



## EDITORIAL

Enlargement is perhaps the most important issue on the European Union's present agenda. The virtually assured entry of Austria (pending member state ratification), the probable entry of Sweden and Finland, and the far less likely entry of Norway into the EU on January 1, 1995 present a number of challenges to the Union's institutional structures and policy mechanisms.

During a visit to Brussels this summer, I was struck by the many problems anticipated in executing EU policy in an extremely diverse territorial arena. The Scandinavian countries highlight a diversity within Europe of which we are all aware, a diversity which is sometimes obscured by the scholarly literature's focus on Brussels. An examination of the implementation of EU policy at the Länder level, or at the level of the autonomous communities in Spain, demonstrates the challenges faced by a policy system composed of quite heterogeneous units. The EU has repeatedly faced this problem, for example, in the implementation of the Single Market Program and competition policy. Enlargement will only serve to make this problem more evident, particularly in the areas of fisheries, agriculture, and the environment. Furthermore, the differences in perspective in the area of external relations are striking. While all the member states give high priority to the EU-US relationship, consensus seems to end there. The attitude toward enlargement to the East is fundamentally different in Spain and Germany.

As several of the excellent essays in this issue of the *Newsletter* discuss, a great deal of attention is being given to the issue of EU institutional reform which will preoccupy the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Though such reform may contribute to the lessening of the "democratic deficit", and provide the EU with more efficient and responsive policymaking capabilities, the problem of ensuring compliance with EU directives will remain an important long-term issue. This will certainly be the case when enlargement extends to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The EU will increasingly be confronted with the dilemma of trying to achieve uniform policy outcomes while using heterogeneous policy levers. Any polity would find such a dilemma incredibly difficult to overcome.

It is possible that the European Parliament may form a partnership with national parliaments in monitoring the execution of EU policies, and thereby provide a necessary condition for effective policymaking over time. This is doubtful, however, for at least two reasons. First, as Michael Shackleton points out, the national parliaments are likely to see the European Parliament as a competitor rather than an ally. Second, most of

the national parliaments are ill-equipped to provide the staff and committee resources that effective oversight requires. The European Commission, although continuing to rely on national governments for most aspects of policy execution, will face strong pressures to ensure a "level playing field". Yet the Commission, despite the familiar cries from several member states that Brussels-based Euro-crats must be kept at bay, is understaffed and faces great problems of organization in ensuring that EU legislation actually structures national administrative and corporate practices. The role of *animateur* is probably no longer sufficient at the current level of integration. If the new Commission President can indeed substantially improve the Commission's administrative capacity through re-organization, the Commission's effective power may actually increase, regardless of the powers given to any other institution. As has become clear in numerous policy areas and national contexts, the power of administration is frequently a match for political power.

Such institutional and policy developments, as well as many other issues, will be considered at the 1995 ECSA Conference, May 11-13 in Charleston, South Carolina. The Call for Papers and Panels appears on the next page. Those interested should be aware that the panel and paper proposal deadline is November 15, 1994. I am delighted to report that the Conference will be held in Charleston's beautiful historic district. This location offers many attractions to participants; a preliminary Conference program and information concerning hotel accommodations and recreational activities will be included with the next issue of the *Newsletter*.

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# CALL FOR PANELS AND PAPERS



## EUROPEAN COMMUNITY STUDIES ASSOCIATION FOURTH BIENNIAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

**MAY 11-13, 1995 CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA**

The European Community Studies Association (ECSA) invites scholars and practitioners engaged in the study of the European Union to submit panel and paper proposals for the 1995 ECSA International Conference. The Program Committee hopes to promote the broadest possible exchange of disciplinary perspectives and research agendas, and it actively encourages proposals from all disciplines concerned with the European Union. Participation by graduate students is welcomed. A limited amount of funding for participant travel may be available.

Panel proposals should include: (1) the names, affiliations and addresses of chair, panelists, and discussant(s); (2) full paper titles and synopses; and (3) a short statement of the panel's theme. Individual paper proposals are also welcomed. The Program Committee will assign those papers to appropriate panels.

**This is the final Call for Panels and Papers for the 1995 ECSA Conference that will appear in the Newsletter. Proposals must be received by November 15, 1994.** Please send proposals and direct inquiries to:

William Burros, Administrative Director  
European Community Studies Association  
405 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh  
Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA  
Phone (412) 648-7635, Fax (412) 648-1168

Participants will be notified of acceptance by December 15, 1994.

The members of the Program Committee are:

David Cameron, Dept. of Political Science, Yale University, Chair  
James Caporaso, Dept. of Political Science, University of Washington  
John Gillingham, Dept. of History, University of Missouri, St. Louis  
John Goodman, Harvard Business School and National Economic Council  
Lily Gardner Feldman, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies  
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Harvard Law School

**Bretton Woods Revisited: An Intergenerational Conference Featuring Many of the Founders and Early Leaders of the Bretton Woods System**

**October 15-17, 1994      Bretton Woods, New Hampshire**

This conference, sponsored by the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, Minneapolis, is intended to create a dialogue between the generations concerning the ability of the Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to respond to contemporary and future challenges. Participants will include a diverse group of globally oriented policy makers and public interest leaders, joined by nearly forty founders and early leaders of the postwar multilateral economy. The keynote speakers include Edward M. Bernstein, Harlan Cleveland, Paul H. Nitze, and Tran Van-Thinh.

Preconference mini-sessions will be held at three locations: Washington, DC, September 23, 1994 at the Paul H. Nitze School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; New York City, September 26, 1994 at the New School for Social Research; and Boston, September 27, 1994 at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

For more information, contact the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, 1313 Fifth Street SE, Suite 303, Minneapolis, MN 55414-1546; Tel (612) 379-5980; Fax (612) 379-5982; E-mail "iatp@igc.apc.org".

**The Politics of Sustainable Development: Theory, Policy, and Practice Within the European Union**

**October 21-23, 1994      University of Crete, Greece**

Following discussions during Research Sessions held at Trondheim in October 1993, an International Conference is being organized in conjunction with The Erasmus University of Rotterdam, University of Crete and University of Teesside under the auspices of The Green Politics Standing Group of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR). For more information, please contact: Dr. Susan Baker, Department of Public Administration, BSK, Erasmus University of Rotterdam, Postbus 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands; phone (+31) 10 408 2096; fax (+31) 10 452 7842.

**21st Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy**

**October 27 & 28, 1994      Fordham Law School, NY, NY**

The Fordham Corporate Law Institute at Fordham Law School in New York City presents this conference which features speakers from the European Commission including Dr. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Director General of DG-IV. Dr. Ehlermann will address "State Aids under EC Competition Law." The Hon. Francis Jacobs, Advocate General of the European Court of Justice will speak on "Judicial Review of Community Trade Measures." Officials of the U.S., Canadian, and Japanese governments and attorneys practicing in this area will also participate. The conference includes a Round-table on Mergers and Joint Ventures. Contact Helen S. Herman, Assistant

Director, at (212) 626-6885; fax (212) 636-6899, for more information.

**Citizenship and Working Classes in Europe and North America in the 19th and 20th Centuries**

**October 28-29, 1994      Paris, France**

This conference is co-organized by the journals *Le mouvement social* and *International Labour and Working Class History*. The Coordinator is Patrick Fridenson, Ecole des Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 54 Blvd. Raspail, 75270 Paris, France.

**Western Conference on British Studies**

**October 28-29, 1994      Fayetteville, AR**

The 21st annual meeting of the Western Conference on British Studies will be hosted by the University of Arkansas. Scholars in all areas of British studies are invited to attend. For further information contact Peter Mellini, WCBS Program Chair, Department of History, Sonoma State University, Rohnert Park, CA 94928; Phone (707) 664-2489; e-mail "PETER.MELLINI@SONOMA.EDU".

**Lothian Foundation Conferences on European Integration**

**November 18-19 and December 15, 1994      London, UK**

The 12th Lothian Conference, "Fin de Siècle Crisis? Euro-American Relations in the Post-Nuclear Age," will be held in London, November 18-19, 1994. The five sessions planned cover the following subjects: the US and European unification; from leadership to 'Equal Partnership'; economic competitive cooperation; foreign policy making; and defense policy.

The 13th Lothian Conference, "A Bank for Europe: Strategies and Conflicts in the Building of the European Central Bank," will be held in London, December 15, 1994. For more information, contact the Lothian Foundation, Whitehall Place, London SW1A 2DA, UK; phone (+44) 71.242.2959.

**Atlantic Economic Society**

**March 10-16, 1995      Vienna, Austria  
October 8-11, 1995      Williamsburg, VA**

Authors should submit 2 copies of at least a 500 word summary and a submission fee of \$49 for AES members (\$59 for non-members) per paper. All accepted participants will be responsible for their own expenses, including the conference registration fee.

Submit papers and requests to serve as chair and/or discussant with number and name of interest area to: Atlantic Economic Conference, Campus Box 1101, Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville, IL 62026-1101; Phone (618) 692-2291; Fax (618) 692-3400.

## REPORTS ON COMPLETED CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPS

### Workshop on Euro-Mediterranean Relations

June 17-18, 1994 University of Reading, UK

This two-day Workshop on the European Union and the Mediterranean was organized by Dr. Stelios Stavridis and Dr. Joel Peters in collaboration with the University of Barcelona and the University of Athens, and partly financed by the European Commission and NATO. The Workshop was attended by about 50 people, mainly academics but also practitioners from a number of Mediterranean and European countries, as well as Japan and the USA. There were also officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the French foreign and defence ministries, the Greek Presidency of the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, the UK Permanent Representation to the European Union, and the WEU Secretariat.

The main objective of the Workshop was to encourage dialogue and research cooperation between Mediterranean experts in Britain, the rest of Europe, the Southern shores of the Mediterranean, both at the individual and institutional levels. The topics discussed included: the EU's relations with the Mediterranean; the question of enlargement to the South (Turkey, Cyprus, Malta); security and defence issues; European responses to the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia and the Middle East Peace Process; and the problems of migration, environment and Islamic fundamentalism in the Mediterranean Basin. For further information, please contact Dr. Stavridis at the Department of Politics, University of Reading, Whiteknights, PO Box 218, Reading RG6 2AA, UK; phone (+44) (0734) 318501; fax (0734) 753833.

## Grants and Fellowships

### 50 Years of Transatlantic Cooperation for Peace and Democracy:

#### European Commission Graduate Fellowship in European Integration at The College of Europe

To celebrate 50 years of Transatlantic Cooperation for Peace and Democracy, ECSA hopes to offer a Fellowship for the Master's Degree in European Studies at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium for the 1995-1996 academic year. Contingent upon funding from the Delegation of the European Commission in Washington, DC, the Fellowship will offer approximately \$15,000 toward tuition, lodging, and travel expenses. The College of Europe, founded in 1949, is the oldest European institution exclusively devoted to postgraduate teaching, focussing on issues of European integration.

The Academic Program of the College of Europe is divided into three parts:

A. Specialized courses which correspond to the student's previous education. There are currently four departments: European political and administrative studies, European economic studies, European legal studies and studies in Human Resources Development

B. Interdisciplinary work which consists of the analysis of subjects in which students from the four departments will participate actively.

C. General courses which deal with major current developments in Europe or with certain more specific problems of contemporary society.

Applicants must possess a high level of proficiency in the French language, have completed a university degree by the term of the Fellowship, and be U.S. citizens. Students may apply for the College of Europe Fellowship by submitting the following items to the ECSA Administrative Office:

1. Letter of application from the student, addressed to the Graduate Fellowship Selection Committee, which discusses:
  - a) the student's preparation and qualifications for the Fellowship
  - b) how the Fellowship will enhance the student's educational and professional goals, and
  - c) the student's proposed department of specialization at the College of Europe.
2. At least two letters of recommendation which comment directly on the applicant's qualifications for the Fellowship.
3. Academic transcript(s), which must include evidence of proficiency in French.
4. Resume or curriculum vitae.

The application deadline is March 1, 1995. Please send all application materials and direct all inquiries concerning the Fellowship to:

Bill Burros, Administrative Director  
ECSA Administrative Office  
405 Bellefield Hall  
University of Pittsburgh,  
Pittsburgh, PA 15260  
Tel (412) 648-7635, FAX (412) 648-1168.

### ECSA Graduate Fellowships to be Continued During the 1995-96 Academic Year at:

#### The University of Limerick, Ireland

Contingent upon available funding from the European Commission Delegation in Washington, DC, ECSA hopes to continue its Graduate Fellowship at the University of Limerick, Ireland in the 1995-1996 academic year.

The ECSA Graduate Fellowship at the University of Limerick leads to the M.A. in European Integration Studies. The program, directed by Dr. Nicholas Rees, is multi-disciplinary and intended for recent graduates in the Humanities and Social Sciences who plan careers in international business and finance, public service, journalism and the media, research and education. A Research Centre for European Studies supports faculty and postgraduate research activities in European integration and the campus library includes a European documentation center.

During the first and second semesters of the European Integration program, students are required to take seven core and two elective core modules which examine the major political, legal, and economic issues of European integration.

The core courses are: Theory of Economic Integration; The European Union as a Legal System; Politics of European Integration; History of the European Idea; Theory and Methodology of Integration; Economic Policies of Economic Integration; and Legal Aspects of Economic Integration. The elective courses are: External Relations of the European Union; Regional Politics and Policy in the European Union and; and National Politics and the European Union.

Students also begin a thesis of 10,000 to 15,000 words in the second semester which is completed in the third semester.

### **University of Sussex, England**

Contingent upon available funding from the European Commission Delegation in Washington, DC, ECSA hopes to continue its Graduate Fellowship at the University of Sussex, England in the 1995-1996 academic year.

The ECSA Graduate Fellowship at the University of Sussex leads to the M.A. in Contemporary European Studies. This program is directed by Professor Helen Wallace. Professor Wallace is also Director of the Sussex European Institute. The Contemporary European Studies program covers both eastern and western Europe, with a wide-ranging core of courses and a variety of specialized options. It is aimed at graduates in social sciences or other appropriate disciplines who wish to add a European dimension to their knowledge, and at graduates in subjects such as French or history who wish to gain a social science background. The primary teaching language for the course is English, but a good working knowledge of another European language is normally expected.

During the first term, all students are required to take the core course, *The Making of Contemporary Europe*. During the second term, students choose three options from a number of available electives in European history, politics, economics, and sociology. Students may select a general approach to European studies, or they may specialize by area or subject. During the third term, students are required to write a thesis of up to 20,000 words. The MA course is also assessed by two examinations (core course) and two 5,000 word papers (on two of the options).

**Application Procedure:** The ECSA Graduate Fellowships at the Universities of Limerick and Sussex will offer approximately \$12,000 toward tuition, lodging, and travel expenses. In applying, students should state whether they are applying for the position at the University of Limerick, or for the position at the University of Sussex. Students may also apply for both positions. However, students doing so must provide a clear explanation of why their qualifications and interests are suitable for both programs. (Because of the special French language requirement, applications for the ECSA Graduate Fellowship at the College of Europe must be made separately.)

To apply for the ECSA Graduate Fellowships at the University of Limerick and/or the University of Sussex, submit the following items to the ECSA Administrative Office:

- 1) Letter of application from the student, addressed to the Graduate Fellowship Selection Committee, which discusses
  - a) the student's preparation and qualifications for the Fellowship, and
  - b) how the Fellowship will enhance the student's educational and professional goals;

- 2) At least two letters of recommendation which comment directly on the applicant's qualifications for the Fellowship;
- 3) Academic transcript;
- 4) Resume or curriculum vitae.

Applicants must be U.S. citizens and possess a university degree by August 31, 1995. The application deadline is March 1, 1995. Please send all application materials and direct all inquiries to Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office.

### **ECSA Dissertation Fellowship Grants**

With funding from The Ford Foundation, the European Community Studies Association (ECSA) will offer four dissertation fellowship grants for the 1995-1996 academic year. These grants provide financial support of \$2,500 for doctoral students preparing dissertations on the European Union. They may be used for travel required for dissertation research, or for books, documents and supplies, manuscript preparation, and other dissertation expenses. Applicants must be U.S. citizens and ECSA members.

The application deadline for this program is March 1, 1995. For application guidelines and further information, please contact Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office.

### **ECSA Curriculum Development Grants**

Contingent upon available funding, the European Community Studies Association (ECSA) will offer curriculum development grants for the 1995-1996 or 1996-1997 academic years. These grants may be used to create new courses on the European Union, or to enrich existing courses with material on the European Union. A maximum of four grants of up to \$3,000 will be awarded. Courses developed or enriched through this program must be taught in the United States. Applicants must be ECSA members, or affiliated with institutional ECSA members.

The application deadline for this program is March 1, 1995. For application guidelines and further information, please contact Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office.

### **1995 German Marshall Fund Research Fellowship Program**

The German Marshall Fund of the United States offers grants for research that seeks to improve the understanding of significant contemporary economic, political and social developments involving the United States and Europe. Projects may focus on either comparative domestic or international issues. Projects should establish the potential importance of their findings either by comparative analysis of a specific issue in more than one country, or by an exploration of that issue in a single country in ways that can be expected to have relevance for other countries.

A Fellowship is intended to allow the recipient to work on research full time, without teaching, administrative or other substantial professional responsibilities, during an academic term or up to one year. Projects of three months or less are not eligible for consideration. Within a fixed maximum (\$30,000), the Fellowship will help meet, but cannot exceed, a recipient's current income. Approximately 11 awards will be made in 1995.

Completed applications must be postmarked no later than November 15, 1994. Submissions will be reviewed by established scholars from various disciplines. An independent selection committee will make recommendations to the Fund. The Fund will announce awards by letter on March 15, 1995.

For application forms and additional information, please contact: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 11 Dupont Circle, N.W., Washington, DC 20036, phone (202) 745-3950.

### **Fulbright European Community Scholar-in-Residence Program**

Institutions are invited to submit proposals to host a European Community (EC) official or an academic from an EC-member country who specializes in EC affairs as a resident fellow for one or both terms of the 1995-96 academic year. Under an arrangement with the EC, up to 4 grants will be available to bring an EC official or scholar to an American campus for the purpose of strengthening expertise in European Community affairs. The resident fellow will give guest lectures and conduct seminars as appropriate, consult with faculty and students on research, engage in collaborative study, and provide outreach to neighboring institutions and the local community. The resident fellow is not expected to teach regular course offerings.

The awards are made available under the auspices of the Fulbright Scholar-in-Residence Program. All submissions will be reviewed by an academic panel convened by the Council for International Exchange of Scholars (CIES) and nominations forwarded to the EC, which will select the U.S. host institutions and propose EC officials/scholars for the positions. The application deadline is November 1, 1994.

For more information concerning this and other Fulbright Programs, please contact Jean McPeck, Council For International Exchange of Scholars, 3007 Tilden Street, N.W. Suite 5M, Washington, D.C. 20008-3009, phone (202) 895-5391.

### **Social Science Research Council 1995 -1996 Dissertation Research Fellowships**

Fellowships are awarded for doctoral dissertation research in Western Europe in the social sciences and humanities. Particularly encouraged are applications from disciplines in which relatively less attention has been devoted to Western Europe, such as economics, social psychology, and sociology. The program also encourages research on problems of public policy common to Western European countries. Applications will also be accepted for research involving both Europe and the United States if required by the comparative nature of the project. There are no citizenship requirements for full-time students enrolled in the United States. American citizens or permanent residents of the United States who are similarly enrolled at accredited foreign universities are also eligible to apply.

The deadline for application is November 1, 1994. For further information, contact the Social Science Research Council, 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158; Tel (212) 661-0280.

### **Social Science Research Council Berlin Program for Advanced German and European Studies**

This program is based at the Free University of Berlin. Its purpose is to encourage the comparative and interdisciplinary study of the economic, political and social aspects of modern and contemporary German and European affairs. The program supports anthropologists, economists, political scientists, sociologists, and all scholars in germane social science and cultural studies fields, including historians working on the period since the mid-19th century.

Fellowships are available at both the dissertation and post-doctoral levels. The application deadline is February 1, 1995. Please contact the Social Science Research Council for further information.

### **Robert Bosch Foundation Fellowship Program**

Individuals interested in working for a year in the Federal Republic of Germany on any aspect of German policy toward the European Union or Central and Eastern Europe are encouraged to apply for the Robert Bosch Foundation Fellowship. No previous knowledge of German is required. Language lessons are included in the overall Fellowship. Students devise their own internships which can be done in Federal Ministries, at the state and local levels, in the private sector or with newspapers and journals. The application deadline is October 15, 1994.

For additional information and an application, please contact Mrs. Elfriede Andros, Program Officer, CDS International, 330 Seventh Avenue, 19th Floor, New York, NY 10001; Phone (212) 760-1400.

## **Program Announcements**

### **USIS Speakers Program**

The U.S. Information Service (USIS) is sponsoring a Speakers Program involving U.S. Embassies and Consulates throughout Europe. The USIS seeks speakers capable of giving the American perspective on EC Affairs, the U.S.-EC relationship, the transatlantic alliance, and related issues. To qualify for the Speakers Program, individuals must have established travel plans in Europe. The USIS will provide compensation for the costs of travel within Europe, daily maintenance, and a modest honorarium. ECSA members traveling from the United States will find this an excellent opportunity to increase their understanding of European perspectives.

Individuals interested in this Program should fax the following information, **well in advance of their travel dates**, to the U.S. Mission to the European Communities in Brussels at (32.2) 512.57.20:

- a) planned European arrival and departure points;
- b) dates of availability;
- c) an abbreviated curriculum vitae;
- d) brief descriptions of topics that you find suitable for discussion; and
- e) fax number(s) where you may be contacted.

## **Jean Monnet Council Announces U.S. Tour of François Duchêne**

The Jean Monnet Council announces the November, 1994 tour of Mr. François Duchêne. Mr. Duchêne is the former Chef de Cabinet for Jean Monnet (Action Committee for the United States of Europe), 1958-63, Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969-74, and a distinguished journalist and author. His most recent work is *Jean Monnet: First Statesman of Interdependence*, to be published by W.W. Norton in September of 1994. This volume is both a biography and an analysis of Jean Monnet's singular contribution to European integration.

Mr. Duchêne will visit a number of U.S. cities. His tentative schedule is as follows:

Washington, DC, November 3: Luncheon and discussion at the Brookings Institution.

Charlottesville, VA, November 8: 11:00 a.m. book event at The Miller Center, University of Virginia.

New Orleans, LA, November 9-11: Program being organized by Eisenhower Center, University of New Orleans.

Minneapolis, MN, November 14-15: Program being organized by Humphrey Center, University of Minnesota.

New York City, November 16-18: Events pending.

San Francisco, CA, November 20: Events pending.

For further information, contact The Jean Monnet Council, 2013 G Street N.W., Washington, DC 20052; Tel (202) 994-0562; Fax (202) 994-0335.

### **Drew University Semester on the European Union**

Drew University offers a Semester on the European Union in Brussels, Belgium each fall. The interdisciplinary program includes courses in economics, political science, and history. Students are also required to take a French language course at the beginning, intermediate, and advanced levels.

The 16-credit, undergraduate program is conducted in English by distinguished European faculty. Students must complete an independent research project on an aspect of European integration. Classes are held at the University of Brussels. Special classes are also held at the headquarters of the EU Commission and other EU organizations in the city. Guest speakers and academic field trips are an integral part of the program. Scholarships are available. Applications are due March 25. For additional information, contact: Office of Off-Campus Programs, Drew University, Madison, NJ 07940-4036; phone (201) 408-3438.

### **Diploma in Languages and European Community Studies University of Portsmouth, UK**

The School of Languages and Area Studies at the University of Portsmouth has launched a one-year (two semester) Diploma in Languages and European Community Studies. This programme builds on the department's already well established Diploma in English Studies, which takes about 150 students - mostly from other EC countries - a year.

The new Diploma, offered at intermediate level (third year of

a four-year course) is designed to give students a combination of language study in one or more of the major European languages, together with in-depth study of the origins, development and functioning of the European Community.

For more information and application details, write to: Admissions Tutor (Diploma in European Community Studies), School of Languages and Area Studies, Hampshire Terrace, Portsmouth PO1 2BU, United Kingdom.

### **European University Institute, Florence, Italy**

The European University Institute (EUI) is a postgraduate teaching and research institute. The mission of the Institute is to contribute to the intellectual life of Europe, through its activities and influence, and to the development of the cultural and academic heritage of Europe in its unity and diversity. In this context, the Institute aims to provide a European academic and cultural training and to carry out research in a European perspective (fundamental, comparative, and Community research) in the area of the social and human sciences.

The four academic departments of the Institute are History and Civilization, Economic, Law and Political and Social Sciences, all of which offer a doctoral degree program. The academic departments are complemented by two interdisciplinary centers. The Robert Schumann Center develops research bearing on important issues confronting contemporary European society. The European Forum brings together experts in a selected topic for one academic year, with emphasis on the international, comparative, and interdisciplinary aspects.

For detailed information on EUI teaching and research activity, request a copy of the Academic Year Prospectus from the Academic Service, European University Institute, Badia Fieslonia, via dei Roccettini 5, I-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI). Tel 39.55.46851 Fax 39.55.599.887

### **European Legal Practice**

The European Legal Practice program at the Tulane Law School is an elective specialization for JD students and an advanced degree for graduate law students. JD students who successfully complete 16 hours of required courses will receive, in addition to the JD degree, a certificate of specialization in European Legal Practice that could prove valuable in enabling them to secure legal positions in the field. Graduate students receive a Master of Comparative Law (Europe) upon successfully completing 22 hours of credits in the program.

For additional information, contact the Tulane Law School Admissions Office, New Orleans, LA 70118, phone (504) 865-5930, or contact Professor Lloyd Bonfield, Director of the European Legal Practice Program, at (504) 865-5850.

### **Centre for European Economic and Public Affairs (CEEPA), University College Dublin**

The CEEPA offers a Master's Degree in Economic and Public Affairs which currently has an enrollment of 29 students. Sixteen of these students are from outside Ireland, with five being from the United States. The programme is actively interested in recruiting students from the United States.

A feature of the Master's programme is the Special Lecture Series, given by a distinguished European figure. Following the appointment of Peter Sutherland to the directorship of GATT, these lectures, formerly given by Mr. Sutherland, are now given by Dr. Garrett FitzGerald, Former Irish Prime Minister and former President of the Council of Ministers of the European Community.

Further information regarding the Master's programme can be obtained from: The Director, Centre for European Economic and Public Affairs, University College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland.

**Post Graduate Program in  
European & International Management  
Universite de Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne**

This one year post graduate programme in Europe & International Business is designed for students willing to become managers in a European and international perspective. The weekly schedule is about 20 hours of courses from October to April, followed by a compulsory 3 months of internships or overseas assignment (as of May). Formal teaching is by lecture, tutorial, seminar, or presentation of case studies, in French or in English. All examinations take place shortly after the end of the courses.

For more information, please contact Professor Max Peyrard, the Program Director, at the Research Center in European & International Management, Room 222 B, U.F.R. Gestion-Sorbonne, 17 rue de la Sorbonne, 75231 Paris Cédex 05- Fax:33 (1) 40 46 31 77.

**Focus on Europe  
Vesalius College, Brussels**

Vesalius College, the international undergraduate division of the Vrije Universiteit Brussels, offers a "Focus on Europe" program for students who want to spend a semester in Brussels. The program concentrates on the European Union and the European integration process, and includes field trips to various European cities. Each field trip is introduced by a seminar dealing with historical, cultural and economic aspects of the city to be visited. On completion of the program, students receive a certificate in addition to the official transcripts of the courses completed. Participants have the option of living with a Belgian host family, or of arranging their own accommodation with the assistance of the College Orientation Office. For details, please contact: Focus on Europe, Vesalius College--VUB, Admissions Office, Dept. 4/E, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussels, Belgium.

**Master in European Studies and  
Master in Public Management  
Université de Genève**

These two-year programmes should be especially useful and attractive for graduates who want to build on economic, political and sociological studies with a comprehensive and up-to-date

advanced understanding of: (1) the European Union and its impact on public affairs (Master in European Studies); or (2) the management of public administration, and the adoption, implementation and evaluation of public policies, with the opportunity to specialize (during the second year) in public management, environmental policy, social policies, or international policy (Master in Public Management).

For more information, please contact Prof. Paolo Urio, Dean, 102, boulevard Carl-Vogt- CH-1221 Genève 4, Switzerland; Tél. 022/7058001. Téléfax 022/7814100.

## **Teaching News**

### **Creating a Network for European Studies at the Secondary Level**

ECSA members with a particular interest in European studies at the secondary level are encouraged to contact George Wrangham, Head of the History Department, The Shipley School, 814 Yarrow Street, Bryn Mawr, PA 19010; phone (610) 525-4300; fax (610) 525-5082.

The teaching of European studies at the secondary level (grades 9-12) is obviously of great importance to all ECSA members. By identifying members with special interests in this area, ECSA hopes to create a bridge for communication between educators at the secondary and university levels and across all disciplines concerned with European studies. They can exchange information on curricula, instructional materials and techniques, and other educational issues.

George Wrangham has designed and is teaching a wholly innovative year-long course on Europe since 1945, including future studies, for advanced students in grades 10, 11, and 12. He has generously offered to serve as the liaison person in this effort. Please contact him at the address above, or Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office for more information.

### **ECSA Syllabi Bank**

ECSA has established a syllabi bank for courses covering the European Union. It contains syllabi for a number of disciplines at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. Upon request, these syllabi are provided without charge to ECSA members.

Many of the syllabi in the bank date from 1990 or 1991. To keep the bank as current and useful as possible, members are asked to contribute their most recent EU-related course syllabi. Please contact Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office for more information.



# Essays

## The Greek Presidency

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The Presidency of the Council has become an increasingly important player in the politics of the Union over the past 25 years. The responsibilities of the office are, however, ill-defined in both the treaties and the Council's Rules of Procedure. As a result, governments holding the Presidency have a significant amount of leeway to do it "their way" -- for good or ill.

Fortunately for the Union there are a number of built-in constraints on any Presidency which serve as a check against folly and even, in certain cases, as a guarantee of success. The most important by far is the fact that the government concerned holds the office for only six months. As a result, its legislative priorities are largely predetermined and even its management of external relations -- an increasingly important Presidency responsibility -- is conditioned by negotiations already in progress or preordained and by the fact that so many of the EU's relationships with other countries are now more or less institutionalised. In these circumstances, every Presidency is forced to rely heavily on the permanent players, the Council Secretariat, COREPER and by no means least the Commission. There are, however, important duties which no officials can perform for their temporary political masters. Every Presidency therefore leaves its mark, good or bad.

The Greek Presidency of the first half of 1994 started with one considerable advantage. Nobody expected very much of it. The EU itself was widely perceived to be in "crises" and nothing in Greece's record either as a member state or, previously, as a holder of the Presidency suggested that it would or could revive the Union's fortunes. Expectations had been lowered still further by developments inside Greece in the months immediately preceding 1994. All the EU institutions are by their nature managed by coalitions representing the most important European political families. The fact therefore that a socialist government replaced a nationalist-conservative one in Athens shortly before the Presidency began was not in itself important. There were nevertheless certain features of the new government's composition and early actions that did not augur well for the Presidency that was to come.

The first concerned the Prime Minister himself. The government of Europe is vested in the final analysis in the twelve heads of government of state and the President of the Commission who together constitute the European Council. Their formal meeting at the end of each Presidency is always the most important single event in the six month period as a whole, and their informal contacts throughout are, cumulatively, just as important if not more so. Bilateral meetings, group summits, involving notably the Christian Democrat heads of government, and weekly or in some cases almost daily telephone conversations provide a *cantus firmus* in a polity that is polyphonous by nature. These contacts are maintained, it need hardly be said, whichever member of the top club happens to hold the Presidency. The

President of the European Council is nevertheless in a special position in the group, since he is able, when necessary, to focus the top level deliberations on specific EU agenda items requiring decision or action. It is he, in other words, who *ex officio* helps -- or should help -- this agreeable club to act, when necessary, as a super Council of Ministers, or government. The personality of the presidency is therefore a matter of significance for the Union as a whole. That is why the reappointment of Andreas Papandreou as Greek Prime Minister in 1993 provoked such foreboding. Few doubted his political instinct or, more generally, his considerable services to Greece and therefore to Europe. The problem lay elsewhere. He was known to be a very sick man, and it was widely assumed therefore that he would be physically unable to play an active Presidency role.

The dangers of a vacuum at the top were compounded by two other developments late in 1993. The Greeks let it be known that they intended to divide chairmanship of the General Affairs Council between the Foreign Minister and the European Minister: the former would look after foreign policy in the strict sense of the word, the latter would be responsible for the rest of EU business. This arrangement aroused misgivings on at least two grounds. In the first place, it perpetuated a distinction between foreign policy and general EU policy, including external economic relations, which most insiders regarded as anachronistic and which, despite the three pillar structure of the Maastricht treaty, the latter had sought to overcome through Article C and the establishment of the Article 151 regime. Coinciding as the Greek Presidency did with the period in which CFSP had to be put into operation, this division of labour in Athens looked -- and in the event proved -- highly unfortunate. The other objection concerned both the status and the personality of the European Minister, Theodoros Pangalos. Impulsive and outspoken, he had quickly become *persona non grata* in Bonn as a result of some singularly undiplomatic language about Germany. He was also junior in hierarchical terms to the foreign ministers over whom he had to preside in the General Affairs Council. As, in addition, he was almost certain at times to have to deputise for the prime minister himself, due to the indisposition of Mr. Papandreou, his relative lack of standing seemed likely to assume even greater significance.

A third factor raised still further doubts about the capacity of the Greek Presidency before it had even started. Presidencies impose huge demands on every national administration, however large or competent they are. As a result, preparations begin years rather than months in advance. When, therefore, the new Greek government announced wide-ranging changes amongst senior officials, including the Permanent Representative himself, only weeks before the Presidency began, the confidence of Greece's partners was not exactly boosted. The "new" Permanent Representative was, it is true, an old Brussels hand, but a quiet posting in Berne towards the end of a distinguished diplomatic career was not, under any stretch of the imagination, the optimal point of departure for an official who was bound, Pangalos apart, to be the key figure in the day-to-day management of the Presidency. The fact that Mr. Zafiriou had furthermore no direct experience of the Maastricht negotiations -- and therefore of the spirit as well as the letter of the treaty -- was further ground for dismay, given the urgent need to implement the long delayed treaty.

Expectations were not therefore high when the Greek

Presidency began in January 1994. In the event, the Greeks did much better than many had anticipated but significantly less well than circumstances demanded or the Union required. To begin with the "successes". They can be found in most policy domains and at many different levels. For example, Constantine Simitis, the Minister for Trade and Industry, performed effectively. So too did his colleague at Social Affairs, where the Presidency made real progress in imposing some direction in an area shot through with ideological divisions. The most systematic evidence of Presidency achievements is, however, to be found as usual in the conclusions of the European Council. In the debacle over the succession to Jacques Delors -- of which more anon -- many commentators overlooked the rather impressive catalogue of decisions and agreements which the European Council took or confirmed at Corfu. They included:

- \* The completion of the membership negotiations with Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden. This was by no means a foregone conclusion when the Greek Presidency began. Some of the points at issue, particularly with Norway, were highly contentious and the timetable, imposed by the European Council itself in October 1993, was widely believed to be over-ambitious. The process was nevertheless finished in time and to the satisfaction of most if not all concerned.
- \* The advancement, within the limits of the possible rather than the rhetorical, of the EU-level discussion of employment and competitiveness. There was never going to be an EU magic wand, but Jacques Delors was justified in his satisfaction with the tone and conclusions of the various Councils of Ministers over the six month period as a whole.
- \* The conclusion of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Russia and the Ukraine, including in both cases provisions which heightened and sharpened dialogue between the EU and their new partners.
- \* Renewed and still more specific acknowledgment of the need for further EU enlargement, albeit after the next inter-governmental conference. At Greek insistence, explicit mention was made in the European Council Conclusions of Cyprus and Malta, even if the pledges it contained were rather less than some in the countries concerned were looking for. More concretely, the European Council asked the Presidency and the Commission to present a detailed report at the next meeting in Essen in December, which gave further details of "the strategy to be followed with a view to preparing for accession".
- \* The advancement of negotiations with Slovenia and the Baltic States.
- \* Agreement that priority should also be given to EU policy towards North Africa including a concrete mandate to the Presidency and the Commission to prepare proposals for the next meeting at Essen.
- \* Involvement of the EU in the practical implementation of the Middle East Peace Process.
- \* The initiation of a joint action in advance of the 1995 conference on the Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation.
- \* The adoption of a number of undertakings towards South Africa in particular and Southern Africa in general.

- \* Modest, but real advances in Pillar III affairs, including an initiative against racism and xenophobia.

- \* Decisions regarding preparations for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), including the establishment of a preparatory operation under the Spanish Presidency in the second half of 1995.

Sceptics might observe that several of these conclusions were long on pledges which it was left to subsequent presidencies, and more particularly the German Presidency, to honour, and short on concrete detail or achievement. It is also true that the single most important achievement of the Presidency, namely the conclusions of the fourth enlargement negotiations, was strongly influenced by German interventions both during the negotiations themselves and in the subsequent European Parliament debate, when a fair number of right of Centre MEP's admitted that they had been encouraged to do their duty by personal letters from Chancellor Kohl. Finally, and most important of all, there is a strong hint of the machine rumbling in spite of rather than because of political leadership in many of the items covered in the list above. When all is said and done, however, the Presidency must be given some credit for facilitating the process.

It would be misleading, however, to conclude this essay on a positive note. The Greek Presidency may not have been as bad as many people expected it to be. It was not, however, the kind of Presidency that the EU required at a moment when a combination of the ratification of the Maastricht treaty and the first signs of economic recovery created a situation in which strong leadership could have raised morale and renewed a sense of direction. The Greeks did little or nothing to inspire either confidence or a sense of purpose. On the contrary, in certain respects they undermined both. Two quite separate issues will have to serve by way of illustration: the failure to find a successor to Jacques Delors and the mismanagement of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

When the European Council failed to agree on a new Commission President at Corfu, a great deal of criticism was directed against the French and the Germans for having tried to "impose" their candidate without adequate consultation. The uncharacteristic clumsiness of Bonn and Paris was, however, more a reflection on the failure of the Presidency to perform its duties than an expression of a new bid for hegemony. It had, after all, been clear from the beginning of the Greek Presidency that a decision about the Commission President would be a major item on the Corfu agenda. It would, therefore, have been prudent if the Presidency had begun to take soundings on an appointment which Mr. Major himself subsequently described as "one of the most important in the world", sooner rather than later. The need for action was in any event crystal clear by April, when it was obvious that the as yet undeclared Lubbers candidacy was running into serious trouble and that there was no self-evident alternative on whom all governments could be expected to agree. It is impossible to assert categorically that the Greek Presidency made no soundings at this stage. It is apparent, though, that however soon they started, they did too little too late. It is also clear why this was so: the Prime Minister was too weak physically to play the role that he ought to have done and Pangelos was too weak politically to take his place, particularly in Bonn where the Chancellor refused to see him. The failure to agree at Corfu on a successor to Jacques Delors was, in the last resort, a failure of the

Presidency.

In many respects, it should not have been surprising that the Greeks also failed to give the EU the lead that it required in the foreign policy field. They had a long record of dissent with their eleven partners over foreign policy issues both big and small. The Balkan crisis and more specifically the Macedonian question had only served to highlight just how divergent their outlook on international affairs frequently was. In the context of 1994, however, Greek idiosyncrasies and administrative shortcomings assumed an altogether greater significance than they had done when Greece had held the Presidency on previous occasions.

This was, after all, the first full term Presidency since the ratification of a treaty which assigned the Presidency the lead role in the implementation of the "new" CFSP. The machinery existed on paper: good intentions had to be turned into practical realities. The need for urgent action to establish the new CFSP mechanisms was made all the greater by the external challenge -- in the Balkans, in post-communist Europe, in North Africa and the Mediterranean, in the Middle East, in South Africa, and by no means least in the North Atlantic, where President Clinton threw down the gauntlet to the EU at the very beginning of the Greek Presidency with a series of speeches in Europe in which he called for a more effective, united European input into the North Atlantic Alliance in particular and global affairs in general.

Six months on, the machinery is still little more than a promise, and the record of practical achievement is so flawed that the morale of even those who believe that a CFSP on the basis of the treaty is feasible has been seriously dented and the confidence of those who never liked what they saw in the treaty has been correspondingly boosted. It would of course be absurd to blame this state of affairs entirely on the Presidency. The Council Secretariat and COREPER, on whom the main weight of the Article 151 regime rests -- or ought to rest -- were somewhat less than energetic and decisive. Sundry Political Directors, not to mention other, senior, pol-mil officials seemed at times to take a perverse delight in thwarting the process, without any serious alternative strategies themselves. The Commission too did not help. Having adopted a thoroughly unsatisfactory management structure in 1993, it proceeded in the second half of that year and still more in 1994 to give every indication of half-hearted commitment to even those arrangements. Prime responsibility must, however, be attributed to the Presidency, whose treaty role Of of paramount importance. As a result of these setbacks, it must be doubted whether the CFSP as envisaged at Maastricht can indeed be implemented without further, fairly drastic surgery in 1996.

Against this background, it is easy to see why, during the six month Greek Presidency, voices were to be heard in EU circles questioning the utility of the office of the Presidency as such. Given the nature of the EU's political system, the Presidency of the Council cannot be abolished: it is a logical expression of the quadripartite system and potentially an ideal mechanism for mobilising the best elements in the member states in the service of the Union as a whole. Yet recent experience and the prospect of still further enlargement to come suggest that the reform of the Presidency should be a priority item on the 1996 IGC agenda. That, however, is the subject of another essay.

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## The European Parliament After The 1994 Elections

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There is general agreement that the existence of a directly-elected Parliament differentiates the European Union from traditional international organisations. There is just as much disagreement about the importance of the European Parliament (EP) within the Union. This article aims to draw attention to recent developments in the life of the institution which are of significance for any analysis of the relevance of the Parliament for the future of the Union.

### The 1994 Elections

Let us start with the fourth direct elections to the EP which took place in June 1994. More people than ever before, 265 million, voted in the 12 Member States but this did not reflect an increase in the rate of participation. At 56% of the electorate, the turnout was closely comparable with the figure for the previous elections in 1989. However, important national variations remained. In four states (Belgium, Greece, Italy and Luxembourg) turnout was over 70% but in three others (United Kingdom, Netherlands and Portugal) it was below 40%. Moreover, in the Netherlands and Portugal, it fell by more than 11 and 15%, respectively, as compared with 1989.

Results as well as turnouts were fundamentally influenced by national factors. The severe losses incurred by government parties in Britain and Spain, the success of the governments in Germany and Italy and the splintering of the French vote across and beyond the traditional parties reflected different domestic circumstances including divergent appreciations of the nature and salience of the European issue. These proved more powerful forces than the considerable efforts of transnational parties to conduct coordinated campaigns on the basis of jointly-agreed manifestoes. The Maastricht Treaty created a new general category, "Citizenship of the Union"; it did not produce a single electorate.

### The Shape of the New Parliament

The new Parliament gathered in Strasbourg for its first plenary session from 19 to 22 July. It is bigger than its predecessor; the previous total of 518 members has been increased to 567 to take account, in particular, of German unification. And we can expect a further increase next year. If all the applicant states (Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden) join, there will be 74 further members, bringing the total to 641. Within less than one year, the Parliament will have grown by a greater number than in the previous 15 years of its existence as a directly-elected institution.

Such an increase poses formidable organisational and political problems. There will be an inevitable learning-process involved for new members as they come to grips with the particularities of the institution, especially so in this Parliament where 60% of the members are new. But the greatest challenge will be the establishment of a set of coherent political priorities. The new

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\*The views expressed in this article are purely personal and do not represent the official view of the European Parliament.

powers that the EP acquired under the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty underlined the importance that it be able to muster the votes of an absolute majority of its members. Until June this meant 260 votes but now that figure has risen to 284 and could increase next year to as high as 321 with the accession of the EFTA states. The achievement of such majorities depends in part on success in guaranteeing the presence of members for votes but more fundamentally requires cooperation between the various political groups.

### The Composition of the Political Groups

After the elections there were long negotiations over the composition of the groups in Parliament. The need to meet certain thresholds governing the number of countries from which members have to be drawn, the attraction of the advantages offered to political groups in terms of financial and staff resources and the search for a sufficient level of ideological conformity caused three groups to disappear and four new ones to emerge. As the table below indicates, the overall shape of the Parliament did not change all that significantly: the Socialist group remains the largest, the Christian Democratic group is still the second largest and together they can muster enough votes to achieve the absolute majority of 284 votes. Nevertheless, this general picture conceals a number of significant changes.

First, the relative position of the two largest groups has slightly weakened. They have both retained more or less the same number of seats but in a Parliament that has increased in size. Together they now make up 63% of the total, a decrease of 6% as compared with the previous Parliament. They can still determine the shape of most decisions, including decisions on office-holders. Together they decided that the new President of the Parliament should be a German Social Democrat, Mr. Klaus Hänsch, on the understanding that a Christian Democrat would succeed him for the second half of the legislature. However, the effect has been to provoke a significant level of protest from the other groups in the Parliament, thereby placing a higher premium on cooperation between the two main groups and encouraging them to look for support (including the possibility of extra members) in the rest of the Parliament. Only with such cooperation can the Parliament reach 284 votes and thereby act effectively.

Political Groups in the EP (as of July 19, 1994)		
Party Group	Before Elections	After Elections
European Socialists (PES)	197	198
European People's Party (EPP)	162	157
Liberal Democratic and Reformist Party (ELDR)	44	43
European United Left	—	28
Forza Europa (FE)	—	27
European Democratic Alliance (EDA)	20	26
Green Group (Greens)	27	23
European Radical Alliance (ERA)	—	19
Europe of Nations (EN)	—	19
Rainbow Group	16	—
Left Unity	13	—
European Right	12	—
Non-attached	27	27
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>518</b>	<b>567</b>

Second, the right within the Parliament has become more heterogeneous than in the past. Following the disappearance of the extreme-right German Republicans, the European Right Group no longer exists. The French National Front members of Mr. Le Pen now sit alongside those from the Italian National Alliance party as Non-attached members. A new group, "Europe of Nations", has appeared which is avowedly committed to opposing the development of further integration. It is composed mainly of French anti-Maastricht campaigners but also includes two left-wing Danish anti-marketeters. And another new group, Forza Europa, is made up exclusively of Italian members of Mr. Berlusconi's Forza Italia party. This increased heterogeneity is likely to make it more difficult to find common ground on the Centre Right.

Third, there is a more perceptible difference between countries whose members are spread over many political groups and those where large numbers are concentrated in a small number of groups. There has been considerable comment in France, for example, over the fact that its members are distributed over seven political groups and the conclusion has been drawn that this is likely to weaken the overall impact of the French view in the institution. In fact, French members in the old Parliament were spread over eight groups, so the situation is less novel than it might appear. However, it has to be seen against a background where there is a much greater concentration of British and German members. The 62 British Labour members constitute the largest national delegation in the Parliament and with the German SPD members constitute a total of 100. It will be difficult to forge majorities without the agreement of these members.

### The Powers of the Parliament

The new Parliament had two immediate opportunities in July to show whether it could devise an effective majority. First, there was the issue of the nomination of the Luxembourg Prime Minister, Mr. Jacques Santer, as Commission President. Under the Maastricht Treaty (Article 158 (2)), the governments of the Member States are called upon to nominate the President of the Commission "after consulting the European Parliament". The first consultation of the Parliament under this procedure came at an inauspicious moment: it followed the veto imposed on the Belgian Prime Minister, Mr. Dhaene, by the British government at the Corfu European Council Summit at the end of June. The Parliament objected strongly to this veto and after Mr. Santer had appeared before the Parliament as a whole (as well as each of the three largest groups in turn), it looked as if it might reject the nomination. All agreed that this would have obliged the European Council to look for a new candidate. In the event, the nomination was narrowly endorsed by 260 votes to 238 with 23 abstentions, essentially because Socialist MEPs from countries where their party is in government (notably, Denmark, Greece and Spain) declined to follow the line of the Socialist group as a whole.

Yet the vote was of major significance for future relations between the Parliament and the Commission. It underlined the importance for the Commission to take account of the Parliament's views and not to assume an automatic alliance in the political debate with the Council of Ministers. It also showed the willingness of the Parliament to exercise greater political control over the Commission and to influence its priorities. We can expect this process to continue. Later this year the Parliament

intends to hold the equivalent of public confirmation hearings on those nominated by governments as members of the Commission before it gives its vote of approval to the Commission as a whole. This is not something which has aroused great enthusiasm in the Commission and the Council but the Parliament is likely to want to draw maximum political advantage to increase its own visibility and to lay down clear markers as to what it expects from the Commission over the next five years.

The second event of the plenary was the first use by the Parliament of its new right of veto. Under the cooperation procedure, introduced under the Single European Act, the Council could always overrule parliamentary amendments, provided it acted unanimously. Maastricht introduced a new co-decision procedure (Article 189b) which enables the Parliament to veto a proposal, even if there is unanimity in the Council. Up to now, it had only had one opportunity to use this new power and it had failed to muster the necessary majority. This time, despite a concerted attempt in a conciliation meeting between the Parliament and the Council to overcome their differences, the EP decisively rejected a proposal to open up the telecommunications market. There were 373 votes in favour of rejection, 45 against and 12 abstentions. The result obliges the Commission to bring forward a new proposal.

The use of this veto aroused a mixed reception. The Financial Times argued that it showed the Parliament had protectionist tendencies and was opposed to market-opening measures. In fact, the rejection was essentially provoked by an institutional argument with the Council over the arcane subject of comitology. The Parliament was opposed to the Council reserving control for itself over the implementing measures stemming from the directive: it wanted a greater role for the Commission in the process and an opportunity to exercise parliamentary scrutiny of secondary legislation. Such institutional arguments, so often at the centre of debate in the European Union, clearly need to be more fully explained now that the Parliament is acquiring more significant powers.

### What Next for the Parliament?

One other recent event also deserves mention. At the Corfu Summit there was agreement that the European Parliament could nominate two members to join the "Comité des Sages" which is due to start work in June next year to prepare the ground for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). This was an important development in that initially the Council was sharply divided on the issue with France and Britain, in particular, opposed.

Membership of the committee will give the Parliament increased status in the run-up to the IGC. For once it will be on the inside looking out rather than in its more traditional stance of looking in from the outside. Moreover, the ground that is likely to be at the centre of the 1996 IGC is very dear to the EP's heart. The debate will be essentially institutional rather than about the extension of the competences of the Union, the issue at the core of Maastricht. The prospect of a Union expanding to more than 20 members by the early part of the next century makes a debate on how to adapt the existing institutional mechanisms unavoidable.

However, the Parliament will be faced with two particular challenges. First, it will have to persuade national parliaments to go along with any increases in its powers. This will not be easy.

Mr. Pandraud, Chairman of the Delegation for European Affairs in the French National Assembly, recently stated: "in the race between the European Parliament and the national parliaments for more power, just one year from constitutional reform of Europe, the second have to clearly take over from the first". The EP is likely to beg to differ.

The other major challenge will be to convince the wider public of the need for a more powerful Parliament as a way of addressing the democratic deficit in the European Union. The passage of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty revealed the degree of reluctance that exists in many states over strengthening the central institutions of the Union. Hence the importance of ensuring as broad a debate as possible before decisions are taken. For the Parliament this means balancing its search for a stronger role as an insider within the institutions with a realisation that it needs to win acceptance outside the world of governments if its legitimacy is to be secured. The way in which the Parliament undertakes this balancing act will be an important indicator of its relevance in the future development of the Union.

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### The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy: An Outsider's Retrospective on the First Year\*

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The author left for Brussels in September 1993 to witness the birth of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU) provided for in Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The TEU entered into force on November 1, 1993. His hypothesis was that CFSP would be a qualitative improvement over its predecessor, European Political Cooperation (EPC).

After all, Title V--as first implemented under the auspices of the Belgian Presidency--provided the legal basis upon which to upgrade EPC operations; bring the old EPC secretariat inside the Council of Ministers and give it a larger and more permanent staff and a budget; better relate the Rome Treaty-based foreign economic powers of the European Community (EC--now Pillar One of the TEU) with the foreign political activities of EPC (now Pillar Two of the TEU) to form more rounded and consistent EU policies; open up the possibility that some decisions may be reached by qualified majorities; and open the door to a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) by designating the Western European Union (WEU) as the EU's future defense arm. It seemed as if the EU would be poised to adopt new kinds of higher profile foreign policy actions previously not thought possible.

By the time the author left Brussels in May 1994, he was struck by the gap between what the EU wants to be and what it is;

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between the potential reach of CFSP and the limits placed on it by governments clinging to sovereignty; between what was agreed to at Maastricht and the interstate and interpillar acrimony over implementation; between the lackluster start of CFSP and what the outside world demands in terms of responsible and more effective EU international leadership; between, according to Christopher Hill, expectations of political leaders and the limited capabilities of common institutions; and between the promulgation of a CFSP on its own merits and the adverse affect on CFSP from crises elsewhere in European integration.

He concluded that CFSP in practice is more an idea than a reality; more an objective than a consensus for action; more an unclear vision than a working definition and a strategic notion of the EU's world role; more a process than a terminus; more a set of procedures than a firm commitment to translate process into outcome; and more a battleground for integrationists and intergovernmentalists than a single vision of how to get from the declaratory and civilian diplomacy of EPC to the foreign policy action and security identity of CFSP.

### **Internal Developments and Outward Appearances**

CFSP as a name can be misleading. Although the "F" in CFSP is a continuation and refinement of EPC, the "S" in CFSP is still futuristic: "...CFSP shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense." (Article J.4) CFSP is an imperfect transitory phenomenon between the old EPC and the next phase of foreign policy cooperation to be addressed during the 1996 inter-governmental conference on political union.

What most struck the author in his search for the elusive CFSP was the inability to graft the political will onto the infant structure to bring CFSP to life and to make decisions happen. After all, EPC had been in operation for over two decades. The UK Government, for example, which lobbied hard for and achieved an intergovernmentalist CFSP at Maastricht, has attempted to dampen CFSP's development, even though one would surmise that such a government would have a stake in CFSP's success. There were (and remain) seemingly endless debates among members and EU bodies over how to define, decide on, establish the parameters of, and pay for new styled joint actions. The stakes are high because CFSP's construction will determine its future course.

Integrationists worry over the "polluting" or "intergovernmentalization" of Pillar One by Pillar Two and intergovernmentalists worry over an integrationist CFSP. Some governments want to isolate the EC Commission in CFSP and others want to keep CFSP out of the hands of any EU body. Still others want to draw on the Commission's assets to serve CFSP but seek to give the Council Secretariat the central administrative role. The European Parliament is kept at bay by the Foreign Ministers, yet Pillar Two will depend on Pillar One's financial and other resources, which are under Parliament's purview.

In its first year, the inward (over outward) aspects of CFSP's development have been stressed by the Twelve and the common EU bodies. Inward development places the premium on building confidence among the Twelve by taking a piecemeal approach to realizing CFSP, e.g., undertaking a few modest joint actions on a trial by error basis and seeking to work out an interinstitutional

modus operandi per case until more comprehensive procedures can be tested and accepted. Witnessing this process has provided the scholar with a revealing education of how contending forces jockey for power and influence over one of the last bastions of sovereignty left to the member states. This has also reduced CFSP's value to the outside world, for while setting up CFSP as an internal matter to be worked out by the Twelve is critical to the EU, the outside world is more interested in constructive outputs.

Outward development will emphasize the impact of joint activity on external targets. The author holds that the outside world needs CFSP more quickly than the EU can deliver it. There is a precedence. Readers will remember that the "expectations gap" was at work as far back as the 1960s-1970s when the EC was forced to address the needs of nonmember states and to adapt to the currents of international interdependence.

Some argue that CFSP is a "non-starter" since it deals with a matter which cuts too deeply into state sovereignty for it to succeed. How can a group of states have a single foreign policy? Few argue that CFSP will result in a more cogent European presence in international politics. The truth of the matter lies in a sophisticated and subtle approach which avoids extremes of overly optimistic and overly pessimistic forecasts. The TEU does introduce novelties and innovations to foreign policy cooperation which--when (and if) blended with the requisite dose of political will and based on consensus--will give the Europeans the wherewithal to better provide for their own collective interests and security.

Although CFSP in 1994 is more an objective than a reality--and despite its growing pains--the reader is urged to recall that the quest to provide for the security of its members is as old as the European project itself. CFSP is a matter of evolution not revolution; it draws on the *acquis communautaire* of the EC and the *acquis politique* of the EPC. Observers who tend to dismiss CFSP within the context of events in any one glimpse of time fail to understand how very strong and durable are the notions which underline it.

A wry view suggests that after more than two decades of EPC, the Europeans do not need to rediscover the wheel. Since CFSP is heir to EPC, one would expect a less cumbersome start. Nevertheless, if only for symbolic reasons, the TEU's passage into law is significant for the development of foreign policy cooperation. A candid camera shot of CFSP as it now stands reveals the outlines of a very small, blurry, embryonic structure. On the basis of previous international experience, it does not take a large imagination to picture a CFSP which will develop over time into something more significant than the old EPC. Judging by the way member governments and EU central bodies have been jockeying for position, influence, and power in the new Pillar Two operations, one is left with the impression that the stakes are very high indeed.

### **The Limits and Possibilities of Incrementalism**

CFSP will develop in fits and starts. The piecemeal approach underwrote EPC. Until a time when CFSP becomes a working reality, the EU's role in the world will be more substantially and accurately represented by the traditional Rome Treaty-based external relations and policies of the EC operating in Pillar One with guidance from Pillar Two. Examples of powers reserved to the EC, based on specific articles of the Treaty of Rome include

the enlargement of the EU to include the Central/Eastern Europeans, association accords which provide the next best thing to membership for the former Soviet republics, substantial financial and technical assistance to support democratization and market reforms in the Ukraine and Russia, diplomatic recognition, use of economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy, and the decision to make or break the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. They will not disappear in the absence of a working CFSP. Instead, they will eventually be given a more calculated political basis once CFSP is developed.

What about the impact of the war in Bosnia on CFSP? Ethnic cleansing and other atrocities committed in Bosnia go against everything for which European integration stands. Surely the EC/EU made mistakes in handling the crisis at the outset. Even if CFSP had been in place when hostilities broke out, many doubt that the EU could have done much more than it did, given the extent to which all other major international actors have been loathe to intervene militarily.

However, unlike the situations in 1914 and 1939 the conflict has been contained and has spared Europe a wider conflagration as a result of the policies of the EU and other key principal actors. The EU states stuck to a common line despite the many strains which tested their unity. EU members, through NATO and the WEU, have joined NATO members in monitoring the UN embargo and have been engaged in the largest and longest humanitarian aid effort since the Berlin Airlift. Thousands of troops from EU member states remain on the ground in ex-Yugoslavia at the service of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).<sup>\*</sup> Others have served in the European Community Monitoring Mission and dozens of them have lost their lives or have sustained injuries in the service of the European Union.

The EU has been actively engaged in providing leadership for the international mediation efforts, yet because the results are so poor, it gets little recognition for a thankless job no other power wanted. This has been the first war in which the EC/EU has been faced with providing international leadership and mediation. The EU has used what carrots and sticks it has at its disposal (short of military force) to promulgate an action plan to settle the conflict. It has worked hard for and achieved a more activist U.S. role and has formed part of a contact group with Russia, the U.S., and the UN to attempt to apply broader international pressure on the belligerents. It is committed to providing the civil administration for a post-war Mostar.

Bosnia will leave an indelible mark on CFSP's development; it will factor into plans to make CFSP a better tool of intelligence and thus better equip the EU to be more aware of, and plan for, potential conflicts before they explode. Indeed the French-inspired CFSP joint action for a European Stability Pact--in which the EU uses its good offices to help neighboring countries in Central/Eastern Europe reach accords on the protection of ethnic minorities and on stabilizing border regions--flows directly from the tragedy of EU policy in Bosnia. The learning curve lives.

<sup>\*</sup>As of July 1994, EU member states had 12,600 troops deployed in Bosnia, with additional numbers deployed with UNPROFOR elsewhere. France (5,000) and the United Kingdom (over 3,600) have provided the largest contingents. Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, and Spain have also committed troops to UNPROFOR.

What has happened in CFSP which is different from before and what does the future hold? The potential for more rounded and consistent foreign policy across the pillars is given a boost by the Title V provisions which put the Permanent Representatives (COREPER) in charge of preparing the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Previously the Political Directors from the members' Foreign Ministers prepared for the EPC meeting of Foreign Ministers outside the Rome Treaty framework. COREPER, a Community body located in Brussels and serviced by the Council Secretariat, is well placed to link the foreign economic and political arms of the EU. The Political Directors will still wield significant influence but symbolically they have had to yield an inch or two of power to a communitarian body.

The Commission gained the right of foreign policy initiative and is developing a mini-foreign ministry of its own in the new Directorate-General (I.A) for Foreign Political Relations. No matter how strong the intergovernmentalist strand in CFSP is, the member states will continue to rely on the Commission's expertise, continuity, institutional memory, Rome Treaty powers in the international economy, and financial resources. CFSP is not a wholly intergovernmental undertaking. The European Parliament will need to fight hard to carve out its proper place in the CFSP edifice through its budgetary and oversight powers. A CFSP which develops in ways arcane and distant from the European Parliament and thus from the citizens of the EU risks popular disenchantment.

As for the "F" in CFSP, the first five joint actions are all modest in reach so that their success can be built upon. All of them, with the possible exception of the Stability Pact, would have occurred under EPC. Thus there is little new here except to the student of political cooperation who is interested in detecting new patterns of decisionmaking. The dispatch of monitors to educate voters and observe elections in Russia is not significant in itself but is important in how it relates to CFSP's inward development. The conveying of humanitarian aid to Bosnia and a new political framework for EU aid to the West Bank and Gaza also illustrate such internal development matters as who pays for what as well as who does what, when, and how. The German and French EU Council Presidencies are expected to be more active in CFSP than their Greek predecessor.

CFSP should not be judged solely in terms of joint action (the TEU does not actually define joint action but lays out the intricate procedures of such action). Joint actions as currently construed could actually be a straight-jacket on EU behavior. CFSP is more than joint actions: it includes common positions, policies, and declarations and it gives Pillar One external relations a political framework.

As for the "S" in CFSP, institutional links and relations between the EU and the WEU, the EU and NATO, and the WEU and NATO have been slow to develop but there is some movement. The WEU has made numerous changes to bring itself closer to the EU and NATO and to EU prospective members, and the Eurocorps is beginning to take shape and expand. The NATO Summit decision of January 1994 to endorse ESDI and CFSP lends a big boost to the EU. NATO gave its full support to the CFSP and ESDI which, it maintained, would strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance; concluded that the EU and NATO share common strategic objectives; and endorsed the notion of

Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) to allow the WEU to draw on NATO assets in support of CFSP (separate but separable forces). Once again the potential for a widened scope of action for CFSP is evident. Only time will tell if CFSP will be strengthened in practice as a result.

EU enlargement to the North and East is thought by many to adversely affect CFSP unless the EU deepens integration and extends majority voting to more decisionmaking. Yet enlargement gives the EU a border with Russia and the Ukraine and thus forces it to think in broad geostrategic terms on the continent. The EU will reinforce its leadership in Europe if, via membership, it can do for Central/Eastern Europe what it did to stabilize democratization in previous southern enlargements.

### Conclusions

The author began with the hypothesis that CFSP would be a qualitative improvement over EPC. The conclusion must be drawn that this is currently the case in terms of treaty principles and intentions; in terms of real outputs with significant impact, substance will have to flow from form. CFSP is off to a slow start but the potential for its institutionalization and operationalization is there--if the political will can be found to make it possible. There is little time left between now and the run-up to the next intergovernmental conference on political union for CFSP to develop a track record from which needed reforms may be ascertained. There will not likely be major breakthroughs in reform of CFSP. Instead, some of the rough edges might be smoothed out. WEU may not yet make it into the EU by 1996 but could by 1998. While CFSP is in a period of uncertainty in the short-term, it is a manifestation of a logic of cooperation which predates and will postdate the end of the Cold War. Thus in the longer-term one can expect a piecemeal development which, while not satisfying to proponents, is still politically necessary.

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### Norway and European Union

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As Norway once again debates its relationship to Europe, the discussion reveals how distant the society is from Continental influences, how little has changed since Norwegians voted "no" to membership in 1972, and how different Norway's political economy is from its Scandinavian neighbors. The EU debate is much more centered around what it means to be Norwegian, in contrast to the EU debate in Sweden, where the discussion focuses on "how Swedes have always been Europeans." As in 1972, Norway is deeply divided between those who view Europe as a threat to economic interests and societal values, and those who believe that Norway's future depends on cooperation with other European states.

As Norwegians prepare for the November 28, 1994 referendum on EU membership, it promises to be the most difficult struggle for pro-EU forces in Northern Europe. In a brilliant political move, Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland managed

to schedule the referendum after the EU vote in Finland on October 16 and in Sweden on November 13.<sup>1</sup> She and the pro-European flank of the Social Democratic Party are banking on a "domino effect" of a Swedish and Finnish "yes" to European integration which will pull Norway into the fold. However, according to a recent public opinion poll in the daily newspaper, Aftenposten, 48% of Norwegians oppose membership while only 33% support it.<sup>2</sup>

The skepticism expressed in recent public opinion polls reflect three central concerns about Europe. Norwegians will be forced to transfer decision-making authority to anti-democratic institutions, where small states have little influence. Membership in the European Union also threatens the "norsk hver dag," (the Norwegian daily life) and the very essence of what it means to be Norwegian. Farmers, fisherman, and others employed in the periphery fear the consequences of liberalizing state subsidies and other government protections required by EU membership.

Politically, Norway is deeply divided about its relationship to Europe. Culturally, Norway is not prepared to be in the EU-- nor is the EU (with the possible exception of Denmark and Britain) ready for the likes of Norway. Economically, Norway depends heavily on its leading export commodity, petroleum, which it can continue to sell to the Continent whether it joins the EU or not. As a consequence, Norwegians are likely to say "no" to European Union--just as they did in 1972, when the issue was also debated, and Norway decided to opt for a more limited partnership with the EC as a member of EFTA.

There are several questions surrounding Norway's relationship to Europe which are puzzling to scholars interested in the study of integration. Why is membership in the EU such a problem for Norway? What are the unique features of Norway's political economy that are an obstacle to deepening cooperation with the EU? Who is for closer ties to Europe and who is against? I will focus my discussion around these questions, in an attempt to offer a better understanding of why Norwegians are such reluctant Europeans.

### Why is EU Membership a Problem for Norway?

Norway has always preferred trade agreements to politically binding relationships with other states. As European Community integration has evolved from a loose partnership of six European states (France, Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux states) to a tight partnership of twelve European states, more and more decisions are made at the supranational level. For Norwegians, who tend to be critical of national decision making in Oslo, the "democratic deficit" in European institutions is a reason not to join. Why should decisions that directly affect Norwegian society be made by Euro-crats in Brussels? As Europe deepens its cooperation to create common European citizenship rights, a common foreign and security policy, a common monetary policy, and increasingly moves into areas that have traditionally been the domain of national governments, Europe is no longer a free trade area, but a union of states, attempting to forge a common identity. The concept of "union" has negative connotations for Norwegians. "Union" conjures up images of subordination and the loss of autonomy to two larger, more powerful states, Sweden and Denmark. As a consequence of Norway's relatively recent independence from Sweden (1905), there is a strong resistance to subordinating the political system to supranational authorities.



Even if Norway joined another "union" and became a member, there would be little possibility of influence--particularly since changes in the EC's system of voting assigns more weight to larger member-states.

Within the "union," Germany's emergence as a regional hegemon is also cause for concern. Some Norwegians are wary of the EU because of a perception that "Germany will own us." While the younger "inter-rail generation" does not share this view of Germany, the legacy of the German occupation of Norway for the duration of WWII still lingers.

As a NATO member-state, it was often assumed that Norway would be interested in cooperating with other European members of NATO in the European Community. Yet, Norway's strong historic ties to the United States have led to a cautious policy towards European defense cooperation. Norway has pursued the policy suggested by James Baker, the former Secretary of State, that "the WEU should not be an alternative to NATO."

The EU may require Norway to change its ways. For example, in the practice of whaling, Norwegian policies conflict with European ambitions. According to the EC Directive on Natural Habitats which came into affect in July 1994, member-states must protect endangered species and prohibit hunting or killing whales. Norway maintains that the careful harvest of a relatively plentiful species (the minke whale) is harmless. Yet will the EU accept Norway's position?

To understand Norwegian societal resistance to the EU, it is important to examine the unique features of Norway's political economy.

### Norway's Political Economy and EU Resistance

Norwegians were blessed (although some economists might say they were cursed) by the discovery of oil and gas off their continental shelf in the 1960s. Because of Norway's dependence on hydroelectric power, all the oil and gas found on the continental shelf could be exported. By relying on the expertise of multinational firms, Norway became a net oil exporter in 1975. Norway could not have planned it better: to enter the oil market following a quadrupling of the oil price! The government has become increasingly reliant on oil revenues, and Norway is the largest provider of natural gas to the European Community.

The revenue from petroleum exports have been used by the state to support industry and agriculture in peripheral areas--thus avoiding the depopulation of rural areas experienced in Sweden. Through an elaborate combination of national government subsidies, and regional development grants, industry and agriculture thrive in areas which are remote and where it would otherwise be impossible to make a living. Norwegians engage in what some experts call "vertical farming," or farming on the side of a mountain. Unlike the Danes who were blessed by abundant, fertile farmland, or the Swedes with the agricultural-rich area of Skane, Norway is predominately bedrock. In order for farmers to maintain their livelihood, they depend on price supports and subsidies from the state.

Because of Norway's unique regional policy and dependence on petroleum revenue, core sectors of the economy have been sheltered from international competition. Norway will have a more difficult adjustment to the imperatives of European integration than its Nordic neighbors. The offshore sector has enabled Norway to have the luxury of debating its relationship to

Europe; and according to energy analysts, oil and gas reserves should cushion the economy well into the next century.

### Who is For and Who is Against?

If we examine Norway's 1972 national referendum on the EC when 53.5% of the voters rejected membership, it is possible to trace the economic interests for and against membership. The fishermen and farmers were overwhelmingly against, while small businesses and manufacturers were in favor of membership. Those sectors which have been sheltered from international competition by state subsidies were threatened by the prospect of EC integration; while the open, export-oriented sectors sought the benefits of a larger market.

If we compare economic interests for and against European Community integration today, there are only a few changes. A new industry has emerged with strong interests in expanding its market in Europe: the fish farmers. The agricultural sector remains firmly against EU membership, and the party most closely tied to agriculture, the Center Party, is vehemently against joining the EU. The small, coastal fisheries are skeptical about closer ties to the EU, and protested the decision by Gro Harlem Brundtland to liberalize trade in fish and fish products with the EC. Proponents of membership are export-oriented companies interested in expanding trade to the member-states of the EU, Norway's largest trading partner.

In contrast to Sweden, where all the major political parties support EU membership, several of Norway's most important parties actively oppose European integration. The strongest opponent is the Center Party, who resigned from the three party coalition government in October 1990 over the negotiations to create a new expanded free trade area with the European Community, the EEA. The Center Party refuses to a part of any government that seeks to join the EU. There are also divisions within the Social Democratic Party, and the Christian People's Party is skeptical about the consequences of EU membership for Norwegian society.

The anti-EU movement, "Nei til EF," which was instrumental in mobilizing societal interests against the EC in the last national referendum campaign (1972), has revived its activity and opened offices throughout Norway. The movement has been effective at stirring up nationalist sentiment. In the words of Kristen Nygaard, a leader of the anti-EU movement, "the Rome Treaty is a threat to the Scandinavian model and the Norwegian way of life."<sup>3</sup> Thus far, the EU opponents have been much more effective at mobilizing the population against membership than the EU supporters have been in convincing Norwegians of the benefits of European integration.

The current debate reminds us of how little has actually changed in Norway. The EU treaty requires approval from the Norwegian people in the form of a national referendum, and a 75% majority approval by the Norwegian Parliament. Both political requirements will be difficult to meet. In the September 1993 elections, which Norwegian political scientist Henry Valen referred to as an "EF valg" (EC election), support for the anti-EU Center Party increased; and fewer voters supported the pro-EU Conservative Party. The effect of the election has been to divide the Norwegian Parliament into two camps, polarized around the issue of Norway's relationship to Europe.

The national referendum of 1972 led to a crisis in Norwegian

party politics. Political parties were fragmented as a consequence of the "no" to membership. The Liberal Party split in two; the left wing of the Social Democratic Party created a new party, the Socialist Left Party, and a new Progress Party emerged in the aftermath of the referendum. As a consequence of their pro-European position, the Social Democrats were unable to discuss the EC question for fifteen years. A "nei" to the EU in November could once again alter the Norwegian party system, by strengthening those parties on the left (SV) and the center (SP) who oppose European integration, and by undermining the legitimacy of the Social Democratic Party.

### Why Join?

Norwegians are reticent about giving up national traditions associated with joining a "union" of larger, more powerful European states. After all, even their southern Scandinavian neighbors, the Danes, who have been members of the EC since 1973, seem skeptical about the implications of the Maastricht Treaty and European Union for the Danish state and society. Why should Norwegians accept intrusive European Community directives, plans to create a Central European bank and Euro-currency, and common foreign and security policies?

Norway's political economy depends on the offshore sector. In contrast to neighboring Sweden where industrial leaders promote European Union membership so that manufacturers will not be excluded from their largest market, Norway can continue to sell its oil and gas to member-states without joining the union. The European Economic Area Agreement enables Norway to have access to the European Community market without accepting all the terms and conditions associated with full membership in the EU.

As long as Norwegians continue to be the blue-eyed Arabs of the north, with abundant energy resources, the country can afford to sit out this accession period. In the unlikely event that a majority of Norwegians adhere to the wishes of Mrs. Brundtland and vote "ja" to membership, the government will be likely to join the political coalition of EU states (Denmark and Britain) who are skeptical to the creation of a European super-state.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup>Austria's June 12, 1994 referendum on entry into the European Union was approved by a 66.4% majority.

<sup>2</sup>Scandinavian Business Review, Volume #2, 1994, p. 11.

<sup>3</sup>See Fakta og Meninger om Norge og EF edited by Per Lund, Kristen Nygaard, and Birget Wiig (Oslo: Hilt and Hansteen, 1989).

### Additional Sources on Norway and European Union:

Bredal, Tore M. "Norway and the European Union: An Overview of Public Opinion in Norway," in The Fourth Enlargement: Public Opinion on Membership in the Nordic Candidate Countries. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 1994.

Matlary, Janne Haaland. "And Never the Twain Shall Meet?" in The Nordic Countries and the EC edited by Teija Tiilikainen and Ib Damgaard Petersen. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies, 1993.

Mjøset, Lars. "Norwegian Political Economy" in Continuity and Change edited by Anne Cohen Kiel. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1993.

Nelsen, Brent. Norway and the European Community Westport: Praeger, 1993.

Scandinavian Studies. Special Issue, Fall 1992. Articles by Kaare Strøm and Christine Ingebritsen.

Svasand, Lars and Ulf Lindstrøm. "Norway: Sliding Towards EC Membership," in Government and Opposition, V. 27, #3, Summer 1992.

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## Distribution and Access of European Union Research Materials in the U.S.

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This essay is intended as an introduction to, not an in-depth study of, European Union (EU) documentation. It briefly describes the publishing output of the EU, the major channels through which these publications are distributed, and methods for accessing these materials. It will not survey individual EU publications, because there are simply too many to cover in a short essay. The author draws on the publications of Barbara Sloan, Head of Public Inquiries, Office of Press and Public Affairs, Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities, Washington, D.C., as well as the author's experience in providing reference assistance in a library which houses an EU depository collection.

### Publications

The various institutions of the EU publish a tremendous amount of material in paper and microform formats. In 1990, for example, the *Official Journal of the European Communities* totaled 450,000 pages, in 9 languages. Other publications, including 85 periodical titles and approximately 500 monographs, totaled 350,000 pages. The Commission publishes approximately 90% of this material.

The EU produces over 20 bibliographic and full-text databases furnishing various types of information, including bibliographic information on publications, statistics, research groups and projects, and legislation. Most are available for free hookup by depository libraries. The *Directory of Public Databases* (Office of Official Publications of the European Communities), available from the Washington, D.C. Delegation office, describes these databases.

### Distribution

The EU distributes copies of all of its "official" (translation: those it wants the public to have) periodical and non-periodical publications to a network of depository libraries in the U.S. These libraries are expected to make all materials available to the public, including through inter-library loan. UNIPUB, 4611-F Assembly Drive, Lanham, Maryland 20706-4391 (800/274-4888) is the sole domestic distributor of EU materials; it sells all subscriptions and priced publications, annuals and yearbooks, and some *Official Journal* and COM (Commission) documents.

## Access

The EU publishes several catalogs indexing its publications, which depository libraries receive, but they are notoriously difficult and time-consuming to use. A trained reference specialist can instruct patrons in their use. EU documentation can be located successfully through on-line catalogs if items are listed under author or title, but often they are not. Instead, items are often cataloged as part of a series rather than as individual items. Check with reference personnel for terms to use in searching. Several on-line databases have information on the EU, e.g., Dialogue and DataStar. Searching online is much quicker and more efficient than manual searching. Consult with your local database searching department to see what is available. The best current searching tool for EU titles is the CD-ROM *Eurocat: The Complete Catalogue of EC Publications and Documents* published by Chadwyck-Healey. It is composed of four bibliographic databases produced by the EU. The title is misleading, however, as *Eurocat* is not really complete. It contains bibliographic information on all materials published by all EU institutions since 1985 and selected materials published before 1985, and is updated quarterly. At roughly \$800 per year, *Eurocat* is an indispensable research tool.

Access to a depository library and *Eurocat* are obviously highly desirable for all researchers of the EU. Locating titles in *Eurocat* and acquiring them through inter-library loan is a good alternative.

If local personnel cannot locate an item or answer a reference question, either they or patrons may contact the academic reference desk (202/862-9565) at the office of the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities in Washington, D.C. This office offers various services and items free of charge, including assistance in locating and furnishing items which personnel at depository libraries cannot locate, and free publications and brochures describing various aspects of the EU. One brochure of particular interest to researchers is "Researching the EC-Official Sources." It is pre-Maastricht and therefore somewhat out-of-date, but it is very useful. The Washington office should be contacted for help on locating items only if a thorough local search proves fruitless.

*Editor's note: Phil Wilkin will contribute an essay to the next issue of the Newsletter which details major EU reference sources.*

### **List of European Union Depository Libraries in the U.S.**

American University, Law Library, 4400 Massachusetts, N.W., Washington, DC 20016

Council on Foreign Relations, Library, 58 East 68th St., New York, NY 10021

Duke University, Public Documents Department, University Library, Durham, NC 27706

Emory University, Law Library, School of Law, Atlanta, GA 30322

George Mason University, Center for European Studies, 4001 North Fairfax Drive, Suite 450, Arlington, VA 22203

Harvard University, Law School Library, Langdell Hall - Law

431, Cambridge, MA 02138

Illinois Institute of Technology, Law Library, 77 South Wacker Drive, Chicago, IL 60606

Indiana University, Government Documents, University Library, Bloomington, IN 47405

Library of Congress, Serial Division, Madison Building, 10 First Street, S.E., Washington, DC 20540

Michigan State University, Documents Department, University Library, East Lansing, MI 48824-1048

New York Public Library, Research Library, Economics & Public Affairs, 42nd & 5th Avenue, New York, NY 10017

New York University, Law Library, School of Law, 40 Washington Square S., New York, NY 10012

Northwestern University, Government Publications, University Library, Evanston, IL 60201

Ohio State University, Documents Division, University Library, 1858 Neil Avenue Mall, Columbus, OH 43210

Pennsylvania State University, Documents Section, University Library, University Park, PA 16802

Princeton University, Documents Division, Library, Princeton, NJ 08544

Stanford University, Central Western European Collection, The Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA 94305

State University of New York, Government Documents, Lockwood Library Building, Buffalo, NY 14260

State University of New York, Government Publications, Library, 1400 Washington Avenue, Albany, NY 12222

University of Arizona, International Documents, University Library, Tucson, AZ 85721

University of Arkansas, Documents Department, UALR Library, 33rd & University, Little Rock, AR 72204

University of California, Documents Department, Central Library, La Jolla, CA 92093

University of California, Documents Department, General Library, Berkeley, CA 94720

University of California, International Documents, Public Affairs Service, Research Library, Los Angeles, CA 90024

University of Chicago, Government Documents, Regenstein Library, 1100 East 57th Street, Chicago, IL 60637

University of Colorado, Government Publications, University Library, Box 184, Boulder, CO 80309-0184

University of Florida, Documents Department, Libraries West, Gainesville, FL 32611

University of Georgia, Law Library, Law School, Athens, GA 30602

University of Hawaii, Government Documents, University

Library, 2550 The Mall, Honolulu, HI 96822

University of Illinois, Law Library, School of Law, 504 East Pennsylvania Avenue, Champaign, IL 61820

University of Iowa, Government Publications, Library, Iowa City, IA 52242

University of Kansas, Government Documents & Maps, University Library, 6001 Malott Hall, Lawrence, KS 66045

University of Kentucky, Government Publications, Margaret I. King Library, Lexington, KY 40506

University of Maine, Law Library, 246 Deering Avenue, Portland, ME 04102

University of Michigan, Serials Department, Law Library, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1210

University of Minnesota, Government Publications, Wilson Library - 409, Minneapolis, MN 55455

University of Nebraska, Acquisitions Division, University Libraries, Lincoln, NE 68588-0410

University of New Mexico, Social Science Coll. Dev., Zimmerman Library, Albuquerque, NM 87131

University of New Orleans, Business Reference, Earl K. Long Library, New Orleans, LA 70148

University of Notre Dame, Document Center, Memorial Library, Notre Dame, IN 46556

University of Oklahoma, Government Documents, Bizzell Memorial Library, Room 440, 401 West Brooks, Norman, OK 73019

University of Oregon, Documents Section, University Library, Eugene, OR 97403

University of Pennsylvania, Serials Department, Van Pelt Library, Philadelphia, PA 19104

University of Pittsburgh, Government Documents/Technical Services, G-20V Hillman Library, Pittsburgh, PA 15260

University of Puerto Rico, Law Library, Law School, Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico, 00931

University of South Carolina, Documents/Microforms, Thomas Cooper Library, Columbia, SC 29208

University of Southern California, International Documents, Von Kleinschmidt Library, Los Angeles, CA 90089

University of Texas, Law Library, School of Law, 727 East 26th Street, Austin, TX 78705

University of Utah, International Documents, Marriott Library, Salt Lake City, UT 84112

University of Virginia, Government Documents, Alderman Library, Charlottesville, VA 22903

University of Washington, Government Publications, University Library FM-25, Seattle, WA 98195

University of Wisconsin, Documents Department, Memorial Library, 728 State Street, Madison, WI 53706

Washington University, John M. Olin Library, Campus Box 1061, 1 Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130

Yale University, Government Documents Center, Seeley G. Mudd Library, 38 Mansfield, New Haven, CT 06520

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## Modeling the European Union--Part II

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John McCormick's welcome invitation to share experiences on collegiate simulations of the European Union deserves response, particularly as he was kind enough to mention the activities of the New York Consortium for Model European Union Simulations (NYCMECS).

Brockport began its EC simulation efforts in 1987, with encouragement from the Washington Delegation of the EC Commission, which advised us that no similar project had been undertaken on an intercollegiate basis. We held our first simulation in the Spring of 1988, with 35 students representing six schools. We organized annual simulations in 1989, 1990, and 1991, with gradually increasing numbers of students and institutions. In 1992, 146 students and faculty advisors from twelve schools traveled to Luxembourg to run a simulation together with about eighty European Students. The European sponsor was the Institute for European International Studies, Luxembourg (Dr. Armand Clesse, Director) and the simulation site was the Luxembourg seat of the EP. Since then, we have held simulations in Brockport in March 1993 and Luxembourg in January 1994. The next simulation is scheduled April 6-9, 1995 in Brockport. If all goes well, we will return to Luxembourg in 1996.

In Luxembourg in 1992, the faculty advisors agreed to organize a consortium to sponsor American participation in future simulations. The Consortium was formed in October 1992 by Canisius College, Colgate University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Hamilton College, Skidmore College, St. John Fisher College, and State University of New York units at Brockport, Buffalo, Cortland, Fredonia, Geneseo, and Jamestown. We agreed to keep the number of our members approximately equal to the number of member-states in the EU. Accordingly, we have now admitted SUNY New Paltz and New York University and have offered associate membership to North Adams State (Massachusetts) and Washington State University. Each full member pays \$250 and each associate member \$100 in annual dues. The consortium is registered as a not-for-profit organization under New York State law and is applying for tax-exempt status with the IRS. A meeting is scheduled in Berlin at the IPSA Congress at which representatives of interested institutions will organize a counterpart European consortium. Our Associate Director, Edgar Morgan, has organized a similar consortium among Pennsylvania schools.

Financial support has come from a number of sources. The Washington office of the European Commission has underwritten

the production of an 82-page "user's manual", a 40-minute professionally made videotape of the 1993 simulation, and an eight-page brochure describing the project. Student travel has been subsidized by the European Commission, private foundations and corporations, the IEIS, and the students' home institutions. Nevertheless, most of the travel costs have been paid by the students (and their parents). The IEIS, the government of Luxembourg, and SUNY Brockport have subsidized conference administrative costs.

The format and content of the simulations have evolved over time. As planned for NYSLUX95, the main resolution will concern the EU Inter-Governmental Conference scheduled for 1996. Previous topics have included entry into phase two of the EMU, immigration, general foreign and defense policies, and admission of Turkey and of Austria. Also, each simulation produces the current world affairs section of the "President's Conclusions" to a European Council meeting and a response to the announcement during the simulation of a "crisis".

Each process follows, as far as practicable, the EU decision-making process. It is likely that the institutions to be simulated in NYSLUX95 will be the Commission; the European Council; the General Affairs, Ecofin, and European Councils; the European Parliament Institutional and Legal Affairs Committees; the Ecosoc Economic, Financial, and Monetary Affairs Section; a section of the Committee of the Regions; a committee of high national civil servants; and COREPER II. Our first simulation began Friday afternoon and ended Sunday noon. The last three have been extended by beginning 24 hours earlier.

We have a well-worked-out procedure for assigning roles. Each Consortium member assumes half of the governmental roles of a member state. The other half are played by European students, usually from the countries they represent. Roles are alternated each year and also from year-to-year. If an American represents the prime minister of a country, a European will represent the foreign minister, an American the economics minister, a European the European affairs minister, and so on. If an American represented the prime minister of a country in 1994, a European will play that part in 1995 and the other roles will alternate accordingly. Country assignments are permuted among the American schools.

In the past, the European Parliament (EP) and Ecosoc roles have been assigned to the schools that represented the respective governments, as far as practicable, but we plan to change that for 1995. Now, we will assign EP roles so that each school's delegation will have as much partisan homogeneity as possible. Ecosoc and Committee of the Regions roles will be assigned according to the principle of interest homogeneity. Role assignments will continue to alternate between American and European students.

This system of specific assignments enables each student to play the role of a real person. The students can research their "alter egos" and assume their identities more realistically during the simulation. The Consortium Director distributes the roles among the institutions and the faculty advisors and students make the assignments within each delegation.

Our experience confirms Professor McCormick's observation that the EU offers more challenging and interesting simulation opportunities than does the UN. It also creates more frustration. Both students and faculty do best to regard these simulations primarily as a problem-solving exercise for the students. The

students should not be upset if the process does not run smoothly and the faculty members should restrain their natural professorial instincts to intervene where they could be much more effective than the students.

Further information on our activities is available from me, NYCMECS Director, State University of New York, Brockport, NY 14420. We sell our user's manual for \$10. Copies of the printed brochure and of our constitution will be sent upon request, free of charge. The videotape of the 1993 simulation can be obtained from Modern Talking Pictures, Inc., 5000 Park Street N., St. Petersburg, FL 33709.

*Editors Note: John McCormick, the coordinator of the Midwestern Model EU and contributor to the Spring/Summer Newsletter, can be contacted at the Department of Political Science, Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis (IUPUI), 425 University Boulevard, Indianapolis, IN 46202; phone (317) 274-4066.*

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## Perspectives

*Editor's Note: This new section of the Newsletter is designed to promote a constructive dialogue on matters of great importance to the EU. The views presented in this section are those of the authors, and not those of ECSA. ECSA takes no positions on matters of public policy. Correspondence for publication concerning the Perspectives section should be sent to Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office.*

### The War in Bosnia: Crisis for the European Union

Alan Cafruny  
Department of Government  
Hamilton College

Submitted August 1, 1994

"The Yugoslav drama has traumatized West European people and done more damage to the process of European unity than the hassle about Maastricht."

Hans van den Broek, International Herald Tribune,  
Jan. 18, 1993.

In July, 1991, war broke out in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. Responding to Slovenia's declaration of independence and occupation of border posts, Serbian units of the former Yugoslav defense forces (JNA) attacked the provisional Slovenian militia. The EC quickly mediated an agreement under which the JNA withdrew from Slovenia, but Serbian forces then turned their attention to Croatia. Fighting alongside Serbian militias in the Krajina, they carried out bloody sieges of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. In January, 1992, Serbia withdrew from Croatia

under a UN agreement in which peacekeeping troops were stationed in the Krajina. Since March, 1992, war has consumed Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnian Serbian forces, supported by Belgrade, have conducted a three year campaign of genocide against Bosnia's Muslim population resulting in more than 200,000 deaths, violent "ethnic cleansing," unprecedented use of rape as an instrument of terror, and other large-scale violations of human rights.<sup>1</sup>

The war in Bosnia constitutes the most dramatic crisis in the history of the European Union. At the outset, the EC rejected America's offer of leadership. Speaking for the troika, Luxembourg's foreign minister Jacques Poos asserted that the crisis represented "the hour of Europe." Yet subsequent events have shown the incapacity of the member states, acting either individually or collectively, to play a constructive role in the region.<sup>2</sup>

Europe's failure cannot be explained in terms of standard arguments about EPC institutional incoherence or inter-governmental rivalry, but rather in political and moral terms. In pursuing a policy of appeasement of the movement for Greater Serbia, EC/EU diplomacy has been remarkably consistent. With the exception of Germany's unilateral decision to recognize Croatia, Western Europe's major powers have displayed a high level of unity and clarity of purpose. The perceptive statement cited at the beginning of this article--by the European Commissioner in charge of external relations--emphasizes the connection between the war in Bosnia and the deep malaise that now afflicts the project of European union.

### **Europe's Response to the Outbreak of War**

Yugoslavia's implosion along "ethnic" and religious lines did not originate from below. Although the conflict is often labelled an ethnic war, or a civil war, these classifications are misleading. They serve to blur the crucial distinction between aggressor and victim, and encourage apathy and disengagement on the part of the international community. As Yugoslavia's economic crisis deepened during the 1970s and 1980s, Federal Yugoslavia's communist party elites promoted national or ethnic allegiances to buttress their fading legitimacy.<sup>3</sup> In the late 1980s Serbian political leaders, intellectuals, and military officers developed a plan for a Greater Serbia including Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and large portions of Croatia. Although the war displays some characteristics of a civil war, it is primarily one of territorial conquest and aggression. It has been imposed from above upon the citizens of the former Yugoslavia, primarily by Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade and Radovan Karadzic, the president of the rump "Serbian Republic of Bosnia." The pretext was the redemption of Serbs scattered throughout the territories of the seceding republics and the establishment of a "purified Greater Serbia."

Milosevic and Karadzic seek not only territorial expansion, but also the ethnic homogenization of the territories falling under military control. The infamous policies of ethnic cleansing are not a byproduct of the conflict, but the very essence of the war aims of Serbia's leadership. The particular viciousness of the Serbian forces reflects not "ancient rivalries" among unreconcilable ethnic groups, as the Serbian leadership and many would-be peacemakers have assumed, but rather the relative harmony among religious and ethnic groups in Bosnia-

Herzegovina that existed prior to 1991. The Serb leadership correctly perceived that high levels of violence were essential to reconfigure politics along the lines of ethnic nationalism.

Preoccupied with negotiations leading to the Maastricht summit of 1991, the EC was not prepared for the crisis in Yugoslavia. Within days after the outbreak of fighting, however, the EPC sent missions to Yugoslavia, pressed all parties for a ceasefire, and called for an emergency meeting of the CSCE. Mindful of the similarities between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and still hoping to preserve the latter, the EC sought to prevent the break-up of Yugoslavia. Under the terms of the Brioni Accords, EC mediators reached an agreement between Belgrade and the provisional Slovenian government leading to the withdrawal of the JNA and the disarming of the Slovenian militia, and arranged with Belgrade to dispatch observers to the various republics. The EC also imposed sanctions and an arms embargo on all of the republics. Although EC mediation ended the war and effectively severed Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia, it also served to free up Serbian troops for the onslaught on Croatia, where local Serb militias had established a "Republic of Serbian Krajina." When Serbian forces attacked Croatia, the EPC underlined its commitment to the maintenance of internal borders, stated its determination "never to recognize changes of frontiers which have not been brought about by peaceful means," and on September 1 negotiated the first of numerous short-lived cease-fires. As the Serbs burned Vukovar and laid siege to Dubrovnik, the EC established an Arbitration Commission chaired by Robert Badinter to make recommendations on the recognition of sovereignty of the various republics. A Peace Commission led by Lord Carrington, working in conjunction with the EC, CSCE, and neighboring states, declared that recognition depended on popular consent, comprehensive arrangements for the protection of human rights, and EC involvement in the settlement. The United Nations established a 14,000-man "protection force" (UNPROFOR, now expanded to 35,000), with headquarters in Sarajevo; Britain and France provided the largest contingents.

With fighting escalating in Croatia and threatening to break out in Bosnia, the establishment of the Badinter Commission represented an exercise in legal obscurantism. It served to delay the recognition of Croatia that might have served as a warning to Serbia. Eventually, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia declared their intention to secede. In the end, only Macedonia satisfactorily fulfilled the requirements for recognition; yet ironically only it was denied recognition. In December, Germany decided unilaterally to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, despite the failure the latter to comply with all requirements. Anxious to sign the Maastricht Treaty and reluctant to break ranks, Britain and France eventually acceded to Germany's *fait accompli*.

Germany's unilateral decision to recognize Slovenia and Croatia has generated a storm of controversy. Serbian leaders proclaimed the emergence of a "Fourth Reich," asserting that the recognition expressed German geopolitical designs and provoked Serbs to rise against the provisional Bosnian government. Paris and London, jealous of their political leadership of the Community and sympathetic to Serbia, echoed this view. As François Mitterrand explained in November, 1991, "Croatia belonged to the Nazi bloc, not Serbia."<sup>4</sup>

Criticism of Germany is misplaced, and serves to shift the blame for the war from Serbia to Bonn. Serbia's plan to conquer Bosnia had been drawn up long before its attack on Croatia, and

its violations of the Yugoslav Constitution had already destroyed the Federation. There is, moreover, no evidence that Germany has hegemonic ambitions in Croatia and Slovenia.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, Germany, along with all other EC nations, had until the fall of 1991 staunchly supported the federation. Only after the coup in the Soviet Union in August, 1991 and German public outrage at the atrocities in Vukovar and, later, Dubrovnik did Germany change her policy. If anything, the EC's failure to recognize Croatia in the summer of 1991 encouraged Serbia to believe that it would have a free hand throughout the region.

### **The War in Bosnia**

Croatian independence placed Bosnia in an untenable position. By the spring of 1992 the JNA had withdrawn its heavy weapons to Serbia, and Bosnian Serbs were mobilizing in conjunction with the JNA. At the same time, Croatian forces were also carrying out their own program of territorial aggrandizement. The arms embargo, initiated by the EC and later sanctioned by the UN, would cripple the fledgling Bosnian army, and indeed resulted in de facto international support for Serbia. At the outbreak of war, the Bosnian military forces had two tanks; Bosnian Serbs had 300.

The Bosnian government also submitted a declaration for recognition, which was rejected by the EC on the grounds that it did not reflect the will of the local Serb population (The population of Bosnia-Herzegovina is 44% Muslim, 32% Serb, and 17% Croat). Bosnia's government called for the establishment of autonomous territories in areas where local minorities formed the majority, emphasizing that its Constitution provided human rights guarantees including the equal treatment of minorities, and declared its willingness to participate in a new Yugoslav federation. Following the referendum of March 1 (boycotted by most Serbs) in which two-thirds of the population voted for independence, Bosnia declared its independence and, only after prodding by the United States, was formally recognized by the EC on April 6.

Since 1992 war has raged throughout Bosnia. By mid-June the Serbs had laid siege to most major Bosnian cities, including Sarajevo. UN troops have lacked a mandate to join battle with the Serbs, and the EC has been unwilling to deploy its troops to enforce the literally hundreds of cease-fire agreements that were negotiated. In August, 1992 a special conference was convened in London, and a negotiating team led by David Owen from the EC and Cyrus Vance from the UN was established in Geneva. The Vance-Owen efforts began as reports of systematic atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and rape camps began to appear in the media. Western governments had been aware of these developments for several months previously, but had withheld this information from the public.

### **Ethnic Provinces and Safe Havens: The Legacy of Vance-Owen**

Between September, 1992 and June, 1993 a series of plans was developed by the Vance-Owen team. The plans were developed in the context of differences of opinion between the US and the EC, and the strong reluctance of all the major NATO powers to use military force. The Vance-Owen strategy was based on the assumption that the conflict was rooted in

irreconcilable ethnic and religious differences, and that the partition of Bosnia was inevitable. It envisioned carving up Bosnia into ten ethnically-based provinces linked together in a loose confederation. The political and moral flaw in the strategy was that it failed to take into account the multi-ethnic reality of Bosnia. The strategy implicitly endorsed Serbian territorial seizures; moreover, given the willingness--if not the eagerness--of the principal negotiator, David Owen, to contemplate revisions based on changing military circumstances and to curry favor with Serbian commanders, it amounted to an endorsement of the legitimacy of Serbian claims and encouraged the practice of ethnic cleansing. As Michael Sheridan reported to The Observer, the Vance-Owen strategy was "an idea that will survive in the annals of European diplomacy as a byword for failure..."<sup>6</sup>

By June of 1993 Owen himself acknowledged that his strategy was unworkable. Recognizing what he termed "unpleasant reality," he then submitted a new plan to Karadzic, Milosevic, Tudjman, and President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia calling for the division of Bosnia into three separate republics. This plan, which would have left Bosnia with "several islands of territory in a sea of hostile neighbors, propped up by faint promises of a corridor to the sea, with the ideal of a state shared between all religions buried in the ruins of Sarajevo,"<sup>7</sup> was rejected by the Bosnian government.

In September, 1993 the European Parliament strongly condemned the Vance-Owen mediation. It expressed "indignation at the failure of the international decision-making structures to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict," and noted that the strategy of ethnic partition "constitutes an extremely dangerous precedent" which condones "the destruction of a multi-ethnic society in Bosnia-Herzegovina and legitimizes the violent aggression that has taken place there."<sup>8</sup>

The failure of the strategy of ethnic partition led to a new emphasis on the concept of "safe havens." In April, 1993, the UN Security Council established Srebrenica, which had been under heavy artillery fire, as a UN-protected safe area, and subsequently declared that Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Bihac, and Gorazde should also be treated as safe areas free from armed attack. UN forces have failed to protect these areas, which are overcrowded, short of food and medical resources, and under indiscriminate shelling. As the Serbian vice around Sarajevo tightened in the winter of 1994, international pressure mounted for the use of airpower. Finally, President Clinton declared a "no fly" zone around Sarajevo and demanded that Serbian forces withdraw to 20 kilometers from the city. US warplanes shot down four Bosnian Serb planes attacking a munitions dump in Central Bosnia. But the precedent established for Sarajevo was not extended to other cities or enclaves. Bosnian Serb forces have continued to shell Gorazde, Tuzla, and even Sarajevo, with impunity. As the International Herald Tribune reported:

Serbian forces around the besieged Muslim enclave of Gorazde have used heavy weapons for two days in a row in strict violation of a NATO ultimatum threatening air strikes...The UN response, however, was not to call on airpower, but to send the Bosnian Serbs a letter.<sup>9</sup>

In February, 1994 the U.S. brokered an accord between Croatia and Bosnia establishing a loose federation. The accord facilitates military cooperation against Serbia and provides a new source of military supply for Bosnia. At the same time, a Contact

Group comprising the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, and Russia was assembled to develop a new peace plan. The Contact Group issued a "take it or leave it" proposal to all parties which represents essentially a continuation of ethnic partition, although somewhat more favorable to Bosnia. Bosnian Serbs are allocated 49% of the territory of Bosnia (they currently occupy 70%), including large areas which they have forcibly seized and "ethnically cleansed." At the present time (July 28), the Bosnian Serbs have refused to sign the document and stepped up their attacks on UN troops and civilians. The Contact Group has declared that it will lift the arms embargo on Bosnia if the Serbs refuse to sign; Russia, however, has indicated strong support for the Serbs. Like previous "peace" plans, the document is unlikely to be obeyed or enforced, even if it is signed.

### Peace and Stability in the Balkan Region?

The war in Bosnia has shattered the dream of a progressive European foreign policy, and the diplomatic initiative has shifted to the United States and Russia. Unfortunately, as American involvement has deepened, it has adopted Europe's approach to the war. Both the U.S. and the EU rationalize appeasement in terms of Russia's support for Serbia. France and Britain oppose lifting the arms embargo and the use of air power on the grounds that these actions would place their troops in jeopardy and interfere with humanitarian efforts. The US condemns Europe's passivity but is unwilling (with the limited exception of Macedonia) to deploy ground troops in the region or to lift the arms embargo.

To be sure, UNPROFOR's provision of humanitarian aid represents an accomplishment. Yet even this function has not been without costs; UNPROFOR has been compelled to observe large-scale atrocities against civilians, and passively to tolerate attacks on its own forces. Humanitarian assistance to displaced populations has indirectly facilitated the policy of ethnic cleansing; much of the aid, moreover, is seized by Serbian militias. Cynics have argued that EU policy has succeeded because it has contained the conflict within the borders of the former Yugoslavia. Yet existing policy strongly resembles the Spanish experience of 1936-9. In both cases, Britain, France, and the US imposed a policy of "neutrality" and arms embargo that indirectly aided a fascist regime with ample access to military supplies. In the 1930s, appeasement did not contain fascism; on the contrary, it provoked its expansion.

Serbia's territorial aims are not limited to Bosnia. Tensions in Kosovo, a region 90% Albanian but politically dominated by Serbs, continue to increase. President Andreas Papandreu of Greece has placed an economic stranglehold over the Republic of Macedonia, thereby encouraging nationalist and irredentist forces both in the new republic and in Greece itself. Albania, Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria all have strong interests in the region and will sooner or later join the conflict if Serbian expansion is not halted. Serbian successes on the battlefield and Western appeasement at the negotiating table have greatly strengthened powerful neo-fascist movements in Russia and elsewhere which look to Serbia as a model.

Despite the arms embargo, Bosnian forces have demonstrated a remarkable capacity for resistance. The effectiveness of credible threats of NATO air strikes, moreover, provides ample evidence that the EU and the US--acting in accordance with

relevant UN resolutions--can compel the Serbs to make substantial concessions or, failing this, to enable Bosnian forces to reconquer and hold lost territories and to provide international guarantees for a viable Bosnian state, the right of return for all refugees, and the guarantee of human rights throughout the region. The EU should lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. In addition, it should tighten sanctions on Belgrade with the intention of driving Milosevic from power. The EU should also provide massive reconstructive aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Finally, the EU should facilitate vigorous prosecution of war crimes under the recently established UN War Crimes Tribunal.

As the founders of the EC recognized, European unity is essentially a political project. The deepening of the union depends on the expansion of human rights and democracy not only within the member states, but throughout Europe. The failure of the EU to uphold principles of human rights and international law in Bosnia thus greatly endangers the increasingly fragile project of union. To allow the consolidation of a Greater Serbia based on military aggression and ethnic cleansing is not simply an injustice to the people of former Yugoslavia. It is also a defeat for the credibility of principles of human rights that are enshrined in the EU and in international law. It establishes a model for the resolution of problems of national identification which encourages intolerance, xenophobia, and brutal violence. Such a model, once firmly established in the territories of former Yugoslavia, is not likely to remain there.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup>The Croatian government has also carried out programs of ethnic cleansing and other violations of human rights, albeit on a somewhat smaller scale. As the war has escalated, Bosnian military forces have also committed human rights violations, but on a much smaller scale and not linked to a policy of ethnic expansionism. They do not compare either in scope or purpose to the barbarism of the Serb leadership. See the periodic reports, "Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia," of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights (Geneva).

<sup>2</sup>For detailed accounts of international legal and diplomatic responses see the following: Mark Weller, "The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," The American Journal of International Law 86, 1992; Pia Christina Wood, "European Political Cooperation: Lessons from the Gulf War and Yugoslavia," in Alan W. Cafruny and Glenda G. Rosenthal, eds., The State of the European Community (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Mark Almond, Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans (London: Heinemann, 1994).

<sup>3</sup>These developments are analyzed in Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

<sup>4</sup>Quoted in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 29, November, 1991.

<sup>5</sup>Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993), pp. 395-7; and Harald Muller, "German Foreign Policy After Unification," in Paul Stares, ed., The New Germany and the New Europe (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 150-4.

<sup>6</sup>Michael Sheridan, "A Torrent of Words Sweeps Bosnia Away," The Independent, 27 June, 1993.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.



8"Resolution on the Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Official Journal of the European Communities C 268/160, 4.10.93.

9July 26, 1994; As Serbian forces advanced on Gorazde in April, 1994, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry declared categorically that the U.S. would not use air power to save the city, a message that reached the Serbs with unmistakable clarity.

### **Comments on "The War in Bosnia: Crisis for the European Union"**

Jonathan Davidson  
EC Delegation in Washington

Professor Cafruny appropriately quotes Commissioner Hans van den Broek as observing that the crisis in former Yugoslavia has traumatized Western Europe and damaged the process of European unity, and rightly describes the war as a crisis for the EU. But far from rejecting America's offer of leadership, as Professor Cafruny asserts, the EU has sought to engage the U.S. and other world leaders in constructive efforts to resolve the crisis. And as Professor Cafruny himself points out, the U.S. has now largely come round to the EU position, following earlier allied divergences.

The EU has appropriately played a leading role in attempts to bring peace to the region and to contain the conflict from spreading. We are acutely aware of the implications of the failure to uphold principles of human rights and of the need to hold to account the perpetrators of atrocities. But the mix of ancient hatreds and the collapse of the former Communist regime of Yugoslavia has so far defied the efforts not only of the EU, but of the whole international community, to achieve peace and to uphold principles of human rights and acceptable conduct.

We are working closely with the U.S. and the UN to enforce Security Council resolutions on economic sanctions, safe havens, no fly zones and zones of exclusion of heavy weapons, while continuing the search for peace. It is not yet clear whether the efforts of the contact group (U.S., certain member states, and Russia) will prevail, or indeed whether the group can remain united long enough to exert a decisive influence in favor of peace. Serb resistance to the group's terms is of course totally unacceptable to the EU, and calls for the strongest possible response. The EU supports NATO's enforcement role, and the contact group's strategy to secure compliance with its peace plan, namely incentives to encourage acceptance, and disincentives to discourage rejection, including stiffer sanctions and the more rigorous enforcement of existing sanctions.

The contact group's initiative is based on the EU peace plan, adopted last November. But, as the Bosnian Serb's rejection illustrates, it is beyond the power of the international community, even acting together in the formidably powerful combination of the U.S., European powers, and Russia, to impose peace. At best, we can create a framework to promote a settlement. In the last analysis we cannot prevent continuation of the war if that is what the parties choose. Nor can anyone be sure that any conceivable peace settlement would be completely compatible with the principles of human rights and democracy that Professor Cafruny and all likeminded citizens rightly would like to restore to Bosnia.

Meanwhile the EU and its member states have provided \$1.29 billion in humanitarian aid and have 16,000 troops on the ground.

Professor Cafruny belittles the impact of this aid. The fact is that it has saved hundreds of thousands of lives and is pursued in conditions of appalling difficulty and risk to those in the line of fire.

Professor Cafruny calls on the EU to lift the arms embargo. International agreement on lifting the embargo may eventually become inevitable, but this should be only a last resort if efforts to secure acceptance of the contact group's peace terms fail. Any eventual agreement to lift the embargo would probably rule out continuation of humanitarian relief, and could widen the conflict. President Clinton has so far resisted Congressional pressure to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, which would jeopardize allied troops and compromise multilateral sanctions in other zones of conflict.

It is for historians to argue whether or not a more decisive military intervention by allied forces at an earlier stage could have resolved the conflict. Military resolve by NATO in recent months appears to have been effective, for example in enforcing the weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo. But there is understandable reluctance in the United States to get drawn into a quagmire, and accordingly stringent conditions circumscribe the use of U.S. and therefore NATO forces. The use of air power, moreover, has obvious implications for the security of European troops on the ground, which dictates complex channels of communication and command for the deployment of NATO forces.

The role of the European Union in Bosnia has been widely criticized, not least in the Union itself. Apart from the enormous human toll on innocent victims in the region, failure to resolve the crisis is a political tragedy for the EU. It is disheartening, to say the least, to live alongside the most violent conflict in Europe since the end of the Second World War, and the potential repercussions of the conflict for other areas of potential instability in Europe are extremely disturbing. It is especially frustrating to have failed to stop the conflict as the EU embarks on a new phase of European integration, with its fledgling Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Professor Cafruny's assertion of "appeasement", however, is unsubstantiated, flowing as it does from the questionable premise that the war is solely the result of Serbian aggression.

The crisis does underscore the fragility of the Maastricht Treaty's aspiration to "assert [Europe's] identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence". The tentative quality of these Treaty provisions illustrates how far the EU must still go to assert its natural role as a force for peace, democracy, human rights, and stability in the continent and the wider world. Sadly the EU's efforts still fall short of what is required to alleviate the suffering and bring about a stable and honorable peace in Bosnia. Looking ahead, the tragedy of former Yugoslavia highlights Europe's need to devise a coherent foreign and security policy, which will be increasingly necessary to cope with the ethnic crisis, regional fragmentation, human rights violations, and political instability in the aftermath of the Cold War. To the extent that this policy can be concerted with the United States, the greater will be the prospects of European and global peace, democracy, and stability.

## Book Reviews

### Special Review of EU Literature for the Classroom:

**Economic and Political Integration in Europe: Internal Dynamics and Global Context.** Edited by Simon Bulmer and Andrew Scott. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994).

**The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration.** Edited by Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994).

**Understanding the New European Community.** William Nicoll and Trevor C. Salmon. (New York: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1994).

There is no sign that interest in the activities and the future of the European project has diminished either among publishers or the reading public. The three titles, which I will review here, are literally the "tip of the iceberg" in the field of EU literature. Each volume, however, takes a different approach to analyzing the EU and European integration and there is not much overlap between them.

Understanding the New European Community by Nicoll and Salmon is a straightforward, accessible textbook which includes a section on the history of the Community, on EC institutions and policies, and on the ongoing debates between member-states. The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, compiled by Nelsen and Stubb, is a reader and details the debates that have led to the construction of the Community while taking a closer look at the ideas which informed practitioners as well as theorists of integration. The last title, Economics and Political Integration in Europe: Internal Dynamics and Global Context, edited by Bulmer and Scott, is a collection of essays written by experts in the field, which ranges from particular policy areas to the position of the EU in the world economy.

As textbooks go, Understanding the New European Community is a great addition to a rapidly growing list of publications. The book is a revision of an earlier edition and is divided into four parts. Part 1 provides a historical background to European integration and stops at the Single European Act of 1986. Part 2 examines the institutions of the Community, and part 3 discusses the Community's major policies. Part 4 focuses on the debates related to European integration, on the attitudes of member-states toward recent developments, and on the ratification of the Treaty on European Union. In sum, Nicoll and Salmon touch upon every aspect of the Community and European integration in a truly comprehensive treatment of the subject

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matter. To lighten up their discussion, they include plenty of graphs, tables, and boxed exhibits which frequently help to clarify a particularly confusing or complex point. My only concern, which is unrelated to the actual content and style of the text, is that the book is long (350 pages!), and perhaps too long to be used in a lower level undergraduate course. Of course this opinion may reflect my own teaching experiences which suggest that students have an easier time mastering short chapters in thin books. It should be clear that the actual number of pages says nothing about the quality of Understanding the New European Community, which is high.

Supplementing primary textbooks are the volumes edited by Bulmer and Scott, and Nelsen and Stubb. The latter team specifically state in their introduction that The European Union is designed to supplement standard textbooks on the history, theory, and practice of European integration. In part 1, the editors compile a selection of writings by West European leaders on the topic of European integration. These include works by Winston Churchill, Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, Charles De Gaulle, Margaret Thatcher, and Jacques Delors which remind the reader of how past and contemporary participants viewed the Community and the unification of Europe. Part 2 presents a brief look at how earlier scholars formulated theoretical propositions which explained, predicted, and prescribed European integration. Excerpts from the writings of Sergio Pistone, David Mitrany, Leon Lindberg, A. Groom, and Bella Balassa provide a nice summary of the various competing theories that preoccupied the scholarly community in the 1950s and 1960s. Part 3 leaps to the present and brings together the new wave of theorizing that aims to conceptualize the unexpected spurt in European integration in the 1980s. Reprints of articles on domestic politics and EC policy (Bulmer), on public opinion and elites (Slater), on organized interests and 1992 (Schmitter and Streeck), on supranationalism and 1992 (Sandholtz and Zysman), on intergovernmental bargaining (Moravcsik), on institutional change in Europe (Keohane and Hoffmann), and on monetary politics (Sandholtz) comprise the second half of the reader.

In the introduction, the editors explain that the primary purpose of the reader is to familiarize students (and their instructors) with the five decade-long debate on Europe. A second objective of the volume is to encourage students to think about why and how nations come together. By and large, the editors succeed in meeting both objectives by pulling together written materials that form an ongoing dialogue about the forces and motives behind European integration. To establish connections between the different chapters and to facilitate dialogue among the authors of the texts, the editors introduce each selection with a short paragraph that places the chapter in context and summarizes the argument. All in all, it is a very useful reader that supplements regular texts which deal with the nuts and bolts of the European Union.

The final volume under review is Economic and Political Integration in Europe. This volume initially appeared as the 1993 September and December issues of the Journal of Common Market Studies to mark its 30th anniversary and is now reissued in book form with a few changes.

The result is a fairly eclectic collection of essays that covers a wide range of topics. The editors provide a general background on what happened in the last ten years, although the following eleven chapters do not directly address the issues raised in the introduction. In the first chapter, the Polish Minister for European

Affairs, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, reproaches the Community for not having invested much time and effort in getting the countries of East and Central Europe to prepare for membership. In Chapter 2, Andrew Moravcsik presents a theoretical analysis of the process of European integration by emphasizing the strength of intergovernmental bargaining among the member-states (a version of this chapter also appears in The European Union).

The following chapters are more descriptive. Helen Wallace raises the troubling question of whether the Community still holds a collective objective that will be able to sustain the process of economic and political integration. Related to this theme, Christopher Hill points out the gap between the foreign policy capabilities of the EU and the role it is expected to play in world affairs. He refers to the obstacles that interfere with the formulation of a common foreign policy, obstacles which he believes cannot be overcome at the present time and might have to wait until the Community becomes a genuine federation. Joseph Weiler analyzes the evolving role of the European Court of Justice and concludes that the ECJ might get embroiled in ever more sensitive and controversial decisions that will intensify public scrutiny and criticism.

For reasons that go unexplained, the next three chapters deal with the impact of regional economic integration on the world economy. Peter Robson discusses the relevance of recent developments in regional economic integration for the developing countries; Deepak Lal assesses the consequences of the formation of regional trading blocs for the global economy; while Stephen Woolcock in chapter 8 argues that regional trading blocs might, in fact, complement the GATT system and therefore draws conclusions opposite from the preceding chapter by Lal.

Moving from this global level back to the developments in the Community, Alexis Jacquemin and David Wright discuss the actions and priorities of business in the post-1992 era. Niels Thygesen in chapter 10 reviews the various options to reform the EMS in the light of the currency turmoil of the early 1990s and the final chapter consists of a round table discussion where three scholars from the disciplines of economics (David Mayes), political science (William Wallace), and European law (Anne-Marie Slaughter) speculate on what to include in a future research agenda aimed at understanding the ongoing process of integration.

Whereas the individual chapters are thoughtful and intelligent and will be useful to students and academics alike, the lack of coherence between the chapters is troubling. The editors should have done more to explain why they settled on this particular range of topics and how these chapters are related to each other. In some instances, this would not have been too difficult as several authors seem to doubt whether the European Union can truly achieve monetary and economic union and reach some agreement on political integration.

Despite the lack of editorial direction, this book too is a valuable addition to the literature. All three books are appropriate for courses that are designed to address current issues in the EU. Each is also an invaluable guide for anyone who wants to know more about the Community and European integration.

**Professor Paulette Kurzer  
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**The European Community: To Maastricht and Beyond  
Edited by Pierre-Henri Laurent. (Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science: 1994).**

Forces of stagnation and progress that promoted the Eurosclerosis of the latter 1970s, the accessions of Greece and the Iberian states, the economic and institutional innovations of the Single European Act, the ratification crisis for the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, and the European Monetary System crash have inspired and challenged scholarly thought on the dynamics of the European Community. Moreover, the end of the Cold War, velvet revolutions of Eastern Europe, German reunification, Yugoslavian crisis, persistent European recession, and trade related challenges with the US and Japan all constitute the context within which the EC must attempt to cope successfully. Contributors to Pierre-Henri Laurent's The European Community: To Maastricht and Beyond provide perspectives on the manner in which such events affect the future of European integration. The Laurent volume revisits the Annals' earlier effort to chronicle the first two decades of European integration, being comprised of essays which relate the progression of Community activity since 1978 to current and future European developments.

In the introductory and concluding chapters, Desmond Dinan and Martin Hillenbrand offer general assessments of the Community's prospects in the introductory and concluding chapters. Tracing major EC developments since 1978, Dinan argues that crises have frequently served as catalysts for further integrative efforts. The stimulating effect that such problems have in the Community leads Dinan to conclude that the prevailing economic and political malaise in Western Europe presents opportunities for further political development and cooperation. While observing that the mood within the Community correlates closely with the business cycle in Western Europe, Hillenbrand also cautions against the tendency for scholars to emphasize existing negative conditions in their accounts on the state of the EC. He specifically addresses problems with US policy toward the Community, warning that an American stance which assumes the failure of the EC or permits disputes over particular issues to strain the general US-EC relationship will be contrary to US interests and diverge significantly from previous American policy.

Two chapters are devoted to the manner in which Germany and Great Britain define their interests within the European Community. In her evaluation of the impact of reunification on German motivations, Lily Gardner Feldman argues that Germany has remained an interdependent EC partner rather than taking on the position of dominant leader or spoiler. Stephen George discusses the difficulty that British Conservatives have encountered in adapting to Community institutions as well as to the constraints which domestic political factors pose for leaders. The absence of a chapter treating the evolution of French interests in the aftermath of British entry and German reunification is an unfortunate omission.

Contributions by Helen Wallace and Juliet Lodge chronicle evolution in the Council of Ministers, Commission, and European Parliament. Other chapters focus on topical issues including financial and monetary integration, the role of the Single Market, cooperation in foreign and security policy, and institutional challenges presented by widening. A case study by John Zysman

and Michael Borrus on the European electronics industries raises questions concerning the EC's effectiveness in promoting competitiveness and adequate indigenous technological development. Zysman and Borrus argue that the EC must strategically assure adequate access to American and Asian supply bases and create a more sophisticated domestic market for final products which will promote more technologically dynamic domestic producers.

The strength of this collection lies in its concise and lucid summary of important events, actors, and issues affecting the European Community since the latter 1970s. Since the purpose of the volume is to review the Community's evolution, general informational narrative comprises more of the text than original research. Although contributors occasionally allude to the debate among neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists, no attempts are made to test these approaches rigorously against evidence supporting particular hypotheses. The volume could be useful as a supplementary text in course work on the Community; however, information is not summarized in the form of graphs, tables, time lines, or appendices.

Lisa Conant  
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**France in the New Europe: Changing Yet Steadfast. Ronald Tiersky. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994).**

In France in the New Europe, Ronald Tiersky examines the ways in which the institutions of the Fifth Republic have rendered the once "exceptional" status of French politics a thing of the past. France in the New Europe is exclusively concerned with the Fifth Republic (1958 - present) and, in particular, concentrates on French politics during the Mitterrand presidency (1981 - present). Tiersky's book is impressively up to date, with frequent references to policies undertaken by the current Balladur Government.

Although he has not expressly done so, Tiersky's book can be divided roughly into two parts. In the first part (chapter 1 through 5), Tiersky devotes his attention to a discussion of the impact of the institutions of the Fifth Republic on French exceptionalism.\* He focuses on the impact of the various institutions of the Fifth Republic--the presidency, parliament, and political parties--and on French electoral politics and voting, as well as on the role of interest groups in French politics. The last half of France in the New Europe turns to a discussion of French political economy, both domestic and international. Here, Tiersky discusses the economic policies of the Mitterrand Presidency, France's changing role in the European Community, and the changing relationship between France and Germany.

Tiersky argues that contemporary France has become less and less "exceptional." "To understand France today one must

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\*The concept of "French Exceptionalism" draws upon the works of Alexis de Tocqueville, Michel Crozier, Stanley Hoffman and Raymond Aron. According to the "French Exceptionalism" thesis, France is unique among European nations due to: (1) the historical recurrence of domestic rebellion and revolution; (2) the existence of a strong, centralized state in combination with an ideologically divided and politically weak civil society; (3) an excessive level of bureaucratization; and (4) a backward economic class resistant to change and modernization.

imagine a radical discontinuity. French politics and political culture changed, abruptly in historical terms, in the 1970s and 1980s. France today is not the old France a few years further along." (p. 20) As evidence of this decline of French exceptionalism, Tiersky cites a decline of partisan politics and voting, an increasing tendency of the major political parties to move towards the ideological center, and a declining salience of social class to politics. This decline in French exceptionalism, he argues, is a direct result of the institutional structure of De Gaulle's Republic--a "synthesis of monarchy and republic." The power that the Fifth Republic gives to the president has resulted in a "re-centering" of French politics through an emphasis on presidential, and therefore majoritarian, politics rather than parliamentary ones.

In Chapter 2, "Political Culture and Public Attitudes," Tiersky first reviews the "exceptionalist" literature before turning to a discussion of the decline of this exceptionalism. While the exceptionalist argument, as exemplified by the works of De Tocqueville, Crozier and Hoffmann, accurately described politics under the Third and Fourth Republics, Tiersky argues that it no longer applies under the Fifth.

"The 'stalemate society - republican synthesis' conception was a brilliant vocabulary and intellectual framework for understanding French society and the pattern of French exceptionalism 1875-1958. In the past few decades, however, and especially following the bizarrely abortive 'revolution' of May-June 1968, it has become harder and harder to avoid the conclusion that the idea of French exceptionalism had lost touch with reality, had become an anachronism ." (p. 19)

In Chapter Three, "The Logic of French Institutions," Tiersky turns to the institutional underpinnings of the Fifth Republic. Tiersky's discussion of the constitutionally determined power of the president, prime minister, and parliament convincingly illustrates that the extremely powerful office of the president has resulted in a suffocated parliament. Only under the conditions of cohabitation does parliament regain political power.

"Either a parade of internally divided power sharing cohabitations could produce a new form of weak 'stalemate' government, or a pattern of confrontational power sharing alternating with unchallenged Gaullist-style presidents could produce a destabilized institutional logic, careening in one election to another from one 'system' to another." (p. 60)

Chapter Four, "Political Parties: The Centering of Right and Left," and Chapter Five, "Elections and Electoral Strategies," explore the impact of the institutional structure of the Fifth Republic on French politics. Tiersky asserts that as the Fifth Republic has matured, the major parties--the *Parti Socialiste*, *Rassemblement pour la République* (RPR), and *Union pour la Démocratie Française* (UDF)--have become increasingly presidential, while the minor parties--the *Parti Communiste Français* (PCF), *Mouvement des Radicaux Gauche*, and *Front National*--have remained parliamentary parties. An important consequence of this has been an increasing tendency of parties to abandon extreme ideological positions in favor of centrist ones in their desire to gain majorities in presidential elections. As he

argues in Chapter Five, this "*recentrage*" of French political parties is related to changes in French voting behavior: a decline in turnout for parliamentary elections and an emergence of anti-consensus voting (for the *Front National* or the Greens).

In Chapter Six, "Interests and Groups: Post-Marxian Bases of French Politics," Tiersky extends the political consequences of Fifth Republic institutions beyond political parties to society. Tiersky contends that the rise in prominence of public interest groups such as *SOS Racisme*, *Médecins sans Frontières*, or Greenpeace is explained by the political opportunities provided by a "decline of ideological war in French politics (p. 162)."

The remainder of France in the New Europe is devoted to a discussion of French political economy, both domestic and international. Here Tiersky reviews the Socialists' experiences with high unemployment, nationalization, industrial policy and monetary policy. Just as the first half of the book argues that French politics are no longer exceptional, the second half contends that the French political economy is decreasingly particular. Tiersky argues that over the course of the past 35 years the characteristics of the French economy and business sector which made France the "sick man of Europe"--a strong traditional agricultural sector, a weak currency, and an inward-looking, ambivalent and competitively weak business class--have been transformed through France's participation in the European Community. "Overall, European integration is forcing French ways of doing things toward European and international norms, which necessarily will reduce the traditional specificities of French economic habits and group structures (p. 145)." Tiersky's discussion of "France and the New Germany" in Chapter 9 is a thoughtful exploration of the dynamics of the Franco-German relationship, from unification to monetary union. He convincingly argues that while German monetary policy has restricted French economic autonomy, France has chosen to participate in European integration as a political means to contain the power of a newly unified Germany.

The first half of France in the New Europe is a masterful discussion of the institutions of the Fifth Republic and their role in the contemporary transformation of French politics from exceptionalism to normalcy. Tiersky's discussion of the manners in which the presidentialism of the Fifth Republic has transformed party politics and resulted in a centering of politics and the emergence of extremist and issue-based parties is particularly convincing. Nevertheless, one wonders whether he is perhaps over-stating the importance of these institutional factors in explaining the disappearance of French exceptionalism. If one looks to other European countries--Great Britain, Germany, or Italy, for example--one can also observe a decline in ideological parties and partisan voting, a rise in extremist parties, a decrease in unionization levels, and the rise of a "new middle class." Consideration of French "normalization" in this comparative context suggests that explanations for the decline of French exceptionalism may also lie outside the institutions of the Fifth Republic. Thus, while the institutions of the Fifth Republic most certainly accelerated and facilitated the "normalization" of French politics, France's position in the global economy and its participation in European integration also played a role in this transformation.

The second half of France in the New Europe is less coherent than the extremely well-developed first half of the book. Discussion of the women's movement and AIDS in Chapter 7,

"Public Policy: Some Key Issues," is a bit thin. Tiersky's treatment of unemployment and nationalization would probably have been better developed in the context of one of the subsequent chapters on French political economy. On the other hand, Tiersky's handling of immigration and racism is well done, particularly as regards multiculturalism and the problem of a French "identity". Despite these shortcomings, Tiersky's discussion of the transformation of French political economy under Mitterrand in the latter half of his book makes some important points regarding economic internationalization and national sovereignty in the European context. One would have liked to see the first and second halves of Tiersky's book linked more explicitly with each other. How does the demise of French exceptionalism on the domestic level relate (or not) to the eroding of French economic backwardness on the international level? But this question is, perhaps, best addressed in a separate project.

In sum, France in the New Europe is an enjoyable and thought-provoking read, suitable for use in an advanced undergraduate setting as well as for scholars of French politics generally. Any shortcomings found in the latter half of the book are far outweighed by the original analysis of the first. Tiersky's examination of the institutional and political underpinnings of the end of French exceptionalism is an important contribution to the study of France and of institutional politics more generally.

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**Studies in Federal Planning: The Collected Federal Union Tracts, 1939-1942** Patrick Ransome (editor). London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1990.

**Pacifism is Not Enough: Collected Lectures and Speeches of Lord Lothian**. John Pinder and Andrea Bosco (editors). London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1990.

In the early years of the Second World War, a group called the Federal Unionists called for a political union of the European continent. They argued that such a union, based on federalist principles borrowed from the U.S. and elsewhere, would render European war obsolete, spur continental prosperity, and serve as the essential building block to eventual one-world government. Federal Planning: The Collected Federal Union Tracts 1939-1942, edited by Patrick Ransome, and Pacifism is Not Enough: Collected Lectures and Speeches of Lord Lothian, edited by John Pinder and Andrea Bosco, are the collected pamphlets and speeches of these passionate unionists. Published by the Lothian Foundation Press in London, these volumes are fascinating historical documents with substantial though limited relevance for contemporary discussions concerning the future of Europe.

As historical documents, these speeches and pamphlets demonstrate how deeply ingrained the notion of union has been in twentieth century Europe. The horrible destruction of two European wars has sent all manner of political thinkers in search of lasting and more peaceful constitutional arrangements. In this case, the fact that the Federal Unionists were Britons also demonstrates that the vocal Euro-skeptics of the United Kingdom have never had the rhetorical playing field all to themselves.

These two volumes also have considerable value as commentary on much more contemporary discussions of

European Union. It is fascinating to read how little the arguments in favor of close integration have changed over the decades. The Unionists of sixty years ago denounced unchecked nationalism as the cause of war and trade barriers; they extolled representative assemblies that would be "elected by the peoples, not appointed by their governments;" they looked forward with anticipation to the unifying effects of a Channel Tunnel and free movement of "European citizens;" and most strikingly, they based their entire program on what we would today call the principle of "subsidiarity":

"Firstly it is desirable to leave to the constituent states as much freedom as possible. Secondly it is necessary to eliminate the possibility of those conflicts of sectional interest which, under independent national sovereignty, might be causes of international friction...That states should have as much freedom as possible follows clearly from our federal intentions. We are not creating a unitary state. We desire to preserve local initiative. The federation exists, not to enforce uniformity, but only to assume such functions as cannot be discharged by the constituent states without giving rise to disunity."

From the perspective of 1994, it is also interesting to note the directions in which the Unionists believed subsidiarity would lead to a federal Europe. Writing in the context of catastrophic world war, Lord Lothian and his colleagues placed the greatest value on common defense and foreign policies. Currencies and commerce might well remain under the control of the constituent members, but matters of war and peace, he believed, would have to be ceded to the center.

On the whole, these books ought to encourage today's proponents of European Union to take pride in the lengthy pedigree of their principles. And these books do remind the reader of the horrors that European conflict can produce. But it would be easy to overstate the relevance of these pamphlets to our own day. If the general outlines of the arguments have changed little over time, the same cannot be said for the political context in which those arguments have been made.

The Unionists of the 1930s, for example, passionately believed (and hoped) that European Union would be only a first step toward world government. Their whole design for European federalism, in fact, was predicated on the notion that this was just the first floor of what would become a tall edifice. They rejected the very notion of the nation-state as an outdated vestige of a dangerous period in human history, and they were working expressly to banish it from the international community. A survey of world conflict today might lead an idealist to the same conclusion, of course. But such a vision does not recommend itself as a guiding star for contemporary unionist efforts.

In a similar vein, the Federal Unionists of the 1930s placed great hopes in the power of international socialism to facilitate the withering of the nation state and the arrival of global (first European) federalism. And they expressed great concerns that intra-European colonial struggles would hinder the comity and shared commitments that union required. Finally, they were firmly convinced that European federalism must find room for the inclusion of the United States. Exclusion of America at this first stage, they believed, would prevent the eventual establishment of worldwide federalism.

All of these matters, which take up chapter after chapter in these books, are to say the very least sharply less relevant today than they were sixty years ago. And therein lies the limitations of these otherwise interesting volumes. The editor has asked me to pay special attention in this review to the value of these books in terms of classroom use. Specialists in the history of European union, or perhaps on comparative federalism, will want these books on their shelves. In addition, those with a particular interest in Britain's peculiar relationship with the idea of "Europe" will find much of value here. But it seems to me highly unlikely that these books will find much of an audience in American university classrooms. Too much of the discussion is focused on either barriers to or facilitator of union that are no longer central to European politics. If you happen to be teaching a course on British attitudes toward European Union in the 1930s, of course, these would be essential texts. Otherwise, I think most professors putting together courses on European politics, even courses focused directly on European Union, would be well advised to look elsewhere.

Professor Timothy Byrnes  
Colgate University

## Publications

### Centre for European Policy Studies

The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels has published four recent studies in its CEPS Paper series arising from its special programme on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy:

*US-EU Foreign Policy Cooperation in the 1990s: Elements of Partnership*, by Roy Ginsberg and Thomas Frellesen  
*The Balkans and CFSP: The Views of Greece and Germany*, two papers by Thanos Veremis and Michael Thumann  
*Plus ça Change...? The European Union "Joint Action" and South Africa*, by Martin Holland  
*The Minority Question in Europe: Towards the Creation of a Coherent European Regime* by Florence Benoît-Rohmer and Hilde Hardeman

Other new titles in the CEPS Paper series include:

*Assured Performance: The Role of Conformity Assessment in Supporting the Internal Market*, by H. Machado Jorge  
*Post-Soviet Transition in the Transcaucasus: Regional and International Implications*, by Shireen Hunter  
*The Fourth Enlargement: Public Opinion on Membership in the Nordic Candidate Countries*, by Peter Ludlow  
*Opening Up the Euro-Market for Textiles*, by Jacques Pelkmans

The following titles have been the subject of recent CEPS Working Documents:

*Why Liberalisation Needs Centralisation: Subsidiarity and EU Telecoms*, by Jeanne-Mey Sun and Jacques Pelkmans  
*The Unexpected Alternation: The 1994 Italian Elections and Their Consequences*, by Gianfranco Pasquino  
*Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy as Part of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy*, by Harald Müller

*The European Monetary Trade-off: Economic Adjustment in Small Countries*, by Erik Jones

New books that CEPS has published include:

*The European Balance*, edited by P.S. Christofferson and J.M. Keller-Noëllet, comprising a foreward by Helmut Kohl and a collection of essays in honor of Niels Ersbøll including a personal note of appreciation by Jacques Delors. Peter Ludlow has contributed a chapter on the role of the Council Presidency and its possible future development beyond 1996.

*Turning Growth into Jobs*, Papers and Proceedings of the European Economic Forum, jointly organised by CEPS and the Dutch Central Planning Bureau

*Improving Economic and Social Cohesion in the EC*, edited by Jørgen Mortensen, Macmillan Press for CEPS

CEPS also publishes a series of Research Reports, which include these recent titles:

*The Search for an Efficient Banking Model: Size, Mergers, and Organisation*, by Juan Bengoechea and Jesús Pizarro

*Externalities in Payment Systems*, by Dirk Schoenmaker

*The Financing of Pensions in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities*, by P.J. Besseling and R.F. Zeew

*Towards a European Financial Area: Achievements, Implementation and Remaining Hurdles*, by Karel Lannoo and Jørgen Mortensen

For more information or to order these publications, please contact CEPS, rue Ducale 33, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium; tel (32.2) 513.40.88; fax (32.2) 511.59.60.

### **Forschungsgruppe Europa Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz**

The Forschungsgruppe Europa of the Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz announces the publication of the following books:

*A European Transport Policy - Ways into the Future*, by Kenneth Button, et al. (Gütersloh, 1994)

*Economic and Market Instruments*, by Peter Hardi (Gütersloh, 1994)

*Europa Öko - Logisch? Wirkungs und Störfaktoren der EG - Umweltpolitik*, Olaf Hillenbrand (Bonn, 1994)

*Was Europa Leisten soll*, International Bertelsmann Forum 1993 (Gütersloh, 1994)

*Reformen von unten. Die neue Zukunft Rußlands*, by Gregorij Jawlinsky (Gütersloh, 1994)

*Russia - The State of Reforms*, by Sergei A. Karaganov (Gütersloh, 1994)

*Whither Western Aid to Russia. A Russian Report of Western Support*, by Sergei A. Karaganov, et al (Gütersloh, 1994)

*Internal Security within the Common Market*, by Reinhard Rupprecht and Markus Hellenthal (Gütersloh, 1994)

*Europa 1993. Perspektiven der europäischen Integration*, by Werner Weidenfeld and Moshe Zimmerman (Jerusalem, 1994)

*Das europäische Einwanderungskonzept*, ed. by Werner Weidenfeld (Gütersloh, 1994)

*Europa '96. Reformbericht für die Europäische Union*, ed. by Werner Weidenfeld (Gütersloh, 1994)

*Maastricht in der Analyse. Materialien zur Europäischen Union*, ed. by Werner Weidenfeld (Gütersloh, 1994)

For further information, please contact The Forschungsgruppe Europa, Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Colonel-Kleinmann-Weg 2 SBII-05, D-55099 Mainz, Germany; Tel 06131/393450; Fax 06131/392992.

### **Political Economy Research Centre University of Sheffield**

The Political Economy Research Centre was officially opened by John Kenneth Galbraith in January 1994. The Centre is dedicated to interdisciplinary research on central issues in political economy. The following Occasional Papers are now available:

*The Economic Question and the Larger Social Scene*, John Kenneth Galbraith, Harvard University.

*Risk Perception*, Mary Douglas, University of London.

*After the End of Politics*, Geoff Mulgan, DEMOS

*The German Model: Adapting to Survive*, David Goodhart, Financial Times

*Voice, Citizenship and Human Capital*, Colin Crouch, Trinity College, Oxford.

These and forthcoming papers may be purchased for £3.50 in the UK or £5 outside of the UK. For more information, please contact Ms. Sylvia McColm, Political Economy Research Centre, University of Sheffield, Elmfield Lodge, Elmfield, Northumberland Road, Sheffield S10 2TY, UK; Tel 0742 826 298; Fax 0742 744 921; E-mail: "s.mccolm@sheffield.ac.uk".

### **Special Issue of the *Review of East European Anthropology on the Yugoslav Conflict***

Volume 11, Nos. 1-2 of the *Review of East European Anthropology* are devoted to a special issue edited by David Kideckel and Joel Halpern on the Yugoslav conflict. The issue contains an introductory essay by Halpern and fourteen articles almost entirely by anthropologists with many decades of familiarity with all of the communities concerned. For more information, please contact Robert Rotenberg, International Studies, DePaul University, 2323 N Seminary, Chicago, IL.

### ***Journal of European Public Policy***

The *Journal of European Public Policy* publishes contributions from all the social sciences and from practitioners at the national and European level in a wide range of public policy areas. Recent special issues have focused on "The European Policy Process" and "The EC Social Dimension". The *Journal of European Public Policy* also contains a substantial Book Notes section, specifically designed to bring information on new books to the policy analysis community quickly.

Contributions should be submitted to: Prof. J. Richardson, Director, European Public Policy Institute, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK. Requests for subscriptions and related information should be directed to Trevina Johnson, Routledge Journals, ITPS Ltd., Cheriton House, North Way, Andover SP10 5BE, UK; Tel + 44 (0) 264 332424; Fax +44 (0) 264 342807.

## *European Journal of International Relations*

Sage Publications announces the launch of the *European Journal of International Relations*, edited by Walter Carlsnaes of Uppsala University Sweden. It will be particularly concerned with conceptual, normative and formal theories, seeking in particular to foster an awareness of methodological and epistemological questions in the study of International Relations. Publication will commence with the March 1995 issue, and four issues will appear each year.

Contributions should be submitted to Prof. Carlsnaes at the Center for European Studies, Department of Government, Uppsala University, PO Box 514, S-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden. Subscription information in Europe may be obtained from SAGE Publications, 6 Bonhill Street, London EC2A 4PU, UK; Tel +44 (0)71 374 0645; Fax +44 (0)71 374 8741. US and Canadian subscribers should contact SAGE Publications at PO Box 5096, Newbury Park, CA 91359.

### **General List of Recent EU-Related Books**

- Malcolm Anderson and Monica Den Boer, eds. *Policing Across National Boundaries*. London and New York: Pinter, 1994.
- Mario Baldassari and Paolo Roberti, eds. *Fiscal Problems in the Single-Market Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
- Olufemi A. Babarinde. *The Lomé Conventions and Development: An Empirical Assessment*. Brookfield, VT: Avebury, 1994.
- George A. Berman. *European Community Law: Selected Documents*. West Publishing Co., 1993.
- Roger D. Billings, Jr. *Handling Business Opportunities in the European Community*. New York: Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1993.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Frans N. Stokman. *European Community Decision Making: Models, Applications, and Comparisons*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.
- Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith, eds. *European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe*. London: Sage, 1994.
- Richard Corbett. *The Treaty of Maastricht: From Conception to Ratification. A Comprehensive Reference Guide*. Harlow, Essex, UK: Longman Group, 1993.
- Alan Dashwood and Derrick Wyatt. *European Community Law*. Sweet, 1993.
- Rob Dixon. *Banking in Europe: The Single Market*. Routledge, 1993.
- François Duchêne. *Jean Monnet: First Statesman of Interdependence*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1994.
- European Policy Forum. *Britain and the Future Europe*. London: European Policy Forum, 1994.
- Guus Extra and Ludo Vernoeven, eds. *Immigrant Languages in Europe*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1993.
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## Association News

### Nominations Requested For 1995-1997 Executive Committee

Nominations for the 1995-1997 ECSA Executive Committee will now be accepted. Members of the Executive Committee determine Association policies and supervise ECSA programs. The Executive Committee has seven members.

Nominations must include (1) a one-page curriculum vitae, and (2) two letters of recommendation. Nominees must be members of ECSA. Self-nominations will be accepted. All nomination materials should be sent to Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office, 405 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. Nominations must be received by November 15, 1994.

A nominating committee will consider the nominations and present a slate of candidates in the Winter 1994-1995 ECSA Newsletter. A ballot will be sent to all ECSA members in early 1995, and the election results will be announced at the May 11-13, 1995 ECSA Conference in Charleston, South Carolina.

### Credit Card Payments Now Accepted

Payment by credit card is now be accepted for ECSA membership fees. As indicated on the membership application and renewal form at the back of the *Newsletter*, both VISA and Mastercard may be used. Credit card facilities will provide many members with a more convenient form of payment and should be particularly helpful for ECSA members residing outside of the United States.

## Increase in Membership Dues to Begin on January 1, 1995

Effective January 1, 1995, ECSA membership dues will increase to \$15.00 for students, \$30.00 for individuals, and \$75.00 for institutions. The Executive Committee approved this modest increase to defray some of the many costs associated with ECSA's growing number of activities and noted that membership fees have not increased since ECSA's founding in 1988.

ECSA membership will continue to provide a large number of benefits, including: free and prompt receipt of several ECSA publications, such as the *Newsletter*, the monograph produced by the biennial US-EC Relations Project (written by Catherine M. Kelleher in 1993 and to be authored by Miles Kahler in 1995), the *Membership Directory*, and a volume of abstracts for papers presented at each biennial ECSA Conference; reduced rates for other publications, including the biennial *State of the European Community* volume; reduced journal subscription rates; and reduced registration and lodging fees at the biennial ECSA Conference.

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## Creating Sections within ECSA? (A Second Call)

Many members responded to the first survey on Sections contained in the Summer 1994 Newsletter. Thank you. If you have not already done so, please respond now. The Executive Committee will meet in November to determine whether or not the creation of Sections is feasible.

Please check the areas which are of most interest to you:

Common Foreign and Security Policy \_\_\_\_\_  
Comparative Economics \_\_\_\_\_  
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