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ECSA REVIEW

From the Chair

GARY MARKS

New Awards

I AM DELIGHTED TO announce that ECSA will be awarding some new prizes at ECSA's Sixth Biennial International Conference Luncheon on Friday, June 4th in Pittsburgh. EU Ambassador Hugo Paemen will also deliver the Conference Keynote Address at the Luncheon immediately following the awards presentations. It is only fitting that an association like ECSA recognize the outstanding achievements of its individual members, and the creation of these prizes takes a step in this direction. There are three prizes:

- A Lifetime Contribution Award for work in the field of European Union studies: The Executive Committee unanimously selects Professor Ernst B. Haas of the University of California at Berkeley as the first recipient of this award. Professor Haas' ideas and books have defined the field of European integration studies, and they remain a potent source of theory testing and elaboration today. The theory with which his name is indelibly associated—neofunctionalism—was not only the first comprehensive theory of European integration but has been by far the most influential.
- A Best Dissertation Prize: Marc Smyrl's dissertation, "European Policies, Regional Programs, Local Politics: Implementing European Community Regional Policy, 1985-1994" (Harvard University, Professor Peter A. Hall, Advisor) has been selected for this award.
- A Best 1997 ECSA Conference Paper Prize: "Who are the 'Masters of the Treaty'? European Governments and the European Court of Justice" by Karen Alter (Smith College) has been selected for this award.

Institutional Reform

This issue of the *Review* includes a ballot insert proposing some important constitutional reforms of ECSA. These reforms have been approved by a two-thirds majority of the Executive Committee and are now placed before the membership at large for your vote. The reforms are designed to do two things. First, they place limits on the tenure of members of the Executive Committee and on the Chair of ECSA. The aim is to open ECSA as much as possible to the participation of its diverse membership. In place of the current system which allows members of the Executive Committee to put their names down for consecutive elections (with no lifetime limit), the proposal before you disallows consecutive terms and places a limit of two terms (eight years total) for any

individual. Second, the reforms stagger elections and increase the length of a term from two years to four years in an effort to provide continuity of membership in the Executive Committee, so that we avoid seating an entirely new Committee with little or no institutional memory. I hope you will take the short time necessary to send in your vote.

Warm Thanks

My term as ECSA Chair comes to an end in June of this year. ECSA's growth reflects that of the European Union itself, and I have greatly enjoyed helping shape this vibrant Association. So much has happened in the past two years: our membership has continued to increase and participation in our e-mail List Server has tripled; the Biennial Conference has gone from strength to strength; ECSA has begun to coordinate the new Network of European Union Centers; we have developed a Network Web site and revamped the ECSA Web site. We have opened up the Association to interest sections, increased the *ECSA Review* from triannual to quarterly publication, and most recently, established our own ECSA Grants and Scholarships Fund. Many, many people have played a creative role in these activities and it is only fitting that I thank them in my final letter from the chair. First and foremost, thanks to ECSA's 1997-1999 Executive Committee which has played a pro-active role in just about every aspect of the reforms of the past couple of years. With e-mail, the possibilities for democratic decision making are enormously enhanced, and the experience of the past two years has opened my eyes to the extent to which e-mail makes it possible to share decision making within a Committee such as this. Vivien Schmidt chairs our Network of European Union Centers subcommittee; Maria Green Cowles is relaunching, with Oxford University Press, our State of the European Union book series; Kathleen McNamara will lead our 1999 US-EU Relations Project to its successful completion this year. Special thanks to Paulette Kurzer, chair of our 1999 Conference Program Committee, who steps down after this issue as book review editor of the *Review*; and welcome to Jeanie Bukowski of Bradley University who will shortly take up this position. I cannot conclude without stressing my debt to Valerie Staats, ECSA's executive director. The combined efforts of these people have made the past two years deeply satisfying to me, and I am convinced, a period of creative development for ECSA.

—GARY MARKS, *University of North Carolina Chapel Hill*

Coordinator of the Network of European Union Centers

ECSA Review Forum

Four ECSA members reflect on institutionalism in European integration studies. Bibliographic references are given on p.9.

Approaches to the Study of European Politics

Vivien A. Schmidt

THIS *EC SA REVIEW FORUM* was inspired by Robert Bates' polemic on area studies, and in particular his argument that area studies is largely irrelevant where it does not aspire to "science," by which he means rational choice institutionalism (Bates 1997). The object of the Forum is not so much to respond directly to Bates' arguments as to consider the question of which approach or approaches are most appropriate to the study of European politics.

In this forum, we have three very different pieces. The first, by George Tsebelis, argues that institutional analysis in the rational choice tradition can provide insights for the explanation of European integration that go beyond intergovernmentalist or neofunctionalist theories. The second, by Thomas Risse, maintains that in explaining the European Union, rather than following rational choice institutionalism, whether methodologically "hard" or "soft," one should consider the use not just of historical institutionalism, the other mainstream methodology, but also of sociological institutionalism. The third, by Fritz W. Scharpf, takes a position somewhere between the other two pieces, by pointing to the dangers of overgeneralization from empirical cases in the pursuit of theories of the rational choice variety and, by implication, by leaving an opening for both historical and sociological institutionalism where rational choice institutionalism does not or can not sufficiently explain.

This introductory essay, rather than coming down on one or another side of the methodological discussion, seeks to put the debate in perspective, by considering the epistemological differences in the three kinds of "institutionalisms" evoked in the Forum pieces. These differences involve such things as the underlying assumptions about the appropriate objects of explanation, the goals of explanation, the kinds of theories or generalizations necessary to explanation, the kinds of "facts" to explain, and the standards of evaluation for explanation. The overall goal of this essay is to argue for tolerance for all three varieties of institutionalism, used where appropriate, much in keeping with the plea by Ian Lustig in the rejoinder to the Bates piece in *PS* (1997).

There is no room here to go into a detailed discussion of the three institutionalisms or of the controversy (for this, see Hall and Taylor 1994; Pierson 1996; and Thelen 1998). All that is possible in this short space is to point to the differences among approaches in an effort to show that these are indeed very different enterprises, each of which provides different insights into political reality.

Broadly speaking, the three approaches have very different objects and goals of explanation: Rational choice institutionalism focuses on intentional, interest-motivated action and seeks to make universal generalizations or predictions about what rational actors will do within a given set of institutions, seen as structures of incentives. Historical institutionalism concentrates instead on the origins and development of the institutions themselves, seen as institutional structures and processes, which are explained by the (often unintended) outcomes of purposeful choices and historically unique initial conditions. Sociological institutionalism concerns itself with culturally framed actions, ideas, and identities that follow from culturally-specific rules and norms. These may or may not be "rational" in the stricter rational choice sense or predictable by way of universal generalizations, although they may be "expectable" within a given cultural context. The three approaches also have very different standards of evaluation, with the sociological approach referring to the "logic of appropriateness," the historical approach following the "logic of path-dependence," and the rationalist approach invoking the "logic of interest."

Naturally, there is overlap among the three approaches, given that interest is generally given expression through culture and can be traced throughout history, that history shapes interest and culture, and that culture gives both history and interest meaning. It stands to reason (whether understood in rationalist, historical, or sociological terms), therefore, that practitioners of any one of the methodologies would claim to account for the objects of explanation of the others, whether because interest can be seen as "nested" or "embedded" in historically evolving institutions or culturally derived norms, because history can be described as the product of the interest-motivated and norm-driven actions of individuals, or because culture can be interpreted as the expression of individuals' cumulative interests or seen as embodied in the community's evolving institutional structures and processes. But whatever the subsumability of one institutionalism by another, the three nevertheless remain methodologically distinct enterprises, each with a different set of insights into political reality, each with different limitations.

Rational choice institutionalism works best at identifying the interests and motivations behind rational actors' behavior within given institutional settings. The deductive nature of its approach to explanation means that it not only is tremendously helpful at capturing the range of reasons actors would normally have for any given action within a given institutional incentive structure and at predicting likely outcomes, but also at bringing out anomalies or actions that are unexpected given the general theory (Scharpf 1997). However, for the most part it cannot explain these anomalies if they depart radically from interest-motivated action (and therefore might better be explained in sociological or historical institutional terms). Moreover, because of its very deductiveness, along with a theoretical generality that often starts from universal claims about rationality, rational choice institutionalism has difficulty explaining any one individual's reason for action within a

given context or any particular set of real political events (see the critique by Green and Shapiro 1994)—although one could argue that the recent attempt to ‘contextualize’ analyses through ‘analytic narratives’ represents a corrective to this problem (Bates *et. al.*, 1998; Levi, n/a). Generally, however, individuals qua individuals are not present here. Explanation is also static, focused on equilibrium conditions, and therefore has difficulty accounting for change over time. Finally, rational choice institutionalism’s emphasis on the self-interested nature of human motivation, especially where it is assumed to be economic self-interest, is value-laden, and can appear economically deterministic.

Historical institutionalism, by contrast, works best at delineating the origins and development of institutional structures and processes over time. It tends to emphasize sequences in development, timing of events, and phases of political change. Interests, moreover, rather than being universally defined, are contextual (Zysman 1994; Thelen 1998). Historical institutionalism tends to be less universalistic in its generalizations and more “mid-range” in its theory-building by focusing on changes in a limited number of countries unified in space and/or time or on a specific kind of phenomenon that occurs in or affects a range of countries at one time or across time (Thelen 1998). But although more particular in its generalizations, the “new” historical institutionalism rarely stays at the level of the “mere story-telling” of which it is sometimes accused by rational choice institutionalists. Noticeably absent is the focus on “great men” or “great moments” characteristic of more traditional historical approaches to political history. In fact, the macro-historical approach prevalent in most accounts tends to emphasize structures and processes much more than the events out of which they are constructed, let alone the individuals whose actions and interests spurred those events. Here, too, then, there are no individual actors as such. But rationality in the strict rational choice sense is present only insofar as the institutions are the intended consequences of actors’ choices, which is often not the case, given the unintended consequences of intentional action and the unpredictability of intervening events. Thus, the “micro-foundational logic,” as rationalists put it, is generally missing from this macro-historical work. Rather than appearing economically deterministic, it can appear historically deterministic or even mechanistic, where it focuses exclusively on continuities and path-dependency. The ‘critical junctures’ literature is a corrective to this problem, since it looks at the ‘configurative’ moments; but in these moments it too looks to groups or classes of actors and developing processes rather than any one set of individual actors or events.

Sociological institutionalism, finally, works best at delineating the shared understandings and norms that frame action, shape identities, influence interests, and affect what are perceived as problems and what are conceived as solutions. Rather than being too general, it is sometimes accused of being too specific, and the ‘cultural knowledge’ it provides is

useful mainly as preliminary to rational choice universalization. But when the objects of sociological institutionalism are subsumed under rational choice explanation, often the very essence of sociological institutionalism, the norms, rules, and reasons which are culturally unique or anomalous because they do not fit generally expected interest-motivations, get lost. Because sociological institutional explanations are arrived at inductively rather than deductively, they can lend insight into individuals’ reasons for action in ways that rational choice institutionalism cannot, whether or not they depart from the norm. Moreover, because of their ability to account contextually for individuals’s reasons for action, they are better able to explain the events out of which historical institutional explanations are constructed. However, because sociological institutionalism makes no universalistic claims about rationality and is generally focused on explanation within rather than across cultures, it risks an implicit relativism which leads some to question whether sociological institutionalism allows for any cross-national generalizations at all. In fact, generalizations are possible here too, by invoking similarities as well as differences in cultural norms and identities, much in the way of historical institutionalism with country-specific institutional structures and processes. The resulting explanation, however, involves a lower level of generality and less parsimonious, “thicker description” than in historical institutionalism, let alone rational choice institutionalism. Finally, rather than appearing either economically or historically deterministic, sociological institutionalism can appear culturally deterministic where it emphasizes the cultural routines and rituals to the exclusion of individual action which breaks out of the cultural norm, i.e., rule-creating action as opposed to rule-following action. Moreover, like the rational choice approach, it too can be too static or equilibrium-focused, and unable to account for change over time—although where it takes an historical perspective, it can also show how norms are institutionalized (see Katzenstein 1996).

Each of the three institutionalisms, thus, offers a different perspective on political reality, each with different objects, goals, and standards of explanation, each with different advantages and disadvantages. So which institutionalism is most appropriate to the study of Europe? In the three selections that follow, we find different responses to this question. This essay suggests, however, that because each offers different insights into reality, Europeanists should use whichever of the three institutionalisms (among other methods) is appropriate to elucidating the problem at hand. And to gain a full sense of reality, they could try to combine all three. A discussion of how to accomplish this, though, must be left for another time.

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George Tsebelis

IT IS QUITE FREQUENT FOR empirical analyses to start by describing two theoretical approaches to the study of the European Union, intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, and then to proceed by stating that none of them can capture the reality of the phenomenon studied (see Cameron 1992 and Lange 1992 as examples). I want to discuss a third theoretical approach, institutional analysis, and suggest that if the other two do not describe well what we see before us, we may want to turn to institutional analysis to understand micro and macro phenomena of integration. In this note I will present the logic of institutional analysis, explain its differences from other approaches, and present some important phenomena in the history of the EU that can readily be understood on the basis of such an approach.

First, at the risk of oversimplifying a little, let me outline the important differences between the three approaches. For intergovernmentalists, governments are the ultimate decision-makers in the EU, they define the process of integration and set its limits; as a consequence, their study of the EU focuses on the defining moments of integration, the signature of treaties (Moravcsik 1998). For neofunctionalists, governments are not the sole important actors in the EU. The focus shifts to the process "whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new and larger center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states." The quote comes from Haas (1961: 366) and if the reader thinks it is too wide and imprecise, she will not find any objection here. Several attempts have been made to apply neofunctionalist principles as well as elaborate on them (Burley and Mattli 1993, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997).

For institutional approaches, the main focus is on the institutional structure of the EU. Why do institutions take such a preeminent role as opposed to say ideas, identities, processes, national interests, spillover effects, or other concepts that could or have been the starting point of the analysis? Let us start from the simplest possible understanding of human interaction. In such an understanding, there are three necessary concepts: the *players* (individual or collective) involved in the interaction, their *strategies* (which jointly determine the outcome), and the *payoffs* that they receive at the end of their interaction. In fact, in game theory these three concepts are sufficient for the description of any game.

If we look closer at the concept of "strategies" we will see that it depends on the sequence of moves that define the game, on the set of choices and information that each player has at the moment that she is called upon to move. These parameters are determined by the institutional structure of the situation. Formal institutions specify that legislation starts with the introduction of a draft of a directive or a regulation by the Commission to the Parliament, and ends by the approval by the Council. Formal institutions specify what is permitted and what is not: for example, the treaties specify that

environmental issues are today (but not in the 1960s) within the jurisdiction of the EU. Formal institutions also specify what the set of choices is for each of the actors: for example, if the EP wants to move a paragraph from one point of a bill to another, it has to introduce two amendments, one deleting the original text, and a second reintroducing it in the new position.

Since institutions determine the choices of actors, the sequence of moves, as well as the information they control, different institutional structures will produce different strategies of the actors, and different outcomes of their interactions. Consequently, one can study institutions in order to see how they are systematically associated with specific outcomes. The study can be theoretical, (on the basis of a formal or informal model) or empirical (association of observed frequencies or patterns of interaction among different actors). Studies like Cederman and Schneider (1994), Crombez (1996, 1997), Garrett (1992, 1995), Garrett and Tsebelis (1996), Moser (1996), Streunenberg (1994), Steunenberg *et al.* (1996), and Tsebelis (1994) fall in the first category; studies like Kreppel and Tsebelis (forthcoming) and Tsebelis and Kalandrakis (forthcoming) in the second.

Studying EU institutions in order to understand the results they produce is very similar to what other branches of comparative politics do. For example, studying the effect of the electoral system on the party system of a country (Duverger's law) or of the influence of committees on legislative outcomes is part of the same conceptual approach, institutional analysis. Once the importance of institutions as a starting point is established, there are two different ways that one can proceed in their study: use them either as independent variables (study their effects) or as dependent variables (study their origins). The first approach, of using institutions in order to explain patterns of outcomes is logically prior to, and easier than explaining why certain institutions were adopted. So, I will start with institutions as independent variables.

The *modus operandi* of the study of the effects of institutions in rational choice theory is equilibrium analysis: actors are assumed to be rational, and trying to maximize the achievement of their goals (or their payoffs), subject to institutional constraints, and to what other actors are doing. If all actors are maximizing, the outcome is the best that each one of them can do, given the choice of the others, which is the essence of equilibrium analysis: no actor can unilaterally improve his situation (because, since he is rational he has selected the best choice given the choices of others). How can we place these theoretical ideas in the analysis of the EU?

There are a series of institutions that have played an important role in the evolution of the EU. Let us take the European Court of Justice, for example. The ECJ established with a series of decisions the supremacy of European law over national law, the direct effect of European legislation, the principle of mutual recognition, which established the common market in practice. All these decisions were made in the late sixties and in the seventies. However, one would be hard pressed to find decisions of equal importance in the late 1980s or in the 1990s. Why?

There is a very simple explanation in institutional terms: the Luxembourg Compromise had forced unanimity in European decisionmaking before the Single European Act. At that time (1987) new institutions were introduced. These institutions prescribed two things: first, that decisions in the Council would be made by qualified majority, second that the proposals would originate with pro-European actors (the Commission and the Parliament). These new rules made it possible for European institutions to make decisions on important issues like the establishment of the single market, through the introduction of hundreds of directives and regulations.

Let us now focus on the "democratic deficit." While different analysts mean different things by the term, one common concern is the role that the EP plays in decision-making in the EU. What is this role? Again, institutional analysis can identify a series of parameters that increased the role of the EP over time. The first would be the *isoglucose* case in which the ECJ ruled that the Council would have to wait before making a decision until the EP gave its consultative opinion. The Court used the fact that the EP was directly elected as the foundation of its reasoning. What difference does it make in the influence of the EP if it is directly elected, or if the Council has to wait for its consultative opinion? A series of bargaining models have demonstrated the importance of delaying in shifting outcomes towards the ideal point of the actor that can introduce these delays (Tsebelis and Money 1997). As a consequence, the *isoglucose* procedure marks a significant shift in the role of the EP, despite the fact that the consultation procedure was not officially modified. But there are more significant changes: the Single European Act endowed the EP with the power of a conditional agenda setter (Tsebelis 1994), Maastricht introduced codecision I which gave the parliament veto power (while taking away conditional agenda setting) (Tsebelis 1997), and Amsterdam turned the EP into a co-equal legislator with the Council through codecision II. These institutional changes have as a result the overall increase of the power of the EP.¹

How about the role of the Commission? While the Commission introduces legislation in all legislative procedures, the reason that it has been very powerful is that in the conciliation and cooperation procedures the Council decides on a Commission proposal and can accept it by qualified majority and modify it by unanimity. This asymmetry between accepting and modifying the Commission proposal was the source of Commission power (see Tsebelis and Kreppel 1998). However, in the codecision procedure (both versions I and II), the Council and the Parliament can agree between them in the last rounds of the procedure and overrule Commission objections. This modification has the result of reducing the importance of the Commission in legislation (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996).

1. The jury is still out in terms of the comparison between conditional agenda setting and unconditional veto; see Tsebelis and Garrett (1997), Garrett and Tsebelis (1997), and Scully (1997).

So, changes in institutional structures had as results shifts of power among the different actors, as well as shifts in the visibility of these actors. These questions that arise naturally inside an institutional analysis framework are existent neither in intergovernmentalism nor in neofunctionalism.

Understanding how institutions operate is the first step to performing a successful institutional change. The EU has undergone institutional changes very frequently (three significant changes the last twelve years). These changes were performed with specific targets in mind, and presumably previous performance was measured against the targets before the next change was undertaken. For example, the role of the Commission and the role of the Parliament were part of the institutional debates, and each constitutional revision of the EU had as target the increase of the power of the Parliament and the decrease of the power of the Commission. There are two different ways of studying institutional change: one is the replication of the principles of the analysis above (rational choice institutionalism) and the other is historical institutionalism. Space constraints will restrict me to what I consider the major difference between the two. Interested readers can read Tsebelis (1990) and Pierson's analysis (1996) to have a more extensive and precise understanding of the differences.

In my view the fundamental difference between rational choice and historical institutionalism is that rational choice performs equilibrium analysis, while historical institutionalism does not. In equilibrium analysis the designers of the new institutions try to study or guess as best they can the properties of the existing institutional structures as well as the plausible alternatives, and select the one that is in their interest. This is the reason why the study of institutions as independent variables is logically prior to the study of institutional change. The fact that different actors try to do their best and the selected institution is the one that commanded the required majority (simple, qualified or unanimous), does not mean that all the consequences of different structures were anticipated. In a study on the adoption of the conditional agenda setting, Tsebelis and Kreppel (1997) find little evidence that most participants knew what they were getting into (although Hallstein, Spaak, and de Gaulle had an accurate understanding).

To conclude, institutional analysis disagrees with intergovernmentalism in its fundamental belief that national actors (governments) alone determine the development of the EU. In terms of the importance of unintended consequences (another major difference between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism), institutional analysis (of rational choice variety) claims that unintended consequences will exist only under conditions of incomplete information. If information is complete, governments will take the results of institutional analyses as input in their bargaining over institutions. In this respect, under conditions of complete information (or some reasonable approximation) institutional analysis has to be used as the basis of intergovernmentalism. Under conditions of incomplete information, institutional analyses will lead to unintended consequences and will look similar to

neofunctionalist analyses, with one significant difference: the rules of what constitutes a rational choice explanation are explicitly stated, and therefore explanations can be easily tested against data, while neofunctionalist arguments are so vague they are almost impossible to falsify.

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Thomas Risse

FOR THE LAST TEN years or so, wars have raged in many U.S. political science departments leading to hostile takeovers and the disappearance of entire subfields of political science. A particular breed of scholars has turned a legitimate meta-theoretical approach to the study of social phenomena into an ideology. Some try to establish rational choice "to occupy a central position within the discipline" and to provide a general framework "which transforms ethnography and narratives into theory-driven claims, amenable to refutation" (Bates 1997: 168-169). The implicit claim is, of course, that only rational choice theory provides the tools by which "area studies narratives" can be transformed in generalizable propositions and in legitimate social science.

Fortunately, such attempts to achieve intellectual and disciplinary hegemony have not yet reached the study of the European Union (EU). Fortunately, scholars of the EU are still busy with empirical and theoretical debates about liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, multi-level governance, and the like (for an excellent review see Hix 1998). They remain far less inclined to engage in meta-theoretical controversies about the relative merits of rational choice versus other theories of social action. The controversy between rational choice and constructivism which has dominated the field of international relations during the last ten years (Checkel 1998; Adler 1997; Price and Reus-Smit 1998) has not yet pre-occupied EU studies (but see Jorgensen 1997).

The dominant "puzzle-" rather than "theory-driven" approach to Europeanization¹ has its merits, but that there are also some dangers. The advantages are quite clear. Problem-driven research tends to keep the feet of scholars on the ground. It prevents them from engaging in fruitless meta-theoretical controversies, unless these debates can be engaged to furthering our understanding of real-world puzzles. Moreover, research starting from empirical puzzles can be fruitfully used to evaluate the relative merits of competing propositions stemming from various theoretical approaches. Thus, good problem-driven research should actually lead to theory-testing.

The risk of "puzzle driven" approaches to the study of Europeanization is to replicate the caricature of "area studies versus general social science (read: rational choice)" that seems to pre-occupy so many political science departments in the U.S. I do not deal here with single case studies or the "n of 1" problem in EU studies which has been successfully laid to

rest in the first *ECISA Review Forum* (X: 3, Fall 1997). Europeanization is a unique social process, but it can certainly be compared to other social processes. The inherent danger of "problem driven" research on the EU even if it employs the comparative case study method, is buying into metatheoretical commitments without being aware of them. This begins with the question of what counts as an empirical "puzzle"? Such puzzles do not fall from heaven, but usually emerge when an empirical case proves to be surprising in light of existing explanations. In other words, previous theoretical commitments define what is being regarded as an interesting empirical question to be researched. Moreover, our meta-theoretical commitments largely determine the range of potential answers to our empirical questions including the research strategy.

It is not surprising, therefore, that most scholars involved in Europeanization studies share a meta-theoretical approach which one could label "soft rational choice" based on the assumption of utility-maximizing actors whose interests are generally taken for granted.² The prevailing controversies in EU studies between liberal intergovernmentalists, on the one hand, and those using network analysis and multi-level governance approaches, on the other hand, share the same rationalist meta-assumptions. Historical institutionalism has only recently entered Europeanization research (Pierson 1996; Bulmer 1998; Pollack 1996). This is surprising, since the European Union is certainly an institution *sui generis*. How can we theorize about an institution such as the EU without exploring further what is an essential element of any institution, namely the intersubjective quality of its norms as collectively shared standards of appropriate behavior (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986)? Sociological institutionalism focussing on rule-guided behavior and the logic of appropriateness as a mode of social rationality which differs substantially from the instrumental rationality of rational choice has not yet generated much empirical research in EU studies (but see Wind 1998; Kohler-Koch 1997). The same holds true for argumentative rationality, i.e., the role of arguing and deliberation whereby actors' interests and their definition of the situation are subject to challenges and counter-challenges (but see Joerges and Neyer 1997). Interestingly enough, monetary integration, on the one hand, and citizenship issues, on the other, are about the only areas of Europeanization where substantial theory-guided empirical research beyond rational choice has been conducted (McNamara 1998; Verdun forthcoming; Marcussen 1998; Risse *et al.* 1998; Checkel 1997; Wiener 1997).

Why is it that sociological institutionalism or social constructivism have not yet generated much empirical research in Europeanization studies? They certainly pose interesting questions which are worthwhile to research: How

1. I prefer the term "Europeanization" to "EU studies," since the European structure of governance entails far more than just processes and events at the EU level in Brussels.

2. As opposed to "hard" rational choice using explicit game-theoretical analysis.

do European law and European regulations achieve their taken for granted nature in the domestic settings? Which socialization effects emerge from the fact that more and more domestic political and bureaucratic actors are continuously involved in European policy-making and implementation? How do member state institutions change in response to the adaptational pressures emanating from European rules and regulations? Can we explain European policy-making "by subterfuge" (Héritier 1997) and informal networking without taking the logic of arguing into account? How does the ongoing process of Europeanization affect collective systems of meanings and understandings including national identities?

I propose two answers why these questions have rarely been tackled so far in Europeanization studies. First, as argued above, the prior meta-theoretical commitment of most puzzle-driven scholars is the assumption that actors pursue instrumentally defined interests and try to maximize given utilities. Second, most of Europeanization research has so far implicitly taken a "bottom up" approach to the problem. I.e., most scholars have focused on how to explain European integration as such. No wonder that strategic bargaining played such a prominent role! The more Europeanization research shifts the perspective and tries to understand the effects of European integration on what we used to call the domestic level, the more it is likely that scholars will be more open-minded toward sociological institutionalism which offers theoretical insights in processes of institutional adaptation. In addition, the more Europe "hits home" and becomes the subject of normal public debates and controversies, the more it is likely that research on meaning constructions and public discourse will increase. In sum, there is hope for social constructivism in Europeanization studies!

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Fritz W. Scharpf

MUCH OF THE POLICY-oriented research conducted within the ECSCA community is of the case-study variety, producing detailed historical accounts of policy processes and outcomes in one or a few historical cases, with explanations emphasizing the importance of situational and institutional conditions and/or of the perceptions, preferences and strategies of the (individual and corporate) actors involved. But since contemporary social science is thought to demand more than accurate descriptions, plausible narratives, and perceptive interpretations, most authors of case studies feel the urge to use their findings as a basis for either formulating or testing theoretical propositions of supposedly universal application. As a consequence, most of these studies begin with a discussion of competing general "approaches" (current favorites are the three institutionalisms, rational choice, historical and sociological), and they then move on to competing "theories" of European integration (with "liberal intergovernmentalism" and "neofunctionalism" alias

"supranationalism" presently competing against each other as well as against "multi-level" and "network" representations of European policy processes and their variants). If the study is well done, it will then typically come to the conclusion that none of the competing approaches is entirely adequate for framing the research design, and that none of the competing theories will fully account for the empirical findings (S. Schmidt 1997). If the author is ambitious, she will then try to improve on the state of the art by formulating new generalizations that perfectly fit her own case and others that she happens to be thinking of. But of course this new "theory" will inevitably be rejected as well by the author of the next empirical study that is focusing on another set of cases.

What explains this endless cycle of generalizations and falsifications that does not seem to advance the field at all? It is, I suggest, a basic misunderstanding of the role of theory in empirical social science research of the case study variety—which is always plagued by the discrepancy between the number of the variables that play a role in the cases studied and the limited number of cases that can be studied by the case method.

Take the example of the Common Agricultural Policy which I had used to illustrate my (rational-choice institutionalist and intergovernmentalist) analysis of the "joint decision trap" (Scharpf 1988). Comparing CAP policy outcomes to similar ones in German federalism, I had concluded that a multi-level governing structure in which decisions at the center depended on the (near unanimous) agreement of sub-central governments (i.e., a governing structure with many veto positions in the sense defined by Tsebelis 1995) would produce policy immobilism. I still think that conclusion was a good one, for the purposes and the range of constellations that I had in mind. In the meantime, however, a number of contributions in the literature have shown that in a variety of policy areas the "joint decision trap" did not prevent significant progress not only in substantive European policy but also with regard to the decision rules themselves (Pierson 1996; Pollack 1994). In other words, my original argument was overgeneralized in the sense that its formulation, though true in its proper domain, seemed to cover constellations where it would not hold. What I might have said instead is that EC decision rules, like those of German federalism, made policy changes more difficult by giving member governments defending the status quo an asymmetrical advantage, and that under the specific (but unspecified) situational conditions prevailing in CAP and in the other policy areas which I had discussed, this advantage could not be overcome by the proponents of change.

The tendency to overgeneralize is so pervasive because generalizations must focus narrowly on a limited set of variables, and because no author of a case study is able to provide a comprehensive list of those unspecified background conditions whose presence is also necessary to produce the specified outcome. By the same token, however, any general theory will be too "narrow" (i.e. focus on too few variables) to account for a concrete individual case. That explains why the

use of individual cases as “test” of general theories is likely to produce mostly “falsifications.”

For an example, take Tsebelis’ contribution to the present issue. I doubt that he truly meant to say that institutions do “determine the choices of actors.” Institutions create opportunity structures and constraints. But what happens within these constraints is very much influenced, first by the characteristics of the *external situation* in which the actors are interacting with each other, second by the characteristics of the actors (their capabilities and cognitive and normative orientations) and, most importantly, by the problem- and policy-specific constellations of actor preferences and options—all of which need to be explicitly conceptualized in any framework that is able to account simultaneously for the influence of institutions and for the fact that situations differ and that actors are purposeful and resourceful agents, rather than rule-following automata (Scharpf 1997).

Different external situations will activate specific actor interests that would otherwise remain dormant, and may thus create situation-specific alliances and conflict lines. Similarly, in some policy areas—e.g., in product-oriented technical standardization—the economic interests of member states will favor uniform European rules, whereas in other areas—e.g., the harmonization of national tax or social-security systems—interest constellations are much less conducive to agreement (Scharpf 1999, Chp.3). Moreover, specific political or ideological preferences of a national government (think of Thatcher on social policy) may make a difference, and ultimately the outcome will also be affected by the strategic and tactical skills of different actors, and their ability to design acceptable compromise solutions and package deals.

In other words, the outcomes of specific European decision processes are not only affected by the institutional rules on which Tsebelis focuses but also by a variety of contingent (and interacting) factors which in combination define the “game” that is being played. Hence, even if we restrict attention to factors that are clearly relevant in rational-choice analyses—thus leaving aside the further contingencies introduced by Thomas Risse’s “constructivist” claims—any individual case that is interesting enough to merit being studied in depth will be characterized by a complex and nearly unique constellation that defies the propositions of any theoretical generalization.

But how could we escape this vicious cycle where empirical studies tend to produce overgeneralized hypotheses, only to see them falsely falsified by the next study, which will proudly present its own overgeneralized propositions, and so on? One solution might be to turn the vice of “selection bias” into a methodological virtue: if test cases are carefully selected so as to hold the unspecified antecedent conditions of a generalized proposition as constant as possible, the risks of false falsification can be minimized. An example is Andrew Moravcsik’s decision to test his fairly general “liberal-intergovernmentalism” hypothesis (Moravcsik 1993) in a study that focuses exclusively on the “great” decisions shaping and changing the constitution of the European

Community through (of course) intergovernmental negotiations (Moravcsik 1998). Of course, if the author of the hypothesis is not also in control of case selection, confirmation depends on a sympathetic reconstruction of unspecified antecedent conditions which may overtax the normal supply of human kindness in competitive academic environments. But that is not the only price. In effect, Moravcsik seems to be squandering the wealth of information produced by his supremely well researched case studies on the effort to prove the narrow proposition that, by and large, national governments are in control of intergovernmental negotiations over treaty revisions.

A more standard solution in the literature treats narrow hypotheses as being merely “probabilistic” laws which, by definition, could not explain or predict a single case and hence could also not be tested in single-case studies. The appropriate procedures are statistical tests on large data sets in which the causal influence of idiosyncratic factors in the individual case would be neutralized by the large-numbers effect. Much of the current work in comparative politics and comparative political economy is of this type (Garrett 1998; Iversen 1999; M. Schmidt 1997). Its limitation arises, first, from the large-numbers condition itself which restricts the amount of information that can be obtained (or, if obtained, processed) for each individual case and, second, in the distortions introduced when theoretically defined variables must be represented by only those empirical indicators for which quantitative measures or plausible proxies can be obtained. But even if these hurdles are overcome, the question is how much the confirmation of a probabilistic law will add to our ability to explain (let alone, predict) the outcome of individual cases? It is of course important to know that Tsebelis’ analytically derived veto-points hypothesis held up in a multivariate statistical study that explains 57 percent of the variance in the adoption of important laws (Tsebelis 1998). But how much does that help us in explaining an individual case when we also know that, within exactly the same constitution with the same number of veto points, the Dutch political system was totally blocked in the 1970s but capable of major policy reforms in the 1980s and 1990s (Visser and Hemerijck 1997)?

This is not a plea against the search for general laws in the social sciences. But it is a plea for separating the activities of theory development and theory testing from research aiming at the explanation of concrete cases. Theory development, while profiting from familiarity with historical and contemporary real-world conditions, is best performed under the discipline of logical analysis and formal modeling—which provide some protection against the temptations of sloppy thinking and ad-hoc interpretations by requiring the explicit and precise specification of assumptions, causal mechanisms, and rules of interaction. Theory testing, to the extent that it is possible at all, is best done under conditions that allow the application of either experimental or statistical controls. Empirical case studies, at any rate, are not the best environment for either activity.

But if general theories do not explain concrete cases, what is their use in empirical research? Here, the normal understanding of "probabilistic theory" is misleading. If it represents a causal mechanism, it makes no sense to think that this mechanism is present 35% of the time, and absent in the remaining 65% of cases. If the causal relationship exists at all, we must assume that it is always present. Thus it makes more sense to consider empirically confirmed causal mechanisms as partial theories that define what we should expect in a specific case. If the predicted effect is not manifest, this suggests that it is being counteracted by another mechanism, presumably specified in another partial theory, which we should then try to identify in our attempt to explain the complex real-world constellations of our case studies. Thus, by separating the activity of theory formulation and testing from the activity of explaining real-world cases, and by accepting the fact that any theory will at best explain a partial aspect of such cases, we might finally get both better explanations and more cumulative theory development.

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
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
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
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
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
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Book Reviews

Jan Zielonka. Explaining Euro-Paralysis: Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998, 266 pp.

Adam Bronstone. European Union-United States Security Relations: Transatlantic Tensions and the Theory of International Relations. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997, 282 pp.

IN THEIR BOOKS, Explaining Euro-Paralysis and European Union-United States Security Relations, Jan Zielonka, a senior scholar at the European Institute in Florence, and Adam Bronstone, a new scholar, respectively, have attempted to find a theory or group of theories that purports to explain EU behavior on the world stage. Zielonka's book is inwardly focused on the EU and how it makes decisions while Bronstone's is outwardly focused on the policy it produces. They both agree that realism's use as a tool of analysis is limited, but that is all they agree upon.

Zielonka's book focuses on the question: "Why does the Union fail to live up to the letter and spirit of the Treaty [on European Union] and its broad political expectations?" (p.1). To answer this question, Zielonka examines five different theories, or schools of thought, as he prefers to call them (p.16): power politics; divergent traditions and conflicting interests; the confusing post-Cold War world; the crisis of modern democracy and the loss of public support and legitimacy; and weak institutions. These schools of thought provide the structure of the book. In each section, he runs down how the particular theoretical perspective explains the EU's difficulty in speaking with one voice. Zielonka is not worried about either combining theories or whether the assumptions on which the theories are based are contradictory. He writes, "I believe that analyses integrating external and internal factors offer a better understanding of foreign and security policy than approaches relying exclusively on one aspect" (p.17). Interestingly, for all the schools of thought he uses, he finds neo-functionalism of little value arguing that there has been a "relative weakness of the spill-over effect in our area of concern" (p.182).

Zielonka concludes that, although all the different perspectives are useful, the explanations focusing on the lack of identity and public legitimacy are the most convincing. To solve its problems, the EU should eliminate the CFSP's defense aspects under discussion, retain the status of a "civilian power", and, since identity and democracy are at the root of the EU's problems, address the question of borders. According to him, "The answer is: adopt a clear policy of differentiation in the process of enlargement and elaborate a sound cooperative framework with the countries that are initially left out. Some kind of enlargement cannot and should not be avoided, but it must not further undermine the Union's

cultural identity and democratic credentials" (p.232).

Zielonka's book is well researched, and in each section, he examines a large number of points. However, with so many different schools of thought being discussed and with each section having such a wide breadth, the reader loses track of which are the most important elements of his analysis. At the end of the book, he concludes that identity and democracy are the keys to understanding, but considering that he gives equal time to all the theories and spends less than two-fifths of the book on these issues, the reader is not persuaded. In addition, his prescriptions such as introducing majority voting in the CFSP (stressing unity and a surrendering of sovereignty) while allowing member states to opt-out of certain sectors of the CFSP (encouraging separate action and the holding-on to sovereignty) seem contradictory.

Bronstone's book is a revised version of his doctoral thesis, and is expertly documented. The book's structure, literature review, and attention to detail are impressive. The crux of his argument is that realism, the dominant underpinning of most analyses of EU-US security relations is inherently flawed, and that the neo-Gramscian position of Robert Cox provides a more comprehensive explanation of EC behavior on the world stage. Using three case studies, the Arab-Israeli situation in the mid-1970s, the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981, and the plight of Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq in 1991, he compares and contrasts US and EC reactions to these situations. In each of these case studies, he asks the same questions: "Can a coherent EC policy be discerned where EC institutions were present alongside those of the member states? If such an EC policy can be found to exist, was this policy different from that of the United States? Can a conventional wisdom, based around the Realist project, comprehensively explain" reactions to each crisis? (p.68). Although the book is titled European Union-United States Security Relations, all the case studies used take place before the European Union or the CFSP were established. His analysis is really of European Political Cooperation in the European Community, and it begs the question of whether the establishment of the CFSP makes his writing dated.

In each section, Bronstone attacks the realist perspective. Naturally, using only three hand-picked case studies weakens his overall argument. In addition, he seems to overlook other possible realist explanations for EC behavior such as the EC took on different positions from the US as a way to challenge American influence on the world stage, or that the EC took on a pro-Arab stance because winning the support of a myriad of Arab and anti-Israeli states which control vital oil interests makes more sense in Realpolitik than supporting Israel. In his conclusion, he firmly supports Robert Cox's Gramscian Marxism as a more comprehensive analytical device, but considering that he spends only seven out of 247 pages on this approach, the reader is left unconvinced. It seems that finding the perfect theory, as Yale Ferguson pointed out in the title of his book, remains the "elusive quest."

**Stephanie Anderson
Bentley College**

Alain Guyomarch, Howard Machin, and Ella Ritchie. France in the European Union. New York: St. Martin's, 1998, 267 pp.

Samy Cohen (ed.). Mitterrand et la Sortie de la Guerre Froide. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998, 473 pp.

FOR A COUNTRY SUCH as France, with *grandeur* as its postwar national ambition and *dirigisme* its postwar approach to industry, protective of its autonomy in foreign policy and insistent on its control over domestic policy, adjustment to the changes resulting from European integration and the end of the Cold War have not been without difficulty. The questions for France have been: To what extent and in which ways should it make common cause in foreign policymaking as opposed to continuing to go it alone? To what extent and in which areas should it give up its control over domestic policymaking for some form of shared control? To what extent and in which ways should it alter its economic and social policymaking systems to respond to changes in the external economic environment? These two books offer extensive insights into just how difficult finding answers to these questions has been for France. At the same time, they help fill a large gap in the literature which has until recently focused either on international politics or on national politics, but rarely on the intersection of the two.

With regard to European integration, Guyomarch, Machin, and Ritchie in France in the European Union provide an excellent account of how European integration has transformed France, and how France has transformed Europe. This extremely useful book charts the history of France's involvement in the process of European integration and of Europe's impact on French politics, policies, and policymaking. It begins with a short review of France's contribution to the building of the EU, then describes the adaptation of the state administration and court system to Europe, the politics of European integration, and the various policy areas affected by European integration, including foreign and security policy, agricultural policy, economic and social policy, territorial policy, and finally, workers' and citizens' rights.

At the EU level, the book finds that the increase in the complexity of policymaking since the 1970s has diminished France's leadership role in Europe along with its ability to shape the EU agenda to its advantage. At the national level, it argues that EU policymaking, along with national reforms, has not only led to a decline in the French state's traditional *dirigisme* and a change in its approach to regulation, with the move in increasing numbers of areas from state administration to regulatory agencies. It has also produced a rebalancing of political power within the state. While certain parts of the executive have been strengthened, in particular the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of France, Parliament has found its already minimal powers reduced whereas the judiciary has found its own reinforced by European integration. Politically,

moreover, the book shows that while the French remain for the most part pro-European, there is nevertheless a significant minority on the right and the left that continues to question the wisdom of "ever closer union," mainly because of the substantial loss of sovereignty. European integration, in sum, has represented a challenge to traditional French notions of state power, politics, and even identity. The same could be said of the changes related to the new post-Communist world environment.

With regard to the end of the Cold War, Samy Cohen in Mitterrand et la Sortie de la Guerre Froide has assembled an admirable group of contributors to consider President Francois Mitterrand's foreign policymaking. Most significantly, the contributors consist not only of French scholars who provide in-depth historical accounts of the major policies but also of some of the main actors involved in making those policies. The result is an incredibly rich source of information on the intricacies of French foreign policies, both the triumphs and the fiascos, in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. In this book, we find answers to puzzles about President Mitterrand's dealings with Germany, Russia, and the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, in particular his faux-pas in attempting to delay German unification in 1990, his lack of initiative when it came to responding effectively to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, and his mistaken judgment with regard to the coup d'état of August 1991 in the former Soviet Union. We also find out about Mitterrand's policies toward Africa, the Middle East, and Asia—his ambivalences, his miscalculations, as well as his coups. Here too, finally, we uncover the reasons behind his European policies, which come out in this book most clearly as the successes.

This is the study of one man and one nation. The main question dealt with in this book is how to understand Mitterrand, one of the most complex and secretive of French leaders, and what to make of his performance: Were his hesitations and political faux-pas the consequences of a man who lacked sufficient imagination to make the transition from a nineteenth-century balance of power view to the twenty-first century? Or were they signs of greater prescience than that shown by other leaders about the problems that would come from rushing headlong into the future? These are the kinds of issues raised in the debates among scholars and practitioners in this book, as they consider the man and the events. What emerges from the book is not only a better understanding of the man, but also a clearer understanding of the inner workings of French policymaking, and the margins of maneuver of a mid-sized power in the "new world order." For an inside view of French presidentialism and French foreign policy at the end of the Cold War, there couldn't be a better book to read.

**Vivien Schmidt
Boston University**

Justin Greenwood. Representing Interests in the European Union. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997, 292 pp.

THIS STRUCK ME AS a really excellent book. It is packed with information, and elegantly written. Above all, Greenwood organises his material well. Although it is a complex subject matter, he manages to hold everything together with meticulous cross-referencing of themes from one chapter to the other chapters in which they are picked up. The long concluding chapter on "Interests and European Integration" breaks what I was beginning to think was an aversion to sustained theoretical discussion in this series. I would have started with this chapter (although it would have been differently written) because of the way in which it touches on all the themes of the book. However, I can see why Greenwood put it at the end, particularly because it was necessary for him to introduce a lot of material on the study of interests in general in the first chapter.

In the Introduction, Greenwood says, "the study of interest representation in the EU is ... far from a specialist pursuit best left to enthusiasts ... it is a central task for any student interested in understanding how the EU really functions" (p.26). Justin clearly is an enthusiast, but I think this book admirably justifies his assertion that what he is studying is not a narrow specialism within the study of the EU, but a central aspect of the subject. I suspect that it is going to be an essential point of orientation for a generation of Ph.D. students looking for a problem to research.

Stephen George
University of Sheffield

Kostas A. Lavdas. The Europeanization of Greece: Interest Politics and the Crises of Integration. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997, 337 pp.

SCHOLARLY ANALYSES OF THE links between European integration and the domestic politics of EU member states tend to focus on the more populous countries, especially the "major" players, France, Germany and Great Britain. Books that explore the politics of smaller countries such as Greece are welcome additions to the literature. Kostas Lavdas' The Europeanization of Greece examines a half-century of Greek foreign economic policy in Europe from the perspective of the country's domestic politics in the face of ever increasing ties to the institutions of European integration.

Observers of European integration have struggled to fit Greece into the prevailing patterns of domestic adaptation to European institutions. The Greek case is intriguing because the country seems to continually lag behind other EU states as integration moves forward. Employing Peter Gourevitch's concept of the second-image reversed, Lavdas sets out to test the effect of Europeanizing influences on the shape of public-

private relations in Greece. Lavdas finds that while European integration did act as a catalyst to partly re-structure Greek governmental relations with economic interest groups, this restructuring was mediated by the nature of interest representation in Greece. Specifically, Lavdas argues that the Europeanization of Greek economic policy occurred within the context of "disjointed corporatism," which the author defines as "the combination of a set of corporatist organizational features and a prevailing political modality that lacks reciprocity and remains incapable of brokering social pacts" (p.17). Thus, while Greece's participation in the process of European integration did serve to promote greater public-private cooperation, the unique element of disjointed corporatism in Greece made this process less smooth than if it had occurred under different circumstances.

Lavdas tests out his hypothesis by examining EC-Greek relations over three "crises of integration" spanning a 40-year period starting in the late 1950s. The book is exceedingly well researched in this aspect and provides a wealth of empirical material. In addition, in order to lend credence to the book's thesis, Lavdas makes occasional comparisons to the process of Europeanization in Portugal and Spain. It would have been nice if the author had expanded this discussion to add a greater comparative context to the study. This would have increased the appeal of the book beyond Greece country specialists.

The book's main flaw is the author's tendency to stray from the central, interesting questions at hand. For example, in Chapter Two, "Theoretical Terrain," Lavdas delves into a vast array of theories of interest representation and state policy making, many of which, while intriguing in some other context, detract from the focus of the study in question. Lavdas would have been well advised to exercise discretion over what to include in this extended literature review. Likewise, the book goes into exacting detail as to the nature of Greek policy making. While this may be of interest to Greece specialists, readers interested in the larger discussion of domestic politics and European integration likely will refrain from wading into the minutiae of the Greek case.

The need to streamline the theoretical analysis and empirical presentation is notable given that Lavdas has some very interesting things to say about domestic adaptation to European integration that are buried in the dense analysis. Lavdas demonstrates convincingly that the Greek situation departs from patterns elsewhere in the EU, including the other Southern European states. By offering a more nuanced account of public-private relations than is typical in the literature on Europeanizing influences on domestic policy, Lavdas opens the door for further research that will explain patterns of adaptation in EU member states as the integration process moves into its final phases.

Michael P. Marks
Willamette University

Anthony Forster. Britain and the Maastricht Negotiations. London: Macmillan, 1999, 207 pp.

THE POST-MAASTRICHT ERA has witnessed an excess of integration literature. The pressure to publish has forced integration scholars to produce an ever increasing number of books and articles in order to keep up with their university requirements. As a consequence, the quality of the literature—scattered with factual mistakes and poor argumentation—has drastically deteriorated. The debate has become detached from reality and practitioners have ceased to take notice of the theoretical models which, if based on solid empirical evidence, could be very helpful in analysing the policy-making process. Anthony Forster's book on Britain and the Maastricht Negotiations is a refreshing exception to this rule.

Forster dissects the British government's negotiation of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and provides a detailed account of the dual Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC)—on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and Political Union (PU)—which led to the Maastricht Treaty. By looking at the negotiations on EMU, social policy, foreign and security policy, and institutional reform, Forster is able to explain British positions in the two IGCs. The central argument of the book is that "the British government's position and achievements in the 1990-91 IGCs can only be understood by close reference to the domestic political context" (p.2). Forster thus analyses the party management problems and international pressures that Prime Minister John Major was facing in succeeding Margaret Thatcher. In convincing fashion Forster casts doubt on the claim that the British government won the negotiations "game, set and match." John Major might have scored a personal victory at Maastricht by being the most skilled negotiator, but when one looks at the supranational outcome of the TEU, it is clear that the negotiations were not a success from the British government's perspective.

Forster concludes by looking at the changes in British European policy brought about by the Maastricht negotiations. In placing the government's negotiating position in a broader context he is able to conclude that the "Euro-sceptics may still be defeated by the flaws in their own arguments...and the hard facts of economic, social and political success might ultimately prove difficult to resist" for subsequent British governments. And indeed, his prediction seems to be materialising as the British government is taking its early steps towards Economic and Monetary Union.

Forster makes his case beyond reasonable doubt—his argument is persuasive and his prose is a joy to read. Forster's book will become *the* authority on Britain and Maastricht and is a must for anyone who claims to be an expert on European affairs and wants to understand how British EU policy is crafted. It should thus be a permanent feature on the bookshelves of academics and practitioners alike.

**Alexander C-G. Stubb
Permanent Representation of Finland to the EU**

ECSA members interested in writing book reviews of recent, EU-related books should contact the Book Review Editor:

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Publishers should send review copies directly to Professor Bukowski.

ECSA Review Forum Bibliography (continued from p.9):

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ECSA Review Interview

Editor's note: The following is a personal interview conducted by ECSA in April 1999 with Enid Miller, Vice President, Mellon Bank, N.A., regarding Mellon Bank's preparation process for both "Big Bank Weekend 1999" and the change-over to the euro.

ECSA: Please give an overview of Mellon Bank's operations, particularly the international.

EM: Mellon Bank currently has a balance sheet of approximately \$50 billion. We are a major international bank with diversified financial services for international financial institutions, businesses and individual consumers on both sides of the Atlantic. Mellon participates in both fee-based and banking services, including investment products, global custody, securities lending, cash management, and more. We offer mutual funds through The Dreyfus Corporation and Founders Asset Management, and in Europe through Newton Management Ltd. Mellon has affiliates or subsidiaries in England, Ireland and Canada, and we also participate in the foreign exchange markets and in trade banking activities.

ECSA: How did Mellon Bank prepare for the launch of the *euro*?

EM: I headed a corporate-wide Euro Task Force, which began in summer 1997, whose function was to guide the corporation through the process of getting ready for the Euro. Our goal was to make sure the corporation was ready for the *euro*—it was truly an operations oriented activity, not a business strategy. We brought together a significant number of areas of the corporation (at least 14 business areas of Mellon Bank participated). The primary areas impacted were global custody, asset management, and foreign exchange.

Our aim was to ensure that all impacted systems and processes would be ready for the *euro* on January 4th. Mellon Bank decided to conduct all stock and bond exchanges in *euros* only, beginning January 4, 1999, and to convert any open trades to *euros* immediately. We wanted to get Mellon Bank ready to convert to the *euro*, all holdings and assets in the *euro* countries, and from that point on to report their value in *euros* only, effective January 4, 1999 just following the Big Bang Weekend. Our overarching goal was to have our systems handle *euro* transactions as just another day's business. Specific tasks to accomplish were many, such as:

- convert overnight to be a *euro*-only custodian of all holdings in *euro* countries
- be ready to trade in the *euro* on January 4, 1999
- redenominate in-country government bonds (e.g., German bonds, in units of *Deutsch marks*)
- convert any open trades (begun in 1998 but not yet settled) to settle in *euros*

ECSA: How long did Mellon Bank's Task Force work to prepare for the change-over?

EM: We spent months preparing for the change-over, including bringing together business people, who came accompanied by their operations and systems backers, to participate in industry forums. Everyone came together as professionals and we agreed to adhere to industry "best practices" standards.

We had to perform systems and processes enhancements, make changes to our cash clearing processes, and conduct test runs with external third parties, such as data vendors, sub-custodians, security and cash clearing providers, and large global custody customers.

We ran two full-blown mock "conversion weekends" internally in October and November 1998, and a partial mock conversion weekend in December (for one part of the business only). During the actual Big Bang Weekend, at the corporate level we had a centralized command center in Pittsburgh, with support from over 20 distinct business units of Mellon Bank. We had people on standby throughout the weekend, not only from human resources and our legal department, but including well over 700 staff in twelve Mellon Bank locations. I'm happy to say that we did it all on schedule and were ready for business in *euros* on Monday, January 4th.

In fact, the first *euro* settlement, executed at 5:30 a.m. Central European Time on January 4th was a Mellon Bank transaction that Citibank Frankfurt cleared on our behalf through the German Central Bank. (The German Central Bank had identified Mellon Bank to handle the first transaction.)

ECSA: Has Mellon Bank encountered any stumbling blocks in changing over to the *euro*?

EM: From our point of view the change-over has been a very smooth operational success. There haven't been any major problems at all.

ECSA: What do you foresee between now and 2002, when the change-over to the *euro* will be complete?

EM: From an operations and process perspective, the transition period does not present significant challenges for Mellon. Part of the three-year transition period is to allow the private sector to set the timing and to take "corporate actions" as need be (for example, regarding equity/debt markets). In the foreign exchange world, Mellon Bank will redenominate private sector debt and equity instruments from legacy national currencies to the *euro*—our system can handle both—but the reality is that most in Euroland are already using the *euro*. For European companies and citizens, many changes will occur during the transition period, including the introduction of *euro* coin and currency in January 2002 and the withdrawal from circulation of legacy coin and currency by July 1, 2002. But these changes do not directly impact Mellon, since we have no retail presence in Europe.

Teaching the EU

Editor's note: In response to member interest, this column is now a regular feature of the ECSA Review. Suggestions and essays from ECSA members for this column are welcomed.

Teaching the European Union in China

Mark Aspinwall

CONFUCIUS ONCE ASKED, "ISN'T it a great pleasure to have a friend visiting from afar?" In 1998 I was made to feel like a friend during two month-long visits to People's University, Beijing, to teach European Union politics. I was an emissary of sorts, sponsored by the EU-China Higher Education Cooperation Programme, which was designed to foster cooperation in teaching and research on the EU between Chinese and European scholars and universities. It seemed to me that it would be worth recording my impressions of this experience, even though they are only glancing impressions.

Part of my remit was to do some straightforward lecture-style teaching to a few dozen undergraduates and about fifteen master's students in several subject areas. The subjects were a general introduction to the EU, the single currency, foreign and security policy, and a slightly more detailed look at the relationship between member states and the EU. I also intentionally spoke about the democratic shortcomings of the EU, which I think provoked some interest among the students.

This was a hodgepodge of issues, but it was offered with plenty of cross-references and at a fairly undemanding level (after an initial adjustment on my part). Unfortunately, the teaching took place in lectures of two to three hours—not the most effective learning environment. In some classes the students sat on hard benches without backs for all this time, getting only a short break every hour. It was old-fashioned chalk and talk ... and talk and talk and talk. No overhead projectors or maps or small group discussions or other pedagogical innovations were available to break the Leviathan-like setting.

My throat gradually dried out from the soft chalk dust, the smoggy air, and the long stretches of speaking. But that was part of the cultural experience, for teaching in China seems to take place primarily in this manner. I was eventually able to open things up a little by having give-and-take discussions (with the wholehearted support of my hosts), but at first we were feeling each other out.

One of the difficulties I faced was the usual one of determining what the students knew already. Their regular lecturers were vague on details, and there were no English language syllabi to check. My normal habit of reading body language for comprehension and interest did not work. Inscrutable might be the wrong word, but my students were not giving much away. So I resorted to asking them questions. This was also not terribly revealing, at least initially.

Part of the problem was language. Although they could all speak English, not everyone was comfortable asking questions or speaking up in a lecture atmosphere. I had made only a few changes from my normal material, and in the early lectures I overshot their knowledge on Europe. I had assumed that I could begin with a discussion of integration theory in the course on EU member state interaction. But it slowly became clear that this was not familiar to them at all. They had not heard of Ernst Haas or Gary Marks or Andrew Moravcsik.

The scale of my misjudgment became clear during the break in the first lecture, when the man who usually teaches the course asked me to explain the difference between intergovernmentalism and federalism. For a comparativist beginning to look into the federalist literature this would have been a reasonable question. But of course for Europeanists the terms are at the very core of the subject.

Yet during the second of the two visits we had a much better give and take, even extending at times to students offering their views. Part of the reason for the difference I think was that I had not worked hard enough the first time to pry them open. Also, on the second visit I had a bunch of very bright sparks in both my groups. Some of them had unrelenting attention spans that bridged the two-to-three hour lectures with scarcely a blink.

Their comments were particularly forceful on security in Eastern Europe and the single currency, seeing the latter as doomed to failure and the former as very worrisome because of Russian instability and a potential German resurgence. Their pessimism was curious given the positive tone of their professors' published works in China. They were also of the view (in terms that Mrs. Thatcher would have been perfectly comfortable with) that political integration should follow economic integration. They did not perceive the two as linked.

One overwhelming impression was their tendency to see integration in power politics terms. The IR theory they had been learning was weighted toward classical realism, with the alternative being idealism. They were not terribly familiar with the neo-liberal institutionalist/interdependence schools of thought, which is not surprising given that official media reports constantly reinforce the notion of state authority and choice. The English language *China Daily* is full of stories about bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and domestic policy solutions to various problems. It was good evidence of how official discourse helps to shape social views of appropriate theories.

In the course of the two months I also made visits to the Chinese Institute for Contemporary International Relations and Beijing University, as well as the five institutions which together (with People's University) make up the Chinese group in the EU-China program. The five are the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Fudan University in Shanghai, Nankai University in Tianjin, Sichuan Union University in Chengdu, and Wuhan University. I gave a variety of talks at these places, from informal discussions with staff and graduate students to a public lecture at Beijing University (on the future of European capitalism).

My discussions with academics tended to be wide ranging—scholars were aware of the major American IR theorists and we talked about Waltz, Fukuyama, the English School, and the U.S. Congress. Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" is especially popular and is widely read as it has been translated into Chinese (unfortunately some were of the impression that it drives U.S. foreign policy). But both Europeans and Europeanists have made few inroads academically. (When they learned I had worked in Congress and then as a lobbyist some of them were very eager to talk about that!)

For someone accustomed to the atmosphere at Western universities there were some incongruous moments, such as the corridor spittoons in Sichuan, the laundry hanging out to dry in many academic office buildings, and lunch banquets featuring chicken feet, fish eyes, and other local delicacies. During one meeting a female Chinese colleague to whom I was speaking turned and spat on the office floor nonchalantly. The student-professor relationship is also different from that of the West, with students doing a lot of informal and unpaid work for the staff, like showing me around and translating.

I made some effort to find out what their journal and book collections were like, and what I found was not promising—most places had some relevant journals (*Journal of Common Market Studies* or *International Organization*) but none had a really complete list (*Journal of European Public Policy* seems to be unknown). Likewise, the book collections were thin, although each of the six universities is a European Documentation Center and so is faced with growing mountains of official publications. I left two of my own syllabi and a list of what seemed to me the essential journals on European integration.

So it was not surprising that the research taking place there is not at a level that would be considered acceptable in Europe or North America. The few articles that I saw by Chinese scholars on European integration tended to be normative and prescriptive (European integration is a good thing and progress toward a single currency should continue), or journalistic policy analysis apparently designed for consumption by government officials.

Political science departments are smaller than economics, management, business, and related departments, and they tend to be weighted toward administration. They attenuate as one moves away from the power centers of Beijing and Shanghai. Sichuan Union University has no politics department at all. There remains a degree of sensitivity about them, despite the new reformist leadership. When I told non-academics that I was in China to teach politics this usually evoked nervous laughter. The study of political science is only just beginning to come into its own and I did not get a sense that a culture of critical analysis had yet emerged.

Also, the EU and its constituent parts have had a lower profile than does the U.S. The EU is now attempting to rectify this, and the program I was involved in must be seen as one element of an institution-building exercise by the EU, and especially by Leon Brittan, who has worked hard to raise the

profile of the EU in China. Of course this institution-building has occurred elsewhere too—the EU-China program is similar to the European Union Centers established at a number of U.S. universities. For its part China is interested in promoting ties with the EU as a balance against American diplomacy.

The objectives of the EU-China Higher Education Cooperation Programme are to help form a lasting interest in EU issues among Chinese students and scholars, in the hope that eventually a critical mass will be formed. Visitors like me were strongly encouraged to form collaborative research links with Chinese scholars, who will also visit the EU. That seems to me a worthy objective, however different our research may appear now. One of the best outcomes of the program would be to develop something of a "Chinese school of thought" on European integration—different from and contributing to the debate now underway about how and why integration occurs. Much if not all of our theoretical debate tends to share a utilitarian view of the integration process. One of my most interesting discussions was with an academic at Nankai University on the contribution of "Asian values" to the EU, and particularly whether peer pressure, group interests, trust, common values, and similar attitudes might be a means of supplementing our largely contractual approaches.

Mark Aspinwall teaches in the Department of Politics, University of Durham, England. His visits to China were made possible by the EU-China Higher Education Cooperation Programme.

ECSA Supporters

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NETWORK OF EUROPEAN UNION CENTERS

News and Notes ...

March 12, 1999: The European Union Center at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign convened, with the College of Agriculture and Consumer Economics, a luncheon lecture in Chicago. Caroline Normand from the Delegation of the European Commission addressed key issues in upcoming trade talks that will take place in the EU. Approximately 35 business leaders from the Chicago region participated.

April 8-9, 1999: The Pittsburgh European Union Center hosted a policy conference, "The New Transatlantic Challenge: Strengthening Institutional Cooperation in Immigration, Policing and Criminal Justice," to examine the ongoing "Europeanization" of Justice and Home Affairs issues and the American "internationalization" of law enforcement and immigration policies. European Commission Delegation Ambassador Hugo Paemen delivered the keynote address for the Pittsburgh Center's inauguration.

April 9-10, 1999: The European Union Center of the University System of Georgia organized a conference, "Civilian Technology Policy in the European Union and the United States: Recent Experiences and New Directions," chaired by Hans Klein and Mark Hallerberg. The conference focused on technology policies of the U.S. and EU; the themes were institutions and frameworks; systems and sector; and research impacts.

April 16-17, 1999: The European Union Center of New York held its Inaugural Conference with the European Legal Studies Center of Columbia Law School and the Institut für Öffentliches Recht, University of Bonn, "Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Problems and Prospects in Light of International Experience and Domestic Legal Environments." Sir Leon Brittan, acting vice-president of the European Commission, gave an address, as did David L. Aaron, Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade, U.S. Department of Commerce.

April 22, 1999: The European Union Center at the University of Wisconsin-Madison sponsored the 1999 Kennan Forum in Milwaukee entitled, "Managing the Euro: How Will European Economic and Monetary Union Change the Global Economic Order?" Keynote speakers were Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa from the European Central Bank and Louis Uchitelle, economics writer for the *New York Times*.

April 22-24, 1999: The North Carolina European Union Center co-sponsored a European Symposium. Focusing on the *euro* and its global effects, this weekend of events included graduate student seminars, lectures at the North Carolina Department of Commerce, public round table discussions, and a professional development seminar for college instructors. Erik Jones (University of Nottingham) and Louis Pauly (University of Toronto) participated in the Symposium as visiting scholars.

April 29, 1999: The European Union Center of California held its inaugural event, a "State of the European Union Address" delivered by Karsten Voigt, Coordinator for German-American Cooperation at the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, on behalf of the current Presidency of the European Union. Voigt is an expert on security policy and is responsible for transatlantic relations with the United States and Canada.



NETWORK OF EUROPEAN UNION CENTERS

News and Notes ...

★ *May 14, 1999:* The European Union Center at the University of Washington (Seattle) held a conference, "Liberalizing Agricultural Trade? CAP Reform, U.S. Policy and Transatlantic Trade Tensions." Speakers included Stefan Tangermann (University of Goettingen), William Coleman (McMaster University), Jim Rollo (University of Sussex), Rob Paarlberg (Wellesley University), Wyn Grant (Warwick University), John Keeler (University of Washington), and Tim Josling (Stanford University).

★ *May 22-23, 1999:* The Missouri European Union Center sponsored a conference in St. Louis, "Issues in Rural Development and Agriculture: Values, Policies, Programs," to compare values underlying EU agricultural policy, and consequences in Europe and the rest of the world. It explored how global trade will affect European agricultural and rural policies. Speakers included Guy LeGras (DG-IV), Jill Long Thompson (Under-secretary for Rural Economic and Community Development, U.S. Department of Agriculture), and Hon. John Hume (MEP from Derry, Northern Ireland).

★ *May 23-24, 1999:* The European Union Center at Harvard University organized a conference, "Transatlantic Futures: The European Union and the United States in the Next Century," examining the contexts in which policy will be made and exploring fundamental issues that the EU and the U.S. will face in the long term—20-25 years from now, with attention to political cultures, ideologies, and the conditions of societies.

The Network of European Union Centers in the United States was launched by the European Union in 1998 to build stronger ties among Europeans and Americans. The ten European Union Centers are located in:

Atlanta:	University System of Georgia
Cambridge:	Harvard University
Illinois:	University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Los Angeles:	Scripps College, Claremont Colleges, and University of Southern California
Missouri:	University of Missouri Columbia
New York:	New York University, Columbia University, City University of New York, and New School for Social Research
North Carolina:	University of North Carolina Chapel Hill and Duke University
Pittsburgh:	University of Pittsburgh
Seattle:	University of Washington
Wisconsin:	University of Wisconsin Madison

To find out more about the Network and each of the participating European Union Centers, please visit the Network Web site at <<http://eucenters.org>>.

The Network of European Union Centers is supported by the European Union, with assistance from the host institutions, and is coordinated by the European Community Studies Association. ECSA's Network of European Union Centers Subcommittee is Vivien Schmidt, Chair (Boston University) and Paulette Kurzer (University of Arizona).

Academic Programs

Please contact each program directly for information on instructional staff, accreditation, courses, policies, fees, and application materials and deadlines.

Centre for European Studies Research (CESR), University of Portsmouth, UK, offers master's and doctoral level research supervision in areas such as European Security and Defense Policy; Euro-governance and European Public Policy; European Law; *et alia*. Contact Professor Richard Gillespie, CESR, University of Portsmouth, Park Building, King Henry I Street, Portsmouth PO1 2DZ, UK; e-mail <richard.gillespie@port.ac.uk>.

The European Union Today and Tomorrow, Paris, June 10-July 28, 1999, is a summer program in English with courses on EU Framework and Principles; Strategic Management; Social Issues; and more. Contact the EU/SP, Sciences Po, 27, rue Saint-Guillaume, F-75007, Paris, France; e-mail <eusp@sciences-po.fr>; Web site at <www.europaris.edu>.

Europainstitut, University of Basel, Switzerland, offers a one-year Master of Advanced European Studies through its interdisciplinary postgraduate program on all aspects of European integration. Application deadline for the 1999-2000 school year is May 31. Contact Europainstitut Basel, Gellerstrasse 27, CH-4020 Basel, Switzerland; e-mail <europa@ubaclu.unibas.ch>; Web <www.unibas.ch/euro/index.html>.

European Academy Summer School 1999, Tyrol, Italy [dates not given], "Transnational Regionalism and Minority Protection in Europe: A Challenge for Eastern Enlargement?" is this summer's topic. Contact Gabriel Toggenburg, European Academy Bozen, Weggensteinstrasse 12/a, I-39100 Bozen/Bolzano, Italy; e-mail <summerschool@eurac.edu>, or visit the Web site at <www.eurac.edu>.

"The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the New International Order," EuroMed Centre, Department of Political Studies, University of Catania Summer School, June 20-26, 1999. For advanced doctoral students who are interested in Mediterranean issues, this bilingual program will include sessions on political conflict and reforms, and the Single Market and Mediterranean countries. Contact Valentina Barbagallo at e-mail <euromed@mbox.unict.it> or visit the Web site at <www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/>.

Master of Arts in European Integration, University of Limerick, is a one-year, full-time interdisciplinary program for recent graduates in the humanities and social sciences, focusing on European integration and the EU as a global economic and political entity. Contact by e-mail <admissions@ul.ie> or visit the Web site at <www.ul.ie>. Application deadline for the 1999/2000 class is June 11, 1999.

Conferences

Globalization and the Good Society

July 8-11, 1999: University of Wisconsin-Madison. Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics Program co-chairs are Bruce Western and ECSA member Frans van Waarden. Paper streams are Communitarian Ideals and Civil Society; Development, Social Change, and Governance; Gender, Work, and Family; Globalization and Local Socio-Economic Development; Industrial Relations and the Political Economy; and others. Contact SASE, P. O. Box 39008, Baltimore, MD 21212; fax 410 377 7965; e-mail <saseorg@aol.com>; or visit the Web site at <http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/sase99/>.

Diversity Within Unity: Civil Society and Human Community

August 2-6, 1999: Prague. This conference focuses on Europe in the widest sense and themes include social, national, and international relationships; civil society, civility, persons, and the state; persons, federalism, communitarianism; and more. Contact conference organizer Dr. Rob Fisher, Westminster College, Oxford, UK, e-mail <rob@fishwest.demon.co.uk>.

Will Europe Work?

August 18-21, 1999: Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam. The European Sociological Association Conference will feature streams on "Collective Identities: Local, Regional, National, European;" "Thinking Europe: Social Theory;" "Beyond Legal Frameworks: Crime, Policing, Traffik;" "Europe in the World System," "Citizenship: National, European, Global;" "Constructing European Institutions," etc. Contact the ESA Conference Secretariat, SISWO, Plantage Muidergracht 4, NL-1018 TV Amsterdam, The Netherlands; visit the Web site <http://www.qub.ac.uk/esa/>; or e-mail <esa@siswo.uva.nl>.

After the Global Crisis? What Next for Regionalism?

September 16-17, 1999: University of Warwick, UK. The Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation hosts this conference on the role of regions as a mediating level of governance. Contact Dr. Shaun Breslin at e-mail <shaun.breslin@warwick.ac.uk> or visit the Web page at <www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/CSFR/>.

Regionalism: Stepping Stone to Globalization?

September 17-18, 1999: University of the Pacific will host the 1999 Western Regional Conference of the Academy of International Business, on all aspects of international business. Contact ESCA member Georgine Kradya, Eberhardt School of Business, University of the Pacific, 3601 Pacific Ave., Stockton, CA, 95211; e-mail <gkradya@uop.edu>.

World Wide Web Sites

The following annotated list highlights Web sites of interest to EU specialists. This issue's selection features sites focusing on gender issues and Europe. NB: All Web site addresses must be preceded by <http://> (omitted here for the sake of brevity).

www.eurosur.org/wide is the Web site and Network for "Women in Development Europe." Available in both Spanish and English, this rich site describes WIDE programs, e.g., "The Future of EU-ACP [African-Caribbean-Pacific] Development Cooperation" and "Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action in the European Union." It also features position papers such as "A Gender Perspective on European Union Trade Policies;" and reports such as "Gender Mapping the European Union Common Trade Policy."

www.ipu.org/iss-e/women.htm represents an activity of the Inter-Parliamentary Union on women in politics, with a very valuable list, *inter alia*, of Women in National Parliaments. Data on percentage of women in the lower or single house are given by country ($n = 180$), with Sweden, Denmark and Finland leading the world. Many other current statistics given.

www.reference.be/wo-manocracy/ is a dated Web site which nonetheless carries valuable documents, figures, organizational charter, facts, links and more on the topic of "Women in Decision-Making"—a self-described network of experts in the European Commission who aim to research and develop the balanced participation of women and men in decision making.

www.esf.org/sn/GPSE1.htm is a project of the European Science Foundation, which sponsors international scientific networks, including this one on "Gender, Politics and the State in Europe." This particular Network will exist for 1999 only and aims to "develop theories of gender and democracy using ... European case studies ... [and] analysis of the significance of gender to policy making in European democratic states."

hgins.uia.ac.be:80/women "EuroMap," an electronic profile of European Women's Studies, is a project of the Centre for Women's Studies at the University of Antwerp. Beyond the usual lists of links, projects, etc., this site offers a Virtual Library with articles and synopses of research results, as well as calls for papers, conferences, and opportunities with the European Educational Exchange Network for Women's Studies and other women's studies programs in Europe.

www.europa.eu.int "Europa" is the multilingual Web site of the European Union. The Council, the Commission, the Parliament and the Courts post their news here, along with a wealth of EU information from a basic primer to official publications, calendars, and news; this site is a very important resource on the EU for all scholars and practitioners and is thus included in each *ECSA Review* annotated Web site list.

Publications

- Ahtisaari, Martti *et alia* (1999) Should the EU Be Redesigned? Brussels, Belgium: Philip Morris Institute.
- Bunyan, Tony (1998) Secrecy, Democracy and the Third Pillar of the European Union. London: Federal Trust.
- Coombes, David (1999) Seven Theorems in Search of the European Parliament. London: Federal Trust.
- Denton, Geoffrey (1999) A New Transatlantic Partnership. London: Federal Trust/TEPSA.
- Dinan, Desmond (1999) Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Directory of EU Information Sources: The Red Book (1999) Genva, Belgium: Euroconfidentiel.
- Egeberg, Morten and Per Laegreid (eds.) (1999) Organizing Political Institutions: Essays for Johan P. Olsen. Oslo, Norway: Scandinavian University Press.
- "Is the Barcelona Process Working? EU Policy in the Mediterranean" (1999) Brussels, Belgium: Philip Morris Institute.
- Jenkins, Charles (1999) Paying for an Enlarged European Union. London: Federal Trust.
- Kruper, Richard (1998) Politics of the European Court of Justice. London: Federal Trust.
- Lehning, Percy B. (1999) European Citizenship: Towards a European Identity? Madison, WI: International Institute. Working Paper Series on European Studies, 2: 3.
- Peterson, John and Margaret Sharp (1998) Technology Policy in the European Union. Houndmill, UK: Macmillan.
- The Rome, Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties: Comparative Texts (1999) Genva, Belgium: Euroconfidentiel.
- Shirley Williams and Andrew Duff (1999) European Futures: Alternative Scenarios for 2020. London: Federal Trust.

European Union Environmental Policy at 25

This special issue (January 1999, 17: 1, pp.1-126) of the journal *Government and Policy (Environment and Planning C)* is edited by ECSA member Dr. Andrew Jordan (CSERGE, UK), and includes contributions from ECSA members Andrea Lenschow, Alberta Sbragia, Anthony Zito, and other authors. Papers discuss the development and implementation of EU policy, the 'greening' of 'non'-environmental sectors, and the EU's growing stature as an international environmental actor. Contact the publisher, Pion Ltd., by e-mail at <admin@pion.demon.co.uk> or Web site <www.pion.co.uk/ep/>.

EIPASCOPE

The journal of the European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, the current number (1999/1) includes essays by ECSA members Roger P. Levy, "Myth and reality in EU programme management," and Ines Hartwig, "Continuité ou changement de la politique européenne de l'Allemagne?" Contact the Institute at P. O. Box 1229, 6201 BE Maastricht, The Netherlands; Web site <www.eipa.nl>.

ECSA News and Notes

State of the European Union, Volume 5

ECSA is pleased to announce that Oxford University Press will publish ECSA's State of the European Union, Volume 5: Risks, Reforms, Resistance or Revival? edited by Maria Green Cowles (The American University) and Michael Smith (Loughborough University). Look for the relaunch of ECSA's State of the European Union series in 2000!

1999-2001 ECSA Election Results

The European Community Studies Association announces the results of its Spring 1999 election for the 1999-2001 Executive Committee, which determines ECSA policies and oversees ECSA programs and activities. The newly elected Committee will be seated at the ECSA Business Meeting (June 3rd) at the Sixth Biennial International Conference. Elected by the membership via mail-in ballots, the new Executive Committee members are: Stephanie Anderson (Bentley College), Maria Green Cowles (The American University), Donald Hancock (Vanderbilt University), Paulette Kurzer (University of Arizona), Mark Pollack (University of Wisconsin Madison), Vivien Schmidt (Boston University), and Sidney Tarrow (Cornell University).

1999 US-EU Relations Project

In February, the 1999 Project Scholars, C. Randall Henning (The American University and the International Institute of Economics) and Pier Carlo Padoan (University of Rome and College of Europe), presented their works in progress on transatlantic perspectives on the *euro*, to an audience of scholars, policymakers and practitioners in Brussels. The Project will conclude with a joint plenary address by Henning and Padoan at the ECSA International Conference in June and the publication by Brookings Institution Press of their works as joint monograph to be released in Fall 1999.

1999 Biennial International Conference

By late April, over 300 persons had completed early registration for the ECSA Conference to be held June 2nd-5th at the Westin William Penn Hotel in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In addition to the US-EU Relations Project Plenary mentioned above, highlights of the Conference will include a Keynote Address by European Union Ambassador Hugo Paemen; the presentation of three new ECSA Prizes; seventy-some panels and roundtables on all aspects of European Union affairs; ECSA's first Poster Session; and exhibits and paper rooms. Extracurricular activities for Conference Delegates will include two receptions, a gala dinner, and more. Visit our Web site at <<http://ecsa.org/conf99.htm>> for full details on how to participate and to register for the Conference on-line.

Miscellany

State of the European Union, Volumes 3 & 4

Lynne Rienner Publishers offers a 20% discount to ECSA members who wish to purchase State of the European Union, Volume 4: Deepening and Widening and/or Volume 3: Building a European Polity? ECSA members may purchase these hardback books for \$US 44 each plus shipping, by writing or faxing Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1800 30th Street, Suite 314, Boulder, CO 80301, USA; fax 303 444 0824.

European Urban Research Association

The European Urban Research Association (EURA) was launched in 1997 to provide a European interdisciplinary forum for research on towns and cities and to inform public debate and improve the quality of urban policy. EURA received start-up funding from the Urban Affairs Association (USA), the European Commission DG-XII, and the UK Economic and Social Research Council. Contact the EURA Secretariat, Faculty of the Built Environment, University of the West of England, Coldharbour Lane, Frenchay, Bristol BS16 1QY, UK; or e-mail <julie.triggle@uwe.ac.uk>.

"What is Europe?" Essay Competition

To celebrate the millennium, the Centre for European Studies Research at the University of Portsmouth, UK, has organized an essay competition. All entries must address the question, "What is Europe?" in 5,000-6,000 words and be accompanied by the appropriate forms, available from the Secretary, Centre for European Studies Research, University of Portsmouth, Park Building, King Henry I St., Portsmouth PO1 2DZ, UK; e-mail <carolyn.carr@port.ac.uk>. The prize is 1,000 pounds, sponsored by Frank Cass Publishers; deadline is 12:00 noon on September 30, 1999. A panel of experts (Susan Bassnett, Richard Overy, and William E. Paterson) will decide the winner and select essays for publication in a volume entitled "What is Europe?" to be published by Frank Cass in 2000.

Newsletters Received

The ECSA Office has recently received newsletters from the following associations around the world with a European- or European Union-related focus: Association of European Studies—Russia; Conference Group on German Politics; Council for European Studies (USA); Turkish Association for European Community Studies; and University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UK). In addition, the following research institutes with some European- or EU-related focus have sent newsletters: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies; Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Information Internationales (Paris); and the Sussex European Institute (Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence) (UK).

ECSA Review

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Inside the Spring 1999 *ECSA Review*:

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Founded in 1988, ECSA is a non-profit organization dedicated to the exchange of information and ideas on European Union affairs. ECSA is the coordinator of the Network of European Union Centers.

Notes for ECSA members ...

- If you are moving, please let the ECSA Administrative Office know your new mailing address and contact coordinates, preferably six weeks in advance, so that you don't miss any of your membership materials.
- We've hit a new level! Just over 500 ECSA members (nearly half of our membership) now subscribe to the ECSA e-mail List Server, a forum for succinct queries and announcements related to European Union affairs. To subscribe, send an e-mail to ecsa+@pitt.edu with this message: **subscribe ecsa@list.pitt.edu**
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