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ECSA REVIEW

Does the European Union Represent an *n* of 1?

Four ECSA members tackle the debate over whether or not the European Union is a unique case, and whether it matters.

James A. Caporaso

BEFORE TURNING TO the central question of this forum, it may be useful to remind ourselves that the study of regional integration began on a distinctly comparative and historical note. The work of Haas and Deutsch, the main co-founders of regional integration studies in the United States, strikingly illustrate this point. In Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (1957), Karl Deutsch and his collaborators under-took a historical-comparative study of state and community formation, drawing on the experiences of multinational empires such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, nation states such as the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Germany, and Italy, and international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Similarly, Ernst Haas, who is remembered mostly for The Uniting of Europe (1958), also wrote extensively about the Nordic Council, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Western European Union, the Council of Europe, and the European Free Trade Association. The title of his essay, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," highlights Haas' search for similarities and differences between integration in Europe and the rest of the world. Philippe Schmitter extended the evolving integration framework to Latin America. Finally, Joseph Nye, in Peace in Parts (1971), set out a conceptual framework for the study of comparative regional integration and then proceeded to apply the framework to Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Europe (East and West). Early integration theorists, while certainly aware of important contextual differences among regional units, did not clamor for "*sui generis* theory."

Yet, as the European Community (EC) developed, thickened its institutional base, expanded the scope of its policy competences, and in general became more complex, it also came to be studied more narrowly, in isolation from other regional integration processes and some would argue in isolation from social theory itself. Which brings me to the questions posed for this *ECSA Review* forum: Does the EC represent an *n* of 1? Is it unique? If so, does it require a theory of its own?

What is the case for uniqueness? It is possible to argue that the processes of integration in Europe are specialized, and qualitatively different from processes elsewhere. The historical thrust of the EC is so novel that it truly represents a Hegelian moment, a novelty that, however prescient in terms of future developments, has no current analogies. If this is so, it is best to describe these developments as accurately as possible, and not to engage in the futile task of shoehorning them into some preconceived theoretical framework.

How can one respond to this position? The first point, drawing inspiration from language philosophy, argues that unique or general are not properties of phenomena in the empirical world, but properties of the language we use to describe them. Few things resist being described one way or the other, depending on the level of generalization used. To say that the EC is unique is simply a shorthand for saying that we have not yet developed the categories, abstract enough, to see the EC as an instance of a more general class of phenomena. Nevertheless, generalization by itself, without an improvement in explanatory capacity, would be a hollow victory. Thus the central question is, "What categories are abstract enough to generate comparable cases, and not so general that they prevent useful comparisons?"

Accepting the above, we can now ask what prevents us from developing general theories that incorporate the EC. I argue that three kinds of differences among regional organizations are regularly treated as obstacles to general theory, that several or all of these conditions are often confounded, and that this retards generalization more than is warranted. These three types of differences are descriptive differences among regions, parametric differences (i.e. in observed relationships), and theoretical differences. I will make some comments about each type of difference, argue that the first and second should not concern us at all, and that the third category is worth extended discussion.

Descriptive differences among regional organizations abound. The conditions surrounding integration in the EEC, the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance, the Organization of African Unity, the Arab League, the Central American Common Market, and the East African Common Market are manifestly different. There were and are important differences with regard to level of economic development, societal pluralism, autonomy of key interest groups, types of economies being integrated, and the role of economic and governmental elites. If differences such as these rule out

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generalization, then generalization clearly is not possible. Few scholars would argue that this is the case. Descriptive differences simply provide important variation to be explained. They are the raw material of explanatory theory.

Parametric differences are differences in functional relationships among variables across regions, differences not merely in facts, but in how those facts are organized into lawful relationships. Thus, in Western Europe the process of integration was led by key interest groups and statesmen, while in Latin America technocrats were more important. Or in Western Europe, the key integrating sectors were those with a high level of autonomy from government, while in certain less developed regions integrating sectors were under strong governmental control. These statements seem to strike at the core of generalization since they undermine the invariance of relationships among variables. However, parametric differences can also be treated as “data,” i.e. observed variation that needs to be explained. The only difference is that there the variation lies in the strength, direction, and even quality of the functional relationship, rather than in each variable per se. By treating these differences as something to be explained, we supply a bridge between idiographic and nomothetic positions, a position espoused long ago by Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune (1970).

Now suppose that observed differences across systems cannot be accounted for by the stock of theories at our disposal. In other words, from the standpoint of our present knowledge, we simply cannot explain the variation across different regions. How do we respond? I admit the answer to this question is partly a matter of faith, or if consciously worked out, of deeply-rooted philosophical beliefs. If we believe that socio-political reality is contextual and that generalizations are bounded by historical-comparative contexts, we will be content to let these differences rest. If we believe that differences in context can themselves ultimately be explained, and that such differences reflect “merely” the state of our knowledge, we will continue to search for even more general theory. My position is the latter. One reason for staking my bets on the nomothetic view is that I don’t think there is any way we can know what we are capable or incapable of knowing in advance (how can we know what we can’t know?). To argue otherwise is to advance a very dubious epistemological claim. If this is true, it makes sense to keep up pressure to develop even more general explanations.

My main argument has been that treatment of the EC as a special case has been driven mostly by disciplinary pressures, the increasing academic division of labor, and the growing complexity of the EC itself, rather than by explicit philosophical argument. Indeed, our philosophical priors have not been put on the table. And it is philosophical commitments, rather than empirical or even theoretical beliefs, that are at issue. If the EC is *sui generis*, this argument should be advanced in explicit terms, so that the debate can be joined.

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Gary Marks

THE EUROPEAN UNION is the most complex, densely institutionalized and authoritative supranational regime in the world. It is unique in many respects. But its uniqueness does not invalidate our efforts to understand it from a comparative perspective. As Max Weber argued in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (1925), every social phenomenon may be viewed from the standpoint of its unique character and as raw matter for generalization. Because the European Union (EU) is an unusual regime, comparison between it and other political arrangements can be particularly revealing. By comparing phenomena that share similarities along causally relevant dimensions, we open up the possibility of systematically controlling for contending causal influences.

The bulk of comparative work on the EU does not compare it with anything else, but conceptualizes a wide variety of lower level units for comparison—e.g., social movements, political parties, interest groups, policy sectors, policy networks, legislative decisions. This strategy multiplies units for comparison by slicing polities into subsystemic parts. At the Seattle ECSA meeting, almost all comparative papers pursued such a strategy. A far less common approach—which I will defend here—is to compare the EU at the macro level with other regimes or polities. Such comparison was a chief preoccupation of first and second generation EU scholars, including Karl Deutsch, Ernst Haas, and Philippe Schmitter, who explicitly thought of European integration as part of a larger universe of integrative processes in other parts of the world.

Does such comparison make sense today, when the EU has developed in ways that are different from any other regional regime or domestic polity? This question is prior to issues of the strengths and weaknesses of small-*n* comparison, for only after one has determined the comparability of social phenomena and, hence, criteria for selecting units for comparison, does one need to discuss methods of comparison.

If one wishes to compare the EU as a whole with something else one must use concepts that stretch across the relevant cases. But as Giovanni Sartori pointed out in his 1970 essay in *American Political Science Review*, there is a trade-off between conceptual generality and substantive content. In order to generalize about social phenomena, one needs to abstract, but in order to say something meaningful one’s concepts should have transparent empirical referents. This tension lies at the core of the *n*=1 issue, but it is not insoluble. There are several ways to conceptualize the EU meaningfully as part of a larger universe of cases.

First, and most obviously, the EU can be conceptualized as an international regime, or more specifically, as an example of a regional regime oriented to economic integration. As a regional regime, the EU may be compared to other free trade areas and customs unions, such as NAFTA, Mercosur, or ASEAN. There are currently around fifty such regimes around the world. A common misperception is that on a scale of supranationality, the EU is the only regime that scores

positively. But NAFTA, Mercosur, and the WTO each exercise some supranational authority in relations with individual member states and can be placed along a continuum with the EU. Such comparison lends itself to investigation of the relationship between level/type of economic integration and level/type of political integration. To what extent (if at all) does economic integration give rise to pressure for political integration?

More recently, some writers have begun to conceptualize the EU as a polity, i.e., a regime responsible for authoritative decisions concerning the allocation of values in a society. This opens up a variety of comparative perspectives. As a multi-level polity, the EU may be compared to other polities in which authority is dispersed among constituent governments at two or more levels. A variety of federal and confederal polities—Switzerland, Germany, Canada and the USA chief among them—share this characteristic. The EU is more diverse than any of these polities, but once again, the issue for comparison is whether one may conceptualize the differences as variations along some meaningful underlying dimension.

As a process of fundamental institutional change, European integration may be compared to previous reallocations of authority, from the diffusion of authority in the break-up of the Carolingian Empire in the ninth century to state building. From this standpoint, one might attempt to explain two-sided shifts in authoritative competencies from central states to subnational and supranational governments in Western Europe over the past forty years by comparison both across space and across time.

Each of these perspectives poses multiple cases for systemic comparison. In this field, as in many others in the social sciences, even the best research design will not allow one to control for the range of plausible causal influences in explaining outcomes. In none of the examples above is it sensible to assume that the cases are independent. Although n does not equal one, the number of comparable cases is unlikely to be great enough to give one sufficient degrees of freedom to control for all, or even most, relevant variables. In short, macro comparison of the EU is imprisoned in a small- n world in which statistical controls are impossible or of limited value. But the explanatory leverage of qualitative comparison is potentially great, and here one may hook into the ongoing debate about case study methods among John Goldthorpe, Charles Ragin, Robert Keohane, Sidney Verba and others.

Comparison is entirely feasible even assuming that the EU is unique. What matters is *second order similarity*, that is, the existence of underlying dimensions on which one may place the EU alongside other cases. The key questions are then whether these dimensions are connotatively precise and descriptively meaningful and whether they provide a useful basis for generalizing. The $n=1$ issue is really a red herring, for the goal of comparison is to find intelligible patterns of commonality beneath apparent diversity.

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Andrew Moravcsik

IF THE EUROPEAN Union (EU) is a unique, *sui generis* political institution, how can social scientists generalize about its dynamics? Which theories are appropriate? How can sufficient empirical variation for testing be generated?

The skeptic's response is to reject generalization outright. In their classic article, Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman reject "tests of competing explanations" aimed at determining "which one is better" as engendering "a false sense of scientism." Sandholtz and others have since reiterated this stance even more forcefully, linking it to "neo-functionalism," "historical institutionalism" and "multi-level governance" interpretations of integration, which focus on unintended consequences and endogenous causes in complex systems that undermine our ability to generalize.

Such skepticism is respectable but in my view exaggerated. The " $n=1$ problem" is not unique to the EU; it is a foundational characteristic of social science. Unlike collisions among elementary particles, complex social interactions are in fundamental ways unique. Yet useful theories and results in international and comparative politics exist because scholars have circumvented the $n=1$ problem by employing "quasi-experimental" methods: Alternative hypotheses derived from general theories are subjected to potential empirical disconfirmation within a research design that controls for certain variables and permits others to vary. The number of cases can be increased by judicious comparison or by disaggregating cases to isolate comparable elements, either within EU politics or between EU cases and others—the latter a method of qualitative inference recently elaborated by Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba. Skeptics offer no fundamental reason why such methods are inappropriate to the study of the EU.

Hence the $n=1$ problem is not a counsel of despair, but a challenge to be more self-conscious and rigorous in the selection of proper theoretical and methodological tools. The theoretical challenge is to select theories appropriate to the scope and nature of the phenomenon being studied. The methodological challenge is to generate sufficient observations to confirm or disconfirm competing causal hypotheses about that phenomenon.

Theoretically, EU studies have made much progress in this direction. Perhaps the most promising trend over the past decade has been the acceptance of Ernst Haas's self-criticism, over a quarter century old, that a *sui generis* theory of "regional integration" can only be a "pre-theory." Such "grand theories" were discarded for various reasons, the most fundamental of which is their lack of microfoundations in general theories of societal interests, state power or institutional delegation. Donald Puchala's oft-cited elephantine metaphor reminds us that multiple and more fine-grained theories are required: A theory of regional integration makes no more sense than a theory of American or comparative politics. The result of ignoring this was deadly: as late as 1990, "regional integration" was with few exceptions a discipline

closed unto itself, uninfluenced and unable to influence rich theoretical developments in international and comparative politics.

Today the study of the EU rests on firmer theoretical foundations. Concepts and theories drawn from general social science theory (e.g. “optimum currency area,” “regulatory state,” “preference intensity” and “conditional agenda-setting”) are the norm. Central approaches to integration (e.g. “intergovernmentalism” and “historical institutionalism”) are no longer *sui generis*, but designate sets of pan-disciplinary theoretical instruments designed to explain specific types of policy outputs within narrower, but more generalizable institutional and functional contexts. Increasingly—though this practice could be more widespread—theories employed in the EU literature rest on explicit assumptions that permit us both to specify precisely the empirical domain in which it does (and does not!) apply, as well as its proper relationship to existing theories. Mark Pollack’s recent demonstration how supranational autonomy emerges within specific conditions of formal delegation defined by intergovernmental theory is a model.

Methodologically, however, EU studies has further to go to meet the $n=1$ challenge. The primary weakness of EU studies today, I submit, is not a lack of theoretical innovation. To the contrary, numerous sophisticated theoretical conjectures exist to explain most important aspects of integration. The primary weakness of EU studies is instead its unwillingness to subject theories to potential disconfirmation through rigorous empirical testing. There are four fundamental reasons for this:

Few studies rest on explicit hypotheses with specified standards of disconfirmation. It is generally unclear what such how we would recognize disconfirming evidence; hence such evidence is almost never reported.

Few studies test alternative theories. With the exception of “straw men” positions that follow from no coherent theory—e.g. the expectation of “lowest common denominator” bargaining outcomes in which every government always achieves its ideal—most studies simply assemble evidence supporting a preferred explanation and ignore alternative explanations.

Few studies engage in comparative analysis. Even though some (though few) studies examine more than one case or disaggregate single cases, such efforts are almost never part of a systematic research design.

Few studies are based on “hard” primary sources, such as government documents, multiple oral histories and reliable reconstructions of confidential decision-making. In contrast to the rich European tradition of EU policy analysis and historical reconstruction, most social scientific analyses of the EU (not least those “Made in the USA”) rest on “soft” primary sources, such as public justifications by governments or journalistic commentary and other secondary sources—or indeed on sheer speculation. Yet given the large amount of ex post commentary and justification of any major European decision and the incentives for governments to be dishonest

and commentators to be speculative, dozens of “soft” sources can be mustered to support almost any claim about integration, no matter how accurate. Such analysis, Ian Lustick has recently shown, tells us little.

In sum, the normal research design in EU studies remains an isolated, anecdotal, unstructured case study grounded in secondary sources. The result: “confirmed” hypotheses and theories about the EU proliferate without bound. Yet where hypotheses are rarely rejected, they are rarely being truly confirmed. Surely EU studies would benefit greatly if we focused more on testing explicit hypotheses, stating in advance what would constitute disconfirmation, considering multiple cases and collecting more reliable qualitative and quantitative data. The ultimate goal should not be to add yet another theory of integration, but (finally) to remove some that are empirically vulnerable.

An obvious benefit of meeting the theoretical and methodological “ $n=1$ challenge” in this way would be a more accurate (and less ideological, but that is another issue) understanding of EU politics. A less direct but perhaps even more important benefit would be a set of lessons for scholars and policy-makers interested in other forms of international cooperation. The study of European integration has traditionally been a harbinger of future theoretical trends, such as theories of regimes and interdependence. Today the EU provides the best laboratory for studying theoretical issues only just emerging elsewhere, such as threats of exit and exclusion, binding interstate legislative procedures, multi-level systems and legal dispute resolution. For policy-makers, too, lessons from the EC experience are directly applicable to problems facing the WTO, NAFTA and other international organizations—Kalypso Nicolaidis’ recent OECD reports on regulatory mutual recognition constitute striking proof. Such lessons can be drawn with confidence, however, only if the analysis on which they are based distinguishes generalizable from contingent phenomena. Overcoming the $n=1$ challenge in this way offers the best means for scholars and policy-makers to exploit and extend the EU’s singular success.

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Mark A. Pollack

THE *SUI GENERIS* OR $n=1$ argument in EU studies is relatively straightforward: the EU, it is argued, is unique in the world as an experiment in political and economic integration, and hence students of European integration have only a single case—the EU itself—to study. If we accept this view, the implications for EU studies are two-fold, and both are disturbing. First, the $n=1$ view suggests that theoretical propositions will be difficult or impossible to test in the EU context, because of the well-known problems of testing hypotheses on a single case. Second, it suggests that any

propositions or findings to emerge from EU studies will not be generalizable beyond the EU to other international or domestic political systems, because of the EU's supposed uniqueness.

Fortunately for the field of EU studies, the European Union need not represent a single case, but may indeed generate multiple cases, or observations, both within the EU and across the EU and other domestic and international political systems. This, in turn, renders possible both hypothesis-testing in the EU, and generalizability beyond the European Union.

To understand why EU studies is not restricted to a single case, consider briefly the standard literature on the comparative method in political science. In the deductive-nomological tradition of comparative political inquiry, the researcher typically begins with a deductive theory specifying a dependent variable as the object of study, a hypothesized explanatory or independent variable, and a series of control variables. Case selection, including the number of cases, follows in this view from the researcher's question and from the dependent and independent variables specified in the theory. Thus, in order to determine the number and selection of cases in an EU study, we need to begin not with the characteristics of the EU itself, but rather with the research question animating a given study.

Traditionally, the central research question in EU studies was how to explain "integration," defined in terms of either institutional development or policy development, or both. For such studies, the EU was indeed the only case, or at least an extraordinary outlier in comparison with other cases, and the *sui generis* argument was compelling. However, as Simon Hix has pointed out, integration *per se* is no longer the only, or even the most common, dependent variable in EU studies. Instead, students of the EU increasingly study variables such as the outcomes of intergovernmental bargains; the adoption (or non-adoption) of advanced social regulations in multi-tiered political systems; the interactions of legislative principals and their executive and judicial agents; the voting behavior of parliamentarians; and the implementation of EU policies in the member states. For each of these research questions, and for many others, students of the EU can generate, and have generated, multiple cases, in two ways.

First, as Keohane, King and Verba point out, a single "case" like the EU may often be disaggregated into a relatively large number of observations at a lower level of analysis. Thus, for example, Andrew Moravcsik finds five major intergovernmental bargains in the history of the EU, Stephan Leibfried and Paul Pierson find a long and complex history of social regulations, Alec Stone finds hundreds of ECJ rulings across various issue-areas, Amie Kreppel finds dozens of roll-call votes by hundreds of MEPs, and Marc Smyrl finds multiple cases of Structural Fund implementation in French and Italian regions. Within the single "case" of the EU, therefore, students of the Union have found material for comparative and even statistical testing of social-scientific hypotheses.

This brings me to a second point, concerning generalizability beyond the EU to other domestic or international "cases." As noted earlier, the supposed incomparability of the EU arose from the fact that early students of European integration took integration itself as their dependent variable, and could not find similar cases of international integration elsewhere. If we shift our focus away from integration to other dependent variables, however, the EU then represents one of a number of cases, and can be profitably compared with other cases--both domestic and international—to test hypotheses about intergovernmental bargaining, regulatory policymaking, principal-agent interactions, parliamentary voting behavior, implementation, and other subjects as well.

There are, of course, methodological problems with such comparisons, which should be acknowledged and dealt with by researchers. Most comparative studies of advanced industrial societies, for example, rely explicitly on "most similar systems" designs, in which cases are selected so as to resemble each other across a range of control variables, while providing variation across the key explanatory variable. Any observed variation in the dependent variable across cases, therefore, is imputed to the hypothesized explanatory variable. The danger with using the EU as a case in such studies is that the EU is likely to differ from other cases along multiple dimensions, making the effect of the hypothesized explanatory variable difficult to ascertain.

This does not, however, mean that comparison of the EU with other political systems is impossible. The problem of variation across control variables, for example, also arises in comparative country studies, and may be alleviated by careful, empirically rich case-study analysis which is attentive to the possible effects, if any, of these variables. Alternatively, the same problem can also be overcome by using a "most different systems" research design, in which a particular empirical relationship is studied comparatively across a range of very different cases. Thus, for example, if policy communities behave similarly in centralized Britain and in the decentralized EU, or if activist courts behave similarly in the domestic US context and the "international law" context of the EU, then our hypotheses about these phenomena may in fact be strengthened by testing them across a range of cases including the EU.

In sum, students of the European Union are not doomed to studying a single case. Instead, they may generate multiple observations within the EU, and proceeding with the proper methodological caution, may begin to engage in comparative hypothesis-testing and generalization beyond the EU as well. For most of us, the $n=1$ problem in EU studies is not a problem.

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Readers are encouraged to respond to this ECSA Review forum by e-mailing comments to <ecsa@list.pitt.edu>.

The Treaty of Amsterdam: An Introductory Analysis

Youri Devuyt

On 16-17 June 1997, the European Council reached a political agreement on the Treaty of Amsterdam containing changes to the European Union's (EU) powers and institutional framework. The Treaty will be [has been] formally signed on 2 October 1997, following the necessary legal editing and revision of the political agreement of June by the jurist-linguists of the Member States. The Treaty shall enter into force only after being ratified by all Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

One month after the Amsterdam European Council, the European Commission presented its "Agenda 2000" which outlines the broad outlook for the development of the EU beyond the turn of the millennium, taking account of the prospect of an enlarged Union. At the same time, the Commission also published its Opinions on the applications for membership from each of the ten Central and Eastern European candidates for accession. While the Commission came to the conclusion that none of them fully satisfied all the political and economic criteria for accession, it considered that Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia could be in a position to satisfy the conditions for membership in the medium term. On that basis, the Commission recommended the Council to open negotiations with these countries, as well as with Cyprus (European Commission, 15 July 1997). The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) which prepared the new Treaty was primarily intended to provide the quasi-Constitutional framework for the enlarging Union.

The IGC was officially opened during at the Turin European Council of 29 March 1996. Its annotated agenda was established by the Reflection Group chaired by Spanish State Secretary for European Affairs Carlos Westendorp (Reflection Group, 5 December 1995). In addition to preparing the EU for enlargement, the Reflection Group identified three main areas which had to be addressed, without embarking on a complete revision of the Treaty:

- making the Union more relevant to its citizens in the fields of human rights, internal security, employment and the environment;
- improving the Union's efficiency and democracy; and
- giving the Union a greater capacity for external action.

The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht were not to be touched by the revision.

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While the Maastricht Treaty negotiations had focused mainly on the extension of European integration to new areas (monetary union, common foreign and security policy and cooperation in the fields of justice and interior affairs), the Amsterdam process was much more an exercise in "modernisation" aimed at strengthening existing structures and eliminating weaknesses (Evans, 1997). The Treaty of Amsterdam maintains the European Union's basic pillar structure, as developed in the Treaty of Maastricht. Thus, the Union still serves as the common roof spanning three pillars.

- Pillar I contains the provisions of the amended Treaty of Rome establishing the European Community (EC). The Community pillar includes Treaty Titles on EMU, Internal Market freedoms, competition policy, the common commercial policy, social policy, consumer protection, the environment, culture, etc. It also contains a Title describing the composition and functions of the Community's institutions (European Parliament, Council, Commission, Court of Justice and Court of Auditors).
- Pillar II deals with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
- The Treaty of Maastricht's Pillar III on cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs receives a new title in the Treaty of Amsterdam: "provisions on police and judicial cooperation in criminal Matters."

Under current Maastricht Treaty practice, Pillar I functions according to the traditional "Community method": the exclusive right of legislative initiative for the Commission, Council voting by qualified majority in such areas as the adoption of harmonisation measures necessary for the functioning of the Internal Market, co-decision for the European Parliament in a number of legislative fields, jurisdiction for the Court of Justice to interpret and verify the legality of Community acts, and primacy of Community law over Member State law. Pillars II and III, while governed by the same institutions, function according to more traditional intergovernmental practices.

The Politics of the Negotiations

The last stage of the IGC was characterised by major political change in the three leading Member States. On May 1, Tony Blair's Labour Party dethroned the Conservatives after their 14-year rule in the UK. In France, President Jacques Chirac's call for early parliamentary elections proved to be a bad gamble. On June 1, Alain Juppé's right-wing government was defeated by Lionel Jospin's left-wing coalition, forcing a weakened Chirac into cohabitation for the remainder of his term. In the Federal Republic, the deterioration of Germany's public finances caused grave problems in the three-party coalition, severely limiting Chancellor Helmut Kohl's margin for maneuver during the IGC.

Kohl was taken hostage by Bavarian Premier Edmund Stoiber, who rivals with Finance Minister Theo Waigel for the leadership of the Christian Social Union (CSU) of Bavaria. While Kohl's federal government depends on the support of the Bavarian CSU, Stoiber has never made a secret of his Eurosceptic attitude. During the final stage of the IGC,

Stoiber's Bavaria—with the help of the other Länder, whose representatives need to approve the new Treaty in the Bundesrat—forced Kohl to adopt a very reluctant attitude towards further European integration. Weakening his position even more, in the Bundesrat, Kohl depends on the Social Democrats (SPD) to push his projects through. Under these particularly vulnerable political circumstances, Kohl—during the final phase of the negotiations—departed substantially from the famous *Reflections on European Policy* by CDU/CSU Parliamentary Leader Wolfgang Schäube and foreign policy spokesman Karl Lammers (*Europe Documents*, 7 September 1994). At the end of the IGC, a weakened Kohl was obliged to veto any meaningful extension of qualified majority voting.

At the same time, Kohl had to control Stoiber's maneuvers against the EMU project. Stoiber was pleading for a "controlled delay" of EMU rather than allowing France, for example, to participate in the third phase while not attaining the 3% budget deficit norm. In order to save his coalition, Kohl was obliged to take a strict attitude on EMU. This collided with Jospin's demand, the week before the Amsterdam European Council, for more time to study the German-inspired budget Stability Pact, which includes fines on Member States that have an excessive budget deficit once EMU's final stage has entered into force. The dispute on macroeconomic policy on the eve of the Amsterdam Summit did not contribute to the creation of a positive Franco-German atmosphere. This constituted a major difference with the stimulating role of the Mitterrand-Kohl couple during the negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty. The post-Cold War and pre-Maastricht chemistry between Mitterrand and Kohl was directly responsible for the inclusion of the EMU and CFSP projects in the Treaty on European Union. No such Franco-German impetus was visible in the pre-Amsterdam days. Rather, the Chirac-Kohl compromise on institutional issues, obtained at the Noordwijk Summit on 26 May 1997, confirmed the status quo.

The weakness of the Franco-German couple allowed Tony Blair to leave his marks on the new Treaty. With his "fresh approach" to the negotiations, Blair rejected the negativism towards the European project that had characterised the Thatcher-Major years. In a largely symbolic move, Blair ended the UK's isolation with regard to social policy and supported the inclusion of an employment Title in the Treaty. At the same time, Blair immediately indicated the limits of European action in the social and employment fields, emphasising national competence and the need for flexibility rather than European legislation. Blair's change of tone did not alter the UK's position on border controls and defense integration.

As Blair also insisted on a reference to animal welfare, proved open to improvements of the environment Title and signaled he would accept enshrining fundamental rights and non-discrimination in the Treaty, his position came very close to that of the three Scandinavian Member States. While reluctant to move on the institutional dossiers and defense, the

social-democratic governments in Sweden, Finland and Denmark succeeded to include stronger Treaty language on employment, environment, equality between men and women, and transparency. Their success was helped by support from the Party of European Socialists (PES).

Boasting nine Socialist Prime Ministers and a Socialist presence in the coalition governments in all other Member States, except Germany and Spain, the PES held a strategic Congress in Malmo the week before the Amsterdam Summit. Little common ground could be found, however, on the fundamental institutional questions. The Congress in Malmo was also marked by the different social and economic language of French Prime Minister Jospin, emphasising the interventionist role of the State and UK Prime Minister Blair, underlining the importance of private initiative and flexibility. As a result, the Socialist governments—internally divided along the traditional social-economic cleavage between its Latin and Northern members—failed to argue along the same lines on the substance of the economic debates in Amsterdam.

Each of the Treaty's main Sections reflects these particular political circumstances.

Freedom, Security and Justice (Section I)

Fundamental rights and freedoms

The strengthening of the EU's human rights provisions and of the non-discrimination principle formed one of the European Parliament's key priorities for the IGC. The Member States reached a broad convergence of views with regard to this aspect at an early stage of the IGC.

In a move which enhances the Constitutional character of the Treaty, "liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law" are listed as the general principles on which the EU is founded. The "existence of a serious and persistent breach" of these principles may lead to the suspension of the (voting) rights of the Member State in question. Respect for fundamental rights also becomes an explicit precondition for applying for EU membership.

Furthermore, the following new provisions on fundamental rights are included:

- the EU's explicit attachment to social rights as defined in the 1961 Council of Europe Social Charter and the 1989 EC Social Charter;
- the promotion of equality between men and women as one of the goals of the Community, with a provision explicitly stipulating that Member States shall not be prevented from adopting measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the underrepresented sex;
- a new non-discrimination clause, enabling the Council (by unanimity, on proposal Commission, in consultation with the European Parliament) to take appropriate action combating discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation;
- the protection of individuals with regard to the processing and free movement of personal data by EU bodies;
- a Declaration to the Final Act underlining that the EC shall take account of persons with a disability when

- drawing up harmonisation measures;
- a Declaration to the Final Act on the abolition of the death penalty; and
- a Declaration to the Final Act emphasising that the EU shall respect the status under national law of churches and non-confessional organisations.

Free movement of persons, asylum and immigration

The second chapter of Section I turned out to be much more controversial. The lack of successful EU action in the fields of justice and home affairs prompted the Commission, Parliament and several Member States to argue strongly in favour of a "communautarisation" of—at least part of—Pillar III. Both the Irish and Dutch Presidencies tackled this by separating three issues: first, the free movement of persons, asylum and immigration would be integrated in the Community Pillar; second, Pillar III provisions on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters would be made more effective, with increased control by Parliament and Court of Justice; and third, the Schengen *acquis* would be integrated in the framework of the EU. This basic framework was maintained at Amsterdam, though in the form of an extremely complex and watered down compromise.

The new Community Title on free movement of persons, asylum and immigration is to ensure intra-EU free movement of persons within 5 years following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. This is to be accompanied by measures regulating the crossing of the EU's external borders, asylum and immigration. A Protocol on asylum for nationals of EU Member States stipulates that the Member States shall be regarded as safe countries of origin. Intra-EU asylum applications should therefore, as a general rule, be regarded as manifestly unfounded.

Initial Presidency texts on the free movement of persons, asylum and immigration foresaw an automatic passage from unanimity to qualified majority voting after a three-year transition period. However, under pressure from the sixteen German Länder, which share responsibility for immigration with the German Federal government, Chancellor Helmut Kohl insisted, during the final days of the negotiations, on greater caution. Recalling that Germany had over the last decade taken in an average of 45-60% of all refugees who have sought asylum in the Union, Kohl saw it as a national duty and a piece of self-preservation to ensure Germany kept a veto-right in the area. As a result, decision-making in this new Pillar I Title remains largely inter-governmental. During the first 5 years, the right of legislative initiative will be shared between Member States and Commission. The Council will decide by unanimity and the role of the European Parliament is limited to consultation. Following this five-year period, the Commission receives exclusive right of initiative. Furthermore, the Council shall then decide by unanimity on the parts of this Title which will be dealt with through the co-decision procedure, including qualified majority in the Council.

From the entry into force of this new Title, the European Court of Justice receives limited jurisdiction, which may not be related to measures concerning the maintenance of law and

order and the safeguarding of internal security. Preliminary rulings are limited to requests by courts of last instance in the Member States. Member States, Council and Commission may request Court of Justice rulings on the interpretation of this Title. However, such interpretations shall not affect judgments of Member State courts which have become *res judicata*.

With Prime Minister Blair insisting on the UK's special island status and the right to keep border control checks, the UK and Ireland obtained two Protocols. The first provides for an opt-out of the free movement of persons Title, with the possibility for participation following a notification of the wish to take part in a decision. The second Protocol recognises the Common Travel Area between the UK and Ireland. Another Protocol deals with the special position of Denmark, providing for an opt-out of the free movement of persons Title and of any decisions with defense implications.

Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters

Two innovations characterise the new Pillar III provisions on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. First, with regard to the policy instruments at the disposal of the Council, new "framework decisions" may be adopted for the purpose of approximating Member State laws. They shall be binding upon the Member States as to the result to be achieved, but leave choice of form and methods to the Member States (cf. Community directives). "Decisions" shall be binding and can be implemented through "measures" adopted by qualified majority. For all other decisions in Pillar III, the Council continues to act by unanimity.

Second, the European Court of Justice receives limited jurisdiction in Pillar III for issues not related to the validity or proportionality of law and order enforcement in the Member States:

- Member States shall be able to make a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings;
- the Court may review the legality of (framework) decisions in actions brought by a Member State or the Commission;
- the Court may be requested to settle disputes between the Member States on the interpretation or application of acts adopted under Pillar III if such a dispute cannot be settled by the Council within a six-month period.

The Schengen acquis

Complementing the creation of the free movement of persons, the Schengen *acquis* is integrated in the EU via a Protocol. Schengen refers to the Agreement on the gradual abolition of checks at common borders of 14 June 1985 and 19 June 1990, signed by Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland and Sweden.

Since the UK and Ireland did not want to participate, the Protocol authorises thirteen Member States to proceed with closer cooperation. For each Schengen measure, the Council has to determine the relevant place in the EU framework. The concrete transposition of the Schengen *acquis* in the relevant

EU provisions must be done by the Council acting by unanimity. As long as this transposition has not taken place, the Schengen *acquis* shall be treated as Pillar III material. All new Member States will have to accept the Schengen *acquis* in full.

The Union and the Citizen (Section II)

Section II addresses a number of issues which affect citizens in their daily lives: employment, social policy, environment, public health, consumer protection, animal welfare, culture, the use of languages, etc.

Employment

The main feature of Section II is the new Title on employment. The Commission and the European Parliament, supported by the Austrian, Belgian, Swedish and Finnish governments actively pushed for explicit Community powers in the struggle for work. This is not surprising in an EU with an unemployment rate of 11% and the Euro-wide media attention for the closing of the Renault plant near Brussels.

The new Title grants the Community competence for the development of a coordinated strategy for employment. This may not, however, include the harmonisation of Member State laws. In a procedure similar to that used for the broad guidelines of economic policy, the European Council shall each year consider the employment situation in the Community and adopt guidelines on employment policy. Furthermore, the Council shall on an annual basis examine the employment policies of the Member States. The main discussion point concerned the proposal providing the Council the possibility for the adoption of "incentive measures" to encourage employment cooperation among the Member States. Believing employment should remain a national policy area, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar resisted the allocation of major budget resources to Community action for employment. As a result, the possibility to adopt "incentive measures" is restricted to (pilot) projects limited in scope and duration.

The discussion on the inclusion of a new employment Title in the Treaty was linked to demands by French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin regarding the EMU project. Elected just one week before the Amsterdam Summit, the Jospin government, composed by Socialists, Communists and Ecologists, insisted that the Union would start making work of active macroeconomic and employment policy coordination as a counter-weight to the Finance Ministers' "myopic focus" on budgetary and monetary discipline. Unless its demands were met, the Jospin government seemed determined to block the so-called Stability Pact, laying down stringent commitments of the Member States, Commission and Council regarding budgetary discipline in EMU's final phase. The German government, under pressure of Bavarian Premier Edmund Stoiber, refused any weakening of EMU's focus on budgetary discipline. Failure to formally adopt the Stability Pact would not only have caused a serious set-back for EMU. It would also have threatened the successful conclusion of the IGC. Following an initiative by Commission President

Jacques Santer, agreement was reached on a double Resolution contributing to the implementation of the two poles of Economic and Monetary Union. In addition to the Resolution on the Stability Pact, the European Council simultaneously accepted a Resolution on Growth and Employment. In a language inspired by the Blair team, putting the emphasis on labour market flexibility, the Resolution provides for enhanced economic and employment coordination. It also urges the European Investment Bank to step up its interventions for high tech and SME projects, and for education, health, (urban) environment and large infrastructure projects.

Social policy

Already during the election campaign, Labour had promised to end the UK's opt-out regarding social policy. While the Maastricht Treaty's Social Protocol is consequently integrated in the Community pillar, the substantive provisions on social policy were not fundamentally changed. Unanimous decision-taking in the Council remains the rule for important social policy areas such as social security, the protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated, collective representation of workers and employers and the ratification by the Council of some European collective bargaining agreements. Only the Belgian, Luxembourg and Italian Prime Ministers proposed Council decision-making by qualified majority voting on minimal rules concerning redundancies and collective representation.

Provisions on the fight against social exclusion were added to the Treaty, providing for "encouragement measures" to be decided by the Council. The original Presidency proposal included the possibility of encouragement measures for the elderly and the disabled too. This was vetoed by Chancellor Kohl who was under pressure to limit Community powers and spending in these areas as much as possible.

Environment

The Dutch Presidency proposals included the extension of qualified majority voting to all aspects of environmental policy, including environmental taxation. This was seen as particularly important to give a new chance to the Commission's initiatives for the introduction of a CO₂ tax. In the Delors White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, the CO₂ tax was not only regarded as a means to limit CO₂ emissions, but also as an alternative way to finance Europe's social security systems. Such an alternative financing technique would, in turn, allow the Member States to reduce social security taxes on labour, thus reducing labour costs. In the end, only Belgium, Italy, Austria, Portugal, and Finland actively supported the Dutch Presidency. Unanimity is consequently retained for Council voting on all taxation questions.

Under pressure from the Scandinavian Member States and Austria, the Treaty of Amsterdam does incorporate new language on the right of Member states to introduce stricter environmental legislation than provided for in the Community's harmonisation measures. While the Member States may request the introduction of new national measures

for environmental reasons following Community harmonisation, the request must be based on "new scientific facts." The Commission can approve or reject the new national provisions. They are deemed rejected if the Commission does not pronounce itself within a six-month period. However, if stricter national measures are approved, the Commission shall immediately examine the need for a general amendment to the Community's harmonisation measures.

Public health, consumer protection and animal welfare

On the initiative of the Commission and under pressure of the European Parliament, public health and consumer protection powers are strengthened in the wake of the BSE crisis. The up-graded Articles on public health, providing for qualified majority voting in the Council and co-decision with the European Parliament, will notably apply for quality and safety of organs and blood, and for veterinary and phytosanitary measures to protect public health. The latter were formerly adopted under Article 43, an agricultural policy provision with mere consultative rights for the Parliament.

Following a UK request, a new Protocol is added to the Treaty on the protection and respect for the welfare of animals while respecting religious rites and cultural traditions.

Culture, subsidiarity and transparency

The new Treaty explicitly confirms that the Community must not merely respect, but promote the diversity of its cultures. Citizens writing to EU institutions must receive an answer in their own language. A new transparency clause underlines that any natural or legal person residing in a Member State has, in principle, the right of access to EU documents. The provisions of Section II are rounded off by a new Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, included mainly under pressure from the German Länder.

An Effective and Coherent External Policy (Section III) *Common Foreign and Security Policy*

The provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have been kept in a separate Pillar. Most of the limited changes included in this Pillar had already been suggested in the report by the Westendorp Reflection Group. To better prepare CFSP decisions, a new Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit will be established in the Council General Secretariat, with personnel drawn from the Member States, Council, Commission, and Western European Union.

CFSP decision-making remains inter-governmental. Unanimity is required for the adoption of common strategies by the European Council. The Treaty provides, however, for the possibility of constructive abstention which shall not prevent the adoption of decisions by unanimity. The Member State abstaining shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the EU. Qualified majority applies when the Council adopts joint actions or common positions on the basis of common strategies or when implementing such actions or positions. A Member State may, nevertheless, request unanimity "for important and stated reasons of national policy." For the first time, a formal vital national interest exception is incorporated in the Treaty.

EU representation for CFSP matters shall continue to be handled by the Presidency. The difficult point regarding CFSP representation was the initial French demand for the appointment of a senior political figure who would ensure "continuity, visibility and efficacy" of the CFSP and act on a permanent basis as the face of the Union in its relations with third countries. During the final stages of the negotiations, France continued to defend the creation of the new position of Secretary General of the European Union for that purpose. As most other Member States did not want to establish a new political function, coming on top of the existing institutions, France in the end agreed assigning the job to the Council Secretary General. Accordingly, the Treaty of Amsterdam makes clear that the Council Secretary General shall exercise the new function of "High Representative for the CFSP", assisting the Presidency in the representation of the EU. The Commission shall be "fully associated" in the representation of the CFSP. The Council can also continue with the practice of appointing special representatives with a mandate in relation to particular foreign policy issues.

While the Treaty does not explicitly provide the EU with legal personality, it does include the possibility for the conclusion of international agreements under the CFSP. This can be interpreted as an indirect way of granting legal personality to the EU. The European Community retains explicit legal personality.

The new provisions on the "progressive framing of a common defense policy, in the perspective of a common defense" explicitly include the so-called Petersberg tasks, i.e., humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and crisis management. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg had, in addition, proposed a Protocol that would set out the stages and a timetable for the concrete integration of the Western European Union (WEU) in the EU. The Protocol was also backed by Greece and Portugal. It proved unacceptable, however, for the UK which wanted to protect NATO's position as Europe's central defense organisation. Furthermore, the Scandinavian countries, Ireland and Austria refused an increasing militarization of the EU. As a result, the Treaty simply stipulates that the EU shall "foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide". To that end, EU and WEU shall draw up an arrangement for enhanced cooperation.

External economic relations

In the field of external economic relations, the IGC did not clear up the post-Opinion 1/94 situation. In that Opinion delivered during the ratification phase of the Uruguay Round Agreement, the European Court of Justice ruled that the Community had exclusive competence for trade in goods only, leading to problems between the Member States and the Commission on the organisation of the EC's unity of external representation in negotiations regarding the World Trade Organisation's "new" topics: trade in services and intellectual property protection. The negotiators failed—mainly due to French and UK resistance—to extend the Community's

traditional negotiating procedure for trade in goods to these "new" areas of international trade diplomacy.

The Presidency's initial proposals would have extended the Community's trade in goods practice—with the Commission as sole Community negotiator—to those international negotiations on services and intellectual property explicitly listed in a narrowly scoped Protocol. Another Protocol would have placed the Commission negotiators under increasing tutelage of the Member States, also for trade in goods. As the Commission refused proposals that would have included a slide-back of its powers, the IGC opted for a minimal enabling clause: the Council can by unanimity extend the Community's practice to the two "new" World Trade Organization topics.

The Union's Institutions (Section IV)

Preparing enlargement

The main task of the IGC was to improve the efficiency of the EU's decision-making process in preparation for enlargement with the Central and Eastern European countries. Few concrete results have been achieved, however.

The central question was the extension of qualified majority voting. In its opinion of 28 February 1996, the Commission had argued that "the difficulty of arriving at unanimous agreement rises exponentially as the number of Member increases." As "adherence to unanimity would often result in stalemate," the Commission proposed "qualified majority voting [as] the general rule" (European Commission, 28 February 1996, 21). Belgium and Italy defended the same message, supported by Austria, Finland and Portugal. France, traditionally reluctant to give up "sovereignty," also agreed to see unanimity scrapped in a significant number of areas such as research, industry, culture, transport, and some decisions in the fields of justice and home affairs and CFSP. Even the Blair government supported a limited extension of qualified majority voting, provided it would remain restricted to areas related to the Internal Market such as research and industrial policy. Strongest resistance against the already rather limited extension list proposed by the Presidency came from Chancellor Kohl. The German government could accept qualified majority voting only on the research framework programme and on compensatory aid for imports of raw materials. Kohl—again under pressure of the Länder—was unable to agree to the Presidency's proposals for majority voting on the right of movement and residence, social security measures necessary for free movement, culture, industry, and environment.

The Dutch Presidency's proposal for a Protocol designed to prepare the Union's institutions for enlargement did not deal with majority voting. It focused exclusively on the presumed link between the composition of the Commission and the re-weighting of the votes in the Council. The Presidency proposed that, when two new Member States would join the EU, the large Member States would give up their second Commissioner. In exchange, the votes in the Council would be re-weighted in their favour (25 votes for Germany, France, the UK and Italy ; 20 votes for Spain; 12

votes for the Netherlands; 10 votes for Belgium, Greece and Portugal; 8 votes for Sweden and Austria; 6 votes for Denmark, Finland and Ireland; and 3 votes for Luxembourg). The Presidency believed that by linking these two issues, an honourable trade-off would be possible between the smaller and larger Member States. This proved to be a miscalculation, mainly because the institutional positions of the Member States could not be reduced to a conflict between large and small Member States.

The French government, in particular, had insisted on both elements of the Presidency's compromise proposal. From the start of the IGC, France had requested a rebalancing of the votes in the Council to give a greater weight to the larger countries. The current voting system is characterised by a relative over-representation of the smaller Member States. In the EU-15, a large Member State such as Germany—with 80 million inhabitants—has 10 votes. A much smaller country like Belgium, with only 10 million inhabitants, still has 5 votes. For the French government, a rebalancing was essential in order to restore the predominant position of the "great powers" within the EU. France emphasised that, since the Treaty of Rome of 1957, the EU had been enlarged with a majority of smaller Member States, a trend likely to continue. In the EU-15, a qualified majority, while requiring 71% of the votes, can be achieved with the backing of Member States representing 58% of the population only. Enlargement with Central and Eastern European countries would bring the demographic weight behind qualified majority further down if the current ponderation of the votes is maintained.

The smaller Member States did not reject the argument that a qualified majority in the Council should at least correspond to a majority of the population. Three problems, however, prevented a compromise on the reponderation. First, Belgium insisted on the missing link with qualified majority voting. In a Union taking its crucial decisions by unanimity, the ponderation of the votes only plays a marginal role. Accordingly, Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene was prepared to discuss a reweighting of the votes only on condition that qualified majority voting would be significantly extended. This was not the case. Second, the large majority of the Member States opted for an entirely new dual majority system, whereby a proposal would need a (two-thirds) majority of Member States as well as a (two-thirds) majority of the population. Such a new voting system would avoid the impression of clear winners and losers. As it would give Germany a greater demographic weight than France, President Jacques Chirac refused to consider it. Third, Spanish Prime Minister Aznar could not agree to any reweighting of the votes which would give Spain less votes than the "other" large Member States. According to Aznar, Spain had during the accession negotiations agreed to having fewer votes in the Council than the other large countries only on condition of having two Commissioners. If the Presidency's Protocol would force Spain to renounce its second Commissioner, Aznar insisted on equality with the large Member States in the number of Council votes.

While fighting for a reponderation of the votes in the Council, President Chirac simultaneously wanted a reduction of the number of Commissioners to maximum ten or twelve, corresponding to the portfolios regarded as necessary by France. While France indicated that it could, in consequence, agree to a Commission which would not systematically have a Commissioner of French nationality, the German, British and Spanish governments signalled that—even a reduced Commission—should maintain on a permanent basis a Commissioner from each of the bigger Member States, possibly with a rotation for the smaller countries. But many of the smaller Member States such as Luxembourg, Ireland, Portugal and the Scandinavian countries equally stated that they considered it inconceivable to give up "their" Commissioner. As agreement on a Commission of ten to twelve members proved impossible, the German government convinced France, at the Extraordinary European Council in Noordwijk, to accept a status quo solution, with a commitment to finding new formula at the time and under more concrete pressure of enlargement.

The "Protocol on institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the European Union", finalised by the Dutch Presidency in the final morning hours of the Amsterdam Summit, maintains the link between Commission composition and the weighting of Council votes:

- at the date of the first enlargement there would only be one Commissioner left for each Member State, on condition an agreement has also been reached on the reweighting of the votes in the Council;
- at least one year before EU membership exceeds 20, a new comprehensive review of the functioning of the institutions would take place.

The disappointed Belgian government added a Declaration to the Protocol stating that the extension of qualified majority voting is "an indispensable condition for concluding the first round of enlargement negotiations." France and Italy also signed the Belgian Declaration.

The Commission, in its Agenda 2000, also stated that the reform regarding the weighting of votes in the Council, accompanied by the reduction in the number of Commissioners to one per Member State—while necessary—"will not be sufficient to proceed with a substantial enlargement." The Commission therefore suggests that "a new Intergovernmental Conference be convened as soon as possible after 2000 [i.e. before any enlargement] to produce a thorough reform...[which] would, in any event, have to involve the introduction of qualified majority voting across the board" (European Commission, 15 July 1997, Vol. I, 6). The European Parliament, which has to give its assent to any enlargement of the Union, has expressed a similar opinion (European Parliament, 26 June 1997).

Other institutional issues

While no agreement could be reached on the composition of the Commission, the Treaty of Amsterdam does provide for a strengthened role of the Commission President. The new Treaty explicitly stipulates that "the Commission shall work

under the political guidance of its President". A Declaration on the organisation and functioning of the Commission takes note of the Commission's own proposal for its reorganisation such as the introduction of a division between members with conventional portfolios and others with specific tasks, a broad discretion for the President in the allocation and reshuffling of tasks, and the desirability of bringing external relations under the responsibility of a Commission Vice-President.

The Treaty also contains a substantial simplification and reduction of legislative procedures. Three legislative procedures remain: consultation, assent, and a co-decision procedure eliminating the third reading stage. The significant extension of the co-decision procedure to most legislative fields is a victory for the European Parliament. Since the negotiators did not want to change the Economic and Monetary Union provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht, the cooperation procedure is retained for that specific field only.

The "Protocol on the role of National Parliaments in the European Union" stipulates that the Conference of European Affairs Committees of the National Parliaments (generally known as COSAC) may address contributions on the EU's legislative proposals to the European Parliament, Council and Commission. The French government insisted on a greater role for the national parliaments in the EU's decision-making. Also on French insistence, a "Protocol on the location of the seats of the institutions and of certain bodies and departments of the European Community" was added to the Treaty, confirming the arrangement agreed at the European Council in Edinburgh (December 1992).

Closer Cooperation - "Flexibility" (Section V)

Section V concerns the possibility for a number of Member States—less than the full EU membership—to cooperate more closely in specific areas, using the institutional framework of the Union.

Even before the start of the IGC, the integration-minded governments insisted on new institutional procedures so that the Union would no longer be condemned to moving forward at the speed of the slowest wagon in the European convoy. At the same time, these governments wanted to avoid the introduction of "flexibility" in the sense of a pick-and-choose Europe ("Europe à la carte") that would undermine the balance between the rights and obligations of the Member States. In their *Reflections on European Policy* of 1994, for example, the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group made a controversial proposal for the strengthening of the "hard core" of countries around monetary union (*Europe Documents*, 7 September 1994, 5).

On 17 October 1996, French Foreign Minister Hervé de Charette and his German colleague Klaus Kinkel launched a joint paper on enhanced cooperation ("coopération renforcée"). According to the Franco-German vision, decisions to establish frameworks of enhanced cooperation would be taken in the Council by those Member States specifically concerned. Moreover, no Member State would be able to veto the formation of frameworks of enhanced cooperation among those that would wish to advance more rapidly. That was the

main reason for the UK's rejection of the Franco-German project. Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, and Ireland also insisted on the need for a unanimous authorisation by all EU Member States of any enhanced cooperation project.

Following Labour's election victory, the Blair government made clear that it was particularly averse to the introduction of enhanced cooperation in Pillar I. As Blair's government wanted to put an end to the UK's opt-out from the Social Agreement, it wondered why it was necessary to create new provisions which would make similar arrangements more likely in the future.

The final compromise included in the Treaty of Amsterdam contains a number of strong reassurances for the reluctant Member States. Both in Pillars I and III, the Council can in principle grant authorisation for closer cooperation by qualified majority. However, any Member State may prevent a vote being taken by invoking "important and stated reasons of national policy." Furthermore, closer cooperation may neither affect the *acquis communautaire*, nor the competences, rights, obligations and interests of those Member States which do not participate. Closer cooperation in the Pillar I may not concern areas which fall within the exclusive competence of the Community or affect Community policies. It may neither constitute a discrimination or restriction of trade, nor distort competition between the Member States. While any closer cooperation arrangement must concern at least a majority of Member States, "outside Members" must be allowed to become parties of closer cooperation frameworks at any time, provided they commit themselves to fully comply with the closer cooperation decisions. Depending on the interpretation of these conditions, "closer cooperation" may effectively be excluded, at least in Pillar I.

Within a framework of closer cooperation, decisions must be taken according to the relevant provisions of the Treaty, i.e., by unanimity or qualified majority, depending on the subject. For example, since the Treaty provisions on taxation stipulate decision-taking by unanimity among the EU-15, a closer cooperation framework on taxation must also function by unanimity among those Member States participating.

Conclusions

The outcome of the negotiations can be summarised in five points. First, progress on the road to integration among the EU-15 is characterised by increasingly complex Treaty arrangements, complemented by numerous Protocols and Declarations. EU Treaty provisions have never been more complex than those invented by the Amsterdam European Council on the free movement of persons, asylum and immigration and on police and judicial cooperation.

Second, the new Treaty clearly reflects the political culture of the new Scandinavian Member States on such topics as non-discrimination, transparency, environmental and consumer protection.

Third, on social and economic issues such as the inclusion of a new employment Title, the Amsterdam European Council had to bridge the traditional gap between the various forms of

capitalism that are coexisting within the EU. That the negotiators did not want to re-open the delicate Maastricht compromise on EMU became clear when—during the discussion on legislative procedures and the powers of the European Parliament—the IGC decided to exempt the EMU provisions from the general elimination of the cooperation procedure. Even a simple institutional change to the EMU Title, not touching the substance of economic policy, was not deemed appropriate.

Fourth, with only the Italian and Belgian governments remaining as persistent defenders of the federal integration model, several new Treaty provisions tend to push the Union in the intergovernmental direction.

- For the first time in EU history, the French interpretation of the Luxembourg compromise is formally recognised in certain parts of the Treaty. That the provisions on CFSP and closer cooperation permit the Member States to legally invoke "important and stated interests of national policy" to oppose qualified majority is an inter-governmental breakthrough, especially since few procedural or substantive conditions are set to restrict the scope of the vital national interest exception.
- Pillar III practices are penetrating Pillar I. During the first five years, the Member States have obtained the co-right of initiative in new Title on free movement of persons, asylum and immigration, thus breaching the exclusive right of initiative of the Commission in Pillar I. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice is severely limited in this new Pillar I Title. Court of Justice interpretations on this Title shall notably not affect judgments of Member State courts which have become *res judicata*.
- After having tried to put the Commission negotiators under greater Member State tutelage in the field of external economic relations, Community practice of trade in goods was not extended to the international economic negotiations of the future: services, intellectual property and investment.
- The choice of the term "closer *cooperation*" instead of "closer *integration*" is also indicative of the inter-governmental trend.

More far-going German proposals designed to undermine the Commission's institutional position were not seriously considered by the other Member States. This first of these German suggestions concerned the introduction of a sun-set clause for all Commission proposals and even EC legislation (which would automatically expire after a set amount of time, except if explicitly confirmed by the Council). The German government also proposed the creation of a Competition Agency outside the Commission framework, which would take over the tasks currently performed by Commission Directorate General IV. While they were not accepted, these proposals did help set the tone of the IGC.

Fifth, in the absence of a concrete and immediate enlargement prospect, the delegations proved unable to agree on the institutional changes necessary to safeguard the

decision-making efficiency of an expanding EU. As a new enlargement round has been formally launched with the publication of the Commission's Opinions and Agenda 2000, it remains to be seen whether the process of adaptation demanded from the applicant countries will be accompanied by a streamlining and deepening of the EU's own working methods. For those focusing on the capacity of the enlarged Union to take decisions, the yardstick for measuring whether the EU is ready for enlargement is not the changing ponderation of votes or the number of Commissioners. These issues are only of importance in so far as they are related to the extension of qualified majority voting. As the Commission stated in preparation for the Lisbon European Council in June 1992, "[n]on-members apply to join because the Community is attractive; the Community is attractive because it is seen to be effective; to proceed to enlargement in a way which reduces its effectiveness would be an error" (European Commission, 24 June 1992, 4).

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Readers interested in the day-to-day evolution of the IGC should consult the excellent IGC pieces included in *Agency Europe* and *European Report*.

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Teaching the EU

Editor's note: In response to member interest, this column is a regular feature of the ECSA Review. The next issue's column will address teaching the EU to a diverse student body, by ECSA member Heather Field, Griffith University (Australia). Suggestions and submissions of essays for this column are welcomed.

Teaching the EU at the Secondary Level

George D. Wrangham

"It is essential, I am sure, for the Community to make a proper effort to be understood in the United States, and that process should begin in school. I very much support your aim," wrote Sir Leon Brittan, Vice President and Commissioner of the European Community, to me a few years ago when I told him I was embarking on a project of teaching the EU at the secondary level.

The US and the EU are among the greatest trade partners in the world; of course they need to know about each other. Many students specialising in fields other than contemporary history or political science in their undergraduate and graduate educations would learn very little about contemporary Europe if the subject is omitted from their secondary educations. Today an American graduate in engineering, chemistry or many other fields is likely to find himself applying for employment in a European international corporation, and he will be at a distinct disadvantage in the job market if he is fundamentally ignorant about the EU. But if he had had his interest in the EU sparked in secondary school, he would likely be better informed.

Dr. Guenter Renner, Director of the European Teacher Academy in Berlin, instructed me precisely how to teach the EU to young people. It is a truly amazing success story! After the Second World War the states of Western Europe seized the opportunity to make future wars among them impossible. How? By each agreeing to relinquish a part of her sovereignty for the good of the whole. It works. There is a lesson here for America in her future, the future that belongs to the young people we are educating today. The continued expansion of the EU will be of close concern to these people, and they need to know the commonalities and differences between the EU and the US, and where the limitations of national sovereignty lie.

On the one hand, contemporary history is the easiest of all subjects to teach in high school. Students always want to know what is going on today. Their enthusiasm is natural and infectious. They are always eager to divert the class away from the teacher's plans of concentrating upon Robespierre, Confucius or Machu Picchu into a discussion

of current events, why the Israelis are constructing settlements in Palestinian East Jerusalem, how nuclear weaponry is being smuggled out of the former Soviet Union, or whether the Swiss government today is truly culpable in the affair of Nazi gold. All this takes on the teacher's part is a good anecdote and away we go. For example, into a grassy roadside bank below the village of Freconrupt in Alsace is set a stone monument to three twenty-year-olds who escaped from the Nazi camp across the valley, were recaptured, and then were fed to the guards' dogs. The inscription concludes, "N'oublions jamais." Yet, later in the same generation, the French and the Germans grew into partners, founding members of the Common Market. Such a paradox demands discussion.

On the other hand, however, this is not to say that teaching the EU at the secondary level is easy for the teacher or the student. Where to start the course or unit, when many members of the class have little or no background in modern European history? How to fit it into the curriculum, especially in those public school districts where the pattern is rigidly set by authorities outside the school and a teacher finds little scope for his creativity, little use for his personal knowledge? Where are the texts, the books of documentary readings? Which are the most worthwhile videotapes? And perhaps most of all, how can a teacher acquire the expertise to educate his charges?

I have some specific suggestions here. ECSA itself is of the greatest value, its biennial conferences and the workshops an intellectual fillip for any instructor. The Delegation of the European Commission in Washington offers free videos and a wealth of print materials, including the introductory and overview levels of the European Union, through its Office of Press and Public Affairs. ECSA member Peter Loedel of West Chester University is preparing a videotape and other curricular materials on teaching an EU simulation course, thanks to an ECSA curriculum development grant. For several years I have been teaching a course on Russia and Contemporary Europe (1945 to the twenty-first century) for students in the tenth, eleventh and twelfth grades. This is unique, I believe, as a year-long course at the secondary level, in which the EU naturally figures large..

The greatest gulf in all the years of education in America, from pre-kindergarten to graduate school, falls between the twelfth grade and the college freshman year. For up to fourteen years the student is educated close to home, and the communities of school and family know each other. Then he goes away to college, and the focus turns to adult life and career—a great leap from high school concerns. It is by no means easy for instructors at the secondary level and in higher education to reach each other across this divide, and in many cases they are actually somewhat diffident in their efforts to do so.

There is indeed a place here for short and well-planned regional conferences on teaching the EU at the secondary level, such as the one Carolyn Rhodes of Utah State

University organized in 1996. There is a very real sense in which we owe this to the future of the young people entrusted to us. I would be glad to share with colleagues my experience in designing and teaching the year-long secondary course on Russia and Contemporary Europe, and can be reached at The Shipley School, 814 Yarrow Street, Bryn Mawr, PA 19010, telephone 610-525-4300, or facsimile, 610-525-5082.

ECSA member George D. Wrangham was educated at Eton College and King's College, Cambridge, UK. He has been head of the History Department at The Shipley School in Bryn Mawr, PA since 1971.

EU Syllabi

The ECSA Administrative office keeps a file of syllabi for courses specifically about the European Union and courses which include the European Union among the covered topics. Such courses range from an undergraduate overview of the EU to graduate courses focusing on EU business or law; other topics and disciplines include EU history, geography, politics, economics or public policy. These syllabi are available to ECSA members for the cost of photocopying.

ECSA seeks to expand and update the syllabi file and asks that members currently teaching courses such as those described above please mail one hard copy of their syllabus(-i) (or e-mail as an attachment), with permission to photocopy and circulate among ECSA members upon request. The e-mail and regular mail addresses can be found in the box below.

The opinions expressed in essays in the *ECSA Review* are solely those of their authors. We welcome submission of scholarly essays on EU-related issues that foster debate and discussion.

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Book Reviews

Colette Mazzucelli. France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create the European Union. New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1997, 353 pp.

In the wake of the Amsterdam Treaty and in preparation for its ratification, France and Germany at Maastricht makes extremely instructive reading. The book analyzes French and German diplomacy during the preparation and negotiation of the 1990/91 Intergovernmental Conferences on economic and monetary union and political union. It also provides a detailed examination of the Maastricht Treaty ratification process in the two countries singled out for closer study.

Why did Mazzucelli choose France and Germany for closer study? "The crucial impact of France and Germany on the momentum of the Maastricht process" with which they acted "at the core of a changing Europe with other states trying to define their status as part of the core or adjust that status if it relegates them to the periphery" is the guiding principle of her choice. Then, she goes further and asserts that the "core" concept was not only relevant among the governments of the European Union, but also constituted a critical notion in their administrative structures. She documents both these assertions extremely well and provides ample interview evidence to confirm the existence of what one diplomatic participant, when referring to French-German diplomacy, labeled a "Community 'subsystem' based on its intensity, duration, formalization, effectiveness and acceptability."

But, a tension existed also between the French and the Germans at Maastricht which has been very much in evidence during the 1996/97 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) culminating in the Treaty of Amsterdam. As Mazzucelli correctly maintains, "The French emphasis on sovereignty is not compatible with German aspirations for a federal Europe in which the institutions of the Union play significant roles." We have little evidence that there has been any change in French priorities despite the disappearance from the scene of the enormously influential Mitterrand. Has the Franco-German "duo" continued to play a pivotal role in an enlarged European Union? I believe that the recent IGC provides us with ample testimony of this. It is just as implausible now as it was in 1990 and 1991 that the initial core group of countries in Stage Three of Economic and Monetary

Union (EMU) would not include both France and Germany. Even though the conditions for economic and monetary union were not directly under discussion in the recent IGC, there is no doubt that concern over French and German abilities to meet the convergence criteria haunted the EU member states throughout the Maastricht Treaty revision process, and will continue to do so until the monetary union is definitively in place.

As far as political union is concerned, the picture is more blurred. There is no longer much talk of a hard core and periphery and even less of a French-German axis. The Amsterdam negotiations suggest that the distinction is now to be drawn between big states and small, old members and new, transatlanticism and Europeanism. Discussions of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) centered much more on a newly significant NATO rather than on the role of WEU.

The story Mazzucelli narrates is a fascinating one. The reader is taken inside negotiations in *cabinets*, ministerial offices and presidential palaces; in national parliaments, government conclaves, Commission meetings, and Council deliberations. We are given a detailed picture of the relationships developed at every level of the bureaucracy and between regional, national and Brussels bureaucracies. This is one of the best documented accounts I have seen of the manifold intricacies of EU politics and negotiation. Mazzucelli has an impressive command of both the primary and secondary materials in French, German, Italian and English. She is also a skilled and assiduous interviewer and has woven into her narrative information obtained over a period of several years. The book is impeccably footnoted and the 33-page bibliography is a mine of information. It is a pleasure to read a book produced with such care.

The narrative of France and Germany at Maastricht is only one part of the story and I almost wish that Mazzucelli had left it at that. But, as is to be expected of all good dissertations-turned-books, the other side of the story is the analytical and theoretical framework. Mazzucelli sought to use a framework of analysis incorporating three approaches to assess the extent of, and limits to, Franco-German cooperation during the Maastricht process: (1) Putnam's two-level games; (2) Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman's four images of civil servants; and (3) Monnet's approach. The analytical framework, she maintains, "is useful to explain the connections among three interrelated aspects of the Maastricht process: (1) the structural and institutional differences at the unit level between the main states involved ... (2) the contrast in the organization of key actors, politico-administrative hybrids (an unfortunate label which conjures up images of two-headed monsters) and bureaucratic personnel, at the domestic levels during the two IGCs ... (3) the multifaceted nature of the internal bargaining and external negotiations within each IGC, and between their agendas, as well as the subsequent impact on the French and German ratification processes."

Personally, I'm not at all happy with the obligation increasingly imposed on young scholars to encumber a first-rate narrative with such "analytical frameworks." The end product is a much less readable book. Mazzucelli's conclusion, therefore, has "Image III actors being transformed into Image IV hybrids." I am perfectly willing to accept, indeed agree with, the contentions made by the author that traditional theories of integration are not able to explain the *sui generis* nature of the IGC process and that a shared culture exists which is embedded in informal practices and formal procedures by which the participants in the IGC process become locked into a collective process of decision making at all levels of negotiation. Nonetheless, why can't we dispense with this other-worldly vocabulary that is a struggle even for well-informed academics

Readers interested in reviewing recent EU-related books for the ECSA Review are encouraged to contact the Book Review Editor:

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and experienced practitioners? Fortunately, the reader's life is made somewhat easier by the author's considerate placement of the analytical interpretation of the various events at the end of each corresponding chapter.

All this being said, France and Germany at Maastricht is very well worth reading. For those who know their way around EU institutions, this is an excellent and informative book. It adds to our understanding of EU negotiations and European integration in a significant way.

Glenda G. Rosenthal
Columbia University

Cees van der Eijk and Mark N. Franklin (eds.) Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996, 516 pp.

Hubert Heinelt and Randall Smith (eds.) Policy Networks and European Structural Funds Brookfield: Aldershot, 1996, 321 pp.

These two valuable books raise a pair of fundamental questions about the EU experiment. How can the Union gain greater legitimacy among member state voters? Should it even try to do so? The authors answer the latter with a firm yes, and have concrete proposals pertaining to the former. Both books provide a wealth of information and are to be recommended.

But that does not mean that the reader leaves either endeavor wholly satisfied. Indeed, for this reviewer, the very effort by both pairs of volume editors to press their cases ultimately leads to the underscoring—not from any fault of their own but due to the subject material—of their apparent weaknesses. For it becomes clear by the end of both books that the efforts to plant, or graft, the EU gospel into or onto the nation-state suffers from the thin local topsoil, let alone hostile terrain.

Let us take European Parliamentary elections (EPes) first. Van der Eijk and Franklin actually have some good news for EU fans. The potential exists, the authors reveal, for holding truly European elections: "Evidence is mounting ... that European voters already constitute a single electorate" (p.331). Eurovoters respond, namely, to the same political "cues," irrespective of their nationality, in EPes. Ideology and strategic choice are clearly most important, followed at "a considerable distance" by issue concerns and government approval. Perhaps surprisingly, postmaterialism "hardly matters" and new politics "trail far behind ... possibly even weaker than the effects of religion and class" (p.364).

Direct elections for the European Parliament (EP) were introduced in 1979 to provide the EC with greater democratic legitimacy via elections involving actual voter choice and legislative accountability. The EP's real but modest increases in powers to meet the traditional roles of the legislative branch in democratic government still leave doubts about its significance. Proponents of the EP say it needs increased powers; opponents say quite the opposite, and skeptics argue the EP should carry out current responsibilities more efficiently before coming back to the table of power for bigger portions.

This whole brouhaha, van der Eijk and Franklin underscore, is irrelevant because EU voters don't vote on EP issues. Only in Denmark do we see EPes being fought over European issues (pp.112, 366). Another exception to the rule arose in France in 1989 when socialist leaders wanted to divert attention from

intraparty squabbles and thus hoisted the European electoral flag (p.371). Even here, "there is little evidence to suggest that voting preferences were much influenced by anything other than domestic considerations." (p.115). Aside from these two cases, EPes "fail to function as proper mechanisms for directing and legitimating the conduct of European affairs..." (p.4). Indeed, party electoral success in EPes is "almost exclusively determined by the course of national political developments and events" (p. 272).

Why is this so? The list of guilty parties is long, and known. Sometimes EPes come so close on the heels of national, municipal or local elections that "voter fatigue" (my phrase, not that of the authors) plays an important role. Voter turnout for EPes hovers around 60%, while that for national elections is in the 80% neighborhood (in several EU countries EPes have made electoral history ... for lowest voter turnout). Large political parties, moreover, are hesitant to emphasize European issues during EPes for fear of revealing real splits within their own parties on the issues. The media prefer, for their part, to stress domestic issues during EPe campaign season, and thus the electorate receives little pertinent information. Partly because of this, EU voters know little about EU institutions or the workings and doings of the EP. So when an EPe is held, very few voters know, in essence, what it is about. Legitimacy thus becomes an irrelevant issue.

If EPes do not perform their most important function, do they have any impact at all? Yes they do. Sometimes they can invigorate political movements, both left (Greens in Britain and France), and the right (Front National in France and the Republikaner in Germany). These effects can be ephemeral, however (Republikaner moved into the EP in 1989 and were thrown out in 1994; Greens in Britain could not capitalize on their new found fortune). Voters can also send a signal to governments that they are displeased, and governments can fine-tune programs. This was the case in Germany and France with immigration after the 1989 EP elections saw far-right movements gain footholds (governments can also ignore these signals, as was the case in Belgium [p.74] and Britain [p.96] after the same EPes).

The authors thus argue that perhaps the most important function of EPes is as a "pressure release," a tool voters can use to signal governments of their displeasure via "quasi-switching," so that during first-order elections for national governments they can act truer to rational self-interest, and not as protest voters (p.305). But "steam regulation" is not the purpose of EP elections. How to come closer to their intended function? The main suggestion the authors have is to open up the meetings of the Council of Ministers so that governments are compelled to account for their activities in an EU setting. Moreover, funding for EPes should be increased substantially so that Europarties could put together real platforms, and the voters genuinely educated on the EP issues (pp.379-381).

Yet as the authors themselves concede, "it is hard to see national party leaders voluntarily taking the steps that we hypothesize..." (p.381). There is, indeed, the rub. Caesar had to cross the Rubicon for compelling reasons. Do national parties in EU states face a similarly urgent logic? The authors maintain, yes, but do not make a very strong case for this, arguing that, ultimately, not conducting EU elections on EU issues could endanger the EU. After compiling so much impressive statistical evidence as to what shapes EPes, they provide scant evidence indeed for this latter assertion (presented in its entirety on p. 385).

The nature of contemporary politics does not offer much encouraging news for their hope that with a proper education in EP issues, which the authors concede are complex if not arcane, then EU citizens can make real and valid EP electoral choices. The most recent national elections in France and Great Britain show to what extent mass marketing has taken over electoral

politics. And mass marketing has an overarching principle: keep the message unified and simple.

Successful politicians have actually known that for a long time. Perhaps the most successful political message, in terms of clarity and ease with which to remember it, is to tell voters just how you have lined their pockets. European Structural Funds (ESF) are a case in point. Perhaps these funds are a way to "fertilize" the European soil out of which a true European politics can grow (sort of along the Brechtian linear logic regarding bread and morality). But as van der Eijk and Franklin note, most politicians in EU state shape their EU message as either (a) how they have held Brussels at bay or (b) how they have milked Brussels for all the cream it is worth.

Heinelt and Smith show how this logic reigns in the realm of ESF. That is not their ultimate point in this fine work that they have edited. They and their co-authors set out to explore to what extent policy networks shape ESF policy. There are two types of policy networks: the vertical version concerns relations from Brussels down to local officials; the horizontal type consists of cooperation between regional public and private interests. To what extent either type exists depends largely upon the state in which they are ensclosed. London (p.108) and Paris (p.143) guard their powers jealously. Madrid (p.229) oversees a state of autonomous regions that must all come to and through it to get to Brussels, and vice versa. The Netherlands has perhaps the closest match between Brussels intentions with ESF as envisioned with the 1998 reforms (plus 1993 revisions), and reality (p.181).

These aforementioned reforms prioritize integrated planning, partnership and subsidiarity. Also emphasized is social dialogue between local communities, labor, and capital in planning and implementation of ESF projects. These factors do come together at times, as shown for Lower Saxony where "innovation networks" (p.301) have been constructed to deal with sectoral crises in shipbuilding and steel.

But what becomes clear after finishing this informative book is that while the money emanates from Brussels, the ultimate logic behind the politics is national. When the Dutch increased their funding for ESF, they made sure to get most of it back through tough bargaining (doubling their budget for 1994-99; pp.179, 189). In Spain, we are told, programs are devised largely to assure the milking of the Euro cash cow (p. 238). Politicians hail the bounty not as the spread of Europe, but as their ability to take care of their constituencies. Brussels might request local authorities to put up signs saying, "This project funded by the European Union." But locals conclude that it is because of our savvy politicians, not because Brussels has a better vision.

So are there policy networks at play with ESF? In the end it's hard to say. Part of the problem has to do with the research design of the book. Most chapters lay out a brief theoretical structure and then delve into a case study. But in many of these—West Midlands (p.115), Valencia (p.231), Emilia-Romagna (p.222)—the authors take pains to underline how unrepresentative the case study can well be for the country as a whole. So what is the reader to make of the findings? This is a perennial problem with case studies, to be sure, but that does not make it any less perennially frustrating.

The other problem with studying policy networks is the nature of their very being. Federal states like Germany allow legally for their existence between local authorities and Brussels. The Netherlands has a tradition of vertical and horizontal policy cooperation. But even Bonn and Amsterdam insist that they have the sole right to negotiate treaties with the EU. Other member countries insist with varying degrees of vigor that they control the planning of structural projects, even their implementation. Which

means that Brussels and non central-state authorities, plus local notables, understand that for them to establish substantive policy networks, much of it must be behind-the-scenes. Phone calls that never took place. That is something hard to research. A point the authors concede elliptically when observing that formal network structures do not necessarily tell the entire tale (p.306).

What then is the impact of policy networks, to the extent that they exist, in the realm of ESF? Well, that depends of course on trying to discern how ESF politics would look with, and without, policy networks. This is well nigh an impossible task. Just take the task of assessing what role ESF has on local economies. A telling point here is that most countries have in place no rigorous method of measuring ESF impact. There is actually no data available to assess what would happen with, and without, the aid. Thus, the authors conclude, "a sound basis for the planning and evaluation of a regional structural policy does not exist" (p.65). Perhaps that is the case because, well, it is beside the point. Maybe the most important point of ESF is seen from a national perspective, to be able to show that the money has been cashiered, and not its ultimate impact. The European Commission's nomenclature of territorial units for statistics is ... NUTS.

However measured, the impact of ESF has been modest. The authors point out how structural projects have failed in the past. ESF cannot be used, history shows, to start regional networks from scratch. And planners have no interest in building more "cathedrals in the desert." Where ESF can be most effective, the authors maintain, is to help regional synergies—those already underway—to keep their momentum via infrastructure projects and human capital improvements (pp.313-314).

Fair enough. But that begs the obvious question, why does the money have to go from national capitals to Brussels, and then back to the local region, for what must be obvious to state planners in the first place? Perhaps because this increases the visibility of the EU. But as noted, national politicians do all they can to reduce this regarding ESF. As underscored in the chapter on France and ESF: "EU policies only exist once each member state has put them into effect through their respective domestic political systems" (p.162).

In these two rewarding books we thus learn to what extent national political parties are unwilling to try experiments with power to promote the European cause via the European Parliament, and how the same logic guides states regarding ESF. Voters, consumers, citizens are not pushing either foci of power to do so. The European soil in which the EU seeks to thrive is thus made of elite and mass composites, and is, to be sure, generally receptive to Brussels. But whether national beliefs and traditions allow the EU gospel to sprout in home soil, even if fertilized heavily with politically noble messages or financial goodies, is uncertain. Perhaps that is why organic farming is making a comeback.

Crister S. Garrett
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William Wallace and Helen Wallace (eds.) Policy-Making in the European Union (3rd Ed.) New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, 509 pp.

At a time when scholars and the general public are becoming more interested in the European Union, many authors and editors are attempting to pull together an overview of the EU as both an institution and a policy-making body. Helen Wallace and William

Wallace have once again proven that this daunting task can indeed be accomplished in a single publication. In the third edition of a previously published title, Policy-Making in the European Union presents a new conceptual framework while following a pattern that has performed well in two previous volumes. As such it is intelligible to the general public and to the student while remaining interesting to the scholar.

The volume does not pretend to present ground-breaking research. However, the editors have managed to assemble a collection of essays—fourteen in all—that give good overviews of nearly every major policy issue that the EU touches. In addition, they provide a conceptual framework for understanding these policy areas, insisting that the road to supranationalism is in no way a straight path upon which a reversal to intergovernmentalism is impossible. Supranationalist progress, they maintain, is often countered by the move to intergovernmentalism, much as the swing of the pendulum to the left is countered by the move back to the right. Over the course of the history of the European experiment, this swing has occurred many times. First, a turn arises toward integration. That turn is followed by a reactionary move to intergovernmentalism and often produces stagnation. The introductory chapters and the conclusion that discuss this process and the institutions that are involved in it prove to be a useful tool in analyzing the central chapters on policy areas, because it is not difficult to apply this idea to every distinct EU issue (if indeed a "distinct issue" exists in policy-making). Some of the policy area essays are very good while others seem somewhat lacking.

The essays on the Single Market and on the banana regime are particularly well organized. Helen Wallace and Alasdair Young have produced a "thumbnail sketch" of a giant topic in their essay on the Single Market. They include history, goals, and results in a compact essay that is easy to follow and does not lose complexity. The chapter demonstrates, moreover, how each step to the Single Market was taken, who was involved, why, and the outcomes of the battles that were fought. Christopher Stevens' chapter on EU banana policy is equally well written. He has provided a detailed glimpse at a single facet of Union policy-making. Stevens demonstrates how old colonial ties and state preferences can influence internal policy-making and how internal policy impacts external relations. This attempt to demonstrate the external impacts of internal market politics seems much more narrowly focused than many—indeed, most—of the other essays included in the volume.

Economic and Monetary Union: The Primacy of High Politics delves into the politics of the EMU and casts light onto that complex subject. The essay is a good example of many authors' attempts to demonstrate the interconnectedness of policy areas. Lukas Tsoukalis makes tying the EMU to other policy areas a defined goal. EMU is important for economic reasons, but "money has also frequently been seen as an instrument for the achievement of wider political objectives" (p.280). He demonstrates how political considerations (along with economic concerns) can influence politics over EMU.

Anthony Forster and William Wallace tackle the complex issue of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) in their essay. The authors give admirable treatment to the history of this primarily intergovernmental and wholly controversial area. From the early days of European Political Cooperation to the GATT negotiations and the Maastricht compromises, the authors trace both developments in the CFSP and their consequences in the world. They conclude that the current situation, in which practitioners are seemingly feeling their way through a maze of compromises, is unstable and imply that progress in the CFSP is slow and difficult.

Several of the essays are unnecessarily complex. The issues themselves are complicated enough without the added impediment to understanding that less well-ordered explanations can produce. However, these chapters are far outweighed by exceptional work that presents the most difficult issues so that the non-expert can grasp them.

Overall, Policy-Making in the European Union is a good reference for the scholar and a good introduction for the student. This is a volume that will be most welcome among those who are currently in search of a good textbook for an undergraduate class on the European Union. It is also a great reference tool in understanding those subject areas outside of a scholar's particular slice of European Union studies. The volume is both coherent within the essays and as a whole, as a third edition should be. It will likely become an even greater standard than its predecessors.

Heather A. Denton
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Peter B. Kenen. Economic and Monetary Union in Europe: Moving Beyond Maastricht. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 219+ pp.

K. B. Gaynor and E. Karakitsos. Economic Convergence in a Multispeed Europe. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997, 265+ pp.

Kenen's Economic and Monetary Union in Europe should be required reading for anyone interested in what the Maastricht treaty says—and does not say—about design of, and transition to, monetary union. Kenen begins the book with a useful overview of the origins of monetary union that sets the stage for the remaining, more analytical chapters. The second chapter details the compromises made during the intergovernmental conference of 1991 that culminated in the Maastricht treaty, including when the final stage of monetary union would begin and the mandate and organization of the European Central Bank. Kenen usefully begins the chapter by exploring the political origins of the content of the treaty, emphasizing German negotiators' insistence that a European Central Bank be independent of political interference and that the transition to full monetary union be lengthy.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 focus on the implementation of a single monetary policy in stage three of monetary union. Throughout, Kenen combines a close reading of the Maastricht treaty with insights from the economic literature to highlight how monetary union might work in practice. He first addresses questions of linking national payments systems, the use of monetary aggregates and interest rate policies, and possible roles for national central banks, and then turns to the treaty's constraints on fiscal policy and identifies a number of possible effects of monetary union on the international system.

Many readers might find chapters 6 and 7 most pertinent to contemporary concerns, since they deal with the transition to stage three of monetary union. Kenen begins by defining the four major "convergence criteria" required for participation in stage three, which constrain fiscal policy, governments' debt stocks, interest rates, and exchange rate stability. (Interestingly, he notes that a close reading of the treaty reveals that the European Council does not need to treat these as "necessary conditions" for participation in monetary union, although it likely will do so.) Although Kenen does not lay out in great detail precisely why politicians negotiated these criteria and not others, he does

Academic Programs

explore what economic theory says about their desirability. The most interesting part deals with "slow-track countries" unlikely to participate in full monetary union from the beginning; he notes that the Maastricht treaty does not deal with the possible political and economic problems to which a multispeed monetary union could give rise. Of course, things have changed since the publication of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe in 1995 and policymakers have addressed many of the concerns Kenen raises, but the book remains an excellent guide to how these developments relate to the Maastricht treaty.

Gaynor and Karakitsos' Economic Convergence in a Multispeed Europe is a nice accompaniment to Kenen's book because the authors address the question of how European countries can minimize the pain of economic convergence on the path toward monetary union. The premise of the book is that countries fall into distinct groups that face very different problems in achieving convergence; these range from a "core" group that has achieved significant inflation, exchange rate, fiscal policy, and government debt convergence and is in the best position to form a monetary union (Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands), a "median" group whose convergence has not proceeded as quickly (Italy, Portugal, and Spain), and a "peripheral" group that has experienced very little convergence (Greece, and by implication, countries in eastern Europe that may want to join a monetary union in the future). The authors argue that failure to acknowledge these differences could actually undermine the political cohesion of the community and popular support for integration, arguing that would be "a recipe not only for economic pain, but also for conservatism in policy making since unanimous agreement is so hard to achieve" (p.3).

The bulk of the book uses general equilibrium, multi-country models with specified fiscal and monetary reaction functions for representative countries (France and Germany for the core, Spain for the median, and Greece for the periphery) to simulate the economic effects of various policy options. These simulations lead the authors to conclude that the optimal convergence path for the periphery is a gradualist strategy of stabilizing first fiscal policy and then the exchange rate. In contrast, for the median group the problem is to achieve convergence relatively quickly without aggravating unemployment; this goal, they argue, would best be achieved by retargeting monetary policy to exploit the current wide bands of the exchange-rate mechanism. Finally, for the core group of countries that already has achieved a significant degree of convergence, the key question is how to use fiscal policy under a full monetary union, and their simulations lead them to conclude that greater flexibility would allow countries to deal with real but not monetary shocks.

In sum, these books provide different but complimentary accounts of the path to monetary union. Kenen's work combines sophisticated economic insights with expert institutional knowledge to highlight remaining political and economic difficulties involved in the transition to and operation of monetary union. Economic Convergence in a Multispeed Europe takes the political strictures of the Maastricht treaty as given, and provides a variety of medium-term forecasts to plot the likely consequences of the attempt to achieve convergence.

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The following is a partial list of EU-related academic programs. Please contact each program directly for information on instructional staff, accreditation, courses, policies, fees and application materials and deadlines.

The **Trans-Atlantic Master's Program** is a new program designed to train experts in transatlantic politics and culture. Students have the unique opportunity to study at universities on both sides of the Atlantic, while undertaking an integrated academic program leading to a master's degree. Graduates have a comparative understanding of transatlantic similarities, as well as specialist expertise on a particular nation. The 12-month program is divided into core, national, specialist and thesis modules. The 1998-99 class will receive their degrees from the universities where they complete their theses.

A consortium of nine universities is cooperating to provide the first transatlantic graduate degree: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (the lead U.S. university); University of Bath; Universidad Carlos III, Madrid; Duke University; Freie Universität Berlin; Humboldt Universität zu Berlin; Université de Paris III; Università degli Studi di Siena; and University of Washington, Seattle. For more information please visit this Web site: <<http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe>> or e-mail to <europe@email.unc.edu>.

Central European University (CEU) is now accepting applications for the 1998-99 academic year for students from any countries. CEU is an internationally recognized institution of post-graduate education in the social sciences based in Budapest, Hungary, with the exception of the department of sociology, located in Warsaw, Poland. CEU offers master's and Ph.D. degrees in European Studies and an interdisciplinary master's program in Southeast European Studies. For additional information and application materials, please contact CEU Admissions Office, Nador u 9, 1051 Budapest, Hungary; telephone 36 1 327 3009; fax 36 1 327 3211; e-mail <admissions@ceu.hu>; Web site <<http://www.ceu.hu>>.

The **German-American Center for Visiting Scholars (CVS)** is a new initiative of the German government to strengthen transatlantic relations in culture, education, and science. As part of that effort, the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, the German Historical Institute, and the German-American Academic Council (GAAC) have jointly established the CVS in Washington, DC. Beginning January 1, 1998, the CVS will enable eight young German and American scientists and scholars, especially from humanities and social sciences, to do research in Washington for up to six months. Rent subsidies may be granted. Please contact the GAAC, 1055 Thomas Jefferson St. NW, Washington, DC 20007 USA; telephone 202 296 2991; fax 202 833 8514; e-mail to <gaac@pop.access.digex.net>.

Grants and Fellowships

ECSA Delegation Fellowships are semester-long opportunities to work as information officers in the Office of Press and Public Affairs at the Delegation of the European Commission, Washington, DC. Contingent on an approved funding request, two ECSA Fellows will be selected for the Fall 1998 semester to participate in the program, which requires a full-time commitment for four months and includes a \$3000 stipend for the semester. Fellows work closely with a staff member in a division of Public Affairs, responding to inquiries on EU matters from U.S. government agencies, think tanks, embassies, academics and the general public.

Applicants must be U.S. citizens and should be senior undergraduate or graduate students of information sciences, international relations, diplomacy, political science, European studies or a related field, with a demonstrated interest in European Union studies. Ability to speak French is helpful but not required. Application deadline is April 1, 1998. Applicants should submit to the ECSA Administrative Office (address given on page 27): 1) application letter addressed to the Selection Committee with a statement of interest in and qualifications for the fellowship; 2) current transcript(s); 3) current résumé or curriculum vita; and 4) three letters of recommendation specifically addressing this fellowship.

ECSA Curriculum Development Grants are being offered for the 1998-99 academic year. Contingent on approval of our funding request, up to four awards of \$3000 each will be made to faculty at U.S. academic institutions developing new or revising previously taught courses on the European Union. These grants fund the acquisition or development of new materials on the EU, not staff effort or capital expenditures.

Applicants must be ECSA members or affiliated with institutions which are ECSA members, and must submit to the ECSA Administrative Office four copies each of: 1) letter of application with rationale for the course; 2) curriculum vita (short version acceptable); 3) detailed proposed course syllabus; 4) itemized budget; and 5) letter of support from departmental or division sponsor. NB: Funds will be disbursed to the institution, not the individual faculty member. Application deadline is April 1, 1998. Please contact Valerie Staats at the ECSA Administrative Office (telephone 412 648 7635 or e-mail <ecs+a@pitt.edu>) to discuss ideas and proposals which have been successful in previous years.

Berlin Program for Advanced German and European Studies announces its doctoral and post-doctoral fellowships for the 1998-89 academic year. The program is open to full-time graduate students enrolled in doctoral programs in the United States or Canada or Ph.D.s who have received the doctorate within the past two calendar years from a North American institution. Fellowships are awarded for up to twelve months for doctoral dissertation field research as well as postdoctoral research leading to the completion of a monograph. The award includes travel to the Freie Universität Berlin, a monthly stipend and some support of intra-European

research travel. The next application deadline is February 3, 1998. Please contact the Social Science Research Council, 810 Seventh Avenue, 31st Flr., New York, NY 10019; tel. 212 377 2700; fax 212 377 2727; e-mail <berlin@ssrc.org>.

Curriculum Development Program of the **Central European University** announces its Spring 1998 sessions for teachers and professionals in the social sciences and humanities for teaching in Central/Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Applicants must be university teachers or professionals in the target region who are preparing new or revising previously taught courses. Sessions will be conducted in English. All costs related to transportation and accommodations during the week-long sessions will be covered. Sessions relevant to EU studies are "International Relations and European Studies," February 16-22, 1998, and "Southeast European Studies," March 2-8, 1998. Application deadline is December 17, 1997. Please contact Curriculum Resource Centre, Central European University, Nador u 9, 1051 Budapest, Hungary; telephone 36 1 327 3189; fax 36 1 327 3190; e-mail <crc@ceu.hu>; Web <<http://www.ceu.hu/crc>>.

The **French-American Foundation** is offering **Bicentennial Fellowships** in 1998-99 for outstanding new scholars whose dissertation requires extensive research in France. These one-year full fellowships are open to U.S. doctoral students to support research on all aspects of French society and culture. Applicants may be doctoral students in anthropology, art history, history, French language and literature, political science, sociology, or an interdisciplinary program. Application deadline is February 2, 1998. Please contact the French-American Foundation, 41 East 72nd Street, New York, NY 10021; telephone 212 288-4400; fax 212 288 4769; e-mail <french_amerfdn@msn.com>.

Albert Gallatin Fellowships are available to U.S. citizen doctoral students whose dissertation research involves some aspect of international studies and who can spend the 1998-99 academic year at the Geneva Institute in Switzerland. Fellows must have a working proficiency in French and will receive a stipend plus round-trip travel between New York and Geneva. Application deadline is March 1, 1998. Address inquiries to the Albert Gallatin Fellowship, International Studies Office, 208 Minor Hall, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903; telephone 804 982 3010; fax 804 982 3011.

International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) offers **Short-Term Travel Grants** for scholarly projects in the social sciences and humanities that focus on Central and Eastern Europe, Eurasia or Mongolia. Applicants must be U.S. citizens or permanent residents and hold a Ph.D. or equivalent terminal degree. The grants generally do not exceed \$3000 and cover airfare on a U.S. airline, per diem, conference registration and miscellaneous research expenses. Projects should seek to advance knowledge of the above-named regions in the U.S. academic community. Application deadline is February 1, 1998. Further information and an application are available on the IREX Web site at <<http://www.irex.org>> or at IREX, 1616 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20006; e-mail <irex@irex.org>.

Conferences and Workshops

Television and European Community Law

November 3-4, 1997, Trier, Germany: The Academy of European Law, Trier, sponsors this conference to examine the legal regulation of cross-border television, particularly in the wake of the European television without borders directive. Conference in English and German (simultaneous translation). (The Academy offers practice-oriented conferences and continuing education programs in most fields of EC law). Contact the Academy of European Law, Dasbachstrasse 10, D-54292 Trier, Germany; telephone 49 651 147 100; facsimile 49 651 147 1020; e-mail <eratrier@msn.com>.

British Leadership for a Federal Europe?

December 11-12, 1997, London, UK: The Lothian Foundation sponsors this conference on the role which Britain will play in the EU during the next decade, starting with an analysis of the British Presidency in 1998. ECSA members Emil Kirchner, Jolyon Howorth, John Peterson, Peter Marsh, Kevin Featherstone and Francis McGowan are among the presenters. This conference will be of particular interest to historians, political scientists, lawyers and policy makers. The Lothian Foundation aims to educate the public on achieving better relations between citizens of the EC and other peoples, particularly those of the USA. Contact the Secretary, Lothian Foundation, 5 Great James Street, London WC1N 3DA, UK; telephone 44 171 242 2959; fax 44 171 404 8586.

Global Impacts of a European Monetary Union

December 15, 1997, Columbia, South Carolina: Sponsored by the Walker Institute of International Studies at the University of South Carolina, this conference will examine the implications of a single currency and common monetary policy for EU member states, as well as EMU's implications for the US dollar, the Japanese yen, trade and payments of Third World countries, and the financial operations of major multinational enterprises. Theodor Waigel, Minister of Finance of the Federal Republic of Germany, will be honored at the conference. Contact the Walker Institute of International Studies, Gambrell Hall, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208; telephone 803 777 8180; fax 803 777 9308; e-mail <iis@garnet.cla.sc.edu>.

Europe and the Regions

February 12-14, 1998, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands: Organized by the Faculty of Public Administration and Public Policy at the University of Twente, this conference will examine the issue of governance in EU

regional policy, with sessions on democracy in Europe; multi-level governance and sovereignty; equity versus efficiency; social capital; inter alia. Please contact Professors Ron Boschma or Rob Schobben, University of Twente, Faculty of Public Administration and Public Policy, P. O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands; fax 31 53 489 4682; e-mail either <r.a.boschma@bsk.utwente.nl> or <r.j.p.schobben@bsk.utwente.nl>.

Europe at the End of the Millennium

February 25-March 1, 1998, Baltimore, MD: This is the eleventh international conference of the Council for European Studies, Columbia University, for social scientists and historians who seek to address matters of broad concern to students of Europe. Possible themes include Cities and Regions; Legacies of European Empires; Gendering European Studies; and Political, Economic, and Cultural Aspects of European Integration, inter alia. Hotel reservations must be made by January 26, 1998. Visit the Council's Web site at <<http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ces>> or contact Council for European Studies, Columbia University, 807 International Affairs Bldg., New York, NY 10027; telephone 212 854 4172; fax 212 854 8808; e-mail <ces@columbia.edu>.

The Fuzzy Edges of Community

May 29-31, 1998, University of Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: ECSA Canada announces its third annual meeting, designed to explore the emergence of regional systems in Europe and North and South America; these are either institutionalized or centered on the European Union, NAFTA, or Mercosur. Whether intergovernmental or supranational in structure, regional systems have profound consequences both for the states who belong to them and those which border on or deal with them. Regional systems can affect the focus and intensity of political attachments and in doing so, may be reshaping communities. Regional communities may be emerging and national communities may be weakening; thus, political communities may increasingly have "fuzzy edges." Topics for exploration may include but are not limited to:

- Circumstances leading to the emergence of regional systems;
- Institutional forms, including relationships which emerge not only among member states, but also with neighboring states (those at the fuzzy edge);
- The degree to which regional systems reshape political identities and affect individuals' definition of community;
- The extent to which regional systems erode, compromise, or "pool" national sovereignty;
- The degree to which regional systems alter or reshape political processes within participating states (impact on parties, interest organizations, etc.);
- The effect of regional systems on commerce, including trade, industrial restructuring and labor relations.

ECSA Canada meetings operate as workshops, and organizers hope to maintain this format in 1998 by minimizing time for presentation of papers and maximizing time for discussion; ECSA Canada would like all the conference papers to be posted on their Web site by April 30, 1998.

Contact the conference organizers: Peter Leslie, Dept. of Political Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada; e-mail <lesliep@qsilver.queensu.ca> or David Long, School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6, Canada; e-mail <dlong@ccs.carleton.ca>. ECSA Canada Chair is Steven Wolinetz, Dept. of Political Science, Memorial University, St. John's, Newfoundland A1B 3X9, Canada; e-mail <ecsac@morgan.ucs.mun.ca>.

The Single Currency

September 1998 [dates not given], Brussels, Belgium: Organized by the ECSA Secretariat (DG-X), European Commission, this international conference will investigate institutional, economic and international aspects of the single currency. Please contact the ECSA Secretariat, 67, rue de Trèves, B-1040 Bruxelles, Belgium; telephone 32 2 230 5472; fax 32 2 230 5608; e-mail <ecsac@pophost.eunet.be>.

Research

Euristote: University Research on European Integration

Of great interest to ECSA USA members, Euristote is the primary archive of university research on European integration. It holds over 22,000 references to university research (such as doctoral theses and post-doctoral research) now being conducted or completed since 1960, in over 350 universities throughout the world. Euristote also contains a list of professors who research European integration and a list of universities, research centers and institutions (with all contact information) involved in researching European integration. Euristote is a project of the European Commission (DG-X) and the European University Institute.

To keep this resource up to date, the organizers of Euristote seek new entries with the following qualifications:

- university doctoral or post-doctoral level research;
- primary research, rather than literature reviews or other secondary-level research;
- relevant to the study of European integration, excluding comparative research and general European studies;
- published since 1994 or an ongoing research project.

ECSA USA has posted Euristote as a link on its Web site, under "What's New" on the home page, including the full questionnaire. Scholars whose research meets the above criteria are encouraged to complete the form on-line and return it by e-mail via the site. Visit ECSA's Web site at <<http://www.pitt.edu/~ecs101>>.

Publications

State of the European Union, Volume 4

Edited by Pierre-Henri Laurent and Marc Maresceau, the fourth in ECSA's series of edited collections on timely EU topics is now available from Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. State of the European Union, Vol. 4: Widening and Deepening, contains essays on the three IGCs (Desmond Dinan); reforming the CFSP (Michael E. Smith); northern enlargement and EU decision-making (John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg); the EU and women (R. Amy Elman); EU/US relations (Roy H. Ginsberg); and other related topics. To order, please contact Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1800 30th Street (314), Boulder, CO 80301; fax 303 444 0824; telephone 303 444 6684.

European Programme Working Papers

"An Overview of Political and Economic Prospects for the Baltic States," Heather Grabbe (Working Paper No. 4), and "The UK Economy in the EU: Performance and Integration Statistics," Ed Smith (Working Paper No. 5) have been released by the European Programme, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, London SW1Y 4LE, UK; e-mail <ep@riia.org>.

Contemporary European Studies Working Papers

"The Economic and Industrial Aspects of Anti-Dumping Policy," Peter Holmes and Jeremy Kempton (SEI Working Paper No. 22) has been released by the Sussex European Institute, University of Sussex, Arts A Building, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9QN, UK; e-mail <sei@sussex.ac.uk>.

European Dossier Series

New titles for 1997, "EU-East Asia Economic Relations," Christopher Dent (No. 42); "Ukraine and the EU," Marko Bojcun (No. 43); "Social Europe: A New Model of Welfare?" Norman Ginsberg (No. 44); "Alternative Paths to Monetary Union." Valerio Lintner (No. 45); "Gender and Citizenship in the EU," Sarah Vaughn-Roberts (No. 46), have been released by the European Dossier Series, London European Research Centre, Faculty of Humanities, 166-220 Holloway Road, London N7 8DB, UK; e-mail <lerc@unl.ac.uk>.

Contemporary European History

Encompassing Eastern and Western Europe from about 1918 to present, this triannual journal is available from Cambridge University Press, 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011; e-mail <journals_marketing@cup.cam.ac.uk>; on the Web at <<http://www.cup.cam.ac.uk>>; telephone 800 872 7423.

Regional and Federal Studies: An International Journal

Frank Cass Publishers publishes a trinannual referred journal as named above, edited by ECSA members John Loughlin, Michael Keating, and Charlie Jeffery, inter alia. Recent articles have covered the Committee of the Regions, the Basque Country, devolution in the UK, Quebec, and election and documentation reports. NB: ECSA members will receive a 20% reduction in the introductory subscription rate. Frank Cass also announces a new Regional and Federal Studies book series. Visit the Frank Cass Web site at <<http://www.frankcass.co>> or e-mail <sales@frankcass.com>.

Monitoring European Integration

The Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) publishes this report series annually, begun in 1990. Report titles follow; Contact CEPR at 25-28 Old Burlington Street, London W1X 1LB, UK; e-mail <cepr@cepr.org>:

- No.1 "The Impact of Eastern Europe," David Begg et alia.
- No.2 "The Making of Monetary Union," David Begg et alia.
- No.3 "Is Bigger Better? The Economics of EC Enlargement," Richard Baldwin et alia.
- No.4 "Making Sense of Subsidiarity: How Much Centralization for Europe?" by David Begg et alia.
- No.5 "Unemployment: Choices for Europe," George Alogoskoufis et alia.
- No.6 "Flexible Integration: Towards a More Effective and Democratic Europe," Mathias Dewatripont et alia.
- No.7 "EMU: Getting the End-game Right," by David Begg et alia.

The Single Market Review

Kogan Page, Ltd. announces the U.S. publication of this report series published on behalf of the European Commission. The 39 reports examine the effects of economic union on European industry and are written by European experts. The Single Market Review is organized in six series: Impact on Manufacturing; Impact on Services; Dismantling of Barriers; Impact on Trade and Investment; Impact on Competition; Aggregate and Regional Impact. Contact Kogan Page at 163 Central Avenue (Suite 4), Dover, NH 03820; e-mail <bizbks@aol.com>.

Forward Studies Unit "Cahiers"

The Forward Studies Unit was established by the European Commission in 1989 to follow the process of European integration. The fifteen-member multidisciplinary research team investigates the issues which affect European integration and the future of the EU. The Unit has launched a new publication series, "Cahiers," and recently issue the first number, "The Future of North-South Relations: Towards Sustainable Economic and Social Development" (1997: 1). The Unit projects future numbers in the series on Mediterranean society

(dialogue among Islam, Judaism and Christianity); a more coherent global economic order; and the shaping actors, shaping factors in Russia. Contact the EC Forward Studies Unit, ARCH-25, 200, rue de la Loi, B-1049 Bruxelles, Belgium; fax 32 2 295 2305.

CEPII Newsletter

Published by the Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII), this is a free newsletter in English containing short research articles and announcements of interest to economists who study Europe. The current issue (1997: 1) includes articles on banking and finance and the euro and exchange rate stability. Contact Sylvie Hurion, CEPII, 9, rue Georges Pitard, 75740 Paris Cedex 15, France; fax 33 1 53 68 55 03; e-mail <postmaster@cepii.fr>.

World Wide Web Sites

The following annotated list highlights new or newly-discovered World Wide Web sites of interest to EU scholars. NB: All Web site addresses must be preceded by http:// which has been omitted here for the sake of brevity.

<www.europa.eu.int> "Europa" is the official server and multilingual Web site of the European Union. The Council, the Commission, the Parliament and the Courts post their news here, along with a wealth of EU information from a basic primer to official publications to a chat room on the Amsterdam Treaty. This site is so complete and important for EU scholars that it will be mentioned in every *ECSA Review*.

<www.gksoft.com/gov> "Governments on the World Wide Web" is an award-winning Web site that is an index to more than 6800 government sites on the Web, including all fifteen EU member states individually and the EU as an entity. Examples of types of sites indexed: parliaments, embassies, city councils, ministries, law courts, and public broadcasting institutions, sorted by more than 161 countries and territories.

<www.prom.org> Prometheus-Europe is a non-governmental organization which aims to analyze European integration and the information provided to the public about it; they are "putting the meaning back into the European construction process." With branches in all fifteen member states, this organization is currently sponsoring a year-long (1997-98) seminar in 23 European cities called "Tomorrow the Euro."

<www.eurunion.org> "The European Union in the US" is the site of the EU's representation in the United States, including the Delegations in Washington and New York. In addition to links on information resources, the EU-US Partnership, and policies and legislation, the site includes a highly valuable and comprehensive alphabetical list of all the Web sites of the EU's institutions and agencies, indexed by subject. Go straight to it at <www.eurunion.org/infores/euindex.htm>.

New Book Titles

- Jeffrey Doerr (1997) The Arming of a European Superstate.
Burke, VA: Chatelaine Press.
- Michael Keating and John Loughlin (eds.) (1997) The Political Economy of Regionalism. (London: Frank Cass).
- Stephen Overturf (1997) Money and European Union.
New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Ruth Pitchford and Adam Cox (eds.) (1997) EMU Explained: A Guide to Markets and Monetary Union. Reuters.
- Horst Ungerer (1997). A Concise History of European Monetary Integration: From EPU to EMU. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing.
- Werner Weidenfeld and Wolfgang Wessels (1997) Europe from A to Z: Guide to European Integration.
Luxembourg: European Commission.
- Peter Xuereb (ed.) (1997) The Individual in the European Union and Malta: Some Central Issues. Malta:
European Documentation and Research Centre.

Calls for Papers

Pan-European International Relations Conference, seeks paper proposals from EU specialists for the September 1998 conference in Vienna, Austria (joint meeting with International Studies Association). Paper proposal deadline is March 31, 1998 and should be submitted to one of these panel topics/chairs:

- "Enlarging the EU: The East-Central Dimension"
Convenor: Meltem Muftuler-Bac, Bilkent University; e-mail <meltem@bilkent.edu.tr>; fax 90 312 266 4948.
- "Enlarging the EU: The Mediterranean Dimension"
Convenor: Atilla Agh, Budapest University of Economics; e-mail <agh@ursus.bke.hu>; fax 36 1 218 8049.
- "Security Dilemmas of the European Union"
Convenor: Hazel Smith, London Centre of International Relations; e-mail <h.a.smith@ukc.ac.uk>; fax 44 171 955 7611.
- "The Common Foreign and Security Policy After EU Enlargement"
Convenor: Paul Luig, Austrian Institute for International Affairs; e-mail <100277.747@compuserve.com>; fax 43 2236 72 514.
- "International Politics of the European Union"
Convenor: Geoffrey Edwards, University of Cambridge; e-mail <gre1000@cus.cam.ac.uk>; fax 44 1227 827 033.
- "The European Union as a Negotiated Order"
Convenor: Michael Smith, Loughborough University; e-mail <m.h.smith@lboro.ac.uk>; fax 44 1509 223 917.
- "The EU and Democracy in the Global System"
Convenor: Fulvio Attina, University of Catania; e-mail <fattina@sistemia.it>; fax 39 95 533 128.

"The Impact of EU Membership on the Foreign Policies of its Member States"
Convenor: Ian J. Manners, University of Kent at Canterbury; e-mail <i.j.manners@ukc.ac.uk>; fax 44 1227 827 848.

"The Santer Commission and World Politics"
Convenor: Federiga Bindi-Calussi, European University Institute; e-mail <bindi@datacomm.iue.it>; fax 39 55 234 6035.

Research Institute for European Studies (RIES), founded in 1994, publishes high-quality research in order to advance inter-disciplinary understanding within and beyond Europe. They seek research papers (8,000-10,000 words) for a monthly publication series and longer papers (15,000 words) for an occasional papers series. Contact either John Nomikos, Executive Research Director, at RIES, 1 Kalavryton Street, Ano-Kalamaki, Athens 17456, Greece; e-mail <jnomikos@itel.gr>; or Adam Morton, Editorial Board Director, Dept. of Int'l Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, Penglais, Ceredigion SY23 4ES; e-mail <adm96@aber.ac.uk>.

The **Institute on Western Europe** will hold its fifteenth annual Graduate Student Conference entitled "**East Meets West: The Challenge of Enlarging the European Union**," March 5-7 at Columbia University, New York City. Papers from all disciplines and on all topics relevant to the conference theme are welcomed, particularly paper proposals on expansions of NATO and the new European defense identity; EU budget and distribution of funds; impact of labor movements on economic stability; financial integration and deregulation; societal implications of further cultural integration; EMU's impact on non-member states; enlargement negotiations at the IGC [no deadline given]. Contact Michelle Segun, e-mail <mms86@columbia.edu>; fax 212 854-8599.

The **Columbia Journal of European Law** is publishing a special issue on "European Administrative and Regulatory Reform;" deadline for submissions is December 31, 1997. The editors welcome submissions on a wide range of legal topics such as administrative procedure and decision-making; efforts for substantive regulatory reform; the use of cost-benefit analysis and other regulatory tools; legislative and administrative simplification; comparative regulatory reform; et alia. Manuscripts must be in English, 15-20 double-spaced pages, preferably in IMB-compatible Wordperfect 6.0 (or higher). Contact the journal at the Columbia School of Law, 435 West 116th Street, New York, NY 10027 USA; e-mail <jenriquez@law.columbia.edu>.

The **Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly** invites scholars in the field of European studies to submit articles and short ECJ casenotes, and also seek scholars willing to review books (300-1,000 words; reviewer keeps the book). Contact the Assistant Editor (for EC Law), Helen Xanthaki, School of Law, Queen's University, Belfast BT7 1NN, Northern Ireland; e-mail <h.xanthaki@qub.ac.uk>; fax 44 1232 325 590.

ECSA Fellows

Christine Strossman, 1996-97 ECSA Fellow at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, writes, "Academically and professionally, there is no place like Brussels for experiencing European integration first-hand. I learned the most up-to-date material from leading economists teaching at the ULB. I conducted my thesis research on the Common Agricultural Policy's effects on incentives and market share in the agro-industrial sector; I was also able to secure an internship at the U.S. Mission to the EU. This combination of theory and practice has provided me with an excellent understanding of how the EU works ... I plan to return to the U.S. and seek opportunities to apply my specialized EU knowledge."

JaNel Green, 1997-98 ECSA Fellow at the College of Europe, Bruges, is taking a course entitled "EU-US Relations" being taught by ECSA member Glenda G. Rosenthal (Columbia University), currently serving as Fulbright Professor of US-EU Relations at the College of Europe.

Keith B. Williams, 1997-98 ECSA Fellow at the Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, writes, "The number of international students in this program is astonishing. We have already had our first exam and given our first presentations. I am investigating internship possibilities for the summer." Mr. Williams is pursuing the master's program in European Union law .

Two ECSA Fellows are spending the Fall 1997 semester at the Delegation of the European Commission, Office of Press and Public Affairs, Washington, DC. Both *Bradley Austin* and *John R. James* work full-time with permanent staff members at the Delegation to respond to public inquiries on EU matters. They receive a \$3000 stipend for the semester.

The **ECSA List Server** was launched in 1996 to be a forum for discussion, debate and information sharing among ECSA USA members. Currently 220 Association members in the U.S. and Europe have subscribed to the list, which is also used occasionally as an information dissemination resource by the ECSA Administrative Office. The list is open to current ECSA USA members who wish to subscribe to it.

To subscribe, send an e-mail message to ECSA at <ecsa+@pitt.edu> with only this one-line message in the text area: *subscribe ecsa@list.pitt.edu*. Be sure to send the message to the e-mail address given above rather than to the entire list. Include no extra spaces or punctuation; if your e-mail messages regularly carry a signature, you must delete the signature lines. It will take several days to process the request and you will receive a welcome message from the University of Pittsburgh's majordomo when you are on the List.

1999 Sixth Biennial Conference

The 1999 Sixth Biennial Conference will be held June 2-5, 1999 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania at the 1916 vintage Westin William Penn Hotel (built by industrialist Henry Clay Frick). The conference runs from Wednesday morning through Saturday afternoon, a change from previous ECSA conference schedules. Local host for the conference will be the Center for West European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, Alberta Sbragia, Director. Visit the ECSA Web site beginning in January 1998 for more detailed announcements and information about the city of Pittsburgh and its region: <<http://www.pitt.edu/~ecsa101>>.

Address Changes

Please notify the ECSA administrative office of any address change as soon as possible, preferably in advance. This will help ensure that you do not miss any publications or other mailings sent to members. Send address changes by e-mail to <ecsa+@pitt.edu> or by facsimile to 412 648 1168.

ECSA Publications

Included in this issue of the *ECSA Review* is the 1996-97 Annual Report, our annual accounting to members, donors, and the public at large of ECSA's activities and operations. In addition, current ECSA members have recently been mailed three publications: the 1997 Conference Paper Abstracts, with ordering form; the 1997 US-EU Relations Project monograph by Project scholar David Vogel, "Barriers or Benefits? Regulation in Transatlantic Trade;" and its companion piece, "The Limits of Liberalization" Conference Report, authored by Maria Green Cowles.

National ECSAs

ECSA USA receives newsletters from other national European Community Studies Associations and has recently received material from the **Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia (CESAA)**, which publishes a substantial newsletter. Contact CESAA at P. O. Box 670, Carlton South, Victoria 3053, Australia; or visit their Web site at <<http://www.arts.unimelb.edu.au/projects/cesaa>>. This office also receives quarterly newsletters and notices of conferences sponsored by the UK's **University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES)**. Contact the UACES Secretariat, King's College, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK; or e-mail <uaces@compuserve.com>.

ECSA USA and many other national ECSAs participate in a loose affiliation known as **ECSA-Net**, organized by the ECSA Secretariat (DG-X) in Brussels. Visit the Web site at <<http://www.ecsanet.org>> and follow the links to the full list of ECSAs from Latin America to the Republic of China.

ECSA Review

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