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ECSA REVIEW

From the Chair

GARY MARKS

Network of European Union Centers

AS YOU MAY know, the European Union has funded a new Network of European Union Centers in the United States. I am delighted to report that the European Community Studies Association has signed a service contract with the European Commission to coordinate this Network. The ECSA's role will be to synthesize and disseminate information about the programs and activities of the ten Centers (the Centers are Harvard University, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, the University of Missouri-Columbia, the University of Pittsburgh, the University of Washington (Seattle), the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and four consortia comprising the Claremont Colleges and the University of Southern California; the Georgia Institute of Technology and the University System of Georgia; Columbia University, City University of New York, New York University, and The New School for Social Research; and Duke University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).

The precise role of the ECSA will be determined in the months ahead as we listen to those active in the Centers and to interested scholars and teachers across the country. The following items are on our agenda as examples of what the ECSA might do:

- link the Centers together through a dedicated Web site, an e-mail List Serve, and the organizing of face-to-face meetings of Center Directors;
- manage a speaker's bureau for the Centers and other universities which would publicize speaker venues and allow sharing of speaker travel expenses among the Centers and other educational institutions;
- publicize conferences at the Centers to facilitate collaboration among the Centers and other institutions;
- serve as a resource base to provide the Centers with access to electronic information sources on the EU;
- circulate a newsletter about the Network, which will go out with the *ECSA Review*; and
- coordinate evaluations of the Centers on behalf of the European Commission.

I mentioned in a previous letter that we were striving to place ECSA on firm financial footing. This initiative helps to do exactly that by giving ECSA a broadened financial basis without in any way compromising the core activities of our Association. In its role as a broad and inclusive Association,

the ECSA will help the ten new EU Centers strengthen EU scholarship in the U.S. as a whole, not just in the funded universities. The ECSA faces in two directions with respect to the new initiative. On the one hand, it will facilitate communication and collaboration among the funded Centers. On the other hand, as a large and diverse membership organization, the ECSA will maximize the value added by the Network for a much broader community of students, scholars, and practitioners.

The ECSA will be launching the Network of European Union Centers World Wide Web site in October, with complete information about Centers' programs and activities. I will be chairing the first meeting of Center Directors in January 1999, and would appreciate any ideas you have for items that should be placed on the agenda.

The Makins Report

I would like to summarize some of the findings of a recent report on the state of European studies written by Christopher Makins and commissioned by The German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Delegation of the European Commission (a full rendering of the report is available on the Web at <www.eurunion.org>). It is difficult to summarize such a diverse and information-packed report. In general, the report is optimistic about the future of European studies, and makes a series of observations about how the field is developing and how it might be improved. While the report does not provide new data about the state of European studies in the U.S., it does a good job in collating data that are already available. With respect to ECSA, the report recognizes:

- how much ECSA has grown in recent years. ECSA is now the largest association of European studies scholars in the U.S.;
- how valuable ECSA's biennial conference is. The report stresses that ECSA conferences have been "highly successful" and that we have been doing a fine job here. We are encouraged to continue to broaden the disciplinary basis of participation and actively solicit the participation of leaders in the field; and,
- that merger of the Council of European Studies with ECSA would be a poor policy and a false economy. The report stresses that the two associations have distinct roles, interests, and to a large extent, memberships. The

(continued on page 6)

Celebrating Ten Years of EU Scholarship Across the Disciplines

Integrating Left and Right: Studying EU Politics

Four ECSA members argue the merits of bringing in the political fight between left and right in the study of European integration.

Kathleen R. McNamara

THE FOLLOWING THREE ESSAYS discuss various aspects of a welcome new trend in the study of the European Union: the explicit focus on partisanship in the politics of European integration. The papers they drawn on were recently presented together at the Conference of Europeanists and the American Political Science Association meetings. To me, they are examples of the "normalization" of the study of the EU in that they use existing and well developed theoretical perspectives from the study of comparative politics, namely the study of political parties, voting and political ideology, to bear on the dynamics of integration. Historically, the study of European integration has been dominated by two approaches: scholars who viewed the EU as a *sui generis* case requiring its own theoretical apparatus, and scholars trained in international relations who approached the EU as a highly institutionalized case of international cooperation among sovereign states. As real world developments have made it difficult to deny that the EU is developing as a political entity of its own, however understood, international relations scholars have moved beyond the billiard ball approach to the study of EU politics, while comparative politics scholars have begun to take seriously the phenomenon of regional governance.

The three essays that follow are indicative of this change, as they ask a very different set of questions from the field's traditional focus on the explaining the extent of integration, typified by the neofunctionalist/intergovernmentalist debate. Instead, these authors ask to what degree partisan politics explain variation in policy outcomes, political preferences, or institutional dynamics in the European Union. The papers that these short essays are drawn from each take on a different level of analysis, illuminating the versatility of the partisan approach: Simon Hix's focus is on the domestic coalitional level; Liesbet Hooghe's on the EU institutional level; and Mark Pollack's on the international treaty level. The meaning and importance of partisanship differs as well: Hix investigates the left-right strategic dimensions of the electoral space within which European policy is formulated; Hooghe analyzes the contestation between neoliberal capitalism and regulated capitalism in the European Commission; while Pollack argues that the Hix and Hooghe use of relatively traditional categories from comparative politics may not capture the new "third way" between left and right typified by Tony Blair, and, Pollack argues, the Amsterdam Treaty.

It is notable that none of the authors denies the political importance of the independence versus integration dimension of EU policymaking, but rather each is engaged in an effort to move forward the research agenda beyond this aspect. Taken together, these analyses help define the initial contours of a coherent and productive research agenda, indicating that the linkages between partisan politics and EU integration can be theoretically specified and systematically studied. They also show how much more work lies ahead for those seeking a sophisticated political understanding of the EU. This research agenda, however, dovetails with broader and encouraging trends in political science towards the systematic study of the interpenetration of domestic and international political dynamics. For example, the study of foreign policy and international conflict has been revived by a renewed emphasis on the causal impact of domestic institutions, ideology and partisanship, often incorporating insights from theories in American and comparative politics. Scholars working on the issue of globalization have been effectively bridging the international/comparative political economy divide by studying the interaction between partisanship, domestic institutions and international trade and capital mobility. That the integration of partisan politics into the study of the EU is occurring alongside these developments in other fields indicates that the normalization of EU studies is well advanced. It may in fact result in our scholarship producing theoretical innovations which illuminate important political dynamics in these other empirical settings, as well as moving us towards a better understanding of the puzzles of European integration.

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Simon Hix

TRADITIONALLY, THE EU POLITICAL space has been conceptualised as uni-dimensional. For example, neofunctionalists argue that actors have allegiances either to the supranational institutions or to domestic institutions and cultures. Similarly, intergovernmentalists argue that governments have vested interests either in promoting or preventing supranational integration. Consequently, despite rival secondary hypotheses about the integration process, these approaches share a core primary assumption: that actors align themselves on a continuum between 'more' or 'less' integration.

Also, several contemporary approaches to the EU have inherited this construct. For example, George Tsebelis ("Maastricht and the Democratic Deficit," *Aussenwirtschaft* 52) has argued that the European Parliament (EP) is always more 'pro-integration' than the median government in the Council, and that the median government is always more pro-integration than the status quo (since the status quo is no EU legislation, or 'no integration'). Consequently, the EP will always prefer any legislative proposal from the Council to the existing status quo.

However, this uni-dimensional conception is no longer sustainable. What we are studying in the contemporary EU is not simply 'integration' but also 'politics.' This may at first seem a fatuous distinction. However, it captures the notion that the EU has moved beyond the initial period of institution-building and system-creation. The EU already possesses the three main characteristics of a 'political system:': *government*: executive, legislative and judicial authority; *politics*: contestation over which values should be promoted in outputs from the EU system; and *policy*: the power to influence the allocation of values in the EU.

On this last characteristic, outputs from the EU system do not simply relate to the pace of economic and political integration, but also to the two classic 'issue dimensions' of domestic politics (S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives, 1967). The first dimension (from the French Revolution) is concerned with 'how far there should be public intervention in individual *social and political freedom* for the public good.' On this dimension, Liberals and Socialists favour 'freedom' whereas Christian Democrats and Conservatives favour 'authority.' In the EU, this dimension is salient on issues like EU citizenship, environmental policy, biotechnology/genetic engineering, women's equality, tobacco advertising, and justice and home affairs (e.g., free movement of persons, immigration and asylum policies, and policing).

The second dimension (from the Industrial Revolution) is concerned with 'how far there should be public intervention in individual *economic freedom* for the public good.' On this dimension, Socialists (and traditional Christian Democrats) favour 'intervention' whereas Conservatives and Liberals favour the 'free market.' In the EU, this dimension is salient in most areas relating to the regulation of the single market (e.g., health and safety at work, workers rights and worker consultation), competition and state aids policies, macro-economic issues under monetary union (e.g., tax harmonisation), social and economic cohesion, and how to combat unemployment.

These dimensions tend to be amalgamated into a single 'left-right' dimension. On the one hand, the left-right is a flexible concept, allowing a single concept to be used to summarise numerous positions and alignments. On the other hand, the left-right enables politics to be conceptualised as both a continuum ('from left to right') and a dichotomy ('left versus right'). These features have consequently enabled the left-right to remain the dominant cognitive frame for ordering and aligning actors in all modern political systems (despite numerous attempts to write its obituary!).

The EU is no different than other systems. Once the EU moves beyond integration to politics, actors inherently become aligned on this left-right dimension *in addition* to the traditional integration-independence dimension. On left-right issues on the EU agenda, the electorate is aligned on socio-economic rather than national lines. For example, on the regulation of workers rights, a worker in France will share a common interest with a worker in Germany, rather than with an employer in France. National differences cross-cut these

socio-economic interests: such as the different existing levels of worker protection in each member state. Nevertheless, such national differences within transnational social groups are still explained by different individual socio-economic interests rather than variations in national cultural identities (M. Gabel, Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, and European Union, 1998).

In the EU institutions, particularly in the post-Maastricht world, political actors must take account of electoral preferences. Politicians in the EU institutions are partisan actors who have come to office through political parties, surround themselves with partisan friends, and will return to partisan networks after their careers in Brussels. Political parties present themselves to the electorate primarily through references to their position on the left-right. This reduces transaction costs of campaigning, but creates a *posteriori* constraints on partisan office-holders. Consequently, once left-right issues arise on the EU agenda, actors in the EU institutions will take up positions relating to their partisan affiliations.

In practical terms, the legislative rules of the EU require oversized-majorities to achieve policy outputs. However, on left-right issues, the EP will not be prepared to accept a take-it-or-leave-it offer from the Council if the status quo (either of no EU regulation or of the previous EU regulation) is closer to the left-right location of the EP majority than the left-right location of the qualified-majority in the Council. (In other words, this might help explain why Tsebelis' theoretical argument about the co-decision procedure is not supported empirically). Also, in the late 1990s, the Council has a simple majority of socialist governments, and the 1994 EP elections produced a centre-left majority and an agenda-setting power for the Socialist Group. Nevertheless, as in the US, the EU system will tend towards 'divided government.' EP elections are 'second order national elections' which tend to result in anti-government votes. As a result, whereas the Council represents governments, the EP will tend to represent opposition parties. Hence, in the 1999 European elections, with Socialists in government in 12 (possibly 13) of the member states, there is likely to be a centre-right majority in the EP.

Overall, if we are to develop better explanations of EU politics and policy-making, we need to use more sophisticated conceptualisations of the 'strategic space' within which actors align themselves in relation to each other. And, as the EU takes on many of the classic public policy responsibilities of domestic systems, a two-dimensional political space is beginning to emerge: where one dimension relates to the independence-integration dimension (of the classic EU scholars), and the other relates to the traditional left-right (of classic partisan politics).

Based on Hix, Simon (forthcoming) "Dimensions and Alignments in EU Politics: Cognitive Constraints and Partisan Responses," European Journal of Political Research, 33. Simon Hix is a lecturer in EU politics and policy in the London School of Economics and Political Science.

THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS become a polity. This is partly the outcome of a market-deepening process in which many non-tariff barriers have been eliminated. At the same time, authoritative decision making has been reallocated from national states to authoritative institutions at supranational and, in many cases, subnational levels of decision making. As more decisions affecting the lives of Europeans are taken at the level of the European Union, so the goals and decisional processes of European integration have become contested. A key question is what will drive EU politics in this new setting. What are the relevant dimensions of contestation? What coalitions will be formed?

Current EU literature furnishes four approaches that formulate sharply different expectations about who the key actors are in this emerging polity and what is the character of contestation. These are not all cleavage/contestation approaches, but they speak to these questions in relatively unambiguous fashion. Two approaches assume that contention in the European Union is primarily territorial, and two imply that EU decision making reflects not only territorial, but also non-territorial conflicts imported from domestic politics.

Neofunctionalism. Since Ernst Haas' work in the 1960s, neofunctionalist models of European integration have conceived of EU politics as structured by contention between pro-integration forces and defenders of national sovereignty. The key actors are supranational actors, particularly the Commission, which are assumed to want to shift authority to the European level because there are good functional reasons to do so. Neofunctionalism is not a theory of contestation, but more one of surreptitious consensus building. The strategy of supranational actors is to win over national actors by means of political and functional spillovers—by socializing them in transnational networks, by persuading them of the functional necessity of deeper integration, or by mobilizing sympathetic societal actors to put pressure on national governments.

Intergovernmentalism. For intergovernmentalists, divergent national interests structure territorial competition. National states are the ultimate decision makers; supranational institutions act as agents in achieving state-oriented collective goods. European policy making is an instrument for state executives to maximize national economic benefits in an interdependent world while minimizing the loss of state sovereignty.

The assumption in these two approaches is that the position one takes on the territorial cleavage predisposes one's position on EU issues. In contrast, a growing number of EU scholars posit that EU decision making reflects ideological, class, sectoral, or functional conflicts—alongside territorial cleavages. I extract from this literature two contrasting approaches.

Policy network approach. There are those who reject the notion of an overarching cleavage structure at the EU or the domestic level. According to this approach, which I label the

policy network model, authority is increasingly compartmentalized in specialist public-private networks—often stretching across territorial levels. The European Union is an extension of this system of networks. The key actors here are functional specialists whose confinement in relatively insulated issue-specific networks discourages them from forming inclusive political coalitions.

Partisan approach. Like Simon Hix and—with some reservations—Mark Pollack, I argue that an overarching cleavage structure is taking shape in the European Union, which can be usefully conceptualized as a two-dimensional space: a territorial, national/European dimension, alongside a non-territorial, left/right dimension.

In this polity many actors play a role: national government leaders, interest groups, Commission officials and judges of the European Court of Justice, public opinion and political parties. Here I want to single out political parties—generally underestimated by other approaches—as key framers of contention. The fact that the European Union is a system of multilevel governance where actors participate in decision making across multiple levels gives parties opportunities to operate at the EU level as well as in national polities. Political parties are the most important aggregators of interests in Western European societies. The positions they take on European issues are, to a considerable extent, shaped by embedded cleavages: left/right, religion, center/periphery, postmaterialist libertarian/traditional cleavage. These cleavages constitute prisms through which parties respond to new European issues. The most widely present domestic cleavage is left/right, and it is this cleavage which has the greatest influence on European contention. It interacts there with the EU-induced supranational/national dimension.

How do these dimensions combine to structure contention in the European Union? I argue that contestation takes the form of competition between two broad projects that encompass major issues of political architecture alongside more mundane issues of political economic policy. At one end of the ideological spectrum stands the neoliberal project. It seeks to insulate the market from political interference by combining European market integration with minimal European regulation (e.g., competition policy). This project attracts those who want minimal political interference in economic decision making, market-liberals seeking selective European and national regulation of market forces, and, in part, nationalists intent on sustaining national sovereignty. The neoliberal project rejects democratic institutions at the European level capable of regulating the market, but seeks instead to generate competition among national governments in providing regulatory climates attracting mobile factors of production. Opposing them is a loose, fluctuating, coalition supporting European regulated capitalism. This project attempts to increase the EU's capacity for regulation by upgrading the European Parliament, promoting the mobilization of social groups, and reforming institutions to make legislation easier. The project for European regulated capitalism attracts social christian-democrats and market-

oriented social-democrats. They promote various versions of social democracy: many concede that markets, not governments, should allocate investment, but many also insist that markets work more efficiently if the state helps to provide collective goods, including transport infrastructure, workforce skills, and cooperative industrial relations. The coalitions behind these projects are neither fixed nor monolithic. They have varied through time and across territory. Yet each project has a crystal-clear bottom line: neoliberals seek to constrain European authoritative decision making; proponents of European regulated capitalism want to deepen it.

Several scholars have begun to collect evidence and test hypotheses derived from the partisan model by examining public opinion, policy decisions (e.g. cohesion policy), treaty bargaining, and political parties at national and European levels. I have sought to explain how top Commission officials stand in relation to these projects. Asking the question to top Commission officials sets a high hurdle for this model. It requires (a) that this contention reaches into the institution with a caste-iron reputation for one-sided supranationalism, and (b) that partisanship frames contention even in a bureaucratic setting where expertise and functional links constrain partisanship. Nevertheless, I am discovering that the Commission is not above or beyond structured political contention. Commission officials take sides in struggles between “Euro-Marketeers” and “Euro-Socialists.” Like many other actors, they are divided about the pursuit of “good common life” in the European Union.

This piece is based on Hooghe, Liesbet, “Euro-Socialists or Euro-Marketeers? Orientations to European Capitalism Among Top Officials in the European Commission,” paper presented at APSA, Boston, 1998. Liesbet Hooghe is assistant professor in comparative politics at the University of Toronto.

Mark A. Pollack

INTEGRATING A LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION into the study of European integration has not been at the center of my research agenda, nor that of the field of EU studies generally. As Kathleen McNamara points out, many EU scholars working today were trained in the field of international relations, and approach the EU as an extraordinarily well developed and institutionalized case of international cooperation. Indeed, it seems to me that an international or intergovernmental approach remains a useful starting point for scholars attempting to understand the development of EU institutions, *including* the ways in which those institutions subsequently constrain EU member governments.

Still, Hix’s challenge to incorporate elements from the comparative politics literature in general, and the left-right dimension of political contestation in particular, is a compelling one. At the very least, such an approach forces us to look beyond the single dimension of national vs. supranational control, to focus on the political *stakes* of the integration process for business, labor, and other interests in

European societies. At its most developed and disciplined, such a two-dimensional approach to EU politics allows scholars like Hix, Hooghe and Marks to develop new theories and new testable hypotheses about the preferences and partisan strategies of political actors in the European arena.

In the context of Hix’s challenge, I set out rather modestly to examine the familiar history of the EU’s intergovernmental conferences through the unfamiliar lens of Hooghe’s and Marks’ ideal types of neoliberalism and regulated capitalism. For the Treaty of Rome, the Single European Act, and the Maastricht Treaty, the argument was, and remains, straightforward: from Rome to Maastricht, the fundamental thrust of the treaties has been neoliberal, in the sense that each of the Community’s constitutive treaties facilitated the creation of a unified European market, while setting considerable institutional barriers to the regulation of that same market. The Treaty of Rome featured important powers for the EEC in the areas of free movement, competition policy, and external trade policy, while granting the Community few powers of positive regulation and only a modestly redistributive Common Agricultural Policy. The Single European Act picked up this basic theme, focusing primarily on the completion of the internal market by 1992. And the Maastricht Treaty focused primarily on the project for Economic and Monetary Union, which has turned out to be a neoliberal project in effect if not in its original conception. (These treaties were not, of course, uniformly neoliberal documents. In order to secure unanimous agreement among the member states, each IGC also adopted some elements of the regulated capitalism project, including some regulatory competences and a European cohesion policy for the poorest regions and member states. Nevertheless, the overall thrust of the treaties remains clearly neoliberal.)

By contrast with the three earlier treaties, the Treaty of Amsterdam represents an outlier. At its center we find no central neoliberal project comparable to the common market, the internal market, or EMU, all of which are left essentially unchanged. Rather, the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was negotiated by governments controlled overwhelmingly by the left and center-left, addresses many of the central issue-areas of the regulated capitalism project, including employment, social policy, the environment, and the powers of the European Parliament. One might thus be tempted—as I was early in my research—to argue that the Amsterdam Treaty represents a left turn in EU history toward the model of regulated capitalism.

Yet, as I examined the negotiation and the text of the Amsterdam Treaty more closely, it became clear that the Treaty does *not* represent the victory of the regulated capitalism model. Indeed, the negotiating record of the 1996 IGC demonstrates that the European project of the center-left is far less self-evident than the ideal type of regulated capitalism might suggest, and was itself the object of political contestation during the negotiation of the Treaty. More specifically, in the weeks prior to the Amsterdam European Council, a traditional socialist agenda for an interventionist,

regulatory Europe championed by French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin collided with a new center-left project promoted by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who accepted the traditional socialist goals of employment and social welfare but was more skeptical of binding regulation and intervention at the European Union level.

After his election in May 1997, Blair immediately reversed a number of long-standing Conservative positions in the 1996 IGC, agreeing to strengthen the powers of the European Parliament, strengthen EU competences in employment and environmental policy, and incorporate the Maastricht Social Protocol into the EC Treaty. Yet, when it came to employment and social policy, Blair went out of his way to distinguish his approach from the traditional socialist

From the Chair (continued from page 1)

report also recognizes that the associations are each run on so lean a basis that there would be few economies in merging them;

- that ECSA should be encouraged to have a more effective presence on the World Wide Web. Visitors to our site at <www.pitt.edu/~ecsa101> will find complete information about the ECSA, its programs and activities—our primary purpose for the site—as well as a variety of pages devoted to resources on teaching and research (e.g., EU simulations, syllabi, resources for secondary teachers, EU-focused academic programs). Our site also has diverse links to other sites that are excellent resources for teachers, researchers, and students alike.

In closing, I would like to draw your attention to several ongoing ECSA activities. First and foremost, plans are well underway for ECSA's Sixth Biennial International Conference (Pittsburgh, PA, June 3-5, 1999). Information about the Conference, including the call for proposals, can be found on our Web site at <www.pitt.edu/~ecsa101/conf99.htm>. We hope to draw an interdisciplinary group of scholars and practitioners from both sides of the Atlantic.

Second, two selection committees are about to begin to evaluate nominations for ECSA's new Best Dissertation (in the field of European integration studies) and Best Conference Paper (from the 1997 Fifth Biennial Conference) Prizes. The inaugural recipients of these Prizes will be announced at the Friday, June 4th luncheon plenary at the Biennial Conference.

Finally, as part of our democratic process of governance of the ECSA, every other year you, the membership, elect an Executive Committee who set policies and determine the activities of the organization. Please note the call for nominations on page 30 of this issue, and please give serious thought to nominating yourself or a colleague. Ballots will be mailed to current ECSA members in March 1999 and the 1999-2001 Executive Committee will take office at the 1999 ECSA Conference in Pittsburgh.

Gary Marks
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

or social-democratic approach. At his first PES conference in Malmo, Sweden, Blair told the delegates that they must "modernise or die ... Our task," he argued, "is not to go on fighting old battles but to show that there is a third way, a way of marrying together an open, competitive and successful economy with a just, decent and humane society" (quoted in *The Daily Telegraph*, 7 June 1997). On the specific provisions of the Treaty, Blair indicated that he would accept an Employment Chapter and a Social Chapter in the Treaty, but only if these emphasized labor market flexibility and avoided over-regulation of the market.

The final provisions in the Treaty of Amsterdam clearly reflect Blair's views. Thus, for example, the Social Chapter was incorporated into the EC Treaty, but no major changes were made to the rather restrictive voting rules for adopting legislation in sensitive areas. With regard to employment, Blair, together with German Chancellor Kohl, rejected any possibility of EU harmonization or any significant EU spending, opting instead for a voluntaristic system of coordinating national employment policies, with an emphasis on flexible labor markets and "employability." Blair's own assessment of Amsterdam is telling in this regard: "The summit as a whole focused in a very, very important way on the issue of jobs and economic reform, the focus being on education, skills, flexible labor markets *"rather than old-style state intervention and regulation"* (quoted in *The European*, 19 June 1997, emphasis added).

What, then, are we to make of this Blairite Treaty? I see two possible interpretations. In the first interpretation, Blair—and by extension the Amsterdam Treaty, which reflects his views—represents the capitulation of the European left, which has swallowed the neoliberal prescription of free trade and monetarist economics, and offers only weak, symbolic Treaty provisions to address questions of employment and social policy without actually providing the Union with the institutional means to act in these areas. The second interpretation, most prominently offered by sociologist Anthony Giddens, is that Blair is in the process of defining a third way, a new radical politics "beyond left and right," based not on state intervention and regulation but rather on preparing individuals to survive and prosper in the new global economy. It is, as yet, too early to judge whether Giddens' interpretation holds water: Blair's third way is as yet poorly defined, especially at the European level, and the Amsterdam Treaty has yet to enter into force. Yet, it remains an intriguing irony that, just as scholars like Hix, Hooghe and Marks are exploring the left-right implications of European integration, centrists like Blair and Giddens claim to be transcending a left-right distinction that is too blunt, and too outdated, to serve as a guide to policy in the new global economy.

This piece is based on Pollack, Mark A., "A Blairite Treaty: Neoliberalism and Regulated Capitalism in the Treaty of Amsterdam," paper presented at APSA, Boston, 1998. Mark A. Pollack is assistant professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin at Madison.

Denationalizing Cities

Robert A. Beauregard

BEFORE "EUROPE" EXISTED as nation-states, it was a collection of cities. Today, Europe is reverting to a variant on that past. National states are prominent but not dominant and transnational relations are increasingly centered on cities.

Urban scholars from Europe and the United States have become infatuated with city-regions: their links across national borders and their role as core elements of national economic development. The linkages bring city-regions into clusters (also known as systems or networks) that prosper or not depending on the nature of their economic, political, social and cultural ties. Overall, the perspective challenges the emphasis on the nation-state and national level forces.

The contemporary impetus for this emphasis begins with globalization. The deepening and broadening of the global economy, the emergence and strengthening of supranational political organizations (such as the World Bank and IMF), the global spread of cultural practices from e-mail to music, and the proliferation of transnational corporations has transformed the role of national systems of economic regulation and opened borders even wider to transnational investment and labor migration. These phenomena are spatially concentrated in cities, leading one observer, Saskia Sassen, to claim that globalization "denationalizes national territory."

At the center of these flows are global cities that service and finance trade, production, and corporate headquarter functions. New York, Tokyo and London sit atop this hierarchy with other cities (e.g., Sao Paulo, Johannesburg) arranged in less dominant networks.

The evolution of the European Union is making national boundaries more permeable there and influences how residents of individual countries identify themselves, to the point that Tony Judt has written that prosperous people and places in Europe identify not with nation-states but with regions. New forms of citizenship--urban and transnational--mediate the once-dominant, nation-based version.

The re-constituting and "downsizing" of strong welfare states is also a factor, since it has lessened resistance to a global capitalism that exacerbates uneven spatial development and forges pathways for the flows of new migrants. Cities have been cast adrift from national supports (Britain and the United States being the most egregious cases). Subsequently, they have embraced U.S.-style local economic development policy in which each city government must draw the bulk of its revenues from "local" economic activity. This has exacerbated competition among cities for investment and spending (tourism being a highly touted economic development strategy) with the corresponding potential for widening polarizations, a prospect of particular importance for

the Western Europe/Eastern Europe divide. Will the affluent, urban region that extends roughly from London through Brussels and Frankfurt to Milan concentrate wealth within its boundaries, leaving other European regions behind?

European urban researchers are deeply involved in understanding these urban networks: how Paris is linked to Milan, how Frankfurt's financial sector impacts that of London, and what a resurgent Berlin means for Brussels. Cross-border flows are treated as serious; they affect not only the developmental trajectories of these cities but also daily life within them.

The urban focus is supported by a variety of research and policy-based initiatives. Directorate-General XII funds collaborative research planning by urban scholars from different European countries and thereby encourages cross-national work. Other projects in which the European Commission is involved are focused on sustainable cities, inter-urban transportation and social integration (the latter being one of the most pressing and perplexing urban questions). EU policy development has a notable spatial component: Europe 2000, Europe 2000+, and European Spatial Development Perspective are three of the key documents that attend to the ways in which urban systems are indifferent to national boundaries. All of this is done against the background of subsidiarity, a policy principle whose spatial implications are under-appreciated.

The European Institute for Comparative Urban Research (EURICUR), housed in Rotterdam, manages comparative research with a strong policy focus. A group of urban scholars is actively engaged in the creation of a European Urban Research Association that will provide a forum for people from different disciplinary and policy backgrounds and foster collaborative, inter-disciplinary and cross-national research. In individual countries, national governments are providing significant support for research into their cities. The Academy of Finland recently launched an innovative Urban Research Programme and the UK Economic and Social Research Council just funded a major program that will include cross-national, comparative research. European urban scholars have not abandoned a country-specific sensitivity, by any means, but they are not so naïve to believe that this is sufficient.

By contrast, the story in the United States is quite backward, expressing a familiar national arrogance. Although urban researchers address individual cities or the country's global cities, New York and Los Angeles, urban networks within the country are virtually ignored. Networks that span national boundaries—for example, Vancouver, Portland and Seattle or El Paso and Ciudad Juarez—are acknowledged, but the overall thrust of research and policy is insular. The National Science Foundation recently announced a special

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initiative on urban research; it is wholly U.S.-centered. National boundaries are seldom crossed.

A city-centered approach can err, of course, by assuming away the lingering powers of national governments or by reifying cities to the same degree once (still?) done for nation-states. Urbanists who embrace globalization are particularly susceptible to an economic perspective when they confer exclusivity on investment and labor flows, the location and reach of transnational corporations, and the purported dissolution of national governments. They must also guard against a spatial determinism that links a city's fate to its spatial fixity and ignores the geographical restlessness of capitalism.

An urban perspective warns us not to privilege the nation-state, particularly in these times. Not all Europeanists, of course, will become urbanists. Urban scholars, moreover, would do themselves a favor by paying more attention to actor-centered international relations and structuralist international political economy. Both, though, must heed the role of cities in the forging of a transnational relations.

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The opinions expressed in essays in the *ECSA Review* are solely those of their authors. The ECSA welcomes submission of scholarly essays on EU-related issues that foster debate and discussion.

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Essay

EU Fiscal Discipline After 1999: The Pact of Stability

Miriam L. Campanella

THE PROVEN VIRTUES of EU member countries (fiscal restraint, low inflation, exchange rate stability) are a clear victory of the EMU policies to bring EU countries to adopt Euro currency on the scheduled date of January 1, 1999. Whether these virtues will be lasting in the absence of exclusion-inclusion policy is still to be seen. The Pact of Stability and Growth (SP) agreed in Amsterdam in July 1997 is an important addendum to EMU institutions. Its standard justification is that it is necessary to (a) achieve enduring fiscal restraint so as to ensure price stability; (b) secure stable exchange rate of the Euro against the world's currencies; and (c) circumvent the risk of forced intervention (bailing out) by the European Central Bank. The SP shares some features of the EMU and to a certain extent introduces some elements of a "fiscal balancing policy,"¹ which is now very much in vogue in the USA.² Since there is no way after January 1, 1999 to deter through exclusion, intemperate countries from undertaking deficit spending, first in the Maastricht Treaty and later in the SP, EU member countries have accepted a common rule for fiscal discipline. The rule states that member countries are allowed to follow a deficit spending policy of lower than 3% of GDP, as long as the deficit is due to the government undertaking productive long-term infrastructural policies. The 3% threshold is, in fact, not an arbitrary figure, as it mirrors the level of estimated average public expenditure in the EC before the 1970s, the years of insane deficit spending. Though the rule does not rival the USA balanced budget policy, its scope is not yet aimed at balancing the public budget; it can be compared to a Balanced Budget Rule insofar as it has been recognized that it is necessary to have an enforcement policy as well. In fact, the motivation of countries such as Germany, Netherlands, and Austria which have inspired the Pact, is to tackle the propensity to have "excessive" deficits, insulate the ECB from inflationary pressures, and avoid the risk of financial rescue.

As for other EMU policies, economics literature has questioned the rationality of the deficit criterion with a wide range of counter-arguments. A critical argument which summarizes well the economic incoherence of the 3% rule argues that as it "implicitly amounts to a current balanced budget rule, i.e., current revenues should equal current

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expenditure” (von Hagen, 1996). Such a rule may prove to be a challenge to the present state of affairs in the EU, which has, by design, a non-federalist constitution regarding budget policy. The introduction of the balanced budget rule can jeopardize the subsidiarity principle of the present EU budget as it considers member countries to be responsible for offsetting asymmetric shocks. As a result, von Hagen observes that the 3% rule can do more harm than good. Eventually it can lead to the creation of an EU budget with more contributions being made by the richer countries. So, the scope of reducing bailing-out profligate governments will not be achieved. This and other arguments can explain why the SP agreed in Amsterdam in July 1997 (EDP2), which duplicates Article 104c of the Maastricht Treaty, has often been portrayed in the economic literature as too stringent and severe, and as other EMU policies, economically inappropriate.³

Other economists argue that EU member governments are unlikely actually to observe the 3% of GDP benchmark in situations where there are steady high rates of unemployment. In their view, they question whether the benchmark is even an appropriate measure to relaunch growth policy in Europe. Some of them predict that a change in the German leadership after the September political elections is likely to cause a turn around in the EU fiscal policy, with the rejection of the SP.

If an economic perspective can lead to an erratic assessment both of the Pact’s rationale and its durability, an examination of the SP against some international relations theories, can reveal interesting elements. It means that the Pact can be seen as an ordinary case of international coordination policy, reinforced with an “if, then” policy. However, provisions such as the peer surveillance service provided by coordination between the European Commission and the European Council are elements which, after the admission session of May 1998, call for a more detailed analysis. There is evidence that in May EU governments, including Germany, were more likely interested in playing “a colluding” game than in exerting an exclusion policy.⁴ The Pact adds evidence to this view even if it includes a “severe punishment discipline.” Scrutinizing the procedure it appears clearly to be engineered to open the way for a “political deal” than to trigger an “if, then” mechanism. A description of the Pact can account for this “political” perspective. Several steps are designed to increase “pressure” on the Member State by means of recommendations and advice aimed at forcing “failing” members to take effective measures to correct their excessive deficit position. The Pact states that if such a correction does not take place, then sanctions may be applied to the member States participating in the EMU.

Detecting the “Excessive” Deficit

In the first version, the one included in the Maastricht Treaty, the 3% threshold could be exceeded without creating the conditions for starting the punishment procedure under three conditions:

(a) *exceptionality*: the origin of the excess has to be outside of the normal range of situations;

(b) *temporariness*: the deficit is allowed to remain above 3% of GDP only for a limited period of time; and,

(c) *closeness*: the deficit must remain close to the reference value.

In practice, the Treaty prescribed that the original cause of the rise of the deficit above 3% ceiling must be exceptional, that the deficit must not, in any case, exceed this threshold by too much, and must promptly return below it once the initial cause no longer applies. These three conditions have to apply simultaneously. The extent of the common subset of events which do not give rise to an excessive deficit depends on the degree of rigidity with which these conditions are interpreted. The Treaty, however, does not specify the exact content of the three constraints. The Stability and Growth Pact (1997) gives a more precise interpretation of conditions (a) and (b). The core elements of the Pact include:

- setting time limits to the various steps of the EDP so as to speed it up and where appropriate, impose sanctions within the calendar year in which the decision on the existence of the excessive deficit is taken;
- defining the meaning of the exceptionality and temporariness conditions; and,
- specifying the conditions in which sanctions will be applied and their scale.

The Pact’s starting point is that the EMU members should set medium-term budgetary targets which are “close-to-balance or in surplus,” thus enabling them to respect the 3% ceiling even during economic downturns.⁵ The exceptionality clause (condition [a]) can be called upon when the excess of the deficit over the reference value is due to an unusual event which was outside the control of the member state in question and which has a major impact on the financial position of the central government current expenditure. It can also apply if the deficit overrun takes place in the presence of a severe economic downturn. The latter case is considered “exceptional” if there is an annual fall in real GDP of at least two percent.

An annual fall in GDP of less than 2% could nevertheless be considered exceptional in the light of other evidence, such as the abruptness of the downturn or the accumulated loss of output relative to past trends. In any case, in evaluating whether the economic downturn is severe, the member state will, as a rule, take an annual fall in real GDP of at least 0.75% as a reference point. This condition recognizes that, in the event of a harsh and persistent recession, the room for budgetary maneuver between close to balance and a deficit of up to 3% of GDP may not be sufficient to cushion the negative effects of the shock on economic activity.

With regard to the temporary nature of the excess of the deficit over 3% of GDP (condition [b]), the Pact allows it only insofar as the “exceptional” conditions mentioned above persist. If the Commission’s budgetary forecast indicates that the deficit would not fall below the reference value in the year following the recession, the country would also be considered to be in a situation of excessive deficit in the year of the recession because it had violated the “temporariness” clause.

The Pact does not deal with the closeness condition (condition [c]). In order of “seriousness:”

- the no-problem case, in which, in spite of the recession, the deficit remains below the 0.75 % threshold;
- the limited-problem case, in which, the deficit exceeds 3% of GDP during the recession, but remains close to it and returns below it immediately after the recession: the three conditions mentioned above apply, hence no excessive deficit occurs;
- the violation of the closeness condition, in which the deficit is pushed well above the reference value, but promptly moves below it as soon as the recession is over; the country is in excessive deficit during the year of the recession, but no sanctions are imposed on it;
- the violation of the temporariness clause, in which the deficit remains fairly close to the 3% ceiling during the recession year, but as it does not move below it in the year after the recession, the country is in excessive deficit during the year of the recession and, unless effective measures to correct the deficit are implemented, there is the presumption that sanctions will be applied;
- the double-violation case, in which both the temporariness and closeness conditions are not respected; there is an excessive deficit which, as in the previous case, could eventually lead to sanctions.

The decision on whether or not an excessive deficit existed during the year of the recession is taken on the basis of figures for the recession year which are reported one year later. In order to avoid the imposition of sanctions, the member state which has been considered to have an excessive deficit has to take immediate action in the year in which the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit is taken. The correction of the deficit should be completed during the year following the identification of the excessive deficit, i.e., in order to avoid sanctions, the member state concerned should bring its deficit below the reference value two years after the occurrence of an excessive deficit and one year after its identification, unless special circumstances are granted.

Surveillance and Enforcement

The surveillance service which takes the 3% deficit target as an absolute target which must be met in every fiscal year, with exemptions approved in only very rare circumstances, includes an enforcement policy which requires non-interest bearing deposits for members found (during a six-month deficit review) to have a deficit in excess of 3% of GDP; and a fine can be imposed if the deficit violation persists for more than two years.⁶ The enforcement mechanism is structured as follows:

Early warning system: monitoring and surveillance:

The Commission and the Council will “study these programs and monitor member States’ budgetary performances with reference to their medium-term objectives and adjustment paths with a view to giving early warning of any significant deterioration which might lead to an excessive deficit.” Once the EDP has been initiated the Council will, in accordance with paragraph 11 of Article 104c of the

Maastricht Treaty “impose sanctions on a prescribed scale.”⁷

Triggering the procedure:

The Commission is invited to commit itself to preparing a report whenever the actual or planned government deficit exceeds the 3% reference value. It will as a rule consider an excess over the reference value resulting from an economic downturn to be exceptional only if there is an annual fall in real GDP of at least 2%. The Economic and financial Committee will formulate an opinion on the Commission’s report within two weeks. Where it decides that an excessive deficit exists, the Council will make recommendations to the member state concerned “with a view to bringing that situation to an end within a given period” (Article 104c [7]). If a member state fails to act in compliance with the successive decisions of the Council under paragraphs 7-9 of Article 104c, the Council will ... impose sanctions including a non-interest bearing deposit. These sanctions would be imposed within ten months of the reporting of the figures notifying the existence of an excessive deficit. The SP foresees an “expedited procedure ... in the case of a deliberately planned deficit which the Council decides is excessive.”

Structure and scale of sanctions:

The Commission can take the following actions on establishing that a government has not complied with the agreement: (1) Call for a non-interest-bearing deposit; (2) Convert this into a fine after two years if the deficit of the government concerned continues to be excessive; and, (3) When the excessive deficit results from non-compliance with the government deficit reference value, the amount of the deposit or fine will be made up of a fixed component equal to 0.2% of GDP, and a variable component equal to one tenth of the excess of the deficit over the reference value of 3% of GDP. There will be an upper limit of 0.5% of GDP for the annual amount of deposits. The amount of the sanction will be based on results obtained for the first year in which the excessive deficit occurred.

Implementation:

The implementation of EDP is subject to a “European Council Resolution” being issued. Such a resolution would give strong political guidance to the Commission, the Council and the member states on the implementation of the procedures. Further, the Pact introduces two regulatory provisions, one to strengthen both the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies and another to speed up and clarify the implementation of the EDP.

Assessing the EDP Against Balanced Budget Rule Policy

Comparative studies on fiscal institutions find that budget procedures and budget institutions do influence budget outcomes. Budget institutions include both procedural rules and balanced budget laws. Analysts of Balanced Budget Rules (BBR) claim that for a BBR to be effective some important provisions are essential. These should be (1) ex post deficit accounting; (2) constitutionally grounded rules; (3) enforcement by an open and politically independent review panel or court which can impose significant sanctions when

there are violations; and (4) a costly amendment procedure (Inman, 1996). EMU budget fiscal discipline can be correctly compared to a BBR case as it establishes that a public deficit lower than 3% is the benchmark for public borrowing and there is a set of enforcement policies. When these procedures, however, are compared to the standard strong BBR, EMU discipline appears to be a *mixture of weak and strong features*. The EDP as a BBR can be considered to be strong as the timing review is required ex post; it should also be considered as strong because override cannot be approved of through majority rules. The amendment process is strong, too, in that it is difficult and costly.

EDP as a BBR is weak in that it sets a feeble enforcement procedure: access is closed, the enforcer is partisan and the penalties, though large, are difficult to assess. Those weaknesses are particularly important as they come from the institutional and political framework within which EDP1 and EDP2 are set. Considering the "institutional environment" within which the decision procedure is to be initiated, politically self-interested parties are seen in:

- Access to the violation procedure is closed, as it is limited to the Commission's initiative. The Commission Report to the Council of Ministers is peremptorily designed to initiate the EDP against a nation which violates of the deficit benchmark (Article 104.c.2).
- Though the Commission is generally defined as a supranational institution, it plays "as a partisan enforcer, whose interest is to seek to create the largest possible EMU" (D. Gros, 1995). Evidence of this inclusive attitude comes from the Commission Report on third stage convergence (March 1998) which is more benevolent than the EMI Report. Though the two institutions seem close, in that they share "supranational features," the Commission has a stronger interest to pursue an all-inclusive and non-conflicting policy which will allow it to gain momentum as the depository of the European political design.

As Inman predicts, the Commission is "unlikely to interpret the guidelines strictly to allow open access to others to bring a BBR violation. Even if charges of violation are made, the inability of the Council of Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) to impose even modest spending guidelines on current violators (e.g., Greece) suggests the political will is lacking to act as an independent enforcer of a BBR" (1996: 30).

Penalties are also weak. Violating nations are required to disclose additional fiscal information before issuing new debt. The European Investment Bank may withhold funds, but only a few EU countries receive significant funding from the Bank. Finally, the Council of Ministers may impose fines or call for non-interest bearing deposits, but these are unlikely to be significant when there is a partisan enforcer. And concluding with Gros' words: "With closed access, a partisan enforcer, and small penalties, the EMU current 3% rule is, at best, a weak BBR" (quotation from Inman, 1996).

The Excessive Deficit Procedure agreed in Amsterdam has been strengthened in three ways:

- Timing: the initiating actor is still the Commission as well the policing actor, the Council of Ministers. The difference is that with the EDP2, Council's recommendation is made public immediately after the deadline set in accordance with Article 3;
- Warning policy: early warning and public recommendation; and,
- Pecuniary sanctions. Deposits or fines will be made up of a fixed component equal to 0.2% of GDP, and a variable component equal to one tenth of the excess of the deficit above the reference value of 3% of GDP. There will be an upper limit of 0.5% of GDP for the annual amount of deposits. The amount of the sanction will be based on the outcome for the year in which the excessive deficit occurred.

When the Amsterdam provisions are assessed one question immediately comes to mind: Is the enforcing procedure enough strong with a politically biased enforcer? At first glance, it seems that the only very new thing which adds real pressure on a violating nation is the decision to make the recommendations of the Commission and the Council public. Publicity can indeed open the eyes of the public a little more, especially of private markets so as to re-admit them as "a market enforcer." Though to a small degree, publicity can place some strength on the Commission's and Council's early warning, the two remaining provisions, which are indeed huge if they are really applied, have to get political approval, which means that these can turn a deadlock which may cause a politically induced delay. Though enforcement procedure is strengthened by tougher pecuniary sanctions, it is still enfeebled with a "weak," politically biased triggering mechanism,⁸ which is left in the hands of the European Council, a political institution *par excellence*, unlikely to seriously self-inflict the announced sanctions.⁹

Concluding Remarks

Why then do we have to take seriously a "discipline" whose authors will probably run in a half-hearted way and that several professional economists assess to be dangerous if really applied? A convincing argument comes from some recent studies (IMF Economic Outlook, 1997; David Currie, 1998). These studies acknowledge that EMU discipline (fiscal consolidation and falling fiscal pressure) has had a pivotal role in the recovery of the public budget policy. They assume, however, steady reduction of deficit spending to be the key to the solution to EU structural unemployment problems. Only if EU governments undertake to seriously reduce current expenditures matched with labor market reforms (including first and foremost a reduction in fiscal pressure), economic growth is likely to exert a beneficial impact on unemployment rates.

IMF simulations depict two alternative scenarios in which lasting fiscal discipline plays a crucial role. In one scenario, EMU policy is assumed to serve as a catalyst for favorable change in both fiscal and labor market policies. This scenario estimates for 2010 an increase in GDP of 2.9%, a falling unemployment rate of 2.0%, and a general government budget

of 0.8%. In the second scenario (“reform fatigue scenario”), the outcomes are much less favorable. With neither additional fiscal consolidation nor labor market reforms, real GDP falls by -2.5 %, the unemployment rate is 2.0, and the general government balance to -1.3 %. The two scenarios—as the IMF analysts argue—illustrate the critical role of the fiscal and structural policies in the *euro* area. Though these policies are likely limited to reaping substantial benefits for participating countries with positive but not significant quantitative spill-over effects on the rest of the world economy, they can have serious consequences if they are not properly implemented on the rest of the world economy. In the second scenario, IMF predicts “serious consequences for Europe,” while other regions “are likely to bear part of the cost” of non-adjustment (IMF, 1997: 77).

With a similar intonation, David Currie admonishes *euro* countries to adopt urgent measures in fiscal and labor market policies: “The loss of exchange rates represents a reduction in flexibility in the European economy, a form of flexibility that has not always been helpful, while the single currency intensifies competition” (p. 51). This would be a competition which, matched to a persistent center-periphery pattern, depicted in interregional income differentials (Krugman, 1991; Gretschmann, 1997), could threaten the European political project as well.

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Notes

- 1 On the need to introduce a constitutional amendment to balance the federal budget see Richard Briffault, 1996.
- 2 The USA public deficit has shrunk to 0.3 % to GDP for fiscal year 1997. According to the Congressional Budget Office and the Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1999, since President Clinton took office, public deficit in the USA has shrunk from 280 billion dollars to 22.6 billion in 1997.
- 3 For a recent updated analysis of the Stability Pact from an economics perspective see Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998.
- 4 This perspective is fully worked out in Campanella, 1998.
- 5 The 3% limit rules against resorting to an automatic stabilizer which is reputed to play a crucial role in European economies. As Eichengreen and Wyplosz comment, “the Stability Pact might prove to be costlier than expected” (1998: 111).
- 6 Inman (1996: 2); Gros (1996: 85).
- 7 Detailed multilateral surveillance, as Art. 3 states, includes: “1. Each participating member State shall submit to the Council and Commission information necessary for the purpose of multilateral surveillance at regular intervals under Article 103 of the Treaty (Maastricht) in the form of a Stability program ... ; 2. A Stability program shall present the following information: (a) the medium-term objective for the budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus and the adjustment path towards this objective for the general government surplus/deficit and the expected path of the general government debt ratio; (b) the main assumption about expected economic development ...; c) a description of budgetary and other economic measures ... an assessment of their quantitative effects on the budget; (d) an analysis of how changes in the main economic assumptions would affect the budgetary and debt position; and, 3. Information ... shall be on an annual basis and shall cover, as well as the current and preceding year, at least the following three years. Warning policy: “In the event that the Council identifies significant divergence of the budgetary position ... or the adjustment to it ... addresses a recommendation ... to take the necessary adjustment measures.”
- 8 In game theory literature, a trigger mechanism applies to a situation in which a government defecting on a cooperative agreement is punished by a reversionary period. Since cooperation is supposed to yield a higher level of welfare associated with the non-cooperative equilibrium, a (in pectore) defecting government should consider carefully whether to defect or cooperate. The “repeated game theorem,” set out by Axelrod (1984) and Axelrod and Keohane (1985), suggests that such a trigger mechanism can sustain the cooperative regime without any explicit use of enforcement penalties between governments. See Atish R. Gosh and Paul Masson, 1992.
- 9 A public choice perspective is developed in Campanella, 1998.

Call for Proposals

State of the European Union: Volume 5 Risks, Reforms, Resistance or Revival?

With the introduction of a single currency in 1999 and the negotiations for the fifth enlargement in 2000, the European Union is at a major crossroads in its history. While the adoption of EMU and the entrance of the new member states hold the promise of creating an "ever closer union," they must take place in a rather turbulent environment. Exogenous shocks such as the Asian financial crisis, the Russian upheaval, and new Balkan problems threaten to derail advances in monetary affairs and common foreign and security policy. Endogenous resistance to further European policy reform in areas such as the budget, CAP, and structural funds has strengthened, as suggested by the meager advances in the Amsterdam Treaty. Indeed, domestic developments, including changes in the political composition of leading governments and growing unemployment, pose further challenges to EU reforms. Examining the risks confronted, the reforms proposed, the resistance encountered, and the revival envisioned in the European Union is the focus of the fifth volume of the ECSA State of the European Union series.

As series editors, we are looking for proposals that do not merely discuss changes and developments in the European Union, but also analyze them in terms of future prospects and theoretical implications. While we are open to subject matter, we are interested in papers that will address the following major themes:

- 1) **Risks** – Key challenges facing the EU including monetary union; enlargement; unemployment; international turbulence in Asia, Russia, and the Balkans; domestic political change and popular skepticism.
- 2) **Reforms and Resistance** – Reforms necessary for the EU to carry out its leadership role both internally and internationally such as institutional reform (including the influence of Amsterdam and the enlargement process), policy reform (i.e., budget, common agricultural policy, social/labor market policy, structural funds, Agenda 2000), Single Market reform, Justice and Home Affairs and Schengen reform, and external policy reform (Transatlantic Economic Partnership, Lomé, WTO).
- 3) **Revival** – Opportunities for the EU and its future, including the implications of a successful EMU, new membership, a strengthened CFSP and security policy, robust economic growth and competitiveness, and a leading role in the WTO.

Proposals are due to the editors no later than **December 15, 1998**. Proposals should include: (1) a short précis (no more than 500 words) in which the author identifies the theoretical and substantive significance of the proposed chapter; and (2) a three-page *c.v.* The author's name, institutional affiliation, address, telephone, fax, and e-mail address must appear in the proposal. *Please send two copies, one to each editor, to the addresses indicated below.*

Authors will be notified of the editors' decision by **March 1, 1999**. Selected papers must be submitted to the editors by **September 1, 1999**. We anticipate bringing the volume to press by **December 1999**. (Note: At the time of this notice, ECSA had not yet selected a publisher for the State of the European Union series. We have received several strong inquiries from leading academic presses, and plan to secure a contract prior to the December 1998 proposal deadline.)

Please send your proposal to the series editors:



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Teaching the EU

Editor's note: In response to member interest, this column is now a regular feature of the ECSA Review. Suggestions and essays from ECSA members for this column are welcomed.

Incorporating the European Union into International Relations Courses

Jeanie Bukowski

MANY OF US who have developed an interest and expertise in European Union studies have completed our degrees in international relations, comparative politics, history and related fields. Almost without exception, our teaching loads include a variety of classes within these disciplines, at both introductory and advanced levels. The European Union is an excellent illustration/example/tool to facilitate students' understanding of major concepts within these fields. Here I will focus on the use of the EU in an Introduction to International Relations lower-level undergraduate course.

Included below is an outline that I have developed for this class, indicating the points at which the EU is introduced and considered. I have found it quite effective to use a discussion of the EU as a logical bridge between the topics of international cooperation and international political economy. Moreover, a discussion of the history and development of the EU provides a good illustration of how conflict in the international (or more specifically European) system can give way to cooperation. Examining the EU also allows the students to apply the concept of "actors" at various levels in the international system.

I first introduce the EU by giving the students an in-class assignment in which I provide copies of a short article on the EU, from *The Economist*, for example. The students must form small groups and read and discuss the article among themselves to 1) identify and characterize as many actors as possible (e.g., Jacques Santer: individual; UK: state), and 2) try to determine what recommendations, decisions, and

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actions are coming from these actors. Through this exercise, the students begin to piece together the fact that many actors at a variety of levels are having some sort of impact on decision-making in the European arena.

We then explore the EU as an intergovernmental organization, with supranational institutions and characteristics, and consider the tension between the two international relations concepts of sovereignty and supranationality (and the related theoretical debate between intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism). In the discussion of international law, we also compare the European Court of Justice and the International Court of Justice.

Throughout the entire discussion of the EU, the students explore the linkages between politics and economics, and in a final section we concentrate on the common currency and EMU as a bridge to the topic of international political economy. I begin this section by having some of the students role play American "travelers" going from country to country in the EU. These students must stop at the desks of the "bankers" in several member-states to exchange money, finding of course that by the end of their journey, even assuming that they have not purchased anything, they end up with much less money than they had when they began. (This exercise is even more effective if you can provide the student bankers will real currencies that you have not changed back into dollars after your last trip to Europe!)

We then move on to a discussion of currency and exchange rates both in the context of the EU and more generally. After the students have a good understanding of these basic political economy concepts, we address the common currency and EMU, and their potential effects on international trade, particularly *vis-à-vis* the United States.

Most introductory international relations texts include at least a small section on the European Union, but it is usually necessary to supplement the text with other readings. I include below several suggestions:

Outline: Introduction to International Relations

- I) Actors in the global system/levels of analysis
- II) Foreign policy
- III) Conflict and Cooperation in the Global System
 - A) Anarchy in the global system
 - B) Power politics (realism, power, balance of power)
 - C) Conflict and International Security
 - D) Cooperation (interdependence, international organization, international law, integration)
 - **Discuss the EU as an example of cooperation emerging from prior conflict in the international system; identify a variety of actors at all levels of analysis; discuss the role of IGOs, particularly in the post-Cold War era; address conflict between concepts of sovereignty and supranationality; compare ECJ and ICJ.
- IV) International Political Economy
 - **Bridge the subjects of cooperation and IPE through a continuation of the EU discussion:

specifically, address the common currency and EMU; discuss international trade, focusing as an example on EU-US relations.

V) Issues/Problems in the Global System: (scarcity, justice and security in the post-Cold War era)

A Brief Guide to Sources

International Relations texts:

Richard W. Mansbach. The Global Puzzle: Issues and Actors in World Politics (2nd. ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997.

- Includes good general discussions of the concepts of interdependence, regional intergovernmental organizations (including the EU), and functionalism.
- In a chapter entitled, "Friendly Economic Adversaries: United States, Japan, and Europe," this text has a section on the EU that includes a brief discussion of its development (focusing heavily on Germany).

John T. Rourke. International Politics on the World Stage (5th. ed.). Guilford, CT: Dushkin Publishing Group/Brown & Benchmark Publishers, 1995.

- Contains two sections on different aspects of the EU:
 - 1) In a chapter on international organization, considers the EU and the concept of supranationalism, including a basic discussion of EU institutions;
 - 2) In a chapter on international economics, includes a brief discussion of EU economic development and issues, including EMU.

Walter S. Jones. The Logic of International Relations. (8th. ed.) New York: Longman, 1997.

- Good discussion of the "world outlook" of the EU, including historical, economic, and political factors.

Supplementary Materials

Kendall W. Stiles. Case Histories in International Politics.

New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995.

- See "Europe Uniting" (Case 23).

John McCormick. The European Union: Politics and Policies. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1996.

- For an international relations course, I recommend keeping this or another specifically EU text on reserve and assigning sections as a supplement to the required IR text.

European Commission Delegation to the US:

<<http://www.eurunion.org>>

- For good supplemental background reading, see the page on "Profile of the EU/The EU in Brief."

West European Studies Homepage, University of Pittsburgh:

<<http://www.pitt.edu/~wwwes>>

- See the "EU Basics: FAQs on the European Union."

European Community Studies Association Web site:

<<http://www.pitt.edu/~ecsa101>>

- Has a very helpful set of annotated "Recommended Links" for library, government, and other resources on the EU. "Teaching and Research" includes links to academic programs focusing on the EU.

Editor's Note: The essay, "Teaching an EU Simulation," which appeared in this column in the Spring 1998 ECSA Review (Vol. XI, No. 2, pp. 10-11), was co-authored by Kirsten Bookmiller, Ed DeClair, and Peter Loedel.

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Book Reviews

Antje Wiener. European Citizenship Practice: Building Institutions of a Non-State. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998, 343 pp.

The development of a European identity built on some form of European citizenship touches upon most if not all of the current debates surrounding the future of the European Union. Reforming EU institutions, dealing with democratic deficits and transparency, tackling the issue of regionalism (as exemplified at the recent Cardiff Summit), continuing the process of enlargement and deepening, to say nothing of expanding and building the common market built on the Euro, will require the unfaltering support of the public. Correspondingly, a strong attachment to "Europe"—a feeling of European citizenship—will facilitate the process of European integration.

Unfortunately, European citizenship has not received much scholarly attention despite its inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty. For example, ECSA's sponsored book, The State of the European Union, Vol. 4, does not cover the topic (the closest would be R. Amy Elman's chapter on the EU and Women). As a result, European Citizenship Practice fills an important void in European Union scholarship. It is a well-timed, deserved, and critical look at a new area of research in European Union studies (as evidenced by the number of "forthcoming" references in the notes). The link Wiener makes between citizenship and institution building, broadly defined to mean the *acquis communautaire*, is crucial to understanding the European Community/European Union as it has developed over the last twenty-five years. Scholars of the European Union should read this book in order to understand this important, but often overlooked, topic.

The book itself is divided into four parts. Part One is divided into three chapters on citizenship in a non-state, contextualized citizenship, and the development of a socio-historical institutional approach. These three chapters provide the theory and methodology that form the basic analytical framework for the book. Parts Two, Three, and Four focus on the case study of building European citizenship based on three historical periods—the debate and discussions surrounding the Paris Summit of 1974, the Fontainebleau Summit of 1984 and the Maastricht Summit of 1991. Included for analysis (among other topics) are the debates surrounding the "special rights policy," passport policy, the Schengen debates, and the SEA. One could argue that a separate and concluding chapter would have added some further clarity to the overall organization of the book. As it stands, the concluding chapter mixes the author's final thoughts on European citizenship with some more detail on the Post-Maastricht period, a period that could still use some minor updating from the 1996-97 IGC.

The book sets out to investigate the EU's developing practice of citizenship in a way that differs from traditional analyses that refer to "the nation state or to the citizen in the first instance" (p. 7). Instead, the author develops the unique concept of "citizenship practice" which is defined as the dynamic citizen-polity relationship. This relationship is built on a model which incorporates a sense of legalized belonging ("formal citizenship"), access to participate in such a relationship, and identity-based links—the three central elements of citizenship in a non-state. These three elements thus create a "contextualized" notion of citizenship based on "distinct institutional arrangements in different places and time" (p. 27). Such an approach allows the author to systematically and successfully develop an understanding of the policy of creating EC/EU citizenship in a supranational context.

Theoretically, Wiener employs socio-cultural, historical, and institutional variables to elaborate on her new notion of EC/EU citizenship practice. She enters into the long-standing debates (none settled and often tedious) in international relations that focus on the value of "social construction" and "ideas" as opposed to other approaches (functionalism, intergovernmentalism, etc.) employed to study European integration. Here, the importance of historical "discursive" practices is emphasized along with a basic introduction into the central institutional actors in EU policy-making: the European Commission, European Parliament, Council of Ministers, European Council, European Court of Justice, and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). By drawing these variables together in one model, the author makes an original contribution to the study of European integration and provides a comprehensive understanding of the expanding *acquis communautaire* of European citizenship.

While she makes a strong case for her model, I did not find the inclusion of the "constructivist" approach to be of any major significance in the final analysis. Ideas, and how they are framed and debated, matter, but they are nothing unless employed by the people, institutions, or nations with the drive, insight, and power to make them matter. As such, this book emphasizes the personalities (Spinelli, Tindemans, Delors, Bangemann, Adonnino, Kohl, Mitterand), institutions (the Commission and Parliament especially, but also the ECJ), and the larger geo-political and geo-economic context (the stagflation era of the mid-1970s, renewed "Cold War" feelings of the early 1980s, and the collapse of the East-West balance by the early 1990s) that have always shaped EC/EU politics. In the end, the historical-institutional approach is more pronounced in the analysis.

More intriguing, perhaps, is the author's use of the concept of "political opportunity structures" (p. 66) to describe the stop and start character of EC/EU policy-making. She effectively illustrates the periods of "political opportunity" when change could occur, when room for maneuver was possible, when ideas, people, and institutions could push European integration—built on citizenship—forward. Ultimately, this would have made a more useful

basic framework within which the author could have then employed the other variables (identified above) that shaped the policy of European citizenship practice.

Heavily researched, more than adequately documented, Wiener's book provides an important text, a foundation for further analysis on this subject. There is much to read here—especially in the endnotes (perhaps too much). Although this was not the author's intention, the book could sprinkle data on European public opinion to illustrate some sense of the "European belonging" the author describes. Readers looking for "hard data" will be disappointed.

Are the citizens of Europe any more connected to the EU than before, despite the leap made at Maastricht? The answer is probably—but much work is still left to be done. This is perhaps the central dilemma facing the EU. If EU officials and national politicians want the support of the population for their ambitious projects—especially EMU, enlargement (and the corresponding and necessary changes in institutions and policies)—they will have to tackle the citizenship problem with even more energy and zeal. But doing so does not earn many votes. Policymakers would do well to read this book to see how long it has taken them to move even as far as they have on European citizenship and to see the links between national and European economic, social, and political forces. As such, European Citizenship Practice is more than just a study of European citizenship. It is a cautionary tale of building Europe.

Peter H. Loedel
West Chester University

Christine Ingebritsen. The Nordic States and European Unity. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998, 219 pp.

Lee Miles. Sweden and European Integration. Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing, 1997, 335 pp.

Robert Geyer. The Uncertain Union: British and Norwegian Social Democrats in an Integrating Europe. Aldershot, England: Avebury, 1997, 229 pp.

The Nordics are an enigma. No five states in Europe share as much of Karl Deutsch's "sense of community" as Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. They are all small countries with overlapping histories (and often overlapping territories). They speak a common language—English—and can, given some patience, understand each other's mother tongue (unless there are Finns, Icelanders, or Sami in the room). Their common religion is lapsed Lutheranism; their common political ideology, social democracy. They love parliaments and royals, democracy and corporatism, peace and peacekeeping, unions, day cares, ombudsmen, job training, trees, the United Nations, windmills, and the sun—which they never see enough of. Their citizens hang out

with each other, hardly noticing their differences, in far away places like the College of Europe, the University of Wisconsin, and Disney World. And yet, despite this abundance of "we-feeling," the Nordics have found it difficult to integrate—with each other, or anyone else.

They are all integrating, of course. All are members of the Nordic Council; all have been members of EFTA and the European Economic Area (EEA). All have wrestled with membership in the European Union (EU). Some have joined, some have not. Denmark entered in 1973, and has kicked against the goads ever since. Finland and Sweden waited until 1995, and while Finland seems to have found a home, preliminary signs indicate that Sweden is feeling very uncomfortable. Iceland is playing hard-to-get; and Norway has left the EU at the altar—twice.

So the questions for Nordic specialists are clear: why have the Nordics resisted integration with each other and the continent? Why have they, nevertheless, sought ever-closer ties with the European Community/Union? Why have they pursued often dramatically different integration policies? And why, after becoming members of the EU, do they have difficulty "getting along"?

Fortunately a number of bright, young scholars with Nordic specialties have begun to address these questions in thoughtful ways. Three of the most promising students of Nordic politics—Christine Ingebritsen (University of Washington), Lee Miles (University of Hull), and Robert Geyer (University of Liverpool)—have recently published significant new books that in one way or another address the key Nordic questions.

Ingebritsen's book is by far the most ambitious. Not only does she address the entire five-country region, but she also seeks to explain the policy choices each country made when faced with new international economic and security challenges after 1985. The result is a theoretically sophisticated monograph that sets the standard for all subsequent work in the area.

In her book Ingebritsen argues that all five Nordic governments have abandoned autonomous national economic and security policies to pursue European collaboration. This fundamental policy shift, which has virtually eliminated the distinctive features of the Nordic Model, was forced by two developments in the late 1980s: the European Community's single market project, and the end of the Cold War. Changes in the international system, however, cannot explain why the five countries took different approaches to integration. Specifically, why have Finland and Sweden followed a "German model" (with its emphasis on centralized authority in supranational institutions) and joined the EU, while Iceland, Norway, and Denmark followed a "British model" (with its emphasis on national authority) and either refused to enter the Union or caused trouble in it? The answer, according to Ingebritsen, rests in an analysis of leading economic sectors and the political interests they generate. If a country's leading sector requires open markets in Europe, the political interests behind that sector will convince the

government—and the electorate in a referendum—that EU membership is economically necessary. If, on the other hand, the leading sector is threatened by the EU, then the domestic political interests will prevent a decision for membership. Sweden and Finland joined the EU because manufacturing (Sweden and Finland) and forestry (Finland) are export-dependent; Denmark stays in because its agriculture and manufacturing benefit from open markets and EU subsidies; Iceland and Norway stay out because fishing and arctic farming are threatened by EU policies, and in Norway's case, oil revenues make staying out economically feasible.

The argument is elegant, and Ingebritsen is at her best when spinning it out of a vast body of theoretical literature. But is she right? Few doubt the impact of the Single European Act and the fall of the Berlin Wall on the policy choices facing the Nordic countries. As both Ingebritsen and Miles point out, the dissolution of the Soviet bloc freed Sweden to consider its economic interests over security concerns; the same goes double for Finland, which soon looked to Europe for markets and protection from an unstable Russia. All of the Nordics knew their economic dependence on the EU required that they join the Single Market, thus their willingness to embrace the EEA. On this Ingebritsen is highly persuasive. But explaining the variation in integration policies from this point is the tricky part.

To convince me that groups tied to leading sectors determined a Nordic state's integration policy, Ingebritsen would have to 1) precisely define "leading sectors," 2) identify the leading sector(s) in each country, 3) tie the sectors to specific political interests, and 4) show that those interests had a decisive influence on government decision makers and voters (in countries holding referenda). Ingebritsen defines a leading sector as "the largest single contributor to national revenue [GDP?]" (p. 10), but then speaks almost exclusively about exports alone. The only data presented to illustrate the strength of leading sectors in each country details "principal exports," such as "machinery" and "food" (p. 117). Furthermore, leading sectors seem to be redefined when they fail to fit the case. Petroleum in Norway, for example, is by far the most important export, but the interests tied to oil and gas were inconsequential in the EU membership debate. What mattered were fishing and farming, which Ingebritsen admits are "marginal to the economy yet symbolically important to the society" (p. 115). So what is really meant by "leading sectors"? Should they be defined economically or socially?

Tying leading sectors to political influence is also problematic. In Sweden the leading sectors favored membership and the political elite was heavily pro-EU, but as Miles points out, the referendum came at a unique moment when favorable public opinion peaked. The vote could easily have been lost despite the influence of leading sectors. Similarly, in Norway, all the leading sectors, according to Ingebritsen, were either neutral (petroleum) or against membership (fishing, farming, whaling, etc.). So why, with the treasury awash in oil revenue, did most of the political

establishment and nearly half of the electorate support membership? Why did Norway even apply? Such questions only illustrate the bluntness of the leading sectors instrument. Ingebritsen is right: leading sectors (however defined) matter because the resources they generate influence political positions and fund political activities. But as Deutsch, Haas, and others pointed out decades ago, integration has an emotional dimension that involves shifting loyalties and "we-feelings." It is about identities, visions of the future, and learning to *want* integration. Economic arguments like Ingebritsen's tell part of the story. But the debates in each Nordic country cannot be understood apart from their domestic cultural contexts. The anger generated by the national discussions—in Norway and Sweden in particular—was rooted as much in clashes of culture (urban v. rural, center v. periphery, left v. right, Nordic v. Continental) as economics. Rokkan and Lipset's social cleavages still mean something in the Nordic countries, and Ingebritsen would have done well to take them more seriously.

Miles and Geyer are also interested in changes in Nordic integration policy. While their studies are more narrowly focused, each offers a fine complement to the Ingebritsen book. Miles' exhaustive and thoroughly documented examination of Sweden's long march to EU membership (and beyond) is rewarding for its wealth of detail and compelling story line. Sweden in the post-war period found itself caught between growing economic interdependence with Europe and its commitment to neutrality. Swedish governments eagerly concluded free trade agreements with European neighbors, and flirted several times with membership in the Community, but always pulled back, citing foreign policy concerns. Miles, like Ingebritsen, attributes Sweden's consideration of membership after 1989 to an altered European security situation and to the need to stem capital flight and secure markets for Swedish manufactures (the leading sector). Miles fills in the details Ingebritsen can only brush over as he tells a political tale filled with many opportunities for EU supporters to fail. Throughout his account, however, Miles makes it clear

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that the Swedish vision of European unity has been and continues to be firmly intergovernmental—i.e., much closer to the British than the German model, *contra* Ingebritsen.

The Miles book covers every issue, debate, and government report relevant to Sweden's relationship with the EU through accession and the first year of membership. But the book fails to put this information in an adequate interpretive or explanatory context. Miles attempts a theoretical contribution by developing the "Swedish Diamond" to explain "the country's transition to full membership [in the EU]" (p. 298). The diamond's four "points" include Sweden's consensual democracy, corporatist economic policy making, economic interdependence, and neutrality. Miles relates how these Swedish distinctives influenced policy outcomes at various times, but although a depiction of the diamond appears with interactive arrows (p. 17), he never systematically describes their relationship to one another, how they are influenced by external factors, or how they affect Sweden's relationship with the EU (the presumed dependent variable). In Miles' hands, the Swedish Diamond is no more than a set of useful labels for discussing changes in the Swedish model.

Robert Geyer adds to our understanding of change in the Nordic region by comparing the evolving integration policies of the labor parties in Norway and Britain. Why, he asks, has the British Labour party become euro-enthusiastic after decades of euro-skepticism, while the Norwegian Labor party remains less enthusiastic about membership in the EU? Geyer's answer is that the British socialists have succumbed to a modernization project (aimed at attracting votes—a successful project it seems) that includes a willing embrace of the "neo-liberal" EU. The Norwegian social democrats, however, have remained closer to their ideological roots and have resisted the temptation to jump on board the market bandwagon. The thesis is intriguing because it represents the anti-EU sentiments of the disaffected left in both Britain and Norway. But I find it unpersuasive.

In my view, the thesis collapses because it has nothing to explain: the two labor parties are remarkable, not for their differences, but for their abundant similarities on this issue. Both parties are headed by labor modernizers who have shed their parties' Marxist baggage, embraced pragmatism, marginalized the far left, distanced their parties from big labor, adopted market solutions to economic problems, and vigorously pursued European integration as a means of preserving the welfare state. Certainly the Norwegian Labor party is divided over Europe, but, indeed, *both* parties have significant euro-skeptical left wings. The Norwegian left may seem more vocal, but only because it fought a recent referendum campaign. Just wait until Tony Blair tries to lead his party in a national vote on EMU!

The five countries of the Nordic region continue to integrate with Europe as a whole. Ingebritsen is probably right: even Iceland and Norway will one day join the EU. But the region remains fascinating because the process has not been easily explained by the theories we have on offer. These

three books have set an empirical foundation and begun an interesting theoretical structure. But more hands are needed.

Brent F. Nelsen
Furman University

Elfriede Regelsberger, Phillippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent, and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.) Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, 406 pp.

Recent European and world events have made the European Union's attempt at foreign policy coordination—from the early European Political Cooperation (EPC) structure to the present Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)—a phenomenon that must be understood by the practitioners of diplomacy, particularly in Europe. In addition, scholars of both Europe and international relations must develop an appreciation for this developing arena of European competence.

Elfriede Regelsberger, Phillippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent, and Wolfgang Wessels, the editors of 1997's Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond, have created a volume that pulls together the historical development of both the EPC and the CFSP and diagnoses of their practical applications in the form of case studies of areas like Somalia and Eastern Europe. In addition, they manage to address the prognosis for the Union's future policy coordination of international political goals.

The editors have chosen authors whose pieces work together to create a deep understanding of the topic of political cooperation in foreign policy. Unlike many edited volumes, these works flow well from one to another. The authors on the whole condemn the EPC and CFSP as cumbersome and unsuccessful. The EPC is now a relic, though its impact is still felt among EU states. The CFSP, placed as it is in the intergovernmental pillar in the system created by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU), has been difficult to implement. The procedures are difficult and awkward and EU institutions have been attempting to carve out a place for themselves in the process of translating treaty into a coordinated security policy.

These authors question the seeming deliberance by which TEU's framers built vagueness into CFSP. It was deemed necessary to maintain CFSP as an obscure set of procedures and goals in order to assure that it would be included in TEU. However, CFSP has subsequently been difficult to operate and to interpret. Its success has therefore been impaired. Case studies of both the EPC and the CFSP that are included in this volume will enable academics and policymakers alike in gauging the (in)effectiveness of the attempt to coordinate security policy.

In a study of the unrest in Somalia, Patrick Keating concludes that the European Union had almost no impact,

either positive or negative, upon the outcomes there (p. 293). Belgium and France took nearly opposite paths, regardless of their common membership in the EU. However, the author suggests that the history of the EPC has demonstrated that the EU has a capacity to learn and reminds us that the CFSP presents an entirely new context within which the member-states must act (p. 293).

Interesting as the case studies of crisis situations are, the EU's relations with Eastern Europe may be a far more important area for action within CFSP for the nations involved as the question of enlargement into former Soviet bloc nations looms. David Allen finds that the EU does not have a consistent policy toward the former Soviet Union (p. 233). Allen asserts that Germany in particular needs coherency in the form of a European policy toward Russia and the FSU states, but that Germany may be forced to make its own policy in the absence of an EU reaction (p. 234).

This volume and these editors have accomplished the grueling task of presenting, in fewer than 400 pages, the history, the development, and the analyses of the EPC and the CFSP. The book raises legitimate questions about the efficacy of a European foreign policy. The TEU leaves unanswered the question of definition of a common foreign and security policy. The contents of a common policy are not addressed. For example, does a common policy of necessity require a common military force? It would seem so in cases like the Somalian case, but the member-states have not interpreted CFSP in this manner. The editors of this volume and the scholars who have contributed to it have presented a complex and interesting analysis of a policy area that will continue to grow and change as it reacts to the developing world security state.

Heather A. D. Mbaye
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John Redmond and Glenda G. Rosenthal (eds.) The Expanding European Union: Past, Present, Future. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, 233 pp.

In their introduction, John Redmond and Glenda Rosenthal stress the "continuity and evolutionary enlargement process" of the EU. Much can "still be learned from an analysis of the 1995 and earlier enlargements" (p. 5). In this respect their emphasis is somewhat different from Christopher Preston (see his Enlargement & Integration in the European Union, London—New York: Routledge, 1997).

The book starts with contributions on the institutional impact of enlargement. Desmond Dinan (Commission), Geoffrey Edwards (Council) and Karlheinz Neureither (European Parliament) usually begin their contributions with discussions of general problems, like the widening/deepening dichotomy. Then they deal in a rather cursory way with the problems of the past, without any extensive empirical

analysis, and speculate about the future, i.e., Eastern enlargement.

The second group of articles deals with EU policies. Tim Josling explains the task of assimilating new members into the Common Agricultural Policy. He stresses the necessity of "further reforms toward a less regulated" CAP, which could be triggered by the eastward enlargement (p. 105). According to David Allen, enlargement has always been "a diplomatic/security matter" (p. 112) and has been dominated by the collective views of the member states, often involving the marginalization of the Commission and the European Parliament. The impact of the successive enlargements on the EPC/CFSP had been slight. Eastern enlargement revives the conflict between long-term political objectives, developed in the CFSP, and the shorter-term economic interests of the EC process (p. 113). Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes make a quite detailed analysis of the impact of enlargement on EU trade and industrial policy. They conclude that in the longer run eastward enlargement will have a substantial effect on the size of the EU as a trading bloc and will probably lead to substantial reforms of the structural funds (p. 150).

András Inotai pleads for a quick Eastern enlargement of the EU. He sees the common roots of all the obstacles for enlargement in the "growing fear of competitiveness throughout western Europe" (p. 162) — which he regards as hardly justified. The calculations of the direct costs of this enlargement are mostly exaggerated. According to his "realistic" calculations, the Visegrád countries would require EU financing of ECU 10–16 billion annually (p. 170). Inotai wants a gradual eastward enlargement which would cost much less than the financing of all nonmembership alternatives (p. 175). Birol Yesilada gives a comprehensive overview of the EU's Mediterranean policy. He is rather critical of the EU's handling of Cyprus, which "will continue to be a thorn in the side of the international community" (p. 187). But he does not deal with the problems and trade-offs between Eastern enlargement and the relations with the Mediterranean nonmember countries.

Roy Ginsberg reminds us of the reinforcing effect for West Germany's democratic transition and consolidation through the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in the early 1950s (p. 211). Enlargement "is both a cause and effect of EU foreign policy activity" (p. 213). For the Mediterranean enlargement and for the eastward enlargement security consideration were and are of "paramount importance" (p. 211). In a short concluding chapter, Redmond and Rosenthal see four implicit debates in connection with Eastern enlargement: (1) the timing of the accession; (2) the development of the CFSP; (3) the relationship between widening and deepening; and (4) the possibility of "variable geometry."

All the contributions are very informed, albeit some of them are a bit too "essayistic" with many words but few facts which could be useful for the future enlargements. Every publication has its inaccuracies and errors, the book by Redmond and Rosenthal being no exception. Among the more

odd mistakes is the rendering of CMEA as “Common Market Economic Area” (p. 157). On p. 204 Ginsberg maintains—wrongly—that the Maastricht Treaty replaced CFSP’s Political Committee by COREPER. But the most fundamental problem of this book, published in 1998, is the fact that it takes into account neither the results of the 1996/97 Intergovernmental Conference nor the Commission’s Agenda 2000. It seems that the contributions were already finished by mid-1996. In 1998, most of them look a bit outdated and are only of historical value.

Paul Luif

Austrian Institute for International Affairs

Kathleen R. McNamara. The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998, 185 pp.

John Maynard Keynes posited that “practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist” at the end of his General Theory. In doing so, he underscored the importance of self-reflection for our understanding of the political economy. At issue is not how vested interests struggle over the distribution of value-added, but rather how economic ideas filter into political discourse, how policy-makers perceive their options, and how institutions and objectives interrelate. This aspect of political economy is somehow at odds with the rest of the discipline, if only because it is so inherently imprecise: ideas are difficult to compartmentalize, influence is hard to measure, and prior intentions blend into post-hoc rationalizations. Nevertheless, the study of ideas and influence is a vital complement to that of income and interests.

Princeton Professor Kathleen McNamara’s new book is a powerful illustration of this complementarity. McNamara examines Europe’s recent history of monetary cooperation with an eye firmly centered on how the costs, benefits, and alternatives are perceived, and on how such perceptions guide institutional design. She argues that Europe’s policy makers became open to the influence of monetarist thought as they confronted the macroeconomic turbulence of the late 1960s and 1970s; that—at the time—monetarism seemed to provide a macroeconomic policy framework compatible with the rapid growth of international capital mobility; and that the relative success of German economic performance strengthened perceptions of the practical merits of monetarist theory. The result was not (always) a blind and immediate application of monetarist prescriptions, but rather a pragmatic and progressive fusion of theoretical insight and political realities: policy makers gradually came to anchor monetary policy on the exchange rate rather than on the money supply (p. 150), and they often used fiscal laxity to temper the impact of monetary rigor (p. 176).

While practical and incremental, McNamara argues, the changeover to monetarism represents a clear break from Europe’s Keynesian past and establishes a new pattern of interaction between different national economies. Europe’s liberalism remains “imbedded” in diverse national frameworks of norms and social values, and yet these norms and values are themselves increasingly—and intentionally—constrained by the requirements of the international goods and factor markets. As a result, Europe is governed by a “consensus of competitive liberalism” (p. 10). This consensus is manifest in institutional performance and design: it can be used to explain the stability of the European Monetary System as well as the structure of the Maastricht Plan for economic and monetary union (EMU).

However, McNamara cautions that consensus does not always promote success, and that failure can undermine consensus. We can trace the monetarist origins of the EMU project, but this is no assurance that the monetary union will function easily in terms of national political and social aspirations. Should EMU conflict (or be perceived to conflict) with other social values—particularly relating to employment conditions—this “consensus of competitive liberalism” may well dissolve. McNamara concludes by arguing in favor of “a more politicized monetary integration process” (p. 177). Such politicization may lack the precision expected by economists and political economists alike, but—as Keynes would no doubt agree—careful self-reflection is vital nonetheless.

Erik Jones

University of Nottingham

ECSA Supporters

The European Community Studies Association is extremely grateful for financial support above and beyond membership dues contributed by these members during the second two quarters of 1998 (April-September):

Jinwoo Choi
Roy H. Ginsberg
Ross C. Horning
Clyde Mitchell-Weaver
Ivor Roberts
Michael J. Sodaro
Joan Steves Ward
Eleanor E. Zeff

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ECSA MEMBERS SAVE 20%!

The State of the European Union, Vol. 4: Deepening and Widening

edited by
*Pierre-Henri Laurent
and Marc Maresceau*

The struggle between those who seek a more integrated, and even a federal, Europe and those proposing a looser confederation was once again highlighted at the 1996-1997 Intergovernmental Conference, and reflected in the IGC's decisions. This fourth volume in the European Community Studies Association's biennial series examines the divisions within the EU in the key areas of the common foreign and security policy, European monetary union, enlargement, and structural reform.

1998/374 pages

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The State of the European Union, Vol. 3: Building a European Polity?

edited by
Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey

"This book is a valuable and welcome addition to the literature on the EU and integration, and it should be of considerable interest to any serious scholar of EU politics."—*American Political Science Review*

This volume, the third in a biennial series, explores the implications of the ratification of the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht) and related developments in the context of integration analysis. The authors reflect on European integration in theoretical and historical perspective, review the impact of widening, deepening, and the "Europeanization" of member state politics on both member states and the Union, and examine the origins and character of a range of policies at the EU level.

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Z-3

ECSA Tenth Anniversary

Perspectives from the ECSA Founders

IN THIS EXCITING tenth anniversary year (1988-1998) of the founding of the European Community Studies Association as an independent, non-profit organization, we look both backward and forward. In looking forward, we have deemed it very important to have the views and recommendations of the ECSA membership to guide us as we plan future directions. (ECSA members kindly responded to our first-ever membership survey, circulated with the Spring 1998 *ECSA Review* and summarized in the 1997-98 Annual Report included with this issue.) In looking backward, we are most fortunate to have the perspectives of that pivotal handful of persons (see the list below) intimately involved in the conception, creation and bold early initiatives of ECSA. Happily, the founders remain active in the Association and their thoughts about it both illuminate the recent history of and inspire those who care about European Union studies.

As the third administrative director of ECSA, I had the great fortune to follow both Desmond Dinan and Bill Burros in this role. I came in at a time (January 1997) when the

organization was being gently cut loose from its seed funders. Fortunately, former ECSA Chair Alberta Sbragia (1993-95) had found an institutional base for the Association at the University of Pittsburgh, a critical move in the organization's maturation. I have had the pleasure of working with a core group of people on various ECSA committees who care enough about ECSA to make sure it remains vital. In that vein, I want to acknowledge the seen but unheralded: the Executive Committee which governs ECSA, made up of seven busy scholars who work long hours without pay to make sure that ECSA projects take place. Without their care and labor, the organization would not succeed, and ECSA owes a debt of deep gratitude to the five elected Executive Committees who have served the Association to date.

Each of the six founding members of ECSA graciously made time to respond to a set of questions I posed about their initial visions for the Association and their views on the development of EU studies as a field. Their replies make clear several resounding themes: the creation and nurturing of ECSA has been an enormous labor, given generously; the organization was developing for several years before it "opened for business" in 1988; and, the happy synergy of the founders' efforts, developments in the European Union, and the open-minded support of several key funders have combined to make ECSA successful in one short decade. Timing is everything, their accounts remind us, but commitment counts for a lot as well. What follows are excerpts from their replies to my questions, in their own words.

Valerie Staats

ECSA's Founders

Where are they now?

DESMOND DINAN is associate professor in the Institute for Public Policy at George Mason University and a visiting fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael.

ROY H. GINSBERG is professor in the Department of Government and Director of the International Affairs Program at Skidmore College.

LEON HURWITZ is professor of political science and associate dean in the College of Arts and Sciences at Cleveland State University.

PIERRE-HENRI LAURENT is professor of history at Tufts University and visiting Fulbright Professor of US-EU Relations at the College of Europe, Brugge.

DONALD J. PUCHALA is professor of public affairs and Director of the Walker Institute of International Studies at the University of South Carolina.

GLENDA G. ROSENTHAL is professor of international studies/political science and Director of the Institute on Western Europe at Columbia University, and Co-Director of the European Union Center of New York.

What did you envision when you conceived of the ECSA?

Roy H. Ginsberg: "EC studies were not adequately represented in other scholarly organizations, and there was also a neglect of the EC as an object of scholarly research and teaching. We needed: more than a study group within a larger organization; intellectual leadership; and, to encourage a new generation of students interested in the EC."

Donald J. Puchala: "My motivation for starting ECSA was more or less political. Research into European integration was declining both quantitatively and qualitatively; the Common Market seemed no longer to be stimulating very much scholarly interest in the U.S. ... The new catch-words were *interdependence* and *regimes*, but few of the people engaged in the new theoretical dialogues paid much attention to Europe or the EC. The purpose of ECSA in my mind was to turn these events around, or at least to institutionalize the importance of continuing to study European integration. We felt that we were bucking an intellectual tide (at least in the U.S.). Ironically, we were in the right place at the right time because "Europe 1992" was born just about the same time that ECSA was. It gave us a tremendous starting momentum!"

Glenda G. Rosenthal: "This was just about the time that there was a renewal of interest in the EC as a result of the 1992 Single Market program and in almost none of our colleges and universities or organizations was there pressure to increase instructional opportunities to meet the demand coming from students and the business community. Many of us were

involved actively in the Council for European Studies, but felt that there was a need for a more specialized professional organization, not to rival CES but to supplement it ... We envisioned a forum and a professional grouping for academics and practitioners whose *primary* research or professional focus was the EC. We did not expect a particularly large group and had rather modest ideas about our program—a conference, newsletter, and occasional workshops.”

Leon Hurwitz: “We envisioned a traditional academic organization with a conference and a journal. Other associations were unresponsive to EC/EU studies.”

Desmond Dinan: “Of course I am nostalgic about ECSA ... For the first four years ... I ran the Association from my home and office and organized the first two conferences ... I have many happy memories of Executive Committee meetings, of meetings of the conference program committees (the first of which took place in my house, where Leon Lindberg stayed over!) ... Having been “present at the creation” and having worked so hard to set up the organization, I derive special pleasure from going to ECSA events, reading ECSA publications (my father-in-law designed the logo!), and meeting old ECSA colleagues. The Association has grown remarkably, and has a sound international reputation. It is better known and regarded in Europe than most of its European counterparts (at the national and pan-European levels). Inevitably, perhaps, it is less interdisciplinary than I had hoped it would be, and is dominated by political science. Also, ECSA has not reached out much beyond academia—but on the other hand, it was always intended to be primarily an academic association ...”

Pierre-Henri Laurent: “I knew that success would be in the hands of a few. We were all interested in creation, and surprising to me, willing to work to get it. We knew we needed money and smartly went to the Delegation. Our first success was dual receptivity—they liked the idea of someone else “doing part of their work” and we found a completely open and “freedom of speech and criticism” organization to help fund us. Very early in our deliberations, we needed a money person—one with bookkeeping experiences, a home institution that was supportive, and willing to work a lot for *rien*. Finally, Leon [Hurwitz] took it and ran with it and this is a central and undeniable reason why it all took off ... for all the differences, there was a striking compatibility in the first elected Executive Committee.”¹

What do you see as ECSA’s most important activities?

[The six respondents unanimously cited two: the Biennial Conference and the *ECSA Review*, formerly the *Newsletter*.]

Roy H. Ginsberg: “The *ECSA Review* ... is the link and the chief means of communication among members in between

From the first ECSA Newsletter ...

VOLUME 1, NO.1 SPRING 1988—Co-edited by Roy H. Ginsberg, Leon Hurwitz and Glenda G. Rosenthal

“Although the idea of the Newsletter predates the founding of ECSA, it represents part of the same scholarly initiative. This initiative goes back to May 1984 when a small group of scholars interested in the EC met for a one-day conference organized by Columbia University’s Institute on Western Europe. At the conclusion of this conference, it was noted that support for and study of the EC was declining in North America and the suggestion was made and unani- mously endorsed that every effort should be made to create an on-going forum for those interested in the EC.

“In October 1985, a second and larger meeting was held in Washington, DC, and in March 1987, a group of scholars met with officials of the Delegation of the Commission of the EC, also in Washington, and discussed ways of strengthening North American academic activities relating to the EC (including the idea of a newsletter). Subsequently, 25 scholars came together in Washington in March 1987 for the third European Community seminar/workshop sponsored by Columbia University’s Institute on Western Europe and the University of South Carolina, with the support of the Delegation of the EC. At a special evening meeting, the newsletter project was unanimously approved and it was also decided to appoint a committee to investigate the possibilities of forming our own European Community Studies Association ...

“Now that the Association has been formed, all those involved look forward to its lively and active development.”

From the *Editorial*, p.1.

ECSA Conferences. It provides an integrating and communication function among members and between members and the leadership. Also, the curriculum development grants: I asked the Washington office of the Commission to support the teaching of a new course on European integration at Skidmore in 1987 which became the model for the curriculum development grants; the course is still being taught at Skidmore every year. The biennial conferences are unparalleled. The ECSA conferences are *the* premier international gatherings of EU scholars. The programs are first rate. The ECSA conference is a wonderful complement to the wider international conferences, e.g., ISA and APSA.”

Glenda G. Rosenthal: “The biennial conference is enormously valuable since it gives us an opportunity to see everyone (senior, junior, practitioner alike) interested in the EU and hear what they have to say. It is also a great opportunity to meet our colleagues from outside North America, particularly Europe, who come to the conference in droves!”

1. The first elected Executive Committee (1989-1991) comprised R. Ginsberg (Chair-Elect), L. Hurwitz, P. Laurent, D. Puchala, and G. Rosenthal (Chair), with D. Dinan as an *ex officio* member and first administrative director. Fifteen candidates ran for five slots in a Spring 1989 election.

Tenth Anniversary Founders Dinner

Mark your calendars and plan to attend ...

- When:** Wednesday, June 2nd, 1999
7:00 - 10:00 pm
- Where:** Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Westin William Penn Hotel
- Why:** To honor the founders, celebrate the successes of ECSA, and establish a scholarship fund.
- Who:** All ECSA members, current and past Executive Committee members, and special friends and supporters will be invited to show their support for ECSA by attending the dinner and contributing to our scholarship program. Details will appear in the next *ECSA Review*.

Donald J. Puchala: "Far, far, far and away the most important activities were the periodic conferences—the big events that put us on the intellectual map, gave us some sense of how many of us there actually were, attracted the very positive attention of the European Commission Delegation, German Marshall Fund, and the Ford Foundation, got the European scholars involved with us and us with them, and, incidentally, stimulated some pretty insightful research. There was great trepidation about the first conference. No one was certain that we would pull it off, or that anybody would actually show up. It was a huge success and ECSA never looked back. I would say that the launching, continuation, and expansion of the *Newsletter* was also an important chapter in ECSA intellectual history. It is really one of the very best associational newsletters available and it is symbolic of the quality that ECSA represents."

How have EU studies changed in the past decade, and what are the prospects for the field and for ECSA?

Roy H. Ginsberg: "There has been a growing recognition at academic institutions of the value of professors who can teach the EU. The quality and quantity of published scholarship on the EC has increased ... We need to try harder to ensure the interdisciplinary nature of ECSA by strongly encouraging non-political scientists to run for the Executive Committee ... given the goals of the founders to provide for the interdisciplinary study of European integration. EU studies are no longer neglected and ECSA has now successfully postdated the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty ... ECSA predates and postdates the SEA and this is encouraging from a long-term perspective."

Glenda G. Rosenthal: "From being a very minor, obscure sub, sub-field for most people, [EU studies] has become a very

serious specialization in tandem with the growing importance and recognition of the EC/EU in world politics. Now, there is not even a small corner of EU studies broadly speaking that is not researched and it is well nigh impossible to be a generalist any more. Graduate students come in with a pretty solid general background obtained in college and are no longer in need of the basics. I also believe that there is a diminishing interest in "theory" ... I think interest in EU studies will be sustained in the U.S. and perhaps grow if the EU goes through a period of successful integration and EMU gets off the ground without too much trauma. The decision by the Commission to designate and fund ten EU Centers in the U.S. will also make a big difference and encourage programs where only minimal instruction is now offered and promote increased interest in the field among junior scholars. We already have a solid "successor generation" (see the current ECSA Executive Committee) and they are being actively encouraged to stay in the field. Bravo!"

Donald J. Puchala: "How have EU studies changed over the last decade? They've actually become EU studies! Early on the study of the EU (EEC, EC, etc.) was entered into mainly for the theoretical edification that was expected to flow forth. Many scholars, including myself, were less interested in the EC per se than in what studying it could tell us about the phenomenon of international (or regional) integration. Europe was a laboratory. The study of the EU has evolved in such ways that scholars' primary objectives have become understanding the EU itself. There is much more substantive work being done, more policy-analytic work (the signal event here was the publication of the Wallace, Wallace and Webb book), more drawing upon concepts and theories from other realms of the social sciences (as in Tarrow's work) and less emphasis on theorizing about international integration. There are of course exceptions, but I can't honestly say that there have been any remarkable contributions to integration theory for a long time.

"The future of EU studies? This is very much linked to the fates and fortunes of the EU itself. If Europe continues to make dramatic moves toward greater unification, as the agenda of broadening and deepening suggests, the EU will continue to attract the attention of researchers, the enthusiasm of doctoral students and the dollars (or euros) of funding agencies. Similarly, if the whole enterprise collapses upon itself, as several quite sensible analysts anticipate, the "decline and fall" will certainly be the subject of great intellectual attention, at least for a respectable amount of time. EU research, and possibly ECSA growth, will fall into jeopardy if the EU gets boring again, as it has the tendency to do. Or, one could enter into this analysis from an altogether different angle and comment upon the institutionalization of EU research virtually all over the world. Scores of research institutes have been established to study the EU (even in China and Korea!); dozens of chaired professorships have been established to seat scholars dedicated to EU studies; ECSA itself has globalized. Naturally, all of this bodes very positively for the longevity of EU studies."

Conferences

European Studies Research Students Conference

November 17, 1998: King's College, London. Conference for research students in the field of European Studies, this annual University Association for Contemporary European Studies event aims to pass on information directly relevant to research students. It also offers the opportunity to become involved in the graduate student network and meet other European Studies research students. Contact the UACES Secretariat, King's College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK; Tel: 44 171 240 0206; Fax: 44 171 836 2350; e-mail: <uaces@compuserve.com>; Web <<http://www.uaces.org/u-info>>.

Cold War Culture: Film, Fact, and Fiction

February 18-21, 1999: Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. This interdisciplinary conference will explore topics dealing with Cold War culture in Europe from 1945 to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the present. Papers may cover literature, cinema, art, architecture, politics, cultural studies, history, European integration, and US-European cultural relations. Please contact the Cold War Conference, Department of West European Studies, 542 Ballantine Hall, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405; Tel: 812 855 3280; Fax: 812 855 7695; e-mail <weur@indiana.edu>.

Western Europe in an Age of Globalization

February 26-28, 1999: Graduate Student Workshop, Center for European Studies, Harvard University. For students of political science, sociology, history and economics to discuss their work and join a discussion on the role of European integration in the globalization process, the effects of globalization and European integration on economic and social policy-making, and their consequences for domestic politics in Western European states. Participation is limited to advanced doctoral students in North America; acceptance is competitive. Funding will be provided for participants' travel and accommodation. For consideration, please send 5 copies each of: 1) CV (with e-mail address); 2) two-page summary of dissertation research (include name of dissertation chair); and 3) one-page abstract describing the aim of the 15-20 page workshop paper. Please send all by *November 6, 1998* to Lisa Eschenbach, Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 27 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138. Tel: 617 495 4303 x231, e-mail <lmeschen@fas.harvard.edu>.

The Changing Face of Europe

March 25-27, 1999: Columbia University, New York. The Organizing Committee of the 16th Annual Graduate Student conference seeks papers addressing economic, political, cultural and historical perspectives of the new Europe as it

approaches the millennium and proceeds toward greater integration. Papers from all disciplines are sought. Potential topics include, but are not limited to, immigration and labor issues, the changing role of the nation-state, gender and family issues, Economic and Monetary Union and other challenges of deepening and widening the European Union. Authors must be enrolled in a degree-granting graduate or professional school program. Papers are selected on a competitive basis in an anonymous referee process. All decisions made by the Selection committee regarding eligibility and awards are final. The Conference will pay for presenters' travel and accommodations; only one author per paper will be accommodated in the case of co-authored submissions. Presenters will compete for three awards of \$500 each. Submission deadline: All papers must be received by *December 31, 1998*.

Please direct inquiries to Ashley Gross or Stephen Tobey, Program Assistants, e-mail: <st237@columbia.edu> at the Institute on Western Europe. Tel: 212 854 4618, fax 212 854 8599 or on the Web at <www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/REGIONAL/WE/iwe.html>. Send submissions to Student Conference Organizing Committee, Institute on Western Europe, Columbia University, 420 West 118th Street, Mail Code 3337, New York, NY 10027 USA.

The European Union in 2010

May 14-15, 1999: London European Research Centre, University of North London, UK. The approaching millennium offers an opportunity to consider how Europe can shape its future as a democratic political and social community, while facing the challenges from international politics, global economic relations, technological change, social change and population movements. Conference themes: 1) What is the future for a social Europe, and the most appropriate model of capitalism to deliver this? 2) What is the nature of the European identity in a world of shifting geographical boundaries? 3) What is Europe's role in the new millennium, and how should the EU position itself in the global society? 4) How is the security of Europe defined and constructed? 5) Citizenship and the European citizen—is there a conflict between law, politics and culture? For further details contact Dr. Mary Farrell, School of European and Language Studies, University of North London, 166-220 Holloway Road, London N7 8DB, UK. Tel 44 171 607 2789, Fax 44 171 753 5108, E-mail <m.farrell@unl.ac.uk>.

ECSA Sixth Biennial International Conference

June 3-5, 1999: Westin William Penn Hotel, Pittsburgh, PA. ECSA's biennial interdisciplinary conference examining all aspects of European integration and European Union studies. Provisional program will be available in early 1999. Visit the Web site now at <www.pitt.edu/~ecsa101/conf99.htm> for news, the provisional program, and tourism information, and for conference registration forms beginning in January 1999.

Grants and Fellowships

German Marshall Fund of the United States

1999 Research Support Program: A new program to support advanced research to improve the understanding of significant contemporary economic, political, and social developments relating to Europe, European integration and relations between Europe and the U.S. The geographic scope includes Western, Central and Eastern Europe, including Russia and Turkey as they relate to Europe, but not the Central Asian countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. Applicants may be U.S. graduate students, recent Ph.D. recipients, and more senior scholars. Special consideration will be given to applicants seeking support for dissertation fieldwork (up to \$20,000) in one or more European countries and to projects involving collaborative research by both established and younger scholars, including projects designed on a transatlantic basis (advanced research grants up to \$40,000). The program will also consider predissertation research grants (up to \$3,000) for completing a dissertation related to Europe. Applications must be postmarked no later than *November 15, 1998*; for forms and additional information, contact The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 11 Dupont Circle NW (Suite 750), Washington, DC 20036; e-mail <info@gmfus.org>.

Minza de Gunzburg Center for European Studies

1999-2000 James Bryant Conant Fellowships in German and European Studies: Up to two residential Fellowships in German and European Studies (\$35,000 over twelve months) will be awarded by the Program for the Study of Germany and Europe for projects that focus on contemporary German or German and European topics in the fields of history, politics, economics, society, or culture. Applicants must be non-tenured persons who are teaching or planning to teach at the university level in North America, and must be officially post-doctoral by July 1, 1999. A publishable monograph is required upon completion of the Fellowship. There is no application form; materials are due by *January 8, 1999*. Submit five sets and the original of a five-page research project description, a dissertation or book abstract, a CV, a cover letter, and two letters of recommendation to Filomena Cabral, Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 27 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, Tel. 617 495 4303, Ext. 201, Fax 617 495 2198, e-mail <cesgrant@fas.harvard.edu>.

John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation

Research and Writing Grants: The Program on Global Security and Sustainability sponsors an annual competition for grants to support innovation and excellence in the analysis of the causes, nature, and consequences of international conflict

and cooperation. The Program seeks to support research and writing projects, in any academic discipline or profession, that promise to illuminate the dynamics of international security, sustainability, and cooperation. Grants may be used in university and organizational settings or may support independent researchers; individuals and 2-person teams are eligible (awards of up to \$75,000 and \$100,000 respectively). Projects may be scheduled to begin as early as October 1999. For further information, contact the Program on Global Security and Sustainability at the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, 140 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, IL 60603 USA, Tel. 312 726 8000; e-mail <4answers@macfdn.org>. Applications must be received by *February 1, 1999*.

Advanced Study Center, University of Michigan

1999-2000 Seminar on Empires, States, and Political Imagination: The Advanced Study Center, The International Institute, University of Michigan, invites proposals from scholars to come to Ann Arbor for one week up to a semester in order to investigate various ways in which territorial boundaries and territorial interconnections have been put together; the different forms in which affinity has been expressed and collectivities organized; and the relations of state-based institutions with networks that cut across political organization. Premodern to twentieth century focuses are welcomed. Proposals may come from any academic discipline, pre- and post-doctoral students and faculty, and community organizers and media professionals. Deadline is *December 1, 1998*. Contact Michelle Austin, Program Coordinator, The Advanced Study Center, International Institute, University of Michigan, 1080 S. University, Ann Arbor, MI 48109; Tel. 734 764 2268; e-mail <asc.info@umich.edu>.

German-American Center for Visiting Scholars

1999 Fellowships: The German-American Center for Visiting Scholars invites applications from young German and American scientists and scholars, in particular humanists and social scientists, for periods of research in Washington, DC of up to six months. The Center has as its mission the intensified involvement of a younger generation of scientists in advanced research and networking, in the interest of developing the German-American partnership. The Center will provide complete workspaces with the data processing and data analysis infrastructure required for interdisciplinary, international work, and will assist the fellows in making the institutional and personal contacts necessary for their research in Washington. Fellows may be granted a rent subsidy if these expenses are not adequately met from other sources, but salaries and travel expenses are not covered. Application deadline is *October 30, 1998*. For further information including application format contact the German-American Center for Visiting Scholars, 1607 New Hampshire Ave. NW, 4th Flr., Washington, DC 20009, Tel. 202 483 9710; Fax 202 483 9717; e-mail <holtermann@gacvs.org>.

World Wide Web Sites

The following annotated list highlights Web sites of interest to EU scholars. Because of the impending change to the new currency in January 1999, this issue's selection features sites focusing on EMU or the euro. NB: All Web site addresses must be preceded by **http://** (omitted here for the sake of brevity).

<www.reuters.com/euro> features Reuters Euro Programme, which includes a useful glossary of terms, a thorough Timetable and History of EMU, and an excellent section, "Big Bang Weekend," about what is likely to happen over the weekend of January 1-4, 1999, when the *euro* is launched.

<www.euro-institut.org>, a French-language site, has a very well-done "*L'ABC de l'euro*." Currently presided over by Frans Andriessen, former vice president of the European Commission, *L'Institut de l'Euro* aims to analyze the legal, economic, technical and institutional aspects of the new currency, be a general resource on the new currency, and facilitate the exchange of views among experts and professionals.

<amue.if.net> represents the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe, an organization of European industrialists supporting monetary union and aiming to assist companies to make the changeover to the new currency. It also provides access to "Euro Files," a valuable electronic resource.

<www.ecu-activities.be> is the site (available in English or French) of a Belgian publication called *Euro/Ecu*; it offers substantive articles on-line on the new currency, as well as historical and current statistics (new articles and current-year statistics available to subscribers only).

<www.ecb.int>, site of the European Central Bank, is a must-visit for EU scholars following the move to a single currency. It provides the constitution, objectives, and tasks of the European System of Central Banks, links to the national banks, and a history of EMU, *inter alia*. For the curious there are illustrations of the new currency in all its demonimations. Click on "Changeover" to find dozens of links to "Web pages on preparations for the changeover to the single currency."

<www.europa.eu.int> "Europa" is the multilingual Web site of the European Union. The Council, the Commission, the Parliament and the Courts post their news here, along with a wealth of EU information from a basic primer to official publications, calendars, and news; this site is a very important resource on the EU for all scholars and practitioners.

For *euro* watchers, Europa offers much information including a new section on "Key Euro indicators on the Internet," e.g., national accounts statistics, monetary and financial indicators, external trade, balance of payments, prices, and more, given both for the EMU countries (see Euro-11) and the fifteen European Union members (see EU-15).

Publications

- Chrysochoou, Dimitris N. (1998) Democracy in the European Union. New York: Taurus Academic Studies.
- Davies, Ian and Andreas Sobisch (eds.) (1998) Developing European Citizens. UK: Sheffield Hallam Univ. Press.
- Dinan, Desmond (ed.) (1998) Encyclopedia of the European Union. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Estrin, Saul and Peter Holmes (eds.) (1998) Competition and Economic Integration in Europe. Gloucester, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- "Europe and the US: The Benefits of Transatlantic Economic Relations." (1998) The EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium Report.
- Ishiyama, John T. and Marijke Breuning (1998) Ethnopolitics in the "New Europe". Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Joly, Danièle et alia (1997) "Refugees in Europe: The Hostile New Agenda." London: Minority Rights Group Report.
- Kastoryano, Riva (ed.) (1998) Quelle Identité pour l'Europe? Le Multiculturalism à l'Epreuve. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
- Keating, Michael (1998) The New Regionalism in Western Europe. Gloucester, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Maitland, Donald and Yao-Su Hu (1998) Europe and Emerging Asia. London: Federal Trust Report.
- Mayhew, Alan (1998). Recreating Europe: The European Union's Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe. UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Moss, Bernard H. and Jonathan Michie (eds.) (1998) The Single European Currency in National Perspective? A Community in Crisis? UK: Macmillan Press.
- Nelson, Brent F. and Alexander Stubb (eds.) (1998) The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration (2nd ed). Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Pollack, Mark A. (1998) "Beyond Left and Right? Neo-Liberalism and Regulated Capitalism in the Treaty of Amsterdam." Madison, WI: International Institute, Working Paper Series on European Studies.
- Rhodes, Carolyn (ed.) (1998) The European Union in the World Community. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Weiler, J.H.H. (1998) "To Be a European Citizen—Eros and Civilization." Madison, WI: International Institute, Working Paper Series on European Studies.
- Xuereb, Peter G. (ed.) (1998) Malta, the European Union and the Mediterranean: Closer Relations in the Wider Context. EDRC Conference. Malta: European Documentation and Research Centre.

Euroscientia Forum

This new journal published by the European Commission (DG-XII) features in its debut issue (1: 1998) articles in French, English, German, Spanish which "promote reflection and debate on science and technology at the European level." Contact by e-mail either <anita.mallada@dg12.cec.be> or <guzzetti@datacomm.iue.it>

Miscellany

Robert Schuman Awards

Fordham Law School has inaugurated two annual prizes in honor of Robert Schuman, and recently awarded them for the first time. The \$500 prizes are awarded to graduating J.D. and LL.M. students who have respectively the highest average in three or more European Union area courses. The designation as "Robert Schuman Awards" is a tribute to one of the seminal further awareness of European Union institutions and law among lawyers and law students. Ann Stanley, J.D. 1998, and Ulrike Paukner, LL.M. 1998, were the prize winners. Ms.

Call for Nominations

Nominations for the 1999-2001 European Community Studies Association (ECSA) Executive Committee are now being accepted. The seven members of the Executive Committee determine Association policy and supervise ECSA programs. Nominations (including self-nominations) must contain a: (1) letter of interest; (2) current *curriculum vitae*; (3) brief biographical sketch not to exceed 100 words; and (4) short narrative describing any past/current service to the Association. Committee members may serve two consecutive two-year terms. All nominees must be members of ECSA.

The Nominating Committee will consider the following in creating a slate of candidates:

- 1 balance of senior and junior scholars;
- 2 representation of women and minority scholars;
- 3 representation of academic discipline;
- 4 representation of geographic location; and
- 5 service to ECSA.

All nomination materials should be sent to Dr. Valerie Staats, ECSA Administrative Director, 405 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. The deadline for receipt of materials is **December 30, 1998**. A slate of candidates will appear in the Winter 1999 *ECSA Review* and a ballot will be sent to current ECSA members in March 1999. Election results will be announced at ECSA's Sixth Biennial International Conference in Pittsburgh in June 1999.

Stanley is attending the College of Europe in Bruges this fall before returning to practice with a New York law firm. Ms. Paukner graduated from the University of Vienna law faculty and is currently taking the New York bar examination before returning to practice in Europe.

Atlantic Rim Institute

At the first International Congress in Boston in 1995, 200 professors, elected officials, government bureaucrats, business executives and NGO leaders from Europe, North America, South America and Africa established the Atlantic Rim Network. Recognizing the existing "Pacific Rim" organizational entities, they spoke enthusiastically of the need for a counterpart structure for developing networks, linkages, contacts and narrowly focused working groups and conferences focused on the nations surrounding the Atlantic. Since then, with support from both the private and public sectors on both sides of the Atlantic, successful initiatives have been developed in such areas as international tourism and economic development, regional maritime issues and increasing access to health care through telemedicine.

In 1998 The Atlantic Rim Institute was established for the purpose of developing the research and teaching dimensions of this concept. Among the projects under consideration are:

- Holding a conference on "the Atlantic Rim" at which scholars will explore the various dimensions (economic, security, cultural, political, etc.) of this concept, to result in publication of a book on "the Atlantic Rim;"
- Development of curricular materials, such as course modules and bibliographies of basic readings;
- Forming and proposing Atlantic Rim related panels for meetings of disciplinary or other associations.

If you would like to be informed on the ongoing development of the Atlantic Rim Institute, please contact ECSA member Peter Karl Kresl, Bucknell University, <kresl@bucknell.edu>, to be added to an e-mail list.

The Monnet Prize Student Essay Competition on Transatlantic Relations

The Washington Delegation of the European Commission is sponsoring a student essay competition devoted to key themes in transatlantic relations; entrants must be U.S. citizens enrolled at the undergraduate level in a college or university in the U.S. The author of the best essay will receive an award of \$1,000, with second and third place prizes of \$750 and \$500. Coverage of the competition will be included in *Europe* magazine. Selected essay entries may also be posted on the Delegation Web site.

The 1,000-word essay (four typed, double-spaced pages) must consider one of several specific topics on the European Union-United States transatlantic relationship. Complete guidelines and submission details are available on the Delegation Web site at <<http://www.eurunion.org/teaching/essay.htm>>. The deadline is *November 15, 1998*.

ECSA Review

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*Thank you for your support of ECSA and
EU scholarship across the disciplines.*



Inside the Fall 1998 *ECSA Review*:

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Founded in 1988, ECSA is a non-profit organization dedicated to the exchange of information and ideas on the European Union. Now celebrating ten years of EU scholarship across the disciplines.

Notes for ECSA members ...

- Mark your calendars now and plan to attend the ECSA's Sixth Biennial International Conference, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, June 3-5, 1999. Visit <www.pitt.edu/~ecsa101/conf99.htm> for full details.
- If you are moving, please let the ECSA Administrative Office know your new mailing address and contact coordinates, preferably six weeks in advance. We cannot be responsible for membership materials sent to an expired address if you have not let us know your new address.
- There are now 400 ECSA members (approximately 40 percent of current membership) subscribed to the ECSA e-mail List Server, a forum for succinct queries and announcements related to EU studies. To subscribe, send an e-mail to <ecsa+@pitt.edu> with this message: subscribe ecsa@list.pitt.edu.
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