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ECSA REVIEW

The Amsterdam Treaty and Flexible Integration

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IN THE EARLY MORNING hours of 18 June 1997 the European Council of Amsterdam concluded the 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of the European Union (EU). One of the main innovations of the Amsterdam Treaty was the institutionalisation of flexible integration,¹ i.e., the possibility for a number of Member States to cooperate more closely in specific areas using the institutional framework of the Union. Though the notion of flexibility is not new to the Union, the Amsterdam Treaty provides the first institutionalisation of the concept of flexibility as a *basic principle* in the Treaties. This article is an attempt to clarify some of the issues relating to flexibility. Flexibility is examined because it is an important legal and political issue, influencing all aspects of Union activity in the future. My aim is to: 1) connect the theoretical and practical models of flexibility and provide definitions, examples and categories of flexibility; 2) give a brief outline of the new provisions on flexible integration in the Amsterdam Treaty; and 3) assess the future implications of flexible integration. In other words, I take the current debate one step further, reformulate what has been said about flexibility, and suggest a categorical framework by which to examine flexible integration in the post-Amsterdam era.

Connecting theoretical and practical models of flexibility

A distinction should be made between the pre-IGC theoretical models and the post-Amsterdam models of practice. However, the division between theoretical and practical models is not clear cut or absolute. Nevertheless, it functions as a road map for both academics and practitioners interested in the notion of flexible integration. Academics, politicians, economists, lawyers and other policy experts have tried to conceptualise and interpret flexibility. The result is that flexibility has taken on its own language which is partly theoretical and partly practical. And whilst flexible integration is the broadest term in both the theoretical and practical worlds, three subcategories of terms can be identified in the theoretical domain and four in the practical.

The subcategories of the theoretical discourse are (a) multi-speed, (b) variable geometry and (c) *à la carte*.² The practical terminology includes (a) transitional clauses, (b) enabling clauses, (c) case-by-case flexibility and redetermined flexibility. The practical can be pegged to the theoretical as

follows: (a) transitional clauses correspond to multi-speed; (b) enabling clauses to variable geometry and (c) case-by-case flexibility and predetermined flexibility correspond to *à la carte*.³ The categorisation, definitions and examples are illustrated in the table on page 3.

Assessing flexibility clauses in the Amsterdam Treaty

What kind of flexibility does the new treaty provide? There are three basic forms of flexibility in the Amsterdam Treaty:⁴ (a) *enabling clauses*, (b) *case-by-case flexibility* and (c) *pre-defined flexibility*. Transitional clauses are not an issue relating to the Amsterdam Treaty; they are more common in relation to enlargement.

An *enabling clause* is the mode of flexible integration which enables the willing and able Member States to pursue further integration—subject to certain conditions set out in the Treaties—in a number of policy areas within the institutional framework of the Union. The enabling clauses are the main flexibility innovation of the Amsterdam Treaty. Examples include a general flexibility clause to be inserted in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (articles 43-45) and clauses specific to the first pillar (article 11) and the third pillar (article 40). The general flexibility clause which is inserted as a new Title VII of the TEU sets out the general conditions and institutional arrangements for the enabling clauses. The aim is to preserve the basic principles of the Treaties and safeguard the interests of any Member State which is outside the framework of closer cooperation. To this end, eight conditions (furthering integration, single institutional framework, last resort, majority of Member States, solidarity, openness, compliance with other provisions) are set out. The conditions outlined in the general flexibility clause are important because they set out the framework for closer cooperation.

The specific clauses applicable to the first and third pillars set out the specific conditions and decision-making mechanisms in both of those areas. In the first pillar, flexibility is restricted by a so-called negative list which states that flexibility can be established as long as the cooperation proposed does not concern areas which fall within the exclusive competence of the Community; does not affect Community policies, actions or programmes; does not concern the citizenship of the Union or discriminate between nationals of Member States; remains within the limits of the powers conferred upon the Community by the Treaty; and does not constitute a discrimination or a restriction of trade between Member States and does not distort the conditions of competition between the latter.

The decision triggering flexibility in the first pillar is taken by a qualified majority vote (QMV). If, however, a Member State declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it opposes the granting of an authorisation, the matter is referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity ("emergency brake"). The initiative for a flexible solution originates in a request from the Member States concerned to the Commission. The Commission then submits a proposal. In the end the Commission has the final say on whether a particular flexible solution will be pursued. The possibility of joining a flexible solution is also dependent on a decision by the Commission.

In the third pillar two conditions apply for flexibility. The co-operation proposed should respect the powers of the European Community, and the objectives laid down in the third pillar and have the aim of enabling the Union to develop more rapidly into an area of freedom, security and justice. These conditions are in line with the more specific conditions set out in areas covered by pre-defined flexibility (see below). The trigger mechanism is the same as in the first pillar--i.e., QMV and the "emergency brake." The difference from the first pillar is that, instead of a binding *proposal*, the Commission gives only a non-binding *opinion* on the initiative put forward by the Member States. In addition, instead of the Commission's approval being required, it is the participating Member States who decide whether a non-participating Member State may join the flexible solution.

Case-by-case flexibility can be defined as the mode of flexible integration which allows a Member State the possibility of abstaining from voting on a decision and formally declaring that it will not apply the decision in question whilst at the same time accepting that the decision commits the Union. This so-called *constructive* or *declaratory abstention* is a mix between a decision-making mechanism and flexibility. The possibility for constructive abstention is granted in the second pillar (article 23).

Constructive abstention is not a new innovation in the Treaties. Article 205(3) of the Treaty on European Community (TEC) states that "abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption by the Council of acts which require unanimity." Almost the exact wording is now used, however, for the first time in the second pillar in article 23: "abstentions by members in person or present shall not prevent the adoption of ... decisions." The difference between the two forms of declaratory abstention is that in the first pillar the decision binds the Union as a whole, including the abstaining Member States; whereas in the second pillar the decision does not bind the abstaining Member State. Nevertheless, article 23 of the Amsterdam

Treaty includes a mutual solidarity clause similar to that of declaration 27 of the TEU. Article 23 states that "In a spirit of Treaty includes a mutual solidarity clause similar to that of mutual solidarity, the Member States concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede the Union action ..."

Pre-defined flexibility is the mode of flexible integration which covers a specific field, is pre-defined in all its elements, including its objectives and scope, and is applicable as soon as the Treaty enters into force. Pre-defined flexibility is primarily established in protocols and declarations of the Amsterdam Treaty. Examples include protocol No.2 integrating the *Schengen acquis* into the framework of the European Union, protocol No. 3 on the application of certain aspects of article 14 of the TEC to the United Kingdom and to Ireland, protocol No. 4 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in the new Title IV on Visas, Asylum, Immigration and other policies related to the free movement of persons and protocol No. 5 on the position of Denmark in *Schengen* and the new Title IV. The most obvious old examples of pre-defined flexibility are the British opt-outs from the Social Protocol and EMU and the Danish opt-outs from EMU, defence, citizenship and police co-operation.

Protocol No. 2 notes that from the date of entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty the *Schengen acquis* shall apply to its signatory Member States. From the same date the Council replaces the *Schengen Executive Committee*. Decisions on the implementation will be taken by unanimity and initiatives and provisions will be subject to relevant provisions of the Treaties. Special arrangements are made for Denmark, the UK, Ireland, Iceland and Norway. It is somewhat unclear what the actual *Schengen acquis* comprises. The *Schengen acquis* is approximately 2000 pages of secondary legislation which has been accumulated since the signing of the *Schengen implementation agreement* of 1990. The Amsterdam Treaty defines the *Schengen acquis* in one page, citing the agreements, conventions, accession protocols, decisions and declarations established under *Schengen*. However, the interpretation of the *acquis* will be difficult.

Protocol No. 3, on the application of certain aspects of Article 14 of the TEC is a step backwards on provisions relating to the free movement of persons. The protocol takes into account the special geographical aspects of the United Kingdom and Ireland, including their Common Travel Area. The specific reference of the protocol is to external border controls. In addition to this protocol there is an Irish declaration to the final act of the Treaty. The declaration states that Ireland will take part in the adoption of measures under the new Title to the maximum extent compatible with the maintenance of its Common Travel Area with the United Kingdom.

Protocol No. 4, on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in the New Title IV is another example of an opt-out. The protocol states that the United Kingdom and Ireland will not take part in adoptions pursuant to the new Title. No measures adopted will be binding on the non-participating

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Flexible Integration: Definitions, Categories and Examples

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THEORETICAL FLEXIBILITY & VARIABLES	DEFINITION	PRACTICAL FLEXIBILITY & VARIABLES	DEFINITION	EXAMPLES
<p>(1) Multi-speed</p> <p>Time When</p> <p><i>1-15 MS participate IGC decision - Unanimity EC budget Acquis preserved Common objectives</i></p>	<p>Mode of flexible integration according to which the pursuit of common objectives is driven by a group of Member States which are both able and willing to go further, the underlying assumption being that the others will follow later.</p>	<p>(1) Transitional flexibility</p> <p>Time When</p> <p><i>1-15 MS participate IGC decision - Unanimity EC budget Acquis preserved Common objectives</i></p>	<p>Mode of flexible integration which is characterised by two-way transitional periods which allow either the new Member State or the old Member States to adapt to a particular policy area, the underlying assumption being that adaptation period is temporal.</p>	<p>EMU Directives Transition periods</p> <p>Articles: 15 (7c) 134 (115)</p>
<p>(2) Variable geometry</p> <p>Space Who</p> <p><i>½ MS if inside no IGC decision - QMV + emerg. Brake Special budget Beyond acquis Different objectives</i></p>	<p>Mode of flexible integration which admits to unattainable differences within the integrative structure by allowing permanent or irreversible separation between a hard core and lesser developed integrative units.</p>	<p>(2) Enabling clauses</p> <p>Space Who</p> <p><i>½ MS if inside no IGC decision - QMV + emerg. Brake Special budget Beyond acquis Different objectives</i></p>	<p>Mode of flexible integration which enables the willing and able Member States to pursue further integration—subject to certain conditions set out in the Treaties—in a number of policy areas within the institutional framework of the Union.</p>	<p>Old Schengen Airbus Ariane Esa Jet Eureka WEU Eurocorps Eurofor Euromarfor</p> <p>Articles: 11 (5a), 14 (J.3), 17 (J.4), 40 (K.12), 43 (K.15), 44 (K.16), 45 (K.17), 168 (130k) 306 (233)</p>
<p>(3) A la carte</p> <p>Matter Who</p> <p><i>1-3 MS IGC decision - Unanimity Special budget Acquis undermined Different objectives</i></p>	<p>Mode of flexible integration whereby respective Member States are able to pick-and-choose, as from a menu, in which policy area they would like to participate, whilst at the same time holding only to a minimum number of common objectives.</p>	<p>(3) Case-by-case flexibility</p> <p>(4) Pre-defined flexibility</p> <p>Matter Who</p> <p><i>1-3 MS IGC decision - Unanimity Special budget Acquis undermined Different objectives</i></p>	<p>(3) Mode of flexible integration which allows a Member State the possibility of abstaining from voting on a decision and formally declaring that it will not apply the decision in question whilst accepting that the decision commits the Union.</p> <p>(4) Mode of flexible integration which covers a specific field, is pre-defined in all its elements, including objectives and scope, and is applicable as soon as the Treaty enters into force.</p>	<p>UK and Social Charter UK and EMU DK and EMU DK and defence DK and III pillar DK and Title IV UK and Title IV IRL and Title IV UK and Schengen IRL and Schengen DK and Schengen</p>

Member States. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom and/or Ireland may notify the Council that it/they wish to take part in the adoption and application of the measure in question. Both countries may at any time notify the Council of its/their intention to accept the measure in question. It is, however, interesting to note that Ireland may notify the Council that it no longer wishes to be covered by the terms of protocol No. 4. This possibility does not exist for the United Kingdom.

Protocol No. 5 on the position of Denmark in *Schengen* and the new Title as a whole complicates things further. The declaration states that Denmark will not take part in the adoption by the Council of measures under the new Title. In essence Denmark can participate in the preparations but not the decisions of the Title. An exception from this rule is provided by visa policy. If the Council adopts a measure that builds on the *Schengen acquis* in the first pillar, Denmark has six months to decide whether to implement this decision in national law. If Denmark decides to do so, the decision will create an obligation under international law between Denmark and the other participating Member States. However, before the *Schengen acquis* is amended, Denmark will maintain the same rights and obligations in relation to the other signatories to the *Schengen* agreements. To put it simply, Denmark is a part of the current *Schengen acquis* but can decide whether it wants to participate in legislation which builds on it. As long as protocol No. 5 is in force Denmark will not be able to participate in any *non-Schengen* co-operation in the new Title. In accordance with its constitutional requirements Denmark can inform the other Member States that it no longer wishes to avail itself of all parts of the protocol.

Future implications of flexible integration

The institutionalisation of all the forms of flexibility arose for two main reasons: first, to cope with the problems relating to the New Title on the Free Movement of Persons, Asylum and Immigration and the incorporation of *Schengen* and second, to manage enlargement and an increasingly heterogeneous Union. But to what extent will the various forms of flexibility be used? The conditions for the enabling clauses in the first and the third pillars are very strict, but nevertheless it seems as if there is legal scope for flexibility in both areas. It is not, however, an issue of whether it can be done; it is more a question of whether there is will or need to do it before the transition periods of the next enlargement has run out sometime after 2015.

In the first pillar, issues relating to European Monetary Union provide an avenue for flexibility—i.e., tax harmonisation. Of the more traditional Community policies, those in transport, social policy, education, vocational training and youth, culture, public health, consumer protection, Trans-European networks, industry, research and development, environment and development cooperation are open to flexible arrangements. Another interesting question, which no one has addressed, is whether the new Title on visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to the free movement of persons falls under the flexibility umbrella. I think it does, but I am not sure that there is much point in differentiating these

issues, especially if the aim is to create a true borderless area of free movement.

As far as the second pillar is concerned it could be argued that constructive abstention will be in rather active use. The Union will proceed on a case by case basis, but I can foresee many issues in Africa (ex. Great Lakes) where only some Member States could be waiving the Union flag. East Timor or human rights in China could be other concrete areas where constructive abstention could come in handy. The bottom line is, however, that Amsterdam did not create a window of opportunity for flexible defence inside the treaty. Outside we will most probably continue with contact groups and flexible defence arrangements in NATO and the WEU.

The third pillar is an area where nothing needs to be excluded from flexibility. The conditions on triggering flexibility are not as stringent as they are in the first pillar. Consequently, we could easily foresee some flexible cooperation in police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. It would not be a surprise to see enhanced cooperation between a limited number of Member States in the harmonisation of penal law or in the combat against crime, terrorism, drugs, etc. A lot of the need for flexibility in the third pillar will depend on how well the Spanish can be contained. In addition some of the development will depend on the rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which is bound to come up with cross-pillar interpretations.

Conclusions

Flexibility was an idea whose time had come. The negotiators of the Amsterdam Treaty seized a window of opportunity and decided to institutionalise the principle. It does not really matter that the clauses are conditional. The main point is that the principle has been installed into the treaties. Though there might be scope for the application of flexibility in all the pillars we will not see it used too much in the near future. Flexibility will still be informal and revolve around the eleven core countries which join the single currency from the start. It is ironic that only a few weeks after the Amsterdam Treaty was signed, the Euro X Council was introduced. In the final stages of the negotiations the French and perhaps the Germans noticed that the new flexibility clauses were not going to be sufficient for creating a hard core and hence the willing and able Member States had to revert back to “good old” informal flexibility. Formal flexibility is a little bit like a nuclear weapon—you can threaten with it but probably will not use it. Flexibility will, however, facilitate compromise.

Institutionalising flexibility is only a first step. The strict conditions are there because whenever new subjects are introduced to the legal framework of the treaties one has to be careful—there is a need for checks and balances. In the end some Member States were of the opinion that flexibility in the first pillar was not possible, in the second it was not desirable and the third it was not necessary since everything had been taken care of pre-defined clauses. It is clear, however, that the debate was politically so important that something had to be inserted in the treaties.

Expansion leads to diversity; and the greater the diversity, the more the issue of flexibility comes to the fore. The institutionalisation of flexibility marks a new stage in the process of European integration. Previously the common objectives were sought in unison; now the Treaty has established a mechanism for permanent differentiation. In the end, the effects of flexible integration will depend on the political will and the legal ability of Member States to apply policies and objectives established in the Treaties. Nevertheless, the most palatable effect of flexibility is that, even though the new members will have to accept the *acquis* as a whole, it will lower the threshold for enlargement: prospective members will find it easier to join the Union. Also, existing Member States will be more open to the accession of new Member States because they know that flexibility can be managed within the framework of the Treaty.

Flexibility will be a main theme of European integration in the next century, and as such calls for extensive research on both sides of the Atlantic.

Notes

1. I use "flexibility" as the overarching term because it is the broadest term signifying all forms of differentiation. Closer cooperation only covers what can be called enabling clauses.
2. For academic models see Stubb, A.C-G. (1996) "A Categorisation of Differentiated Integration," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 2: 283-295. For practical models see Stubb, A. C-G. (1997) "The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and the management of flexible integration," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 4:1, 37-55.
3. The categorisation in this article is part of my Ph.D. thesis, *Flexible Integration and the Amsterdam Treaty: Negotiating Differentiation in the European Union*, to be submitted to the International Relations Department of the London School of Economics in December 1998.
4. For extended argumentation see:
Edwards, G. and Philippart, E. (1997) "Flexibility and the Treaty of Amsterdam: Europe's New Byzantium?" *CELS Occasional Paper*, No. 3, Cambridge, November.
Ehlermann, C-D. (1998), "Differentiation, Flexibility, Closer Cooperation: The New Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty," European University Institute, Florence.
de la Serre, F. and Wallace, H. (1997) "Flexibility and Enhanced Cooperation in the European Union: Placebo rather than Panacea?" *Research and Policy Papers* No. 2, revised version, Groupement d'études et de Recherches "Notre Europe," September, Paris.
Shaw, J. (1998) "Flexibility and legitimacy in the domain of the Treaty establishing the European Community," *European Law Journal* 4: 63-86.
Stubb, A. C-G. (1997) "The Amsterdam Treaty and Flexible Integration: A Preliminary Assessment," paper presented at IPSA seminar in Brussels and in South Korea.

ECSA Prizes

The ECSA's 1997-99 Executive Committee has established two prizes to be awarded biennially at the ECSA Biennial International Conference. The aim of the prizes is to recognize and encourage excellence in scholarship in the field of EU studies. Each prize will carry a small cash award and will be announced and presented to the recipients at the Biennial Conference luncheon. Selection committees will be comprised of ECSA Executive Committee members and established EU scholars. The prizes and their stipulations are:

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The ECSA Prize for Best Conference Paper will be awarded in 1999 to an outstanding paper presented at the 1997 Biennial Conference in Seattle. All those who presented an original paper at the Conference and who circulated their papers in advance of the meeting will be eligible. The prize carries a cash award of \$100 US. To apply for the prize, please send three paper copies of the version of the paper that you presented at the 1997 Seattle Conference, to the ECSA Administrative Office (contact coordinates given below). NB: Papers may not be submitted by e-mail, facsimile, or on diskette. Deadline for submission of papers for the 1999 ECSA Prize for Best Conference Paper is September 15, 1998.

ECSA Prize for Best Dissertation

The ECSA Prize for Best Dissertation will be awarded to a dissertation on European integration submitted in completion of the Ph.D. at a U.S. university between September 1, 1996 and August 31, 1998. The student must have defended and deposited the dissertation and graduated during this period, and the dissertation must include a signed, dated dissertation committee approval page. Only one dissertation per department at an institution may be nominated for this prize. The prize carries a cash award of \$250 US. Department chairs should send one paper copy of the dissertation with a cover letter to the ECSA Administrative Office (contact coordinates given below). Dissertations may not be submitted by e-mail, facsimile, or on diskette. Deadline for nominations for the ECSA Prize for Best Dissertation is September 15, 1998.

Send Best Conference Paper and Best Dissertation Prize nominations to:

Valerie Staats, Ph.D., Administrative Director
ECSA Administrative Office
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Essay

International Cooperation: Technology Transfer in the Information Society

Attilio Stajano

WHILE THE MILESTONES of new Treaties marked the evolution of the European Union's institutional landscape, the citizens of Europe became more aware of being part of a community broader than their own States. A community planning for the social and economic development of the old continent in a stable and peaceful political environment. In this context, the European Commission funded, in the spirit of subsidiarity, precompetitive research and technological development programmes. Together with a programme for the mobility of students, researchers and scholars, the EU cross-border research programmes (notably in the area of information and communication technologies) have contributed to an expanding European research community which supports innovation in both the technological base for the information society and its applications. This research community, impressive for its quality and its size, is now evolving as a result of the convergence of information processing, communication and media. This community brings together users and suppliers, and creates a network of researchers, industrialists and enterprises throughout Europe, and beyond; in fact, the challenges of the networked economy are global, like the information society, and can only be addressed with new transatlantic alliances. The U.S.-based enterprises are also faced with these challenges, with the additional aggravation that many of them, due to the size of the U.S. market, may not have been ever exposed to operating in international and heterogeneous markets.

Research projects have produced significant technological breakthroughs, which form the basis for integrated business solutions. However, the road from research results to the market is long, hard and lonely. The convergence of technologies and of media is improving the effectiveness with which the results of research programmes may be presented and the ways in which technology transfer is implemented. This is described in the following section about ProSOMA.

The European Commission services directorate for industrial affairs, are aware that technology transfer in the new decade must face the challenges of the information society. This requires in practice the ability to serve a global, networked economy, where protecting intellectual property will be more complex and to address a multicultural

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environment, with many languages, business practices, and different levels of literacy and of infrastructure. The challenges of the information society require alignment with convergence of technologies and of media, and, not least, it demands increased financial support for the growth of companies spinning out of research.

In full awareness of the demands of the information society, *Esprit*, the European Community programme on Information Technologies, an initiative of the European Commission, Directorate-General III for Industrial Affairs (DG-III) aimed at strengthening the European information technology industry in the worldwide marketplace through cross-borders co-operative research and development projects, is offering advanced technology transfer support aimed at increasing the industrial impact of EC-funded research and technological development. There is still a very long way to go, but the success stories mentioned below indicate that we are headed in the right direction. Four lines of action are here described and they are all open to EU-U.S. cooperation.

Protection, intelligence and dissemination of results

The collaborative nature of *Esprit* facilitates the networking process. The collaboration needed in the RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT phase, however, may be different to that needed for successful exploitation. To provide more focused support, a new service, PROSOMA, has been launched to help businesses benefit from the successes achieved in *Esprit*. The service provides a virtual meeting point between those whose participation in *Esprit* has contributed to the technology base for the "Information Society," and those who can benefit from what has been achieved. The PROSOMA service helps to increase the industrial impact of the *Esprit* programme by bridging the gap between research and the marketplace and facilitating access to and uptake of research results. For many organizations the completion of an *Esprit* project is only the first step towards a successful outcome. To make the most of their results, further work is usually needed, either to fine-tune the results or to make the jump from pilot or demonstration-scale to full commercial product. Networking brings IT technology providers into contact with systems developers, equipment manufacturers, venture capitalists, technology brokers and end-users. Any or all of these can provide the additional inputs needed to commercialize a result and help bridge the gap between research and the marketplace, and in so doing turn innovation into business.

The PROSOMA service comprises interactive multimedia presentations, through which *Esprit* participants present their results. The presentations are accessible both via the World Wide Web and on CD-Rom. Collectively, the presentations form a "technology fair"—a multimedia showcase of innovative results. Technology brokers, venture capitalists and potential end-users can search the presentations for solutions to specific needs, or for results in particular fields of technological development or application areas.

Presentations comprise summary descriptions of the results together with details of business and technical aspects.

Multimedia elements include schematic presentations explaining how a result works, interviews with developers or end-users, and video presentations of results being applied. For an even greater level of detail, there is access to background papers and reports. The presentations of research results are complemented by information about the terms and conditions for their uptake provided by the result owners on their own Web sites. Here the result owners present the research and development results integrated in their product lines and provide independent presentations on commercial aspects of the results achieved under the *Esprit* programme.

Access to financial markets for small/medium enterprises

Turning innovation into business implies facilitating the access to the financial market for small/medium enterprises (SMEs). The European Commission helps to create the conditions for enterprises to develop products and services for an international marketplace, utilizing the *Esprit* programme research results. The Information Society Technology Conference, open to international investors, has been planned as an annual event where the financial market and the information technology community can meet and where business contacts can be initiated between innovators and investors.

International events

The globalization of markets implies a worldwide competition. Innovative enterprises need to become visible at the global level. In this context, upon invitation of the State of Texas, the U.S. Department of Commerce and the European Commission have organized a partnership building event between EU- and U.S.-based companies which will take place in Forth Worth, Texas on April 14-16, 1999. This event is the paradigm for other initiatives under consideration to create platforms on which, on the basis of reciprocity, innovative EU and U.S. enterprises can increase their visibility and establish joint ventures and other business alliances.

This event will involve chiefly small/medium enterprises operating on electronic commerce and the underlying enabling communication and multimedia technologies. Electronic commerce has been at the top of the political agenda for the last year for more than one reason: electronic commerce is a relatively new phenomenon and has been attracting a considerable amount of attention. Growth rates are impressive and therefore the prospects for productivity gains and employment are very positive. Electronic commerce was 'born global' and requires global solutions. What remains to be clarified is the exact nature of these solutions, what the appropriate fora for discussion are, and how they should be implemented. One of the guiding principles remains 'no regulation for regulation's sake alone'. Instead, governments must adopt a minimalist and flexible approach. Both the EU and the U.S. have indicated that the expansion of global electronic commerce will essentially be market-led and driven by private initiative. Both the EU and the U.S. agree that governments must provide a clear, consistent and predictable legal framework to ensure adequate protection of public interest objectives. Along the same lines, the Center for West European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh and the

European Commission are considering co-organizing a conference, in the year 2000, on regulation in the networked economy, where such issues will be debated.

Best practice and benchmarking

A national programme of industrial visits started in the mid-1980s in the UK to offer chief executives from industrial enterprises, mainly SMEs, an opportunity to visit during one full day an innovative enterprise presenting its best practice on a specific innovative process, product, or service. The program is widely publicized on the World Wide Web and in a catalogue, which is free upon request. The organization of the program is assured an Agency, by appointment of the Department for Trade and Industry. Over the years the program, called "Connect for Better Business," developed into a great success, and was the origin of similar programmes in several other countries: Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain. In 1995 a cross-border dimension was added. Now the European Commission proposes it as an initiative on an international scale, with a view to organizing, on the basis of reciprocity, visits of U.S. chief executives to European innovative enterprises and vice versa.

Conclusions

In the years to come the Commission's Directorate General for Industrial Affairs will develop further the lines of action described above, and initiate new ones. The main thrust of the new actions will be twofold: a broader international dimension and a strengthened initiative on awareness about and protection of intellectual property, with support for licensing and patenting internationally. Each of the four ongoing projects outlined above is open to international co-operation, beyond the EU. While decisions to enter into industrial cooperation are the responsibility of businesses, the European Commission acts to encourage enterprises to launch such initiatives, by seeking to establish a legal, regulatory and organizational framework which is favorable to industrial co-operation. In this context, it welcomes the participation of industrial representatives from the U.S. in the activities described above to provide a forum for discussion and exchanges of views and possibly to create the conditions for business alliances. Persons interested in the European Commission's PROSOMA, including the *Esprit* initiative, should visit <www.prosoma.lu> on the World Wide Web or send an e-mail to <esprit@dg3.cec.be>.

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Gary Cooper: Meet the European Union

G. Jonathan Greenwald

MY TOUR AT THE U.S. Mission to the European Union transformed thirty professional years of general unhappiness with American media coverage of Europe into a specific complaint: even our few newspapers that maintain foreign correspondents badly report the European story by misrepresenting, if not ignoring, the EU.

I arrived in Brussels the week in 1993 when Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat first called upon Commission President Jacques Delors. After presenting a Washington Bullets autographed basketball to the otherwise austere leader who reads a French sports paper daily, Eizenstat acknowledged that much of what he was learning about the EU surprised him. This, he said, was due considerably to the fact that Brussels stories were virtually absent from the U.S. press.

Only the Wall Street Journal, Eizenstat noted, had a Brussels bureau, but it worked primarily for the European edition. Delors, Eizenstat suggested, should visit New York and Washington to urge editors to put journalists in Brussels. Delors tried and failed. Brussels still has no U.S. news bureau. Recently The New York Times opened a new European office—in Istanbul.

Personal and professional reasons contribute to this neglect. A reporter explained to me that staffers "want to live in Paris or London. They think Brussels is dull, and the editors don't believe there is much political news here." Many in the State Department feel the same way. Europe's old embassies retain a glamour Brussels lacks. Senior officials still see Europe as a collection of atomized power centers, transatlantic relations as the sum of bilateral relations with Germany, Britain, France ...

I reviewed *Washington Post* coverage for five weeks in March-April 1998. The search function on the *Post's* Internet site permits by-name retrieval of articles on Liechtenstein, Andorra and 218 other countries but not the European Union. Only nine of 275 "Europe" items, including those on travel and investment, dealt significantly with the EU. Serious news analyses among them from Paris, London and Bonn bureaus unsurprisingly reflected national slants.

Americans can hardly be faulted for concluding that the major European developments revolve around NATO and Bosnia. That is what their media reports and President Clinton and the State Department say. There is a symbiosis to this message. Busy policy makers take time to read newspapers.

G. Jonathan Greenwald retired from the Foreign Service to write and teach. The author of books and articles on European politics, he was Minister Counselor of the U.S. Mission to the European Union, 1993-1997.

That these rarely contradict their sense of priorities makes it easier to maintain that despite the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, not so much has changed across the Atlantic.

Two generations ago Vance Packard wrote brilliantly on the classic Western film, "High Noon," as American foreign policy parable. Gary Cooper, the marshal slow to anger but magnificent in a fight who initially organized peace through collective defense, faces down bad guys a second time in a shootout after abandonment by argumentative, pleasure loving townsfolk unwilling to share defense burdens. It may no longer be politically correct that the pacifist bride (Grace Kelly) helps by shooting one villain in the back. As much as Americans might like to renounce the marshal's star, it was apparent even in the 1950s that Cooper's subsequent abandonment of the feckless town was unrealistic policy.

The self-image exercise is still on the mark, however. Collective defense grounded in traditional armed security concepts remains at the forefront of thinking. America's military strength is seen as the backbone of the fragmented European village. Bosnia, from which we allegedly held back until Europeans failed and then put to right is viewed as replaying lessons from 1917, 1941, and 1949. Listening to European objections to our prescriptions for "rogue" regimes, we imagine we hear the sophistry put to Gary Cooper in the film's Thucydidean church debate scene.

This mind-set leaves little room for a European Union without military muscle that relies on the *acquis communautaire* and mutual interest in expanding prosperity for much of its security. Our journalists and politicians acknowledge these matter. To switch metaphors from Hollywood to another American passion, however, NATO, Bosnia and political-military concerns are the foreign policy Big Leagues; the EU is Minor League, unworthy of much attention from strategic thinkers handling superpower security.

The tendency to belittle the EU extends to its major preoccupation, European Monetary Union (EMU). Until last year, we in Brussels had difficulty focusing State and Treasury on it. I am not naive about advance planning. One March, George Shultz asked my office to analyze his short and long term challenges. Time line for the former was Easter, for the latter November's election. Disinterest in EMU, however, stemmed from disbelief Europe could pull it off. Europeans had talked of EMU for decades, we were reminded, and always retreated.

It is now accepted that irrevocable decisions to create EMU are being taken this spring. EU leaders are grudgingly given marks for bearing political pain while wrestling economic numbers into conformity with Maastricht Treaty criteria. Otherwise foreign policy elites are edgy, a mood caught by a Post survey: "Pitfalls Line Path to Euro, Analysts Say. National Disparities Make Currency Union Vulnerable."

It is difficult to find analysis that balances dangers with EMU's potential to stimulate political as well as economic union. It is hard to avoid concluding there is pique at European presumption to invest so much in a venture that, if successful,

would produce a more equal, but undoubtedly less pliant, Transatlantic partner. There is certainly worry the effort needed for the EMU gamble saps Europe's energy to support policies Americans deem more important.

For example, EMU may eventually generate EU self-confidence to take tough organizational and budgetary decisions needed for enlargement. However, current preoccupation slows that process, which to Washington seems more strategic than a common currency. Maastricht's budgetary limits also force our allies to sacrifice NATO force modernization targets.

Obviously the two sides of the Atlantic assess post-Cold War requirements differently. Here the priority remains political-military. We want a strong Europe but believe we really need loyal support when confronting villains. Over there emphasis is on political-economic steps that will consolidate Europe's strength and perhaps ultimately make it Washington's equal on whatever does not come down to firepower.

NATO remains indispensable for a portion of what threatens Europe as Bosnia shows. Arguably it is the best instrument for handling some problems outside Europe. Equally certainly EU foreign policy is still a work in progress. Its slow decision making processes favor lowest common denominators. Its behavior often strengthens American prejudice that the EU is only a commercial enterprise with unrealistic political presumptions. Members haggle over narrow interests and delay measures like timely integration of Eastern Europe that would reassure friends they take the security concepts of the founding generation seriously. Last year's Intergovernmental Conference largely failed its three challenges: more efficient external representation, institutional reform to facilitate enlargement, and a citizen-friendly treaty.

In the 1970s Henry Kissinger famously lamented not knowing what number to dial for Europe, and wags speculated whether a stumble-prone President Ford could simultaneously walk and chew gum. Fragmented, EMU-obsessed Brussels still fails those tests.

Nevertheless, a solid case can be made that the EU does much better on many tests relevant to the 1990s. Amsterdam's shortcomings were largely attributable to the judgment of Europe's leaders that they needed to hoard compromises to keep EMU on course. Bosnia's warfare was exceptional. A more prominent risk for European states and the neighborhoods they inhabit is internal instability due to inadequate civil societies and market economies. The changing balance of threats is apparent even in the Balkans. NATO helped preserve Bosnia but could not prevent the break-up of Yugoslavia itself. It can lessen Kosovo dangers by placing troops on tense borders, but it could not have prevented last year's meltdown in Albania.

Massive EU contributions in this new security environment are frequently unappreciated. More than five times as much assistance for building civil and economic structures has flowed east from Brussels than from Washington. Similar disparity exists for the Middle East.

U.S. tax payers fund an unequaled military while equivalent European expenditures plunge. No prudent person wishes to tamper with the Sixth Fleet's security shield in the Mediterranean. But the U.S. has nothing like the EU's Barcelona Initiative that spends billions to prepare a giant free trade zone that may eventually alleviate much instability in that region. Foreign security policy has become as much about resources to help Ukraine transform its energy sector as NATO guarantees to Kiev. There EU foreign policy is at least as effective as America's. Increasingly prominent global issues are another field where the EU contributes. Its export controls, financial strength, support for Western values and willingness to make some economic sacrifice largely complement U.S. efforts on non-proliferation, population pressure, environmental degradation, and transnational crime.

Disparagement of the EU thus combines misunderstanding of what is happening on the continent with misreading of the changed security equation—plus disbelief that with respect to its friends, the only superpower is less dominant than when the Berlin Wall stood. As long as the EU performs less well than an aspiring equal partner needs to, it will share responsibility for resulting friction. That is little consolation, however, for a United States that cannot join Europe's strengths more effectively to its own on an extensive security agenda unless it rethinks fundamental concepts.

As a practitioner I objected to critiques without suggestions for improvement. Accordingly, I offer three:

1) ECSCA members can reduce disputes by educating the public that the EU is more than a trade machine, that it uniquely joins state and international organization elements with important security components. A participant at a recent Council on Foreign Relations discussion criticized EU hypocrisy in arguing for collective calculation of members' pollution at the Kyoto Conference while opposing Washington's wish to share an emissions-trading "umbrella" with Japan and Russia. His dismissal of the argument the EU is building a supranational state echoed official unhappiness. In Brussels I frequently found the State Department unsympathetic to explanations of why mixed competence under EU law justified conference seats for each member state and the Commission.

2) Greece-Turkey-Cyprus conflicts can at the least disrupt enlargement. In an editorial on "The Cyprus Mess" bearing markings of official backgrounding, the Washington Post wrote "... the European Union fumbled the opportunity away. Now there is fresh talk of war, and it's American diplomacy to the rescue, again." The EU handled Turkey's membership application tactlessly and under Greek pressure broke Customs Union-tied promises to help pay for Turkish economic restructuring. But everyone has been foolish, including the U.S. Richard Holbrooke, the President's special representative, recently repeated that we want Turkey in the EU, a loudly public stance that reflects little appreciation the EU is not a NATO-style coalition of roughly like-minded states but a government that requires equivalent standards of political, legal and economic development from members.

Our line deludes Ankara into believing the U.S. can twist the EU's arm, thus removing incentive for reforms that could eventually make membership realistic.

Holbrooke, the Bosnia settlement architect, notoriously disrespects the EU as crisis resolver but Washington and Brussels should cease criticism and deliver common messages in the Mediterranean. The EU knows the U.S. uniquely can talk to military leaders who increasingly call shots in Ankara. In turn, Europeans are more likely to reconsider the undiplomatic way they put off Turkey if we avoid finger pointing and follow a partner strategy.

3) A big project energizes a relationship. The New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), negotiated in 1995, was to do this. It is facilitating useful agreements and defusing problems like Helms-Burton. It never fired public imagination, however. New initiatives are likely at the May Summit in London, but statesmen should consider what more is appropriate by the NTA's fifth anniversary in 2000. Worth study is a North Atlantic Economic Community (NATEC) treaty proposed by Ellen Frost (Transatlantic Trade: A Strategic Agenda, Institute for International Economics, 1997), linking a free trade goal with political-economic institutional competence complementing NATO. Senate ratification would update U.S. security policy and give new weight to EU ties.

Teaching the EU

Editor's note: In response to member interest, this column is now a regular feature of the ECSA Review. Suggestions and essays from ECSA members for this column are welcomed.

Teaching an EU Simulation

Peter Loedel

Introduction¹

The Pennsylvania/Maryland Consortium's European Union Simulation Project is an intercollegiate academic exercise that is now in its sixth year of operation. Since its creation in 1993, the number of participating schools has quadrupled and approximately 200 students participated in the simulation exercise held December 4-6, 1997 in Washington, DC. The consortium's extraordinary growth enables us to replicate more completely the complex decision-making processes of the post-Maastricht European Union. Below, we detail the simulation's organization, pedagogical implications, and the larger theoretical questions raised in the process for other universities interested in adopting a similar framework.

Structure of the simulation

Proper setting up of the simulation's structure is key and demands a great deal of time, energy, and attention to administrative detail prior to the semester the program is run.²

Faculty need to determine in advance the parameters of the simulation, including the major actors and components of the decision-making structure to be represented (Commissioners, European Parliamentary members, Ministers, etc.), as well as voting systems to be used (co-decision, etc.). Professors must also give significant consideration to the issue to be addressed, taking into account research accessibility, technical level of expertise required and relevance for understanding current EU politics. There is also inevitable negotiation over country assignments. Once the consortium has stabilized, participants may want to consider implementing a rotating system. Finally, faculty must establish specific ground rules for the simulation meeting itself, including acceptable parliamentary procedure.

Prior to the actual convening of the simulation, student commissioners from each university meet at a centralized location to craft a resolution—the proposal to be debated and amended during the simulation. Via fax, e-mail, or telephone, student commissioners often meet two or three times in follow-up sessions to perfect this document. Student commissioners truly enjoy this drafting process. It frees up the professor's time, facilitates a sense of student ownership in the program early on, as well as provides the class with a resource knowledgeable in the simulation topic.

On the first day of the actual simulation, students attend briefing sessions at their respective embassies, at the State Department, and conduct a satellite, teleconference (graciously set up at the Finnish embassy) with EU representatives in Brussels. On the first evening, party groupings, Ministerial Councils, Commissioners or Heads of State, attend a "working dinner" to initiate the first discussions on the resolution and elect, if appropriate, leadership positions. Days two and three are spent largely in small group meetings designed to encourage participation. Simultaneous sessions of three ministerial councils, two parliamentary committees, and Commission meetings provide everyone with the opportunity to participate. The simulation ends as the parliamentary committees and ministerial councils combine their resolution and submit it to the heads of state for approval/amendments. A combined European Parliamentary session takes a final vote, yes or no, on the document.

If structured well, the simulation will serve your teaching objectives well (see below). Faculty should be reassured that the simulation may get off to a slow start, particularly as the students overcome the shyness factor in working closely with peers from other institutions. Yet students become more at ease as they deeply immerse themselves into the project. In the meantime, faculty should resist intervening or coaching. The simulation belongs to the students and they should have the opportunity to work out the problems and issues that inevitably arise before and during the simulation meeting.

Pedagogical issues

New consortium faculty often ask how best to set up a course for this kind of project. There are a variety of options that can be tailored to an institution's specific curricular program. Courses are often set up as capstone senior seminars on the European Union or are incorporated into existing

offerings on international relations, West European politics, comparative politics, international organizations, and law. For an EU-only course, material can be divided into three sections, starting with a broad, regional introduction and then progressively narrowing the focus to the country and issue relevant to the simulation. One possible course structure might include: I) larger themes and concepts in Western European politics, economics, and society; II) EU institutions, actors, and decision-making procedures; and III) specific policy topic and country as they relate to the simulation. Assessment includes in-class examinations, class participation, written discussion questions, in-depth research projects, and simulation participation. Student involvement should be strongly emphasized in all stages of the course.

The simulation program achieves numerous and diverse learning objectives. It promotes student understanding of the integration processes currently transforming Europe and creates a greater appreciation of cultural diversity. Student/faculty interaction both in and out of the classroom and small group learning is facilitated. Participants acquire skills that are essential to professional success, including public speaking, expository writing, the use of logic and reasoning, group negotiations, and problem solving. More specifically, students are introduced to the art of diplomacy, recreate dynamic and complex political processes, and personally experience behavioral and institutional constraints confronting EU actors.

Many students comment that the program was the "best experience" of their educational career. Students have personal stakes in the outcome of the simulation. They discuss the subject matter outside the normal structure of the simulation, during breaks, in the hallways, at breakfast, and in the evening. They lobby, build coalitions, and work on details as they draft policy. As they break out of the traditional classroom format, they experience the feeling of leadership, speak out, set the agenda, and present arguments, not to a professor, but to their peers. They also get frustrated, tired, and find the work at times tedious. Still they enjoy it overall, as they push determinedly through each step of the simulation. In other words, the students experience everything that is related to "politics."

We would all argue that the simulation has achieved its stated goals and provides a valuable learning experience for both students and faculty. However we continually adjust and adapt the simulation to work out any problems that may have developed in the simulation. In this way we seek to improve the student's learning experience with each new simulation.

Conclusion: theory and practice

A big challenge facing those of us teaching the EU is how best to present to our students the theoretical and analytical issues surrounding EU integration.³ While students discuss in class the theoretical debates over integration theory,

functionalism, intergovernmentalism and evaluate whether approaches from comparative politics or international relations can best explain European integration, it is often difficult for them to make the connection between the theory and reality of the EU.

We believe that the simulation is a powerful tool to bridge that divide. The simulation captures the institutional dynamics of the EU. It demonstrates the supranationality of the Commission and political parties. It illustrates the relevance of "spillover" as the students make connections among issues. They also highlight the importance of nation states and national leaders as they build coalitions in the ministerial councils and assert national interest as the Heads of State meet. Power also matter in EU politics. Students also perceive that EU politics is driven by "groups of human beings."⁴ The simulation gives students a concrete sense of who or what is doing the acting as well as how those actors are shaped by the institutions, rules, and power structures reflected in the simulation and the "real" EU.

In sum, we find that the simulation provides maximum effect, both pedagogical and theoretical. Not only do students come away from the simulation with a thorough understanding of the EU, but they also come away with a better understanding of themselves and their abilities. They also have a lot of fun in the process—an ideal educational experience.

Editor's Note: Two other ECSA members, William Andrews of SUNY Brockport and John McCormick of Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, have developed and run successful EU simulation courses for several years.

Notes

1. This article is based on papers presented at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the Northeast Political Science Association: Ed DeClair, "Organization and Goals: Getting the EU Simulation off the Ground;" Kirstin Bookmiller, "Pedagogical Cross-Pressures: The Classroom and the Intercollegiate Simulation on the EU;" and Peter Loedel, "Theory and Practice: The EU Simulation." We are thankful to Ed Morgan, founder of the European American Institute; his inspiration and resolve continue to make the simulation a great success. For questions, please contact Peter Loedel at <ploedel@wcupa.edu>. A Web site and video on the simulation will also be available in Fall 1998; the development of both is partially supported by a 1997-98 ECSA Curriculum Development Grant.
2. An institution can expect to spend approximately \$2500 total for the simulation (fees, hotel, transportation, etc.). The student/faculty ratio should not exceed 15/1.
3. Gary Marks, Chair of ECSA, recently noted such concerns in "Comparative Politics and International Relations: Suggestions for a Unitary Approach," *ECSA Review*, X: 2, Summer 1997.
4. Marks, p. 1.

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**ECSA Sixth Biennial International Conference
June 2-5, 1999 * Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania**

**Call for Paper and Panel Proposals
Deadline for receipt of all proposals is October 15, 1998**

The European Community Studies Association of the United States invites scholars and practitioners engaged in the study of the European Union to submit panel and paper proposals for the 1999 Sixth Biennial International Conference. The Program Committee hopes to promote the broadest possible exchange of conceptual and theoretical approaches and research agendas. All research topics are welcome that are of interest to those in the profession. The committee actively seeks proposals relevant to the study of the European Union from scholars who specialize in both comparative and single case studies from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. The Committee would also like to see proposals on the use of new information technology in the classroom and its innovative application in the instruction of European Union studies.

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Local host for the Conference will be the University of Pittsburgh's Center for West European Studies, Alberta Sbragia, Director. For questions about the proposal process, please contact the ECSA via:



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Book Reviews

John Redmond (ed.) The 1995 Enlargement of the European Union. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 1997, 184 pp.

Lee Miles (ed.) The European Union and the Nordic Countries. New York: Routledge, 1996, 310 pp.

The accession of the Austrians, Finns and Swedes to the European Union in 1995 generated great excitement (not all of it positive) in the applicant states as well as the Union itself. Political elites attached great hopes to membership, though three years later popular support for the European project remains only in Finland. Finland's euro-phoria is best exemplified by its commissioner, Erkki Liikanen, whom the *Economist* dubs one of the most competent in Brussels. Post-accession opinion polls in Austria and Sweden suggest great levels of disillusionment, with more than sixty percent of the population indicating that they would reject membership. What accounts for the divergent perspectives of the new member-states? For those interested in understanding the implications of Swedish, Finnish and Austrian entry into the EU, these two volumes are a good place to start. The Redmond and Miles texts are clearly related, but have different purposes. The Redmond text focuses upon the issues related to the fourth enlargement, while the Miles volume explores the interactive implications of the recent Nordic enlargement. The Miles volume presents a more extensive analysis not only of implications of the membership for the Nordic states but also their imprint on the development of the European Union.

The Redmond volume is an analysis of the issues surrounding the 1995 enlargement, and thus includes a chapter on Norway, 'the one that got away.' This compact volume is a concise guide to the 1995 enlargement which has three objectives: 1) it presents the evolution of EU-EFTA (European Free Trade Association) relations and the decision for full membership by several EFTA states; 2) it examines the most pressing issues for the four applicants both in negotiations and in their referenda; and 3) it sets the 1995 enlargement in the wider context of European integration. Why study this relatively painless enlargement so carefully? Redmond argues that the Nordics and Austria present an interesting case of enlargement because 'they changed their minds;' they had earlier rejected the European project and sought to create in EFTA the economic advantages of the Common Market without its attendant supranationalism and threats to sovereignty and neutrality, clear concerns for the young and neutral EFTA states.

Christopher Preston offers an especially interesting account of relationship of EFTA and the EU historically, both the creation of two rival trade blocs and their eventual rapprochement in the European Economic Area (EEA).

Preston presents EFTA as a reactive organization, shaped by the political concerns of sovereignty and neutrality. However, as the momentum in Brussels for the completion of single market accelerated in the mid-1980s, EFTA as an alternative became increasingly unsatisfactory. The EEA, which sought to economically involve the EFTA states in the single market but forbade them any political decision-making power over single market policies taken in Brussels, was similarly inadequate. As Redmond notes, the lack of political voice in the EEA posed a greater threat to sovereignty than becoming a full member. External conditions and the demise of the Soviet threat lead to a reappraisal of the meaning of neutrality for Sweden, Finland and Austria, further opening the door for membership.

Each applicant country is profiled in a chapter which addresses the most pressing issue related to membership. David Phinnemore describes how the issue of Alpine transit resonated both in the Austrian accession negotiations and in the referendum, particularly in preserving the high environmental standards associated with Austrian transport policy. Austria and the new Nordic member states are noted for their high environmental standards, and the 1995 accession was accompanied by a non-binding declaration to improve environmental standards across the EU. Lee Miles assesses the changing conception of neutrality for the new applicant states and how a redefinition of neutrality as well as the end of the East-West division created conditions amenable for seeking full membership in the EU. Miles also addresses the effect of the accession of neutrals on the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), noting that all three new members have a preference for intergovernmental, unanimous decision-making and maintaining a clear distinction between the collective security obligations of the Western European Union and participation in CFSP process. Sweden's refusal to compromise her military non-alignment may face even greater challenges as Europe pushes for a common defense policy as stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty. Finland's mad dash into the arms of the EU after the lapse of her (largely imposed) Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the former Soviet Union was almost unseemly, given the restraint with which Finns had conducted their careful and nuanced post-war policy. David Arter reviews the constraints on Finnish integration into Europe and discusses the *volte-face* in Finnish-European relations. The needs of Finnish agriculture, beset by a harsh climate, were the major negotiating and political obstacle to membership in an otherwise eager applicant. In "Norway: the one that got away" Clive Archer details the importance of fisheries not only to the Norwegian economy but in the effort to keep rural areas populated. The Common Fisheries Policy thus presented negotiating and political difficulties.

The bulk of Redmond's volume serves as a snapshot of the national decisions for (or against) membership. The focus is thus mostly on the national context of enlargement. In the last chapter, Redmond provides a limited and initial assessment of how the 1995 enlargement will affect the

institutions and policies of the Union itself given the environmental and social welfare proclivities of the new member states. Redmond points to their likely support of small state interests, greater environmental protection and standards, social cooperation, and the fight against unemployment. Yet, little in-depth analysis is given of these issues, and the volume admits to a narrow focus on the enlargement issue. As such, it is most useful for those interested in the issues and controversies of the enlargement process.

The Nordic applications for membership in the EU were accompanied by something of an "identity crisis" in the Nordic region, as manifest by announcements of the end of Scandinavian Social Democracy (see, for instance, Geyer, Moses and Ingebritsen [eds.], Globalism, Europeanization and the End of Scandinavian Social Democracy, forthcoming from Macmillan). The importance of examining the interactive changes introduced by EU membership of the Nordic States, the "reluctant Europeans", needs incisive analysis, which is precisely what the volume edited by Lee Miles provides. What will be the impact of membership on these famously generous welfare states, and how will their presence affect developments in Brussels? The Miles volume presents an overview of Nordic, EFTA and EU relations, the bilateral relations of the five Nordic states (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Iceland) with the EU, and an assessment of Nordic membership and EU policy in areas such as monetary integration, social policy, the environment, energy, and the CFSP.

While there is considerable overlap in the descriptions of EFTA EU relations in these two volumes, in the Miles volume there is a crucial chapter by Alastair H. Thomas on Nordic integration. Often called 'the other European community,' Nordic integration is adamantly intergovernmental, but the multiple agreements in several areas (a passport union, reciprocal recognition of qualifications, harmonization of social security systems, a common labor market for the region) have created a web of integration that in some areas exceeds the EU's more bureaucratic, sometimes supranational approach. The success of Nordic integration explains the Nordic preferences for intergovernmentalism and the defense of sovereignty in cooperative undertakings. The realignment of Nordic relations, with Norway and Iceland remaining outside the EU institutions, will certainly complicate and perhaps even diminish the self-conscious "Nordic identity."

The "National Dimension" chapters in the Miles text cover the same territory as the Redmond text, but some of the chapters are more analytical than the "politically hot issue" approach taken in the Redmond volume. For instance, Thomas Pedersen applies Charles Hermann's rather sophisticated analytical framework of foreign policy change to Denmark's changing EU orientation around 1990. Pedersen is thus able to not only provide an important empirical account of Danish EU policy but reveal the strengths and weaknesses of this analytical framework. Not all of the country specific chapters in Part II are as theoretically or conceptually rigorous, but all provide interesting empirical accounts of the bilateral relationships with the EU.

The last section of the book which assesses the influence of Nordic enlargement on EU developments in a number of areas is the most interesting and ambitious, given the relatively short period of membership for the new Nordic members. Ian Barnes explores the possibility of Swedish and Finnish participation in monetary integration and EMU, which opinion polls in both societies reveal as an extremely unpopular prospect. Barnes presents a clear analysis of the developments toward a single currency (though the dates have changed since his writing), the specificities of the Nordic economies, and the likely consequences of EMU participation, namely the diminution of social provisions required by European monetary policy reflecting Bundesbank preference for low inflation. While the prospect of EMU was uncertain when this chapter was written, the analysis presented still holds. Sweden and Finland have taken divergent paths on the road to EMU: Finland has implemented austerity measures and is thus on the auto-bahn to EMU while Sweden has been loathe to implement the requisite budget cuts and is likely to take the more scenic route. The impending decision on "ins" and "outs" for participation in EMU will likely reflect these different choices.

Social policy is clearly an interest of these Nordic welfare societies, and Debra Johnson provides an overview of European social policy and the principle of subsidiarity. She focuses on the contributions that the Nordics will bring to EU social policy and less on the impact of membership on Nordic social policy. Her analysis suggests that the Nordics will stand firm on social standards and attempt to prevent social dumping, while fiercely protecting national provisions and high standards. Thus, subsidiarity would appear to protect Nordic social policy preferences. However, given the demands of EMU and the loss of macroeconomic policy instruments to maintain high levels of employment and taxation as detailed by Barnes, the capacity of the Nordic states to maintain extensive, Scandinavian welfare provision is impaired and subsidiarity may be something of a myth for the Nordics.

Readers interested in reviewing recent EU-related books for the *ECSA Review* are encouraged to contact the Book Review Editor:

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The question of a Nordic identity in the area of foreign and defense policy is also examined in the volume, though consideration is separated into the Nordic neutrals and the NATO Nordics. Clearly, defense has been a common policy amongst the Nordics despite the effort to create a common Nordic defense arrangement in the early post-war period. Foreign policy, however, has been an area of considerable Nordic cooperation, particularly in the United Nations and other multilateral fora. What is the impact of EU-divided Nordic region on CFSP as well as Nordic cooperation in tertiary areas? These chapters focus on the former rather than the latter. Lauri Karvonen and Bengt Sundelius detail how Sweden and Finland were able to redefine neutrality to include the possibility of EU membership. In both cases, the roles played by the foreign policy leadership were crucial in overcoming initial public resistance, through an open policy debate in Sweden and in a centralized, less transparent fashion in Finland. They are more interested in detailing how the neutrals overcame the neutrality obstacle than investigating the implications of neutrality for the developing CFSP.

Clive Archer presents a broader analysis of the NATO Nordics, Denmark and Norway (with limited discussion of Iceland) and their approach to CFSP. Denmark has been traditionally stand-offish with respect to cooperation in European foreign policies, while Norway despite being outside the EU has nonetheless cooperated with the EU in foreign policy discussions and shares common priorities. Both chapters detail well the issues related to a potentially more important European foreign policy and how the Nordics might fit in, but they provide little analysis of non-regional foreign policy arenas in which the Nordic identity has been quite strong, particularly the United Nations. What will be the impact of a strengthening CFSP on the extensive Nordic cooperation in multilateral fora? Archer suggests that Nordic UN peacekeeping cooperation has increased in the 1990s, but what of the joint Nordic statements in the UN, the coordination of policies within the World Bank and UNDP? There was discussion during the negotiations about the strength of a Nordic bloc in foreign policy, and CFSP discourages such sub-regional blocs. An interesting area of investigation, which is not undertaken in this study, is to determine how EU membership has affected Nordic cooperation in extra-regional areas. The Nordic identity may be subsumed in the context of the EU, but does it continue outside the region?

These texts are rich introductions to the region for non-Scandinavianist scholars as well as undergraduates and a valuable resource for those interested in issues related to EU enlargement. They are surely the references to be consulted as the Nordic-European relationship evolves and the EU faces the continued dilemma of "deepening and widening" in the next enlargement.

Katie Verlin Laatikainen
Chatham College

Giandomenico Majone (ed.) Regulating Europe. New York: Routledge, 1996, 315 pp.

One of the pervasive challenges faced by students of European political economy is that of understanding the relationship between current developments in national-level institutions and the processes taking place at the EU level. This book by Giandomenico Majone, with contributions from seven other European scholars, takes up this challenge by focusing on two parallel and interrelated phenomena: the shift toward statutory regulation by independent agencies in many European countries, and the delegation of regulatory authority by national governments to EU institutions, in particular the European Commission. This delegation of regulatory powers to bodies that are not under the direct control of elected political authority raises important questions for empirical theories of regulation (such as why elected executives choose to give up their regulatory powers to independent agencies) as well as normative questions concerning the democratic accountability of regulators. Majone takes up both types of questions. He offers a theoretical model to explain the choices of politicians that also serves as the basis for a normative defense of statutory regulation. The book starts out with four chapters by Majone that discuss 1) alternate modes of regulation (regulation through public ownership and self-regulation vs. statutory regulation through independent agencies); 2) various theories of regulation (including normative and positive versions of the economic theory of regulation and institutionalist theories developed by political scientists); 3) the rise of statutory regulation in EU member states; and 4) the selective expansion of the EU Commission's role as regulator. These are followed by six case-study chapters by other authors who focus on specific areas of regulation in individual member states, and a chapter by Laraine Laudati that considers the Commission's role in competition policy. The book closes with two additional chapters by Majone, in which he considers first the "political and institutional defects revealed by the case-studies" and the requirements for efficient statutory regulation in Europe, and secondly, the legitimacy of statutory regulation by independent agencies in light of democratic theory.

Majone offers two explanations for the rise of statutory regulation in Europe. The first is that governments choose to delegate their regulatory powers to independent agencies in order to solve a time-inconsistency problem and gain policy credibility. This argument has traditionally been associated with monetary policy and with the literature on central bank independence, but Majone argues that it applies to many regulatory spheres. The second explanation has to do with the decline of the Keynesian welfare state. The increased importance of budgetary constraints on governments has led to a shift away from the redistributive conception of the state that prevailed in Europe in the postwar period in favor of a regulatory model that focuses on increasing aggregate welfare by ensuring efficiency. While the redistributive Keynesian welfare state hinged on a majoritarian conception of

democracy, the later model of statutory regulation by independent (and presumably apolitical) regulators, Majone suggests, can be justified in terms of a Madisonian conception of democracy, in which the separation and diffusion of powers serves to ensure against majority tyranny. In making this argument, Majone relies heavily on the analogy of the United States. Indeed, he argues that the current trend toward statutory regulation in Europe can be seen as evidence that the Keynesian welfare states of the past are being replaced by an American-styled "regulatory state" at the European level. The emphasis on aggregate efficiency concerns (rather than a redistributive agenda) of such a regulatory state, he suggests, is more consistent with current budgetary constraints and with the political realities of an integrated Europe. Thus, he rejects standard criticisms of the lack of accountability of independent agencies and EU institutions as being based on a majoritarian conception of democracy that, following Lijphart, may not be appropriate for a territorial unit as heterogeneous and pluralistic as the EU.

While Majone's theoretical analysis is thought-provoking and engaging, the individual case-study chapters do not always seem to bear him out. Part of the problem is the analytic focus of these chapters tends to be much narrower and country-specific than the theoretical framework laid out by Majone at the outset. A chapter on health and safety regulation by Robert Baldwin argues that the expansion and acceptance of EU regulatory authority hurts the legitimacy of the British Health and Safety Commission and Executive. Another chapter on Britain by Albert Weale, this time on environmental regulation, argues that the deregulation and re-regulation of pollution controls in Britain has not responded to any clear conception of the state and its relation to the economy. The rest of the chapters all focus on aspects of competition policy in other EU states (Pio Baake and Oliver Perschau on Germany, Fabrice Demarigny on France, Lluís Cases on Spain, and Michelle Everson on the insurance sector in Germany). Virtually all of them emphasize the fact that governments retain important powers of discretion over the implementation of competition policy even when they have created independent regulatory agencies, and that they use these powers to ensure exceptions from strict competition rules. Laudati makes an analogous point when she argues that the European Commission itself lacks objectivity in its implementation of competition policy and therefore tends to favor the parties in merger cases.

Majone acknowledges these deviations from the "regulatory state" model and highlights the need for a stronger commitment to statutory regulation at both the national and EU levels. Yet the behavior of European governments in practice, as described in the case-studies, raises some doubt about his own interpretation of why the shift to statutory regulation is taking place. If the problem of time-inconsistency and the search for policy credibility really has been the central motivating factor for governments, why have they not allowed statutory regulation to reach its logical conclusions? The analogy to the United States may be

instructive: independent regulatory agencies were the historical results of political battles between the legislative and executive branches of governments. The motivations that led politicians to create these institutions were thus quite different from the social functions that served to justify them or that they eventually might have come to serve.

In spite of these issues, this book makes an important contribution to the debate over the future of regulation and governance in the Europe. Majone's analysis is highly engaging and, more importantly, has clear theoretical foundations. His stipulation of a connection between different regulatory modes and majoritarian *versus* non-majoritarian conceptions of democracy offers an alternative way of thinking about the relationship between economic and political integration in Europe. His use of the American analogy (and of the American literature on regulation) moreover will make this book particularly appealing to an American audience. Although his defense of statutory regulation will not convince everyone, it will have to be taken very seriously by students of European politics.

Sofía A. Pérez
Boston University

Hussein Kassim and Anand Menon (eds.) The European Union and National Industrial Policy. New York: Routledge, 1996, 300 pp.

David G. Mayes (ed.) The Evolution of the Single European Market. Lyme, NH: Edward Elgar, 1997, 286 pp.

The two books seemingly deal with different EU topics, but both analyze the development of policies in the European Union and the role of the member states in the development and implementation of different policies. Both books illustrate that during the existence of the European Union, policy matters are increasingly being decided by European Union institutions and less by the individual members themselves or through cooperation among the members on an ad hoc basis. Both books are the results of Economic and Social Research Council funding and involved researchers from many EU member states during multiple-year research projects.

The European Union and National Industrial Policy takes a more intergovernmental approach, although the EU members are not considered independent actors. The editors use the term "autonomy" to describe the relationship between the member states and the European Union. Autonomy refers to the limited power of the EU member over major policy issues, such as trade. The editors prefer this term as opposed to sovereignty, which would indicate that each country has full control over the policies at hand.

The book covers a large number of major industrial policy areas, including steel, aerospace, air transport, energy, water, and television. Before focusing on the policy areas, the first three chapters give an overview of the theoretical background of the integration process. This forms a backdrop for the

subsequent studies on the policy fields. Jeremy Richardson discusses the theoretical background and indicates that one would have difficulty explaining and analyzing the policy process given the existing theories.

Each writer discusses one policy issue and focuses mainly on the national policy of one of the four largest EU members. The authors analyze how the EU influenced the national policy process and how, in some cases, the member states influenced the outcome of the policy process on the EU level. For instance, Matthew William Fraser's chapter on television shows how the French government was able to force the EU to redraft its broadcast policy to make it more protectionistic, in particular towards the blocking of the broadcasting of American television programs in Europe and thus France.

The second book, The Evolution of the Single European Market, is similarly concerned with policy making and the relationship between the European Union institutions and the member states. However, this book concentrates on the development, the influencing, impact, and changing of the rules. Eight writers concentrate on one aspect of the development of rules. For example, one chapter is devoted to the competition among rules. Stephen Woolcock examines the central development of rules at EU level versus the competition among the member states to create rules. In the latter case, the assumption is that each country will create rules that would benefit its business community and might attract additional foreign investment. If that is the case, eventually, the EU will have rules in place in each member state that would reduce the overall regulatory difficulties in Europe.

The Evolution of the Single European Market outlines in detail the process in the development and implementation of the rules. The different EU treaties as well as European Court cases are heavily referenced throughout the book. These references make for a technical discussion of the topics and might be of lesser interest to the general reader on EU matters. Despite this shortcoming, the book is important in its analysis of the long-term affects of the integration process in regards to policy making and implementation.

Both books are examples of extensive European research on the policy making process in the EU and are important in showcasing the practical aspects of the integration process. The European Union and National Industrial Policy is a good example of the development of the rules discussed in The Evolution of the Single European Market. Thus, the two books are closely related, although their titles do not indicate this.

Jaap Donath
Florida Atlantic University

Alan W. Cafruny and Carl Lankowski (eds.) Europe's Ambiguous Unity: Conflict and Consensus in the Post-Maastricht Era. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997, 271+ pp.

The institutional and policy changes initiated by the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty have spurred "a broadening and a reformulation of opposition" (p. 271) to the

European Union. This book thus analyzes, in two parts, "the changing configuration of social forces activated by Western European integration" (p. 1).

Part 1 addresses such conceptual issues as the "Contending Models of Governance in the EU" and Europe's Ambiguous Federalism," and by way of solution—or so it seems—follows up with three critiques of economic liberalism. In their discussion of stato-centrist vs. multilevel governance theoretical models, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks make a convincing case in favor of the latter. They argue that the Commission does not possess sole regulatory initiative, but neither does it serve "merely as an agent of state executives." It has, in fact, "significant space for autonomous action." In addition, because "states no longer monopolize links between domestic and European actors," because lobbies and regions "now mobilize intensively in Brussels," because of the extension of qualified majority voting and the death of the "veto culture" within the Council of Ministers, because of the establishment of the cooperation and co-decision procedures with the EP, and because the ECJ is not so much an impartial monitor as a dynamic factor of legal integration, policy initiation and implementation are in fact "increasingly intermeshed" at the national and European levels. Multi-level governance posits that policy-making in the EU is "increasingly a shared competence;" regional integration does not confront national sovereignty head-on, since nation-states are capable, as intergovernmentalists rightly point out, "of crushing direct threats to their existence." Instead, national and EU institutions are "locked into mutual dependence" and "are being melded gently into a multilevel polity" (pp.23-38). In a following chapter, Michael Shackleton extends this consideration of a new European system of governance by examining the EU's crisis of legitimacy from three perspectives: the reinforcement of the EP, the further involvement of national parliaments and, beyond formal legitimation, social legitimation through political parties and subsidiarity. But, this chapter seems to ignore the crisis of electoral politics in Western Europe, especially the emergence of antisystemic parties (e.g., the National Front, the Italian Northern League).

For the Left, "European integration over the last decade has been widespread consensus on neoliberal solutions" (p.124). Thus, three scholars present "alternatives to a neoliberal Europe" (p.109). Shalini Venturelli offers a sophisticated consideration the "Information Society in Europe" and carefully argues against what she sees as the "Passing of the Public Service Paradigm of European Democracy" (p.85). Thomas Hueglin shows the mixture of "political ambiguity [and] economic rationality" that underlies "Europe's Ambiguous Federalism" (p.45), while Alan Cafruny explores "the constraints and opportunities that the EU represents for the European Left" (p.109). Quite clearly, this first part presents a contrast between two detached academic analyses and the criticism of EU economic liberalism.

Part 2 considers five national responses to European integration: French political parties' opposition from 1981 to 1996 (Pia Christina Wood), the German Greens (Carl

ECSA Book Series

Lankowski), Scotland (Michael Keating), Ireland, and finally the Nordic countries (Christine Ingebritsen). These national case studies are concise yet detailed, reliable and current accounts. In their chapter on "The Irish Response to European Integration," John Coakley and others outline a typology of opposition to the EU. Opposition may be concerned with specific outcomes or principles, may be explicitly oriented toward a set of goals, or may be more diffuse. It may also be "assessed in terms of the range of its objectives (specific, sectoral, global) and the duration of the period over which it is exercised (limited, permanent)" (p.209). Such frameworks are most useful for drawing transnational comparisons and should have found a place in the editors' introduction.

All ten chapters demonstrate the highest standards of scholarship but Parts 1 and 2 seem juxtaposed rather than integrated. This reviewer also questions the editors' contention that Brussels' growing legislative impact is "largely hidden from view by use of the directive ..." Directives do constitute "the EU's dominant legal instrument" and do "express a joint European decision in a national idiom" (p.8). But if Brussels' impact were indeed "hidden from view," how then does one account for today's widespread anti-European Union sentiments? This book would also have greatly benefited from another national case study dealing with the deep-seated British reluctance toward the EU.

This volume proves timely, as the coming ratification of the Amsterdam treaty—and the Danish referendum—will refuel debates on the orientation and finality of the European polity. Given current circumstances, a renationalization of European politics on the 1970s model seems unlikely, but a further "nationalist backlash" (p.3) in some parties and regions of the EU is to be expected. Europe's ambiguous unity will remain, for quite some time, a timely issue.

Michel Gueldry

Monterey Institute of International Studies

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The ECSA would like to thank the following Association members who made financial contributions above and beyond their membership dues during the first quarter of 1998:

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The ECSA's State of the European Union book series has been an important contribution to the study of the European Union. As one of the first publications devoted to the EU, the series filled an important gap in the literature (see facing page for information on the latest volume). As part of our periodic review of ECSA programs, the ECSA Executive Committee is reexamining our State of the European Union series. With the maturation of the field of EU studies, the Publications Committee (a sub-committee of the Executive Committee) is investigating ways that the series could be strengthened. One option is to maintain the series as a theoretically informed overview of EU developments. While other publications provide year-end reviews of EU activities, our State of the European Union series remains an important "state of the theory" text. The Publications Committee has determined that, if this option is pursued, steps must be taken to ensure that the editing and publication processes are done in a timely manner. Moreover, it is clear that this publication must appear both in paperback and hardcover forms.

Another option is to develop a new State of the European Union series that would focus not on year-end summaries, but on specific, substantive issues in and approaches to EU studies. With the ECSA imprimatur, the new series would encourage books and monographs on the EU that address particular needs in the literature. For example, the new series could feature an undergraduate textbook or an edited volume based on excellent papers from particularly coherent panels at an ECSA conference. The new series could appear on an annual or a biennial basis. Further, while the series has greatly benefited from its association with Lynne Rienner Publishers, the Committee believes that the time has come for the State of the European Union series to be open for competitive bid. Thus, whatever option is chosen, the Publications Committee will begin discussions with a number of publishers regarding the series' marketing, paperback publication, and so on.

The Publications Committee welcomes your input in the series review process. Would you support the continuation of the current State of the European Union series provided that the turn-around time for the publication be significantly shortened? Or would you support the development of a new series devoted to specific EU issues? What sort of publications might be appropriate for a revised ECSA publications series? Please send your comments and suggestions to the Publications Committee members, listed below. We plan to make a final decision on the series in the next few months. Thank you.

ECSA 1997-99 Publications Committee

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The State of the European Union, Vol. 4: Deepening and Widening

Edited by Pierre-Henri Laurent and Marc Maresceau

The struggle between those who seek a more integrated, and even a federal, Europe and those proposing a looser confederation was once again highlighted at the 1996-1997 Intergovernmental Conference, and reflected in the IGC decisions. This fourth volume in the European Community Studies Association's biennial series examines the divisions within the EU in the key areas of the common foreign and security policy, European monetary union, enlargement, and structural reform. The essays:

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Publications

Contemporary European Studies

This new series will be launched in Summer 1998 by UACES (University Association for Contemporary European Studies) with Sheffield Academic Press in the UK. The series will draw on expert practitioners and academics as well as promising young scholars, aiming for a wide readership, and will focus on both the European Union and wider aspects of contemporary Europe. Clive Archer, Manchester Metropolitan University, will edit the series, and the first four titles will cover EU enlargement, financing, regional and structural policies, and democracy. Contact Prof. Clive Archer, Dept. of Politics and Philosophy, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester M15 6LL, UK; e-mail <c.archer@mmu.ac.uk>.

Cornell University Institute for European Studies

The Institute for European Studies, Cornell University, has recently launched a Working Paper Series and solicits papers from faculty members at area colleges and universities. Papers may be from any discipline with a European focus. Contact Susan Tarrow, Associate Director, Institute for European Studies, 120 Uris Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853; e-mail <ies@admin.is.cornell.edu>. Recent titles in the series have included "Left-wing violence and state response: United States, Germany, Italy and Japan, 1960s-1990s" by Peter J. Katzenstein (98.1); "Efficiency of the Welfare State" by Claudine Gouyette and Pierre Pestieau (98.2); and "Building a Composite Polity: Popular Contention in the European Union" by Sidney Tarrow (98.3).

EurAmerica: Journal of European and American Studies

This journal devoted to a "wide variety of perspectives on European and American cultures" is published in Chinese with English abstracts and bibliographies, by the Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Nankang, Taipei, Taiwan 115, Republic of China; fax 886 2 785 1787. Vol. 27, No. 4 (December 1997) includes an article, "Second-order elections and European Parliament elections: An empirical test with British data" by Wei-feng Huang.

Collegium: News of the College of Europe

Published in French and English by the College of Europe in Brugge, this slim periodical publishes news from the College as well as short scholarly pieces such as "Les illusions du rôle international de l'Euro" by Dominique Forest and "The labour market: not that much of a woman's world" by Carmen Suárez García, in the current issue (9: 1, 1998). Chief editor is Marc Vuijsteke, *Collegium*, College of Europe, Dijver 9-11, B-8000 Brugge, Belgium; e-mail <collegium@coleruop.be>.

New Books and Monographs

- Cafruny, Alan and Patrick Peters (eds.) (1998) The Union and the World: The Political Economy of a Common European Foreign Policy. The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.
- Collier, Ute (ed.) (1998) Deregulation in the European Union: Environmental Perspectives. London: Routledge.
- Davidson, Ian (1997) Jobs and the Rhineland Model. London: Federal Trust Report.
- European Parliament Secretariat, Task Force on Enlargement, Briefings on enlargement of the European Union with regard to: "Cyprus" (No.1); "Romania" (No.3); "Czech Republic" (No.4); "Malta" (No.5); "Bulgaria" (No.6); "Institutional Aspects" (No.15); and "Controlling and Protecting European Union Finances" (No.16).
- Henig, Stanley (1997) The Uniting of Europe: From Discord to Concord. London: Routledge.
- Hobday, Mike *et alia* (1998) "The Pacific Asian electronics industries: Technology governance and implications for Europe." Working Papers in Contemporary European Studies, Sussex European Institute, No. 24.
- McNamara, Kathleen R. (1998) The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Memedovic, Olga *et alia* (eds) (1998) Globalization of Labour Markets: Challenges, Adjustment and Policy Response in the EU and LDCs. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
- Moussis, Nicholas (1997) Access to European Union: Law, Economics, Policies. Genva, Belgium: Euroconfidential.
- Neal, Larry (1998) The Economics of the European Union and the Economies of Europe. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
- "The new transatlantic marketplace" (1997) Communication from the European Commission to the Council, European Parliament, and the Economic and Social Committee. Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, Catalogue No. CB-CO-98-173-EN-C.
- Piening, Christopher (1997) Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Redmond, John and Glenda G. Rosenthal (1998) The Expanding European Union: Past, Present, Future. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Rees, Teresa L. (1998) Mainstreaming Equality in the European Union. London: Routledge.
- Regelsberger, Elfriede *et alia* (eds) (1997) Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Roberts, Geoffrey K. (1997) Party Politics in the New Germany. Herndon, VA: Pinter/Cassell.
- Rose, Richard (1997) What is Europe? A Dynamic Introduction. New York: HarperCollins.
- Wallace, Helen (1998) "Coming to terms with a larger Europe: Options for economic integration." Working Papers in Contemporary European Studies, Sussex European Institute, No. 23.

Conferences

Reinvent Europe: Project Europe 2020

May 29-30, 1998, Athens, Greece: Organized by Prometheus-Europe, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Culture, and others, this meeting at the Agora in Athens aims to launch Europe 2020, an interactive debate on the future of European integration for EU citizens. Questions to be debated include implications of the Single Market and the *euro*; enlargement; the EU's response to the popular desire to participate in the elaboration of Europe; EU administrative complexity vis-à-vis efficiency; *et alia*. Visit the Web at <<http://www.prom.org>>; or e-mail <centre@prom.org> for more information.

The Fuzzy Edges of Community

May 29-31, 1998, University of Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: ECSA Canada's third annual meeting will explore the emergence of regional systems in Europe and North and South America. Contact Peter Leslie, Dept. of Political Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada; e-mail <lesliep@qsilver.queensu.ca> or David Long, School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6, Canada; e-mail <dlong@ccs.carleton.ca>, or Steven Wolinetz, Dept. of Political Science, Memorial University, St. John's, Newfoundland A1B 3X9, Canada; e-mail <ecsac@morgan.ucs.mun.ca>.

European Integration and the Transatlantic Relationship and Trade

June 12, 1998, London, UK: Cosponsored by Baylor University, Middlesex University and the Atlantic Council of the UK, this third annual Conference on The Future of the Atlantic Community will bring together government officials and scholars from the USA, France, Germany, and the UK to consider how New Transatlantic Marketplace proposals may be affected by both EMU and the EU's eastern enlargement. Contact Anna Pavlakos, Conference Secretary, Middlesex University, White Hart Lane, London N17 8HR, UK; fax 44 181 362 6652; e-mail <a.pavlakos@mdx.ac.uk>.

From Pragmatic Solution to Global Structure

July 16-19, 1998, Münster, Germany: The European Peace Research Association (EuPRA) and others are organizing this conference on the legal legacy of Westphalia and Europe pre- and post-1648. Topics include The Westphalian System; International Law: From Grotius to European Community Law; The Monetary Structures of Europe; *inter alia*. Contact the Department of Political Science, University of Twente, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands; facsimile 31 53 489 4734; e-mail <j.h.dewilde@bsk.utwente.nl>.

The Single Currency

September 1998, Brussels, Belgium: Organized by the ECSA Secretariat (DG-X), European Commission, this international conference will investigate the institutional, economic and international aspects of the single currency. Contact the ECSA Secretariat, 67, rue de Trèves, B-1040 Bruxelles, Belgium; telephone 32 2 230 5472; fax 32 2 230 5608; or e-mail <ecsa@pophost.eunet.be>.

UACES Research Conference

September 9-11, 1998, London, UK: The University Association for Contemporary European Studies hosts its third annual research conference for academics and others interested in the process of European integration. Contact the UACES Secretariat, King's College, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK; e-mail <uaces@compuserve.com>.

Europe and Empire: Encounters, Transformations, Legacies

October 16-18, 1998, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University's Center for European Studies and Program for the Study of Germany and Europe are sponsoring this workshop for doctoral students at North American universities in history, politics, anthropology, and cultural and literary studies. Students selected will present their work and interact with leading scholars; transportation and accommodation will be provided. Contact the Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 27 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138; e-mail <imeschen@fas.harvard.edu>; tel. 617 495 4303, Ext.231. Application deadline is May 1. Proposed themes are:

- Governance, law, and political institutions
- Civilization and culture
- Labor, class and property relations
- Ideas and ideologies of nation and race
- Constructions of gender and the family
- Conceptions of historical development and progress
- Philosophical universalism: human rights
- Contestations: defending, resisting the imperial project
- Post-colonial legacies

European Culture

October 28-31, 1998, Pamplona, Spain: Organized by the University of Navarra's Centre for European Studies, this interdisciplinary conference will include sections on Europe and the European Union with regard to migrations and cultural change; linguistic diversity; effects of culture on economy; effects of technology and media on European culture; *et alia*. Visit the Conference Web site at <<http://web1.cti.unav.es/castellano/Pamplona/otros/cde/congreso>>; e-mail <vcongre@unav.es>; or contact Centro de Estudios Europeos, Universidad de Navarra, E-31080 Pamplona, Spain; fax 34 48 425 622.

World Wide Web Sites

The following annotated list highlights new or newly-discovered World Wide Web sites of interest to EU scholars. NB: All Web site addresses must be preceded by **http://** which has been omitted here for the sake of brevity.

<citizens.eu.int> is the site of the "Citizens First" Signpost Service, an EC initiative aimed at better informing European citizens about their specific rights. EU citizens (and others) can download detailed factsheets in their preferred languages after choosing any of the fifteen member states from the home page. The site answers questions on employment, travel, study and other rights of EU citizens wanting to move among the member states. (The Signpost Service also has toll-free telephone numbers in each member state, given on the site.)

<presid.fco.gov.uk> is the official site for the UK's European Union six-month Presidency (January-June 1998). It includes fourteen sections such as Basic Questions; Priorities; Young Europe, and the Half-Time Report—currently listing 45 achievements of the UK Presidency in its first three months. One link even explains the development of the UK Presidency's logo (fifteen colorful and whimsical, soft-edged stars) and the children who drew them.

<www.eusceptic.org> describes itself as the site of European EU skeptics, aiming to "create a political environment where people can discuss alternatives to the existing Union of Maastricht." Maintained by the EDN (*Europe de Nations*) group in the EU Parliament, Brussels, this site includes sections on the *euro*, Maastricht, and the "David Group"—an informal group of MEPs from Denmark, Sweden and Finland who are "critical of or opposed to Maastricht."

<www.esf.c-strasbourg.fr> is site of the European Science Foundation (ESF), which aims to "advance science in Europe," using the term science to mean higher learning in the broadest sense. The ESF has 62 member organizations in 21 European countries, comprising individual scientists, research councils, and academies in all EU member states to, e.g., "forge research agendas, increase research capacities, advise policy makers." Working with the European Commission, the ESF has membership sections in the Physical Sciences, Medicine, Life Sciences, Humanities, and Social Sciences.

<www.europa.eu.int> "Europa" is the official server and multilingual Web site of the European Union. The Council, the Commission, the Parliament and the Courts post their news here, along with a wealth of EU information from a basic primer to official publications to a chat room on the Amsterdam Treaty. This site is so complete and important for EU scholars that it will be mentioned in every *ECSA Review*.

Academic Programs

Please contact each program directly for information on instructional staff, accreditation, courses, policies, fees, and application materials and deadlines.

International Executive Training Program, "Managing Transactions and Legal Risk in a Global Economy," American University, June 15-July 17, 1998 (five sessions). For lawyers, negotiators, business executives and government officials, with seminars, hands-on training and case studies. Faculty come from government, business, academia, legal practices, and international organizations. Visit the Web site at <www.wcl.american.edu/workshop> or tel. 202 274 4003.

University of Catania Summer School, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership," Euromed Centre, Department of Political Studies, July 5-12, 1998. For advanced doctoral students who are interested in Mediterranean issues, the program will include sessions on issue analysis and research methodologies. Contact organizer Valentina Barbagallo at e-mail <barbav@vm.unict.it> or visit the Web site at <www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/Sschool.htm> for an application.

Master of Arts in European Integration, University of Limerick, is a one-year, full-time interdisciplinary program for recent graduates in the humanities and social sciences who plan careers in international business, public service, journalism, or research and education. The program focuses on the contemporary significance of European integration and the EU as a global economic and political entity. Contact by e-mail <admissions@ul.ie> or visit the Web site <www.ul.ie/~govsoc>. Application deadline is June 12, 1998.

Academy of European Law Trier, Trier, Germany. Ongoing series of seminars, workshops and short courses aimed at lawyers, notaries public, tax advisors, judges, public prosecutors and other law practitioners in EU member states or in countries interested in cooperation with the European Union. Topics in law: administrative, civil, competition, consumer protection, intellectual property, procedural, and many more. Contact Academy of European Law Trier, Metzger Allee 4, D-54295 Trier, Germany; fax 49 651 937 3790.

International Workshop, "Energy Resources and Conflict Resolution," August 16-23, 1998, Constantza, Romania. For diplomats, civil servants, students and scholars. Topics: the Black Sea Area geopolitical landscape; promoting "Euro-regions" to overcome conflict and build prosperity; access to energy resources; and more. Working language is English. Contact Dr. Colette Mazzucelli, The Black Sea University Foundation, 1864 74th Street, Brooklyn, NY 11204; telephone 718 234 0143; e-mail <colettegrace@earthlink.net>.

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- There are now 300 ECSA members (approximately 30 percent of current membership) subscribed to the ECSA e-mail List Server. This forum is for succinct queries and announcements related to EU studies, not for commercial or promotional announcements. The ECSA List Server is now moderated, meaning that messages go through the ECSA Administrative Office for approval before being posted to the List.
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