



## EDITORIAL

This issue of the ECSA Review brings us closer to the 1997 ECSA Conference, scheduled for May 29 to June 1 in Seattle. All ECSA members are encouraged to submit a panel or paper proposal according to the guidelines given on page two. The Executive Committee is hopeful that the number of proposals will match or even outnumber the more than 300 received for the very successful 1995 Conference in Charleston. Proposals from the broad range of disciplines related to the study of the EU are welcomed, and proposals focusing upon various Pillar Three issues are particularly encouraged.

I am delighted to report that Ambassador Hugo Paemen, Head of the European Commission Delegation to the United States, has accepted our invitation to be the Conference keynote speaker. Ambassador Paemen assumed his current post in 1995 after serving as the Commission's Deputy Director-General for External Relations. In that position he was responsible for the Commission's negotiating team during almost the entire duration of the Uruguay Round. His address promises unique insights into the transatlantic economic relationship and the role of the US and the EU in the international economy.

Professor David Vogel of the Haas School of Business, University of California-Berkeley, and Professor Donald Puchala, Director of the Walker Institute of International Studies, University of South Carolina will also give plenary addresses. Vogel's session will represent the culmination of his work as author for the 1997 US-EU Relations Project. His monograph, Regulatory Cooperation Between the European Union and the United States, will be published in Summer of 1997. Puchala will discuss various scenarios for transformations in the international system of the 21st century, with particular concern for how these changes will shape policy choices for the US and EU.

Conference registration forms, accommodation details, and travel arrangements will be distributed with the next issue of the ECSA Review. Those wishing to receive these forms at an earlier date should contact administrative director Bill Burros, or keep an eye on the ECSA World Wide Web site at "http://www.pitt.edu/~ecsa101". I am told that the ECSA Web site will contain this information and a "multi-media tour" of Seattle featuring links to virtual coffee houses, restaurants, sight-seeing packages and other important tourist information.

ECSA's many other activities continue. A preview of State of the EU, Volume IV: The Widening and Deepening Exercise, 1995-1996, edited by Pierre-Henri Laurent and Marc Maresceau, appears on page 33. This work will make an important contribution to our understanding of many of the issues currently facing the IGC. We eagerly await its publication by Lynne Rienner in Fall of 1997.

JAMES A. CAPORASO  
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Our grant and fellowship programs also continue, as described on pages four and five. Contingent upon funding from the European Commission Delegation in Washington, DC, the M.A.-level Graduate Fellowships in European Integration provide invaluable opportunities for American students at several European universities. Funding is also pending for an exciting new Graduate Fellowship program at the European Commission Delegation.

We are hopeful that the Marcello Buzzonetti Fellowship at the European University Institute will be maintained. Formerly known as the "Jacques Delors" Fellowship, this award has been renamed to honor the memory of Marcello Buzzonetti, the Secretary General of the European University Institute from 1973 until his death in 1995. Discussions are underway to continue this prestigious Fellowship - interested doctoral students should keep in touch with the ECSA Administrative Office for further information. Finally, faculty members are encouraged to submit proposals for ECSA's Curriculum Development Grants. The guidelines for this program have been expanded to include release time for course preparation and to encourage the use of new technologies in the classroom.

The Executive Committee is currently searching for a new sponsor of the Dissertation Fellowship Grants program formerly funded by the Ford Foundation. We are very grateful to the Ford Foundation for its generous support of ECSA from 1990 to 1996, and hope to find alternative funding sources for the dissertation fellowships and other programs in the future. Though the current fundraising environment presents a major challenge to these efforts, the Executive Committee is currently working on several alternatives for continued support. We very much hope that we shall be able to attract funding for the 1997-1998 Dissertation Fellowships. Any suggestions from ECSA members as to potential funders would be greatly appreciated!

### Inside...

<b>Conferences and Workshops</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Grants and Fellowships</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Program Announcements</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Research News</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Teaching News</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Essays</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Book Reviews</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>Publications</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>Association News</b>	<b>35</b>

This publication was made possible by generous grants from the Delegation of the European Commission, Office of Press and Public Affairs, Washington, D.C. and the Ford Foundation.

# CALL FOR PANELS AND PAPERS



## EUROPEAN COMMUNITY STUDIES ASSOCIATION FIFTH BIENNIAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

MAY 29 - JUNE 1, 1997 SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

The European Community Studies Association (ECSA) invites scholars and practitioners engaged in the study of the European Union to submit panel and paper proposals for the 1997 ECSA International Conference. The Program Committee hopes to promote the broadest possible exchange of disciplinary perspectives and research agendas. The Committee actively encourages proposals from a broad range of topics relating to the European Union, including numerous "Pillar 3" issues: minorities, citizenship, human rights, immigration, crime and police cooperation. Participation by graduate students is welcomed, and a limited amount of funding for participant travel may be available.

Panel proposals should include: (1) names, affiliations, and full addresses of chair, panelists, and discussant(s); (2) full paper titles and synopses; and (3) a short statement of the panel's theme. Individual paper proposals are also welcomed. The Program Committee will assign those individual papers accepted to appropriate panels.

**Proposals must be received by November 10, 1996.** Please send proposals and inquiries to:

Bill Burros, Administrative Director  
European Community Studies Association  
405 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh  
Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA  
Phone (412) 648-7635  
Fax (412) 648-1168  
E-mail: [ecsa+@pitt.edu](mailto:ecsa+@pitt.edu)

The Members of the 1997 ECSA Conference Program Committee are:

David Cameron, Department of Political Science, Yale University  
Neil Fligstein, Department of Sociology, University of California-Berkeley  
Ellen Frost, Institute for International Economics  
Alan Henrikson, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University  
Carl Lankowski, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies  
Gary Marks, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Chair)

Conference registration forms, information on accommodations, and on travel arrangements will be distributed with the Winter 1996-1997 ECSA Review. This information (as well as links for information about the Seattle area) will also be available at the ECSA World Wide Web site, URL <<http://www.pitt.edu/~ecsa101>>.

## UACES

The University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) of the UK sponsors conferences throughout the year. Forthcoming meetings include:

### The New Commission

London, October 18, 1996

### National Perspectives: Domestic Consequences of the

EMU, London, October 25, 1996

### Openness and Transparency - Meaningful or Meaningless,

Cardiff, December 4, 1996

### Designer's Europe

London, December 13, 1996

### 27th Annual Conference

Surrey University, Guildford, January 6-8, 1997

### UACES Research Conference

Loughborough University, September 10-12, 1997

For further information, contact Susan Jones, UACES Secretariat, King's College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK; Tel/Fax (+44) 171 240 0206; email: <100633.1514@compuserve.com>.

### **Arbeitskreis Europäische Integration (AEI)**

The Arbeitskreis Europäische Integration (AEI) of Germany is sponsoring the following conferences:

#### Germany in Europe

Bonn, November 14-16, 1996

#### Constitutional Law in the EU

Heidelberg, November 28-30, 1996

#### The Mediterranean Policy of the EU

Date to be confirmed

#### Media Policies in the EU: Between Cultural Vision and Economical Necessity

Date to be confirmed

For more information on these conferences, contact the AEI, c/o Frau Meike Leube, Bachstrasse 32, D-53115 Bonn, Germany; Tel +49 228 729.00.20; Fax +49 228 69.84.37.

### **German Studies Association**

This twentieth annual conference of the German Studies Association will be held October 10-13, 1996 in Seattle. For more information, contact Glenn R. Cuomo, Division of Humanities, New College of USF, 5700 N. Tamiami Trail, Sarasota, FL 34243-2197; Tel (941) 359-4262; Fax (941) 359-4298; Email: <cuomo@virtu.sar.usf.edu>.

### **Europe and the Mediterranean**

This October 14-16, 1996 international conference in Alicante, Spain is organized by AUDESCO (ECSA-Spain). For more information, contact AUDESCO, c/o CE-Oficina en España, Paseo de la Castellana 46, E-28046 Madrid, Spain; Tel +34 1.431.57.11; Fax +34 1.576.03.87.

### **International Trust Law and Policy**

The Fordham Corporate Law Institute announces its 23rd Annual Conference on International Trust Law and Policy, to be held October 17-18, 1996 in New York City. The speakers include representatives from the European Commission and the US government. For further information contact T. Scott Lilly,

Program Coordinator, at tel (212) 636-6777, fax (212) 636-6984, or e-mail "slilly@lex.lawnet.fordham.edu".

### **Norway: Effects and Influences in Peace Negotiations and Human Rights.**

The October 23-24, 1996 Johan Jorgen Holst Memorial Symposium at the University of Washington will feature addresses by Ambassador Torvald Stoltenberg, former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and United Nations Negotiator in the former Yugoslavia (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina), and currently Norwegian Ambassador to Denmark, and by Dr. Marianne Heiberg, negotiator/facilitator of back channel negotiations in Oslo between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization which led to the signing of the Declaration of Principles in September, 1993. For further information, contact Professor Terje Leiren, Department of Scandinavian, University of Washington, phone (206) 543-0645.

### **On the State of the EU Integration Process: Enlargement and Institutional Reforms**

This November 6-10, 1996 international conference is sponsored by the Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of Law. The language of the conference is English. For information, contact Prof. Ferenc Mádl, Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of Law, Institute of the Law of Conflicts and International Economic Relations, H-1053 Budapest, Egyetem tér 1-3, Hungary; tel/fax +36 266-5999.

### **Ireland, the IGC and the Challenge of the Future**

The University of Limerick and the European Parliament Office are holding this November 8, 1996 Conference in Limerick, Ireland. The Conference will involve government ministers, MEPs of different nationalities, and representatives of national regional authorities. For information, contact Professor Nicholas Rees, Jean Monnet Professor of European Institutions and International Relations, or Dolores Taaffe, Conference Coordinator, at the Centre for European Studies, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland; tel +353 61 333644; fax +353 61 330316.

### **The Legal Limits of a Europe at Several Speeds and in Different Groups**

This November 14-15, 1996 conference is sponsored by the Academy of European Law of Trier. For information, contact Academy of European Law of Trier, Dasbachstrasse 10, D-54292 Trier, tel +49 651 107100; fax +49 651 14 71 020.

### **The Priorities of the Dutch Presidency**

This bi-annual Trans-European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA) conference will be organized in November or December of 1996, in cooperation with the Interdisciplinaire Studiegroep Eurpeses Integratie (ISEI). For information, contact Nathalie de Reede, IESI Secretariat, Riouwstraat 137, NL-2585 HP Den Haag, tel +31 70 3508620; fax +31 80 3587606.

### **European Union/American Union A Transatlantic Exploration of Institutional and Policy Development**

This January 23, 1997 Conference in New York City is organized by the Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public

Service, New York University. The conference will engage in comparative analysis of the processes of EU and US integration as a means of enhancing understanding of institutional and policy development within each union. It is designed to follow a course jointly offered by the Wagner School and the Institute for European Studies, Free University of Brussels. The conference will be teleconferenced to Brussels. Scholars and public officials are invited to participate by submitting paper proposals or by registering to attend the conference sessions.

For more information, contact the organizers, Professors Dennis Smith and Ian Holliday at the Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, New York University, 600 Tisch Hall, New York, NY 10012; tel (212) 998-7425; fax (212) 995-4162; e-mail "imh1@is5.nyu.edu".

#### **AUSE International Conference on Fiscal Federalism**

The Associazione Universitaria di Studi Europei (AUSE) announces an International Conference on Fiscal Federalism, to be held January 24th and 25th, 1997 in Pavia, Italy. For more information contact Dr. Alberto Onetti by e-mail at <onetal@eco.unipv.it>, or by fax at (+39) 0382 23300-506228.

#### **ECPR Joint Sessions**

The European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) will hold its 25th Joint Sessions of Workshops in Bern, Switzerland, February 27 to March 4, 1997. The deadline for applications to participate in the workshop is December 1, 1997. For a list of workshops and their respective directors, contact ECPR Central Services, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, Essex, UK; fax +44 1206 872500; e-mail "ECPR@ESSEX.AC.UK"; WWW site "http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/".

#### **The End of the Welfare State? Social Policy, Citizenship Rights and Welfare Provision in a Changing Europe**

The Institute on Western Europe at Columbia University announces its Fourteenth Annual Graduate Student Conference, March 6-8, 1997. Papers should discuss the effects of the economic and political changes which have swept Europe in recent decades on the areas of social policy, citizenship rights, and welfare provision. Exemplary topics include (but are not limited to) financial integration and deregulation, the decline of active labor market policies, and the retrenchment of regulation. Papers of 20-50 pages in length must be sent in hard copy and on a 3.5" diskette (MS Word preferred) and include a one-page abstract. The submission deadline is December 31, 1996 (receipt). The Conference plans to pay for presenters' travel and accommodations during the Conference. Send submissions to: Student Conference Organizing Committee, Institute on Western Europe, 420 West 118th Street, Mail Code 3337, New York, NY 10027. For more information contact Michele Wray; (tel) 212-854-4618; (fax) 212-854-8599; e-mail: mlw25@columbia.edu.

#### **American Conference for Irish Studies (ACIS)**

The annual meeting of ACIS will be held in Albany, New York, April 17-19, 1997. The theme for the conference is "Faultlines," and papers on this or related themes are sought. The submission deadline is October 10, 1996, and proposals should be sent to Lucy McDiarmid, Villanova University, 1931 Panama St., Philadelphia, PA 19103. McDiarmid's fax number after October 1 will be 215-545-3015.

## **Grants and Fellowships**

### **ECSA Graduate Fellowships in European Integration**

Contingent upon the approval of funding from the Office of Press and Public Affairs, European Commission Delegation, Washington, DC, ECSA hopes to offer three M.A. level Graduate Fellowships for the 1997-1998 academic year. These Fellowships provide support toward tuition, living, and travel expenses. The Fellowships will be located at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, the Institute of European Studies, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium, and the European Law Program at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain.

Students must possess a high level of proficiency in the appropriate language, have completed a university degree (B.A. or B.S) by August of 1997, and be U.S. citizens to apply for these fellowships.

**The College of Europe** is the oldest European institution exclusively devoted to postgraduate teaching, focusing on issues of European integration. The Academic Program of the College of Europe is divided into four departments: European Political and Administrative Studies, European Economic Studies, European Legal Studies (J.D. required for admission) and Studies in Human Resources Development.

**The Institute of European Studies, Université Libre de Bruxelles** is exclusively devoted to postgraduate teaching at the Master's level. The Academic Program is divided into four parts: European Law (J.D. required for admission), European Economy, European Policy, and a Complementary Diploma in European Studies.

**The European Law Program, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Jurídicas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid** includes an externship with a Spanish law firm, multinational corporation, or European university. Program coursework provides comprehensive coverage of the institutions and policies of the European Union. Unlike the programs above, which are completed in one year, the European Law Program is of eighteen months duration.

#### **To Apply**

Students may apply simultaneously for the Fellowships at the College of Europe and the Université Libre de Bruxelles. However, students doing so must provide a clear explanation for why their qualifications and interests are suitable for each program. Students applying for more than one program must also indicate which is their preferred Fellowship location.

Applications for the ECSA Graduate Fellowships at the College of Europe and the Université Libre de Bruxelles must include all of the following:

1. Letter of application from the student, addressed to the Graduate Fellowship Selection Committee, addressing:
  - a) the student's preparation and qualifications for the Fellowship;
  - b) how the Fellowship will enhance the student's educational and professional goals; and
  - c) the student's proposed area(s) of specialization at the program(s) chosen.
2. Three letters of recommendation which comment directly on the applicant's qualifications for the Fellowship.
3. Academic transcript(s).

4. Certification of proficiency in French from an officially recognized Language School or Institute (e.g. Alliance française, British Council, TOEFL).
5. Resume or curriculum vitae.

Applicants to the European Law Program, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid should submit the same application materials as above, with the exception that their certification of proficiency (item 4) must be in Spanish.

The application deadline is April 1, 1997. All application materials must be postmarked by that date. Please send all application materials and direct all inquiries concerning this program to:

Bill Burros, Administrative Director  
 ECSA Administrative Office  
 405 Bellefield Hall  
 University of Pittsburgh  
 Pittsburgh, PA 15260  
 Phone (412) 648-7635  
 E-mail: [ecsa+@pitt.edu](mailto:ecsa+@pitt.edu)

#### **ECSA Graduate Fellowship Program at the Delegation of the European Commission**

Contingent upon approved funding, ECSA announces a fellowship program providing graduate students with the opportunity to work as information officers in the Press and Public Affairs division of the Delegation of the European Commission, Washington, DC. Under the supervision of permanent staff, fellowship recipients will respond to inquiries on EU matters from U.S. government agencies, the U.S. Congress, international organizations, embassies, academics, think-tanks and the general public.

Two fellowships are planned for each of the Spring (January to May) and Fall (September to December) 1997 semesters. Students will be able to gain academic credit if provided for by their academic institution. Applicants must be citizens of the United States, currently enrolled in a graduate program in the United States. Knowledge of the French language is preferred but not mandatory.

Applicants should send the following materials to the ECSA Administrative Office:

1. Letter of application, addressed to the Graduate Fellowship Selection Committee, explaining the applicant's interest in the Fellowship. Applicants should be able to demonstrate an interest in EU studies or related areas, or in a combination of EU studies and library science studies.
2. Three letters of recommendation;
3. Undergraduate and graduate academic transcript(s); and
4. Resume or curriculum vitae.

The application deadline for the Spring 1997 semester is **November 15, 1996**. Women and minority candidates are strongly encouraged to apply.

#### **ECSA Curriculum Development Grants**

Contingent upon available funding, the European Community Studies Association (ECSA) will offer curriculum development grants for the 1997-1998 or 1998-1999 academic years. These grants may be used to create new courses on the European Union, or to enrich existing courses with material on the European Union. This year's competition is particularly concerned with promoting

the use of innovative technologies in the classroom. Release time for instructors engaged in course development may be included in grant proposals.

A maximum of four grants of up to \$3,000 will be awarded. Courses developed or enriched through this program must be taught in the United States. Applicants must be ECSA members, or affiliated with institutional ECSA members.

The application deadline for this program is April 1, 1997. For application guidelines and further information, please contact Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260; Tel (412) 648-7635, FAX (412) 648-1168; E-Mail "[ecsa+@pitt.edu](mailto:ecsa+@pitt.edu)".

#### **ECSA Marcello Buzzonetti Fellowship at the European University Institute**

With support from the Office of Press and Public Affairs, Delegation of the European Commission, Washington, DC, this Fellowship at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy was established in 1995 to commemorate 50 years of transatlantic cooperation. The Fellowship enables an advanced graduate student to pursue coursework and dissertation research on the European Union. Formerly known as the Jacques Delors Fellowship, the Fellowship was renamed in 1996 to honor the memory of Mr. Marcello Buzzonetti, the Secretary General of the European University Institute from 1973 until his death in 1995. Mr. Buzzonetti was instrumental in establishing this unique opportunity for American doctoral students. The European University Institute has generously granted a tuition waiver to the 1996-1997 Fellow.

**Joel Herndon** of Emory University has been selected as the Marcello Buzzonetti Fellowship recipient for the 1996-1997 academic year. Mr. Herndon will continue work on his doctoral dissertation, "Europe in Transition: Territorial Parties in the European Union."

Discussions are underway to continue this Fellowship during the 1997-1998 academic year. Interested students should contact the ECSA Administrative Office or consult the ECSA World Wide Web site at "<http://www.pitt.edu/~ecsa101>" for updates.

#### **Robert Bosch Foundation Fellowship Program**

The Robert Bosch Foundation is currently accepting applications for its 1997-1998 Fellowship Program. This nine-month work and study program will begin in September 1997 with an introductory seminar in Bonn, Germany, and Fellows will then work as interns in the public and private sectors. Applicants should possess a graduate or professional degree and some relevant work experience in one of the following fields: Business Administration, Economics, Journalism, Law, Mass Communication, Political Science, or Public Affairs. The application deadline is October 15, 1996. For more information and application materials contact Elisabeth Helmke, CDS International, Inc., 330 Seventh Avenue, 19th Floor, New York, NY 10001; (tel) 212-760-1400; (fax) 212-268-1288

#### **The Alexander von Humboldt Foundation Opportunities for International Research Collaboration**

The Alexander von Humboldt Foundation of Bonn, Germany, provides highly qualified individuals of all nationalities the opportunity to conduct research in Germany. The Foundation's North American Office in Washington, D.C., distributes information on collaborative research support programs to North American scholars. Since 1953 the Foundation has enabled more than 3500 scholars from the United States and Canada to

participate in such programs.

For more information about the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and its programs, please contact Dr. Bernard Stein, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Suite 903, 1350 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036; (202) 296-2990; fax:(202) 833-8514.

### **1997-1998 Fulbright Scholar and NATO Research Grant Opportunities for US Faculty and Professionals**

The following Fulbright and NATO Research Grant Opportunities are available for 1997-1998:

#### Fulbright European Union Scholar-in-Residence Program

Institutions are invited to submit proposals to host a EU official or an academic from an EU-member country who specializes in EU affairs as a resident fellow for one or both terms of the 1997-1998 academic year. The EU resident fellow will receive salary and other benefits from the EU, while the Fulbright Scholar Program will provide partial maintenance support here in the US, health insurance, and international travel expenses. Application deadline: November 1, 1996.

1997 Fulbright German Studies Seminar. Three-week interdisciplinary seminar on German society today in Bonn, Leipzig, Munich and Berlin during June and July 1997. Designed to expose American academics to a broad spectrum of current German culture and society. Participants will meet leading experts in German print and broadcast media. Unlike past years, the 1997 seminar will be offered in English. The seminar is open to faculty in German Studies, communications, history, sociology, and political science. U.S. citizenship and Ph.D., Ph.D. candidacy, or equivalent experience is required. Community college faculty are encouraged to apply. Application deadline: November 1, 1996.

#### U.S.-Germany International Education Administrators Programs

Three-week seminar in Germany during April/May 1997 on current issues in Germany higher education and international education exchange. Applications are invited from full-time administrators in a number of educational settings. Community college administrators are encouraged to participate. Application deadline: November 1, 1996.

#### NATO Advanced Research Fellowships and Institutional Grants

Awards are to promote research leading to publication on political, security, and economic issues directly affecting the health of the NATO alliance. Research in one or more of the European member countries, with time spent at NATO headquarters, is strongly encouraged. For individuals, Ph.D. or equivalent professional status and U.S. citizenship required. Fellowships are intended for scholars of established reputation. Institutional grants are offered to departments of political science, international affairs, institutes, centers for security studies, and research teams. Application deadline: January 1, 1997.

For further information, contact the Council for International Exchange of Scholars, 3007 Tilden Street, NW., Suite 5M, Box GNEWS, Washington, D.C. 20008-3009; Tel 202/686-4000; Fax 202/362-3442; Internet: info@ciesnet.cies.org.

### **Fellowship List for Western Europe on the World Wide Web**

The World Wide Web Homepage of the Center for West European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, contains an extensive "Graduate Student Fellowship List for Western Europe." The list features titles, brief descriptions of topic areas, and contact

information for more than 100 fellowship programs. To access the list, go to URL <<http://www.pitt.edu/~wesnews>> and click on the menu item "Fellowships".

### **Jane Bryant Conant Fellowships in German and European Studies**

These fellowships will be awarded for 1997-1998 by the program for the Study of Germany and Europe at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University. Applications are accepted from non-tenured persons who are teaching or planning to teach at the university level in North America. Projects should focus on contemporary German or German and European topics, and should be in the fields of history, politics, economics, society, or culture. There is no application form; materials are due by January 17, 1997. Submit four sets and the original of a five-page research project description, a dissertation abstract, a C.V., and two letters of recommendation. Contact Gina Chella, Minda de Gunzburg, Center for European Studies, 17 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138; (tel) 617-495-4303 ext. 240; (fax) 617-495-2198; (email) <cesgrant@fas.harvard.edu>.

### **German Marshall Fund Research Fellowships**

The German Marshall Fund of the United States offers grants for post-doctoral research that seek to improve the understanding of significant contemporary economic, political and social developments involving the US and Europe. About 11 awards of up to \$30,000 allow recipients to work on research full time for an academic term or full year. An additional \$2,000 travel allowance is possible. Applications from younger scholars are encouraged. Completed applications must be postmarked no later than November 15, 1996. For more information and application forms contact Susan Smith, Program Assistant, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 11 Dupont Circle, N.W., Washington, DC 20036; (tel) 202-745-3950.

### **German Academic Exchange Service Grants for German Studies Programs**

The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) sponsors grants for undergraduates, graduate students, Ph.D. candidates, and faculty in German studies. Seven programs are supported in the 1996 financial year: Team-teaching in German Studies provides seed money to strengthen German area studies (no deadline); Best Syllabi in German Studies Prizes (March 1 deadline); Sur Plaze Grants to study contemporary German affairs (November 1 and May 1 deadline); two summer seminars in the US (March 1 and March 15); short-term research grant in contemporary German Literature (January 31 deadline); a summer residency program at the American Institute for Contemporary German Literature (January 31 deadline); and a summer residency program at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (April 14 deadline). For more information contact the German Academic Exchange Service, New York Office, 950 Third Avenue, 19th Floor, New York, NY 10022; (tel) 212-758-3223.

### **European Forum Fellowships in "International Migrations: Geography, Politics, and Beyond"**

The European Forum Fellowships at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy bring together for one academic year acknowledged specialists in a given theme, to conduct research primarily of a comparative and interdisciplinary nature. Ten fellowships for the entire 1997-1998 academic year, and a

variable number of shorter-term fellowships are being offered along the theme, "International Migrations: Geography, Politics, and Beyond". Applicants should hold a doctorate. To apply, submit a brief research project proposal which fits into this research programme, with a regular application form. For information, conditions of fellowships, application form and a detailed research programme contact: The European Form, European University Institute, Villa Schifanoia, Via Boccaccio 121, I-50133 Florence, Italy; fax +39 55 4685-575; e-mail "Forinfo@datacomm.iue.it". The deadline for application is September 30, 1996 (postmark).

#### **The American-Scandinavian Foundation Awards for Study in Scandinavia**

These awards offer Grants (\$3,000) and Fellowships (up to \$15,000) to promote educational and cultural exchange with Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, allowing individuals to pursue research or study in one or more of these countries for up to one year. Awards are made in all fields. The application deadline is November 1, 1996. For more information, contact the American-Scandinavian Foundation, 725 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10021; tel (212) 879-9779; fax (212) 249-3444.

## **Program Announcements**

### **USIS Speakers Program**

The U.S. Information Service (USIS) has a regional office, the Regional Resources Unit based at the American Embassy in London. The Regional Resources Unit seeks speakers capable of giving the American perspective on EU Affairs, the U.S.-EU relationship, the transatlantic alliance, and related issues, to participate in Speakers Programs involving the U.S. Embassies and Consulates throughout Europe.

To qualify for the Speakers Program, individuals must have established travel plans in Europe. The Regional Resources Unit will provide compensation for the costs of travel within Europe, daily maintenance, and a modest honorarium. ECSA members traveling from the United States will find this an excellent opportunity to increase their understanding of European perspectives.

Individuals interested in this Program should fax the following information, **well in advance of their travel dates**, to the Regional Resources Unit, American Embassy London, at +44 171 499.8218:

- a) planned European arrival and departure points;
- b) dates of availability;
- c) an abbreviated curriculum vitae;
- d) brief descriptions of topics that you find suitable for discussion; and
- e) fax number(s) where you may be contacted.

### **University of Limerick, Ireland MA Program in European Integration**

This course, currently in its eighth year of operation, is multi-disciplinary in character with students taught by a team of academics drawn from history, law, politics and economics. In addition, a number of outside speakers from the academic world and public life contribute lectures and seminars during the academic year. The program is full-time, and weekly seminars

are scheduled over the course of two semesters. During the second semester students spend a residential week at the Irish Institute for European Affairs in Leuven, Belgium.

The course attracts a wide variety of students from the European Union, Central and Eastern Europe and North America. Students in the program may have the opportunity to assist with the teaching of undergraduate courses in the European Studies program, which provides additional education experience and is also a source of funding

For more information, contact Dr. Nicholas Rees, Jean Monnet Professor of European Institutions and International Relations, Course Director for the M.A. in European Integration, University of Limerick, Ireland; Tel +353 61 202445; Fax +353 61 202569.

## **Research News**

### **1996 Intergovernmental Conference Online**

The European Commission has set up a database for the IGC on the Internet. It is located on the EC Web-server, EUROPA. The URL for EUROPA is <<http://eurupa.eu.int>>. To access the IGC database, select the window "On the Political Agenda: next steps to integration" and then go to the heading "EU's future shape - The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference". The database includes the following items:

- \*IGC general information and thematic fact-sheets
- \*New documents (complete text of most recent documents)
- \*Other key documents
- \*Speeches of EU representatives
- \*Speeches of Member State representatives
- \*EU Institutions' documents
- \*Member States' documents
- \*Other institutions' activities and documents
- \*Seminars, conferences, and other events related to the IGC

### **The European Commission Delegation on the Web**

The Washington Delegation of the European Commission has established a World Wide Web site at URL <<http://www.eurunion.org>>. The site provides information on the activities and services of the Delegation, as well as full text documents and press releases.

### **Seminar and Archive on the IGC**

The Forschungsinstitut für Politische Wissenschaft und Europäische Fragen, Universität zu Köln, Germany has organized a seminar to explore various issues related to the IGC '96, including theories on integration, the history of the "European Constitution", the Maastricht Treaty, proposals for reforms of the structures, and positions of the different Member States.

A special archive on the IGC has also been established, containing proposals from all main political and social actors on the European level as well as in the national contexts. Exchange is envisaged with other institutions via E-mail and internet in order to establish some kind of "1996 network".

For more information, contact Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Wessels, Jean Monnet Chair in EC Law, Forschungsinstitut für Politische Wissenschaft und Europäische Fragen, Universität zu Köln, Gottfried-Kelletr Str. 6, D-50931 Köln, Germany; Tel +49 221-470 4131; Fax +49 221-470 5017; E-mail: <[ahw03@rrz.uni-koeln.de](mailto:ahw03@rrz.uni-koeln.de)>.



## ECPR Standing Group on the European Union

This is a newly established Group which aims to support the development of the field by serving as a structure of information, promotion and coordination of research efforts. It will monitor the state of investigation on EU politics and signal neglected aspects. A wide range of topics are of interest to the Standing Group, for example: institutions and decision-making systems, political forces and processes, policies, common foreign and security policy, Union-state relations, integration theory and Union development.

The immediate aims of the group are: to publish a directory of specialists; to establish an informal newsletter which can diffuse information on research (in progress and accomplished), books and reviews, scientific meetings and conferences, schools and courses, data banks and archives, available research funds, etc.. The Standing Group will also collaborate on the organization of workshop proposals on EU politics.

For more information, contact: Professor Fulvio Attinà, Dipartimento di Studi Politici, Università di Catania, via Vittorio Emanuele 49, I-95131 CATANIA, Italy. Tel: (+39) 95 532 866/645; Fax: 95 533 128.

### University of Manchester On-line Public Access Catalogue

COPAC is a new on-line catalogue based at the University of Manchester. It provides researchers with access to some of the largest university research libraries in the UK and Ireland free of charge, and may be accessed through the World Wide Web at URL <<http://copac.ac.uk/copac/>>, or through Telnet at <[copac.ac.uk](http://copac.ac.uk)>, logging in with username "copac" and password "copac". For more information contact the COPAC Helpdesk via e-mail at <[copac@mcc](mailto:copac@mcc)>.

### ECSA-NET on the Move

The ECSA-NET, an internet resource sponsored by ECSA-World and DGX of the European Commission, is now available at URL <<http://www.epms.nl/ecsatop.htm>>. As described in the Spring/Summer issue of the ECSA Review, ECSA-NET is "under construction" but ultimately aims to provide a variety of information on EU studies scholars, events and programs throughout the world.

### Virtual Seminar on the European Union

The Study Program in International Careers, Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Finland is seeking partners for a virtual seminar on the European Union and international organizations. The seminar will place course materials, seminar papers, and public e-mail discussions on the Program's Web site at URL <<http://helsinki.fi/neu>>. Those interested can join the mailing list on the planning of collaboration by sending e-mail to <[maiser@valt.helsinki.fi](mailto:maiser@valt.helsinki.fi)>, with the text "SUBSCRIBE NEU-PART".

### CES Research Planning Groups for "The European Court and National Courts" and "United Germany in an Integrating Europe"

The Council for European Studies, with support from the Office of Press and Public Affairs, Washington Delegation of the European Commission, is sponsoring several Research Planning Groups in European Integration. The Research Planning Group on "The European Court and National Courts" met at Harvard University in May of 1995. This project examines the reception

of European Community law by national courts. The project plans to publish papers presented at Harvard as working papers under the auspices of the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute. An edited volume is expected by the end of 1996. The Research Planning Group on "United Germany in an Integrating Europe" met in June, 1995 in Budapest. Participants examined how European politics has been shaped by an assertion of German power, by the growing importance of the European integration process, and by the effect Germany has on smaller European states through this process. Over a dozen thematic papers and a number of country and issue-oriented case studies were delivered. For more information on the Research Planning Groups, contact the Council for European Studies, 808-809 School of International and Public Affairs, New York, NY 10027; tel (212) 854-4172 or 4727.

### The 1996 Maastricht Journal Prize

The 1996 Maastricht Journal Prize will be awarded to the student or recent graduate who submits an article of outstanding quality to the Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law. The winning article will be published and the author will receive a prize of 2,000 Dfl (approx. \$US 1,100). Other articles may also be published. For information, contact the Executive Editor, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, University of Limburg, Metro, P.O. Box 616, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, tel +31 43 3883060; fax +31 43 32599091; internet "<<http://www.rulimburg.nl:80/~metro/journal.htm>>".

### European University News

This publication is produced by the Jean Monnet Project - Universities, DGX (Information, Communication, Culture, Audiovisual) of the European Commission. Edited by Anne Serizier, European University News contains a wealth of information on scholarly activities, programs, and publications. ECSA-USA members resident in the United States may request a sample copy from Bill Burros at the ECSA-USA administrative office.

## Teaching News

### Free Educational Videos on the EU

Videos from the European Union are available free of charge for instructional purposes within the United States. The list of titles has recently been updated with nine new video programs. The Office of Press and Public Affairs of the European Commission Delegation, Washington, DC will shortly send details of the new titles to ECSA members.

For more information, readers should contact Karol Media, the company responsible for distributing the videos, by phone at (717) 822-8899, or by fax at (717) 822-8226.

### Brief Guide to Secondary Resources

A brief guide to resources for teaching about the EU at the secondary level is available from the ECSA Administrative Office. The guide was compiled by Bill Burros for an August, 1996 Workshop sponsored by Utah State University and the Delegation of the European Commission, Washington, D.C. on "Integrating the EU Studies in the Secondary Curriculum." It may be of use to departments with outreach programs at the secondary level. A portion of the guide is posted on the ECSA web site at "<<http://www.pitt.edu/~ecsa101>>".



# Essays

## Italy's EU Presidency

Fulvio Attinà  
University of Catania

The Presidency considered it paramount:

*to establish common guidelines for national employment policies, common indicators to measure their effectiveness, an action plan to back up those policies and periodic monitoring of employment and unemployment trends.*<sup>1</sup>

Barring any accidents, unexpected emergencies or new problems appearing in its six month term, the Italian Presidency wanted to be judged on the solution of the most important matters facing the European Union (EU), and on making the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) start well. Of course, it did not decline the task of forwarding common policies and solving the numerous problems of co-operation in the daily conduct of EU affairs.

The Priorities of the Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union dealt with most of the problems and matters on the floor, with three priority areas and one prominent point in each area. The programme document of the January to June 1996 Semester also gave attention to the preparation of the IGC and its inaugural talks in Turin.

In the first paragraph of the Priorities, the Presidency made the important admission that European ideals "seem to have lost their power to attract public support." To restore such support, Italy's proposal was to engage European institutions to "tackle those problems of civil society and of security which impinge most heavily on public awareness in all Member States." Priority areas and prominent points were linked to the aim of reawakening public support for the building of the Union. The Presidency pledged to improve the effectiveness and raise the profile of the action of the European Union (EU) in the "threefold role" of promoting an integrated economic area, a community of citizens, and a larger role for the EU in international relations. The three priority areas coincide with this threefold role. In the first area, employment was the prominent point; in the second, Europol; and in the third, Bosnia.

As usual, things did not go just as planned. EU institutions and foreign and partner governments urged Rome to take forward and bring to a close the dossiers they considered most important. Unexpected emergencies and problems (most notably, the "mad cow" crisis) put the Presidency under stress. Delicate issues required intense activity, and some of them were given a satisfactory solution (notably, the controversy with Slovenia). Last but not least, domestic politics also claimed priority, but did not derail the Presidency train.

### Priority areas and prominent points

The EU as an integrated economic area: Stimulating employment. Importance was given to the task of preparing the technical and legal instruments for an orderly and smooth transition to the third stage of the EMU. However, most of the Presidency's energy was spent convincing the Member States of the need to formulate EU strategies safeguarding and augmenting employment. Italy's preference had been set for an intense coordination of national and EU strategies:

*First and foremost the process of consultation between the Union and the Member States will need to be taken forward on the basis of the principles defined at Essen in order to confirm the pivotal role of policies to stimulate employment.*

Italy's attention to unemployment coincided with the commitment of Commission President Jacques Santer to prepare an initiative in this area. In March, Santer submitted to the European Council in Turin the '*European Confidence Pact for Employment*'. The Pact's aim was to introduce a consistent strategy of the European institutions, the member governments and both sides of industry. In Turin, political leaders confirmed their commitment to job creation and welcomed the Council Presidency's intent to attach maximum importance to the subject at the next meeting in Florence. In preparation for the meeting, the Presidency held a Tripartite (governments, social partners and the Commission) Conference on growth and employment.

In Florence (June 21 and 22) the Council followed the Commission's approach and decided that an open and flexible process should be adopted to create a macroeconomic framework favourable to employment, to speed up the labour market reforms and to make better use of the Union's policies in the interest of growth and employment. The Council emphasized that high and sustained non-inflationary economic growth over the medium term is essential to significantly reduce the EU's unacceptably high level of unemployment, and to combat the threat of social exclusion. To this end, it called on the Member States to step up their efforts at budgetary consolidation, taking account of the desirability of reducing expenditure rather than increasing revenue, making a selective restructuring of expenditure that encourages intangible investment in human capital, research and development, innovation and the infrastructure essential to competitiveness, and giving priority to active policies for employment.

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was said to be against giving the Commission a coordinating role in this effort. This was denied by the Presidency, but it conceded that Santer's Confidence Pact will receive further study before final presentation to the Council, and that the EU's strategy for employment and growth can be successful only if appropriately coordinated with national strategies.

The EU as a community of citizens: Fostering individual and collective security and Europol. The Italian Presidency pledged to work toward convincing European citizens that the EU is a guarantor of freedom and security, and an authority able to foster the development of individual and collective identities. To match coherent action with such an ambitious pledge, the Presidency's prominent strategy was to make tangible progress in the area of Pillar Three. Responding to the increasing need for individual and collective security and to combat organized international crime, the Presidency made every effort to step up the creation of Europol. Indeed, the Conclusions of the Florence Council counted on effective results in this area. The final outstanding problem concerning the establishment of Europol - enabling the European Court of Justice to give preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Europol Convention - was settled. However, the much wanted Convention to facilitate extradition between Member States, which is of the greatest importance in

the fight against organized crime and terrorism, was not ready for signature.

***The EU as a leading player in international relations: Promoting peace and democracy in Bosnia*** In the January Programme, the Presidency repeated the most common declarations on the CFSP (such as that a firm and dynamic external image of the Union is claimed by the need for stability and security in Europe, by proliferating crisis scenarios and increasing disparity between North and South) and affirmed that CFSP can be developed along two dimensions: the systematic synergy with external activities of Community competence and the relationship with WEU in the field of military security. Even if this part of the January document is the most extended and generic one, the Presidency indicated several priority areas for direct action. These areas were the former Yugoslavia, the Mediterranean and the transatlantic dialogue. At the end of the Semester, only the first could demonstrate visible results.

The Presidency was convinced that the EU's action in former Yugoslavia must be consolidated and more decisive integration of CFSP into the peace process achieved. It based the EU's post-war role in Bosnia on a strategy aimed at linking economic reconstruction to the restoration of political stability and co-existence in the region. The Ministerial Meeting of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), created by the Dayton Peace Agreements, was held in Florence on June 13 and 14. This was an important achievement for the Italian government. A week later, in the Declaration on Former Yugoslavia included in the Conclusions of the Presidency, the European Council promised political and economic support to Bosnia and pledged EU contribution to the electoral process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With regard to reconstruction, a crucial element in fostering reconciliation and progressive return to normal life, the Council promised the continuation of financial aid to the country without discrimination toward any party complying with the Peace Agreement obligations.

If the results on Bosnia are meager, those on the Mediterranean and the "transatlantic dialogue" are even smaller. In the case of the transatlantic dialogue, significant actions were achieved outside the reach of the Italian Presidency. Two weeks before the opening of the Semester, the EU and US had signed in Madrid the New Transatlantic Agenda; and two weeks before the conclusion of the Semester, the annual Transatlantic Summit was held in Washington. The importance of EU-US relations was acknowledged in the opening document of the Presidency, which advocated "the involvement of the principal world partners in a global plan of stabilization" as the guiding principle of the EU's relationship with the rest of the world. The Florence Conclusions simply took note of the report of the Senior Level Group and the priorities set out in the Washington Summit for the next six months of the dialogue. In addition, it expressed "deep concern" over the adopted (Helms-Burton) and pending (D'Amato) legislation on the USA's boycotting of foreign firms investing in Cuba, Iran and Libya, and proclaimed the right and intention of the Council to react in defence of European interests.

A different kind of consideration must be given to the Mediterranean priority. In the opening document of the Semester, the Italian government promised to forward Euro-Mediterranean cooperation by "giving substance to the conclusions of the Barcelona Conference." It affirmed that it had "already identified a number of priority sectors in which important initiatives will be organized," but acknowledged that:

*it will be necessary to overcome the current lack of a unified framework and the serious problems affecting regional integration in the area, initiating a parallel process whereby rapprochement with the Union is accompanied by the development of cooperation between the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean.*

Indeed, taking a prominent stance on the Mediterranean area was regarded as the natural task of the Italian Presidency. Rome should not have lost this chance. It had a wonderful card to play for improving its position in the Mediterranean and consolidating its oscillatory policy in the region. The opposite came true. Pending association agreements with Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon were not signed, and the Florence Conclusions simply expressed satisfaction with the "wide range of meetings at all levels" held in the first half of 1996 to implement the Barcelona Declaration or the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Work Programme.

### Italy and the IGC

Recognition of declining public support for the European construction project was also the premise of the March document outlining the Italian position on the IGC. Italy reaffirmed the importance of enhancing efficiency and democracy to bring citizens closer to the EU, and to make these qualities more readily apparent in the EU's fundamental principles. It advocated "the drafting of a Treaty which the citizens can read" (underlined in the original) by "amalgamation and simplification of the texts in force". In this respect, Italy's position is consonant with the European Parliament's invitation to compose a single, "consolidated" treaty of the Union.<sup>2</sup>

The most important points of the Italian position may be summarized as follows:

- Italy wants to include in the initial part of the Treaty certain fundamental rights (such as non-discrimination and respect for minorities) and add civil and social rights to the actual content of the European citizenship.
- Italy aims at more accurate identification of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) sector. JHA matters might form the object of common positions, common actions and agreements. Progressive transfer to the Community sphere of immigration, asylum and the juridical status of foreigners legally residing in the Union is also asked by Italy. Common positions and actions should be juridically compulsory; legal instruments comparable to community directives should be introduced; the Court of Justice should be competent for JHA matters and the Parliament granted greater control on JHA. The Schengen Convention should be incorporated in the Treaty.
- Italy suggests the inclusion of a chapter on Employment and the Social Protocol in the Treaty. Energy, tourism and civil protection should be included in the EU's competencies.
- The Commission's right of initiative should be extended in JHA. The number of Commissioners should be smaller than that of the Member States.
- Majority vote in the Council should be the generalised with the exception of some constitutional provisions, qualified vote extended, and the vote of the Member States re-weighted to give greater consideration to population.
- Italy considers it important to enlarge European Parliament involvement in the areas of CFSP and JHA and to approach parity between the Parliament and the Council. This requires

establishing a hierarchy of norms and reducing the number of legislative procedures down to three: assent, codecision and consultation.

- In the sector of external relations, Italy recommends the creation of a body with analysis, planning and implementation tasks, led by a Secretary General who would guarantee continuity in the action of the EU by working with the successive Council Presidencies. It is possible to correct the unanimity rule by reaching previous consensus at the higher decision-making level (the European Council) on the principles and contents of the Union's foreign policy. Such consensus would make it possible to resort to more flexible decision-making procedures such as constructive abstention and qualified strengthened majority. To accomplish the European Security and Defence dimension requires the enforcement of the Treaty provisions in full compliance with the transatlantic links and, at the same time, the integration of WEU structures into the EU.

All Member States have made known their positions on the expected results of the IGC. Coincident, similar and different points in their positions are recorded and analyzed by groups of researchers and task-forces of various institutions. The continuing negotiations will surely demonstrate the complexity of forming such an accord.

Italy's Presidency undertook the heavy responsibility of making the negotiations start well. The leadership position in this task was held by an Italian diplomat, Silvio Fagiolo, who allowed people to say what they wanted to say. To press negotiators to clarify all their proposals, point out priority preferences and even remove ambiguities was considered contrary to the nature of the early negotiation rounds.

Regarding the organization and procedure of the Conference, the Italian government did not get all it wanted. Italy strongly supported giving full Conference membership to the European Parliament. The Turin Council decision *associating* the Parliament to the work of the IGC was a compromise between contrasting national positions.<sup>3</sup> However, those in favour of full membership of the Parliament, like Italy, considered the decision a great change from past conferences of treaty reform. Contrary to the preference of some governments against any form of presence for the Parliament, the Parliament was promoted to half-partner of the negotiation. This was a "*sostanziale avanzamento*" - a great leap forward - in the words of the Italian Prime Minister, Lamberto Dini.

On substantial matters, the European Heads of Government were rather close to Italy's positions. In Florence, they gave the Conference the mandate to, among other things:

*bring the Union closer to the citizens in particular by living up to their expectations as regards the fulfillment of the objective of a high level of employment while ensuring social protection, ... making environmental protection more effective and coherent at the level of the Union in order to secure sustainable development; ... meeting their need for security, which implies improving substantially the means and the instruments against terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking; ... strengthening and enlarging the scope of the Union's common foreign and security policy [by, among other means,] ... closer links between the European Union and the WEU, ...; and, finally, assuring, also in view of enlargement, the good functioning of Institutions while respecting their balance, and the efficiency of the decision-making process.<sup>4</sup>*

## Emergency: The BSE Crisis

On March 27 the Union banned the export of British beef after London's announcement on a possible link between bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), or "mad cow" disease, and Creutzfeld-Jacob disease of the human brain. This was the beginning of a three-month confrontation between the British government and the other Member States. The dispute was settled by a June 21 agreement brought forth by the Italian Presidency in concert with the Commission and the other EU governments. The agreement brought to an end one of the Union's worst political crises in recent times, and was acknowledged as a diplomatic success of the Italian Presidency.

One month before the agreement, the British government had taken the unprecedented action of blocking nearly 100 actions or pieces of legislation to force EU institutions to lift the ban. The Italian government, in harmony with the other Member States and the Commission, was firm and resolute. It never pledged to make concessions but worked to reach a good solution for the EU and John Major, the British Prime Minister. Major called the settlement, devised in Florence at the last minute before the beginning of the Council, a "common sense agreement". He wanted to make clear to his electorate that he had not made concessions without benefits. The other Union members, however, were glad that BSE was eradicated from the Florence table without reverting to the situation created by the imposition of the ban. In the last minutes of the dispute, the Italian Prime Minister in charge, Romano Prodi, had put before Major an agreement with a phased lifting of the ban and a clause containing the "case by case" exemption of the ban for export of British beef to non-EU countries. These concessions to Great Britain and the agreement on the phased lifting were the payoff the British government needed to present to domestic public opinion, and especially to the Conservative party members who strongly opposed cooperation with the EU.

The fact that Major had to preserve the loyalty of his party's strong Thatcherite, anti-European wing by defying Brussels at every turn was at the heart of the matter. For that reason, it is not wrong to consider the settlement of the "mad cow" dispute a good thing for the United Kingdom.<sup>5</sup> If it is good for the British people to oppose EU policies which infringe upon national sovereignty, keeping the United Kingdom within the EU is also in their interest. However, the end of the "mad cow" confrontation will not prevent Major from taking the next two European Council meetings, hosted by Ireland in October and December of 1996, as a platform to re-open his confrontational tactics with the EU and give new impetus to the Conservative Party's anti-European line.

## Enlargement and the case of Slovenia

Italy received a mandate from the Madrid Council to carry on the preparations for extending EU membership to Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). The Florence Council reaffirmed this commitment and advocated that the initial phase of negotiations with the CEECs coincide with the start of the negotiations with Cyprus and Malta, which are scheduled to begin six months after the conclusion of the IGC. The Italian Presidency worked in harmony with the competent Commissioners to make it possible to meet this dateline. The Italian Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister pledged support to the CEECs expectations at all meetings with the political representatives of those countries. They also gave strong support to the governments of Malta and Cyprus, who can rightly claim to be the first

“newcomers”, having presented their application well in advance of the others and because they are the “most qualified” to do so, as the Italian Foreign Minister, Susanna Agnelli, said on May 14 at the conclusion of the Association Council’s meetings with the two Mediterranean countries.

The Italian Presidency succeeded also in reaching a significant and long-awaited agreement with Slovenia over the estate properties of Italians expelled from their land by the government of Yugoslavia at the end of World War Two. The settlement of the bilateral quarrel lifted Rome’s opposition to the signature of Slovenia’s Association Agreement with the EU. The agreement, signed in Luxembourg on 10 July, allowed Slovenia’s representatives to take part in the closing ceremony of the Florence European Council with the representatives of the CEECs, the Baltic states, Cyprus and Malta.

### Italian Domestic Politics and the Semester

Italian domestic politics, known for high government turnover and now also for the interruption of parliamentary terms (the last one in 1996 was the fourth in a row), has been going through a process of crisis and transformation during the last four years. The path of change has not been linear and progressive, but discontinuous, zigzagging and of uncertain outcome. Now, it seems to be moving on to less troubled waters. Confidence is rising in political and economic circles that the crisis may soon be overcome. There is also moderate confidence in the durability of the center-left coalition government. The Prime Minister, Romano Prodi, has repeatedly pledged to keep his post for the five-year parliamentary term. Ruling since late May, he has been able to make important legislation on fiscal and economic issues because his government enjoys a rather solid parliamentary majority. Yet, Prodi faces many difficulties in achieving institutional and administrative reforms.

For a long time, the uncertain demarcation between the governing majority and the opposition (and especially the left opposition) was the evil and fortune of Italy. In the long run, it caused more troubles than benefits to Italian democracy and politics. In the present Parliament, majority and opposition(s) are instead clear separated: on one side, the governing center-left coalition (sometimes called the “Olive Alliance” and sometimes the “Progressive Pole”), on the other the opposition center-right coalition (frequently called the “Liberties Pole”). The deputies of the separatist northern movement, the *Lega Lombarda*, are isolated parliament members, unable to give majority status to any party alignment. Still, they cause great tension in Italian politics by calling for secession from Rome. The announced declaration of the Padania independence on September 15 may result in a serious disturbance of Italy’s political climate.

Political crisis came to surface in Italy in 1992 with the “*tangentopoli*”,<sup>6</sup> the great corruption scandal that overwhelmed large sectors of the Italian political class and all the parties of the governing coalition. Yet, 1992 is also recorded as the year of the first successful referendum on reforming the proportional electoral system, a major cause of degeneration of the Italian party system and the transformation of the Italian democracy into a *partitocrazia* (degenerated party government). The electoral reform, promulgated by the Parliament two years after the referendum, replaced the existing system of extreme proportionalism with a mixed, mostly majoritarian system which was supposed to allow for stable government. However, the 1994 national elections did not produce a reduction in the number of the parties in the Parliament, nor the most sought after goal of creating two separate party coalitions, the winning majority and

the losing opposition coalition. These deceptive electoral results were not completely unexpected. The fact was that the new mixed electoral system was a compromise between those who wanted to install bipolarism in Italy because this was seen as the fundamental requisite for making democracy work in advanced societies, and those who advocated tripolarism as the most suitable structure of the Italian party system because center parties are seen as essential actors of the political game to avoid fatal confrontation of Left and Right parties. Almost everybody concedes that the segments of the Italian society cannot be represented by a small number of parties.

Silvio Berlusconi, the media tycoon and leader of the frail coalition which gained in the June 1994 elections and broke out some months later, made his government in August 1994. Berlusconi did not promote important legislation and resigned because the *Lega Lombarda*, an essential partner of the coalition, refused to support his leadership. This opened the most serious phase of Italy’s political crisis. People and politicians were uncertain whether it could be settled by calling new elections to give the electorate a second chance to select, through the new electoral system conceived for that purpose, the party coalition to lead the country for the five-year parliamentary term, or whether it was better to produce appropriate institutional reforms before again consulting the electorate.

The latter scenario posed two alternative reform strategies: the electoral and the constitutional one. According to the former, the infant, mixed and mostly majoritarian electoral system was to be immediately killed because it had not worked as expected. This posed the problem of finding a substitute. Proposals varied from the adoption of a strictly majoritarian system, to the correction of the existent one by making stronger either its proportional or majoritarian attributes to underpin conditions for multipartisan or bipartisan according to preference, to the re-adoption of the old proportional system. According to the constitutional reform strategy, the solution to the crisis was not just a matter of bringing political parties back on the right road by the appropriate electoral system. The crisis was rooted in the institutional architecture of the Republic as outlined in the Constitution. Two institutional correction proposals confronted each other: one was directed at changing the “form of government”, the other the “form of state”. The former aimed at substituting the parliamentary form of the Italian government system with a presidential or semi-presidential one. The latter aimed at substituting the centralist form of the Italian state with a federal one. However, to reconcile the opposing factions and avoid fierce confrontation and political stalemate, a trade-off agreement emerged. It embodied change in both forms at the same time, with the centrifugal forces at work in federalism and the centralizing forces at work in presidentialism providing the sought after institutional balance. On this basis the debate on constitutional reforms continued and in July the Parliament approved the decision to create a bi-cameral commission to study how to correct and update the fifty years old Republican Constitution.

If the *tangentopoli* did not cause but unveiled Italy’s political crisis, the variety of therapies to overcome the critical situation of the last years demonstrates that political parties, in spite of their wrongdoing, are not responsible for all aspects of the crisis. Recent political analyses<sup>7</sup> point to the complex relationship between the conduct of the political parties and the institutions as explanation of both the social and political development of Italy from the end of the World War to the Seventies, and the critical situation of contemporary Italy. The content of such an explanation is that, by exploiting the opportunities given by social

and constitutional institutions, the Italian political parties have been able to integrate a wide range of social sectors into the state. But, once the integration was completed through economic and social reforms, partly concerted by majority and opposition parties (the Italian *consociational* model), political parties kept on with the old practice. For this reason, they came to be responsible for using state institutions and public resources to keep their own electorates without adopting the policies needed to meet the new demands of the society they had contributed to modernize. Protected by the proportional system from being punished by the electorate, and by *consociational* parliamentary practices, they drew from the state bucket all residual resources until the system broke down.

In spite of his intent to change politics and put the system in order again, Berlusconi was doomed to fail because he had a small parliamentary majority (almost nonexistent in the Senate) with little cohesion, especially given the presence of such an heterogeneous partner as the *Lega Lombarda*, which is a localist, protest party. After the Berlusconi government resigned, it was replaced with a "technical" government sustained by a parliamentary majority arranged to execute the "four points" programme. The government was led by Lamberto Dini, formerly Berlusconi's economic minister. Dini had no parliamentary seat or party affiliation. His cabinet was expected to resign well before the beginning of the EU Semester but lasted longer, while repeatedly affirming to be on the point of resigning. For this reason, the period preceding the Semester was burdened by the double debate on whether to go to the election polls or make reforms first, and on whether reform should involve only the electoral law or substantial constitutional changes. To call national elections and replace the government during the EU Presidency period was presented by opponents of the dissolution of the parliament as wrong and potentially disastrous for Italy's reputation and performance in the Council Presidency. Indeed, the Semester became a pretext to keep on with the debate and postpone the elections. Most of Italy's political leaders were not ready to undergo an electoral campaign seen as having an uncertain outcome.

In the middle of the Semester, however, both the debate on the best way out of the crisis and Dini's resistance in office were exhausted, the Parliament was dissolved according to constitutional rules, and Italians went to the polls. The center-left coalition won the elections and Romano Prodi was designated Prime Minister.

Contrary to the oft-voiced fears of discontinuity and low performance, the Italian Presidency was not touched by the domestic political crisis and replacement of government. Dini's Foreign Minister, Susanna Agnelli, left her post to Dini, now Prodi's Foreign Minister. This special turnover can be seen as a factor of continuity in the EU Presidency, but continuity was mainly assured by the fact that a great number of the matters dealt with in the Semester were the responsibility of the Italian diplomats, long accustomed to frequent ministerial turnover. In her leaving speech to the Parliament, Agnelli acknowledged the merit of Italian diplomats by saying that domestic political matters had not become "that feared disturbing factor" for two reasons: the competence shown by personnel at all levels involved in the conduct of the Semester, and the pro-European orientation of the Italian political class.

This last factor may require some clarification, given Italy's well-known failure to implement EU legislation. This failure is caused mainly by the inability of the Italian decision-making and administrative system to execute norms and regulations that do

not match Italian norms and regulatory standards. The pro-European Italian political class has not adapted national decision-making and administrative system to European standards for the same reason that explains the degeneration process of Italian politics. Political parties refused to change state practices and public policies to avoid the risk of losing electoral support that might accompany the imposition of limitations on vested interests.<sup>8</sup>

### Italy, EMU and the EU's Future Aims

The Semester period, with the occurrence of national elections and government replacement, may prove advantageous to Italy's effort of "keeping up to Europe". The coincidence of the electoral campaign with the Semester forced the two party blocs to confront the need for upgrading the national decision-making and administrative system to European standards. First of all, they clearly defined their position on EU matters. Large agreement emerged but not a complete one. The two coalitions expressed similar opinions on important issues such as placing CFSP under the direction of a secretariat close to the Commission, placing cooperation in the military field under the coordination of the WEU, fully integrated in the Union, to reform and simplify decision-making procedures, to take Council's decisions in most cases by qualified majority, and to simplify and extend the use of the co-decision procedure, enlarging the powers of the European Parliament. But there was not the same support for monetary union and the target of reaching the convergence criteria set by the Treaty on European Union. Indeed, a faction of Berlusconi's *Forza Italia* party, headed by Antonio Martino, a professor of economics and the foreign minister in Berlusconi's government, opposes the design of the monetary union on the basis of a liberal ideology and rejects economic policy measures aimed at ensuring Italy's compliance with the Maastricht convergence criteria.

EMU and the Maastricht criteria have been acutely debated in Italy since the time of the Semester. Martino represents the fears of those who consider Italy's economic structure vulnerable to other EU economies if monetary sovereignty is renounced. Other critics point to the dramatic consequence of state budget cuts on the Italian model of welfare and social security system if Italy obliges to Maastricht criteria. The thesis of Italy's economic vulnerability, however, did not convince many. In political and economic circles confidence on the capability of the Italian economy to *keep up to Europe* prevails. As stated by another economist: "the underlying political economy has all the energy and resources needed for the task."<sup>9</sup>

On the contrary, the issue of undertaking "domestic sacrifices" to comply with the convergence criteria receives much more attention and is much more controversial. The last weeks of the Semester saw fierce confrontation on this point. Prime Minister Prodi, though declaring the great importance of Italy's ability to meet with the convergence criteria, asked the Parliament to approve budget cutting and fiscal measures as part of a plan to approach the Maastricht criteria not immediately, but in successive steps. Parliament approved Prodi's measures with much criticism from the opposition. This criticism reached its apex when the Italian Commissioner responsible for the internal market, Mario Monti, a leading professor of monetary economy, reproached as insufficient Prodi's plan to reduce the state deficit.

To understand the problem of cutting public debt in Italy, one must again refer to the cause of Italy's political degeneration. Despite the fact that current public revenues outstrip public spending, paying the interests on old debts, totaling more than 120% of GDP, puts the budget deficit at 8 % of GDP. Contrary

to Monti's criticism based on the conviction that Italy's economy can undergo larger budget cuts, Prodi intends to maintain the target of 4.4 % of GDP for the deficit in 1997, instead of going all out to hit the 3 % needed to get into the single currency bloc in January 1999. The eventual delay of Italy's entry into the EMU could be the "political" price for the governing coalition's approval of the strategy of cutting public spending in the years ahead.

Before the Semester was completed, Prodi made important visits to Bonn and Paris. Prodi was praised for bringing Italy into political stability. According to press rumors, he was also given assurances that Italy will be accepted in EMU from its inception as long as his policy continues along the path to achieve the 3 % criterion. In exchange, Italy will not object to Belgium's entry in EMU, despite the large Belgian public debt.<sup>10</sup>

Meeting the German Chancellor and French President was not only a matter of economic interests. It is a long-time objective of Italian diplomacy to find a good partner across the Alps. Historically, "sister nation" France was the would-be good partner, but in the European Community such a special relationship brought few benefits. In the Seventies, special relations with Germany appeared much more advantageous from an economic and political point of view, given the ascending role of Germany in the economy and politics of the continent. In the meantime, Franco-German relations grew to considerable importance in Europe while Italy was unable to create solid alignment with any of the two countries. Italy's relationship with France have even deteriorated in recent times, due mostly to reciprocal misunderstandings and inconsistent *prestige* tactics on both sides of the Alps. Unlike his predecessor Lamberto Dini, whose government did not avoid public confrontation with France on issues like the Italian currency exchange policy (blamed by Paris as unfair and detrimental to French economic interests) and the French nuclear arms policy (condemned by Italy on the world stage of the United Nations), Prodi aims at reconciling with France. In addition, he wants to be praised by both France and Germany as a reliable economic and political partner. His great aspiration could be to bring Italy to close relations with those countries and perhaps to replace the Duo (Bonn and Paris) with the Trio (Berlin, Paris and Rome) as the leading figure of Europe.

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> See *Priorities of the Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union*, EurOp, SN4809/95 ani/JM/ct; also available at <<http://europa.eu.int/en/record/it96.html>>.

<sup>2</sup> In March, the Parliament brought to conclusion the "Consolidated Treaty of the European Union". See EP, DG IV, Political series, W-17/rev.

<sup>3</sup> The decision was that "the European Parliament will be closely associated with the work of the Conference to enable it to have regular and detailed information on the progress of discussions and to make known its point of view on any matter discussed whenever it feels this to be necessary".

<sup>4</sup> See *Florence European Council Presidency Conclusion*.

<sup>5</sup> In the words of British Commissioner Leon Brittan, John Major was "playing to the gallery" (see Michael Mann, *Brittan attacks UK's bid to curb ECJ*, "European Voice", 11-17 July 1996).

<sup>6</sup> The money offered to or asked by the corrupt politician or administrator is called in Italy *tangente*.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, A. Mastropaolo (1996), *La repubblica dei destini incrociati*, Firenze, La Nuova Italia; and O. Lanza, *Politics and governance in Contemporary Italy*, in K. Lavdas and J.

Magone (eds), *Politics and governance in Southern Europe* Westview Press, Boulder, 1996.

<sup>8</sup> On this point, see, F. Attinà, *Italy*, in D. Dinan (ed), *Encyclopedia of the European Union*, forthcoming; F. Attinà (1996), *La prima repubblica in Europa*, in "Europa Europe", V, 1, 29-52. M. Giuliani (1992), *Il Processo Decisionale Italiano e le Politiche Comunitarie*, in "Polis", VI, 2, 307-346; S. Romano (1996), *Italy's constitutional crisis*, in "The International Spectator", 31, 2, 5-16; F.M. Bindi (1996), *Italy: in need of more EU democracy*, in S.S. Andersen and K.A. Eliassen (eds), *The European Union: how democratic is it?*, London, Sage, 101-116. <sup>9</sup> See P.C. Padoan (1996), *Can Italy keep up to Europe?*, in "The International Spectator", 31, 2, 17-36.

<sup>10</sup> See T. Jones, *Cautious budget sparks debate*, "European Voice", 11-17 July 1996.

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### The Future of the European Union and Implications for European-American Cooperation: An Interview with Secretary General Jürgen Trumpf, Parliamentary State Secretary István Szent-Iványi and Ambassador Carlos Westendorp by Dr. Colette Mazzucelli\*

*This interview was held on 9 July 1996 on the eve of a panel discussion in which Trumpf, Szent-Iványi and Westendorp spoke at The Harvard Club of New York City. The panel discussion was moderated by Dr. Gale Mattox, Professor of Political Science at the Naval Academy at Annapolis and a former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department. The discussion was organized by the Council Secretariat's Liaison Office in New York and the Robert Bosch Foundation Alumni Association (RBFAA) in conjunction with the American Council on Germany (ACG), the Fletcher Club of New York, the Jean Monnet Council, the Civic Education Project (CEP) and Women In International Security (WIIS).*

**Mazzucelli:** Secretary General Trumpf, the recent decision of the Florence European Council that Stage Three of EMU will begin on 1 January 1999 reaffirms the political will of the Union to achieve a single European currency, otherwise known as the Euro. Could you please comment on progress made in the area of budgetary and fiscal discipline and on the significance of the Verona ECOFIN Council meeting?

**Trumpf:** Yes, thank you. I would like to say the year 1996 is the year to prepare all the necessary legislation for the third stage to function smoothly. There are three big subjects, two of them are mentioned in your questions. The third one is about the legal status of the Euro, but this is highly complicated and is dealt with mainly by experts. I would like to say regarding your first question about how to ensure stability in the third stage there is,

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of course, the general demand of the Treaty that there ought to be strict budgetary and financial discipline. Member states which will be able to join the third stage would have to continue with a policy of not creating budgetary deficits in their national fiscal policies. The Treaty has some provisions about this. The Treaty says that in general there should not be a deficit which is higher than 3% of GNP. How can this be assured and strengthened? There are some ideas which have been put forward at the Verona Council which you also mention in your question. Some good progress has been made on this point. The Verona Council discussed the ideas of the German finance minister. The ECOFIN ministers will continue to discuss these matters during their next informal meeting to be held in Dublin at the end of September. Work focuses on several issues: how medium term budget targets should appropriately be set taking into account the obligations to avoid deficits exceeding 3 percent; how best to implement the surveillance mechanisms which exist in the Community already especially the so-called excessive deficit procedure; and how to create a sort of presumption that, if excessive deficits should be incurred, how appropriate sanctions might be triggered. The aim is to have a credible mechanism which would have preventive effects. On all these questions good progress has been made, but final solutions will have to be found in time before the third stage really begins.

**Mazzucelli:** Ambassador Westendorp and Secretary General Trumpf, given that all of the Union's member states will not be able to participate in the EMU on 1 January 1999, could you describe some ways in which cooperation may be facilitated between the non-participating member states and those states adopting the Euro as their currency? Some observers of European Union affairs are concerned that this distinction between non-participating and participating member states may lead to the end of the Fifteen's political cohesion in the Union? Do you believe that this is a legitimate concern?

**Westendorp:** Why are you asking me this question? You are implying that I may represent a country which is not going to be there. No really, we are striving very much to be in the third stage but, of course, there are member states which are not going to be there. Not all of them will have the same single currency. The mechanism should be one which fulfills two conditions. This is being studied at present; it is not yet decided. One condition is that the discipline is also kept not only by those states which are in, but also by those which are out. At the same time, it is important that there are no new barriers or obstacles between those member states which are in and those which are out. That is to say, it is important that the decisions taken by those which are in do not make it more difficult for those which are out to join, when they are ready. What does this mean? It means that in principle there should be something similar to the present mechanism, the monetary mechanism between those with a single currency, the area of in's, and those which are out. In exchange for this discipline for the outs, and also to be in the mechanism, the rules of the present system, i.e., support of a currency in difficulties, should also be applicable.

**Trumpf:** Well, I would like to say that sometimes there is a feeling that the creation of the single currency for some member states, with others which are not able to participate, might create political difficulties for the cohesion of the Union. I wouldn't say that this follows necessarily because at the moment we have a situation with 14 or 15 currencies, 15 if you count the Luxembourg as a separate one from the Belgian, and one very, very strong central bank. The new system is designed to change a bit the

inequalities. Of course, the new currency, hopefully, is going to be a very strong currency and a very stable currency. There is, of course, also the feeling that, as Ambassador Westendorp said, there must be a cohesion between these two groups and it is necessary to have the new monetary system, EMS, and also an exchange rate mechanism. These ideas have been developed quite positively already. Probably the new mechanism is similar to the old one; but of course it will no longer have the D-mark as its anchor but the Euro. It will probably have wide bands around the central rates, such as after 1993, and as Ambassador Westendorp mentioned, there ought to be a role in helping others, a role in interventions. That would certainly be the pivotal role for the European Central Bank in foreign exchange markets at the margin or intermarginal, but on the other hand, the European Bank, or the future European Bank, will certainly demand a decisive role in calling for realignments, if they should be necessary. I would like to say a word, that, of course, the ECOFIN Council is one structure. When decisions are being taken, every-body talks and everybody is present as it is already in the ERM, although there not everyone participates. But when it comes to decisions then only the so-called in's, only those which participate in the third stage will have the vote. The common discussion of this will certainly help in the cohesion of the whole system.

**Mazzucelli:** State Secretary Szent-Iványi and Secretary General Trumpf, after the European Council in Florence, would you please share with us your respective views on the progress made in the "structural dialogue" with the countries of central and eastern Europe during the Italian Presidency? Could you also please comment on any recent joint EU-US initiatives with regard to individual countries and/or the region as a whole?

**Szent-Iványi:** Frankly speaking, we do not see any real progress in the structural dialogue. The structural dialogue has been adopted at the Essen Council and since then is working. It has some good, positive sides. This means we have regular meetings on different levels, foreign minister and different ministerial levels. That's good and accepted by central European countries. But sometimes we expressed and confirmed our criticism on the real content of the structural dialogue. The structural dialogue reminds us sometimes of structural monologues where we have an opportunity to deliver a speech. And many parallel speeches have been delivered without any real conclusion, monitoring and follow-up and so on. We are very interested in making a more substantial account as such. The Hungarian government has submitted some proposals to have a structural dialogue on lower levels as well, i.e., the expert level which will be important. We suggested a better prepared agenda of the ministerial meetings, pragmatic procedures from the sessions, which make the real dialogue possible, and not only parallel monologues, and monitored follow-up of the decisions. The basic idea is excellent, but the practice is exhausting and less advantageous for the applicant countries and for the member states as well. That's the reason that we would like to suggest a combined effort from both sides to make the structural dialogue more substantive.

As far as the second part of your question is concerned, on the US-EU initiatives let me say that I am not aware of any common, joint initiatives with regard to the applicant countries. Maybe there are some EU-US initiatives related to the EU. We know that there are some basic institutions which are contributing to cooperation between the EU and the applicant countries like the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and so on. There is a strong US element



and they have contributed very much, but these are not EU institutions. We do not see any major, important common initiatives. We are not against common initiatives. We would warmly welcome this, but I have not had any experience of this kind.

**Trumpf:** Well, I agree with what Mr. Szent-Iványi has just said. The basic idea is good and the practice is sometimes good and sometimes not so good. There are experiences in certain technical fields like environment or transport where ministers have been very happy to have these exchanges. It must be said that the Union has never before held such an intensive round of meetings with third countries as in the structural dialogue. Whether or not a ministerial meeting is fruitful and has good results certainly depends on the preparation on the lower level. In some cases there are extensive preparations which are, as far as I know, kept to the Community side. In the structural dialogue, there is a meeting also of the ambassadors and so on, but that is already at the political level and not at the expert level. I could give you a lot of figures, but it does not really help. We have seen that it depends on the questions which are treated in the structural dialogue. If the dialogue is about a question covering the internal market, where it is especially important in order to improve the pre-accession strategy to prepare the central and eastern European countries for their integration into the internal market, if that preparation is done well, it is useful and it is appreciated on both sides. But there are also meetings, I could cite the General Affairs Council, which has so much business during the day and a half it is meeting, especially now with the 1996 IGC running at the same time, during which it is very difficult for the 15 ministers to cope with what is on the agenda. Then sometimes the meetings are not so satisfactory to both sides.

Regarding the last part of the question, there are to my knowledge no joint EU-US initiatives. There are, of course, initiatives which cover partly the same field. There is the question of the Police Academy in Budapest which is something very much promoted by the United States.

**Szent-Iványi:** But not promoted by the EU now. We are looking for EU support.

**Trumpf:** You are looking for EU support.

**Szent-Iványi:** We did not get it.

**Trumpf:** ...but for the time being it has not materialized.

**Szent-Iványi:** I know.

**Trumpf:** ...because the EU, to be quite frank, also wishes to have a certain participation when these plans are drawn up and not only afterwards to be associated with them.

**Mazzucelli:** That is the idea of a joint initiative.

**Trumpf:** Yes, indeed.

**Mazzucelli:** Secretary General Trumpf and Ambassador Westendorp, given the outcome of the recent elections in Russia, could you please give us your respective views concerning the European Union's policy toward Russia and the NIS in the area of security broadly defined? This definition of security includes economic instruments and the more recent initiatives in internal security as listed in the third pillar of the Maastricht Treaty. What are some of the priorities of the New Transatlantic Agenda and the Joint EU-US Action Plan in the security area?

**Westendorp:** Well, the first idea is that the result of the election has been a positive one. I should say this given the situation and

the last appearances on television of President Yeltsin which gave us the impression that he was not in very good shape. But in the end the unanimous analysis is that the outcome has been positive for Russia, positive for the world in general. The position of the government especially is reinforced. There is the hope of a beginning of what is going to be a long process of democratization in Russia, which would be the first time that Russia has a democratic system. But still, we were talking with our Hungarian colleague, and we came to the conclusion that democracy cannot be introduced overnight. You have to work on that for a long time. But they are on a good track. Of course, Russia is a crucial element for European security and for world security. We have to take into account that the victory against communism was not a victory against a country but a victory against a system. The system is over and the European Union has the need, the obligation to support Russia's effort toward democratization. We have taken a lot of steps in this direction. The Secretary General will most certainly refer to them more accurately. I am not in the position to give you precise dates, but the European Union has made a lot of steps toward Russia. We are working together in the Atlantic Alliance with the United States and our allies to create confidence between NATO and Russia in Partnership for Peace in order to give them the right impression that NATO is not against Russia, but it is something that is going to cooperate with them in the security field. Regarding the enlargement of NATO which is already decided, everybody says when they talk about it that the "if," the fact, is decided but not the "when," or the time. I have the impression that after the Russian election results this enlargement, at least starting with three countries, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, would be a fact in the not too distant future. This is my impression, but of course, I may be wrong.

**Szent-Iványi:** I hope very much that you are not wrong.

**Trumpf:** I might add a few facts, starting by confirming that the European Union as such has always supported the reform process and consolidation of democracy in Russia. This is why everybody in the Union itself welcomes very much the outcome of the recent elections. Our relationship to Russia is based on a partnership agreement, PCA or Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which was signed quite some time ago, but is not yet ratified by all member states. We hope that ratification will come quickly. We also have since November 1995 developed in our common foreign and security policy the strategy of our future relations with Russia. We are committed to establishing a substantial partnership with Russia in order to promote economic, social and democratic reform. The third element in the whole relationship is the TACIS program which is a sort of program of technical help. We put quite some considerable sums in the Russian federation to establish all sorts of different fields, giving them advice how to create legislation as the basis for a democratic and market oriented society, and as far as security is concerned I would say that both in the Florence European Council and in the transatlantic agenda we have stressed the indivisibility of security on both sides of the Atlantic and the full involvement of Russia in the development of comprehensive European security architecture.

**Mazzucelli:** Secretary General Trumpf, in view of the efforts to address differences in trade relations among the EU, Japan and the US at the recent Lyon G-7 Summit, could you please outline for us a list of the most concrete agenda priorities which the World Trade Organization (WTO) should establish during its first ministerial meeting? Would you please comment on the

significance of recent EU-US initiatives to achieve a telecommunications accord in the WTO framework ?

**Trumpf:** Well, there is not yet an agreed agenda for the conference in Singapore, and we have not as the Union finally commented, we're having this topic on our agenda for the July Council. One could already say that in light of the work which has been going on in Geneva under Chairman Ruggiero, the items could be grouped in three main issues: implementation of the Uruguay Round, of its results; the current negotiations on the built-in agenda, arising from Marrakech including trade and environment; and then liberalization issues, trade and investment, trade and competition and similar things. This is probably going to be the main agenda. Well, there is one new element which we could perhaps say that there is already some sort of transatlantic agreement. At the summit in Lyon, we all expressed the desire to work for a successful conclusion on the negotiations in telecommunications, which will take place until early 1997. In general, these are very difficult negotiations especially as far as all the services are concerned. They were agreed at Marrakech, but there are fields in which progress is not so visible.

**Mazzucelli:** Ambassador Westendorp and Secretary General Trumpf, could you please share with us your impressions of the current progress and/or difficulties during the 1996 Revision Conference particularly as these relate to external and internal security and the future enlargement of the Union. In your view, what is the significance of recent French participation in meetings of the North Atlantic Council in terms of the elaboration of a common foreign and security policy for the Union and its relations with NATO?

**Trumpf:** I will leave the answer to the author of the Westendorp Report.

**Westendorp:** But you are more updated.

**Trumpf:** No, no.

**Westendorp:** I left some months ago. I have the impression that the Westendorp Report was clearer than the mess in which the Conference is at present. But, of course, it was not a negotiating exercise, it was more of a kind of collective brain storming and we could reach a common ground among let's say nearly all of us but one, which was the United Kingdom, of course. For the rest of us, there were quite unanimous views of what we have to do in the Conference, that is to say to introduce elements to respond to the concerns of the citizens. Today, due to the global market, the loss of competitiveness in Europe, the fight against unemployment, we have to work together at the European level to give an added value to what we are doing at the national level. But this is more or less agreed. The problem is how to introduce this into the Treaty. The second item was to give visibility and coherent action to foreign policy. This is not easy, but the planification unit is perhaps one thing which everybody in the Reflection Group accepted, although I do not know what is going on at present. This unit would exist together with a figure of Mr. or Mrs. Foreign Policy, which is more controversial. There are three possibilities: the *status quo* which is the easiest one; to introduce Mr. or Mrs. Foreign Policy who would be a political figure outside of the institutional framework. In my opinion, this would be wrong. It would introduce more confusion because the European Union does not have a telephone number, but as a result we would have several telephone numbers which is worse. And the third possibility, which I think is a reasonable one, is to reinforce the Council Secretariat and to invest the Secretary

General with the capabilities similar to the Secretary General of NATO, working together with the Presidency in exercise of the Council and with the Commission. This is something which could be possible.

As far as defense is concerned, well, the question is how to reinforce the European identity without jeopardizing the Atlantic Alliance. This is the real exercise. I think the concept of CJTF (Combined Joint Task Forces) is something that goes beyond the classical concept of Article 5. When one of the countries of the Alliance is attacked, the other has to respond. Now there are new tasks, called the Petersburg tasks, which are humanitarian action possibilities having only European interests and not necessarily American interests, in which the Europeans could use these forces which are of the Alliance in order to serve these new tasks. I think the French initiative and the French move is a positive one, because the Alliance has changed. It will help Spain also very much because we have also a peculiar situation. If the new structure is changed, there is no longer a need to be different. So I think it would be a good occasion for all of us to participate in the Alliance on an equal footing. It would be very peculiar if for instance Hungary joins entirely in the new structure and not Spain. I mean all of us would have to be the same. We will have problems, especially with the Communists in Spain, but we will overcome this.

**Mazzucelli:** I guess the time in 1986 when there was the referendum, who was it, Manuel Fraga?

**Westendorp:** Yes, Manuel Fraga defended abstention. He abstained, but now they have changed completely. Yes.

**Mazzucelli:** It was very interesting to follow that referendum. I remember it quite well.

**Trumpf:** I have very little to add. I agree with practically everything Ambassador Westendorp just said. I would like to dwell a little bit on the parts you said, enlargement in this connection. Enlargement is, of course, always in the minds of all the people who negotiate in this conference. The basic wish is to make the Union fit for an enlargement with another 12 countries, candidate countries, central and eastern European countries and Cyprus and Malta. Well, in CFSP there is something which I have learned here at the seat of the United Nations. It already has a positive effect because the Union presents its views, not as a Union of 15, but practically of 30 countries. There is a high ratio of agreed positions of the Union to resolutions in the frame of the United Nations. It's about 90% where everybody agrees, and the agreement is then in most cases also shared by the candidate countries and by countries which belong to the European Economic Area; Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein. So here it already works quite well. Then, of course, there are a lot of problems to make and to have a common foreign and security policy, not just by diplomatic moves, by declarations, by statements, by supporting resolutions, but also by action. That is to say, by common action in the field of foreign policy and security. This is exactly the field where the Conference focuses; how to make it possible to act more in pooling resources, in the preparation of decisions, all this planning and so on which was mentioned by Ambassador Westendorp in executing these decisions and also taking them quickly and efficiently. I think the Conference is well on its way. I think the real negotiations about these questions will now start under the Irish Presidency. The ground has been covered up until now during the first three months of the Conference under the Italian Presidency. We are hopeful to achieve results which will allow the Union to be a

major player in the field of foreign and security policy.

**Mazzucelli:** If I may, I have a copy of the Westendorp Report with me. I have one particular question which I find of interest. The idea concerns the organization and working methods regarding two levels for the General Affairs Council. The preparation could perhaps be done on a level where the ministers for European affairs could take part and then the ministers would be left with the really crucial political issues. Is that something...

**Trump:** It hasn't been discussed yet further.

**Mazzucelli:** So it is something which has been written in the Report, but not discussed yet.

**Trumpf:** It is for the actual negotiation when it comes to this particular point.

**Westendorp:** For that you don't need to change the Treaty. This is a working method of the Council which you can introduce in practice. As a matter of fact, you have several other occasions in which the foreign ministers do not follow the whole Council. They go because they have a lot of things to do. They leave the deputies or the European ministers for other business. Usually the foreign ministers only go to lunches because they want to discuss only political things. But all the things which are subject to quarrel they prefer to leave to the European ministers. I think this is the practice, but it could be improved. The working methods of the Council could be improved and should be improved, but you don't need to change the Treaty for that

**Mazzucelli:** State Secretary Szent-Iványi, could you please comment on the Hungarian involvement in the Partnership for Peace (PFP)? What are some of the Hungarian contributions to European security, generally speaking, and in terms of the Bosnian peace process? Could you please give your impressions of the first joint military exercise of the Western European Union (WEU) near Metz, France?

**Szent-Iványi:** Thank you. As far as the Hungarian involvement in PFP is concerned, let me start by saying that Hungary was one of the first joining countries of PFP. Hungary has played a very important and very active role in participating in all operations and all activities like joint maneuvers, setting up a new regional training center, and establishing a regional center for military environmental security. In Hungary we have started to adapt the Hungarian legal system to NATO standards and to PFP standards. That means we have adopted the SOFA agreement, NATO standards in the Parliament. This has been ratified. Last year we took part in more than 200 different military, and planning and other activities. We wanted to demonstrate that Hungary is a willing and able country that would like to be an active and cooperative partner in NATO. And we do hope very much PFP can be a good ante chamber, a good preparation for NATO membership.

As far as the second part of your question is concerned, how could we contribute to the Bosnian peace process? As you know, Hungary is a country which offered its whole logistical supplying routes on the soil of Hungary to contribute to that process. This means that the Americans deployed 7,000 troops and Hungary provided three bases, including one of the biggest air bases in central Europe, to supply the IFOR troops in Bosnia. The Hungarian parliament has sent an engineering unit to Croatia and Bosnia. Hungary has offered the same opportunity to the Nordic military units in the southern part of the country. That means that we would like to demonstrate that Hungary is deeply involved and interested in maintaining the peace or at least the cease fire in

Bosnia. We are very much interested as an almost neighboring country. Serbia and Croatia are in between, but we are very close to the situation. Hungary has been touched by the Bosnian War in the last 4 or 5 years. As you know, so many refugees have come to Hungary. Hungary has suffered under the sanctions of the embargo and it has some losses in the bilateral trade we used to have before the War.

As far as the joint exercise of WEU is concerned, we highly appreciate that first exercise. We highly appreciate the opportunity that we can send observers to be on the spot, and to see how it is going on. That can give some new perspectives and new horizons for the countries which are going to be part of NATO and going to be part of the CJTF common operation. I don't have any personal or detailed experience about that, but as far as we see that was a successful and good exercise.

**Mazzucelli:** Ambassador Westendorp and State Secretary Szent-Iványi, could you please share with us your respective views about upcoming enlargement talks as these pertain to the Union's budget and the distribution of economic and social cohesion funds for priority projects in the environment and trans-European networks? Do you believe that CAP reform, budgetary politics and the issue of enlargement could be mutually reinforcing processes to promote integration as the Union takes in more member states?

**Westendorp:** It is a very delicate question. It is very controversial inside the Union. There are especially net contributors, those states which pay more than they receive. They would like to reduce the expenditure of the Union as much as possible and they would like that the enlargement does not necessarily lead to an increase of the present budget. This means, even though we have a ceiling of 1.27% of the gross national product of the whole Union, they believe that we could save money in other activities. These activities are mainly two in the view of those states which really think that we have to continue with the same expenditure. These are the structural funds, on the one hand, and the agricultural expenditure. Well, this view is not defended by others, especially those which have an important agricultural sector, not only the less favored countries in the Union but also, for instance, France, which would really oppose ferociously any modification to the Common Agricultural Policy. And, on the other hand, there is a common view by those countries which are really receiving cohesion funds because they are less well off than the others to deviate the funds they are receiving to the newcomers. The idea is that there will be cohesion, but for all of us and that the newcomers will need perhaps more help than those that are already in the Community. But the money for them has to come from all of us, not only from those who are receiving the money so as to just make a transfer to the newcomers. Well, this is going to be a hell of a dispute after the Conference because this will be discussed later. Of course, it is going to be one of most difficult issues. In the end, as you said, what is going to happen is that we will have to compromise. There will be some increase in funds and some, let us say, restructuring of the present expenditure. That is my feeling.

**Szent-Iványi:** I fully agree with Mr. Westendorp. I cannot really contribute to that, only to add a little to this issue. As you know the Hungarian government finds it is very important to maintain the basic idea of the European cooperation which is solidarity among the European nations. That is very important. Without that solidarity Europe will disintegrate and split up into small and unsustainable units. And for that reason, I do think we have to look for a good and acceptable compromise for all the concerning

parties. I fully agree with Mr. Westendorp. Of course we are not seeking to deter the so-called "rich nations" and we do not like to endanger poor or less affluent nations. That means that all of the countries, including the future candidates, are very much interested in reaching and achieving a new compromise on this, as Mr. Westendorp pointed out. In that moment, it's not a really vital and essential issue because that Delors II Package is expiring in 1999. I do not hope, maybe I hope, but I do not think that we can join earlier than 1999. That means the current regime will expire by the end of the century. Then the first countries can join the European Union. That is the time to renegotiate and find out then.

As far as the CAP is concerned, let me react on that because there are some fears that central and eastern European countries can impose some dangers and problems to the European agriculture. In that respect, I fully agree with Mr. Fischler, Commissioner for Agriculture. He has published and edited a very intelligent and bright report on the agriculture of future candidates. And it underlines that the central European countries do not impose any real danger. If you look at the figures of the Hungarian agriculture, which is only 3% of the current European Union agricultural production, 2/3 of it is consumed in the domestic market. That means only 1% in the Union's market which cannot mean any real danger for that market. Moreover, the traditional market of Hungarian agriculture involves more outside countries than the European Union's market.

And my last remark, I am sure CAP should be reformed, radically reformed, independently from the enlargement of the Union. Even in the case that the enlargement won't take place by 2000 or 2002, CAP cannot be maintained. CAP is a very, excuse me for that criticism, but in my mind CAP is a very inefficient and very unnatural form of subsidies and subvention to agriculture. The basic idea of the European Union is free trade. It's not only one, but one of its basic philosophies. Free trade is a good and advantageous philosophy for generating real benefits for all of the participants. CAP is completely alien and different from that based on the idea that agriculture is one of the legacies, one of the important parts of cultural heritage and should be maintained even in the case of unprofitability and inefficiency. It won't work. The idea is attractive and sympathetic. But if you look at the processes going on with the Marrakech agreement and with the WTO agreements and the whole process of the world markets globalization, the European Union won't be able to maintain that system for a long time. This means the central European countries are not guilty for reforming that which is unavoidable and indispensable.

**Westendorp:** I should introduce some nuance to this. Well, of course, you are right that the CAP costs a lot of money. The conditions of agricultural production in Europe are not the same as in other areas, such as the United States or Argentina. So in many cases we have to maintain certain agricultural farming activity in Europe even if this activity is not competitive at international standards because somebody has to take care of the landscape. That is why I think we cannot only give the solution to the market. We need to introduce some corrections and I think the CAP at present has already changed from price subvention to a more direct income subvention for farmers. This is, of course, also controversial. There will be a discussion on that between the two big schools of thought, let's say the ultra liberal and the more or less social democratic, of which we represent these two tenets.

**Mazzucelli:** State Secretary Szent-Iványi, how is the Hungarian government trying to inform its citizens about the European Union? What are some of the reforms taking place within the

Hungarian government to prepare for the enlargement negotiations to open in 1998?

**Szent-Iványi:** The Hungarian government has adopted in 1995 an overall communication strategy in favor of informing the Hungarian citizens about the whole process, the basic institutions and what the European Union could and should mean for Hungary. That's a good program, a very spectacular program. We have introduced many, you may know better, many Europe days in the countryside, broadcast programs, television programs and so on. Another important part of that program, just now we are beginning the training and retraining of the most important targeting groups. We have analyzed...the society and the basic vocational and professional groups which are in touch, in constant working contact with the European Union. It turned out that the civil servants, lawyers, teachers, journalists and economists are very much influenced by that, and we started to retrain and educate them in workshops, study groups, seminars and so on. That's important for us because the Hungarian government has undertaken an obligation to put to a referendum the issue of EU enlargement. However, according to the Hungarian Constitution, it won't be necessary. That was an imminent, general need, a necessity and demand to decide on this very important issue. We would like to offer and provide accessible information for the population so they can decide on that, if they are aware of the importance of the question.

As far as the institutional reform is concerned, this year we have started an overall strategy of institutional reform. This means we have set up a new integrational system which is chaired by an integration Cabinet headed by the Prime Minister and the ministers who are dealing with the European Union. One of them is the integrational state secretariat in the framework of the foreign ministry. On the other side, there is the integrational strategic working group which is more or less independent, not completely independent, but it is an expert group dealing with the European Union.

**Mazzucelli:** Excuse me, is this the group of Professor Inotai?

**Szent-Iványi:** Exactly.

**Mazzucelli:** If I may, will the conclusions or recommendations of the Inotai group be made public so that the people could be aware of the findings of this particular group?

**Szent-Iványi:** Yes, yes exactly. It will be published at the end. They have a double task in the system. One of these tasks is research and analysis. The other is advising the Prime Minister and the integrational Cabinet. That's important. There is only one missing element of that integrated system, that is the social background of it. We would like to set up a social council or social supportive council for integration which can include the churches, trade unions, the employees associations, owners, industries and so on. That is missing, but all in all, we could coordinate and concentrate the major competence in the framework of the foreign ministry which is a good direction. I think that this should be appropriate for enlargement and for the negotiations in 1998.

**Mazzucelli:** And the Chair within the foreign ministry would be state secretary...

**Szent-Iványi:** State Secretary Somogyi.

**Mazzucelli:** Thank you.

**Mazzucelli:** Secretary General Trumpf, could you please explain the European Union's perception of the Helms-Burton Act

regarding Cuba and similar pending laws regarding Iran and Libya? What are the implications of these types of legislation for relations between the European Union and the United States within the World Trade Organization?

**Trumpf:** The Council has come back to this question on occasions and it is really concerned. It takes the view that the Helms-Burton Act and other draft US legislation of an extraterritorial nature, is in conflict with international law. And it harms the rights of the EU and its interests in the trade and investment sectors. The Council is considering all the options available to the Union within the WTO and in other fora to defend its rights and interests. Within the WTO, we have asked the United States for consultations under the relevant Articles of the agreements. These consultations have started a few days ago on the 4th of June in Geneva. The Union might ask for a panel to be convened to examine this question. Of course, we wish as a Union to strengthened our trade relations with the United States, but within the framework of an open, multilateral system based on the respect of international law. We would like the WTO procedures for settling disputes to be followed strictly in this case as in others. In this spirit, we have also asked the United States not to apply the laws relating to Cuba, Iran and Libya because we wish to avoid a situation in which we would have to take counter measures. Counter measures always bear the risk of escalation and this is not what we want to do. We deeply regret this legislation. Our strong feeling is that we should strictly abide by the international rules of not creating law which interferes with the legislation of other states.

I might add we certainly share the concern of the United States in dealing with the countries in question. However, we do not see that there is a case that the United States makes laws which then do not apply to its own citizens only, but which really apply to citizens or companies of third countries outside the scope of jurisdiction and legislation of the United States.

**Mazzucelli:** Ambassador Westendorp, could you please share with us your views about the European Union in the United Nations (UN)? Are there outstanding issues areas in which the European Union and the United States could work together? Does the European Union believe that the UN will be able to meet its financial obligations?

**Westendorp:** It is my impression that I have come in a difficult time because the United Nations is attacked by many sides and by public opinion in general. And I have the strong feeling that if the UN didn't exist, we would have to invent the organization because otherwise we should go back to quarrels which the UN has solved through our dialogue, for instance, Iran and Iraq sitting around the same table is something which is now possible. This is something you cannot measure because of the failures of the UN which are there, but still internationalism is a goal which I think we should keep. The problem is that both for ideological and for financial reasons, the UN is under attack. We agree with the US that the UN needs a certain restructuring in order to make the organization more efficient in a rational way and we could cooperate on that very clearly, without passion and without having only CNN in mind, but really seeing the problem. When I say without passion, I mean after the US elections because you know any country during an election is impossible to deal with. In the US, the problem is that the elections take more than one year. So in one year's time we are living in a very complicated situation. I hope that after the elections things will be easier. For the time being we are worried because of the failure, the bankruptcy situation of the United Nations. The European Union is paying cash and we are

giving more than 35% of the total contributions. The US is not paying what it should and this is creating a difficult situation. The blame for the US not paying the organization is about half of the present situation of difficulty.

I think that the role of the European Union with the United States is cooperation in the field of the UN in many aspects because we have the same type of responsibility around the world. We have to share the responsibilities and that is why the Transatlantic Agenda has identified a lot of actions to be done together. We could and should cooperate in this. Of course, we can also cooperate in the restructuring of the United Nations, but the US has to pay. And the others too, of course, but the others are less important. Now the possibility of the US and the EU to act together and to coordinate actions within the UN is a desirable thing. But the problem is that there are some members of the European Union which are at the same time permanent members of the Security Council. They are reluctant to represent the interests of the Union because this will mean that they will have to accept common positions in the Security Council. This is, of course, a goal of the CFSP, but is not yet achieved. Although as the Secretary General said, in practice 90% of the decisions are agreed in the European Union.

**Mazzucelli:** State Secretary Szent-Iványi, what are your impressions of investments made in Hungary on the part of individual Western European countries, the European Union and the United States? Is there still an imbalance in the investments made in the Western part of the country, i.e., Audi in Gyor, as compared to eastern Hungary?

**Szent-Iványi:** Thank you. A short answer to that. As you know, Hungary is one of the major recipients of the foreign investment in central and eastern Europe. Almost half of that total sum of foreign investment in central and eastern European countries was made in Hungary. It has a very interesting structure and composition because the United States took the lead, still has the lead without any doubt. Almost 40% of the total sum of investments came from the US and there are some strategic investments, giant multinational investments, GE, Ford, General Motors and so on. The second major investor is Germany. After that comes Austria and Italy, this means all the others are European Union member states. Interestingly, not France or Great Britain. They are fifth or sixth. Hungary is an open country, completely liberalized for investments. This means we have privatized assets and we opened up to all the interested partners. This is the final result of that process. There is some territorial imbalance, that's true. The western part of Hungary has a high performance relatively speaking and is highly attractive for investors. Budapest attracted 1/4 of the total investments. And the other large part came into western Hungary, across the Austrian border close to Italy.

The eastern part, the so-called depression area, which used to be the center of the Hungarian heavy industry and coal mining and so on, that's forgotten by investments. In that case, Hungary and the government made a lot of efforts, set up a regional fund, invited many leading politicians and investors and businessmen. Recently, Mr. Vranitzky has visited that part of Hungary and has highlighted the good facilities and the good opportunities there. Certainly, we would like to see more balance in the investments made in eastern Hungary, but may I say that it is not unknown for the European Union member states that some parts of the countries are not that developed. In Italy, the northern part of Lombardi, for example, is much more advanced than the Mezzogiorno. We envisage and confront the same fate which we

hope to overcome partly with the help and assistance of foreign investments.

**Mazzucelli:** Today, I happened to see a Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the adoption of a new Constitution by the Ukraine. I pose the following question in particular because Ukraine is receiving a lot of attention in American journals. I thought it might be interesting for American readers to hear respective European viewpoints on the importance of this country.

Secretary General Trumpf, State Secretary Szent-Iványi and Ambassador Westendorp, what is the role of the Ukraine in Europe? Are there ways in which the European Union and the United States could pursue stronger initiatives in multilateral assistance to this country? Or will this assistance remain primarily bilateral?

**Trumpf:** For the Union, of course, the Ukraine is a neighboring European country, and as you said the Union has welcomed into force this new Constitution in the Ukraine which is going to bring the country still closer to our family of democratic European nations. We have always supported the independence, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Ukraine. Early in 1994, in one of the very few cases where we have taken a common position according to the Maastricht Treaty, we have done this on our own in relations with the Ukraine. We think this is an important country, not only in general development, economic, democratic and so on, but also in the sense of security. The Ukraine has made a very big contribution to arms control and non-proliferation. It has allowed START I to enter into force. It was quite an important thing to deactivate all the nuclear materials, war heads and launchers, to destroy all that or take it out of the country. That is a very good contribution to international stability. We have also a partnership agreement with Ukraine, but the ratification procedures are not completed in all 15 member states. So it is not yet fully in force, but the trade aspect of it has been implemented in advance. All things taken into consideration, we would like to say that the Union thinks that the Ukraine is an important country and deserves all the assistance and help on its way to come out of the former system that we can give to it. It is, of course, not a country which is among the candidate countries because the Union somehow has to draw a line. The line would say that there are countries that are European countries and, of course, they belong to the Council of Europe. There has been no question thus far, however, of the Ukraine being a candidate for accession.

Our main concern remains the definite closing of the Chernobyl nuclear station and we hope the G7 Action Plan will be implemented as was foreseen. We are giving under the Action Plan 500 million ECU to assist them in closing down, but, of course, this is a very real and great concern to our population. Practically the whole of Europe suffered greatly after the incident a long time ago. We shoulder part of the support for the Ukraine, but we hope that the rest of the international community plays its part too.

**Szent-Iványi:** Ukraine has a real importance for us. The importance is that it is between Hungary and Russia. This is a 1000 kilometer safety zone and we are very much interested in helping and assisting Ukrainian independence. Hungary is playing an active role by sponsoring Ukraine's membership in the Council of Europe. Hungary also invited Ukraine into the Central European Initiative. We would like to strengthen the new European identity in the Ukraine. The Ukraine, as you know, is really a successor state of the former Soviet Union. It comes from

another past and another heritage compared to many other central and eastern European countries. I do not think it is reasonable to speak in the short and medium term of Ukraine's membership into NATO or into the European Union. It is much better to have good and improving relations in economic and many other fields. In that respect, Ukraine has a tremendous potential in economic terms, but the current state of affairs of the economy in Ukraine is less than desirable.

**Westendorp:** I agree with this analysis. It is a very important country and I think in spite of the difficult situation they have made great efforts to modernize the economy and to introduce reforms in their political system. I've been in Kiev and one has the impression that it is a poor country, but it's a European country. And that is why I have the impression that one day perhaps, I don't know how long from now, we will have to consider the possibility of seeing the Ukraine in the European Union. Not in the short or medium run, but I'm sure all of us will see this. They will apply for accession in the Union.

**Szent-Iványi:** With Armenia and Georgia.

**Westendorp:** This is different. I think this is different.

**Szent-Iványi:** That's different. Exactly. In the medium or long term.

**Westendorp:** Yes.

**Mazzucelli:** What you say reminds me of something Monnet said: "For the changes born of change are unpredictable." Therefore, one can't say necessarily when, but the mind thinks. We could envisage perhaps something, but it's for the future.

**Westendorp:** Yes.

**Trumpf:** Thank you.

**Westendorp:** Very good.

**Mazzucelli:** Thank you all.

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## The TABD: An Entrepreneurial Force behind the New Transatlantic Agenda

Selina Jackson\*

The Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) is an unprecedented venture in government-business partnership tackling issues relating to the world's most important economic relationship - that between the United States and the European Union. It has no formal structure and no official secretariat; nor is it a new institution or simply another business organization designed to influence policy makers. Rather, the TABD is a private-sector *force* designed to respond to the new reality of trade; namely that companies are functioning globally and their involvement in the making of international trade policy is a natural outgrowth of such globalization.

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The TABD has been called an "experiment in entrepreneurial diplomacy" where American and European business leaders at the CEO-level work together to develop common objectives. Those objectives are jointly communicated to senior-level U.S. and European Union officials who, in turn, work with business to develop "smart" policy with the ultimate goal of benefiting both economies through improved competitiveness and the creation of new jobs.

### Origins of TABD and the Seville Conference

The idea of a business-driven transatlantic dialogue was launched at a meeting sponsored by the EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Brussels on December 15, 1994, by the late U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown. Considering the importance of the U.S.-EU economic relationship, Secretary Brown had come to the conclusion that traditional government-to-government communication was no longer enough. He reasoned that as the practitioners of international commerce, business leaders are best positioned to see the practical effects of trade policy and, therefore, should be consulted in the policy-making process.

After the initial proposal, Secretary Brown met with European Commission Vice President Sir Leon Brittan and the European Commissioner for Industry Dr. Martin Bangemann to develop the idea. They sent a joint letter to 1,800 American and European companies and business associations to gauge business interest. Based on the responses to the letter, the European Commission and the Department of Commerce determined that sufficient interest existed to warrant a high-level business-government conference on transatlantic trade relations. Brown, Brittan and Bangemann agreed to hold the conference in Seville, Spain, under the Spanish Council Presidency in November 1995. The business responses also determined the four working group topics that the Seville Conference would address: Standards, Certification and Regulatory Policy; Trade Liberalization; Investment; and Relations with Third Countries.

With the conference site chosen and agenda proposed, the Department of Commerce and the European Commission each recruited two business executives to serve as Conference co-chairs. On the U.S. side, they asked Xerox CEO Paul Allaire and Ford Motor Company CEO Alex Trotman. From Europe, Jürgen Strube, CEO of BASF, and Peter Sutherland, Chairman of Goldman Sachs International, were recruited. It is interesting to note the personal transatlantic interests of each of the co-chairs. Earlier in their careers, Allaire and Trotman both had served as heads of their company's European branches, Rank Xerox and Ford Europe, respectively. Strube had previously served as the head of BASF's North American Regional Division. Sutherland, who was heading the European branch of an American-based company, had previously served in the European Commission and as Director-General of the GATT. The CEOs of Tenneco, Westvaco, Dresser Industries, and AMP Incorporated also signed on as U.S. working-group chairs. Each had a European counterpart with whom he worked to prepare for the Seville Conference. Cautious optimism surrounded the preparation to the conference. Since such an initiative had never before been tried, some companies and associations questioned the sincerity of government commitment to the process.

The Seville Conference proved to be a great success. The transatlantic business community worked together effectively to produce a joint document which included seventy recommendations on practical ways to reduce impediments to trade. The teamwork-like climate between the European and American

business executives became known as the "Spirit of Seville." The participants clearly had understood that the purpose of the Seville Conference was to produce specific and practical joint recommendations, and to be heard as a common transatlantic business voice.

The Seville Declaration states:

*Our common goal is to keep both Europe and the U.S. competitive in the world economy. Our ability to meet this global challenge requires common efforts to create the right framework conditions for trade, research and development. Competitiveness is hampered both by excessive regulation and by differences between EU and U.S. regulatory systems.*

The goal of the TABD, the Declaration continues:

*is to encourage the political leaders to analyze the competitive situation on both sides of the Atlantic to ensure that laws and regulations converge wherever possible to allow market forces to accelerate economic growth and job creation and improve international competitiveness.*

The government participants delivered on their promise to give serious consideration to the business recommendations and many of them were incorporated into the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and the U.S.-EU Action Plan resulting from the December 1995 Summit meeting of U.S. President Bill Clinton, European Commission President Jacques Santer, and then Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González. The Office of the US Trade Representative and the Department of State joined the Commerce Department in recognizing the TABD as integral to developing the New Transatlantic Marketplace - the economic cornerstone of the NTA - which aims to create a transatlantic area where goods, services, and capital can flow freely across the Atlantic.

### Follow-up to Seville

In Seville, the conference co-chairs addressed the need to develop a strategy to follow-up with the appropriate government authorities regarding the Seville recommendations. Ford CEO Alex Trotman and BASF CEO Jürgen Strube agreed to serve as co-chairs of the follow-up process. They also agreed that no new institutions should be created. Instead, they would tap the trade expertise of interested companies and harvest the capabilities of existing organizations already involved in work on transatlantic relations.

The Seville recommendations were organized into fifteen issue groups and issue managers were assigned on both sides of the Atlantic to steer the common business community's interest in these areas. The first issue group, the Transatlantic Advisory Committee on Standards, Certification and Regulatory Policy (TACS), is further divided into sectors including (among others) automotive, pharmaceutical, electronics, telecommunications and information technology. The TACS is chaired by Dana Mead, CEO of Tenneco, and Jan Timmer, CEO of Philips.

At the TABD Steering Committee meeting in Brussels in May 1996, issue managers submitted a "Progress Report" which developed the Seville recommendations into concrete proposals for government action as well as outlining business expectations. The report has been praised by U.S. Government officials as an invaluable reference tool during inter-agency meetings.

Some of the key goals outlined in the Progress Report are:



- Standards, Certification and Regulatory Policy
  - Further regulatory cooperation to remove costly barriers caused by differing standards and regulatory policies;
  - Conclusion of the Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs);
- WTO Issues  
A continued commitment to the multilateral process and priority attention to be given to the full implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments and, in addition, progress towards China's accession to the WTO;
- Information Technology Agreement  
A commitment to the successful outcome of ITA negotiations by December 1996, extended to the maximum number of countries and products;
- Intellectual Property  
Full and complete implementation of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) by the U.S., EU, and its member states and accelerated implementation of TRIPs by key third-country markets;
- International Business Practices  
Commitment to implement promptly the 1994 and 1996 OECD recommendations, including the elimination of tax deductibility of bribes and the criminalization of bribery;
- Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs)  
Development and implementation of a Small Business Initiative to include a new information system and a program to assist small businesses to explore trade opportunities and facilitate joint ventures and export financing; and
- Investment and R&D  
A shared commitment to open investment regimes including the principles of national treatment of investors and investments.

One area which bears potential "low-hanging fruit" is standards and regulatory harmonization. In the area of automobile regulation, for example, U.S. and European governments both regulate many of the same aspects of the automobile, with differing test and certification requirements. Many of these unique local requirements have no added safety or environmental benefit, yet they raise costs, minimize consumer choice, and represent a significant burden on manufacturers wishing to serve both markets. These issues were among those addressed at the Transatlantic Conference on Harmonization of Auto Regulations held in April 1996 under the rubric of the TABD.

#### **The June 1996 U.S.-EU Summit and the Future of TABD**

The Helms-Burton Act and similar action toward Iran and Libya largely overshadowed the trade agenda of the June 1996 U.S.-EU Summit. As a result, the work of the TABD was one of the few positive elements of the agenda. Jürgen Schrempp, CEO of Daimler-Benz, and John Luke, Jr., CEO of Westvaco, represented the transatlantic business community at the Summit for the TABD. Their participation indicates the continued government commitment to the TABD and opens the way for future business involvement at the highest political level. At a lunch hosted by U.S. Secretary of Commerce Mickey Kantor and attended by President Santer and Charlene Barshefsky, acting

U.S. Trade Representative, the CEOs urged the governments to act quickly to implement the joint business proposals as outlined in the Progress Report. The intimate setting of the lunch allowed for a candid business-government exchange of perspectives. CEOs attending the lunch departed with a clearer understanding of the political realities facing the policy makers while political leaders obtained a better view of private-sector commercial objectives and frustration with certain trade policies.

The round-table format used at the Summit will be replicated at the next CEO-level TABD conference to be held in Chicago on November 8-9, 1996. The purpose of the Chicago conference will be to enhance further the business-government partnership and to develop common solutions to the problem of removing remaining barriers to transatlantic trade. The Chicago conference will, by necessity, be smaller and more intimate than Seville. The role of the government will change from observer and recipient of recommendations, as in Seville, to an active discussion partner. Co-chairing the conference along with Strube and Trotman will be Brittan, Bangemann, and Kantor.

The TABD has provided the private sector with a seat at the table in shaping the future of the Transatlantic marketplace. The U.S. Government and the European Commission already have indicated their desire for the continuation of the TABD process. At a press conference following the TABD steering committee meeting in Brussels on May 23, 1996, Undersecretary of Commerce Stuart Eizenstat noted:

*No one would have quite imagined the degree to which the TABD has influenced government decision-making on both sides of the Atlantic. It has become deeply enmeshed and embedded into the U.S. government decision-making process on a whole range of regulatory, trade, and commercial issues. It is regularly cited and is part of the ongoing discussions between the EU and the U.S. The TABD has had a truly remarkable impact in our country, in the Transatlantic dialogue, and multilaterally.<sup>2</sup>*

Business is willing to continue its involvement, if the governments can prove that action on business recommendations is underway. The Chicago conference will test whether this "experiment in entrepreneurial diplomacy" is truly worthwhile. If Chicago meets its goals, the TABD may very well become a model for other trading relationships.

#### **Notes**

<sup>1</sup> Norman Levine, "A Trans-Atlantic Bargain," Journal of Commerce, May 10, 1996, p. 6A.

<sup>2</sup> Stuart Eizenstat, "Statement at the TABD Press Briefing," Brussels, May 23, 1996.

## ECSA-C Holds First Meeting

Steven B. Wolinetz  
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The European Community Studies Association - Canada (*Association d'études Sur la Communauté Européenne--Canada*) held its inaugural conference at Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario, May 31-June 2, 1996. The theme was **Redesigning Europe: Canadian Perspectives on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union**. Financial support was provided by the European Commission and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The Delegation of the European Union in Ottawa provided crucial support at different stages. Located in the Niagara peninsula, Brock's campus provided an excellent setting for the launch of ECSA-C. The region is known not only for the Falls, but also key battles in the War of 1812, and wineries whose product, vastly improved, helped to toast the new organization.

The European Community Studies Association - Canada is the newest member of the World ECSA community. Established in June, 1995, ECSA-C is intended to provide a meeting point for people interested in the society, politics, history, or economics of the European Union and its member-states, and to provide a Canadian perspective to the study of the EU and European integration.

That Canadian perspective was more than evident at ECSA-C's first meeting. Papers and presentations ranged more widely and considered not only the IGC, but also EU policy processes and the problems with which the EU and its member-states must grapple. Successive sessions examined models for institutional change; approaches to the study of integration in large systems; policy processes in comparative, multi-lateral, and inter-governmental perspectives; common foreign and security policy; problems and prospects of monetary union; and integration and disintegration in Canada, the European Union, and its member-states. Gijs de Vries, member of the European Parliament from the Netherlands and leader of European Liberal, Democratic and Reform Party delivered the keynote address at the opening banquet. Canadian perspectives came not only from meeting in conjunction with other academic associations under the rubric of the Learned Societies, but also in the approaches taken to the study of the EU: Accustomed to continual constitutional debate and all too aware of the aches and pains of federalism, paper presenters and commentators typically treated the EU as either a federal entity or a multi-level system of governance. Comparisons with Canada and other federal systems were very much in evidence. Arguments on the merits and demerits of intergovernmental vs. Comparative approaches were virtually absent. Instead, the term intergovernmental was usually associated not with a theory of relations between the sovereign member states of the EU, but rather with the internal working of federations.

The meeting kicked off with remarks by ECSA-C President Steven Wolinetz, and comments by Panayotis Soldatos, Jean Monnet Chair at the University of Montreal on the IGC. These flowed into the opening session, **Redesigning Europe: models for institutional change**. Here, John-Erik Fossum, Brigid Laffan, and Gretchen MacMillan set the stage for later discussion. Drawing on March and Olsen, Kymlica, and Charles Taylor, Fossum led off by considering constitutional debate and constitutional change in comparative context. Constitutions, Fossum suggested, are in some respects, "rule by the dead over the living." Changing them is not easy. Older constitutions could

be drafted by elites, working in camera. However, neither Canadian first ministers nor the European Council enjoy the same legitimacy. Popular pressures preclude elite compacts, but non-elites are unable to reach agreement. Those who try, whether in the EU, Canada, or in other settings, must grapple not only with a politics of exchange, potentially manageable, but also a politics of identity, recognition, and difference, itself a product of the levelling of earlier social and value structures. Brigid Laffan and Gretchen MacMillan then examined issues confronting the IGC in light of decision-making structures. Laffan highlighted the sameness of EU constitutional debate; tensions among effectiveness, legitimacy, and diversity; the limits of the "Monnet method" (integration from above); and the disjuncture between political and economic integration, and then examined the difficulty which the EU, in light of its lack of "wholeness" and "affective attachment" will face in moving beyond stalemate or "partial deepening." Gretchen MacMillan followed by considering different types of intergovernmentalism and the extent to which the three pillars of the EU displayed state-like or supranational characteristics: policy-making processes in pillar I are more like those of federal states. The Maastricht Treaty assigned state-like functions to pillars II and III (Foreign and Security Policy Justice and Home Affairs) but provided only for supranational decision-making processes. In addition, member-states not only differ in the capabilities of member-states and their willingness to use them, but also on the degree to which the EU should take on such functions.

Examination of the EU in light of federal models continued in session II, on approaches to the study of integration in large systems. Robert Harmsen used Smiley and Watts' distinction between intra-state and inter-state federalism to examine issues confronting the IGC. One problem confronting the EU, Harmsen argued, is that the IGC, is dealing largely with problems of intra-state federalism (rebalancing of powers...) without addressing questions of inter-state federalism, such as the rights and duties of member-states. However, the former, in Harmsen's view, cannot be resolved without considering the latter. Taking a different direction, Thomas Hueglin then considered tensions among models and visions of a European polity. The increased tendency to view the EU as a plural and almost informal system of governance stands in sharp contrast to earlier models of governance, which either emphasized or assumed territory, and critiques which emphasize growing regional or social imbalances. Needed is a holistic approach which takes account both of new forms of federalism and structural imbalances and the extent to which plural systems of governance obscure democratic control and commitments to social equity.

Subsequent sessions focused on EU policy processes, the role and influence of individual member-states, Common Foreign and Security Policy, and monetary union. Comparative approaches were very much in evidence both in Grace Skogstad's comparison of agricultural policy change in the EU and Canada and in Michelle Cloutier's detailed examination of the drafting of the packaging directive in light of national and group pressures and a changing institutional context. Cloutier used the packaging directive case to demonstrate the limits of intergovernmentalism as an explanation of policy formation on issues such as environmental regulation. Her paper included a detailed review of the literature on policy networks. Deborah van Nijnatten and Patrick Fafard treated environmental policy from a different perspective, examining the role and influence of German state and non-state actors on emissions control and the packaging directive. In a somewhat different vein, Henry Milner compared Nordic perspectives on the EU.

Common Foreign and Security Policy was considered both in a paper by Robert Cutler on policy formation and in a roundtable with Ferry de Kerckhove (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), David Long, Alex Moens, Ambassador John Beck, (Head of the European Union Delegation to Canada) and Edelgard Mahant. De Kerckhove focused on the EU's impact on Canada, while the other three addressed the limitations of the CFSP. David Long argued that the CFSP was no improvement over its predecessor, EPC. Instead, CFSP had institutionalized the confusions and uncertainty of the EPC, decreased accountability and, in a case of "spillback," had increased intergovernmentalism. Alex Moens amplified these sentiments, arguing that the CFSP represented "a deliberate attempt to do high politics with a security angle;" that a fast-paced CFSP was not required by the dynamics of European integration; and that the inclusion of the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty reflected political opportunism. However, in Moens' view, European integration could not be extended by "a sheer act of divided political will." Because of the presence of other organizations, particularly the WEU and NATO, there had been need for the EU to develop a security capability. By creating a "gap between means and goals" participation without integration killed integration. Pillar II was a "Euro-killer." Ambassador Beck echoed many of these themes: The three pillar structure, adopted in the TEU, was in Beck's view a problematic development. Compartmentalization and mixed competences have meant that the Commission cannot always speak with a single voice on trade, services, or issues of intellectual property. Moreover, insufficient analytical capacity and the absence of budgetary provisions for common actions under the CFSP tended to inhibit the formulation and implementation of common policies. Making decisions and then passing the hat to see who would contribute was not the most effective way of getting something done.

The panel on EMU featured papers by Patrick Crowley and by Robert Ankli and Hank Brand (all economists) and by political scientist Amy Verdun. Crowley and Ankli and Brand explored the difficulties, technical and economic of achieving monetary union, while Amy Verdun considered differences between economic and political spillover and possible consequences for political legitimacy. Discussant William Coleman extracted questions and arguments about legitimacy and accountability: If you could secure agreement on EMU, would the European Monetary institute have sufficient legitimacy to implement it? And, if states could achieve EMU, would this undermine the legitimacy of the EU? One feature of the process (Verdun) was a tendency for powers to be given to the proposed central bank without ensuring its accountability. This was different from the national level, where independent central banks must coexist with ministers of finance. Five observations followed: 1) that a large number of institutional changes were occurring behind technical facades (Ankli and Brand); 2) that recourse to open market operations makes central banks (along with those whom they regulate) key players in financial markets, raising questions about whether central banks would put their credibility with financial markets ahead of their responsibilities to citizens (Ankli and Brand); 3) that efforts to demonstrate financial resolve by establishing independent central banks reduce accountability (Crowley) and increase democratic deficits (Verdun); 4) that links between central banks and ministers of finance and the cabinet will be weaker at the European level; and 5) that it is not certain that maintaining credibility of financial institutions should take precedence over reducing democratic deficits.

The conference ended with a roundtable on integration and

disintegration in Canada, the EU and its member-states. William Chandler led off by commenting on what had not been discussed during the conference: His list included leaders; the politics of nation-states as a factor in integration; public opinion; and changing societal forces. Steven Wolinetz commented on factors which might contribute or detract from integration and noted that there were different ways in which identity might be constructed, and that these might change over time. Issues to be considered include regional tensions, the fragility of political units, and contrasting results of attempts to build identities (for example, in Canada and the EU, and the 19th and 20th century United States). Peter Leslie suggested the need to go back to beginnings and consider both ways in which consensus could be built and the difficulties of completing constitutional structures: because scarcity exacerbates regional differences and provides grist for the politics of identity, we should not regard the politics of difference as an aberration. We need not only theories of integration but also theories of fragmentation and disintegration. Finally, Alberta Sbragia reiterated the importance of markets and environment and the economic dimensions of regional conflict. In considering demographic or technological changes, or flows of foreign direct investment, we need to consider the territorial dimensions of redistribution. In many countries, reorganization of the territorial distribution of power is taking place at the same time that political processes at the central level are being reorganized. Although territorial dimensions have typically been subordinate, territory is becoming an increasingly important aspect of fiscal federalism.

The closing roundtable raised as many questions as it answered. However, that was no matter. The conference was considered a success by everyone who attended and, all-in-all, the only mistake that organizers Steven Wolinetz and Patrick Fafard made was the meeting room was too small. More important, the conference attracted attention not only from Europeanists and comparativists but also from Canadianists, and provided a setting in which expertise on federalism could be brought to bear on the study of the European Union.

ECSA-Canada is now expanding its membership, and trying to reach out beyond its initial core in Political Science. ECSA-C will be holding annual meetings in the context of the Learned Societies, the rubric under which academic associations meet in Canada. The 1997 meetings will be held June 6-8 at Memorial University, St. John's, Newfoundland, shortly after the ECSA-USA meetings in Seattle. As in 1996, ECSA-C will coincide or overlap with those of major academic associations in the social sciences. We hope to have a distinctive programme, taking advantage of both Newfoundland's physical remoteness and its proximity to Europe. We would be happy to entertain proposals for papers and panels and would welcome guests and new members. For details, contact Steven Wolinetz at the address below.

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# Report on the 1996 ECSA Workshop: "The Role of the European Union in the World Community"

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During May 16-19 the 1996 ECSA Workshop was held in Jackson Hole, Wyoming under the co-sponsorship of ECSA and the Department of Political Science at Utah State University. The topic under discussion was "The Role of the European Union in the World Community." Funding for the Workshop was provided by Utah State University and the European Commission Delegation, Washington, DC.

Due to funding limitations, as well as to the provisions of the Merrill Endowment of Utah State University, the workshop was limited to paper presenters, student observers from Utah State, and ECSA Executive Committee members who graciously agreed to donate their time to participate as discussants. Despite the small numbers of participants, the workshop was a resounding success. The round-table give and take of ideas was extensive and productive as paper presenters and discussants exchanged perspectives and analytical insights, and worked constructively to better understand the evolving character of the European Union in international affairs.

The purpose of the workshop was to gather together an interested group of scholars and students to examine the question "What is the Role of the European Union as an Actor in International Affairs?" Eight papers were presented which delved into different aspects of EU activity in external relations--from trade, monetary relations and the environment, to international security and defense policy. Paper presenters were Michael Smith and David Allen from Loughborough University in the U.K., Stefan Schirm from the Center for European Studies at Harvard University and Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Germany; James Caporaso and Joseph Jupille from the University of Washington; Sophie Meunier from Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Madeleine Hosli from the European Institute for Public Administration in The Netherlands and University of Michigan; Antje Herrberg from the European Research Unit at Aalborg University in Denmark; Fraser Cameron from DGIA of the European Commission in Brussels; and Roy Ginsberg from Skidmore College. Participants were given the challenge of moving beyond mere chronicles of EU external policy and asked to think about how to define and assess the role of the European Union in the world community.

During two days of intensive discussion a number of insightful and stimulating observations were made that helped us to identify and consider the following specific questions: When we refer to the European Union as an actor in the global arena how do we characterize it? Is it a cooperative organization of like-minded member states or an evolving autonomous actor in its own right? Does it have an identity that is different from the collective expression of its member states? When it enters into negotiations with other international actors do they recognize its authority as a separate autonomous entity, distinct from its member states? How influential is the European Union in world affairs? Is it influential in some issue areas and not in others? Is its presence felt (and considered) in some realms while missing in other realms, and why might these variances exist? What gives the European Union authority and legitimacy in international affairs? When we consider the European Union as an international actor what is its personification? To answer these questions one

must consider the place of the European Union in the world system, its relationship with its member states, its perception by other actors in the world arena, and its developing institutional character.

From our discussions it became clear that no one would claim that the European Union is a unidimensional entity with a single purpose and unitary capability such as one might characterize a nation state. Nor would we characterize it as simply an international organization which reflects the multidimensional interests and capabilities of its member states. It consists of a set of arrangements that is unlike any other in the history of international relations. It spawned from a range of integrative agreements undertaken by its member states to facilitate regional cooperation, market interdependence and economic development, and in so doing solve age-old rivalries and conflicts. The degree to which its member states have voluntarily transferred their respective sovereignty to a supra-national arrangement is unprecedented in international relations. Only in the process of nation-building and the creation of new sovereign nation-states can one find historical parallels.

Yet its development has not been linear, and in the realm of EU foreign policy this has been especially evident. Some areas of integration have developed much further than others, and often steps to deepen integration have followed periods of non-cooperation and skepticism. Thus, even the label "Union" must be considered advisedly, because agreement on the degree to which integration is desirable or the degree to which member states should submit to a common voice has not been reached. This has been apparent in intra-EU affairs, but is even more obvious in external policies. Because sovereignty is shared between the member states and the European Union, this state of affairs affects how policy is projected abroad and how others in the world view and deal with the EU and its constituent parts. As the workshop papers revealed, the degree to which member states are willing to forego individual policies in favor of influencing a common policy, and the degree to which other international actors are forced to take into account the structure and influence of the European Union depends heavily on the particular issue at hand, the historical patterns of interaction involved, and the ability of individual member states to legally or credibly "go it alone." The European Union's capacity to act as a separate and influential entity, therefore, has much to do with its legitimacy at home and abroad, and this in turn varies from issue area to issue area. However, it is important to keep in mind that if we were assessing the capacity of various individual countries to act independently and with purpose in the international arena, we would also find differences across issue areas.

During the workshop efforts were made to identify "benchmarks" or criteria by which the EU can be measured as an international actor, and these efforts led to an interesting observation about how scholars tend to assess the capacity of the EU to act influentially in international affairs. The tendency to compare the European Union with a sovereign nation state was pervasive, growing out of a desire to utilize descriptions that were familiar and also to find common means of assessing the EU's identity and presence in the world community. Moreover, workshop participants were often tempted to compare the European Union's "actorhood," not only with nation state sovereignty, but with nation states that enjoy a high degree of centralized governance. This is not so surprising given the European orientation of the group; however, such a comparison emphasizes the differences between national foreign policy making and EU foreign policy making, accentuating the

autonomy enjoyed by the former and the cumbersome pluralism often faced by the latter. Given such stark contrasts, one might be very pessimistic about the degree to which the European Union can act as a distinct participant in external relations.

Those of us who are more familiar with the United States' model in foreign policy-making were less inclined to make such a demanding and dichotomous comparison, because the U.S. experience, based as it is on separation of powers and checks and balances, seems more akin to the type of foreign policy process taking shape in the European Union. For example, when evaluating the cohesiveness and consistency of EU foreign policies, U.S. scholars are less impatient with the institutional divisions of power that sometimes result in the Council of Ministers limiting or overturning Commission initiatives. We see this institutional reality as a factor that shapes the character of the European Union in international affairs, but not as evidence that the European Union has no definite character. This is not so different from the U.S. Congress rejecting the foreign policy initiatives of the American Executive. Just because the Commission is freer to act on behalf of the Union in some realms than in others does not necessarily indicate the absence of the European Union as a distinct actor in international affairs. The EU is not merely manifested by the activities of the Commission, but must be considered as a complex whole.

While proponents of a more cohesive U.S. foreign policy are sometimes frustrated by the constitutional constraints that prevent greater Executive authority in international politics, they would not claim that this results in the absence of an identifiable role for the United States in global affairs. The significant difference, of course, is that the Council of Ministers is the intergovernmental representation of the Member States, while the U.S. Congress is much less geopolitical in its representation, and many assess the ability of the European Union to act externally by measuring Commission activity against Council (and therefore Member State) prerogative and interference. However, it seems more appropriate to characterize the European Union in international relations as one--albeit somewhat pluralistic--entity, taking into account its particular intergovernmental features without denying its distinctive role as a significant and recognizable actor.

It was clear from our discussion that no single view exists about how to define the European Union in the world community, but there was general agreement on that fact that the EU has begun to upstage Member States in a number of areas and that the rest of the world is increasingly aware of, and taking into account, the EU's presence. Most participants concurred that the European Union is an evolving international actor of considerable weight with an impressive set of unique accomplishments in the realms of trade and financial influence, human rights, development and pan-European relations. It was also noted that the changing international context has a lot to do with the opportunities and constraints faced by the EU as it ventures into new activities (such as security policy). Finally, workshop participants agreed that the legal and institutional foundations for an expanded role for the European Union are crucial, noting in particular the importance of Commission initiative and majority voting in the Council.

Like most productive workshops, the 1996 ECSA Workshop on "The Role of the European Union in the World Community" raised as many questions as it answered, provoking intense discussion and fruitful ideas. I have barely skimmed the surface in this brief report. In order to share the best of the project with those of you who are interested in the European Union from this perspective, it is our intention to utilize some of the papers presented at the workshop as the core of an edited volume. Our

aim is to appeal to an audience that includes international relations scholars and students as well as those interested more specifically in European Union studies. Presenters are currently revising their papers with the workshop comments in mind, and we hope to have a completed manuscript ready for submission this fall.

## Book Reviews

**Michael J. Baun. An Imperfect Union: The Maastricht Treaty and the New Politics of European Integration. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. Pp. 182.**

Michael Baun, an assistant professor of political science at Georgia State University, has written an excellent account of the vicissitudes of European integration in the post-Cold War period. The bulk of his short book explores the road to Maastricht, which Baun sees as having been paved largely by France and Germany in response to the revolutionary events in central and eastern Europe in 1988 and 1989, culminating in German unification. Baun then examines the causes and conduct of the ratification crisis, focusing especially on popular reaction against the treaty itself and on the impact of the 1992-1993 currency crises. Nevertheless, Baun's concluding chapter provides a refreshingly optimistic outlook for European integration, despite the European Union's recent difficulties and present predicament.

Would there have been a Treaty on European Union (TEU) had German unification not happened? The conventional wisdom is that there probably would have been a treaty or a quasi-constitutional act of some sort because, regardless of events in central and eastern Europe, plans for economic and monetary union (EMU), which required a revision of the Treaty of Rome, were well advanced by 1989. The ensuing treaty or act might not have been concluded at Maastricht, and might not have been as extensive as the TEU. After all, as Baun points out, it was the prospect of German unification that galvanized France and Germany to press for deeper political integration (hence the intergovernmental conference on political union) in order to embed a united Germany firmly into a united Europe and to give the EC the capacity to act on a rapidly changing international stage.

Baun acknowledges that the development of EMU was initially unrelated to German unification, but goes on to link EMU and German unification in the following way: "What the events of 1989 did," Baun writes, "was to accelerate action on EMU,

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making it a matter of much greater geopolitical urgency (which may have contributed to an overly ambitious schedule for EMU, one that got too far ahead of both public opinion and economic conditions" (pp. 155, 156). Indeed, without the prospect of German unification there might never have been an EMU. After all, as Baun points out, it was a perceived need to assuage France and other EC member states about the consequences of impending unification that bolstered Chancellor Kohl's resistance to the German central bank's and finance ministry's strong opposition to EMU.

Given that German unification may have rescued EMU (although possibly at a cost of undermining public support for it), what impact did German unification have on the rest of the TEU? Again, it is a commonplace that the prospect of German unification led to a separate IGC on political union, which in turn gave the TEU most of its content and character.

Yet, just as the IGC on EMU originated in events predating German unification but may have had its outcome profoundly shaped by that event, the IGC on EPU may have owed its existence to German unification but was otherwise largely unaffected by that event. The famous letter from Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand to the Italian Presidency in December 1990, outlining the two leaders' aspirations for the EPU negotiations (and therefore constituting an unofficial agenda), was a motley collection of items which, in most cases, had nothing to do with the Cold War's end. Even the foreign and security policy wish-list had a quaint, early 1980s ring to it.

The greatest paradox, of course, is that France (and other member states) subsequently balked at making the kinds of institutional reforms which Kohl had espoused as a means of tying united Germany firmly into the putative EU. Those reforms had been long-standing German objectives in any case, and their non-realization at Maastricht provided further evidence that, despite a supposed sense of urgency brought about by the Cold War's end, the political union talks really amounted to business as usual. The TEU's pathetic provisions for a common foreign and security policy are ample testimony to the member states' imperviousness in 1991 to the extraordinary changes taking place in the world around them.

As a result, the EU which emerged from the 1991 IGCs is indeed imperfect, and unable to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War period. Moreover, the ensuing ratification crisis shook the fledgling Union to its core.

Can the EU be saved? The current IGC should provide a welcome opportunity for reform, but a patent lack of political will (in other words, a combination of national governments' opposition, indifference, and weakness) means that nothing much will happen.

Under the circumstances, how can Baun be optimistic? First, because he believes that the basic economic and security imperatives that impelled integration in the past remain important today, and may become even more important in the future. Second, because he sees variable geometry, which is bound to increase as the EU enlarges and diversifies, as a positive development. And third, because he is confident that France and Germany, the traditional motors of integration, will continue to pull together.

Baun's outlook may be too rosy, and a more detailed elaboration of his ideas about the EU's future would have been welcome. Nevertheless, like his earlier analysis of the Maastricht negotiations, treaty, and ratification crisis, Baun's observations on the EU's predicament and prospects are timely and thought-provoking. Combining sound scholarship and lucid prose,

An Imperfect Union is a distinguished addition to Westview Press' new series of interdisciplinary perspectives on contemporary Europe.

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**Kevin Featherstone and Roy H. Ginsberg. The United States and the European Union in the 1990s, Partners in Transition, 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996. Pp. 310.**

When the first edition of this book appeared in 1993, Kevin Featherstone and Roy H. Ginsberg expected the enthusiasm of the Maastricht Summit to prevail and the planned schedule for the further unification of Europe to be sustained. In their second edition the authors have updated information and have provided a reflective 'Postscript' in which they consider the impact of the events of the last three years on the American-European Union relationship. The sobering events resulting from the public debates in Denmark, France, and Britain on the terms of the Maastricht agreement and the EMU (European Monetary Union), and the failure of the Europeans alone to address the Bosnian crisis have required a reappraisal of the positions advanced in the first edition. However, it should be noted that with the exception of the 'Postscript,' there have been no substantive changes from the first edition.

Featherstone (University of Bradford) and Ginsberg (Skidmore College) have structured their study into three principal components. The initial section addresses the 'New Context of United States-European Union Relations.' The second section considers an 'Empirical Analysis of US-EU Interdependence' within the framework of political, economic, and social dimensions. Finally, the third element focuses on the 'Research and Policy Implications' of the transformation the US-EU relationship. The authors are concerned with several themes - the analytical questions relating to how to study the US-EU relationship, hegemony, interdependence, realism, and neo-mercantilism as forces which continue to have impact on the relationship. The historical development of the US-European relationship since 1945 is reviewed in a lengthy introduction. Later, the authors develop arguments which suggest that in the current 'post-hegemonic' period the sensitivities of both camps have been shaped and influenced by their societies' goals and policy-making procedures, the conflict between the nationalists and the supranationalists, and the ability to sustain policy values in a decade characterized by turbulence in Eastern Europe and the unpredictability inherent in democratic states. In the 'Postscript' the authors contend that their initial position on US-EU interdependence has been affirmed by the recent intensity of the relationship. However, Featherstone and Ginsberg do adjust their views because of several unexpected developments: the backlash against Maastricht, the decline in support for supranationalism, the failure of the GATT process to develop more fully, the potential expansion of NATO to sixteen members (including several Eastern European countries), and the Bosnian experience. The authors suggest that the Europeans will require more time to develop the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) component of Maastricht and that the United States will have to await that development before a new phase in their interdependent relationship can emerge.

Featherstone and Ginsberg provide excellent documentation with notes and references given for each chapter. In addition,



thirty-three tables relating to a broad range of US-EU relations are included. The tables provide data on relevant topics including trade, investment, disputes, public attitudes, government policies, Presidential visits, and levels of public ownership of essential industries. Finally, the book closes with two appendices. The first is entitled 'Form and Content of United States-European Community Relations' and consists of a chart tracking the economic and political history of US-EU relations. The second appendix provides the text of the Transatlantic Declaration on EC-US Relations of November 1990. With the publication of this second edition, The United States and the European Union in the 1990s, Partners in Transition remains the most important book in the field for scholars, undergraduate and graduate students, and others interested in the status and future of US-EU relations.

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Jeff Kenner, Editor. Trends in European Social Policy: Essays in Memory of Malcolm Mead. Aldershot, England: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1996. Pp. 311.

Stephan Leibfried and Paul Pierson, Editors. European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995. Pp. 465.

For decades the social policy of the European Community attracted little attention. The important developments in social policy occurred in member states and not in the EC. Now the situation is reversed, at least in terms of scholarly interest. The body of literature dealing with social policy in the EC is growing in comparison with studies of social policy in the member states. Scholars from a variety of disciplines now study EC social policy, trying to assess its distinctive attributes, its relevance for integration and its relative importance in the panorama of EC policies.

European Social Policy, edited by Stephan Leibfried and Paul Pierson, gathers together many of the strands in the debate about the significance of EC social policy. One of the purposes of the book is to investigate the scope and dynamics of European social policy. The investigation encompasses studies of individual policies, comparisons of EC social policy with developments in the United States and Canada as well as more theoretical assessments of the future of social policy and the factors that will shape that future. The book contains thirteen chapters by European and American scholars such as Martin Rhodes and George Ross.

In many respects, European Social Policy continues the discussions found in Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the "New" European Community edited by Alberta Sbragia (Brookings, 1992). It is a book which would stir lively debates in a seminar on European integration. Its target audience is probably scholars and graduate students interested in the dynamics of integration. The editors argue in both the excellent opening and closing chapters that the EC can best be conceptualized as part of a multi-tiered system of governance. Not all the contributors, however, accept this argument. The book will, no doubt, provoke numerous debates and contribute to the ongoing search for the essence of European integration.

Trends in European Social Policy edited by Jeff Kenner is a very different book. It is valuable for specialists on social policy because it provides unique and in-depth studies of the law and social policy. The contributors are legal experts with both

academic and professional experience. (The book is a tribute to the late Malcolm Mead, a distinguished British labor lawyer.) While the contributors to European Social Policy generally paint with broad strokes and their references are primarily to the secondary literature, the contributors to Trends in European Social Policy probe into the depths of the various facets of social policy and rely on primary sources.

The books also differ in their definition of social policy. Paul Pierson and Stephan Leibfried employ T. H. Marshall's definition that social policy results from the use of political power to modify or supplement the economic system in order to achieve results which the economic system would not achieve on its own. This broad definition leaves scope for a chapter on the Common Agriculture Policy -- a topic not usually considered part of social policy. The definition may also be the reason that the contributors generally give little consideration to values and culture, and do not focus on the role of important players in policy-making such as Directorate General V. In contrast, Kenner turns to EC documents to define social policy and states that, while social policy is almost impossible to define precisely, it encompasses the unfulfilled ambition to provide the Community with a human face. In the opening chapter, he not only traces the development of EC social policy, he also presents a balanced assessment of the role of "soft law". (His chapter would make an excellent reading for a course on EC social policy.)

The remaining five chapters in Trends in European Social Policy deal with specific aspects of social policy and place EC social policy within the context of international conventions and national laws. They also highlight the important role which the Court plays in defining EC social policy. The depth and grasp exhibited by many of the contributors is almost unique in the existing body of literature on social policy.

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Catherine Hoskyns. Integrating Gender: Women, Law and Politics in the European Union. London and New York: Verso, 1996. Pp. 248.

Catherine Hoskyns traces the evolution of European Union women's policy from its antecedents in the 1950s to its most recent manifestations in the mid 1990s. Through her insightful and detailed examination of the variety and layers of EU initiatives for women, Hoskyns effectively portrays the structures, processes and politics that are associated with all EU policy. Consulting the interdisciplinary secondary sources in English and French, and conducting primary research in Ireland, Belgium, Great Britain, and Germany, Hoskyns situates this arguably exhaustive study of EU policy for women within several different literatures; feminist theory, EU Studies, public policy analysis, public law, gender and politics, and international relations.

Going beyond simply telling the story of EU policy for women, Hoskyns holds together her analysis by following three major "threads" which she introduces in Chapter One, weaves into her eight body chapters, and uses to structure her conclusions in Chapter Ten. The first analytical strand touches upon issues related to the formulation, implementation and effects of women's policy at the EU level. The second covers the development of a women's network and women's activism at the EU and nation-state levels around this new policy area. The third structuring theme juxtaposes the unfolding of this new policy against the development (or the lack of development) of the EU



since its inception. Taken together, these three threads capture the overall goal of Hoskyns book, which is to show how studying and understanding gender-specific policies at the EU level provides crucial insights into the politics of the EU, gender politics, and transnational politics more generally. As Hoskyns states:

My contention is that a European perspective helps to illuminate some of the situations women face in the nineties, and the women-centered approach throws fresh light on international politics in general and the EU in particular. (196)

Hoskyns also pays close attention to the role of the European Court of Justice and the pertinent jurisprudence that the ECJ has produced in this area. Another important focus, often omitted in studies of women's policy, is the question of EU policy toward "black and migrant" women. Not only is Chapter Nine devoted to this issue, it is addressed throughout the book in discussions about which women EU policy is designed for.

The book succeeds in making significant contributions to many different fields at both empirical and theoretical levels. First, and perhaps most importantly, Hoskyns conducts a definitive empirical study of EU women's policy. In my work on French women's policy formation, I have been plagued by the absence of a survey of EU women's policy. Indeed for most students of gender and policy in Europe, the multitude of dry bureaucratic reports and legalistic analyses has been difficult to wade through to get at the big picture of the politics of women's EU policy. Second, Hoskyns provides working definitions of such key concepts as neo-functionalism and neo-realism, women's politics, gender, and feminism. Hoskyns establishes a terminology by which the reader can better understand her analysis and, in doing so, follows basic principles of social science inquiry.

Third, Hoskyns shows how fully understanding the dynamics of women's EU policy puts into questions theories about the EU. For instance, she argues that Streeck's notion of equal opportunities policy as being an example of "encapsulated federalism", where a specific area of policy has few repercussions in other areas, is incorrect (197). Rather, she maintains that women's policy has consistently "spilled over" into many other policy areas. Fourth, throughout the book Hoskyns brings in feminist theory to better illuminate the policy processes and outcomes under study. Hoskyns' overall approach to disaggregating the notion of women and their so-called common interests is just one example of how this book speaks to current work in feminist theory.

At the same time that the highly cross-cutting nature is a strength of this book, it is also its weakness. Often, in presenting definitions of concepts or making statements about work already done in the field, Hoskyns neglects to go into a detailed discussion of specific scholarship and debates within that area. In many cases, Hoskyns will define a concept without showing its origins. Notable examples include definitions of social policy, policy formation, women's policy, women's interests and the different types of women elite policy makers. Also, Hoskyns does not forward a single argument that is followed through in her analysis. Instead the reader comes away from the book with several different arguments at several different levels of analysis. These gaps, however, related more to the complexity of the EU and the cross-cutting nature of women's policy than to any profound analytical neglect, in no way undermine the need for all students of European Union politics to read this book.

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**Christopher Lord. Absent at the Creation: Britain and the Formation of the European Community, 1950-1952. Aldershot, England: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1996. Pp. 175.**

As historians study British policy toward European integration in the 1950's, they concentrate on the different events and circumstances that led Britain to remain aloof from post-war European integration. Economic historians such as Milward have considered Britain's external economic and commercial policy as a major factor in Britain's refusal to engage in more concrete involvement in European integration. In contrast, Diplomatic historians have sought to balance foreign economic policy assessments with more traditional diplomatic accounts of British attitudes toward European cooperation. Christopher Lord's book, Absent at the Creation: Britain and the Formation of the European Community, 1950-1952 attempts to draw on both economic and diplomatic assessments, bolstered by a limited but crucial theoretical discourse. Lord's work provides an overarching analysis of British policy in this period, focusing on the importance of domestic political constraints and wider foreign policy considerations that governed British attitudes toward post-war western integration.

Lord provides a rich account of the factors that shaped Britain's decision not to take part in the European Coal and Steel Community. Lord uses both archival and secondary material to paint a picture of the inner debates in British government, and the interactions between different national elites in the formative years of post-war European cooperation. This short, concise book illuminates why Britain failed, for the first time, to take part in an international organisation set up in the post-war period.

The introduction outlines Lord's general argument that British aloofness from the first stage of the European Community was the result of an exceptionalism grounded in a unique set of attitudes and institutional characteristics. Unwilling to make any concessions toward supranationalism, Britain felt that its economic and strategic importance to Western Europe ensured sufficient leverage over any attempts by the Six at constructing a new political entity in Europe.

Chapters 2-6 provide important insights into the reactions to negotiations over the Schuman Plan. They cover, inter alia, the debates about sovereignty and what supranational European institutions would mean for the British state, the genesis of the Schuman Plan, and domestic political receptivity. The discussion on sovereignty centers on Britain's refusal to cede any power vested in the British Parliament, which was viewed as "the locus of authority with final political authority." This discussion also describes the incompatibility of the Schuman Plan with Labour's own preferred model of political economy. In his discussion of sovereignty, Lord interweaves a preference divergence hypothesis in which state-market relations in Britain were at odds with those of Continental Europe. Not only was the Schuman Plan unacceptable in terms of its supranationalism, but Lord suggests that its economic and political arguments were contrary to Labour values. As his analysis of contemporary domestic politics reveals, Britain was concerned with national integration. For the Labour Party, bent on nationalization, the Schuman Plan was promoted by six states that suffered from the four C's: conservatism, clericalism, cartelism and capitalism. These problems, Lord concludes, inhibited British participation in the initial negotiations.

While many diplomatic historians view British policy in the early 1950's as remarkably consistent, Lord documents several windows of opportunity in which Britain could have shifted course. Initial concerns among government officials about non-participation, unpublished counter proposals in 1950, and discussions of association with the Coal and Steel Community all provide evidence, in Lord's view, that Britain did consider alternatives to remaining absent at the creation. The internal debates in British policy circles during the early 1950s provide an interesting glimpse into differences of opinion between the Cabinet Office and Foreign Office. Lord's research provides a useful empirical assessment of variations in administrative cultures in Britain.

In chapter 4, Lord addresses the external constraints on British policy. In contrast to the domestic factors above, Lord investigates the validity of two foreign policy priorities which governed British policy: (i) economic and financial goals which sought to establish the importance of Sterling as an international currency; and (ii) a leadership role based on Britain's special relationship with the United States. In covering these topics, Lord's analysis is on familiar ground. Much has already been written about Britain's external economic policy by Strange (1971) Hall (1986), Blank (1978), Milward (1984) and others.

Chapter 5 provides a succinct overview of the security concerns that preoccupied West European politics in this period. Lord rightly argues that the British response to the Schuman Plan cannot be understood without attention to the broader security context, and offers a balanced account of British assessments of the security implications of the Schuman Plan.

Lord's analysis in chapter 6 of the diplomatic manoeuvring between Britain and the Six is the most interesting chapter of the book. Here, he analyses the benevolence of Britain towards the Schuman Plan. As Lord demonstrates in Chapter 5, part of the reason for the lack of outright opposition is the Franco-German rapprochement which was viewed positively for security reasons. The stabilization of West European politics through Franco-German reconciliation was considered so important for NATO that "any failure to give effect to the Schuman proposals would amount to a setback in the cold war." (Lord: 123) More importantly, outright opposition would have strained relations with the United States. As Lord rightly argues, American acquiescence toward British non-participation was based on the condition that Britain would exercise leadership and support for the integration project, rather than any acknowledgment of the special relationship that Britain believed continued to exist.

While Britain believed that it could play a leadership role from the outside, Lord notes that British policymakers did not accurately perceive the degree to which the negotiations establishing the Community had created a shared learning experience among the Six. While the Schuman Plan demonstrated the importance of flexibility and compromise, Britain was unable to shift perspective quickly enough to embrace these new norms of political behavior. In discussing this, Lord recognizes that Britain's reluctance to embrace this new, more supranational approach to international institution-building was not irrational. Given the history of 1914 to 1950, "confidence in collaboration was fragile, and it was therefore, not entirely logical for governments to tie themselves to the mast of European integration." (Lord: 164)

Although Absent at the Creation is a thoroughly researched book, it reads awkwardly in places. While the conclusion outlines different interpretations about British non-participation, it would have been helpful if Lord had instead set out the different debates

at the beginning. The conclusion would thus be more integrated into the text, and provide readers with a more straightforward analysis of the most appropriate interpretation. Overall, Lord's book is a helpful interpretation of the importance of diplomatic manoeuvring in the early years of European integration. It will certainly be of interest to those teaching and researching Britain's relationship with and participation in the European Union.

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## Publications

### *State of the European Union, Volume 3: Building a European Polity?*

The most recent volume in ECSA's State of the EU/EC series is available from Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Edited by Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey, the volume considers the implications of the Treaty of European Union, in the context of integration analysis for both the member states and the EU itself. In addition to an introductory essay by the Editors, twenty chapters are included in sections devoted to "Reflections on European Integration," "Europeanization of National Politics," and "European Public Policy Making: Internal and External Dimensions."

The regular purchase price for this volume is \$49.95, plus shipping. ECSA members receive a discount rate of \$39.95 which includes shipping. Orders should be sent to Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1800 30th Street, Suite 314, Boulder, CO 80301; Fax (303) 444-0824; Tel (303) 444-6684.

### 1995 ECSA Conference Papers on CD-ROM

ELLIS Publications of Maastricht is offering a CD-ROM title of papers presented at the 1995 ECSA Conference. Over 130 papers from a variety of disciplinary perspectives and on a broad range of EU-related topics are included. Papers may be displayed on screen, printed out, saved partially, or saved as a complete document.

Problems experienced in production have regrettably set back distribution of the CD ROM. These problems have been resolved, however, and ELLIS Publications intends to respond to all standing orders by October 1, 1996.

The standard price is US \$175.00 plus US \$25.00 for postage and handling. ECSA-USA members (individuals, students, and institutions) receive a special discount rate of US \$99.00 plus US \$25.00 postage and handling. Authors contributing to the ECSA Conference CD-ROM Collection receive previously agreed discounts. Orders may be made by credit card (VISA, MasterCard and American Express); otherwise pre-payment is required. Credit card orders must include the card number and expiration date. All orders must include a full postal address, telephone, fax number and e-mail address. Orders may be faxed directly to:

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#### **European Voice**

This recently launched 32-page weekly of the Economist Group is devoted entirely to EU issues, "a weekly of the Union for the Union." For subscription information, contact European Voice at tel +44 181 289 7955; or at fax +44 181 289 7955.

#### **SAIS Review special issue "The New Germany in the New Europe" now available online**

Co-edited by David P. Calleo and Markus Jelitto, the Fall 1995 New Germany special issue of SAIS Review considers the implications of German unification on regional politics, European security, and the global economy. Browse the full text of this special issue for an unlimited time at URL <[http://www.press.jhu.edu/demo/sais\\_review/](http://www.press.jhu.edu/demo/sais_review/)>.

#### **The European Union and the 1996 IGC: Discussion Papers of the Jean Monnet Group of Experts**

This series of 16 papers is published by the Centre for European Union Studies, University of Hull in conjunction with the Representation of the European Commission in the UK. For information, contact Professor Juliet Lodge, Centre for European Union Studies, Dept. of Politics, University of Hull, Hull HU6 7RX, UK.

#### **The European Parliament, the Commission, and the Intergovernmental Conference 1996**

This publication is a compilation of summaries of papers presented at the Seminar of the Research Committee on European Integration of the International Political Science Association. For information, contact Dr. Karlheinz Neunreither, Parlement européen, Direction générale 2, 97-113 rue Bélliard, 1040 Bruxelles, tel +32 2 284 2870.

#### **Euroscope Reports**

The European Integration Program of the Institute for International Relations, Zagreb has established this series of working papers. The second issue in the Euroscope Reports series, "Energy Policy: A Way for Further Integration" by Ana-Maria Bormosa is now available. For more information, contact the Institute for International Relations, Ul. Lj. F Vukotinovica 2, P.O. Box 303, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia; tel +385 1 4554522; fax +385 1 44 40 59; e-mail "europa@mairmo.irmo.hr".

#### **New Europe: A Guide to Emerging Markets in Central and Eastern Europe**

New Europe is a weekly bulletin providing commentaries, outlook analyses, planning data, independent intelligence, assessments, strategic issues, financial, business and political

interest interests for over 29 countries. For more information, contact New Europe, 225 Chapel Street, Prahran, VIC 3181, Australia; tel +03 9529 2922; Fax +03 9521 1644; e-mail: [ne@new-europe.com.au](mailto:ne@new-europe.com.au).

#### **Federal Trust Papers on the IGC**

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The Centre for Economic Policy Research offers books and reports on various aspects of European integration. These include the Monitoring European Integration series of reports on the progress of economic integration in Europe and book titles such as Competition Policy and the Transformation of Central Europe by John Fingleton, Eleanor Fox, Damien Neven and Paul Seabright, and Banking Sector Development in Central and Eastern Europe by Ronald W. Anderson, Erik Berglöf, and Kálmán Mizsei. For further information, contact the Centre for European Policy Research, 25028 Old Burlington Street, London W1X 1LB, UK; tel +44 171 878 2900; fax +44 171 878 2999.

#### **Reading Papers in Politics**

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#### **European Policy Research Unit Series**

This series of Manchester University Press "aims to provide advanced textbooks and thematic studies of key public issues in contemporary Europe." Recent books in this series include The Regions and the New Europe: Patterns in Core and Periphery

# A Preview of *State of the European Union, Volume IV*

A preview of the section themes, chapter titles and contributors to *State of the European Union, Volume IV: The Widening and Deepening Exercise, 1995-1996* is provided by the editors, Pierre-Henri Laurent (Tufts University) and Marc Maresceau (University of Ghent). This volume will be published in the second-half of 1997, again by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

## *Introduction*

1. Maastricht II: The IGC Monetary, Security and Reform Agenda and The Enlargement Imperative - Pierre-Henri Laurent (Tufts University) and Marc Maresceau (University of Ghent)

## *The Backdrop*

2. The IGC and the Renegotiation of the European Order After the Cold War - William Wallace and Anthony Forster (London School of Economics)
3. Reflections on the Three IGCs, 1985-1996 - Desmond Dinan (George Mason University)

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5. Germany and the EMU - Dorethea Heisenberg (Yale University)
6. EMU and the Implications for non-EMU States - Alison Watson (University of St. Andrews)

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19. The EU and Russia in the Post Cold War Era - Vassil Breskovi (European University Institute)
20. The EU and the WTO Global Trading System - Mary Footer (The International Development Law Institute, Rome)

Development, edited by Martin Rhodes, and Mass Media and Media Policy in Western Europe by Peter Humphreys. Forthcoming books include The European Union and Member States: Towards Institutional Fusion, edited by Dietrich Rometsch and Wolfgang Wessels, and The Governance of the Single European Market, edited by Kenneth Armstrong and Simon Bulmer. For order information, contact Manchester University Press, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9NR, UK; tel +44 161 273 5539; fax +44 161 274 3346. The European Policy Research Unit also has a homepage on the World Wide Web at "http://les.man.ac.uk/government/epru/".

## Short List of Recent Books on the EU

- Malcolm Anderson and Monica Den Boer, Policing the European Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)
- Philippe Barbour, ed., The European Union Handbook (Chicago, Ill.; London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1996)
- Robert Bideleux and Richard Taylor, eds., European Integration and Disintegration: East and West (London ; New York : Routledge, 1996)
- John B. Braden, Henk Folmer, Thomas S. Ulen, eds., Environmental Policy with Political and Economic Integration: The European Union and the United States (Cheltenham, UK ; Brookfield, Vt., US: Edward Elgar, 1996)
- Noreen Burrows and Jane Mair, European Social Law (Chichester: John Wiley, 1996)

- Michael Calingaert, European Integration Revisited : Progress, Prospects, and U.S. Interests (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996)
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- Alan Dashwood, et al, Variable Geometry--A Recipe for Europe: A Monitoring European Integration Report (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1996)
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- Andreas Musolff, Christina Schaffner, and Michael Townson, eds., Conceiving of Europe : Diversity in Unity (Aldershot [England]; Brookfield [Vt.], USA: Dartmouth, 1996)
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