



**EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
STUDIES ASSOCIATION**
Vol. XII, No. 4 ISSN 1090-5758
FALL 1999 www.ecsa.org

ECSA REVIEW

From the Chair

Vivien A. Schmidt

European Union Studies: Looking to the Next Millennium

WITH THE COMING OF the millennium, it is probably time to take stock of where European Union studies has been and where it is going. Over the past fifteen years or so, there has been an incredible burgeoning of EU studies. Although the field itself spans the post-war period, its history has paralleled that of European integration itself. After the initial enthusiasms following the ECSC and the Treaty of Rome, the field, as the integration process itself, fell into the doldrums of Eurosclerosis, only to reemerge reinvigorated beginning in the mid-1980s with the activities surrounding the Single Market Act and the Maastricht Treaty. By now, EU studies has become a field of tremendous breadth, spanning a full range of social science disciplines, employing a wide variety of methodological approaches, and covering a great panoply of topics and theoretical issues related to European integration. Its growth, moreover, has been fueled not only by the academic interest naturally excited by the facts of European integration but also by the comparatively large amount of funding to study integration made available from the European Commission, member-state governments, private foundations, and a few multinational corporations.

European Union studies has become in a comparatively short time a field rich in content and in resources. But this in and of itself represents a challenge for the future: to make sense of what is rapidly becoming a cacophony of voices speaking on Europe and to make proper use of the resources available. How to integrate the field of EU studies and how to allocate the funding most appropriately are two of the major questions facing the field at the start of the new millennium. The answers are not clear.

For the integration of the field, the worst possible answer would be to fix on a single theoretical or methodological approach, as has increasingly been the direction taken by some social scientific disciplines. The very vitality of EU studies stems in large measure from its theoretical eclecticism, its methodological diversity, and its multidisciplinary nature. And yet, the very range of

theories, methods, and disciplines means that EU studies risks being seen as little more than a patchwork quilt, or merely "area studies" rather than social *science*.

How then to integrate the field and to allocate funds appropriately? I have no substantive answer to this question. But there may very well be a procedural one: the European Community Studies Association, together with the regionally based European Union Centers in the United States, would provide the fora in which American scholars who study the EU could begin to build toward a more integrated field.

The idea is to facilitate intellectual interchange among scholars who focus on similar problems but take different theoretical, methodological, or disciplinary perspectives. Through the ECSA conference in Madison in June 2001 as well as through workshops sponsored by the European Union Centers, both before and after the conference, we would be able to create a new, on-going dynamic of research cooperation. Instead of the standard patchwork of conference panels or workshops, where participants come together only once, we would enable people to collaborate together on a longer time frame, in order to allow for a truly productive exchange of ideas. Such working groups could also become the basis for new interest sections in ECSA, which could themselves in turn sponsor workshops at European Union Centers (or elsewhere) and panels at future ECSA conferences.

The challenge for the next millennium, in short, is for ECSA and the ten European Union Centers to work together to provide the fora and the funding necessary for ECSA members and European Union Center participants to be able to collaborate with one another in the intellectual work necessary to the integration of EU studies as a field.

This issue of the *ECSA Review* includes a set of essays, organized by Executive Committee member Mark Pollack, which together form a current "state of the European Union" survey of the major events of 1999. As in each issue of the *Review*, we also offer our regular "Teaching the EU" column, essays on new EU-focused books, and more. We welcome your feedback on this and all ECSA endeavors.

—VIVIEN A. SCHMIDT, *Boston University*

Coordinator of the Network of European Union Centers

The European Union in 1999: Finances, Institutions, and War

THE GERMAN PRESIDENCY OF the European Union (January-June 1999) inherited a full political agenda, including the long-awaited launch of the new single currency, as well as the negotiation of the Commission's "Agenda 2000" financial package. In addition to these pre-scheduled issues, however, the German Presidency also encountered two major institutional developments—the resignation of the Santer Commission in March, and the election of a new center-right majority in the European Parliament in June—and a major foreign policy issue, namely NATO's war in Kosovo and its aftermath. In this *ECSA Review*, four ECSA members analyze the events of the German Presidency and discuss their implications for the long-term development of the Union. In the first of the following four essays, Carl Lankowski reviews the "Red-Green German Presidency," with particular attention to the ways in which the Presidency was shaped by the domestic politics of Germany's first federal coalition between the Social Democratic Party and the Greens, as well as the intra-party rivalry between Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Finance Minister Oskar Lafontaine, whose resignation in March opened the way for a more centrist approach from the new government. Next, John Peterson examines the surprise resignation of the Santer Commission, and reassesses our scholarly evaluation of Santer in light of the Commission's political demise. In the third essay, Brigid Laffan analyses the negotiation and outcome of the Berlin European Council, which agreed the Agenda 2000 financial package for the period 2000-2006. The final package, Laffan points out, limits the Union to its existing financial ceiling of 1.27% of the Union's GDP, but the new financial perspectives are likely to come under strain when new members begin to join the EU early in the next century. Finally, Amie Kreppel discusses the historic victory in the June European Parliament elections of the center-right People's Party of Europe, which won a larger number of seats than the Socialist group for the first time in two decades. The resulting polarization of the Parliament into left- and right-wing blocs, she argues, may introduce a new ideological debate into the Parliament, but it does so at the risk of endangering the legislative capacity of the Parliament, and thus of the Union itself.

—Mark A. Pollack

Germany's 1999 EU Council Presidency Carl Lankowski

THE SEPTEMBER 1998 FEDERAL elections led to a national coalition government of Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens

(Bündnis 90-Die Grünen) with a ten-vote Bundestag majority and raised expectations about the orchestration of an EU reform agenda. After all, the German result meant that social democratic participation in national governments figured in all but two EU Member States. And both Germany and France, together traditionally the motor of integration, sported ministers of environment wearing the green party label, and environment is an issue-area with a particularly ambitious European vocation. Overall, this constellation might be said to embody an important juncture in the EU's evolving political culture.

Germany's Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer stood well within the rhetorically "post-Westphalian" tradition of his party as he launched the presidency with a speech on January 13 to the European Parliament. The speech was notable for its forthright arguments in favor of developing and formalizing the EU as a constitutional order aspiring to greater social balance that is also inclusive of eastern Europe.

While the German presidency managed the big issues and surprises it inherited well and did manage to set some policy accents, problems of coordination led to some blunders and rhetoric outran policy deliverables in at least one key area. The central inherited agenda included the "Agenda 2000" financial package, the European employment pact, and the launch of Economic and Monetary Union, which started on schedule with the New Year and without major problems. The major surprises were the resignation of the Commission on March 16, necessitating the nomination of a new Commission president, and the war in Kosovo (NATO's air campaign was launched on March 24). In addition, the Amsterdam Treaty came into force, which mandates a more ambitious EU role in foreign, security and defense affairs. "Amsterdam" also assigns greater legislative and countervailing powers to the European Parliament, the regular election of which occurred in June.

The German presidency booked two signal achievements. The first was the successful outcome of the March 24-26 European Council in Berlin devoted to Agenda 2000, which established a financial framework designed to accommodate the first stage of eastern enlargement without breaking the budget (see Laffan essay below).

The second major success of the German presidency, the EU response to the Kosovo war, may presage a major turning point in its ability to pursue a common foreign and security policy. German leadership played a central role in this critical process. Foreign Minister Fischer's "six-point plan" provided an essential strategic framework for resolving the crisis in a manner that would hold NATO together, bring in the Russians, and define a role for the EU. That role is now materializing in the form of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, the outline of which was agreed at the June European Council in Cologne. Implicitly, this role also includes the possibility of EU military operations in similar circumstances, even without direct U.S. participation. The political dimension of Fischer's leadership was notable for its effect on the political ethos within and beyond Germany. To

send German combat troops outside the NATO area, and for the first time not as part of a UN contingent, it was necessary to make the case for German international responsibility through Europe and with the Americans to skeptics in his own party and to the political class generally.

Still, the outcome to date also reveals how little European integration had resolved the question of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). After all, the air war was only possible because of the availability of U.S. planes, ordinance, logistics, intelligence and communications capabilities, systems which since the collapse of the Soviet Union have developed at a tempo that calls into question the basic technical inter-operability of NATO's national contingents. In this sense, the post-hostility celebration of European unity at the Cologne European Council in June, the naming of NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana as the first "Mr. CFSP," and the July Anglo-Italian initiative for European defense consolidation are rhetorical down-payments on defining the kind of actor "Europe" can be, as well as the interests on behalf of which and the circumstances in which it will act.

Germany's "red/green" government was not as successful on the employment and macroeconomic policy fronts. Finance Minister Oskar Lafontaine was the co-architect of the SPD 1998 federal electoral victory and chairman of that party. Inspired by France's notion of a countervailing power to the ECB, an ambitious strategy of euro-zone macroeconomic policy coordination was to have played a central role in reducing unemployment, the government's central objective. Lafontaine armed himself for the task by relocating responsibilities for EU policy coordination from the economics ministry to his own ministry, along with the statistical and economic forecasting units. The heart of the strategy was to be a program of controlled deflation designed to create the headroom for structural economic reforms prepared by neo-corporatist dialogues between representatives of management and employees, both at EU (Employment Pact) and national (Alliance for Jobs) levels. Already in October, Lafontaine began jawboning the Bundesbank to lower its interest rates to sustain a broad-based recovery and transferred his public pleading to the ECB after January 1. But Europe's central bankers were not amused by what they perceived as an encroachment on the perceived autonomy of the new institution. The German finance minister antagonized some of his EU counterparts when designs for tax harmonization were floated and irritated business in Germany with his domestic tax package. Also subjected to intramural sniping, rumored to have been encouraged in the Chancellery, Lafontaine resigned his government, party, and parliamentary posts dramatically on March 11, eerily presaging a change of course that parallels that undertaken under the Mitterrand government in 1983, when Jacques Delors was installed with the mandate to bring France into conformity with its neo-liberal European environment. The equivalent German shift in policy was signaled three months later with the publication of the long-awaited Blair/Schröder "third way/new middle" reform paper released the week before the European

Parliamentary elections. Thin in substance, the paper signaled "more market," a smaller and more effective public sector, and greater personal responsibility, though not a "market society."

However, encouragement issuing from the new single market/monetary union framework to greater flexibility in product, capital and labor markets gives the Blair/Schröder paper the look of a lagging rather than a leading indicator. The Agenda 2000 agreement preserves the basically austere fiscal architecture of European integration. In this context, the much-vaunted EU Employment Pact could add little more to the process begun in Essen in 1994 during the last German Council presidency than a commitment to hold "macro-economic dialogues" in ECOFIN Councils.

Paradoxically, German leadership was weakest and coordination problems most in evidence in the policy area in which it had enjoyed its strongest reputation: the environment. Germany did put the idea of an energy tax back on the EU agenda, preparing for it well with the adoption of its own domestic eco-tax. But since it was a tax, the project fell within the domain of the finance ministers. Indeed, the high expectations environmentalists placed in Germany's Green Environmental Minister Jürgen Trittin were subverted on several occasions, most dramatically when Schröder, bending to lobbying from Volkswagen, instructed Trittin to hold up implementation of the already agreed end-of-life auto-recycling directive. The latter action led to an immediate uproar within the EU environmental policy community that encompassed the Commission and all of the other environmental ministers except the British, whose Prime Minister Tony Blair was lobbied by Schröder on the matter. Still, some progress was achieved in advancing strategies to integrate environmental dimension into other policy areas, and on chemicals policy and labeling of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). In the end, the NGO verdict on Germany's environmental policy stewardship is revealing: "In EU policy the German government showed almost no respect for its European partners, above all the smaller ones, and showed little understanding of and sensitivity to political procedures and decision-making processes in Brussels" (see Greger 1999).

Outside of NATO, transatlantic relations were taken up in the semi-annual US-EU Summit, held on 21 June in Bonn. The fact that Germany also chaired the G8 this year simplified coordination over resolving the Kosovo conflict and formulating Balkans Stability Pact. In advance of the summit, yet another transatlantic civil society dialogue was launched. The Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue (TAED) brought representatives from several dozen American and European NGOs together from 1-3 May in Brussels in a meeting hosted by the European Environmental Bureau (EEB). Several working groups were formed, which released statements at the NGO-government forum phase of the exercise that were critical of the fundamental lack of attention to sustainability issues in the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP). For their part, the governments agreed at their June summit to set

up an “early warning system” to head off trade disputes over hot button issues in sectors such as agricultural biotechnology going into the WTO ministerial scheduled for November in Seattle.

Despite its election-conditioned late start and lack of seasoning, the Schröder/Fischer team acquitted itself reasonably well in directing the first red/green EU Council presidency. While Fischer reassured his colleagues with respect to Germany’s fundamental commitment to deeper and wider integration and demonstrated an impressive ability to bind the 68ers to this project even when it required compromises with fervently held beliefs, Schröder represented German interests with a directness that his predecessor would not allow. Sometimes lines were crossed and sensitivities needlessly abraded. So it is emblematic that Germany’s EU stewardship came to a close with the Chancellor instructing his ministers not to participate in Council meetings where German was not used as an official working language.

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Jacques Santer: The EU’s Gorbachev **John Peterson**

FOR YEARS, THE RUNNING gag about the European Commission was that half of its officials worked far too hard for their own good, and the other half did no work at all. The trouble was that it was impossible to tell which half was which. Like most allegories, this one had an element of truth. Starting in the mid-1980s, the Commission began to take on a progressively wider and more ambitious array of policy tasks, especially after 1989 when it became the ringleader of western aid to the East, without anything close to a commensurate increase in resources. Metcalfe’s (1992) portentous portrait of a Commission destined to drown in a sea of responsibilities, most of which it had accepted with great enthusiasm and pride, had more EU scholars than usual scrambling to get hold of the *Australian Journal of Public Administration*.

Few scholars doing fieldwork in Brussels during the latter part of Jacques Delors’ Presidency (1985-94) could have failed to notice that the Commission had become overburdened, under-resourced, and badly managed. The power of *cabinets*, or personal advisors of Commissioners, to intervene in the work of the services on behalf of national capitals was one of the great untold stories of Brussels policy-making, until Ross’ (1995) insider’s study of the Delors *cabinet* was published. The Commission appeared relatively unconcerned about results and implementation, as opposed to fresh ideas and initiatives. No one pretended that the internal market really existed at the end of 1992.

The EU’s eastern aid programmes, PHARE and TACIS, saw large amounts of money earmarked for purposes (and recipients) ranging from laudable to dubious, with management in the hands of a very few, often quite young, and ferociously overworked officials. The Maastricht Treaty negotiations produced a result at odds with the Commission’s (especially Delors’) preferences. Denmark’s rejection of the Treaty in the 1992 referendum, followed by the Bosnian war, cast a pallor over the end of the Delors era.

Jacques Santer was nobody’s first choice to succeed Delors, but his commitment to “doing less, but doing it better” seemed a sensible tonic for the Commission. A pared-down legislative agenda was inevitable after the single market programme was essentially finished (if far from fully implemented). Still, most proposals tabled by the Commission after 1994 seemed better-researched, more cost-conscious and less picked at by *cabinets*. In contrast to Delors, Santer took an avid interest in the management of the Commission, particularly rivalries between its services (i.e., industry v. environment) and Commissioners. Financial management preoccupied the Commission in ways unimaginable during the Delors years, with Budget Commissioner Erkki Liikanen seeking to establish a new “value for money” ethos. An ambitious internal evaluation entitled *Designing Tomorrow’s Commission* was launched in 1998 to try to cut down on duplication, overlap and waste.

Most assessments of the Santer Commission have emphasised a changed political environment, far less conducive to “great leaps forward” in European integration. Many have acknowledged Santer’s lack of vision, but still been upbeat about his reformist ambitions. Contributing to a comparative study of political corruption, the present author concluded that—given all of its limitations and frailties—the Commission was a “remarkably proficient bureaucracy” (Peterson 1997: 562). A later, retrospective appraisal argued that Santer “had earned a reputation as a competent, ‘safe pair of hands’” who had, above all, presided over the launch of the Euro, which was “surely enough to earn any Commission President a proud legacy” (Peterson 1999: 61).

Before the latter analysis was even published, Santer had resigned in disgrace. The report of a “Committee of Independent Experts” (1999: 144), convened by the European Parliament (EP), into allegations of nepotism and mismanagement in the Commission offered a devastating critique of a bureaucracy in which it was “becoming difficult to find anyone who has even the slightest sense of responsibility.” Whatever future historians conclude, Santer’s legacy seems unlikely to be “proud.”

Were EU scholars seduced by Santer’s (and Liikanen’s) reformist rhetoric? The Commission is surely one of the world’s most open bureaucracies, in terms of access to officials—most keen to defend their institution—

by scholars seeking interviews and advice. Hunters captured by the game? Shame on us?

There is no question that Santer showed a lack of political judgment in the spring of 1999. When the Commission's long-running battle with the EP over budgetary improprieties and allegations of nepotism (especially against Edith Cresson) came to a head, Santer's acknowledged lack of political weight (see Peterson 1999: 52-54; Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 41) cost him dearly. It is also clear that Santer—by all accounts amiable, affable, and known to friends as “Champagne Jacques”—was a victim of bad luck.

The Santer Commission did more than any before it to try to improve the way the “house” worked (see Laffan 1997; Peterson 1997; Cram 1999). It encountered a formidable array of problems and obstacles to reform, many of which had become long and firmly rooted. Nine months before Santer's humiliating exit, EU Heads of Government had agreed a declaration at the June 1998 Cardiff summit congratulating the Commission for its efforts to improve its efficiency and management.

The “Independent Experts” had exactly five weeks to compile their report, yet went into painstaking detail about allegations that extended far back in time. In fact, most of the serious improprieties it uncovered—besides Cresson's—occurred during the Delors years. The bitter animosity between Delors and the Experts' chair, André Middlehoek, dating back to the latter's tenure as head of the EU's Court of Auditors, was clearly manifest in the report. The report revealed how personal battles can quickly become inter-institutional in EU politics.

Once the Experts' report was published (on 15 March 1999), matters moved much faster than Santer could control them. With an EP vote on a motion of censure pending, the Socialist Group leader, Pauline Green, said she would urge her group to vote to sack all 20 Commissioners on the strength of the report. Santer reportedly pleaded with Cresson to resign, and tried to convince both the French President and Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin, to urge to her to do the same, but was rebuffed by all three. At an all-night meeting of the college of Commissioners, Santer prevaricated and gave no clear lead. Eventually, Neil Kinnock (Commissioner for Transport) and Karel Van Miert (Competition)—both Socialists, like Cresson (as well as one other Commissioner, precisely whom is disputed) unveiled letters of resignation to their colleagues, urging each of them to fall on their swords, too. If all members of the college *except* Cresson did likewise, according to the thinking, then the EP's motion of censure would be highly personalised since Cresson would technically be the “entire Commission.” When the drift of the meeting became clear, Santer urged that the entire Commission, since it was a collegial body, should resign. But the idea did not originate with Santer.

The following morning, Santer appeared at a press conference that was the focus of intense, pan-European media interest, a very rare commodity in the EU. Santer was combative and petulant, insisting that the Experts' report was “wholly unjustified in tone.” Santer's defiance was clearly ill-judged but his fate appeared to have been sealed by a random interpretation gaffe. Asked about charges that his wife had real estate interests in buildings used by the EU in Luxembourg, Santer responded (correctly) that the experts' Report (p.133) had found the charges to be unfounded. Thus the President declared (in French) himself *blanchi*, or exonerated and free of guilt. Yet, the phrase was interpreted into English as “I am whiter than white,” a sound byte which led most stories in the English-speaking media (including the BBC and *Financial Times*). Language can still be a formidable barrier to understanding in the New Europe.

Afterwards, Santer's support evaporated quickly. José María Gil-Robles, the President of the EP (and, like Santer, a Christian Democrat), bellowed that the entire Commission had to “leave now and not in nine months time.” Even the former British Prime Minister, John Major, Santer's main backer in 1994—describing him then as “the right man in the right place at the right time”—admitted that he had been “the wrong choice.”

Less than ten days after Santer's resignation, the European Council chose his successor, the former Prime Minister of Italy, Romano Prodi, at the Berlin summit. In assembling his new team, Prodi's own prerogative was strengthened considerably by new Amsterdam Treaty provisions—for which Santer had campaigned hard—stating that future Commissioners would be nominated “by common accord with the nominee for President” and “work under the political guidance of the President.” Prodi did not veto any national candidates for the Commission and had to operate within distinct political limits. Yet, several of his own preferences clearly were heeded (see Peterson and Bomberg 1999). Afterwards, Prodi bluntly insisted that his Commission would act as a “European government,” with himself playing the role of Prime Minister. His own sweeping proposals for reforming the Commission, and consolidating his own power over it, explicitly drew on the final report arising from Designing Tomorrow's Commission.

Santer thus became the EU's Gorbachev: swept away by the tide of reform he himself unleashed. The launch of the Euro *was*, at least, an administrative triumph for Santer, but the political battle had already been won, in key respects, by Delors. Not everyone in the Commission liked or supported Delors, but his dynamic leadership created a powerful *esprit de corps*. In times of trouble the Commission closed ranks, defended the institution, and articulated a vision of a united Europe that rallied key allies, including many in the EP. Santer's lack of vision,

and comparatively weak leadership, left him isolated when crunch time came in March 1999.

Interesting days are ahead for students of the Commission. Arguably, the new Commission looks less impressive on paper than its predecessor, but Prodi has very high ambitions for restoring the Commission's prestige. Failure is likely to mean a permanent swing in the institutional balance of power towards the Council (and, in some respects, the EP). Of course, advocates of intergovernmentalist models of EU politics would argue that it makes little difference who heads the Commission: personalities and institutions don't really matter, at least compared to national preferences. We shall see.

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The Berlin Summit: Process and Outcome of the Agenda 2000 Budgetary Proposals **Brigid Laffan**

THE FUTURE FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE for the European Union agreed at Berlin (24-25 March 1999) was the third major budgetary package deal negotiated by the Union since February 1988. The aim of this brief assessment of the Berlin agreement is to analyse the processes that led to the final deal and the outcome that was achieved.

From Proposals to Negotiating Framework

The boundaries of the negotiations were established by the July 1997 Agenda 2000 proposals that set out the Commission's opinions on the applicants, the future financing of the budget from 2000 to 2006, and related reforms of the structural funds and the common agricultural policy (CAP). The Commission's proposals were conservative and cautious. The Commission pitched the "own resources" ceiling at 1.27 per cent of GNP, the level agreed for the Delors 2 package. Within this ceiling, the Commission proposed some increase in structural spending and extensive reform of the milk, beef and cereal regimes.

At the Cardiff European Council (15-16 June 1998), March 1999 was set as the deadline for agreement on the overall package. Consequently the future financial package was a central part of the Austrian Presidency programme (latter half of 1998) and the top priority of the German Presidency (first half of 1999). The negotiations were taken very seriously in all of the national capitals and by the EU institutions because the outcome would have an impact on the relative benefits and costs of the EU budget for some time to come. The negotiations were broken down into three negotiating chapters or "boxes"—the future financial perspective, the structural funds, and the CAP. The General

Affairs Council acted as the overall co-ordinator and filter to the European Council, where all of the critical decisions were taken. The ECOFIN Council dealt with the financial aspects of the financial perspective and the Agricultural Council was responsible for the CAP dossiers. The formal Council sub-structure—COREPER, the Special Agricultural Committee and the relevant working parties—met intensively during the German Presidency. This formal institutional structure was augmented by a number of high-level groups that were crucial to an agreed outcome. These were a Friends of the Presidency Group, a Structural Actions Group (Treasury attachés in the Permanent Representations) and a third group involving the Secretaries General of the national agricultural ministries. The complexity of the issues required a strengthening of the formal Council system to add negotiating capacity.

From Framework to Deal

The main cleavage was between the net beneficiaries and the net contributors but there were others. There were differences between the big budgetary paymasters and those that contributed proportionately less, between the CAP supporters club and those wanting deep reform, and between the UK with its tailored made rebate and those arguing for a generalised rebate system. A key feature of the Agenda 2000 negotiations was the high decibel demands from the net contributors for a more equitable system of burden sharing. Germany was to the fore in demanding a reduction in its onerous contributions. The Netherlands was also a key player in the net contributors club as it had become a major contributor in per capita terms. Sweden and Austria, two new member states, added to the chorus of states demanding a fairer budgetary deal. France, as a marginal net contributor, was identified as one of those states that would have to carry a larger financial burden. While recognising that there would have to be changes, France was not going to surrender its receipts from the CAP without a fierce diplomatic battle. The UK wanted to protect the status quo, especially its rebate system.

The net beneficiaries or the cohesion club wanted to maintain the key features of the Union's cohesion policies. Spain adopted a very entrenched negotiating position, aided by Greece and Portugal. Ireland found itself in a difficult position as economic growth in the 1990s decisively altered its socio-economic position. The applicant states were bystanders to the internal EU negotiations, knowing that failure to agree to a new financial package would undermine their bid for membership.

In October 1998, the Commission published a report on the system of "own resources," a report that was designed to illustrate who paid what and who benefited from the EU budget. The report confirmed that Germany, followed by Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands and Britain were the paymasters. It also illustrated that the UK rebate was no longer as justified as it once was. The Commission, in a proposal that would prove highly controversial, suggested that a partial re-nationalisation of the CAP would re-balance the budget and would alleviate the costs of the CAP.

When the German Presidency took over in January 1999, it faced the formidable task of getting unanimous agreement from the member states on the overall package. Few would have predicted that this could be achieved. Yet in Berlin, the member states reached agreement after a tortuous summit which was preceded by a very intensive round of meetings at all levels in the Council hierarchy. The agreement was achieved in traditional EU style by a series of compromises and deals. Germany was faced with the trade off between a successful Presidency and its domestic preferences for a much reduced contribution to the budget. The Schröder government opted for a successful presidency, confirming the well known insider view that “the Presidency costs.” Three events in March—the resignation of German Finance Minister Oskar Lafontaine, the resignation of the entire Santer Commission, and the outbreak of war in Kosovo just as the government leaders met in Berlin—added urgency to their task.

What Kind of Deal

At an early stage in the negotiations, the member states agreed to ring-fence pre-accession aid and budgetary resources for the applicants once they joined. The proposals identified 2002 as the earliest possible date of entry. If a

longer time frame, as is likely, for accession is required, the enlargement reserve cannot be used to finance policies in the existing union (see Table 1). The message on enlargement was that it was affordable and could be accommodated within tight budgetary limits (for the details of the agreement, see the Berlin Presidency Conclusions on the Web at europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/mar99_en.htm).

The Commission’s “own resources” report and the caution of its original proposals meant that budgetary stabilisation was central to the outcome. By March 1999, the key debate was about how much money should be allocated to overall Union expenditure, and how this should be distributed among the different budgetary headings. The Commission’s projected commitments budget for 2006 of 105.2 billion euro (EU 15) was reduced to 90.2 billion euro at Berlin. The outcome was thus a consolidation of the European Union’s public finance capacity rather than the significant increases recorded in 1988 and 1992. The ceiling on payments as a percentage of gross national product was pitched at 1.13% for 2006, well within the 1.27% in the existing “own resources” margin (see Table 1 below).

TABLE 1: FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK, EU-21

(Source: Berlin European Council Presidency Conclusions)

EUR million - 1999 prices	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Appropriations for commitments							
1. Agriculture	40920	42800	43900	43770	42760	41930	41660
2. Structural Operations	32045	31455	30865	30285	29595	29595	29170
3. Internal Policies	5900	5960	6000	6050	6100	6150	6200
4. External Action	4550	4560	4570	4580	4590	4600	4610
5. Administration	4560	4600	4700	4800	4900	5000	5100
6. Reserves	900	900	650	400	400	400	400
7. Pre-Accession Aid	3120	3120	3120	3120	3120	3120	3120
8. Enlargement			6450	9030	11610	14200	16780
TOTAL COMMITMENTS	91995	93385	100255	102035	103075	104995	107040
TOTAL PAYMENTS	89590	91070	98270	101450	100610	102350	101530
<i>of which: enlargement</i>			4140	6710	8890	11440	14210
Payments as % of GDP	1.13%	1.12%	1.14%	1.15%	1.11%	1.09%	1.09%
Margin	0.14%	0.15%	0.13%	0.12%	0.16%	0.18%	0.18%
Own Resources Ceiling	1.27%	1.27%	1.27%	1.27%	1.27%	1.27%	1.27%

Agriculture proved, not unexpectedly, to be one of the most difficult issues to achieve agreement on. The Commission's proposal that there should be a partial re-nationalisation of the CAP failed to fly when faced with the implacable opposition of the French. The outcome on agriculture fell well short of the Commission's proposals for reform. An Agricultural Council agreement in early March 1999 was seriously diluted at Berlin, when President Chirac played the "green card." Reform of the dairy regime was postponed, and the Commission's proposed cereal price cut of 20 per cent in 2000 was diluted to a reduction of 15 per cent in two stages by 2002. There must be serious questions over the outcome on agriculture, particularly its compatibility with the direction of world trade negotiations and the prospect of enlargement. A number of review clauses on agriculture in the Berlin Conclusions could well mean that the agricultural outcome agreed at Berlin will not survive intact to 2006. Spain proved to be the most trenchant negotiator on cohesion policy, unwilling to accept anything less than the 237 billion euros proposed by the Commission for cohesion spending over the seven year period. Known by its partners as the "no, no, no state," its position began to shift in the lead-up to the European Council. The Berlin outcome amounted to 213 billion euro.

Unfinished Business

The EU managed to find the negotiating capacity to agree a deal at Berlin, notwithstanding the complexities and controversies of the issues at stake. In the end, none of the member states wanted to re-open the bruising budgetary battles of the past. The shadow of Kosovo and the institutional crisis engendered by the demise of the Santer Commission was sufficient to promote compromise. Although the German Presidency gained, German domestic preferences were once again sacrificed. France and the UK clearly won the diplomatic game although the question of a generalised rebate mechanism and further reform of the CAP will return to the agenda. The cohesion states managed to protect financial flows from the structural and cohesion funds, although this package must be viewed as the last large envelope they are likely to receive. The Berlin financial perspective remains a pre-enlargement perspective, an agreement for the fifteen.

Brigid Laffan is Jean Monnet Professor of European Politics, University College Dublin.

The June 1999 Elections, Amsterdam, and the Perils of Ideology

Amie Kreppel

THE JUNE 1999 ELECTIONS were significant for the future of Europe in several respects. An unprecedented level of apathy among European voters marked the latest elections. Overall turnout was the lowest ever at just under 50% with an all-time low of 23% in the UK. Additionally, for the first time since direct elections began in 1979 the center-right People's Party of Europe (PPE), now the PPE and European Democrats,

gained a plurality of the 626 seats in the European Parliament (EP). With 233 seats they hold over 50 seats more than the 180 seats controlled by the second largest party, the Socialist Party of Europe (PSE). Most recently, during the first plenary session of the new Parliament (July 19-23) these electoral results led to the first seriously contested election for the position of President of the EP since at least 1989 when the two largest groups agreed to rotate the post between them every 2½ years. While much attention is currently being given to the European voter apathy and low turnout, I focus here on the emerging potential for an ideological divide in the newly elected EP and the possible consequences for the EU as a whole.

There were three candidates officially contesting the July Presidential election: the Finnish Green Heidi Hautala, the Portuguese Socialist Mario Soares and the French PPE candidate Nicole Fontaine. Although the latter easily won in the first ballot, the political drama surrounding her election was unprecedented in the last 15 years. Generally the PPE and PSE agree ahead of time on a candidate and the other party group waits until the second half of the parliamentary term for their candidate to hold the office. In the most recent presidential elections neither party group was willing to wait so both ran candidates (a third candidate from a smaller group like the Greens frequently runs but is of little practical significance). There were numerous political reasons for both the PPE and PSE to insist on their candidate for the first part of the legislative term. The Socialists, expecting to win the elections, had already chosen the distinguished Mario Soares of Portugal and could not easily ask him to cool his heels for a few years. On the other side the PPE felt that it had justly won the right to elect the first president of the term, having emerged as the largest group in the new Parliament. The result was an extremely contentious battle that led to a tremendous increase in the importance of the Liberal group, since whichever side they chose was likely to win. In the end, Fontaine was elected as the first president of the new parliament, with Liberal leader Pat Cox to take over for the subsequent 2½ years of the term. The overall result was to make this presidential election fundamentally different from those of the past 15 years by injecting a level of ideological tension not frequently seen in the EP on major institutional questions.

To understand the impact of the elections and the potential significance of the apparently new sense of competition between the PPE and PSE it is important to remember some basic facts about the EP, its internal structure and its developmental history. The Parliament is the only directly elected body in the European Union. It is also the only body that represents the vast majority of the national level political parties, as opposed to just those in Government. The EP has long been the institutional stepchild of the legislative process in the EU. Between 1958 and 1970 it had only consultative powers and these only in some areas. In 1970 and 1975 it was given partial budgetary powers. In 1986 the first real leap forward occurred in the legislative realm with the

Single European Act (SEA) and the addition of the cooperation procedure. These powers were expanded further with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 which introduced co-decision I and II respectively. In terms of legislative powers the Parliament is now generally considered to be influential, although the extent of that influence is still very much a subject of debate (Tsebelis, 1996, 1995, 1994; Scully, 1997; Moser, 1996; Kreppel, forthcoming). What is crucial to remember, and I will return to this shortly, is that the EP is not now, nor will it ever be, a legislative hegemon within the EU. The Parliament is an equal (or almost equal depending on your view) partner in what is a legislative triumvirate.

Within the Parliament the PPE and PSE have been the two largest groups since the Parliament was created in 1958 and even before then in the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Between them they have consistently controlled 50%–70% of the seats in the Parliament. This is significant because it means that together they can accomplish anything, but in opposition they can stalemate the entire Parliament, or even the legislative process as a whole (especially now under co-decision II). During the years following the SEA the two groups have consistently worked together to further the institutional and legislative interests of the EP as a whole (Kreppel and Tsebelis, forthcoming; Kreppel, 1999, 1998). Although there are clear areas which divide the two groups ideologically, and for which compromise is not possible, they vote together between 60%–70% of the time across legislative procedure and stage (Kreppel, 1999, 1998).

The high level of cooperation between the two groups has drawn frequent comment and criticisms from within (primarily the Liberal and other small groups) and outside of the Parliament (Corbett *et al.*, 1995; Dinan, 1994). The apparent lack of a clear ideological left-right divide in the EP has been seen as a sign of its weakness and institutional immaturity (Westlake, 1994; Nugent, 1994). I address the accuracy of this assertion elsewhere (Kreppel, 1999). What is important here is the potential usefulness of this situation, not for the two parties involved (as is often asserted) but for the Parliament and indeed the European Union as a whole. And here I remind the reader of the cooperative nature of the legislative game in the EU. The Commission, at least a qualified majority of the Council and a majority (or absolute majority) of the EP must all agree for legislation to be introduced and successfully passed under cooperation and co-decision I and II. These two procedures now account for roughly 25–30% of all EU legislation and often the most controversial and significant (such as the single market harmonization plan).

Given that neither the Commission nor the Council, which appoints it, has ever consisted of a single party, or even a single political family, compromise is a fundamental requirement of all EU policy. This is an accepted aspect of both the Council and the Commission. The first consists of national leaders representing national interests and national governments that are generally of the ideological center-left or center-right (but rarely both). The Commission is a “collegial” body that works under the auspices of collective

responsibility. Although officially free from national interests, its Members often take part in political party meetings and are clearly aligned with the major political families. Proof of the importance of the ideological background of Commission Members can be seen in the current debate in Germany over the appointment of a Socialist and a Green as the new German Commissioners despite the landslide of the Christian Democrat CDU-CSU in the June EP elections. Despite the significance of ideology in both of these institutions collegiality and compromise are the norm, so why then should we expect or want ideological dogmatism from the third player in the legislative game?

Although it is tempting to compare the EP to the national parliaments of the Member States and judge it on those grounds, to do so is fundamentally mistaken. The EP has no Government to sustain in office and no single institution in the EU is hegemonic in the legislative arena. While it's true that the Parliament and the Commission are becoming more closely linked since Maastricht and Amsterdam, the relationship is still quite far from the norm in the Member States. The EU executive is fundamentally independent. This frees the Parliament from the need to form static coalitions of the majority versus the minority. In this sense it is very similar to the US Congress. Not unsurprisingly in the USA, where the legislature is also free from responsibility of supporting a Government, there is a great deal of bipartisan activity. Indeed, the similarities do not stop there. In the USA, as in the EU, there is a legislative triumvirate. The House of Representatives, the Senate and the President must all agree for legislation to be passed. Given the norm of divided government in the post war era a similar need for compromise is clear. Even veto overrides require such vast majorities that they must fundamentally be bipartisan.

What does all this mean? Perhaps it means that we should reassess the role of ideology within the EP taking into account the broader EU institutional environment and not national political norms. It means that we should be wary of an ideologically dogmatic EP. This is especially true given the new powers allotted to the EP by the Amsterdam Treaty (particularly co-decision II) and the current ideological divide between the largely left-leaning Council (eleven of fifteen Members are Socialist) and the right-leaning EP majority.¹ If the past trend of general ideological compromise were abandoned it is easy to imagine an extremely conflictual relationship developing between the Council and the EP, which have never been on the best of terms. The newly implemented co-decision II procedure now requires that a compromise be reached between the EP and the Council in conciliation if EP amendments cannot be adopted outright or the legislation fails. Thus, a dogmatically ideological Parliament could effectively stall further integration if it were so inclined. At the very least its ability to blackmail the Council has significantly increased and could potentially have a chilling effect on the integration process. This is particularly worrying given the challenges of enlargement that loom in the not-too-distant future.

This is an extremely brief forum in which to deal with a very complex issue. Several aspects of this potential problem have been ignored such as the details on the voting procedures and the impact of absenteeism on any EP activity. But the fundamental argument is an important one. Anyone who has paid attention to the rhetoric surrounding the EP and the party groups recently is familiar with call for less cooperation between the PPE and PSE and a greater role for ideology. A young member of the Socialist group nicely summed up this position. When I asked if he was disappointed by the decision of Liberals to align with the PPE, meaning that the Socialists would fail to obtain the presidency during this legislative term he replied "not at all, at least now there will be democracy in the EP. I would rather be in the opposition than continue the undemocratic alliance between the PSE and PPE." This may well be a rallying cry for the masses, a way to help raise interest and participation in European elections, but it could also very easily damage the delicate balance that is the foundation of EU integration.² European integration is fundamentally about compromise between both national and ideological interests. The norm of compromise between the PPE and PSE may have been due to majority voting requirements or a more base desire for internal power. Regardless, it has served a very real purpose and allowed the EP to have a significant impact of the legislative output of the EU (Kreppel, forthcoming). If it ends and dogmatism becomes the norm, the EP risks at best its own marginalization and at worst the stagnation of EU policy on a broad scale.

1. I say majority because of the recent deal struck between the PPE and the Liberal group, the ELDR. Although clearly labeled a "constitutive agreement" only for the purposes of the Presidential elections and the internal Members Statute, there is a diffused belief within the EP and the press that the deal marks a greater level of cooperation between the two groups against the Socialists and other left-wing party groups.

2. It has been suggested that the lack of an apparent ideological divide is in part to blame for voter disinterest, although the more frequently blamed culprit is the recent Commission scandal that forced the resignation of the Santer Commission in March and reinforced perceptions of EU corruption.

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
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Teaching the EU

Editor's note: In response to member interest, this column is a regular feature of the ECSA Review. Suggestions and essays from ECSA members for this column are welcomed.

Team-Teaching the EU Across Disciplines

Katja Weber and Bettina Cothran

WITH AN EVER INCREASING focus on globalization many universities recently have internationalized their curriculum and encouraged faculty to be more open to innovative teaching techniques. A few months ago I took up this challenge by team-teaching a course on the European Union in German with a colleague from the Department of Modern Languages at Georgia Tech. Since "teaching across the curriculum" turned out to be a rewarding way to introduce students to the European Union, we would like to share our experiences.

We began by applying for a German Academic Exchange Service Team Teaching Grant to free up time for course development. Since our course "The New Europe: A Close-up View of the European Union" (*Das Neue Europa: Die Europäische Union im Blickpunkt*) covered the subject matter in a foreign language, we combined the expertise of a political scientist fluent in German with the expertise of a language professor knowledgeable in applied subject matters. Both of us are familiar with the Internet and we used Web-CT course tools¹ to provide on-line study guides and discussion questions.

Our course was open to students from all majors who had studied German for at least two years. We ended up with a diverse group—both in terms of majors (international affairs, computer science, economics, engineering) and language skills (native Germans, advanced and intermediate speakers).

Topics and Materials

We focused on "the usual suspects" as topics for introductory EU courses. We began with a video entitled *Was wäre, wenn es die EU nicht gäbe?* (What would the world look like without the EU?)—an authentic television clip pedagogically prepared for viewing by students. We then turned to a historical introduction of the European Union, scrutinized the various member-states and the main political institutions, examined the Economic and Monetary Union, the

Common Foreign and Security Policy, U.S.-EU relations, and, finally, engaged in "widening versus deepening" debates.

We assigned one English text as background reading, and then based our lectures on two German textbooks, numerous German newspaper articles, and German Web sites. The assigned materials were:

- Neill Nugent, *The Government and Politics of the European Union* (4th ed.) Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999
- "Europa 2000: Die Europäische Union," Bonn: Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1998 (an authentic information text booklet)
- Helga Seel, "Deutschland in Europa-Europa in Deutschland," Bonn: Inter Nationes, 1995 (a collection of texts, cartoons, etc. prepared for classroom teaching)
- Articles from the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *der Spiegel*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, etc.

Particularly helpful Web sites are (all from the EU's Web site, "Europa"):

- europa.eu.int/abc-de.htm
(the ABCs of the EU given in German)
- europa.eu.int/abc/obj/chrono/de/index.htm
(the history of the EU)
- europa.int/en/eu/states.htm
(background on the member-states)

Course Objectives/Requirements

Our goal was to equip students to think critically about the EU and to prepare them for the demands of an increasingly global marketplace by encouraging them to use their foreign language skills in an area in which they were gaining expertise. Moreover, we sought to enhance student learning by integrating an on-line component. We also sought to hone language skills, provide advanced specialized vocabulary, and enhance discussion techniques.

Each student had to give one PowerPoint presentation introducing one EU member-state (students doubled up for some of the larger countries) and hand in a written (three-page) report summarizing the main findings. We required two further reports (three pages typed double-spaced) in which the students had to demonstrate understanding of the workings of the EU, its goals, and underlying philosophies. All work was presented in German.

To test how much of the lecture and discussion material was retained by the students we administered a midterm and a final exam that included an oral section. The rest of the student's grade was based on quizzes and class participation.

Synopsis of a Typical Class Meeting

The class met twice a week for a total of three hours/week over a ten-week period. Before our first class meeting we had worked out a division of labor such that the political science professor would lecture and lead discussion on the topics to be addressed, whereas the language professor would be in charge of the linguistic aspects of the material to be covered.

Most of the time, we began our class in the language laboratory where a student (or a team of students) would

1. Web-CT is a tool that facilitates the creation of World Wide Web-based educational environments. It can be used to create an entire on-line course, or merely to supplement existing courses. Examples of course tools include timed quizzes, on-line grading, e-mail among course participants, course glossary, student progress tracking, student presentation areas, etc. For more information on Web-CT, instructors may consult www.webct.com/.

introduce one of the EU member-states via PowerPoint presentation. Typically, we saw a map of the country, its flag, sometimes listened to its national anthem, and then learned about the country's history, political and economic development, culture, scientific achievements, and role in the EU. Then the students were encouraged to ask questions and we compared the country to other EU members and the U.S.

These country profiles were then followed by lectures on specific topics and class discussions. To assure a change of pace and involve the more timid students, we often resorted to breaking up in discussion groups of 4 or 5 students. While the students were brainstorming we would sit in on group discussions to monitor progress. Occasionally, one of us would work with the more advanced students and the other with the intermediate level group to allow for discussions on different proficiency levels. Students then would report their group findings to the entire class.

We also visited the language lab to conduct Web exercises. Sometimes we asked the students to examine EU-related Web pages in German and to take note of two or three interesting facts dealing with the euro or security issues that the students then would have to share with the rest of the class. Or, we instructed the students to surf the Web to come up with a list of useful Web sites for a specific topic (enlargement; court cases; monetary union). We typically ended our classes by discussing homework assignments, returning previous exercises, and fielding questions or concerns.

Lessons Learned

For a teaching experiment like ours to work, both instructors must be interested in teaching the course and must be fully committed to its success. Team-work in all phases (course design, collecting materials, discussions, grading, etc.) is essential and one needs to understand that teaching across the curriculum, most likely, will be more time-consuming than a regular course.

Since this was the language instructor's second class taught under the aegis of "teaching across the curriculum" she was prepared for the challenges and rewards of this type of team-teaching effort. I, on the other hand, encountered a rocky start. I knew after the first class meeting that I would have to tone down my lectures considerably, since the students showed greater language problems than I had expected. And, initially, I found myself getting frustrated having to teach a course that, in my mind, was progressing at a "snail's pace" and that lacked the kind of detailed discussions I was used to from teaching EU courses in English.

The students' reception convinced me, however, that the benefits of our course definitely outweighed the costs, and hence that it was okay that we would not be able to cover as much material as in a similar course taught in the students' native languages. The tests showed clearly that the students were learning a lot about the subject matter, and class discussions revealed that language skills were improving

noticeably. Several weeks into the quarter the majority of our students began to show real enthusiasm for the subject matter, bringing newspaper clippings to class dealing with recent EU developments, initiating discussions about course related topics they found particularly interesting, and some students even continued their debates outside of class at German *Stammtisch* (gathering of German speakers on campus). We also received e-mails from students eager to engage us in scholarly discussions outside of class as well as repeated requests for information on our European Studies certificate. In short, student feedback was very positive and convinced us that we were, in fact, accomplishing a lot. Students said:

"I have really learned a ton about the European Union and I really feel my German is improving. I hope this course is offered again."

"The two professors complemented each others' styles well. Class discussions were of great benefit in improving language ability...the lectures were extremely informative and enjoyable."

"The class topics are interesting and exciting, which pertain to the world today. This class is a great course because it is a practical class. I think the class should continue to be taught in German, because the perspective is different."

Encouraged by our students' positive reactions, but at the same time realizing that there is room for improvement, we have already secured departmental permission to teach this course again. We also managed to obtain additional funding in the form of a University System of Georgia Course Enhancement Grant that will help us to increase the technology component of our course. Next on our agenda will be to create digital images, record and include sound and video in our Web pages, and to make greater use of the communication and management tools of Web-CT.

For us the bottom line is that teaching the EU across the curriculum makes a lot of sense. Ideally, we'd teach a course similar to the one outlined here in all major EU languages.

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ECSCA members interested in writing an essay for the "Teaching the EU" column should send an e-mail to Valerie Staats at <ecsa+@pitt.edu> with a one paragraph synopsis of the proposed topic. All academic disciplines are of interest.

Book Reviews

André Szász. The Road to European Monetary Union. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999, 258 pp.

IN THIS BOOK ANDRÉ Szász, former executive director of the Dutch Central Bank, adds his perspective on the political economy of the development of European monetary union in a historically based overview. While there is a wide field of new books on various aspects of European monetary union, this book's clear focus is on an insider's vision of the paths taken and avoided over the past thirty years. The book explains and illustrates the major stages in the progression toward monetary integration in Europe. Each step of the process from the Treaty of Rome up to the beginning of Stage Three of EMU is documented with references to the political actors and their actions. The Road to European Monetary Union's main strength is its clear and precise statement of the positions of the main political forces at work in shaping the degree of progression and precise direction of each step taken.

The book combines a straightforward presentation of the major stages and issues addressed during the long struggle to foster cooperative economic policies in dealing with exchange and interest rates and related matters of monetary policy. The approach delivers a nice blend of political and economic analysis. The political points most often relate to positioning the interests and bargaining strategies of the governments of the two major states, France and Germany, responsible for moving monetary union forward. Frequently, the governmental positions are contrasted with the stance taken by the central bankers, most often from either the Bundesbank or the Nederlandsche Bank. The political analysis is complemented with details concerning financial market reactions to the implementation of institutional reforms or interventions in foreign exchange markets, with the credibility of any policy change being measured by the standard of market reaction and sustainability.

The level of analysis is suitable for an audience of scholars interested in the general area of European integration. The presentation is not overly technical but does assume a basic knowledge of the workings of foreign exchange markets and in particular the relationships among central bank interest rate and money supply policies, exchange rates, and balance-of-payments accounts. Familiarity with the major arguments surrounding issues, e.g., the importance of the Maastricht fiscal criteria for membership in EMU, is important for the book's more in-depth discussions of the appropriate level and degree of economic and political integration in the EU.

Generally Szász's presentation resembles an annotated trip guide where each segment of the journey is clearly marked, e.g., the period of German reunification, and the highlights on route are pointed out, e.g., German monetary union. This approach succeeds for the traveler interested in getting from the point of origin to the final destination in an efficient

fashion. What it lacks is any guidance for travelers straying a bit from or wanting to explore off the designated route.

Specialists in the areas of European political economy and monetary theory and policy will be disappointed with the book. There are many other current books with much more detailed and advanced analysis of the economic problems inherent in the evolving EMU project. On the political-economy side Szász fails to give any depth to the presentation of the alternative positions and stances taken by governments engaged in the decision-making process. We are told what the French and German stances were and how they changed over time but we are left with little guidance in making more than simple conjectures about the dynamic political processes and forces at work in France and Germany which interacted to produce this particular set of governmental positions. As an alternative, readers interested in a fresh and insightful approach to such questions might wish to consult Karl Kaltenthaler's splendid recent work on the German side of the political relationships (Germany and the Politics of Europe's Money, Duke University Press, 1998).

In summary, Szász has produced a well-organized and well-written historical analysis of the interplay between central banks, governments, and financial markets in shaping the direction and results of alternative cooperative arrangements on monetary matters in Europe. While more specialized scholars will find the book of limited interest, the book should be welcomed by a more general audience of scholars and students of European integration.

**David L. Cleeton
Oberlin College**

David Hine and Hussein Kassim (eds.). Beyond the Market: The EU and National Social Policy. London: Routledge, 1998, 231 pp.

THE PRODUCT OF ONE of a series of ESRC-funded research seminars on the issue of state autonomy in the European Community, Beyond the Market: The EU and National Social Policy is an edited volume of essays which examine the impact of the European Union on the formation and content of national social policies. The book, which is edited by David Hine and Hussein Kassim, examines in detail the extent to which developments such as the growth of EC regulatory powers, the emergence of long-term unemployment, the gradual evolution of Euro-corporatism, and the increased social policy activism of the European Commission and Court of Justice have influenced the policy making capabilities of EU member state governments. Though it suffers from the kind of inconsistency that is common to many edited, multi-authored volumes, Beyond the Market does contain several timely and informative chapters that should be read with interest by scholars of both European integration and comparative European politics.

Though the issue of social policy was touched upon in several articles of the Treaty of Rome, the European

Community remained until the 1980s largely unwilling and/or unable to address in any kind of substantive fashion most social policy areas. This was particularly the case with social policy issues that were of the redistributive variety. For the most part, EC social policy initiatives prior to the 1980s were developed with the objective of enhancing the ongoing process of market integration, and little effort was made to infringe upon the member states' perceived authority to develop and administer redistributive social policies. Thus, for the better part of its first thirty years of existence, the EC did not represent any real threat to member state autonomy or sovereignty in the area of social policy.

But as the essays in the present volume suggest, much has changed in the past ten years or so that has (at least partially) altered this pattern. Quite obviously, the Maastricht Agreement on Social Policy, which went into effect in November 1993, represents the most tangible example of an extension of Community competencies in the broad field of social policy. In addition, the extension of the qualified majority voting principle to much of the social policy realm in the early 1990s seemed to represent an encouraging development for those wishing to see a shift toward greater EU legislative activism in a number of important sectors, most notably those related to labor-management relations. Still, as most of the book's chapters either explicitly or implicitly suggest, one should not rush to assume that measures such as these have been followed by the rapid creation of an EU-controlled federal welfare state. Indeed, as Martin Rhodes observes in Chapter 3, the EU remains as a supranational actor with little real capacity or legitimacy for creating either a social policy system or direct intervention in the social policy affairs of its member states (p.37). In the absence of an activist social policy, then, how has the EU impacted state autonomy in social policy matters? First, the neoliberal market-building measures associated with its ongoing efforts to achieve economic integration have effectively reduced the social policy-making flexibility of the member governments (p.45). Secondly, and as David Hine points out in his chapter, the "didactic activism" of the Commission in its non-legislative activities has contributed to an erosion of state autonomy in the area of social policy-making (p.8).

It is this activism that many of the book's better chapters effectively document and explain. In Michael Gold's chapter, for instance, the Commission is seen as a vital agent in the current move toward a neo-corporatist framework for social dialogue at the EU level. The implications for the member states of the Commission's social partnership initiatives are potentially significant in that there appears to have emerged real interest on the part of multi-national corporations for EU-level information disclosure, consultation, and contract negotiation standards (pp.123-127). In the area of employment policy, too, EU activism has produced substantive policy dialogue within the EU's institutional apparatus among trade union and business association representatives that has begun to erode state autonomy in the area of labor market policy (although the national governments clearly remain dominant

in this area). As Jens Bastian's essay (Chapter 6) suggests, this trend appears to have been further encouraged by a developing consensus among member state governments (except, of course, the UK) that their persistent domestic unemployment problems are increasingly in need of supranational solutions. But EU activism is perhaps best illustrated by the developments described in the chapter on regulatory policy by Giandomenico Majone (Chapter 2). Here, the Commission's entrepreneurial efforts to expand its power in the regulatory arena, despite persistently tight budgets, is effectively documented. For Majone, this EU activism, combined with a growing demand for regulation at the member state level, has led to a rather substantial rise in EU regulatory power and authority (pp.20-21).

Less successful efforts on the part of EC institutions to federalize social policy are documented and explained in chapters by Sonia Mazey and Susan Milner. Mazey focuses on the EU's efforts to extend national sex equality and sexual discrimination laws in the workplace. For Mazey, EC institutional maneuvering, while successful in bringing the status of women in the workplace to the forefront of the European social policy debate, has actually produced only mixed results in terms of legislation and implementation. Aggravating the situation are the worsening economic conditions and the resurgence of neoliberalism in several member states which is prompting growing support for deregulation in the EU (p.152). These patterns are affecting EU efforts to address the area of occupational training policy as well. As Milner (Chapter 9) illustrates, training policy remains an area where differences among member states are notably substantial, and while there seems to be a general consensus that job skill enhancement is a legitimate area for governmental involvement, the EC thus far has been unable to "Europeanize" the job training issue. In short, state autonomy has yet to be threatened by EU action in this important social policy area.

Despite the relatively slow pace at which the movement toward integration is occurring in the policy sectors just discussed, there appears to be real and meaningful progress in other social policy areas. As several of the chapters in *Beyond the Market* reveal, EU institutional activism seems to be a primary source of this progress. As David Hine suggests, the EC has often been able to act as a significant catalyst for change through its role as facilitator, forum provider, and "menu setter" (p.12). But as most of the essays in the book point out, other factors, most notably global economic pressures, have played crucial roles in facilitating policy convergence in those social policy sectors where common standards and policies have been created. What does all this say about the issue of state autonomy? For most of the book's authors, the member states' position of dominance in social policy matters remains generally intact. But it is clear from the empirical evidence presented that, in certain social policy areas, Europeanization has occurred—often with the direct support of the member states themselves.

Mark J. Gobeyn
Bradley University

Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, and John D. Stephens (eds.). Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 528 pp.

THIS BOOK REPRESENTS AN intellectual *tour de force* in the field of comparative political economy, and brings together several distinguished scholars to analyze and update the transformation of advanced capitalist democracies in the 1990s. The book fills critical analytical gaps in political-economic transformational theories since an earlier seminal work, Goldthorp's Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, was published in 1984. Goldthorp's work concluded that social democratic government in advanced capitalist democracies using highly centralized systems of national collective bargaining were most effective in simultaneously maintaining low rates of unemployment and inflation while producing solid economic growth and providing adequate welfare state services. Throughout the early and late 1980s, neither social democratic market interventionism nor the policies of the conservative governments in these so-called "neocorporate states" were successful in maintaining the economic growth rate of the post-World War II "golden age." Both forms of governance failed to strike a balance between price stability and unemployment. Scholars and analysts identified a gap in the findings and conclusions of the mid-1980s studies. Continuity and Change attempts, and succeeds, at filling the gap (since 1984 until the present time) by reanalyzing the path of the political economies of advanced capitalist societies. In the process, the editors provide a current assessment of continuity and change in contemporary capitalist democracies regarding the influence of several socioeconomic parameters. The work evaluates key social conditions, international and domestic political and economic processes and institutions, public policies, and styles of political governance to explain the success and difficulties of contemporary capitalist democracies.

ECSA members interested in writing book reviews of recent, EU-related books should contact the Book Review Editor:

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The editors bring together several authors to examine the ways in which the bases of macroeconomic policies shifted in the mid-1990s. Part I deals with the international setting, incorporating essays by McKeown, Simmons, Hooghe and Marks to examine the impact of globalization, regional integration, and international capital on the domestic political economy of capitalist democracies. Simmons' essay, "The Internationalization of Capital," is especially insightful. She provides a perceptive commentary on constraints imposed by international capital and global financial markets on the ability of national governments to influence certain national instruments of macroeconomic policy, including interest rates and fiscal policy.

Part II explores the shift in the bases of macroeconomic policy with respect to domestic political economic changes, especially those changes that resulted in the unraveling of the neocorporatist approaches in the present decade. In a perceptive piece, "The Political Economy of Europe in an Era of Interdependence," Hall argues that employers succeeded in placing bargaining flexibility in several European countries where the working class had significant political and economic power to orchestrate a cohesive bargaining strategy vis-à-vis national capital. These employers were increasingly unwilling to succumb to cross-industry and national level labor market coordination. This position was bolstered by several changes: fundamental shifts in the economy, transformations in the technology of production, and alterations in the variety and pattern of consumption, in particular. Several authors, notably Klausen (in Part II) and Esping-Andersen (in Part III), identify and comment on the public policy consequences of yet another important change: the shift in the economy from a manufacturing to a service economy, and the entry of large number of women into the labor force. The labor force became increasingly heterogeneous as the proportion of white-collar, female, and professional employees increased while blue-collar manufacturing employees declined. Bargained wage restraint—which had been the hallmark of neocorporatist bargaining to benefit workers by expanding, among others, the welfare state and producing a more equitable distribution of economic reward—could no longer be sustained.

This compilation of writings is comprehensive and will satisfy a multitude of interests. Readers who are interested in the changing dynamics of labor market institutions will benefit from other essays in this volume (Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange; Moene and Wallerstein). In similar fashion, political scientists and sociologists interested in the broad theme of linkages between changes in the social structure, occupational and class structure, and political behavior and party systems will find the contributions by Esping-Andersen and Kriesi useful.

This volume is not limited to labor market institutions. The editors have correctly recognized that other institutions in the domestic and international political economy influence the prospects of economic growth as well as the degree of effectiveness of aggregate monetary and fiscal instruments.

Essays by Hall, King and Wood, and Soskice discuss various institutions spanning the production regime. Further, Parts II and III of this work contain several essays which explore the interconnection between the economic production regime and the welfare state policies of national governments.

One major advantage of this work over Goldthorp's landmark volume and several other major works—notably Stephens (1979), Leon and Maier (1985), Streeck (1994, 1993, 1992a)—is that this collection contains several contributions that are fundamentally concerned with the dynamics of the interplay between political institutions, process and behavior and the institutions of political economy. In this regard, several essays in Part III of this volume (King and Wood; Kitschelt; van Kersbergen) summarize and refine prevailing thinking on socioeconomic and political interactions.

This volume does have a few shortcomings regarding the global focus and continuity between major parts of the work. Western Europe remains the predominant focus in this collection. It would have been interesting to compare the United States with Western European countries in terms of the consequences of well-documented differences in economic policy, the politics of expansion or contraction of the welfare state, and the like. Insight could be gained from evaluating the form of government, party system, the political and economic strength of labor, key social conditions, mechanisms of policy making, America's hegemonic position as a global power, etc., in comparison to the European base. Several essays address this comparison; the chapters by Esping-Andersen, McKeown, Stephens, Huber and Ray, and King and Wood provide some insights. However, the topic does not receive adequate attention. Another shortcoming is the lack of a substantive link between changes in the international setting and the domestic political economy. The implications of international trading and financial regimes have been discussed (McKeown; Simmons). The editors deserve credit for recognizing the importance of the international setting. However, there is some disconnection between Part I and the remainder of the volume. To be sure, the problem of linking the international system level to the state/society level is a major analytical challenge in the fields of international relations and international and comparative political economy. Nevertheless, international economic settings, in particular the global financial markets, exert a critical impact on domestic political economy, and this impact warrants an in-depth analysis. A case in point can be found with the largest financial and industrial firms of Western Europe. These firms are traded as American Depository Receipts on the American stock exchanges and thereby are vulnerable to Wall Street's institutional investors and the Federal Reserve's action on federal funds discount rates. Simmons notes that increasingly national instruments of macroeconomic policies, particularly interest rates, are straight-jacketed by the response of international capital. However, she does not go far enough in her analyses. One would need to establish the way in which financial markets—such as Wall Street portfolio managers—respond to macroeconomic policies and “undesirable”

situations in the domestic economy. Responses to overvalued exchange rates, bulging current account deficits, expansionary monetary policies, welfare state expansionism, and other situations could be evaluated and compared with actual capital flight or its threat, and potential constraints on the ability of national governments to effectively manage the economy.

These minor shortcomings do not overshadow the important contributions of this work. Whether it is the scope of subject, the wealth of evidence, the range of methodological approaches, the ability to frame major issues in terms of the pressures for convergence and divergence amongst capitalist democracies, this landmark volume is a shining contribution to the literature. I strongly recommend it for graduate and advanced undergraduate courses on the political economy of advanced capitalist democracies.

Shah Tarzi
Bradley University

New EU-Related Publications Received

- Bertrand, Gilles et alia (1999) “Scenarios Europe 2010: Five Possible Futures for Europe.” European Commission: Forward Studies Unit.
- Bridges, Brian (1999) Europe and the Challenge of The Asia Pacific: Change, Continuity and Crisis. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Diez, Thomas (1999) Die EU Lesen: Diskursive Knotenpunkte in der Britischen Europadebatte. Opladen, Germany: Leske and Budrich.
- Duke, Simon (1999) “From Amsterdam to Kosovo: Lessons for the Future of CFSP,” EIPASCOPE 1999/2, 2-15.
- Lee, Sang-Gon et alia (eds.) (1999) The Global Integration of Europe and East Asia: Studies of International Trade and Investment. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Register of Current Research into European Integration 1999/2001 in the UK (UACES Information Guide 29). Compiled by Susan Jones. London: UACES.
- Sweet, Morris L. (1999) Regional Economic Development in the European Union and North America. Westport, CT: Praeger-Greenwood.

Journals

- Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* (Lynne Rienner Publishers).
- Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* (Carfax).
- Nationalities Papers* (Carfax).

Miscellany

The Center for Public Law at the Université Libre de Bruxelles has launched Odysseus, an academic network for legal studies on asylum and immigration in Europe. The Odysseus network aims to analyze the legislation of EU member states and of the EU in the areas of migration and asylum. Working languages are English and French. Contact Philippe De Bruycker, Director of the Center of Public Law and Main Coordinator, at e-mail debruyck@ulb.ac.be.



NETWORK OF EUROPEAN UNION CENTERS

News and Notes for Fall 1999

September 1, 1999: The European Union Center of the University System of Georgia held a conference on Wednesday, September 1, concerning the European Economic and Monetary Union. Entitled "Explaining Monetary Commitment Technologies: The Political Foundations of EMU," the event brought together leading economists and political scientists to explore the political determinants on the choice of exchange rate regime and on the degree of central bank independence. Session I covered "Experience with fixed exchange rates and/or central bank independence prior to EMU," and Session II focused on "When and where have fixed exchange rates and/or central bank independence been stable outcomes?"

September 1-2, 1999: Completing an event that began in late August, the EU Center in North Carolina began the academic year with the first in a series of workshops on "Dimensions of Contestation in the European Union." The second workshop will be held in April 2000. The goal of the project is to bring together a group of European and American experts on citizens, elections, and political parties to write a book on whether and how political cleavages are arising in the European Union. Draft chapters will be available on the Center's Web site after the final workshop meeting in April at www.unc.edu/depts/europe (follow the links for conferences).

September 10, 1999: The Ambassador of Finland, Jaakko Laajava, addressed the community at the European Union Center at the University of Illinois for their inaugural European Union Day. He discussed the state of the European Union under Finland's presidency. On October 22-23, the Illinois EU Center hosted a conference in Chicago for a select group of sixty corporate leaders, government officials, consumer representatives, and academics to focus on the contrasting regulatory environments emerging in the U.S. and the EU for genetically modified organisms. The Illinois EU Center is also offering a team-taught interdisciplinary graduate seminar this fall, "EU-US Trade Relations: Non-Tariff Barriers."

September 20, 1999: The University of Missouri European Union Center hosted a gathering for European students at the University to meet and share perspectives with American students in European studies and international business. Also in September, Center Director Andrew Balas visited the European Commission in Brussels for project negotiations and meetings. The Missouri EU Center dinner on October 19, 1999 highlighted the start of the EU Center's second year and gave recognition to first year accomplishments. Horst Reichenbach, of the Commission's Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Protection, was an honored guest.

September 29, 1999: The European Union Center in Pittsburgh welcomed the visit of His Excellency Jean-Claude Juncker, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, who participated in an EU Center colloquium entitled, "Perspectives on European Integration." Other colloquium participants from Luxembourg included His Excellency Luc Frieden, Minister of Budget and Treasury, and Her Excellency Arlette Conzemius, Ambassador to the United States. This fall the Pittsburgh EU Center also welcomes Professor Giandomenico Majone, who is teaching a course on free trade, economic integration, and harmonization, as well as their Fall EU Fellow Willem Noë (DG-III), an economist who studies competition policy.

September 1999: The EU Center of California welcomed the first group of students in the new EU Junior Scholars Seminar at The Claremont Colleges. Selected students attend the public events of the Center and read works pertaining to the theme of the Center's events (currently enlargement). The Junior Scholars also meet with visitors to the European Union



NETWORK OF EUROPEAN UNION CENTERS

News and Notes for Fall 1999

Center in a small group setting, to explore issues introduced in the public addresses in greater depth. This seminar, team-taught by Center Co-Director David Andrews (Scripps College) and Deputy Director Nigel Boyle (Pitzer College) will become the capstone course of a program in European Union Studies.

★ **September 1999:** The EU Center of New York welcomed numerous visiting scholars for the new academic year. Andrew Moravcsik, Government and European Studies, Harvard University, is a Senior Research Fellow and Visiting Professor of Politics at New York University and Senior Visiting Fellow at the Italian Academy for Advanced Study at Columbia. John Glenn, European University Institute, is NYU's EU Post-Doctoral Scholar for 1999/2000 and Milada Vachudova, European Studies, Harvard University, is the EU Post-Doctoral Scholar at Columbia. The New York EU Center also hosts shorter-term visiting scholars in residence.

★ **October 7-8, 1999:** The workshop, "Regional Governance that Works: Models and Experiences in Europe and the United States," was co-sponsored by the Wisconsin EU Center, the Center on Wisconsin Strategy (COWS), and the European Territorial Excellence Project (Eurexcter). COWS is a nationally recognized "think-do tank" based at UW-Madison; Eurexcter is an action-research project directed by Robert Villeneuve of Electricité de France/Gaz de France. The workshop involved practitioners, activists, and academics from both sides of the Atlantic to discuss local labor market and regional/urban governance strategies and initiatives in Europe and the U.S. This event helped launch the Wisconsin EU Center's Theme II: "Labor Markets, Employment, and Social Protection: Transatlantic Dialogue on Work and Welfare."

★ **October 21-23, 1999:** The EU Center in Seattle kicked off its 1999-2000 conference calendar with a three-day conference on "The German *Wende* and the Transformation of Europe." The event brought in scholars from Germany, Canada, and the United States, and was a multi-disciplinary forum involving sociologists, historians, political scientists, and literary scholars. In addition to the papers presented, the conference also featured an exhibition, "Germany: Divided and United, 1949-1999," in cooperation with the German Consulate. As a third component to this conference, the EU Center organized a workshop for secondary school educators on some of the major themes related to German unification.

★ **November 20-21, 1999:** The EU Center at Harvard University co-sponsored a conference, "Portugal: Strategic Options in a European Context." The interdisciplinary conference used Portugal as a benchmark case of a small European country increasingly integrated into the global market and the European Union, and drew inferences from the discussion which might help design future policy. Four areas of focus were represented in the conference panel discussions: Cultural Identity and Literature, The State and Social Policy, Economics and Finance, and Science and Research Policy. Leading authorities in their fields gave lectures. Also in November, André Adam and Stewart Eldon discussed "Does 'Europe' exist in the UN?"

The Network of European Union Centers in the United States was launched by the European Union in 1998 to build stronger ties among Europeans and Americans. To find out more about the Network and each of the European Union Centers, please visit the Network Web site at www.eucenters.org. The Network of European Union Centers is supported by the European Union and the host institutions, and is coordinated by the European Community Studies Association. ECSA's Network of European Union Centers Committee: Maria Green Cowles (The American University), Paulette Kurzer (University of Arizona), Vivien A. Schmidt (Boston University), and Sidney Tarrow (Cornell University).

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Conferences

October 12-14, 1999: "Transatlantic Regulatory Harmonization and Global Standards," The George Washington University, Washington, DC, three-day conference. Contact Reba Carruth at tel. 202 994-1759, or e-mail racarr@gwu.edu.

October 15, 1999: "The Europeanisation of Political Parties," University of Limerick, Ireland, one-day seminar. Web site www.ul.ie/~ceuros or e-mail edward.moxon-brown@ul.ie.

October 18-19, 1999: "An Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the EU," Academy of European Law Trier, Luxembourg, two-day conference. Web site www.era.trier.de or e-mail info@era.trier.de.

October 25-26, 1999: "EMU: Realignment In and Out of the Eurozone," The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, two-day conference. Contact Georgina Wright at tel. 171 957 5700 or e-mail gwright@riia.org.

November 4-5, 1999: "Sovereign Debt: Risk and Strategy," The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, two-day conference. Contact Georgina Wright at tel. 171 957 5700 or e-mail gwright@riia.org.

November 19, 1999: "The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union," University of Limerick, Ireland, one-day colloquium. Web site www.ul.ie/~ceuros or e-mail edward.moxon-brown@ul.ie.

November 22-23, 1999: "Keep Ahead with European Information," European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, The Netherlands, two-day conference. Web site www.eipa.nl or e-mail j.groneschild@eipa-nl.com.

December 2-3, 1999: "Globalisation, Regional Integration and Democratic Governance: Challenges for the EU," Research Committee on European Unification, Brussels, Belgium, two-day conference. E-mail Bruni Kees at Bkees@europarl.eu.int.

April 6-8, 2000: "Rethinking Europe: UACES 30th Anniversary Conference and Fifth Research Conference," University Association for Contemporary European Studies, Budapest, Hungary, three-day conference. Web site www.uaces.org or e-mail admin@uaces.org.

June 5-July 14, 2000: "Berlin 2000: Literature, Culture, and Politics from 'Zero Hour' to the 'Berlin Republic,'" University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Berlin, Germany, six-week seminar for U.S. college and university teachers. Stipend available. Contact Siegfried Mews at tel. 919 966 1641 or e-mail mews@email.unc.edu.

Calls for Proposals

Shifting Borders, Negotiating Places: Cultural Studies and the Mutation of Value(s)

February 22-23, 2000: Second Annual Interdisciplinary Conference of Loyola University at University of Rome, "La Sapienza." This international conference will bring together scholars to discuss the development of cultural studies in North America and Europe. At a time when Europeans are unifying politically and economically, they must also rethink their cultural identity/ies. Doing so entails reconsidering the relations between "high" and "low" cultures. These relations will not only determine Europe's cultural values, but will also reshape its political and economic possibilities. Unpublished papers from all disciplines are welcomed, especially cross-disciplinary papers; selected papers will be published by Bordighera, Inc. (Purdue University Press). Papers may be in English or Italian. Send 500-word abstract by fax to 39 06 355 88 352 or by e-mail to ellis@luc.edu; Web site www.luc.edu/schools/grad/int/romeconf. Deadline: November 22, 1999.

E2K: A New Vision for Europe

March 30-April 1, 2000: The 17th Annual Graduate Student Conference of the Institute on Western Europe, Columbia University, New York, seeks papers from all disciplines addressing economic, political, sociological, and cultural challenges facing Europe in 2000 and beyond. Topics may include but are not limited to, foreign policy, labor, economic and monetary union, welfare, the role of the nation-state, and EU enlargement. Papers must be in English and should be 20-50 pages in length, and must not have been previously published. Authors must be enrolled in a degree-granting graduate or professional school program. Presenters will compete for three awards of \$500 each. Direct inquiries to Mary Demeri at md430@columbia.edu or Seema Srinath at ss1058@columbia.edu; Web site www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/REGIONAL/WE/iwe.html. Deadline: December 31, 1999.

Cultura Europea/European Culture

October 25-28, 2000: The VI Congreso of the Centre for European Studies of the University of Navarre, Spain, invites proposals for its 2000 Conference from students, professors, and professionals in all fields from anthropology to urban planning. Five sections will be organized on the following themes: 1) cultural identity; 2) cultural and urban policies; 3) currency and culture; 4) popular culture (European identity?); and 5) European cultural policy. A broad number of interdisciplinary sections are also offered. Contact the Conference Secretariat at Centro de Estudios Europeos, Universidad de Navarra, E-31080 Pamplona, Spain; e-mail ebanus@unav.es. Deadline: as soon as possible, or by September 1, 2000.

Grants and Fellowships

Young Scholars Networking Grants

In conjunction with its 12th Conference of Europeanists (March 30-April 1, 2000, Chicago), the Council for European Studies will offer Young Scholars Networking Grants on a competitive basis to foster pre-conference networking to develop panels. To be eligible, participants must show that they have used the EuropaNet Web site to connect with other scholars in developing their panel proposal and that the proposal has been accepted by the conference committee. Guidelines, forms, bulletin boards, and grant information can be found at www.europanet.org. Please address questions to Ioannis Sinanoglou at e-mail is8@columbia.edu.

German Marshall Fund Research Support Program

The German Marshall Fund of the United States offers grants for advanced research on significant contemporary economic, political, and social developments relating to Europe, European integration, and relations between Europe and the U.S. Projects should involve comparative analysis of a specific issue in more than one country, or the exploration of an issue in a single country in ways that can be expected to have relevance for other countries. The geographic scope is Western, Central, and Eastern Europe, including Russia and Turkey as they relate to Europe. Amount of support varies. Information and downloadable application forms are available at www.gmfus.org. Deadline: November 15, 1999.

Post-Doctoral Research Fellowships, Oxford

Nuffield College (Oxford, UK) invites applications from graduates from any country who wish to undertake social sciences research. The main interests of the College are in economics, politics, and sociology, broadly construed to include, e.g., recent history, econometrics, international relations, and social psychology. Candidates should have completed the doctoral thesis by October 1, 2000, and should not, by that date, have spent more than eight years in post-graduate study in the social sciences and/or employment in a teaching or research post in the social sciences. Fellows with a doctorate receive £15,090 and fellows who have not completed their doctorate receive £8,289; fellows receive free single accommodation in College or a housing allowance and funds are available for research support. For more information contact Alison Bateman, Secretary to the PRF Competition, Nuffield College, Oxford, OX1 1NF, UK; e-mail bateman@nuf.ox.ac.uk. Deadline: November 26, 1999.

Conant Fellowships in German and European Studies

Up to two Fellowships in German and European Studies will

be awarded for 2000-01 by the Program for the Study of Germany and Europe at Harvard University. Non-tenured persons who are teaching or planning to teach at the university level in North America may apply. Topics should be located in the fields of history, politics, economics, society or culture, and preference will be given to projects that involve Germany. The Fellowship offers \$35,000 over a 12-month period and is residential at the Center for European Studies at Harvard. A publishable monograph is required upon completion. Applicants must be officially post-doctoral by July 1, 2000. Submit five sets and the original of a 5-page research project description, a dissertation or book abstract, a c.v., a cover letter, and two letters of recommendation to Abby Collins, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 27 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138; e-mail cesgrant@fas.harvard.edu. Deadline: January 14, 2000.

Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown

The Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University, will sponsor two resident Research Associates for the 2000-01 academic year. Applications are invited from young scholars who are U.S. citizens or permanent residents, and whose academic interests focus on German and European topics in politics, society, economics, history (19th and 20th centuries), literature, or culture. A grant of \$30,000 for the 10-month academic year will be awarded and contributory health insurance is available. There is no application form. Submit letter of application, c.v., detailed project description, writing samples, three letters of reference (to be sent separately by referees), and, for those not possessing the Ph.D., confirmation that the Ph.D. will be awarded by August 2000, to the Director, Research Association Program, Center for German and European Studies, Box 571022, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 20057; questions, telephone 202 687 5602. Deadline: January 21, 2000.

Berlin Program for Advanced German and European Studies

The Berlin Program for Advanced German and European Studies (established in 1986 at the Freie Universität Berlin and the Social Science Research Council in the U.S.) supports anthropologists, economists, political scientists, sociologists, and all scholars in relevant social science and cultural studies fields. The Program accepts applications from U.S. and Canadian nationals or permanent residents who are full-time graduate students in social sciences or humanities and who have completed all coursework required for the Ph.D., or who have received the Ph.D. within the past two years. Awards provide 9-12 months of research support in Berlin and a stipend of DM 2,000 per month. For information and application contact Berlin Program, Social Science Research Council, 810 Seventh Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY, 10019; telephone 212 377 2700; e-mail berlin@ssrc.org; Web site www.ssrc.org. Deadline: February 1, 2000.

ECSA Review

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Notes for ECSA members ...

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- As of September 1999, about 580 ECSA members (nearly half of our current membership) now subscribe to the ECSA e-mail List Server, a forum for succinct queries and announcements related to European Union affairs. To subscribe, send an e-mail to ecsa+@pitt.edu with this line only in the body of your message:
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