luxembourg, Paris (Luxembourg subsequently withdrew its candidature). The Council called on the institutional working group to produce an agreed organigramme for a collocated organisation, to draw up a detailed comparison of the technical dossiers of the candidate capitals for collocation, and to prepare an appropriate paper with recommendations for ministers to consider at their meeting in The Hague on 18th-19th April 1988.

3. In order to ensure the orderly implementation of any reorganisational decisions taken or to be taken, the Council agreed to extend until 30th June 1988 the fixed-duration contracts of agency staff which were originally to terminate at the end of December 1987. The Council also agreed to

5. See Annex IV.

6. See Annex V.

7. See Annex VI.

block funds for posts in the agencies which became vacant by the end of 1987, or would become vacant in 1988.

IV. Enlargement

Ministers in The Hague in October also addressed the question of possible enlargement. They agreed, inter alia, that in principle WEU should not be a closed shop, but that the objective of any enlargement should be to strengthen the organisation.

On the basis of the conclusions on enlargement reached at that meeting, ministers may, at their spring 1988 meeting, in conformity with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, invite Portugal and Spain to open the appropriate discussions with a view to their possible accession.

V. Relations between the Council and the Assembly

There has been a growing number of contacts between representatives of the Council and the Assembly, with a welcome increase in the substantive content of their discussions.

In the platform adopted in The Hague, the member states paid tribute to the rôle of the WEU Assembly in the development of a more cohesive European defence identity: they "highly valued the continued involvement in this endeavour of the WEU Assembly which is the only European parliamentary body mandated by treaty to discuss all aspects of security including defence".

1. Main meetings between representatives of the Council and those of the Assembly organs

(i) *7th July in The Hague:* official visit to the Netherlands by Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly; Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands granted him an audience; in addition Mr. Goerens met Mr. van den Broek (Chairman-in-Office of the Council) and Mr. van Eekelen, the Netherlands Foreign and Defence Ministers. He also met the Prime Minister, Mr. R. Lubbers, the Presidents of the two houses of parliament and representatives of the WEU presidency.

(ii) *13th October in The Hague:* meeting between Mr. van den Broek and Mr. van Eekelen and the Presidential Committee of the Assembly.

(iii) *16th October:* visit of Mr. Goerens to Bonn. Mr. Goerens had conversations with Foreign Minister Mr. Hans Dietrich Genscher and Defence Minister Dr. Manfred Wörner. Furthermore, he met Mr. Heinz Westphal, Vice-President of the Bundestag, and other prominent parliamentarians of the Bundestag.

(iv) *22nd-23rd October:* Mr. Goerens' visit to London: during his bilateral visit to London on 22nd-23rd October, Mr. Goerens was received by the Speaker of the House of Commons; he held discussions with the Defence Secretary, Mr. George Younger, the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, and the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Mr. David Mellor. He also met members of parliament and the media.

(v) *27th October in The Hague* (after the ministerial Council): meeting between the presidency of the Council, represented by MM. van den Broek and van Eekelen, and the Presidential Committee of the Assembly.

(vi) *30th November to 2nd December in Paris:* second part of the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly. Speeches by MM. van den Broek, van Eekelen, Raimond, Mellor, each followed by discussions.

2. Documents transmitted to the Assembly

(i) The first part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council to the Assembly on the Council's activities for the period 1st January to 30th June 1987.

(ii) Replies of the Council to Recommendations 442 to 445 adopted by the Assembly at its extraordinary session in Luxembourg on 27th and 28th April 1987 and to Recommendations 446 to 448 adopted by the Assembly at the first part of its thirty-third ordinary session.

(iii) Replies of the Council to Written Questions 274 to 279.

VI. Activities of the Public Administration Committee

(Period covered: 1987)

The Public Administration Committee, which meets once every six months, held its two meetings of 1987 in Winchester, from 27th to 29th May, and in Alghero, from 30th September to 2nd October. These meetings were as usual devoted to exchanges of information on administrative developments in the member countries during the preceding months and to the preparation of the annual seminar for government officials. In 1987, the XXXVIth seminar was held at Taormina in Italy from 9th to 14th November. Meanwhile, six study visits were made during 1987 by officials between WEU countries.

*VII. Budgetary and administrative questions*⁸

(Period covered: 1987)

1. Separate consideration of the pensions and operating budgets of the WEU Assembly was ini-

8. Concerning the activities of the co-ordinated organisations, see Annex VII.

tiated as a result of a ministerial decision at Luxembourg in April. The Council took this decision with retroactive effect from January 1987. The pensions budget follows its own natural rate of increase or decrease, determined by the legal obligation of applying the pension scheme rules; the operating budget follows the rate of zero real growth.

2. Unforeseen departures caused extra expenditure not forecast in the pensions budget of the ministerial organs, and this led to the submission of a revised 1987 budget; supplementary funds were required for the pensions budget only, the operating budgets remaining – after transfers – neutral.

3. The Budget and Organisation Committee met three times during the year and discussed inter alia:

the effects of separate consideration of the Assembly's pension and operating budgets for the purposes of agreeing a growth rate for the latter, and the Assembly's greater autonomy in budgetary matters, unblocking the Agencies' travel allowances, the Assembly's 1987 supplementary budgets, the ministerial organs's revised budget for 1987 and the WEU budgets for 1988.

4. While discussions are continuing in the Council on reorganisation and collocation, it was agreed that the 1988 ministerial organs' budget would be based, in so far as possible, on the maintenance of the existing situation in London and Paris. The submission of revised budgets would take place at the appropriate time. Meanwhile, funds for vacant posts in the agencies were frozen.

ANNEX I

WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

*Platform on European security interests**The Hague, 27th October 1987*

1. Stressing the dedication of our countries to the principles upon which our democracies are based and resolved to preserve peace in freedom, we, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the member states of WEU, reaffirm the common destiny which binds our countries.
2. We recall our commitment to build a European union in accordance with the single European act, which we all signed as members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence.
3. An important means to this end is the modified Brussels Treaty. This treaty, with its far-reaching obligations to collective defence, marked one of the early steps on the road to European unification. It also envisages the progressive association of other states inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination. We see the revitalisation of WEU as an important contribution to the broader process of European unification.
4. We intend therefore to develop a more cohesive European defence identity which will translate more effectively into practice the obligations of solidarity to which we are committed through the modified Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties.
5. We highly value the continued involvement in this endeavour of the WEU Assembly which is the only European parliamentary body mandated by treaty to discuss all aspects of security including defence.

*
* *

- I. Our starting point is the present conditions of European security.
 1. Europe remains at the centre of East-West relations and, forty years after the end of the second world war, a divided continent. The human consequences of this division remain unacceptable, although certain concrete improvements have been made on a bilateral level and on the basis of the Helsinki final act. We owe it to our people to overcome this situation and to exploit in the interest of all Europeans the opportunities for further improvements which may present themselves.
 2. New developments in East-West relations, particularly in arms control and disarmament, and also other developments, for example in the sphere of technology, could have far-reaching implications for European security.
 3. We have not yet witnessed any lessening of the military build-up which the Soviet Union has sustained over so many years. The geostrategic situation of Western Europe makes it particularly vulnerable to the superior conventional, chemical and nuclear forces of the Warsaw Pact. This is the fundamental problem for European security. The Warsaw Pact's superior conventional forces and its capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action are of special concern in this context.
 4. Under these conditions the security of the Western European countries can only be ensured in close association with our North American allies. The security of the alliance is indivisible. The partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic rests on the twin foundations of shared values and interests. Just as the commitment of the North American democracies is vital to Europe's security, a free, independent and increasingly more united Western Europe is vital to the security of North America.
 5. It is our conviction that the balanced policy of the Harmel report remains valid. Political solidarity and adequate military strength within the Atlantic Alliance, arms control, disarmament and the

search for genuine détente continue to be integral parts of this policy. Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary.

*
* *

II. European security should be based on the following criteria:

1. It remains our primary objective to prevent any kind of war. It is our purpose to preserve our security by maintaining defence readiness and military capabilities adequate to deter aggression and intimidation without seeking military superiority.
2. In the present circumstances and as far as we can foresee, there is no alternative to the western strategy for the prevention of war, which has ensured peace in freedom for an unprecedented period of European history. To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk.
3. The substantial presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces plays an irreplaceable part in the defence of Europe. They embody the American commitment to the defence of Europe and provide the indispensable linkage with the United States strategic deterrent.
4. European forces play an essential rôle: the overall credibility of the western strategy of deterrence and defence cannot be maintained without a major European contribution not least because the conventional imbalance affects the security of Western Europe in a very direct way.

The Europeans have a major responsibility both in the field of conventional and nuclear defence. In the conventional field, the forces of the WEU member states represent an essential part of the alliance. As regards nuclear forces, all of which form a part of deterrence, the co-operative arrangements that certain member states maintain with the United States are necessary for the security of Europe. The independent forces of France and the United Kingdom contribute to overall deterrence and security.

5. Arms control and disarmament are an integral part of western security policy and not an alternative to it. They should lead to a stable balance of forces at the lowest level compatible with our security. Arms control policy should, like our defence policy, take into account the specific European security interests in an evolving situation. It must be consistent with the maintenance of the strategic unity of the alliance and should not preclude closer European defence co-operation. Arms control agreements have to be effectively verifiable and stand the test of time. East and West have a common interest in achieving this.

*
* *

III. The member states of WEU intend to assume fully their responsibilities:

(a) In the field of western defence

1. We recall the fundamental obligation of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty to provide all the military and other aid and assistance in our power in the event of armed attack on any one of us. This pledge, which reflects our common destiny, reinforces our commitments under the Atlantic Alliance, to which we all belong, and which we are resolved to preserve.
2. It is our conviction that a more united Europe will make a stronger contribution to the alliance, to the benefit of western security as a whole. This will enhance the European rôle in the alliance and ensure the basis for a balanced partnership across the Atlantic. We are resolved to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance.
3. We are each determined to carry our share of the common defence in both the conventional and nuclear field, in accordance with the principles of risk- and burden-sharing which are fundamental to allied cohesion:
 - in the conventional field, all of us will continue to play our part in the on-going efforts to improve our defences;
 - in the nuclear field also, we shall continue to carry our share: some of us by pursuing appropriate co-operative arrangements with the United States; the United Kingdom and France by continuing to maintain independent nuclear forces, the credibility of which they are determined to preserve.

4. We remain determined to pursue European integration including security and defence and make a more effective contribution to the common defence of the West.

To this end we shall:

- ensure that our determination to defend any member country at its borders is made clearly manifest by means of appropriate arrangements,
- improve our consultations and extend our co-ordination in defence and security matters and examine all practical steps to this end,
- make the best possible use of the existing institutional mechanisms to involve the defence ministers and their representatives in the work of WEU,
- see to it that the level of each country's contribution to the common defence adequately reflects its capabilities,
- aim at a more effective use of existing resources, inter alia by expanding bilateral and regional military co-operation, pursue our efforts to maintain in Europe a technologically advanced industrial base and intensify armaments co-operation,
- concert our policies on crises outside Europe in so far as they may affect our security interests.

5. Emphasising the vital contribution of the non-WEU members of the alliance to the common security and defence, we will continue to keep them informed of our activities.

(b) In the field of arms control and disarmament

1. We shall pursue an active arms control and disarmament policy aimed at influencing future developments in such a way as to enhance security and to foster stability and co-operation in the whole of Europe. The steadfastness and cohesion of the alliance and close consultations among all the allies remain essential if concrete results are to be brought about.

2. We are committed to elaborate further our comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament in accordance with the alliance's declaration of 12th June 1987 and we will work within the framework of this concept as envisaged particularly in paragraphs 7 and 8 of this declaration. An agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for the global elimination of land-based INF missiles with a range between 500 and 5 500 km will constitute an important element of such an approach.

3. In pursuing such an approach we shall exploit all opportunities to make further progress towards arms reductions, compatible with our security and with our priorities, taking into account the fact that work in this area raises complex and inter-related issues. We shall evaluate them together, bearing in mind the political and military requirements of our security and progress in the different negotiations.

(c) In the field of East-West dialogue and co-operation

1. The common responsibility of all Europeans is not only to preserve the peace but to shape it constructively. The Helsinki final act continues to serve as our guide to the fulfilment of the objective of gradually overcoming the division of Europe. We shall therefore continue to make full use of the CSCE process in order to promote comprehensive co-operation among all participating states.

2. The possibilities contained in the final act should be fully exploited. We therefore intend:

- to seek to increase the transparency of military potentials and activities and the calculability of behaviour in accordance with the Stockholm document of 1986 by further confidence-building measures;
- vigorously to pursue our efforts to provide for the full respect of human rights without which no genuine peace is possible;
- to open new mutually beneficial possibilities in the fields of economy, technology, science and the protection of the environment;
- to achieve more opportunities for the people in the whole of Europe to move freely and to exchange opinions and information and to intensify cultural exchanges,

and thus to promote concrete improvements for the benefit of all people in Europe.

It is our objective to further European integration. In this perspective we will continue our efforts towards closer security co-operation, maintaining coupling with the United States and ensuring conditions of equal security in the alliance as a whole.

We are conscious of the common heritage of our divided continent, all the people of which have an equal right to live in peace and freedom. That is why we are determined to do all in our power to achieve our ultimate goal of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.

ANNEX II

Meeting of 20th August 1987 on the situation in the Gulf

**Letter dated 31st August 1987 from Mr. H. van den Broek,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,
to Mr. Charles Goerens, President of the Assembly of Western European Union**

The Hague, 31st August 1987

Dear President,

In view of the interest often expressed by the Assembly in the implications that crises occurring in other regions may have for Europe and bearing in mind our discussions in The Hague on 7th July 1987, I wish to inform you personally as follows.

On 20th August, the presidency convened a group of senior officials from the ministries for foreign affairs and defence of the member states of WEU to consider the situation in the Gulf. The presidency acted in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and the decision taken in Rome in October 1984 to hold consultations whenever necessary on the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world. To my knowledge, this is the first time such a meeting has been held. We agreed to consider these matters in more depth in order to bring about greater co-operation.

For your information and that of the Assembly, I enclose the guidelines for the press agreed upon at the close of the meeting on 20th August.

Yours sincerely,

signed: Hans van den Broek

Press guidelines for the presidency

1. At the invitation of the Netherlands, which chairs Western European Union, high officials from the ministries for foreign affairs and defence of the member states met in The Hague on 20th August 1987 to consider the different aspects of the situation in the Gulf area in the context of the current efforts of the United Nations to bring an end to the Iraq-Iran conflict. This meeting was held pursuant to Article VIII of the WEU treaty and, more recently, to the decision taken by ministers in Rome in October 1984 to consider whenever appropriate the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world.
2. We had a thorough and useful exchange that contributed to a harmonisation of views. It was agreed to continue this process of concertation.
3. It was stressed that Security Council Resolution 598 should be fully implemented forthwith so as to bring the conflict between Iraq and Iran to an end. Member countries of WEU will continue to support all efforts aimed at achieving this. In this context they reiterated their support for the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
4. Europe's vital interests require that the freedom of navigation in the Gulf be assured at all times. The member states strongly condemned all actions contrary to that principle.
5. Participants took note of the measures already undertaken or envisaged by individual member countries. They agreed to continue to consult each other and exchange information in order to further develop their co-operation.

*Meeting of 15th September 1987 on the situation in the Gulf****Press guidelines for the presidency***

At the invitation of the Netherlands, which chairs the Western European Union, and pursuant to the decision they took at their meeting of 20th August 1987 to continue to consult each other and exchange information in order to further develop their co-operation, high officials of the ministries for foreign affairs and defence of the member states met in The Hague on 15th September 1987.

They had a thorough exchange of views on recent developments in the Gulf and the efforts being undertaken by the United Nations to bring to an end the conflict between Iraq and Iran. They again stressed that Security Council Resolution 598 should be fully implemented forthwith. They will continue to support the efforts of the Secretary-General and of the Security Council.

They underlined the importance they attach to the principle of freedom of navigation. They noted the decisions taken by some member countries since the last meeting to commit naval forces to the Gulf region.

Participants reiterated their decision to continue the process of concertation. It was agreed that representatives of the member countries of WEU will continue to meet to exchange information and to discuss related issues.

Meeting of 14th October 1987 on the situation in the Gulf

Press guidelines

High officials from the ministries of foreign affairs and defence of the member states of WEU met in The Hague on 14th October 1987 to pursue their consultations on matters pertaining to the situation in the Gulf area.

They noted that the navies of five member countries will be active in the region. They discussed how to improve their contacts in order to enhance co-ordination on the practical/technical level, fully respecting the national character of their respective activities.

They agreed to continue their consultations.

ANNEX III

Summary of conclusions drawn up by the Netherlands presidency of the WEU ministerial Council in The Hague on 26th-27th October 1987

1. Platform: the document was agreed upon and released for publication.
2. Report on European security interests: ministers took note of the report.
3. French-German military co-ordination: France and FRG will keep the partners informed on new developments in this field.
4. The Gulf: consultation and concertation by high-level officials, as initiated in The Hague on 20th August, will be continued and improved. The presidency will call a meeting of the contact points at the navy staffs (appointed in conformity with the meeting of 14th October in The Hague) whenever needed.
5. Interim report on security in the Mediterranean: ministers took note of the interim report. The working group was instructed to continue its activities.
6. Restructuring of the ministerial organs: the three agencies will be merged into one new entity. The new entity will resort directly under the Secretary-General. There is a consensus on the principle of co-location, but as yet no agreement on the location itself. As to this last issue, it was agreed that the presidency would further look into matter and revert to it at a later stage. The Secretary-General would on the basis of the foregoing, work out an organigramme to be submitted to the Permanent Council before 1st December 1987.
7. Enlargement: WEU is not a closed shop. Enlargement should strengthen the organisation and not jeopardise its cohesion. The following general principles were formulated:
 - candidates should accept the WEU treaty;
 - candidates should accept the platform and express their readiness to give concrete expression to the obligations contained therein;
 - candidates should settle their outstanding problems on defence issues within NATO.
8. WEU communication system: the desirability of the system was acknowledged, the Permanent Council would revert to this matter at its next meeting.
9. Management of defence resources: the Netherlands will host a seminar on this subject in March 1988.
10. Information to NATO allies: Briefing of the non-WEU allies following ministerial Councils as provided in III,5 of the platform.

ANNEX IV

***Application of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty
on forces of Western European Union***

(Period covered: 1987)

(i) Levels of forces of member states

For the year under review, the Council has continued with its customary tasks of forces control in implementation of Protocol No. II. As indicated in the 32nd report, and in accordance with the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984, the control of conventional weapons listed in Annex IV to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty has been abolished as from 1st January 1986.

(a) Forces under NATO command

The maximum levels of ground, air and naval forces which member states of WEU place under NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty. So that it may satisfy itself that the limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II are not exceeded, the Council receives information every year concerning the levels in question, in accordance with Article IV of that Protocol. This information is obtained in the course of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and is transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking officer designated by him to that end. The information, as at the end of 1986, was conveyed at the appropriate time. The same procedure is under way for the information as at the end of 1987.

Furthermore, the Council takes the necessary steps to implement the procedure laid down in its resolution of 15th September 1956, whereby the levels of forces of WEU member states under NATO command are examined in the light of the annual review.

For the year 1986, the permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom examined the level of forces of WEU member states and reported to the Council.

The Council noted that the level of forces of the member states of WEU, as set out in the NATO force plan, fell within the limits specified in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II, as at present in force. It also took note of a declaration on French forces made by the representative of France.

The same procedure is under way for the year 1987.

(b) Forces under national command

As stated above, the Council is continuing with its control of forces of member states maintained on the mainland of Europe, and remaining under national command – internal defence and police forces, forces for the defence of overseas territories, and common defence forces – specified in the agreement of 14th December 1957.

(ii) United Kingdom forces stationed on the mainland of Europe

The Government of the United Kingdom has informed the Council that the average number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1987 in accordance with the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty was 54 334. The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty there. In 1987, there were on average 949 men redeployed in this way to Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated, these units would be speedily returned to their duty station in an emergency affecting NATO.

Furthermore, the Government of the United Kingdom has informed the Council that the strength of the United Kingdom's contribution to the second allied tactical air force in 1987 was:

Rôle	Aircraft/equipment	Squadrons
Strike/attack	Tornado	7
Offensive support	Harrier	2
Reconnaissance	Jaguar	1
Air defence	Phantom	2
	Rapier surface-to-air missiles	4
Air transport	Puma	1
	Chinook	1
Ground defence	RAF regiment	1

ANNEX V

*Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments**(Period covered: 1987)**(i) Conventional weapons*

For the reasons already given, the Agency's controls on conventional weapons have been abolished.

*(ii) Situation concerning the control of atomic, chemical and biological weapons**(a) Atomic weapons*

Since the situation has remained the same as in previous years, the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of atomic weapons.

(b) Biological weapons

All the member countries again gave their agreement, for 1987, to the renewal of the list of biological weapons subject to control as accepted by the Council in 1981. The Council noted the fact.

As in previous years, however, the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of biological weapons.

(c) Chemical weapons

The Agency asked member countries for their agreement to renew in 1987 the list of chemical weapons subject to control. This agreement was given and the Council noted the fact. The Agency therefore continued to use this list for its control activities in 1987.

In implementation of Article III of Protocol No. III, which lays down conditions to enable the Council to fix levels of chemical weapons that may be held on the mainland of Europe by those countries which have not given up the right to produce them, and in accordance with the Council decision of 1959, the Agency asked the countries concerned, in its questionnaire, whether production of chemical weapons on their mainland territory had passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage. As in the past, all these states replied in the negative.

In addition, the Agency asked all the member states to declare any chemical weapons that they might hold. Since all the member states replied in the negative, the Agency carried out no quantitative controls of chemical weapons in 1987.

The competent authorities of the country concerned provided the Agency with a detailed, precise and complete reply to the request for information – aimed at facilitating the control of non-production of chemical weapons – which was sent to them by the Agency in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Council in 1959 and with the directive received from the Council in 1960. In addition, the procedure applied with these authorities since 1973 was again used.

The information thus provided helped to determine at which chemical plants agreed controls would be carried out in 1987.

The Agency continued to carry out the agreed controls in accordance with established procedures. Four controls were carried out in 1987. A delegation from the national authorities took part in each control operation.

None of these controls revealed any evidence of manufacture of chemical weapons within the meaning of Annex II to Protocol No. III.

ANNEX VI

*Activities of the Standing Armaments Committee**(Period covered: 1987)*

1. The Standing Armaments Committee did not meet during the period covered by this report.
2. Nevertheless, the working group on the updating of WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 on trials methods for wheeled vehicles continued its work with regular meetings. After a total of seven meetings, the working group 4.FT.6 completed its updating work in November 1987. Its remaining activities will be taken over by the relevant NATO working group.
3. Working Group No. 8 on operational research has also continued its activities. It met twice in 1987, the second meeting being combined with a seminar on methods and software for decision-making, particularly for the selection of projects or weapons systems or personnel.

ANNEX VII

*Co-ordinated organisations**(Period covered: 1987)*

1. The Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts held nine meetings in 1987. In addition, there were eleven meetings of the Committee of Heads of Administration, nine joint meetings of the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General with the Standing Committee of Staff Associations, as well as one meeting of the Committee of Secretaries-General.

The main subjects dealt with in the framework of co-ordination, some of which are still under review, were as follows:

- the triennial review of salaries incorporating a review of the salary adjustment procedure and the allowances;
- the updating of the purchasing power parities (in co-operation with the European Communities) for the member countries, and the reference towns or regions to be established to conduct proper and equitable comparisons;
- the functioning of the framework of co-ordination;
- the periodic adjustment of salaries and allowances.

2. The European Patent Office withdrew its ten-year old application for full membership of the co-ordinated organisations' framework, and now enjoys temporarily a special observer status.

*European co-operation in armaments research and development –
guidelines drawn from the colloquy*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ²
by Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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APPENDIX

Programme of the colloquy, London, 7th-8th March 1988

1. Adopted in committee by 8 votes to 2 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Wilkinson (Chairman); Mr. Bassinet (Vice-Chairman); MM. Adriaensens, Böhm, Caccia, De Bondt, Fourré, Mrs. Francese, MM. Garrett (Alternate: Lambie), Hengel, Hill (Alternate: Shelton), Intini, Lenzer, Parry, Malfatti, Mechttersheimer, Schmidt, Souvet (Alternate: Prat), Valleix, van der Werff, Worrell.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

***on European co-operation in armaments research and development –
guidelines drawn from the colloquy***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising the importance of maintaining a strong defence industrial base within the member nations of WEU and within Western Europe as a whole as a fundamental political, economic and strategic objective;
- (ii) Conscious that the budgetary allocations for defence are not likely to grow as much as the cost of new defence equipment in real terms, and that therefore better use needs to be made within Western Europe of existing financial provisions for defence;
- (iii) Aware that new technologies offer improved solutions to some of the security problems facing the western alliance;
- (iv) Believing that the IEPG has proved itself an effective instrument for harmonising the operational requirements and re-equipment timescales of the armed forces of Western Europe and that, without detracting from the political responsibilities of the WEU Council of Ministers and Assembly, it is now ready to be assigned a greater rôle in promoting joint military research;
- (v) Concerned that in spite of numerous successful collaborative equipment projects, governments in Western Europe have proved themselves unsuccessful as yet in organising a unified military research effort to eliminate the wastefulness of duplicated national research programmes;
- (vi) Hopeful that a more rational utilisation can be achieved of national armaments research, testing, trials and development establishments by opening them to use by the armed forces and armaments companies of other countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To fulfil their rôle, repeatedly emphasised by the Council, as members of WEU to provide political impetus to bodies concerned with arms co-operation by taking decisive action to accelerate the formulation of a common policy in IEPG for military research and more cost-effective armaments development in Western Europe;
2. To establish a European advanced defence research agency funded from a common budget initially provided by WEU nations and later by other European NATO member countries as well;
3. To help the IEPG to meet its goals more rapidly by:
 - (a) affording the IEPG better political support through a regular institutionalised dialogue with the Assembly of WEU;
 - (b) granting it a small permanent international specialist secretariat as recommended in the EDIS report "Towards a stronger Europe";
4. To encourage individual countries to collaborate in the use of each other's armaments research, testing, trials and development establishments;
5. To mobilise more effectively the work of the universities and of the civilian research community for defence research with a corresponding mechanism to permit civilian industry to benefit commercially from the results of military research;
6. To involve defence manufacturers much more closely in the formulation of operational requirements both on a national and European basis.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In his address to the WEU Assembly in December 1986, Lord Carrington, the NATO Secretary General expressed his belief that Europe should try to achieve more co-operation in armaments research and development. This challenging suggestion was taken up by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions which organised a colloquy on the subject in London from 7th to 8th March 1988.

2. The purpose was to focus opinions from governments, industry, administration and the scientific community on this issue. It was hoped that from this wide range of opinions new views might emerge to provide a fresh impetus for enhanced collaboration which has long been an objective of the Assembly of WEU. The contributors emphasised the problems, which are clearly formidable.

3. Judging from the excellent attendance and the reactions of the media, the committee was not mistaken about the topical character of the subject chosen. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that many contributions also paid attention to armaments co-operation in general rather than to the specific subject of the colloquy, clearly indicating that there are still a number of basic problems to be solved, especially in the areas of industrial collaboration in the armaments field and in the definition of common operational requirements and re-equipment timescales between the armed forces of different nations and hence joint armament programmes.

4. This report will seek to review all the main problems discussed at the colloquy. The recommendation will focus only on the clear questions which deserve priority attention.

II. An integrated long-term strategy for Europe

5. It is well-known that research and development programmes for new weapons systems encompass an ever-larger time span as modern weapons become increasingly sophisticated. These systems, whose research and development have to be initiated in the next few years, will have to serve the military forces of the western alliance well into the 21st century, in some cases at least until the year 2010 and even occasionally beyond that date.

6. The weapons procured for the democratic nations of Western Europe have to match the evolving security of the members of the NATO

alliance. This requires a clear assessment of the strategic and geopolitical developments of the next few decades. Only in this context will defence planners and military staff produce an integrated long-term strategy and hence define appropriate weapons systems and their requirements. The weapons procurement process cannot sensibly be carried out in a strategic vacuum. Foreign policy considerations and political as well as economic judgment must have an input in addition to a military assessment of threat.

7. Mr. Fred C. Iklé, co-Chairman of the Commission which presented the Discriminate Deterrence report, delivered a stimulating address. He pointed out that apart from the classical contingencies of an all-out conventional war on the Central Front of the NATO alliance in Western Europe or the ultimate horror of an all-out nuclear attack, the comity of western nations will have to be prepared for other, probably less obvious, contingencies. These might be limited but specifically targeted attacks by Soviet forces, designed to isolate the victims of aggression and to deny them the security guarantee of NATO's common response. It should also be kept in mind that the security of Western Europe depends on defending what are called the NATO flanks such as Norway and the Baltic or Turkey and the Balkans, as well as critical regions beyond the area of responsibility of the NATO alliance, such as the Gulf.

8. An inordinate focus on crises on the central front might prepare for weapons systems whose range, speed of response and striking power are too limited to serve the defence of Western Europe in these more remote areas of threat and military imbalance. Given the wide range of possible conflicts for which NATO needs to prepare in the coming decades, Western Europe will need more versatile, flexible and mobile capabilities. New technologies will make feasible new military operations and missions. These new technologies will include greatly enhanced accuracy of delivery systems, intelligent munitions, stealth and a crucial range of capabilities in space.

9. It will certainly not be easy to introduce these strategies and the new technologies required. Not least because military establishments are conservative and find it far easier to continue well-trodden paths, especially since national and international bureaucracies are cumbersome by nature. In this respect it was interesting to note the criticism of European strategic experts of the Discriminate Deterrence report, partly owing to some deeply-rooted ways of thinking which the report is trying to change.

However such reactions were not surprising in the light of past European responses to the enhanced radiation weapon, follow-on forces attack, increased use of helicopters on the battlefield, not to mention strategic defence against ballistic missile attacks.

10. It is however dangerous to assume – as some people in the West are doing – that Gorbachev's Soviet Union no longer presents a military threat. Recent developments indicate that in parallel with a process of economic change and industrial modernisation, the Soviet Union is becoming more unstable. Potential ethnic conflicts have broken out. Islamic consciousness is growing and raised expectations of improved living standards and more political openness will prove very difficult to satisfy. A Soviet empire in decline could prove almost as great a risk to its neighbours as a Soviet empire that is vigorous. The West's abilities for peaceful coexistence and crisis management will be tested to the full to ensure that a declining and fissiparous Soviet empire implodes rather than explodes to the detriment of its neighbours.

III. Collective security requires a collective response to threats

11. A prerequisite for full European armaments co-operation is comprehensive harmonisation of operational requirements. Part of this process is a generally-accepted, credible, objective and consistent assessment of the threat, which at this moment does not exist within the framework of NATO. The Stokes report (WEU Assembly Document 1115) recently paid attention to this deficiency. At the colloquy, Sir Donald Hall in particular expressed the view that there should be an agreed set of criteria for evaluating intelligence data, for conducting threat analysis and for testing the sensitivity of the assumptions used.

12. Many speakers agreed that national military staffs are too accustomed to writing their requirements for new defence equipment in a context of full and unfettered national sovereignty. Even if they know that they will have to deter the same threat as their neighbouring allies, and that their forces should be interoperable in an alliance framework they all too often differ in their assessment of the equipments required.

13. It was also pointed out that very detailed requirements focusing on the highest possible performance, combined with overoptimism about the cost and programme implications as well as inflexibility over unduly ambitious specifications during development itself easily lead to the production of "gold-plated" weapons, whose capabilities are not cost-effective. Here, Mr. Chevallier made a sensible suggestion, proposing that military requirements should be expressed in outline descriptive parameters according to a scale of desirability rather than in terms of fixed

performance absolutes. Expressing the broad outlines and cardinal points required allows industry to grasp the essentials whilst leaving it more scope for initiative in seeking solutions.

14. In defining their requirements, military staffs should also bear in mind that their search for the ultimate in equipment performance often leads to hopelessly unrealistic solutions as far as cost is concerned and all too often to very late entry into service for new equipment. This, combined with shrinking defence budgets, could lead to a dramatic quantitative reduction in equipment which Europe can ill afford to permit in view of the present imbalance with the Warsaw Pact, America's economic and military power decline and Western Europe's growing responsibilities. Increasing emphasis on "design-to-cost" practices for weapons systems and subsystems, where the client asks for the best equipment possible for a fixed price, will therefore be inevitable.

15. If military staffs from different nations are brought together at an early stage in the planning process – which fortunately is increasingly the case in both NATO and the IEPG – industry should be allowed to make an early contribution to the debate before the outline operational requirement is agreed as was rightly pointed out by Mr. Dassault among others. Agreement on the type of weapon system required should then be followed up by a rigorous analysis of the necessary performance, particularly with regard to the last few per cent of performance as against value for money. Such a procedure might prevent long drawn-out debates on the performance required which, in practice, might not be achieved by industry or might even be a reason for built-in unreliability.

IV. Interchange of technology between civil and military programmes

16. Every year no less than a quarter of the world research and development resources is allocated for military purposes, which in financial terms amounts to about \$100 000 million, keeping 1.5 million people employed. With all the finance and manpower involved, it is worth examining if this money is well spent and if there is enough interchange of know-how and reciprocal benefit between the civil and military field.

17. Mr. Curien in his address pointed out that in some sectors, in particular major aeronautical programmes, many space and some nuclear programmes, there is enough interaction between military and civil to make sure that money is not wasted. This is not the case in major data-processing programmes, mainly due to the fundamentally different economic constraints between military and civil programmes.

18. In general, however, even if there is enough interaction, major military programmes at the moment do not have much direct spin-off for major civil programmes. Although there are some clear examples such as the use of composite materials which has been extended from military to civil aircraft construction and active controls as well which are a feature of the A-320 Airbus, no opportunity should be neglected of exploiting such spin-offs, and EEC Commissioner Narjes drew attention to the Defence Technology Enterprise in the United Kingdom which has developed ways of facilitating transfers from defence to civil uses. He rightly argued that it may be useful to consider the establishment of similar arrangements at European level.

19. Another interesting British initiative is the Civil Industrial Access Scheme (CIAS), whose aim is to broaden industry's access to the facilities and expertise of the Ministry of Defence. Facilities are offered for experimentation and the scientific staff of companies may be allowed to participate in research programmes of mutual benefit to industry and the ministry. Users will be charged for the use of facilities and for the time of ministry staff members who are consulted, but the charges will also take account of the benefits for the Ministry of Defence itself.

20. On the other hand, as was rightly argued by Mr. Gergorin of MATRA, some civil technology as in certain fields of microelectronics or computers can have an impact in the military field and allow time and money to be saved in developing military systems.

21. In this context it is interesting to mention that a recent study published by the United States Defence Science Board concerning the potential for greater use of commercial components and systems in military equipment has demonstrated that in doing so costs could be reduced by 10 to 1 at the component level and by between 4 and 8 to 1 at the system level¹. This fact blunts the edge of the argument that commercial electronic components would not be suitable for military systems. Indeed, such commercial components can have even higher performance and are of higher quality than military components because of the large volume of production and extensive field experience achieved with commercial systems.

V. Fair return

22. One of the most difficult and perhaps delicate problems in European arms co-operation is the question of fair return whereby national industries are compensated by being attributed a fair share of each programme on a case by case basis, the division of the industrial workload

reflecting each individual nation's investment in a collaborative programme.

23. It is quite understandable that high spending on armaments is more easily accepted by the electorate when a national government can guarantee the maximum involvement of its own national armaments industry and a fair return system, on first thoughts, seems to be an attractive solution. However, Mr. Chevallier, Sir Donald Hall and Mr. Dassault firmly criticised this system.

24. According to Mr. Chevallier, it is a questionable form of protectionism, especially within an alliance of developed countries whose global trade balances out. Also in the defence industry, European countries should make use of the innovative potential of their economies, the dynamism of their firms and the political and economic liberalism which is the basis of their societies. It is very important therefore to lower protectionist barriers in the defence industry.

25. Sir Donald Hall likewise argued that the principle of fair return militates against competition in the market. The suggestion in the European Defence Industry Study (EDIS) report "Towards a stronger Europe" that the European members of NATO should adopt the European Space Agency formula of the return coefficient did not find favour in his eyes because the promise of future balance would require excessive faith on the part of all concerned.

26. Moreover, he made it clear that even the device of competing consortia as a means of achieving fair return in practice might lead to a bizarre form of competition. Here the companies which are their nation's sole representative cannot lose and competition would be restricted to companies which have national rivals. This in turn would not necessarily eliminate the least efficient or the least capable industries on a European scale.

27. Altogether it seems very difficult to reconcile the maintenance of the principle of fair return in collaborative procurement programmes with the search for rationalisation, more efficiency and the greatest possible savings as Mr. Dassault believed. The European agricultural policy is an alarming example of the way well-intended protectionist measures can totally run out of control.

28. Within Europe, the only solution at least for vital branches of the defence industry will be gradually to lower protectionist barriers. In general, this should not cause insurmountable problems for nations with an all-round, well-developed, modern economy. In order to avoid unduly abrupt economic repercussions such as a disproportionate increase in unemployment or the loss of national bases for emergency industrial mobilisation, Mr. Barattieri suggested providing traditional escape clauses on the model of Article 226 of the EEC treaty.

1. Defence Science Board summer study on commercial components, Washington, DC, July 1986.

29. The gradual lowering of protectionist barriers does not provide a solution, however, for nations with a less-developed defence industry. Mr. Gimelli rightly pointed out that the need to pay closer attention to the requirements of the southern flank is becoming increasingly clear. The defence burden of the southern flank weighs differently and more heavily on certain countries, which frequently are also those with a lower economic capability. Collaborative arms procurement programmes should be designed to meet the particular needs of these countries and no doubt this is a case where the strong should help the weak. The committee will pay further attention to this specific issue in a subsequent report, following its projected visit to Portugal. It is an issue which the IEPG is already addressing, following a study submitted to it by Greece. A number of specific measures have been implemented by the IEPG to support member countries with less-developed defence industries and these will be reviewed on a regular basis by the IEPG.

VI. Reciprocal purchasing arrangements

30. Several speakers mentioned the issue of reciprocal purchasing, which means that countries buy each other's defence equipment on a reciprocal basis. A great advantage of such a system would be that it can offer the benefits of increased scale without the overheads of classical collaborative programmes which also easily lead to overcapacity. Moreover, it was mentioned that this is a way of collaborative procurement which could be conducted satisfactorily on the basis of national research and development.

31. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the ideal reciprocal purchasing system can be achieved only in a common defence market with open competition and with joint long-term defence equipment planning. Failure to achieve a correct balance over a given number of years could quickly ruin all good intentions and disturb relations between partners.

32. While in principle reciprocal purchasing seems to offer a most cost-effective solution, the resulting specialisation might finally work against the original objective. Specialisation indeed tends to create or strengthen monopoly positions which, in the long run, are detrimental to economic efficiency.

33. Under present conditions individual companies will, for reasons of competition, try to maintain a high level of ability over the full spectrum of skills required for their sector. Without specific programmes, Europe is still a long way from systematic specialisation of manpower and facilities between the various national industries.

VII. The rôle of bureaucracy

34. The EDIS report recommended that ministers examine their procurement organisations with a view to reducing government involvement. Criticism was vented of the practice of defence ministries setting up multi-discipline project management to mirror the one established by the prime contractor. Such teams carry out contract negotiation and cost monitoring and, even worse, second guess the prime contractor on technical and management issues. If the contract is well negotiated and adequate periodic reporting arrangements are made, the report continued, it is in the best interest of the customer to leave industry to do its job.

35. This argument was elaborated by Sir Donald Hall and Mr. Fichtmüller who agreed that at present too many officials are engaged in micromanagement of projects, implying that much of industry's time and effort is devoted to servicing their demands. Both industrialists pointed out that there will always be a need for continuous dialogue with the customers' representatives, but they argued that the increasing application of fixed and ceiling prices should facilitate restraint on the side of the governments.

VIII. Research and development, the attitude of industry

36. It was rightly pointed out at the colloquy that there is a distinction between pure research, mainly a task for universities and research establishments, applied research, conducted by industry to transfer the results of pure research into marketable products, and development, the activity concerned with evolving technology or demonstrating technological feasibility. On the other hand, it was agreed that there was absolutely no doubt that, for the sake of efficiency, this whole system of resources should be closely co-ordinated, especially in the defence procurement process.

37. All industrialists made it quite clear that a prime objective of their companies is to make a profit, without which they cannot exist. An industrial company will always try to exploit the fruits of its research and development. This means that having the full property rights of patents is of primordial importance for any industry. Unique technological knowledge is one of the main means of gaining a lead over competing companies and consequently making a profit. Sharing knowledge with other companies at an early stage of research and development is therefore, in fact, a contradictory activity in a situation of competition.

38. Even more complicated questions arise for property rights of patents which are the result of applied research and development funded by

governments but in fact critically dependent on accumulated company knowledge and expertise. Here the interests of a sound industry require that a clear distinction be made between government- and privately-funded work and that the conditions applying be well defined. Whatever proposals governments make for collaborative research and development should allow industry to reap the rewards of its own investment.

39. At the moment, the defence industry is not inclined to make the inevitably long-term and high-risk investments in the research and development of advanced technologies, the more so because of the considerable uncertainty regarding future defence budgets and government procurement programmes.

40. In general, there seems to be little chance of collaborative armaments research and development programmes being conducted by industry without government funding or without collaborative procurement programmes. The investment needed for applied research and development in advanced technology is so extremely high that it will be necessary to set up complementary programmes rather than parallel and competing efforts. This in turn will force nations to give up the classical objective of autarky in defence procurement, which is in fact out of date since the establishment of the collaborative defence of Western Europe after the second world war.

IX. No military Eureka

41. There was frequent conjecture whether it would not be useful to establish a military Eureka programme. Although opinions at the colloquy diverged slightly, there was no general enthusiasm for a military Eureka. The idea behind Eureka is essentially to promote projects for the highly-competitive short- and middle-term market, concentrating on marketable products or concepts, a philosophy quite alien to arms procurement programmes. It has been clearly spelled out in the recent Fourné report (WEU Assembly Document 1118, paragraphs 193-197) that the Eureka structure, which has no working programme and no common budget, is not compulsory and does not specifically favour the exchange of technology. It therefore is not suitable for a European defence research and development programme.

X. IEPG

42. Both the United Kingdom Secretary of State George Younger and the Netherlands Minister of State Jan van Houwelingen proudly mentioned IEPG's achievements. Indeed, progress has been made and there are fifteen harmonised staff targets. One of the more promising is the staff target for a future tactical transport aircraft to come into service at the end of the next

decade and which might also be used as a maritime patrol and airborne refuelling aircraft. At the moment it is not quite clear if this IEPG activity is dovetailed with the conventional armaments planning system now being introduced in NATO for a two-year experimental period. In order to achieve a better understanding of the plans and planning methods of national defence research and development institutions so that duplications may be reduced and existing testing facilities made available for common use, the directors of these national institutions have been meeting every year since 1986. The final goal should be the harmonisation of the various national research plans.

43. Work is in progress on ten co-operative technology projects (CTPs), but it should be noted that the process of defining these projects has not yet been completed. Meanwhile, work is continuing on an inventory of technological areas which could be of interest for the various member countries and might lead to new CTPs. In the framework of a different parallel approach, countries have, on the basis of their national priorities, designated certain technology areas as priority areas.

44. The EDIS report presented a basket of useful recommendations and suggestions but significantly many speakers and participants agreed that the most useful proposal, namely a common European military research fund, was buried at Seville last year notwithstanding the vehement protestations to the contrary of the ministers present, who argued that they went as far as is practical. The common research fund, they believed, would be premature. It would also require a permanent secretariat within IEPG for its administration and the idea of a permanent IEPG secretariat was turned down by ministers yet again at Seville.

45. At a recent meeting in Rome at the end of March, the National Armaments Directors of IEPG provisionally agreed to a proposal for an action plan based on a number of recommendations from the EDIS report. Later this year the IEPG ministers are expected to give it their final approval. The contents of this action plan are not known for the moment and there is still reason for scepticism.

46. Reviewing the whole spectrum of activities in the IEPG, it cannot be denied that, in principle, it has chosen to tackle the right issues. In particular the harmonisation of operational requirements has rightly been seen as the prerequisite for progress in European arms collaboration. Moreover, with all the West European allies as members, there seems to be ample reason to pursue further European co-operation in armaments research and development through the IEPG. The IEPG has a good record of achievement on which to build.

47. It is a serious miscalculation, however, for European defence ministers to believe they can attain the ambitious goals set for the IEPG without the full political endorsement of their national governments and the consequent backing of the electorate through members of parliament. Staffed by officials of national defence ministries, the IEPG has no collective entity to which it is responsible and the national defence ministers who give it direction have not as yet mobilised and informed European political constituency in support of the IEPG's work, which is what the Assembly of WEU can uniquely contribute.

48. WEU, apart from being a forum for discussion and harmonisation of European security policy, should also play its rôle in providing enhanced political direction to the IEPG. If it is accepted that the IEPG is to pursue more vigorously the harmonisation of defence collaboration in its widest sense to include defence research, it should be made certain, on behalf of the national electorates of at least the seven countries of WEU, that individual national governments do it effectively. Only the elected members of the Assembly of WEU can do this.

49. The rôle in armaments co-operation of the Standing Armaments Committee and the agency for security questions of WEU was not discussed at the colloquy. Until now, the Council of Ministers has not been able to conclude its process of reflection or decide on the future location of these bodies, thus tacitly extending the transitional period which should have ended on 31st December 1987. It should be stated here that in this matter the committee still fully abides by the text of Recommendation 454 adopted by the Assembly in December 1987 to which the Council has given only a partial and evasive reply.

XI. The legal framework

50. Even if the internal open market of the European Community is accomplished by 1992, it will not apply to the national defence industries. According to Article 223 of the Rome Treaty, "Any member state may take whatever measures it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security and which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material". On the other hand, the single European act in Title II, Article 130 F reads as follows: "The Community's aim shall be to strengthen the scientific and technological bases of European industry and to encourage it to become more competitive at international level". More specifically, in Title III, Article 30, paragraph 6 it is stated that the member states "...are ready to co-ordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security".

51. Clearly there is a peculiar discrepancy between the objective formulated in Title III, Article 30, paragraph 6 of the single act and the

text of Article 223 of the Rome Treaty which has not been amended by the single act. Here one should not forget that the single act describes a non-binding long-term objective in a fairly general manner. It hardly needs to be explained that at the moment opinions of member states in the European Community differ widely on the need, way and timing for achieving this goal. Governments may continue to deliberate on the best possible solutions for collaborative European arms procurement, but meanwhile industry does not want to be pinned down by too tight a straitjacket. It therefore seems appropriate for the time being to take less far-reaching steps on a more practical level and in a more restricted framework to ensure short-term progress.

52. Nevertheless, harmonisation of some basic rules of company law seems essential, whatever course armaments co-operation in Europe may take. Here Mr. Barattieri mentioned for instance that not all IEPG countries have company law allowing the use of consortium-type structures meeting the needs of co-operation. He referred to European Community directive 2137/85 of 25th July 1985 as a small step in the right direction, but that still leaves too much choice to individual member states. It is thus still very difficult to constitute collaborative management structures in countries other than the United Kingdom, France and Germany. It is therefore desirable, as Mr. Barattieri argued, for the EEC to return to the idea of recognising the validity of forming the legal entities allowed in the legislation of one member state for actions in another.

XII. Export to third markets

53. An issue where the policies of different national governments and economic interests may diverge is the export of armaments. It is not the intention to discuss this subject in full here, which was not the main topic of the colloquy and which is subject to wide policy differences between the member states of the alliance. Several industrialists made it clear that the export of armaments has often allowed industry to recover development costs and provide it with an adequate baseload of work. Exploiting overseas markets will remain an essential factor in reaching financial viability for many military projects. While at present political and security clearance to export is largely a matter for national governments, closer European arms collaboration could result in vetoes on proposed exports. A binding arrangement regarding the issue of exportability should therefore be built into any industrial agreement on arms collaboration.

XIII. More effective and co-operative use of facilities

54. Mr. Curien called for more effective and co-operative use of facilities. His suggestion has much to recommend it, especially because success

is possible here in the short term and without a grand design. In this way, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands have a joint programme for designing a new type of wind tunnel for aerodynamic tests. Several participants will finance it from both civil and military budgets, as it will be used for both military and civil applications.

55. National research establishments could be used effectively by other members of the alliance. Mention should be made here of a feasibility study for a defence research agency being carried out in the United Kingdom. The aim is to place the six non-nuclear research establishments under the Ministry of Defence in a more contractual relationship with their customers both within and outside the ministry and to create the kind of management environment where they can more easily exploit their intellectual and physical assets.

56. As Mr. Curien rightly pointed out, there are many areas such as flight test centres, propulsion test centres, maritime test facilities, that might very reasonably be suitable for international civil and military co-operation. Investment including both material and intellectual elements should be stimulated on a transnational basis in order to create networks of action in Europe, linking the best engineers and the best scientists for emerging technology in such fields as electronics, computers and artificial intelligence.

57. Nor should it be forgotten that universities are an impressive intellectual resource of which more use could be made. Universities are better adapted to the demands of modern industry than many industrialists might suspect. They are prepared to co-operate in programmes even if these have to be protected to a certain degree. Their contribution to pure research needs to be more effectively harnessed.

XIV. No abuse of secrecy in defence-oriented research and development

58. The issues of data inter-change between military and civil research and development, transnational investments and the use of universities in defence programmes cannot be discussed without touching upon questions of secrecy, security classification and intellectual property rights. Several speakers, in particular Mr. Narjes and Mr. Curien, stressed that those concerned should resist the temptation to overclassify or excessively restrict defence-funded research and development.

XV. Towards a joint European research programme

59. As has been advocated many times before, a joint European defence research programme should be established if grave waste in financial

and human resources owing to unnecessary duplication is to be avoided. Recently, similar proposals were advocated extensively in both the EDIS report and the Fourré report already mentioned. At the colloquy, Mr. Gergorin advocated it with compulsive logic. To achieve this, a transnational defence research agency would have to be formed.

(a) The creation of a technology base

60. Until now, the larger part of European defence research effort has been directed towards individual or collaborative major weapon systems programmes. Industrialists have made it abundantly clear that for them there is little reason to conduct collaborative armaments research without a collaborative procurement programme. Supranational procurement is still regarded as very futuristic because it assumes a degree of loss of national sovereignty which individual countries are unwilling to accept.

61. For an officially-sponsored joint European defence research programme, a prime objective should be to develop and maintain a European-scale technological base, which, as pointed out by Mr. Narjes, should also allow equitable trade in technology with main competitors in the United States, Japan and possibly other highly-industrialised countries. It is not difficult to choose the technologies most appropriate for research. They should be technologies of general use in military applications such as subsystems, components and materials. Advanced manufacturing technology is another basic area where, in the long term, spectacular results could be achieved.

62. Mr. Gergorin specifically mentioned microelectronics, where parallel and duplicated programmes are being conducted in at least four WEU member states and where all endeavours to integrate or at least connect these national programmes have so far failed. Other sectors might be lasers, advanced materials, stealth technology and military applications of space.

(b) A light and flexible structure

63. The new fashion in international collaboration is to have light structures which can easily be adapted to changing circumstances. There is no reason why the European advanced defence research agency, as the managing organisation might be called, should not follow this trend.

64. The agency could be formed with the governments of the WEU member countries, which are after all the most highly-industrialised in Western Europe, taking the lead. All member countries could be represented on the board which should decide programmes unanimously. There would be a chief executive with full author-

ity to implement the policy guidelines and select the best competitive bid for a research programme. The IEPG would be responsible for setting the agency policy directives and should report on progress in this field as in others to the Assembly of WEU. The democratic accountability of the IEPG is negligible at present.

65. It is essential, however, to have some form of international secretariat to support the IEPG in its expanded responsibilities. The lack of an international secretariat has deprived the IEPG of the machinery to sustain a rôle of growing importance for European defence, however laudable the idea of not building a bureaucracy.

(c) A quick start

66. The European advanced defence research agency should be established soon and start operation with a modest programme. The chances of success are enhanced if, at the start, only one or two research programmes are launched. Important decisions about creation and organisation have to be made, staff appointed and working practices established. A relatively light workload in the early years would be prudent until the new agency has proved its effectiveness.

XVI. Conclusions

67. There is no doubt that economic necessities force Western European countries to rationalise their arms procurement. The political climate is not favourable for increased defence spending so better value for money is more important than ever. The notion that any procedure chosen for the rationalisation process will have unpleasant side effects for several of the countries and industries concerned makes many governments hesitate to take the decisive steps which are essential.

68. Although much progress has been made, and although there is hardly a major arms procurement programme in Europe without some bilateral or multilateral co-operation, there are still too many shortcomings. Most such co-operative programmes are still established on

a case-by-case basis, with every programme involving difficult negotiations for harmonising requirements and in-service dates, ensuring fair financial return, an equitable workshare, appropriate design authority and industrial management structures.

69. On the government side a permanent structure for harmonising threat assessment and the ensuing equipment requirements is needed. Industry has shown that it is not afraid of open competition on the European market, but it should be involved much earlier in the formulation of new requirements. To this end, governments should adopt a more open European rather than national approach to procurement and lower protectionist barriers within Europe.

70. European co-operation in research and development is still in its infancy. One major step forward which could easily be achieved would be to make more effective and co-operative use of existing facilities. This would be progress of great significance but governments should exercise more active political and financial support for this relatively straightforward idea to create the pressure necessary for real progress to be made.

71. However, if the European defence industry is not to become less competitive in global terms and if it is to be able to meet the demanding operational requirements of the next century, quick and decisive action should be taken now. It is a prime responsibility of governments to establish a joint European defence research programme in order to create an advanced technology base for industry. Prerequisites for such a programme are a common research budget and a small but permanent and international managing staff, working for a joint defence research agency. This requires above all an act of political will to which WEU itself can contribute. Enhanced arms collaboration has long been one of the most persistent themes of the Assembly of WEU. The Assembly's preoccupation with this subject has been shown to be fully justified and should be accompanied by action on the part of the Council of Ministers which should give continued and formal support both to the work of a strengthened IEPG and to the establishment of the new European defence research agency and its common budget.

APPENDIX

PROGRAMME OF THE COLLOQUY

Monday, 7th March 1988

10 a.m. First sitting

Mr. Charles GOERENS, President of the Assembly of Western European Union

Mr. John WILKINSON, Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and General Rapporteur

Mr. Alfred CAHEN, Secretary-General of WEU

Theme: The need for co-operation in armaments research and development

Mr. George YOUNGER, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom

Mr. Fred C. IKLÉ, Former Under-Secretary of Defence of the United States

Mr. Jacques CHEVALLIER, Armaments Director-General, France

3 p.m. Second sitting

Theme: Patterns of co-operation

Mr. Jan van HOUWELINGEN, Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands

Mr. Karl-Heinz NARJES, Vice-President of the European Commission

Mr. Vittorio BARATTIERI DI SAN PIETRO, Counsellor for Community Affairs to the Minister for Industry and Trade of Italy

Mr. Jean-Louis GERGORIN, Senior Vice-President, Corporate Strategy, Matra, France

Tuesday, 8th March 1988

9.30 a.m. Third sitting

Theme: prospects, advantages and disadvantages for the industry

Sir Donald HALL, Chairman, Marconi Defence Systems, United Kingdom

Mr. Serge DASSAULT, President, Director-General, Avions Marcel Dassault, France

Mr. Enrico GIMELLI, President of the Association of Aerospace Industries, Italy

Dr. Carl Peter FICHTMÜLLER, Executive Vice-President, MBB; President, Helicopters and Military Aircraft Group, Federal Republic of Germany

2.30 p.m. Fourth sitting

Theme: Defence research and development. A closed shop? (Spin-off to and exchange of technology with civilian industry)

Mr. Hubert CURIEN, President of the Defence Science Council, France

General discussion

Summing up by the Chairman of the committee and General Rapporteur

Farewell and closing remarks by the President of the Assembly

4.30 p.m. Press conference

*European co-operation in armaments research and development –
guidelines drawn from the colloquy*

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2¹

tabled by Mrs. Francese and others

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:
“ Concerned by the increase in clandestine sales of arms to belligerent countries, ”
2. Leave out paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft recommendation proper and insert a new paragraph as follows:
“ To take measures, co-ordinated between members of WEU and with the various international organisations and groups of countries, to put an end to clandestine sales of arms to belligerent countries, in particular Iran and Iraq, and to countries on which the United Nations has imposed an embargo. ”

Signed: Francese, Pieralli, Pecchioli, Rubbi

1. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1988 (amendment 1 agreed to; amendment 2 withdrawn).

*European co-operation in armaments research and development –
guidelines drawn from the colloquy*

AMENDMENTS 3, 4 and 5¹

tabled by Mr. Hardy and others

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “ research agency ” insert “ concerned with conventional capacities ”.
4. Leave out paragraph 3 (b) of the draft recommendation proper.
5. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, at the end, add “ but without effecting any reduction in research and development for non-military purposes ”.

Signed: Hardy, Stoffelen, Coleman, Ruddock, Lambie, Ewing, Litherland, Redmond, Scheer, Baarvelt-Schlaman, Thompson, Parry

1. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1988 (amendments 3 and 5 agreed to; amendment 4 negatived).

*European co-operation in armaments research and development –
guidelines drawn from the colloquy*

AMENDMENT 6¹

tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski

6. Leave out paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
“ Recognising the importance of maintaining a defence industrial base within the member nations of WEU based on an economic division of work and adapted to the relevant threat; ”

Signed: Klejdzinski

1. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1988 (amendment agreed to).

*European co-operation in armaments research and development –
guidelines drawn from the colloquy*

AMENDMENTS 7, 8 and 9¹

tabled by Mrs. Francese and others

7. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.
8. Leave out paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper.
9. Insert a new paragraph at the end of the draft recommendation proper as follows:
“ To take measures, co-ordinated between members of WEU and with the various international organisations and groups of countries, to put an end to clandestine sales of arms to belligerent countries, in particular Iran and Iraq, and to countries on which the United Nations has imposed an embargo. ”

Signed: Francese, Pieralli, Pecchioli, Rubbi

1. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1988 (amendments negatived).

**DRAFT OPINION ON THE BUDGETS OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEARS 1987 (REVISED) AND 1988 ¹**

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration ²
by Mr. Morris, Rapporteur*

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on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988

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submitted by Mr. Morris, Rapporteur

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Reply of the Council to Recommendation 447

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. *Linster* (Chairman); Mr. *Sinesio*, Mrs. *Pack* (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. *Biefnot*, Mrs. *Blunck* (Alternate: *Böhm*), MM. *Bohl*, *Chartron* (Alternate: *Fourré*), *Dhaille* (Alternate: *Prat*), Dame *Peggy Fenner*, MM. *Greco*, *de Jong* (Alternate: *de Kwaadsteniet*), *Klejdzinski*, *Morris*, *Noerens* (Alternate: *De Bondt*), *Oehler*, *Redmond* (Alternate: *Lambie*), *Rathbone* (Alternate: *Shelton*), *Rauti*, *Triglia*, *Worrell*, *Zierer*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

*on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988*

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1987 (revised) and 1988, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Recognising that:
 - (a) future development of the budgets is stymied whilst there is no positive decision on timing and place for collocation;
 - (b) the Council has thankfully removed pension payments outside the expenditure of the Assembly, thereby enabling the Assembly to prepare realistic budgets;
- (iii) Nevertheless noting that:
 - (a) the budgets of the ministerial organs, based on the former organograms of the Secretariat-General and the Paris agencies, take no account of the many posts that have become vacant in recent years;
 - (b) consequently, estimates for "Personnel costs" in the budgets of the ministerial organs are excessive and lead to the build-up of a reserve that can be used subsequently for other purposes, as was the case in 1987;
 - (c) for the budget of the Paris agencies alone, the Council has decided to block a sum of F 4 926 000 (corresponding to six posts already vacant in 1987 and seven others which will become vacant in 1988), thereby making this sum unavailable for other requirements such as the creation of four new posts in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly;
 - (d) the Council has also reserved the right to consider the Assembly's request for these four posts in the general context of the collocation of the ministerial organs and their restructuring, although no political decision on this point seems imminent;
 - (e) application of the zero growth criterion is meaningless when related to budgets which do not reflect the true financial implications of the activities of the organs concerned or, in general, their requirements,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Without further delay, follow up the decision taken by the Council of Ministers in The Hague on 27th April 1987 to collocate the ministerial organs of WEU and give them a new organogram with new terms of reference and new tasks;
2. Decide consequently:
 - (a) to have a general revision made of the budget of the ministerial organs for 1988 to take account of this new integrated single agency situation;
 - (b) to separate the pensions budget of the ministerial organs from the operating budget;
 - (c) to ensure greater clarity in the budget of the ministerial organs and prevent sums earmarked for staff salaries and allowances being used for other purposes;
3. In the meantime, give urgent consideration to the Assembly's proposal to create four new posts in the Office of the Clerk;
4. Agree to study the problem of twin-grading at every level of the hierarchy in order to determine the conditions for possible promotions so as to improve the staff's career prospects;
5. Above all, recognise that the reactivation and credibility of WEU is dependent on these decisions.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Morris, Rapporteur)

I. Preliminary considerations

1. According to Article VIII (c) of the Charter of the Assembly, "the Assembly shall express its views in the form of an opinion or recommendation on the annual budget of Western European as soon as it has been communicated".

2. The present report has been prepared in application of this provision and relates to the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988.

3. In accordance with the criteria followed in preparing reports on earlier financial years, the present report should consider only the financial implications of the activities of the Council and its subsidiary organs since the Presidential Committee has referred examination of these activities and related problems to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

4. In this context, an opinion on the abovementioned budgets can be valid only if it takes account of the structure of the organisation and its programme of work because it is in this light that the budget as a whole can be justified.

5. It has to be noted, however, that details of these factors are not yet known. On the one hand, the structure is uncertain because, in accordance with the decision taken by the Council of Ministers in The Hague on 27th October 1987, it is strictly linked with the collocation of all the WEU ministerial organs, whereas member countries are still far from unanimous on the choice of a single seat; on the other hand, it is hard to see how the financial implications of activities which can but suffer from the delay in restructuring can be considered.

6. This is particularly true since, in the first part of its annual report to the Assembly for the period January to June 1987 (Document 1123, Chapter I.1), the Council gives only fairly vague information about the activities of the ministerial organs, as follows:

(vi) The Secretary-General has, in addition to his other activities, continued to play a vital part in the reactivation process by supporting and serving the Permanent Council and the above groups on a daily basis.

(vii) The agencies, in close contact with the secretariat, have provided the Council with studies and work which they have been mandated to carry out. The Assembly was informed of this work in a letter from the Secretary-General dated 24th March 1987."

7. While appreciating the major contribution made by the Secretary-General to the Council and its various working groups, your Rapporteur can but note that the activities of the Secretariat-General and the agencies consisted of preparing studies which are still unknown to the Assembly. In his letter of 24th March 1987, the Secretary-General mentioned only the mandates of the three agencies while specifying that these "may be revised once the governments have reached an agreement on their final structure".

8. Your Rapporteur therefore has to note that in view of the objective difficulties involved in making budgetary proposals for 1988 on sound bases, the ministerial organs adopted the solution of prolonging into 1988 the transitional period which should have ended in 1987 and consequently quite simply renewing the budgets for the previous financial year except for minor adjustments subject to revision during the year as soon as the Council takes a decision on collocation and restructuring.

9. It is evident that for these reasons the Assembly is not able to give a real opinion on the budgets in question. However, your Rapporteur considers it is still possible to comment on these budgets.

II. The budgets of the Secretariat-General

10. There were two reasons for submitting a supplementary budget in 1987:

- to carry over unexpended credits from the financial year 1986 in order to meet expenditure under the same heads in 1987;
- to take account of new factors such as the considerable additional cost of pensions.

11. The table at Appendix I, which is an extract from document C-B (87) 10, shows the adjustments in the initial budget for 1987 proposed by the Secretariat-General and approved by the Council with a view to attaining the two aims mentioned above. However, when examined closely, the figures given represent only the final result of operations that have been completed and the basic budget document B (87) 17 has to be consulted in order to ascertain the reasons for these operations and their interdependence.

12. An analysis of the revised budget of the Secretariat-General has allowed your Rapporteur

to summarise the adjustment operations that are the subject of this budget as follows:

- (a) the bringing forward from the financial year 1986 to the financial year 1987 of a net sum (income less receipts) of £139 770 corresponding to expenditure on staff and premises committed in 1986 but which could not be paid before 31st March 1987;
- (b) an estimate of possible savings (£47 871), in particular under Head A.I "Personnel costs", and use of this sum to cover expenditure that was unforeseen or underestimated in the initial budget for 1987.

13. Information given in the budget document gives no clear picture of how far the two abovementioned operations are connected, in other words, whether part of the sum brought forward from 1986 was taken into account in estimated expected savings in 1987. If so, your Rapporteur, while recognising the legitimacy of the abovementioned carrying forward operation since it conforms with Article 10 (c) of the Financial Regulations of Western European Union, could but point out the irregularity of using sums brought over from the financial year 1986 for expenditure of another kind relating to the financial year 1987.

14. In this connection, the abovementioned Article 10 (c) of the Financial Regulations is quite definite:

"If payment of a commitment for the previous year has not been made before 1st April, the credits concerned shall be cancelled automatically and corresponding credits will be taken up in the budget of the current financial year. Such action shall be regularised by notification to the Budget Committee."

15. The meaning of this article is so clear that no further comment seems necessary. But your Rapporteur's attention was also drawn to the fact that it was possible to make considerable savings in 1987 thanks to the vacancies of a number of posts included in the organogram of the Secretariat-General and that it was indeed these savings that were earmarked for offsetting the deficit in other sectors of expenditure. Thus, the revised budget for 1987 shows a reduction of £12 379 in the net total operating budget and an increase of £16 489 in the net grand total (including pensions).

16. As stressed in reports on earlier financial years, this practice allows a reserve to be built up which can be drawn upon during the financial year for purposes that were unforeseen or, in any event, not specifically taken into account in the ordinary budgets.

17. This practice, which has become current in the WEU ministerial organs in recent years, has the following drawbacks:

- it makes generally unavailable large sections of the overall budget that the governments of member countries intend to be used for financing the activities of all the WEU organs, including the Assembly;
- it includes the use of sums earmarked for salaries to finance other activities whereas it is a general principle, universally recognised and often referred to by the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee, that such operations should not be allowed;
- it distorts budgetary data and affects the growth rates of the budgets concerned which consequently do not reflect accurately enough the true requirements devolving from the programme of work of the WEU ministerial organs.

18. Your Rapporteur therefore wishes this practice to be abandoned once and for all. Since the forthcoming restructuring of all the ministerial organs also involves updating the organogram of the Secretariat-General, this will be a unique opportunity to make estimates under Head A.I more accurate and in conformity with true requirements. Moreover, compared with this privileged situation, it must be borne in mind that the Assembly for its part has been waiting for years for the Council to grant it the funds necessary to add four new posts to the establishment of the Office of the Clerk. Your Rapporteur will revert to this question in the conclusions to this report.

19. The budget of the Secretariat-General for 1988 - as shown in the table from document C-B (87) 18 given at Appendix III - has evolved in a way that at first sight might seem surprising since its growth rate compared with the revised budget for 1987 (2.07%) appears to be lower than the expected rate of inflation in the United Kingdom of 3.4%. It would thus appear to show a decline and an actual reduction in activities. But this is not so: in the explanatory memorandum to the budget it is specified that these activities are likely to increase considerably.

20. In fact, the budgets of the ministerial organs are presented in accordance with criteria which do not allow them to be grasped immediately and, if they - and in particular their trend - are to be interpreted correctly, at least two consecutive budgets have to be compared in depth.

21. Thus, the 1988 growth rate of 2.07% is merely nominal and becomes far higher if it is borne in mind that:

- (a) the revised budget for 1987 (first element of comparison between 1987 and 1988) has a grand total increased by

large sums brought forward from the previous financial year;

- (b) the same revised budget for 1987 includes very considerable expenditure for the leaving allowances paid to officials leaving the organisation.

22. It should be recalled that this problem was already raised in Recommendation 433 in which the Assembly proposed that the Council show in the two parts of the budget (operating budget and pensions budget) two categories of expenditure: ordinary and extraordinary expenditure, to make it easier to follow the evolution of the budgets. However, in its reply the Council said "governments have preferred to maintain the present system on the assumption that a substantial and detailed explanation for each item of expenditure is given in Part II of the budget".

23. Perhaps, when the ministerial organs have found their final configuration and are working normally, the Council will be able to return to the Assembly's proposal and take it into account for reasons of clarity and efficiency.

III. The budgets of the Paris agencies

24. In the general comments on the *revised budget for 1987* of the agencies for security questions, it is stated that "the drafting of a 1987 revised budget for the agencies is prompted by the financial repercussions of a certain number of measures and facts which arose after the approval of the original budget, the effects of which the agencies have merely been able to register. On the one hand, this has led to additional, sometimes quite considerable, expenditure while, on the other hand, it has led to appreciable savings which reduce the revised net total of the two budgets (operating and pensions) together, although the total does show a net increase of F 1 066 300, i.e. 3.26%, which is due entirely to the pensions budget relative to the net total of the same initial budgets for 1987."

25. In fact, the very large savings made due to several posts that were vacant in 1987 not being filled (F 1 192 500), plus the balance of other minor adjustments in the operating budget (F 7 200), allowed a rise in staff salary scales to be met (F 700 000) and, in particular, part of the exceptional expenditure for the payment of leaving allowances (F 815 000), an indemnity for loss of job (F 611 500) and a new pension (F 139 500). Thus, it was possible to bring the grand total in the supplementary budgets of the agencies (operating budget and pensions budget) down to F 1 066 300.

26. In regard to the *ordinary budget for 1988*, it should be specified that at the present juncture with the Council of Ministers' decision of principle to collocate all the ministerial organs – the place and date of collocation are still being dis-

cussed at political level – three possibilities were considered for the preparation of this budget, i.e.:

- (a) to prepare updated budgets in the usual manner on the basis of the present organogram and location of the WEU organs;
- (b) to approve an updated budget as above but to block part of it bearing in mind possible changes in the London and Paris establishments;
- (c) not to approve the budget for 1988 and to adopt the one-twelfth per month rule set out in Article 7 (b) of the Financial Regulations.

27. Since the bodies concerned chose the second solution, estimates in the budget under consideration were based on the old organogram, but, in order to block credits relating to vacant posts, the latter were estimated at F 4 926 000 for six posts already vacant in 1987 and seven which will become vacant in 1988. Funds for the second post of Director (approximately F 660 000) were maintained pending a final decision on the matter.

28. Apart from estimates for staff, minor adjustments were made in other heads of the budget, as shown in the tables at Appendices V and VI.

29. As a whole, the budget of the Paris agencies for 1988 shows a growth rate of 3.75% in operating expenditure and receipts and a reduction of 7.57% in pensions expenditure and receipts. As a result, taken together, the two parts (operating budget and pensions budget) show a growth rate of 1.41%. In reality, these growth rates are not significant because they take no account of sums blocked which alone represent 12.70% of the total of Head B.I, 17.69% of the net total operating budget and 14.37% of the net grand total budget (including pensions).

30. The anomaly of this situation, which the foregoing considerations help to underline, is quite clear. As for the criteria adopted by the Paris agencies, i.e. to base estimates under Head B.I on all staff as if there were no vacancies, your Rapporteur can but refer to the comments in paragraphs 15 to 18 of the present report.

IV. Conclusions

31. In accordance with his preliminary considerations, your Rapporteur has tried to analyse the budgets of the ministerial organs in order to bring out the essential aspects and reach general conclusions.

32. It now seems beyond doubt that these budgets do not give an accurate picture of the present situation of the ministerial organs – in particular the Paris agencies – or of the future situation as envisaged on the basis of more realistic working hypotheses. Your Rapporteur consi-

ders that merely on the basis of the decision to merge the three Paris agencies under the authority of the Secretary-General budget estimates could have been better calculated on the basis of a provisional organogram of that single agency taking account of the present situation, it being understood that this organogram would be valid until all the organs are collocated.

33. In this way, the budgets of the ministerial organs, although still temporary, would at least have shown the real situation in which these organs are now operating.

34. Furthermore, the large amounts blocked by Council decision but which might here and now be considered almost wholly appropriated would have allowed the Assembly's pressing request for the creation of four new posts, on which the Council has reserved the right to take a decision in the context of the reorganisation of WEU, to be examined.

35. Your Rapporteur emphasises that it is essential for the ministerial organs to terminate as soon as possible the precarious situation prevailing at the beginning of 1988: both the reactivation and the credibility of WEU are at stake.

*V. Action taken
on Assembly Recommendation 447*

36. In adopting Recommendation 447 (see Appendix VII), apart from the question of the single seat – often referred to in the present report – the Assembly drew the Council's attention to two other points, i.e.:

- application to WEU budgets of the growth rate used by the EEC in drawing up its budgets;
- dual-grading at every level of the hierarchy.

37. In its reply to this recommendation, the Council said criteria for establishing European Community budgets could not be applied to WEU. In substance, this confirmed its will to continue to apply the zero growth criterion. For the Assembly itself, this criterion was to be applied to the operating budget, the pensions budget henceforth being drawn up in application of the juridical commitments stemming from the pension scheme.

38. Your Rapporteur does not wish to repeat all the arguments against applying this criterion

or to recall its adverse effects. Previous rapporteurs have studied them in great detail and it is therefore enough to refer to their reports. However, he considers it necessary to stress that because the decision to separate the pensions budget from the operating budget was not extended to the ministerial organs, a problem of equity arises and also the official responsible for budgetary management has to show considerable ingenuity in finding the wherewithal to meet the new pensions which become payable over the years.

39. The reserve of artificially built-up amounts created by maintaining vacant posts in the organogram is only one example. Your Rapporteur commented above on their impact and the use made of them, inter alia to meet expenditure under the pensions budget. He therefore considers that if the budgets of the ministerial organs are to retain due clarity and accuracy the Council's decisions on separating the pensions budget from the operating budget should be extended to these budgets. Your Rapporteur believes this provision and the establishment of a carefully worked-out new organogram to allow the ministerial organs to carry out their tasks are a sine qua non if their budgets are to express the true financial implications of their activities.

40. On dual grading, the Council's reply seems unsatisfactory insofar as it does not tackle the problem of the promotion of deserving long-serving officials. These are officials who have been at the ceiling of their grade for years without the organisation, because of its small size, being able to offer them the possibility of applying for more senior duties as is the case in the other co-ordinated organisations. It is worth stressing that in the past the Council examined this question but never reached any conclusions since it appeared, at the level of co-ordination, that the problem could be solved only in the framework of each organisation which should deal with it separately and independently.

41. Aware of the working conditions and morale of WEU officials and recognising the legitimate expectations of those who, for many years, have been working efficiently and with devotion for the organisation through thick and thin, your Rapporteur wishes the Council, once the boundaries of future development are decided, to undertake a study on the problem of how to recompense adequately officers of long service who have reached the maximum grade for their position.

APPENDIX I

*WEU revised budget for 1987*¹*Section A (Secretariat-General)*

	Budget 1987 (£)	Brought forward from 1986 (£)	Amendments proposed (£)	Revised estimates (£)
Personnel costs	1 809 323	111 925	- 36 170	1 885 078
Travel	49 545		4 893	54 438
Other operating costs	165 030	64 000	3 077	232 107
Purchases	8 234			8 234
Buildings	10 000			10 000
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	2 042 132	175 925	- 28 200	2 189 857
WEU tax	654 342	45 539	- 15 821	684 060
Other receipts	32 360	544		32 904
TOTAL INCOME	686 702	46 083	- 15 821	716 964
Net ordinary budget	1 355 430	129 842	- 12 379	1 472 893
Net pensions	236 396	9 928	28 868	275 192
NET TOTAL BUDGET	1 591 826	139 770	16 489	1 748 085

National contributions

	600ths	£	+	£	=	£
Belgium	59	13 744		1 621		15 365
France	120	27 954		3 298		31 252
Germany	120	27 954		3 298		31 252
Italy	120	27 954		3 298		31 252
Luxembourg	2	466		55		521
Netherlands	59	13 744		1 621		15 365
United Kingdom	120	27 954		3 298		31 252
	600	139 770		16 489		156 259

1. C-B (87) 10.

APPENDIX II

*WEU revised budget for 1987*¹*Section B (Paris agencies)*

	Budget 1987 (F)	Amendments proposed (F)	Revised Estimates (F)
Salaries and allowances	36 936 300	53 000	36 989 300
Travel	500 000	—	500 000
Other operating costs	2 255 000	(-) 121 900	2 133 100
Purchase of furniture, etc.	30 000	—	30 000
Buildings	78 400	—	78 400
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	39 799 700	(-) 68 900	39 730 800
WEU Tax	12 773 000	(-) 68 900	12 704 100
Other receipts	197 100	—	197 100
TOTAL INCOME	12 970 100	(-) 68 900	12 901 200
Net	26 829 600	—	26 829 600
Net pensions	5 914 000	1 066 300	6 980 300
NET TOTAL	32 743 600	1 066 300	33 809 900

National contributions

	600ths	(F)
Belgium	59	104 853
France	120	213 260
Germany	120	213 260
Italy	120	213 260
Luxembourg	2	3 554
Netherlands	59	104 853
United Kingdom	120	213 260
	600	1 066 300

1. C-B (87) 10.

APPENDIX III

*Secretariat-General*¹*Summary of estimated expenditure and income for 1988*

	Expenditure /income 1986 (£)	Credits revised for 1987 (£)	Credits proposed for 1988 (£)	Difference between 1988 and 1987	
				(£)	(%)
<i>Expenditure</i>					
Personnel costs	1 531 196	1 885 078	1 953 510	68 432	3.63
Travel	59 230	54 438	51 540	- 2 898	- 5.32
Other operating costs	168 609	232 107	215 495	- 16 612	- 7.16
Purchases	5 302	8 234	12 000	3 766	45.74
Buildings	-	10 000	10 000	-	-
Total	1 764 337	2 189 857	2 242 545	52 688	2.41
<i>Income</i>					
WEU tax	541 988	684 060	703 944	19 884	2.91
Other receipts	35 293	32 904	28 860	- 4 044	- 12.29
Total	577 281	716 964	732 804	15 840	2.21
NET TOTAL	1 187 056	1 472 893	1 509 741	36 848	2.50
Pensions	217 717	275 192	274 595	- 597	- 0.22
TOTAL	1 404 773	1 748 085	1 784 336	36 251	2.07

1. C-B (87) 18.

APPENDIX IV

*Agencies in charge of security questions*¹*Budget estimates for 1988**Summary*

	Expenditure /income 1986 (F)	Revised credits for 1987 (F)	Credits proposed for 1988 (F)	Difference between 1988 and 1987	
				(F)	(%)
<i>Expenditure</i>					
B.I. Personnel costs	35 111 413.83	37 000 100	38 787 200	1 787 100	4.83
B.II. Travel	425 738.17	500 000	400 000	(-) 100 000	(-) 20.00
B.III. Other operating costs	1 917 511.05	2 122 300	2 225 700	103 400	4.87
B.IV. Purchases	47 245.00	30 000	30 000	0	0.00
B.V. Buildings	70 000.00	78 400	0	(-) 78 400	- 100.00
Total	37 571 908.05	39 730 800	41 442 900	1 712 100	4.31
<i>Income</i>					
B.VI. WEU tax	12 066 458.11	12 704 100	13 413 000	708 900	5.58
B.VII. Other receipts	418 400.81	197 100	195 000	(-) 2 100	- 1.07
Total	12 484 858.92	12 901 200	13 608 000	706 800	5.48
NET TOTAL	25 087 049.13	26 829 600	27 834 900	1 005 300	3.75
Pensions	5 764 027.07	6 980 300	6 452 000	(-) 528 300	- 7.57
GENERAL NET TOTAL	30 851 076.20	33 809 900	34 286 900 *	477 000	1.41

1. C-B (87) 18.

*. Of which F 4 926 000 are blocked.

APPENDIX V

Trend of budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU between 1987 and 1988

	Secretariat-General (£)			Paris agencies (French francs)		
	1987	1987 revised	1988	1987	1987 revised	1988
<i>A. Operating budget</i>						
I. Staff	1 809 323	1 885 078	1 953 510	36 936 300	36 989 300	38 787 200
II. Travel	49 545	54 438	51 540	500 000	500 000	400 000
III. Other operating costs	165 030	232 107	215 495	2 255 000	2 133 100	2 225 700
IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment	8 234	8 234	12 000	30 000	30 000	30 000
V. Buildings	10 000	10 000	10 000	78 400	78 400	—
Total expenditure	2 042 132	2 189 857	2 242 545	39 799 700	39 730 800	41 442 900
Receipts	686 702	716 964	732 804	12 970 100	12 901 200	13 608 000
NET TOTAL	1 355 430	1 472 893	1 509 741	26 829 600	26 829 600	27 834 900
<i>B. Pensions budget</i>						
Pensions and allowances .	299 065	341 757	342 249	6 999 000	8 025 800	7 642 000
Pensions receipts	62 669	66 565	67 654	1 085 000	1 045 500	1 190 000
NET TOTAL	236 396	275 192	274 595	5 914 000	6 980 300	6 452 000
NET GRAND TOTAL (A + B)	1 591 826	1 748 085	1 784 336	32 743 600	33 809 900	34 286 900

APPENDIX VI

*Variations in the budgets of the ministerial organs
for 1987 (revised) and 1988 compared with previous budgets*

	Secretariat-General (£)					Paris agencies (French francs)				
	1987	1987 revised		1988		1987	1987 revised		1988	
		(+ or -)	(%)	(+ or -)	(%)		(+ or -)	(%)	(+ or -)	(%)
A. Operating budget										
I. Staff	1 809 323	+ 75 755		+ 68 432		36 936 300	+ 53 000		+1 797 900	
II. Travel	49 545	+ 4 893		- 2 898		500 000	-		- 100 000	
III. Other operating costs	165 030	+ 67 077		- 16 612		2 255 000	- 121 900		+ 92 600	
IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment	8 234	-		+ 3 766		30 000	-		-	
V. Buildings	10 000	-		-		78 400	-		- 78 400	
Total expenditure ...	2 042 132	+ 147 725	7.23	+ 52 688	2.41	39 799 700	- 68 900	- 0.17	+ 1 712 100	+ 4.31
Receipts	686 702	+ 30 262		+ 15 840		12 970 100	68 900		+ 706 800	
NET TOTAL	1 355 430	+ 117 463	8.66	+ 36 848	2.50	26 829 600	-	0.00	+ 1 005 300	+ 3.75
B. Pensions budget										
Pensions and allowances	299 065	+ 42 692	14.27	+ 492		6 999 000	+ 1 026 800		- 383 800	
Pensions receipts	62 669	+ 3 896		+ 1 089		1 085 000	39 500		+ 144 500	
NET TOTAL	236 396	+ 38 796	16.41	- 597	-0.21	5 914 000	+ 1 066 300	+ 18.03	- 528 300	- 7.57
NET GRAND TOTAL (A + B)	1 591 826	+ 156 259	9.81	+ 36 251	+ 2.07	32 743 600	+ 1 066 300	+ 3.25	+ 477 000	+ 1.41

APPENDIX VII

RECOMMENDATION 447¹*on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987²*

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1986 (revised) and 1987, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Considering that:
 - (a) the presentation of the budgets for 1986 (revised) and 1987 has been simplified by reducing the number of sub-heads and grouping all social charges under one sub-head and all expenditure on staff under one head but that ordinary expenditure has not been separated from extraordinary expenditure as recommended by the Assembly in Recommendation 433;
 - (b) consequently, because of the effect of extraordinary expenditure, the growth rate of these budgets cannot be accurately compared with the rate of inflation fixed for applying the zero growth criterion;
 - (c) furthermore, the evolution of budgets since 1985 shows an increase above the zero growth rate since the requirements of reactivating WEU – including the restructuring of the ministerial organs – have been taken into account in this budget;
 - (d) in addition, the payment of pensions to newly-retired officials could no longer be included in the operating budget without jeopardising the activities of the various organs;
 - (e) the zero growth rate obviously no longer being of any value, the Council should establish a more objective and effective criterion for preparing WEU budgets;
 - (f) analysis of the various categories of expenditure in the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU shows that expenditure on staff alone represents about 90% of total operating expenditure;
 - (g) this percentage could be improved considerably and amounts under Head I “Permanent staff” could be used for other operating expenditure if the two seats in London and Paris were combined to allow their now separate services to be merged;
- (iii) Regretting that:
 - (a) three posts assigned to the Secretariat-General remained vacant throughout 1986 whereas the Council refused the creation of new posts in the WEU Assembly;
 - (b) the Council has given a new interpretation of criteria for dual grading which entirely ignores the wishes of the staff to achieve career prospects subject to certain conditions of seniority;
- (iv) Welcoming the fact that at the close of the ministerial meeting on 28th April 1987 Mr. Poos, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, informed the Assembly that the Council of Ministers had decided to agree to a separate budget for pensions and to recognise the Assembly’s budgetary independence within the limits of agreed appropriations, this decision to take effect immediately,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Apply the same criterion for increasing WEU budgets as is applied by the EEC in establishing its budget;
2. Apply to the operating budget of the Assembly for 1987 the growth rate of 2.79 % agreed upon for its budget as a whole, including pensions, i.e. an increase of F 379 983;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1987 during the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session (4th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the reports tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Documents 1088 and 1105).

3. Examine the possibility of:
 - (a) uniting the ministerial organs of WEU in a single seat and preparing one table of establishment integrating the services now divided between the two seats;
 - (b) establishing dual grading at every level of the hierarchy to improve the staff's career possibilities.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹***to Recommendation 447***

1. After due consideration, the Council has concluded that the criteria for determining the budgets of the European Communities should not be applicable to WEU.

2. When the Council agreed to a growth rate of 2.79% for the 1987 Assembly budget, which was above the anticipated rate of inflation of 2% for France, it did so in order to compensate partially for the high pension budget (Part II of the budget). Because of this high pension expenditure, the increase of the operating budget (Part I of the budget) was only 0.49%.

When the Council of Ministers decided on 28th April 1987 that the pension budget of the Assembly should, with immediate effect, be separated from the operating budget, the result was that:

- the pension budget would be determined in accordance with the legal obligations resulting from the application of the pension scheme rules;
- the operating budget would be determined according to the zero real growth principle.

In the light of this decision, the Council would refer the Assembly to the Secretary-General's letter dated 15th July 1987, a copy of which is annexed hereto. (See annex to reply of the Council to Recommendation 445).

3. (a) The possibility of collocating the ministerial organs is part of the current deliberations on the reorganisation of WEU.

In examining collocation, the Council is mindful, amongst other considerations, of the overall increase in efficiency which could result.

(b) As stated in its reply to Recommendation 433, the Council recalls that the general principle of dual grading is that the higher of the two grades represents the approved position in the establishment table. The lower of the two grades is added to enable the organisation to recruit staff who are judged to possess the basic qualifications called for but may not have had previous experience.

Dual grading, therefore, is not intended to create promotion possibilities over and above the approved establishment table, but to facilitate recruitment.

The Council also recalls that the marked difference of 30 to 33% between the minimum and maximum salaries in a grade (seniority steps) exists, amongst other things, to compensate financially for limited career possibilities in international organisations. The Council also takes the view that the common grading and salary system, as well as the common pension scheme, for the co-ordinated organisations encourage job mobility.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd October 1987 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 30th October 1987.

Action by the Presidential Committee

REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee
by Mr. Sarti, Vice-President of the Assembly*

1. The Presidential Committee, which is composed of the President and Vice-Presidents of the Assembly and the Chairmen of committees and political groups, has a permanent mandate and also carries out specific tasks.

2. Statutorily, the Presidential Committee is a think-tank responsible for defining the broad lines of the Assembly's work. It pursues a dialogue with the committees so as to be able to decide which subjects should be debated in plenary sitting, subject to any modifications to the Assembly's agenda due to a previous question being put or a motion being tabled with a request for urgent procedure.

3. Under the Rules of Procedure, the Presidential Committee also ensures the continuity of the Assembly's action and in this context may take any initiatives it considers desirable subject to their being submitted to the Assembly for ratification.

4. Finally, the Assembly may instruct the Presidential Committee to carry out specific tasks between sessions and it has to report on their implementation, as is done in the present report.

5. Because of a combination of orders from the Assembly and initiatives of its own, the Presidential Committee's work since the last session has followed two main lines, i.e. the strengthening of relations with the United States and the affirmation of a European personality. In these areas, it has had some success, but remains most concerned about the structure of the organisation since there have been no positive results in this respect.

*
* *

6. The Washington INF agreement and the problem of its ratification by the United States Senate, the declaration of 4th November 1987 in which the President of the United States, after contradictory statements by United States administration spokesmen, proclaimed his support for the reactivation of WEU and all its political implications, including the achievement of a European union with security and defence responsibilities, and, finally, the discussion about

burden-sharing which has spread in the United States in the context of the presidential election: all these circumstances have led the Assembly and the Presidential Committee, at the request of the former, to take action to strengthen relations with the United States.

7. In Order 70, the Assembly, considering that priority should be given to consolidating links with the United States, invited the Presidential Committee "to promote a regular dialogue" between the Assembly and Congress. The Presidential Committee was instructed "to avoid the reactivation of WEU adding to transatlantic misunderstanding". It was incumbent upon it to make American congressmen and public opinion understand that the sole purpose of building the European pillar was to strengthen the alliance and that, by pulling together, the Europeans' sole aim was to improve the dialogue with the United States whose contribution to joint security remained essential.

8. But the alliance is strong only if none of its parties feels imperilled. Europeans, who are particularly exposed because of the division of Europe as instanced by the division of Germany, must concert their approach to specific security concerns. Following a debate on disarmament, the Assembly came to the conclusion that the treaty on intermediate nuclear forces signed between the United States and the Soviet Union was in the interests of both Europe and the alliance as a whole. It therefore decided, in Resolution 77, to urge the United States Senate to ratify that treaty as soon as possible.

9. In this context, the President of the Assembly decided to make an official visit to the United States and the Presidential Committee decided to join the General Affairs Committee on the occasion of its visit to the United States capital. At the request of the American authorities, the two visits were held simultaneously from 11th to 13th April 1988.

10. In the United States the President had a different programme of meetings from the General Affairs Committee. In the absence of Mr. Shultz, Secretary of State, he met his deputy, Mr. Whitehead, and Mr. Holmes, Assistant Secretary of State. He also had talks in Congress. During this time, the Presidential Committee had talks

at the State Department, the Department of Defence and Congress and with members of the Atlantic Institute in Washington, including General Goodpaster.

11. Burden-sharing was clearly one of the Americans' main concerns. Together with the members of the General Affairs Committee, the Presidential Committee endeavoured to show the people it met the importance of the part played by Western Europe in the defence of the alliance and that, by strengthening co-operation between its members, WEU allowed Europeans to make an even more substantial contribution to joint security.

12. The Presidential Committee noted how necessary it was for the Assembly to send one of its three political committees to Washington each year to examine with American congressmen problems of joint interest. It is to be hoped that these visits will be balanced by visits by American congressmen to our Assembly. The proposal made by the President of the Assembly to members of Congress in this sense was given a warm welcome and the latter believed Congress should be represented at Assembly sessions by a permanent delegation of observers. This would meet our wish to institutionalise Euro-American relations. However, this idea must be followed up in American political circles which are, at present, fully taken up with the electoral campaign.

13. Relations with Congress should be completed by relations between the Assembly and the United States administration. Before his tour of European capitals, Mr. Taft, Under-Secretary of State for Defence, addressed the Presidential Committee and the General Affairs Committee. The first steps were taken by Mr. Goerens for representatives of the administration to address the Assembly and give the United States Government's views when matters relating specifically to the American contribution to the security of the alliance are debated by the Assembly.

14. Relations between Europe and the United States are of particular importance since the United States has bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, the outcome of which necessarily affects our security. We should therefore be gratified that, in the past year, the United States has consulted its allies on these questions. For instance, the agreement on intermediate nuclear forces was the subject of in-depth talks in various alliance bodies. The Assembly considered this to be a first step towards balanced, controlled disarmament and that the agreement should not jeopardise the strategy of deterrence on which European security is based. It therefore urged the United States to ratify the treaty as soon as possible.

15. The Americans were reminded of the Assembly's point of view and they conveyed to

the President of the Assembly, during his talks, the American authorities' satisfaction at the support they thus received from the European assembly with defence responsibilities.

16. Our talks with the United States authorities often related to WEU's action in the Gulf. They were particularly satisfied to see Europe's support for their action in that region of the world. They were told that the Assembly had congratulated the Netherlands presidency on taking the initiative of making use of the potential of Article VIII of the Brussels Treaty. The provisions of this article allow the Council to examine measures to be taken to counter a threat to peace, in whatever area of the world it may arise, provided a member country so requests. The co-ordination of naval operations by member countries and Luxembourg's financial support have thus allowed tangible action to be taken in the framework of WEU. It can consequently be seen that WEU is a body in which reflection and consultation can lead to action.

17. Our American allies informed us that they would welcome similar action being developed in other regions of the world. I believe we should welcome the coincidence of American and European interests in the Gulf which is of crucial importance for Europe's oil supplies. But such a fortunate convergence will perhaps not be so easy in other regions. It will therefore be for the Council to determine, case by case, the conditions in which new forms of Euro-American co-operation might be developed. However this may be, the burden-sharing to which United States congressmen pay so much attention is not confined to a mere strengthening of conventional forces in Europe. Burden-sharing also means responsibility-sharing.

18. The Assembly for its part is continuing to make Europe's voice heard. When it asserts itself in the exercise of its responsibilities, Europe is asserting its personality at the same time. The Assembly does not just encourage the Council to take action. It pursues its own action in favour of joint objectives and sets an example.

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19. The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions had proposed to the Presidential Committee that a colloquy be held in London at the beginning of March 1988. The Presidential Committee gave its full support to an initiative which corresponded so well to the concern always felt by the Assembly to promote European defence industries.

20. The colloquy was held in ideal conditions thanks to the twofold support of the Foreign Office and of the United Kingdom Delegation through Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. The standard of

papers and the response to them in the press show that the colloquy was a definite success.

21. It was a salutatory reaction at a time when Japanese competition is becoming stronger, new countries are taking their share of the armaments market and the United States is calling on Europeans to procure equipment whose development it has already amortised and which, it says, only needs to be modernised to adapt it to the requirements of European military headquarters. For Europe is not composed of institutions alone. It is a body of research workers, engineers and technicians who are waiting for us to give them an opportunity to make the most of their imagination and work and to give substance to the idea of Europe.

22. If the European pillar is to be strengthened, it must also be enlarged.

23. The Assembly had underlined the value it attached to the early accession of Portugal to the modified Brussels Treaty. The Presidential Committee therefore decided to visit Lisbon on 22nd and 23rd February 1988. It was given a particularly warm welcome. But above all it was able to see from its talks with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence, the President of the Assembly and representatives of the main Portuguese political parties that they unanimously considered their country had already started to adapt its armed forces to the defence effort corresponding to its rôle in the alliance.

24. Portugal's commitment to Europe seemed as firm as its Atlantic solidarity. As a member of the European Economic Community and playing a full part in the work of political co-operation, Portugal is obviously prepared to give the building of Europe the dimension it lacks in security matters. The Portuguese authorities all told us that Portugal intended to shoulder all the undertakings provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty, including the most binding one, i.e. compulsory assistance in the event of aggression. They also showed that they were anxious to apply the principles defined in the platform adopted in The Hague, giving them, as the President of the Assembly wrote to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, "together with the other member countries, the full significance implied by the requirements of European security".

25. Confirming the importance the Assembly attaches to its Recommendation 446 on the accession of Portugal, the Presidential Committee therefore urged the Council, at its next ministerial meeting, to make the necessary arrangements for Portugal to take its due place in WEU.

26. At the ministerial meeting in The Hague, it was satisfied to see that the Council had followed its opinion and that the Council's statement on the subject took up the arguments expressed by the President of the Assembly on behalf of the Presidential Committee.

27. The Presidential Committee also welcomed the Council's decision simultaneously to invite Spain to hold the necessary discussions on its possible accession, the same arguments being invoked in favour of the accession of both countries of the Iberian peninsula. This decision corresponds to the wish expressed by the Assembly in June 1986 in Recommendation 432.

28. It is already clear that one of the Presidential Committee's tasks will be to ensure that the enlargement of WEU to include these two countries is achieved without delay. The President of the Assembly has already established contacts with a view to organising talks between the Presidential Committee and the Spanish authorities. Furthermore, the Presidential Committee had already decided to invite Mr. Serra, Minister of Defence of Spain, Chairman of the IEPG, to address the Assembly during the debate on the report to be presented by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on European co-operation in armaments research and development – guidelines drawn from the colloquy. The Presidential Committee is happy to note that the Spanish Government has accepted its invitation. Thus, for the first time, the Assembly will be addressed by a representative of the government of a country which is not yet a member of the organisation. Clearly, in what we hope will be the near future, Spain is prepared to play a vital rôle in the IEPG, of which it now has the chairmanship, and WEU should give the political impetus necessary to ensure that its action is wholly successful and its potential fully developed.

29. In Order 70, the Assembly instructed the Presidential Committee to pursue its exchanges of views with the Supreme Soviet. The Presidential Committee stressed the fundamental difference between our relations with the United States and any contacts that may be made with Soviet authorities. The Bureau of the Assembly was not offered an official platform in Moscow and there is no question of inviting Soviet speakers to address the Assembly. However, useful working meetings might be organised in order to discuss ways of guaranteeing Europe's security and international peace at a lower level of armaments. The Presidential Committee will therefore endeavour to work out appropriate means of pursuing the exchanges of views with members of the Supreme Soviet that began in April 1987. It will not fail to keep the Assembly informed of its conclusions.

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* *

30. The state of the Presidential Committee's external relations can therefore be considered favourable. It is unfortunately not possible to say

the same for the internal problems of the organisation.

31. These problems were set out in a petition submitted by Mr. Hintermann, former Assistant Secretary-General of WEU. It was the first time a petition had been addressed to the President of the Assembly. The Presidential Committee declared the petition in order and referred it to the General Affairs Committee. The questions it raises are dealt with in the report to be presented by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

32. Mr. van der Sanden's report clearly describes the contrast between praiseworthy action by the Council and officials of the seven member countries meeting periodically under the aegis of WEU and the present deadlock in regard to structural matters. The delay in communicating the annual report, which did not reach the Assembly until after the last committee meetings, is probably due to this situation.

33. The Presidential Committee has never held the chairmanship-in-office responsible for the blameworthy aspects of relations between the Council and the Assembly. On the contrary, it has endeavoured to assist the chairmanship-in-office in its delicate task and it was in view of the Netherlands Government's commitments that it postponed the date of the present session by one week. It wishes to congratulate the chairmanship-in-office on the standard of the dialogue it has developed with the Assembly, the impetus it has given to the activities of WEU, in particular the implementation of the provisions of Article VIII of the treaty in the Gulf, and, finally, the opening of discussions on the accession to WEU of the two countries of the Iberian peninsula.

34. The Presidential Committee has to note, however, the Council's inability to introduce the administrative means of pursuing long-term action. The Assembly had expressed the wish that the reorganisation of WEU be completed swiftly. The Presidential Committee pursued its dialogue with the Council on this question. It could but note that the governments found it impossible to agree on the place where the ministerial organs would be collocated, on their organogram and on the mandate of the single agency.

35. Pending reorganisation, the Council, while recognising the Assembly's needs, on the one

hand, and the existence of vacant posts in the budgets of the ministerial organs, on the other, has nevertheless not authorised the Assembly to complete the structure of the Office of the Clerk set out in its organogram. In the circumstances, the Presidential Committee therefore had to remind the Council of its wholehearted disapproval of the link the Permanent Council has established between the structure of the Office of the Clerk and that of the ministerial organs.

36. Thankfully, the draft recommendation in the report by Mr. Morris repeats the Assembly's position on a problem which should already have been settled. It is now for the Assembly to urge the Council as strongly as possible to put an immediate end to an absurd situation.

37. The Assembly has specific requirements and cannot agree to bear the burden of the Council's inability to complete the task it set itself. If the Council fails to find an early solution to a problem that has been outstanding for so long, its relations with the Assembly can but deteriorate seriously.

38. Nothing would be more regrettable just when the dialogue between the governmental and parliamentary bodies of the organisation has so far been harmonious.

39. More than ever, we must work together to allow WEU to play a now essential part in the building of Europe.

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* *

40. The need to define European interests in disarmament, controversy over burden-sharing, the essential enhancement of the Euro-American dialogue, dangers arising outside the NATO area and, in short, all the international problems looming up at the approach of the twenty-first century make it incumbent upon WEU to enlarge and strengthen itself, failing which it will be impossible to establish the European union necessary to complete and establish a balance in the Atlantic Alliance. It must now be agreed to give Europe the necessary means. The Assembly and the Presidential Committee will work together to ensure that Europe takes shape in answer to the call of the future.

APPENDICES

- I. Relations between the Council and the Assembly: letter from Mr. Goerens to Mr. van den Broek and answer by Mr. van den Broek
 - II. Preparation of the meeting with the presidency of the Council: letter from Mr. Goerens to Mr. van den Broek
 - III. Visit to the United States from 11th to 13th April 1988: letter from Mr. Goerens to Mr. Shultz, United States Secretary of State
 - IV. Letters from Mr. Goerens to Mr. van den Broek dated 20th and 24th May 1988
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APPENDIX I

*Letter from Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly,
to Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*

Paris, 23rd December 1988

.....

As the New Year draws close, the members of the Presidential Committee, who met in Paris on Thursday, 17th December, join me in conveying to you their best wishes for success in the accomplishment of your important duties and express the wish that the New Year will allow you to complete the task which started so well in the year that has just ended.

The Presidential Committee has asked me to confirm the value it attaches to organising meetings with the presidency before ministerial meetings. This will allow a dialogue to be held on matters on the Council's agenda and any problems which may arise in relations between the Council and the Assembly to be examined jointly.

For this purpose, I venture to suggest holding a meeting between 1st and 18th March 1988 when we might discuss the implementation of the platform, which is an expression of Europe's defence identity. It is indeed particularly important, following the conclusion of the Washington agreement, to define Europeans' common interests on complex disarmament matters and to harmonise member countries' views on the various problems that affect European security.

If you agree, this meeting would be held just before the colloquy on European co-operation on armaments research and development in London on 7th and 8th March 1988 with the participation of the Presidential Committee. My colleagues and I would particularly appreciate examining with you the way in which the Council intends to give political impetus to such European co-operation.

Another of the Council's successes in 1987 was the introduction of procedure for harmonising member countries' policies in the Gulf and co-ordinating their operations. My colleagues and I wish to examine developments in this connection with you and your colleague, Mr. van Eekelen.

This meeting would also allow us to assess the extent of the efforts that still have to be made to settle outstanding problems: on the one hand, the completion of the restructuring and collocation of the ministerial organs and, on the other hand, the enlargement of WEU to include Portugal and Spain.

Finally, the Assembly wishes to recall that there are still gaps in the structure of its secretariat since the Council subjected the creation of four new posts to the completion of the restructuring of the ministerial organs. It would be paradoxical for the Assembly to have to continue to endure the consequences of the governments' difficulty in reaching agreement on the organisation and seat of the ministerial organs.

My colleagues and I attach the greatest importance to this preparatory meeting between the Presidential Committee and the presidency being followed by a meeting between the Presidential Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the General Affairs Committee and the Council at the close of the ministerial meeting. Thus, the Assembly would be able to obtain early, substantial information about the results of the Council's work and analyse it and draw its own conclusions during the session that is to be opened on 30th May.

I should therefore be very grateful if you would present the conclusions of the ministerial meeting to the Presidential Committee, Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and General Affairs Committee at the close of the Council meeting. Such a dialogue would be of even greater interest if it could include representatives of governments of other member states who might agree to remain a few hours in The Hague to take part in this meeting with the Assembly committees.

Finally, I have great pleasure in inviting you to present the annual report of the Council at our forthcoming session and your colleague, Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence, to take part in our debates.

I should be pleased to know whether you could arrange to speak during the morning of Tuesday, 31st May 1988. I enclose the agenda of the session.

.....

Charles GOERENS

Letter from Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, to Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly

The Hague, 22nd January 1988

.....

First, allow me to thank you for the good wishes you conveyed to me on behalf of the Presidential Committee. I in turn send you my most sincere wishes for 1988. You can be sure that the Netherlands presidency will continue its efforts to maintain close, constructive relations with the Assembly and keep you informed as fully as possible of developments in WEU.

Like you, I think it desirable for us to meet before the meeting of the Council of Ministers this spring to discuss the matters referred to in your letter. I can therefore confirm that my defence colleague, Mr. van Eekelen, and I will, with the greatest pleasure, receive the Presidential Committee at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 17th March at 10 a.m.

Furthermore, the Assembly will, as usual, be informed of the results of the meeting of the Council of Ministers. For this purpose, I propose that we meet on Tuesday, 19th April, at 3 p.m. I have informed the Permanent Council in London of your wish for other ministers, who are able, to take part in these discussions.

I also wish to thank the Assembly for having postponed its forthcoming plenary session in Paris to allow the presidency to present the annual report of the Council and take part in the debates. I propose to address the Assembly on Tuesday, 7th June, at 11 a.m.; my colleague, Mr. van Eekelen, proposes to do so the next day, also at 11 a.m.

You may be sure that I shall have great pleasure in taking part in the discussions at our forthcoming meetings.

.....

Hans van den BROEK

APPENDIX II

*Letter from Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly,
to Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*

Lisbon, 24th February 1988

.....

Following its meetings with members of the Portuguese Government and Parliament, the Presidential Committee noted that there was a consensus among the principal political parties in favour of a defence effort designed to allow Portugal, one of the founder members of NATO, to play its full rôle in the alliance and demonstrate in an effective manner its solidarity with the other members in the event of attack.

Portugal is equally convinced of its commitment to the building of Europe. This has already been expressed in the framework of the European Community and political co-operation and should be confirmed without delay in the framework of the modified Brussels Treaty.

Portugal is clearly prepared to assume the undertakings embodied in this treaty and to apply the principles defined in the platform adopted in The Hague, giving them, together with the other member countries, the full significance implied by the requirements of European security.

The Presidential Committee thus confirms the importance the Assembly attaches to its Recommendation 446 and urges the Council, at its next ministerial meeting, to make the necessary arrangements for Portugal to take its due place in WEU.

.....

Charles GOERENS

APPENDIX III

*Letter from Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly,
to Mr. Shultz, United States Secretary of State*

Paris, 23rd March 1988

.....

Further to my letter of 8th January concerning my forthcoming visit to the United States authorities, I wish to provide you with a few details about the simultaneous visits to be made by the Presidential Committee and the General Affairs Committee to Washington from 11th to 13th April 1988.

The WEU Assembly instructed its steering body, the Presidential Committee, to promote a regular dialogue between the Assembly and the United States Congress in order to avoid the reactivation of WEU adding to "transatlantic misunderstandings". This committee has therefore decided to take part in the visit to be paid by our General Affairs Committee to the United States authorities. It will thus be able, during its talks with various members of Congress, to give its views on the Assembly's resolution on the INF treaty and to stress the value it attaches to ratification of that agreement. It will also, as invited to do by the Assembly, raise the question of the consequences for Europe's security of any American-Soviet agreements on the limitation of armaments, the aims to be pursued in the CSCE and threats to international peace which may arise outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty.

I personally will endeavour to show that the building of a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance can but help to strengthen the alliance, as President Reagan proclaimed in his speech of 4th November 1987.

I intend to do my utmost to dispel any doubts that may remain in this respect. The reactivation of WEU will motivate Europeans in their defence effort, facilitate a better use of limited resources to increase the effectiveness of that effort and smooth out differences between member states. It must lead to greater cohesion and strength in the alliance.

The fear has sometimes been expressed in Europe that the pursuit of disarmament negotiations may lead to the United States and Europe being decoupled and deterrence weakened. In point of fact, the Atlantic summit meeting's approval of the platform adopted by the WEU Council in The Hague is further confirmation of the western strategy for preventing war. It is nevertheless essential for the dialogue between the United States and Europe to be pursued in depth to allow both sides to understand each other better and to work together to defend peace and build a better world.

It is in this spirit that I shall be going to Washington and I attach the utmost importance to holding talks with you yourself and Mr. Carlucci, the Secretary of Defence.

.....

Charles GOERENS

APPENDIX IV

*Letter from Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly,
to Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*

Paris, 20th May 1988

.....

On the eve of the first meeting between representatives of the governments of the WEU member countries and of the Spanish and Portuguese Governments, I wish to set out the Assembly's feelings on the matter.

The Assembly has very good reasons for satisfaction on the announcement of this meeting since the decision to start discussions with Spain and Portugal is in line with the prospects it had itself advocated, in particular in Recommendation 432. Furthermore, it notes that the reasons given by the Council in support of its decision of 20th April are the very ones the Assembly had expressed when calling for the application to Spain and Portugal of Article XI of the Brussels Treaty.

On behalf of the Assembly, I therefore trust these discussions will be concluded swiftly. The two countries concerned have subscribed fully to all the provisions of the treaty and all the principles set out in the platform adopted in The Hague. Considering that no obstacle should consequently stand in the way of the enlargement of WEU to include the two countries of the Iberian peninsula, the Assembly is determined to pursue its action to allow them to take their rightful place in developing security Europe as soon as possible. The Assembly is preparing to make the necessary arrangements to receive their parliamentary delegations.

.....

Charles GOERENS

*Letter from Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly,
to Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*

Paris, 24th May 1988

.....

With a view to enlightening you regarding the Assembly's feelings as the plenary session approaches, I first wish to thank you for the courteous way in which you have conducted the dialogue with it. Although, in spite of your efforts, the annual report of the Council arrived too late, the Assembly appreciated your constant determination to answer as fully as possible the questions put to the Council and the remarks presented to it.

I also have pleasure in congratulating you on the results you have obtained while guiding the Council's work. With the adoption of the platform on European security interests, the co-ordination of action by member states to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf, the extension of the Council's activities and the decision to hold talks with a view to the accession of Spain and Portugal to the modified Brussels Treaty, the Netherlands presidency will have left its mark on the history of WEU.

The Assembly merely regrets that the Council has been unable to agree on giving WEU the structure and means which are the conditions of lasting success.

Due to the will of the Council, the Assembly feels the effects of this failure. The restructuring of the Office of the Clerk is incomplete. It has still not been granted the four posts that should have allowed it to carry out its tasks in less precarious conditions, although several posts are kept vacant in the ministerial organs.

The Assembly will not fail to call upon the Council, this time very strongly, at last to make available to it the four posts foreseen in the memorandum to the Council dated 4th November 1986. I appeal to you to give your full support to the Assembly's request.

I am convinced that the Netherlands Government will continue in the future to give the Assembly's recommendations all the attention they warrant.

Once again, I convey to you my thanks and congratulations.

.....

Charles GOERENS

*Written Questions 280 and 281 and replies of the Council***QUESTION 280**

*put by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
on 24th February 1988*

1. On what date or dates was The Hague platform communicated to either all the non-WEU members of NATO or to those countries wishing to join WEU?
2. Will they now report the replies received from each country concerned?
3. In particular, what obstacle now stands in the way of inviting Portugal to join WEU?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
and received at the Office of the Clerk
on 11th April 1988*

1. On 27th October 1987, the Netherlands presidency informed the ambassadors of the NATO countries accredited in The Hague of the outcome of the WEU ministerial meeting. On that occasion, the text of the platform on European security interests was made available to the ambassadors.
2. The presidency was not instructed by the Council to solicit a reply from the NATO countries on the text of the platform.
3. The possible enlargement of WEU is being discussed within the Council and in the special working group. The matter will also be considered at the Ministerial Council meeting in The Hague on 18th-19th April.

QUESTION 281

*put by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
on 9th May 1988*

1. On how many occasions since 1980 has the annual report from the Council been received on time and what reasons have been given for

such failures as have taken place in keeping to the timetable?

2. What steps is the Council taking to instruct its officials to comply with the need to make its annual report available to the Assembly on time?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
and received at the Office of the Clerk
on 3rd June 1988*

1. The annual reports, including the one covering 1984, used to reach the Assembly around February/March of the subsequent years. The Council is well aware of the fact that the reports could not be transmitted as rapidly after October 1984, when the reactivation of the organisation was decided upon. It was precisely with a view to meeting the wishes of the Assembly as much as possible that the document has been divided into two biannual parts since 1986. The Council may point out that since 1984 the activities of Western European Union have taken on a predominantly political character which is reflected in the annual and biannual reports. The reports of the previous period were of a largely technical and even routine nature and could thus be finalised more rapidly.

2. The Council will continue to do everything possible in order to speed up the finalisation of the biannual reports. It may be observed that the second part of the thirty-third annual report was approved by the Council on 27th April last and dispatched on 28th April, i.e. about six weeks before the next session of the Assembly. The report, however, apparently reached the General Affairs Committee only after its meeting of 9th May. This unfortunate delay was attributable to postal dispatching. In the future an advance copy will be sent by facsimile in order to avoid repetition of such delays.

Structure of the Office of the Clerk

MOTION FOR AN ORDER

*tabled by Mr. Sinesio and others¹
under Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure*

The Assembly,

Considering:

- (i) That the four posts foreseen in the memorandum sent to the Council on 4th November 1986 have still not been filled;
- (ii) The urgency of completing the structure of the Office of the Clerk to allow the Assembly to respond to the reactivation of WEU;
- (iii) That corresponding credits are available in the WEU budget,

INSTRUCTS THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

1. To take the necessary steps to ensure that the Council accedes to the Assembly's request as a matter of urgency;
2. To call for a joint meeting with the Council of Ministers before the end of the Netherlands chairmanship-in-office if the Assembly does not obtain satisfaction on this matter.

*Signed: Sinesio, Hennicot-Schoepges, Kittelmann, Triglia, Malfatti, Linster, Sarti, Pieralli, Greco,
Dudley Smith*

1. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1988 (motion referred to the Presidential Committee).

Guest speakers

MOTION FOR AN ORDER ¹

*tabled by Mr. Soell and others
under Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure
with a request for urgent procedure*

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that at the first part of its thirty-fourth ordinary session there are seven non-parliamentary speakers and that major debates are therefore interrupted and lose their coherence;
- (ii) Recalling the repeated protests made in the Assembly about the excessive number of speakers from outside the Assembly,

INSTRUCTS THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY

To seek an agreement with the Council to limit the number of ministerial speeches at any one part-session of the Assembly.

Signed: Soell, Ahrens, Klejdzinski, Linster, Redmond, Thompson, Coleman, Derycke, Hardy, Antretter

1. See 6th sitting, 9th June 1988 (motion referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges).

*Disarmament**(The prospects for Western Europe after the Moscow summit)*DRAFT RECOMMENDATION ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ¹
by Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur,
with a request for urgent procedure*

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the recent summit meeting in Moscow between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union as a further step towards arms limitation;
- (ii) Welcoming the ratification of the INF treaty by the Senate of the United States (as recommended in Resolution 77 adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1987) and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR;
- (iii) Disappointed that a bilateral agreement on reductions in strategic weapons systems was not ready in time for the summit meeting, but convinced nevertheless that there is a firm basis for such an agreement, incorporating effective means of verification, and that this should be seen as of paramount importance;
- (iv) Recalling and approving the Council statement in The Hague, that Western European Union will pursue an active arms control and disarmament policy exploiting "all opportunities to make further progress towards arms reductions, compatible with our security and with our priorities";
- (v) Convinced that the European nations and particularly Western European Union members should contribute substantially to the process of arms control,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue to press for the earliest opening of negotiations on conventional stability concentrating on asymmetrical reductions in conventional forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals, together with associated discussions regarding human rights in the Soviet bloc;
2. Express full support for a properly verifiable bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union which would provide for at least a 50% reduction in strategic missile forces;
3. Apply the principles defined in the Hague platform to determine and uphold European security interests in the context of negotiations on disarmament and the control of armaments;
4. Press member governments to initiate urgent research into verification technology so that Western Europe is ready to contribute practically to conventional arms control agreements;
5. Associate the WEU agency closely with its reflection and work on disarmament and arms control, ensuring that the considerable expertise and experience acquired by the Agency for the Control of Armaments is not neglected and dissipated at the very moment that considerations such as verification are assuming paramount importance, and instruct the agency *inter alia* to:
 - (a) study conditions for conventional disarmament respecting European security requirements;
 - (b) study methods of verifying conventional and chemical disarmament.

1. Adopted in committee by 9 votes to 0 with 7 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Kittelmann (Chairman); MM. de Beer (Alternate: *Tummers*), Fourré (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alloncle, Mrs. *Baarveld-Schlaman*, MM. Cariglia, Cox (Alternate: *Thompson*), De Decker (Alternate: *Vreven*), *Derycke*, *Fiandrotti*, *Fioret* (Alternate: *Fassino*), Hardy, Irmer, Jung, *Konen*, *de Kwaadsteniet*, Mrs. *Lalumière*, MM. *Lemmrich* (Alternate: *Bühler*), *Matraja*, *Pecchioli*, *Scheer* (Alternate: *Antretter*), *Sinesio*, *Sir Dudley Smith*, MM. *Speed*, *Steiner*, *Steverlynck*, *Stokes*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Disarmament

(The prospects for Western Europe after the Moscow summit)


AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Kittelmann and others

1. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
“Continue to press for the earliest opening of negotiations on conventional stability concentrating on asymmetrical reductions in conventional forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals and for progress on all three baskets of the CSCE, particularly the one on human rights, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and understanding;”

Signed: Kittelmann, Stoffelen, Reddemann, Finsberg, Pieralli

1. See 6th sitting, 9th June 1988 (amendment agreed to).

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