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IGC 2000 Watch (Part I): Origin and Preparation Desmond Dinan and Sophie Vanhoonacker

Editor's note: This is the first of a series which will run concurrently with the 2000 IGC and conclude with the signing of a new Treaty, which is expected to take place at the Nice European Council in December 2000.

LEFTOVERS ARE RARELY appetizing, but need to be eaten anyway. Few member states have an appetite for the so-called Amsterdam leftovers but all agree that they must be tackled, especially in view of enlargement. Three key institutional issues—the size and composition of the Commission; weighting of votes in the Council; and the possible extension of qualified majority voting (QMV)—were left on the table in Amsterdam in 1997, apparently because national leaders lacked the physical stamina to resolve them during a marathon European Council.

The situation was more complicated than that. Small member states would not forgo a commissioner; most large member states would not forgo a second commissioner without being given more votes in the Council; a Dutch presidency paper on reweighting came too late in the conference; and few member states would agree to extend QMV significantly. It was easier to defer these matters to another IGC.

Enlargement had become the rationale for the 1996-1997 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), and institutional reform had become a yardstick for the EU's willingness to facilitate enlargement. By that measure the EU seemed indifferent to enlargement and the IGC was unsuccessful. Member states were in no hurry to revisit institutional reform in 1998, focusing instead on pressing issues such as EMU and Agenda 2000. Their complacency ended abruptly in early 1999 during the Commission resignation crisis when institutional reform suddenly became a hot topic. At the beginning of its presidency in January 1999 Germany declared that an IGC might take place in 2001; six months later the European Council proclaimed in Cologne that the IGC would begin *and end* in 2000.

Holding another IGC was one track of the EU's reform strategy. Internal institutional overhaul, primarily of the Commission but also of the Council, was the other. Commission and Council reform would be reasonably far-reaching, but member states remained unenthusiastic about a new IGC. Amsterdam was an unhappy memory: IGC preparation, negotiation, and ratification had taken far too long and the results were unsatisfactory. Opinion differed on whether IGC 2000

should be prepared by a pre-Amsterdam-type Reflection Group or a smaller committee of experts. Critical of the Reflection Group's usefulness, and unable to reach agreement on the composition of an expert committee, member states decided in June 1999 to let the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) do the preparatory work.

Nor could member states agree on the scope of the IGC. Cologne confirmed that negotiations would cover the Amsterdam leftovers, plus "any further Treaty amendments required, in particular relating to [other] European Institutions ..." This gave an opening to those member states eager to widen the IGC's agenda, in particular by renegotiating the Amsterdam Treaty's provisions for flexibility—differentiated integration through closer cooperation among certain member states within the EU framework. Numerous unrelated agenda items, ranging from a revision of the common commercial policy (a cherished Commission objective) to budgetary reform (a cherished EP objective), were also floated by various actors at various times in subsequent months.

All member states agreed that two big issues, which had gathered momentum during Germany's presidency, should be dealt with in parallel with the IGC, possibly converging with it at the end. These were the proposed Charter of Fundamental Rights and the rapidly-emerging European Security and Defense Policy. The former would be negotiated in a unique inter-institutional setting involving national representatives, Euro-parliamentarians, and national parliamentarians. The latter would be negotiated by national governments because, as Finland's foreign minister revealingly remarked, member states wanted to discuss defense in an exclusively intergovernmental setting.

An IGC, of course, is not exclusively intergovernmental. The Commission participates fully (but cannot vote) and the EP is "closely associated" with it (IGC negotiators liaise with EP representatives). Caught up in its resignation crisis, the Commission was uninvolved in discussions about the IGC at the beginning of 1999. No sooner was Romano Prodi nominated to head the Commission, however, than he seized upon the IGC as a means to enhance his leadership within the college-to-be and the Commission's position within the EU system. He did so by asking a trio of experts, under the chairmanship of former Belgian prime minister Jean-Luc Dehaene, to draft an "orientation paper" on the Commission's approach to the conference. As expected, Dehaene advocated a strong Commission role and an ambitious IGC agenda.

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Democracy and Constitutionalism in the European Union

FOR MUCH OF THE past decade, EU politicians and scholars have debated the nature of the so-called “democratic deficit” in the European Union. In the eyes of its critics, the EU policy process is dominated by unelected officials from the European Commission and member governments, negotiating in a process that is closed and distant from European electorates, and in which the directly elected European Parliament plays only a secondary role.

By the end of the 1990s, the notion of a democratic deficit was being increasingly applied to other international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). During the tempestuous meeting of the WTO last November, for example, representatives of civil society from around the globe converged on Seattle, decrying the organization’s closed decision-making process and lack of democratic accountability, in terms strikingly similar to the EU debate. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Seattle meeting, EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy has suggested that the WTO—and other international organizations like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which have since come in for similar public criticism—could learn from the experience of the European Union, which has long grappled with issues of democratic accountability and openness.

The ability to draw lessons from the EU, however, presupposes some degree of consensus on the nature of the EU’s democratic deficit and the steps that might be taken to reduce that deficit. The essays in this *ECSA Review Forum* suggest that such a consensus remains elusive, at the level of both diagnosis and prognosis. In the first essay, Philippe C. Schmitter argues that the problem of democratic legitimation, if not yet a crisis, poses a serious challenge to the European Union, to which EU leaders can and should respond through a series of democratic reforms. By contrast, both Giandomenico Majone and Andrew Moravcsik argue in their essays that the proper yardstick for the analysis of the EU and other international organizations is not a national model of democracy, but rather the principle of *constitutionalism*, of government limited by a separation of powers and the rule of law. By this standard, both Majone and Moravcsik argue, the EU fares better than its democratic critics might suggest, although Majone suggests that a major administrative reform on the model of the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act would increase both the transparency and the constitutional legitimacy of the EU policy process. More generally, given the increasing power and importance of the EU and other international organizations, both scholars and practitioners are likely to continue the debate over the proper democratic—or constitutional—standards according to which international organizations should be designed and normatively evaluated. —Forum Editor

Philippe C. Schmitter

IT IS NEITHER FEASIBLE nor desirable to try to democratize the European Union *tutto e subito*—completely and immediately. Not only would the politicians not know how to do it, but there is also no compelling evidence that Europeans want it. Nothing could be more dangerous for the future of an eventual Euro-democracy than to have it thrust upon a citizenry that is not prepared to exercise it, and that continues to believe its interests and passions are best defended by *national* not *supranational* democracy.

However, for the reasons I discuss below, it may be timely to begin to experiment with improvements in the quality of embryonic Euro-democracy through modest reforms in the way citizenship, representation and decision-making are practiced within the institutions of the European Union. Even in the absence of a comprehensive, i.e., constitutional, vision of what the supra-national end-product will look like, specific and incremental steps could be taken to supplement (and not supplant) the mechanisms of accountability that presently exist within its member states.

Since, as seems obvious to me, the rules and practices of an eventual Euro-democracy will have to be quite different from those existing at the national level, it is all the more imperative that Europeans act cautiously when experimenting with political arrangements whose configuration will have to be unprecedented, and whose consequences could prove to be unexpected—perhaps, even unfortunate.

There are, in my opinion, two reasons why it may be timely to begin this experiment sooner rather than later:

(1) There is considerable evidence that rules and practices of democracy at the national level have become increasingly contested by citizens. This has not (yet) taken the form of rebellious or even “unconventional” behavior, but of what Gramsci once called “symptoms of morbidity” such as greater electoral abstention, decline in party identification, more frequent turnover in office and rejection of the party in power, lower prestige of politicians and higher unpopularity of chief executives, increased tax evasion and higher rates of litigation against authorities, skyrocketing accusations of official corruption and, most generally, a widespread impression that contemporary European democracies are simply not working well to protect their citizens. It would be overly dramatic to label this “a general crisis of legitimacy,” but something isn’t going well—and most national politicians know it.

(2) There is even more compelling evidence that individuals and groups within the European Union have become aware of how much its regulations and directives are affecting their daily lives, and that they consider these decisions to have been taken in a remote, secretive, unintelligible and unaccountable fashion. Whatever comfort it may have given them in the past that “unwarranted interference” by the Eurocrats in Brussels could have been vetoed by their respective sovereign national governments, this has been dissipated by the advent of qualified majority voting. Europeans feel themselves, rightly or wrongly, at the mercy of a process of integration that they do not

understand and certainly do not control—however much they may enjoy its material benefits. Again, it would be overdramatizing the issue to call this “a crisis of legitimacy” but that “permissive consensus” of the past is much less reliable—and supranational officials know it.

These two trends are probably related causally—and together they create a potentially serious “double bind” for the future of democracy in Europe. If the shift of functions to and the increase in supra-national authority of the EU have been contributing to decline in the legitimacy of “domestic democracy” by calling into question whether national officials are still capable of responding to the demands of their citizenry, and if the institutions of the EU have yet to acquire a reputation for accountability to these very same citizens when aggregated at the supra-national level, then, democracy as such in this part of the world could be in jeopardy. Admittedly, the grip of this double bind is still loose, but it is tightening. The national “moribidity symptoms” show no sign of abating; the supra-national “permissive consensus” shows abundant signs of waning.

Between the two trends, there is still space for the introduction of democratic reforms, but who will be willing (and able) to take advantage of the rather unusual political opportunity space formed by monetary unification and eastern enlargement (not to mention, the increasingly skewed outcome of Euro-elections) is by no means clear. The potentiality exists for acting preemptively before the situation reaches a crisis stage and before the compulsion to do something becomes so strong that politicians may overreact, but will it be exploited?

My hunch is that the “Monnet Method” of exploiting the spill-overs between functionally related issue arenas to advance the level and scope of integrative institutions has exhausted its potentials—precisely because of increased citizen awareness and further politicization. Switching to an overtly political strategy of democratization might be sufficient to renew the momentum that has clearly been lost since the difficult ratification of the Maastricht treaty and the frustrated expectations of the Amsterdam Treaty. If only one could rekindle within the process of Euro-democratization that same logic of indirection and gradualism based on an underlying structure of functional interdependence and an emerging system of collective problem-solving, the process of European integration might be given the *relancement* that it has so frequently sought and so badly needs. Except that this time, the result may not be so foreseeable or controllable. Democratization, especially in such unprecedented circumstances and for such a large-scale polity, is bound to activate unexpected linkages, to involve less predictable publics and to generate less limited expectations.

We have good reason, thanks to democratic theory, for believing that specific forms of citizenship, representation and decision-making are closely interrelated in a self-reinforcing fashion within stable democratic regimes. But, thanks to the absence of much theorizing about democratization, we are a lot less well informed about how these elements came together historically and even less well informed about how they might combine under contemporary circumstances. The pseudo-sub-

disciplines of “transitology” and “consolidology” have only just begun to draw attention to these dynamic relations within the neo-democracies of the post-1974 wave of democratization—and it is far from evident that their (tentative) conclusions would have any relevance for democratizing an interstate organization composed, not of relatively recent democracies, but of relatively ancient ones (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Schmitter 1995). About all that we can assert with confidence is that there have been and still are many different sequences involved in the relation between citizenship, representation and decision-making—and that these sequences have produced rather substantial differences in both the rapidity with which democracy was consolidated and the type of democracy which subsequently emerged.

Another thing that we do know is to be wary of reifying the experiences of previous democratizers, especially the experience of a single sequence of nation building, state formation and regime consolidation. It is very tempting to assert that, because the EU does not have the necessary and sufficient elements that produced democracy in country “X” some time ago, then it cannot possibly be democratized now. For reasons that are obscure to me, this seems especially characteristic of German scholars who postulate a “universalistic” sequence whereby an *ethnos* must precede a *demos*, and the latter can only be created by an explicit constitutional act whereby this *demos* or people “submits itself to a political order of its own invention.”¹ Perhaps, it is because Germany was one of the few European states where a “a belief in communality” (*Gemeinsamkeitsglauben*) preceded the formation of its national state or because of the strength of legal-formalism in its juridical tradition (*Verrechtlichung*). Elsewhere in Europe, the state was often established long before a “feeling of belonging to a (single) community” existed among its subjects and, indeed, played a significant role in bringing about such a feeling. Moreover, in one major case, there was no single-formal constitutional “act of will,” just a lengthy accumulation of precedents (Great Britain). In others (France, Spain, Portugal), there have been so many constitutions and major constitutional revisions that it seems absurd to claim that any of them provided an exclusive foundation for political order. My second hunch is that the moment for a dramatic act of “self-constitutionalization” has long since passed in the EU and that the *ethnos-demos-politeia* sequence is going to have to be inverted—or, it will not lead to a stable democratic regime within contemporary Europe.²

1. The quote is from Claus Offe (1999), but it seems reflective of a broader strand of German thinking that goes back to Jellinek, Weber, Habermas, and the contemporary Supreme Court judge, Dieter Grimm—all of whom are cited approvingly by Offe.

2. For a discussion of some twenty “modest” and “not-so-modest” reforms that might be introduced incrementally in order to democratize EU institutions, see Schmitter (forthcoming).

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Giandomenico Majone

ALTHOUGH CONTEMPORARY WESTERN DEMOCRACIES are all constitutional democracies, “constitutionalism” and “democracy” are historically and conceptually distinct. While the first term refers to limited government, to restrained and divided state power, the second implies a potentially unlimited exercise of that power. Indeed, in the pure majoritarian model of democracy, majorities should be able “to control all of government... legislative, executive and, if they have a mind, judicial ... and thus to control everything politics can touch” (Spitz 1984, quoted in Lijphart 1991: 485).

The distinction between constitutionalism and democracy is important not only to political philosophers; it is essential for understanding the nature of the democratic deficit in the European Community/European Union (EC/EU) and, more generally, the legitimacy problems of nonmajoritarian institutions such as constitutional courts, independent central banks, and international organisations like the WTO. As I have argued elsewhere, current arguments about the democratic deficit in the EC/EU may be classified into three main groups, according to the legitimacy standards they use: standards based on the analogy with national institutions; standards derived from the democratic legitimacy of the member states; and standards of social justice (Majone 1998).

Arguments in the first group tend to equate European institutions and national institutions, or to assume that the former will converge to the familiar model of parliamentary democracy. The analogy with national institutions leads, for example, to the claim that the European Parliament (EP) should have an independent power of legislative initiative because national parliaments are so empowered. According to the arguments in the second group, the legitimacy of the integration process proceeds from the democratic legitimacy of the member states. In this view, the veto power of each national government is the single most legitimating element of the integration process, while the shift to majority voting is the root cause of the legitimacy problem (Weiler 1991).

Finally, arguments relying on social standards are ostensibly about the democratic deficit, but in fact are driven by a different agenda: dissatisfaction with the slow pace of political integration, or concerns about the future of the national welfare state. According to these critics the EC/EU lacks legitimacy primarily because of its failure to provide social justice. By the social standards prevailing in the member states, the EC/EU is a “welfare laggard” and thus cannot count on the social acceptance enjoyed by the national welfare states.

There is no room here to go into a detailed critique of these arguments. It suffices to point out that if the expression “democratic deficit” is taken literally—an absence or incomplete development of institutions which we take for granted in a parliamentary democracy—then a deficit of democracy is indeed a distinctive feature of a process within which economic and political integration not only have different speeds but follow different principles—supranationalism in one case, intergovernmentalism in the other. Such a historically unique

approach can succeed only if the economic and political tracks are kept as separate as possible—a key insight of functionalist theories of regional integration. Thus, a deficit of democracy will remain endemic at the European level as long as the majority of citizens of the member states continue to view the nation state as the real arena of democratic politics and oppose the idea of a super-state, while supporting far-reaching economic integration. Such a deficit is the price we pay in order to preserve national sovereignty largely intact in such key areas as taxation, income redistribution, and foreign and security policy.

However, the expression “democratic deficit” is also used to indicate a set of problems—control of discretion, accountability, transparency, fairness—that arise whenever important powers are delegated to institutions which, by design, are not directly responsible to the voters or to their elected representatives. One important reason why democratic governments delegate powers to nonmajoritarian institutions is the need to achieve credible policy commitments. Because a legislature or a majority coalition cannot bind a subsequent legislature or another coalition, public policies are always vulnerable to reneging and hence lack credibility. Delegation to politically independent bodies is an effective solution to the commitment problem. Thus delegation of regulatory powers to some agency distinct from the government itself is best understood as a means whereby governments can commit themselves to regulatory policies that would not be credible in the absence of such delegation. Whether the commitment is achieved most effectively by delegation to international or supranational rather than to national agencies is an open question in any particular case (Gatsios and Seabright 1989).

The key normative problem of such delegation is how to control the exercise of essentially legislative powers by agencies that do not enjoy formal democratic legitimation. The century-old experience of the American regulatory state suggests that procedural controls are well adapted to discipline agency discretion without excessively intruding upon the delegated authority implicit in an enabling statute. Under the 1946 U.S. Administrative Procedure Act (APA) agency adjudication was made to look like court adjudication, including the adversarial process and requirement of a written record as the basis of agency decisions. APA requirements for rule making were much less demanding. However, with the growth of environmental and risk regulation, rule making (e.g., standard setting) became important and federal judges began to develop stricter standards. Starting from the general requirements contained in the APA, they succeeded in formulating new principles to improve the transparency and substantive rationality of rule making. As a consequence, today agency rules have to be accompanied by records and findings even more detailed and elaborate than had been originally envisaged for formal adjudication. It should be noted that the progressive judicialization of regulatory proceedings makes the arguments in favour of an independent regulatory branch more plausible by making the agencies more and more court-like (Shapiro 1988).

The enactment of a European APA would significantly improve the legitimacy of Community policy making. The

proliferation of committees, working groups, and agencies shows how urgent is the need for a single set of rules explaining the procedures to be followed in each case. The overlap of the activities of such bodies and the divergences between rules governing their functioning create a real lack of transparency. In such a situation, where it is difficult for the citizens of the Union to identify the body which is responsible for decisions that apply to them, both procedural and substantive legitimacy are reduced to a vanishing point (Majone 1996).

A European APA would not only contribute to the legitimacy of EC policy making, but also serve as model for the member states and for international organisations such as WTO. The need for greater transparency and accountability is in fact even more urgent at national and international level than at the European level. For example, English public law still lacks a general obligation on public administrators to give reasons for their decisions, whereas the framers of the European treaties were well aware of the significance of reason-giving requirements for the legitimacy of non-majoritarian institutions. According to Martin Shapiro, Article 190 of the Treaty of Rome—which obliges the Council and the Commission to state the reasons of all their legal acts—is one of the world’s central devices for judicial enforcement of bureaucratic transparency (Shapiro 1992).

The requirement that administrators give reasons for their decisions activates a number of other mechanisms for enforcing transparency and controlling agency discretion: public participation and debate, notice-and-comment, information exchange, peer review, complaint procedures, responsibility, judicial review. It is the lack or insufficient development of such constitutional mechanisms, rather than the absence of direct accountability to the voters or their elected representatives, that undermines regulatory legitimacy at all levels of governance.

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LIKE NEARLY ALL OTHER international institutions, the European Union (EU) has been deliberately constructed in order to constrain the actions of its member states.¹ EU member governments have pooled and delegated considerable legislative, adjudicative, and enforcement powers. They have acquiesced in, even encouraged, subsequent constraints on sovereignty. Today many analysts of the EU are concerned that the resulting supranational institutions are not—or not to a sufficient degree—democratically legitimate. The EU, we hear time and time again, suffers from a “democratic deficit.”

What does it mean to say the EU lacks democratic legitimacy? Traditionally the EU has been justified largely by its outputs—economic and, according to some, geopolitical benefits for its member states and their citizens. In the past ten years, the conventional view argues, these accomplishments

have increasingly been called into question as a sufficient justification for European governance. Perhaps this rising doubt results from the EU’s failure to address major political problems such as unemployment, immigration, and instability in the Balkans; perhaps from the EU’s move into new areas where citizens take more notice of its actions; perhaps from the entry of new countries with traditions of more participatory politics; perhaps from salient events, such as national referenda and management scandals in Brussels. Whatever the causes, increasing public discussion has focused the attention of many commentators on the need to justify the EU through more democratic institutions—to provide “input legitimacy” rather than “output legitimacy.”

From this perspective, the EU appears presumptively illegitimate. It could be otherwise, so the argument runs, only if citizens had a greater formal role in selecting its policies—or, at the very least, in selecting those who select its policies. The more direct the representation and the more numerous the citizens involved, the more democratically legitimate the institution. To be sure, such critics are ideologically varied, and differ in their assessment of the ultimate consequences. Eurofederalists believe that much must be done to increase democratic accountability, lest the EU stagnate or even collapse. Social democrats seek a generous European social policy to balance trade liberalization and monetary discipline. Euroskeptics—most notably those on the extreme right of the British, French, Italian and Austrian political spectrums, but also some in parties of the left—fear the creation of a “superstate” in Brussels, and cite recent scandals and the Commission’s efforts to promote certain sorts of regulation as evidence that EU officials wield their bureaucratic discretion in an arbitrary manner. All agree that European decision-makers are distant, technocratic, and ultimately unaccountable.

The lack of consensus as to the concrete implications of the “democratic deficit” should immediately alert us as to the lack of precision in many such criticisms. And indeed, when we examine the arguments more precisely, they still fail to convince—for at least four reasons.

First, *the EU is an exceptionally weak and dependent state structure*. Euroskeptical fears of a corrupt and arbitrary superstate run by all-powerful Brussels-based technocracy are strikingly at odds with a simple factual description of the organization. The EU has none of the attributes of conventional strong state. It has essentially no police powers and no army. It has an exceptionally small tax base, about 2-3% of national government budgets, with little immediate prospect of expansion. Fiscal spending is only minimally discretionary, since its parameters are tightly controlled by national governments through repeated unanimous vote. Accordingly, spending remains tied largely to enduring priorities, notably agricultural policy and structural funding.

Supranational officials can achieve little on their own. To be sure, the Commission’s power of proposal grants it a critical role as a legislative agenda setter, but any decision must still be vetted by a supermajority of weighted votes in the Council and by a majority in the European Parliament. Passing legislation

in the EU is thus, mathematically speaking, more difficult than passing a constitutional amendment in the US system. Once legislation is in place, moreover, EU officials enjoy relatively little formal autonomy in its implementation—a generalization with few exceptions. For one thing, the EU bureaucracy is too small. Leaving clerical, logistical and translation services aside, European officials number only around 5000—no more than the size of the local administration of a small European city. This total is unlikely to increase in the near future; indeed, the next round of EU reforms may well reduce the size of the Commission significantly.

One obvious implication is that Commission officials have little to do with the actual implementation of most EU policies, which takes place instead at the national level. Supranational officials devote most of their time to setting broad guidelines (under the watchful eye of *comitologie*), monitoring state behavior, and developing new proposals. (Even in the judicial arena, the EU's area of greatest comparative advantage, the European Court of Justice does little more than advise national courts via Article 177.)

Supranational officials are also subject to intense scrutiny. The most notorious of recent scandals—in which a French politician not known for her scrupulous behavior, but never called to account in France, was forced to resign as Commissioner when subjected to the transnational transparency and higher standards of propriety in Brussels—is the exception that proves the rule.

Overall, a few areas excepted, national officials and judges continue to dominate everyday policy-making.

Second, *all EU institutions are under direct or indirect democratic control*. The notion that the EU can function without democratic support is quite misleading. Most obvious is the European Parliament, composed of directly elected representatives. The EP is increasingly usurping the role of the Commission as the primary interlocutor to the Council of Ministers in the EU legislative process. While the Commission still initiates legislation, it is now the EP that, in the final instance, controls the agenda—that is, the EP can make proposals to the Council that are more difficult to amend than to accept.

The Council of Ministers is itself also democratically accountable. The permanent representative of each country receives instructions from a national executive elected directly or through parliamentary vote. Even Commissioners and ECJ judges, though clearly more insulated, are named by directly elected national governments.

To be sure, the scope of the EU, as well as its distance from individual voters, serves to insulate national officials and executives, as well as supranational officials, from a measure of immediate accountability. It thereby “strengthens the state,” in the sense of increasing the domestic influence of national executives, ministers, and perhaps even ministerial officials. The question is whether this sort of delegation, within a more broadly democratic context, is normatively justifiable—an issue to which I now turn.

Third, *limitations on democratic accountability are often normatively justified*. To see why political decision-making should not always be majoritarian, it is useful to begin with the observation that many institutions in modern liberal democratic societies are insulated from the direct political influence of individuals and groups in civil society. Indeed, the essence of constitutional design lies in the designation of different processes of representation—some tighter, some looser—for different functions. Though all functions of government are *ultimately* under control by voters or their immediate representatives, there is no expectation (in theory or in practice of democratic governance) that all such functions be immanently under such control. Constitutional architects regularly design strong non-participatory, non-majoritarian institutions, such as courts, independent technical agencies, diplomatic and military establishments, central banks, independent national executives, and complex arrangements for the separation of powers.

Such limitations on majoritarian decision-making may be normatively justifiable, broadly speaking, if they increase the efficiency and technical competence of decision-making, guarantee political, cultural or socioeconomic rights against majority decisions, or offset imperfections in representative institutions. Is this the case in Europe?

There is good reason to believe so, because the most powerful and autonomous EU institutions—its constitutional court, central bank, technical administration, external trade negotiators, and competition authorities—all arise in areas where persistent imperfections in representative institutions create long-term threats to weak political groups. While we need not go so far as has Giandomenico Majone, who sees non-majoritarian institutions as legitimate where pure “efficiency” considerations dominate, we can safely say that these are all areas in which insulated national executives and supranational officials act in the interest of a diffuse majorities of consumers, citizens, and victims of uncompetitive behavior and environmental degradation to overturn policies set to the advantage of powerful, particularistic interest groups. On this reading, non-majoritarian decision-making is justified in democratic theory not simply because it may be efficient, but because, ironically, it may better represent the long-term interests of the median voter than does a more participatory system—in distributive conflicts as well as matters of efficiency.

One strong piece of evidence for this interpretation is the striking parallel between the use of non-majoritarian institutions at the EU level and their use within the member states themselves. The most autonomous EU institutions are found precisely in those areas—constitutional adjudication, trade diplomacy, technical administration, central banking, and prosecution—where non-majoritarian decision-making is most legitimate in the domestic polities of the member states. There is, after all, a large literature on the “decline of parliaments” in European domestic polities, most of which has nothing to do with European integration. By contrast, the EU is hardly present in those areas about which voters care most, such as policies on taxation, social protection and pensions, education, and defense and foreign affairs—areas in which EU policies do little more

than police secondary markets. This suggests that the non-majoritarian character of EU decision-making is the result not so much of the particularities of transnational governance but of general functional imperatives unique to the issue-areas where the EU is active. In this regard, the EU performs much the same political function for European governments as a strong executive and “fast-track” legislation has for postwar America—a function that could be argued to have a democratic result (i.e., one favorable to the median citizen) precisely because it is non-majoritarian.

Some critics of the EU, like critics of the strong U.S. executive, nonetheless insist that supermajoritarian decision-making, the strong judiciary and Commission, and the strengthening of national executives (along with the Treaty of Rome mandate for trade liberalization and the subsequent rise in economic interdependence) have introduced an illegitimate neo-liberal bias into EU policy. The EU liberalizes trade and tightens monetary discipline but discourages labor organization and social spending. Fritz Scharpf and others argue that tight controls on EU decision-making create “joint-decision traps” that favor particularistic interest groups—notably industrial and agricultural exporters—at the expense of workers, consumers, and other broader groups in society.

This is a curious claim because—this is my fourth and final point—*there is little evidence of an overall policy bias in European governance*. If we consider national and EU policies together, it is hard to conclude that Europeans enjoy insufficient social protection. Scharpf’s critique implies that there exists majority support, both within and across EU member states, for different policies—for example, lower agricultural subsidies and higher social spending, which would prevail absent a joint decision trap. There is little evidence for this. In the case of agricultural spending, as Elmar Rieger has shown, the claim is demonstrably false. Most countries outside the EU, Sweden and Switzerland for example, long maintained *higher* agricultural subsidies than governments within Europe. In the case of social policy, as Paul Pierson and Stefan Leibfried conclude, most European governments realize the need to control government spending—often for reasons having little to do with interdependence. If any majority emerged in the EU, they conclude, it would most likely support lower rather than higher social expenditures. There is, in sum, every reason to believe that the current structure of the EU serves primarily to strengthen, rather than obstruct, underlying tendencies in member state policy.

Overall, the EU is certainly no “superstate,” and it is far from obvious that it is democratically illegitimate—whether judged by the standards of democratic theory or existing domestic practices. The key to this conclusion is to avoid treating the EU as an ideal national democracy but instead to conceive it as a *limited, multi-level constitutional polity*. This is not, of course, to deflect all criticism, for it may well turn out that there are imperfections in the democratic pedigree of EU governance. Yet we can identify and redress true democratic imperfections only once we take full account of the factors I have outlined above: the extreme constraints on EU policy, the

complex multi-level synergies between domestic and EU institutions, and the true nature of modern constitutional government.

1. This essay develops arguments in Moravcsik (1998) and Moravcsik (1994), and work in progress.

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Committed Europeans: Finland and the EU Presidency Christine Ingebritsen

WHILE MANY OBSERVERS view the five Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) as “reluctant Europeans,” the Finns represent a study in contrasts. More committed to the adoption of the euro and regional level governance than its neighbors, Finland joined the European Union on January 1, 1995, and has proven to be the best student in the 1995 entering class. Under Finnish leadership, the Presidency of the EU has been highly effective, with some new directions that reflect Finnish diplomatic perseverance as well as values important to a Nordic welfare state that has fundamentally redefined its position in Europe.^{1, 2}

How has the Finnish government demonstrated its commitment to European governance? In three ways, Finnish leadership of the EU has been historically unprecedented, reflecting geopolitical conditions and political priorities unique to this northernmost corner of Western Europe.

First, the Finns (not surprisingly) have focused their attention on geopolitical conditions that are all too familiar from their perspective. The so-called Northern Dimension, designed to stabilize the situation in neighboring Russia, has received a very prominent place in Finland’s diplomatic priorities.

Unfortunately, events in Chechnya have placed the Northern Dimension on ice. This has been a grave setback for the Finnish Presidency, since no other state in Europe is likely to give an equivalent amount of diplomatic energy to the situation in Russia—nor will they share the Finnish experience in dealing effectively with Moscow.

Second, the Finns have given the highest administrative priority to EU matters. Preparations for assuming the presidency began as early as a year in advance. By the time Finland assumed the EU Presidency in June of 1999, the government was determined to make the most of the opportunity to lead.

According to sources in Washington diplomatic circles, the Finns have assumed the role with extreme dedication, and all ministries have given EU matters the highest priority. Matters not related to the EU Presidency (including promotions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) have been put on hold.

When the World Trade Organization met in Seattle, all Nordic delegations were willing to send a representative to the University of Washington to participate in a panel on Scandinavian-EU trade issues—*except* for the Finnish delegation. The amount of diplomatic energy devoted to back-channel meetings and EU-related discussions precluded Finnish participation in extra sessions during these international meetings. Thus, all available diplomatic energy has been devoted to leaving a legacy of dedication, efficiency, and principled leadership.

A third dimension of the Finnish EU Presidency reflects norms and values typical of Nordic social democracies, but

somewhat unique to EU deliberations. The now well-known language controversy, which irritated representatives from Germany and Austria, occurred at the onset of the Finnish Presidency. When the Presidency announced its intention to conduct deliberations only in French and English, and no longer in German as past presidencies had done, the Austrian and German delegations expressed their dismay by walking out of the opening session. A certain equality among members—regardless of size, characterized Finnish leadership in this instance.

Another example of cultural norms can be found in the outcome of the European Council meetings held in Helsinki on 10 and 11 December 1999. The agenda adopted as the Millennium Declaration shows evidence of new areas of collaboration (symbolic of diplomatic success) as well as items which were clearly supported by the Finns. For example, priority has been given to institutional reforms—including a commitment to greater transparency and accountability. European-wide cooperation on security and defense matters has been given greater specification under Finnish leadership. Emphasis has also been placed on social adjustment to “the information society” and a “knowledge-based economy”—both central to a state where Nokia leads the stock market and the capital city is referred to as “virtual Helsinki.”

A renewed commitment to the environmental dimension, as well as an inclusion of human rights considerations in the Helsinki Conference report are further examples of issues which have long received precedence in Finnish foreign policy-making. Under the Finnish EU Presidency, the EU took the decision to initiate new negotiations with a long list of candidate countries—including Turkey. Deepening has long been a Finnish priority, yet widening will be another legacy of Helsinki’s leadership.

The ultimate test of Finland’s capacity to influence the direction and substance of EU collaboration, however, will be in the resilience of ideas generated under Finnish leadership. Will the EU give Russia and the Baltic Sea region heightened attention in its external relations? To what extent will European defense initiatives continue to embody many of the parameters defined in Helsinki? Will human rights and the environment be more carefully specified under successive EU presidencies? At any rate, the Finns have left their mark: they are and will remain, committed Europeans.

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1. The author thanks Jorma Korhonen from the Finnish Embassy in Washington, D.C., and Robert Rinehart, Nordic Affairs Expert at the Foreign Service Institute and George Washington University for helpful input in the preparation of this article.

2. For documentation of the Finnish Presidency, including the program of the Presidency, press releases, and conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, see the Presidency website at <http://presidency.finland.fi>

ECSA Review Essay

European Security and Defense Cooperation: An Institutional Analysis Anand Menon

ALL OF A SUDDEN, the EU's relationship with defense policy is "once again a hot topic" (Robertson 2000). Recent developments have been impressive and rapid. The St. Malo declaration of December 1998 spoke of the determination of Britain and France to build an autonomous European defense capacity. The Cologne European Council the following June named former NATO-Secretary General Javier Solana as the EU's High Representative for Foreign Policy. Finally, the Helsinki summit last December set the goal of allowing EU member states to deploy a force of 50-60,000 troops within 60 days for the duration of at least a year. Commentators claim such initiatives will have significant consequences (Medley 1999), though they are divided on what these will be. Whilst Americans worry about the potentially divisive effects an EU defense dimension will have within NATO (Bolton 2000), Europeans applaud the new-found commitment to create it (Hurd, 2000).

Equally strikingly, there is little theoretically informed literature to turn to in order better to understand and explain such developments. European defense cooperation has long represented a turn-off for political scientists, for several reasons. First, most of the literature on the subject is descriptive, and therefore unlikely to engage those studying other policy sectors. Moreover, realism's domination of security studies effectively precluded interest in security institutions, viewed merely as reflections of interstate power relations, transitory marriages of convenience designed to aggregate power in the face of Cold War enemies. Finally, defense apparently provided little to study given the lack of formal competence enjoyed over it by the EC/EU.

Not that this last explanation represents a particularly compelling justification for neglect. Because supposedly general theories ignore the security related considerations that drew France and Germany to contemplate integration in the first place, their claim to general explanatory value is undermined. Indeed, European integration would not have proceeded as smoothly as it did during these crucial formative years had not NATO taken defense co-operation off the agenda, leaving the West Europeans free to focus on economics instead (McCarthy 1999: 151, 157). Instances where integration failed to occur, moreover, should be of interest to those engaged in explaining why it does. Dependent variables should vary, and consideration of the European Defense Community would have added an interesting extra element to, for instance, Moravcsik's (1998) explanation of "grand bargains."

So how should one set about explaining the EU's involvement in defense affairs? One thing is clear: reliance on neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism is not the way ahead.

To mention just one reason among many, both tend to think of European integration as existing within an international vacuum, and are therefore unable to account for the important role played by other international institutions in shaping policy outcomes. Given the fact that the EC's inactivity in defense matters for many years was due almost entirely to the existence of NATO, this clearly limits their explanatory bite somewhat.¹

Mainstream political science has recently begun to discover security institutions (Haftendorn et. al. 1999). The study of institutionalism in general has, of course, taken off in recent years, spawning squabbles between proponents of different variants as to which most accurately captures their role in mediating between individuals and outcomes (for excellent summaries, see *ECSA Review* 1999, Hall and Taylor, 1997, Peters 1999). Without entering into such arguments here, what is of note is the considerable mileage to be gained from applying institutionalist approaches to politics to the evolution of the EU's defense role.

To take but one example, Douglass North (1990) sees institutions as a rational response to problems of imperfect information and uncertainty. Three implications follow. First, whilst institutions may mitigate against the worst effects of information problems, they do not solve them, hence allowing a role for the unanticipated consequences of institutional design. Second, institutions once created take on a life of their own: they are both actors and arenas. Finally, the creation of institutions does not solve once and for all distributional conflict between their creators. Indeed, they generally embody and can perpetuate such conflict.

The institutional "game" played in Western Europe in the defense sphere since 1945 illustrates these points nicely. The co-operation problem confronting West European states in the 1940s was that of how best to ensure protection against a perceived Soviet threat. Simultaneously, questions of power management between West European states were also critical – notably the task of controlling Germany. NATO emerged as the institution most capable of satisfying member states on both counts by, in Lord Ismay's famous phrase, keeping the "Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down."

From the early 1950s, NATO's institutional structure grew denser and more complex. Periodic challenges to its supremacy stemmed from French concern that the distribution of gains within it favored the "Anglo-Saxons" at France's expense. De Gaulle's memorandum of 1958, his abortive Fouchet Plan of 1962, and the Franco-German Treaty of 1963 were all attempts either to alter the structures of NATO so as to rectify this situation, or to create alternative institutions within which French influence would have been greater (Menon 2000).

The fall of the Berlin Wall led to a profound shift in the demand for institutionalised security and a competition between institutions and their proponents for primacy over European security. One response was the convening of the EU's Maastricht IGC on political union, partly a consequence of a belief that European influence over security affairs (or, in institutionalist terms, the distributional gains available to European states) would be greater within European as opposed

to transatlantic structures. That NATO ultimately reinforced its role was due partly to the joint decision trap (Scharpf 1988), under which veto players and a status quo default position meant that states such as Britain, which perceived NATO as providing them with significant distributive benefits, were able to stymie attempts to create a meaningful CFSP. Partly, too, NATO's durability stemmed from the fact that its bureaucratic structures played a key role in providing a response consistent with its maintenance, in the shape of the series of reforms starting at the London summit of July 1990.

In consequence, when Europe was confronted with a series of crises ranging from the Gulf War to the former Yugoslavia, NATO represented the only option in terms of an effective multilateral European response, and a tried and trusted option with well-entrenched standard operating procedures at that. In other words, although NATO would not have been created in its current form after the end of the Cold War, its existence and the failure to create alternatives meant that it not only survived, but prospered. Not only have its tasks, membership and geographic scope expanded, but, as we shall see below, it has also succeeded in creating two structures to contain Europe's defense aspirations.

We are currently witnessing further reconsideration of the benefits European states reap from NATO. The impact of Kosovo on both Britain and France was great, leading them to question their attitudes towards a NATO that continues to be dominated by the United States. Albright's bullying at Rambouillet, and American carping at the Europeans' inability to deal with their own problems, have spurred both London and Paris into desiring more autonomous defense capabilities for Europe. However, the prospects for success of recent initiatives are profoundly limited, and again, an understanding of the role and importance of institutions helps us to explain why.

To claim that the EU is about to arm itself with an "autonomous" defense policy is to misunderstand the nature of defense institutions in Western Europe. Even should the proposed European intervention force be created, resource constraints mean that the EU states will continue to need to "borrow" American hardware to carry out military missions. Certainly, the NATO command structures have recently been reformed precisely in order to "lighten" them and to enable European-only forces to undertake missions in which the other allies had no interest. Any decision to launch such an operation, however, would require unanimous approval from the North Atlantic Council. This body includes not only the Americans, who could well have reasons to block any European initiative in which they have no interest in participating, but also Turkey which has better reasons than most to suspect the intentions of EU member states.

Moreover, consider for a moment the differences between the EU and NATO. Whilst both work on the basis of unanimity, NATO relies on delegation to ensure the effective taking and swift implementation of decisions. The Secretary General chairs NATO meetings and plays key role in manufacturing compromise between its members. Moreover, once military operations are underway, decision-making power is delegated

to an integrated military structure designed for efficiency rather than to ensure political oversight. Finally, and most importantly, NATO contains a hegemon of sorts. The United States bears the brunt of the defense burden in return for an effective leadership role.

In contrast, decision making in the EU is generally characterized by complex trade-offs and compromise both between issues and between member states over specific issues. Threats of vetoes and side-payments are common if not exactly conducive to swift action in the face of military threats. Imagine, for instance, if Spain demanded another doubling of the structural funds as a price for its support for EU intervention in the next Kosovo. Moreover, there is no obvious leader within the EU. Indeed, quite the opposite: the whole system is designed to take disproportionate account of the interests of smaller member states, who react publicly and angrily to any suggestion that greater efficiency requires the creation of any kind of large power directorate. Such a directorate, however, may represent a *sine qua non* for military efficiency. Third, Javier Solana's recent comment that the Council's Justus Lipsius building contains "as many holes as Swiss cheese" was hardly a vote of confidence in its security arrangements. It may be that certain policy sectors cannot simply be slotted into the EU portfolio, as they require a completely different kind of institutional setting.

Good institutional reasons exist, therefore, to suggest that recent attempts to give the EU a more effective defense role will not amount to much. Two further issues are worth noting, if only briefly. First, institutionalism represents a useful method of analyzing institutional efficiency. In a non-zero transaction cost world, institutional outcomes are not uniquely efficient solutions to common problems. An institutionalist story would have much to say on how inter and intra-institutional competition between European and transatlantic institutions in the 1990s have affected their ability to carry out their allotted tasks. Indeed, one might argue that both NATO's forays into peacekeeping and the "softer side" of security, and the EU's recent obsession with defense, represent dangerous distractions, assigning each organization a new set of tasks for which it is institutionally ill-equipped.

Second, those variants of institutionalism that treat preferences as endogenous and hence shaped by interaction within institutions should not be dismissed (though simply tacking them onto rationalist accounts, as some have done, is both methodologically and epistemologically suspect). Interesting work remains to be done on how national preferences have been altered by forty years of interaction within NATO, not to mention how, if at all, the multinational military units beginning to proliferate on the continent change the perceptions of their participants concerning questions of identity.

Clearly, the above represents merely a selective overview. The moral of this essay, however, should be clear. Defense is worth studying, and worth studying in a theoretically informed manner if developments are to be successfully explained and understood. Institutionalism provides a useful tool kit with which to embark upon this task.

1. Whilst the role of NATO makes this shortcoming particularly obvious for defense policy, it is not limited to this sector. The Bretton Woods system presumably partly explains why EMU was not seriously discussed until the 1970s. The existence of the Council of Europe, moreover, has served to limit EC forays into the cultural sphere, and has limited its impact on, for instance, broadcasting policy (Fraser 1996).

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Teaching the EU

Editor's note: Suggestions for and submissions of essays by ECSA members on teaching about the EU are welcomed. Please query ECSA via e-mail at ecsa@pitt.edu.

The European Parliament Simulation Richard Piper

SIMULATIONS THAT SEEK TO mirror real-life situations and engage students in active learning have become increasingly popular teaching devices in recent years, as a component of a broad movement in higher education toward actively engaging students in participatory types of learning. By requiring students to "think on their feet," make applications of knowledge and cope with group interaction, simulations have been found to enhance learning in various classroom environments (Smith and Boyer 1996, Bonwell and Eison 1991, Study Group on the Conditions of Excellence in American Higher Education 1984). At the University of Tampa, simulations have become a key ingredient in the curriculum and have also been utilized with targeted secondary school audiences as a means of both education and recruitment.

This European Parliament Simulation at the University of Tampa has been developed with the primary purposes of advancing students' knowledge of and interest in the European Parliament and the European Union, while at the same time enhancing students' communicating, negotiating and critical thinking skills. In contrast to the Pennsylvania/Maryland Consortium's European Union Simulation Project and most other European Union simulations (Loedel 1998), it focuses on the European Parliament (EP) and is designed for use in a classroom during a relatively short time period (one to two weeks of 50-minute class periods) and for various sizes of classes. It has been employed in seven classes to date, including one at the graduate level, one at the Honors undergraduate level, two at the non-Honors undergraduate level, and three in secondary school International Baccalaureate programs. In the University classes, the simulation lasted approximately two weeks in each class, with two class periods allocated to preparation, two to the simulation itself, and two to debriefing and analysis. Only four class periods were utilized in the high school simulations due to time constraints.

Structure of the Simulation

Prior to the simulation, students complete readings and hold discussions on the European Union in general and the European Parliament in particular. Each class member is assigned a constituency and a party and is instructed to play roles appropriate to that constituency and party in the mock Parliament. To assist in that task, each student receives a country and party information packet describing the content of ten legislative issues and how her/his country and party have generally responded to similar issues in the past. There are discussions of constituency and party pressures and of personal

values that shape differing approaches to such issues as agricultural protection, monetary policy, lobbying reform, regional development, workplace democracy, expansion of the European Union, and the “beef crisis.”

The simulation itself begins with participants meeting with their party colleagues in party groups. Members of the European Peoples Party and the Party of European Socialists, the two largest parties, meet as groups throughout this period. Members of the smaller parties meet briefly with their own party groups but then are permitted to meet with others across party lines or to hold discussions with the EPP or PES members. These initial caucus meetings choose party leaders and provide the first arena for discussions and bargaining, as each party strives to achieve party objectives.

At the next stage are country meetings, in which members meet with others from their nation-state, regardless of party, and exchange information and seek methods of working together to achieve common goals. The party and national meetings highlight role conflicts, illustrate the need for compromise if anything is to be accomplished and give participants the “big picture” above and beyond the goals and arguments appearing in their own party/constituency packets.

Following is the general session of the European Parliament. Members meet as one assembly, sitting with their party groups as in the real Parliament. They elect a President, using the same procedural rules as in the actual European Parliament, and set an agenda, determining the order in which the proposed measures will be addressed. They then address the three proposals to which members have assigned highest priority and eventually pass, defeat or table each of these. After the first session (usually lasting 50-60 minutes), the professor calculates a party and constituency “score” for each MEP and gives that to her/him at the beginning of the next class period.

The second session largely repeats the steps of the first one, except that there is no new election of a President and the time period for party caucuses and country meetings is shortened a little (since participants now know one another better than before and there are only seven issues to discuss, instead of the original ten). After the second session, the professor calculates the final party and constituency scores, returning them to the participants at the beginning of the next class period, and indicating to each how her/his career prospects may be affected.

The final stage of the simulation consists of two class periods of debriefing and reflection, during which the professor and students compare/contrast studies of actual European Parliamentary behavior and that which was observed in the simulation, analyze such theoretical models as William Riker’s “minimum winning coalition” and its applicability or lack thereof to the EP (Riker 1962), and discuss philosophical questions such as appropriate parliamentary representation (trustee, delegate, politico, as in Eulau, *et. al.*, 1959) and the alleged “democratic deficit” in the European Union. Students are also required to write essays about the simulation, analyzing it in terms of both empirical and normative issues, and to take an examination on the European Parliament and the issues confronting it.

Evaluation and Conclusion

Each class was surveyed after the simulation to measure students’ responses. Students’ assessments of the educational value of the simulation were overwhelmingly positive: 97% found it to be a valuable learning experience, 97% disagreed that the class time spent on this simulation would have been better spent on lectures, 85% said that the simulation greatly enhanced their knowledge of current European issues. Written comments were highly enthusiastic: “This was my best class experience ever,” was a fairly typical quote. There were few significant differences in the assessments at the different levels, though the graduate and Honors classes appeared to gain slightly more from the experience than the non-Honors university and secondary school students did.

Given current evaluation data, there is a lack of solid empirical evidence that the simulation raises student knowledge and understanding above levels that would be achieved in its absence, though the professor’s impression is that it does so and the students clearly perceive that it does so. The next step is to study two paired classes, one using the simulation and the other not doing so, and compare examination and other results.

The European Parliament Simulation is still a work in progress. The author intends to experiment with a less-structured version in Honors and graduate courses, where students are likely to be able to research the issues and party/constituency positions on their own and may need few cues of the type that have been provided in the party and constituency packets. The author and his colleagues also intend to try to develop improved measurements of the “value added” by the simulation. Suggestions from readers are welcome.

Richard Piper is Dana Professor of Government and World Affairs at The University of Tampa, Florida. He developed the European Parliament Simulation as part of a Title VI grant from the U. S. Department of Education.

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
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
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Book Reviews

Stuart Croft, John Redmond, G. Wyn Rees, and Mark Webber. The Enlargement of Europe. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1999, 188 pp.

IN THE ENLARGEMENT OF EUROPE, four British political scientists attempt to chronicle and analyze the five separate enlargement processes that are still ongoing in Europe's major intergovernmental institutions—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe (COE). The book consists of individual chapters devoted to each organization that survey briefly its cold war purpose and institutional highlights of that era. Each chapter then shifts to explaining how each organization has adapted itself to the vastly different environment of post-Cold War Europe.

The authors present at the outset a multi-dimensional view of enlargement, which is explored in each chapter. Enlargement is conceptualized as incorporating adaptations in number of members, growth of functional roles, and also changes in internal structural processes and decision-making procedures that are related to the absorption of more states and functions into the organization. Croft, Redmond, Rees, and Webber clearly favor a neo-liberal institutionalist approach that regards international institutions as key actors on the world stage capable of fostering cooperation between states. Constructivism is also backed as a means of institutionalizing common political values across various intergovernmental entities.

The book is a useful handbook for students or scholars interested in the various post-cold war developments across Europe's institutional architecture. The accession of each state beyond the European core membership of the cold war era is documented along with an explanation of the enlargement process that has emerged for each institution. As liberal institutionalists, the authors tend to focus on the role of values and the organizations' roles in institutionalizing western political values. Indeed, they argue that it is this emphasis on exporting western political norms to the eastern portions of Europe that was a key institutional adaptation across the board and which led to the survival of each organization in post-cold war Europe.

The enlargement of NATO is portrayed as an inevitable event triggered by steps first taken at the end of the cold war to reach out to the east. The authors point out that NATO's history has featured the accession of multiple states simultaneously (Greece and Turkey), enlargement in the face of massive international hostility (West Germany), and within the context of major internal resistance (Spain) (p.24). Vis-à-vis other potential European contributors to continental security, NATO is viewed as a sort of "mission hoarder" that enlarges functionally without regard for coordination with or delegation to other European institutions. The creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was highlighted in particular as

undercutting the influence of the simultaneously enlarging CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe). An argument sustained throughout the text—that no overarching strategy or common vision of Europe was driving a coordinated enlargement effort of the European institutional architecture—was well supported in the NATO chronicle.

The EU chapter is a comprehensive treatment of the enlargement of the EU's membership and functions against the backdrop of European states' varied commitments to the principle of integration and especially to the federalist vision. This chapter is the strongest analytically in the book in that it both astutely analyzes and differentiates institutional, member, and aspirant interests across a range of EU policy areas—budgetary and financial issues, the ever-present widening vs. deepening debate, and the various perceptions of responsibility to export the EU's political and economic standards to the east. The authors predict that enlargement will breed division across various regional fault lines and suggest that a multi-tiered EU with separate tiers going at different speeds toward different destinations would be the most desirable outcome for the integration process. The authors lament that aspirants may accede to the EU for the wrong reasons, meaning that they may not share the federalist vision but are motivated instead by the benefits of the single market.

An interesting related omission and consequent weakness of the book is the lack of any reference to integration theory or functionalism. The vision and indeed, the brilliance, of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman was to entice states to follow their self-interest in order to achieve short-term tangible benefits but to do so in a way that unconsciously led participating states ever closer to political integration (see McCormick, The European Union: Politics and Policies, 1999, pp.12-25). The works of such integration scholars as Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg go uncited and undiscussed (for example, Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957, 1958 and 1968, and Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, 1963).

The remaining chapters deal with the Western European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Council of Europe. The WEU was unrealistically built up as a potential rival to NATO although the case for its relevance in the post-Cold War era was never adequately made. Indeed, NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative is scarcely mentioned even though it has proven to be the destination of choice for the postcommunist states and other Western European non-NATO states seeking membership and the fulfillment of security objectives through participation in European security institutions.

Problems of institutional division of labor and purpose permeate the OSCE and COE chapters. The authors argue that lack of coordination and competition has characterized these bodies' post-Cold War enlargements and adaptations. They criticize each for their virtually unmitigated expansion to the east in such a way that may have compromised the organizations' standard-setting functions in democratic politics, economics, and human rights. Although missions have not been

completely de-conflicted, the text highlights how each institution has gradually settled on specialized limited roles. The OSCE has focused on conflict prevention and crisis management while the COE has directed its efforts to human rights protection and the elaboration of human rights standards.

The book is a well-researched and written volume for scholars in search of an up-to-date assessment of the enlargement of Europe's major intergovernmental institutions within a single analytical framework. This achievement fills a descriptive, and to some extent analytical, gap in the literature. Its emphasis on institutionalist approaches may also be perceived as a weakness, however, in that the relevance of other theoretical approaches is insufficiently explored. For instance, states' lack of support for institutional coordination, cooperation, and more explicit standards for enlargement stems from states' unwillingness to abandon completely realist approaches to the pursuit of their interests. Unwillingness to embrace the east completely with the extension of membership in the EU and NATO is rooted in realpolitik rationales that favor the pursuit of self-interest over the benefits of cooperative security and the export of economic stability to the east.

The Enlargement of Europe is a thorough chronology of key developments in each of the institutions in the post-Cold War era. The volume also makes important strides toward identifying key conceptual areas that will spark further contention in the region as the enlargement processes continue. It is impressive in its multi-faceted descriptions of the various institutional evolutions, but less strong in offering a framework to help sort out the inevitable debates that loom over the political, economic, and security identities of European states, the redistribution of European wealth and resources, and the applicability of exporting European values beyond the western European core states.

Marybeth Peterson Ulrich
U.S. Army War College

Simon Hix. The Political System of the European Union. New York: St. Martin's Press/Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999, 427 pp.

THE EUROPEAN UNION IS a not a state, but certainly a fully functioning political system operating in ways comparable to the U.S. federal system of government. This is the central premise in The Political System of the European Union, the latest addition to St. Martin's/Macmillan's series of textbooks on the EU. The author sets out to present the EU as a working political system with stable and clearly-defined institutions for collective decision-making and with citizens and social groups seeking to influence the outputs of that system. Consequently, Hix does not waste much time discussing the nature of the beast, but instead quickly proceeds to advocating a general rational institutionalist perspective for his subsequent examination of the government, politics and policy-making of the European Union. What then follows is a generally impressive coverage

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of the institutions and policies of the EU based upon much current research, especially on electoral and parliamentary behavior at the European level. In the first part of the book, covering the "government" of the EU, the author uses the distinction between the Executive (Chapter 2), Legislature (Chapter 3) and Judiciary (Chapter 4) to present the major political institutions of the Union.

The principal-agent distinction (Chapter 2) is a clear, but risky model to use for a discussion of the complex relationship between the Council and the Commission, as it may tempt the analyst to over-emphasize—as Hix does—the subordinate position of the Commission to the Council. Fortunately, the relative autonomy of the Commission in establishing formal rights in the policy process is recognized in the "intergovernmental" field of Justice and Home Affairs (pp.327-328).

EU lawmaking (Chapter 3) takes place in a classic two-chamber legislature with the Council (the dominant chamber) representing the "states" and the European Parliament representing the citizens of the EU. The author here introduces a two-dimensional policy space (left-right and pro-anti Europe) which is used to provide a highly readable discussion of coalition patterns in the Council and the Parliament. One of the numerous qualities of The Political System of the EU is that the two-dimensional policy space is carried through to the discussions of the "social base" (public opinion and cleavages) (Chapter 5) and the party system in the EP. This creates a unique theoretical coherence to an introductory text on the EU.

The "Government" part of the book concludes with a review of political science explanations of the gradual "constitutionalisation" of the EU (Chapter 4). Interestingly, ECJ "activism" and the inter-court competition at the national level are not the only explanations offered; the role played by "transnational litigants" and lawyers is also included in this analysis.

Interest representation in the EU (Chapter 7) is discussed on the basis of pluralism, corporatism and consociationalism and the important role played by the Commission in championing "civil society," for instance environmental groups and sub-national public authorities.

In final part of the book, entitled "Policy-Making," Hix concentrates more on policy itself than on the *making* of policy.

The various steps in the policy process, from formulation to implementation, could arguably have deserved some consideration. Policy-specific theories, for instance regarding regulatory policy, are thus preferred to broader explanatory frameworks from public policy theory such as subsystems theory (e.g. network theory). The chapters on regulatory policy (Chapter 8), the EMU (Chapter 10) and citizen freedom and security policies (Chapter 11) are, however, particularly good. In Chapter 12, the author provides an overview of the EU's "global policies," that is the external trade and aid policies and the attempts to establish a common foreign and security policy. The most valuable part of this chapter is not necessarily the discussion of two competing IR approaches, realism and liberalism, but rather establishing the link between the internal policy development of the EU and external events. The different policy orientations of the Commission and member states are also covered in this chapter. Unfortunately, the chapter on redistributive policies (Chapter 9) does not include the reforms introduced to the Structural Funds at the Berlin Summit (March 1999), but does present a typology of policies as well as a section on the budget of the EU.

This textbook is not the one for historical accounts or exhaustive empirical detail. Instead, it offers a coherent, concise and theoretically-guided introduction to the institutions, workings and policies of the European Union, with current research particularly emphasized in the chapters on electoral and party behavior. Thus, The Political System of the European Union will be a valuable companion to more descriptive accounts of the EU and certainly provides a reference point for further theoretical discussion, including at a graduate level.

Jonny Trapp Steffensen
Cambridge University

J. A. E. Vervaele, ed. Compliance and Enforcement of European Community Law. Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999, 426 pp.

THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION for the European Union encompasses the economic sector, together with development of European private law, administrative law and criminal law within the Member States. However, the role of compliance and enforcement of the Union law in that process also requires Member States' adjustments to measure effectiveness of all the Union's common policies. The monitoring and enforcement of compliance are carried out by both the EU and the individual Member States. In 1991, Utrecht University proposed a research project entitled, "Compliance and Enforcement of European Community Law." The research project, which focused particularly on the Dutch legal order, was supported by the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), and operated between 1991 and 1997. The culmination of this research was an international congress in November 1997 held at Utrecht University, at which both project researchers and external experts exchanged views. This book contains the

proceedings of this international conference. Overall, one of the conference aims was to gauge whether a *modus operandi* was in place for an *ius commune* (law of the Community) to emerge in Europe.

Essentially, the volume's essays are clustered in three parts. Part One comprises seven essays with a focus on the general framework within which to determine the effectiveness of Community law. The authors (Francis Snyder, Martin Shapiro, Roel de Lange, Kamiel Mortelmans, Christian Joerges, Ellen Vos, Frans van Waarden and Albertine Veldman) test their ideas by looking at the European Union's constitutionalism and projected effects of the European Monetary Union, aspects of horizontalization of law enforcement and its European distinctiveness, the present structures of transnational governance, the national regulatory styles, legal theoretical concepts and legal methods of research as applied to the relations between the Community legal system, on the one hand, and local or regional systems of (private) governance or enforcement, on the other.

Part Two of this book deals with the enforcement of Community law via national, administrative, civil and criminal law, with attention based on the regulatory systems embracing agriculture, fisheries and foodstuffs. The theme around which these case studies are pursued, by Astrid Berg, Marieke Lugt, Hugo van Steijn, Anneloes van der Zijde, Gerhard Dannecker and Rob Widdershoven, is the shifting boundaries of public and private enforcement. A second theme in this part centers on the shifting boundaries of European and national enforcement. Four contributors, namely, Aster Veldkamp, Nicolien Dirkzwager, Diana Comijs and Bert Swart provide insights and critiques with regard to three subjects: structural funds, transfrontier transfer of waste, and customs law. As the editor notes, contributions in this part of the book first attempt to determine to what extent is it possible to talk about the Europeanization of enforcement through civil, administrative and criminal law, and second, to what degree we can find horizontalization of enforcement.

These aforementioned questions are explored by Walter van Gerven, Manfred Zuleeg, the editor, John Vervaele, and Gerrit Betlem, in their analysis of the civil liability of the state, administrative and criminal sanctions based on European standards, and cross-border private enforcement of EU law.

The editor's aim and, indeed, the entire project points out that further research surrounding collaborative compliance and enforcement is necessary. This book represents a successful melding of legal theory, the comparative method, and European law and its relationship to the domestic law of the Union's Member States. Although the contributors' focus is based on their familiarity with the Dutch administrative and legal system, this work has a broader significance, and is meant to provoke and encourage further investigation of the enforcement and compliance of European Community law. Solid research and reflection permeates each of the essays. This carefully thought-out experiment is heartily endorsed by this reviewer.

Dan Turack
Capital University



EUROPEAN COMMUNITY STUDIES ASSOCIATION
Seventh Biennial International Conference
"Globalization, European Integration, and Domestic Transformation"
May 31-June 2, 2001
Madison, Wisconsin

Call for Paper and Panel Proposals

Deadline for receipt of all proposals is November 1, 2000.

The European Community Studies Association invites scholars and practitioners engaged in the study of Europe and the European Union to submit panel and paper proposals for the 2001 Seventh Biennial International Conference. The general theme of the conference will be: "Globalization, European Integration, and Domestic Transformation." The Program Committee hopes to promote broad exchange of disciplinary perspectives and research agendas, and is particularly interested in work that relates issues of European union to country-level politics and policies and to the broader international context. The Committee actively seeks proposals relevant to the European Union from scholars from a variety of disciplines, including work that places the EU in comparative perspective. Participation by graduate students is welcomed.

The 2001 Conference Program Committee members are:

Martin Schain, Politics and European Studies, New York University (Chair)
George Bermann, School of Law, Columbia University
Russell Dalton, Department of Political Science, University of California Irvine
Jytte Klausen, Department of Government, Brandeis University
Helen Milner, Department of Political Science, Columbia University
Mark Pollack, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin Madison

For complete guidelines on the proposal process as well as general information about the Conference and its location, please visit the ECSA Web site at www.ecsa.org/conf2001.html

Panel proposals must be accompanied by the Panel Proposal Cover Sheet, available on the Web site and included with this issue of the *ECSA Review*. Individual paper proposals are also welcomed, and the Program Committee will assign those individual papers accepted to appropriate panels. Paper proposals must be accompanied by the Paper Proposal Cover Sheet, also available on the Web site and included with this issue of the *ECSA Review*. The Proposal Cover Sheets may be printed from the Web site or photocopied as need be.

Panel and paper proposals should be submitted by regular mail (not by fax or e-mail) to ECSA, 405 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA. We regret that we won't be able to consider proposals received after the November 1 deadline. Proposers will receive responses in writing no later than the end of January 2001. For questions about the Conference, please visit the ECSA Web site or send an e-mail to [<ecsa@pitt.edu>](mailto:ecsa@pitt.edu).



NETWORK OF EUROPEAN UNION CENTERS

News and Notes for Spring 2000

✧ **March:** In conjunction with the EU Center at Illinois multidisciplinary seminar, "The European Union and EU-US Relations," Michael Newman, Director of the London Research Centre at the University of North London, presented a public lecture on "Democratic Deficits and the European Union." The Illinois Center is currently accepting applications for grants of \$5000 to enable eight University of Illinois graduate students to conduct extensive research in Europe this summer. On April 6, Günter Verheugen, Commissioner of Enlargement for the European Commission, examined the political, economic, and social implications of EU expansion in an event co-sponsored by the EU Centers in Illinois and Wisconsin and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

✧ **March 16-22:** The EU Center of the University System of Georgia welcomed Paolo Cecchini as a Visiting Scholar for a week; Mr. Cecchini is the author of the "Costs of Non-Europe" and served as the former European Commission Deputy Director General for the Internal Market. The EUC-USG sponsored a two-day event including an EU Curriculum Workshop on April 13th and a conference entitled "EU-US Relations: A Partnership in Transition" on April 14th. Conference participants included Desmond Dinan, Ellen Frost, Irene Finel-Honigman, Maria Green Cowles, Simon Serfaty, Charles Krupnick, Ludger Kuhnhardt and Adrian Taylor. The EUC-USG will also host a conference entitled "EU-US Data Privacy Policy" in late May.

✧ **March 23-25:** The EU Center in North Carolina hosted the second annual "European Symposium" with co-sponsorship from area business and trade associations. The theme of this year's symposium was "EU Enlargement: Central Europe." The series of events included special seminars, a roundtable discussion for Research Triangle businesses and a day-long Saturday professional development seminar for college faculty from North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia. The North Carolina EU Center is also accepting applications from advanced Ph.D. students to attend their summer institute in Chapel Hill on May 20-21. More information on both events can be found at www.unc.edu/depts/eucenter.

✧ **March 30-April 1:** Issues of immigration policy, racism, and the redefinition of citizenship were the focus of a conference jointly organized by the EU Center of California and the Scripps College Humanities Institute. Mario Soares, member of European Parliament and former Prime Minister and President of Portugal, delivered the State of the European Union address in conjunction with the conference. He was joined by California Lieutenant Governor Cruz M. Bustamante and Dolores Huerta, co-founder of the United Farm Workers, who also delivered keynote addresses. Politicians, activists and academics discussed migration, a topic of vital interest both for California and for the EU member states.

✧ **April 7-8:** The European Union Center at the University of Pittsburgh hosted a policy conference "The Future of EU-US Aviation Relations." The conference examined the challenges facing governments, airlines and other interested parties involved in the development and regulation of commercial aviation between Europe and North America. The conference is timed to provide an opportunity to follow up on issues raised and proposals offered at the international conference on air transport in the 21st century held in Chicago in December 1999 under the auspices of the U.S. Dept. of Transportation. The Center is also host this spring to numerous academic and policy-practitioner visitors.

To find out more about the Network of European Union Centers, please visit the Web site at www.eucenters.org. The European Union launched the Network in 1998 to build stronger ties among Europeans and Americans. ECSCA's Network of European Union Centers Committee: Sidney Tarrow (Cornell University), Chair; Maria Green Cowles (American University); Paulette Kurzer (University of Arizona); Vivien A. Schmidt (Boston University).



NETWORK OF EUROPEAN UNION CENTERS

News and Notes for Spring 2000

✧ *April 14-15:* The Wisconsin European Union Center held a workshop, "Work, Welfare, and Governance in Europe and the United States: A Transatlantic Dialogue." Leading specialists from Europe—Bernhard Ebbinghaus (Max Planck Institute, Cologne), Maurizio Ferrera (Bocconi University), Janine Goetschy (Nanterre), Anton Hemerijck (Leiden), Ida Regalia (Milan), Martin Rhodes (EUI), Robert Salais (CNRS), and Alain Supiot (Nantes)—joined specialists from the USA: Joel Handler (UCLA), Paul Osterman (MIT), and Charles Sabel (Columbia), as well as UW-Madison faculty. Workshop texts will be developed into longer, formal papers for presentation at a major conference in Spring 2001, whose proceedings will form the basis of a collective volume edited by the Center co-directors Jonathan Zeitlin and David Trubek.

✧ *April 27-29:* The EU Center in Seattle hosted its first conference to focus on cyberspace, "Regulating the Internet: EU and U.S. Perspectives." The interdisciplinary conference covered a wide range of topics including data privacy, issues of equity and access, and the regulation of e-commerce. European and American experts on Internet regulation, as well as officials from the European Commission and industry representatives from MS-NBC, participated on conference panels. Washington State Attorney General Christine Gregoire gave the conference keynote speech on April 27 in an opening session co-sponsored by the EU Center and the University of Washington School of Law.

✧ *March, April, May:* The EU Center of New York sponsored talks this spring on "The Future of Currency Blocks" by Zanny Minton Beddoes; "EU Enlargement: A Debate," with Anand Menon, Dimitris Chrysochoou, Milada Vachudova, John Glenn, and Glenda Rosenthal; "Internet Tools for EU Research," by Barbara Sloan; "Future of German-American Relations" by Hans von Stackelberg; "The Stability Pact in the EU Monetary Union" by Alessandra Casella; and "Eastern Enlargement of the EU" also by John Glenn. Spring conferences included "E2K: A New Vision for Europe" (the 17th Annual Graduate Student Conference at Columbia University) and "Re-Mapping Europe: Territory, Membership and Identity in a Supranational Age," at NYU. Five doctoral students from Columbia, New School University and NYU conducted field work this spring in Europe with the aid of EU Center travel grants.

✧ *April and May:* The EU Center at the University of Missouri welcomed Oliver Nette, First Secretary to the European Commission's Delegation in Washington, D.C., who discussed the New Transatlantic Agenda with students in the Center's new EU Certificate Program. The Center also hosted two major conferences in Columbia, MO: (April 12-14) Bert van Barlingen, Head of the Trade Section of the European Commission's Delegation to Washington, spoke on EU-U.S. trade relations at a conference co-hosted with the School of Law and the Department of Economics, "The Impact of Economic and Monetary Union on European Union Employment and Social Policy." The second conference (May 22-23), "US-EU Policy Issues in Animal Production," welcomed Anastassios Haniotis (Councillor, European Commission: Agriculture) and Bertrand Carsin (Director, Scientific Health Opinions: European Commission) to Columbia and was co-sponsored by the UM College of Veterinary Medicine.

✧ *April and May:* The EU Center at Harvard University continued its "Visions of European Governance" series with talks in April and May by Philippe Maystadt, President of the European Investment Bank and former Belgian Minister of Finance; by Frederik Bolkestein, Dutch Member of the European Commission in charge of the Internal Market, Taxation and Customs Union; and by Richard Corbett, Member, European Parliament, and Member, European Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Affairs. Also, in cooperation with the Iberian Study Group at Harvard, Antonio de Oyarzbal, Ambassador of Spain, spoke on the European Defense Initiative and NATO.

(continued from p.1)

Prodi sought to use the Dehaene report to unite the new college behind a major political initiative and to force member states to negotiate far-reaching reforms. He was only moderately successful. Some commissioners resented what they saw as Prodi's attempted *fait accompli*. Ironically, his strongest supporter was Michel Barnier, a former (Gaullist) French minister for European affairs who assumed responsibility within the Commission for the IGC. The two Britons, by contrast, urged caution, fearing that a forceful approach would antagonize national governments. They were right. Thus the Dehaene report (October 18) marked the high-point of Prodi's overt ambition on the IGC front. The Commission's report to the presidency (November 10) was more restrained than the Dehaene Report, and the Commission's official opinion on the IGC (January 26) was slightly more restrained than the report to the presidency, but was nonetheless far ahead of most member state positions.

This did not endear Prodi to the more assertive EP, whose own deliberations on the forthcoming IGC were nevertheless characterized by serious divisions between and within political groups. MEPs' preferences for a narrow or broad agenda seemed in many cases to mirror those of their own governments. It was with some difficulty that the EP adopted a resolution on the IGC (November 18) and a short, pro-forma opinion on it (February 3). Although more ambitious than the member states' and the Commission's positions, the EP's resolution and opinion were, by parliament's own standards, quite moderate.

As the Finnish Prime Minister discovered during a tour of national capitals in the run-up to the Helsinki summit, most member states were either hostile (notably Britain, France, Spain, and Sweden) or indifferent (notably Germany) to the idea of a broad IGC. Their concerns were both substantive and procedural. Substantively, some of them opposed initiatives that might lead to deeper integration. Procedurally, they sought to limit the agenda in an effort to ensure the IGC's completion by the end of the year. Although eager also to complete the IGC on time, the Benelux countries made a last-minute effort, in a joint paper to the presidency in early December, to swing support behind a broad agenda. While sympathetic to the Benelux position, Finland took what was then the course of least resistance and, in its presidency paper, advocated a less ambitious approach. Following a lively debate in Helsinki (December 10-11), the European Council endorsed the Finnish position but added in its conclusions that "the incoming Presidency ... may propose additional issues to be taken on the agenda of the Conference."

Within a few weeks the new Portuguese presidency cleverly exploited this opening. It was pushed by the Belgians and Dutch, who made a compelling case for renegotiating flexibility: of the Amsterdam leftovers, a trade-off between the size/composition of the Commission and the reweighting of votes in the Council could probably be agreed among member states, but agreement to extend QMV would be much harder to achieve. Without such an agreement, decision-making in an enlarged EU could be paralyzed. Already, in an EU of fifteen member states, unanimity led to indecision and frustration, as the on-

going saga of the European Company Statute demonstrated. Flexibility was the only alternative to more widespread use of QMV. But as long as member states could veto closer cooperation, the procedure seemed unworkable. Therefore, why not scrap the "emergency brake" applicable to closer cooperation and reduce the threshold for participation in it to a minority of member states?

By themselves the Belgians, Dutch, and Portuguese would not have succeeded in putting flexibility firmly on the agenda. The Commission's and EP's support—as outlined in their respective opinions on the IGC—was helpful, but not crucial. What proved decisive was the willingness of France and Germany to go along with them. They did so because they realized that a radical extension of QMV was highly unlikely, and that relaxing the flexibility rules could therefore be advantageous. Britain was unenthusiastic about both extending QMV and renegotiating flexibility, at least until the existing treaty provisions for closer cooperation had been fully tested. By contrast, Italy announced on the eve of the conference its eagerness to revisit flexibility.

Thus, as the conference opened on February 14, most member states agreed that flexibility should be reexamined as part of a badly-needed reform of institutional procedures. Going beyond the Amsterdam leftovers, other agenda items would undoubtedly be raised and perhaps formally introduced during the IGC itself, if only to facilitate a global package deal at the end. All of the actors agreed that the conference should finish by December 2000, at the European Council in Nice. The record of IGCs past suggests that such deadlines are usually met, although often at the expense of unfinished business (e.g., the Amsterdam leftovers) or unsatisfactory agreements on contentious issues (e.g., the Social Protocol). One thing at least seemed certain: the IGC would end in an intense bargaining session among the heads of state and government on intricate institutional issues. Less certain was the impact on the IGC of an unexpected and unprecedented event: the imposition by other member states of diplomatic sanctions against Austria following the inclusion of the far-right Freedom Party in government in early 2000.

What conclusions can be drawn from the IGC's origins and preparation? First, this is an IGC unlike any other. It is motivated not by a momentum for greater integration but by the need to address unfinished institutional and procedural business. Although complex and potentially divisive issues, the Amsterdam leftovers (plus flexibility) comprise a relatively discrete agenda. Because of its focus on institutional representation and voting weights, the IGC threatens to expose a hitherto latent cleavage in the EU: that between small and large member states. The inclusion of flexibility may ameliorate that divide by focusing attention on another cleavage: unable and/or unwilling member states vs. willing and able member states.

Second, developments so far reinforce an intergovernmentalist perspective on major EU decision making. Member states, not supranational institutions, are the key actors. Yet it is the smaller member states that have so far done most of the running. This will probably change as the IGC progresses, when

the stakes rise and especially when France takes over the presidency in July 2000 (for the first time in EU history, a big member state will preside over the negotiation of major treaty changes). The combination of a French Presidency, a French Commissioner with responsibility for the IGC, and a *de facto* French head of the Council Secretariat will be interesting to observe.

Third, IGC 2000 is inherently unsatisfying and indigestible. Voting weights, the size and composition of the Commission, and the scope of QMV are undeniably important issues, affecting as they do such key procedures and principles as decision-making, coalition building, efficiency, and legitimacy. However, they are intrinsically uninteresting to a non-specialist audience. By dealing only with the Amsterdam leftovers or even with a broader agenda, the IGC threatens to turn into a caricature of the EU itself. By their nature IGCs are arcane in any case, but IGC 2000 has the potential to reinforce a negative stereotype of the EU at precisely the time when the EU needs some positive publicity. Hence the importance for the EU of linking the IGC in the public mind with internal reforms already underway, notably in the Council and the Commission. In particular, the EU must continue to improve the quality of its governance not simply by reconfiguring numbers, but by making its institutions more open and accountable.

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Announcements

Conferences

- May 9-12, 2000*: "Walking the Tightrope: European Unity within Cultural Diversity," European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, Netherlands. Web site <www.eipa-nl.com>.
- May 12-13, 2000*: "Europe and Its Mediterranean Crossroads: The Cultures of Europe, North Africa and Asia," Center for Western European Studies, Kalamazoo College, Kalamazoo, MI. Contact e-mail <cfwes@kzoo.edu> or tel. 616.337.7329.
- May 15-16, 2000*: "Television and New Media in Europe: Legislation, Liberalisation, Self-Regulation," Academy of European Law, Trier, Germany. Contact e-mail <info@era.int>.
- July 30-August 1, 2000*: "European Odyssey: The EU in the New Millennium," Quebec, Canada, ECSA-Canada conference. Web site at <web.uvic.ca/ecsac> or e-mail <lloy@uvic.ca>.
- September 11-16, 2000*: "Industrial Relations and European Integration," graduate student workshop at University of Crete, Greece. Visit the Web site at <www.soc.uoc.gr>.
- September 18-22, 2000*: "Effectiveness of EU Business Associations," Brussels, EuroConference sponsored by DG for Research *et alia*. Contact e-mail <euro.conference@ey.be>.
- October 3-6, 2000*: "Europe Facing the Challenges of the 21st Century," Havana, Cuba, Centro de Estudios Europeos. Contact e-mail <conferencia8@cee.org.cu> or fax 53 7 241 435.
- October 5-7, 2000*: "Democracy Beyond the Nation-State: Perspectives on a Post-National Order," Athens, Greece, EuroConference hosted by the Hellenic Political Science Association. Contact e-mail <hpsagr@cc.uoa.gr>.

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Miscellany

Robert Bosch Foundation Research Scholars Program in Comparative Public Policy and Institutions, at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies in Washington, D.C. Fellowships for post-doctoral or newly tenured scholars are tenable for 6-month periods in Washington, from July 2000-June 2002. Contact AICGS / Bosch Research Scholars Committee, 1400 16th Street NW, Suite 420, Washington, DC 20036, Web site at <www.aicgs.org>.

Studentships in European Studies/European Integration at the Institute of European Studies, Queen's University of Belfast. The grants cover fees and maintenance for M.Phil. and Ph.D. candidates to begin September 2000. Candidates from within and outside the EU will be considered. Contact Postgraduate Admissions (Research), Institute of European Studies, Queen's University, Belfast BT7 1NN, Northern Ireland; Web site <www.qub.ac.uk/ies> or e-mail <r.harmsen@qub.ac.uk>

American University's School of International Service has recently launched a **Graduate Research Center on Europe** in Trento, Italy, for graduate students enrolled in degree programs at U.S. institutions. The Center supports research projects on any European or global issue that involves field work in Europe, and promotes both scholarly and practical experiences including internships and the development of informal networks among young professionals. Students can register for up to 12 academic credits. Visit the Web site at <www.american.edu/academics/sis/centers> or e-mail Dr. Linda Lubrano, Center Director, at <lubrano@american.edu>.

EU Law Interest Section

The **ECSA EU Law Interest Section** has been launched and its Web pages are on the ECSA Web site at www.ecsa.org/eulawsection.html. The Web pages include a letter from the Section Organizer, D. Bruce Shine; an electronic forum for Section members; a list of Section members; a set of annotated EU Law-related Web links; and more. The EU Law Interest Section will have its first meeting at the ECSA 2001 Conference in Madison, Wisconsin. Interested ECSA members may contact Shine by e-mail at shimas@chartertn.net. Persons who do not have access to e-mail or the Internet should contact D. Bruce Shine, Esq., Shine & Mason, 433 East Center Street, Kingsport, TN 37660 USA, with a brief letter describing your EU law-related interest; queries regarding Section membership should be addressed to the ECSA office at e-mail ecsa@pitt.edu or by regular mail to ECSA, 405 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA.

From the Chair

IT IS TIME ONCE again for ECSA's biennial Call for Proposals for our Seventh Biennial International Conference (May 31-June 2, 2001), which will take place at the Monona Terrace Community and Convention Center in Madison, Wisconsin, and which will be hosted locally by the European Union Center of Wisconsin. The conference program committee, under the leadership of Chair Martin Schain (New York University), has issued the call for proposals with the broad theme of "Globalization, European Integration, and Domestic Transformation." The program committee, along with the ECSA Executive Committee, encourages panel and paper proposals from all disciplines and from both academics and practitioners. The Call for Proposals is included in this issue on page 17 and full details about the Conference and its location may be found on the ECSA Web site at www.ecsa.org.

This will be the first ECSA Conference to take place in the Midwestern United States, and we are certain participants will enjoy the setting. The Conference site, in fact, is a community center designed by Frank Lloyd Wright and built on the shore of Lake Monona in Madison. Madison itself is a lively university and state government center, renowned for its fabulous outdoor Saturday market among other things, and is an easy trip from both Milwaukee, Wisconsin (90 minutes' drive) and Chicago, Illinois (three hours' drive).

By now current ECSA members will have received their copies of *Transatlantic Perspectives on the Euro* by C. Randall Henning and Pier Carlo Padoan, our 1999 US-EU Relations Project scholars. Henning has recently been interviewed for a piece on the euro by *Asahi Shimbun*, a major Japanese daily newspaper. One aim of our US-EU Relations Project is to spark interest in a current transatlantic topic, and it appears that the Henning/Padoan collaboration is doing just that.

We are also delighted to report that we have in hand a proposal for a second ECSA Interest Section, this one on political economy. We plan to approve this section and have it up and running shortly. It will be lead by ECSA members Erik Jones (University of Nottingham) and Amy Verdun (University of Victoria). ECSA members interested in legal issues should know that the EU Law Interest Section has been formally launched and already has a set of Web pages on the ECSA site at www.ecsa.org/eulawsection.html. There is an electronic forum for Section members, and more, and the EU Law Section will hold its first meeting at the 2001 ECSA Conference. We hope that other interest sections will develop and we will provide an opportunity for them to meet at the 2001 Conference.

Finally, the 2000 ECSA Member Directory goes to press shortly and will be mailed to ECSA members this summer. It contains full contact information as well as detailed EU-related biographical information about current ECSA members. We hope that ECSA members will find the biennial Member Directory to be a valuable resource and networking tool.

VIVIEN A. SCHMIDT
Boston University

ECSA Review

The *ECSA Review* (ISSN 1090-5758) is published four times yearly by the European Community Studies Association, a membership association and non-profit organization founded in 1988 and devoted to the exchange of information and ideas about the European Union. We welcome the submission of scholarly, EU-related manuscripts. Subscription to the *ECSA Review* is a benefit of Association membership.

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Founded in 1988, ECSA is a non-profit academic and professional organization dedicated to the exchange of information and ideas on European Union affairs. ECSA coordinates the Network of European Union Centers in the United States.

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