



European Communities

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

WORKING DOCUMENTS

English Edition

420.41 text

1986-87

+ 327.37

6 October 1986

A SERIES

DOCUMENT A 2-107/86 /B

REPORT

drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee

on arms control and disarmament and their importance
to the European Community

Part B: EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Rapporteur: Sir Peter VANNECK

PE 97.992/fin./B
Or. EN

B
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
A. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>	
(i) General approach to the problem of arms control and disarmament	14
(ii) Timing of the report	15
(iii) Scope of the report	15
(iv) The role of the European Community and the European Parliament.	16
B. <u>THE GENEVA ARMS TALKS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION</u>	
(i) Background to the Geneva talks.....	17
(ii) The INF and START talks.....	17
(iii) The Reagan-Gorbachev Summit.....	19
(iv) The US Strategic Defence Initiative.....	20
(v) The EUREKA Initiative.....	23
C. <u>THE MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION (MBFR) TALKS IN VIENNA</u>	24
D. <u>THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA</u>	
(i) Chemical weapons	26
(ii) Non-Proliferation Treaty/Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban.....	27
(iii) Prevention of the arms race in outer space.....	28
(iv) Radiological weapons.....	29
E. <u>THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, STOCKHOLM</u>	29
F. <u>THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS</u>	31
G. <u>ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT</u>	32
H. <u>THE POSITION OF JAPAN</u>	37
I. <u>SOME OTHER ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT</u>	
(i) Peace movements	38
(ii) Nuclear-free zones	39
J. <u>CONCLUSIONS</u>	41
ANNEX	43

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AND THEIR IMPORTANCE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

1 This Explanatory Statement has been drawn up following exchanges of view in the Sub-Committee on Security and Disarmament on 26 April and 31 October 1985.

A. INTRODUCTION

(i) General approach to the problem of arms control and disarmament

2 The decision to draw up this report reflects the importance for the European Community of arms control and disarmament. But these matters are also important for the entire human community, East and West, North and South, and not just for this generation but also for the generations which, we can only hope, are to come.

3 Although there are widely diverging views within the European Parliament on various aspects of arms control and disarmament, on other aspects of these questions there is considerable agreement.

4 Thus, for example, although there may be disagreement about the methods of achieving disarmament and about the precise nature of Europe's relations with the two superpowers, there is a broad measure of agreement on the urgent necessity of achieving effective multilateral arms control and disarmament and on the need for the voice of the European Community to be heard and for its views to be taken into account.

5 It is the Rapporteur's intention first to examine recent developments and the current situation in this field as objectively as possible and secondly, in making concrete suggestions, to concentrate on the points on which a clear majority of members of the European Parliament can agree.

6 The Rapporteur proposes neither on the one hand unilateral disarmament nor, on the other hand, complacency. Our aim is neither to win the arms race nor to create it. Our aim is first to limit it and then, if possible, to end it on a mutually-balanced and verifiable basis. The report attempts to make a pragmatic, reasonable and constructive contribution in the field of multilateral disarmament.

7 Total disarmament is, for the foreseeable future, an unrealistic goal. The experience of history lends its weight to the reality and the perceived values of mutual fear. However, just as we must not be naive if we are to preserve our freedom, so we must not be despairing if we are to guarantee the future of our planet.

(ii) Timing of the report

8 The report is being prepared at a propitious moment in East-West relations. Although major problems remain to be overcome and although the relative failure of arms control negotiations in the past does not permit a high degree of optimism, the resumption of the dialogue between the two superpowers since the US Presidential election in November 1984 means that there can now be real hope for progress towards arms control and disarmament. The improvement in East-West relations in recent months has already led to limited progress, for example at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna, and at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building measures and Disarmament in Europe.

9 The talks between President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev which took place in Geneva in November 1985 are the most important recent development in the arms control sphere and are central to the hopes for progress.

10 However, the other sets of negotiations which are taking place in other forums remain highly significant both for their own sake and because of their potential relationship to the bilateral Geneva talks on arms control.

(iii) Scope of the report

11 This report, while not duplicating any of the other reports which are being prepared within the Sub-Committee, will attempt to cover briefly all the major arenas where arms control and disarmament negotiations are taking place:

- The Geneva talks between the two superpowers which opened on 12 March,
- The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna,
- The UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva,
- The CSCE Conference on Confidence- and Security-building measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCBDE or CDE) in Stockholm,
- The role of the United Nations in the disarmament field.

12 The report will also deal with a number of other aspects of arms control and disarmament including the role of peace movements, nuclear-free zones and some economic aspects of armament and disarmament.

(iv) The role of the European Community and the European Parliament

13 Any decisions taken in the disarmament and arms control fields are of enormous importance to the citizens of the European Community. The European Parliament is, therefore, not merely a casual observer of the various negotiations which are taking place, but, as the directly elected representative Assembly of the people of Europe, is responsible for protecting, insofar as possible, their real and immediate interests.

14 The Governments of all the Member States of the European Community do participate in some of the forums already mentioned, such as at the United Nations General Assembly and at the Stockholm CSCE Conference. In the discussions which take place there they can and do make known their views individually and, through the Presidency, collectively. Some of the Member States also take part in other forums such as the MBFR talks in Vienna and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

15 Sometimes, however, the negotiations are entirely bilateral between the superpowers, as is the case with the ongoing 'umbrella' talks which are taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva.

16 While the Twelve have welcomed and supported, as has the Parliament, the talks which are now taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union, they have at the same time emphasised that these negotiations are situated in the more general context of East-West relations as a whole. Europe is, and has always been closely concerned in such negotiations, and this was recognised by President Reagan, whose first act, after concluding his Summit talks with Mr Gorbachev in Geneva, was to brief the NATO Heads of Government in Brussels.

17 The potential influence of the European Community and the Parliament on the super-powers have been increased by the facts that further US-USSR summits are planned for 1986 and 1987, thus providing opportunities for bringing a Community viewpoint to bear - opportunities which it should seize. Further, the incorporation into the Community Treaties, by means of the European Act signed on 17 February 1986, of European Political Cooperation gives Parliament

new possibilities to influence the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve. Third, the Parliament must pursue with the Foreign Ministers the proposal made in the Klepsch Report of April 1984,¹ and the Hänsch Report of April 1984² for new procedures, based on the so-called 'Gymnich' formula,³ to ensure closer and more constructive mutual consultation between the Foreign Ministers and the USA.

B. THE GENEVA ARMS TALKS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

(i) Background to the Geneva talks

18 Mr Shultz, the US Secretary of State, and Mr Gromyko, then Soviet Foreign Minister, met in Geneva on 7 and 8 January 1985 to work out a joint understanding of the subject and the aims of the talks. In the joint statement issued after that meeting the sides agreed 'that the subject of the negotiations would be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their inter-relationship'. They further agreed that the objectives of the negotiations 'would be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, and limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability'.

19 It was agreed that the negotiations would be conducted by a delegation from each side divided into three groups (one to deal with strategic nuclear weapons, one with intermediate-range nuclear weapons and one with space weapons).

(ii) The INF and START talks

20 In effect the Geneva talks replace both the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Force) and the START (Strategic Arms Reduction) talks which were broken off by the Soviet Union following the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Western

¹ Resolution on shared European interests, risks and requirements in the Security field, OJ C 127/70, 14.5.1984: see also Explanatory Statement, paras. 65-66. (Doc. 1-80/84B)

² Resolution on political relations between the European Community and the United States, OJ C 127/89, 14.5.1984, paras. 10 and 30.

³ In April 1974 the Foreign Ministers of the Nine agreed to delay a decision in

Europe in November 1983. The Geneva talks also include under their 'umbrella' the question of weapons in space. Although the INF and START talks did not produce concrete results, it is worth considering them briefly in the context of this report since they have prepared the ground for certain aspects of the current Geneva talks and since some of the ideas put forward at the earlier negotiations can be expected to resurface in one form or another.

21 The INF talks, which opened in November 1981, concerned intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. At the heart of the negotiations was the NATO decision of 1979 to deploy Pershing-II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, in response to the Soviet Union's deployment of SS-20 missiles. Whereas the Soviet Union wished in the negotiations to prevent the deployment of Pershing-II and cruise missiles while maintaining its own already deployed SS-20 missiles, the United States would only consider non-deployment to the extent that the Soviet Union would destroy its SS-20s. Before the breakdown of the negotiations, a number of serious proposals were made. The following, briefly, were amongst the more important proposals put forward:

- The 'zero option' put forward by the United States called for the destruction of all SS-20s (and also the earlier, less sophisticated SS-4s and 5s) in exchange for an agreement not to deploy Pershing-II and cruise missiles in Western Europe;
- Soviet proposals to withdraw SS-20s into the Eastern part of the USSR;
- The so-called 'walk-in-the-woods' proposal put forward by the two chief negotiators but rejected by their respective governments: namely that the Soviet Union should be allowed to deploy 75 SS-20s in 'European Russia' and 90 in the Eastern part of the USSR; neither side was to deploy in Europe more than 150 of certain specified types of aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons: NATO was to be permitted to deploy 75 cruise missile-launchers with 4 missiles each, but no Pershing II missiles: and fresh negotiations were to open on further reductions immediately this agreement was signed;
- the so-called 'walk-in-the-park' proposal, disclaimed by both sides, envisaging equal reductions of 572 warheads on each side.

22 The START talks, aimed at reducing the level of strategic nuclear forces, opened in Geneva in June 1982. The talks were a continuation of the earlier Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The lack of progress at the START talks before they were suspended in December 1983 reflected both the difficult international climate and a major difference of opinion between the Soviet Union, which wished to freeze existing levels of nuclear weapons, and the United States which wished to achieve reductions in existing levels of ballistic missile warheads.

(iii) The Reagan-Gorbachev Summit

23 The lack of progress during 1985 in the Geneva arms talks indicated the need for a new impulse to be given to the negotiations on arms control and disarmament. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in Geneva in November 1985 for two days of talks, much of the time being spent without advisers. In the resulting joint statement (see Annex) the two leaders concluded that 'a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought'. They pledged that their countries would 'not seek to achieve military superiority'. It was agreed that work at the Geneva arms talks should be accelerated, and early progress was called for particularly in regard to 'the principle of 50% reductions in the nuclear arms of the US and the USSR appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement'. The leaders further agreed that during these negotiations 'effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon'.

24 President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev also agreed to studies on centres to reduce nuclear risk (a new agreement on the Washington Moscow 'hot-line' was achieved). They reaffirmed their commitment to the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in particular to Article 6 thereof which calls for negotiations on matters of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament. The two leaders also called for progress in the MBFR talks at Vienna, in the Geneva negotiations on chemical weapons and at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm.

25 In commenting on the talks, President Reagan said that 'the real report card on Geneva will not come in for months or even years'. He listed the problems that remained to be solved as: the need to reduce sharply nuclear offensive weapons and to move to non-nuclear defensive systems; peaceful resolution of conflicts in Asia, Africa and Central America; the advancement

of the cause of liberty; and the fulfilment of international treaties. Mr Gorbachev saw the needs to be: to decrease the threat of nuclear war; to prevent the arms race moving into space; and to reduce the arms race on earth.

26 Thirteen out of the sixteen Heads of Government of NATO states and all their Foreign Ministers, met in Brussels on 21 November to hear President Reagan's report on the summit. All expressed approval, the principal absentee being President Mitterrand, who stated in Paris that European countries should together protect themselves against an arms race in space.

27 As regards the Press, Le Monde took the view that Mr Gorbachev was banking on the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) becoming a victim of budget reductions by the US Congress, and being less strongly pursued after the end of President Reagan's term of office in November 1988.⁴ The Financial Times quoted the view of Soviet specialists that Congress may regard closer US-USSR relations, rather than progress in the Geneva arms talks, as a reason for cutting back on the US weapons programmes; the importance of the summit might thus lie in developments in other areas.⁵ Most journals noted no concrete progress had been made on any aspects of arms control or disarmament, and some believed that lack of such progress before the next summit in June 1986 in Washington, DC, and the one thereafter in the USSR in 1987 would be badly received in the US, the USSR and in Europe.⁶

(iv) The US Strategic Defence Initiative

28 One of the most contentious issues at the Geneva arms talks is the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) announced by President Reagan on 23 March 1983. The question of the SDI is also being mentioned by Mr Bernard Reymond in his report on the European Community and the Security of Western Europe. However, since SDI so clearly has implications for current arms control negotiations it has seemed appropriate to include some consideration of the SDI in this report.

29 The purpose of the SDI, currently a research programme, is to identify ways to exploit recent advances in ballistic missile defence technologies that have potential for strengthening deterrence. The SDI is not based on any

⁴ Le Monde, 23 November 1985

single or preconceived notion of what an effective defence system would look like. A number of different concepts, involving a wide range of technologies, are being examined. The aim of the SDI is to substitute for the threat of nuclear retaliation, insofar as possible, a plausible defence against nuclear attack, to replace 'mutual assured destruction' with 'mutual assured survival'.

30 As a theoretical longterm aim, there is a case for its being considered laudable. The world might indeed be a safer place if technology could be developed and made available to all concerned which would prevent a nuclear attack from reaching its target. The strongly and widely held doubts which have been expressed about the SDI, however, relate not only as to whether the aim is desirable but even more as to whether it is achievable. Four distinguished Americans wrote recently in *Foreign Affairs*⁷: 'What is centrally and fundamentally wrong with the President's objective is that it cannot be achieved'. It is possible that the ultimate potential of the SDI is not total defence but rather the provision of enough protection for US land based missiles and bombers to prevent a first strike attack.

31 A second major objection to the SDI is that it would also encourage the Soviet Union both to pursue similar technology and to enhance its nuclear strike capability to render the SDI ineffective. Just as it is difficult to predict precisely what results the SDI research will provide, so it is difficult to predict precisely what the technological and strategic response to the SDI will be.

32 A third objection is that the SDI, whatever its effectiveness in the long term, seems certain to lead to a degree of uncertainty and instability in the short and medium term. For, frightening though the threat of 'mutual assured destruction' may be, it has proved an effective deterrent, acceptable to both sides. To move away from that concept without simultaneously ensuring 'mutual assured survival' would be to introduce a dangerous variable into the strategic equation.

7 'The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control' by McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara and Gerard Smith, in Foreign Affairs, Winter 1984/85.

33 A related consideration is that the deployment of an SDI system or the field testing of such a system or its components, would breach Article 5 of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty - one of the few significant arms control achievements.

34 Against this background, it must be recalled that the Soviet Union, despite its protestations about the SDI, has been continuing a programme of research on both traditional and advanced anti-ballistic missile (BMD) technologies that has been underway for many years. Furthermore, the Soviet Union, like the United States, has also been researching space weapons and is understood already to have a fully deployed anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. These anti-satellite weapons, as well as those being developed by the United States, threaten to endanger the important monitoring and communication functions which the satellites perform. In a sense, therefore, President Reagan's SDI initiative is based on research (such as ASAT and BMD research) which has already been undertaken for some time by both sides.

35 It has been argued that technological progress has a momentum of its own and is inevitable. If so, it is a sad reflection on humanity that science should control man rather than man science. Less philosophically, if the attempt to pursue the SDI is inevitable, so too is the attempt to develop technology to render the SDI ineffective.

36 Individual Western European countries have so far been somewhat divided and uncertain in their response to the SDI initiative. The tentativeness of their response is an indication of the politically sensitive and strategically significant implications of the SDI. The arguments which have been outlined briefly in this paper are not meant to represent a case against the initiative but are advanced to suggest that the issue should be approached with a modicum of scepticism.

37 Mrs Thatcher and President Reagan were reported to have reached a constructive agreement in December 1984 on four points in relation to the Strategic Defence Initiative:

- The West is seeking balance with the Soviet Union, not superiority over it,
- SDI is a research programme and deployment must be a matter of negotiation, taking account of existing agreements,
- The purpose of the exercise is to enhance, not to undermine deterrence,

- The aim of arms control negotiations should be to seek lower levels of offensive forces.

38 Scepticism must, however, remain even about the research programme itself - its potential, its possible destabilising effect, its relationship to the arms race - and in March 1985, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe posed a number of critical questions about the SDI. He said that the US nuclear guarantee must be enhanced by defensive deployments, 'not only enhanced at the end of the process but at its very inception'. He also feared that 'the prospect of new defences being deployed would inescapably crank up the levels of offensive nuclear systems designed to overwhelm them'.

39 The SDI initiative itself, whatever view one takes of it, clearly has implications for the future relations between Europe and the United States. Quite apart from its strategic significance it has a political significance, and it has become another source of difficulty in relations between the Member States and the USA, not least because no European leaders were consulted before the SDI was launched. On the one hand the British Government has been the only one to sign a formal agreement with the US Government covering the terms on which British companies and universities should participate in SDI research projects. On the other hand, the French Government at first rejected a formal agreement of this sort, but has recently been in contact with the US Department of Defence. No other Government in the Twelve has made a formal agreement with the US Government, but they have not dissuaded individual research bodies from exploring the possibilities of obtaining research contracts for SDI.

(v) The EUREKA Initiative

40 President Mitterrand's 'EUREKA' initiative for joint European high technology research is significant in the context of Europe's response to SDI. A number of its aspects relate closely to SDI research fields:

- optronics
- new industrial materials
- fifth generation megacomputers
- high-energy laser and particle beams
- the growth in 'artificial intelligence'.

41 Since it was launched early in 1985, the EUREKA proposal has made considerable progress. Several Community Governments have pledged funds to support it, as has the European Commission; projects have been identified as potentially worthy of support in the EUREKA framework; and the participation of non-EEC countries has been provided for. The European Parliament, in a resolution adopted in October 1985⁸ welcomed the EUREKA initiative, 'both as a non-military European response to the SDI programme and as the means for an aggressive European technological and industrial policy'. Parliament also wished the EUREKA project to be incorporated into the EEC, that the Commission should have a vital role in the project's development, and that it should itself participate in its definition and implementation. The Rapporteur should, perhaps, add that SDI cannot be accurately classified as 'military' and EUREKA as 'non-military'.

C: THE MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION (MBFR) TALKS

42 The MBFR talks, which have been in progress in Vienna since 1973, concern the 'mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe' and are confined to conventional forces and weapons. Although the two sides have reached a degree of common ground, no agreement has yet been reached on troop reductions. Agreement has, however, been reached on the following fundamental objectives:

- (i) reductions should lead to 'common collective ceilings' on forces in the area of 900,000 men, including not more than 700,000 ground forces,
- (ii) reductions would be in two phases: in phase 1 only US and Soviet forces would be withdrawn,
- (iii) reductions could affect armaments as well as numbers of forces,
- (iv) 'associated measures' (including, most importantly, means of verification) would accompany an agreement on force reductions.

43 Amongst the remaining points of disagreement, the following are amongst the most significant:

⁸ Resolution on Europe's response to the modern technological challenge, 8 October 1985, paras. 5, 7 - 9. OJ C 288/34, 11.11.1985. (Report by Mr Poniatowski, Doc. A2-109/85)

- Western demands for more specific arrangements for verification,
- Western calls for prior agreement on 'data' (NATO claims that the Warsaw Pact underestimates its current troop strength),
- Eastern demand for separate ceiling on the forces of each country,
- Eastern demand for separate ceiling on air force personnel,
- Eastern demand for more specific agreements about the withdrawal of armaments.

44 Proposals have been made by both sides with regard to such matters. In 1982 both NATO and the Warsaw Pact presented separate draft treaties for the first time. A new NATO proposal was introduced in April 1984.

45 Most recently, on 15 February 1985, the Warsaw Pact presented a new proposal with a view to breaking the deadlock at the MBFR talks. The proposal provided for the initial reduction of 20,000 troops by the Soviet Union and 13,000 by the US within a year of an agreement being reached. This would be followed by a larger cut back in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces to a level of 600,000 men on each side. The plan foresaw a second stage during which the states in Central Europe would agree to freeze the level of their forces for three years.

46 These proposals were criticised by the West as being inadequate as regards verification. On 3 December 1985 NATO put forward new proposals based on those of the Warsaw Pact. An initial reduction of 11,500 Soviet, and 5,000 US troops was envisaged, followed by the three-year freeze proposed earlier. The new elements in the NATO plan were that the initial withdrawal could be made without prior agreement on data, and that verification procedures would be considerably intensified. It is to be hoped that the Reagan-Gorbachev Summit of November 1985 will in fact open up avenues towards progress in the MBFR talks.

D. THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

47 The Conference on Disarmament (CD), formerly the Committee on Disarmament, constitutes the single multilateral negotiating body for global disarmament. Amongst the more important matters dealt with by the CD are the following:

- (i) The attempt to negotiate a comprehensive ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons,
- (ii) Non-Proliferation Treaty/Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban,

- (iii) Prevention of the arms race in outer space,
- (iv) Radiological weapons.

(i) Chemical weapons

48 In recent years the CD has perhaps registered its greatest degree of progress in the field of chemical weapons. The Rapporteur is conscious that a separate report is being drawn up on chemical and biological weapons within the Sub-Committee on Security and Disarmament. While it is not his intention to trespass on a field which is being dealt with elsewhere, the Rapporteur will deal briefly with this question in order to provide as complete a picture as possible of the various disarmament negotiations which are taking place.

49 The particular significance of chemical weapons in the disarmament process is that there appears to be a realistic possibility of eliminating these weapons entirely through a process of negotiation. This would both be a significant achievement in itself and a positive example of arms control negotiations which could have a positive impact in other forums.

50 Briefly, there are two main reasons for optimism about the prospects for progress in this field at the CD in Geneva.

Firstly, there appears to be a relatively high degree of international consensus that these weapons should be abolished. The Ad-Hoc Working Group of the Conference on Disarmament (the CD/CW) has accepted - as indeed the United States and the Soviet Union have - that the objective in relation to chemical weapons is comprehensive disarmament and not a mere ceiling or set of limitations. On the Western side there has indeed already been a degree of unilateral arms control in this field with the UK abandoning production in 1955 and subsequently disposing of its stockpile and the United States unilaterally renouncing further production in 1969.

Secondly, it appears possible to extract chemical weapons from the strategic equation to an extent that is not possible with many other forms of weapons. The development, production and stock-piling of biological and toxin weapons has already been entirely prohibited by the 1972 Convention (although it is alleged that the Soviet Union has breached the Convention). The use of chemical weapons has also been prohibited by the

Geneva Protocol of 1925, and although its provisions has not always been respected - most recently in the Iran/Iraq war - there appears to be a solid basis for progress.

51 Although major problems remain to be overcome in the negotiations, notably with regard to verification procedures, considerable progress has been made. Significantly, in February 1984, the Soviet delegation accepted in principle the international on-site inspection of the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. In March 1985 the British Government made proposals for the routine inspection of civil chemical plants and, in a further paper which drew on previous Canadian and Netherlands Government papers, in April 1985 set out proposals for the institutions necessary to implement a Chemical weapons convention. These included a new international organisation to implement the convention, which would have power to conduct random, routine, international, on-site inspection of declared chemical plants.

(ii) The Non-Proliferation Treaty/Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970.

52 The Treaty contains both the acceptance by the principal nuclear powers of undertakings to engage in negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament and a corresponding commitment by the non-nuclear states which became parties to the Treaty not to enter the nuclear arms race. Two nuclear weapon states - China and France - have not signed the Treaty.

53 If the Treaty is to be judged on the basis of its implementation by the non-nuclear weapons states which are party to it then it may be considered a major success (although it is a matter of grave concern that some states remained outside the framework of the NPT). However, such a positive judgement cannot be made on the discharge by the nuclear weapon states parties of their obligation to proceed to the negotiated containment, curtailment and elimination of nuclear weapons.

54 The NPT Third Review Conference took place in September 1985 and provided a quinquennial opportunity to review the functioning of the Treaty. The Final Declaration noted the great and serious concerns expressed about the nuclear capability of South Africa and Israel and the calls on all States to prohibit the transfer of nuclear facilities, resources or devices to these countries.

The Conference affirmed its determination to strengthen further the barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons ... to additional States. It called for nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

55 A comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, complementing the partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 (in which the United States, the Soviet Union and the UK agreed to halt tests in the atmosphere, in space and underwater) would represent a pragmatic and significant step towards multilateral nuclear disarmament and would constitute a timely demonstration of a serious commitment to the process of arms control and disarmament. Two further partial test bans signed by the US and Soviet Union in 1974 and 1976 have not been ratified because of disputes about verification and linkage (the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty). Although the CD set up an ad-hoc working group on this question in 1982, and although, in June 1983, Sweden submitted to the CD a revised version of its 1977 draft Treaty banning nuclear weapon test explosions in all environments, little progress has been made.

56 On 17 April 1985 the Soviet Union said that it was ready to agree to a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons to coincide with the fortieth anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. Tripartite negotiations from 1977 to 1980 between the US, the UK and the Soviet Union on a comprehensive test ban Treaty are reported to have been close to final agreement when they were suspended. The NPT Third Review Conference in September 1985 deeply regretted that a comprehensive multilateral nuclear test ban Treaty banning all nuclear tests by all states in all environments for all time had not been concluded so far, and called on all nuclear weapon states to negotiate such a treaty.

(iii) Outer Space

57 The CD also attempts to negotiate on preventing the militarisation of outer space. Its work in this field is, however, overshadowed by the bilateral 'umbrella' negotiations which opened between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva in March 1985. One of the three groups at the bilateral talks is to deal with space weapons.

58 A number of proposals concerning outer space have come before the CD in recent years, notably:

- a Soviet proposal to negotiate a treaty prohibiting the stationing in outer space of weapons of 'any kind',
- a proposal, submitted by the group of non-aligned countries, for an agreement to prevent the arms race in outer space 'in all its aspects'.

59 As a result of disagreement over a mandate for a working group on this subject at the CD, no working group has been set up and little concrete progress has been made.

(iv) Radiological Weapons

60 Since 1979 the CD has been considering the question of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. A joint US/Soviet proposal on the major elements of a convention constitutes the basis for discussion. (The US and the Soviet Union define a radiological weapon as any device, other than a nuclear explosive, specifically designed to employ radioactive material by disseminating it to cause destruction, damage or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material, as well as any radioactive material other than that produced by a nuclear explosive device, specifically designed for such use)⁹

61 Among the problems which have arisen are those of agreeing a definition of radiological weapons (since many countries object to a definition specifically excluding nuclear explosives) and of defining the scope of the convention.

E. THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

(This Conference and the CSCE process more generally are dealt with in a separate report being drawn up within the Sub-Committee on Security and Disarmament).

62 The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe opened in Stockholm in January 1984. The Conference is an integral part of the CSCE process (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe). The participating States agreed at the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Madrid (1980-1983) to convene the Stockholm Conference and the Concluding Document of the Madrid meeting sets out the mandate of the Conference.

⁹-----
The SIPRI Yearbook 1983

63 The mandate states that the aim of the Stockholm Conference is 'as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the CSCE ... to undertake in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations'.

64 It is envisaged that the Conference will take place in two principal stages. The first stage, which opened in January 1984, is devoted to 'the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe'. A future CSCE follow-up meeting (the next one is due to commence in Vienna in November 1986) will 'consider ways and appropriate means for the participating states to continue their efforts for security and disarmament in Europe, including the question of supplementing the present mandate for the next stage of the (Stockholm) Conference'.

65 Despite the title of the Conference (indeed it is sometimes referred to as the Conference on Disarmament or CDE), it is clear that the mandate does not envisage discussion of disarmament as such during the first phase of the Conference. However, developments at the Stockholm Conference are worth examining briefly in this report because, notwithstanding the mandate, a number of disarmament-related proposals have already been put forward by the Soviet Union and because any progress at the Stockholm Conference and indeed in the CSCE process generally could have a positive impact on disarmament negotiations for other forums.

66 During 1984, five sets of proposals were tabled at the Stockholm Conference, most notably by NATO, by the Soviet Union and by the Neutral and Non-aligned (the other proposals have come from Romania and Malta).

67 On 3 December 1984 a working structure for the Conference was finally agreed on the basis of a proposal by the neutral and non-aligned countries. The structure provides for two working groups - one to deal with Helsinki-type confidence- and security-building measures and the other will consider a limitation in the size of military manoeuvres and greater openness in the disposition of military forces as well as the Soviet Union's 'political' proposals, notably for a treaty on the non-use of force.

68 During the fifth session of the Conference which opened on 29 January 1985, the Soviet Union put forward a proposal entitled 'Basic provisions for a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations'. The proposal envisages that the participating states would commit themselves not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons. This commitment according to the proposal, would be applicable not only in Europe but outside Europe including in space and in international waters. The United States has indicated that it is ready to confirm the principle of the non-use of force in the context of a global agreement on concrete confidence- and security-building measures but believes that the Soviet Union has not yet demonstrated that it is willing to discuss proposals in this sense.

69 On 8 May 1985 President Reagan, in a major address to the European Parliament, made four proposals for the easing of tension between East and West, one of which concerned the CDE. The President suggested that the CDE should 'act promptly and agree on the concrete confidence-building measures proposed by the NATO countries. The USA is prepared to discuss the Soviet proposal on non-use of force in the context of Soviet agreement to concrete confidence-building measures'¹⁰

70 In October, Mr Gorbachev indicated that the USSR was willing to negotiate on a US and NATO proposal for procedures requiring NATO and the Warsaw Pact to give annual advance notice of military manoeuvres. But several difficult issues remain unresolved, such as the Soviet desire to add independent air and sea movements to the land-based exercises, of which advance notification would have to be given. This approach has been rejected by the USA.

F. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

71 The United Nations Organisation is an important world forum for the discussion of disarmament matters. The Ten should continue to coordinate their positions with a view to speaking with one voice at the General Assembly.

72 Each year the UN General Assembly passes many resolutions designed to support the principle of arms control and disarmament and which often contain useful proposals on specific matters in this regard. While the United Nations may sometimes be considered ineffective, its repeated calls for disarmament ultimately represent common sense and - if listened to - offer hope for the

¹⁰-----
Annex to OJ No. 2-326, Debates of the European Parliament, 8 May 1985

future of the world in which we live. If the voice of the United Nations is not heard, it is not because it does not speak but because there are those who do not wish to hear.

73 The Secretary General of the United Nations also has a particular role to play, for example with regard to investigating allegations of the use of chemical weapons.

74 The United Nations has itself held two Special sessions on Disarmament. While these special sessions serve the useful function of drawing public attention to the need for effective arms control, the success in practical terms, as of the United Nations in general, depends on the political will of those who are most directly concerned in the disarmament and arms control negotiations - notably the superpowers.

G. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT

75 The high levels of defence expenditure by both East and West mean that developments in the arms control and disarmament fields could have considerable economic implications for the countries concerned.

76 Cut backs in military programmes or expenditure could, at least temporarily, increase unemployment in some countries. In the longer term, however, a considerable degree of conversion should be possible.

77 At the same time, savings on military expenditure could offer opportunities for expenditure in other areas. It is frightening that \$550 billion is spent globally every year on armaments, more than one million dollars per minute. It is shocking when one thinks of the crushing poverty of a large proportion of the world's population which can only be solved by a huge increase in development aid, and of those third world countries which spend such an unnecessarily high proportion of their own GNP on arms.

78 The amounts do not constitute a case for any one country's unilateral disarmament. They constitute an overwhelming case for serious, urgent and imaginative moves towards multilateral disarmament.

79 The figures in the following tables with regard to the percentage of research and development budgets devoted to defence must be regarded as somewhat tentative because of the difficulty of producing truly comparable

figures for different nations. Some research and development expenditure not classified as relating to defence may have defence implications and similarly some expenditure related to defence may have spin-offs in non-military fields. For the purposes of this report it is the general outline and perceptible trends which are of significance.

1. Total Defence Expenditure

Country	As a % of government spending ¹⁾		As a % of GDP/GNP ²⁾	
	1980	1983	1980	1983
B	9.2	8.1	3.3	3.3
DK	7.4	6.8	2.5	2.4
D ³⁾	22.5	23.2	3.3	3.4
GR	22.9	19.3	5.5	6.9
F	18.9	18.7	4.0	4.2
IRL	3.5	3.1	1.9	1.8
I	5.7	5.1	2.4	2.8
L	3.1	3.2	0.9	0.9
NL	7.1	7.2	3.1	3.3
UK	12.4	13.7	5.0	5.5
P	9.2	8.9	3.5	3.5
E	15.9	13.4	2.4	2.4
USA	24.0	29.6	5.6	7.4
JAP	5.1	5.4	0.9	1.0
USSR ⁴⁾	:	:	15	16

Source: The Military Balance 1985-1986, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

1) Based on local currency. These figures are designed to show national trends only. International comparisons may be invalidated by differences in the scope of government sector and in budgetary definitions

2) Based on local currency. GDP figures are principally used; or, in their absence, GNP figures

3) Including aid to West Berlin

4) U.S. DIA Estimates

2. RATIO OF GOVERNMENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R and D) APPROPRIATIONS TO TOTAL BUDGET (%)

	1982	1983	1984
BELGIUM	1.43	1.35	1.36
DENMARK	1.31	1.43	1.63
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY	4.24	4.02	4.08
FRANCE	5.59	5.96	6.20
GREECE	0.60	0.55	0.66
IRELAND	0.71	0.80	0.77
ITALY	1.32	1.42	1.58
LUXEMBOURG	0.00	0.00	0.00
NETHERLANDS	2.26	2.48	2.38
UNITED KINGDOM	3.10	3.16	3.20
EUR-10	3.16	3.18	3.26

Source: EUROSTAT, CRONOS data bank. File ZRD 1

3. RATIO OF GOVERNMENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R & D) APPROPRIATIONS TO GDP (%)

	1982	1983	1984
BELGIUM	0.65	0.60	0.59
DENMARK	0.47	0.51	0.54
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY	1.21	1.15	1.12
FRANCE	1.32	1.40	1.45
GREECE	0.20	0.20	0.24
IRELAND	0.39	0.41	0.39
ITALY	0.64	0.71	0.77
LUXEMBOURG	0.00	0.00	0.00
NETHERLANDS	0.93	1.02	0.98
UNITED KINGDOM	1.33	1.33	1.35
EUR-10	1.10	1.11	1.12

Source: EUROSTAT, CRONOS data bank, File ZRD 1

4. PERCENTAGE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R & D) BUDGETS DEVOTED TO DEFENCE

	1982	1983	1984
BELGIUM	0.52	0.28	0.23
DENMARK	0.25	0.24	0.73
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY	8.53	9.61	9.98
FRANCE	35.39	32.67	33.41
GREECE	0.00	0.39	3.46
IRELAND	0.00	0.00	0.00
ITALY	4.76	5.71	8.32
LUXEMBOURG	0.00	0.00	0.00
NETHERLANDS	3.04	2.94	3.11
UNITED KINGDOM	47.65	49.13	50.36
EUR-10	24.73	24.48	25.45

Source: EUROSTAT, CRONOS data bank, File ZRD 1

5. DEFENCE EXPENDITURE OF USA AND JAPAN (in \$ millions and at constant prices)

	1975	1980	1981	1983
Japan	8,205	9,767	10,041	10,939
United States	139,277	143,981	153,884	186,544

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1984, Table 3A.2, p. 118

H. THE POSITION OF JAPAN

80 Although Article 9 of the Japanese constitution lays down that the country cannot resort to aggression and prohibits the establishment of a potential for war, it reserves to Japan the right of self-defence. In addition since World War II every Japanese Government has followed the three anti-nuclear principles of Japanese security policy, viz. total prohibition of the possession of nuclear weapons, of their manufacture, and of their introduction into the national territory.

81 In pursuance of these provisions, Japan has in the last ten years spent no more than 1% of GDP per year on the armed forces. This situation served to reassure Japan's lesser neighbours in South-East Asia, who for 30 years after 1945 benefited also from the immense military power in South-East Asia and the Pacific of the United States. However, the Vietnam war showed that this power was no longer predominant, and in the last decade the military power of both the USSR and China has been substantially increased in East Asia.

82 These imperatives of security have led US Governments to press the Japanese to build up their self-defence forces, in order to share the military burden, assumed hitherto almost entirely by the United States, of safeguarding democratic states in East and South East Asia. The fact that the USA has so far had little success in this policy affects the security of Europe, in that US military resources are unduly stretched, and the US Congress is led to seek cut-backs in US force strengths in the NATO area and elsewhere. Thus the strength of the Japanese self-defence forces is of direct military consequence to the Alliance. From another point of view, the security cost burden on the Japanese economy has been for decades so much lighter than for the economies of the USA and the NATO allies that the latter have brought strong pressure to bear on Japan to play a wider security role, not only in East and South-East Asia security, but in the Pacific area.

83 In response to this pressure Japan, supported by the USA, sought from NATO the status of an 'external associate', so as to lay the foundations of a defence triangle including the USA, Europe and Japan. This approach was however rejected by the European members of the Alliance in 1983. Whatever the rights and wrongs of this decision, it remains of direct interest to the Community Member States who are members of NATO that Japan should play a greater part in the organisation of her legitimate self-defence, in order to free US military resources for other commitments.

84 A small move was made in this direction in September 1985 when the Japanese Government published a five-year defence spending plan for the armed forces (1986-90) which represents expenditure of an average of 1.4% per year of GDP. Although politically the breaking of the 1.0% per year barrier implied some risk to the Government, it could be expected to go some way to appease anti-Japanese, protectionist feeling in Congress and - less directly - in Europe.

I. SOME OTHER ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT

85 In order to provide as complete a picture as possible of disarmament issues the report will focus briefly on some other aspects of the problems raised. It could be argued that an entire report could be devoted to each of these issues and the treatment of them here will necessarily be brief.

(i) Peace movements

86 The peace movements appear to draw their strength from three main strands of opinion, that is to say pacificism, nationalism and anti-Americanism. Since 1980 the movements have been strongest in the Federal Republic, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and in Sweden.

87 Although World War II was described by both sides as a just war, its appalling toll in human life and the destruction of cities and towns, and the collapse of the economies of several European countries led many to espouse the cause of pacifism. Furthermore the nature of nuclear war and its consequences for Europe led to wide support for the pacifist cause, especially among Church leaders and active Church members, particularly in the Protestant Church in Northern Europe. The anti-Americanism which partly fuels the peace movements was born in the decade of the Vietnam war and the subsequent Watergate scandal. It was re-activated by the twin-track decision of NATO in 1979 to station Cruise and Pershing missiles in NATO Member States unless the Soviet Union withdrew its missiles targeted on Western Europe. The overtly anti-Soviet policies and statements of President Reagan and Secretary of State Haig in 1980 - 1982 served to many to justify growing anti-American feelings.

88 A growing nationalism in Europe, which on the one hand has hindered progress towards the development of the Community, has on the other hand tended to reject involvement in military alliances such as NATO and to seek bilateral relations between West European countries and the Soviet Union. Economic

recession and massive unemployment have led to scepticism about the benefits to be derived from international economic organisations, such as the EEC, GATT, the OECD, and to a desire for national independence.

89 The apogee of the peace movements was perhaps in 1981, when in October 300,000 Germans demonstrated in Bonn against the stationing of Cruise and Pershing missiles in their country. One month later an enormous demonstration in Amsterdam showed that a wide cross-section of the population were opposed to the missiles. In the United Kingdom rallies against the missiles and against nuclear weapons, and in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament, attracted tens of thousands of people in 1981 and 1982.

90 The last series of protests against the stationing of missiles was in the Netherlands in 1985, when 3.5 million signatures were put to a petition against deployment. Although successive Dutch Governments delayed a decision to deploy, it was finally taken in November 1985. A protest meeting called shortly before by the pacifist movement attracted only 25,000 people.

91 Deployment of the missiles has taken place in some countries and will continue in others. Although the peace movements have been balked in their attempts to prevent it, the force of their campaigns may be traced in the rejection by NATO of the neutron bomb, the changed tone of President Reagan's approach to East-West relations, and the strenuous efforts made by the USA and its NATO allies to make genuine progress in the various negotiations on arms control and disarmament.

(ii) Nuclear-free zones

92 There have over the years been a number of proposals for nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ) throughout the world. Each such proposal should be examined separately and on its merits. Perhaps the most significant agreement to date was the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (The Tlateloco Treaty).

93 As far as the central question of genuine, effective, verifiable and multilateral disarmament is concerned, NWFZ's are at best a peripheral issue since the creation of such zones will not of itself reduce the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers which are a threat to the entire world, including nuclear-free zones.

94 While it is not possible to deal in detail with any of the proposals in this report, the following are amongst the more significant proposals which have been put forward as far as Europe is concerned.

Central Europe

95 As early as 1957, the Polish Foreign Minister Mr Rapacki suggested the idea of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Central Europe. This suggestion was taken up in the report of the Independent (Palme) Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues in June 1982, which recommended the establishment of a 'battlefield nuclear weapon free zone' in Europe. What was envisaged was a 300 kilometre wide zone dividing East and West and including parts of the FRG, the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

96 Whereas such a zone might reduce the risk of precipitate, accidental or pre-emptive use of short-range nuclear weapons deployed in forward positions, it might be disadvantageous to the West because the Soviet Union, for geographical reasons, could reintroduce nuclear weapons to such a zone more quickly than the United States and because of the particularly important role of nuclear deterrence in NATO strategy. Also, the West might wish to use tactical nuclear weapons first, in face of a massive Soviet conventional attack.

The Balkans

97 In 1957 Romania proposed a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Balkans. This proposal was taken up by Bulgaria in October 1981 and most recently by Greece in 1983. Although a conference involving some of the Balkan states took place in 1984, no conclusions were reached and a number of states in the region - notably Turkey - remain sceptical.

Nordic area

98 All of the Nordic countries are committed to non-possession of nuclear weapons, having signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and none of them have nuclear weapons on their territory. The region does not, however, constitute an NWFZ since the two NATO members, Norway and Denmark, are not committed to remaining nuclear weapons-free in wartime. A proposal has been circulating

for many years that the Nordic area should be designated a nuclear weapon-free zone. This proposal is supported by the Swedish Government and was most recently formulated by the Prime Minister, Mr Palme, in 1982.

J. CONCLUSIONS

99 Before drawing up conclusions, it is necessary briefly to discuss the relations of the European Community to the United States in regard to arms control and disarmament. During the term of office of President Carter and the first term of President Reagan, it was often difficult for European Governments to discern US policy lines on arms control and disarmament, by reason of their lack of definition, liability to sudden alteration and apparent, frequent disregard of European interests.

100 Since President Reagan's re-election in November 1984, however, and the accession to power of General Secretary Gorbachev, the two super-powers have re-opened their dialogue, and the US Government has, as regards the Geneva talks and the summit of November 1985, consulted the Allies more closely. To some extent, closer consultation has resulted from demands in this sense made by the Allies, from their increasing cohesion within European political cooperation and from the added weight gained by the accession of Spain and Portugal.

101 But the total lack of consultation prior to President Reagan's March 1983 speech on SDI and the initially tackless approach of the US Department of Defense to the Allies as regards SDI, have done much to damage the improved relationship on East-West relations, apart from disagreements over regional conflicts, economic issues and so on.

102 Europe's strongest card as regards the arms control and disarmament negotiations is to define in advance, more clearly and more consistently the attitude of the Community and, separately, of those of its Member States in NATO, to the ongoing and many-faceted negotiations. This requires the Community to exploit to the full the opportunities for defining a coherent foreign policy, covering security and political and economic relations, offered by the European Act of February 1986, which brings European Political Cooperation into the Treaties. The first such comprehensive Community foreign policy to be defined should be in the field of relations with the United

States, and must be based on the resolutions of the European Parliament in this specific field, and in the sectors of security, and political and economic relations.

103 Parliament must be vigilant to ensure that the Community takes up this challenge and uses its new instrument to the full in order to formulate considered, timely and cogent policies on arms control and disarmament to the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance.

104 Such policies should be based on the following general principles -

- (1) The need for the West to remain strong enough to defend itself,
- (2) The clamant need to achieve real arms control and disarmament,
- (3) The acceptance by the super-powers of Europe's role in all negotiations in this field.

JOINT STATEMENT AFTER THE GENEVA SUMMIT 19-21 NOVEMBER 1985

The first part of the text of the joint US-Soviet statement after the Summit talks was:

'These comprehensive discussions covered the basic questions of US-Soviet relations and the current international situation. The meetings were frank and useful. Serious differences remain on a number of critical issues.

While acknowledging the differences in their systems and approaches to international issues, some greater understanding of each side's view was achieved by the two leaders. They agreed about the need to improve US-Soviet relations and the international situation as a whole.

In this connection the two sides have confirmed the importance of an ongoing dialogue, reflecting their strong desire to seek common ground on existing problems.

They agreed to meet again in the nearest future. The General Secretary accepted an invitation by the President of the United States to visit the United States of America and the President of the United States accepted an invitation by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU to visit the Soviet Union. Arrangements for and timing of the visits will be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

In their meetings, agreement was reached on a number of specific issues. Areas of agreement are registered on the following pages.

SECURITY

The sides, having discussed key security issues, and conscious of the special responsibility of the USSR and the US for maintaining peace, have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognising that any conflict between the USSR and US could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasised the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.

NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS

The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

They agreed to accelerate the work at these negotiations, with a view to accomplishing the tasks set down in the joint US-Soviet agreement of 8 January 1985, namely to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability.

Noting the proposals recently tabled by the US and the Soviet Union, they called for early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 per cent reductions in the nuclear arms of the US and the USSR appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement.

During the negotiations of these agreements, effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon.

RISK REDUCTION CENTRES

The sides agreed to study the question at the expert level of centres to reduce nuclear risk, taking into account the issues and developments in the Geneva negotiations. They took satisfaction in such recent steps in this direction as the modernisation of the Soviet-US hotline.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan re-affirmed the commitment of the USSR and the US to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and their interest in strengthening together with other countries the non-proliferation regime, and in further enhancing the effectiveness of the treaty, *inter alia* by enlarging its membership.

They note with satisfaction the overall positive results of the recent review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The USSR and the US reaffirm their commitment, assumed by them under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to pursue negotiations in good faith on matters of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament in accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty.

The two sides plan to continue to promote the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency and to support the activities of the agency in implementing safeguards as well as in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

They view positively the practice of regular Soviet-US consultations on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which have been businesslike and constructive to continue this practice in the future.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

In the context of discussing security problems, the two sides reaffirmed that they are in favour of a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. They agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter.

The two sides agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on the level of experts on all aspects of such a chemical weapons ban, including the question of verification. They agreed to initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons.

MBFR

The two sides emphasised the importance they attach to the Vienna (MBFR) negotiations and expressed their willingness to work for positive results.

CDE

Attaching great importance to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) and noting the progress made there, the two sides stated their intention to facilitate, together with the other participating states, an early and successful completion of the work of the conference. To this end, they reaffirmed the

need for a document which would include mutually acceptable confidence and security building measures and give concrete expression and effect to the principle of non-use of force.

PROCESS OF DIALOGUE

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed on the need to place on a regular basis and intensify dialogue at various levels. Along with meetings between the leaders of the two countries, this envisages regular meetings between the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and the US Secretary of State, as well as between the heads of other ministries and agencies. They agree that the recent visits of the heads of ministries and departments in such fields as agriculture, housing and protection of the environment have been useful.

Recognising that exchanges of views on regional issues on the expert level have proven useful, they agree to continue such exchanges on a regular basis.'

f * * * * *

Source: The Times, 22 November 1985.