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ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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(Second Part)

The future of European security

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee
by Mr. von Hassel, Rapporteur

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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1. Adopted in Committee by 12 votes to 2 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee: Sir Frederic Bennett* (Chairman); MM. De Poi, Portheine (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Berrier (Alternate: *Baumel*), Mrs. Boniver, Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Brugnon, Conti Persini (Alternate: *Amadei*), Deschamps, Druon, Gessner (Alternate: *Vohrer*), Hanin

(Alternate: *Michel*), *Hardy*, *von Hassel*, Lagneau, Lord McNair (Alternate: *Kershaw*), MM. Mangelschots (Alternate: *van Waterschoot*), *Mende*, Mommersteeg, *Müller*, *Péridier*, *Lord Reay*, MM. Thoss, *Urwin*, *Valiante*, *Vecchietti*, Voogd.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on the future of European security

The Assembly,

Considering that the joint interest of all its members is to promote collective security so as to consolidate peace and promote détente and disarmament;

Considering that Europe has to face a threat that is now formidable because of the Soviet Union's superiority in many fields;

Considering that the Soviet Union's operations beyond the European continent extend this threat to the economic and political fields;

Considering that Europe's security can be guaranteed only by the cohesion and strength of the Atlantic Alliance and the resolve of its members;

Considering that the fulfilment of this requirement calls for close agreement between the European and American members of the Atlantic Alliance on their joint defence policy;

Considering that the situation requires the European element of the Alliance to make a greater effort to take part in joint defence and disarmament initiatives, particularly with regard to conventional weapons;

Considering that, to be effective, this effort implies close co-operation in the production of armaments;

Considering that the European Community has established solidarity between most European members of the Atlantic Alliance so that on many matters they are in a position to express joint views on questions which are outside the Community's purview;

Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty, with the North Atlantic Treaty, constitutes the basis of European security;

Considering that the European Community is not in a position to replace WEU in exercising that organisation's defence and armaments responsibilities but that steps should be taken here and now to face up to the requirements of European security,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Set up a working group to examine measures to be taken by all member countries to adapt WEU to the present requirements of European defence and instruct it to study in particular:

- (a) the co-ordination of member countries' policies in its areas of responsibility, namely defence, armaments and disarmament;
- (b) the participation of Ministers of Defence or their representatives in its meetings when matters which concern them are discussed;
- (c) the convening of meetings before those of the North Atlantic Council with a view to identifying the joint views of its members on matters relating to Europe's security;
- (d) the question of inviting all countries which are members of the EEC, have applied for membership or are European members of NATO also to negotiate their accession to the modified Brussels Treaty or, if they do not wish to do so, their association with the activities of WEU;
- (e) the action to be taken on the study being conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee so that the outcome may be a true European armaments policy.

Draft Resolution
on the future of European security

The Assembly,

Considering that the WEU Assembly remains the only European assembly with responsibilities in defence questions;

Considering that the election of the parliamentary assembly of the European Communities by direct universal suffrage gives that assembly new authority in the framework of the Rome Treaty;

Considering it desirable to establish links between these two assemblies,

DECIDES

1. To instruct the Presidential Committee, on its initiative, to consider with the Bureau of the assembly of the European Communities the possibility of organising an exchange of observers between the two assemblies;
2. To instruct its President to examine with the President of the European Parliament all the questions raised by this exchange of observers;
3. To instruct the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee to contact the Chairman of the Political Committee of the assembly of the European Communities with a view to co-ordinating the political work of the two assemblies.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. von Hassel, Rapporteur)

I. Europe's security aims

1. There were about eight million victims during the first world war in Europe. In the second world war, almost 45 million Europeans were killed. The subsequent growth in armaments, and nuclear armaments in particular, has been such that there is every reason to think that a third world war would leave Europe in a state of almost total devastation and that the population would be practically wiped out, even if nuclear weapons were not used. But this is hardly probable. It is enough to glance at a map of the world to see that Europe could not be spared in the event of hostilities between the Soviet Union and the United States. Its wealth, its population and the narrow confines between the iron curtain and the shores of the Atlantic make it a vital stake and any future war will inevitably be fought on its soil.
2. There is therefore no interest, whether national or ideological, which would warrant the risk of any European country or nation sparking off a war. This fact cannot and does not escape any of the Western European countries and, since the end of the second world war, no European government has even thought of using force, let alone done so, to obtain benefits of any kind whatsoever, at least in Europe.
3. No political party, whether in government or in opposition, has ever considered war as a means of attaining aims of any kind whatsoever. This means that some have accepted a situation which, in another age, would have seemed intolerable, such as the division of Germany and the German people and the situation imposed on Berlin. But no one, in Germany or elsewhere, has done anything to start a war that might change this situation. No one has even considered doing so. Consequently, any accusations that may have been levelled at a European state, or even a party, of militarism, revanchism or aggressiveness are and were unfair, completely unfounded and slanderous. They are, and remain, dangerous insofar as they are liable to incur or perpetuate mistrust for which today there is no justification but which may sow discord between nations with common situations and aims.
4. Peace can be secured only if an opponent refrains from the idea that an attack on Western Europe could be of advantage to him. The West's policy must also be a defence policy, which means the opponent is deterred from any attack or pressure. This policy is no longer conceived as an instrument of a foreign policy directed towards the attainment of national goals but merely as a means of ensuring security, i.e. peace, no longer for one country or another, but for the whole of Europe, since no one can hope to evade a war which might break out on the European continent.
5. This desire for peace does not mean that Europe is not prepared to make the sacrifices it considers necessary to defend its freedom. The whole population of all the countries of Europe has steadfastly accepted such sacrifices because it realised the need for them. Most Western European countries have compulsory military service for their youth. All spend a considerable proportion of their gross national product on maintaining and equipping their armed forces. When, in 1979, it became apparent that an additional financial effort was necessary to ensure Europe's security, all the members of NATO accepted the principle of an annual increase of at least 3 % in constant values in their defence budgets, in spite of the difficulties they were all experiencing due to a long-term deeply-rooted economic recession.
6. Thus, there can be no ambiguity in Europe's attitude towards everything contributing to a policy of détente. All Europeans seek détente in East-West relations provided it does not weaken their security. They all have the same interest in limiting as far as possible the sacrifices which they have to make to ensure their defence. But they cannot agree to a foreign policy which diminishes the effect of these sacrifices, i.e. which jeopardises their security.
7. The policy of détente cannot therefore be separated from Europe's overall defence policy. It is closely linked with and an integral part of defence policy since it seeks to strengthen security while reducing expenditure on armaments. It is therefore an unassailable responsibility of Western European Union under the modified Brussels Treaty. It has long been prominent in WEU's work and the Assembly has on many occasions examined its aspects and implications, even after nine-power Europe took over many of these questions in the framework of political consultations between the nine governments.
8. Disarmament and the limitation of armaments have always been a major aim of Europeans but only in the framework of a global policy which includes consultations amongst

allies and negotiations with the Soviet Union, its allies and all countries concerned. In varying ways and to a greater or lesser extent they have all taken part in disarmament negotiations, particularly in the framework of the Geneva Disarmament Committee. The United Nations special session on disarmament in 1978 showed the interest and importance of disarmament for European countries whichever alliance they belonged to or whether they were neutral or non-aligned. Europe played a decisive rôle at that session and was very largely responsible for the changes then made in the composition and methods of work of the Disarmament Committee.

9. Although the European countries were not asked to take a direct part in the SALT negotiations, they have followed them very closely, particularly in their consultations with their American partner, and have made it clear that they wish them to be successful as long as they do not in any way compromise Europe's security. Similarly, the European members of NATO have taken part in the MBFR talks and have tried to make them advance in the same direction.

10. Your Rapporteur points out that after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan some politicians were heard to say that the only way to overcome the mounting tension would be by a policy of disarmament. Your Rapporteur is in favour of all serious talks on disarmament. But those who believe this might be a remedy for the crisis should note that the Geneva Committee held its 867th meeting in 1980 without recording any major results in terms of European security and disarmament. The least that can be said is that its work is desperately slow, even assuming that there is still hope of some outcome. Naturally, events in 1979 and 1980, particularly the invasion of Afghanistan, did nothing to raise hopes and it is now unrealistic to base a policy on disarmament which would be tantamount to responding to a succession of challenges to Western Europe's security by a display of weakness and an attitude of appeasement, the effects of which would probably be the reverse of the aim sought, i.e. the consolidation of peace. Indeed, at the present juncture, the development of détente and disarmament cannot be envisaged without, to say the least, a new appraisal of the threats to international peace and an assessment of the forces deployed by the Soviet Union and its allies.

11. Any initiatives the Soviets may take at present in the name of détente and disarmament do not seem to be aimed at achieving concrete results based on maintaining the balance and developing peaceful relations but rather at undermining the unity of Europe and the Atlantic Community and weakening their

determination to continue to make the sacrifices necessary for their security.

12. Europe's freedom is indivisible and the West must do its utmost to avoid being carried away by proposals which conceal such dangers. In facing up to the implications of the present situation and examining the threats facing Europe our sights must be set firmly on the objective of security based on détente and effective disarmament.

13. Soviet moves to denounce NATO as a militarist, aggressive or revanchist undertaking must be discounted straight away. The Atlantic Alliance is in fact purely defensive and NATO is in no way designed for an offensive policy, nor an offensive strategy: NATO is absolutely unable to attack. There are therefore no grounds for ideas that the West should show understanding for the Soviet Union which feels itself surrounded and hence threatened by the West. Such views take no account of the Soviet Union's perfect knowledge of the text of the North Atlantic Treaty, the structure of NATO and the democratic decision-taking machinery of all the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance under parliamentary supervision. The Soviet Union fully realises what it is doing in pursuing, for political purposes, this line of propaganda which seeks to divide the West and weaken its defence effort. The West must not forget that peace in Europe since 1945 cannot be attributed to international opinion, the United Nations Charter and its application or talks on détente and disarmament but only to the balance of force guaranteed by NATO which alone has given certain shape – still ill-defined – to an international order which it alone maintains. This means that however great may be the attachment to peace and the desire to bring about real disarmament and détente on the part of the members of the Atlantic Alliance, they would be running counter to their aims if they did not first seek to maintain – or, at the present juncture, restore – the balance without which there can be neither peace nor law.

II. Threats to European security

1. Political aspects

14. The seizure of power by the Communist Party in Russia in 1917 introduced a completely new concept of international relations on the part of the Bolcheviks. They saw the Russian revolution merely as a step towards world revolution and revolution in any one country meant the power, army and external policy of the Soviet Union being placed at the service of that revolution. Since then, therefore, the cause of revolution and that of the Soviet

Union have become merged in the eyes of communist leaders the world over – admittedly with a few exceptions such as Tito in Yugoslavia and Mao Tse-tung and his successors in China. Hence, they consider that it is the class struggle – which they believe to be history's principal driving force – which is expressed in international relations and that this struggle cannot come to an end until communists have assumed power throughout the world.

15. However, this does not mean the Soviet Union is prepared to leap blindly into any venture in the name of revolution. On many past occasions, it has shown great flexibility in implementing its schemes and has applied them very realistically. As long as the "capitalist world" has sufficient cohesion and force to inflict defeat or intolerable losses on the Soviet Union in the event of open hostilities, the latter will be deterred from taking the risk of a direct confrontation, in Europe at least, as long as it knows the West will not hesitate to use its full force to ensure its security. This has led it to use other means of weakening the capitalist side, leaving itself room to build up its strength and perhaps, tomorrow, to win the day while avoiding open confrontation.

16. But such means can be deployed only under cover of Soviet strength. The Soviet Union has therefore started to build up what is probably the largest and best equipped army in the world, forming a navy equal to the strongest in the world, i.e. that of the United States, and developing nuclear power equal to that of its potential enemy in every field and which now in many respects is in the lead.

17. The economic and social cost of this tremendous armaments effort has been considerable and has left the Soviet people far behind Western Europe and the United States in terms of personal consumption. To impose these sacrifices, the Soviet Government has for several decades had to maintain a dictatorship difficult to tolerate and a main effect of which has been the complete isolation of the population to prevent it from knowing the true situation in the rest of the world. This dictatorship is an essential condition for the success of Soviet external policy.

18. A revolutionary policy has been worked out for countries where capitalism is firmly entrenched which includes weakening western positions outside Europe and cutting the western countries off from their essential resources, particularly Middle East oil and ores for the European market mainly from southern Africa. It is from every point of view in the interests of the Soviet Union to win over to its ideological system the countries recently freed from colonialism or bring them under its domination. If at one time it had such illusions, its

experience with China certainly quelled them. The communist order is intended for industrialised countries in which it can lean on a large and organised working class, but marxist logic, which here corresponds to a fairly realistic assessment of the facts, holds that capitalism is inherently condemned to expand continually and consequently all forces opposing such expansion can halt it and thus provoke its self-destruction.

19. That is why the Soviet Union has no hesitation in encouraging all movements capable of destabilising regions whose production or markets may be useful to the West and to this end it relies equally on nationalist forces and religious, ethnic or economic movements. This does not mean the Soviet Union gives equal support and assistance to all such forces but it is liable to make use of them or even stir them up if they are likely to play a rôle in world strategy. This is probably the explanation for the operations instigated or supported by the Soviet Union in South-East Asia, the Near and Middle East and Africa.

20. A look at a map of the Indian Ocean indicating all the subversive movements encouraged, aided or provoked by the Soviet Union and its conquests and those of its allies in the past five years would show a threefold pincer-movement closing on the ocean through which most Middle East oil has to pass: much of the oil consumed by the United States, 60 % of that consumed by Western Europe and 90 % of Japanese requirements. As long as the West remains as dependent as it now is on oil imports from the Middle East, the ability to close the Persian Gulf will give the Soviet Union strong means of pressure. The West has of course sensed the danger and taken steps to allow it to escape this pressure in the future, first by building up oil reserves which now amount to about four months' consumption and second by developing, as decided in Venice in June 1980, alternative forms of energy for the western economy to depend less closely on Middle East oil, its price and supply routes. However, the effects of these measures will be felt only in the long term and, for the next ten years at least, the West will remain very largely dependent on that area of the world.

21. On the eastern side of the Indian Ocean, the three claws of the pincer are clearly discernible: the seizure of the whole of Vietnam by a pro-Soviet régime, the domination of Laos, the conquest of Cambodia and the outbreak of fighting between Vietnam and Thailand in June 1980 indicate that the Indochinese peninsula is in the process of falling entirely into the hands of the Soviet Union or its friends. The invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 allowed the Red Army, in crossing the highest mountain barrier in the world, to come 500 km closer

to the Strait of Hormuz from which it is now separated only by a crumbling Iranian state and the Baluchi province of a singularly weakened Pakistan. Finally, the third claw of the pincer is in the northern Near East where the Soviet Union is encouraging continuous internal disturbances in Turkey with several hundred victims of terrorism each month, where Syria seems on the brink of another revolution and Iraq has an army almost entirely equipped by the Soviet Union.

22. In face of this direct or indirect thrust by the Soviet Union towards the south, the development of Soviet influence in the Arabian peninsula and Africa is the second part of the pincer movement closing on the Indian Ocean. The Arabian peninsula is threatened by a dynamic South Yemen, with the powerful assistance of the Soviet Union, and by a Palestinian diaspora which may now be said to be threatening the stability of nearly all the states in the region. Although little is still known about the events in Mecca in autumn 1979, they indicate that the strength of dissenting forces has become considerable, even in Saudi Arabia. There are numerous Palestinians and they hold key positions in the Gulf oil states. They have their political and military organisation and constitute a major threat to stability in the area.

23. In Africa, the Soviet Union has found a series of staging posts, some in the north, others in the centre or south of the continent, *inter alia* in Algeria, Libya, Ethiopia, Guinea, Benin, Zambia and Mozambique. The presence of a large Cuban contingent and a number of technicians from East Germany allows these countries to be used as a base for bringing pressure and steady threats to bear on South Africa and for fomenting instability, unrest and dissent in most African countries. But South Africa alone accounts for 40 % of African industry and 45 % of its mining output, 86 % of world platinum output, 83 % chromium, 14 % vanadium, 49 % gold, 48 % manganese and 46 % fluorine, not to speak of the importance of the Cape route for world trade since 78 % of Europe's oil supplies pass by that route, including 68 % of those of the Federal Republic and 99 % of those of France, plus 80 % of Western Europe's imports of raw materials.

24. It is therefore impossible to isolate the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan from a whole series of other events occurring all round the Indian Ocean and which show a coherent attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to use this region in a global strategy.

25. The present economic crisis in the West provides the Soviet Union with an excellent opportunity for developing this undertaking by strengthening all the elements of internal dissension in the "capitalist" countries. The

communist parties may play this rôle, but they do not have a monopoly. The development of terrorism in Turkey and its continuation in Italy are alarming factors of destabilisation. The crisis also allows advantage to be taken of growing differences between the western countries' economic interests in order to break up the cohesion of the capitalist world. Communist party exploitation of national feelings in certain European countries and above all the spread of nationalist claims in the industrial, trade and even agricultural fields indicate that this is a concerted operation designed to ruin the western alliance and weaken the ability of each western country to resist Soviet pressure and, furthermore, to annihilate the West's overall ability to resist this pressure by destroying its cohesion.

26. Such an undertaking implies the use of propaganda as an essential means of separating the West from the third world countries by assimilating the cause of the West's security to that of imperialism, colonialism and capitalism. This propaganda campaign of course finds many footholds in the third world and in the West and its effectiveness cannot be denied. The exploitation of feelings left over from past history, however unjustified they may now be, is a habitual method of destroying the West's cohesion. Anti-Americanism in Europe or anti-Germanism in certain countries are the themes of propaganda which has been pushed relentlessly ever since the end of the second world war. Moreover, the assimilation of Soviet policy to the interests of peace or even justice and freedom is a leitmotiv propagated by a large number of organisations, some of which, directly or indirectly run by Moscow, such as the "Peace Movement", aim at weakening the western societies' will to resist. In this field too times of crisis favour the development of such propaganda.

27. These various factors do not allow it to be concluded that the Soviet Union is preparing for a final assault on the capitalist world. It is far more likely that it is seeking a position of force from which to negotiate with the capitalist powers, whose inevitable decline can but be speeded up by the economic crisis, in order to work out, at least in the first stage, a sort of division of the world, of influences and of wealth. Without taking any risks, of nuclear war at least, the Soviet Union would thus have gained a strong position for the subsequent stages of a necessary world revolution in face of which the West would be divided, weakened and demoralised, if not neutralised. Shifting from the class struggle to the foreign policy and diplomatic field also means proceeding with caution and moderation so as not to compromise certain results by resorting to reckless policies.

28. This probably explains the moderation shown by the Soviet Union once it realised that its intervention in Afghanistan might jeopardise its whole external policy, make it lose the advantages it had gained and create tension which could but isolate and weaken it. At the end of June 1980, just before the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the Soviet Union, announcing the withdrawal of a few troops from Afghanistan after having told the world a few weeks earlier that it would apply the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty for socialist states, showed that it did not intend to press on with the confrontation with the West, which was determined to refuse the *fait accompli* and had the support of a large proportion of the non-aligned countries. It should be noted moreover that according to available information the Soviet troops withdrawn from Afghanistan were immediately replaced and everything indicates that the size of the forces engaged in that country increased during the summer.

29. It is with this in mind that the Soviet Union's military threat to the free world must be assessed: for the Soviet Union, there is no truly military field separate from the political field, the military being placed at the service of a highly political cause, particularly since political action itself is thought out as strategy.

2. Military aspects

(a) Armaments

30. Such a policy could not in fact be pursued without the Soviet Union building up military strength which on the one hand ensures the country's security and, on the other, allows it to protect its operations against any intervention by the capitalist powers and furnishes a means of acting against and bringing pressure to bear on countries where it wants its will to prevail. This explains why, since the 1917 revolution, the Soviet Union has been making a steady armaments effort. Since 1945, its aim has been to ensure that it has overwhelming military superiority over absolutely any adversary in every field. Since that date, it has regularly assigned 11 to 15 % of its gross national product to defence as compared with a current figure of less than 6 % for the United States and 3 to 4 % for most European members of the Atlantic Alliance in the last five years. In 1979, NATO decided on an increase of 3 % at constant values in the military budgets of member states. But it will take about ten years for this decision, if effectively and continuously applied, to produce an increase of even one per cent in the proportion of gross national product assigned to defence since it is only about 1⁰⁰⁰ of the GNP. This constant

imbalance in military expenditure between the two sides explains why, for the past few years, the Soviet Union has been on the way to becoming the world's leading military power, although NATO still considers it can to a certain extent make up for its quantitative inferiority by its more advanced technology.

31. (i) *Where strategic nuclear forces are concerned*, the SALT II agreements, signed in 1979 but whose ratification by the United States Senate was postponed *sine die* after the invasion of Afghanistan, reflected the real balance of forces by acknowledging that the Soviet Union can claim definite superiority as regards the number of delivery vehicles. In view of the characteristics of the means of delivery, the number of MIRVed warheads on each side, the number of nuclear submarines deployed and the total number of strategic nuclear weapons available, this numerical superiority does not seem to give the Soviet Union decisive superiority over the United States. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the Soviet Union has, to say the least, achieved parity in such weapons.

32. (ii) *For long-range theatre nuclear weapons* the situation is quite different. Since 1978, the Soviet Union has been deploying a new generation of multi-warhead missiles, the SS-20, particularly on the European side, which already ensure overwhelming superiority and this will be the case for some time to come. These weapons are capable of attaining with extreme accuracy any target whatsoever on the territory of Western Europe and are thus very largely capable of disarming NATO forces without the latter being able to retaliate with weapons of an equivalent type. It is currently estimated that there are 450 Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missiles and 180 SS-20 missiles (each with three nuclear warheads making a total of 540 nuclear warheads) deployed in Europe. To these should be added the long-range nuclear weapon-carrying bombers known in the West as the "Backfire" bombers. SS-20 missiles are being deployed at a rate of more than one a week, which means that if the West keeps exactly to its present time-table, in 1983, when the first western long-range theatre nuclear weapons are deployed, the Soviet Union will already have deployed about 400 SS-20 missiles. In these circumstances, for a long time to come the Soviet Union will be able, in the event of hostilities, to choose the level of operations and hence dissociate the interests of the United States, which are above all to avoid using strategic nuclear weapons, from those of Europe which has as much to fear from SS-20s as from strategic missiles.

33. (iii) *In conventional weapons*, the Soviet Union and its allies have long had considerable numerical superiority in troops, aircraft and

tanks and now the same is true for the quality of their equipment since the Soviet Union, for instance, has already introduced a third generation of aircraft since the second world war whereas NATO is still at the second generation. In spite of the larger number of weapons deployed by the Soviet Union, the West for many years considered that its superior technology allowed it to have more perfected, reliable and effective weapons systems, thus offsetting its quantitative inferiority. However, large-scale investments by the Soviet Union in its armaments industry and the systematic guidance of its best scientists, engineers and managers mean, according to all available information, that it has now achieved qualitative parity, thus depriving the West of its last remaining advantage. With a long period of military service, some 27,000 combat tanks in Europe compared with 11,000 for NATO, very powerful artillery and a numerous and modern air force (5,800 tactical aircraft for the Warsaw Pact in Europe compared with 3,300 for NATO), the Soviet Union is almost certain of being able to beat NATO forces in the event of generalised hostilities which remain below the nuclear threshold. The Soviet Union is therefore able to force NATO into the difficult position of having to be the first to use nuclear weapons, which may obviously raise doubts about the western deterrent, i.e. about the determination of the NATO countries to resist Soviet pressure.

34. It can thus be seen that Leonid Brezhnev's promise to the Czechoslovak Communist Party in Prague in February 1977 is gradually coming true: "In 1985, we shall have attained most of our objectives in Western Europe and the reversal of forces will then be so decisive that we shall be in a position to impose our will each time this is necessary".

35. (iv) *In the naval field*, the Soviet Union has made a major effort in the last ten years and it now has a nuclear or conventional capability of intervening anywhere in the world. Admittedly, it has fewer and smaller aircraft-carriers than the United States and its allies but the presence of Soviet aircraft-carriers in the Indian Ocean is a means of bolstering Soviet political and military influence there. The entire Soviet surface fleet numbers 132 vessels compared to 196 for the United States but its naval tonnage exceeds that of the United States and, in view of the United States' need to defend long lines of communication, this ensures the Soviet Union clear superiority.

36. It has 305 submarines of which 87 have a missile-launching capability, 83 are nuclear-propelled attack submarines and 135 conventionally-propelled attack submarines, compared with 41 strategic submarines, 70 nuclear-propelled attack submarines and 8 convention-

ally-propelled submarines for the United States plus 9, 11 and 49 submarines of the three categories for the European Community countries. The Soviet Union is therefore ahead of the West and can intervene in force along the lines of communication between Europe and the United States. Thus, following recent naval manoeuvres, the Soviet commander-in-chief announced triumphantly in a wireless message, not in code, that he was in a position to cut the links between Western Europe and the United States for five days in the event of hostilities.

(b) *Strategic positions*

37. The Soviet Union is therefore becoming the world's leading military power and its qualitative and quantitative lead is growing steadily. Its power is further strengthened by the strategic positions threatening the West's security that it has gained since the second world war and which enhance the value of its armaments.

38. (i) *In Europe* itself, from the North Cape to the Black Sea, it is deploying nuclear-warhead missiles capable of destroying in a few minutes the principal towns or a large number of military installations in all the Western European countries and thus practically annihilating the forces deployed by NATO. The stationing of the Soviet army in Czechoslovakia in 1968 placed it at the very centre of Europe and, even with conventional forces, it can threaten the principal route between Northern and Southern Europe.

39. (ii) *In Asia and Africa*, the Soviet Union now has a large number of bases which allow it to maintain a vast fleet in the Indian Ocean and supply any of its allies with weapons and equipment at very short notice. If it is borne in mind that, for the Soviet Union, the distance from its frontiers or coasts to the oil-producing areas of the Persian Gulf varies from 1,400 to 2,400 km by air and is 2,800 km by sea (to Syria), whereas for the United States the distance varies from 6,000 to 7,000 km in the first case and from 10,000 to 15,000 km in the second, that the Soviet Union has 15 airborne divisions which can be brought into the area, 2 of them within 5 days, whereas the United States has to allow about 18 days to bring 2 divisions into the Gulf, and that the occupation of Afghanistan has further improved the Soviet transport capability, the magnitude of the Soviet Union's ability to intervene can be seen. Control of Aden and the coast of Ethiopia further increases its superiority and extends its reach to a large part of the African continent.

40. Conversely, countries wishing to rely on the West for their security, whether in Asia or in Africa, are now threatened. In particular,

this is so for Pakistan, shut in between a hostile India and Afghanistan which is occupied by the Red Army, Thailand, now under direct attack by Vietnamese forces armed and assisted by the Soviet Union, and South Africa, isolated by Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique which are also to varying degrees armed, assisted or advised by the Soviet Union.

(c) *Soviet aims*

41. This incredible military deployment is not necessarily destined to make an all-out assault on the free world, in the immediate future at least, but rather to weaken the West materially and place it at the mercy of Soviet good will for supplies of oil and raw materials needed for its economy and to induce the western countries to seek security by coming to direct terms with the Soviet Union because they no longer have confidence in the effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. The Soviet Union has already announced that it could guarantee Western Europe's oil supplies, which is the same as saying that it could also deny them. In this way, the Soviet Union would assume an overwhelming influence over the European members of the Atlantic Alliance and would deprive NATO of its substance by gaining control over the economic survival and military capability of these countries.

42. In the event of war, the Soviet Union would be able to choose the level of hostilities and consequently place the enemy before the choice between escalation, thus assuming responsibility for and risk of destruction, or bowing to Soviet demands. Thus, the ultimate aim of all these military means designed to undermine the Atlantic Alliance and to disrupt NATO is to isolate the Western European countries in face of Soviet pressure and to give full effect to the political means used to ensure Soviet preponderance in the world.

43. Admittedly, in recent years the Soviet Union's intentions have seemed peaceful. It has taken major steps in the limitation of nuclear weapons and in security and co-operation in Europe, it has given up its claims to control West Berlin and has taken part in the MBFR negotiations and the Geneva Disarmament Committee. But for it to continue along this course the Atlantic Alliance must remain strong: the stronger it is, the longer the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions will last.

44. But since 1970 the Soviet Union's military potential has become strong enough for it to enjoy the full spectrum of political and military options and it can henceforth undertake anything anywhere at any time. All in all, this potential will be a far greater danger to the West than any intentions that, rightly or wrongly, may be attributed to it.

III. *The requirements of western security*

45. Faced with such a many-sided threat covering so vast an area, the West's security depends on unyielding cohesion. No state, probably not even the United States, can think of taking on the Soviet challenge alone.

1. *Military solidarity*

46. In the military field, only the United States, thanks to its own nuclear potential, is able to provide a credible deterrent to Soviet strategic weapons. This is beyond the ability of even the European powers that have nuclear weapons and for Europe there is no alternative to the NATO guarantee that the American deterrent will work. NATO ensures the presence of American conventional and nuclear forces on European soil and hence that any attack on Western Europe will meet United States and Canadian forces and, consequently, the whole spectrum of American strength, including its strategic nuclear weapons.

47. When General de Gaulle worked out and described the basic strategy for the French nuclear force, he made it clear that France did not intend to leave the Atlantic Alliance and that its strategy had a place only in relation to the strength of American deterrence and in the framework of a policy of collective defence which gave the national character of the French strike force its full value: insufficient on its own to deter Soviet aggression, it sought to give France, a European power, a means of transforming any conflict whatsoever into nuclear war and therefore gave Europe a new element of deterrence and hence of security.

48. The very concept of the British nuclear force is closely linked with that of the United States, and it is placed under NATO integrated military command in peacetime, subject to the right to withdraw it in the event of the United Kingdom's vital interests being at stake. There is therefore no question of the United Kingdom's defence being separated from that of the Alliance as a whole. A fortiori, the defence policy of all the other European countries depends on the integrated defence system which guarantees the umbrella of American strategic weapons as well as the reinforcement of United States theatre nuclear weapons on the continent of Europe.

49. In these conditions, anything that may weaken the links between Western Europe and the United States and Canada is a serious danger for the security of all and especially of the European members of the Alliance. The Soviet Union is aware of this and, in peacetime, deploys every political means available to stir up differences between the members of the

Atlantic Alliance and, in wartime, its strategy would be first and foremost to break the links between Europe and the United States and Canada. Hence, any indication of Europe moving away from its North American partners in the Atlantic Alliance would be a serious threat to the security of Europe. There is a risk of any call for Europe to become independent of the United States and Canada leading to a break-up of NATO, thus destroying the security of the western world and above all of the part of Europe which has remained free.

2. Political solidarity

50. This obviously does not mean that Europe has no right to criticise the United States, but in its own interests its criticism must not be overdone and Europeans must not lose faith in American policy nor, above all, in the determination of the United States to defend Europe in the event of attack. Any signs of this might well induce the United States and Canada to react negatively towards Europe as happened to some extent in the early months of 1980, when American public opinion felt that Europe was not giving President Carter its full support in the dispute with Iran and in his strong complaints about the invasion of Afghanistan. Any increase or prolongation of such reactions from American public opinion would inevitably leave room for doubts about the United States' determination to use all the means at its disposal to ensure the defence of Western Europe and would consequently make a *de facto* division between Europe and the United States and therefore weaken the European defence system.

51. Moreover, if the two groups of partners in the Atlantic Alliance were thus to drift apart, it might induce certain European states to try to ensure their own security by means which would quickly break up the Alliance and weaken collective security. This would be the case in particular if some sought, through direct and isolated closer contacts with the Soviet Union, the illusory guarantee of their own security at the expense of that of the European continent as a whole. Together, these two effects would be a real triumph for Soviet strategy since they would allow the Soviet Union to attain one of its principal goals without even having to resort to force. It is therefore evident that such attacks, aimed at destroying the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance, are part of the Soviet Union's political and strategic calculations and that Europe must be careful not to heed them.

52. To be effective, the Atlantic Alliance's defence policy must be based on a realistic view of the threats to the West and take account *inter alia* of the fact that détente is possible only if the Warsaw Pact powers, which are the other side of the world balance with the Atlan-

tic Alliance, are absolutely convinced that they must take the free world, its determination and strength seriously. This means that to ensure its security the West must be united and determined to remain so, it must be well-enough armed to meet any threat effectively and respond to any attack and it must be resolutely determined to defend itself.

3. Flexible response

53. None of the experts, whether in universities or in the armed forces, any longer denies the fact that the Warsaw Pact has far more armaments than are needed for a defensive strategy and a military policy based merely on the defence of its positions. Its armed forces are organised and deployed in terms of an offensive policy, not a defensive one.

54. In view of its situation, Europe cannot consider a strategy of confrontation with the Soviet Union and must consequently base its security on deterrence alone, which does not mean, in the present state of the balance of forces, that only nuclear forces play a part. For deterrence to be fully effective, it is in fact essential that the timing and nature of the West's retaliation to any aggression should be and remain uncertain and incalculable for the Soviet leaders. For instance, they must not be sure of being able to conduct aggression at a level fixed by them beforehand and they must have to reckon on American nuclear retaliation before Western Europe has been invaded. This element of deterrence is essential if the Soviet Union is to be prevented from relying on its conventional superiority in order to envisage winning a war by keeping it at conventional level and convinced that the risk it would take by attacking would be impossible to calculate beforehand. The same is true of its superiority in medium-range nuclear weapons as long as the American decision to station 600 Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe (i.e. with three warheads per missile, a total of 1,800 nuclear warheads) has not been implemented.

55. The doctrine of flexible response is therefore the only one which meets the needs of Western European security. It means that at every level NATO must have means of beating Soviet aggression and, short of this, it must be able to escalate the fighting to a higher level without immediately launching an exchange of strategic nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union. NATO forces must be deployed so as to convince Soviet military planners that there could be no certainty or even serious hope of conducting the fighting on their own terms.

56. The effectiveness of the flexible response therefore depends on the Alliance being in

strong enough shape to assure observers that Europeans and Americans are determined to defend Europe and that they have the means of doing so, i.e. that they have sufficient forces, equipped with weapons of all kinds, to make credible any threat on their part to resort to escalation to counter possible attacks. This has military implications – not to allow the Soviet Union to have a weapon against which the West has no means of retaliating, as tends to be the case at present for long-range theatre weapons – and political implications – the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance.

4. Requirements of a policy of deterrence

57. A long history of international relations has shown in fact that it is often for lack of internal cohesion rather than because of attacks from without that alliances fail to work in that either they no longer manage to avoid war or they break apart – sometimes during the wars they have not been able to avoid. Thucydides already gave a masterly demonstration of this in relation to the Athens maritime confederation, and the history of Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries provides many other examples.

58. The unity and solidarity of the western community have already proved their effectiveness. Thus, the West's vital interests have not been defied or called in question whenever the West has clearly demonstrated that it was united in its determination to defend them. A first instance was the attempt to blockade Berlin in 1948, when the United States found the appropriate response and showed that any further escalation of the Soviet operation would run up against American military might.

59. This determination and the maintenance of a balance of force in Europe in spite of the gigantic military effort made by the Soviet Union over the years led to the emergence of détente and its progressive development through increased trade, meetings, conferences and negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons, the reduction of conventional forces and security and co-operation in Europe since this process called for mutual confidence which could not find a guarantee in the Soviet Union's need to respect force. Thus, far from being an obstacle to détente, as communist propaganda has been trying to show for more than a quarter of a century, the West's strength and solidarity are a condition of détente and, more than any other factor, they have prevented any attack on the territories guaranteed by the Atlantic Alliance ever since its formation.

60. There is no reason to doubt the future of this cohesion, whatever might have been said or thought in recent years. France's withdrawal

from the NATO integrated military organisation may have opened the door for such speculation, but General de Gaulle and his successors have never called in question France's determination to stand by its undertakings under the North Atlantic Treaty and the modified Brussels Treaty. All that is known about the trend of its defence policy and its foreign policy, its nuclear effort and the deployment of its forces totally negates the idea that it might be a weak link in the defence system of the Alliance.

61. Your Rapporteur believes there is no question of making an indirect attempt to bring France back into the NATO integrated commands. As then Federal Minister of Defence, your Rapporteur deplored France's withdrawal from NATO. But this is now a fact and France's decision must be respected: the defence of Europe must be based on the idea that France will not return to NATO in the foreseeable future but will in no way call in question its membership of the Atlantic Alliance. This seems to be a basis of understanding between France and its partners, particularly as political circles in all the countries of the Alliance fully realise that there can be no European defence policy without the United States and France. Similarly, discussions in France about defence show that that country too considers there can be no defence without the participation of the United States. Outside NATO, France plays a special rôle and, because it feels responsible for Europe's security, it is a particularly strong element of the European pillar of the Alliance. In his speech at the *Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale* on 11th September 1980, Mr. Barre left no doubt about this rôle, underlining the priority France gave to deterrence, its determination to have the most effective weapons and its concern not to dissociate its security from that of its neighbours.

62. Similarly, the unswerving determination of all members of the Alliance in face of approaches or pressure by the Warsaw Pact countries to make them go back on their undertakings in the Atlantic community is most promising for the future. For thirty years, there has been no rift in the solidarity of the Atlantic community for the defence of the freedom of all its members, nor has any member tried to avoid its commitments.

63. It is precisely this remarkable success of the Alliance that now raises the question of its adaptation to take account of the changes that have occurred both inside and outside the Atlantic community and of the evolution of the threats it is designed to meet so that it may continue to play its full rôle in the interest of the security of all its members and of peace and the pursuit of détente.

64. Here, it is the joint management of the Alliance that ensures that efforts made by each member country have a maximum effect for the benefit of the security of all.

IV. *The European pillar of the Alliance*

1. *Europe's place in the Alliance*

65. The West's security cannot be guaranteed unless account is taken of the nature of the political aims of the Soviet Union, the strength of the Warsaw Pact forces deployed against Western Europe and the close link between the development of détente and the maintenance of security. There can be no question of any member of the Atlantic community conducting its policy in the light of just one of the joint aims and, in particular, the idea that the North American members of the Alliance might specialise in defence and the European members might play the rôle of détente would have disastrous consequences and destroy the solidarity on which deterrence is based. Everyone's security depends closely on the policy of common defence and the development of détente.

66. This means that the Alliance must, so to speak, be jointly managed by all its members so that, on the one hand, each one's efforts produce the maximum results for joint security and, on the other hand, no rift may form between the members in questions of defence policy or in their relations with the Warsaw Pact countries.

67. One way or another, strengthening NATO means strengthening its European element. Changing circumstances and growing threats to world peace and the obligations they impose on the American partners of the Alliance, particularly in areas not covered by the North Atlantic Treaty and especially in the Middle East, call for a special effort by Europe. Europeans must in fact be able, should the need arise, to take over from any American forces temporarily withdrawn from Europe for deployment in another part of the world so that the security guaranteed by the NATO military system is not jeopardised. It remains that the deterrent value of the Alliance is largely based on the physical presence of American forces in Europe, particularly in the Federal Republic, where no European forces can reasonably replace them.

68. But apart from this particular problem, the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance cannot be truly ensured unless there is some degree of balance between its European and American components. This was the idea advanced by President Kennedy in his speech at Philadelphia on 4th July 1962 when he referred to the

organisation of an Atlantic community based on two pillars. This concept is still just as topical, even though it is taking longer to implement than John Kennedy thought.

2. *The European components of the Alliance*

69. The present growth of the European Communities is the first sign of this European pillar as it creates a community of interests between the various Western European states. However, this community of interests does not always mean community of views on defence matters and a number of measures may be envisaged in order to strengthen the cohesion of the European pillar of the Alliance in the near future.

70. For instance, *Greece* should be encouraged to resume its place in NATO without delay. Its differences with Turkey are not sufficient reason for Greece to sever ties with its allies, particularly as it has no true deterrent of its own.

71. At the NATO ministerial meeting in Ankara in June 1980, Mr. Muskie, United States Secretary of State, held separate talks with the Greek and Turkish Ministers for Foreign Affairs and subsequently said there were quite good prospects of Greece returning to the organisation which it had left after the Cyprus affair in 1974. The Greek Government for its part agreed that priority should be given to returning to NATO in connection with a bilateral Greek-American agreement on American military bases in Greece. In other words, Greece seems convinced that joining the EEC and returning to NATO are two parallel steps, the aim being for Greece to play a full part in both.

72. In the case of *Spain*, its accession to the Atlantic Alliance has become a necessity and the Spanish authorities seem to be aware of this, as recalled by President Carter on 25th June 1980 when he was visiting Madrid. Spain is linked to the United States by a treaty of mutual assistance which expires in 1981 and grants the United States one naval base and three air bases on Spanish territory in exchange for economic and military assistance amounting to \$ 1,250 million but the United States and the Spanish Government have apparently agreed to replace this bilateral treaty by Spain's accession to NATO: Mr. Ouja, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, has announced that his country would apply for accession in 1981 and might become a member in 1983. However, Mr. Ouja asked for two guarantees:

- (i) that the process of integrating Spain into the EEC would be continued

because of the interdependence between the economic and military integration of Spain in Western Europe;

- (ii) that the Spanish-British negotiations on transferring the sovereignty of Gibraltar to Spain be well under way, preliminary negotiations having already begun between the United Kingdom and Spain.

73. Apart from a 200,000-strong army, a 48,000-strong navy and a 40,000-strong air force, Spain would bring the Alliance a highly valuable strategic position both on the Mediterranean and on the Atlantic, thanks to the Canary Islands.

74. Conversely, it might be in the joint interest of the Europeans to link the accession of Spain to NATO with membership of the European Economic Community. Its accession to NATO might be examined at the same time as its admission to the EEC. In fact, just as Spain does not intend to join NATO without being admitted to the EEC, and for the same reasons, its partners may link its admission to the EEC with membership of NATO. Moreover, there is every indication that the Spanish socialists, who were for a long time hostile to Spain's participation in the Atlantic Alliance, will no longer refuse to have Spain take its place in the West's collective defence system in Europe. As a condition, they wish the Spanish people to be consulted by referendum. Nor would anything prevent the three countries which have applied for membership of the European Community being encouraged to accede at the same time to the modified Brussels Treaty and WEU, thus giving an institutional framework to the European pillar of the Alliance. Finally, a solution should be found whereby Ireland, in view of its special situation, might be associated in one way or another with its European partners in the defence field.

75. Broader foundations might naturally be envisaged for the European pillar, particularly since Norway and Turkey are members of NATO and the Mediterranean is still Europe's *mare nostrum*, providing access to its vital centres whose control is essential for its security, and the Norwegian Sea is a route between Europe and North America, *inter alia* for Soviet submarines.

76. As a result of a referendum, *Norway* refused to join the EEC. The distances separating its most exposed territories – the Great North and the islands in the Barents Sea – from the central sector of European defence are so great that Norway is hesitant about its defence being too closely associated with that of the Central Europe sector and hopes for a special contribution to its defence from the United States and

Canada. In these circumstances, an attempt should be made to find a special solution to the problem of its participation in the European pillar of the Atlantic community.

77. This also applies to *Turkey*, whose relationship with the EEC will have to be determined in the next few years and whose position at the heart of the Middle East and on the frontiers of the Soviet Union raises particular problems.

78. The fact that the means of all the European members of the Atlantic Alliance are not identical in no way weakens the cohesion of the European pillar of the Alliance. On the contrary, the British and French nuclear forces can, and in fact do, make a major contribution to collective security. In recent years, *the United Kingdom* has been wondering whether to modernise its nuclear force by adopting a new generation of means of delivery. It has decided to make the necessary financial sacrifices to modernise its nuclear force and has thus committed itself to a long-term defence policy in which nuclear weapons will play an essential rôle.

79. *France* for its part is in the process of modernising its strike force. It is replacing the missiles on the Plateau d'Albion by more powerful and more accurate means. It has just decided to build a sixth nuclear submarine and on 27th June 1980 President Giscard d'Estaing announced that research had been carried out since 1976 for developing enhanced radiation weapons and missiles with mobile launchers. The French neutron weapon should be ready for deployment in 1983.

80. The existence and modernisation of the British and French nuclear forces considerably strengthens the Alliance's deterrent capability and more effectively than could be done by a European nuclear force which has often been mentioned but never seriously envisaged by the governments of any of the countries capable of playing a major rôle in its formation. The United Kingdom has never responded to approaches about the development of Franco-British nuclear weaponry. At the very time he was setting up the French strike force, General de Gaulle announced that he intended this force to remain under the sole responsibility of the French head of state. The idea of Franco-German nuclear co-operation has never been part of the French Government's policy nor that of the Federal German Government.

81. Indeed, *the Federal Republic* has always considered that it would derive no advantage from the possession of nuclear weapons and to have them would involve a strong risk of special difficulties in its relations with the Eastern European countries. Moreover, it fears that

the production of a European nuclear weapon might provide a reason or pretext for reducing the American presence in Europe.

82. This does not mean that the Federal Republic, any more than its European partners, is against the existence and development of the French and British nuclear forces. It therefore considers, as the North Atlantic Council formally declared in Ottawa in June 1974, that the French and British nuclear forces make a most useful contribution to the joint defence of the West on the one hand because of the weapons themselves and on the other – and above all – because they help to make it even more difficult for the Soviet Union to calculate the nature of the response to be expected in the event of attack.

3. Europe's armaments

83. Further, NATO, and particularly its European component, must make a major effort to make up for the time it has lost in the last ten years in the power and modernisation of its armaments, both nuclear and conventional. *In the nuclear field*, which mainly concerns the Americans, this implies *inter alia* the introduction of new weapons in response to the long-range theatre nuclear weapons deployed by the Soviet Union, particularly the SS-20s. These weapons are Pershing II and cruise missiles. It is surprising how slow the European members of NATO are to agree to the deployment of these weapons, which are essential for Europe's security, on their territory. At present, the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom are known to have accepted the principle and in June 1980 the British Government even indicated the sites it was reserving for cruise missiles on its territory. Italy has also agreed to the deployment of cruise missiles on its territory. Belgium has again postponed taking a decision, and there has been no positive sign from the Netherlands. Europe therefore bears heavy responsibility in the delays accumulated by the Alliance in the sector of long-range theatre weapons.

84. However, it should be noted that it will not be possible to start deploying the Pershing II before 1983 and that, in view of the present rate at which the SS-20s are being introduced, the Soviet Union will still have a considerable lead in theatre weapons for a long time to come.

85. Moreover, in view of the overwhelming tank superiority of the Soviet Union and its allies it seems essential for NATO to introduce as soon as possible a weapon capable of preventing the Soviet Union taking advantage of this superiority, i.e. enhanced radiation missiles, commonly known as *neutron shells*. It is well

known that for several years the Soviet Union and the communist parties have been conducting a vast propaganda campaign to induce the West to renounce this weapon for the very reason that they consider it to be effective. It would be most dangerous for the West to pay heed to such propaganda and further delay the development of this weapon. The French Government for its part seems to have understood this.

86. In fact, the Alliance as such has already taken its decision. In 1965, when Federal Minister of Defence, your Rapporteur had an opportunity of discussing with his then United States counterpart, Mr. McNamara, the need to increase the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent capability by developing an extremely accurate and highly mobile nuclear weapon with a very limited target area – about a square kilometre – and little fallout so as to cause only a minimum of radioactive pollution over a small area and for a short time in order to meet the challenge of Soviet conventional armaments – and particularly its tank superiority – without jeopardising the survival of a civilian population far from the battlefield. Such limitation of its effects should make the use of such a weapon credible and make it an effective instrument of deterrence. This weapon, which is merely a piece of artillery, is now being developed and meets the Alliance's requirements in the framework of a defensive strategy based on deterrence.

87. The deployment of *new conventional weapons* mainly concerns Western Europe. This is essential since Europe has fallen well behind the Soviet Union, particularly where aircraft are concerned. Thus, NATO forces must now be equipped with anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles with conventional warheads to prevent the Soviet Union taking advantage of its superiority in these two areas.

88. This effort is quite clearly in Europe's interest since it must prevent the United States being faced with a choice between nuclear war involving the use of strategic nuclear weapons and abandoning Europe. Only if Europe has the means and determination to defend itself effectively will the United States find itself really committed to apply the strategy of flexible response. A passive or cowardly attitude on the part of the Europeans can but spark off isolationist reactions in the United States and consequently aggressive reactions in the Soviet Union.

4. European armaments policy

89. This would mean the European members of NATO calling up troops who would have to be armed and equipped at very short notice.

This has implications in many fields, including that of armaments. The symposium organised by the WEU Assembly in Brussels in October 1979 showed – if it was not already evident – how incoherent the armaments policies of the European states are and how intolerable such a position is becoming. In spite of an agreement of principle on the need for interoperability of equipment of the various armies deployed in Europe, progress in this field has been insignificant and the forces having to take part in a common system on the same territory may well not be capable of operating because every country clings jealously to national concepts based more on traditions and peculiarities of military headquarters than on necessities.

90. It is essential for NATO to ensure without delay that all the forces that might have to operate on the Central European front can stock up in the armouries of any national army and that a maximum of interoperability is achieved as soon as possible. In Central Europe, there is no longer any national defence or any particular theatre of operations. In the event of war, any commander-in-chief must be able to call on contingents from any other country to meet the urgent requirements he has to handle.

91. The absence of standardisation and a fortiori inadequate joint production of armaments lead to competition in weapons production by European manufacturers with ruinous repercussions on military budgets and, hence, European taxpayers. Unit production costs are too high, making users prefer, in many cases, to procure the armaments they require outside Europe, which further increases the waste of public money and prevents the best use being made of the already inadequate credits earmarked for defence equipment by the European countries.

92. Since WEU started, its member countries, through the *Standing Armaments Committee*, have been defining European defence equipment requirements and types of armaments corresponding to these requirements so as to unify the European armaments market as far as possible. It has to be recorded that the SAC has so far managed to achieve only very limited results with considerable loss of time. Even its study of the situation in the European armaments industries is advancing at the speed of a tortoise, not by fault of the international secretariat of the SAC which has zealously tried to pursue its study but rather of the governments which have been very parsimonious in providing the necessary elements of information and above all have shown no interest in a task which they themselves decided should be undertaken. It may be wondered whether the vast amount of work already done is not des-

igned to lie dormant in the drawers of national administrations without their doing anything to draw the consequences in the field of joint production.

93. Further, the European members of the Atlantic Alliance organised the *Independent European Programme Group*, also intended to promote co-operation between military headquarters and the appropriate departments of Defence Ministries with a view to promoting the joint production of armaments. Although its sub-groups have proliferated, this group has in turn met the same difficulties resulting from an absence of will to succeed on the part of national departments which intend to remain *de facto* masters in their areas of responsibility.

94. Finally, it is on a *bi- or trilateral basis* that a number of weapons, including a few surface ships, aircraft and missiles, and even, more recently, tanks have been produced on a joint basis. But the standardisation of European armaments is essential and will become increasingly so, and the European Community will no longer be able to dissociate itself from this matter, as Mr. Davignon, member of the Commission, underlined at the Brussels symposium.

95. However, since the European countries' forces are solely or almost solely intended for deployment in a European theatre of operations, unlike American forces which may have to intervene in any part of the world, there is no technical reason why European armaments should not be unified. The only explanation for these difficulties and delays is the rigid attitude of military headquarters and of the relevant technical services or the special interests of armaments-producing firms and the pressure they are able to bring to bear on states. Similarly, the lack of determination on the part of governments to overcome these obstacles leads to incredible delays both in interoperability and in joint production or standardisation of armaments in Europe.

5. *Inter-allied consultations*

96. Finally, all these necessary arrangements require increased consultations between the American and European partners of the Alliance in the framework of NATO, without it being necessary to extend the defence area defined in the North Atlantic Treaty or to offer Europe's military support for an American policy aimed at curbing Soviet expansion in Asia and Africa. This policy was expressed *inter alia* in the "Carter doctrine", announced after the invasion of Afghanistan, according to which any further steps by the Soviet Union to attain its objectives would be considered sufficient reason for military action and thus involve an

inestimable risk. Such a declaration is particularly important in view of the threat to countries such as Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Oman, Iran and Saudi Arabia. It implies a redeployment of American forces, particularly in the Indian Ocean, and, above all, much greater mobility.

97. The West's aim is not and must in no case be to bring about a "division of the world" into two zones of influence but on the contrary to prevent Soviet policy imposing its views – as in Afghanistan – on countries which wish to remain non-aligned. The West can respond to the Soviet challenge by defending the freedom of peoples to choose their own course in their political, economic and social systems and in their external relations. This is the purpose of the measures taken by the United States.

98. The Soviet Union must not be given the impression that this American reaction might bring the advantage of separating the United States from its European allies. Consequently, Europe must show unremitting interest in and support for American policy outside Europe, but this it will not do if procedure for consultation in the framework of NATO is not considerably improved.

99. Hence, for the sake of western security Europe must participate to a greater extent than in the past in decisions taken jointly by members of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly in the framework of the North Atlantic Council. Such participation is essential if there is to be a real increase in the sacrifices made by Europeans for the joint defence, financially and where troop levels are concerned, and if decisions taken by the American authorities without consulting their European partners are not, as on several occasions in the recent past, to arouse misunderstandings and negative reactions among Europeans. It might also be said that, in the same way, decisions taken by one or other Western European country or even by the Nine on several occasions in recent months have aroused similar reactions among the American partners in the Atlantic Alliance because there was no prior consultation. The slow reactions of the Nine in following up the decisions taken by the United States regarding the crises in Iran and Afghanistan and the steps taken by the Nine to express their views on the Palestine situation provided several examples which are still fresh in our minds. Consultations between allies should be extended systematically to cover all aspects of the threat to the Atlantic Alliance, including those which concern its plans or its periphery and also the non-military aspects since a global challenge should be met by a global strategy. It is in no one's interest to exclude countries which are not able, or are not called upon, to take part in

military measures which might be taken by one country or another.

100. Generally speaking, it seems clear that Europe is in no way willing or prepared to intervene in any way whatsoever in the Middle East, whereas the United States is setting in place the military means to counter a possible Soviet aggression in the area by stationing a naval force off the coast of Oman, reorganising its Diego Garcia base and building up, on American territory, a combat-ready force of 110,000 men with the necessary air transport. But this in no way means that Europe can or wishes to dissociate itself from this area, which is vital for its oil supplies.

101. Certain European countries have forces capable of intervening outside the European theatre, particularly in Africa, where several military operations have been conducted on a limited scale in which others did not wish to or could not participate. Insofar as such operations concern the security of Europe and of the whole western world, they should be the subject of consultations between the partners in the Atlantic Alliance.

102. These consultations should also cover doctrine for the use of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons. Countries without nuclear weapons are closely and directly concerned by the way the nuclear powers intend to use their forces, and in particular their tactical nuclear weapons, in case of hostilities, since fighting would inevitably cover the whole territory of Europe. It should be added that a doctrine based on deterrence concerns all countries taking part in the deterrence, even if they do not make a nuclear contribution.

103. Although the idea of a European nuclear force does not seem to conform to Europe's true possibilities today, this in no way means that the Western European countries have no interest in jointly examining their approach to the problem of their defence which can no longer, in present technical conditions, be ensured by each country in isolation. On the contrary, there is every reason for them to examine together how the forces of each country should be deployed in peacetime and used in wartime to ensure maximum effectiveness and there is nothing to prevent these consultations also covering the use of nuclear weapons and their deployment in the NATO system. In view of the special status of the French deterrent and the rôle it plays in Europe's defence policy, consultations – Franco-German in particular – on its use might make a useful contribution to the western deterrent.

104. Finally, consultations should also cover all problems linked with the limitation of arma-

ments, force reductions and disarmament. There is a problem with regard to the SALT negotiations where the American participants obviously kept their allies informed, in the framework of NATO, of the progress of work, but such consultations were sometimes inadequate or too late. Naturally, negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe cannot succeed – and cannot even take place – without close consultation between all the members of NATO but, if these negotiations are to be continued, it would be desirable for France to take part in them so that all the problems raised by maintaining or transforming the balance of force in Europe may be considered. Finally, the prospects of a meeting to be held in Madrid in autumn 1980 to examine and verify the application of decisions taken at the conference on security and co-operation in Europe and which is *inter alia* to cover confidence-building measures, or of a European disarmament conference proposed by France, imply the existence and operation of a system of close consultations between the members of the Atlantic Alliance.

6. The frameworks of European co-operation

105. Whether it is a question of armaments production, the preparation of disarmament negotiations, the limitation of forces and armaments or events which concern international peace but which take place outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, there are obviously differences between the ways in which these matters are understood or handled on either side of the Atlantic. But if Europe wishes its American partners to listen to it, it must be in a position to know, express and uphold its views and interests in face of the United States which individual European states cannot do. The existence of a European pillar in a balanced alliance means Europe must exist politically.

106. The European Community is of course the principal factor of cohesion of this European pillar, even if not all the European members of the Alliance belong to the Community and certain members of the Community are not members of the Atlantic Alliance. Nevertheless, the establishment of a European economic entity expresses and strengthens *de facto* economic solidarity. This solidarity has been strengthened by the creation of a monetary union between several countries and the recent election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage which have made Europe more and more of a reality. However, in defence matters there is no satisfactory expression of solidarity since the Communities have no responsibilities in this area and certain Community countries are radically opposed to Community responsibilities being extended to cover defence.

107. Although it is evident that joint industrial policy concerns the armaments field and nine-power political consultations concern defence policy, which forms part of foreign policy, particularly where East-West relations are concerned, it does not seem possible at the present time to consider overcoming the obstacle constituted by opposition to extending the Community's work to include the military field.

108. Furthermore, *Western European Union* which, under the modified Brussels Treaty, has undeniable defence responsibilities, does not at present have a sound basis of solidarity and has never been able to work out a European defence policy for lack of agreement between the European governments on this point. The second pillar of the Atlantic Alliance therefore in fact exists at economic level but it has never been possible to build anything solid in the field of foreign policy and still less in that of defence.

109. Yet the development of the *European Communities* leads towards European defence policy being handled by Community bodies primarily because of the place occupied by the armaments industry in the European economy, a place which is continually growing and which, thanks to the development of the latest technology, in particular in the nuclear, electronic, computer and aircraft sectors, means that today the number and skill of firms working for defence and armaments are growing. But for this reason it is increasingly difficult to distinguish firms working solely for the civil sector. Commercial, technological and financial exchanges between European industries are and will become ever more numerous, so a common industrial policy henceforth calls for a common armaments policy.

110. Moreover, the Community has expressed the wish to give shape to the co-ordination of member countries' foreign policies in the framework of nine-power political consultations. This has had noticeable results and, during the first months of 1980, Community positions and declarations have been worked out on many matters relating to European security. But those consultations do not seem to have prevented certain governments from taking unilateral action, without warning their partners beforehand, in a number of matters which nevertheless related to the security of Europe as a whole. The development of nine-power consultations, soon to be twelve or thirteen powers since there is talk of Turkey being associated with them even before it joins the EEC, and the practice of holding consultations at short notice in the event of emergency are becoming an absolute necessity.

111. Finally, the European Communities quite evidently constitute the hub round which the Europe of the future is in the process of organising itself which means that security and defence questions must one day find a place in the work of the Communities. The necessary immediate measures can therefore be of only a provisional nature and designed to prepare for this Community future of which there are now glimpses.

112. The day the obstacles are removed – the present limitation of Community responsibilities, the refusal by certain countries to have these responsibilities extended and the fact that several European members of the Alliance are not yet members of the EEC – it will probably be possible to achieve early and complete identity between the European Community and the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

V. *The organisation of European security*

1. *The modified Brussels Treaty*

113. In present circumstances, *WEU* is still the only truly European organisation with responsibility for defence matters, which should enable it to help to form the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty confers this duty on it, providing for close co-operation between *WEU* and *NATO*:

“In the execution of the treaty, the high contracting parties and any organs established by them under the treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of *NATO*, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of *NATO* for information and advice on military matters.”

114. There is therefore no legitimate reason for setting a European defence organisation, *WEU*, against the Atlantic Alliance since the Brussels Treaty was modified specifically in order to organise Europe's participation in western defence. However, the same treaty gave a special dimension to European solidarity in its Article V, which provides for all the *WEU* member countries to afford each other automatic assistance in the event of one of them being attacked. This is an extremely serious undertaking since the party attacked has to be afforded “all the ... assistance in their power” and is therefore far more binding than the corresponding article in the North Atlantic Treaty, which makes provision only for consul-

tations in the event of an attack on one of the signatories. Consequently, any speculation there may be about the nature of the participation of any of the members of *WEU* in the common defence would be based on the supposition that the member concerned would not respect its signature, which there is no reason to think would be the case.

115. Moreover, Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty is completed by Article VIII which set up a Council that can meet at short notice at the request of any one of the member countries to examine all matters relating to co-operation between these countries in every field so that the Alliance might effectively be based on true solidarity.

116. But *WEU* suffers from a number of political handicaps. First, it groups only some members of today's Community Europe and a fortiori a smaller proportion of the members of the future Community, which will probably have twelve or thirteen members. Moreover, the *WEU* Council has never really exercised all its responsibilities under the modified Brussels Treaty since, from the outset, it relied on *NATO* for everything relating to defence proper and the exercise of its cultural and social responsibilities was subsequently handed over to the Council of Europe. Since the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Community, it has relied wholly on the Community to exercise its economic responsibilities, and the development of nine-power consultations has removed much of the substance of consultations held in the *WEU* Council.

117. The Council as it now is no longer plays any rôle at all. This might be welcome if its responsibilities were effectively exercised satisfactorily in wider frameworks. This is obviously not so for all that relates to defence and armaments, and the weakness of the *WEU* Council corresponds to a very real weakness of Europe.

118. The modified Brussels Treaty also includes differences between the rights and obligations of its members which were perfectly comprehensible at a time when, less than ten years after the end of the second world war, the protocol modifying the Brussels Treaty was drawn up, signed and ratified. Some of these inequalities are still topical. For instance, the fact that the United Kingdom has to maintain an army and an air force on the territory of the Federal Republic is as necessary as ever for Europe's security. Similarly, the Federal Republic has no desire to have the restrictions on the production of NBC weapons lifted as it has no intention of acquiring them.

119. Conversely, the restrictions on the production of conventional weapons by the Federal Republic hindered the competitive capacity of

that country's naval industries without meeting any present need and made it more difficult for the Federal Republic to take part in a joint armaments policy until the WEU Council decided, on 21st July 1980, to accede to Germany's request by removing the naval restrictions imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany.

120. Finally, there are differences of interpretation about the way certain powers intend to fulfil their undertakings in the event of a crisis. This applies essentially to France, which withdrew from the NATO integrated commands at the time it developed its nuclear force. It is understandable that the French Government should wish there to be some uncertainty about the cases in which it would engage its nuclear force. This is in the interest of the joint deterrent, in view of the fact that France has never questioned its signature of the North Atlantic Treaty or the modified Brussels Treaty which commits the French nuclear force under Article IV. Nevertheless, this ambiguity, particularly when it extends to the deployment of France's conventional forces in the Federal Republic, may be a factor of weakness for Europe if France's withdrawal from NATO is not offset by its close participation in military consultations between the European members of the Atlantic Alliance.

2. WEU bodies

121. If WEU is to play its due rôle in setting up the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, its structures must be adapted to Europe's joint defence ambitions. In particular, the Council should regularly include defence questions on its agenda, including matters relating to disarmament, which means that the Ministers of Defence or their representatives should take part in the work of the Council. As long as the WEU Council only includes representatives of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs, it is hard to see how it could co-operate effectively in building a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. The Council might also meet at an appropriate level prior to meetings of the North Atlantic Council so as to ascertain Europe's point of view on matters to be handled subsequently in the Atlantic framework.

122. It would also be advisable to make full use of the Standing Armaments Committee, as your Rapporteur has suggested above. In its reply to Recommendation 331, the Council recently agreed that the SAC might carry out work for the Assembly. It is now for the Assembly to avail itself of this possibility, but such co-operation must not be detrimental, as the Council specifies, moreover, to the pursuit of the SAC's normal work or of its present study; placing a ministerial institution at the disposal of a parliamentary body must in no

way be taken to mean that the government authorities are losing interest in that institution.

123. Finally, WEU should be enlarged to include all the members, and consequently also the new members, of the EEC so as to involve them more closely in the examination of the requirements of joint security. Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty provides for such enlargement and there is no need to let it lapse, although it has never been applied in the twenty-five years of WEU's existence.

124. Consideration of all the questions raised by this necessary adaptation of the structures of WEU to the realities of European security should be undertaken immediately since it meets an urgent need both in the field of armaments and in that of Europe's defence and security. It is naturally the WEU Council that will have to assume responsibility for this examination and to this end it should set up a permanent working group on which member countries would be represented. This group should be instructed to decide on measures to be taken with regard to the activities of WEU, including the revision of Protocol No. III, action to be taken on the SAC's study, the possible enlargement of WEU to include all member countries of the European Community and the countries which have applied for membership and the new course to be given to the Council's work, with all the implications this may have, *inter alia* through the effective participation of representatives of the Ministries of Defence.

125. Moreover, the WEU Assembly must be associated with this work and it should instruct the General Affairs Committee, through officially-communicated information, to follow the work of the Council and consider what subsequent action should be taken.

3. The WEU Assembly

126. *The WEU Assembly* for its part might play an active part in setting up the European pillar of the Atlantic Community. As the European parliamentary organisation responsible for defence, armaments and disarmament matters, set up under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, it has sole responsibility for defence matters. At the present juncture, it would not be reasonable to call in question the modified Brussels Treaty in view of the security benefits Europe derives from Article V. All the governments seem agreed on this point. The full treaty must therefore be applied effectively, including Article IX which specifies that the Assembly shall be "composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe", while allowing the WEU Assembly to

become the effective parliament of Europe in areas which are its sole responsibility.

127. However, it is clear that, because it was elected by direct universal suffrage, the European Parliament is destined to become the parliamentary component of the Europe of tomorrow. In the future it will therefore be its task to constitute the parliamentary element of a Community whose responsibilities would be extended to cover defence and armaments matters and it would be logical for the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament to be brought closer together now. It is not possible to have identical membership in the immediate future because the modified Brussels Treaty specifies that it is the delegations of the WEU countries to the Council of Europe Assembly that constitute the delegations to the WEU Assembly and, very soon, these delegations, or most of them at least, will no longer include any members of the European Parliament because of the latter's election by direct universal suffrage which often makes plurality of office impossible *de facto* if not *de jure*.

128. Furthermore, the WEU Assembly has an organic link with the national parliaments which alone can supervise member states' defence policies and it is through these parliaments that the WEU Assembly can and does exercise an influence – naturally difficult to assess – on national defence policies and hence on Europe's defence policy since this is still a mere conglomeration of national policies.

129. However, the WEU Assembly must here and now associate itself with the European Parliament, which represents some 250 million inhabitants of Western Europe, will represent even more in a few years' time and supervises the European Communities over which it exercises effective powers.

130. Cutting the links between the European Parliament and the national parliaments has at the same time the effect of conferring specific legitimacy on the European Parliament because it is based on the will of its European electorate. A connection between the two assemblies seems clearly necessary, but for the time being this cannot be done officially. A connection is possible however through the appointment of permanent observers to each other's assembly.

131. Answering Senator Boucheny on 6th June 1980, Mr. François-Poncet, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, said:

“There is no provision in the Brussels Treaty or the Rules of Procedure of the WEU Assembly for inviting observers. To create special observer status for a delegation from the assembly of the European Communities would be to disregard the respective responsibilities of

the WEU Assembly and of the assembly of the European Communities, the latter not being competent to discuss armaments or defence questions. As far as the French Government is aware, moreover, no such proposal has yet been submitted to the Assembly or the Presidential Committee of WEU.”

132. This answer invites comment for, although the composition of the WEU Assembly was specified in the treaty, the invitation of observers has never been the subject of any provisions by the governments which have always accepted the practice of all the European parliamentary assemblies inviting parliamentary observers. There is wide experience of this since observers from the parliaments of several non-member countries of WEU, members of the Atlantic Alliance, attend each of the WEU Assembly's sessions.

133. Observers sent by the European Parliament to the WEU Assembly might however play a larger rôle. They might, for instance, be more numerous – a figure of about twenty might be agreed upon, which would represent hardly more than a fifth of the number of members of the WEU Assembly – but, unlike observers from national parliaments, they would no longer have to confine their speeches to matters of direct concern to their countries. Everything that concerns Europe concerns the European Parliament, so its observers should have all the rights of members of the WEU Assembly, i.e. the right to speak and the right to attend committee meetings. Only the right to vote could obviously not be granted to them.

134. Your Rapporteur realises this proposal arouses some mistrust and reservation among members of the WEU Assembly. However, he wishes to recall that the modified Brussels Treaty was drafted and adopted at a time when the European Parliament did not exist. Had it then existed, the WEU Assembly would have been associated with that parliament rather than with the Council of Europe for constituting its delegations.

135. At the present juncture, it is therefore normal to allow all the main tendencies in the European Parliament to be represented in a delegation of observers which should be large enough, but not so large as to upset the normal course of work in the WEU Assembly. Insofar as these observers would not be entitled to vote, this would have no effect on Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty. Their presence would obviously not be as beneficial to the European Parliament as to the WEU Assembly since the latter would be able to take advantage of the potential strength of the European Parliament and its political groups, whereas the European Parliament would have little to expect of

observers sent to it by the WEU Assembly, except perhaps for the link with the national parliaments which it will be lacking in the near future.

136. In any event, if some such solution is not found in the fairly near future, it will be impossible to prevent the European Parliament from discussing matters which are as vital for Europe as peace and war, security, détente and disarmament. To take cover behind claims of exclusive responsibility will remain without effect. It is better to make the most of a situation than to hide one's head in the sand without a thought for the future.

137. In the long run, it is hoped before the end of this new decade, such participation should lead to a merger of the two assemblies in a single European Parliament with universal powers, i.e. capable of being the true parliament of a Europe master of its destiny. The present proposal merely paves the way for this solution, without requiring any revision of the modified Brussels Treaty or of the treaty setting up the European Community. It is hard to see what principle could be invoked for refusing to allow the members of Europe's Parliament to take part in the work of the only European assembly with responsibilities in defence matters.

VI. Conclusions

138. As Professor Wilhelm Grewe, former Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic to NATO, said in a recent speech at Wolfsburg: "Criticism within the Alliance is inevitable and legitimate, but it must be constructive and strengthen its resolve, not just assert verbal solidarity in order to evade the issue." This is the sense of the present report.

139. A few obvious facts should therefore be recalled:

(i) Although détente and disarmament are Europe's goals, it cannot consider sacrificing its security for them, as was stressed in the Harmel report which, already in 1967, examined measures to be taken to achieve a better balance in NATO.

(ii) Security is above all the result of deterrence, ensured mainly by the United States, and means maintaining American forces in Europe as a guarantee of the United States' determination to defend Europe by every means at its disposal.

(iii) It is therefore ensured by the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and by all the forces that NATO can earmark for a strategy of flexible response.

(iv) Cohesion, essential for meeting both political and military threats, means the Alliance must rest on a strong European pillar, based on the awareness of the European members of the Alliance of the interdependence of their destinies.

(v) Any adaptation of the Alliance to a world in which threats are becoming increasingly imminent depends on the formation of the European pillar.

(vi) This calls for a regrouping of the Western European countries, the elaboration of a common armaments policy and close co-ordination of their foreign and defence policies, also covering areas outside the North Atlantic Treaty area.

(vii) The European Community is the natural framework for this regrouping.

(viii) At the present juncture, WEU is still the only European organisation in which member-countries are required to co-ordinate their defence policies.

(ix) Consequently, WEU must be quickly adapted to the present requirements of the Atlantic Alliance so that it may help to form the European pillar of the Alliance.

(x) At the same time, WEU must help to prepare the future, which, in the parliamentary field, means establishing permanent links between the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament.

(xi) To this end, the WEU Assembly should extend a permanent invitation to observers from the European Parliament to take part in all its work, but without the right to vote.

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